7 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4f2af75243484897307a179315cab34a.pdf 9f221d4cbd3972e47a783e0e280c74f2 PDF Text Text 64 SLOVAKIA A HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MATICA SLOVENSKA IMRICH KRUZLIAK The concept of the Matica Sloven.ska. (The Slovak Institute of the Arts and Sciences) has its roots far in the times before its establishment in 1863. The earlier learned societies, federations of intellectuals, which often had only a confessional or local character, can be considered as the predecessors of the Matica Slovenska.: The Learned Society of Maly Hont, Societas Slavica, The Learned Society of the mining (Banska) area; also The Slovak Learned Society of Bernolaik, Hamuliak's Society of Admirers of the Slovak Language and Literature, and the Tatrin of Ludovit Stur. The programs of the last three societies were adopted by the Matica Slovenska.. Besides domestic efforts to establish the Matica Slovenska, we must also mention Safa.rik's interest who, at that time, was the director of the Serbian Gymnazium in Novy Sad. He used to write to his countrymen in Slovakia, particularly after the founding of the Serbian Matica in 1823 - which was founded with this help - to give serious thought to the idea of establishing a similar society in Slovakia. Safarik wrote a:bout the matter to, among others, Hamuliak, Kollar and Palacky. Hamuliak liked the idea very much, so much fo fact that, in 1857, when he was about to retire, he donated his personal library to the gymnazium at Banska. Bystrica only on tihe condition that it be handed over to the Matica Slovenska as soon as it was established. M. that time Hamuliak attempted to organize a literary society in Banska. Bystrica, which would be headed by Safarik, a recognized scientific authority. There were several such similar efforts in Slovakia in those years, but not one of them was realized. The Magyar authorities woulq not allow a charter either to Hamuliak or to Stur. With tihe revolutionary years at hand, 1848-49, the Slovaks, too, t ook up arms to seek political freedom. Having failed in the attempt, the Slovaks had to travel the bitter road of sacrifice and oppression. Many hopes were crushed, many enthusiasts were silenced, and many �SLOVAKIA 65 more self-sacrificing Slovaks withdrew to the background. Nevertheless, the concept of the Matica did not die, but continued to live in the hearts and minds of the people, awaiting an opportune moment. In 1859, a Slovak patriot, Natan J. Petian, bequeathed 9,000 Gold Crowns for the establishment of the Matica. Two years prior to that, Jonas Zaborsky established a literary foundation with the Czeoh Matica to support the publication of Slovak works, with the reservation, however, that the foundation be transferred to the Matica Slovenska once it came into being. Then followed the historical year 1861, the year of the famous Slovak Memorandum which brought new hopes to the Slovaks. Representatives of the Slovak provinces of Hungary came to Tuiiciansky Sviity Martin to the public meeting arranged for June 6-7, 1861. There in the presence of thousands of people they wholeheartedly adopted the historical Memorandum of the Slovak Nation, with which they hoped to gain recognition for national and political individuality and the political rights to which they felt entitled. There it was, too, that the decision was made to request permission to establish the Matica Slovenska. Emperor Francis Joseph very graciously received the Slovak delegation, headed by Bishop Stephen Moyses, on December 12, 1861. Impressed by the Memorandum, he promised to comply with their righteous requests. The Slovaks were jubilant, figuring that the way was cleared to establish the Matica Slovenska. In Pest'., Jan Franci sci worked feverishly to complete the By-Laws of the Matica; the work was ready on August 1. But the local regency council returned the By-Laws to Francisci, because it found that t:he Matica Slovenska would also be interested in political action. The Magyar authorities also opposed naming the building of the Matica the "Home of the Slovak Nation." Furthermore, they would not permit the organization of affiliates in Slovak communities and cities; they wished to limit the activity and influence of the Matica and make it subject to the control of a royal commissioner. Difficulties were also encountered when it came to selecting a location for the Matica. At first the Matica Slovenska was to be located at Brezno-above-the-Hron (Brez- �66 SLOVAKIA no nad Hronom). The town council had given its approval, but later recalled it, after pressure was applied by royal commissioner Havas of Zvolen. Other Slovak towns wanted the Matica, particularly Turciansky Svaty Martin and Liptovsky Sva.ty Mikulas. The St. Martin town iI'epresentat!on said that it considered it "a most sacred duty" to offer residence to the Matica Slovenska. On October 29, 1862, the local regency council announced the decision of the Emperor who had, by decree, on August 21, allowed the establishment of the Matica Slovenska. The temporary committee of the Matica proclaimed the joyous news in the Pesfbudinske Vedomosti on November 4, 1862. Thereupon a membership drive and a campaign for funds were instituted. The committee then called a meeting of the Matica on August 4, 1863. From, the fall of 1862 to the end of July 1863, more than 50,000 Gold Crowns were collected for the Matica. Francisci at that time joyously exclaimed: "My dear nation, you are indeed arising from the dust, but you are rising as a giant!" The Foundation of the Matica Slovenska On August 4, 1863, great throngs of Slovaks from practically all parts of Slovakia travelled to Turciansky Svaty Martin for the first general meeting of the Matica Slovenska.. Bishop Stephen Moyses was wildly acclaimed along the route to Martin by hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. After he had led the Slovak delegation in December, 1861, to the Emperor, Bishop Moyses became the most popular man in Slovakia, the leader of the Slovak people. In St. Martin, Charles Kuzma.ny, a Lutheran clergyman, welcomed Moyses with a memorable speech in whioh he sad: "Entire milleniums now look upon you and upon us from the height of these hills; all the valleys of our hallowed Tatra Mountains to the blue Danube gaze upon you with the eyes of the here present matured generation and from the faces of these children there looks upon you and upon llS the entire future of the Slovak nation. You are going to perform an act for the entire history of this nation, a monument to the past and a foundation for the future, the �SLOVAKIA 67 twofold gate, closed for the injustices of the past and opened for the glory of future ages." Tihe meeting was opened by Jan Francisci, chairman of the temporary committee, who, among other things, said: "We, the sons of the Slovak nation:, which had no haven to turn to in the face of injustice, have gathered here to place the cornerstone on which shall rest the temple and stability of Slovak national life." Wihen Francisci asked Bishop Moyses to preside at the meeting, the multitude went wild with joy. The spontaneous acclamation accorded Bishop Moyses was tantamount to electing him the first president of the Matica Slovenska. After the crowd quieted down, Bishop Moyses said: "Where there is a question of honors and decorations, I always like to be the last, because I do not and never did yearn for honors . . . Where, 1h owever, there is a question of service to my Slovak people and willingness to render service, as well as sacrifices for the development of our nation, I never did withdraw, I am not going to withdraw, I do not wish to withdraw, and I shall not withdraw... " Charles_Kuzmany became vice-president of the Matica. Francisci and Daxner were nominated for the function, to honor them for the services they rendered to the Slovak nation, but they declined the nomination, as they had agreed to beforehand t!hat the office should go to Kuzmany, who at that time had been expelled from Banska Bystrica by the enemies of the Slovak cause and had been accepted by the ecclesiastical community in Turciansky Svaty Martin. There were also other tactical reasons for this move. The Slovaks did not wish to have politically exposed individuals at the head of the Matica, especially not those who had taken an active part in the revolution. The personalities of Moyses and Kuzmany, representing ·b oth confessions (Catholic and Lutheran), reflected the solidarity and unity of the Slovak nation. In the act of allowing the establishment of the Matica, the Slovaks saw the recognition of the existence of the Slovak nation on the part of the Emperor. His gift of a thousand Gold Crowns to the Matica was joyously ac- �68 SLOVAKIA claimed by the Slovaks. When the Slovaks learned that the Emperor had named Bishop Moyses as his personal counsellor, their joy knew no bounds. The convention ordered a delegation to visit the Emperor to express its sin- ----cere gratefulness and fealty. The First Period of the Matica (1863-1875) The Matica Slovenska began its activity in 1863, that is, in the year the Slovaks commemorated the millenium of the advent of Sts. Cyril and Methodius to the territory of ancient Slovaks, Great Moravia. At that time there were grandiose celebrations in various cities of Slovakia, whereby the Slovaks demonstrated their cultural and political antiquity. J. M. Hurban had this in mind when, at the Matica meeting, he moved that "the establishment of the Matica Slovenska take place in commemoration of the CyriloMethodian baptism and the thousand-year-old Christianity of our nation." Because Sts. Cyril and Methodius brought to our forefathers not only Christianity but also the elements of Slovak literature, Bishop Moyses "wholeheartedly agreed with the motion of Dr. Hurban," as S. H. Vajansky later recorded. The establishment of the Matica Slovenska. was followed attentively by other Slovanic nations. The Croatian Bishop Strossmayer donated a thousand Gold Crowns to the Matica which sought the favor and support of cultural factors of other Slovanic nations. At its first and second meetings, the Matica elected outstanding Slovanic scholars as charter and honorary members. Paragraph 32 of the Matica By-Laws noted its cooperation with other Slovanic cultural institutions. According to paragraph 1, the Matica Slovenska was "a union of admirers of the nation and Slovak life" and it chief aim was: to cultivate and propagate Slovak literature and the fine arts, as well as to rouse moral and intellectual education and thereby also aid the material welfare of the Slovak nation. The cooperation of the intelligentsia and the people was the prerequisite to the cucce.ss of Matica activity. Bishop Moyses stressed this in his speeches. The Matica, from its very beginning, unfolded its acti- �SLOVAKIA 69 vity in two fields: the field of science and the field of enlightenment, that is in the field of educating people. The building of a great library and mus~um were on its program. Unfortunately, the activity of the Matica was dependent on the success of public drives for finances. And because the amounts raised thusly were less and less with passing years, they were not sufficient to c01Ver the needs of the Matica. John Gotcar suggested that the government subsidize the •a ctivity of the Matica as it did in the case of Magyar and German institutions. The matter was brought up in parliament, but the majority of deputies repudiated it. In the first period of its existence, the Matica published books and periodicals, built its home, supported the alumnea of the Slovak gymnasiums, gave stipends to students, and supported the artists Bohuii and Klemens. Altogether in these twelve years (1863-1875), the Matica published 40 books and newspapers, Moyses's and Kozacek's speeches in the Matica, which it distributed gratis among the people, two volumes of the Archives of Old Documents, a souvenir book to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Mikulas Subic Zrinsky, Dobsinsky's articles about Slovak folklore, two volumes of Slovak national songs and tales, a National Almanac, a Slovak Reader, Slovak school texts; then it also sought to fix orthographical usage according to Hattala's grammar, and even devoted itself to geological research in Slovakia. There were <voices that the Matica devote itself only to scientific activity. Jonas Zaborsky was especially vocal about this. But the Matica could not do this, because the need to educate the people at large was very great. From 1868, the Matica began to develop several scientific departments which became the motivators of Matica activity especially in its second period, after 1919. In the first period these departments could not sufficiently develop their activity because of the lack workers and financial means. In a few years the Matica gained so much respect and weight with the Slovak public that Vajansky, evaluating its activity, wrote gleefully: "For the Slovak nation the Matica was everything on which could depend our national feeling, national consciousness, national pride and hope." �70 SLOVAKIA The assemblies of the Matica, especially after Slovak cultural and economic life began to be concentrated in St. Martin, were important national and social occasions, during which Slovaks discussed their plans for the future. Thanks to the Matica, St. Martin became the bastion of the defensiive battle of the Slovaks and the cradle of Slovak activities. After Bishop Moyses's death in 1869, the office of president was left vacant for one year, out of deference to the Bishop, then Abbot Jozef Koza.eek took over the office. The participation of the Matica delegates in the various festivities of Slovanic nations meant much to the Slovaks politically and nationally. The Magyar authorities were alert; they readily recognized such activity as anti-Magyar, that is, "anti-State." Already in 1867, Vtliam Pauliny Toth complained that Slovak patriots were being vilified and made suspect of treason just because they were members of the Matica. This also characterized the position of the Matica. When the Matica Slovenska came into being, the conditions were not at all favorable for the national and cultural life of the Slovaks. The authorities repeatedly acc.uaed the Matica of "Pan-Slavism" and of making preparations to destroy Hungary. Soon enough the fight against the Matica was identified with the fight against the Slovak nation, against the freedom and independence of the Slovak nation: to Slovaks it became increasingly clear that probably the last fight for their national survival was at hand. In vain did officials of the Matica try to convince the Magyar State officials that their institution was not an enemy of the State. The Magyar press increased its attacks against everything Slov,ak, declaring: "the Slovak is not a man . . . there is no Slovak nation . . . The Slovaks are Pan-Slavists, enemies of the State . . . There is no Slovak language . . . the official and only recognized tongue in Hungary is Magyar." Slovak leaders felt the Matica's days were numbered. At the general meeting of the Matica on August 5, 1874, more Slovaks came to St. Martin than had come during the previous ten years. Daniel Lichard said �SLOVAKIA 71 on that occasion: (we are not supposed to exist) "nevertheless here we a.re!" The cause of the Slovaks once again seemed hopeless. After the settlement with Austria was reached in 1867, resulting in the Dual-Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), the Magyars had absolute control of Hungary with over half its population being non-Magyar. In Pest, the name of the Matica Slovenska was on the blacklist. The Magyars instituted hearings against the Matica on November 19, 1875, outlawed its activities on April 6, 1875, and dissolived it on November 12, 1875, by order of the Minister of the Interior, Koloman Tisza. The property of the Matica was confiscated only to be used against the Slovaks: Tisza declared cynically that the property cannot be given to the Slovak nation, because "in Hungary there is no Slovak nation." The Slovaks, however, were now more determined than ever to fight for their national survival against Magyar chauvinism. The Matica was not to be revived until 1919. The Matica's Second Period (1919-1954) Forty-four years had to elapse before the Matica Slovenska was revived. During that time many political changes had taken place. Old Hungary was split up and the Slovak nation-whose existence was denied by Koloman Tisza in 1875-was able to form a state in 1918. Much had been neglected since 1875; there was much to do for the Matice Slovenska after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. On January 1, 1919, representatives of the Slovak people, the sons of the founders of the Matica, gathered solemnly at Turciansky Svaty Martin to open the gates of the Matica in the newly-formed Czecho-Slovak State. Thus began its second period of activity, which was to last until 1954, when Matica activities came to an end at the hands of Communists. It soon became evident that the troubles of the Matica were not over and new storm clouds gathered over Slovakia to test anew the political capacity and political maturity of the Slovaks. That the struggles over the spiritual individuality of the Slovak nation - which this time were evoked by a mistaken "Czechoslovak" national conception- �72 SLOVAKIA were transferred over to the arena of the Matica, clearly demonstrated its important role in the life of the Slovaks. In this period, right from the beginning, the head of the Matica w.as Jozef Skultety, a direct descendant of the generation from the first Matica period. He was a worthy successor of the first Matica presidents, a recognized national authority, and a defender of the Moyses-Kuzmany tradition. Until 1932, Stefan Krcmery was executive secretary of the Matica; Jozef C. Hronsky succeeded Krcmery. When Hronsky became executive director of the Matica during the lifetime of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), the secretaryship went to Jan Martak. The activity of the Matica during this period was twofold: scientific work and public instruction. The Matica attracted writers and educators, scientific workers, priests and students; it organized local units in many towns and communities. The tradition and the spirit of the Matica Slovenska. did not fit into the pattern of the concept of the "Czechoslovak" nation, which the Czechs defined as a single ethnic entity for world consumption. The Czechs, however, knew they were Czechs a,nd not Slovaks or "Czechoslovaks"and the Slovaks lmew they were Sl<Waks and not Czechs or "Czechoslovaks." The defenders and promoters of the "Czechoslovak" ideology, having the support of Czech politicians made an attempt to anchor themselves in the Matica and to influence especially the work of its linguistic and historic departments. Under their guidance the Matica, in 1931, publtshed the "Pravidla slovenskeho pravopisu" (Rules of Slovak Orthography) which did not conform to the legality or purity of literary Slovak. This evoked a storm of opposition in Slovakia which was quelled with the victory of the Slovak tendency during the mass meeting of the Matica on May 12, 1932. The heralds and promoters of the conception of the "Czechoslovak" language and the "Czechoslovak" nation were voted out of office at this meeting and Jozef C. Hronsky, one of the most eminent of modern Slovak n<Wellists, was elected executive secretary of the Matica Slovenska. The Matica events evoked a strong response in the political life of the Slovaks, especially am~g the younger �SLOVAKIA 73 generation. At the end of June, 1932, members of this generation, representing all political parties, held ,a conference at Trencianske Teplice at which they unanimously backed a federated Czecho-Slovak State. It was from their rank's that the Matica recruited tl\e workers it needed to fulfil its mission. Historian Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky was named secretary of the scientific departments of the Matica in 1934; Dr. Henrich Bartek and Dr. tudovit Nova.kl specialized as linguists; Dr. Andrew Mraz, Dr. Stanislav Meciar and Dr. Jan Marta.k were given the t~k of developing the ,h istory of Slovak literature; Dr. Jozef Cincik specialized in the art department; and Karol Plicka's forte was ethnology. As soon as the Matica Slovenska. was revived after World War I, it began to publish the literary monthly review "Slovenske Pohfady," which had been founded by Jozef M. Hurban in 1845. The indi'Vidual departments of the Matica gradually began to publish their own magazines. In time the Matica also publit;hed periodicals, such as "Slovensko" (review of culture in general), "Slovenska Rec" (linguistic) , "Slniecko" (youth magazine) , and others. The Matica's "Pedagogicky Zbornik' (Pedagogical Magazine) was, for many years, the only magazine of its kind in the entire Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Matica also supported amateur theater productions and published "Nase Divadlo" (Our Theater); Ferdinand Hoffman specialized in t~ field. Of course, the Matica Slovenska published various literary works of many authors-Slovak and non-Slova:kfor the edification and reading pleasure of the Slovaks: scientific and artistic tomes, children's readers and story books; the collected works of the Slovak classics; translations from foreign literature; textbooks; Rules of Orthography; Rizner's Bibliography of Slovak Letters (6 Vols.); Polivka's "Supis Slovenskych Rozpra.vok" (Inventory of Slovak Tales), etc. The Matica Slovenska. expanded its activities enormously during the life of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), when its membership and staff personnel reached its highest peak. It was under Hronsky that the Matica built the great book-printing plant Neografia, one of the most modern in Central Europe. --- �74 SLOVAKIA From 1919 to 1944, the Matica Slovenska multiplied. Slovak literary and scientific works as never before. The reason for this was not only a more favorable climate, but especially because the Matica had the services of able and devoted men like Jozef Skultety, Stefan Krcmery, Jozef C. Hronsky, Frantisek Hrusovsky, and many others. At the end of World War II, the complexion of the Matica Slovenska changed completely. With Dr. Edward Benes, Stalin's errand boy, in the president's chair againthe same chair he voluntarily and willingly gave u,p in October, 1938, to flee to England - a Communist beachhead was established in Czecho-Slovakia, in the heart of Europe. A question mark hung over the fate of the Matica. Even though the first indications were that the Matica would be able to continue its wo:r1k, as the days and months rolled by the political power of the "people's democratic regime" began to intervene more and more in the :work of the Matica, violating its tradition and direction. For the first time in the history of the Matica, its president became an exposed politician, Laco N ovomesky, the Commissioner of Education. And the worst of it was that the Matica in those years had no personalities who could protect it with the weight of their authority. Jozef Skultety was a very old man, and the new director of the Matica, Dr. Jan Martak, lacked firmness. Under the circumstances, for which Slovak patriots cannot be held responsible, the Matica Slovenska was completely controlled by the Communists, even though the "Slovak Democrats" of Dr. Jozef Lettrich won 62 per cent of the Slovak electorate in 1946. Old workers were retired, investigated, jailed, disfranchised and persecuted. Already in 1945 it was quite apparent that the Matica was fast becoming a tool of communistic cultural politics. Even the name "Matica Sloven.ska" bothered the Reds. It meant something special, it was a symbol of the efforts and the masses of the people that were opposed to Communism; and the Reds feared that the hundreds of local assem!blies of the Matica could well .become dangerous centers or cells of anti-Communist resistance. It so happened that the Communist regime, by order of the Slovak National Council of April 'l:l, 1954, put a �Sl..OVAKIA 75 stop to the work of the Matica. The Matica building was changed into a central library and the State appropriated the property of the Matica. Shades of 1875 (when the Magyars dissolved the Matica) ! Attempts were made to organize a Matica Slovenska outside of Slovakia by Slovak exiles in the free world, notably by Hronsky, in 1959, in Argentina, with little success, however, thus far. About the closest thing to the Matica was organized in Cleveland, Ohio, by the Right Rev. Theodore J. Kojis, O.S.B., Abbot of St. Andrew-Svorad's Abbey, on September 15, 1952. It is called the Slovak Institute (Slovensky Ustav) and is devoted to practically the same work as the Matica of Slovakia. Lack of finances and personnel limit its activity, but the Slovak Institute of Cleveland, Ohio, nevertheless, is a going institution. Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky, eminent Slovak historian, was the Institute's first director. His untimely death in 1956 was a setback for the Institute. Cleveland's Slovak Institute, however, definitely holds out the promise of a better future under the directorship of the youthful but energetic Father Andrew Pier, 0, S. B. The Institute has already proved its worth and deserves the support of all Slovaks in the free world. An earlier attempt to found a Matica Slovenska in America was made by Rev. Stephen Furdek of Cleveland, Ohio, in 1893. The meeting he called for Chicago, ID., Sept. 26, 1893, was attended by some 100 Slovak leaders, clergymen and layman, who approved the idea. The organization just about got off the ground when it folded because of dissention in Slovak ranks and lack of vision, tolerance and understanding among Slovak leaders. The Matica quit operation after August, 1899. BIBLIOGRAPHY Frantisek Bokes: Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, Bratislava, 1946; Viliam Pauliny-T6th, Turo. Sv. Martin, 194-2. JuHus Botto: Dejiny Matice slovenakej 1863-1875, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1923. Konstanitln Culen : Rc>ky alove-nakych nadeji a sklamani 1843-1875, Tmava, 1932. Frantillek Hrusovaky : Slovenaky Uatav v Clevelande, reprint from "MOST"-Vol. 2, No. 2, 1955, Cleveland, Ohio. AJ-oj11: KoUse'k: U28. Borba katolfkov za alovenclnu a slobodu, Bratislava, �76 SLOVAKIA Stefa.n Krcmery: Stopit'desiat rokov elovenskej literatury, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1943. Da,nieiJ. Lichard: Rozhovory o Slovenskej Matici, Viedeii, 1865. Jan ,Mart.A'k: Otok na spisovnu 1lovenoi1nu, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1942. Andrej Mra.z: Jozef Skult6ty, Tu~. Sv. Mar.Un, 1933; Matica slovenekA v rokoch 1863-1875, Tu.re. Sv. MarMn, 193-6. Jan V. Ol'lllis: Zo 1loven1kej minuloati narodnej a literarnej, Pra:ha, 1932. Stefan Pasiar: Dejiny slovenakych l'udovych kniinic, Martin, 1957. Eugen Pauliny: Dejiny spiaovnej 1lovenciny, Bratislava, 19·48. MiLam. P4M.t: Dejiny slovenakej literatury, Bratislava., 1960. Daniel Rapant: K pociatkom madarizacie, Bratis lava, 19.2-'7 and 1931; Tatrin, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1•950. Sbornik na poceat' Jozefa SkultHyho, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1933. Jozef Skultety: Slivnoat' Mial!ice 1lovenakej ozivotvorenej, T,uro. Sv. Martin, 1919; Stodvadsat'pit' rokov zo alovenak6ho zivota 17901914, Turi!. Sv. Mlllrtin, 1•9 20; 0 Slovakoch, Turi!. Sv. Mal'tin, 1938. Svetozar Hurban Va.jamsk:S,: Zivot Stefana Moyaeaa, Turc. Sv. Martin, 193:5. Jan Vllikovskf: D~jiny literarnich apolecnostf malohontakych, Bratislava, 1935. l!.U D, Bratislava, 1954, No. 9'9, April 27, p. 1. MOST, Cleveland, Ohio, 1954, No. 1, pp. 26, 37; 195-6, No. 1, pp. 2-12; 1959, "No. 3, 'PP, 135-136 and No. 4, p , 14'5; 1960, No 3-4, pp, 97-104. SLOVENSKE NOVINY, Viedeii, 18-50, No. 39 ; 18.'il, Nos. 137, 149. VERB,UM, Kosice, 1947, No. 2, pp. 65-69, 98-102. SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE by Gilbert L. Oddo - the first complete history of the Slovak people and their country in the English language - may be ordered from the following: Jednota Printery fhe Slovak lnstitute <;\ ~d~et!~xn _l~ Mrs. Julia Krajcovic 1648 W 18th Street Chicago 8 m Mr. Paul C Kaz1mer 1122 Sylvan Avenue Homestead Pa M2~rlevM~1 ·l1aas~nBV~~lB~lhaazl~edk 19. 4922 S Leclaire Avenue Chicago 38 Ul Mr John Horecky 2264 Walton Avenue New York 53. N Y l'he book has 384 pages and a cloth cover and . sells for $6.00. Get your -copy today! 0 ;· g :A:R:IOQ01~~00000000000000<XI � 64 SLOVAKIA A HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MATICA SLOVENSKA IMRICH KRUZLIAK The concept of the Matica Sloven.ska. (The Slovak Institute of the Arts and Sciences) has its roots far in the times before its establishment in 1863. The earlier learned societies, federations of intellectuals, which often had only a confessional or local character, can be considered as the predecessors of the Matica Slovenska.: The Learned Society of Maly Hont, Societas Slavica, The Learned Society of the mining (Banska) area; also The Slovak Learned Society of Bernolaik, Hamuliak's Society of Admirers of the Slovak Language and Literature, and the Tatrin of Ludovit Stur. The programs of the last three societies were adopted by the Matica Slovenska.. Besides domestic efforts to establish the Matica Slovenska, we must also mention Safa.rik's interest who, at that time, was the director of the Serbian Gymnazium in Novy Sad. He used to write to his countrymen in Slovakia, particularly after the founding of the Serbian Matica in 1823 - which was founded with this help - to give serious thought to the idea of establishing a similar society in Slovakia. Safarik wrote a:bout the matter to, among others, Hamuliak, Kollar and Palacky. Hamuliak liked the idea very much, so much fo fact that, in 1857, when he was about to retire, he donated his personal library to the gymnazium at Banska. Bystrica only on tihe condition that it be handed over to the Matica Slovenska as soon as it was established. M. that time Hamuliak attempted to organize a literary society in Banska. Bystrica, which would be headed by Safarik, a recognized scientific authority. There were several such similar efforts in Slovakia in those years, but not one of them was realized. The Magyar authorities woulq not allow a charter either to Hamuliak or to Stur. With tihe revolutionary years at hand, 1848-49, the Slovaks, too, t ook up arms to seek political freedom. Having failed in the attempt, the Slovaks had to travel the bitter road of sacrifice and oppression. Many hopes were crushed, many enthusiasts were silenced, and many �SLOVAKIA 65 more self-sacrificing Slovaks withdrew to the background. Nevertheless, the concept of the Matica did not die, but continued to live in the hearts and minds of the people, awaiting an opportune moment. In 1859, a Slovak patriot, Natan J. Petian, bequeathed 9,000 Gold Crowns for the establishment of the Matica. Two years prior to that, Jonas Zaborsky established a literary foundation with the Czeoh Matica to support the publication of Slovak works, with the reservation, however, that the foundation be transferred to the Matica Slovenska once it came into being. Then followed the historical year 1861, the year of the famous Slovak Memorandum which brought new hopes to the Slovaks. Representatives of the Slovak provinces of Hungary came to Tuiiciansky Sviity Martin to the public meeting arranged for June 6-7, 1861. There in the presence of thousands of people they wholeheartedly adopted the historical Memorandum of the Slovak Nation, with which they hoped to gain recognition for national and political individuality and the political rights to which they felt entitled. There it was, too, that the decision was made to request permission to establish the Matica Slovenska. Emperor Francis Joseph very graciously received the Slovak delegation, headed by Bishop Stephen Moyses, on December 12, 1861. Impressed by the Memorandum, he promised to comply with their righteous requests. The Slovaks were jubilant, figuring that the way was cleared to establish the Matica Slovenska. In Pest'., Jan Franci sci worked feverishly to complete the By-Laws of the Matica; the work was ready on August 1. But the local regency council returned the By-Laws to Francisci, because it found that t:he Matica Slovenska would also be interested in political action. The Magyar authorities also opposed naming the building of the Matica the "Home of the Slovak Nation." Furthermore, they would not permit the organization of affiliates in Slovak communities and cities; they wished to limit the activity and influence of the Matica and make it subject to the control of a royal commissioner. Difficulties were also encountered when it came to selecting a location for the Matica. At first the Matica Slovenska was to be located at Brezno-above-the-Hron (Brez- �66 SLOVAKIA no nad Hronom). The town council had given its approval, but later recalled it, after pressure was applied by royal commissioner Havas of Zvolen. Other Slovak towns wanted the Matica, particularly Turciansky Svaty Martin and Liptovsky Sva.ty Mikulas. The St. Martin town iI'epresentat!on said that it considered it "a most sacred duty" to offer residence to the Matica Slovenska. On October 29, 1862, the local regency council announced the decision of the Emperor who had, by decree, on August 21, allowed the establishment of the Matica Slovenska. The temporary committee of the Matica proclaimed the joyous news in the Pesfbudinske Vedomosti on November 4, 1862. Thereupon a membership drive and a campaign for funds were instituted. The committee then called a meeting of the Matica on August 4, 1863. From, the fall of 1862 to the end of July 1863, more than 50,000 Gold Crowns were collected for the Matica. Francisci at that time joyously exclaimed: "My dear nation, you are indeed arising from the dust, but you are rising as a giant!" The Foundation of the Matica Slovenska On August 4, 1863, great throngs of Slovaks from practically all parts of Slovakia travelled to Turciansky Svaty Martin for the first general meeting of the Matica Slovenska.. Bishop Stephen Moyses was wildly acclaimed along the route to Martin by hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. After he had led the Slovak delegation in December, 1861, to the Emperor, Bishop Moyses became the most popular man in Slovakia, the leader of the Slovak people. In St. Martin, Charles Kuzma.ny, a Lutheran clergyman, welcomed Moyses with a memorable speech in whioh he sad: "Entire milleniums now look upon you and upon us from the height of these hills; all the valleys of our hallowed Tatra Mountains to the blue Danube gaze upon you with the eyes of the here present matured generation and from the faces of these children there looks upon you and upon llS the entire future of the Slovak nation. You are going to perform an act for the entire history of this nation, a monument to the past and a foundation for the future, the �SLOVAKIA 67 twofold gate, closed for the injustices of the past and opened for the glory of future ages." Tihe meeting was opened by Jan Francisci, chairman of the temporary committee, who, among other things, said: "We, the sons of the Slovak nation:, which had no haven to turn to in the face of injustice, have gathered here to place the cornerstone on which shall rest the temple and stability of Slovak national life." Wihen Francisci asked Bishop Moyses to preside at the meeting, the multitude went wild with joy. The spontaneous acclamation accorded Bishop Moyses was tantamount to electing him the first president of the Matica Slovenska. After the crowd quieted down, Bishop Moyses said: "Where there is a question of honors and decorations, I always like to be the last, because I do not and never did yearn for honors . . . Where, 1h owever, there is a question of service to my Slovak people and willingness to render service, as well as sacrifices for the development of our nation, I never did withdraw, I am not going to withdraw, I do not wish to withdraw, and I shall not withdraw... " Charles_Kuzmany became vice-president of the Matica. Francisci and Daxner were nominated for the function, to honor them for the services they rendered to the Slovak nation, but they declined the nomination, as they had agreed to beforehand t!hat the office should go to Kuzmany, who at that time had been expelled from Banska Bystrica by the enemies of the Slovak cause and had been accepted by the ecclesiastical community in Turciansky Svaty Martin. There were also other tactical reasons for this move. The Slovaks did not wish to have politically exposed individuals at the head of the Matica, especially not those who had taken an active part in the revolution. The personalities of Moyses and Kuzmany, representing ·b oth confessions (Catholic and Lutheran), reflected the solidarity and unity of the Slovak nation. In the act of allowing the establishment of the Matica, the Slovaks saw the recognition of the existence of the Slovak nation on the part of the Emperor. His gift of a thousand Gold Crowns to the Matica was joyously ac- �68 SLOVAKIA claimed by the Slovaks. When the Slovaks learned that the Emperor had named Bishop Moyses as his personal counsellor, their joy knew no bounds. The convention ordered a delegation to visit the Emperor to express its sin- ----cere gratefulness and fealty. The First Period of the Matica (1863-1875) The Matica Slovenska began its activity in 1863, that is, in the year the Slovaks commemorated the millenium of the advent of Sts. Cyril and Methodius to the territory of ancient Slovaks, Great Moravia. At that time there were grandiose celebrations in various cities of Slovakia, whereby the Slovaks demonstrated their cultural and political antiquity. J. M. Hurban had this in mind when, at the Matica meeting, he moved that "the establishment of the Matica Slovenska take place in commemoration of the CyriloMethodian baptism and the thousand-year-old Christianity of our nation." Because Sts. Cyril and Methodius brought to our forefathers not only Christianity but also the elements of Slovak literature, Bishop Moyses "wholeheartedly agreed with the motion of Dr. Hurban," as S. H. Vajansky later recorded. The establishment of the Matica Slovenska. was followed attentively by other Slovanic nations. The Croatian Bishop Strossmayer donated a thousand Gold Crowns to the Matica which sought the favor and support of cultural factors of other Slovanic nations. At its first and second meetings, the Matica elected outstanding Slovanic scholars as charter and honorary members. Paragraph 32 of the Matica By-Laws noted its cooperation with other Slovanic cultural institutions. According to paragraph 1, the Matica Slovenska was "a union of admirers of the nation and Slovak life" and it chief aim was: to cultivate and propagate Slovak literature and the fine arts, as well as to rouse moral and intellectual education and thereby also aid the material welfare of the Slovak nation. The cooperation of the intelligentsia and the people was the prerequisite to the cucce.ss of Matica activity. Bishop Moyses stressed this in his speeches. The Matica, from its very beginning, unfolded its acti- �SLOVAKIA 69 vity in two fields: the field of science and the field of enlightenment, that is in the field of educating people. The building of a great library and mus~um were on its program. Unfortunately, the activity of the Matica was dependent on the success of public drives for finances. And because the amounts raised thusly were less and less with passing years, they were not sufficient to c01Ver the needs of the Matica. John Gotcar suggested that the government subsidize the •a ctivity of the Matica as it did in the case of Magyar and German institutions. The matter was brought up in parliament, but the majority of deputies repudiated it. In the first period of its existence, the Matica published books and periodicals, built its home, supported the alumnea of the Slovak gymnasiums, gave stipends to students, and supported the artists Bohuii and Klemens. Altogether in these twelve years (1863-1875), the Matica published 40 books and newspapers, Moyses's and Kozacek's speeches in the Matica, which it distributed gratis among the people, two volumes of the Archives of Old Documents, a souvenir book to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Mikulas Subic Zrinsky, Dobsinsky's articles about Slovak folklore, two volumes of Slovak national songs and tales, a National Almanac, a Slovak Reader, Slovak school texts; then it also sought to fix orthographical usage according to Hattala's grammar, and even devoted itself to geological research in Slovakia. There were <voices that the Matica devote itself only to scientific activity. Jonas Zaborsky was especially vocal about this. But the Matica could not do this, because the need to educate the people at large was very great. From 1868, the Matica began to develop several scientific departments which became the motivators of Matica activity especially in its second period, after 1919. In the first period these departments could not sufficiently develop their activity because of the lack workers and financial means. In a few years the Matica gained so much respect and weight with the Slovak public that Vajansky, evaluating its activity, wrote gleefully: "For the Slovak nation the Matica was everything on which could depend our national feeling, national consciousness, national pride and hope." �70 SLOVAKIA The assemblies of the Matica, especially after Slovak cultural and economic life began to be concentrated in St. Martin, were important national and social occasions, during which Slovaks discussed their plans for the future. Thanks to the Matica, St. Martin became the bastion of the defensiive battle of the Slovaks and the cradle of Slovak activities. After Bishop Moyses's death in 1869, the office of president was left vacant for one year, out of deference to the Bishop, then Abbot Jozef Koza.eek took over the office. The participation of the Matica delegates in the various festivities of Slovanic nations meant much to the Slovaks politically and nationally. The Magyar authorities were alert; they readily recognized such activity as anti-Magyar, that is, "anti-State." Already in 1867, Vtliam Pauliny Toth complained that Slovak patriots were being vilified and made suspect of treason just because they were members of the Matica. This also characterized the position of the Matica. When the Matica Slovenska came into being, the conditions were not at all favorable for the national and cultural life of the Slovaks. The authorities repeatedly acc.uaed the Matica of "Pan-Slavism" and of making preparations to destroy Hungary. Soon enough the fight against the Matica was identified with the fight against the Slovak nation, against the freedom and independence of the Slovak nation: to Slovaks it became increasingly clear that probably the last fight for their national survival was at hand. In vain did officials of the Matica try to convince the Magyar State officials that their institution was not an enemy of the State. The Magyar press increased its attacks against everything Slov,ak, declaring: "the Slovak is not a man . . . there is no Slovak nation . . . The Slovaks are Pan-Slavists, enemies of the State . . . There is no Slovak language . . . the official and only recognized tongue in Hungary is Magyar." Slovak leaders felt the Matica's days were numbered. At the general meeting of the Matica on August 5, 1874, more Slovaks came to St. Martin than had come during the previous ten years. Daniel Lichard said �SLOVAKIA 71 on that occasion: (we are not supposed to exist) "nevertheless here we a.re!" The cause of the Slovaks once again seemed hopeless. After the settlement with Austria was reached in 1867, resulting in the Dual-Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), the Magyars had absolute control of Hungary with over half its population being non-Magyar. In Pest, the name of the Matica Slovenska was on the blacklist. The Magyars instituted hearings against the Matica on November 19, 1875, outlawed its activities on April 6, 1875, and dissolived it on November 12, 1875, by order of the Minister of the Interior, Koloman Tisza. The property of the Matica was confiscated only to be used against the Slovaks: Tisza declared cynically that the property cannot be given to the Slovak nation, because "in Hungary there is no Slovak nation." The Slovaks, however, were now more determined than ever to fight for their national survival against Magyar chauvinism. The Matica was not to be revived until 1919. The Matica's Second Period (1919-1954) Forty-four years had to elapse before the Matica Slovenska was revived. During that time many political changes had taken place. Old Hungary was split up and the Slovak nation-whose existence was denied by Koloman Tisza in 1875-was able to form a state in 1918. Much had been neglected since 1875; there was much to do for the Matice Slovenska after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. On January 1, 1919, representatives of the Slovak people, the sons of the founders of the Matica, gathered solemnly at Turciansky Svaty Martin to open the gates of the Matica in the newly-formed Czecho-Slovak State. Thus began its second period of activity, which was to last until 1954, when Matica activities came to an end at the hands of Communists. It soon became evident that the troubles of the Matica were not over and new storm clouds gathered over Slovakia to test anew the political capacity and political maturity of the Slovaks. That the struggles over the spiritual individuality of the Slovak nation - which this time were evoked by a mistaken "Czechoslovak" national conception- �72 SLOVAKIA were transferred over to the arena of the Matica, clearly demonstrated its important role in the life of the Slovaks. In this period, right from the beginning, the head of the Matica w.as Jozef Skultety, a direct descendant of the generation from the first Matica period. He was a worthy successor of the first Matica presidents, a recognized national authority, and a defender of the Moyses-Kuzmany tradition. Until 1932, Stefan Krcmery was executive secretary of the Matica; Jozef C. Hronsky succeeded Krcmery. When Hronsky became executive director of the Matica during the lifetime of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), the secretaryship went to Jan Martak. The activity of the Matica during this period was twofold: scientific work and public instruction. The Matica attracted writers and educators, scientific workers, priests and students; it organized local units in many towns and communities. The tradition and the spirit of the Matica Slovenska. did not fit into the pattern of the concept of the "Czechoslovak" nation, which the Czechs defined as a single ethnic entity for world consumption. The Czechs, however, knew they were Czechs a,nd not Slovaks or "Czechoslovaks"and the Slovaks lmew they were Sl<Waks and not Czechs or "Czechoslovaks." The defenders and promoters of the "Czechoslovak" ideology, having the support of Czech politicians made an attempt to anchor themselves in the Matica and to influence especially the work of its linguistic and historic departments. Under their guidance the Matica, in 1931, publtshed the "Pravidla slovenskeho pravopisu" (Rules of Slovak Orthography) which did not conform to the legality or purity of literary Slovak. This evoked a storm of opposition in Slovakia which was quelled with the victory of the Slovak tendency during the mass meeting of the Matica on May 12, 1932. The heralds and promoters of the conception of the "Czechoslovak" language and the "Czechoslovak" nation were voted out of office at this meeting and Jozef C. Hronsky, one of the most eminent of modern Slovak n<Wellists, was elected executive secretary of the Matica Slovenska. The Matica events evoked a strong response in the political life of the Slovaks, especially am~g the younger �SLOVAKIA 73 generation. At the end of June, 1932, members of this generation, representing all political parties, held ,a conference at Trencianske Teplice at which they unanimously backed a federated Czecho-Slovak State. It was from their rank's that the Matica recruited tl\e workers it needed to fulfil its mission. Historian Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky was named secretary of the scientific departments of the Matica in 1934; Dr. Henrich Bartek and Dr. tudovit Nova.kl specialized as linguists; Dr. Andrew Mraz, Dr. Stanislav Meciar and Dr. Jan Marta.k were given the t~k of developing the ,h istory of Slovak literature; Dr. Jozef Cincik specialized in the art department; and Karol Plicka's forte was ethnology. As soon as the Matica Slovenska. was revived after World War I, it began to publish the literary monthly review "Slovenske Pohfady," which had been founded by Jozef M. Hurban in 1845. The indi'Vidual departments of the Matica gradually began to publish their own magazines. In time the Matica also publit;hed periodicals, such as "Slovensko" (review of culture in general), "Slovenska Rec" (linguistic) , "Slniecko" (youth magazine) , and others. The Matica's "Pedagogicky Zbornik' (Pedagogical Magazine) was, for many years, the only magazine of its kind in the entire Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Matica also supported amateur theater productions and published "Nase Divadlo" (Our Theater); Ferdinand Hoffman specialized in t~ field. Of course, the Matica Slovenska published various literary works of many authors-Slovak and non-Slova:kfor the edification and reading pleasure of the Slovaks: scientific and artistic tomes, children's readers and story books; the collected works of the Slovak classics; translations from foreign literature; textbooks; Rules of Orthography; Rizner's Bibliography of Slovak Letters (6 Vols.); Polivka's "Supis Slovenskych Rozpra.vok" (Inventory of Slovak Tales), etc. The Matica Slovenska. expanded its activities enormously during the life of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), when its membership and staff personnel reached its highest peak. It was under Hronsky that the Matica built the great book-printing plant Neografia, one of the most modern in Central Europe. --- �74 SLOVAKIA From 1919 to 1944, the Matica Slovenska multiplied. Slovak literary and scientific works as never before. The reason for this was not only a more favorable climate, but especially because the Matica had the services of able and devoted men like Jozef Skultety, Stefan Krcmery, Jozef C. Hronsky, Frantisek Hrusovsky, and many others. At the end of World War II, the complexion of the Matica Slovenska changed completely. With Dr. Edward Benes, Stalin's errand boy, in the president's chair againthe same chair he voluntarily and willingly gave u,p in October, 1938, to flee to England - a Communist beachhead was established in Czecho-Slovakia, in the heart of Europe. A question mark hung over the fate of the Matica. Even though the first indications were that the Matica would be able to continue its wo:r1k, as the days and months rolled by the political power of the "people's democratic regime" began to intervene more and more in the :work of the Matica, violating its tradition and direction. For the first time in the history of the Matica, its president became an exposed politician, Laco N ovomesky, the Commissioner of Education. And the worst of it was that the Matica in those years had no personalities who could protect it with the weight of their authority. Jozef Skultety was a very old man, and the new director of the Matica, Dr. Jan Martak, lacked firmness. Under the circumstances, for which Slovak patriots cannot be held responsible, the Matica Slovenska was completely controlled by the Communists, even though the "Slovak Democrats" of Dr. Jozef Lettrich won 62 per cent of the Slovak electorate in 1946. Old workers were retired, investigated, jailed, disfranchised and persecuted. Already in 1945 it was quite apparent that the Matica was fast becoming a tool of communistic cultural politics. Even the name "Matica Sloven.ska" bothered the Reds. It meant something special, it was a symbol of the efforts and the masses of the people that were opposed to Communism; and the Reds feared that the hundreds of local assem!blies of the Matica could well .become dangerous centers or cells of anti-Communist resistance. It so happened that the Communist regime, by order of the Slovak National Council of April 'l:l, 1954, put a �Sl..OVAKIA 75 stop to the work of the Matica. The Matica building was changed into a central library and the State appropriated the property of the Matica. Shades of 1875 (when the Magyars dissolved the Matica) ! Attempts were made to organize a Matica Slovenska outside of Slovakia by Slovak exiles in the free world, notably by Hronsky, in 1959, in Argentina, with little success, however, thus far. About the closest thing to the Matica was organized in Cleveland, Ohio, by the Right Rev. Theodore J. Kojis, O.S.B., Abbot of St. Andrew-Svorad's Abbey, on September 15, 1952. It is called the Slovak Institute (Slovensky Ustav) and is devoted to practically the same work as the Matica of Slovakia. Lack of finances and personnel limit its activity, but the Slovak Institute of Cleveland, Ohio, nevertheless, is a going institution. Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky, eminent Slovak historian, was the Institute's first director. His untimely death in 1956 was a setback for the Institute. Cleveland's Slovak Institute, however, definitely holds out the promise of a better future under the directorship of the youthful but energetic Father Andrew Pier, 0, S. B. The Institute has already proved its worth and deserves the support of all Slovaks in the free world. An earlier attempt to found a Matica Slovenska in America was made by Rev. Stephen Furdek of Cleveland, Ohio, in 1893. The meeting he called for Chicago, ID., Sept. 26, 1893, was attended by some 100 Slovak leaders, clergymen and layman, who approved the idea. The organization just about got off the ground when it folded because of dissention in Slovak ranks and lack of vision, tolerance and understanding among Slovak leaders. The Matica quit operation after August, 1899. BIBLIOGRAPHY Frantisek Bokes: Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, Bratislava, 1946; Viliam Pauliny-T6th, Turo. Sv. Martin, 194-2. JuHus Botto: Dejiny Matice slovenakej 1863-1875, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1923. Konstanitln Culen : Rc>ky alove-nakych nadeji a sklamani 1843-1875, Tmava, 1932. Frantillek Hrusovaky : Slovenaky Uatav v Clevelande, reprint from "MOST"-Vol. 2, No. 2, 1955, Cleveland, Ohio. AJ-oj11: KoUse'k: U28. Borba katolfkov za alovenclnu a slobodu, Bratislava, �76 SLOVAKIA Stefa.n Krcmery: Stopit'desiat rokov elovenskej literatury, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1943. Da,nieiJ. Lichard: Rozhovory o Slovenskej Matici, Viedeii, 1865. Jan ,Mart.A'k: Otok na spisovnu 1lovenoi1nu, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1942. Andrej Mra.z: Jozef Skult6ty, Tu~. Sv. Mar.Un, 1933; Matica slovenekA v rokoch 1863-1875, Tu.re. Sv. MarMn, 193-6. Jan V. Ol'lllis: Zo 1loven1kej minuloati narodnej a literarnej, Pra:ha, 1932. Stefan Pasiar: Dejiny slovenakych l'udovych kniinic, Martin, 1957. Eugen Pauliny: Dejiny spiaovnej 1lovenciny, Bratislava, 19·48. MiLam. P4M.t: Dejiny slovenakej literatury, Bratislava., 1960. Daniel Rapant: K pociatkom madarizacie, Bratis lava, 19.2-'7 and 1931; Tatrin, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1•950. Sbornik na poceat' Jozefa SkultHyho, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1933. Jozef Skultety: Slivnoat' Mial!ice 1lovenakej ozivotvorenej, T,uro. Sv. Martin, 1919; Stodvadsat'pit' rokov zo alovenak6ho zivota 17901914, Turi!. Sv. Mlllrtin, 1•9 20; 0 Slovakoch, Turi!. Sv. Mal'tin, 1938. Svetozar Hurban Va.jamsk:S,: Zivot Stefana Moyaeaa, Turc. Sv. Martin, 193:5. Jan Vllikovskf: D~jiny literarnich apolecnostf malohontakych, Bratislava, 1935. l!.U D, Bratislava, 1954, No. 9'9, April 27, p. 1. MOST, Cleveland, Ohio, 1954, No. 1, pp. 26, 37; 195-6, No. 1, pp. 2-12; 1959, "No. 3, 'PP, 135-136 and No. 4, p , 14'5; 1960, No 3-4, pp, 97-104. SLOVENSKE NOVINY, Viedeii, 18-50, No. 39 ; 18.'il, Nos. 137, 149. VERB,UM, Kosice, 1947, No. 2, pp. 65-69, 98-102. SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE by Gilbert L. Oddo - the first complete history of the Slovak people and their country in the English language - may be ordered from the following: Jednota Printery fhe Slovak lnstitute <;\ ~d~et!~xn _l~ Mrs. Julia Krajcovic 1648 W 18th Street Chicago 8 m Mr. Paul C Kaz1mer 1122 Sylvan Avenue Homestead Pa M2~rlevM~1 ·l1aas~nBV~~lB~lhaazl~edk 19. 4922 S Leclaire Avenue Chicago 38 Ul Mr John Horecky 2264 Walton Avenue New York 53. N Y l'he book has 384 pages and a cloth cover and . sells for $6.00. Get your -copy today! 0 ;· g :A:R:IOQ01~~00000000000000<XI � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 64 SLOVAKIA A HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MATICA SLOVENSKA IMRICH KRUZLIAK The concept of the Matica Sloven.ska. (The Slovak Institute of the Arts and Sciences) has its roots far in the times before its establishment in 1863. The earlier learned societies, federations of intellectuals, which often had only a confessional or local character, can be considered as the predecessors of the Matica Slovenska.: The Learned Society of Maly Hont, Societas Slavica, The Learned Society of the mining (Banska) area; also The Slovak Learned Society of Bernolaik, Hamuliak's Society of Admirers of the Slovak Language and Literature, and the Tatrin of Ludovit Stur. The programs of the last three societies were adopted by the Matica Slovenska.. Besides domestic efforts to establish the Matica Slovenska, we must also mention Safa.rik's interest who, at that time, was the director of the Serbian Gymnazium in Novy Sad. He used to write to his countrymen in Slovakia, particularly after the founding of the Serbian Matica in 1823 - which was founded with this help - to give serious thought to the idea of establishing a similar society in Slovakia. Safarik wrote a:bout the matter to, among others, Hamuliak, Kollar and Palacky. Hamuliak liked the idea very much, so much fo fact that, in 1857, when he was about to retire, he donated his personal library to the gymnazium at Banska. Bystrica only on tihe condition that it be handed over to the Matica Slovenska as soon as it was established. M. that time Hamuliak attempted to organize a literary society in Banska. Bystrica, which would be headed by Safarik, a recognized scientific authority. There were several such similar efforts in Slovakia in those years, but not one of them was realized. The Magyar authorities woulq not allow a charter either to Hamuliak or to Stur. With tihe revolutionary years at hand, 1848-49, the Slovaks, too, t ook up arms to seek political freedom. Having failed in the attempt, the Slovaks had to travel the bitter road of sacrifice and oppression. Many hopes were crushed, many enthusiasts were silenced, and many SLOVAKIA 65 more self-sacrificing Slovaks withdrew to the background. Nevertheless, the concept of the Matica did not die, but continued to live in the hearts and minds of the people, awaiting an opportune moment. In 1859, a Slovak patriot, Natan J. Petian, bequeathed 9,000 Gold Crowns for the establishment of the Matica. Two years prior to that, Jonas Zaborsky established a literary foundation with the Czeoh Matica to support the publication of Slovak works, with the reservation, however, that the foundation be transferred to the Matica Slovenska once it came into being. Then followed the historical year 1861, the year of the famous Slovak Memorandum which brought new hopes to the Slovaks. Representatives of the Slovak provinces of Hungary came to Tuiiciansky Sviity Martin to the public meeting arranged for June 6-7, 1861. There in the presence of thousands of people they wholeheartedly adopted the historical Memorandum of the Slovak Nation, with which they hoped to gain recognition for national and political individuality and the political rights to which they felt entitled. There it was, too, that the decision was made to request permission to establish the Matica Slovenska. Emperor Francis Joseph very graciously received the Slovak delegation, headed by Bishop Stephen Moyses, on December 12, 1861. Impressed by the Memorandum, he promised to comply with their righteous requests. The Slovaks were jubilant, figuring that the way was cleared to establish the Matica Slovenska. In Pest'., Jan Franci sci worked feverishly to complete the By-Laws of the Matica; the work was ready on August 1. But the local regency council returned the By-Laws to Francisci, because it found that t:he Matica Slovenska would also be interested in political action. The Magyar authorities also opposed naming the building of the Matica the "Home of the Slovak Nation." Furthermore, they would not permit the organization of affiliates in Slovak communities and cities; they wished to limit the activity and influence of the Matica and make it subject to the control of a royal commissioner. Difficulties were also encountered when it came to selecting a location for the Matica. At first the Matica Slovenska was to be located at Brezno-above-the-Hron (Brez- 66 SLOVAKIA no nad Hronom). The town council had given its approval, but later recalled it, after pressure was applied by royal commissioner Havas of Zvolen. Other Slovak towns wanted the Matica, particularly Turciansky Svaty Martin and Liptovsky Sva.ty Mikulas. The St. Martin town iI'epresentat!on said that it considered it "a most sacred duty" to offer residence to the Matica Slovenska. On October 29, 1862, the local regency council announced the decision of the Emperor who had, by decree, on August 21, allowed the establishment of the Matica Slovenska. The temporary committee of the Matica proclaimed the joyous news in the Pesfbudinske Vedomosti on November 4, 1862. Thereupon a membership drive and a campaign for funds were instituted. The committee then called a meeting of the Matica on August 4, 1863. From, the fall of 1862 to the end of July 1863, more than 50,000 Gold Crowns were collected for the Matica. Francisci at that time joyously exclaimed: "My dear nation, you are indeed arising from the dust, but you are rising as a giant!" The Foundation of the Matica Slovenska On August 4, 1863, great throngs of Slovaks from practically all parts of Slovakia travelled to Turciansky Svaty Martin for the first general meeting of the Matica Slovenska.. Bishop Stephen Moyses was wildly acclaimed along the route to Martin by hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. After he had led the Slovak delegation in December, 1861, to the Emperor, Bishop Moyses became the most popular man in Slovakia, the leader of the Slovak people. In St. Martin, Charles Kuzma.ny, a Lutheran clergyman, welcomed Moyses with a memorable speech in whioh he sad: "Entire milleniums now look upon you and upon us from the height of these hills; all the valleys of our hallowed Tatra Mountains to the blue Danube gaze upon you with the eyes of the here present matured generation and from the faces of these children there looks upon you and upon llS the entire future of the Slovak nation. You are going to perform an act for the entire history of this nation, a monument to the past and a foundation for the future, the SLOVAKIA 67 twofold gate, closed for the injustices of the past and opened for the glory of future ages." Tihe meeting was opened by Jan Francisci, chairman of the temporary committee, who, among other things, said: "We, the sons of the Slovak nation:, which had no haven to turn to in the face of injustice, have gathered here to place the cornerstone on which shall rest the temple and stability of Slovak national life." Wihen Francisci asked Bishop Moyses to preside at the meeting, the multitude went wild with joy. The spontaneous acclamation accorded Bishop Moyses was tantamount to electing him the first president of the Matica Slovenska. After the crowd quieted down, Bishop Moyses said: "Where there is a question of honors and decorations, I always like to be the last, because I do not and never did yearn for honors . . . Where, 1h owever, there is a question of service to my Slovak people and willingness to render service, as well as sacrifices for the development of our nation, I never did withdraw, I am not going to withdraw, I do not wish to withdraw, and I shall not withdraw... " Charles_Kuzmany became vice-president of the Matica. Francisci and Daxner were nominated for the function, to honor them for the services they rendered to the Slovak nation, but they declined the nomination, as they had agreed to beforehand t!hat the office should go to Kuzmany, who at that time had been expelled from Banska Bystrica by the enemies of the Slovak cause and had been accepted by the ecclesiastical community in Turciansky Svaty Martin. There were also other tactical reasons for this move. The Slovaks did not wish to have politically exposed individuals at the head of the Matica, especially not those who had taken an active part in the revolution. The personalities of Moyses and Kuzmany, representing ·b oth confessions (Catholic and Lutheran), reflected the solidarity and unity of the Slovak nation. In the act of allowing the establishment of the Matica, the Slovaks saw the recognition of the existence of the Slovak nation on the part of the Emperor. His gift of a thousand Gold Crowns to the Matica was joyously ac- 68 SLOVAKIA claimed by the Slovaks. When the Slovaks learned that the Emperor had named Bishop Moyses as his personal counsellor, their joy knew no bounds. The convention ordered a delegation to visit the Emperor to express its sin- ----cere gratefulness and fealty. The First Period of the Matica (1863-1875) The Matica Slovenska began its activity in 1863, that is, in the year the Slovaks commemorated the millenium of the advent of Sts. Cyril and Methodius to the territory of ancient Slovaks, Great Moravia. At that time there were grandiose celebrations in various cities of Slovakia, whereby the Slovaks demonstrated their cultural and political antiquity. J. M. Hurban had this in mind when, at the Matica meeting, he moved that "the establishment of the Matica Slovenska take place in commemoration of the CyriloMethodian baptism and the thousand-year-old Christianity of our nation." Because Sts. Cyril and Methodius brought to our forefathers not only Christianity but also the elements of Slovak literature, Bishop Moyses "wholeheartedly agreed with the motion of Dr. Hurban," as S. H. Vajansky later recorded. The establishment of the Matica Slovenska. was followed attentively by other Slovanic nations. The Croatian Bishop Strossmayer donated a thousand Gold Crowns to the Matica which sought the favor and support of cultural factors of other Slovanic nations. At its first and second meetings, the Matica elected outstanding Slovanic scholars as charter and honorary members. Paragraph 32 of the Matica By-Laws noted its cooperation with other Slovanic cultural institutions. According to paragraph 1, the Matica Slovenska was "a union of admirers of the nation and Slovak life" and it chief aim was: to cultivate and propagate Slovak literature and the fine arts, as well as to rouse moral and intellectual education and thereby also aid the material welfare of the Slovak nation. The cooperation of the intelligentsia and the people was the prerequisite to the cucce.ss of Matica activity. Bishop Moyses stressed this in his speeches. The Matica, from its very beginning, unfolded its acti- SLOVAKIA 69 vity in two fields: the field of science and the field of enlightenment, that is in the field of educating people. The building of a great library and mus~um were on its program. Unfortunately, the activity of the Matica was dependent on the success of public drives for finances. And because the amounts raised thusly were less and less with passing years, they were not sufficient to c01Ver the needs of the Matica. John Gotcar suggested that the government subsidize the •a ctivity of the Matica as it did in the case of Magyar and German institutions. The matter was brought up in parliament, but the majority of deputies repudiated it. In the first period of its existence, the Matica published books and periodicals, built its home, supported the alumnea of the Slovak gymnasiums, gave stipends to students, and supported the artists Bohuii and Klemens. Altogether in these twelve years (1863-1875), the Matica published 40 books and newspapers, Moyses's and Kozacek's speeches in the Matica, which it distributed gratis among the people, two volumes of the Archives of Old Documents, a souvenir book to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Mikulas Subic Zrinsky, Dobsinsky's articles about Slovak folklore, two volumes of Slovak national songs and tales, a National Almanac, a Slovak Reader, Slovak school texts; then it also sought to fix orthographical usage according to Hattala's grammar, and even devoted itself to geological research in Slovakia. There were <voices that the Matica devote itself only to scientific activity. Jonas Zaborsky was especially vocal about this. But the Matica could not do this, because the need to educate the people at large was very great. From 1868, the Matica began to develop several scientific departments which became the motivators of Matica activity especially in its second period, after 1919. In the first period these departments could not sufficiently develop their activity because of the lack workers and financial means. In a few years the Matica gained so much respect and weight with the Slovak public that Vajansky, evaluating its activity, wrote gleefully: "For the Slovak nation the Matica was everything on which could depend our national feeling, national consciousness, national pride and hope." 70 SLOVAKIA The assemblies of the Matica, especially after Slovak cultural and economic life began to be concentrated in St. Martin, were important national and social occasions, during which Slovaks discussed their plans for the future. Thanks to the Matica, St. Martin became the bastion of the defensiive battle of the Slovaks and the cradle of Slovak activities. After Bishop Moyses's death in 1869, the office of president was left vacant for one year, out of deference to the Bishop, then Abbot Jozef Koza.eek took over the office. The participation of the Matica delegates in the various festivities of Slovanic nations meant much to the Slovaks politically and nationally. The Magyar authorities were alert; they readily recognized such activity as anti-Magyar, that is, "anti-State." Already in 1867, Vtliam Pauliny Toth complained that Slovak patriots were being vilified and made suspect of treason just because they were members of the Matica. This also characterized the position of the Matica. When the Matica Slovenska came into being, the conditions were not at all favorable for the national and cultural life of the Slovaks. The authorities repeatedly acc.uaed the Matica of "Pan-Slavism" and of making preparations to destroy Hungary. Soon enough the fight against the Matica was identified with the fight against the Slovak nation, against the freedom and independence of the Slovak nation: to Slovaks it became increasingly clear that probably the last fight for their national survival was at hand. In vain did officials of the Matica try to convince the Magyar State officials that their institution was not an enemy of the State. The Magyar press increased its attacks against everything Slov,ak, declaring: "the Slovak is not a man . . . there is no Slovak nation . . . The Slovaks are Pan-Slavists, enemies of the State . . . There is no Slovak language . . . the official and only recognized tongue in Hungary is Magyar." Slovak leaders felt the Matica's days were numbered. At the general meeting of the Matica on August 5, 1874, more Slovaks came to St. Martin than had come during the previous ten years. Daniel Lichard said SLOVAKIA 71 on that occasion: (we are not supposed to exist) "nevertheless here we a.re!" The cause of the Slovaks once again seemed hopeless. After the settlement with Austria was reached in 1867, resulting in the Dual-Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), the Magyars had absolute control of Hungary with over half its population being non-Magyar. In Pest, the name of the Matica Slovenska was on the blacklist. The Magyars instituted hearings against the Matica on November 19, 1875, outlawed its activities on April 6, 1875, and dissolived it on November 12, 1875, by order of the Minister of the Interior, Koloman Tisza. The property of the Matica was confiscated only to be used against the Slovaks: Tisza declared cynically that the property cannot be given to the Slovak nation, because "in Hungary there is no Slovak nation." The Slovaks, however, were now more determined than ever to fight for their national survival against Magyar chauvinism. The Matica was not to be revived until 1919. The Matica's Second Period (1919-1954) Forty-four years had to elapse before the Matica Slovenska was revived. During that time many political changes had taken place. Old Hungary was split up and the Slovak nation-whose existence was denied by Koloman Tisza in 1875-was able to form a state in 1918. Much had been neglected since 1875; there was much to do for the Matice Slovenska after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. On January 1, 1919, representatives of the Slovak people, the sons of the founders of the Matica, gathered solemnly at Turciansky Svaty Martin to open the gates of the Matica in the newly-formed Czecho-Slovak State. Thus began its second period of activity, which was to last until 1954, when Matica activities came to an end at the hands of Communists. It soon became evident that the troubles of the Matica were not over and new storm clouds gathered over Slovakia to test anew the political capacity and political maturity of the Slovaks. That the struggles over the spiritual individuality of the Slovak nation - which this time were evoked by a mistaken "Czechoslovak" national conception- 72 SLOVAKIA were transferred over to the arena of the Matica, clearly demonstrated its important role in the life of the Slovaks. In this period, right from the beginning, the head of the Matica w.as Jozef Skultety, a direct descendant of the generation from the first Matica period. He was a worthy successor of the first Matica presidents, a recognized national authority, and a defender of the Moyses-Kuzmany tradition. Until 1932, Stefan Krcmery was executive secretary of the Matica; Jozef C. Hronsky succeeded Krcmery. When Hronsky became executive director of the Matica during the lifetime of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), the secretaryship went to Jan Martak. The activity of the Matica during this period was twofold: scientific work and public instruction. The Matica attracted writers and educators, scientific workers, priests and students; it organized local units in many towns and communities. The tradition and the spirit of the Matica Slovenska. did not fit into the pattern of the concept of the "Czechoslovak" nation, which the Czechs defined as a single ethnic entity for world consumption. The Czechs, however, knew they were Czechs a,nd not Slovaks or "Czechoslovaks"and the Slovaks lmew they were Sl<Waks and not Czechs or "Czechoslovaks." The defenders and promoters of the "Czechoslovak" ideology, having the support of Czech politicians made an attempt to anchor themselves in the Matica and to influence especially the work of its linguistic and historic departments. Under their guidance the Matica, in 1931, publtshed the "Pravidla slovenskeho pravopisu" (Rules of Slovak Orthography) which did not conform to the legality or purity of literary Slovak. This evoked a storm of opposition in Slovakia which was quelled with the victory of the Slovak tendency during the mass meeting of the Matica on May 12, 1932. The heralds and promoters of the conception of the "Czechoslovak" language and the "Czechoslovak" nation were voted out of office at this meeting and Jozef C. Hronsky, one of the most eminent of modern Slovak n<Wellists, was elected executive secretary of the Matica Slovenska. The Matica events evoked a strong response in the political life of the Slovaks, especially am~g the younger SLOVAKIA 73 generation. At the end of June, 1932, members of this generation, representing all political parties, held ,a conference at Trencianske Teplice at which they unanimously backed a federated Czecho-Slovak State. It was from their rank's that the Matica recruited tl\e workers it needed to fulfil its mission. Historian Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky was named secretary of the scientific departments of the Matica in 1934; Dr. Henrich Bartek and Dr. tudovit Nova.kl specialized as linguists; Dr. Andrew Mraz, Dr. Stanislav Meciar and Dr. Jan Marta.k were given the t~k of developing the ,h istory of Slovak literature; Dr. Jozef Cincik specialized in the art department; and Karol Plicka's forte was ethnology. As soon as the Matica Slovenska. was revived after World War I, it began to publish the literary monthly review "Slovenske Pohfady," which had been founded by Jozef M. Hurban in 1845. The indi'Vidual departments of the Matica gradually began to publish their own magazines. In time the Matica also publit;hed periodicals, such as "Slovensko" (review of culture in general), "Slovenska Rec" (linguistic) , "Slniecko" (youth magazine) , and others. The Matica's "Pedagogicky Zbornik' (Pedagogical Magazine) was, for many years, the only magazine of its kind in the entire Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Matica also supported amateur theater productions and published "Nase Divadlo" (Our Theater); Ferdinand Hoffman specialized in t~ field. Of course, the Matica Slovenska published various literary works of many authors-Slovak and non-Slova:kfor the edification and reading pleasure of the Slovaks: scientific and artistic tomes, children's readers and story books; the collected works of the Slovak classics; translations from foreign literature; textbooks; Rules of Orthography; Rizner's Bibliography of Slovak Letters (6 Vols.); Polivka's "Supis Slovenskych Rozpra.vok" (Inventory of Slovak Tales), etc. The Matica Slovenska. expanded its activities enormously during the life of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), when its membership and staff personnel reached its highest peak. It was under Hronsky that the Matica built the great book-printing plant Neografia, one of the most modern in Central Europe. --- 74 SLOVAKIA From 1919 to 1944, the Matica Slovenska multiplied. Slovak literary and scientific works as never before. The reason for this was not only a more favorable climate, but especially because the Matica had the services of able and devoted men like Jozef Skultety, Stefan Krcmery, Jozef C. Hronsky, Frantisek Hrusovsky, and many others. At the end of World War II, the complexion of the Matica Slovenska changed completely. With Dr. Edward Benes, Stalin's errand boy, in the president's chair againthe same chair he voluntarily and willingly gave u,p in October, 1938, to flee to England - a Communist beachhead was established in Czecho-Slovakia, in the heart of Europe. A question mark hung over the fate of the Matica. Even though the first indications were that the Matica would be able to continue its wo:r1k, as the days and months rolled by the political power of the "people's democratic regime" began to intervene more and more in the :work of the Matica, violating its tradition and direction. For the first time in the history of the Matica, its president became an exposed politician, Laco N ovomesky, the Commissioner of Education. And the worst of it was that the Matica in those years had no personalities who could protect it with the weight of their authority. Jozef Skultety was a very old man, and the new director of the Matica, Dr. Jan Martak, lacked firmness. Under the circumstances, for which Slovak patriots cannot be held responsible, the Matica Slovenska was completely controlled by the Communists, even though the "Slovak Democrats" of Dr. Jozef Lettrich won 62 per cent of the Slovak electorate in 1946. Old workers were retired, investigated, jailed, disfranchised and persecuted. Already in 1945 it was quite apparent that the Matica was fast becoming a tool of communistic cultural politics. Even the name "Matica Sloven.ska" bothered the Reds. It meant something special, it was a symbol of the efforts and the masses of the people that were opposed to Communism; and the Reds feared that the hundreds of local assem!blies of the Matica could well .become dangerous centers or cells of anti-Communist resistance. It so happened that the Communist regime, by order of the Slovak National Council of April 'l:l, 1954, put a Sl..OVAKIA 75 stop to the work of the Matica. The Matica building was changed into a central library and the State appropriated the property of the Matica. Shades of 1875 (when the Magyars dissolved the Matica) ! Attempts were made to organize a Matica Slovenska outside of Slovakia by Slovak exiles in the free world, notably by Hronsky, in 1959, in Argentina, with little success, however, thus far. About the closest thing to the Matica was organized in Cleveland, Ohio, by the Right Rev. Theodore J. Kojis, O.S.B., Abbot of St. Andrew-Svorad's Abbey, on September 15, 1952. It is called the Slovak Institute (Slovensky Ustav) and is devoted to practically the same work as the Matica of Slovakia. Lack of finances and personnel limit its activity, but the Slovak Institute of Cleveland, Ohio, nevertheless, is a going institution. Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky, eminent Slovak historian, was the Institute's first director. His untimely death in 1956 was a setback for the Institute. Cleveland's Slovak Institute, however, definitely holds out the promise of a better future under the directorship of the youthful but energetic Father Andrew Pier, 0, S. B. The Institute has already proved its worth and deserves the support of all Slovaks in the free world. An earlier attempt to found a Matica Slovenska in America was made by Rev. Stephen Furdek of Cleveland, Ohio, in 1893. The meeting he called for Chicago, ID., Sept. 26, 1893, was attended by some 100 Slovak leaders, clergymen and layman, who approved the idea. The organization just about got off the ground when it folded because of dissention in Slovak ranks and lack of vision, tolerance and understanding among Slovak leaders. The Matica quit operation after August, 1899. BIBLIOGRAPHY Frantisek Bokes: Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, Bratislava, 1946; Viliam Pauliny-T6th, Turo. Sv. Martin, 194-2. JuHus Botto: Dejiny Matice slovenakej 1863-1875, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1923. Konstanitln Culen : Rc>ky alove-nakych nadeji a sklamani 1843-1875, Tmava, 1932. Frantillek Hrusovaky : Slovenaky Uatav v Clevelande, reprint from "MOST"-Vol. 2, No. 2, 1955, Cleveland, Ohio. AJ-oj11: KoUse'k: U28. Borba katolfkov za alovenclnu a slobodu, Bratislava, 76 SLOVAKIA Stefa.n Krcmery: Stopit'desiat rokov elovenskej literatury, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1943. Da,nieiJ. Lichard: Rozhovory o Slovenskej Matici, Viedeii, 1865. Jan ,Mart.A'k: Otok na spisovnu 1lovenoi1nu, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1942. Andrej Mra.z: Jozef Skult6ty, Tu~. Sv. Mar.Un, 1933; Matica slovenekA v rokoch 1863-1875, Tu.re. Sv. MarMn, 193-6. Jan V. Ol'lllis: Zo 1loven1kej minuloati narodnej a literarnej, Pra:ha, 1932. Stefan Pasiar: Dejiny slovenakych l'udovych kniinic, Martin, 1957. Eugen Pauliny: Dejiny spiaovnej 1lovenciny, Bratislava, 19·48. MiLam. P4M.t: Dejiny slovenakej literatury, Bratislava., 1960. Daniel Rapant: K pociatkom madarizacie, Bratis lava, 19.2-'7 and 1931; Tatrin, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1•950. Sbornik na poceat' Jozefa SkultHyho, Turi!. Sv. Martin, 1933. Jozef Skultety: Slivnoat' Mial!ice 1lovenakej ozivotvorenej, T,uro. Sv. Martin, 1919; Stodvadsat'pit' rokov zo alovenak6ho zivota 17901914, Turi!. Sv. Mlllrtin, 1•9 20; 0 Slovakoch, Turi!. Sv. Mal'tin, 1938. Svetozar Hurban Va.jamsk:S,: Zivot Stefana Moyaeaa, Turc. Sv. Martin, 193:5. Jan Vllikovskf: D~jiny literarnich apolecnostf malohontakych, Bratislava, 1935. l!.U D, Bratislava, 1954, No. 9'9, April 27, p. 1. MOST, Cleveland, Ohio, 1954, No. 1, pp. 26, 37; 195-6, No. 1, pp. 2-12; 1959, "No. 3, 'PP, 135-136 and No. 4, p , 14'5; 1960, No 3-4, pp, 97-104. SLOVENSKE NOVINY, Viedeii, 18-50, No. 39 ; 18.'il, Nos. 137, 149. VERB,UM, Kosice, 1947, No. 2, pp. 65-69, 98-102. SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE by Gilbert L. Oddo - the first complete history of the Slovak people and their country in the English language - may be ordered from the following: Jednota Printery fhe Slovak lnstitute <;\ ~d~et!~xn _l~ Mrs. Julia Krajcovic 1648 W 18th Street Chicago 8 m Mr. Paul C Kaz1mer 1122 Sylvan Avenue Homestead Pa M2~rlevM~1 ·l1aas~nBV~~lB~lhaazl~edk 19. 4922 S Leclaire Avenue Chicago 38 Ul Mr John Horecky 2264 Walton Avenue New York 53. N Y l'he book has 384 pages and a cloth cover and . sells for $6.00. Get your -copy today! 0 ;· g :A:R:IOQ01~~00000000000000<XI  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Hundred Years of the Matica Slovenská Description An account of the resource Imrich Kružliak Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 64-76 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kružliak, Imrich, 1914-2019 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8c532810a94976495b9931f97ec22776.pdf d3414a49ae71d586201a59257f6dbe41 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 7 MILAN RASTISLAV STEFANIK (1880-1919) THE MAN WHO SPOKE TO THE STARS' Michal Ksinan 2 Outside of the Czech and Slovak Republics, people are fairly familiar with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the men responsible for the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and who also served as its first presidents. However, another of the country's founders, Milan Rastislav Stefanik, is much less known , partly because his tragic death in 1919 prevented him from holding a key office for any length of time. Although he is relatively unknown to the wider international public, his contemporaries compared him to Pierre Choderlos de Laclos for the use of military tactics in love affairs, 3 to Lawrence of Arabia for vision, to Napoleon Bonaparte for ambition, to Jules Michelet" for patriotism, and to one of the apostles for conviction.5 Who was this man who charn1ed his surroundings all his life and still continues to charm people today? In order to answer this question , I will present this person to the Englishspeaking reader who is often unfamiliar with Stefanik by emphasising several key points in his life. 6 The Young Man Stefan ik was born on 2 1 July 1880 in the hamlet of Kosariska in today 's western Slovakia (Upper-Hungary at the time) to th e family 1 This article was supported by gran ts VEGA n° 2/0087/20 and APVV n° 17-0399. T he auth or works in the Institute of Hi story of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 3 French genera l and novelist ( 174 1- 1803) best known for Les Liasons dangere11ses. ~ A famous French hi storian ( 1798- 1874 ). 5 Antoine Mares, Edvard Bene!i : Un drame entre Hitler et Staline (Paris, Perrin, 2015), 70. 6 This artic le is modified version of the texts published in the book: Michal Ksirian , Milan Rastisla v Stefanik, tran s. Julia Sherwood (Bratislava: Lindeni jointly with the Slovak National Archive, 20 19) . For more details, see the first scie ntifi c biography of Stefanik published in French : Michal Ksiri an, L 'homme qui parfait avec /es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik , heros ji·anco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EU R 'Orbem, 2019). Its Slovak translation will be published under the titl e Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Mui , ktm)i sa rozpraval s hviezdami by Slovart publi shing hou se and an Engli sh transla tion under the title Milan Ras/is/av S1efanik : The Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia by Routledge publishing house. 2 �8 SLOVAKIA 2021 of a Lutheran pastor with strong national convictions. Rai sed in a deeply religious family, Milan Stefanik used to hold similar beliefs. However, during his student days in Prague he was confronted with many liberal views. Discussions in Jeronym, a Protestant c lub, gave him a new perspective on faith. Its members debated progressive theo logical issues and read foreign journals. Stefanik was particularly influenced by the professor of philosophy Masaryk, and in light of his lectures started to question his Christian faith and indeed the existence of God. Not only did Milan Stefanik reject the divine essence of Jesus C hrist, he went so far as to doubt the very existence of God . He rejected reli gion and believed only in science, something that was regarded as genuinely heretical in his environment; that is why hi s father threw the young rebel out of his house in the summer of 1900. Although this breach was not permanent, it demonstrated that young Milan Stefanik had embarked upon a new journey.7 In thi s respect Stefanik can serve as a typical example of the phenomenon of secularisation in the nineteenth century that one can describe as "a loss of orientation , of certain ty, of a single world-view, of a core of reality. " 8 Another key deci sion of the young Stefanik was to switch from studying civi l engineering at Prague's Imperial and Royal Czech Technical High School (1898- 1900) to a degree in astronomy in the Faculty of Arts at the Czec h Charles-Ferdinand University (today's Charles Univers ity) in 1900- 1904. Astronomical studies fit more his romantic nature, even though thi s led to further conflicts between him and his father. The Astronomer After finishing hi s studies in Prague in 1904, Stefanik decided to go to Paris. He took every possible step to embark on a career in science. He started by taking an unpaid job in the observatory in Meudon under professor Jules Janssen, but that came to an end in 1906 when the leading position at the observatory passed to Henri Deslandres, since neither of the men got along. 9 After that Stefanik was appo inted to the paid position 7 Jaromir Va vra. Vzpo minky na Milana Ste(anika [Remini scences on Milan Stefa nik] (Ceske Velenice, Pave l Nobis, 1930), 15- 16. 8 Jifi Hanus, Historie modern! doby [History of the Modem Age] (B rn o, Barrister & Principal, 2004), 80. 9 Fra ni;:oise La unay, Un globe-trotter de la physique celeste. L ·astronome Jules Janssen (Paris, l' Observa toire de Paris, Vuibert, 2008), 256. �SLOVAKIA 2021 9 of deputy director of the Mont Blanc Observatories Society, thi s time with the help of the daughter and widow of the then deceased Jules Janssen. After a year in this post, Stefanik found himself jobless again. Then he decided to establish his own observatory. He had to decide between North Africa and a certain island in French Polynesia. Stefanik settled on the much closer North Africa. He travelled around, mostly in Algeria and Tunisia, but failed to find a suitable location for an observatory. On behalf of the French Bureau des longitudes, Stefanik then tra vell ed to Tahiti to observe the passage of Halley's Comet and to conduct further astronomical observations on an island in French Polynes ia. 10 The plan to observe Halley's Comet fell through because cloud cover made observation impossible. However, Stefanik did manage to carry out the final part of his plan. He decided to extend his stay on Tahiti and explore the conditions for meteorological and astronomical observations, " Provided Tahiti is shown to offer good conditions for astronomical observations, I would be interested in building a permanent observatory (a scientific embassy) there." 11 For Stefanik building a permanent observatory with a functioning meteorological service on thi s island was hi s most important pre-war scientific project. Traveller, Artist and Collector One of the most common astronomical phenomena that Stefanik focused on was the solar ecli pse that forced him to travel all around the world. He observed thi s phenomenon in Spain ( 1905) where all astronomers who observed it were received by Spanish King Alfonso XIII , in Turkistan ( 1907), but his observations failed because of bad weather, and on hi s way back he met with Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, on Vava'u Island ( 1911) where he had the best results among all sc ientific missions , and in Brazil ( 1912) where again his observations failed beca use of bad weather. Meanwhile, he took beautiful pictures during those journeys. Stefanik was not only interested in astronomica l observations, but also in the life and habits of the locals. During hi s stay in Tahiti , Stefanik bought a horse-drawn cart that he used primarily to check up 10 Rasti slav Rajc hl , Stefanikova paNiska feta [Stefanik 's Pari sian Yea rs] (Praha, Ev ropsk y literarni klub, 1937), 132. 11 Zapisniky M. R. Stefa nika [The Diari es o f M. R. Stefanik) ed . Jose f Bartiisek and Jaroslav Bohac (Praha, Pamatnik osvoboze ni, 1935), 172. �SLOVAKIA 2021 on the meteoro logical stations he had created and also to explore interesting parts of the island. He befriended French officers serving on a gunboat named Zelee and sailed with them to the lesser-known islands of French Pol ynesia. Here Stefanik di scovered and identified some Gaugin woodcuts in Puna'auia, owned by a Tahitian woman who may have been the painter's lover. Inspired by thi s discovery, he continued hi s search and found in her hut a carved wooden tobacco box with relief figures and, e lsewhere, a wooden relief ofa woman . 12 Exotic objects brought back from all five of the planet's inhabited continents formed the most interesting parts of Stefanik's collection. His friendly relations with the natives and hi s ability to develop a quick rapport with new people helped him to acquire these objects . Ivan Kmo remembered Stefanik's apartment thus : It was a strange kind of apartment. In fact, rather than an apartment, it was a small museum. It started in the hallway, which was full of drums, arrows and other weapons used by various indigenous peoples. And the tiny rooms were crammed with exotic objects. I was particularly impressed by the Oriental rugs and Gaugin's woodcuts from Tahiti. Hi s study boasted books, joumals, astronomical equipment and- a beautiful view of the rooftops of Paris. 13 Stefanik also enjoyed entertaining visitors to hi s apartment on the sixth floor at 6 Rue Leclerc with magic trick s. He mastered eighteen illusionist tricks, including cards emerging from a glass, flying and shrinking cards, and a magic wandering ring. 14 He had learned these tricks for a small fee at magicians' gatherings in Paris and bought his equipment from the Academy of Magic. 12 Franti sek Kele and Mi ros lav Musil , Navraty do Po~vnezie. Po S1efanikov1ich slopach [Returns to Polynes ia. Following in the Footsteps of Stefanik ) (OF PRI NT, 1996), 55. 13 Ivan Kmo , " Spomi enky na uj a Milana" [Memori es on Unc le Milan) in S1efanik . Kniha prva : 5pomienl,.y a pos/rehy [S tefanik . Boo k One: Memories and Observations] , ed . Stefan Osusky and Bohdan Pav lu (Praha, Svaz slovenskeho studen tstva v Bratislave, 1938), 38. 14 V ladimir Z uberec, " Za l\1by a zauj my Milana Rasti slava Stefanik a" [The Hobbies and Interests of Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ) in Zbornik Slovenskeho narodneho miizea - His16ria 32 (Martin, Osveta, 1992), I 13- 14. �SLOVAKIA 2021 11 A Worldwide Wireless Telegraph etwork To find suitable support fro m the French government for hi s observatory at Tahiti , Stefanik dev ised hi s own strategy. Through the Bureau des longitudes he planned to donate the observatory and all of its equipment and instruments to the state or the colony, which would cover its operating costs. 15 Willi am Mauri ce Fawtier, the French governor of the colonies in Oceania, asked Stefanik to identify a suitab le location for a wireless station on Tahiti , 16 and subseq uently to have it built and to run it. Stefa nik wanted to join the observatory and wireless station. Thank s to state subsid ies and profits generated by the stati on he would have had suffi cient materi al support. In those days France, the on ly country w ith po liti cal interests in Oceania, was not yet conn ected by wireless telegraph with these colonies, with the exception of New Caledonia. Contact with Tahiti was key, since the island's importance was ex pected to grow following the opening of the Panama Canal. In Jul y of 1912 a draft bill of the Law on an Intercontinenta l Wireless Telegraph Network, to connect the French co loni es scattered around the world with the mother country, was tabled in the French Parliament. Three branches were to radiate fro m Fra nce to the colonies : one w ith Coc hinchina (today the southern part of Vietnam), another w ith the island of Martinique and a third one in the Pac ifi c, with the station s in New Caledonia, th e Marquesas lslands and Tahiti. 17 One of the tasks Stefanik was supposed to fulfil during hi s mi ss ion in Ec uad or ( 1913) was to obtain permi ss ion to establi sh a wireless telegraph station on one of the Galapagos Islands, to facilitate comm unication with Papeete. In spite of the competition of German, Briti sh and America ns companies who had a strong position in these countri es, Stefanik succeeded. 18 Sometime earli er he had presented the French Senator and hi s protector Emil e C hautemps with the project of an 15 Slovensky narodn y archiv, Brati slava (S lovak National Arc hi ves, hereinafter SNA), OF : M. R. Stefanik, box 33, inv. no. I 06 1, Paris, 22 January 19 13, Letter of M. R. Stefan ik to an unknown person (perhaps E. Boutroux). 16 SNA , OF: M. R. Stefa nik, box 33 , inv. no. I 059, Papeete, 16 Octobe r 1913, letter of the governor of the French coloni es in French Pol ynesia W. Fawtier to M. R. Stefan ik . 17 Rasti slav Rajchl , M. R. Stefanik (Praha, Orb is, 194 7), 14- 16 . i x See more: Ekvadorsky zapisnik [Ecuadorian Diary], ed. Vl adimir Polivka (Bratislava, VSSS, 2005, I' ' editi on 1928) . �12 SLOVAKIA 2021 intercontinental telegraph network. Each station was to have an observatory and to provide a meteorological service . In Europe it was to be based on Mont Saleve near Geneva, in Asia its location was to be Hong Kong, in Africa in Morocco, and in Australia and Oceania in Tahiti. Stefanik also wanted to acquire the island of Floriana (Galapagos Islands) to reinforce the French influence in the region , but these projects were doomed because the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared the USA's reaction . He did, however, succeed in strengthening France's influence in Ecuador. At the outbreak of the Great War, Stefanik returned to France. He was in Morocco when the news reached him that he had been made a knight of the Legion d'honneur, with this citation: "Having been entrusted with missions to Tahiti and the Republic of Ecuador in 1913 he exhibited outstanding skill and provided extraordinary service to the merchant navy and to French interests. He founded and estab1ished, at his own expense, an observatory on Tahiti and organised a comprehensive meteorological service on the islands of French Oceania." 19 Stefanik had an extraordinary talent for planning globa l projects. He thought in bold and broad strokes and was not content with partial or local solutions. This was undoubtedly one reason why he so often captivated his friends . On the other hand, he d id not always manage to bring his plans to fruition . Sometimes he seemed to bite off more than he could chew. Pilot, Soldier and Inventor Stefanik became a French citizen in 1912 and was drafted in August of 1914 when the First World War broke out. Because of health problems, Stefanik reported for duty in January of 1915 as a pilot and flew over the Western front. In this ro le he focused on so lving problems relating to military aviation . In those days a big problem was communications between pilots and their bases, which he wanted to solve by installing a radio transmitter in his Maurice Farman airplane. As this proved too heavy, he constructed a "parlophone" (from French parler "to speak") to enab le the pilot to communicate w ith his base. He also mulled over the idea of a vertical launch and landing and exp lored 19 Archi ves nati ona les, Paris, LH/2548/35 - M. R. Ste fanik . �SLOVAKIA 2021 13 the best possible use of binoculars.20 Although most of Stefanik's ideas and inventions were not accepted, his military superiors appreciated " his valuable scientific knowledge." 2 1 Stefanik was also interested in the use of meteorology for military aviation. After constructing a meteorological station in the commune of Brias, he tested various meteorological instruments for their possible use in aircraft at various heights. Weather forecasts could be exploited, not only in aviation, but also in the planning of military actions by the infantry. For this reason, General Ferdinand Foch entrusted him with estab li shing a meteorological service for the section of the front under his command. Stefanik refused to take command of this service and left for a mission in Serbia in order to fight the invading AustroH ungarian army.22 Later, Stefanik founded and organised a meteorological service for the Romanian army. He also planned to set up an inter-allied meteorological service for the armies of the Entente. 23 Stefanik's military career was truly exceptional. Mobilised as a rank-and-file soldier in August of 1914, he did not start serving until January of 1915 and three years later (June of 1918) had reached the rank of Brigadier-General. It should be noted, however, that Stefanik's meteoric rise through the ranks was mainly the result of his diplomatic activities, which French officials used to boost his prestige in the eyes of his compatriots, as well Allied soldiers, diplomats and politicians. He also received numerous military and civilian honours , such as the French army's Croix de guerre (w ith bronze palm), the Italian Military Cross, the Serbian Gold medal for bravery, as well as being made a Knight, Officer and Commander of the Legion d'honneur. 20 Zuberec, "Zal'uby a za ujm y Milana Rastis lava Stefanika", 109- 135. SNA , OF: M. R. Ste fanik, box 33 , in v. no. I 037, Pari s, 13 August I 9 I 5, Au suj et des fu sils- mitrailleurs LEWIS a venir d ' Ang leterre. 21 La memoire conservee du general Milan Rastisla v Stefanik dans /es archives du Service historique de la Defense, ed. Frederi c Gue lton, Emm anuelle Bra ud and Michal Ksinan (Paris, SHD, 2008), 26. See [Emile] Prat, " Vzpominky z roku 1915" [Memories from 1915), in Stefaniki,v memorial [Stefa nik 's Memori a l] , ed. Amost Bares (Praha, Pamatnik odboj e, I 929), 153. 23 Rasti slav Rajchl, " M. R. Ste fanik jako organisator vojenske meteorology" [M . R. Stefanik as Organiser o f Military Meteorol ogy], Ri.fr hvezd, 11° 5 (May 1948), I 00--104. 22 �14 SLOVAKIA 2021 The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak Movement During the First World War, the self-determination of nations became one of the principles of international relations. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state grew out of the close cooperation between leaders of the two nations that had developed in the nineteenth century, as the idea of Slavic mutuality gained ground, and also thanks to the linguistic proximity between Czech and Slovak, two distinct, but closely-related languages. From the geopolitical point of view, Czech and Slovak leaders abroad wanted to replace AustriaHungary as a barrier to German expansion to the East (Orang nach Oesten) by a chain of independent states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) supported by the Entente. 24 But, the "Czechoslovak question" was completely unknown in the West. To fight this ignorance, the Czechoslovak National Council , the highest organ of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during the Great War, established in m id-1916 started a press propaganda campaign. Masaryk was its President, Josef Dtirich Vice-President, Edvard Benes General Secretary, and Stefanik representative of the Slovaks. After Dtirich's expulsion, he was replaced as Vice-President by Stefanik. Branches of the Czechoslovak National Council were established in several Entente countries, led by supporters of its political orientation.25 Political Seducer To gain support for the Czechoslovak movement among the Entente Powers, a lot of work behind the scenes was needed. Thanks to his astronomic and diplomatic missions before the war, Stefanik was in touch with the most important French politicians. Before going into Stefanik's powers of persuasion, we need first look at his image in French society. In the Third Republic scientists had a very positive image and a cult of science seemed to have become a new lay religion . We must never forget that Stefanik was an astronomer, mathema24 Tomas G. Masaryk, La Nouvelle Europe, ed. Alain Soubigou (Pari s, L ' Hannattan, 2002, 1st edition 191 8), 120, 11 5. 25 Edouard Benes, Souvenirs de guerre et de noire revolution (! 9/4-191 8) I vol. (Pari s, Ernest Lero ux, 1928), 128. Vojensky ustfedni archiv - Vojensky historicky archiv, Prague, f. CSNR - Pari s, CSNR Ill , box 22, correspondence of Benes with Masaryk, 20 June 191 6, Benes writin g to Masaryk. �SLOVAKIA 2021 15 tician, meteorologist, pilot, specialist in wireless telegraphy, and traveller etc. Such a person easily aroused interest in Parisian or Rome "salons" where the most important French or Italian politicians met. Stefanik often enjoyed the favour of women in these circles who were enchanted by him. Several people have written that Stefanik could win over diplomats and politicians with his sense of humour. Robert de Billy, a French diplomat in Rome, recounts the following: Stefanik was charged with observing the solar eclipse in Polynesia, where the visibility would be best. Without any hesitation, he travelled to a small remote island somewhere in the Polynesian archipelago. After disembarking with his telescope, he informed the native chief that the sun would soon disappear but that the government of the Republic (cognizant of its protective responsibilities) had sent Stefanik to ensure that sunlight would return. Everything happened as expected. The tribal chief, astoundded by the night in the middle of the day , and the return of the star on the exact day the magician had predicted, fell at the feet of this supernatural being, the master of magic.26 Many people, not least Stefanik himself, were aware of hi s propensity to exaggerate but everyone knew that his accounts were based on a wealth of true stories and experience. Stefanik suffered from ill health from an early age. He was of slender stature and General Maurice Jan in recalled that his frail bodily frame did not seem built for the enormous amount of energy it contained.27 One cause of Stefanik's poor health was the scale of his ambition, whether in his initial eagerness to make his mark as a scientist or, in later years, in his fight for the creation of Czechoslovakia . The constant nervous strain he was under, frequent travel across all five continents in pursuit of science and later on diplomatic and military missions, undoubtedly left their mark on his health. Recalling Stefanik's health problems, the writer Bertrand de Jouvenel described them as his sacrifice for the nation . "Stefanik never stopped travelling. We would encounter him as a major, we would encounter him as a General , ever 26 Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Pari s - La Coum euve (hereinafter AMA E), PA-AP 2 I, Robert de Billy, vol. 5, Le general Stefanik . 27 Dusan Kovac, S1efanik a Janin. Pribeh pria1e/'s1va [Stefanik and Janin. The Story o f a Friendship] (Brati slava, Dilema, 200 I), 63-65. �16 SLOVAKIA 2021 paler, ever more frantic , he would eat and speak less and less. One might say that the more he gives of his life to his country the less of it is left in him ." 28 In his attempts to persuade others, Stefanik never hesitated to play on their emotions, or cha ll enge the logic of his audience. His scientific work and travels equipped him with a huge arsena l of knowledge, experience and anecdotes. One of his great virtues was his ability to exploit all these to his benefit, or rather, for the benefit of the Czechoslovak liberation movement. The social recognition of these virtues afforded him high standing, which he was able to exploit. The Czechoslovak Army (Legions) in France and Italy The army formed an extremely important, if not the most important, part of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, and Stefanik was one of its chief organisers. From the very moment the war broke out, Czechs and Slovaks abroad began to organise into various combat units fighting alongside the Entente powers, to prove their loyalty to the Allies and to burnish their anti-Austrian credentials. The Czechoslovak National Council sought to unify and direct these various tendencies. A French presidential decree dated 16 December 1917 authorised the formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.29 However, the problem was that there were neither Czech or Slovak prisoners-ofwar, or a sizeable Czech nor Slovak community on French territory, since France was primarily involved in fighting German forces on the Western front. Bringing Czechoslovak volunteers to France became Stefanik ' s primary aim. The Czechoslovak National Counci l intended to recruit mainly in Italy, Russia and the United States. However, the volunteers were not expected to serve on ly in the army but rather, at their own discretion, could also be deployed in military factories. In an effort to find the vo lunteers for the Czechoslovak army in France Stefanik "Minister of Emergency Situations" went to Russia (1916- 1917), Romania (1916- 1917), the USA ( 1917), Italy (1918), 28 Bertrand de Jouvenel , Un voyageur dans le siec/e (Paris, Robert La fTont, 1979), 48-49. 29 AMA E, C PC 1896-191 8, Guerre 19 14- 191 8, Autriche-Hongri e, vo l. 157 , Pari s, 16 December 191 7, Report to the President of the French Republi c. �SLOVAKIA 2021 17 and Russia again ( 19 I 8- 1919). 30 With various successes in those countries, a Czechoslovak Legion with I 0,000 men was established in France and took part in battles on the Western front in the summer and autumn 1918. In Italy in 1918 there were a large number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. These had been assembled in separate camps in Padula, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, and Badia Sulmona. Stefanik wanted them to be deployed to France, but this was opposed by the Italian government. It was only prepared to authorise the formation of an auxiliary force to be deployed behind the lines, providing support for the Italian military. As this offer was not favourable to the Czechoslovak movement, Stefanik entered into talks with Italy's top officials. He negotiated with General Armando Diaz, the Minister of War, with King Victor Emmanuel III , with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, and with Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando.31 Following these negotiations, which Stefanik had to handle with utmost sensitivity due to the country's internal political problems, an agreement was reached on 19 April 191 8. 32 The Czechoslovak Legion was to operate under the Italian supreme command but the political influence over its members would be held by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The French Ambassador in Italy had a very positive view of the agreement: "It seems to me that these conditions represent the best we could have secured from the Italian government."33 Two days later, on 21 April , the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, Stefanik signed an agreement on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council , while Orlando did so on behalf of the government ofltaly. The negotiations Stefanik conducted in Italy can be regarded as his most significant achievement. The Czechoslovak Legion was the first foreign an11y which received permission to operate on 3 ° Karel Pichlik, Bohumfr Klipa and Jitka Zabloudilova, Ceskosluvensti legionah (/914 - 1920) [The Czechos lovak Legionnaires ( 1914- 1920)] (Praha, Mlada fronta, 1996), 150- 59. Mark Corn wa ll, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle fo r Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, GB, Macmillan , 2000), 159. See also: Leo Val iani , The End of Austria-Hungmy (New York , A lfred A. Knopf, 1973). 32 Pavel He lan, " La Legione cecoslovacca," in // Patto di Roma e la Legione cecoslovacca. Tra Grande Guerra e Nuova Europa. ed. Francesco Leoncini (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2014), 67- 72. 33 AMAE, C PC 1896-1918, Guerre 1914- 1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 158, Rome, 19 April 19 18, Barrere writting to th e Minister of Foreign Affairs, no . 841-842. 31 �18 SLOVAKIA 2021 Italian soil. The creation of Polish and Romanian units followed much later. 34 Further important events connected to Stefanik and the Czechoslovak Army in Italy were placing the military flag of the Czec hoslovak Army on the Altar of the Fatherland in Rome on 24 May 1918, on the anniversary of Italy entering the war; this episode was of extraordinary propaganda importance. The Czech Amelie Posse- Brazdova recalled Stefanik's speech on this occasion: " Like a masterful and ingenious conductor, he played all our trembling heartstrings, leaving not one untouched ."35 Finally around 20,000 Czechoslovak so ldiers fought on the Italian front. The Legions in Russia Stefanik went on his first mission to Russ ia in 1916 and was busy dealing with the internal problems of the Czechoslovak movement. After the February Revolution of 19 17, the new Russian Provisional Government authorized the project of the Czechoslovak Legion in the country, but later changed its position . Only in July 19 I 7, after a successful battle at Zborov (in the frame of the Keren sky Offensive) of the Czechoslovak Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs and Slovaks from Ru ssia and thus Russian citizens, the government permitted recruitment among prisoners-of-war. The Legions in Russia grew quickly. Fol lowing the Bolshevik coup in October of I 9 I 7, the new government was intent on making peace with Germany. This put the Czechoslovak Army into a difficult position, since, in the aftermath of such an agreement, its members would no longer be in a territory that shared a front wi th Gemrnny or Austria-Hungary, and would thus have no enemy to fight. In addition, a number of factions were vying for power in Ru ss ia. Masaryk demanded strict neutrality with regard to internal Russian affairs, but in practice this was difficult to achieve. The orders received by the Czechoslovak Army were constantly changing. The Briti sh would have preferred to keep it in Russ ia under their command, while the French wanted to redeploy the Leg ion to the 34 Angelo Tamborra, L 'idea di nazinnalita e la guerra / 914-1918 (Trento, lnstituto per la storia de l Ri so rgimento ita liano, 1963), 37-43 . 35 Eva Kranz. Amelie Posse- Brazdnva. Zivot spjaty s Ceskoslovenskem [Amelie Posse- Brazdova. A Life Linked w ith Czechoslova ki a] ( Praha, Akropo li s, 20 11 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 19 Western front. 36 Soon, open conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to disarm them after an incident in Chelyabinsk. Czechoslovak Army representatives, meeting at a congress in Chelyabinsk, decided to prepare for their passage to France via Vladivostok and to resist any attempts to be stopped. The troops quickly captured the Trans-Siberian Railway and were soon openly fighting the Bolsheviks. Later, this capture changed its purpose- the Legions wanted to facilitate the invasion of Russia planned by the Allies. However, after initial successes on the part of the Czechoslovaks, the Bolsheviks gradually began to prevail. 37 Matters turned even more complicated following the coup led by the monarchist Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Siberia in November of 19 I 8. Most of the 60,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were left-leaning and were not eager to see the counter-revolution prevail. However, Kolchak was allied with the Entente, and thus also with Czechoslovakia. Jan Juricek portrayed the situation in Siberia as follows: The soldiers complained about the excessive demands of officers who, ambitious though they were, lacked in experience. The Czechoslovak commanders, in turn , lamented the fact that Russia's White Guard had no appetite for fighting , was prone to flee or to surrender to the enemy, demoralizing our soldiers. The local commanders of the Siberian anti-Bolshevik forces , on the other hand, complained (to General Janin) that the Czechoslovaks' meddling in Russian politics was inappropriate.38 By the time Stefanik arrived in Siberia in November of I 9 I 8 - he had left France in August of 19 I 8 - the Great War had ended and the soldiers did not understand the need for further fighting, as Czechoslovakia had already been established. At first Stefanik tried to convince the Legionnaires that they had to fight to ensure favourable 36 Karel Pichlik, Bez legend [Without Legends] ( Praha, Panorama, 199 1), 377. See: Betty Miller Unterberger, The United States, Revo/utionCIIJ' Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Victor S. Mamatey, The Un ited States and East Central Europe /914- 191 8. A Studv in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda ( Princeton, ew Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957). 3~ Jan Jurfcek, Milan Rastisla v St~fanik (Bratislava, Q 111 , 2006, P' edi ti on 1968), 150. 37 �20 SLOVAKIA 2021 conditions for the peace treaties and the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He hoped the Legion could fight its way across Russia to the newlyformed state in the heart of Europe. However, Stefanik changed hi s mind after visiting large numbers of Czechoslovak troops on the front. He and General Maurice Janin (the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion in Russia appointed by the Government of France with the consent of the Czechoslovak National Council) concluded that a withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army was inevitable. They would have to leave Russian forces to fight the Bolsheviks, while the Czechoslovak army was to focus on defending the Trans-Siberian railway. 39 Masaryk gave Stefanik powers of attorney to carry out an internal reorganisation of the army, as well as in matters of international policy. Thanks to their complex origin and development, the Legions in Russia were run democratically. The Legionnaires addressed each other as "brother" and the Legion was led by the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia through elected representatives. While this form of self-government was relatively acceptable in a volunteer army, following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 191 8, the Legion became a regular army that had to be subordinate to the government. Stefanik abolished the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia. 40 By order number 588, issued only after his departure, Stefanik banned the holding of the second Congress of the Czechoslovak Army and the committee's activities. However, Congress delegates had already been elected. The soldiers were unwilling to give up their elected bodies. Enforcing command number 588 turned out to be very difficult. The conflict between the military command and the soldiers grew to such an extent that a total rift in the army was imminent. 41 Stefanik realised that he would be unable to resolve the situation of the Czec hoslovak army in Siberia and returned to Paris, where he started talks with Allied military officials, Marshal Ferdinand Foch in particular. He demanded either an allied intervention or a complete withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army. In April of 1919 Stefanik sent the following note to T.G. Masaryk: "An inter-allied military 39 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 17, Omsk, 19 Apri l 1919, Jan in writi ng to the minister of war, no. 992. 40 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 16, Vladivostok, 27 December 191 8, Regnault and Martel writing to the Foreign Ministry, no. 18 I. 41 Pichlik, Klipa and Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti legionah 246-47. �SLOVAKIA 2021 21 intervention will not take place; our men are perishing in Siberia. Our allies do not always keep their promises because these are made thoughtlessly. There is political and moral chaos."42 The Birth of Czechoslovakia, the Death of Stefanik At the beginning of 1918, the military situation of the Entente Powers was very difficult. Serbia and most of the territory of Romania had been overrun by the enemy in 1915 and in 1916. In 1917 Italy suffered a great defeat at Caporetto and the Italian front moved I 00 km south. The next year Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, which allowed the Germans to move large numbers of soldiers to the Western front. The Central Powers wanted to win a decisive victory with a large offensive in the spring of 191 8, before the arrival of thousands of soldiers from the United States to Europe. In these complex circumstances the Entente powers were more wi lling to support any project that would weaken their enemies. That is why the movements of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary gained more ground. Thanks to their military efforts in France, Italy but mainly in Russia, the international position of the Czechoslovak National Counci l became stronger. It was step-by-step recognized as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by the Entente Powers. When Czech and Slovak representtatives proclaimed the founding of Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 in Prague, and on October 30 in Turciansky Sv. Martin in Slovakia, its international position was assured thanks also to Stefaniks' activities. Stefanik died soon after the creation of Czechoslovakia. His last diplomatic task was to find a compromise between the Italian and French claims to command the Czechoslovak army in the new state, and he succeed where others cou ldn 't. 43 Stefanik decided fly in an Italian plane to his homeland but it crashed while landing at 4 May 1919. His death aroused a lot of suspicions and resulted in conspiracy theories bringing accusations against Benes, with whom Stefanik did 42 Archiv Ustavu T. G. Masaryka, Prague, f. TGM-R, box 424, Paris, 3 April I 919, M. R. Stefanik writing to T . G. Masaryk. 43 Laura Fortunato, " La Mi ssione militare italiana in Slovacchia: un tentativo di "diplomazia militare" fallito," in Per Rila Tolomeo, scrilli di amici sulfa Dalmazia e I 'Europa cen/ro-orienlale fl, ed . E. Capuzzo, B. C revato-Se lvaggi and F. Guida (Venez ia, La Musa Talia, 2014 ), 13 7- 205. �22 SLOVAKIA 2021 not get along, against freemasons, Czechs, Hungarians and so on . The sum total of the facts and evidence available to us today suggests that Stefanik's death was an accident. Of the many who have written on the subject, it was Pavo) Kanis and his documentary film Stefanik. A Hero 's Story, Homeland (20 I 0) that I find the most persuasive. The Memory of Stefanik One might say that the 20 1h century replacements of various statues in what is now L.:udovit Stur Square in Bratislava reflected the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Each change of reg ime in Czechoslovakia was also reflected in changes of statues. This kind of " marking" of territory is not unusual. Quite the contrary. Every reg ime is interested in erecting monuments to figures who represent ideas and va lues close to its heart and have in some way contributed to the development of a particular community or nation. As part of the celebrations of the Hungarian millennial arriva l in the Danube Valley in 1896, a competition was held in Bratislava (then known as Pozsony in Hunga rian and Pressburg in German) for the design of a monument commemorating the coronations of Habsburg rulers that had been held in the city. The competition was won by sculptor Jan Fadrusz with a sculptural group depicting Empress Maria Theresa's ascent to the throne in 1740. Maria Theresa was acceptable as a symbol both to the Hungarians, who revered , indeed idealised her for her pos itive attitude to Hungarian statehood, as well as, of course, to the Habsburgs, who had a forged a close bond with the city of Pressburg, where the coronations were held for centuries. The scu lpture of Maria Theresa was erected on 16 May 1897 on the Royal Hill Square, w hich was then renamed Coronation Hill Square. 44 The lnterwar Period and the Slovak State The newly-founded Czechoslovakia faced serious problems. It had to preserve its existence by forgin g the idea of a Czechoslovak nation while distancing itse lf from everything Habsburg and Hungarian . Soon after Bratislava was occupied by the Czechos lovak army in February of 1919, someone threw a sack over the head of Maria Theresa and the statue was later boarded up. Neith er the Hungarians nor 44 Pavel Dvorak, Zia ta kniha Bratislavv [Golden book of Brati slava] (Bratislava, Slovensky spi sova tel', 1993), 498- 506. �SLOVAKIA 2021 23 the Habsburgs were prepared to accept the fact that the monarchy had collapsed and did everything they could to bring the Slovaks back into Hungary's fold. King Charles I Habsburg wanted to return to Hungary in October of 1921, intending to ascend to throne. In response to this plan a partial mobilization was declared in Czechoslovakia, which also led to the removal of the statue. Local members of the Sokol, the Czech gymnastics organization, and former Legionnaires, destroyed the statue "as a symbol the oppressive regime. " Once the statue of Maria Theresa had been removed, the next problem arose: who should replace her? It was decided to replace her with a statue of General Stefanik. In 1927 the Committee for the Erection of a Monument of Milan Rastislav Stefanik announced a competition, but the winner wasn't selected so, it was repeated the following year. The winning design was by the Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka's statue of Milan Stefanik surrounded by four lions g uarding the coats-of-arms of the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia - Bohemia; Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Kafka later modified his design , leaving a single lion presiding over the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms. The lion was originally to face the Danube River but, after Austria's Anschluss in March of 1938, it was turned to face towards the Slovak National Museum, allegedly to avoid irking Hitler. But the unveiling ceremony, planned for the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia never happened, because of the Munich Agreement. During demonstrations marking the proclamation of Slovakia's autonomy in October of 1938, protesters pelted the lion with stones. 45 From a brotherly point of view, this change could be characteristic of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. Stefanik was one of the most important founders of Czechoslovakia. His funeral in 1919 was reminiscent of a royal one. After his death a number of statues and memorials were erected across the country. The most monumental one is the memorial on Bradlo Hill in western Slovakia, by the renowned Slovak sculptor Dusan Jurkovic, erected between 1924 and 1928. This monument has become on May 4 th , the anniversary of his death, the site of something resembling an annual national pilgrimage (except for the Communist 45 Zdenek Hojda and Jifi Pokorn y, Pomniky a zapomniky [Memorial s and Anti-Memorials] (Praha, Paseka, 1996), 175- 182. �24 SLOVAKIA 2021 period with a short political detente in 1968- 1969).46 Czechoslovakia, a country in the heart of Europe, fell victim to the political turmoil of the twentieth century, as well as its own lack of internal stability. It failed to secure the loyalty of its minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians and , ultimately, one of its constituent nations- the Slovaks. The state that was founded on 28 October 1918 ceased to exist twenty-one years later on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia, under pressure from Hitler's Germany, declared its independence. Adolf Hitler is said to have declared "Die katze muss weg", although it cannot be confirmed, when he saw the sculpture from a boat on the Danube. Other sources claim that it was another highranking Naz i who said that the cat (i.e. the Czech lion) had to go, but the pilot could stay. One part of the Slovak public was never too keen on the monument. Anyz, the company that had made the original cast of both statues, replaced the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms with the Slovak one, but that was not enough to save the "cat." In May of 1940, Slovak soldiers removed the lion from its base. From the Coup de Prague in 1948 until Today The end of the war brought about a restoration of Czechoslovakia and also the communist takeover of 1948. The Czechoslovak liberation movement of the First World War did not suit communist ideologues and their version of history. They set out to fight the "bourgeois" liberation legend of Masaryk , Stefanik and Benes. 47 Stefanik' s statues throughout Slovakia began to disappear, mostly at night. This new trend was bound to affect Bratislava as well, with respect to what was then Roosevelt (now Stur) Square and the statue that graced it. The statue of Stefanik was melted down in the early I 950s. 48 The name of the square proved to be equally unsuitable and changed from Roosevelt Square to Stur Square. However, 46 Peter Macho, "M. R. Stefanik - bohatier a muceni k?," [M. R. Stefanik - Hero and Martyr?] in Mvty na.fr slovenske [Our Slovak Myths] , ed. Eduard Krekovi c, Elena Mannova and Eva Krekovi cova (Bratislava, AEP, 2005), 172. 47 See L.:udo vi t Holotik, Stefciniko vska legenda a vznik CSR [The Stefanik Legend and the Fou ndin g of the Czec hoslovak Republic] (Bratislava, SAV, 1958). 48 Milan Varos, Stratene slovenske poklady 2 [Lost Slovak Treasures 2] (Ma rtin , Matica slovenska, 2007), 457- 6 1. �SLOVAKIA 2021 25 as it too k seve ral yea rs to ma ke, the statue of L.:udov ft Stur49 and hi s assoc iates was not placed in the square until th e ea rl y 1970s. De mand s for Stefa nik' s re habilitati o n began to be vo iced eve n before th e end of th e co mmuni st reg ime. 50 On th e occas io n o n the 70th anni ve rsa ry of th e fo undin g of Czec hoslova ki a, Ka fk a's lion was a lso pl aced o n th e plinth , a lbe it not on Stur Squ a re, wh ere it used to be befo re, but in fro nt of th e Sl ovak Nati o na l Muse um. It stood o n a py lo n 14.8 5 metres hi g h, 2 metres wid e and 4 me tres in length , bea rin g th e insc ripti o n " On 28 Octobe r 191 8 th e shared moth erl a nd of Czec hs and S lo vak s, th e Czec hos lova k Re publi c was fo und ed ." The fa ll of the communi st regime in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, fo ll owed by the "ve lvet di vorce" in 1993, res ulted in the creati on of separate Czec h and S lova k Republics. Stefa nik now retoo k hi s place in the Slovak Pantheon of heroes and hi s memory is omnipresent in today's Slovaki a. If you travel to Bratislava by air, you will land at M. R. Stefanik Airport, while the scientific schedul e of Ivan Bella, Slovakia's first man in space, was known as the Stefanik Miss ion etc. The stori es of the Stur Square did not end , however. C urrently vo ices a re heard de ma ndin g that the sculpture o f L:udov ft Stur and hi s assoc iates be moved to ano th er loca ti o n, s uch as N a mes ti e slobody ( Freedo m Squ a re), and a re pli ca of th e statu e of Mari a Th eresa be mounted aga in o n the embankme nt. Th ese proposa ls have stirred up a li ve ly publi c debate - and po le mi cs . Mea nw hil e th e li o n, toge th er w ith a new ly-cas t Stefa nik , have bee n moved to an area in fro nt of th e new Slova k N ati o na l Th ea tre, betw ee n two buildings ofa shopping ce ntre. A noth er fo unde r o f th e first Czechos lova k Republi c - Masa ryk - now towers ove r th e squ are in front o f th e Nati o na l Mu se um . As observe d by th e hi sto ri an Pave l Dvora k : "The Stur statue is the fourth costl y monument erec ted on the fo rmer Co ronation Hill, a place that has had many names, ending as 49 th ( 18 15- 1856) one of the leaders of the S lova k movement in the I 9 centu ry and the ma in cod i11er of standard Slova k. 50 See Martin Mocko, " Yi liam Plevza a ,, rehab il itacia" M . R. Stefanika ( I)" [V iliam Plevza and '' Rehabi litation" of Stefa ni k ( I)], Nave slovo, 17 Septembe r 20 I 9, https://www.noves lovo.sk/c/V iliam Plevza a rehabilitac ia M R Stefanika I and its 2nd and 3'd cont inuati ons. �26 SLOVAKIA 2021 L:udovit Stur Square today. This small square is not where history was made, but it is where it has revealed its most grotesque face. " 51 51 Dvorak, Zlata kniha Bratislavy, 503 . � SLOVAKIA 2021 7 MILAN RASTISLAV STEFANIK (1880-1919) THE MAN WHO SPOKE TO THE STARS' Michal Ksinan 2 Outside of the Czech and Slovak Republics, people are fairly familiar with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the men responsible for the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and who also served as its first presidents. However, another of the country's founders, Milan Rastislav Stefanik, is much less known , partly because his tragic death in 1919 prevented him from holding a key office for any length of time. Although he is relatively unknown to the wider international public, his contemporaries compared him to Pierre Choderlos de Laclos for the use of military tactics in love affairs, 3 to Lawrence of Arabia for vision, to Napoleon Bonaparte for ambition, to Jules Michelet" for patriotism, and to one of the apostles for conviction.5 Who was this man who charn1ed his surroundings all his life and still continues to charm people today? In order to answer this question , I will present this person to the Englishspeaking reader who is often unfamiliar with Stefanik by emphasising several key points in his life. 6 The Young Man Stefan ik was born on 2 1 July 1880 in the hamlet of Kosariska in today 's western Slovakia (Upper-Hungary at the time) to th e family 1 This article was supported by gran ts VEGA n° 2/0087/20 and APVV n° 17-0399. T he auth or works in the Institute of Hi story of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 3 French genera l and novelist ( 174 1- 1803) best known for Les Liasons dangere11ses. ~ A famous French hi storian ( 1798- 1874 ). 5 Antoine Mares, Edvard Bene!i : Un drame entre Hitler et Staline (Paris, Perrin, 2015), 70. 6 This artic le is modified version of the texts published in the book: Michal Ksirian , Milan Rastisla v Stefanik, tran s. Julia Sherwood (Bratislava: Lindeni jointly with the Slovak National Archive, 20 19) . For more details, see the first scie ntifi c biography of Stefanik published in French : Michal Ksiri an, L 'homme qui parfait avec /es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik , heros ji·anco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EU R 'Orbem, 2019). Its Slovak translation will be published under the titl e Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Mui , ktm)i sa rozpraval s hviezdami by Slovart publi shing hou se and an Engli sh transla tion under the title Milan Ras/is/av S1efanik : The Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia by Routledge publishing house. 2 �8 SLOVAKIA 2021 of a Lutheran pastor with strong national convictions. Rai sed in a deeply religious family, Milan Stefanik used to hold similar beliefs. However, during his student days in Prague he was confronted with many liberal views. Discussions in Jeronym, a Protestant c lub, gave him a new perspective on faith. Its members debated progressive theo logical issues and read foreign journals. Stefanik was particularly influenced by the professor of philosophy Masaryk, and in light of his lectures started to question his Christian faith and indeed the existence of God. Not only did Milan Stefanik reject the divine essence of Jesus C hrist, he went so far as to doubt the very existence of God . He rejected reli gion and believed only in science, something that was regarded as genuinely heretical in his environment; that is why hi s father threw the young rebel out of his house in the summer of 1900. Although this breach was not permanent, it demonstrated that young Milan Stefanik had embarked upon a new journey.7 In thi s respect Stefanik can serve as a typical example of the phenomenon of secularisation in the nineteenth century that one can describe as "a loss of orientation , of certain ty, of a single world-view, of a core of reality. " 8 Another key deci sion of the young Stefanik was to switch from studying civi l engineering at Prague's Imperial and Royal Czech Technical High School (1898- 1900) to a degree in astronomy in the Faculty of Arts at the Czec h Charles-Ferdinand University (today's Charles Univers ity) in 1900- 1904. Astronomical studies fit more his romantic nature, even though thi s led to further conflicts between him and his father. The Astronomer After finishing hi s studies in Prague in 1904, Stefanik decided to go to Paris. He took every possible step to embark on a career in science. He started by taking an unpaid job in the observatory in Meudon under professor Jules Janssen, but that came to an end in 1906 when the leading position at the observatory passed to Henri Deslandres, since neither of the men got along. 9 After that Stefanik was appo inted to the paid position 7 Jaromir Va vra. Vzpo minky na Milana Ste(anika [Remini scences on Milan Stefa nik] (Ceske Velenice, Pave l Nobis, 1930), 15- 16. 8 Jifi Hanus, Historie modern! doby [History of the Modem Age] (B rn o, Barrister & Principal, 2004), 80. 9 Fra ni;:oise La unay, Un globe-trotter de la physique celeste. L ·astronome Jules Janssen (Paris, l' Observa toire de Paris, Vuibert, 2008), 256. �SLOVAKIA 2021 9 of deputy director of the Mont Blanc Observatories Society, thi s time with the help of the daughter and widow of the then deceased Jules Janssen. After a year in this post, Stefanik found himself jobless again. Then he decided to establish his own observatory. He had to decide between North Africa and a certain island in French Polynesia. Stefanik settled on the much closer North Africa. He travelled around, mostly in Algeria and Tunisia, but failed to find a suitable location for an observatory. On behalf of the French Bureau des longitudes, Stefanik then tra vell ed to Tahiti to observe the passage of Halley's Comet and to conduct further astronomical observations on an island in French Polynes ia. 10 The plan to observe Halley's Comet fell through because cloud cover made observation impossible. However, Stefanik did manage to carry out the final part of his plan. He decided to extend his stay on Tahiti and explore the conditions for meteorological and astronomical observations, " Provided Tahiti is shown to offer good conditions for astronomical observations, I would be interested in building a permanent observatory (a scientific embassy) there." 11 For Stefanik building a permanent observatory with a functioning meteorological service on thi s island was hi s most important pre-war scientific project. Traveller, Artist and Collector One of the most common astronomical phenomena that Stefanik focused on was the solar ecli pse that forced him to travel all around the world. He observed thi s phenomenon in Spain ( 1905) where all astronomers who observed it were received by Spanish King Alfonso XIII , in Turkistan ( 1907), but his observations failed because of bad weather, and on hi s way back he met with Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, on Vava'u Island ( 1911) where he had the best results among all sc ientific missions , and in Brazil ( 1912) where again his observations failed beca use of bad weather. Meanwhile, he took beautiful pictures during those journeys. Stefanik was not only interested in astronomica l observations, but also in the life and habits of the locals. During hi s stay in Tahiti , Stefanik bought a horse-drawn cart that he used primarily to check up 10 Rasti slav Rajc hl , Stefanikova paNiska feta [Stefanik 's Pari sian Yea rs] (Praha, Ev ropsk y literarni klub, 1937), 132. 11 Zapisniky M. R. Stefa nika [The Diari es o f M. R. Stefanik) ed . Jose f Bartiisek and Jaroslav Bohac (Praha, Pamatnik osvoboze ni, 1935), 172. �SLOVAKIA 2021 on the meteoro logical stations he had created and also to explore interesting parts of the island. He befriended French officers serving on a gunboat named Zelee and sailed with them to the lesser-known islands of French Pol ynesia. Here Stefanik di scovered and identified some Gaugin woodcuts in Puna'auia, owned by a Tahitian woman who may have been the painter's lover. Inspired by thi s discovery, he continued hi s search and found in her hut a carved wooden tobacco box with relief figures and, e lsewhere, a wooden relief ofa woman . 12 Exotic objects brought back from all five of the planet's inhabited continents formed the most interesting parts of Stefanik's collection. His friendly relations with the natives and hi s ability to develop a quick rapport with new people helped him to acquire these objects . Ivan Kmo remembered Stefanik's apartment thus : It was a strange kind of apartment. In fact, rather than an apartment, it was a small museum. It started in the hallway, which was full of drums, arrows and other weapons used by various indigenous peoples. And the tiny rooms were crammed with exotic objects. I was particularly impressed by the Oriental rugs and Gaugin's woodcuts from Tahiti. Hi s study boasted books, joumals, astronomical equipment and- a beautiful view of the rooftops of Paris. 13 Stefanik also enjoyed entertaining visitors to hi s apartment on the sixth floor at 6 Rue Leclerc with magic trick s. He mastered eighteen illusionist tricks, including cards emerging from a glass, flying and shrinking cards, and a magic wandering ring. 14 He had learned these tricks for a small fee at magicians' gatherings in Paris and bought his equipment from the Academy of Magic. 12 Franti sek Kele and Mi ros lav Musil , Navraty do Po~vnezie. Po S1efanikov1ich slopach [Returns to Polynes ia. Following in the Footsteps of Stefanik ) (OF PRI NT, 1996), 55. 13 Ivan Kmo , " Spomi enky na uj a Milana" [Memori es on Unc le Milan) in S1efanik . Kniha prva : 5pomienl,.y a pos/rehy [S tefanik . Boo k One: Memories and Observations] , ed . Stefan Osusky and Bohdan Pav lu (Praha, Svaz slovenskeho studen tstva v Bratislave, 1938), 38. 14 V ladimir Z uberec, " Za l\1by a zauj my Milana Rasti slava Stefanik a" [The Hobbies and Interests of Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ) in Zbornik Slovenskeho narodneho miizea - His16ria 32 (Martin, Osveta, 1992), I 13- 14. �SLOVAKIA 2021 11 A Worldwide Wireless Telegraph etwork To find suitable support fro m the French government for hi s observatory at Tahiti , Stefanik dev ised hi s own strategy. Through the Bureau des longitudes he planned to donate the observatory and all of its equipment and instruments to the state or the colony, which would cover its operating costs. 15 Willi am Mauri ce Fawtier, the French governor of the colonies in Oceania, asked Stefanik to identify a suitab le location for a wireless station on Tahiti , 16 and subseq uently to have it built and to run it. Stefa nik wanted to join the observatory and wireless station. Thank s to state subsid ies and profits generated by the stati on he would have had suffi cient materi al support. In those days France, the on ly country w ith po liti cal interests in Oceania, was not yet conn ected by wireless telegraph with these colonies, with the exception of New Caledonia. Contact with Tahiti was key, since the island's importance was ex pected to grow following the opening of the Panama Canal. In Jul y of 1912 a draft bill of the Law on an Intercontinenta l Wireless Telegraph Network, to connect the French co loni es scattered around the world with the mother country, was tabled in the French Parliament. Three branches were to radiate fro m Fra nce to the colonies : one w ith Coc hinchina (today the southern part of Vietnam), another w ith the island of Martinique and a third one in the Pac ifi c, with the station s in New Caledonia, th e Marquesas lslands and Tahiti. 17 One of the tasks Stefanik was supposed to fulfil during hi s mi ss ion in Ec uad or ( 1913) was to obtain permi ss ion to establi sh a wireless telegraph station on one of the Galapagos Islands, to facilitate comm unication with Papeete. In spite of the competition of German, Briti sh and America ns companies who had a strong position in these countri es, Stefanik succeeded. 18 Sometime earli er he had presented the French Senator and hi s protector Emil e C hautemps with the project of an 15 Slovensky narodn y archiv, Brati slava (S lovak National Arc hi ves, hereinafter SNA), OF : M. R. Stefanik, box 33, inv. no. I 06 1, Paris, 22 January 19 13, Letter of M. R. Stefan ik to an unknown person (perhaps E. Boutroux). 16 SNA , OF: M. R. Stefa nik, box 33 , inv. no. I 059, Papeete, 16 Octobe r 1913, letter of the governor of the French coloni es in French Pol ynesia W. Fawtier to M. R. Stefan ik . 17 Rasti slav Rajchl , M. R. Stefanik (Praha, Orb is, 194 7), 14- 16 . i x See more: Ekvadorsky zapisnik [Ecuadorian Diary], ed. Vl adimir Polivka (Bratislava, VSSS, 2005, I' ' editi on 1928) . �12 SLOVAKIA 2021 intercontinental telegraph network. Each station was to have an observatory and to provide a meteorological service . In Europe it was to be based on Mont Saleve near Geneva, in Asia its location was to be Hong Kong, in Africa in Morocco, and in Australia and Oceania in Tahiti. Stefanik also wanted to acquire the island of Floriana (Galapagos Islands) to reinforce the French influence in the region , but these projects were doomed because the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared the USA's reaction . He did, however, succeed in strengthening France's influence in Ecuador. At the outbreak of the Great War, Stefanik returned to France. He was in Morocco when the news reached him that he had been made a knight of the Legion d'honneur, with this citation: "Having been entrusted with missions to Tahiti and the Republic of Ecuador in 1913 he exhibited outstanding skill and provided extraordinary service to the merchant navy and to French interests. He founded and estab1ished, at his own expense, an observatory on Tahiti and organised a comprehensive meteorological service on the islands of French Oceania." 19 Stefanik had an extraordinary talent for planning globa l projects. He thought in bold and broad strokes and was not content with partial or local solutions. This was undoubtedly one reason why he so often captivated his friends . On the other hand, he d id not always manage to bring his plans to fruition . Sometimes he seemed to bite off more than he could chew. Pilot, Soldier and Inventor Stefanik became a French citizen in 1912 and was drafted in August of 1914 when the First World War broke out. Because of health problems, Stefanik reported for duty in January of 1915 as a pilot and flew over the Western front. In this ro le he focused on so lving problems relating to military aviation . In those days a big problem was communications between pilots and their bases, which he wanted to solve by installing a radio transmitter in his Maurice Farman airplane. As this proved too heavy, he constructed a "parlophone" (from French parler "to speak") to enab le the pilot to communicate w ith his base. He also mulled over the idea of a vertical launch and landing and exp lored 19 Archi ves nati ona les, Paris, LH/2548/35 - M. R. Ste fanik . �SLOVAKIA 2021 13 the best possible use of binoculars.20 Although most of Stefanik's ideas and inventions were not accepted, his military superiors appreciated " his valuable scientific knowledge." 2 1 Stefanik was also interested in the use of meteorology for military aviation. After constructing a meteorological station in the commune of Brias, he tested various meteorological instruments for their possible use in aircraft at various heights. Weather forecasts could be exploited, not only in aviation, but also in the planning of military actions by the infantry. For this reason, General Ferdinand Foch entrusted him with estab li shing a meteorological service for the section of the front under his command. Stefanik refused to take command of this service and left for a mission in Serbia in order to fight the invading AustroH ungarian army.22 Later, Stefanik founded and organised a meteorological service for the Romanian army. He also planned to set up an inter-allied meteorological service for the armies of the Entente. 23 Stefanik's military career was truly exceptional. Mobilised as a rank-and-file soldier in August of 1914, he did not start serving until January of 1915 and three years later (June of 1918) had reached the rank of Brigadier-General. It should be noted, however, that Stefanik's meteoric rise through the ranks was mainly the result of his diplomatic activities, which French officials used to boost his prestige in the eyes of his compatriots, as well Allied soldiers, diplomats and politicians. He also received numerous military and civilian honours , such as the French army's Croix de guerre (w ith bronze palm), the Italian Military Cross, the Serbian Gold medal for bravery, as well as being made a Knight, Officer and Commander of the Legion d'honneur. 20 Zuberec, "Zal'uby a za ujm y Milana Rastis lava Stefanika", 109- 135. SNA , OF: M. R. Ste fanik, box 33 , in v. no. I 037, Pari s, 13 August I 9 I 5, Au suj et des fu sils- mitrailleurs LEWIS a venir d ' Ang leterre. 21 La memoire conservee du general Milan Rastisla v Stefanik dans /es archives du Service historique de la Defense, ed. Frederi c Gue lton, Emm anuelle Bra ud and Michal Ksinan (Paris, SHD, 2008), 26. See [Emile] Prat, " Vzpominky z roku 1915" [Memories from 1915), in Stefaniki,v memorial [Stefa nik 's Memori a l] , ed. Amost Bares (Praha, Pamatnik odboj e, I 929), 153. 23 Rasti slav Rajchl, " M. R. Ste fanik jako organisator vojenske meteorology" [M . R. Stefanik as Organiser o f Military Meteorol ogy], Ri.fr hvezd, 11° 5 (May 1948), I 00--104. 22 �14 SLOVAKIA 2021 The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak Movement During the First World War, the self-determination of nations became one of the principles of international relations. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state grew out of the close cooperation between leaders of the two nations that had developed in the nineteenth century, as the idea of Slavic mutuality gained ground, and also thanks to the linguistic proximity between Czech and Slovak, two distinct, but closely-related languages. From the geopolitical point of view, Czech and Slovak leaders abroad wanted to replace AustriaHungary as a barrier to German expansion to the East (Orang nach Oesten) by a chain of independent states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) supported by the Entente. 24 But, the "Czechoslovak question" was completely unknown in the West. To fight this ignorance, the Czechoslovak National Council , the highest organ of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during the Great War, established in m id-1916 started a press propaganda campaign. Masaryk was its President, Josef Dtirich Vice-President, Edvard Benes General Secretary, and Stefanik representative of the Slovaks. After Dtirich's expulsion, he was replaced as Vice-President by Stefanik. Branches of the Czechoslovak National Council were established in several Entente countries, led by supporters of its political orientation.25 Political Seducer To gain support for the Czechoslovak movement among the Entente Powers, a lot of work behind the scenes was needed. Thanks to his astronomic and diplomatic missions before the war, Stefanik was in touch with the most important French politicians. Before going into Stefanik's powers of persuasion, we need first look at his image in French society. In the Third Republic scientists had a very positive image and a cult of science seemed to have become a new lay religion . We must never forget that Stefanik was an astronomer, mathema24 Tomas G. Masaryk, La Nouvelle Europe, ed. Alain Soubigou (Pari s, L ' Hannattan, 2002, 1st edition 191 8), 120, 11 5. 25 Edouard Benes, Souvenirs de guerre et de noire revolution (! 9/4-191 8) I vol. (Pari s, Ernest Lero ux, 1928), 128. Vojensky ustfedni archiv - Vojensky historicky archiv, Prague, f. CSNR - Pari s, CSNR Ill , box 22, correspondence of Benes with Masaryk, 20 June 191 6, Benes writin g to Masaryk. �SLOVAKIA 2021 15 tician, meteorologist, pilot, specialist in wireless telegraphy, and traveller etc. Such a person easily aroused interest in Parisian or Rome "salons" where the most important French or Italian politicians met. Stefanik often enjoyed the favour of women in these circles who were enchanted by him. Several people have written that Stefanik could win over diplomats and politicians with his sense of humour. Robert de Billy, a French diplomat in Rome, recounts the following: Stefanik was charged with observing the solar eclipse in Polynesia, where the visibility would be best. Without any hesitation, he travelled to a small remote island somewhere in the Polynesian archipelago. After disembarking with his telescope, he informed the native chief that the sun would soon disappear but that the government of the Republic (cognizant of its protective responsibilities) had sent Stefanik to ensure that sunlight would return. Everything happened as expected. The tribal chief, astoundded by the night in the middle of the day , and the return of the star on the exact day the magician had predicted, fell at the feet of this supernatural being, the master of magic.26 Many people, not least Stefanik himself, were aware of hi s propensity to exaggerate but everyone knew that his accounts were based on a wealth of true stories and experience. Stefanik suffered from ill health from an early age. He was of slender stature and General Maurice Jan in recalled that his frail bodily frame did not seem built for the enormous amount of energy it contained.27 One cause of Stefanik's poor health was the scale of his ambition, whether in his initial eagerness to make his mark as a scientist or, in later years, in his fight for the creation of Czechoslovakia . The constant nervous strain he was under, frequent travel across all five continents in pursuit of science and later on diplomatic and military missions, undoubtedly left their mark on his health. Recalling Stefanik's health problems, the writer Bertrand de Jouvenel described them as his sacrifice for the nation . "Stefanik never stopped travelling. We would encounter him as a major, we would encounter him as a General , ever 26 Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Pari s - La Coum euve (hereinafter AMA E), PA-AP 2 I, Robert de Billy, vol. 5, Le general Stefanik . 27 Dusan Kovac, S1efanik a Janin. Pribeh pria1e/'s1va [Stefanik and Janin. The Story o f a Friendship] (Brati slava, Dilema, 200 I), 63-65. �16 SLOVAKIA 2021 paler, ever more frantic , he would eat and speak less and less. One might say that the more he gives of his life to his country the less of it is left in him ." 28 In his attempts to persuade others, Stefanik never hesitated to play on their emotions, or cha ll enge the logic of his audience. His scientific work and travels equipped him with a huge arsena l of knowledge, experience and anecdotes. One of his great virtues was his ability to exploit all these to his benefit, or rather, for the benefit of the Czechoslovak liberation movement. The social recognition of these virtues afforded him high standing, which he was able to exploit. The Czechoslovak Army (Legions) in France and Italy The army formed an extremely important, if not the most important, part of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, and Stefanik was one of its chief organisers. From the very moment the war broke out, Czechs and Slovaks abroad began to organise into various combat units fighting alongside the Entente powers, to prove their loyalty to the Allies and to burnish their anti-Austrian credentials. The Czechoslovak National Council sought to unify and direct these various tendencies. A French presidential decree dated 16 December 1917 authorised the formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.29 However, the problem was that there were neither Czech or Slovak prisoners-ofwar, or a sizeable Czech nor Slovak community on French territory, since France was primarily involved in fighting German forces on the Western front. Bringing Czechoslovak volunteers to France became Stefanik ' s primary aim. The Czechoslovak National Counci l intended to recruit mainly in Italy, Russia and the United States. However, the volunteers were not expected to serve on ly in the army but rather, at their own discretion, could also be deployed in military factories. In an effort to find the vo lunteers for the Czechoslovak army in France Stefanik "Minister of Emergency Situations" went to Russia (1916- 1917), Romania (1916- 1917), the USA ( 1917), Italy (1918), 28 Bertrand de Jouvenel , Un voyageur dans le siec/e (Paris, Robert La fTont, 1979), 48-49. 29 AMA E, C PC 1896-191 8, Guerre 19 14- 191 8, Autriche-Hongri e, vo l. 157 , Pari s, 16 December 191 7, Report to the President of the French Republi c. �SLOVAKIA 2021 17 and Russia again ( 19 I 8- 1919). 30 With various successes in those countries, a Czechoslovak Legion with I 0,000 men was established in France and took part in battles on the Western front in the summer and autumn 1918. In Italy in 1918 there were a large number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. These had been assembled in separate camps in Padula, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, and Badia Sulmona. Stefanik wanted them to be deployed to France, but this was opposed by the Italian government. It was only prepared to authorise the formation of an auxiliary force to be deployed behind the lines, providing support for the Italian military. As this offer was not favourable to the Czechoslovak movement, Stefanik entered into talks with Italy's top officials. He negotiated with General Armando Diaz, the Minister of War, with King Victor Emmanuel III , with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, and with Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando.31 Following these negotiations, which Stefanik had to handle with utmost sensitivity due to the country's internal political problems, an agreement was reached on 19 April 191 8. 32 The Czechoslovak Legion was to operate under the Italian supreme command but the political influence over its members would be held by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The French Ambassador in Italy had a very positive view of the agreement: "It seems to me that these conditions represent the best we could have secured from the Italian government."33 Two days later, on 21 April , the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, Stefanik signed an agreement on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council , while Orlando did so on behalf of the government ofltaly. The negotiations Stefanik conducted in Italy can be regarded as his most significant achievement. The Czechoslovak Legion was the first foreign an11y which received permission to operate on 3 ° Karel Pichlik, Bohumfr Klipa and Jitka Zabloudilova, Ceskosluvensti legionah (/914 - 1920) [The Czechos lovak Legionnaires ( 1914- 1920)] (Praha, Mlada fronta, 1996), 150- 59. Mark Corn wa ll, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle fo r Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, GB, Macmillan , 2000), 159. See also: Leo Val iani , The End of Austria-Hungmy (New York , A lfred A. Knopf, 1973). 32 Pavel He lan, " La Legione cecoslovacca," in // Patto di Roma e la Legione cecoslovacca. Tra Grande Guerra e Nuova Europa. ed. Francesco Leoncini (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2014), 67- 72. 33 AMAE, C PC 1896-1918, Guerre 1914- 1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 158, Rome, 19 April 19 18, Barrere writting to th e Minister of Foreign Affairs, no . 841-842. 31 �18 SLOVAKIA 2021 Italian soil. The creation of Polish and Romanian units followed much later. 34 Further important events connected to Stefanik and the Czechoslovak Army in Italy were placing the military flag of the Czec hoslovak Army on the Altar of the Fatherland in Rome on 24 May 1918, on the anniversary of Italy entering the war; this episode was of extraordinary propaganda importance. The Czech Amelie Posse- Brazdova recalled Stefanik's speech on this occasion: " Like a masterful and ingenious conductor, he played all our trembling heartstrings, leaving not one untouched ."35 Finally around 20,000 Czechoslovak so ldiers fought on the Italian front. The Legions in Russia Stefanik went on his first mission to Russ ia in 1916 and was busy dealing with the internal problems of the Czechoslovak movement. After the February Revolution of 19 17, the new Russian Provisional Government authorized the project of the Czechoslovak Legion in the country, but later changed its position . Only in July 19 I 7, after a successful battle at Zborov (in the frame of the Keren sky Offensive) of the Czechoslovak Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs and Slovaks from Ru ssia and thus Russian citizens, the government permitted recruitment among prisoners-of-war. The Legions in Russia grew quickly. Fol lowing the Bolshevik coup in October of I 9 I 7, the new government was intent on making peace with Germany. This put the Czechoslovak Army into a difficult position, since, in the aftermath of such an agreement, its members would no longer be in a territory that shared a front wi th Gemrnny or Austria-Hungary, and would thus have no enemy to fight. In addition, a number of factions were vying for power in Ru ss ia. Masaryk demanded strict neutrality with regard to internal Russian affairs, but in practice this was difficult to achieve. The orders received by the Czechoslovak Army were constantly changing. The Briti sh would have preferred to keep it in Russ ia under their command, while the French wanted to redeploy the Leg ion to the 34 Angelo Tamborra, L 'idea di nazinnalita e la guerra / 914-1918 (Trento, lnstituto per la storia de l Ri so rgimento ita liano, 1963), 37-43 . 35 Eva Kranz. Amelie Posse- Brazdnva. Zivot spjaty s Ceskoslovenskem [Amelie Posse- Brazdova. A Life Linked w ith Czechoslova ki a] ( Praha, Akropo li s, 20 11 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 19 Western front. 36 Soon, open conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to disarm them after an incident in Chelyabinsk. Czechoslovak Army representatives, meeting at a congress in Chelyabinsk, decided to prepare for their passage to France via Vladivostok and to resist any attempts to be stopped. The troops quickly captured the Trans-Siberian Railway and were soon openly fighting the Bolsheviks. Later, this capture changed its purpose- the Legions wanted to facilitate the invasion of Russia planned by the Allies. However, after initial successes on the part of the Czechoslovaks, the Bolsheviks gradually began to prevail. 37 Matters turned even more complicated following the coup led by the monarchist Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Siberia in November of 19 I 8. Most of the 60,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were left-leaning and were not eager to see the counter-revolution prevail. However, Kolchak was allied with the Entente, and thus also with Czechoslovakia. Jan Juricek portrayed the situation in Siberia as follows: The soldiers complained about the excessive demands of officers who, ambitious though they were, lacked in experience. The Czechoslovak commanders, in turn , lamented the fact that Russia's White Guard had no appetite for fighting , was prone to flee or to surrender to the enemy, demoralizing our soldiers. The local commanders of the Siberian anti-Bolshevik forces , on the other hand, complained (to General Janin) that the Czechoslovaks' meddling in Russian politics was inappropriate.38 By the time Stefanik arrived in Siberia in November of I 9 I 8 - he had left France in August of 19 I 8 - the Great War had ended and the soldiers did not understand the need for further fighting, as Czechoslovakia had already been established. At first Stefanik tried to convince the Legionnaires that they had to fight to ensure favourable 36 Karel Pichlik, Bez legend [Without Legends] ( Praha, Panorama, 199 1), 377. See: Betty Miller Unterberger, The United States, Revo/utionCIIJ' Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Victor S. Mamatey, The Un ited States and East Central Europe /914- 191 8. A Studv in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda ( Princeton, ew Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957). 3~ Jan Jurfcek, Milan Rastisla v St~fanik (Bratislava, Q 111 , 2006, P' edi ti on 1968), 150. 37 �20 SLOVAKIA 2021 conditions for the peace treaties and the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He hoped the Legion could fight its way across Russia to the newlyformed state in the heart of Europe. However, Stefanik changed hi s mind after visiting large numbers of Czechoslovak troops on the front. He and General Maurice Janin (the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion in Russia appointed by the Government of France with the consent of the Czechoslovak National Council) concluded that a withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army was inevitable. They would have to leave Russian forces to fight the Bolsheviks, while the Czechoslovak army was to focus on defending the Trans-Siberian railway. 39 Masaryk gave Stefanik powers of attorney to carry out an internal reorganisation of the army, as well as in matters of international policy. Thanks to their complex origin and development, the Legions in Russia were run democratically. The Legionnaires addressed each other as "brother" and the Legion was led by the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia through elected representatives. While this form of self-government was relatively acceptable in a volunteer army, following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 191 8, the Legion became a regular army that had to be subordinate to the government. Stefanik abolished the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia. 40 By order number 588, issued only after his departure, Stefanik banned the holding of the second Congress of the Czechoslovak Army and the committee's activities. However, Congress delegates had already been elected. The soldiers were unwilling to give up their elected bodies. Enforcing command number 588 turned out to be very difficult. The conflict between the military command and the soldiers grew to such an extent that a total rift in the army was imminent. 41 Stefanik realised that he would be unable to resolve the situation of the Czec hoslovak army in Siberia and returned to Paris, where he started talks with Allied military officials, Marshal Ferdinand Foch in particular. He demanded either an allied intervention or a complete withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army. In April of 1919 Stefanik sent the following note to T.G. Masaryk: "An inter-allied military 39 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 17, Omsk, 19 Apri l 1919, Jan in writi ng to the minister of war, no. 992. 40 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 16, Vladivostok, 27 December 191 8, Regnault and Martel writing to the Foreign Ministry, no. 18 I. 41 Pichlik, Klipa and Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti legionah 246-47. �SLOVAKIA 2021 21 intervention will not take place; our men are perishing in Siberia. Our allies do not always keep their promises because these are made thoughtlessly. There is political and moral chaos."42 The Birth of Czechoslovakia, the Death of Stefanik At the beginning of 1918, the military situation of the Entente Powers was very difficult. Serbia and most of the territory of Romania had been overrun by the enemy in 1915 and in 1916. In 1917 Italy suffered a great defeat at Caporetto and the Italian front moved I 00 km south. The next year Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, which allowed the Germans to move large numbers of soldiers to the Western front. The Central Powers wanted to win a decisive victory with a large offensive in the spring of 191 8, before the arrival of thousands of soldiers from the United States to Europe. In these complex circumstances the Entente powers were more wi lling to support any project that would weaken their enemies. That is why the movements of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary gained more ground. Thanks to their military efforts in France, Italy but mainly in Russia, the international position of the Czechoslovak National Counci l became stronger. It was step-by-step recognized as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by the Entente Powers. When Czech and Slovak representtatives proclaimed the founding of Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 in Prague, and on October 30 in Turciansky Sv. Martin in Slovakia, its international position was assured thanks also to Stefaniks' activities. Stefanik died soon after the creation of Czechoslovakia. His last diplomatic task was to find a compromise between the Italian and French claims to command the Czechoslovak army in the new state, and he succeed where others cou ldn 't. 43 Stefanik decided fly in an Italian plane to his homeland but it crashed while landing at 4 May 1919. His death aroused a lot of suspicions and resulted in conspiracy theories bringing accusations against Benes, with whom Stefanik did 42 Archiv Ustavu T. G. Masaryka, Prague, f. TGM-R, box 424, Paris, 3 April I 919, M. R. Stefanik writing to T . G. Masaryk. 43 Laura Fortunato, " La Mi ssione militare italiana in Slovacchia: un tentativo di "diplomazia militare" fallito," in Per Rila Tolomeo, scrilli di amici sulfa Dalmazia e I 'Europa cen/ro-orienlale fl, ed . E. Capuzzo, B. C revato-Se lvaggi and F. Guida (Venez ia, La Musa Talia, 2014 ), 13 7- 205. �22 SLOVAKIA 2021 not get along, against freemasons, Czechs, Hungarians and so on . The sum total of the facts and evidence available to us today suggests that Stefanik's death was an accident. Of the many who have written on the subject, it was Pavo) Kanis and his documentary film Stefanik. A Hero 's Story, Homeland (20 I 0) that I find the most persuasive. The Memory of Stefanik One might say that the 20 1h century replacements of various statues in what is now L.:udovit Stur Square in Bratislava reflected the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Each change of reg ime in Czechoslovakia was also reflected in changes of statues. This kind of " marking" of territory is not unusual. Quite the contrary. Every reg ime is interested in erecting monuments to figures who represent ideas and va lues close to its heart and have in some way contributed to the development of a particular community or nation. As part of the celebrations of the Hungarian millennial arriva l in the Danube Valley in 1896, a competition was held in Bratislava (then known as Pozsony in Hunga rian and Pressburg in German) for the design of a monument commemorating the coronations of Habsburg rulers that had been held in the city. The competition was won by sculptor Jan Fadrusz with a sculptural group depicting Empress Maria Theresa's ascent to the throne in 1740. Maria Theresa was acceptable as a symbol both to the Hungarians, who revered , indeed idealised her for her pos itive attitude to Hungarian statehood, as well as, of course, to the Habsburgs, who had a forged a close bond with the city of Pressburg, where the coronations were held for centuries. The scu lpture of Maria Theresa was erected on 16 May 1897 on the Royal Hill Square, w hich was then renamed Coronation Hill Square. 44 The lnterwar Period and the Slovak State The newly-founded Czechoslovakia faced serious problems. It had to preserve its existence by forgin g the idea of a Czechoslovak nation while distancing itse lf from everything Habsburg and Hungarian . Soon after Bratislava was occupied by the Czechos lovak army in February of 1919, someone threw a sack over the head of Maria Theresa and the statue was later boarded up. Neith er the Hungarians nor 44 Pavel Dvorak, Zia ta kniha Bratislavv [Golden book of Brati slava] (Bratislava, Slovensky spi sova tel', 1993), 498- 506. �SLOVAKIA 2021 23 the Habsburgs were prepared to accept the fact that the monarchy had collapsed and did everything they could to bring the Slovaks back into Hungary's fold. King Charles I Habsburg wanted to return to Hungary in October of 1921, intending to ascend to throne. In response to this plan a partial mobilization was declared in Czechoslovakia, which also led to the removal of the statue. Local members of the Sokol, the Czech gymnastics organization, and former Legionnaires, destroyed the statue "as a symbol the oppressive regime. " Once the statue of Maria Theresa had been removed, the next problem arose: who should replace her? It was decided to replace her with a statue of General Stefanik. In 1927 the Committee for the Erection of a Monument of Milan Rastislav Stefanik announced a competition, but the winner wasn't selected so, it was repeated the following year. The winning design was by the Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka's statue of Milan Stefanik surrounded by four lions g uarding the coats-of-arms of the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia - Bohemia; Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Kafka later modified his design , leaving a single lion presiding over the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms. The lion was originally to face the Danube River but, after Austria's Anschluss in March of 1938, it was turned to face towards the Slovak National Museum, allegedly to avoid irking Hitler. But the unveiling ceremony, planned for the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia never happened, because of the Munich Agreement. During demonstrations marking the proclamation of Slovakia's autonomy in October of 1938, protesters pelted the lion with stones. 45 From a brotherly point of view, this change could be characteristic of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. Stefanik was one of the most important founders of Czechoslovakia. His funeral in 1919 was reminiscent of a royal one. After his death a number of statues and memorials were erected across the country. The most monumental one is the memorial on Bradlo Hill in western Slovakia, by the renowned Slovak sculptor Dusan Jurkovic, erected between 1924 and 1928. This monument has become on May 4 th , the anniversary of his death, the site of something resembling an annual national pilgrimage (except for the Communist 45 Zdenek Hojda and Jifi Pokorn y, Pomniky a zapomniky [Memorial s and Anti-Memorials] (Praha, Paseka, 1996), 175- 182. �24 SLOVAKIA 2021 period with a short political detente in 1968- 1969).46 Czechoslovakia, a country in the heart of Europe, fell victim to the political turmoil of the twentieth century, as well as its own lack of internal stability. It failed to secure the loyalty of its minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians and , ultimately, one of its constituent nations- the Slovaks. The state that was founded on 28 October 1918 ceased to exist twenty-one years later on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia, under pressure from Hitler's Germany, declared its independence. Adolf Hitler is said to have declared "Die katze muss weg", although it cannot be confirmed, when he saw the sculpture from a boat on the Danube. Other sources claim that it was another highranking Naz i who said that the cat (i.e. the Czech lion) had to go, but the pilot could stay. One part of the Slovak public was never too keen on the monument. Anyz, the company that had made the original cast of both statues, replaced the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms with the Slovak one, but that was not enough to save the "cat." In May of 1940, Slovak soldiers removed the lion from its base. From the Coup de Prague in 1948 until Today The end of the war brought about a restoration of Czechoslovakia and also the communist takeover of 1948. The Czechoslovak liberation movement of the First World War did not suit communist ideologues and their version of history. They set out to fight the "bourgeois" liberation legend of Masaryk , Stefanik and Benes. 47 Stefanik' s statues throughout Slovakia began to disappear, mostly at night. This new trend was bound to affect Bratislava as well, with respect to what was then Roosevelt (now Stur) Square and the statue that graced it. The statue of Stefanik was melted down in the early I 950s. 48 The name of the square proved to be equally unsuitable and changed from Roosevelt Square to Stur Square. However, 46 Peter Macho, "M. R. Stefanik - bohatier a muceni k?," [M. R. Stefanik - Hero and Martyr?] in Mvty na.fr slovenske [Our Slovak Myths] , ed. Eduard Krekovi c, Elena Mannova and Eva Krekovi cova (Bratislava, AEP, 2005), 172. 47 See L.:udo vi t Holotik, Stefciniko vska legenda a vznik CSR [The Stefanik Legend and the Fou ndin g of the Czec hoslovak Republic] (Bratislava, SAV, 1958). 48 Milan Varos, Stratene slovenske poklady 2 [Lost Slovak Treasures 2] (Ma rtin , Matica slovenska, 2007), 457- 6 1. �SLOVAKIA 2021 25 as it too k seve ral yea rs to ma ke, the statue of L.:udov ft Stur49 and hi s assoc iates was not placed in the square until th e ea rl y 1970s. De mand s for Stefa nik' s re habilitati o n began to be vo iced eve n before th e end of th e co mmuni st reg ime. 50 On th e occas io n o n the 70th anni ve rsa ry of th e fo undin g of Czec hoslova ki a, Ka fk a's lion was a lso pl aced o n th e plinth , a lbe it not on Stur Squ a re, wh ere it used to be befo re, but in fro nt of th e Sl ovak Nati o na l Muse um. It stood o n a py lo n 14.8 5 metres hi g h, 2 metres wid e and 4 me tres in length , bea rin g th e insc ripti o n " On 28 Octobe r 191 8 th e shared moth erl a nd of Czec hs and S lo vak s, th e Czec hos lova k Re publi c was fo und ed ." The fa ll of the communi st regime in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, fo ll owed by the "ve lvet di vorce" in 1993, res ulted in the creati on of separate Czec h and S lova k Republics. Stefa nik now retoo k hi s place in the Slovak Pantheon of heroes and hi s memory is omnipresent in today's Slovaki a. If you travel to Bratislava by air, you will land at M. R. Stefanik Airport, while the scientific schedul e of Ivan Bella, Slovakia's first man in space, was known as the Stefanik Miss ion etc. The stori es of the Stur Square did not end , however. C urrently vo ices a re heard de ma ndin g that the sculpture o f L:udov ft Stur and hi s assoc iates be moved to ano th er loca ti o n, s uch as N a mes ti e slobody ( Freedo m Squ a re), and a re pli ca of th e statu e of Mari a Th eresa be mounted aga in o n the embankme nt. Th ese proposa ls have stirred up a li ve ly publi c debate - and po le mi cs . Mea nw hil e th e li o n, toge th er w ith a new ly-cas t Stefa nik , have bee n moved to an area in fro nt of th e new Slova k N ati o na l Th ea tre, betw ee n two buildings ofa shopping ce ntre. A noth er fo unde r o f th e first Czechos lova k Republi c - Masa ryk - now towers ove r th e squ are in front o f th e Nati o na l Mu se um . As observe d by th e hi sto ri an Pave l Dvora k : "The Stur statue is the fourth costl y monument erec ted on the fo rmer Co ronation Hill, a place that has had many names, ending as 49 th ( 18 15- 1856) one of the leaders of the S lova k movement in the I 9 centu ry and the ma in cod i11er of standard Slova k. 50 See Martin Mocko, " Yi liam Plevza a ,, rehab il itacia" M . R. Stefanika ( I)" [V iliam Plevza and '' Rehabi litation" of Stefa ni k ( I)], Nave slovo, 17 Septembe r 20 I 9, https://www.noves lovo.sk/c/V iliam Plevza a rehabilitac ia M R Stefanika I and its 2nd and 3'd cont inuati ons. �26 SLOVAKIA 2021 L:udovit Stur Square today. This small square is not where history was made, but it is where it has revealed its most grotesque face. " 51 51 Dvorak, Zlata kniha Bratislavy, 503 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 7 MILAN RASTISLAV STEFANIK (1880-1919) THE MAN WHO SPOKE TO THE STARS' Michal Ksinan 2 Outside of the Czech and Slovak Republics, people are fairly familiar with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the men responsible for the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and who also served as its first presidents. However, another of the country's founders, Milan Rastislav Stefanik, is much less known , partly because his tragic death in 1919 prevented him from holding a key office for any length of time. Although he is relatively unknown to the wider international public, his contemporaries compared him to Pierre Choderlos de Laclos for the use of military tactics in love affairs, 3 to Lawrence of Arabia for vision, to Napoleon Bonaparte for ambition, to Jules Michelet" for patriotism, and to one of the apostles for conviction.5 Who was this man who charn1ed his surroundings all his life and still continues to charm people today? In order to answer this question , I will present this person to the Englishspeaking reader who is often unfamiliar with Stefanik by emphasising several key points in his life. 6 The Young Man Stefan ik was born on 2 1 July 1880 in the hamlet of Kosariska in today 's western Slovakia (Upper-Hungary at the time) to th e family 1 This article was supported by gran ts VEGA n° 2/0087/20 and APVV n° 17-0399. T he auth or works in the Institute of Hi story of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 3 French genera l and novelist ( 174 1- 1803) best known for Les Liasons dangere11ses. ~ A famous French hi storian ( 1798- 1874 ). 5 Antoine Mares, Edvard Bene!i : Un drame entre Hitler et Staline (Paris, Perrin, 2015), 70. 6 This artic le is modified version of the texts published in the book: Michal Ksirian , Milan Rastisla v Stefanik, tran s. Julia Sherwood (Bratislava: Lindeni jointly with the Slovak National Archive, 20 19) . For more details, see the first scie ntifi c biography of Stefanik published in French : Michal Ksiri an, L 'homme qui parfait avec /es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik , heros ji·anco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EU R 'Orbem, 2019). Its Slovak translation will be published under the titl e Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Mui , ktm)i sa rozpraval s hviezdami by Slovart publi shing hou se and an Engli sh transla tion under the title Milan Ras/is/av S1efanik : The Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia by Routledge publishing house. 2 8 SLOVAKIA 2021 of a Lutheran pastor with strong national convictions. Rai sed in a deeply religious family, Milan Stefanik used to hold similar beliefs. However, during his student days in Prague he was confronted with many liberal views. Discussions in Jeronym, a Protestant c lub, gave him a new perspective on faith. Its members debated progressive theo logical issues and read foreign journals. Stefanik was particularly influenced by the professor of philosophy Masaryk, and in light of his lectures started to question his Christian faith and indeed the existence of God. Not only did Milan Stefanik reject the divine essence of Jesus C hrist, he went so far as to doubt the very existence of God . He rejected reli gion and believed only in science, something that was regarded as genuinely heretical in his environment; that is why hi s father threw the young rebel out of his house in the summer of 1900. Although this breach was not permanent, it demonstrated that young Milan Stefanik had embarked upon a new journey.7 In thi s respect Stefanik can serve as a typical example of the phenomenon of secularisation in the nineteenth century that one can describe as "a loss of orientation , of certain ty, of a single world-view, of a core of reality. " 8 Another key deci sion of the young Stefanik was to switch from studying civi l engineering at Prague's Imperial and Royal Czech Technical High School (1898- 1900) to a degree in astronomy in the Faculty of Arts at the Czec h Charles-Ferdinand University (today's Charles Univers ity) in 1900- 1904. Astronomical studies fit more his romantic nature, even though thi s led to further conflicts between him and his father. The Astronomer After finishing hi s studies in Prague in 1904, Stefanik decided to go to Paris. He took every possible step to embark on a career in science. He started by taking an unpaid job in the observatory in Meudon under professor Jules Janssen, but that came to an end in 1906 when the leading position at the observatory passed to Henri Deslandres, since neither of the men got along. 9 After that Stefanik was appo inted to the paid position 7 Jaromir Va vra. Vzpo minky na Milana Ste(anika [Remini scences on Milan Stefa nik] (Ceske Velenice, Pave l Nobis, 1930), 15- 16. 8 Jifi Hanus, Historie modern! doby [History of the Modem Age] (B rn o, Barrister & Principal, 2004), 80. 9 Fra ni;:oise La unay, Un globe-trotter de la physique celeste. L ·astronome Jules Janssen (Paris, l' Observa toire de Paris, Vuibert, 2008), 256. SLOVAKIA 2021 9 of deputy director of the Mont Blanc Observatories Society, thi s time with the help of the daughter and widow of the then deceased Jules Janssen. After a year in this post, Stefanik found himself jobless again. Then he decided to establish his own observatory. He had to decide between North Africa and a certain island in French Polynesia. Stefanik settled on the much closer North Africa. He travelled around, mostly in Algeria and Tunisia, but failed to find a suitable location for an observatory. On behalf of the French Bureau des longitudes, Stefanik then tra vell ed to Tahiti to observe the passage of Halley's Comet and to conduct further astronomical observations on an island in French Polynes ia. 10 The plan to observe Halley's Comet fell through because cloud cover made observation impossible. However, Stefanik did manage to carry out the final part of his plan. He decided to extend his stay on Tahiti and explore the conditions for meteorological and astronomical observations, " Provided Tahiti is shown to offer good conditions for astronomical observations, I would be interested in building a permanent observatory (a scientific embassy) there." 11 For Stefanik building a permanent observatory with a functioning meteorological service on thi s island was hi s most important pre-war scientific project. Traveller, Artist and Collector One of the most common astronomical phenomena that Stefanik focused on was the solar ecli pse that forced him to travel all around the world. He observed thi s phenomenon in Spain ( 1905) where all astronomers who observed it were received by Spanish King Alfonso XIII , in Turkistan ( 1907), but his observations failed because of bad weather, and on hi s way back he met with Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, on Vava'u Island ( 1911) where he had the best results among all sc ientific missions , and in Brazil ( 1912) where again his observations failed beca use of bad weather. Meanwhile, he took beautiful pictures during those journeys. Stefanik was not only interested in astronomica l observations, but also in the life and habits of the locals. During hi s stay in Tahiti , Stefanik bought a horse-drawn cart that he used primarily to check up 10 Rasti slav Rajc hl , Stefanikova paNiska feta [Stefanik 's Pari sian Yea rs] (Praha, Ev ropsk y literarni klub, 1937), 132. 11 Zapisniky M. R. Stefa nika [The Diari es o f M. R. Stefanik) ed . Jose f Bartiisek and Jaroslav Bohac (Praha, Pamatnik osvoboze ni, 1935), 172. SLOVAKIA 2021 on the meteoro logical stations he had created and also to explore interesting parts of the island. He befriended French officers serving on a gunboat named Zelee and sailed with them to the lesser-known islands of French Pol ynesia. Here Stefanik di scovered and identified some Gaugin woodcuts in Puna'auia, owned by a Tahitian woman who may have been the painter's lover. Inspired by thi s discovery, he continued hi s search and found in her hut a carved wooden tobacco box with relief figures and, e lsewhere, a wooden relief ofa woman . 12 Exotic objects brought back from all five of the planet's inhabited continents formed the most interesting parts of Stefanik's collection. His friendly relations with the natives and hi s ability to develop a quick rapport with new people helped him to acquire these objects . Ivan Kmo remembered Stefanik's apartment thus : It was a strange kind of apartment. In fact, rather than an apartment, it was a small museum. It started in the hallway, which was full of drums, arrows and other weapons used by various indigenous peoples. And the tiny rooms were crammed with exotic objects. I was particularly impressed by the Oriental rugs and Gaugin's woodcuts from Tahiti. Hi s study boasted books, joumals, astronomical equipment and- a beautiful view of the rooftops of Paris. 13 Stefanik also enjoyed entertaining visitors to hi s apartment on the sixth floor at 6 Rue Leclerc with magic trick s. He mastered eighteen illusionist tricks, including cards emerging from a glass, flying and shrinking cards, and a magic wandering ring. 14 He had learned these tricks for a small fee at magicians' gatherings in Paris and bought his equipment from the Academy of Magic. 12 Franti sek Kele and Mi ros lav Musil , Navraty do Po~vnezie. Po S1efanikov1ich slopach [Returns to Polynes ia. Following in the Footsteps of Stefanik ) (OF PRI NT, 1996), 55. 13 Ivan Kmo , " Spomi enky na uj a Milana" [Memori es on Unc le Milan) in S1efanik . Kniha prva : 5pomienl,.y a pos/rehy [S tefanik . Boo k One: Memories and Observations] , ed . Stefan Osusky and Bohdan Pav lu (Praha, Svaz slovenskeho studen tstva v Bratislave, 1938), 38. 14 V ladimir Z uberec, " Za l\1by a zauj my Milana Rasti slava Stefanik a" [The Hobbies and Interests of Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ) in Zbornik Slovenskeho narodneho miizea - His16ria 32 (Martin, Osveta, 1992), I 13- 14. SLOVAKIA 2021 11 A Worldwide Wireless Telegraph etwork To find suitable support fro m the French government for hi s observatory at Tahiti , Stefanik dev ised hi s own strategy. Through the Bureau des longitudes he planned to donate the observatory and all of its equipment and instruments to the state or the colony, which would cover its operating costs. 15 Willi am Mauri ce Fawtier, the French governor of the colonies in Oceania, asked Stefanik to identify a suitab le location for a wireless station on Tahiti , 16 and subseq uently to have it built and to run it. Stefa nik wanted to join the observatory and wireless station. Thank s to state subsid ies and profits generated by the stati on he would have had suffi cient materi al support. In those days France, the on ly country w ith po liti cal interests in Oceania, was not yet conn ected by wireless telegraph with these colonies, with the exception of New Caledonia. Contact with Tahiti was key, since the island's importance was ex pected to grow following the opening of the Panama Canal. In Jul y of 1912 a draft bill of the Law on an Intercontinenta l Wireless Telegraph Network, to connect the French co loni es scattered around the world with the mother country, was tabled in the French Parliament. Three branches were to radiate fro m Fra nce to the colonies : one w ith Coc hinchina (today the southern part of Vietnam), another w ith the island of Martinique and a third one in the Pac ifi c, with the station s in New Caledonia, th e Marquesas lslands and Tahiti. 17 One of the tasks Stefanik was supposed to fulfil during hi s mi ss ion in Ec uad or ( 1913) was to obtain permi ss ion to establi sh a wireless telegraph station on one of the Galapagos Islands, to facilitate comm unication with Papeete. In spite of the competition of German, Briti sh and America ns companies who had a strong position in these countri es, Stefanik succeeded. 18 Sometime earli er he had presented the French Senator and hi s protector Emil e C hautemps with the project of an 15 Slovensky narodn y archiv, Brati slava (S lovak National Arc hi ves, hereinafter SNA), OF : M. R. Stefanik, box 33, inv. no. I 06 1, Paris, 22 January 19 13, Letter of M. R. Stefan ik to an unknown person (perhaps E. Boutroux). 16 SNA , OF: M. R. Stefa nik, box 33 , inv. no. I 059, Papeete, 16 Octobe r 1913, letter of the governor of the French coloni es in French Pol ynesia W. Fawtier to M. R. Stefan ik . 17 Rasti slav Rajchl , M. R. Stefanik (Praha, Orb is, 194 7), 14- 16 . i x See more: Ekvadorsky zapisnik [Ecuadorian Diary], ed. Vl adimir Polivka (Bratislava, VSSS, 2005, I' ' editi on 1928) . 12 SLOVAKIA 2021 intercontinental telegraph network. Each station was to have an observatory and to provide a meteorological service . In Europe it was to be based on Mont Saleve near Geneva, in Asia its location was to be Hong Kong, in Africa in Morocco, and in Australia and Oceania in Tahiti. Stefanik also wanted to acquire the island of Floriana (Galapagos Islands) to reinforce the French influence in the region , but these projects were doomed because the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared the USA's reaction . He did, however, succeed in strengthening France's influence in Ecuador. At the outbreak of the Great War, Stefanik returned to France. He was in Morocco when the news reached him that he had been made a knight of the Legion d'honneur, with this citation: "Having been entrusted with missions to Tahiti and the Republic of Ecuador in 1913 he exhibited outstanding skill and provided extraordinary service to the merchant navy and to French interests. He founded and estab1ished, at his own expense, an observatory on Tahiti and organised a comprehensive meteorological service on the islands of French Oceania." 19 Stefanik had an extraordinary talent for planning globa l projects. He thought in bold and broad strokes and was not content with partial or local solutions. This was undoubtedly one reason why he so often captivated his friends . On the other hand, he d id not always manage to bring his plans to fruition . Sometimes he seemed to bite off more than he could chew. Pilot, Soldier and Inventor Stefanik became a French citizen in 1912 and was drafted in August of 1914 when the First World War broke out. Because of health problems, Stefanik reported for duty in January of 1915 as a pilot and flew over the Western front. In this ro le he focused on so lving problems relating to military aviation . In those days a big problem was communications between pilots and their bases, which he wanted to solve by installing a radio transmitter in his Maurice Farman airplane. As this proved too heavy, he constructed a "parlophone" (from French parler "to speak") to enab le the pilot to communicate w ith his base. He also mulled over the idea of a vertical launch and landing and exp lored 19 Archi ves nati ona les, Paris, LH/2548/35 - M. R. Ste fanik . SLOVAKIA 2021 13 the best possible use of binoculars.20 Although most of Stefanik's ideas and inventions were not accepted, his military superiors appreciated " his valuable scientific knowledge." 2 1 Stefanik was also interested in the use of meteorology for military aviation. After constructing a meteorological station in the commune of Brias, he tested various meteorological instruments for their possible use in aircraft at various heights. Weather forecasts could be exploited, not only in aviation, but also in the planning of military actions by the infantry. For this reason, General Ferdinand Foch entrusted him with estab li shing a meteorological service for the section of the front under his command. Stefanik refused to take command of this service and left for a mission in Serbia in order to fight the invading AustroH ungarian army.22 Later, Stefanik founded and organised a meteorological service for the Romanian army. He also planned to set up an inter-allied meteorological service for the armies of the Entente. 23 Stefanik's military career was truly exceptional. Mobilised as a rank-and-file soldier in August of 1914, he did not start serving until January of 1915 and three years later (June of 1918) had reached the rank of Brigadier-General. It should be noted, however, that Stefanik's meteoric rise through the ranks was mainly the result of his diplomatic activities, which French officials used to boost his prestige in the eyes of his compatriots, as well Allied soldiers, diplomats and politicians. He also received numerous military and civilian honours , such as the French army's Croix de guerre (w ith bronze palm), the Italian Military Cross, the Serbian Gold medal for bravery, as well as being made a Knight, Officer and Commander of the Legion d'honneur. 20 Zuberec, "Zal'uby a za ujm y Milana Rastis lava Stefanika", 109- 135. SNA , OF: M. R. Ste fanik, box 33 , in v. no. I 037, Pari s, 13 August I 9 I 5, Au suj et des fu sils- mitrailleurs LEWIS a venir d ' Ang leterre. 21 La memoire conservee du general Milan Rastisla v Stefanik dans /es archives du Service historique de la Defense, ed. Frederi c Gue lton, Emm anuelle Bra ud and Michal Ksinan (Paris, SHD, 2008), 26. See [Emile] Prat, " Vzpominky z roku 1915" [Memories from 1915), in Stefaniki,v memorial [Stefa nik 's Memori a l] , ed. Amost Bares (Praha, Pamatnik odboj e, I 929), 153. 23 Rasti slav Rajchl, " M. R. Ste fanik jako organisator vojenske meteorology" [M . R. Stefanik as Organiser o f Military Meteorol ogy], Ri.fr hvezd, 11° 5 (May 1948), I 00--104. 22 14 SLOVAKIA 2021 The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak Movement During the First World War, the self-determination of nations became one of the principles of international relations. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state grew out of the close cooperation between leaders of the two nations that had developed in the nineteenth century, as the idea of Slavic mutuality gained ground, and also thanks to the linguistic proximity between Czech and Slovak, two distinct, but closely-related languages. From the geopolitical point of view, Czech and Slovak leaders abroad wanted to replace AustriaHungary as a barrier to German expansion to the East (Orang nach Oesten) by a chain of independent states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) supported by the Entente. 24 But, the "Czechoslovak question" was completely unknown in the West. To fight this ignorance, the Czechoslovak National Council , the highest organ of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during the Great War, established in m id-1916 started a press propaganda campaign. Masaryk was its President, Josef Dtirich Vice-President, Edvard Benes General Secretary, and Stefanik representative of the Slovaks. After Dtirich's expulsion, he was replaced as Vice-President by Stefanik. Branches of the Czechoslovak National Council were established in several Entente countries, led by supporters of its political orientation.25 Political Seducer To gain support for the Czechoslovak movement among the Entente Powers, a lot of work behind the scenes was needed. Thanks to his astronomic and diplomatic missions before the war, Stefanik was in touch with the most important French politicians. Before going into Stefanik's powers of persuasion, we need first look at his image in French society. In the Third Republic scientists had a very positive image and a cult of science seemed to have become a new lay religion . We must never forget that Stefanik was an astronomer, mathema24 Tomas G. Masaryk, La Nouvelle Europe, ed. Alain Soubigou (Pari s, L ' Hannattan, 2002, 1st edition 191 8), 120, 11 5. 25 Edouard Benes, Souvenirs de guerre et de noire revolution (! 9/4-191 8) I vol. (Pari s, Ernest Lero ux, 1928), 128. Vojensky ustfedni archiv - Vojensky historicky archiv, Prague, f. CSNR - Pari s, CSNR Ill , box 22, correspondence of Benes with Masaryk, 20 June 191 6, Benes writin g to Masaryk. SLOVAKIA 2021 15 tician, meteorologist, pilot, specialist in wireless telegraphy, and traveller etc. Such a person easily aroused interest in Parisian or Rome "salons" where the most important French or Italian politicians met. Stefanik often enjoyed the favour of women in these circles who were enchanted by him. Several people have written that Stefanik could win over diplomats and politicians with his sense of humour. Robert de Billy, a French diplomat in Rome, recounts the following: Stefanik was charged with observing the solar eclipse in Polynesia, where the visibility would be best. Without any hesitation, he travelled to a small remote island somewhere in the Polynesian archipelago. After disembarking with his telescope, he informed the native chief that the sun would soon disappear but that the government of the Republic (cognizant of its protective responsibilities) had sent Stefanik to ensure that sunlight would return. Everything happened as expected. The tribal chief, astoundded by the night in the middle of the day , and the return of the star on the exact day the magician had predicted, fell at the feet of this supernatural being, the master of magic.26 Many people, not least Stefanik himself, were aware of hi s propensity to exaggerate but everyone knew that his accounts were based on a wealth of true stories and experience. Stefanik suffered from ill health from an early age. He was of slender stature and General Maurice Jan in recalled that his frail bodily frame did not seem built for the enormous amount of energy it contained.27 One cause of Stefanik's poor health was the scale of his ambition, whether in his initial eagerness to make his mark as a scientist or, in later years, in his fight for the creation of Czechoslovakia . The constant nervous strain he was under, frequent travel across all five continents in pursuit of science and later on diplomatic and military missions, undoubtedly left their mark on his health. Recalling Stefanik's health problems, the writer Bertrand de Jouvenel described them as his sacrifice for the nation . "Stefanik never stopped travelling. We would encounter him as a major, we would encounter him as a General , ever 26 Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Pari s - La Coum euve (hereinafter AMA E), PA-AP 2 I, Robert de Billy, vol. 5, Le general Stefanik . 27 Dusan Kovac, S1efanik a Janin. Pribeh pria1e/'s1va [Stefanik and Janin. The Story o f a Friendship] (Brati slava, Dilema, 200 I), 63-65. 16 SLOVAKIA 2021 paler, ever more frantic , he would eat and speak less and less. One might say that the more he gives of his life to his country the less of it is left in him ." 28 In his attempts to persuade others, Stefanik never hesitated to play on their emotions, or cha ll enge the logic of his audience. His scientific work and travels equipped him with a huge arsena l of knowledge, experience and anecdotes. One of his great virtues was his ability to exploit all these to his benefit, or rather, for the benefit of the Czechoslovak liberation movement. The social recognition of these virtues afforded him high standing, which he was able to exploit. The Czechoslovak Army (Legions) in France and Italy The army formed an extremely important, if not the most important, part of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, and Stefanik was one of its chief organisers. From the very moment the war broke out, Czechs and Slovaks abroad began to organise into various combat units fighting alongside the Entente powers, to prove their loyalty to the Allies and to burnish their anti-Austrian credentials. The Czechoslovak National Council sought to unify and direct these various tendencies. A French presidential decree dated 16 December 1917 authorised the formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.29 However, the problem was that there were neither Czech or Slovak prisoners-ofwar, or a sizeable Czech nor Slovak community on French territory, since France was primarily involved in fighting German forces on the Western front. Bringing Czechoslovak volunteers to France became Stefanik ' s primary aim. The Czechoslovak National Counci l intended to recruit mainly in Italy, Russia and the United States. However, the volunteers were not expected to serve on ly in the army but rather, at their own discretion, could also be deployed in military factories. In an effort to find the vo lunteers for the Czechoslovak army in France Stefanik "Minister of Emergency Situations" went to Russia (1916- 1917), Romania (1916- 1917), the USA ( 1917), Italy (1918), 28 Bertrand de Jouvenel , Un voyageur dans le siec/e (Paris, Robert La fTont, 1979), 48-49. 29 AMA E, C PC 1896-191 8, Guerre 19 14- 191 8, Autriche-Hongri e, vo l. 157 , Pari s, 16 December 191 7, Report to the President of the French Republi c. SLOVAKIA 2021 17 and Russia again ( 19 I 8- 1919). 30 With various successes in those countries, a Czechoslovak Legion with I 0,000 men was established in France and took part in battles on the Western front in the summer and autumn 1918. In Italy in 1918 there were a large number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. These had been assembled in separate camps in Padula, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, and Badia Sulmona. Stefanik wanted them to be deployed to France, but this was opposed by the Italian government. It was only prepared to authorise the formation of an auxiliary force to be deployed behind the lines, providing support for the Italian military. As this offer was not favourable to the Czechoslovak movement, Stefanik entered into talks with Italy's top officials. He negotiated with General Armando Diaz, the Minister of War, with King Victor Emmanuel III , with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, and with Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando.31 Following these negotiations, which Stefanik had to handle with utmost sensitivity due to the country's internal political problems, an agreement was reached on 19 April 191 8. 32 The Czechoslovak Legion was to operate under the Italian supreme command but the political influence over its members would be held by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The French Ambassador in Italy had a very positive view of the agreement: "It seems to me that these conditions represent the best we could have secured from the Italian government."33 Two days later, on 21 April , the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, Stefanik signed an agreement on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council , while Orlando did so on behalf of the government ofltaly. The negotiations Stefanik conducted in Italy can be regarded as his most significant achievement. The Czechoslovak Legion was the first foreign an11y which received permission to operate on 3 ° Karel Pichlik, Bohumfr Klipa and Jitka Zabloudilova, Ceskosluvensti legionah (/914 - 1920) [The Czechos lovak Legionnaires ( 1914- 1920)] (Praha, Mlada fronta, 1996), 150- 59. Mark Corn wa ll, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle fo r Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, GB, Macmillan , 2000), 159. See also: Leo Val iani , The End of Austria-Hungmy (New York , A lfred A. Knopf, 1973). 32 Pavel He lan, " La Legione cecoslovacca," in // Patto di Roma e la Legione cecoslovacca. Tra Grande Guerra e Nuova Europa. ed. Francesco Leoncini (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2014), 67- 72. 33 AMAE, C PC 1896-1918, Guerre 1914- 1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 158, Rome, 19 April 19 18, Barrere writting to th e Minister of Foreign Affairs, no . 841-842. 31 18 SLOVAKIA 2021 Italian soil. The creation of Polish and Romanian units followed much later. 34 Further important events connected to Stefanik and the Czechoslovak Army in Italy were placing the military flag of the Czec hoslovak Army on the Altar of the Fatherland in Rome on 24 May 1918, on the anniversary of Italy entering the war; this episode was of extraordinary propaganda importance. The Czech Amelie Posse- Brazdova recalled Stefanik's speech on this occasion: " Like a masterful and ingenious conductor, he played all our trembling heartstrings, leaving not one untouched ."35 Finally around 20,000 Czechoslovak so ldiers fought on the Italian front. The Legions in Russia Stefanik went on his first mission to Russ ia in 1916 and was busy dealing with the internal problems of the Czechoslovak movement. After the February Revolution of 19 17, the new Russian Provisional Government authorized the project of the Czechoslovak Legion in the country, but later changed its position . Only in July 19 I 7, after a successful battle at Zborov (in the frame of the Keren sky Offensive) of the Czechoslovak Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs and Slovaks from Ru ssia and thus Russian citizens, the government permitted recruitment among prisoners-of-war. The Legions in Russia grew quickly. Fol lowing the Bolshevik coup in October of I 9 I 7, the new government was intent on making peace with Germany. This put the Czechoslovak Army into a difficult position, since, in the aftermath of such an agreement, its members would no longer be in a territory that shared a front wi th Gemrnny or Austria-Hungary, and would thus have no enemy to fight. In addition, a number of factions were vying for power in Ru ss ia. Masaryk demanded strict neutrality with regard to internal Russian affairs, but in practice this was difficult to achieve. The orders received by the Czechoslovak Army were constantly changing. The Briti sh would have preferred to keep it in Russ ia under their command, while the French wanted to redeploy the Leg ion to the 34 Angelo Tamborra, L 'idea di nazinnalita e la guerra / 914-1918 (Trento, lnstituto per la storia de l Ri so rgimento ita liano, 1963), 37-43 . 35 Eva Kranz. Amelie Posse- Brazdnva. Zivot spjaty s Ceskoslovenskem [Amelie Posse- Brazdova. A Life Linked w ith Czechoslova ki a] ( Praha, Akropo li s, 20 11 ), 134. SLOVAKIA 2021 19 Western front. 36 Soon, open conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to disarm them after an incident in Chelyabinsk. Czechoslovak Army representatives, meeting at a congress in Chelyabinsk, decided to prepare for their passage to France via Vladivostok and to resist any attempts to be stopped. The troops quickly captured the Trans-Siberian Railway and were soon openly fighting the Bolsheviks. Later, this capture changed its purpose- the Legions wanted to facilitate the invasion of Russia planned by the Allies. However, after initial successes on the part of the Czechoslovaks, the Bolsheviks gradually began to prevail. 37 Matters turned even more complicated following the coup led by the monarchist Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Siberia in November of 19 I 8. Most of the 60,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were left-leaning and were not eager to see the counter-revolution prevail. However, Kolchak was allied with the Entente, and thus also with Czechoslovakia. Jan Juricek portrayed the situation in Siberia as follows: The soldiers complained about the excessive demands of officers who, ambitious though they were, lacked in experience. The Czechoslovak commanders, in turn , lamented the fact that Russia's White Guard had no appetite for fighting , was prone to flee or to surrender to the enemy, demoralizing our soldiers. The local commanders of the Siberian anti-Bolshevik forces , on the other hand, complained (to General Janin) that the Czechoslovaks' meddling in Russian politics was inappropriate.38 By the time Stefanik arrived in Siberia in November of I 9 I 8 - he had left France in August of 19 I 8 - the Great War had ended and the soldiers did not understand the need for further fighting, as Czechoslovakia had already been established. At first Stefanik tried to convince the Legionnaires that they had to fight to ensure favourable 36 Karel Pichlik, Bez legend [Without Legends] ( Praha, Panorama, 199 1), 377. See: Betty Miller Unterberger, The United States, Revo/utionCIIJ' Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Victor S. Mamatey, The Un ited States and East Central Europe /914- 191 8. A Studv in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda ( Princeton, ew Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957). 3~ Jan Jurfcek, Milan Rastisla v St~fanik (Bratislava, Q 111 , 2006, P' edi ti on 1968), 150. 37 20 SLOVAKIA 2021 conditions for the peace treaties and the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He hoped the Legion could fight its way across Russia to the newlyformed state in the heart of Europe. However, Stefanik changed hi s mind after visiting large numbers of Czechoslovak troops on the front. He and General Maurice Janin (the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion in Russia appointed by the Government of France with the consent of the Czechoslovak National Council) concluded that a withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army was inevitable. They would have to leave Russian forces to fight the Bolsheviks, while the Czechoslovak army was to focus on defending the Trans-Siberian railway. 39 Masaryk gave Stefanik powers of attorney to carry out an internal reorganisation of the army, as well as in matters of international policy. Thanks to their complex origin and development, the Legions in Russia were run democratically. The Legionnaires addressed each other as "brother" and the Legion was led by the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia through elected representatives. While this form of self-government was relatively acceptable in a volunteer army, following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 191 8, the Legion became a regular army that had to be subordinate to the government. Stefanik abolished the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia. 40 By order number 588, issued only after his departure, Stefanik banned the holding of the second Congress of the Czechoslovak Army and the committee's activities. However, Congress delegates had already been elected. The soldiers were unwilling to give up their elected bodies. Enforcing command number 588 turned out to be very difficult. The conflict between the military command and the soldiers grew to such an extent that a total rift in the army was imminent. 41 Stefanik realised that he would be unable to resolve the situation of the Czec hoslovak army in Siberia and returned to Paris, where he started talks with Allied military officials, Marshal Ferdinand Foch in particular. He demanded either an allied intervention or a complete withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army. In April of 1919 Stefanik sent the following note to T.G. Masaryk: "An inter-allied military 39 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 17, Omsk, 19 Apri l 1919, Jan in writi ng to the minister of war, no. 992. 40 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 16, Vladivostok, 27 December 191 8, Regnault and Martel writing to the Foreign Ministry, no. 18 I. 41 Pichlik, Klipa and Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti legionah 246-47. SLOVAKIA 2021 21 intervention will not take place; our men are perishing in Siberia. Our allies do not always keep their promises because these are made thoughtlessly. There is political and moral chaos."42 The Birth of Czechoslovakia, the Death of Stefanik At the beginning of 1918, the military situation of the Entente Powers was very difficult. Serbia and most of the territory of Romania had been overrun by the enemy in 1915 and in 1916. In 1917 Italy suffered a great defeat at Caporetto and the Italian front moved I 00 km south. The next year Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, which allowed the Germans to move large numbers of soldiers to the Western front. The Central Powers wanted to win a decisive victory with a large offensive in the spring of 191 8, before the arrival of thousands of soldiers from the United States to Europe. In these complex circumstances the Entente powers were more wi lling to support any project that would weaken their enemies. That is why the movements of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary gained more ground. Thanks to their military efforts in France, Italy but mainly in Russia, the international position of the Czechoslovak National Counci l became stronger. It was step-by-step recognized as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by the Entente Powers. When Czech and Slovak representtatives proclaimed the founding of Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 in Prague, and on October 30 in Turciansky Sv. Martin in Slovakia, its international position was assured thanks also to Stefaniks' activities. Stefanik died soon after the creation of Czechoslovakia. His last diplomatic task was to find a compromise between the Italian and French claims to command the Czechoslovak army in the new state, and he succeed where others cou ldn 't. 43 Stefanik decided fly in an Italian plane to his homeland but it crashed while landing at 4 May 1919. His death aroused a lot of suspicions and resulted in conspiracy theories bringing accusations against Benes, with whom Stefanik did 42 Archiv Ustavu T. G. Masaryka, Prague, f. TGM-R, box 424, Paris, 3 April I 919, M. R. Stefanik writing to T . G. Masaryk. 43 Laura Fortunato, " La Mi ssione militare italiana in Slovacchia: un tentativo di "diplomazia militare" fallito," in Per Rila Tolomeo, scrilli di amici sulfa Dalmazia e I 'Europa cen/ro-orienlale fl, ed . E. Capuzzo, B. C revato-Se lvaggi and F. Guida (Venez ia, La Musa Talia, 2014 ), 13 7- 205. 22 SLOVAKIA 2021 not get along, against freemasons, Czechs, Hungarians and so on . The sum total of the facts and evidence available to us today suggests that Stefanik's death was an accident. Of the many who have written on the subject, it was Pavo) Kanis and his documentary film Stefanik. A Hero 's Story, Homeland (20 I 0) that I find the most persuasive. The Memory of Stefanik One might say that the 20 1h century replacements of various statues in what is now L.:udovit Stur Square in Bratislava reflected the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Each change of reg ime in Czechoslovakia was also reflected in changes of statues. This kind of " marking" of territory is not unusual. Quite the contrary. Every reg ime is interested in erecting monuments to figures who represent ideas and va lues close to its heart and have in some way contributed to the development of a particular community or nation. As part of the celebrations of the Hungarian millennial arriva l in the Danube Valley in 1896, a competition was held in Bratislava (then known as Pozsony in Hunga rian and Pressburg in German) for the design of a monument commemorating the coronations of Habsburg rulers that had been held in the city. The competition was won by sculptor Jan Fadrusz with a sculptural group depicting Empress Maria Theresa's ascent to the throne in 1740. Maria Theresa was acceptable as a symbol both to the Hungarians, who revered , indeed idealised her for her pos itive attitude to Hungarian statehood, as well as, of course, to the Habsburgs, who had a forged a close bond with the city of Pressburg, where the coronations were held for centuries. The scu lpture of Maria Theresa was erected on 16 May 1897 on the Royal Hill Square, w hich was then renamed Coronation Hill Square. 44 The lnterwar Period and the Slovak State The newly-founded Czechoslovakia faced serious problems. It had to preserve its existence by forgin g the idea of a Czechoslovak nation while distancing itse lf from everything Habsburg and Hungarian . Soon after Bratislava was occupied by the Czechos lovak army in February of 1919, someone threw a sack over the head of Maria Theresa and the statue was later boarded up. Neith er the Hungarians nor 44 Pavel Dvorak, Zia ta kniha Bratislavv [Golden book of Brati slava] (Bratislava, Slovensky spi sova tel', 1993), 498- 506. SLOVAKIA 2021 23 the Habsburgs were prepared to accept the fact that the monarchy had collapsed and did everything they could to bring the Slovaks back into Hungary's fold. King Charles I Habsburg wanted to return to Hungary in October of 1921, intending to ascend to throne. In response to this plan a partial mobilization was declared in Czechoslovakia, which also led to the removal of the statue. Local members of the Sokol, the Czech gymnastics organization, and former Legionnaires, destroyed the statue "as a symbol the oppressive regime. " Once the statue of Maria Theresa had been removed, the next problem arose: who should replace her? It was decided to replace her with a statue of General Stefanik. In 1927 the Committee for the Erection of a Monument of Milan Rastislav Stefanik announced a competition, but the winner wasn't selected so, it was repeated the following year. The winning design was by the Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka's statue of Milan Stefanik surrounded by four lions g uarding the coats-of-arms of the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia - Bohemia; Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Kafka later modified his design , leaving a single lion presiding over the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms. The lion was originally to face the Danube River but, after Austria's Anschluss in March of 1938, it was turned to face towards the Slovak National Museum, allegedly to avoid irking Hitler. But the unveiling ceremony, planned for the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia never happened, because of the Munich Agreement. During demonstrations marking the proclamation of Slovakia's autonomy in October of 1938, protesters pelted the lion with stones. 45 From a brotherly point of view, this change could be characteristic of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. Stefanik was one of the most important founders of Czechoslovakia. His funeral in 1919 was reminiscent of a royal one. After his death a number of statues and memorials were erected across the country. The most monumental one is the memorial on Bradlo Hill in western Slovakia, by the renowned Slovak sculptor Dusan Jurkovic, erected between 1924 and 1928. This monument has become on May 4 th , the anniversary of his death, the site of something resembling an annual national pilgrimage (except for the Communist 45 Zdenek Hojda and Jifi Pokorn y, Pomniky a zapomniky [Memorial s and Anti-Memorials] (Praha, Paseka, 1996), 175- 182. 24 SLOVAKIA 2021 period with a short political detente in 1968- 1969).46 Czechoslovakia, a country in the heart of Europe, fell victim to the political turmoil of the twentieth century, as well as its own lack of internal stability. It failed to secure the loyalty of its minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians and , ultimately, one of its constituent nations- the Slovaks. The state that was founded on 28 October 1918 ceased to exist twenty-one years later on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia, under pressure from Hitler's Germany, declared its independence. Adolf Hitler is said to have declared "Die katze muss weg", although it cannot be confirmed, when he saw the sculpture from a boat on the Danube. Other sources claim that it was another highranking Naz i who said that the cat (i.e. the Czech lion) had to go, but the pilot could stay. One part of the Slovak public was never too keen on the monument. Anyz, the company that had made the original cast of both statues, replaced the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms with the Slovak one, but that was not enough to save the "cat." In May of 1940, Slovak soldiers removed the lion from its base. From the Coup de Prague in 1948 until Today The end of the war brought about a restoration of Czechoslovakia and also the communist takeover of 1948. The Czechoslovak liberation movement of the First World War did not suit communist ideologues and their version of history. They set out to fight the "bourgeois" liberation legend of Masaryk , Stefanik and Benes. 47 Stefanik' s statues throughout Slovakia began to disappear, mostly at night. This new trend was bound to affect Bratislava as well, with respect to what was then Roosevelt (now Stur) Square and the statue that graced it. The statue of Stefanik was melted down in the early I 950s. 48 The name of the square proved to be equally unsuitable and changed from Roosevelt Square to Stur Square. However, 46 Peter Macho, "M. R. Stefanik - bohatier a muceni k?," [M. R. Stefanik - Hero and Martyr?] in Mvty na.fr slovenske [Our Slovak Myths] , ed. Eduard Krekovi c, Elena Mannova and Eva Krekovi cova (Bratislava, AEP, 2005), 172. 47 See L.:udo vi t Holotik, Stefciniko vska legenda a vznik CSR [The Stefanik Legend and the Fou ndin g of the Czec hoslovak Republic] (Bratislava, SAV, 1958). 48 Milan Varos, Stratene slovenske poklady 2 [Lost Slovak Treasures 2] (Ma rtin , Matica slovenska, 2007), 457- 6 1. SLOVAKIA 2021 25 as it too k seve ral yea rs to ma ke, the statue of L.:udov ft Stur49 and hi s assoc iates was not placed in the square until th e ea rl y 1970s. De mand s for Stefa nik' s re habilitati o n began to be vo iced eve n before th e end of th e co mmuni st reg ime. 50 On th e occas io n o n the 70th anni ve rsa ry of th e fo undin g of Czec hoslova ki a, Ka fk a's lion was a lso pl aced o n th e plinth , a lbe it not on Stur Squ a re, wh ere it used to be befo re, but in fro nt of th e Sl ovak Nati o na l Muse um. It stood o n a py lo n 14.8 5 metres hi g h, 2 metres wid e and 4 me tres in length , bea rin g th e insc ripti o n " On 28 Octobe r 191 8 th e shared moth erl a nd of Czec hs and S lo vak s, th e Czec hos lova k Re publi c was fo und ed ." The fa ll of the communi st regime in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, fo ll owed by the "ve lvet di vorce" in 1993, res ulted in the creati on of separate Czec h and S lova k Republics. Stefa nik now retoo k hi s place in the Slovak Pantheon of heroes and hi s memory is omnipresent in today's Slovaki a. If you travel to Bratislava by air, you will land at M. R. Stefanik Airport, while the scientific schedul e of Ivan Bella, Slovakia's first man in space, was known as the Stefanik Miss ion etc. The stori es of the Stur Square did not end , however. C urrently vo ices a re heard de ma ndin g that the sculpture o f L:udov ft Stur and hi s assoc iates be moved to ano th er loca ti o n, s uch as N a mes ti e slobody ( Freedo m Squ a re), and a re pli ca of th e statu e of Mari a Th eresa be mounted aga in o n the embankme nt. Th ese proposa ls have stirred up a li ve ly publi c debate - and po le mi cs . Mea nw hil e th e li o n, toge th er w ith a new ly-cas t Stefa nik , have bee n moved to an area in fro nt of th e new Slova k N ati o na l Th ea tre, betw ee n two buildings ofa shopping ce ntre. A noth er fo unde r o f th e first Czechos lova k Republi c - Masa ryk - now towers ove r th e squ are in front o f th e Nati o na l Mu se um . As observe d by th e hi sto ri an Pave l Dvora k : "The Stur statue is the fourth costl y monument erec ted on the fo rmer Co ronation Hill, a place that has had many names, ending as 49 th ( 18 15- 1856) one of the leaders of the S lova k movement in the I 9 centu ry and the ma in cod i11er of standard Slova k. 50 See Martin Mocko, " Yi liam Plevza a ,, rehab il itacia" M . R. Stefanika ( I)" [V iliam Plevza and '' Rehabi litation" of Stefa ni k ( I)], Nave slovo, 17 Septembe r 20 I 9, https://www.noves lovo.sk/c/V iliam Plevza a rehabilitac ia M R Stefanika I and its 2nd and 3'd cont inuati ons. 26 SLOVAKIA 2021 L:udovit Stur Square today. This small square is not where history was made, but it is where it has revealed its most grotesque face. " 51 51 Dvorak, Zlata kniha Bratislavy, 503 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880-1919): The Man Who Spoke to the Stars Description An account of the resource Michal Kšiňan Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 7-26 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kšiňan, Michal, 1983- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/43238533a84c77e42113ebf07f3426a1.pdf ef777dbe49c69f4a4bc73ef517c5cad9 PDF Text Text 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . �SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 �74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 �SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 �76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. �78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 �SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. �80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 �82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 . � 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . �SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 �74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 �SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 �76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. �78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 �SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. �80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 �82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. 78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Émigrés in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Actions against Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Jozef Kirschbaum (1961-1966/68) Description An account of the resource Petr Kubík Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 72-82 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kubík, Petr, 1963- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e3079eeccc6e86efed774db51630d377.pdf eeb77fd02d34f9f19427c4c6aa3ed8fb PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 99 The Place of Slovak A:mong Slavic Languages The western world has many hazy notions, unfortunate misconceptions, and erroneous views about the proper place of Slovak in the family of Slavic tongues. To a marked degree, these views were craftily shaped by the systematic propagandizing of various administrators in the Prague government which in the 1918-1938 period sponsored one theory of Czech philologists with such fanfare and publicity that a well-meaning and easily persuaded audience in the West often did not recognize propaganda as such; specifically it did not distinguish the difference that exist between an advertised theory-one that had been examined and decisively controverted a long time ago--and the true state of affairs. Let us review a bit of this. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, there was a school of Czech philologists (Gebauer, Vondrak, Pastrnek, and somewhat later, especially after 1918, Vazny, Travnicek, Hujer et al.) that undertook popularizing the idea that the Slovak language is just a dialect of the Czech, or more conveniently to their purpose, just a dialect of the "Czechoslovak" tongue. It is not our intent to analyze the circumstances surrounding the origins of their theory or the contrived propaganda used to promote it; neither are we going to examine the inadequate linguistic backgrounds or the scant understanding of the Slovak language that characterize some of the supporters of this theory; nor shall we consider the political motivation of ·their efforts . It is the idea itself that concerns us here. A theory of this kind was again fondly argued somewhat later-during the period of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, 1918-1938, and was handily used as a theoretic substructure to support the movement of Czech domination over the Slovaks; specifically, it was their "scientific" justification for the attempt to czechize the Slovaks. A typical example of such pseudoscientific assumptions adopted by some Czech scholars was the study of Professor F. Travnicek: �100 SLOVAKIA "Czechoslovak relationship based on language considerations" (the periodical Bratislava VII, 1933, pp. 217-234), which endorse the recommendation that the Slovaks adopt Czech as their literary language-or put it directly-that they become czechized. In the interim between the two world wars, Czech officialdom not only sponsored the theory of the so-called "Czechoslovak" language through home and foreign publications, it also used every means to make the theory a reality, to impose its adoption. Note the trend even in such matters as this example: In 1938 Dr. Jan Stanislav, who is at present professor of the history of the Slovak language at the univerzity of Bratislava, wrote and prepared for publication a Slovak grammar. By official restriction (and this as late as 1938! ) the work was subjected to a change of title: Czechoslovak grammar (Prague-Presov, 1938), and the author was advised "to heed the instruction guides that were issued here between the two wars for the teaching of the Czech and Slovak language in intermediate schools." In the spirit of this directive, the author was further required "to compile a parallel history of the Czech and Slovak language" and to publish it within the theory of the "Czechoslovak language." (cf. J. Stanislav, Dejiny slovenskeho jazyka, I, Bratislava, 1958, p. 21). Knowledgeable scholars like Boris Unbegann (cf. Bulletin de la Societe de linguistique de Paris, XXXIX, pp. 151-152), who doubtless was unaware of the fact that in the Czecho-Slovak Republic scientific research must conform to inflexible governmental controls and directives in order to make even an intermediate grammar suited for high school adoption, validly criticized the author for an unorthodox position concerning a "Czechoslovak" tongue. The unsavory proposition about a "Czechoslovak language" was formidably opposed not only by Slovak scholars but also by linguists of other Slavic nations. From as early as the nineteenth century Russian Slavists (0. Bod'anskij, Izmail Sreznevskij) regarded Slovak as a discrete language. Gebauer's theorizing (cf. primarily his Historickd mluvnice jazyka ceskeho, I, Prague-Vienna, 1894) was convincingly refuted by Timofej D. Florinskij, Professor of the university of Kiev and one of the outstanding Russian Slavists of the nineteenth century, specifically in his opus Lekcii po �SLOVAKIA 101 slavianskomu jazykoznaniju (Part II. Petersburg-Kiev, 1897, pp. 220-344). In this study Professor Florinskij em- phatically rejects Gebauer's thesis that Slovak is a dialect of Czech, and he amply demonstrates that Slovak justly has its own identity and place in the family of Slavic tongues along with Czech, Polish, Serbian, Croatian, Russian and other Slavic languages. The Soviet philologist A. M. seliscev defends a similar position in his book Slavianskoje jazykoznanije (I. Moscow, 1941). The renowned Slovak grammarian and philologist Samo Czambel championed the south-Slavic character and orientation of Slovak as well as its absolute distinction from and non-dependence on Czech (cf. such works as Czambel's Slovenskd rec, I, pp. 29 ff., and Slovenskd rec a jej miesto v rodine slovanskych jazykov, 1906). He supports the conclusions of his research with weighty proofs for the position that Slovak does not belong to the class of west-Slavic languages but that it is rather of the southSlavic branches. Up to the present time, this thesis of Czambel has not been either universally endorsed nor definitely and conclucively disproved. (On this subject consult the following authorities: Stefan Kniesza, "Zur Geschichte der Jugoslavismen im Mittelslowakischen," Etudes slaves et roumaines, I, Budapest, 1948, pp. 139-147. J. Stanislav, "Juhoslavizmy v strednej slovencine," Slovenska rec, xv, 1949-1950, no. 2, pp. 37-45.) This position of Czambel is accepted, for example, by the Ukrainian philologist P. Buzuk (Narys istorii ukrainskoi movy, Kiev, 1927). In his book I storija na bulgarski ezik, I, 1919, the Bulgarian linguist B. Conev uses a number to excerpts paralleling Slovak and Bulgarian passages to indicate the south-Slavic, and even the specifically Bulgarian characteristics of the Slovak manner of expression. This kind of common bond between central-Slovak and the south-Slavonic languages is also pointed out by the Polish linguist Z. Stieber ("Jugoslavizmy w dijalekcie srodkowoslowackim," Lud slawianski, Cracow, 1930, I 2 A, pp. 230244). There are language scholars of the West who are fond of calling attention to the similarities and kinship between the Czech and the Slovak languages. It is true, for example, that some western-Slovak and Moravian-Slovak dialects �102 SLOVAKIA represent the transition to Czech and are apparently closer to Czech than to any other Slavic tongue. Yet let it not be forgotten that by the same token there are east-Slovak dialects that figure the transition from Slovak to Polish (cf., for example, Czambel, Slovenskd rec, I, 1, p. 29) . Czambel upholds the view that this speech is really a form of Slovakized Polish; Stieber (Stanowisko m6wy Slovak6w, 1937) maintains that it is a dialect produced by a mutation of Polish and Slovak. Among the newer Slovak linguists who more recently brought conclusive proof that Slovak is definitely a discrete language, we have such scholars as Dr, tudovit Novak ( Jazykovedne glosy k ceskoslovenskej otdzke, 1935, pp. 71-93) and Dr. Henrich Bartek ("Prispevok k dejinam slovenciny," Sbornik literdrno-vedeckeho odboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha, roe. III, vol. 1-2, 1936, pp. 37-117). See also the Polish Slavist Stieber (Stanowisko m6wy Slowak6w . pp. 15 ff .) . Dr. Novak writes that the Slovak language is "a lingual product of very ancient origin but it has a distinctively original and independent evolution of its own, wholly unallied to the Czech. Today's central Slovak is a direct organic continuation from the proto-Slovanic speech that was proper to that region." Dr. Novak further stresses the point that the linguistic distinction of central Slovak "began evolving far back in the primeval ultra-Carpathian fatherland and continued even in the domain of mid-European territory" and that "central Slovak developed separately and independently." After World War II, the official Marxist department of linguistics and philology in the Czecho-Slovak Republic abandoned the theory of a "Czechoslovak" tongue affirming that such a proposition is scientifically unsound and untenable. "Officially" it endorsed the thesis that Slovak is a distinctive language in the family of Slavic languages (cf. Jozef Kirschbaum, "Contemporary tendencies in Slovak philology," in Slavic and East European Studies, vol. IV, no. 3-4, p. 13, Montreal, 1960). Interestingly, every year brings a rather significant number of books translated in the Czecho-Slovak Republic from Czech to Sloyak and conversely from Slovak to Czech. Anyone who is sufficiently interested in this subject can pursue it further by examining the list of titles published �SLOVAKIA 103 annually by the UNESCO "Index translationum." And inasmuch as social life and relations within the state require of some people an easy and ready acquaintance with both tongues, a number of Slovak-Czech and CzechSlovak dictionaries have been published. ( Cf., for example, Jaroslav Necas-Miloslav Kopecky's Slovensko-cesky a ceskoslovensky slovnik rozdilnych vyrazu, Statni pedagogicke nakladatelstvi, Prague, 1964, 512 pp.) Although this NecasKopecky dictionary lacks a great number of words whose Czech form is totally different from Slovak and are essential in every-day contacts and communication (e.g., klebeta-Cz. pomluva; metla-Cz. koste; pohar-Cz. sklenice; zeml'a-Cz. houska, etc.), still it deserves the close study and examination of western promoters who naively accept the notion retailed by Czech propaganda about the "affinity" of Slovak and Czech. It is true that Slovak-Czech and Czech-Slovak dictionaries were compiled at an even earlier date (e.g. F. Frydecky-P. Kempis, Pfirucni slovnik cesko-slovensky a slovenskocesky, 1919; J. Kubin, Slovnik cesko-slovensky, Prague, 1920; P. Tvrdy, Ceskoslovensky diferencidlny slovnik, Trnava, 1922; J. K. Garaj, Prirucny slovnik diferencidlny a synonymicky, Turciansky sv. Martin, 1937; M. Kalal, Slovnik z literatury a ndreci, etc.). Recently there appeared a new dictionary compiled specifically for military usage (Ceskoslovensky vojensky slovnik, The Ministry of National Defense, Prague, 1962, 350 pp.). All this, however, by no means indicates a final halt on the part of the Czechs to czechize the Slovaks and their language. At the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, the learned journal Slovenskd rec, vol. 31, no. 2, 19.66, pp. 82, 105, 106, 107, 112 carries reports of a number of Slovak linguists exposing the pressures to which the political administration had resorted in order to coerce these scholars to introduce Czech words into a large Slovak dictionary then in preparation. Leaders holding top positions in the so-called "age of the cult of personality" advocated a movement of assimilation. In Slovakia this movement is characterized particularly by intensified Czech terrorism in the effort to occupy Slovakia. Writing in Kulturny zivot (no. 39, 1964), a communist periodical published in Bratislava, the communist writer Michael �104 SLOVAKIA Charvat thus characterized this effort: "As far as eye can see throughout the socialist world, the crest of the rule of the personality cult falls short of total decline in verbal creativity. With us in Slovakia, however, over and above this situation there are also other distinct matter that once and for all ought to be made clear, Though all the social sciences were influenced by the cult of personality, none yielded to this movement as readily and as completely as did Slovak officialdom's department of linguistics. Incredible as it may seem, in this period it actually revived the decadent anti-marxist theory of Czecho-Slovakism, a product of the Benes-Prazak day. Where champions of the personality cult promoted offering 'fraternal help' in place of liquidating the Slovak nation, there official linguistic circles substituted for liquidation of the Slovak language the expression 'an approximation of Slovak to Czech'." These attempts evoked passionate resistance not only among Slovak linguists but on the part of all Slovak public as well . Especially repugnant and detested were bilingual-Czech and Slovak-radio and television programs, and this reaction of non-acceptance came from both Slovak and Czech audiences. Czech viewers and listeners understood Slovak broadcasts poorly; for the Slovaks there was an added aggraviation since Czech is to them first and foremost the language of an overlording element that must be resisted. It is interesting to note that the Czech Milan s imecek observed in the Czech Literdrne noviny (Prague, February 26, 1966 )) that "bilingual broadcasts are a definite aspect of lingual schizophrenia." The Bratislava Kulturny zivot of November 25, 1966, no. 48, p. 6 makes the following commentary concerning this wrangle: "Consider the problem of our bilingual broadcasts. The Prague studio, for example, requires the television films of Saturday and Sunday to be dubbed in Czech exclusively, explaining that viewers complain because they do not understand Slovak. This objection can be raised validly by the Slovak audiences as well, charging obvious difficult y with Czech." The paper further observes that "every cultivated nation has its rights to dubbing and t herefore there must be a perspective of reckoning with the eventual dubbing of adult films into Slovak as well. It becomes a serious situation in the domain of films for cine - �SLOVAKIA 105 ma. The poor attendance which Czech lands and Moravia report at Slovak films is attributed to the comprehension problem-among other factors. For this reason, dubbing Czech onto Slovak films is now under serious consideration." Dr. Andrew Kubina translated by Sister M . Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. The Slovak Dictionary of 1648 The discovery of a Latin-Magyar-Slovak dictionary published by the univerzity press in Trnava in 1648 brings proof that a Slovak literary language existed i~ Slovakia as early as two hundred years before Anton Bernolak, the scholar who codified Slovak grammar in 1787. The earliest listing of this book is found in Csery's catalogue of books published by the Trnava university press (Historia C. R. Scientiarum universitatis Pestiensis, fasc. III ab anno 1641-1660) . It is dated 1648: "Typographia in domo S. Adalberti in platea Pistorum collocata est, et expressit: Vocabularium Ungarico-Slavico-Latinum. Tyrnaviae 1649 in 8° ." In his study A Bibliography of Slovak Writings compiled in 1946, Jan Misianik called attention to this entry in Csery's accmmt. He concluded, however, that the dictionary itself had not been preserved since he was not able to find it anywhere. 1 Finally this work, so significant in the field of Slovak letters was most fortunately discovered by the eminent historian Msgr. Jan Postenyi, a papal prelate, who had searched long years for some trace of it. In 1967, with the help of devoted scholarly friends, he had the good fortune to come upon it in the library of Brno university. The volume is titled "Verborum in institutione gramatica contentorum in ungaricum et sclavonicum translatio. Secundum ordinem Alphabeticum, Tyrnaviae Typis Academicis, per Philippum Jacobum Mayr, Anno 1648."2 The words "Monasterij Rayhrad" are written in ink on the cover of the book. Apparently the book originally belonged to the Benedictine library in Rajhrad. This fifty-page dictionary with words recorded in Slovak is the oldest known Slovak dictionary. � SLOVAKIA 99 The Place of Slovak A:mong Slavic Languages The western world has many hazy notions, unfortunate misconceptions, and erroneous views about the proper place of Slovak in the family of Slavic tongues. To a marked degree, these views were craftily shaped by the systematic propagandizing of various administrators in the Prague government which in the 1918-1938 period sponsored one theory of Czech philologists with such fanfare and publicity that a well-meaning and easily persuaded audience in the West often did not recognize propaganda as such; specifically it did not distinguish the difference that exist between an advertised theory-one that had been examined and decisively controverted a long time ago--and the true state of affairs. Let us review a bit of this. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, there was a school of Czech philologists (Gebauer, Vondrak, Pastrnek, and somewhat later, especially after 1918, Vazny, Travnicek, Hujer et al.) that undertook popularizing the idea that the Slovak language is just a dialect of the Czech, or more conveniently to their purpose, just a dialect of the "Czechoslovak" tongue. It is not our intent to analyze the circumstances surrounding the origins of their theory or the contrived propaganda used to promote it; neither are we going to examine the inadequate linguistic backgrounds or the scant understanding of the Slovak language that characterize some of the supporters of this theory; nor shall we consider the political motivation of ·their efforts . It is the idea itself that concerns us here. A theory of this kind was again fondly argued somewhat later-during the period of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, 1918-1938, and was handily used as a theoretic substructure to support the movement of Czech domination over the Slovaks; specifically, it was their "scientific" justification for the attempt to czechize the Slovaks. A typical example of such pseudoscientific assumptions adopted by some Czech scholars was the study of Professor F. Travnicek: �100 SLOVAKIA "Czechoslovak relationship based on language considerations" (the periodical Bratislava VII, 1933, pp. 217-234), which endorse the recommendation that the Slovaks adopt Czech as their literary language-or put it directly-that they become czechized. In the interim between the two world wars, Czech officialdom not only sponsored the theory of the so-called "Czechoslovak" language through home and foreign publications, it also used every means to make the theory a reality, to impose its adoption. Note the trend even in such matters as this example: In 1938 Dr. Jan Stanislav, who is at present professor of the history of the Slovak language at the univerzity of Bratislava, wrote and prepared for publication a Slovak grammar. By official restriction (and this as late as 1938! ) the work was subjected to a change of title: Czechoslovak grammar (Prague-Presov, 1938), and the author was advised "to heed the instruction guides that were issued here between the two wars for the teaching of the Czech and Slovak language in intermediate schools." In the spirit of this directive, the author was further required "to compile a parallel history of the Czech and Slovak language" and to publish it within the theory of the "Czechoslovak language." (cf. J. Stanislav, Dejiny slovenskeho jazyka, I, Bratislava, 1958, p. 21). Knowledgeable scholars like Boris Unbegann (cf. Bulletin de la Societe de linguistique de Paris, XXXIX, pp. 151-152), who doubtless was unaware of the fact that in the Czecho-Slovak Republic scientific research must conform to inflexible governmental controls and directives in order to make even an intermediate grammar suited for high school adoption, validly criticized the author for an unorthodox position concerning a "Czechoslovak" tongue. The unsavory proposition about a "Czechoslovak language" was formidably opposed not only by Slovak scholars but also by linguists of other Slavic nations. From as early as the nineteenth century Russian Slavists (0. Bod'anskij, Izmail Sreznevskij) regarded Slovak as a discrete language. Gebauer's theorizing (cf. primarily his Historickd mluvnice jazyka ceskeho, I, Prague-Vienna, 1894) was convincingly refuted by Timofej D. Florinskij, Professor of the university of Kiev and one of the outstanding Russian Slavists of the nineteenth century, specifically in his opus Lekcii po �SLOVAKIA 101 slavianskomu jazykoznaniju (Part II. Petersburg-Kiev, 1897, pp. 220-344). In this study Professor Florinskij em- phatically rejects Gebauer's thesis that Slovak is a dialect of Czech, and he amply demonstrates that Slovak justly has its own identity and place in the family of Slavic tongues along with Czech, Polish, Serbian, Croatian, Russian and other Slavic languages. The Soviet philologist A. M. seliscev defends a similar position in his book Slavianskoje jazykoznanije (I. Moscow, 1941). The renowned Slovak grammarian and philologist Samo Czambel championed the south-Slavic character and orientation of Slovak as well as its absolute distinction from and non-dependence on Czech (cf. such works as Czambel's Slovenskd rec, I, pp. 29 ff., and Slovenskd rec a jej miesto v rodine slovanskych jazykov, 1906). He supports the conclusions of his research with weighty proofs for the position that Slovak does not belong to the class of west-Slavic languages but that it is rather of the southSlavic branches. Up to the present time, this thesis of Czambel has not been either universally endorsed nor definitely and conclucively disproved. (On this subject consult the following authorities: Stefan Kniesza, "Zur Geschichte der Jugoslavismen im Mittelslowakischen," Etudes slaves et roumaines, I, Budapest, 1948, pp. 139-147. J. Stanislav, "Juhoslavizmy v strednej slovencine," Slovenska rec, xv, 1949-1950, no. 2, pp. 37-45.) This position of Czambel is accepted, for example, by the Ukrainian philologist P. Buzuk (Narys istorii ukrainskoi movy, Kiev, 1927). In his book I storija na bulgarski ezik, I, 1919, the Bulgarian linguist B. Conev uses a number to excerpts paralleling Slovak and Bulgarian passages to indicate the south-Slavic, and even the specifically Bulgarian characteristics of the Slovak manner of expression. This kind of common bond between central-Slovak and the south-Slavonic languages is also pointed out by the Polish linguist Z. Stieber ("Jugoslavizmy w dijalekcie srodkowoslowackim," Lud slawianski, Cracow, 1930, I 2 A, pp. 230244). There are language scholars of the West who are fond of calling attention to the similarities and kinship between the Czech and the Slovak languages. It is true, for example, that some western-Slovak and Moravian-Slovak dialects �102 SLOVAKIA represent the transition to Czech and are apparently closer to Czech than to any other Slavic tongue. Yet let it not be forgotten that by the same token there are east-Slovak dialects that figure the transition from Slovak to Polish (cf., for example, Czambel, Slovenskd rec, I, 1, p. 29) . Czambel upholds the view that this speech is really a form of Slovakized Polish; Stieber (Stanowisko m6wy Slovak6w, 1937) maintains that it is a dialect produced by a mutation of Polish and Slovak. Among the newer Slovak linguists who more recently brought conclusive proof that Slovak is definitely a discrete language, we have such scholars as Dr, tudovit Novak ( Jazykovedne glosy k ceskoslovenskej otdzke, 1935, pp. 71-93) and Dr. Henrich Bartek ("Prispevok k dejinam slovenciny," Sbornik literdrno-vedeckeho odboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha, roe. III, vol. 1-2, 1936, pp. 37-117). See also the Polish Slavist Stieber (Stanowisko m6wy Slowak6w . pp. 15 ff .) . Dr. Novak writes that the Slovak language is "a lingual product of very ancient origin but it has a distinctively original and independent evolution of its own, wholly unallied to the Czech. Today's central Slovak is a direct organic continuation from the proto-Slovanic speech that was proper to that region." Dr. Novak further stresses the point that the linguistic distinction of central Slovak "began evolving far back in the primeval ultra-Carpathian fatherland and continued even in the domain of mid-European territory" and that "central Slovak developed separately and independently." After World War II, the official Marxist department of linguistics and philology in the Czecho-Slovak Republic abandoned the theory of a "Czechoslovak" tongue affirming that such a proposition is scientifically unsound and untenable. "Officially" it endorsed the thesis that Slovak is a distinctive language in the family of Slavic languages (cf. Jozef Kirschbaum, "Contemporary tendencies in Slovak philology," in Slavic and East European Studies, vol. IV, no. 3-4, p. 13, Montreal, 1960). Interestingly, every year brings a rather significant number of books translated in the Czecho-Slovak Republic from Czech to Sloyak and conversely from Slovak to Czech. Anyone who is sufficiently interested in this subject can pursue it further by examining the list of titles published �SLOVAKIA 103 annually by the UNESCO "Index translationum." And inasmuch as social life and relations within the state require of some people an easy and ready acquaintance with both tongues, a number of Slovak-Czech and CzechSlovak dictionaries have been published. ( Cf., for example, Jaroslav Necas-Miloslav Kopecky's Slovensko-cesky a ceskoslovensky slovnik rozdilnych vyrazu, Statni pedagogicke nakladatelstvi, Prague, 1964, 512 pp.) Although this NecasKopecky dictionary lacks a great number of words whose Czech form is totally different from Slovak and are essential in every-day contacts and communication (e.g., klebeta-Cz. pomluva; metla-Cz. koste; pohar-Cz. sklenice; zeml'a-Cz. houska, etc.), still it deserves the close study and examination of western promoters who naively accept the notion retailed by Czech propaganda about the "affinity" of Slovak and Czech. It is true that Slovak-Czech and Czech-Slovak dictionaries were compiled at an even earlier date (e.g. F. Frydecky-P. Kempis, Pfirucni slovnik cesko-slovensky a slovenskocesky, 1919; J. Kubin, Slovnik cesko-slovensky, Prague, 1920; P. Tvrdy, Ceskoslovensky diferencidlny slovnik, Trnava, 1922; J. K. Garaj, Prirucny slovnik diferencidlny a synonymicky, Turciansky sv. Martin, 1937; M. Kalal, Slovnik z literatury a ndreci, etc.). Recently there appeared a new dictionary compiled specifically for military usage (Ceskoslovensky vojensky slovnik, The Ministry of National Defense, Prague, 1962, 350 pp.). All this, however, by no means indicates a final halt on the part of the Czechs to czechize the Slovaks and their language. At the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, the learned journal Slovenskd rec, vol. 31, no. 2, 19.66, pp. 82, 105, 106, 107, 112 carries reports of a number of Slovak linguists exposing the pressures to which the political administration had resorted in order to coerce these scholars to introduce Czech words into a large Slovak dictionary then in preparation. Leaders holding top positions in the so-called "age of the cult of personality" advocated a movement of assimilation. In Slovakia this movement is characterized particularly by intensified Czech terrorism in the effort to occupy Slovakia. Writing in Kulturny zivot (no. 39, 1964), a communist periodical published in Bratislava, the communist writer Michael �104 SLOVAKIA Charvat thus characterized this effort: "As far as eye can see throughout the socialist world, the crest of the rule of the personality cult falls short of total decline in verbal creativity. With us in Slovakia, however, over and above this situation there are also other distinct matter that once and for all ought to be made clear, Though all the social sciences were influenced by the cult of personality, none yielded to this movement as readily and as completely as did Slovak officialdom's department of linguistics. Incredible as it may seem, in this period it actually revived the decadent anti-marxist theory of Czecho-Slovakism, a product of the Benes-Prazak day. Where champions of the personality cult promoted offering 'fraternal help' in place of liquidating the Slovak nation, there official linguistic circles substituted for liquidation of the Slovak language the expression 'an approximation of Slovak to Czech'." These attempts evoked passionate resistance not only among Slovak linguists but on the part of all Slovak public as well . Especially repugnant and detested were bilingual-Czech and Slovak-radio and television programs, and this reaction of non-acceptance came from both Slovak and Czech audiences. Czech viewers and listeners understood Slovak broadcasts poorly; for the Slovaks there was an added aggraviation since Czech is to them first and foremost the language of an overlording element that must be resisted. It is interesting to note that the Czech Milan s imecek observed in the Czech Literdrne noviny (Prague, February 26, 1966 )) that "bilingual broadcasts are a definite aspect of lingual schizophrenia." The Bratislava Kulturny zivot of November 25, 1966, no. 48, p. 6 makes the following commentary concerning this wrangle: "Consider the problem of our bilingual broadcasts. The Prague studio, for example, requires the television films of Saturday and Sunday to be dubbed in Czech exclusively, explaining that viewers complain because they do not understand Slovak. This objection can be raised validly by the Slovak audiences as well, charging obvious difficult y with Czech." The paper further observes that "every cultivated nation has its rights to dubbing and t herefore there must be a perspective of reckoning with the eventual dubbing of adult films into Slovak as well. It becomes a serious situation in the domain of films for cine - �SLOVAKIA 105 ma. The poor attendance which Czech lands and Moravia report at Slovak films is attributed to the comprehension problem-among other factors. For this reason, dubbing Czech onto Slovak films is now under serious consideration." Dr. Andrew Kubina translated by Sister M . Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. The Slovak Dictionary of 1648 The discovery of a Latin-Magyar-Slovak dictionary published by the univerzity press in Trnava in 1648 brings proof that a Slovak literary language existed i~ Slovakia as early as two hundred years before Anton Bernolak, the scholar who codified Slovak grammar in 1787. The earliest listing of this book is found in Csery's catalogue of books published by the Trnava university press (Historia C. R. Scientiarum universitatis Pestiensis, fasc. III ab anno 1641-1660) . It is dated 1648: "Typographia in domo S. Adalberti in platea Pistorum collocata est, et expressit: Vocabularium Ungarico-Slavico-Latinum. Tyrnaviae 1649 in 8° ." In his study A Bibliography of Slovak Writings compiled in 1946, Jan Misianik called attention to this entry in Csery's accmmt. He concluded, however, that the dictionary itself had not been preserved since he was not able to find it anywhere. 1 Finally this work, so significant in the field of Slovak letters was most fortunately discovered by the eminent historian Msgr. Jan Postenyi, a papal prelate, who had searched long years for some trace of it. In 1967, with the help of devoted scholarly friends, he had the good fortune to come upon it in the library of Brno university. The volume is titled "Verborum in institutione gramatica contentorum in ungaricum et sclavonicum translatio. Secundum ordinem Alphabeticum, Tyrnaviae Typis Academicis, per Philippum Jacobum Mayr, Anno 1648."2 The words "Monasterij Rayhrad" are written in ink on the cover of the book. Apparently the book originally belonged to the Benedictine library in Rajhrad. This fifty-page dictionary with words recorded in Slovak is the oldest known Slovak dictionary. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1969, Vol. 19 Description An account of the resource Vol. 19 (No. 42), 1969. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1969 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 99 The Place of Slovak A:mong Slavic Languages The western world has many hazy notions, unfortunate misconceptions, and erroneous views about the proper place of Slovak in the family of Slavic tongues. To a marked degree, these views were craftily shaped by the systematic propagandizing of various administrators in the Prague government which in the 1918-1938 period sponsored one theory of Czech philologists with such fanfare and publicity that a well-meaning and easily persuaded audience in the West often did not recognize propaganda as such; specifically it did not distinguish the difference that exist between an advertised theory-one that had been examined and decisively controverted a long time ago--and the true state of affairs. Let us review a bit of this. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, there was a school of Czech philologists (Gebauer, Vondrak, Pastrnek, and somewhat later, especially after 1918, Vazny, Travnicek, Hujer et al.) that undertook popularizing the idea that the Slovak language is just a dialect of the Czech, or more conveniently to their purpose, just a dialect of the "Czechoslovak" tongue. It is not our intent to analyze the circumstances surrounding the origins of their theory or the contrived propaganda used to promote it; neither are we going to examine the inadequate linguistic backgrounds or the scant understanding of the Slovak language that characterize some of the supporters of this theory; nor shall we consider the political motivation of ·their efforts . It is the idea itself that concerns us here. A theory of this kind was again fondly argued somewhat later-during the period of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, 1918-1938, and was handily used as a theoretic substructure to support the movement of Czech domination over the Slovaks; specifically, it was their "scientific" justification for the attempt to czechize the Slovaks. A typical example of such pseudoscientific assumptions adopted by some Czech scholars was the study of Professor F. Travnicek: 100 SLOVAKIA "Czechoslovak relationship based on language considerations" (the periodical Bratislava VII, 1933, pp. 217-234), which endorse the recommendation that the Slovaks adopt Czech as their literary language-or put it directly-that they become czechized. In the interim between the two world wars, Czech officialdom not only sponsored the theory of the so-called "Czechoslovak" language through home and foreign publications, it also used every means to make the theory a reality, to impose its adoption. Note the trend even in such matters as this example: In 1938 Dr. Jan Stanislav, who is at present professor of the history of the Slovak language at the univerzity of Bratislava, wrote and prepared for publication a Slovak grammar. By official restriction (and this as late as 1938! ) the work was subjected to a change of title: Czechoslovak grammar (Prague-Presov, 1938), and the author was advised "to heed the instruction guides that were issued here between the two wars for the teaching of the Czech and Slovak language in intermediate schools." In the spirit of this directive, the author was further required "to compile a parallel history of the Czech and Slovak language" and to publish it within the theory of the "Czechoslovak language." (cf. J. Stanislav, Dejiny slovenskeho jazyka, I, Bratislava, 1958, p. 21). Knowledgeable scholars like Boris Unbegann (cf. Bulletin de la Societe de linguistique de Paris, XXXIX, pp. 151-152), who doubtless was unaware of the fact that in the Czecho-Slovak Republic scientific research must conform to inflexible governmental controls and directives in order to make even an intermediate grammar suited for high school adoption, validly criticized the author for an unorthodox position concerning a "Czechoslovak" tongue. The unsavory proposition about a "Czechoslovak language" was formidably opposed not only by Slovak scholars but also by linguists of other Slavic nations. From as early as the nineteenth century Russian Slavists (0. Bod'anskij, Izmail Sreznevskij) regarded Slovak as a discrete language. Gebauer's theorizing (cf. primarily his Historickd mluvnice jazyka ceskeho, I, Prague-Vienna, 1894) was convincingly refuted by Timofej D. Florinskij, Professor of the university of Kiev and one of the outstanding Russian Slavists of the nineteenth century, specifically in his opus Lekcii po SLOVAKIA 101 slavianskomu jazykoznaniju (Part II. Petersburg-Kiev, 1897, pp. 220-344). In this study Professor Florinskij em- phatically rejects Gebauer's thesis that Slovak is a dialect of Czech, and he amply demonstrates that Slovak justly has its own identity and place in the family of Slavic tongues along with Czech, Polish, Serbian, Croatian, Russian and other Slavic languages. The Soviet philologist A. M. seliscev defends a similar position in his book Slavianskoje jazykoznanije (I. Moscow, 1941). The renowned Slovak grammarian and philologist Samo Czambel championed the south-Slavic character and orientation of Slovak as well as its absolute distinction from and non-dependence on Czech (cf. such works as Czambel's Slovenskd rec, I, pp. 29 ff., and Slovenskd rec a jej miesto v rodine slovanskych jazykov, 1906). He supports the conclusions of his research with weighty proofs for the position that Slovak does not belong to the class of west-Slavic languages but that it is rather of the southSlavic branches. Up to the present time, this thesis of Czambel has not been either universally endorsed nor definitely and conclucively disproved. (On this subject consult the following authorities: Stefan Kniesza, "Zur Geschichte der Jugoslavismen im Mittelslowakischen," Etudes slaves et roumaines, I, Budapest, 1948, pp. 139-147. J. Stanislav, "Juhoslavizmy v strednej slovencine," Slovenska rec, xv, 1949-1950, no. 2, pp. 37-45.) This position of Czambel is accepted, for example, by the Ukrainian philologist P. Buzuk (Narys istorii ukrainskoi movy, Kiev, 1927). In his book I storija na bulgarski ezik, I, 1919, the Bulgarian linguist B. Conev uses a number to excerpts paralleling Slovak and Bulgarian passages to indicate the south-Slavic, and even the specifically Bulgarian characteristics of the Slovak manner of expression. This kind of common bond between central-Slovak and the south-Slavonic languages is also pointed out by the Polish linguist Z. Stieber ("Jugoslavizmy w dijalekcie srodkowoslowackim," Lud slawianski, Cracow, 1930, I 2 A, pp. 230244). There are language scholars of the West who are fond of calling attention to the similarities and kinship between the Czech and the Slovak languages. It is true, for example, that some western-Slovak and Moravian-Slovak dialects 102 SLOVAKIA represent the transition to Czech and are apparently closer to Czech than to any other Slavic tongue. Yet let it not be forgotten that by the same token there are east-Slovak dialects that figure the transition from Slovak to Polish (cf., for example, Czambel, Slovenskd rec, I, 1, p. 29) . Czambel upholds the view that this speech is really a form of Slovakized Polish; Stieber (Stanowisko m6wy Slovak6w, 1937) maintains that it is a dialect produced by a mutation of Polish and Slovak. Among the newer Slovak linguists who more recently brought conclusive proof that Slovak is definitely a discrete language, we have such scholars as Dr, tudovit Novak ( Jazykovedne glosy k ceskoslovenskej otdzke, 1935, pp. 71-93) and Dr. Henrich Bartek ("Prispevok k dejinam slovenciny," Sbornik literdrno-vedeckeho odboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha, roe. III, vol. 1-2, 1936, pp. 37-117). See also the Polish Slavist Stieber (Stanowisko m6wy Slowak6w . pp. 15 ff .) . Dr. Novak writes that the Slovak language is "a lingual product of very ancient origin but it has a distinctively original and independent evolution of its own, wholly unallied to the Czech. Today's central Slovak is a direct organic continuation from the proto-Slovanic speech that was proper to that region." Dr. Novak further stresses the point that the linguistic distinction of central Slovak "began evolving far back in the primeval ultra-Carpathian fatherland and continued even in the domain of mid-European territory" and that "central Slovak developed separately and independently." After World War II, the official Marxist department of linguistics and philology in the Czecho-Slovak Republic abandoned the theory of a "Czechoslovak" tongue affirming that such a proposition is scientifically unsound and untenable. "Officially" it endorsed the thesis that Slovak is a distinctive language in the family of Slavic languages (cf. Jozef Kirschbaum, "Contemporary tendencies in Slovak philology," in Slavic and East European Studies, vol. IV, no. 3-4, p. 13, Montreal, 1960). Interestingly, every year brings a rather significant number of books translated in the Czecho-Slovak Republic from Czech to Sloyak and conversely from Slovak to Czech. Anyone who is sufficiently interested in this subject can pursue it further by examining the list of titles published SLOVAKIA 103 annually by the UNESCO "Index translationum." And inasmuch as social life and relations within the state require of some people an easy and ready acquaintance with both tongues, a number of Slovak-Czech and CzechSlovak dictionaries have been published. ( Cf., for example, Jaroslav Necas-Miloslav Kopecky's Slovensko-cesky a ceskoslovensky slovnik rozdilnych vyrazu, Statni pedagogicke nakladatelstvi, Prague, 1964, 512 pp.) Although this NecasKopecky dictionary lacks a great number of words whose Czech form is totally different from Slovak and are essential in every-day contacts and communication (e.g., klebeta-Cz. pomluva; metla-Cz. koste; pohar-Cz. sklenice; zeml'a-Cz. houska, etc.), still it deserves the close study and examination of western promoters who naively accept the notion retailed by Czech propaganda about the "affinity" of Slovak and Czech. It is true that Slovak-Czech and Czech-Slovak dictionaries were compiled at an even earlier date (e.g. F. Frydecky-P. Kempis, Pfirucni slovnik cesko-slovensky a slovenskocesky, 1919; J. Kubin, Slovnik cesko-slovensky, Prague, 1920; P. Tvrdy, Ceskoslovensky diferencidlny slovnik, Trnava, 1922; J. K. Garaj, Prirucny slovnik diferencidlny a synonymicky, Turciansky sv. Martin, 1937; M. Kalal, Slovnik z literatury a ndreci, etc.). Recently there appeared a new dictionary compiled specifically for military usage (Ceskoslovensky vojensky slovnik, The Ministry of National Defense, Prague, 1962, 350 pp.). All this, however, by no means indicates a final halt on the part of the Czechs to czechize the Slovaks and their language. At the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, the learned journal Slovenskd rec, vol. 31, no. 2, 19.66, pp. 82, 105, 106, 107, 112 carries reports of a number of Slovak linguists exposing the pressures to which the political administration had resorted in order to coerce these scholars to introduce Czech words into a large Slovak dictionary then in preparation. Leaders holding top positions in the so-called "age of the cult of personality" advocated a movement of assimilation. In Slovakia this movement is characterized particularly by intensified Czech terrorism in the effort to occupy Slovakia. Writing in Kulturny zivot (no. 39, 1964), a communist periodical published in Bratislava, the communist writer Michael 104 SLOVAKIA Charvat thus characterized this effort: "As far as eye can see throughout the socialist world, the crest of the rule of the personality cult falls short of total decline in verbal creativity. With us in Slovakia, however, over and above this situation there are also other distinct matter that once and for all ought to be made clear, Though all the social sciences were influenced by the cult of personality, none yielded to this movement as readily and as completely as did Slovak officialdom's department of linguistics. Incredible as it may seem, in this period it actually revived the decadent anti-marxist theory of Czecho-Slovakism, a product of the Benes-Prazak day. Where champions of the personality cult promoted offering 'fraternal help' in place of liquidating the Slovak nation, there official linguistic circles substituted for liquidation of the Slovak language the expression 'an approximation of Slovak to Czech'." These attempts evoked passionate resistance not only among Slovak linguists but on the part of all Slovak public as well . Especially repugnant and detested were bilingual-Czech and Slovak-radio and television programs, and this reaction of non-acceptance came from both Slovak and Czech audiences. Czech viewers and listeners understood Slovak broadcasts poorly; for the Slovaks there was an added aggraviation since Czech is to them first and foremost the language of an overlording element that must be resisted. It is interesting to note that the Czech Milan s imecek observed in the Czech Literdrne noviny (Prague, February 26, 1966 )) that "bilingual broadcasts are a definite aspect of lingual schizophrenia." The Bratislava Kulturny zivot of November 25, 1966, no. 48, p. 6 makes the following commentary concerning this wrangle: "Consider the problem of our bilingual broadcasts. The Prague studio, for example, requires the television films of Saturday and Sunday to be dubbed in Czech exclusively, explaining that viewers complain because they do not understand Slovak. This objection can be raised validly by the Slovak audiences as well, charging obvious difficult y with Czech." The paper further observes that "every cultivated nation has its rights to dubbing and t herefore there must be a perspective of reckoning with the eventual dubbing of adult films into Slovak as well. It becomes a serious situation in the domain of films for cine - SLOVAKIA 105 ma. The poor attendance which Czech lands and Moravia report at Slovak films is attributed to the comprehension problem-among other factors. For this reason, dubbing Czech onto Slovak films is now under serious consideration." Dr. Andrew Kubina translated by Sister M . Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. The Slovak Dictionary of 1648 The discovery of a Latin-Magyar-Slovak dictionary published by the univerzity press in Trnava in 1648 brings proof that a Slovak literary language existed i~ Slovakia as early as two hundred years before Anton Bernolak, the scholar who codified Slovak grammar in 1787. The earliest listing of this book is found in Csery's catalogue of books published by the Trnava university press (Historia C. R. Scientiarum universitatis Pestiensis, fasc. III ab anno 1641-1660) . It is dated 1648: "Typographia in domo S. Adalberti in platea Pistorum collocata est, et expressit: Vocabularium Ungarico-Slavico-Latinum. Tyrnaviae 1649 in 8° ." In his study A Bibliography of Slovak Writings compiled in 1946, Jan Misianik called attention to this entry in Csery's accmmt. He concluded, however, that the dictionary itself had not been preserved since he was not able to find it anywhere. 1 Finally this work, so significant in the field of Slovak letters was most fortunately discovered by the eminent historian Msgr. Jan Postenyi, a papal prelate, who had searched long years for some trace of it. In 1967, with the help of devoted scholarly friends, he had the good fortune to come upon it in the library of Brno university. The volume is titled "Verborum in institutione gramatica contentorum in ungaricum et sclavonicum translatio. Secundum ordinem Alphabeticum, Tyrnaviae Typis Academicis, per Philippum Jacobum Mayr, Anno 1648."2 The words "Monasterij Rayhrad" are written in ink on the cover of the book. Apparently the book originally belonged to the Benedictine library in Rajhrad. This fifty-page dictionary with words recorded in Slovak is the oldest known Slovak dictionary.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Place of Slovak Among Slavic Languages Description An account of the resource Andrew Kubina, LL.D. Slovakia, Vol. 19 (No. 42), 1969 pp. 99-105 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1969 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/26765bd5010a2a7822479dc74800ceae.pdf 11edbc7e2cceb27a544c1ea73479a25c PDF Text Text 12 SLOVAKIA Three Kinds of Slovak Folk Literature Eva Susan Kucekova The following categories of Slovak folklore represent some of its oldest forms. Lyrical genres, such as m agical formul ae or incantations , ceremonial calendar poetry , and ceremonial fa mily poetry, a re of ritual and ceremonial character. The sample selections introduced in this pa per were taken from a comprehensive modern collection of Slovak folkl ore entitled Slovensky folk16r: Chrestomatia, and edited b y the foremost authority on the subj ect, the late Andrej Melichercfk . 1 Melichercfk based hi s anthology on Pavo! Dobsinsky' s publications , as well a s on other collections of Slovak folklore, for example those edited by Jozef I:. . Holuby, Jan Kollar and Jirf Polfvka . 2 The folklori c material collected by Dobsinsky and others is rendered in the dialect of the region from which it originated. MAGICAL FORMULAE Magical fo rmulae a re incantations associated with ritu als. These non-narrative forms are very ancient and are closely related to ce rem onial calendar poetry. M agical formulae were u sually connec ted with special rites and performed on spec ific occasions and/or holidays . They were often perform ed by semiprofessional m en and women (" wi se m en " and " wise wom en ") who were well versed in m agic. There are two types of incantations: tho se which were supposed to bring a desired effect( " sympathethic magic" ), and those which were supposed to preve nt undes irable and ha rmful effects (" preve ntive magic" ). Incantations we re u sed to brin g a hu sba nd , m ake one fall in love, prevent and cure illness , increase the yield of the fi elds, and also bring illness or bad lu ck upon a n enem y . Some incan tations were chanted primarily by girls or young women. " Puddle, Puddle," " Will ow, Willow," and " And You , Elm ," are typical examples of love incantations. Once m arried , a bride would chant an incanta tion " I Sow the Seed " and wish for good lu ck and prosperity . �SLOVAKIA 13 Magical formulae are rhythmical and based on syntactic parallelisms ; they rely extensively on various euphonic and semantic devices. Due to the fact that magical formulae are so closely associated with magic, their ritual form remains unchanged throughout the centuries . Magical incantations contain many pre-Christian elements, upon which a new layer of C hri st ian symbols has been added . Love Incantations This love incantation shows water as a powerful source of magic. T aken from fords at midnight , water was believed to attract lovers and help a girl get married . While bathing, girls chanted the following incantation: Puddle , puddle,' get me a husband! Above the bridge, below the bridge, let him go nowhere but to our house! Above th e footbrid ge, below th e footbr idge, don 't let him rest but in ou r house 1 I 'm not pouring away, I 'm pouring in: bachelors , wid owers, merchants, fiddlers, even those small boys I call after me, after my body , aft er my clothes , after my heels, a ft er this hou se of ours. Not by my power do I say this, but I say it by the divine power, from J es us Christ till m idn ight. And help me in this God th e Father, the Son , a nd the H oly Ghost!' H oly Trini ty , help me reach hap piness and get married. 1 Kaluza, kalu za, daj muza 1 Vyse mosta, ni ze mosta, aby nemal nikde miesta len u nas! Vyse lavky, ni ze lavky, aby nem al nikd e stavky len u nas 1 Neod lievam, ale prilievam: mladencov, vdovcov, kupcov , aj hudcov , aj tych malickych chlapcov za sebou volam, za mym telom , za m ymi satami, za mym i patami, za tym nasfm domom . J a to nehovorfm ze svej moc1, lez to hovorfm z bozskej m oci, od pana J ezisa Kri sta do pol noci. A k tomu mi dopomahaj Boh otec , Boh sy n , Boh du ch svaty! Svata troj ica , bud mi dobra pomocnica k vse tkemu dobremu, k stavu manzelskemu! p. 54 �14 SLOVAKIA On the eve of St. George ' s Day (April 24) , young girls made wreaths from different kinds of flowers and boughs. Later, wreaths were tossed into the air. It was believed that the girl whose wreath was caught on a tree branch would get married within a year. To attract a beloved, girls would make wreaths from nine different boughs and chant the following incantation: 2 A ty vaz - ty ho vaz, a ty hrab - se m ho hrab , a ty kJen - se m ho zen , a ty svfb - se m ho sib, a ty sip - ty ho stfp , a ty tfn - sem ho hrn , a ty dub - ty ho l'ub , a ty bez - za nim bez, a ty lieska - za nim vri es kaj ! And you, elm - you bind him , and you, hornbeam - rake him here, and you , maple - drive him here, and you , red dogwood - whip him here, and you , wild rose - you prick him, and you , thorn bush - push him here , and you , oak - you love him , and you , lilac - run aft er him , a nd you , hazel, - yell aft er him p . 57 Bridal Incantation A woman married into her husband's family . As soon as the bride entered her husband's house after the wedding, she would scatter flaxs6ed, millet and poppy seed in the yard for good luck , while chanting the following: 2 I sow the seed , to succeed with all my breed ; I sow millet, for others to beg m y fav or; I sow poppy seed , for this to last foreve r. Sejem se m eno, ab y sa mi viedl o vsetko ple meno; sej em proso, aby sa mi vse tci prosili ; sej em m ak, aby bolo vzdycky tak . p . 61 Incantation by the Willow To make sure that they would grow beautiful long hair, young girls would comb their hair under a willow on Good Friday at dawn. While combing their hair, they wished for a good husband . Willow, willow , ge t m e a m an , red as a rose , white as a fl ower, a nd good as honey. ' Vfba, vfb a , d aj mi mu za, ce rve neho a ko ru za a bieleho a ko kve t, a dobreho ako med . p . 62 �SLOVAKIA 15 CEREMONIAL CALENDAR POETRY Ceremonial calendar poetry celebrates different festivals of the year. The original calendar festivals coincided with the solstices and equinoxes. Calendar poetry contains many pre-Christian mythological elements which have been intertwined with and sometimes replaced by Christia n elements. In the calendar poetry of Slovakia a nd other Slavic countries which have been under Catholic influence, Christian features pred ominate. The traditions connected with calendar poetry are still being practi ced in some Slovak villages , particularly around holidays such as Christmas, New Year ' s and Easter. The classification of calendar poetry corresponds to the agricultural cycles, and all four seasons of the year are represented. In the poetry , three seasons are associated with the cultivation of the soil, while the last one is concerned with the harvest itself. The poetry is full of incantations and magical formulae meant to secure a good harvest and placate nature , which was often thought of as hostile. In the pre-Christian era the peasants turned for h elp to their gods and during Christian times to the numerous Christian saints. They would ask for good and prosperous years , abundant harvest, a nd good health and happy family life. Along with incantations and magical formulae, calendar poetry also contains chants , recitations , songs, riddles, and prognostications . In this poetry each season has its own characteristic customs . The winte r solstice cycle , beginning in November , is best represented. Its poetry is of a prophetic nature, and touche s on both family life and the prosperity of the homestead. The most important days of the season were the last 12 before Christmas since they represented the 12 months of the year; these days were used to judge what the weather would be like for the w hole next year. Children went caroling from hou se to house, a nd it was important that they b e healthy for if they were, they would bring good health to the fa rm ers ' fa milies as well . Moreover, the living room h a d to be cleaned a nd whitewashed in eve ry house to preve nt any kind of illn ess from ente rin g. Numerous C hri stmas customs were practiced o n C hristmas Eve . Basicall y , they were meant to express the farmer ' s thanksgiv in g for good crops in the preceding season, a nd to h elp assure a nd predict a good harvest in the forthcoming year. The latter kind were u su ally connected wit h magic . There we re rules of condu ct which were st ri ctl y followed �16 SLOVAKIA on Christmas Eve. For example, one could not light the house unless the Christmas Eve dinner - the biggest meal of the year - was already set on the table. The numerous courses of the meal had to follow acertain sequence . Christmas carolers were offered food and drink , and the boys were also given money. Many of the Christmas carols have a joking tone - besides bringing best wishes they expressly ask for a reward as in ''I Am a Very Small Boy,'' or ''I'm Just a Little Boy .' ' Sometimes they would ask expressly for money as in the carol "We Have Brought You Some News . '' New Year's wishes were also humorous in tone and expressed the good mood which prevailed in every household on that day . It was believed that if one felt happy on New Year's Day , he or she would be happy during the coming year. One song jokingly suggests that the farmer's stove burn out from too much cooking and baking: "I wish you in this/ coming New Year / that a side of your oven / may fall out." Carols for the eve of the Three Magi combine religious and secular motifs. Thus, in " Lord , Grant Us a Merry Evening," best wishes are expressed for everyone in the house, including the servants. Immediately after come Epiphany motifs, dealing with the birth of Christ and the arrival of the Three Kings. The Epiphany carol is concluded with a rather anticlimatic ending: the old man (probably the patriarch of the house) is not at home and has gone hunting. Very often , the boys were masked as the Three Kings, Joseph and Mary, and would perform a co medy based on the ancient legend . The Christmas ceremonial cycle ended with the Three Kings motif. Thematically, then , Slovak ceremonial calendar poetry focuses upon the four cycles of the year and the agricultural tradition con nected with them . It also contains the themes of love and fertility, and elements of ancestor worship, which are not treated here. From the formal point of view, calendar poetry is characte rized by symm etric bipartite verse and the frequent use of asso nance . Pre-Christmas Period The winter cycle of calendar poetry begins with St. Thomas's Day (December 21 ) , the shortest day of the year. Small boys walked around the village with a piece of steel, wishing farmers good lu ck in the next farming year : �SLOVAKIA 17 I have b rought you a piece of steel' so th a t you would not fall out of bed. Have as m a n y calves on yo ur farm as there a re spoons on your shelf. Have as man y oxen in your stable as there are logs in your shed. Let your girls have as many suito rs as there are dishes on your rack. May yo ur lads own as many hafts' as there are hearths in you r house. May as man y youn g men wear feathers in their caps• as you have number of dau ght ers. Have as m a ny more ears of corn in you r backyard as there are pictures on your walls. I ask onl y as many kreuzers' 0 as there are mirrors here. I wish you a good morning 1 Doniesou som vam ocele, aby ste nevypadli z postele. Kol'ko mate za ramom lyz iciek, tol'ko mate vo dvore teliciek; kol'ko mate na sope kolov, tol'ko mate V mastali volov; kol'ko mate za ramom tanierov , tol'ko maju vase dievky frajero v ; kol'ko mate vo vasom dome ohnisk, tol'ko maju vas i parobci porisk ; kol'ko zije vasich deer, tol'ko maju mladenci pier ; kol'ko ma te na stene obrazov , tol'ko raz vo vasom humne kl asov; kol'ko mate tuna zrkadov, !en tol'ko mi dajte krajciarov. Dobro rano vinsujem 1 p. 70 Christmastime Many Christmas carols and son gs are connected with the Christm as season. Both children and ad ults went from house to hou se caroling M erry C hristmas. For their service they expected som e reward. Many of these carols are joking in character, as is evident from the following carols: �18 SLOVAKIA I a m a very sm all boy. M y fa th er has se nt me to you , to ge t so methin g from you , but m ake it qui ck, for m y stomach rumbl es. J a som chl apec ve l'mi m aly, mn a moj otec k vam poslali, zeby ste mi dafo dali , ale chytro , lebo m i uz v bru chu svitlo. p. 70 2 I ' m ju st a little boy. I'm askin g fo r my sm all bag : a pi ece of cake a nd piece o f pie. T omorrow , I ' ll b rin g yo u a bird . If th at see m s too little, I will brin g you so me pork ; and if tha t 's not enough , I 'll b ri ng yo u a cat's ta il. J a so m maly, nevelicky, pyta m se be do ka psicky: kus kola.ca, kus kabaca, d onesiem vam zajtra vtaca. Ak sa vam to ma.lo vid f, d onesiem vam porfov iny; ak je vam to ni e dost', d onesiem va m z m acky chvost. p . 71 3 W e have b rought you so me news, we have come to you r feas t . The Saviour desce nded from H eave n , and we ca me to be your gues ts. A jug of wine is on th e table , and we are under your farm yard window, but you don ' t offer us a n y win e, nor do you have an y brand y th a t we ca n trea t ourselves to, and sing you songs eve n ni ce r . W e don ' t want your past ry, we' ll crac k a few nu ts.'' H ey, we a re not little ki ds , wh o get j ust a kreu ze r apiece. If yo u don ' t give us twe n ty we wo n ' t co me on New Yea r's Day. D oni esli sm e vam novinu , prisli sm e k vam na hos tinu , Sos tupi l Spasti el' z vysosti . M y sm e prisli k va m za hos ti . Krcah s vfn om j e na stole, m y sme pod oblokom v dvore , a nam vina nedavate, palenky ti ez ni c nem a te, co b y sme sa castu va]i a vam krajsie zaspievali . O pekance va m nechcem e, oriesky si poklcieme. A my sme ni e chl a pci m ali, ze by Ste nam krajc iar d ali. Ak na m dvads ia tnik ned a te, na Novy rok nas nema te. p. 71 New Year's Wish es Early in th e m ornin g on New Year's D ay, m en a nd youn g boys went from house to hou se, w ishin g lo ts of lu ck, p rosperity , a nd good h ealth to everyon e in the house . M ost of th eir w ishes foc u sed upon su ccessfu l fa rmin g a nd m a n age m e n t. I wish you in th is coming New Year, V in sujem vam V tento nas tavajuc i nov y rok , �SLOVAKIA that a side of your ove n may fall out , " that your wife may get pregna nt this year! Give us foo d and drink and stay well! 19 aby va m vypadol z pece bok, aby vam bola vasa gazdin a na te nto rok samod ruh a 1 Vypit', zajest' na m d ajte, a dob re sa tu m aj te 1 p . 78 2 l wish you plenty of hemp , bu shels of beets, a whole bin of blossoms, and a ba rnful of children' Vinsujem va m moc konopi, mecu repy , zacinok puckov, plevienec deti 1 p. 79 3 This l wish to all'' with vigo r and joy : to peasants, bags for their shoulders ; to shep herd s, porridge; to cows, good pasture; to pigs, lots of mast to make them fat. Vinsujem smele vse tk ym vese le : sedliakom vrece, pine na piece; pastiero m kase a kravam pase; svi niam zaludu, ze tu cne budu . p . 79 The Three Magi On the eve of Epiphany, children went from house to house, singing carols in which the Epiphany motifs were interspersed with such commonplace motifs as farming and the farmer's eve ryday activity. Lord, grant us a merry eve ning ," to the farmer, first of all! And then to th e farmwife, and then to all the se rvants! The Three M agi a rri ve from the East, wo rshippin g this fam il y. Do not worship this fa mil y but worship only the beloved Lo rd! " And you , bright star, go before us, Lord , Jesus C hri st, grant us a good ni ght! And you , Joseph , I say to you , do not leave the Virgin M ary 1 D on ' t you kn ow who is going to be bo rn ? The Virgin M ary is to bear a so n . There is a red rose on your table , �SLOVAKIA 20 let you r daught er marry a handsome man 1 There is a tu li p atop your table , yo ur son is ge ttin g read y to see his love. There is a handso me fe llow in this house , perhaps he ' d give us six kreu ze rs for a wrea th . God wi ll give him a lovely wife , whether it ' s Anna o r Susanna. The old man is not at home , he went out hunting . D aj nam Boh vecer diz vesely, najprv panu hospodarov i I A poto m aj tej hospod ince, po hospodin ce vseckej cel'adce 1 ldu tri a krali od vychod u , kl a naju sa tomut o rod u. Nekla naj te sa tom uto rod u , len sa kl a najte mil emu Bohu! A ty, j as na hviezd a, predchadzaj nas, pane J ezu Kri ste, dob ru noc nam d as 1 A ty , J ozefe, j a mlu vim tebe, neopust'aj pann y M a rie ! Nevid, co sa m a na sve t narod it'? M a panna Maria sy na porodit'. Na vaso m stole ce rve na ru za, daj vasej panenk e sva rn eho mu za 1 Na vaso m stole tulipan stoji, vas m lad enecek se k fraj erce strojL J est V tomto dome sva rn y ml adenec, azda nam on d a ses tak na veniec. D a jemu Panboh svarnu zenu , Annu alebo Zu za nu . Sta reho pana doma neni, isli oni po pol'uvanL pp. 79-80 Carnival Season Th e post-Chri stmas period does not present as m a n y cerem onies as th e C hri stmas season. The tim e of fasiangy (carni val season) was ch aracte rized b y a m asked procession which was to secure a good harvest. Th e carniv al processio n h ad mu sical accompaniment , u su all y a n accordi on . Most en gaged couples were also married during carnival season , sin ce there w as rela tively plenty of time for elaborate weddi n g celebration s, w hi ch las ted for several d ays. At the e nd of th e carnival seaso n , young m e n in ce re monial m asks we nt from ho u se to ho u se, collecting eggs, bacon , a nd m o ney. They �SLOVAKIA 21 would sing humorous songs, such as " Shrovetide, P entecost. . m which they would ask for a piece of bacon . From these donations they would arrange a feast for the youth of the entire village. The main course was bacon and eggs, while the money paid for the music . Shrovetide, P entecos t, and Easter pass by, 16 he who has no fur coat , feels cold . I have none, I have none, I ' m shakin g all over, give me some bacon " to fill my belly . H ere I got nothin g, over there something, maybe. They killed a m osqu ito , a nd got some bacon . There up the chimney," a tom cat sits on the bacon , go chase him away and cut me a piece; if you cut me too sm all a piece, you will cut your fin gers. Give to the teacher " a piece as big as a d oo r , to me , a piece as big as a goose. Fasangy, Turice, V el'ka noc byva, kto nem a kozucha, zima mu byva. Ja nemam, ja nem a m , !en sa tak tras im , daj te mi slaninky, nech sa popasim . Tuto mi nedali , tuto mi d aj u, K om a ra zabili , slaninku m aj u . A ta m hore na komin e, sedi kocur na sla nin e, h ybajte ho zohn at' a mne ku s odrezat', az mi mal y odrezete, svoje prsty poreze te. R echtorovi j ako dve re a mn e ku s - ako hus 1 pp . 82-83 Easter The spring custom s include taking out Morena (the goddess of dea th in the p agan Slavic traditio n) , ta king out the old m a n (dedko - possibly a m ale equivalent of Moren a), and welcoming in the n ew summe r . However , the sprin g ce remonial cycle is cente red prim a rily around Easter , the most important religious holiday of the season . Easte r customs still co nta in m a ny pre -Christia n ele m e nts, which have been prese rved up to the 20th century . For example, on Good Friday a t d awn, girls would chant incantations while ba thing, wishing for a hu sba nd (see " Pud- �22 SLOVAKIA dle, Puddle" in the preceding section). On Easter Monday, groups of ten to fifteen men and boys went from house to house, wishing the womenfolk a Happy Easter. It was a part of the tradition that they flogged women's legs with a birch switch and doused their heads with fresh water. This proced ure had a symbolic purifying function . If a young man was courting a particular young woman, he was expected to visit her house , thus showing his interest and affection. Then, the girl would reward her favorite suitor with the most lavishly decorated Easter egg. Besides the eggs, everybody would also receive drinks, food, sweets, and little boys would get money. Easter, Easter, will it come soon? which lad will pour water over me] Pour the water , pour the water, on my hair and head , but do spare my nice new skirt. Vel'ka noc , Vel'ka noc, kedyze uz bude? ktoryze ma suhaj oblievati prfde? Oblievaj, oblievaj, vlasy aj hlavicku , ale mi zasanuj tu novu suknicku. p . 93 Pentecost marked the beginning of the summer cycle. Many traditions were centered around the summer solstice and St. John's Eve CTune 24). On that day, love incantations were chanted and the future was foretold . Also, magic was practiced against witches whose power was believed very strong on that day. The later part of the summer season is poorer in folklore because of increased work in the fields . Harvest The autum cycle begins with the harvest season . During the harvest season, songs were sung in the fields, or on the way home after a day 's work. Thematically , they are associated with the work itself, love between two young people ("We Reaped Here") , or the feast following the work ("Master, Make Ready for a Feast "). Some of these songs are joking in tone . The songs sung around the harvest wreath reflect old Slovak customs . After the harvest, a procession of harvesters would walk from the fields to the house of the farmer who had hired them . Led by a young man who was carrying a colorful flag and a young woman wearing a wreath made of wild flowers , they would sing songs and some- �SLOVAKIA 23 times play music ("For Which Girl Shall We Weave a Wreath Today?"). In these songs, the peasants expressed their joy and happiness over a rich harvest. They also expressed their hope for the same bounty for the years to come. Harves t time offers a whole series of songs connected with this important agricultural season. They may refer to the work itself, or love between a young girl and a young man from the same village, or else the rest during the break or at the end of the day . W e reaped here , we reaped the re , in the valley, in th e valley, and the birdie, mottled birdie keeps singing, kee ps singin g. Kde sm e zali , tu sme fali , na doline , na doline , a ten vtacik, jarabacik pres pevuje , prespevuje. As the birdie , mottled birdie goes around th e tree , a rou nd the tree , so does m y d ea r, m y beloved go around me, around me . J ak ten vtacik, jarabacik okolo pna , okolo pna , tak moj mil y, najmilejsf okolo mna , okolo mn a. We reaped here , we reaped th ere, behind a path , behind a path , whoever will be our master, our clerk, our clerk? Kde sme zali , tu sme fali, za chonnfkom , za chonnfkom , ktoze bude nas fm panom , ura nnfkom , ura nnfkom ? p . 99 2 Master, make read y for a feas t, for a feast , we ' ve don e all the work for you . Master , prepa re the repast , th e repas t , a twelve- pound roas t. Add to it pints of wine , pints of wine, and a roasted capon. H otuj , pa ne , oldomas, oldomas , zrob ili sme , kd e co mas. H otuj , pa ne , veceru , vece ru, d vanas t' funtov pecenu . Este k tom u pint vfna, pint vfna, peceneho kapuna . p. 100 Around the h arvest wreath might be sung the foll owing song: 3 For which girl shall we weave a wreath today? For th e one chose n by the handsom es t young ma n . Wh o shall we let ca rry th e fl ag tod ay ? The one who hands hi s ri ght ha nd to her . T hat Ond1·is Slavik a nd Anna Bl ahej , �SLOVAKIA 24 they would make a nice couple would Lord grant it. Masters, our masters , open the gates, we bring you a gift - a nice pair of reapers. Harvesters back from the fields , cover the tables, the mapl e tables with linen tabl e-cloths. Ktorejze dnes, ktorej uvijeme veniec~ Tej, ktoru vyberie najkrajsi mladenec . Komuze dnes , komu dame niest' zastavu? Tomu , co jej poda svoju rucku pravu. Ten Ondris Slavike, ta Anna Blaheje, to by bou pekny par, keby im Panboh dau! Pani nasi, pani, otvarajte brany, nesieme vam darik, zencov pekny parik. Idu zenci z roli, prestierajte stoly, stoly javorove, obrusy kmentove. p. 100 CEREMONIAL FAMILY FOLKLORE Ceremonial family folklore focuses primarily on the most important events in an individual's life: birth, marriage and death . While only songs are discussed here (they are the most common form), the Slovak ceremonial family tradition is expressed in poems, proverbs, sayings, riddles, and short dramatic performances as well. Christening Songs In the distant past , the birth of a child was accompanied by rituals and many magic practices . Such practices, it was believed, would protect the mother and her child, and would also secure health and happiness for the child as he or she matured. These magic practices gradually developed into joyful, social celebrations to welcome the new member of the family . 10 Thematically, the christening songs are directly connected with the child's birth and prospects. They frequently mention the responsibilities and problems connected with his or her upbringing, and wish the child a happy life, prosperity, and even a good spouse. Some songs stress the importance attached to having male offspring: '' And if you my wife,/would have a boy ... " If the child is a girl, the song may wish her beauty, or possibly stress the importance of chastity or industrious- �25 SLOVAKIA ness: " Freedom and chastity prevail everywhere, / whichever girl has them , let her guard them .'' Other songs may express the abruptly felt loss of freedom experienced by the young parents , especially the new mother: '' ... m y freedom is crying in the cradle.'' M any songs are j okin g in tone and form the less serious part of the christening ceremony in Slovak villages . H ere, for example, the new parents tease each other a bout their responsibility for rocking the baby: '' Rock him , m y dear . .. I'm his mother.'' And here again, the m other m ockin gly compares her situation with that of the carefree life of unm arried m en and women: " I used to have a good time , ... m y maiden name/ is blotted out," or " As the maiden s d ance . . . while I , poor thing , / rock a baby ." Slovak christening songs usually have the following rhyme pattern : aa-bb-cc-dd. The number of syllables is usually the same in each line. Man y songs use assonance and employ colloquial express10ns . J ano , J ano, mily Jano! Donesu ti chl apca rano. K ed donesu , budem mati , vychova ho moja mati. A ked puojdem dolinami , vychovam ho malina mi , a ked puojdem sfrym svetom vychovam ho bielym kvetom . J ohn, John dear J ohn" They will bring you a boy tomorrow. Wh en they bring him, I'll keep him ," my mother wi ll raise him . And when I go down the valleys, I will raise him on raspberri es, and when I go in the wide world , I will raise him on white flo wers. p. 143 2 If you , m y wife," would have a boy, I would hire a wet nurse , a chef, a cook, a caretaker , and a house keeper. K eby si ty, zena moja , chlapca mal a, drzau by ti dojku , kuchara , kucharku, i safa ra i safarku. p. 144 3 Freedom and chastity prevail everyw here," whichever girl has th em, let her guard them . I would have protected mine, but it is too late. my freedom is crying in th e cradle. Sloboda, poctivost', ta vsade panuj e, kt ore j u di evca ma, nech si ju va ruje. I ja bych si moju , uz je ponecase, uz moja slobod a V belcove m i place. p . 144 �26 SLOVAKIA 4 As the maidens dance," they whirl around in circles, while I, poor thing, rock a baby. J a k tie panny tancuju, do kola sa zvrcuju, a ja neboz ia tko kolfsem diet'at ko. Rock him, my d ea r husband , he is such a lovely boy. Rock him yourself, you are his mother . Kolfbaj ho moj mily, vsak je synak spanily. Kolfbaj si sama, vsak si mu ty mama. I would be a fool to rock him by myself, You surely are his father just as I 'm his mother. Bola by ja blazon kolfba ti sama, vsak si mu ty otec jako i ja mama . I used to have a good time when luck served me, sitting by the window, with a handsome young man . Byvalo mi, byvalo, ked' mi stestia sluzilo, sedajfcej v okne, s mladeneckom pekne. I used to sit with him , now I am married to him , m y maiden name was blotted out. Sedala som, sedala, u z sem ho i dostala, me panenske jmeno bolo vymazano. pp. 144-45 Wedding Songs Of the three areas of ceremonial family folklore discussed here, the wedding ceremony offers the greatest variety of folklore material. This is because in Slovakia the wedding ceremonies of most villages and towns contained traditions that were peculiar to that particular locale . There were often specific differences between the ceremonies of neighboring villages even within a relatively small geographic area. 16 The entire ritual consisted of three parts: the period before the wedding during which a wedding contract was m ade between the future inlaws; the wedding ceremo ny itself, and the feast after the young couple had retired. The wedding actually began when the wedding guests gathered and the bride and groom left for the ceremony in the church. The first five selections under the headin g "Wedding Songs" are examples of what the wedding party might sing along the way. After the ceremony the bride and groom as well as the guests would arrive at the bride groom's h ouse , where the festivities would take place . The feast was and still is the culmination of the whole wedding. The structure of the entire wedding ceremon y was originally quite �SLOVAKIA 27 rigid . There were dan ces, ceremonial speeches, dramatic speeches and acts, as well as songs. All proceeded according to a traditionally fixed pattern . 1 7 Today, the songs themselves are no longer a part of the ceremony, and while many of the other forms remain (such as dances and speeches) the rigid , traditional patterns are no longer followed . Thematically, the bride is the focus of the often-lyrical and teasing ceremonial songs. Her beauty , upbringing, future as a married woman, and her character are all described in these songs: "Mother, mother, you have a lovely daughter''; ''Mother, mother, you may be proud . . . '' The most frequently mentioned virtues on the bride's part are modesty , diligence , obedience, and chastity. Some of the songs, especially those following the taking of the wreath and placing of the bonnet on the bride's head (when she symbolically becomes a woman), are permeated with laments: ''I lost my headdress . .. I like wearing it.'' Other songs picture the bride taking leave of her parents, relatives and friends: thanking her parents for her upbringing, expressing her sorrow about leaving them, and sometimes also expressing apprehension about her future with the bridgegroom' s family. Wedding songs and speeches employ rhymed verse, often of the following pattern : aa-bb-cc. The number of syllables is usually the same in each line. As in christening songs, wedding songs also employ assonance. Mother, mother, you have a lovely daughter , we will take her from you even if you hide her. Should you lock her behind four locks, we sure will get her with fin e words. Mamicka , mamicka, peknu dceru mate, m y vam ju vezmeme , co ju aj schovate . Co by ste ju zamkli aj styrma zamka mi , my ju dostaneme peknymi slova mi. p. 151 2 G et married , ge t ma rried , m y love, well will you learn what tyranny is. Get m arried , get m arri ed, my love , a birch switch awaits you behind th e door. V ydaj sa !en, vydaj , frajeruock a rn oj a, sak sa ve ru dozvies , aka je to zvola. V ydaj sa !en , vyd aj, fraj eruocka moj a, caka t'a za dve rmi ta b rezova hola. p. 151 �28 SLOVAKIA 3 I kept it a sec ret, a secret, but I won't anymore, mother, ge t the feath erbeds" read y, I ' m ge ttin g m ar ried. Thank you , mother , thank you, d ea r , for taking care of me wh ile I was a child . T aj ila som , taji la, uz tajit' nebudem , chystaj , m am ka, perin y, vydavat' sa budem . Dakujem va m , mamicka, dakujem va m sta ra, co ste vy mna chovali , kym so m bola mala . p . 152 4 M ot he r, mot her, you may be proud th at yo ur girl 's gettin g married still chaste. Chaste , she's getting ma rri ed to a you ng man , they both will be wearing a rosemary wreat h .'" Mamicka, mamicka , pekn a vasa chvala , ze sa vafa d ieuka poct iva vydava. Poctiva vyd ava, be ri e ju ml ade nec, budu mat' obidva z rozmarinu ve ni ec. p . 152 5 Whateve r yo u give me, oh, eternal Lord , just don ' t give me a n old hag with children . An old hag rumbl es like a ba rrel of bee r a nd a young girl ' s jumpy like a squirrel. I ' II give the old hag a fl a tca ke 10 to chew on, and th e yo ung gi rl a pair of boots to jump in . Co mi das, to das, pa ne boze vecny, !en ze mi nedavaj staru babu s det'mi. A ta stara dud le, ako z piva bocka a ta mlada skace a ko veve ru ocka. D am starej Osucha , aby ho fova la , ml ad ej na cizmicky, aby si skaka la. p. 152 On the way back from the church , the weddin g party sings songs like the following: 6 Now you a re ours, Ann ie, now you are ours, we a re tak in g you home from the wedd ing. They paid a lotll for your wedd ing, we have tied your hands with a stole . 1 ' Uz si ty, An icka, uz si teraz nasa, uz t'a my ved ieme domov ze sobasa . Od tvojho sobasa tvrdy toliar dali, uz sme tvoje rucky stolou poviazali. p . 153 �SLOVAKIA 29 7 Jaj , co si plakala, ked t'a sobasili? Var si si m ys lela l'ubit' sa s inymi ? A ja som sa bala tej tvojej materi, ked' ona ma jazyk zo samej oceli . Oh , why did you cry at your wedding? Maybe you thought of loving others? No, I was afraid of your moth er , becau se she has a tongue of steel. p. 154 During the wedding feast the bridgegroom and bride may sing to each other: 8 Bridegroom: Welcome, d ear little dove," half of my heart 1 I'm fl ying from bu sh to bush to see your cheeks. As soon as my heart spotted you, it looked back with joy , m y wish was fulfill ed. I want to ask you , Molly , are you willing to m a rry m e? will your fat her let you go? do you want to be my wife? Vitaj, mila holubicka, muojho srdca polovicka 1 Lietam od kricka do kricka, abych videl tvoje licka . J ak t'a moje srdce zrelo , od radosti zas pozrelo , podl'a vuoli sa mi stalo. Chcem sa, Marka, t'a p ytati, m as ty vuolu za mna iti , ci t'a otec chce pu stiti , ci chces mojou zenou byti? p. 161 Bride: You can't find fault with me, yo u can do as you please. Wh y should I spare myself, 34 when I like to see you. You can profit from m e Wh a t ca n I d o? I can tear old shirts to rags , throw wood into the stove, in the kitchen I have good luck, I can cook cabbage wit hout lard, and you wi ll li ck your fingers. l can make scrambled eggs , as my fat her knows . You , m y fat her , tell them what a special di sh it is 135 Nieto na mne ziadna chyba , mozes robit', co ti treba. Co by lutovala seba, ked' ja rada vidim teba . Zo mn a m ozes osoh vziati, co zo mn a moze vystati? Viem starie kosele driapat', dreva do peci nam eta t', aj v ku chyni sa mi stescf, mozem navar it' kapusty bez mas ti , oblfzes prsty. Viem spravit' praze ni cu z vaj ec. o com vie svadobny otec. T y pan svadobny otec povedz , aka je to obzvlastna vec 1 p. 161 The bonneting of the bride had its own special songs . 36 �SLOVAKIA 30 9 I lost m y headdress," m y green wreath, " the best m an" fo und it , a ha ndso me yo ung m an . H ey, bes t m an , best ma n , I beg of you , give me bac k that headb and , I like wearing it. If you like wearing that head ba nd so mu ch , surely you ' d ask the best man more ni cely . Stratila som partu, zeleny ve ni ec, nasiel mi ju dru zba, sva rny ml adenec. H ej , dru zba, hej, dru zba, pekn e t'a prosfm , d ajze mi tu partu , rad a ju nosfm 1 K eby si ty pa rtu rada nosila, ve ru by si druzbu krajsie prosila . p . 163 10 The bell s of r.upca' 0 have a ve ry ni ce rin g," 1 Annie , they ' ll kn ock off yo u r head ba nd . They will kn ock it off with nin e bells, so you won ' t go out with oth er yo un g men . So you won't go out , just love your husband , th e handso me J ohnn y, who is d evo ted to you . Tie lupcian ske zvo ny vel'mi pekne zvo ni a, u z tebe, Ani cka, tvoju pa rtu zro ma . Zronia ti ju , zronia deviatimi zvo ncf, abys nechodil a s cudzfmi mladencf. Abys nechodil a, mu za si l'ubila , Janfcka svarnyho, tebe oddan yho. p . 163 Wailing Over the Dead The practice of wailing over the dead form ed a n integral p a rt of the fun e ral ceremony , a nd according to the Muran Articles of the Protestant Church from 1585 , wailing had been widely practiced in Slovakia.42 The lam ents were performed by semi-professional wailers , usually by older women , who wailed a t the funeral for a fe e. Some times , the laments were perform ed by rela tives. The laments over the d ead were generally improvi sed on the spur of the moment , with the hired person attempting to express lyrically the dee p sorrow felt by the relatives and friends of the deceased. They also m e ntioned the good traits of the deceased, the progress of hi s or her illn ess (as in " Oh , My D ear Child "), and would dram atize the actual d emise of the deceased , portraying him as he took leave of hi s fa mily, relatives, and friends. The laments over the d ead are st ru ctured differentl y from other folklore genres . Since they h ad to be open for improvisa tions , they are �SLOVAKIA 31 free in form. They usuall y do not have regular stanzas or rhyme. Assonance predominates over rhym e and they are sung as melodic recitations. Laments can be characterized not only b y the lack of formal structure, but also by a certain degree of looseness and incoherency, possibly utilized to stress the depth of sorrow felt by the relatives and friends . This looseness is demonstra ted in the poem "George , George" in which the last two stanzas are only vaguely related to the theme of the first two stanzas. Oh , my dear child , beloved Angel," what shall I do without you , my dear souJ? My hea rt was bleeding while you were suffering, you looked at me, I couldn ' t help. Your fath er was walking stunned in the yard , walkin g aimlessly, not saying a word . You chattered to me your sweet words th e wh ole day, you dear innocent ch ild , a nd when you r father came home from th e fi elds, you smiled so that he would take you in his arms , and th ere was no end to your talking, and your father took d elight in you, hi s treasure. Ach, moj e drah uo diet'a, anjel premileny, cuo pocnem bez teba, moj a draha dusa, srdce mi zatislo, ked si sa trapilo, hl'adelo si na mna, nemohla som pomuoct'. Otec ti po dvore omrace ny chodiu , nikde miesta nemau, slov ka nepovedau. Stebotalo si mi slad uskymi recmi cely den, ty draha nevinnost ' premila , a ked otec z pol'a do domu sa vratiu, usmi evalo si sa, kym t'a k sebe nevzau, a n ebolo recom tvojim dlh o konec , a otec sa tesiu v tebe drahy poklad. p. 164 2 George, George, yo ur godfather ca me ," for yo u to plow hi s fi elds. You a re through with plowing since the Lord called you. Juro , Juro , km otor prise!, aby si mu orat' isol. A ty si uz dooral , ked' t'a panboh povolal. Ycs te rd ay you ate three sa usages," a nd a lot of bread. 46 Today you lie on th e bier, like a hog on a ca rt . Y ce ra si zjel tri jelita , aj chl eba z polk yky zita. Dnes uz lezis na marach ako bravec na karach. �32 SLOVAKIA M y dea r go lde n m oustache" would be fit fo r strin gs, my ve r y d ear ha ir , would be good fo r ropes. M oje m ile, zlate fuzy, boli ze by na mot u zy, moj e premile vlasy boli by na povrazy. Wh en he bega n to play hi s bagpipe: " tati -lat i, ta ti-l a ti ," he go t a farth ering" to bu y spices, he dropped it behind his shirt. K ed si pocal gajdovati : ta ti -lati , ta ti-l ati , ma! turak na koreni a, vsy pal ho do zahreni a. p . 165 NOTES ' Andrej M elichercfk , ed. , Slo vensky Folkl6r: Chrestomatia (Bra tislava: Slove nska Akademi a Vied, 1959) . ' J ozef r. . Holuby, Folklore studi es published ma inl y in Slovenske Pohl'ad y between 1883 a nd 1897; Jan Kolla r , N arodnie spievanky, I-II (Bra ti slava, 1953); Jii'i Polivka, Supis slo ven skych rozpravok I-V (Turciansky Svaty M artin , 1923 -1932). ' The fo lkloric ma teri al collected by Dobsinsky a nd oth ers is re ndered in th e dialec t o f the region fro m which it origina ted . The page reference to M elichercfk is give n in th e tex t a ft er th e Slovak ori ginal. ' " Puddle, Puddle ." In the Slova k, this love inca nta ti on has an irregul a r rhym e (aabbb-c-ddd-c-ee-fff- e-g-hh-g- iii -j- k-ll -m m) whi ch was sac rificed in th e tra nsla ti on fo r the sake of accuracy. • Although th e magical for mulae are pagan in origin , they contain refe rences to C hristi a nit y. ' Lit. · " H oly T rinity,/be a good helpe r to me/ to eve rythin g good,/ to the state of m a trimon y" (II. 26-29). 6 The colors refer to the body: red or pink cheeks were considered a sign of good health , a nd a white co m plex ion was much valued by both men and women, partl y as a sign of class di stin ction . O nly feuda l lords and wealth y merchants who di d not have to work in th e fi elds could afford to have white skin a ll year aro un d. " H oney " is a traditi onal refe rence to good te mper . 7 " I have brought you a piece of steel. . " With the exce ption of the wishes in the las t lin e, the Slova k poe m co nsis ts of rh ym in g co upl ets. All bu t 11 . 1 and 2 a re revised in order to con vey a prope r word order in English . Steel (iron) was co ns idered p ro tect ion aga ins t evil and fa iries in Europe (Maria Tymocz ko). ' H a ft is a ha nd le of a hoe, ax, scyt he, and oth er ag ricultu ral tools. H ere the number of hafts represen ts the far mer 's pros perity. 9 A typical orname n t a mong young marri ed village me n . Wh en give n by a you ng unm a r ried women, th e feather was co nside red a sign of affect ion. '° K re u ze r (o r kreutzer) was a small cop per coin in Aust ri a and Ge rmany, the 100th part of th e fl orin . It was so called because th e coin had th e fi gu re of a cross on it. A penny wou ld be probabl y the closest co n temporary eq ui valent to the kreuzer. " Wal nu ts and hazlenu ts were trad itionally eaten at C hristmas tim e after the ma in meal. �SLOVAKIA 33 " " I wi sh you in thi s/comin g New Yea r " : This is a very popular N ew Year 's wish . The unu su al wi sh , " that a side of your oven/ m ay fa ll out" (11 .3 -4) probably ha s the same conn otat ion as th e En gli sh '' break a leg!'' It also sugges ts a wi sh of prosperity to the farm er , i.e., th a t hi s oven m ay be fill ed to burstin g, or ove rh eated with con stant cooki ng a nd baking. " Fo rmall y, thi s poe m is arran ged in rh ymin g coupl ets but asson an ce plays a m o re impo rtant role . " This carol is loosely a rra nged in rh yming couplets. Again, the assonance a nd the rhym e take precedence ove r m eanin g, and thi s ex plains why such seemingly unrela ted them es as th e Three Kings, the Star of Bethlehem , J oseph and M a ry o n the one hand, and the rose, th e tulip on the ta ble, and the old man's huntin g expedition on th e other ha nd , fo und their place in thi s carol. The carol is a mi xture of religious and secular m otifs. " C hildren , dressed as the Three Magi, arrive a t a farmh ou se and sing. Yet they mu st no t sin g a bout the fa rm er ' s fa mil y, but the H oly Famil y of the Na tivity. 16 ' ' Sh rovetide, Pentecos t, and Easter ... '' This j okin g carnival song is ar ranged in rh ym in g coupl ets. 11 Fatback bacon (usual ly with no lean m eat) was a staple diet , often a snack, fo r village peo ple. It was ofte n eaten with baked potatoes a nd _onio ns, o r j ust plain bread . 18 Fa tback baco n u sed to be sm oked (cured ) in th e chimn ey. 19 The teac her , alo ng with the p riest a nd th e m ayo r , was amon g th e m ost prominent peo ple in th e vill age. 0 ' S loven sko: l', ud - II. cast', ed s. Boze na Filova et al. (B ra ti slava: O bzo r , 1975). " In the Slovak o ri ginal, thi s son g has a regula r rh yme pat tern: aa-b b-cc-dd . The first two lines ad d ress th e m a in speaker . " J oh n" is appa ren tl y a youn g fath er whose wife d ied in childbirth . T he fat her says that he will kee p his so n , but the boy ' s grandmoth er will have to bring him up . Them a ticall y, the so ng expresses conce rn fo r th e boy ' s upbringin g. In the seco nd stan za , the speake r ind icates that he m ay have to leave hi s nat ive vill age, probably in search of wo rk . T hi s was a co mm on prac ti ce among im poverished village rs. " Lit .: " I 'll have. " In 11. 3 an d 4 coll oqui al form s of the ve rb " to have " and the nou n " m other" have bee n used. The forms a re iden tical: mati , wh ich fac il itates th e rh ym e and keeps th e sam e num ber of syll a bles in each line. There a re eight sylla bles in each line, and th e standa rd m o nosy lla bic word m at' wo uld have redu ced th e syll a bles dow n to seven in 11 .3 a nd 4 . " The origin al son g uses assonance ra ther th an rh ym e. A fat her-to-be is th e speaker in this so ng . H alf-jokin g , he stresses the importance of a male offspring. H e p rom ises to pa m pe r hi s wife if she bears him a son . " The original so ng uses asson a nce . T he speaker , proba bly an un wed m o th er, po nders her fat e a nd talks a bout social conve nti on s. " W ith th e excepti o n of stanza 3, the so ng has a near regul a r rh ym e: aa-bb-cc-dd-e -fg- f-hh- ii -jj- kk. T he speaker in th is so.ig is the ba by 's moth er who regrets th e loss of her freedo m as a mother and/or a wife . It is not qu ite clear from the context wheth er she is m a rri ed o r no t. I n either case, it was not proper of her to joi n the ca refree d a nce of unm arri ed m en a nd wome n . �34 6 SLOVAKIA Slovensko: E,ud, p. 1057. " Melichercfk , p. 26 " A featherbed is a strong cloth con tainer thi ckly filled with goose feathers and down and used as a bed cover in lieu of blankets. Featherbeds were a part of the bride's dowry, which also included pillows, sheets, towels, cloths, etc . The dowry was collected throughout the years practically after the day the girl was born . Goose down and stripped feathers were collected ever y year from the fami ly's fl ock of geese and stashed in a special bag for each d aughter in the family. The wealthier the bride , the higher the pile of featherbeds and pillows atop her bed . " A rosemary wreath was a decoration used on such occasions as weddings and funerals . H ere it is a symbol of chastity. 0 ' A fl atcake (osuch ) is a simple, flat cake, usually round. It is baked from bread dough , which is sometimes mixed with a different type of fl our or else potatoes. " Lit .: "They paid a hard thaler for your wedding ," obviously meaning the dowry. Thaler (also taler) was a large silver coin u sed in various German states and in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was worth 30 silver groschen, worth about 3s. sterling . The word "dollar" is derived from " th aler." " R efe rring to the priest's vestments durin g the wedding ce remony, the stole is a long, decorated strip of cloth worn like a scarf by officiating clergymen of various chu rches. 33 In the Slovak original, each line consists of eight syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aaaa-bbb-cccc. " The meaning is not quite clear here. It probably indicates the bride's submission to the groom . 35 In this poem, each line consists of eight syllables . The rh yme pattern is: aaaa-bb-ccbbb-dddd. 36 Bonneting of the bride is the culmination of the wedding ceremony. The bride becomes a married woman when her wreath is replaced by a bonnet. 31 Headband or headdress is a wreath decorated with colorful ribbons, worn by un married women and brides. Married women wore bonnets or scarves. 38 Each line in this song consists of eleven syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aa-bb-cc. 39 It was customary that the best man led the bride to the wedding and took off her wreath or headband. H e led the bride down the aisle, whereas the bridesmaid led the bridegroom down the aisle. He was referred to as the " leading " best man and wore a sword to distinguish himself from other best men who wore sticks decorated with scarves . '° Cupca is a town in Central Slovakia, where many local customs and traditions have been preserved. 41 Each line in this song consists of twelve syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aa-bb-c-d. " Melichercfk, p . 142. 43 This lame ntation has a sporadic rhyme pattern: a-b-c-d-ee-f-g-ee- h-i. The lines consist of 12 to 13 syllables. 44 The poem has the following rhym e pattern: aa-bb-cc-dd-ee-ff-gg-hh . The lines consist of seven to eight syllables. 45 Pork sausage in natural casing. It is made of rice or grits combined with ground meat , liver, blood and spices. The sausages were usu all y made in winter or early ' �SLOVAKIA 35 spring when the fatt ened pigs were slaughtered . " '' ... a lot of bread.'' This is a free translation due to the discrepancy in the printed word indicating the amount of rye from which the bread was made . The original version of this song, titled, " W a iling over a D ead Husband" (Sbomik slovenskych n arodnych piesnf, povestf, prfslovf, porekadiel, hadok, hier, obycajov a povier [A Collection of Slovak Folk Songs, Riddles, Games, Customs, and Superstitions], II , (Turciansky Sva ty Martin : Matica slovenska, 18741) spells the wordpolkyly, which would mean half a kilo. On the other hand , Melichercik's edition lists the word polkyky (fem. gen. sg. ), which was an old , popula r measure in Slovak villages . The word k yky is of Ukrainian ori gin (a Ukrainian word for a scarf worn by village women, "babushka" type). ·since scales were a luxury item in the past, the amount of rye from which a loaf of bread was m ade was m easured in the scarf. Pol means half, i.e., the bread was made from half the amount measured by the scarf. 47 The poem , somewhat joking in character, shows the improvising character of funeral recitations. The stanzas wander from one subject to another, touching some memories of the dead man that may o r may not be relevant for the occasion of the funeral, but they are important in the eyes of the wailer. " " Farthing" is a free translation, indicating that the coin was small. In the Slovak original , turak was a small coin , worth one and a half groschen . It was used in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This paper is based on a doctoral dissertation , " Slovak Folklore : An Anthology, " at the Un iversity of M assachuset ts in Amh erst , 1982. I th ank especially Professors Sarah N. Lawall a nd Zdenek Salzmann . Presented in part in P anel 128 , " Slovak Literature as a Mirror of the National Awakening ," at the AAASS co nvention in Philadelphia on 8 November 1980 , and in Panel 65 , "The Village in Slovak Literature ," at the AAASS convention in Asiloma r , California on 2 1 September 1981. � 12 SLOVAKIA Three Kinds of Slovak Folk Literature Eva Susan Kucekova The following categories of Slovak folklore represent some of its oldest forms. Lyrical genres, such as m agical formul ae or incantations , ceremonial calendar poetry , and ceremonial fa mily poetry, a re of ritual and ceremonial character. The sample selections introduced in this pa per were taken from a comprehensive modern collection of Slovak folkl ore entitled Slovensky folk16r: Chrestomatia, and edited b y the foremost authority on the subj ect, the late Andrej Melichercfk . 1 Melichercfk based hi s anthology on Pavo! Dobsinsky' s publications , as well a s on other collections of Slovak folklore, for example those edited by Jozef I:. . Holuby, Jan Kollar and Jirf Polfvka . 2 The folklori c material collected by Dobsinsky and others is rendered in the dialect of the region from which it originated. MAGICAL FORMULAE Magical fo rmulae a re incantations associated with ritu als. These non-narrative forms are very ancient and are closely related to ce rem onial calendar poetry. M agical formulae were u sually connec ted with special rites and performed on spec ific occasions and/or holidays . They were often perform ed by semiprofessional m en and women (" wi se m en " and " wise wom en ") who were well versed in m agic. There are two types of incantations: tho se which were supposed to bring a desired effect( " sympathethic magic" ), and those which were supposed to preve nt undes irable and ha rmful effects (" preve ntive magic" ). Incantations we re u sed to brin g a hu sba nd , m ake one fall in love, prevent and cure illness , increase the yield of the fi elds, and also bring illness or bad lu ck upon a n enem y . Some incan tations were chanted primarily by girls or young women. " Puddle, Puddle," " Will ow, Willow," and " And You , Elm ," are typical examples of love incantations. Once m arried , a bride would chant an incanta tion " I Sow the Seed " and wish for good lu ck and prosperity . �SLOVAKIA 13 Magical formulae are rhythmical and based on syntactic parallelisms ; they rely extensively on various euphonic and semantic devices. Due to the fact that magical formulae are so closely associated with magic, their ritual form remains unchanged throughout the centuries . Magical incantations contain many pre-Christian elements, upon which a new layer of C hri st ian symbols has been added . Love Incantations This love incantation shows water as a powerful source of magic. T aken from fords at midnight , water was believed to attract lovers and help a girl get married . While bathing, girls chanted the following incantation: Puddle , puddle,' get me a husband! Above the bridge, below the bridge, let him go nowhere but to our house! Above th e footbrid ge, below th e footbr idge, don 't let him rest but in ou r house 1 I 'm not pouring away, I 'm pouring in: bachelors , wid owers, merchants, fiddlers, even those small boys I call after me, after my body , aft er my clothes , after my heels, a ft er this hou se of ours. Not by my power do I say this, but I say it by the divine power, from J es us Christ till m idn ight. And help me in this God th e Father, the Son , a nd the H oly Ghost!' H oly Trini ty , help me reach hap piness and get married. 1 Kaluza, kalu za, daj muza 1 Vyse mosta, ni ze mosta, aby nemal nikde miesta len u nas! Vyse lavky, ni ze lavky, aby nem al nikd e stavky len u nas 1 Neod lievam, ale prilievam: mladencov, vdovcov, kupcov , aj hudcov , aj tych malickych chlapcov za sebou volam, za mym telom , za m ymi satami, za mym i patami, za tym nasfm domom . J a to nehovorfm ze svej moc1, lez to hovorfm z bozskej m oci, od pana J ezisa Kri sta do pol noci. A k tomu mi dopomahaj Boh otec , Boh sy n , Boh du ch svaty! Svata troj ica , bud mi dobra pomocnica k vse tkemu dobremu, k stavu manzelskemu! p. 54 �14 SLOVAKIA On the eve of St. George ' s Day (April 24) , young girls made wreaths from different kinds of flowers and boughs. Later, wreaths were tossed into the air. It was believed that the girl whose wreath was caught on a tree branch would get married within a year. To attract a beloved, girls would make wreaths from nine different boughs and chant the following incantation: 2 A ty vaz - ty ho vaz, a ty hrab - se m ho hrab , a ty kJen - se m ho zen , a ty svfb - se m ho sib, a ty sip - ty ho stfp , a ty tfn - sem ho hrn , a ty dub - ty ho l'ub , a ty bez - za nim bez, a ty lieska - za nim vri es kaj ! And you, elm - you bind him , and you, hornbeam - rake him here, and you , maple - drive him here, and you , red dogwood - whip him here, and you , wild rose - you prick him, and you , thorn bush - push him here , and you , oak - you love him , and you , lilac - run aft er him , a nd you , hazel, - yell aft er him p . 57 Bridal Incantation A woman married into her husband's family . As soon as the bride entered her husband's house after the wedding, she would scatter flaxs6ed, millet and poppy seed in the yard for good luck , while chanting the following: 2 I sow the seed , to succeed with all my breed ; I sow millet, for others to beg m y fav or; I sow poppy seed , for this to last foreve r. Sejem se m eno, ab y sa mi viedl o vsetko ple meno; sej em proso, aby sa mi vse tci prosili ; sej em m ak, aby bolo vzdycky tak . p . 61 Incantation by the Willow To make sure that they would grow beautiful long hair, young girls would comb their hair under a willow on Good Friday at dawn. While combing their hair, they wished for a good husband . Willow, willow , ge t m e a m an , red as a rose , white as a fl ower, a nd good as honey. ' Vfba, vfb a , d aj mi mu za, ce rve neho a ko ru za a bieleho a ko kve t, a dobreho ako med . p . 62 �SLOVAKIA 15 CEREMONIAL CALENDAR POETRY Ceremonial calendar poetry celebrates different festivals of the year. The original calendar festivals coincided with the solstices and equinoxes. Calendar poetry contains many pre-Christian mythological elements which have been intertwined with and sometimes replaced by Christia n elements. In the calendar poetry of Slovakia a nd other Slavic countries which have been under Catholic influence, Christian features pred ominate. The traditions connected with calendar poetry are still being practi ced in some Slovak villages , particularly around holidays such as Christmas, New Year ' s and Easter. The classification of calendar poetry corresponds to the agricultural cycles, and all four seasons of the year are represented. In the poetry , three seasons are associated with the cultivation of the soil, while the last one is concerned with the harvest itself. The poetry is full of incantations and magical formulae meant to secure a good harvest and placate nature , which was often thought of as hostile. In the pre-Christian era the peasants turned for h elp to their gods and during Christian times to the numerous Christian saints. They would ask for good and prosperous years , abundant harvest, a nd good health and happy family life. Along with incantations and magical formulae, calendar poetry also contains chants , recitations , songs, riddles, and prognostications . In this poetry each season has its own characteristic customs . The winte r solstice cycle , beginning in November , is best represented. Its poetry is of a prophetic nature, and touche s on both family life and the prosperity of the homestead. The most important days of the season were the last 12 before Christmas since they represented the 12 months of the year; these days were used to judge what the weather would be like for the w hole next year. Children went caroling from hou se to house, a nd it was important that they b e healthy for if they were, they would bring good health to the fa rm ers ' fa milies as well . Moreover, the living room h a d to be cleaned a nd whitewashed in eve ry house to preve nt any kind of illn ess from ente rin g. Numerous C hri stmas customs were practiced o n C hristmas Eve . Basicall y , they were meant to express the farmer ' s thanksgiv in g for good crops in the preceding season, a nd to h elp assure a nd predict a good harvest in the forthcoming year. The latter kind were u su ally connected wit h magic . There we re rules of condu ct which were st ri ctl y followed �16 SLOVAKIA on Christmas Eve. For example, one could not light the house unless the Christmas Eve dinner - the biggest meal of the year - was already set on the table. The numerous courses of the meal had to follow acertain sequence . Christmas carolers were offered food and drink , and the boys were also given money. Many of the Christmas carols have a joking tone - besides bringing best wishes they expressly ask for a reward as in ''I Am a Very Small Boy,'' or ''I'm Just a Little Boy .' ' Sometimes they would ask expressly for money as in the carol "We Have Brought You Some News . '' New Year's wishes were also humorous in tone and expressed the good mood which prevailed in every household on that day . It was believed that if one felt happy on New Year's Day , he or she would be happy during the coming year. One song jokingly suggests that the farmer's stove burn out from too much cooking and baking: "I wish you in this/ coming New Year / that a side of your oven / may fall out." Carols for the eve of the Three Magi combine religious and secular motifs. Thus, in " Lord , Grant Us a Merry Evening," best wishes are expressed for everyone in the house, including the servants. Immediately after come Epiphany motifs, dealing with the birth of Christ and the arrival of the Three Kings. The Epiphany carol is concluded with a rather anticlimatic ending: the old man (probably the patriarch of the house) is not at home and has gone hunting. Very often , the boys were masked as the Three Kings, Joseph and Mary, and would perform a co medy based on the ancient legend . The Christmas ceremonial cycle ended with the Three Kings motif. Thematically, then , Slovak ceremonial calendar poetry focuses upon the four cycles of the year and the agricultural tradition con nected with them . It also contains the themes of love and fertility, and elements of ancestor worship, which are not treated here. From the formal point of view, calendar poetry is characte rized by symm etric bipartite verse and the frequent use of asso nance . Pre-Christmas Period The winter cycle of calendar poetry begins with St. Thomas's Day (December 21 ) , the shortest day of the year. Small boys walked around the village with a piece of steel, wishing farmers good lu ck in the next farming year : �SLOVAKIA 17 I have b rought you a piece of steel' so th a t you would not fall out of bed. Have as m a n y calves on yo ur farm as there a re spoons on your shelf. Have as man y oxen in your stable as there are logs in your shed. Let your girls have as many suito rs as there are dishes on your rack. May yo ur lads own as many hafts' as there are hearths in you r house. May as man y youn g men wear feathers in their caps• as you have number of dau ght ers. Have as m a ny more ears of corn in you r backyard as there are pictures on your walls. I ask onl y as many kreuzers' 0 as there are mirrors here. I wish you a good morning 1 Doniesou som vam ocele, aby ste nevypadli z postele. Kol'ko mate za ramom lyz iciek, tol'ko mate vo dvore teliciek; kol'ko mate na sope kolov, tol'ko mate V mastali volov; kol'ko mate za ramom tanierov , tol'ko maju vase dievky frajero v ; kol'ko mate vo vasom dome ohnisk, tol'ko maju vas i parobci porisk ; kol'ko zije vasich deer, tol'ko maju mladenci pier ; kol'ko ma te na stene obrazov , tol'ko raz vo vasom humne kl asov; kol'ko mate tuna zrkadov, !en tol'ko mi dajte krajciarov. Dobro rano vinsujem 1 p. 70 Christmastime Many Christmas carols and son gs are connected with the Christm as season. Both children and ad ults went from house to hou se caroling M erry C hristmas. For their service they expected som e reward. Many of these carols are joking in character, as is evident from the following carols: �18 SLOVAKIA I a m a very sm all boy. M y fa th er has se nt me to you , to ge t so methin g from you , but m ake it qui ck, for m y stomach rumbl es. J a som chl apec ve l'mi m aly, mn a moj otec k vam poslali, zeby ste mi dafo dali , ale chytro , lebo m i uz v bru chu svitlo. p. 70 2 I ' m ju st a little boy. I'm askin g fo r my sm all bag : a pi ece of cake a nd piece o f pie. T omorrow , I ' ll b rin g yo u a bird . If th at see m s too little, I will brin g you so me pork ; and if tha t 's not enough , I 'll b ri ng yo u a cat's ta il. J a so m maly, nevelicky, pyta m se be do ka psicky: kus kola.ca, kus kabaca, d onesiem vam zajtra vtaca. Ak sa vam to ma.lo vid f, d onesiem vam porfov iny; ak je vam to ni e dost', d onesiem va m z m acky chvost. p . 71 3 W e have b rought you so me news, we have come to you r feas t . The Saviour desce nded from H eave n , and we ca me to be your gues ts. A jug of wine is on th e table , and we are under your farm yard window, but you don ' t offer us a n y win e, nor do you have an y brand y th a t we ca n trea t ourselves to, and sing you songs eve n ni ce r . W e don ' t want your past ry, we' ll crac k a few nu ts.'' H ey, we a re not little ki ds , wh o get j ust a kreu ze r apiece. If yo u don ' t give us twe n ty we wo n ' t co me on New Yea r's Day. D oni esli sm e vam novinu , prisli sm e k vam na hos tinu , Sos tupi l Spasti el' z vysosti . M y sm e prisli k va m za hos ti . Krcah s vfn om j e na stole, m y sme pod oblokom v dvore , a nam vina nedavate, palenky ti ez ni c nem a te, co b y sme sa castu va]i a vam krajsie zaspievali . O pekance va m nechcem e, oriesky si poklcieme. A my sme ni e chl a pci m ali, ze by Ste nam krajc iar d ali. Ak na m dvads ia tnik ned a te, na Novy rok nas nema te. p. 71 New Year's Wish es Early in th e m ornin g on New Year's D ay, m en a nd youn g boys went from house to hou se, w ishin g lo ts of lu ck, p rosperity , a nd good h ealth to everyon e in the house . M ost of th eir w ishes foc u sed upon su ccessfu l fa rmin g a nd m a n age m e n t. I wish you in th is coming New Year, V in sujem vam V tento nas tavajuc i nov y rok , �SLOVAKIA that a side of your ove n may fall out , " that your wife may get pregna nt this year! Give us foo d and drink and stay well! 19 aby va m vypadol z pece bok, aby vam bola vasa gazdin a na te nto rok samod ruh a 1 Vypit', zajest' na m d ajte, a dob re sa tu m aj te 1 p . 78 2 l wish you plenty of hemp , bu shels of beets, a whole bin of blossoms, and a ba rnful of children' Vinsujem va m moc konopi, mecu repy , zacinok puckov, plevienec deti 1 p. 79 3 This l wish to all'' with vigo r and joy : to peasants, bags for their shoulders ; to shep herd s, porridge; to cows, good pasture; to pigs, lots of mast to make them fat. Vinsujem smele vse tk ym vese le : sedliakom vrece, pine na piece; pastiero m kase a kravam pase; svi niam zaludu, ze tu cne budu . p . 79 The Three Magi On the eve of Epiphany, children went from house to house, singing carols in which the Epiphany motifs were interspersed with such commonplace motifs as farming and the farmer's eve ryday activity. Lord, grant us a merry eve ning ," to the farmer, first of all! And then to th e farmwife, and then to all the se rvants! The Three M agi a rri ve from the East, wo rshippin g this fam il y. Do not worship this fa mil y but worship only the beloved Lo rd! " And you , bright star, go before us, Lord , Jesus C hri st, grant us a good ni ght! And you , Joseph , I say to you , do not leave the Virgin M ary 1 D on ' t you kn ow who is going to be bo rn ? The Virgin M ary is to bear a so n . There is a red rose on your table , �SLOVAKIA 20 let you r daught er marry a handsome man 1 There is a tu li p atop your table , yo ur son is ge ttin g read y to see his love. There is a handso me fe llow in this house , perhaps he ' d give us six kreu ze rs for a wrea th . God wi ll give him a lovely wife , whether it ' s Anna o r Susanna. The old man is not at home , he went out hunting . D aj nam Boh vecer diz vesely, najprv panu hospodarov i I A poto m aj tej hospod ince, po hospodin ce vseckej cel'adce 1 ldu tri a krali od vychod u , kl a naju sa tomut o rod u. Nekla naj te sa tom uto rod u , len sa kl a najte mil emu Bohu! A ty, j as na hviezd a, predchadzaj nas, pane J ezu Kri ste, dob ru noc nam d as 1 A ty , J ozefe, j a mlu vim tebe, neopust'aj pann y M a rie ! Nevid, co sa m a na sve t narod it'? M a panna Maria sy na porodit'. Na vaso m stole ce rve na ru za, daj vasej panenk e sva rn eho mu za 1 Na vaso m stole tulipan stoji, vas m lad enecek se k fraj erce strojL J est V tomto dome sva rn y ml adenec, azda nam on d a ses tak na veniec. D a jemu Panboh svarnu zenu , Annu alebo Zu za nu . Sta reho pana doma neni, isli oni po pol'uvanL pp. 79-80 Carnival Season Th e post-Chri stmas period does not present as m a n y cerem onies as th e C hri stmas season. The tim e of fasiangy (carni val season) was ch aracte rized b y a m asked procession which was to secure a good harvest. Th e carniv al processio n h ad mu sical accompaniment , u su all y a n accordi on . Most en gaged couples were also married during carnival season , sin ce there w as rela tively plenty of time for elaborate weddi n g celebration s, w hi ch las ted for several d ays. At the e nd of th e carnival seaso n , young m e n in ce re monial m asks we nt from ho u se to ho u se, collecting eggs, bacon , a nd m o ney. They �SLOVAKIA 21 would sing humorous songs, such as " Shrovetide, P entecost. . m which they would ask for a piece of bacon . From these donations they would arrange a feast for the youth of the entire village. The main course was bacon and eggs, while the money paid for the music . Shrovetide, P entecos t, and Easter pass by, 16 he who has no fur coat , feels cold . I have none, I have none, I ' m shakin g all over, give me some bacon " to fill my belly . H ere I got nothin g, over there something, maybe. They killed a m osqu ito , a nd got some bacon . There up the chimney," a tom cat sits on the bacon , go chase him away and cut me a piece; if you cut me too sm all a piece, you will cut your fin gers. Give to the teacher " a piece as big as a d oo r , to me , a piece as big as a goose. Fasangy, Turice, V el'ka noc byva, kto nem a kozucha, zima mu byva. Ja nemam, ja nem a m , !en sa tak tras im , daj te mi slaninky, nech sa popasim . Tuto mi nedali , tuto mi d aj u, K om a ra zabili , slaninku m aj u . A ta m hore na komin e, sedi kocur na sla nin e, h ybajte ho zohn at' a mne ku s odrezat', az mi mal y odrezete, svoje prsty poreze te. R echtorovi j ako dve re a mn e ku s - ako hus 1 pp . 82-83 Easter The spring custom s include taking out Morena (the goddess of dea th in the p agan Slavic traditio n) , ta king out the old m a n (dedko - possibly a m ale equivalent of Moren a), and welcoming in the n ew summe r . However , the sprin g ce remonial cycle is cente red prim a rily around Easter , the most important religious holiday of the season . Easte r customs still co nta in m a ny pre -Christia n ele m e nts, which have been prese rved up to the 20th century . For example, on Good Friday a t d awn, girls would chant incantations while ba thing, wishing for a hu sba nd (see " Pud- �22 SLOVAKIA dle, Puddle" in the preceding section). On Easter Monday, groups of ten to fifteen men and boys went from house to house, wishing the womenfolk a Happy Easter. It was a part of the tradition that they flogged women's legs with a birch switch and doused their heads with fresh water. This proced ure had a symbolic purifying function . If a young man was courting a particular young woman, he was expected to visit her house , thus showing his interest and affection. Then, the girl would reward her favorite suitor with the most lavishly decorated Easter egg. Besides the eggs, everybody would also receive drinks, food, sweets, and little boys would get money. Easter, Easter, will it come soon? which lad will pour water over me] Pour the water , pour the water, on my hair and head , but do spare my nice new skirt. Vel'ka noc , Vel'ka noc, kedyze uz bude? ktoryze ma suhaj oblievati prfde? Oblievaj, oblievaj, vlasy aj hlavicku , ale mi zasanuj tu novu suknicku. p . 93 Pentecost marked the beginning of the summer cycle. Many traditions were centered around the summer solstice and St. John's Eve CTune 24). On that day, love incantations were chanted and the future was foretold . Also, magic was practiced against witches whose power was believed very strong on that day. The later part of the summer season is poorer in folklore because of increased work in the fields . Harvest The autum cycle begins with the harvest season . During the harvest season, songs were sung in the fields, or on the way home after a day 's work. Thematically , they are associated with the work itself, love between two young people ("We Reaped Here") , or the feast following the work ("Master, Make Ready for a Feast "). Some of these songs are joking in tone . The songs sung around the harvest wreath reflect old Slovak customs . After the harvest, a procession of harvesters would walk from the fields to the house of the farmer who had hired them . Led by a young man who was carrying a colorful flag and a young woman wearing a wreath made of wild flowers , they would sing songs and some- �SLOVAKIA 23 times play music ("For Which Girl Shall We Weave a Wreath Today?"). In these songs, the peasants expressed their joy and happiness over a rich harvest. They also expressed their hope for the same bounty for the years to come. Harves t time offers a whole series of songs connected with this important agricultural season. They may refer to the work itself, or love between a young girl and a young man from the same village, or else the rest during the break or at the end of the day . W e reaped here , we reaped the re , in the valley, in th e valley, and the birdie, mottled birdie keeps singing, kee ps singin g. Kde sm e zali , tu sme fali , na doline , na doline , a ten vtacik, jarabacik pres pevuje , prespevuje. As the birdie , mottled birdie goes around th e tree , a rou nd the tree , so does m y d ea r, m y beloved go around me, around me . J ak ten vtacik, jarabacik okolo pna , okolo pna , tak moj mil y, najmilejsf okolo mna , okolo mn a. We reaped here , we reaped th ere, behind a path , behind a path , whoever will be our master, our clerk, our clerk? Kde sme zali , tu sme fali, za chonnfkom , za chonnfkom , ktoze bude nas fm panom , ura nnfkom , ura nnfkom ? p . 99 2 Master, make read y for a feas t, for a feast , we ' ve don e all the work for you . Master , prepa re the repast , th e repas t , a twelve- pound roas t. Add to it pints of wine , pints of wine, and a roasted capon. H otuj , pa ne , oldomas, oldomas , zrob ili sme , kd e co mas. H otuj , pa ne , veceru , vece ru, d vanas t' funtov pecenu . Este k tom u pint vfna, pint vfna, peceneho kapuna . p. 100 Around the h arvest wreath might be sung the foll owing song: 3 For which girl shall we weave a wreath today? For th e one chose n by the handsom es t young ma n . Wh o shall we let ca rry th e fl ag tod ay ? The one who hands hi s ri ght ha nd to her . T hat Ond1·is Slavik a nd Anna Bl ahej , �SLOVAKIA 24 they would make a nice couple would Lord grant it. Masters, our masters , open the gates, we bring you a gift - a nice pair of reapers. Harvesters back from the fields , cover the tables, the mapl e tables with linen tabl e-cloths. Ktorejze dnes, ktorej uvijeme veniec~ Tej, ktoru vyberie najkrajsi mladenec . Komuze dnes , komu dame niest' zastavu? Tomu , co jej poda svoju rucku pravu. Ten Ondris Slavike, ta Anna Blaheje, to by bou pekny par, keby im Panboh dau! Pani nasi, pani, otvarajte brany, nesieme vam darik, zencov pekny parik. Idu zenci z roli, prestierajte stoly, stoly javorove, obrusy kmentove. p. 100 CEREMONIAL FAMILY FOLKLORE Ceremonial family folklore focuses primarily on the most important events in an individual's life: birth, marriage and death . While only songs are discussed here (they are the most common form), the Slovak ceremonial family tradition is expressed in poems, proverbs, sayings, riddles, and short dramatic performances as well. Christening Songs In the distant past , the birth of a child was accompanied by rituals and many magic practices . Such practices, it was believed, would protect the mother and her child, and would also secure health and happiness for the child as he or she matured. These magic practices gradually developed into joyful, social celebrations to welcome the new member of the family . 10 Thematically, the christening songs are directly connected with the child's birth and prospects. They frequently mention the responsibilities and problems connected with his or her upbringing, and wish the child a happy life, prosperity, and even a good spouse. Some songs stress the importance attached to having male offspring: '' And if you my wife,/would have a boy ... " If the child is a girl, the song may wish her beauty, or possibly stress the importance of chastity or industrious- �25 SLOVAKIA ness: " Freedom and chastity prevail everywhere, / whichever girl has them , let her guard them .'' Other songs may express the abruptly felt loss of freedom experienced by the young parents , especially the new mother: '' ... m y freedom is crying in the cradle.'' M any songs are j okin g in tone and form the less serious part of the christening ceremony in Slovak villages . H ere, for example, the new parents tease each other a bout their responsibility for rocking the baby: '' Rock him , m y dear . .. I'm his mother.'' And here again, the m other m ockin gly compares her situation with that of the carefree life of unm arried m en and women: " I used to have a good time , ... m y maiden name/ is blotted out," or " As the maiden s d ance . . . while I , poor thing , / rock a baby ." Slovak christening songs usually have the following rhyme pattern : aa-bb-cc-dd. The number of syllables is usually the same in each line. Man y songs use assonance and employ colloquial express10ns . J ano , J ano, mily Jano! Donesu ti chl apca rano. K ed donesu , budem mati , vychova ho moja mati. A ked puojdem dolinami , vychovam ho malina mi , a ked puojdem sfrym svetom vychovam ho bielym kvetom . J ohn, John dear J ohn" They will bring you a boy tomorrow. Wh en they bring him, I'll keep him ," my mother wi ll raise him . And when I go down the valleys, I will raise him on raspberri es, and when I go in the wide world , I will raise him on white flo wers. p. 143 2 If you , m y wife," would have a boy, I would hire a wet nurse , a chef, a cook, a caretaker , and a house keeper. K eby si ty, zena moja , chlapca mal a, drzau by ti dojku , kuchara , kucharku, i safa ra i safarku. p. 144 3 Freedom and chastity prevail everyw here," whichever girl has th em, let her guard them . I would have protected mine, but it is too late. my freedom is crying in th e cradle. Sloboda, poctivost', ta vsade panuj e, kt ore j u di evca ma, nech si ju va ruje. I ja bych si moju , uz je ponecase, uz moja slobod a V belcove m i place. p . 144 �26 SLOVAKIA 4 As the maidens dance," they whirl around in circles, while I, poor thing, rock a baby. J a k tie panny tancuju, do kola sa zvrcuju, a ja neboz ia tko kolfsem diet'at ko. Rock him, my d ea r husband , he is such a lovely boy. Rock him yourself, you are his mother . Kolfbaj ho moj mily, vsak je synak spanily. Kolfbaj si sama, vsak si mu ty mama. I would be a fool to rock him by myself, You surely are his father just as I 'm his mother. Bola by ja blazon kolfba ti sama, vsak si mu ty otec jako i ja mama . I used to have a good time when luck served me, sitting by the window, with a handsome young man . Byvalo mi, byvalo, ked' mi stestia sluzilo, sedajfcej v okne, s mladeneckom pekne. I used to sit with him , now I am married to him , m y maiden name was blotted out. Sedala som, sedala, u z sem ho i dostala, me panenske jmeno bolo vymazano. pp. 144-45 Wedding Songs Of the three areas of ceremonial family folklore discussed here, the wedding ceremony offers the greatest variety of folklore material. This is because in Slovakia the wedding ceremonies of most villages and towns contained traditions that were peculiar to that particular locale . There were often specific differences between the ceremonies of neighboring villages even within a relatively small geographic area. 16 The entire ritual consisted of three parts: the period before the wedding during which a wedding contract was m ade between the future inlaws; the wedding ceremo ny itself, and the feast after the young couple had retired. The wedding actually began when the wedding guests gathered and the bride and groom left for the ceremony in the church. The first five selections under the headin g "Wedding Songs" are examples of what the wedding party might sing along the way. After the ceremony the bride and groom as well as the guests would arrive at the bride groom's h ouse , where the festivities would take place . The feast was and still is the culmination of the whole wedding. The structure of the entire wedding ceremon y was originally quite �SLOVAKIA 27 rigid . There were dan ces, ceremonial speeches, dramatic speeches and acts, as well as songs. All proceeded according to a traditionally fixed pattern . 1 7 Today, the songs themselves are no longer a part of the ceremony, and while many of the other forms remain (such as dances and speeches) the rigid , traditional patterns are no longer followed . Thematically, the bride is the focus of the often-lyrical and teasing ceremonial songs. Her beauty , upbringing, future as a married woman, and her character are all described in these songs: "Mother, mother, you have a lovely daughter''; ''Mother, mother, you may be proud . . . '' The most frequently mentioned virtues on the bride's part are modesty , diligence , obedience, and chastity. Some of the songs, especially those following the taking of the wreath and placing of the bonnet on the bride's head (when she symbolically becomes a woman), are permeated with laments: ''I lost my headdress . .. I like wearing it.'' Other songs picture the bride taking leave of her parents, relatives and friends: thanking her parents for her upbringing, expressing her sorrow about leaving them, and sometimes also expressing apprehension about her future with the bridgegroom' s family. Wedding songs and speeches employ rhymed verse, often of the following pattern : aa-bb-cc. The number of syllables is usually the same in each line. As in christening songs, wedding songs also employ assonance. Mother, mother, you have a lovely daughter , we will take her from you even if you hide her. Should you lock her behind four locks, we sure will get her with fin e words. Mamicka , mamicka, peknu dceru mate, m y vam ju vezmeme , co ju aj schovate . Co by ste ju zamkli aj styrma zamka mi , my ju dostaneme peknymi slova mi. p. 151 2 G et married , ge t ma rried , m y love, well will you learn what tyranny is. Get m arried , get m arri ed, my love , a birch switch awaits you behind th e door. V ydaj sa !en, vydaj , frajeruock a rn oj a, sak sa ve ru dozvies , aka je to zvola. V ydaj sa !en , vyd aj, fraj eruocka moj a, caka t'a za dve rmi ta b rezova hola. p. 151 �28 SLOVAKIA 3 I kept it a sec ret, a secret, but I won't anymore, mother, ge t the feath erbeds" read y, I ' m ge ttin g m ar ried. Thank you , mother , thank you, d ea r , for taking care of me wh ile I was a child . T aj ila som , taji la, uz tajit' nebudem , chystaj , m am ka, perin y, vydavat' sa budem . Dakujem va m , mamicka, dakujem va m sta ra, co ste vy mna chovali , kym so m bola mala . p . 152 4 M ot he r, mot her, you may be proud th at yo ur girl 's gettin g married still chaste. Chaste , she's getting ma rri ed to a you ng man , they both will be wearing a rosemary wreat h .'" Mamicka, mamicka , pekn a vasa chvala , ze sa vafa d ieuka poct iva vydava. Poctiva vyd ava, be ri e ju ml ade nec, budu mat' obidva z rozmarinu ve ni ec. p . 152 5 Whateve r yo u give me, oh, eternal Lord , just don ' t give me a n old hag with children . An old hag rumbl es like a ba rrel of bee r a nd a young girl ' s jumpy like a squirrel. I ' II give the old hag a fl a tca ke 10 to chew on, and th e yo ung gi rl a pair of boots to jump in . Co mi das, to das, pa ne boze vecny, !en ze mi nedavaj staru babu s det'mi. A ta stara dud le, ako z piva bocka a ta mlada skace a ko veve ru ocka. D am starej Osucha , aby ho fova la , ml ad ej na cizmicky, aby si skaka la. p. 152 On the way back from the church , the weddin g party sings songs like the following: 6 Now you a re ours, Ann ie, now you are ours, we a re tak in g you home from the wedd ing. They paid a lotll for your wedd ing, we have tied your hands with a stole . 1 ' Uz si ty, An icka, uz si teraz nasa, uz t'a my ved ieme domov ze sobasa . Od tvojho sobasa tvrdy toliar dali, uz sme tvoje rucky stolou poviazali. p . 153 �SLOVAKIA 29 7 Jaj , co si plakala, ked t'a sobasili? Var si si m ys lela l'ubit' sa s inymi ? A ja som sa bala tej tvojej materi, ked' ona ma jazyk zo samej oceli . Oh , why did you cry at your wedding? Maybe you thought of loving others? No, I was afraid of your moth er , becau se she has a tongue of steel. p. 154 During the wedding feast the bridgegroom and bride may sing to each other: 8 Bridegroom: Welcome, d ear little dove," half of my heart 1 I'm fl ying from bu sh to bush to see your cheeks. As soon as my heart spotted you, it looked back with joy , m y wish was fulfill ed. I want to ask you , Molly , are you willing to m a rry m e? will your fat her let you go? do you want to be my wife? Vitaj, mila holubicka, muojho srdca polovicka 1 Lietam od kricka do kricka, abych videl tvoje licka . J ak t'a moje srdce zrelo , od radosti zas pozrelo , podl'a vuoli sa mi stalo. Chcem sa, Marka, t'a p ytati, m as ty vuolu za mna iti , ci t'a otec chce pu stiti , ci chces mojou zenou byti? p. 161 Bride: You can't find fault with me, yo u can do as you please. Wh y should I spare myself, 34 when I like to see you. You can profit from m e Wh a t ca n I d o? I can tear old shirts to rags , throw wood into the stove, in the kitchen I have good luck, I can cook cabbage wit hout lard, and you wi ll li ck your fingers. l can make scrambled eggs , as my fat her knows . You , m y fat her , tell them what a special di sh it is 135 Nieto na mne ziadna chyba , mozes robit', co ti treba. Co by lutovala seba, ked' ja rada vidim teba . Zo mn a m ozes osoh vziati, co zo mn a moze vystati? Viem starie kosele driapat', dreva do peci nam eta t', aj v ku chyni sa mi stescf, mozem navar it' kapusty bez mas ti , oblfzes prsty. Viem spravit' praze ni cu z vaj ec. o com vie svadobny otec. T y pan svadobny otec povedz , aka je to obzvlastna vec 1 p. 161 The bonneting of the bride had its own special songs . 36 �SLOVAKIA 30 9 I lost m y headdress," m y green wreath, " the best m an" fo und it , a ha ndso me yo ung m an . H ey, bes t m an , best ma n , I beg of you , give me bac k that headb and , I like wearing it. If you like wearing that head ba nd so mu ch , surely you ' d ask the best man more ni cely . Stratila som partu, zeleny ve ni ec, nasiel mi ju dru zba, sva rny ml adenec. H ej , dru zba, hej, dru zba, pekn e t'a prosfm , d ajze mi tu partu , rad a ju nosfm 1 K eby si ty pa rtu rada nosila, ve ru by si druzbu krajsie prosila . p . 163 10 The bell s of r.upca' 0 have a ve ry ni ce rin g," 1 Annie , they ' ll kn ock off yo u r head ba nd . They will kn ock it off with nin e bells, so you won ' t go out with oth er yo un g men . So you won't go out , just love your husband , th e handso me J ohnn y, who is d evo ted to you . Tie lupcian ske zvo ny vel'mi pekne zvo ni a, u z tebe, Ani cka, tvoju pa rtu zro ma . Zronia ti ju , zronia deviatimi zvo ncf, abys nechodil a s cudzfmi mladencf. Abys nechodil a, mu za si l'ubila , Janfcka svarnyho, tebe oddan yho. p . 163 Wailing Over the Dead The practice of wailing over the dead form ed a n integral p a rt of the fun e ral ceremony , a nd according to the Muran Articles of the Protestant Church from 1585 , wailing had been widely practiced in Slovakia.42 The lam ents were performed by semi-professional wailers , usually by older women , who wailed a t the funeral for a fe e. Some times , the laments were perform ed by rela tives. The laments over the d ead were generally improvi sed on the spur of the moment , with the hired person attempting to express lyrically the dee p sorrow felt by the relatives and friends of the deceased. They also m e ntioned the good traits of the deceased, the progress of hi s or her illn ess (as in " Oh , My D ear Child "), and would dram atize the actual d emise of the deceased , portraying him as he took leave of hi s fa mily, relatives, and friends. The laments over the d ead are st ru ctured differentl y from other folklore genres . Since they h ad to be open for improvisa tions , they are �SLOVAKIA 31 free in form. They usuall y do not have regular stanzas or rhyme. Assonance predominates over rhym e and they are sung as melodic recitations. Laments can be characterized not only b y the lack of formal structure, but also by a certain degree of looseness and incoherency, possibly utilized to stress the depth of sorrow felt by the relatives and friends . This looseness is demonstra ted in the poem "George , George" in which the last two stanzas are only vaguely related to the theme of the first two stanzas. Oh , my dear child , beloved Angel," what shall I do without you , my dear souJ? My hea rt was bleeding while you were suffering, you looked at me, I couldn ' t help. Your fath er was walking stunned in the yard , walkin g aimlessly, not saying a word . You chattered to me your sweet words th e wh ole day, you dear innocent ch ild , a nd when you r father came home from th e fi elds, you smiled so that he would take you in his arms , and th ere was no end to your talking, and your father took d elight in you, hi s treasure. Ach, moj e drah uo diet'a, anjel premileny, cuo pocnem bez teba, moj a draha dusa, srdce mi zatislo, ked si sa trapilo, hl'adelo si na mna, nemohla som pomuoct'. Otec ti po dvore omrace ny chodiu , nikde miesta nemau, slov ka nepovedau. Stebotalo si mi slad uskymi recmi cely den, ty draha nevinnost ' premila , a ked otec z pol'a do domu sa vratiu, usmi evalo si sa, kym t'a k sebe nevzau, a n ebolo recom tvojim dlh o konec , a otec sa tesiu v tebe drahy poklad. p. 164 2 George, George, yo ur godfather ca me ," for yo u to plow hi s fi elds. You a re through with plowing since the Lord called you. Juro , Juro , km otor prise!, aby si mu orat' isol. A ty si uz dooral , ked' t'a panboh povolal. Ycs te rd ay you ate three sa usages," a nd a lot of bread. 46 Today you lie on th e bier, like a hog on a ca rt . Y ce ra si zjel tri jelita , aj chl eba z polk yky zita. Dnes uz lezis na marach ako bravec na karach. �32 SLOVAKIA M y dea r go lde n m oustache" would be fit fo r strin gs, my ve r y d ear ha ir , would be good fo r ropes. M oje m ile, zlate fuzy, boli ze by na mot u zy, moj e premile vlasy boli by na povrazy. Wh en he bega n to play hi s bagpipe: " tati -lat i, ta ti-l a ti ," he go t a farth ering" to bu y spices, he dropped it behind his shirt. K ed si pocal gajdovati : ta ti -lati , ta ti-l ati , ma! turak na koreni a, vsy pal ho do zahreni a. p . 165 NOTES ' Andrej M elichercfk , ed. , Slo vensky Folkl6r: Chrestomatia (Bra tislava: Slove nska Akademi a Vied, 1959) . ' J ozef r. . Holuby, Folklore studi es published ma inl y in Slovenske Pohl'ad y between 1883 a nd 1897; Jan Kolla r , N arodnie spievanky, I-II (Bra ti slava, 1953); Jii'i Polivka, Supis slo ven skych rozpravok I-V (Turciansky Svaty M artin , 1923 -1932). ' The fo lkloric ma teri al collected by Dobsinsky a nd oth ers is re ndered in th e dialec t o f the region fro m which it origina ted . The page reference to M elichercfk is give n in th e tex t a ft er th e Slovak ori ginal. ' " Puddle, Puddle ." In the Slova k, this love inca nta ti on has an irregul a r rhym e (aabbb-c-ddd-c-ee-fff- e-g-hh-g- iii -j- k-ll -m m) whi ch was sac rificed in th e tra nsla ti on fo r the sake of accuracy. • Although th e magical for mulae are pagan in origin , they contain refe rences to C hristi a nit y. ' Lit. · " H oly T rinity,/be a good helpe r to me/ to eve rythin g good,/ to the state of m a trimon y" (II. 26-29). 6 The colors refer to the body: red or pink cheeks were considered a sign of good health , a nd a white co m plex ion was much valued by both men and women, partl y as a sign of class di stin ction . O nly feuda l lords and wealth y merchants who di d not have to work in th e fi elds could afford to have white skin a ll year aro un d. " H oney " is a traditi onal refe rence to good te mper . 7 " I have brought you a piece of steel. . " With the exce ption of the wishes in the las t lin e, the Slova k poe m co nsis ts of rh ym in g co upl ets. All bu t 11 . 1 and 2 a re revised in order to con vey a prope r word order in English . Steel (iron) was co ns idered p ro tect ion aga ins t evil and fa iries in Europe (Maria Tymocz ko). ' H a ft is a ha nd le of a hoe, ax, scyt he, and oth er ag ricultu ral tools. H ere the number of hafts represen ts the far mer 's pros perity. 9 A typical orname n t a mong young marri ed village me n . Wh en give n by a you ng unm a r ried women, th e feather was co nside red a sign of affect ion. '° K re u ze r (o r kreutzer) was a small cop per coin in Aust ri a and Ge rmany, the 100th part of th e fl orin . It was so called because th e coin had th e fi gu re of a cross on it. A penny wou ld be probabl y the closest co n temporary eq ui valent to the kreuzer. " Wal nu ts and hazlenu ts were trad itionally eaten at C hristmas tim e after the ma in meal. �SLOVAKIA 33 " " I wi sh you in thi s/comin g New Yea r " : This is a very popular N ew Year 's wish . The unu su al wi sh , " that a side of your oven/ m ay fa ll out" (11 .3 -4) probably ha s the same conn otat ion as th e En gli sh '' break a leg!'' It also sugges ts a wi sh of prosperity to the farm er , i.e., th a t hi s oven m ay be fill ed to burstin g, or ove rh eated with con stant cooki ng a nd baking. " Fo rmall y, thi s poe m is arran ged in rh ymin g coupl ets but asson an ce plays a m o re impo rtant role . " This carol is loosely a rra nged in rh yming couplets. Again, the assonance a nd the rhym e take precedence ove r m eanin g, and thi s ex plains why such seemingly unrela ted them es as th e Three Kings, the Star of Bethlehem , J oseph and M a ry o n the one hand, and the rose, th e tulip on the ta ble, and the old man's huntin g expedition on th e other ha nd , fo und their place in thi s carol. The carol is a mi xture of religious and secular m otifs. " C hildren , dressed as the Three Magi, arrive a t a farmh ou se and sing. Yet they mu st no t sin g a bout the fa rm er ' s fa mil y, but the H oly Famil y of the Na tivity. 16 ' ' Sh rovetide, Pentecos t, and Easter ... '' This j okin g carnival song is ar ranged in rh ym in g coupl ets. 11 Fatback bacon (usual ly with no lean m eat) was a staple diet , often a snack, fo r village peo ple. It was ofte n eaten with baked potatoes a nd _onio ns, o r j ust plain bread . 18 Fa tback baco n u sed to be sm oked (cured ) in th e chimn ey. 19 The teac her , alo ng with the p riest a nd th e m ayo r , was amon g th e m ost prominent peo ple in th e vill age. 0 ' S loven sko: l', ud - II. cast', ed s. Boze na Filova et al. (B ra ti slava: O bzo r , 1975). " In the Slovak o ri ginal, thi s son g has a regula r rh yme pat tern: aa-b b-cc-dd . The first two lines ad d ress th e m a in speaker . " J oh n" is appa ren tl y a youn g fath er whose wife d ied in childbirth . T he fat her says that he will kee p his so n , but the boy ' s grandmoth er will have to bring him up . Them a ticall y, the so ng expresses conce rn fo r th e boy ' s upbringin g. In the seco nd stan za , the speake r ind icates that he m ay have to leave hi s nat ive vill age, probably in search of wo rk . T hi s was a co mm on prac ti ce among im poverished village rs. " Lit .: " I 'll have. " In 11. 3 an d 4 coll oqui al form s of the ve rb " to have " and the nou n " m other" have bee n used. The forms a re iden tical: mati , wh ich fac il itates th e rh ym e and keeps th e sam e num ber of syll a bles in each line. There a re eight sylla bles in each line, and th e standa rd m o nosy lla bic word m at' wo uld have redu ced th e syll a bles dow n to seven in 11 .3 a nd 4 . " The origin al son g uses assonance ra ther th an rh ym e. A fat her-to-be is th e speaker in this so ng . H alf-jokin g , he stresses the importance of a male offspring. H e p rom ises to pa m pe r hi s wife if she bears him a son . " The original so ng uses asson a nce . T he speaker , proba bly an un wed m o th er, po nders her fat e a nd talks a bout social conve nti on s. " W ith th e excepti o n of stanza 3, the so ng has a near regul a r rh ym e: aa-bb-cc-dd-e -fg- f-hh- ii -jj- kk. T he speaker in th is so.ig is the ba by 's moth er who regrets th e loss of her freedo m as a mother and/or a wife . It is not qu ite clear from the context wheth er she is m a rri ed o r no t. I n either case, it was not proper of her to joi n the ca refree d a nce of unm arri ed m en a nd wome n . �34 6 SLOVAKIA Slovensko: E,ud, p. 1057. " Melichercfk , p. 26 " A featherbed is a strong cloth con tainer thi ckly filled with goose feathers and down and used as a bed cover in lieu of blankets. Featherbeds were a part of the bride's dowry, which also included pillows, sheets, towels, cloths, etc . The dowry was collected throughout the years practically after the day the girl was born . Goose down and stripped feathers were collected ever y year from the fami ly's fl ock of geese and stashed in a special bag for each d aughter in the family. The wealthier the bride , the higher the pile of featherbeds and pillows atop her bed . " A rosemary wreath was a decoration used on such occasions as weddings and funerals . H ere it is a symbol of chastity. 0 ' A fl atcake (osuch ) is a simple, flat cake, usually round. It is baked from bread dough , which is sometimes mixed with a different type of fl our or else potatoes. " Lit .: "They paid a hard thaler for your wedding ," obviously meaning the dowry. Thaler (also taler) was a large silver coin u sed in various German states and in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was worth 30 silver groschen, worth about 3s. sterling . The word "dollar" is derived from " th aler." " R efe rring to the priest's vestments durin g the wedding ce remony, the stole is a long, decorated strip of cloth worn like a scarf by officiating clergymen of various chu rches. 33 In the Slovak original, each line consists of eight syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aaaa-bbb-cccc. " The meaning is not quite clear here. It probably indicates the bride's submission to the groom . 35 In this poem, each line consists of eight syllables . The rh yme pattern is: aaaa-bb-ccbbb-dddd. 36 Bonneting of the bride is the culmination of the wedding ceremony. The bride becomes a married woman when her wreath is replaced by a bonnet. 31 Headband or headdress is a wreath decorated with colorful ribbons, worn by un married women and brides. Married women wore bonnets or scarves. 38 Each line in this song consists of eleven syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aa-bb-cc. 39 It was customary that the best man led the bride to the wedding and took off her wreath or headband. H e led the bride down the aisle, whereas the bridesmaid led the bridegroom down the aisle. He was referred to as the " leading " best man and wore a sword to distinguish himself from other best men who wore sticks decorated with scarves . '° Cupca is a town in Central Slovakia, where many local customs and traditions have been preserved. 41 Each line in this song consists of twelve syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aa-bb-c-d. " Melichercfk, p . 142. 43 This lame ntation has a sporadic rhyme pattern: a-b-c-d-ee-f-g-ee- h-i. The lines consist of 12 to 13 syllables. 44 The poem has the following rhym e pattern: aa-bb-cc-dd-ee-ff-gg-hh . The lines consist of seven to eight syllables. 45 Pork sausage in natural casing. It is made of rice or grits combined with ground meat , liver, blood and spices. The sausages were usu all y made in winter or early ' �SLOVAKIA 35 spring when the fatt ened pigs were slaughtered . " '' ... a lot of bread.'' This is a free translation due to the discrepancy in the printed word indicating the amount of rye from which the bread was made . The original version of this song, titled, " W a iling over a D ead Husband" (Sbomik slovenskych n arodnych piesnf, povestf, prfslovf, porekadiel, hadok, hier, obycajov a povier [A Collection of Slovak Folk Songs, Riddles, Games, Customs, and Superstitions], II , (Turciansky Sva ty Martin : Matica slovenska, 18741) spells the wordpolkyly, which would mean half a kilo. On the other hand , Melichercik's edition lists the word polkyky (fem. gen. sg. ), which was an old , popula r measure in Slovak villages . The word k yky is of Ukrainian ori gin (a Ukrainian word for a scarf worn by village women, "babushka" type). ·since scales were a luxury item in the past, the amount of rye from which a loaf of bread was m ade was m easured in the scarf. Pol means half, i.e., the bread was made from half the amount measured by the scarf. 47 The poem , somewhat joking in character, shows the improvising character of funeral recitations. The stanzas wander from one subject to another, touching some memories of the dead man that may o r may not be relevant for the occasion of the funeral, but they are important in the eyes of the wailer. " " Farthing" is a free translation, indicating that the coin was small. In the Slovak original , turak was a small coin , worth one and a half groschen . It was used in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This paper is based on a doctoral dissertation , " Slovak Folklore : An Anthology, " at the Un iversity of M assachuset ts in Amh erst , 1982. I th ank especially Professors Sarah N. Lawall a nd Zdenek Salzmann . Presented in part in P anel 128 , " Slovak Literature as a Mirror of the National Awakening ," at the AAASS co nvention in Philadelphia on 8 November 1980 , and in Panel 65 , "The Village in Slovak Literature ," at the AAASS convention in Asiloma r , California on 2 1 September 1981. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1982-83, Vol. 30 Description An account of the resource Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 12 SLOVAKIA Three Kinds of Slovak Folk Literature Eva Susan Kucekova The following categories of Slovak folklore represent some of its oldest forms. Lyrical genres, such as m agical formul ae or incantations , ceremonial calendar poetry , and ceremonial fa mily poetry, a re of ritual and ceremonial character. The sample selections introduced in this pa per were taken from a comprehensive modern collection of Slovak folkl ore entitled Slovensky folk16r: Chrestomatia, and edited b y the foremost authority on the subj ect, the late Andrej Melichercfk . 1 Melichercfk based hi s anthology on Pavo! Dobsinsky' s publications , as well a s on other collections of Slovak folklore, for example those edited by Jozef I:. . Holuby, Jan Kollar and Jirf Polfvka . 2 The folklori c material collected by Dobsinsky and others is rendered in the dialect of the region from which it originated. MAGICAL FORMULAE Magical fo rmulae a re incantations associated with ritu als. These non-narrative forms are very ancient and are closely related to ce rem onial calendar poetry. M agical formulae were u sually connec ted with special rites and performed on spec ific occasions and/or holidays . They were often perform ed by semiprofessional m en and women (" wi se m en " and " wise wom en ") who were well versed in m agic. There are two types of incantations: tho se which were supposed to bring a desired effect( " sympathethic magic" ), and those which were supposed to preve nt undes irable and ha rmful effects (" preve ntive magic" ). Incantations we re u sed to brin g a hu sba nd , m ake one fall in love, prevent and cure illness , increase the yield of the fi elds, and also bring illness or bad lu ck upon a n enem y . Some incan tations were chanted primarily by girls or young women. " Puddle, Puddle," " Will ow, Willow," and " And You , Elm ," are typical examples of love incantations. Once m arried , a bride would chant an incanta tion " I Sow the Seed " and wish for good lu ck and prosperity . SLOVAKIA 13 Magical formulae are rhythmical and based on syntactic parallelisms ; they rely extensively on various euphonic and semantic devices. Due to the fact that magical formulae are so closely associated with magic, their ritual form remains unchanged throughout the centuries . Magical incantations contain many pre-Christian elements, upon which a new layer of C hri st ian symbols has been added . Love Incantations This love incantation shows water as a powerful source of magic. T aken from fords at midnight , water was believed to attract lovers and help a girl get married . While bathing, girls chanted the following incantation: Puddle , puddle,' get me a husband! Above the bridge, below the bridge, let him go nowhere but to our house! Above th e footbrid ge, below th e footbr idge, don 't let him rest but in ou r house 1 I 'm not pouring away, I 'm pouring in: bachelors , wid owers, merchants, fiddlers, even those small boys I call after me, after my body , aft er my clothes , after my heels, a ft er this hou se of ours. Not by my power do I say this, but I say it by the divine power, from J es us Christ till m idn ight. And help me in this God th e Father, the Son , a nd the H oly Ghost!' H oly Trini ty , help me reach hap piness and get married. 1 Kaluza, kalu za, daj muza 1 Vyse mosta, ni ze mosta, aby nemal nikde miesta len u nas! Vyse lavky, ni ze lavky, aby nem al nikd e stavky len u nas 1 Neod lievam, ale prilievam: mladencov, vdovcov, kupcov , aj hudcov , aj tych malickych chlapcov za sebou volam, za mym telom , za m ymi satami, za mym i patami, za tym nasfm domom . J a to nehovorfm ze svej moc1, lez to hovorfm z bozskej m oci, od pana J ezisa Kri sta do pol noci. A k tomu mi dopomahaj Boh otec , Boh sy n , Boh du ch svaty! Svata troj ica , bud mi dobra pomocnica k vse tkemu dobremu, k stavu manzelskemu! p. 54 14 SLOVAKIA On the eve of St. George ' s Day (April 24) , young girls made wreaths from different kinds of flowers and boughs. Later, wreaths were tossed into the air. It was believed that the girl whose wreath was caught on a tree branch would get married within a year. To attract a beloved, girls would make wreaths from nine different boughs and chant the following incantation: 2 A ty vaz - ty ho vaz, a ty hrab - se m ho hrab , a ty kJen - se m ho zen , a ty svfb - se m ho sib, a ty sip - ty ho stfp , a ty tfn - sem ho hrn , a ty dub - ty ho l'ub , a ty bez - za nim bez, a ty lieska - za nim vri es kaj ! And you, elm - you bind him , and you, hornbeam - rake him here, and you , maple - drive him here, and you , red dogwood - whip him here, and you , wild rose - you prick him, and you , thorn bush - push him here , and you , oak - you love him , and you , lilac - run aft er him , a nd you , hazel, - yell aft er him p . 57 Bridal Incantation A woman married into her husband's family . As soon as the bride entered her husband's house after the wedding, she would scatter flaxs6ed, millet and poppy seed in the yard for good luck , while chanting the following: 2 I sow the seed , to succeed with all my breed ; I sow millet, for others to beg m y fav or; I sow poppy seed , for this to last foreve r. Sejem se m eno, ab y sa mi viedl o vsetko ple meno; sej em proso, aby sa mi vse tci prosili ; sej em m ak, aby bolo vzdycky tak . p . 61 Incantation by the Willow To make sure that they would grow beautiful long hair, young girls would comb their hair under a willow on Good Friday at dawn. While combing their hair, they wished for a good husband . Willow, willow , ge t m e a m an , red as a rose , white as a fl ower, a nd good as honey. ' Vfba, vfb a , d aj mi mu za, ce rve neho a ko ru za a bieleho a ko kve t, a dobreho ako med . p . 62 SLOVAKIA 15 CEREMONIAL CALENDAR POETRY Ceremonial calendar poetry celebrates different festivals of the year. The original calendar festivals coincided with the solstices and equinoxes. Calendar poetry contains many pre-Christian mythological elements which have been intertwined with and sometimes replaced by Christia n elements. In the calendar poetry of Slovakia a nd other Slavic countries which have been under Catholic influence, Christian features pred ominate. The traditions connected with calendar poetry are still being practi ced in some Slovak villages , particularly around holidays such as Christmas, New Year ' s and Easter. The classification of calendar poetry corresponds to the agricultural cycles, and all four seasons of the year are represented. In the poetry , three seasons are associated with the cultivation of the soil, while the last one is concerned with the harvest itself. The poetry is full of incantations and magical formulae meant to secure a good harvest and placate nature , which was often thought of as hostile. In the pre-Christian era the peasants turned for h elp to their gods and during Christian times to the numerous Christian saints. They would ask for good and prosperous years , abundant harvest, a nd good health and happy family life. Along with incantations and magical formulae, calendar poetry also contains chants , recitations , songs, riddles, and prognostications . In this poetry each season has its own characteristic customs . The winte r solstice cycle , beginning in November , is best represented. Its poetry is of a prophetic nature, and touche s on both family life and the prosperity of the homestead. The most important days of the season were the last 12 before Christmas since they represented the 12 months of the year; these days were used to judge what the weather would be like for the w hole next year. Children went caroling from hou se to house, a nd it was important that they b e healthy for if they were, they would bring good health to the fa rm ers ' fa milies as well . Moreover, the living room h a d to be cleaned a nd whitewashed in eve ry house to preve nt any kind of illn ess from ente rin g. Numerous C hri stmas customs were practiced o n C hristmas Eve . Basicall y , they were meant to express the farmer ' s thanksgiv in g for good crops in the preceding season, a nd to h elp assure a nd predict a good harvest in the forthcoming year. The latter kind were u su ally connected wit h magic . There we re rules of condu ct which were st ri ctl y followed 16 SLOVAKIA on Christmas Eve. For example, one could not light the house unless the Christmas Eve dinner - the biggest meal of the year - was already set on the table. The numerous courses of the meal had to follow acertain sequence . Christmas carolers were offered food and drink , and the boys were also given money. Many of the Christmas carols have a joking tone - besides bringing best wishes they expressly ask for a reward as in ''I Am a Very Small Boy,'' or ''I'm Just a Little Boy .' ' Sometimes they would ask expressly for money as in the carol "We Have Brought You Some News . '' New Year's wishes were also humorous in tone and expressed the good mood which prevailed in every household on that day . It was believed that if one felt happy on New Year's Day , he or she would be happy during the coming year. One song jokingly suggests that the farmer's stove burn out from too much cooking and baking: "I wish you in this/ coming New Year / that a side of your oven / may fall out." Carols for the eve of the Three Magi combine religious and secular motifs. Thus, in " Lord , Grant Us a Merry Evening," best wishes are expressed for everyone in the house, including the servants. Immediately after come Epiphany motifs, dealing with the birth of Christ and the arrival of the Three Kings. The Epiphany carol is concluded with a rather anticlimatic ending: the old man (probably the patriarch of the house) is not at home and has gone hunting. Very often , the boys were masked as the Three Kings, Joseph and Mary, and would perform a co medy based on the ancient legend . The Christmas ceremonial cycle ended with the Three Kings motif. Thematically, then , Slovak ceremonial calendar poetry focuses upon the four cycles of the year and the agricultural tradition con nected with them . It also contains the themes of love and fertility, and elements of ancestor worship, which are not treated here. From the formal point of view, calendar poetry is characte rized by symm etric bipartite verse and the frequent use of asso nance . Pre-Christmas Period The winter cycle of calendar poetry begins with St. Thomas's Day (December 21 ) , the shortest day of the year. Small boys walked around the village with a piece of steel, wishing farmers good lu ck in the next farming year : SLOVAKIA 17 I have b rought you a piece of steel' so th a t you would not fall out of bed. Have as m a n y calves on yo ur farm as there a re spoons on your shelf. Have as man y oxen in your stable as there are logs in your shed. Let your girls have as many suito rs as there are dishes on your rack. May yo ur lads own as many hafts' as there are hearths in you r house. May as man y youn g men wear feathers in their caps• as you have number of dau ght ers. Have as m a ny more ears of corn in you r backyard as there are pictures on your walls. I ask onl y as many kreuzers' 0 as there are mirrors here. I wish you a good morning 1 Doniesou som vam ocele, aby ste nevypadli z postele. Kol'ko mate za ramom lyz iciek, tol'ko mate vo dvore teliciek; kol'ko mate na sope kolov, tol'ko mate V mastali volov; kol'ko mate za ramom tanierov , tol'ko maju vase dievky frajero v ; kol'ko mate vo vasom dome ohnisk, tol'ko maju vas i parobci porisk ; kol'ko zije vasich deer, tol'ko maju mladenci pier ; kol'ko ma te na stene obrazov , tol'ko raz vo vasom humne kl asov; kol'ko mate tuna zrkadov, !en tol'ko mi dajte krajciarov. Dobro rano vinsujem 1 p. 70 Christmastime Many Christmas carols and son gs are connected with the Christm as season. Both children and ad ults went from house to hou se caroling M erry C hristmas. For their service they expected som e reward. Many of these carols are joking in character, as is evident from the following carols: 18 SLOVAKIA I a m a very sm all boy. M y fa th er has se nt me to you , to ge t so methin g from you , but m ake it qui ck, for m y stomach rumbl es. J a som chl apec ve l'mi m aly, mn a moj otec k vam poslali, zeby ste mi dafo dali , ale chytro , lebo m i uz v bru chu svitlo. p. 70 2 I ' m ju st a little boy. I'm askin g fo r my sm all bag : a pi ece of cake a nd piece o f pie. T omorrow , I ' ll b rin g yo u a bird . If th at see m s too little, I will brin g you so me pork ; and if tha t 's not enough , I 'll b ri ng yo u a cat's ta il. J a so m maly, nevelicky, pyta m se be do ka psicky: kus kola.ca, kus kabaca, d onesiem vam zajtra vtaca. Ak sa vam to ma.lo vid f, d onesiem vam porfov iny; ak je vam to ni e dost', d onesiem va m z m acky chvost. p . 71 3 W e have b rought you so me news, we have come to you r feas t . The Saviour desce nded from H eave n , and we ca me to be your gues ts. A jug of wine is on th e table , and we are under your farm yard window, but you don ' t offer us a n y win e, nor do you have an y brand y th a t we ca n trea t ourselves to, and sing you songs eve n ni ce r . W e don ' t want your past ry, we' ll crac k a few nu ts.'' H ey, we a re not little ki ds , wh o get j ust a kreu ze r apiece. If yo u don ' t give us twe n ty we wo n ' t co me on New Yea r's Day. D oni esli sm e vam novinu , prisli sm e k vam na hos tinu , Sos tupi l Spasti el' z vysosti . M y sm e prisli k va m za hos ti . Krcah s vfn om j e na stole, m y sme pod oblokom v dvore , a nam vina nedavate, palenky ti ez ni c nem a te, co b y sme sa castu va]i a vam krajsie zaspievali . O pekance va m nechcem e, oriesky si poklcieme. A my sme ni e chl a pci m ali, ze by Ste nam krajc iar d ali. Ak na m dvads ia tnik ned a te, na Novy rok nas nema te. p. 71 New Year's Wish es Early in th e m ornin g on New Year's D ay, m en a nd youn g boys went from house to hou se, w ishin g lo ts of lu ck, p rosperity , a nd good h ealth to everyon e in the house . M ost of th eir w ishes foc u sed upon su ccessfu l fa rmin g a nd m a n age m e n t. I wish you in th is coming New Year, V in sujem vam V tento nas tavajuc i nov y rok , SLOVAKIA that a side of your ove n may fall out , " that your wife may get pregna nt this year! Give us foo d and drink and stay well! 19 aby va m vypadol z pece bok, aby vam bola vasa gazdin a na te nto rok samod ruh a 1 Vypit', zajest' na m d ajte, a dob re sa tu m aj te 1 p . 78 2 l wish you plenty of hemp , bu shels of beets, a whole bin of blossoms, and a ba rnful of children' Vinsujem va m moc konopi, mecu repy , zacinok puckov, plevienec deti 1 p. 79 3 This l wish to all'' with vigo r and joy : to peasants, bags for their shoulders ; to shep herd s, porridge; to cows, good pasture; to pigs, lots of mast to make them fat. Vinsujem smele vse tk ym vese le : sedliakom vrece, pine na piece; pastiero m kase a kravam pase; svi niam zaludu, ze tu cne budu . p . 79 The Three Magi On the eve of Epiphany, children went from house to house, singing carols in which the Epiphany motifs were interspersed with such commonplace motifs as farming and the farmer's eve ryday activity. Lord, grant us a merry eve ning ," to the farmer, first of all! And then to th e farmwife, and then to all the se rvants! The Three M agi a rri ve from the East, wo rshippin g this fam il y. Do not worship this fa mil y but worship only the beloved Lo rd! " And you , bright star, go before us, Lord , Jesus C hri st, grant us a good ni ght! And you , Joseph , I say to you , do not leave the Virgin M ary 1 D on ' t you kn ow who is going to be bo rn ? The Virgin M ary is to bear a so n . There is a red rose on your table , SLOVAKIA 20 let you r daught er marry a handsome man 1 There is a tu li p atop your table , yo ur son is ge ttin g read y to see his love. There is a handso me fe llow in this house , perhaps he ' d give us six kreu ze rs for a wrea th . God wi ll give him a lovely wife , whether it ' s Anna o r Susanna. The old man is not at home , he went out hunting . D aj nam Boh vecer diz vesely, najprv panu hospodarov i I A poto m aj tej hospod ince, po hospodin ce vseckej cel'adce 1 ldu tri a krali od vychod u , kl a naju sa tomut o rod u. Nekla naj te sa tom uto rod u , len sa kl a najte mil emu Bohu! A ty, j as na hviezd a, predchadzaj nas, pane J ezu Kri ste, dob ru noc nam d as 1 A ty , J ozefe, j a mlu vim tebe, neopust'aj pann y M a rie ! Nevid, co sa m a na sve t narod it'? M a panna Maria sy na porodit'. Na vaso m stole ce rve na ru za, daj vasej panenk e sva rn eho mu za 1 Na vaso m stole tulipan stoji, vas m lad enecek se k fraj erce strojL J est V tomto dome sva rn y ml adenec, azda nam on d a ses tak na veniec. D a jemu Panboh svarnu zenu , Annu alebo Zu za nu . Sta reho pana doma neni, isli oni po pol'uvanL pp. 79-80 Carnival Season Th e post-Chri stmas period does not present as m a n y cerem onies as th e C hri stmas season. The tim e of fasiangy (carni val season) was ch aracte rized b y a m asked procession which was to secure a good harvest. Th e carniv al processio n h ad mu sical accompaniment , u su all y a n accordi on . Most en gaged couples were also married during carnival season , sin ce there w as rela tively plenty of time for elaborate weddi n g celebration s, w hi ch las ted for several d ays. At the e nd of th e carnival seaso n , young m e n in ce re monial m asks we nt from ho u se to ho u se, collecting eggs, bacon , a nd m o ney. They SLOVAKIA 21 would sing humorous songs, such as " Shrovetide, P entecost. . m which they would ask for a piece of bacon . From these donations they would arrange a feast for the youth of the entire village. The main course was bacon and eggs, while the money paid for the music . Shrovetide, P entecos t, and Easter pass by, 16 he who has no fur coat , feels cold . I have none, I have none, I ' m shakin g all over, give me some bacon " to fill my belly . H ere I got nothin g, over there something, maybe. They killed a m osqu ito , a nd got some bacon . There up the chimney," a tom cat sits on the bacon , go chase him away and cut me a piece; if you cut me too sm all a piece, you will cut your fin gers. Give to the teacher " a piece as big as a d oo r , to me , a piece as big as a goose. Fasangy, Turice, V el'ka noc byva, kto nem a kozucha, zima mu byva. Ja nemam, ja nem a m , !en sa tak tras im , daj te mi slaninky, nech sa popasim . Tuto mi nedali , tuto mi d aj u, K om a ra zabili , slaninku m aj u . A ta m hore na komin e, sedi kocur na sla nin e, h ybajte ho zohn at' a mne ku s odrezat', az mi mal y odrezete, svoje prsty poreze te. R echtorovi j ako dve re a mn e ku s - ako hus 1 pp . 82-83 Easter The spring custom s include taking out Morena (the goddess of dea th in the p agan Slavic traditio n) , ta king out the old m a n (dedko - possibly a m ale equivalent of Moren a), and welcoming in the n ew summe r . However , the sprin g ce remonial cycle is cente red prim a rily around Easter , the most important religious holiday of the season . Easte r customs still co nta in m a ny pre -Christia n ele m e nts, which have been prese rved up to the 20th century . For example, on Good Friday a t d awn, girls would chant incantations while ba thing, wishing for a hu sba nd (see " Pud- 22 SLOVAKIA dle, Puddle" in the preceding section). On Easter Monday, groups of ten to fifteen men and boys went from house to house, wishing the womenfolk a Happy Easter. It was a part of the tradition that they flogged women's legs with a birch switch and doused their heads with fresh water. This proced ure had a symbolic purifying function . If a young man was courting a particular young woman, he was expected to visit her house , thus showing his interest and affection. Then, the girl would reward her favorite suitor with the most lavishly decorated Easter egg. Besides the eggs, everybody would also receive drinks, food, sweets, and little boys would get money. Easter, Easter, will it come soon? which lad will pour water over me] Pour the water , pour the water, on my hair and head , but do spare my nice new skirt. Vel'ka noc , Vel'ka noc, kedyze uz bude? ktoryze ma suhaj oblievati prfde? Oblievaj, oblievaj, vlasy aj hlavicku , ale mi zasanuj tu novu suknicku. p . 93 Pentecost marked the beginning of the summer cycle. Many traditions were centered around the summer solstice and St. John's Eve CTune 24). On that day, love incantations were chanted and the future was foretold . Also, magic was practiced against witches whose power was believed very strong on that day. The later part of the summer season is poorer in folklore because of increased work in the fields . Harvest The autum cycle begins with the harvest season . During the harvest season, songs were sung in the fields, or on the way home after a day 's work. Thematically , they are associated with the work itself, love between two young people ("We Reaped Here") , or the feast following the work ("Master, Make Ready for a Feast "). Some of these songs are joking in tone . The songs sung around the harvest wreath reflect old Slovak customs . After the harvest, a procession of harvesters would walk from the fields to the house of the farmer who had hired them . Led by a young man who was carrying a colorful flag and a young woman wearing a wreath made of wild flowers , they would sing songs and some- SLOVAKIA 23 times play music ("For Which Girl Shall We Weave a Wreath Today?"). In these songs, the peasants expressed their joy and happiness over a rich harvest. They also expressed their hope for the same bounty for the years to come. Harves t time offers a whole series of songs connected with this important agricultural season. They may refer to the work itself, or love between a young girl and a young man from the same village, or else the rest during the break or at the end of the day . W e reaped here , we reaped the re , in the valley, in th e valley, and the birdie, mottled birdie keeps singing, kee ps singin g. Kde sm e zali , tu sme fali , na doline , na doline , a ten vtacik, jarabacik pres pevuje , prespevuje. As the birdie , mottled birdie goes around th e tree , a rou nd the tree , so does m y d ea r, m y beloved go around me, around me . J ak ten vtacik, jarabacik okolo pna , okolo pna , tak moj mil y, najmilejsf okolo mna , okolo mn a. We reaped here , we reaped th ere, behind a path , behind a path , whoever will be our master, our clerk, our clerk? Kde sme zali , tu sme fali, za chonnfkom , za chonnfkom , ktoze bude nas fm panom , ura nnfkom , ura nnfkom ? p . 99 2 Master, make read y for a feas t, for a feast , we ' ve don e all the work for you . Master , prepa re the repast , th e repas t , a twelve- pound roas t. Add to it pints of wine , pints of wine, and a roasted capon. H otuj , pa ne , oldomas, oldomas , zrob ili sme , kd e co mas. H otuj , pa ne , veceru , vece ru, d vanas t' funtov pecenu . Este k tom u pint vfna, pint vfna, peceneho kapuna . p. 100 Around the h arvest wreath might be sung the foll owing song: 3 For which girl shall we weave a wreath today? For th e one chose n by the handsom es t young ma n . Wh o shall we let ca rry th e fl ag tod ay ? The one who hands hi s ri ght ha nd to her . T hat Ond1·is Slavik a nd Anna Bl ahej , SLOVAKIA 24 they would make a nice couple would Lord grant it. Masters, our masters , open the gates, we bring you a gift - a nice pair of reapers. Harvesters back from the fields , cover the tables, the mapl e tables with linen tabl e-cloths. Ktorejze dnes, ktorej uvijeme veniec~ Tej, ktoru vyberie najkrajsi mladenec . Komuze dnes , komu dame niest' zastavu? Tomu , co jej poda svoju rucku pravu. Ten Ondris Slavike, ta Anna Blaheje, to by bou pekny par, keby im Panboh dau! Pani nasi, pani, otvarajte brany, nesieme vam darik, zencov pekny parik. Idu zenci z roli, prestierajte stoly, stoly javorove, obrusy kmentove. p. 100 CEREMONIAL FAMILY FOLKLORE Ceremonial family folklore focuses primarily on the most important events in an individual's life: birth, marriage and death . While only songs are discussed here (they are the most common form), the Slovak ceremonial family tradition is expressed in poems, proverbs, sayings, riddles, and short dramatic performances as well. Christening Songs In the distant past , the birth of a child was accompanied by rituals and many magic practices . Such practices, it was believed, would protect the mother and her child, and would also secure health and happiness for the child as he or she matured. These magic practices gradually developed into joyful, social celebrations to welcome the new member of the family . 10 Thematically, the christening songs are directly connected with the child's birth and prospects. They frequently mention the responsibilities and problems connected with his or her upbringing, and wish the child a happy life, prosperity, and even a good spouse. Some songs stress the importance attached to having male offspring: '' And if you my wife,/would have a boy ... " If the child is a girl, the song may wish her beauty, or possibly stress the importance of chastity or industrious- 25 SLOVAKIA ness: " Freedom and chastity prevail everywhere, / whichever girl has them , let her guard them .'' Other songs may express the abruptly felt loss of freedom experienced by the young parents , especially the new mother: '' ... m y freedom is crying in the cradle.'' M any songs are j okin g in tone and form the less serious part of the christening ceremony in Slovak villages . H ere, for example, the new parents tease each other a bout their responsibility for rocking the baby: '' Rock him , m y dear . .. I'm his mother.'' And here again, the m other m ockin gly compares her situation with that of the carefree life of unm arried m en and women: " I used to have a good time , ... m y maiden name/ is blotted out," or " As the maiden s d ance . . . while I , poor thing , / rock a baby ." Slovak christening songs usually have the following rhyme pattern : aa-bb-cc-dd. The number of syllables is usually the same in each line. Man y songs use assonance and employ colloquial express10ns . J ano , J ano, mily Jano! Donesu ti chl apca rano. K ed donesu , budem mati , vychova ho moja mati. A ked puojdem dolinami , vychovam ho malina mi , a ked puojdem sfrym svetom vychovam ho bielym kvetom . J ohn, John dear J ohn" They will bring you a boy tomorrow. Wh en they bring him, I'll keep him ," my mother wi ll raise him . And when I go down the valleys, I will raise him on raspberri es, and when I go in the wide world , I will raise him on white flo wers. p. 143 2 If you , m y wife," would have a boy, I would hire a wet nurse , a chef, a cook, a caretaker , and a house keeper. K eby si ty, zena moja , chlapca mal a, drzau by ti dojku , kuchara , kucharku, i safa ra i safarku. p. 144 3 Freedom and chastity prevail everyw here," whichever girl has th em, let her guard them . I would have protected mine, but it is too late. my freedom is crying in th e cradle. Sloboda, poctivost', ta vsade panuj e, kt ore j u di evca ma, nech si ju va ruje. I ja bych si moju , uz je ponecase, uz moja slobod a V belcove m i place. p . 144 26 SLOVAKIA 4 As the maidens dance," they whirl around in circles, while I, poor thing, rock a baby. J a k tie panny tancuju, do kola sa zvrcuju, a ja neboz ia tko kolfsem diet'at ko. Rock him, my d ea r husband , he is such a lovely boy. Rock him yourself, you are his mother . Kolfbaj ho moj mily, vsak je synak spanily. Kolfbaj si sama, vsak si mu ty mama. I would be a fool to rock him by myself, You surely are his father just as I 'm his mother. Bola by ja blazon kolfba ti sama, vsak si mu ty otec jako i ja mama . I used to have a good time when luck served me, sitting by the window, with a handsome young man . Byvalo mi, byvalo, ked' mi stestia sluzilo, sedajfcej v okne, s mladeneckom pekne. I used to sit with him , now I am married to him , m y maiden name was blotted out. Sedala som, sedala, u z sem ho i dostala, me panenske jmeno bolo vymazano. pp. 144-45 Wedding Songs Of the three areas of ceremonial family folklore discussed here, the wedding ceremony offers the greatest variety of folklore material. This is because in Slovakia the wedding ceremonies of most villages and towns contained traditions that were peculiar to that particular locale . There were often specific differences between the ceremonies of neighboring villages even within a relatively small geographic area. 16 The entire ritual consisted of three parts: the period before the wedding during which a wedding contract was m ade between the future inlaws; the wedding ceremo ny itself, and the feast after the young couple had retired. The wedding actually began when the wedding guests gathered and the bride and groom left for the ceremony in the church. The first five selections under the headin g "Wedding Songs" are examples of what the wedding party might sing along the way. After the ceremony the bride and groom as well as the guests would arrive at the bride groom's h ouse , where the festivities would take place . The feast was and still is the culmination of the whole wedding. The structure of the entire wedding ceremon y was originally quite SLOVAKIA 27 rigid . There were dan ces, ceremonial speeches, dramatic speeches and acts, as well as songs. All proceeded according to a traditionally fixed pattern . 1 7 Today, the songs themselves are no longer a part of the ceremony, and while many of the other forms remain (such as dances and speeches) the rigid , traditional patterns are no longer followed . Thematically, the bride is the focus of the often-lyrical and teasing ceremonial songs. Her beauty , upbringing, future as a married woman, and her character are all described in these songs: "Mother, mother, you have a lovely daughter''; ''Mother, mother, you may be proud . . . '' The most frequently mentioned virtues on the bride's part are modesty , diligence , obedience, and chastity. Some of the songs, especially those following the taking of the wreath and placing of the bonnet on the bride's head (when she symbolically becomes a woman), are permeated with laments: ''I lost my headdress . .. I like wearing it.'' Other songs picture the bride taking leave of her parents, relatives and friends: thanking her parents for her upbringing, expressing her sorrow about leaving them, and sometimes also expressing apprehension about her future with the bridgegroom' s family. Wedding songs and speeches employ rhymed verse, often of the following pattern : aa-bb-cc. The number of syllables is usually the same in each line. As in christening songs, wedding songs also employ assonance. Mother, mother, you have a lovely daughter , we will take her from you even if you hide her. Should you lock her behind four locks, we sure will get her with fin e words. Mamicka , mamicka, peknu dceru mate, m y vam ju vezmeme , co ju aj schovate . Co by ste ju zamkli aj styrma zamka mi , my ju dostaneme peknymi slova mi. p. 151 2 G et married , ge t ma rried , m y love, well will you learn what tyranny is. Get m arried , get m arri ed, my love , a birch switch awaits you behind th e door. V ydaj sa !en, vydaj , frajeruock a rn oj a, sak sa ve ru dozvies , aka je to zvola. V ydaj sa !en , vyd aj, fraj eruocka moj a, caka t'a za dve rmi ta b rezova hola. p. 151 28 SLOVAKIA 3 I kept it a sec ret, a secret, but I won't anymore, mother, ge t the feath erbeds" read y, I ' m ge ttin g m ar ried. Thank you , mother , thank you, d ea r , for taking care of me wh ile I was a child . T aj ila som , taji la, uz tajit' nebudem , chystaj , m am ka, perin y, vydavat' sa budem . Dakujem va m , mamicka, dakujem va m sta ra, co ste vy mna chovali , kym so m bola mala . p . 152 4 M ot he r, mot her, you may be proud th at yo ur girl 's gettin g married still chaste. Chaste , she's getting ma rri ed to a you ng man , they both will be wearing a rosemary wreat h .'" Mamicka, mamicka , pekn a vasa chvala , ze sa vafa d ieuka poct iva vydava. Poctiva vyd ava, be ri e ju ml ade nec, budu mat' obidva z rozmarinu ve ni ec. p . 152 5 Whateve r yo u give me, oh, eternal Lord , just don ' t give me a n old hag with children . An old hag rumbl es like a ba rrel of bee r a nd a young girl ' s jumpy like a squirrel. I ' II give the old hag a fl a tca ke 10 to chew on, and th e yo ung gi rl a pair of boots to jump in . Co mi das, to das, pa ne boze vecny, !en ze mi nedavaj staru babu s det'mi. A ta stara dud le, ako z piva bocka a ta mlada skace a ko veve ru ocka. D am starej Osucha , aby ho fova la , ml ad ej na cizmicky, aby si skaka la. p. 152 On the way back from the church , the weddin g party sings songs like the following: 6 Now you a re ours, Ann ie, now you are ours, we a re tak in g you home from the wedd ing. They paid a lotll for your wedd ing, we have tied your hands with a stole . 1 ' Uz si ty, An icka, uz si teraz nasa, uz t'a my ved ieme domov ze sobasa . Od tvojho sobasa tvrdy toliar dali, uz sme tvoje rucky stolou poviazali. p . 153 SLOVAKIA 29 7 Jaj , co si plakala, ked t'a sobasili? Var si si m ys lela l'ubit' sa s inymi ? A ja som sa bala tej tvojej materi, ked' ona ma jazyk zo samej oceli . Oh , why did you cry at your wedding? Maybe you thought of loving others? No, I was afraid of your moth er , becau se she has a tongue of steel. p. 154 During the wedding feast the bridgegroom and bride may sing to each other: 8 Bridegroom: Welcome, d ear little dove," half of my heart 1 I'm fl ying from bu sh to bush to see your cheeks. As soon as my heart spotted you, it looked back with joy , m y wish was fulfill ed. I want to ask you , Molly , are you willing to m a rry m e? will your fat her let you go? do you want to be my wife? Vitaj, mila holubicka, muojho srdca polovicka 1 Lietam od kricka do kricka, abych videl tvoje licka . J ak t'a moje srdce zrelo , od radosti zas pozrelo , podl'a vuoli sa mi stalo. Chcem sa, Marka, t'a p ytati, m as ty vuolu za mna iti , ci t'a otec chce pu stiti , ci chces mojou zenou byti? p. 161 Bride: You can't find fault with me, yo u can do as you please. Wh y should I spare myself, 34 when I like to see you. You can profit from m e Wh a t ca n I d o? I can tear old shirts to rags , throw wood into the stove, in the kitchen I have good luck, I can cook cabbage wit hout lard, and you wi ll li ck your fingers. l can make scrambled eggs , as my fat her knows . You , m y fat her , tell them what a special di sh it is 135 Nieto na mne ziadna chyba , mozes robit', co ti treba. Co by lutovala seba, ked' ja rada vidim teba . Zo mn a m ozes osoh vziati, co zo mn a moze vystati? Viem starie kosele driapat', dreva do peci nam eta t', aj v ku chyni sa mi stescf, mozem navar it' kapusty bez mas ti , oblfzes prsty. Viem spravit' praze ni cu z vaj ec. o com vie svadobny otec. T y pan svadobny otec povedz , aka je to obzvlastna vec 1 p. 161 The bonneting of the bride had its own special songs . 36 SLOVAKIA 30 9 I lost m y headdress," m y green wreath, " the best m an" fo und it , a ha ndso me yo ung m an . H ey, bes t m an , best ma n , I beg of you , give me bac k that headb and , I like wearing it. If you like wearing that head ba nd so mu ch , surely you ' d ask the best man more ni cely . Stratila som partu, zeleny ve ni ec, nasiel mi ju dru zba, sva rny ml adenec. H ej , dru zba, hej, dru zba, pekn e t'a prosfm , d ajze mi tu partu , rad a ju nosfm 1 K eby si ty pa rtu rada nosila, ve ru by si druzbu krajsie prosila . p . 163 10 The bell s of r.upca' 0 have a ve ry ni ce rin g," 1 Annie , they ' ll kn ock off yo u r head ba nd . They will kn ock it off with nin e bells, so you won ' t go out with oth er yo un g men . So you won't go out , just love your husband , th e handso me J ohnn y, who is d evo ted to you . Tie lupcian ske zvo ny vel'mi pekne zvo ni a, u z tebe, Ani cka, tvoju pa rtu zro ma . Zronia ti ju , zronia deviatimi zvo ncf, abys nechodil a s cudzfmi mladencf. Abys nechodil a, mu za si l'ubila , Janfcka svarnyho, tebe oddan yho. p . 163 Wailing Over the Dead The practice of wailing over the dead form ed a n integral p a rt of the fun e ral ceremony , a nd according to the Muran Articles of the Protestant Church from 1585 , wailing had been widely practiced in Slovakia.42 The lam ents were performed by semi-professional wailers , usually by older women , who wailed a t the funeral for a fe e. Some times , the laments were perform ed by rela tives. The laments over the d ead were generally improvi sed on the spur of the moment , with the hired person attempting to express lyrically the dee p sorrow felt by the relatives and friends of the deceased. They also m e ntioned the good traits of the deceased, the progress of hi s or her illn ess (as in " Oh , My D ear Child "), and would dram atize the actual d emise of the deceased , portraying him as he took leave of hi s fa mily, relatives, and friends. The laments over the d ead are st ru ctured differentl y from other folklore genres . Since they h ad to be open for improvisa tions , they are SLOVAKIA 31 free in form. They usuall y do not have regular stanzas or rhyme. Assonance predominates over rhym e and they are sung as melodic recitations. Laments can be characterized not only b y the lack of formal structure, but also by a certain degree of looseness and incoherency, possibly utilized to stress the depth of sorrow felt by the relatives and friends . This looseness is demonstra ted in the poem "George , George" in which the last two stanzas are only vaguely related to the theme of the first two stanzas. Oh , my dear child , beloved Angel," what shall I do without you , my dear souJ? My hea rt was bleeding while you were suffering, you looked at me, I couldn ' t help. Your fath er was walking stunned in the yard , walkin g aimlessly, not saying a word . You chattered to me your sweet words th e wh ole day, you dear innocent ch ild , a nd when you r father came home from th e fi elds, you smiled so that he would take you in his arms , and th ere was no end to your talking, and your father took d elight in you, hi s treasure. Ach, moj e drah uo diet'a, anjel premileny, cuo pocnem bez teba, moj a draha dusa, srdce mi zatislo, ked si sa trapilo, hl'adelo si na mna, nemohla som pomuoct'. Otec ti po dvore omrace ny chodiu , nikde miesta nemau, slov ka nepovedau. Stebotalo si mi slad uskymi recmi cely den, ty draha nevinnost ' premila , a ked otec z pol'a do domu sa vratiu, usmi evalo si sa, kym t'a k sebe nevzau, a n ebolo recom tvojim dlh o konec , a otec sa tesiu v tebe drahy poklad. p. 164 2 George, George, yo ur godfather ca me ," for yo u to plow hi s fi elds. You a re through with plowing since the Lord called you. Juro , Juro , km otor prise!, aby si mu orat' isol. A ty si uz dooral , ked' t'a panboh povolal. Ycs te rd ay you ate three sa usages," a nd a lot of bread. 46 Today you lie on th e bier, like a hog on a ca rt . Y ce ra si zjel tri jelita , aj chl eba z polk yky zita. Dnes uz lezis na marach ako bravec na karach. 32 SLOVAKIA M y dea r go lde n m oustache" would be fit fo r strin gs, my ve r y d ear ha ir , would be good fo r ropes. M oje m ile, zlate fuzy, boli ze by na mot u zy, moj e premile vlasy boli by na povrazy. Wh en he bega n to play hi s bagpipe: " tati -lat i, ta ti-l a ti ," he go t a farth ering" to bu y spices, he dropped it behind his shirt. K ed si pocal gajdovati : ta ti -lati , ta ti-l ati , ma! turak na koreni a, vsy pal ho do zahreni a. p . 165 NOTES ' Andrej M elichercfk , ed. , Slo vensky Folkl6r: Chrestomatia (Bra tislava: Slove nska Akademi a Vied, 1959) . ' J ozef r. . Holuby, Folklore studi es published ma inl y in Slovenske Pohl'ad y between 1883 a nd 1897; Jan Kolla r , N arodnie spievanky, I-II (Bra ti slava, 1953); Jii'i Polivka, Supis slo ven skych rozpravok I-V (Turciansky Svaty M artin , 1923 -1932). ' The fo lkloric ma teri al collected by Dobsinsky a nd oth ers is re ndered in th e dialec t o f the region fro m which it origina ted . The page reference to M elichercfk is give n in th e tex t a ft er th e Slovak ori ginal. ' " Puddle, Puddle ." In the Slova k, this love inca nta ti on has an irregul a r rhym e (aabbb-c-ddd-c-ee-fff- e-g-hh-g- iii -j- k-ll -m m) whi ch was sac rificed in th e tra nsla ti on fo r the sake of accuracy. • Although th e magical for mulae are pagan in origin , they contain refe rences to C hristi a nit y. ' Lit. · " H oly T rinity,/be a good helpe r to me/ to eve rythin g good,/ to the state of m a trimon y" (II. 26-29). 6 The colors refer to the body: red or pink cheeks were considered a sign of good health , a nd a white co m plex ion was much valued by both men and women, partl y as a sign of class di stin ction . O nly feuda l lords and wealth y merchants who di d not have to work in th e fi elds could afford to have white skin a ll year aro un d. " H oney " is a traditi onal refe rence to good te mper . 7 " I have brought you a piece of steel. . " With the exce ption of the wishes in the las t lin e, the Slova k poe m co nsis ts of rh ym in g co upl ets. All bu t 11 . 1 and 2 a re revised in order to con vey a prope r word order in English . Steel (iron) was co ns idered p ro tect ion aga ins t evil and fa iries in Europe (Maria Tymocz ko). ' H a ft is a ha nd le of a hoe, ax, scyt he, and oth er ag ricultu ral tools. H ere the number of hafts represen ts the far mer 's pros perity. 9 A typical orname n t a mong young marri ed village me n . Wh en give n by a you ng unm a r ried women, th e feather was co nside red a sign of affect ion. '° K re u ze r (o r kreutzer) was a small cop per coin in Aust ri a and Ge rmany, the 100th part of th e fl orin . It was so called because th e coin had th e fi gu re of a cross on it. A penny wou ld be probabl y the closest co n temporary eq ui valent to the kreuzer. " Wal nu ts and hazlenu ts were trad itionally eaten at C hristmas tim e after the ma in meal. SLOVAKIA 33 " " I wi sh you in thi s/comin g New Yea r " : This is a very popular N ew Year 's wish . The unu su al wi sh , " that a side of your oven/ m ay fa ll out" (11 .3 -4) probably ha s the same conn otat ion as th e En gli sh '' break a leg!'' It also sugges ts a wi sh of prosperity to the farm er , i.e., th a t hi s oven m ay be fill ed to burstin g, or ove rh eated with con stant cooki ng a nd baking. " Fo rmall y, thi s poe m is arran ged in rh ymin g coupl ets but asson an ce plays a m o re impo rtant role . " This carol is loosely a rra nged in rh yming couplets. Again, the assonance a nd the rhym e take precedence ove r m eanin g, and thi s ex plains why such seemingly unrela ted them es as th e Three Kings, the Star of Bethlehem , J oseph and M a ry o n the one hand, and the rose, th e tulip on the ta ble, and the old man's huntin g expedition on th e other ha nd , fo und their place in thi s carol. The carol is a mi xture of religious and secular m otifs. " C hildren , dressed as the Three Magi, arrive a t a farmh ou se and sing. Yet they mu st no t sin g a bout the fa rm er ' s fa mil y, but the H oly Famil y of the Na tivity. 16 ' ' Sh rovetide, Pentecos t, and Easter ... '' This j okin g carnival song is ar ranged in rh ym in g coupl ets. 11 Fatback bacon (usual ly with no lean m eat) was a staple diet , often a snack, fo r village peo ple. It was ofte n eaten with baked potatoes a nd _onio ns, o r j ust plain bread . 18 Fa tback baco n u sed to be sm oked (cured ) in th e chimn ey. 19 The teac her , alo ng with the p riest a nd th e m ayo r , was amon g th e m ost prominent peo ple in th e vill age. 0 ' S loven sko: l', ud - II. cast', ed s. Boze na Filova et al. (B ra ti slava: O bzo r , 1975). " In the Slovak o ri ginal, thi s son g has a regula r rh yme pat tern: aa-b b-cc-dd . The first two lines ad d ress th e m a in speaker . " J oh n" is appa ren tl y a youn g fath er whose wife d ied in childbirth . T he fat her says that he will kee p his so n , but the boy ' s grandmoth er will have to bring him up . Them a ticall y, the so ng expresses conce rn fo r th e boy ' s upbringin g. In the seco nd stan za , the speake r ind icates that he m ay have to leave hi s nat ive vill age, probably in search of wo rk . T hi s was a co mm on prac ti ce among im poverished village rs. " Lit .: " I 'll have. " In 11. 3 an d 4 coll oqui al form s of the ve rb " to have " and the nou n " m other" have bee n used. The forms a re iden tical: mati , wh ich fac il itates th e rh ym e and keeps th e sam e num ber of syll a bles in each line. There a re eight sylla bles in each line, and th e standa rd m o nosy lla bic word m at' wo uld have redu ced th e syll a bles dow n to seven in 11 .3 a nd 4 . " The origin al son g uses assonance ra ther th an rh ym e. A fat her-to-be is th e speaker in this so ng . H alf-jokin g , he stresses the importance of a male offspring. H e p rom ises to pa m pe r hi s wife if she bears him a son . " The original so ng uses asson a nce . T he speaker , proba bly an un wed m o th er, po nders her fat e a nd talks a bout social conve nti on s. " W ith th e excepti o n of stanza 3, the so ng has a near regul a r rh ym e: aa-bb-cc-dd-e -fg- f-hh- ii -jj- kk. T he speaker in th is so.ig is the ba by 's moth er who regrets th e loss of her freedo m as a mother and/or a wife . It is not qu ite clear from the context wheth er she is m a rri ed o r no t. I n either case, it was not proper of her to joi n the ca refree d a nce of unm arri ed m en a nd wome n . 34 6 SLOVAKIA Slovensko: E,ud, p. 1057. " Melichercfk , p. 26 " A featherbed is a strong cloth con tainer thi ckly filled with goose feathers and down and used as a bed cover in lieu of blankets. Featherbeds were a part of the bride's dowry, which also included pillows, sheets, towels, cloths, etc . The dowry was collected throughout the years practically after the day the girl was born . Goose down and stripped feathers were collected ever y year from the fami ly's fl ock of geese and stashed in a special bag for each d aughter in the family. The wealthier the bride , the higher the pile of featherbeds and pillows atop her bed . " A rosemary wreath was a decoration used on such occasions as weddings and funerals . H ere it is a symbol of chastity. 0 ' A fl atcake (osuch ) is a simple, flat cake, usually round. It is baked from bread dough , which is sometimes mixed with a different type of fl our or else potatoes. " Lit .: "They paid a hard thaler for your wedding ," obviously meaning the dowry. Thaler (also taler) was a large silver coin u sed in various German states and in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was worth 30 silver groschen, worth about 3s. sterling . The word "dollar" is derived from " th aler." " R efe rring to the priest's vestments durin g the wedding ce remony, the stole is a long, decorated strip of cloth worn like a scarf by officiating clergymen of various chu rches. 33 In the Slovak original, each line consists of eight syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aaaa-bbb-cccc. " The meaning is not quite clear here. It probably indicates the bride's submission to the groom . 35 In this poem, each line consists of eight syllables . The rh yme pattern is: aaaa-bb-ccbbb-dddd. 36 Bonneting of the bride is the culmination of the wedding ceremony. The bride becomes a married woman when her wreath is replaced by a bonnet. 31 Headband or headdress is a wreath decorated with colorful ribbons, worn by un married women and brides. Married women wore bonnets or scarves. 38 Each line in this song consists of eleven syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aa-bb-cc. 39 It was customary that the best man led the bride to the wedding and took off her wreath or headband. H e led the bride down the aisle, whereas the bridesmaid led the bridegroom down the aisle. He was referred to as the " leading " best man and wore a sword to distinguish himself from other best men who wore sticks decorated with scarves . '° Cupca is a town in Central Slovakia, where many local customs and traditions have been preserved. 41 Each line in this song consists of twelve syllables. The rhyme pattern is: aa-bb-c-d. " Melichercfk, p . 142. 43 This lame ntation has a sporadic rhyme pattern: a-b-c-d-ee-f-g-ee- h-i. The lines consist of 12 to 13 syllables. 44 The poem has the following rhym e pattern: aa-bb-cc-dd-ee-ff-gg-hh . The lines consist of seven to eight syllables. 45 Pork sausage in natural casing. It is made of rice or grits combined with ground meat , liver, blood and spices. The sausages were usu all y made in winter or early ' SLOVAKIA 35 spring when the fatt ened pigs were slaughtered . " '' ... a lot of bread.'' This is a free translation due to the discrepancy in the printed word indicating the amount of rye from which the bread was made . The original version of this song, titled, " W a iling over a D ead Husband" (Sbomik slovenskych n arodnych piesnf, povestf, prfslovf, porekadiel, hadok, hier, obycajov a povier [A Collection of Slovak Folk Songs, Riddles, Games, Customs, and Superstitions], II , (Turciansky Sva ty Martin : Matica slovenska, 18741) spells the wordpolkyly, which would mean half a kilo. On the other hand , Melichercik's edition lists the word polkyky (fem. gen. sg. ), which was an old , popula r measure in Slovak villages . The word k yky is of Ukrainian ori gin (a Ukrainian word for a scarf worn by village women, "babushka" type). ·since scales were a luxury item in the past, the amount of rye from which a loaf of bread was m ade was m easured in the scarf. Pol means half, i.e., the bread was made from half the amount measured by the scarf. 47 The poem , somewhat joking in character, shows the improvising character of funeral recitations. The stanzas wander from one subject to another, touching some memories of the dead man that may o r may not be relevant for the occasion of the funeral, but they are important in the eyes of the wailer. " " Farthing" is a free translation, indicating that the coin was small. In the Slovak original , turak was a small coin , worth one and a half groschen . It was used in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This paper is based on a doctoral dissertation , " Slovak Folklore : An Anthology, " at the Un iversity of M assachuset ts in Amh erst , 1982. I th ank especially Professors Sarah N. Lawall a nd Zdenek Salzmann . Presented in part in P anel 128 , " Slovak Literature as a Mirror of the National Awakening ," at the AAASS co nvention in Philadelphia on 8 November 1980 , and in Panel 65 , "The Village in Slovak Literature ," at the AAASS convention in Asiloma r , California on 2 1 September 1981.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Three Kinds of Slovak Folk Literature Description An account of the resource Eva Susan Kucekova Slovakia, Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83 pp. 12-35 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucekova, Eva Susan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9413ffa2fd93e550347188753b7d33a3.pdf 7fdf70c9433ba45bf2de2217e32752cd PDF Text Text 32 SLOVAKIA ANDREJ HLINKA'S JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1926 Stefan Kucik Andrej Hlinka belongs among those in Slovak history whose achievements await a complex analysis and evaluation. He and his activities were ignored or misinterpreted by most Marxist historians during the communist era. On the other hand, he was also very controversial. The aim of this article is to analyze the circumstances and the course of his journey to the USA in 1926. Although the official reason for Hlinka's journey was to participate in the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, he made use of his visit to lecture to American Slovaks and to raise funds for the cause of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. After some disagreements between the Slovak League of America and Jozef Husek, the lecture tour was held under the auspices of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. Even if his lecture tour to the USA proved financially disappointing to Hlinka, he did win the sympathy of American Slovaks to his person, and to the autonomist movement in Slovakia. On June 20- 24, 1926 the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in Chicago, Illinois. As the first such Congress on the soil of the United States of America, 1 it presented the Reverend Andrej Hlinka of Rufomberok an opportunity to visit American Slovaks for the first time. Although American Slovaks had already invited Hlinka visit them in 1924, Czechoslovak authorities had refused to grant him a passport because he had been prosecuted for having illegally travelled to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In 1926 he was again prosecuted and, despite having been cleared by the County Court in Bratislava, in March of that year, he was sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight days in jail for his article on T. G. Masaryk' s favortism of the Jews published in the daily Slovak on April 5, 1924. 1 The second time such a congress met in th e USA was in 1976 tional Euchari stic Congress in Philade lphia, Pennsy lvani a, the 4 1st Interna- �SLOVAKIA 33 After explaining that he wished to travel to the Eucharistic Congress, Jan Cerny' s administration finally granted him a passport. 2 Andrej Hlinka was repeatedly invited to America by the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom led by Jozef Husek.3 On April 21 , 1926 the weekly Jednota published a letter from Hlinka to Husek dated April 3, 1926. In this letter Hlinka announced that he would arrive accompanied by his secretary Andrej Genit and the Parliamentary Deputy Jozef Buday on June 3-4, 1926. He asked Husek to prepare a schedule for his lectures. He wrote that his passport was valid for half a year, which he wished to spend in the USA, provided that political issues would not force his return home. 4 While Hlinka was granted a passport to travel to the Eucharistic Congress on April 30, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague about the details of Hlinka's planned journey. According to the Ministry in Bratislava, the goal of Hlinka's journey was to spread autonomist propaganda on behalf of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (hereinafter HSPP) and to raise funds for the Party. He also allegedly planned to draft a resolution of Slovak complaints and pleas and to submit it to the Czechoslovak government and to the League ofNations.5 Hlinka outlined the programme of his journey in the daily Slovak on May 23 , 1926. Among other things he stated that, as early as in 1894 he was asked by American Slovaks to "choke the hydra" of brotherly quarrels among them, but thus far he had not been enable to do so. Now he was going to America to enlighten the Slovaks and to help the Republic and the nation. He was going where the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements were signed. He wanted to see with 2 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hli nka (I 864 - I 926) (Brati slava, 1934), p. 544 . Ibid. , p. 543. 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahran icnich veci Ceske republiky [Archi ves of the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs of the Czech Republi c] (here inafter AMZV CR), fund (here inafter f. ) Ill. sekce MZV 19 I 8 - 1939 [3 rd section Mini stry of Foreign Affairs 19 I 8 193 8] (hereinafter III), in ventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22 , fo lder (here inafter fold .) 651 . The report o f the Consul ate of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) in Pittsburgh, to the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs (hereinafter MFA ) of the CSR in Prague from April 22, 1926 ; Jednota, April 2 1, 1926, p. 4. 5 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld. 651. Letter of the Minister of the CSR with Full Powers fo r the Admini stration of Slovakia in Brati slava to the MFA in Prague, April 30, 1926 . 3 �34 SLOVAKIA his own eyes and hear with his own ears if it was a sin to demand autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Constitution. 6 At the time of the Hlinka's trip to the USA, reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh characterized the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America as quite tense. Besides personal problems, anxiety arose from frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government' s failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement. Meanwhile, State Insurance Commissioners were exerting pressure on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues, which greatly upset their members. 7 The reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh also described an alleged rivalry between Ivan Bielek, the President of the Slovak League of America and Jozef Rusek. Apparently, Rusek feared losing his editorship of the weekly Jednota at the upcoming 22 nd convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania on September 20 - 25 , 1926. His rival was Jan C. Sciranka, editor of Slovak v Amerike. The owner of the Slovak v Amerike was Bielek's brother-in-law Christopher L. Orbach.8 However, according to the report of the Pittsburgh Consulate, the tension between Bielek and Rusek soon dissipated. On April 14, 1926 Bielek published an article entitled Segedin-Mirov in Slo vak v Amerike, in which he denounced the imprisonment of Hlinka in the Czech Mirov prison for having offended President Masaryk. According to the Consulate, Bielek did so because he needed Husek's support at the upcoming convention of the National Slovak Society and the congress of the Slovak League of America. 9 Soon, however, arguments within the Slovak-American autonomist camp broke out again, thanks to Jozef Rusek. In a letter of April 3, 1926, Hlinka asked Rusek to prepare his lecture schedule. Rusek began to register applications for Hlinka's lectures and he wished to carry out this tour under the aegis of the Committe of Friends of Slovak Freedom. Some newspapers and organizations protested: the banker Michal Bosak in his weekly Obrana, a number of priests who 6 Slovak, May 23, 1926, pp. 1-2. AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 650. Report of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, April 15, 1926. 8 ibid. 9 i bid. 7 �SLOVAKIA 35 supported the programme of the Magyarone priest Frantisek Jehlicska for the return of Slovakia to Hungary, and Bielek and Orbach in 10 Slovak v Amerike. In addition, the Committe had already been out of existence for three years. It was originally founded to purge the "Czechoslovaks" from the Slovak League of America, and then it merged with it. Despite this fact, Husek kept the title of president of this non-existent organization, announced the arrival of Hlinka to Slovak priests and newspapers and launched the campaign on his own. II Although Jozef Husek, through his contact with Slovak priests in America started to organize Hlinka's lecture tour, the Slovak League of America, led by president Bielek, also started to organize the lectures. It established an organizing committee, composed almost entirely of priests. Husek refused to become a member of this committee and the Slovak v Amerike started to complain about Husek's actions. 12 As a result, a group of Slovak priests ended up organizing Hlinka's lecture tour and the Slovak League of America, even though it compiled the schedule of the lectures, did not control the • 13 pnests. On May 26-27 the 16 th congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Detroit. The congress "with great joy received the news, that the noble leader of the Slovak nation, Msgr. Hlinka, President of the People's Party, would visit American Slovaks." It expressed confidence in him and promised that it would "with all its strength help his noble efforts and during his stay he would be a guest of the Slovak League of America." 14 Hlinka and his colleague Jozef Buday, together with Hynek Dostal , editor of the Czech-American newspaper Hlas, which supported autonomy for the Slovaks, 15 were named honorary members of the Slovak League of America. 10 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situat ion report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 11 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 12 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prag ue, October 5, I 926. 13 Ibid. 14 A MZV CR, f. 111 , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 15 Ibid. of the Consul ate of the CS R of the Consulate of the CSR of the Consul ate of the CSR of the Co nsulate of the CSR �36 SLOVAKIA At the congress of the Slovak League, the previous officers were re-elected under the leadership of Ivan Bielek. Husek criticized this outcome. 16 He reported that the League had no funds , he accused the officers of incompetence, and warned that the League would perish if nothing was done to build up its treasury. 17 However, all these arguments between Husek and Bielek were simply personal. In fact, the Slovak League under the leadership of Ivan Bielek (1920- 1934) championed the Pittsburgh Agreement and openly supported the Slovak autonomist movement in the Czechoslovak Republic . The "Czechoslovaks" in America also prepared for the arrival of Andrej Hlinka. For instance, the Reverend Jozef Murgas of WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, that at the next meeting of priests of eastern Pennsylvania, he would ask them if their real interest was in politics or in religion and he promised to inform Getting of their answer. 18 Hlinka's arrival was announced by the daily Slovak (Bratislava) on June 4, 1926: "On June 3 our editorial staff received this telegram from Halifax : We have arrived safely. - Hlinka." 19 From the Canadian port of Halifax, Hlinka' s ship continued on to New York City, where it docked on June 5, 1926. 20 About 300 American Slovaks welcomed Hlinka at the dock. Once he had disembarked, Hlinka briefly outlined the goal of his journey. He stressed that he had come to work for both the Slovak nation and for his homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. He emphasized concord, unity, the settling of petty arguments and forgivness, because "the nation needs us all and it needs us united." 21 In a 26-car procession the delegation proceeded to the Church of St. John Nepomucene on 66 th street, where the Reverend Stefan J. Krasul'a had been the pastor since 1916. An official reception was held in the Parish Hall, where the representatives of American Slovaks delivered their speeches.22 Here Andrej Hlinka spoke his 16 Ibid. Jednota, Jun e 2, 1926, p. 4. 18 A MZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. Missive of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA , April 15, I 926. "Czechos lovaks" were Slovaks who supp,orted th e unitary policies of the Czechoslovak government in Prague. 9 Slovak, June 5, 1926, p. I. 20 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 21 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. 22 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 17 �SLOVAKIA 37 memorable words: "If there were no America, Slovakia would still be under the Magyar yoke. To its credit the Slovaks finally got rid of the thousand-year subjugation." 23 The Slovak League of America officially welcomed Hlinka in the evening at a session of its local branch. 24 On this occassion the Slovak League also issued an official communique which was published by the daily Slowik in Bratislava. 25 A banquet was held the next day under the aegis of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. The banquet marked the completion of the programme of welcome with speeches by representatives of various Slovak organizations. Hlinka and Buday were presented with special diplomas, certifying that the Slovak League of America had granted them honorary memberships. 26 After the official welcome in New York, Jozef Rusek left the organizing of Hlinka's lecture tour to the Slovak League of America. 27 It began in Chicago after the end of the Eucharistic Congress on June 27, 1926. 28 According to the official announcement of the president of the Slovak League of America, published in the daily Slovak on July 14, 1926, Hlinka requested that lectures be presented on working days, because at the time of the announcement, there were already 136 requests for lectures. 29 Since the content of Hlinka's lecture in Chicago was generally the same as at other places in the USA, I will summarize it based upon the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago. The lecture was held in the Ashland Boulevard Auditorium which had a capacity of 4,000. The Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago stated that two thirds of the hall was filled, 30 which, in comparison with the 23 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 25 Slovak, June 16, 1926, p. I. 26 Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 27 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1965), p. 210. 28 AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago region. Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CSR in Washington, DC, July 30, 1926. 29 Slovak, July 14, 1926, p. 3. 30 The daily Slovak gave the number of 5,000 - 5,500 and stated that the hall was overcrowded. Cf. Slovak, July 16, I 926, p. 3. 24 �38 SLOVAKIA number of Slovaks living in Chicago, the majority of whom were Catholics, was not that great. Information on the lectures was also disseminated by priests from their pulpits. Tickets were sold in the churches and by the Slovak Catholic Federation. This was designed to prevent unauthorized persons from attending. The $1,000 rent for the hall was paid by the Slovak Catholic Federation. The profits were given to Andrej Hlinka. Tickets were sold for 50 and 75 cents, $1.00 and $2.00, depending upon the seating.31 As the report of the Consulate states, the beginning of the lecture was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, Hlinka and his entourage arrived at 2:45 p.m. The audience welcomed him with a standing ovation. The session was openned by Jan Mayer, the president of the Slovak Catholic Federation, who introduced the guests. After him Gregor K. Vaniscak, the pastor of the Slovak Parish of St. Michael the Archangel in Chicago, spoke highly of the great Andrej Hlinka's work for the Slovak nation. He compared Hlinka with the three "most important people in world history" - George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Cardinal Richelieu. After that Andrej Hlinka delivered his speech. The audience greeted him with applause and some shouted: "Viva, hooray! " Somebody from the audience, allegedly a Slovak Communist, tried to disrupt the lecture and shouted "Shame on him!" for which he was ejected by the police. Some tried to distribute the communist daily Rovnost' /'udu, for which they were also ejected and held overnight at the police station. According to the report of the Chicago consulate, Andrej Hlinka first read the list of donors who contributed to the fund Narod sebe [The Nation for Itself] and to the HSPP's election fund . He asked the donors to keep their trust in him, because he had received all the money and had spent every penny for the right purpose. As evidence he cited the establishment of Slovak Catholic enterprises such as the Lev printery, the daily Slovak, and, most importantly, the half million votes that the HSPP had gained in the last parliamentary elections, which made it the most powerful political party in Slovakia. He asked American Slovaks to continue to remember the HSPP and its struggle for recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the autono31 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Report of the Consu late of th e CS R in Chi cago on the political acti vities of th e Peopl e's Party leaders in th e Chi cago region. Supplement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CS R in Was hin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. �SLOVAKIA 39 my of Slovakia. Hlinka stated that he and the HSPP did not want anything more than that Slovaks be masters in Slovakia and Czechs in Bohemia and that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" concerning the self-determination of nations be also applied to the Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Agreement. He declared that he was not against the Czechoslovak Republic and he was ready to "both live and die" for it, because October 28 was also the result of his nation-building efforts . He had struggled in Slovakia against the Magyars, who imprisoned him, first in Rufomberok, and then in Segedin. He added that Slovakia had long awaited October 28, 1918 as the day of liberation from the Magyar yoke. However, Hlinka continued, Slovak sons did not fight in the Czechoslovak Legions to move from one yoke to another. Instead of freedom , Slovaks were now offered "Czechization." Jozef M. Hurban, when he with others led the revolt against the Magyars in 1848, already spoke of the Slovak nation and not a "branch of the Czech nation." Similarly, when the Matica slovenska was founded in 1863, the Slovak leaders set its aim as the defence of the Slovak language as a national language and not a "Czech dialect." To spread the Czech language in Slovakia it was not necessary to establish the Matica slovenska. Therefore, if Hlinka now demands autonomy for Slovakia and wants the Pittsburgh Agreement to be respected and incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, he does not want anything new. The Memorandum of Stefan Marko Daxner from as early as in the 1860's requested from the Hungarian government a so-called "Slovak Region" that completely agrees with his present request for autonomy. However, according to Hlinka, the Czech language rules in Slovak courts, offices and schools. Catholic schools were taken from the Slovaks in spite of the fact that the Catholics form the majority in Slovakia and they have to pay taxes to maintain the school system. For these taxes Slovak Catholic children are being indoctrinated with atheism and are taught by teachers such as a certain Bilek, who was a servant in Bohemia, but in Slovakia was made a high school professor! Moreover, Hlinka continued, Slovak intellectuals cannot find work at home. Slovak workers have to look for freedom in America. Despite the fact that Slovaks constitute 15% of the total number of inhabitants in Czechoslovakia, they are virtually absent from the �40 SLOVAKIA state administration . In high schools Slovaks have no principal. From among 786 high school professors, only 175 are Slovaks. An even greater disproportion exists in the railways--from among 13,000 employees, only 412 are Slovaks. There are enough qualified intellectuals in Slovakia, but the Prague government ignores them. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is not just political posturing, but is a cultural and economic need and is crucial to the existence of the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Hlinka stated that he wanted the Slovak and Czech nations to come together and jointly work on maintaining and developing their common state, but by observing equality in the national, cultural and economic spheres. He is not creating discord for the sake of discord. He supports the Czechoslovak Republic, which he proved when the communist attack on Slovakia occurred. Then the Czechoslovak governent had an opportunity to negotiate with him and establish order; the same was true after the last parliamentary elections, in which the HSPP gained the largest number of votes in Slovakia. However, the HSPP was not even noticed by the Czechoslovak government, it was not called by the government and it was even not considered to be necessary to negotiate with it.32 As the consulate report stated, Andrej Hlinka spoke for more than an hour. The tone of his voice was gentle and polite, hence very impressive. The audience often expressed its approval with applause, especially when he defended himself against accusations of treason and Magyaronism. On this occassion he stated that his life was an open book, from which every unbiased person could read, that he had always been selflessly fighting for the rights of the Slovak people. Before World War I, when he defended the rights of the Slovaks, the Magyars accused him of being a "Pan-Slav" and after the war, when he defended the same rights, the secularists and gullible Czechs accused him of being a Magyarone. In this context he asked the audience if it was possible that he would lead the Slovak people back to Magyar slavery, in which it had suffered for more than a thousand years? If anybody with common sense could accuse him of being an instrument of the Magyars, who, because of his fight for the rights of the Slovak nation, had escorted him from one prison to another? Hlinka concluded with an appeal to American 32 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 41 Slovaks to support him and the HSPP in this fight for autonomy and the recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement. 33 After Hlinka Jozef Buday delivered his speech. According to the consular report, he was "thoughtless and rudely incited against the atheistic Czechs." He complemented the factual parts of the speech, in which Hlinka mentioned the Czech injustice against the Slovaks. 34 The consular report further stated that F. Wilson, a representative of the district council, spoke after Buday. After him came Andrej Gerat, who criticized the methods of education in Slovakia. After Gerat the Rev. G. K. Vaniscak read this resolution: 1. We support the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 2. We demand that the Pittsburgh Agreement to be incorporated into its Constitution. 3. We demand for Slovaks Slovak Christian schools . 4. We demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks be given priority m government offices, post offices, the railways, etc. 5. We demand that the Slovak language be exclusively used as the official language in all schools, offices, etc. After Vaniscak read the resolution, he asked the audience to possibly supplement it. Allegedly, some Communist suggested that all county and episcopal manors be confiscated and parceled out to the poor. After a short silence, the audience started to rise up and wanted to throw him out. Andrej Hlinka called for calm and said that the question had been politely put, so it would be politely answered. He answered that he agreed that all the manors be parceled out to the people who tilled them. Though the government is doing so, it is doing it along political lines. Concerning the episcopal manors, these belong to the Church, ergo to the people. From them schools, monasteries, publications, magazines and everything that the Church needs are maintained. Why should these manors be confiscated and parceled out when they are owned by all the people? 35 The Communist, as the daily Slo vak noted, said: "Thank you for the explanation, now 33 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. �42 SLOVAKIA I know everything. I am content. " 36 The resolution was approved in the original wording. 37 Before the session ended, Andrej Hlinka talked to his countrymen from Orava about the annexation of parts of Spis and Orava by Poland. In the name of the HSPP he promised that he would negotiate to have these regions returned to Slovakia. 38 The session concluded with the national hymn ,,Lightening over the Tatras." 39 There followed a banquet, at which Frantiska C. Jakabcinova, the president of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, gave Hlinka and Buday a gold membership medal and a gift of $1,000.40 On July 3, 1926, Andrej Hlinka had one more lecture in Chicago, the content of which was much the same as the first one. Among other places at which Hlinka and Buday lectured were Kenosha, Wisconsin, on July 3, Milwaukee, on July 14, Streator, Illinois, on July 5, Mount Olive, Illinois, on July 8, East St. Louis, on July 10, St. Louis, Missouri, on July 11 , and in Whiting, Indiana, on July 14, 1926. Then Hlinka's lectures continued in the Cleveland region. The content of these lectures was everywhere almost the same. 41 According to the consular report, the impact of Hlinka' s lectures upon the Slovak people in America was great. Workers debated them in factories and there were also quarrels and even battles (in Hege42 wich, Illinois, and Chicago Heights). Andrej Hlinka's message was summed up by Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, as follows: 1. A. Hlinka declined an interview with the editorial staff of the Czech Narodne listy before his departure to America; 36 Slovak, July 16, 1926, p. 3. 37 A MZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld . 651. Report of the Co nsul ate of the CS R in Chica- go on the political activ ities of th e Peo ple's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Suppl ement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CSR in Washin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Slovak, Jul y 16, 1926, p. 3. 41 A MZV CR, f. III, i. no. 22 , fold. 651. Report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CS R in Washington , DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 42 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 43 2. He does not fear the separation of church and state and he foretold the extinction of the Slovak Lutherans if it happened; 3. The next president of Czechoslovakia will accept the Pittsburgh Agreement; 4. Hlinka severely criticized Edvard Benes and Vavro Srobar; 5. Hlinka stressed several times that he had nothing to do with Frantisek Jehlicska, but he lectured at places, where the lectures were organized by Jehlicska's followers; 6. The lectures resulted in an anti-Czech mood; 7. Collecting money was many times carried out in such a way as if it were the only purpose of the lectures; 8. Andrej Gerat put most of the resolutions to a vote for further use in Slovakia.43 Hlinka, according to his own words, visited more than one hundred parishes, took part in eighty sessions and had more than two hundred lectures. "In the whole of America only four Catholic priests did not attend our lectures that were held in their town or neighborhood." 44 Part of Andrej Hlinka's journey to the USA was for the purpose of fund-raising . The Slovak League of America created a motto for the collection: Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. In this context it printed envelopes with the following text: I believe in the sovereignty of the Slovak nation. I believe in the united Czecho-Slovak Republic. I believe my own contrymen-leaders. I believe in the gradual administration of Slovakia. I believe that a Slovak should have priority in Slovakia. I believe that a Czech is Czech and a Slovak is Slovak. I believe that, by enacting the Pittsburgh Agreement, conditions between Czechs and Slovaks will improve, hence we willingly support the Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. 45 43 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consu late of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 44 Andrej Hlinka v Amerike [Andrej Hlinka in America]. In Jednota : Katolic/..y kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7. Middletown, PA: First Catholi c Slovak Union, 1927, p. 38. 45 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consulate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926 . �44 SLOVAKIA At the same time the Slovak League of America published the leaflet Svoji svojim [One for oneself] , in which it invited people to become its members. 46 However, the Slovak League did not have much influence over the financial part of Hlinka' s lectures. These were organized by priests in a committee established by the League. Allegedly, the envelopes were not distributed everywhere and it might happen that a local priest took the collected money, withdrew a certain amount to cover the costs of organizing the lecture, and turned the balance over to Hlinka in the form of a personal check. 47 About the collections it can be said that, there were fs laces where the fund-raising drive could not be properly organized, 8 but, on the other hand, there were places where a sizeable amount of money was raised. Milan Getting estimated the total raised was $10,000. However, he added that his estimate should be treated with some reserve. For instance, at the convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in September of 1926, Jozef Husek allegedly proposed to give Hlinka $5 ,000, but the delegates objected that the head office gave, without their consent, $1 ,000 to each Slovak bishop. They agreed on the same amount for Andrej Hlinka.49 At that time, the assets of the organization totaled $5,095 ,583 .37.50 The Slovak League of America, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, could not contribute to Hlinka, because its treasury was too small. 5 1 The final result of the fund-raising drive was most pertinently expressed by Hlinka in his letter to the Reverend Jan Postenyi after his return from the USA: "As you know, I have returned with fame , pennants and rings-but not many dollars. Business is business and I 46 AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. The leaflet Svoji svojim. AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 48 For instance, the lecture in Pittsburgh, that was held on Sund ay August 8, 1926, because according to Pennsylvania law, one co uld not collect an entrance fee. Cf. Ibid 49 AMZ V CR, f. lll, i. no. 22 , fo ld. 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of th e CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 50 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - / 965 (Cleveland : First Catholic Slovak Uni on, I 965), p. 2 I 2. 51 AMZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situation report of th e Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, I 926. 47 �SLOVAKIA 45 am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 52 According to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America. Allegedly, Gerat did not stick to the official schedule, which resulted in Hlinka presenting his lectures without reference to the local organizing committee. However, the main cause of the annoyance of American Slovaks was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at the parish of the nationalist Stefan Panik in Torrington, Connecticut, but instead agreed to lecture at Andrej Komara's parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 53 As Milan Getting noted, Komara had been denounced by neighboring Slovak priests as a Magyarone. Therefore, by accepting his invitation, Hlinka disappointed many of his followers .54 Allegedly, after the lecture at Komara's parish on October 3, 1926, Hlinka and Gerat55 began to show a certain nervousness. This, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, arose from the fact that Hlinka had failed to settle the arguments in the SlovakAmerican Catholic camp. It could also have been a result of their disappointment in the fund-raising drive. Another reason could have been the development of the political situation back home. In addition, Hlinka could see that the audience at his lectures was declining. He may also have been frustrated by articles published in the Czechoslovak daily Newyorsky dennik, which attacked him during his whole stay in the USA. 56 52 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Tmave [Archives of the Society of St. Adalbert in Tmava] , fascic le (hereinafter fasc.) 156. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 53 According to the Newyorsky dennik, Komara promised Hlinka $2,000, which, according to Getting, Hlinka did not deny. Cf. AMZV CR, f. Ill, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of th e CSR in Prague from October 15 , 1926. Not following the schedule of the lectures was also reported in Jednota, October 6, 1926, p. 2. 54 AMZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MF A of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 55 Meanwhile, Buday returned to Slovakia. He left America on July 24, 1926. Cf. Slovak, August 6, 1926, p. 1. 56 AMZV CR, f. 111, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. �46 SLOVAKIA The last of Hlinka's lectures in the USA was in New York City on October 11 , 1926. 57 He left the USA on October 13 , 1926 and returned to Slovakia on October 22, 1926. 58 Even if the conclusion of his lecture tour to the USA looked disappointing, it did not radically affect the attitudes of American Slovaks to his person, nor the autonomist movement in Slovakia. It is apparent, therefore, that on the occasion of the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, Illinois, Andrej Hlinka, made use of his trip to lecture and to raise funds in favour of autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America at that time was quite tense. The reasons for the tension were personal problems, frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government's failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement and the pressure of State Insurance Commissioners on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues. After initial disagreements, Hlinka's lecture tour was organized by a committee composed almost entirely of priests. Hlinka visited more than one hundred Slovak parishes, took part in eighty discussions and presented more than two hundred lectures. However, the fund-raising drive did not bring the expected results. In addition, according to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America by not having respected the schedule of the local organizational committee. The main cause of the annoyance, however, was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at nationalist Stefan Panik's parish in Torrington, Connecticut, but rather at the parish of the alleged Magyarone Andrej Komara in Bridgeport. Even if in the end his lecture tour to the USA disappointed many Slovak nationalists, Hlinka did not lose the sympathy of American Slovaks, nor support for the autonomist movement in Slovakia. 57 58 Ibid. Slo vak, October 23 , 1926, p. 3. � 32 SLOVAKIA ANDREJ HLINKA'S JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1926 Stefan Kucik Andrej Hlinka belongs among those in Slovak history whose achievements await a complex analysis and evaluation. He and his activities were ignored or misinterpreted by most Marxist historians during the communist era. On the other hand, he was also very controversial. The aim of this article is to analyze the circumstances and the course of his journey to the USA in 1926. Although the official reason for Hlinka's journey was to participate in the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, he made use of his visit to lecture to American Slovaks and to raise funds for the cause of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. After some disagreements between the Slovak League of America and Jozef Husek, the lecture tour was held under the auspices of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. Even if his lecture tour to the USA proved financially disappointing to Hlinka, he did win the sympathy of American Slovaks to his person, and to the autonomist movement in Slovakia. On June 20- 24, 1926 the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in Chicago, Illinois. As the first such Congress on the soil of the United States of America, 1 it presented the Reverend Andrej Hlinka of Rufomberok an opportunity to visit American Slovaks for the first time. Although American Slovaks had already invited Hlinka visit them in 1924, Czechoslovak authorities had refused to grant him a passport because he had been prosecuted for having illegally travelled to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In 1926 he was again prosecuted and, despite having been cleared by the County Court in Bratislava, in March of that year, he was sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight days in jail for his article on T. G. Masaryk' s favortism of the Jews published in the daily Slovak on April 5, 1924. 1 The second time such a congress met in th e USA was in 1976 tional Euchari stic Congress in Philade lphia, Pennsy lvani a, the 4 1st Interna- �SLOVAKIA 33 After explaining that he wished to travel to the Eucharistic Congress, Jan Cerny' s administration finally granted him a passport. 2 Andrej Hlinka was repeatedly invited to America by the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom led by Jozef Husek.3 On April 21 , 1926 the weekly Jednota published a letter from Hlinka to Husek dated April 3, 1926. In this letter Hlinka announced that he would arrive accompanied by his secretary Andrej Genit and the Parliamentary Deputy Jozef Buday on June 3-4, 1926. He asked Husek to prepare a schedule for his lectures. He wrote that his passport was valid for half a year, which he wished to spend in the USA, provided that political issues would not force his return home. 4 While Hlinka was granted a passport to travel to the Eucharistic Congress on April 30, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague about the details of Hlinka's planned journey. According to the Ministry in Bratislava, the goal of Hlinka's journey was to spread autonomist propaganda on behalf of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (hereinafter HSPP) and to raise funds for the Party. He also allegedly planned to draft a resolution of Slovak complaints and pleas and to submit it to the Czechoslovak government and to the League ofNations.5 Hlinka outlined the programme of his journey in the daily Slovak on May 23 , 1926. Among other things he stated that, as early as in 1894 he was asked by American Slovaks to "choke the hydra" of brotherly quarrels among them, but thus far he had not been enable to do so. Now he was going to America to enlighten the Slovaks and to help the Republic and the nation. He was going where the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements were signed. He wanted to see with 2 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hli nka (I 864 - I 926) (Brati slava, 1934), p. 544 . Ibid. , p. 543. 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahran icnich veci Ceske republiky [Archi ves of the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs of the Czech Republi c] (here inafter AMZV CR), fund (here inafter f. ) Ill. sekce MZV 19 I 8 - 1939 [3 rd section Mini stry of Foreign Affairs 19 I 8 193 8] (hereinafter III), in ventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22 , fo lder (here inafter fold .) 651 . The report o f the Consul ate of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) in Pittsburgh, to the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs (hereinafter MFA ) of the CSR in Prague from April 22, 1926 ; Jednota, April 2 1, 1926, p. 4. 5 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld. 651. Letter of the Minister of the CSR with Full Powers fo r the Admini stration of Slovakia in Brati slava to the MFA in Prague, April 30, 1926 . 3 �34 SLOVAKIA his own eyes and hear with his own ears if it was a sin to demand autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Constitution. 6 At the time of the Hlinka's trip to the USA, reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh characterized the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America as quite tense. Besides personal problems, anxiety arose from frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government' s failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement. Meanwhile, State Insurance Commissioners were exerting pressure on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues, which greatly upset their members. 7 The reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh also described an alleged rivalry between Ivan Bielek, the President of the Slovak League of America and Jozef Rusek. Apparently, Rusek feared losing his editorship of the weekly Jednota at the upcoming 22 nd convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania on September 20 - 25 , 1926. His rival was Jan C. Sciranka, editor of Slovak v Amerike. The owner of the Slovak v Amerike was Bielek's brother-in-law Christopher L. Orbach.8 However, according to the report of the Pittsburgh Consulate, the tension between Bielek and Rusek soon dissipated. On April 14, 1926 Bielek published an article entitled Segedin-Mirov in Slo vak v Amerike, in which he denounced the imprisonment of Hlinka in the Czech Mirov prison for having offended President Masaryk. According to the Consulate, Bielek did so because he needed Husek's support at the upcoming convention of the National Slovak Society and the congress of the Slovak League of America. 9 Soon, however, arguments within the Slovak-American autonomist camp broke out again, thanks to Jozef Rusek. In a letter of April 3, 1926, Hlinka asked Rusek to prepare his lecture schedule. Rusek began to register applications for Hlinka's lectures and he wished to carry out this tour under the aegis of the Committe of Friends of Slovak Freedom. Some newspapers and organizations protested: the banker Michal Bosak in his weekly Obrana, a number of priests who 6 Slovak, May 23, 1926, pp. 1-2. AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 650. Report of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, April 15, 1926. 8 ibid. 9 i bid. 7 �SLOVAKIA 35 supported the programme of the Magyarone priest Frantisek Jehlicska for the return of Slovakia to Hungary, and Bielek and Orbach in 10 Slovak v Amerike. In addition, the Committe had already been out of existence for three years. It was originally founded to purge the "Czechoslovaks" from the Slovak League of America, and then it merged with it. Despite this fact, Husek kept the title of president of this non-existent organization, announced the arrival of Hlinka to Slovak priests and newspapers and launched the campaign on his own. II Although Jozef Husek, through his contact with Slovak priests in America started to organize Hlinka's lecture tour, the Slovak League of America, led by president Bielek, also started to organize the lectures. It established an organizing committee, composed almost entirely of priests. Husek refused to become a member of this committee and the Slovak v Amerike started to complain about Husek's actions. 12 As a result, a group of Slovak priests ended up organizing Hlinka's lecture tour and the Slovak League of America, even though it compiled the schedule of the lectures, did not control the • 13 pnests. On May 26-27 the 16 th congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Detroit. The congress "with great joy received the news, that the noble leader of the Slovak nation, Msgr. Hlinka, President of the People's Party, would visit American Slovaks." It expressed confidence in him and promised that it would "with all its strength help his noble efforts and during his stay he would be a guest of the Slovak League of America." 14 Hlinka and his colleague Jozef Buday, together with Hynek Dostal , editor of the Czech-American newspaper Hlas, which supported autonomy for the Slovaks, 15 were named honorary members of the Slovak League of America. 10 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situat ion report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 11 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 12 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prag ue, October 5, I 926. 13 Ibid. 14 A MZV CR, f. 111 , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 15 Ibid. of the Consul ate of the CS R of the Consulate of the CSR of the Consul ate of the CSR of the Co nsulate of the CSR �36 SLOVAKIA At the congress of the Slovak League, the previous officers were re-elected under the leadership of Ivan Bielek. Husek criticized this outcome. 16 He reported that the League had no funds , he accused the officers of incompetence, and warned that the League would perish if nothing was done to build up its treasury. 17 However, all these arguments between Husek and Bielek were simply personal. In fact, the Slovak League under the leadership of Ivan Bielek (1920- 1934) championed the Pittsburgh Agreement and openly supported the Slovak autonomist movement in the Czechoslovak Republic . The "Czechoslovaks" in America also prepared for the arrival of Andrej Hlinka. For instance, the Reverend Jozef Murgas of WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, that at the next meeting of priests of eastern Pennsylvania, he would ask them if their real interest was in politics or in religion and he promised to inform Getting of their answer. 18 Hlinka's arrival was announced by the daily Slovak (Bratislava) on June 4, 1926: "On June 3 our editorial staff received this telegram from Halifax : We have arrived safely. - Hlinka." 19 From the Canadian port of Halifax, Hlinka' s ship continued on to New York City, where it docked on June 5, 1926. 20 About 300 American Slovaks welcomed Hlinka at the dock. Once he had disembarked, Hlinka briefly outlined the goal of his journey. He stressed that he had come to work for both the Slovak nation and for his homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. He emphasized concord, unity, the settling of petty arguments and forgivness, because "the nation needs us all and it needs us united." 21 In a 26-car procession the delegation proceeded to the Church of St. John Nepomucene on 66 th street, where the Reverend Stefan J. Krasul'a had been the pastor since 1916. An official reception was held in the Parish Hall, where the representatives of American Slovaks delivered their speeches.22 Here Andrej Hlinka spoke his 16 Ibid. Jednota, Jun e 2, 1926, p. 4. 18 A MZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. Missive of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA , April 15, I 926. "Czechos lovaks" were Slovaks who supp,orted th e unitary policies of the Czechoslovak government in Prague. 9 Slovak, June 5, 1926, p. I. 20 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 21 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. 22 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 17 �SLOVAKIA 37 memorable words: "If there were no America, Slovakia would still be under the Magyar yoke. To its credit the Slovaks finally got rid of the thousand-year subjugation." 23 The Slovak League of America officially welcomed Hlinka in the evening at a session of its local branch. 24 On this occassion the Slovak League also issued an official communique which was published by the daily Slowik in Bratislava. 25 A banquet was held the next day under the aegis of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. The banquet marked the completion of the programme of welcome with speeches by representatives of various Slovak organizations. Hlinka and Buday were presented with special diplomas, certifying that the Slovak League of America had granted them honorary memberships. 26 After the official welcome in New York, Jozef Rusek left the organizing of Hlinka's lecture tour to the Slovak League of America. 27 It began in Chicago after the end of the Eucharistic Congress on June 27, 1926. 28 According to the official announcement of the president of the Slovak League of America, published in the daily Slovak on July 14, 1926, Hlinka requested that lectures be presented on working days, because at the time of the announcement, there were already 136 requests for lectures. 29 Since the content of Hlinka's lecture in Chicago was generally the same as at other places in the USA, I will summarize it based upon the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago. The lecture was held in the Ashland Boulevard Auditorium which had a capacity of 4,000. The Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago stated that two thirds of the hall was filled, 30 which, in comparison with the 23 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 25 Slovak, June 16, 1926, p. I. 26 Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 27 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1965), p. 210. 28 AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago region. Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CSR in Washington, DC, July 30, 1926. 29 Slovak, July 14, 1926, p. 3. 30 The daily Slovak gave the number of 5,000 - 5,500 and stated that the hall was overcrowded. Cf. Slovak, July 16, I 926, p. 3. 24 �38 SLOVAKIA number of Slovaks living in Chicago, the majority of whom were Catholics, was not that great. Information on the lectures was also disseminated by priests from their pulpits. Tickets were sold in the churches and by the Slovak Catholic Federation. This was designed to prevent unauthorized persons from attending. The $1,000 rent for the hall was paid by the Slovak Catholic Federation. The profits were given to Andrej Hlinka. Tickets were sold for 50 and 75 cents, $1.00 and $2.00, depending upon the seating.31 As the report of the Consulate states, the beginning of the lecture was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, Hlinka and his entourage arrived at 2:45 p.m. The audience welcomed him with a standing ovation. The session was openned by Jan Mayer, the president of the Slovak Catholic Federation, who introduced the guests. After him Gregor K. Vaniscak, the pastor of the Slovak Parish of St. Michael the Archangel in Chicago, spoke highly of the great Andrej Hlinka's work for the Slovak nation. He compared Hlinka with the three "most important people in world history" - George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Cardinal Richelieu. After that Andrej Hlinka delivered his speech. The audience greeted him with applause and some shouted: "Viva, hooray! " Somebody from the audience, allegedly a Slovak Communist, tried to disrupt the lecture and shouted "Shame on him!" for which he was ejected by the police. Some tried to distribute the communist daily Rovnost' /'udu, for which they were also ejected and held overnight at the police station. According to the report of the Chicago consulate, Andrej Hlinka first read the list of donors who contributed to the fund Narod sebe [The Nation for Itself] and to the HSPP's election fund . He asked the donors to keep their trust in him, because he had received all the money and had spent every penny for the right purpose. As evidence he cited the establishment of Slovak Catholic enterprises such as the Lev printery, the daily Slovak, and, most importantly, the half million votes that the HSPP had gained in the last parliamentary elections, which made it the most powerful political party in Slovakia. He asked American Slovaks to continue to remember the HSPP and its struggle for recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the autono31 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Report of the Consu late of th e CS R in Chi cago on the political acti vities of th e Peopl e's Party leaders in th e Chi cago region. Supplement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CS R in Was hin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. �SLOVAKIA 39 my of Slovakia. Hlinka stated that he and the HSPP did not want anything more than that Slovaks be masters in Slovakia and Czechs in Bohemia and that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" concerning the self-determination of nations be also applied to the Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Agreement. He declared that he was not against the Czechoslovak Republic and he was ready to "both live and die" for it, because October 28 was also the result of his nation-building efforts . He had struggled in Slovakia against the Magyars, who imprisoned him, first in Rufomberok, and then in Segedin. He added that Slovakia had long awaited October 28, 1918 as the day of liberation from the Magyar yoke. However, Hlinka continued, Slovak sons did not fight in the Czechoslovak Legions to move from one yoke to another. Instead of freedom , Slovaks were now offered "Czechization." Jozef M. Hurban, when he with others led the revolt against the Magyars in 1848, already spoke of the Slovak nation and not a "branch of the Czech nation." Similarly, when the Matica slovenska was founded in 1863, the Slovak leaders set its aim as the defence of the Slovak language as a national language and not a "Czech dialect." To spread the Czech language in Slovakia it was not necessary to establish the Matica slovenska. Therefore, if Hlinka now demands autonomy for Slovakia and wants the Pittsburgh Agreement to be respected and incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, he does not want anything new. The Memorandum of Stefan Marko Daxner from as early as in the 1860's requested from the Hungarian government a so-called "Slovak Region" that completely agrees with his present request for autonomy. However, according to Hlinka, the Czech language rules in Slovak courts, offices and schools. Catholic schools were taken from the Slovaks in spite of the fact that the Catholics form the majority in Slovakia and they have to pay taxes to maintain the school system. For these taxes Slovak Catholic children are being indoctrinated with atheism and are taught by teachers such as a certain Bilek, who was a servant in Bohemia, but in Slovakia was made a high school professor! Moreover, Hlinka continued, Slovak intellectuals cannot find work at home. Slovak workers have to look for freedom in America. Despite the fact that Slovaks constitute 15% of the total number of inhabitants in Czechoslovakia, they are virtually absent from the �40 SLOVAKIA state administration . In high schools Slovaks have no principal. From among 786 high school professors, only 175 are Slovaks. An even greater disproportion exists in the railways--from among 13,000 employees, only 412 are Slovaks. There are enough qualified intellectuals in Slovakia, but the Prague government ignores them. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is not just political posturing, but is a cultural and economic need and is crucial to the existence of the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Hlinka stated that he wanted the Slovak and Czech nations to come together and jointly work on maintaining and developing their common state, but by observing equality in the national, cultural and economic spheres. He is not creating discord for the sake of discord. He supports the Czechoslovak Republic, which he proved when the communist attack on Slovakia occurred. Then the Czechoslovak governent had an opportunity to negotiate with him and establish order; the same was true after the last parliamentary elections, in which the HSPP gained the largest number of votes in Slovakia. However, the HSPP was not even noticed by the Czechoslovak government, it was not called by the government and it was even not considered to be necessary to negotiate with it.32 As the consulate report stated, Andrej Hlinka spoke for more than an hour. The tone of his voice was gentle and polite, hence very impressive. The audience often expressed its approval with applause, especially when he defended himself against accusations of treason and Magyaronism. On this occassion he stated that his life was an open book, from which every unbiased person could read, that he had always been selflessly fighting for the rights of the Slovak people. Before World War I, when he defended the rights of the Slovaks, the Magyars accused him of being a "Pan-Slav" and after the war, when he defended the same rights, the secularists and gullible Czechs accused him of being a Magyarone. In this context he asked the audience if it was possible that he would lead the Slovak people back to Magyar slavery, in which it had suffered for more than a thousand years? If anybody with common sense could accuse him of being an instrument of the Magyars, who, because of his fight for the rights of the Slovak nation, had escorted him from one prison to another? Hlinka concluded with an appeal to American 32 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 41 Slovaks to support him and the HSPP in this fight for autonomy and the recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement. 33 After Hlinka Jozef Buday delivered his speech. According to the consular report, he was "thoughtless and rudely incited against the atheistic Czechs." He complemented the factual parts of the speech, in which Hlinka mentioned the Czech injustice against the Slovaks. 34 The consular report further stated that F. Wilson, a representative of the district council, spoke after Buday. After him came Andrej Gerat, who criticized the methods of education in Slovakia. After Gerat the Rev. G. K. Vaniscak read this resolution: 1. We support the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 2. We demand that the Pittsburgh Agreement to be incorporated into its Constitution. 3. We demand for Slovaks Slovak Christian schools . 4. We demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks be given priority m government offices, post offices, the railways, etc. 5. We demand that the Slovak language be exclusively used as the official language in all schools, offices, etc. After Vaniscak read the resolution, he asked the audience to possibly supplement it. Allegedly, some Communist suggested that all county and episcopal manors be confiscated and parceled out to the poor. After a short silence, the audience started to rise up and wanted to throw him out. Andrej Hlinka called for calm and said that the question had been politely put, so it would be politely answered. He answered that he agreed that all the manors be parceled out to the people who tilled them. Though the government is doing so, it is doing it along political lines. Concerning the episcopal manors, these belong to the Church, ergo to the people. From them schools, monasteries, publications, magazines and everything that the Church needs are maintained. Why should these manors be confiscated and parceled out when they are owned by all the people? 35 The Communist, as the daily Slo vak noted, said: "Thank you for the explanation, now 33 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. �42 SLOVAKIA I know everything. I am content. " 36 The resolution was approved in the original wording. 37 Before the session ended, Andrej Hlinka talked to his countrymen from Orava about the annexation of parts of Spis and Orava by Poland. In the name of the HSPP he promised that he would negotiate to have these regions returned to Slovakia. 38 The session concluded with the national hymn ,,Lightening over the Tatras." 39 There followed a banquet, at which Frantiska C. Jakabcinova, the president of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, gave Hlinka and Buday a gold membership medal and a gift of $1,000.40 On July 3, 1926, Andrej Hlinka had one more lecture in Chicago, the content of which was much the same as the first one. Among other places at which Hlinka and Buday lectured were Kenosha, Wisconsin, on July 3, Milwaukee, on July 14, Streator, Illinois, on July 5, Mount Olive, Illinois, on July 8, East St. Louis, on July 10, St. Louis, Missouri, on July 11 , and in Whiting, Indiana, on July 14, 1926. Then Hlinka's lectures continued in the Cleveland region. The content of these lectures was everywhere almost the same. 41 According to the consular report, the impact of Hlinka' s lectures upon the Slovak people in America was great. Workers debated them in factories and there were also quarrels and even battles (in Hege42 wich, Illinois, and Chicago Heights). Andrej Hlinka's message was summed up by Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, as follows: 1. A. Hlinka declined an interview with the editorial staff of the Czech Narodne listy before his departure to America; 36 Slovak, July 16, 1926, p. 3. 37 A MZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld . 651. Report of the Co nsul ate of the CS R in Chica- go on the political activ ities of th e Peo ple's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Suppl ement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CSR in Washin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Slovak, Jul y 16, 1926, p. 3. 41 A MZV CR, f. III, i. no. 22 , fold. 651. Report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CS R in Washington , DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 42 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 43 2. He does not fear the separation of church and state and he foretold the extinction of the Slovak Lutherans if it happened; 3. The next president of Czechoslovakia will accept the Pittsburgh Agreement; 4. Hlinka severely criticized Edvard Benes and Vavro Srobar; 5. Hlinka stressed several times that he had nothing to do with Frantisek Jehlicska, but he lectured at places, where the lectures were organized by Jehlicska's followers; 6. The lectures resulted in an anti-Czech mood; 7. Collecting money was many times carried out in such a way as if it were the only purpose of the lectures; 8. Andrej Gerat put most of the resolutions to a vote for further use in Slovakia.43 Hlinka, according to his own words, visited more than one hundred parishes, took part in eighty sessions and had more than two hundred lectures. "In the whole of America only four Catholic priests did not attend our lectures that were held in their town or neighborhood." 44 Part of Andrej Hlinka's journey to the USA was for the purpose of fund-raising . The Slovak League of America created a motto for the collection: Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. In this context it printed envelopes with the following text: I believe in the sovereignty of the Slovak nation. I believe in the united Czecho-Slovak Republic. I believe my own contrymen-leaders. I believe in the gradual administration of Slovakia. I believe that a Slovak should have priority in Slovakia. I believe that a Czech is Czech and a Slovak is Slovak. I believe that, by enacting the Pittsburgh Agreement, conditions between Czechs and Slovaks will improve, hence we willingly support the Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. 45 43 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consu late of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 44 Andrej Hlinka v Amerike [Andrej Hlinka in America]. In Jednota : Katolic/..y kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7. Middletown, PA: First Catholi c Slovak Union, 1927, p. 38. 45 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consulate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926 . �44 SLOVAKIA At the same time the Slovak League of America published the leaflet Svoji svojim [One for oneself] , in which it invited people to become its members. 46 However, the Slovak League did not have much influence over the financial part of Hlinka' s lectures. These were organized by priests in a committee established by the League. Allegedly, the envelopes were not distributed everywhere and it might happen that a local priest took the collected money, withdrew a certain amount to cover the costs of organizing the lecture, and turned the balance over to Hlinka in the form of a personal check. 47 About the collections it can be said that, there were fs laces where the fund-raising drive could not be properly organized, 8 but, on the other hand, there were places where a sizeable amount of money was raised. Milan Getting estimated the total raised was $10,000. However, he added that his estimate should be treated with some reserve. For instance, at the convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in September of 1926, Jozef Husek allegedly proposed to give Hlinka $5 ,000, but the delegates objected that the head office gave, without their consent, $1 ,000 to each Slovak bishop. They agreed on the same amount for Andrej Hlinka.49 At that time, the assets of the organization totaled $5,095 ,583 .37.50 The Slovak League of America, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, could not contribute to Hlinka, because its treasury was too small. 5 1 The final result of the fund-raising drive was most pertinently expressed by Hlinka in his letter to the Reverend Jan Postenyi after his return from the USA: "As you know, I have returned with fame , pennants and rings-but not many dollars. Business is business and I 46 AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. The leaflet Svoji svojim. AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 48 For instance, the lecture in Pittsburgh, that was held on Sund ay August 8, 1926, because according to Pennsylvania law, one co uld not collect an entrance fee. Cf. Ibid 49 AMZ V CR, f. lll, i. no. 22 , fo ld. 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of th e CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 50 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - / 965 (Cleveland : First Catholic Slovak Uni on, I 965), p. 2 I 2. 51 AMZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situation report of th e Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, I 926. 47 �SLOVAKIA 45 am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 52 According to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America. Allegedly, Gerat did not stick to the official schedule, which resulted in Hlinka presenting his lectures without reference to the local organizing committee. However, the main cause of the annoyance of American Slovaks was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at the parish of the nationalist Stefan Panik in Torrington, Connecticut, but instead agreed to lecture at Andrej Komara's parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 53 As Milan Getting noted, Komara had been denounced by neighboring Slovak priests as a Magyarone. Therefore, by accepting his invitation, Hlinka disappointed many of his followers .54 Allegedly, after the lecture at Komara's parish on October 3, 1926, Hlinka and Gerat55 began to show a certain nervousness. This, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, arose from the fact that Hlinka had failed to settle the arguments in the SlovakAmerican Catholic camp. It could also have been a result of their disappointment in the fund-raising drive. Another reason could have been the development of the political situation back home. In addition, Hlinka could see that the audience at his lectures was declining. He may also have been frustrated by articles published in the Czechoslovak daily Newyorsky dennik, which attacked him during his whole stay in the USA. 56 52 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Tmave [Archives of the Society of St. Adalbert in Tmava] , fascic le (hereinafter fasc.) 156. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 53 According to the Newyorsky dennik, Komara promised Hlinka $2,000, which, according to Getting, Hlinka did not deny. Cf. AMZV CR, f. Ill, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of th e CSR in Prague from October 15 , 1926. Not following the schedule of the lectures was also reported in Jednota, October 6, 1926, p. 2. 54 AMZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MF A of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 55 Meanwhile, Buday returned to Slovakia. He left America on July 24, 1926. Cf. Slovak, August 6, 1926, p. 1. 56 AMZV CR, f. 111, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. �46 SLOVAKIA The last of Hlinka's lectures in the USA was in New York City on October 11 , 1926. 57 He left the USA on October 13 , 1926 and returned to Slovakia on October 22, 1926. 58 Even if the conclusion of his lecture tour to the USA looked disappointing, it did not radically affect the attitudes of American Slovaks to his person, nor the autonomist movement in Slovakia. It is apparent, therefore, that on the occasion of the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, Illinois, Andrej Hlinka, made use of his trip to lecture and to raise funds in favour of autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America at that time was quite tense. The reasons for the tension were personal problems, frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government's failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement and the pressure of State Insurance Commissioners on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues. After initial disagreements, Hlinka's lecture tour was organized by a committee composed almost entirely of priests. Hlinka visited more than one hundred Slovak parishes, took part in eighty discussions and presented more than two hundred lectures. However, the fund-raising drive did not bring the expected results. In addition, according to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America by not having respected the schedule of the local organizational committee. The main cause of the annoyance, however, was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at nationalist Stefan Panik's parish in Torrington, Connecticut, but rather at the parish of the alleged Magyarone Andrej Komara in Bridgeport. Even if in the end his lecture tour to the USA disappointed many Slovak nationalists, Hlinka did not lose the sympathy of American Slovaks, nor support for the autonomist movement in Slovakia. 57 58 Ibid. Slo vak, October 23 , 1926, p. 3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 32 SLOVAKIA ANDREJ HLINKA'S JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1926 Stefan Kucik Andrej Hlinka belongs among those in Slovak history whose achievements await a complex analysis and evaluation. He and his activities were ignored or misinterpreted by most Marxist historians during the communist era. On the other hand, he was also very controversial. The aim of this article is to analyze the circumstances and the course of his journey to the USA in 1926. Although the official reason for Hlinka's journey was to participate in the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, he made use of his visit to lecture to American Slovaks and to raise funds for the cause of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. After some disagreements between the Slovak League of America and Jozef Husek, the lecture tour was held under the auspices of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. Even if his lecture tour to the USA proved financially disappointing to Hlinka, he did win the sympathy of American Slovaks to his person, and to the autonomist movement in Slovakia. On June 20- 24, 1926 the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in Chicago, Illinois. As the first such Congress on the soil of the United States of America, 1 it presented the Reverend Andrej Hlinka of Rufomberok an opportunity to visit American Slovaks for the first time. Although American Slovaks had already invited Hlinka visit them in 1924, Czechoslovak authorities had refused to grant him a passport because he had been prosecuted for having illegally travelled to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In 1926 he was again prosecuted and, despite having been cleared by the County Court in Bratislava, in March of that year, he was sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight days in jail for his article on T. G. Masaryk' s favortism of the Jews published in the daily Slovak on April 5, 1924. 1 The second time such a congress met in th e USA was in 1976 tional Euchari stic Congress in Philade lphia, Pennsy lvani a, the 4 1st Interna- SLOVAKIA 33 After explaining that he wished to travel to the Eucharistic Congress, Jan Cerny' s administration finally granted him a passport. 2 Andrej Hlinka was repeatedly invited to America by the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom led by Jozef Husek.3 On April 21 , 1926 the weekly Jednota published a letter from Hlinka to Husek dated April 3, 1926. In this letter Hlinka announced that he would arrive accompanied by his secretary Andrej Genit and the Parliamentary Deputy Jozef Buday on June 3-4, 1926. He asked Husek to prepare a schedule for his lectures. He wrote that his passport was valid for half a year, which he wished to spend in the USA, provided that political issues would not force his return home. 4 While Hlinka was granted a passport to travel to the Eucharistic Congress on April 30, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague about the details of Hlinka's planned journey. According to the Ministry in Bratislava, the goal of Hlinka's journey was to spread autonomist propaganda on behalf of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (hereinafter HSPP) and to raise funds for the Party. He also allegedly planned to draft a resolution of Slovak complaints and pleas and to submit it to the Czechoslovak government and to the League ofNations.5 Hlinka outlined the programme of his journey in the daily Slovak on May 23 , 1926. Among other things he stated that, as early as in 1894 he was asked by American Slovaks to "choke the hydra" of brotherly quarrels among them, but thus far he had not been enable to do so. Now he was going to America to enlighten the Slovaks and to help the Republic and the nation. He was going where the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements were signed. He wanted to see with 2 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hli nka (I 864 - I 926) (Brati slava, 1934), p. 544 . Ibid. , p. 543. 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahran icnich veci Ceske republiky [Archi ves of the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs of the Czech Republi c] (here inafter AMZV CR), fund (here inafter f. ) Ill. sekce MZV 19 I 8 - 1939 [3 rd section Mini stry of Foreign Affairs 19 I 8 193 8] (hereinafter III), in ventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22 , fo lder (here inafter fold .) 651 . The report o f the Consul ate of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) in Pittsburgh, to the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs (hereinafter MFA ) of the CSR in Prague from April 22, 1926 ; Jednota, April 2 1, 1926, p. 4. 5 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld. 651. Letter of the Minister of the CSR with Full Powers fo r the Admini stration of Slovakia in Brati slava to the MFA in Prague, April 30, 1926 . 3 34 SLOVAKIA his own eyes and hear with his own ears if it was a sin to demand autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Constitution. 6 At the time of the Hlinka's trip to the USA, reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh characterized the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America as quite tense. Besides personal problems, anxiety arose from frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government' s failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement. Meanwhile, State Insurance Commissioners were exerting pressure on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues, which greatly upset their members. 7 The reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh also described an alleged rivalry between Ivan Bielek, the President of the Slovak League of America and Jozef Rusek. Apparently, Rusek feared losing his editorship of the weekly Jednota at the upcoming 22 nd convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania on September 20 - 25 , 1926. His rival was Jan C. Sciranka, editor of Slovak v Amerike. The owner of the Slovak v Amerike was Bielek's brother-in-law Christopher L. Orbach.8 However, according to the report of the Pittsburgh Consulate, the tension between Bielek and Rusek soon dissipated. On April 14, 1926 Bielek published an article entitled Segedin-Mirov in Slo vak v Amerike, in which he denounced the imprisonment of Hlinka in the Czech Mirov prison for having offended President Masaryk. According to the Consulate, Bielek did so because he needed Husek's support at the upcoming convention of the National Slovak Society and the congress of the Slovak League of America. 9 Soon, however, arguments within the Slovak-American autonomist camp broke out again, thanks to Jozef Rusek. In a letter of April 3, 1926, Hlinka asked Rusek to prepare his lecture schedule. Rusek began to register applications for Hlinka's lectures and he wished to carry out this tour under the aegis of the Committe of Friends of Slovak Freedom. Some newspapers and organizations protested: the banker Michal Bosak in his weekly Obrana, a number of priests who 6 Slovak, May 23, 1926, pp. 1-2. AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 650. Report of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, April 15, 1926. 8 ibid. 9 i bid. 7 SLOVAKIA 35 supported the programme of the Magyarone priest Frantisek Jehlicska for the return of Slovakia to Hungary, and Bielek and Orbach in 10 Slovak v Amerike. In addition, the Committe had already been out of existence for three years. It was originally founded to purge the "Czechoslovaks" from the Slovak League of America, and then it merged with it. Despite this fact, Husek kept the title of president of this non-existent organization, announced the arrival of Hlinka to Slovak priests and newspapers and launched the campaign on his own. II Although Jozef Husek, through his contact with Slovak priests in America started to organize Hlinka's lecture tour, the Slovak League of America, led by president Bielek, also started to organize the lectures. It established an organizing committee, composed almost entirely of priests. Husek refused to become a member of this committee and the Slovak v Amerike started to complain about Husek's actions. 12 As a result, a group of Slovak priests ended up organizing Hlinka's lecture tour and the Slovak League of America, even though it compiled the schedule of the lectures, did not control the • 13 pnests. On May 26-27 the 16 th congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Detroit. The congress "with great joy received the news, that the noble leader of the Slovak nation, Msgr. Hlinka, President of the People's Party, would visit American Slovaks." It expressed confidence in him and promised that it would "with all its strength help his noble efforts and during his stay he would be a guest of the Slovak League of America." 14 Hlinka and his colleague Jozef Buday, together with Hynek Dostal , editor of the Czech-American newspaper Hlas, which supported autonomy for the Slovaks, 15 were named honorary members of the Slovak League of America. 10 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situat ion report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 11 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 12 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prag ue, October 5, I 926. 13 Ibid. 14 A MZV CR, f. 111 , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 15 Ibid. of the Consul ate of the CS R of the Consulate of the CSR of the Consul ate of the CSR of the Co nsulate of the CSR 36 SLOVAKIA At the congress of the Slovak League, the previous officers were re-elected under the leadership of Ivan Bielek. Husek criticized this outcome. 16 He reported that the League had no funds , he accused the officers of incompetence, and warned that the League would perish if nothing was done to build up its treasury. 17 However, all these arguments between Husek and Bielek were simply personal. In fact, the Slovak League under the leadership of Ivan Bielek (1920- 1934) championed the Pittsburgh Agreement and openly supported the Slovak autonomist movement in the Czechoslovak Republic . The "Czechoslovaks" in America also prepared for the arrival of Andrej Hlinka. For instance, the Reverend Jozef Murgas of WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, that at the next meeting of priests of eastern Pennsylvania, he would ask them if their real interest was in politics or in religion and he promised to inform Getting of their answer. 18 Hlinka's arrival was announced by the daily Slovak (Bratislava) on June 4, 1926: "On June 3 our editorial staff received this telegram from Halifax : We have arrived safely. - Hlinka." 19 From the Canadian port of Halifax, Hlinka' s ship continued on to New York City, where it docked on June 5, 1926. 20 About 300 American Slovaks welcomed Hlinka at the dock. Once he had disembarked, Hlinka briefly outlined the goal of his journey. He stressed that he had come to work for both the Slovak nation and for his homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. He emphasized concord, unity, the settling of petty arguments and forgivness, because "the nation needs us all and it needs us united." 21 In a 26-car procession the delegation proceeded to the Church of St. John Nepomucene on 66 th street, where the Reverend Stefan J. Krasul'a had been the pastor since 1916. An official reception was held in the Parish Hall, where the representatives of American Slovaks delivered their speeches.22 Here Andrej Hlinka spoke his 16 Ibid. Jednota, Jun e 2, 1926, p. 4. 18 A MZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. Missive of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA , April 15, I 926. "Czechos lovaks" were Slovaks who supp,orted th e unitary policies of the Czechoslovak government in Prague. 9 Slovak, June 5, 1926, p. I. 20 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 21 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. 22 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 17 SLOVAKIA 37 memorable words: "If there were no America, Slovakia would still be under the Magyar yoke. To its credit the Slovaks finally got rid of the thousand-year subjugation." 23 The Slovak League of America officially welcomed Hlinka in the evening at a session of its local branch. 24 On this occassion the Slovak League also issued an official communique which was published by the daily Slowik in Bratislava. 25 A banquet was held the next day under the aegis of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. The banquet marked the completion of the programme of welcome with speeches by representatives of various Slovak organizations. Hlinka and Buday were presented with special diplomas, certifying that the Slovak League of America had granted them honorary memberships. 26 After the official welcome in New York, Jozef Rusek left the organizing of Hlinka's lecture tour to the Slovak League of America. 27 It began in Chicago after the end of the Eucharistic Congress on June 27, 1926. 28 According to the official announcement of the president of the Slovak League of America, published in the daily Slovak on July 14, 1926, Hlinka requested that lectures be presented on working days, because at the time of the announcement, there were already 136 requests for lectures. 29 Since the content of Hlinka's lecture in Chicago was generally the same as at other places in the USA, I will summarize it based upon the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago. The lecture was held in the Ashland Boulevard Auditorium which had a capacity of 4,000. The Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago stated that two thirds of the hall was filled, 30 which, in comparison with the 23 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 25 Slovak, June 16, 1926, p. I. 26 Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 27 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1965), p. 210. 28 AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago region. Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CSR in Washington, DC, July 30, 1926. 29 Slovak, July 14, 1926, p. 3. 30 The daily Slovak gave the number of 5,000 - 5,500 and stated that the hall was overcrowded. Cf. Slovak, July 16, I 926, p. 3. 24 38 SLOVAKIA number of Slovaks living in Chicago, the majority of whom were Catholics, was not that great. Information on the lectures was also disseminated by priests from their pulpits. Tickets were sold in the churches and by the Slovak Catholic Federation. This was designed to prevent unauthorized persons from attending. The $1,000 rent for the hall was paid by the Slovak Catholic Federation. The profits were given to Andrej Hlinka. Tickets were sold for 50 and 75 cents, $1.00 and $2.00, depending upon the seating.31 As the report of the Consulate states, the beginning of the lecture was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, Hlinka and his entourage arrived at 2:45 p.m. The audience welcomed him with a standing ovation. The session was openned by Jan Mayer, the president of the Slovak Catholic Federation, who introduced the guests. After him Gregor K. Vaniscak, the pastor of the Slovak Parish of St. Michael the Archangel in Chicago, spoke highly of the great Andrej Hlinka's work for the Slovak nation. He compared Hlinka with the three "most important people in world history" - George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Cardinal Richelieu. After that Andrej Hlinka delivered his speech. The audience greeted him with applause and some shouted: "Viva, hooray! " Somebody from the audience, allegedly a Slovak Communist, tried to disrupt the lecture and shouted "Shame on him!" for which he was ejected by the police. Some tried to distribute the communist daily Rovnost' /'udu, for which they were also ejected and held overnight at the police station. According to the report of the Chicago consulate, Andrej Hlinka first read the list of donors who contributed to the fund Narod sebe [The Nation for Itself] and to the HSPP's election fund . He asked the donors to keep their trust in him, because he had received all the money and had spent every penny for the right purpose. As evidence he cited the establishment of Slovak Catholic enterprises such as the Lev printery, the daily Slovak, and, most importantly, the half million votes that the HSPP had gained in the last parliamentary elections, which made it the most powerful political party in Slovakia. He asked American Slovaks to continue to remember the HSPP and its struggle for recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the autono31 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Report of the Consu late of th e CS R in Chi cago on the political acti vities of th e Peopl e's Party leaders in th e Chi cago region. Supplement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CS R in Was hin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. SLOVAKIA 39 my of Slovakia. Hlinka stated that he and the HSPP did not want anything more than that Slovaks be masters in Slovakia and Czechs in Bohemia and that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" concerning the self-determination of nations be also applied to the Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Agreement. He declared that he was not against the Czechoslovak Republic and he was ready to "both live and die" for it, because October 28 was also the result of his nation-building efforts . He had struggled in Slovakia against the Magyars, who imprisoned him, first in Rufomberok, and then in Segedin. He added that Slovakia had long awaited October 28, 1918 as the day of liberation from the Magyar yoke. However, Hlinka continued, Slovak sons did not fight in the Czechoslovak Legions to move from one yoke to another. Instead of freedom , Slovaks were now offered "Czechization." Jozef M. Hurban, when he with others led the revolt against the Magyars in 1848, already spoke of the Slovak nation and not a "branch of the Czech nation." Similarly, when the Matica slovenska was founded in 1863, the Slovak leaders set its aim as the defence of the Slovak language as a national language and not a "Czech dialect." To spread the Czech language in Slovakia it was not necessary to establish the Matica slovenska. Therefore, if Hlinka now demands autonomy for Slovakia and wants the Pittsburgh Agreement to be respected and incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, he does not want anything new. The Memorandum of Stefan Marko Daxner from as early as in the 1860's requested from the Hungarian government a so-called "Slovak Region" that completely agrees with his present request for autonomy. However, according to Hlinka, the Czech language rules in Slovak courts, offices and schools. Catholic schools were taken from the Slovaks in spite of the fact that the Catholics form the majority in Slovakia and they have to pay taxes to maintain the school system. For these taxes Slovak Catholic children are being indoctrinated with atheism and are taught by teachers such as a certain Bilek, who was a servant in Bohemia, but in Slovakia was made a high school professor! Moreover, Hlinka continued, Slovak intellectuals cannot find work at home. Slovak workers have to look for freedom in America. Despite the fact that Slovaks constitute 15% of the total number of inhabitants in Czechoslovakia, they are virtually absent from the 40 SLOVAKIA state administration . In high schools Slovaks have no principal. From among 786 high school professors, only 175 are Slovaks. An even greater disproportion exists in the railways--from among 13,000 employees, only 412 are Slovaks. There are enough qualified intellectuals in Slovakia, but the Prague government ignores them. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is not just political posturing, but is a cultural and economic need and is crucial to the existence of the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Hlinka stated that he wanted the Slovak and Czech nations to come together and jointly work on maintaining and developing their common state, but by observing equality in the national, cultural and economic spheres. He is not creating discord for the sake of discord. He supports the Czechoslovak Republic, which he proved when the communist attack on Slovakia occurred. Then the Czechoslovak governent had an opportunity to negotiate with him and establish order; the same was true after the last parliamentary elections, in which the HSPP gained the largest number of votes in Slovakia. However, the HSPP was not even noticed by the Czechoslovak government, it was not called by the government and it was even not considered to be necessary to negotiate with it.32 As the consulate report stated, Andrej Hlinka spoke for more than an hour. The tone of his voice was gentle and polite, hence very impressive. The audience often expressed its approval with applause, especially when he defended himself against accusations of treason and Magyaronism. On this occassion he stated that his life was an open book, from which every unbiased person could read, that he had always been selflessly fighting for the rights of the Slovak people. Before World War I, when he defended the rights of the Slovaks, the Magyars accused him of being a "Pan-Slav" and after the war, when he defended the same rights, the secularists and gullible Czechs accused him of being a Magyarone. In this context he asked the audience if it was possible that he would lead the Slovak people back to Magyar slavery, in which it had suffered for more than a thousand years? If anybody with common sense could accuse him of being an instrument of the Magyars, who, because of his fight for the rights of the Slovak nation, had escorted him from one prison to another? Hlinka concluded with an appeal to American 32 Ibid. SLOVAKIA 41 Slovaks to support him and the HSPP in this fight for autonomy and the recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement. 33 After Hlinka Jozef Buday delivered his speech. According to the consular report, he was "thoughtless and rudely incited against the atheistic Czechs." He complemented the factual parts of the speech, in which Hlinka mentioned the Czech injustice against the Slovaks. 34 The consular report further stated that F. Wilson, a representative of the district council, spoke after Buday. After him came Andrej Gerat, who criticized the methods of education in Slovakia. After Gerat the Rev. G. K. Vaniscak read this resolution: 1. We support the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 2. We demand that the Pittsburgh Agreement to be incorporated into its Constitution. 3. We demand for Slovaks Slovak Christian schools . 4. We demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks be given priority m government offices, post offices, the railways, etc. 5. We demand that the Slovak language be exclusively used as the official language in all schools, offices, etc. After Vaniscak read the resolution, he asked the audience to possibly supplement it. Allegedly, some Communist suggested that all county and episcopal manors be confiscated and parceled out to the poor. After a short silence, the audience started to rise up and wanted to throw him out. Andrej Hlinka called for calm and said that the question had been politely put, so it would be politely answered. He answered that he agreed that all the manors be parceled out to the people who tilled them. Though the government is doing so, it is doing it along political lines. Concerning the episcopal manors, these belong to the Church, ergo to the people. From them schools, monasteries, publications, magazines and everything that the Church needs are maintained. Why should these manors be confiscated and parceled out when they are owned by all the people? 35 The Communist, as the daily Slo vak noted, said: "Thank you for the explanation, now 33 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 42 SLOVAKIA I know everything. I am content. " 36 The resolution was approved in the original wording. 37 Before the session ended, Andrej Hlinka talked to his countrymen from Orava about the annexation of parts of Spis and Orava by Poland. In the name of the HSPP he promised that he would negotiate to have these regions returned to Slovakia. 38 The session concluded with the national hymn ,,Lightening over the Tatras." 39 There followed a banquet, at which Frantiska C. Jakabcinova, the president of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, gave Hlinka and Buday a gold membership medal and a gift of $1,000.40 On July 3, 1926, Andrej Hlinka had one more lecture in Chicago, the content of which was much the same as the first one. Among other places at which Hlinka and Buday lectured were Kenosha, Wisconsin, on July 3, Milwaukee, on July 14, Streator, Illinois, on July 5, Mount Olive, Illinois, on July 8, East St. Louis, on July 10, St. Louis, Missouri, on July 11 , and in Whiting, Indiana, on July 14, 1926. Then Hlinka's lectures continued in the Cleveland region. The content of these lectures was everywhere almost the same. 41 According to the consular report, the impact of Hlinka' s lectures upon the Slovak people in America was great. Workers debated them in factories and there were also quarrels and even battles (in Hege42 wich, Illinois, and Chicago Heights). Andrej Hlinka's message was summed up by Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, as follows: 1. A. Hlinka declined an interview with the editorial staff of the Czech Narodne listy before his departure to America; 36 Slovak, July 16, 1926, p. 3. 37 A MZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld . 651. Report of the Co nsul ate of the CS R in Chica- go on the political activ ities of th e Peo ple's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Suppl ement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CSR in Washin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Slovak, Jul y 16, 1926, p. 3. 41 A MZV CR, f. III, i. no. 22 , fold. 651. Report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CS R in Washington , DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 42 Ibid. SLOVAKIA 43 2. He does not fear the separation of church and state and he foretold the extinction of the Slovak Lutherans if it happened; 3. The next president of Czechoslovakia will accept the Pittsburgh Agreement; 4. Hlinka severely criticized Edvard Benes and Vavro Srobar; 5. Hlinka stressed several times that he had nothing to do with Frantisek Jehlicska, but he lectured at places, where the lectures were organized by Jehlicska's followers; 6. The lectures resulted in an anti-Czech mood; 7. Collecting money was many times carried out in such a way as if it were the only purpose of the lectures; 8. Andrej Gerat put most of the resolutions to a vote for further use in Slovakia.43 Hlinka, according to his own words, visited more than one hundred parishes, took part in eighty sessions and had more than two hundred lectures. "In the whole of America only four Catholic priests did not attend our lectures that were held in their town or neighborhood." 44 Part of Andrej Hlinka's journey to the USA was for the purpose of fund-raising . The Slovak League of America created a motto for the collection: Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. In this context it printed envelopes with the following text: I believe in the sovereignty of the Slovak nation. I believe in the united Czecho-Slovak Republic. I believe my own contrymen-leaders. I believe in the gradual administration of Slovakia. I believe that a Slovak should have priority in Slovakia. I believe that a Czech is Czech and a Slovak is Slovak. I believe that, by enacting the Pittsburgh Agreement, conditions between Czechs and Slovaks will improve, hence we willingly support the Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. 45 43 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consu late of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 44 Andrej Hlinka v Amerike [Andrej Hlinka in America]. In Jednota : Katolic/..y kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7. Middletown, PA: First Catholi c Slovak Union, 1927, p. 38. 45 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consulate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926 . 44 SLOVAKIA At the same time the Slovak League of America published the leaflet Svoji svojim [One for oneself] , in which it invited people to become its members. 46 However, the Slovak League did not have much influence over the financial part of Hlinka' s lectures. These were organized by priests in a committee established by the League. Allegedly, the envelopes were not distributed everywhere and it might happen that a local priest took the collected money, withdrew a certain amount to cover the costs of organizing the lecture, and turned the balance over to Hlinka in the form of a personal check. 47 About the collections it can be said that, there were fs laces where the fund-raising drive could not be properly organized, 8 but, on the other hand, there were places where a sizeable amount of money was raised. Milan Getting estimated the total raised was $10,000. However, he added that his estimate should be treated with some reserve. For instance, at the convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in September of 1926, Jozef Husek allegedly proposed to give Hlinka $5 ,000, but the delegates objected that the head office gave, without their consent, $1 ,000 to each Slovak bishop. They agreed on the same amount for Andrej Hlinka.49 At that time, the assets of the organization totaled $5,095 ,583 .37.50 The Slovak League of America, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, could not contribute to Hlinka, because its treasury was too small. 5 1 The final result of the fund-raising drive was most pertinently expressed by Hlinka in his letter to the Reverend Jan Postenyi after his return from the USA: "As you know, I have returned with fame , pennants and rings-but not many dollars. Business is business and I 46 AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. The leaflet Svoji svojim. AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 48 For instance, the lecture in Pittsburgh, that was held on Sund ay August 8, 1926, because according to Pennsylvania law, one co uld not collect an entrance fee. Cf. Ibid 49 AMZ V CR, f. lll, i. no. 22 , fo ld. 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of th e CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 50 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - / 965 (Cleveland : First Catholic Slovak Uni on, I 965), p. 2 I 2. 51 AMZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situation report of th e Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, I 926. 47 SLOVAKIA 45 am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 52 According to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America. Allegedly, Gerat did not stick to the official schedule, which resulted in Hlinka presenting his lectures without reference to the local organizing committee. However, the main cause of the annoyance of American Slovaks was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at the parish of the nationalist Stefan Panik in Torrington, Connecticut, but instead agreed to lecture at Andrej Komara's parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 53 As Milan Getting noted, Komara had been denounced by neighboring Slovak priests as a Magyarone. Therefore, by accepting his invitation, Hlinka disappointed many of his followers .54 Allegedly, after the lecture at Komara's parish on October 3, 1926, Hlinka and Gerat55 began to show a certain nervousness. This, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, arose from the fact that Hlinka had failed to settle the arguments in the SlovakAmerican Catholic camp. It could also have been a result of their disappointment in the fund-raising drive. Another reason could have been the development of the political situation back home. In addition, Hlinka could see that the audience at his lectures was declining. He may also have been frustrated by articles published in the Czechoslovak daily Newyorsky dennik, which attacked him during his whole stay in the USA. 56 52 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Tmave [Archives of the Society of St. Adalbert in Tmava] , fascic le (hereinafter fasc.) 156. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 53 According to the Newyorsky dennik, Komara promised Hlinka $2,000, which, according to Getting, Hlinka did not deny. Cf. AMZV CR, f. Ill, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of th e CSR in Prague from October 15 , 1926. Not following the schedule of the lectures was also reported in Jednota, October 6, 1926, p. 2. 54 AMZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MF A of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 55 Meanwhile, Buday returned to Slovakia. He left America on July 24, 1926. Cf. Slovak, August 6, 1926, p. 1. 56 AMZV CR, f. 111, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 46 SLOVAKIA The last of Hlinka's lectures in the USA was in New York City on October 11 , 1926. 57 He left the USA on October 13 , 1926 and returned to Slovakia on October 22, 1926. 58 Even if the conclusion of his lecture tour to the USA looked disappointing, it did not radically affect the attitudes of American Slovaks to his person, nor the autonomist movement in Slovakia. It is apparent, therefore, that on the occasion of the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, Illinois, Andrej Hlinka, made use of his trip to lecture and to raise funds in favour of autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America at that time was quite tense. The reasons for the tension were personal problems, frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government's failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement and the pressure of State Insurance Commissioners on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues. After initial disagreements, Hlinka's lecture tour was organized by a committee composed almost entirely of priests. Hlinka visited more than one hundred Slovak parishes, took part in eighty discussions and presented more than two hundred lectures. However, the fund-raising drive did not bring the expected results. In addition, according to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America by not having respected the schedule of the local organizational committee. The main cause of the annoyance, however, was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at nationalist Stefan Panik's parish in Torrington, Connecticut, but rather at the parish of the alleged Magyarone Andrej Komara in Bridgeport. Even if in the end his lecture tour to the USA disappointed many Slovak nationalists, Hlinka did not lose the sympathy of American Slovaks, nor support for the autonomist movement in Slovakia. 57 58 Ibid. Slo vak, October 23 , 1926, p. 3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Andrej Hlinka's Journey to the USA in 1926 Description An account of the resource Štefan Kucík Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010 pp. 32-46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucík, Štefan, 1979- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/57e722dd66721df48d670064e04aa791.pdf 3d6c95dfd0761ce55e93b680ab7c1546 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS: BISHOP JAN VOJTASSAK'S ABORTED JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1923 r V V r Stefan Kucik In 1923 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak, bishop of the diocese of Spis in Slovakia, decided to undertake a pastoral journey to Slovak Catholics in the United States of America. However, Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue him a passport. They considered his trip to be political. It turns out that Vojtassak's planned journey conflicted with Czechoslovak government plans to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Upon hearing of this refusal, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America published an open letter to Tomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the president and his government. To counteract the impact of this letter, the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter to the president, ostensibly by a group of American Slovaks who supported him and his government. Interestingly, this "anti-letter" was written by an official of Czechoslovak intelligence. While many scholars have dealt with the biography of bishop Jan Vojtassak, only Robert Letz has provided us with a thorough explanation of the reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant him passport in 1923 .1 In this context, however, no one has pointed to the open letters addressed to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation and the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York. The present article will try to fill this gap, as well as to put the matter into a broader context. I Robert Letz, "Bi skup Jan Vojtassak a slovenska politika V medzi vojnovom obdobi," in Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, Ivan Chalupecky, ed. (Spisska KapitulaSpisske Podhradie: Ki\azsky seminar biskupa Jana Vojtassaka, 2003 ), 25 -52. �8 SLOVAKIA After Jan Vojtassak had been appointed bishop of Spis towards the end of 1920,2 along with Marian Blaha for the diocese of Banska Bystrica and Karol Kmet'ko for the diocese of Nitra, American Slovaks rejoiced. As early as December 22, 1920, editor Jozef Husek wrote in the Catholic weekly Jednota : "Only those who look at the deep religious sentiment of our people, and their simple faith and devotion to the Holy Church, can understand what it means for Catholic Slovaks to have apostles of their own flesh and blood, of their national sentiment and outlook. " 3 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak was ordained a bishop in Nitra on February 13, 1921. In a fortnight he assumed his office in Spisska Kapitula. In his first pastoral letter, Vojtassak outlined a program of his future activities. He was aware of the negative consequences of the Great War. He realized that the war had caused many to lose their faith in God, and felt that the war's ravages threatened the very basis of love for one 's neighbours. It not only produced a lot of cripples, but largely devastated people' s spiritual values . At war's end materialism and the class struggle began to appear and hatred toward the Catholic Church grew. In Czechoslovakia, the strong anti-Catholic character of the new political system was evident right after the war. The Czechs did not show much consideration for the religiosity of Slovakia. They also tended to undervalue the contribution of the Slovak Catholic clergy in the creation of the common independent state,4 whether in Slovakia or in the USA, and tended to forget that Roman Catholics constituted the vast majority of both populations. The Czechoslovak government, however, was not satisfied with just the secularization of the new country. It also decided to transfer its anti-Catholicism to Czech and Slovak communities in America. In order to promote the newly established Czechoslovak Church among American compatriots, it sent a mission led by its first bishop Gorazd Pavlik to the USA. In connection with this mission, which 2 For the appointment, ordination and enthronement of bishop Jan Vojta~~ak see Ivan Chalupecky, "Obsadenie spi~skeho biskupskeho stolca po roku 19 18," in Chalupecky, Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, 7-24. 3 Jozef Paufo, 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, I 965), 165 . 4 Ivan Chalupecky, Biskup Jan Vojtassak: K jeho verejnej a politickej cinnosti (Rufo mberok: Katolicka univerzita v Rufo mberku, Filozofi cka fakulta, 2009), 2 1-25. �SLOVAKIA 9 was carried out between June 1922 and January 1923,5 an incident which became infamous in the history of the Slovak Catholic Church occurred. It filled both Slovak Catholics in Czechoslovakia and in America with much indignation. The incident lay behind the refusal of Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to the bishop of Spis. Jan Vojtassak had decided to travel to America as early as December of 1922. He had reached his decision on the basis of a circular letter issued by Antonin Cyril Stojan, Archbishop of Olomouc. Addressed to all ordinaries in Slovakia, the letter was based upon an earlier one sent by Czech Catholic priests in America on the basis of instructions received from the Czech episcopate. They had been asked to try to paralyze Gorazd Pavlik's activities, because some Slovak priests in America had begun to affiliate with the new Czechoslovak Church. The Czech priests emphasized that they had not succeeded in their work among American Slovaks because they were Czechs and not Slovaks. Had the episcopate sent Slovak priests among American Slovaks, these would have been more successful. 6 This circular letter, as well as reports published in Slovak-American newspapers and republished in Slovakia, plus a number of private letters received from individuals across the United States, led bishop Vojtassak to decide to lead a mission to the USA. 7 He was also aware that many Slovak Catholics in America came from his diocese. Vojtassak's mission was fully supported by the Czech mission of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the USA, as well as by Archbishop A. C. Stojan and other Slovak and Czech bishops, along with the former apostolic nuncio Clemente Micara. The Holy See also agreed with Vojtassak' s planned journey to America. 8 Bishop Vojtassak began to prepare for his trip in April of 1923. Slovak organizations in the USA were informed of his coming.9 In May of the same year, Vojtassak applied for a passport. Although at that time passports were usually granted by district authorities, Vojtassak's application was forwarded to the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava. Thence it was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, whence it was 5 Letz, " Bi skup ... ," 47 . Slovak (Bratislava), July 5, 1923, 1; Jednota (Middletown, PA), July 25 , 1923, 4. 7 Slovak, July 5, 1923, 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Letz, "Biskup ... ," 44. 6 �SLOVAKIA returned back to Bratislava. This kind of procrastination continued for a month. To try to expedite matters, Vojtassak travelled to Bratislava and even to Prague, but his efforts proved fruitless . The parliamentary deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party Vaclav Myslivec, as well as some parliamentary deputies of the Slovak People's Party, intervened with the Minister of the Interior Jan Malypetr. The latter, however, refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport with the comment that "he knows Catholic bishops who lie. " 10 In order to comprehend such a rude refusal, one needs to understand the situation in the Slovak-American community in the first years after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After Tomas G. Masaryk had left America in the fall 1918, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Cleveland to decide on sending a delegation to Slovakia. 11 According to Albert P. Mamatey, president of the League, 12 the delegates were to make contact with political leaders in the old country and to let them know about the Pittsburgh Agreement concluded with T. G. Masaryk in May of 1918. 13 Upon their arrival in Slovakia, the delegates acted impartially. In their Privet delegacie Slovenskej ligy v Amerike [Address of the Delegation of the Slovak League of America] dated April 9, 1919, they expressed their surprise at the growing political struggles in Slovakia. Therefore, they initially hesitated to give the Pittsburgh Agreement to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Responsible for Slovakia, or to Ferdis Juriga or Andrej Hlinka, the most popular priests and politicians in the Slovak People ' s Party. 14 They considered the political squabbles among the many new political parties a waste of energy for a small nation. 15 Upon their return to the USA, two of the delegates, Jozef Rusek, the editor of Jednota and Milan Getting, the editor of New Yorksky dennik, reported on the situation in Slovakia at the 12th Congress of the Slovak League held in Scranton, PA, on May 29, 1919. Jozef 10 Slowik, July 5, 1923, 1. Nave Slo vensko (Pittsburgh, PA), December 2, 19 18, 2-3. 12 Albert Pavo! Mamatey was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1911 to 1920. 13 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slav. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., dna 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, PA: Slovak League of America), 9. 14 Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1929), 226-227. 15 Slovak, May 3, 1919, I. 11 �SLOVAKIA 11 Husek advised American Slovaks to be careful in pressing for the autonomy of Slovakia as promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, because at that time it might help Magyar efforts to re-annex Slovakia to Hungary. However, he did not abandon his claim to the autonomy of Slovakia. He postponed it to a time when the situation in Slovakia would improve. 16 Milan Getting, on the other hand, did not even mention the autonomy of Slovakia. He reported on his plan of agitation against Magyarization in Slovakia. He worked out this plan on the basis of a suggestion made by Minister V. Srobar. Since Srobar was short of funds, Getting returned to the USA to ask American Slovaks to purchase a printing press for Minister Srobar's agitation. 17 Despite Jozef Husek's advice not to immediately press for the autonomy of Slovakia and Milan Getting's ignoring of the issue, American Slovaks began to very heatedly discuss this matter. 18 On July 31, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Pittsburgh and accepted the brochure Politicka nauka vzh/'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat [Political Perspective Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State] 19 as the basis of its future activities. The brochure stated that the Slovak League of America decided to support its program of autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. The final arrangement of the Czecho-Slovak state, however, it left to the Slovaks in the old country. 20 Another representative of the Slovak League of America, who reported on the situation in Slovakia right after the World War I, was Ignac Gessay. However, he did not belong to the above mentioned delegation. This renowned Slovak-American editor was sent to Slovakia somewhat later. The reason for his mission was a lack of reliable information from Europe at the beginning of 1919. 21 American 16 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slov. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., diia 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, 19 19), 24. 17 Ibid. , 30-31. 18 Sidor, Slovaci... , 231. 19 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Trnave, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 299K3. Zapisnica zo sch6dze Ustrednej spravy Slovenskej Ligy vydrziavanej di\a 31. jula 191 9 v Henry Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. The brochure was written by editor Jan A. Feriencik and published by the Slovak League of America in 19 19. Informally, it was called .. Politicky Katechismus " [Political Catechism]. 20 Jan A. Feriencik, Politicka nauka vzhl'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat (Pittsburgh: Slovenska liga v Amerike, 19 19), 7. 21 Dobry Pastier, April 19 19, 7. �12 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, therefore, decided to establish an information office, at first in Paris, and once regular postal service had been established between Czecho-Slovakia and the USA, in Slovakia too.22 This task was entrusted to lgnac Gessay, at that time an editor of Nave Slovensko, 23 official organ of the Slovak League of America.24 In his report to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on October 24, 1919, Gessay recommended that American Slovaks take a neutral stand on the issue of Slovak autonomy. He suggested a gradual implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement and warned radical Slovak-American autonomists that immediate autonomy would have been fatal for the new republic. 25 Both Gessay's and Husek's initial reports had a huge impact on the official stand of the Slovak League towards autonomy. Jozef Rusek, however, would gradually change his mind and then would support the autonomist movement in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League on October 24, 1919, two delegates of the Slovak People's Party, the Rev. Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala, also appeared. Jozef Rudinsky had been sent to the USA by several leaders of the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka in August of 1919. He had been chosen as a trustworthy person whose task it was to defend the idea of Slovak autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic among American Slovaks, and to inform them of the Party's activities. In addition, Rudinsky was supposed to raise funds for the autonomist movement. On the suggestion of the Rev. Frantisek Jehlicska, Jozef Kubala, a merchant from Vrbove, joined Rudinsky before his departure to the USA. In Poland, however, they both joined the Rev. Hlinka's delegation to Paris, in an attempt to have autonomy for Slovakia included in the Paris Peace Treaties. After a week's stay in the capital of France and the delegation's expulsion from that country, Ru- 22 Slovensky narodny archiv, Brati slava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter SNA), fund (hereinafter f.) Slovenska liga v Amerike [Slovak League of America], folder (hereinafter fold .) 2. Albert Mamatey to Frantisek Stas, April 17, 191 9. 23 Nave Slovensko, official organ of the Slovak League of America in 1918-1922. 24 Jgnac Gessay, S/ovensko po oslobodeni (Cleveland: Slovenska liga v Amerike), 4; ASSV, fasc . 236CI0. Authorization for Ignac Gessay, April 26, 1919. 25 Gessay, S/ovensko ... , 26-28, 37-38. �SLOVAKIA 13 dinsky and Kubala continued on their original journey to the United States, where they arrived on October 13, 1919. 26 At the time of the delegates' trip to the USA the majority of American Slovaks felt distaste for the policy of the Slovak People's Party.27 This aversion arose mainly from the reports of Jozef Husek and Ignac Gessay, as well as Andrej Hlinka' s faux pas in connection with his rash journey to the Paris Peace Conference. Another reason was the fact that the delegates arrived in America with Polish passports and Polish visas, and not Czecho-Slovak. 28 Having presented their credentials to the League, Jozef Rudinsky was asked to explain his mission to America. He clarified the position of the Slovak People's Party at length. Like the Slovak League of America, the People's Party demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. It also wanted autonomy for Slovakia to be included in the Paris Peace Treaties. Therefore, he had come to the USA, along with Jozef Kubala, to agitate for autonomy and to raise funds towards this end. 29 Although the Executive Committee of the Slovak League did not find anything contrary to its program in the Rudinsky mission, it nevertheless took a negative stand towards it. Rudinsky and Kubala did not have any credentials from the Czecho-Slovak government and the League did not agree with Hlinka's journey to the Paris Peace Conference. The League accused the delegates of driving a wedge between the Slovaks and Czechs in America, which might have had a negative impact on their coexistence in the USA, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. 30 On the other hand, the Executive Commit26 Robert Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky - vyznamna osobnost' Turzovky," in Turzovka kriiom-kraiom, Ivan Gajdiciar ed. (Turzovka: Spolok priatel'ov Turzovky, 2010), 328329. 27 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Rufomberok: Lev, 1921 ), 11 . 28 Karol Sidor, "Zasahy Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike do politickeho vyvinu slovenskeho (1914 - 1939)," in Slovenska liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna, Mikulas Sprinc, ed. (Scranton, PA : Slovenska liga v Amerike, 1947), 54. 29 ASSV, fasc . 299A6. Zapisnica zo schodze Ustredneho vyboru Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydrziavanej di\a 24. okt6bra I 919 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli v Pittsburgh, Penna. JO Masarykuv ustav a Archiv Akademie ved Ceske republiky, V. V. i., Archiv UTGM, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter MUA AV CR, AUTGM), f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 459. Rezolucia Slovenskej Ligy prijata na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednyrn vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., di\a 24. a 25. okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919. (For the letter without attachments see Slovenske �14 SLOVAKIA tee issued a memorandum, in which American Slovaks demanded the gradual implementation of the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement in the newly-created Czecho-Slovakia. 31The resolution against Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala and the League's subsequent memorandum expressed American Slovaks' efforts to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it also reflected their efforts to maintain their neutral stand and not to be drawn into political affairs in Slovakia. In such a situation, the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party could not rely on the authority of the Slovak League of America. They, therefore, approached two Slovak-American organizations which disagreed with the League 's stand: the Slovak Catholic Federation and the First Catholic Slovak Union. Jozef Rudinsky expressed his ideas mainly in the weekly Jednota , where he was assisted by Jozef Husek, and in the newspaper Obrana, which was edited by the Rev. Jan Metod Liscinsky.32 While Rudinsky and Kubala, assisted by Slovak-American Catholic organizations, were agitating in the USA for Slovak autonomy, Albert Mamatey left on a three-month journey (December 10, 1919 March 14, 1920) to Czecho-Slovakia. His intentions were very much the same as that of the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party in the USA, i.e. that the Pittsburgh Agreement should be incorporated into the future Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Upon his return to the United States, Mamatey reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee in Pittsburgh on April 8, 1920. 33 He had traveled to Czecho-Slovakia via France and Switzerland. In Paris, he had met with Stefan Osusky, the general secretary of the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Peace Conference and a vyst'ahovalectvo: Dokumenty 3, Frantisek Bielik, Elo Rakos, eds. (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1976), 165-172, document no. 325); ASSV, fasc . 299A9. Prehlas a verejne osvedcenie Slov. Ligy. 31 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R- republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 45 9. Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy Prijate na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednym vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., dna 24. a 25 . okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919; Jednota, October 29, 1919, I. 32 Sidor, Slovaci... , 235; Letz, "JozefRudinsky ...," 329-330. 33 ASSV, fasc . 299A4. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia ustr. a vyko. vyboru Slov. ligy 8. apr. 1920 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli, Pittsburgh, Pa. �SLOVAKIA 15 delegate of the Slovak League of America to Masaryk in 1916. 34 When Mamatey suggested that the Slovaks should have been contractually guaranteed their home rule at the Paris Peace Conference in the same way as had the Ruthenians, Osusky offered the following explanation: "During the whole war, we cooperated and worked with our brothers the Czechs for our independence as a UNIT, as two branches of one nation that belong together. Thanks to this UNIFIED stand with our brothers the Czechs, the Allies recognized our independence, our separation from the Magyars and our joining with the Czechs. "35 Osusky, however, was not worried about the future of the Slovaks. He promised that they would get everything that they asked for and that they wished, except for things that might be detrimental to them: "Because what we do not want, what would be detrimental or destructive for Slovakia, as for instance, a separate Diet at this time, nobody from the outside wi 11 force upon us nor put into our minds." 36 After this meeting, the intervention of Albert Mamatey on behalf of the autonomy of Slovakia sounded unconvincing. He had met with T. G. Masaryk, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, with Edvard Benes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Vavro Srobar, the Minister with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia, and others. In February of 1920, Mamatey had also taken part in the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies. Almost all with whom he had negotiated, had agreed with the view that at that time the autonomy of Slovakia with a separate Diet would have been fatal for Slovakia. Mamatey, however, had negotiated only with the members of 34 For more on Osusky, his earlier life in America and his mission to Europe, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia," Slovak Studies, 8 (1968), 27-30 and 57-66. 35 Zprava Predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana Ustrednemu Vyboru Slov. ligy v Pittsburghu, Pa. dna 8. aprila 1920 o Jeho ceste a missi v Cesko-slovenskej republike (Pittsburgh, 1920), 8. 36 Ibid. �16 SLOVAKIA the centralist Czechoslovak political parties and opponents of the legislative autonomy of Slovakia. In connection with the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies a regrettable incident occurred. The Club had passed a resolution which was supposed to confirm that in the draft Constitution there be included everything that had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, except for a separate Diet. However, the signatures of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party (Alois Kalisek, Jan Kovalik, Stefan Onderco, Jozef Sivak and Florian Tomanek) on the resolution had been forged. This affair came to light only after the resolution had been cited in full in the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America addressed to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1922.37 Even if the resolution significantly influenced the future attitudes of American Slovaks to the issue of the autonomy of Slovakia, it seems that it did not have a great impact on the views of Albert Mamatey. On February 28, 1920, one day before he left Czecho-Slovakia, Albert Mamatey received a letter from Milan Hodza, the Minister for the Unification of Laws and one of the main Slovak political leaders. In this letter, Hodza had also rejected a separate Slovak Diet. Despite the unwillingness of the main political representatives to accept the claim to a Slovak Diet, Albert Mamatey did not hesitate to conclude his report with the words: "Slovakia may look forward to a great future," although he added that "it would take some time." 38 However, it is well-known how important a separate Diet was for American Slovaks. Jozef Rusek expressed their outlook very clearly: "Autonomy without a Diet, without legislation, is no autonomy. Indeed, autonomy is a Diet and a Diet is autonomy! Without a Diet there is no autonomy!" 39 Albert Mamatey must have been aware of the importance of a separate Slovak Diet to fulfill the promise of autonomy. He must have also known that if the requirement of a separate Slovak Diet had been deleted from the Pittsburgh Agreement, the latter would have been worthless. His attitude on the issue of the autonomy of 37 Memorandum Slovenskej ligy v Amerike upravene na vladu a Narodne Shromaidenie Cesko-Slovenskej Republiky v zaujime vtelenia Pittsburghskej Dohody do iistavy C-S Republiky (Pittsburgh : Slovak League of America, 1922). 38 Ibid. , 26. 39 Jednota, February 18, 1920, 4. �SLOVAKIA 17 Slovakia began to change by the beginning of 1919. In one of his letters addressed to Dr. Miloslav Francisci of Cleveland, son of a famous Slovak revolutionary hero of 1848, Mamatey wrote: "I have been fighting for the national individuality of the Slovak nation for over four years. I have insisted that the Slovaks are not just an "appendix" of the Czech nation, but the Slovaks are as independent a nation as the Czechs. However, I have gotten tired of the constant fighting. Anyways, the fate of the Slovak nation will not be determined by us from America, but by those back home. - You, I and hundreds of others here in America have done our duty. " 40 In accordance with his changed attitude towards autonomy for Slovakia and his hardly concealable inclination towards government policy, which was fuelled by the promise of the office of Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, Albert Mamatey decided to paralyze the agitation of Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala among American Slovaks. To this end he arranged that two delegates of the Czechoslovak government were sent to America. The mission of the Roman Catholic priest Ladislav Moys and the social democrat Jan Pocisk, did not bear fruit. They failed to persuade American Slovaks to approve of the Czechoslovak Constitution and their activities in the USA were deplored by the "Response" [Ohlas] of the Slovak Catholic Federation. 41 In response to the steps taken by Albert Mamatey and by the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek announced his resignation from the League. He accused the leading League officials of having knowingly and intentionally missed the opportunity to have Slovakia constitutionally guaranteed the right to 40 Aibert Mamatey to M . Francisci, January 22, 1919. It was published in Konstantin Culen, "Zo zaviatych listov (Z korespondencie A. Mamateya s Dr. M. Franciscim)," in Literarny almanach Slovaka v Amerike na rok 1962 (Middletown, Pa.: Hrobak Publications), 147. 41 Dobry Pastier (Middletown, PA), April 1920, 14-15; Jan Pankuch, Dejiny clevelandskych a lakewoodskych Slovakov (Cleveland, 1930), 188; Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Andreja, 1937), 274; Paufo, 162163; Natalia Krajfovicova, "Americki Slovaci a slovenski autonomisti v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR," in Miroslav Peknik et al. , Ferdinand Juriga: /'udovy smer slovenskej politiky (Bratislava: VEDA, 2009), 260. �18 SLOVAKIA home rule and individual national, cultural and economic life within the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, he accused the League's officials of morally and financially supporting agitation against the Pittsburgh Agreement. 42 As a result, no Slovak-American Catholic organization attended the 13th Congress of the Slovak League held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 24-25, 1920. 43 After the Congress, the Slovak League of America was subjected to a lot of criticism by Jozef Husek. The latter concluded that the League "ceases to be the moral and official representative of the Slovak-American colony."44 As a result, the role that had been played in the promotion of Slovak national demands by the Slovak League of America began to be played by representatives of Slovak American Catholics led by the Slovak Catholic Federation and those organizations with which the Federation closely co-operated.45 However, after the Slovak National Party had split from the Slovak National and Agrarian Party in March of 192 I in order to be able more vigorously to demand the legislative autonomy of Slovakia, the Slovak League of America, led by its new president Ivan Bielek,46 began to change its stand. One of the first consequences of the creation of the Slovak National Party was the adoption of a compromise declaration requesting the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement at the conference of the representatives of American Slovaks in Washington, DC, on May 21 , 1921 . In this declaration, American Slovaks demanded that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also requested the gradual autonomy of Slovakia. 47 Another event that influenced the Slovak League of America was the secession of the Slovak People's 42 Jednota, June 19, 1920, 4. Pauco, 160. 44 Jednota , Jul y 7, 1920, 4. 45 Pauco, 160. 46 Ivan Bielek, a fo rmer newspaper editor, was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1920 to 1934. As the first vice-president of the League, Bielek became its president after Albert Mamatey resigned in September of 1920 due to his appointment as a consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Pittsburgh. Jednota, September 22, 1920, 2; Slovak Institute and Reference Library in Cleveland (hereinafter SIRL), fasc. Mamatey, Albert 1870 - 1923. "Pan Mamatey sa vzdava predsednictva Slov. Ligy," newspaper clipping, September 17, 1920. 47 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 317, 320. 43 �SLOVAKIA 19 Party from the common parliamentary club of the Czechoslovak People 's Party in November of 1921. 48 On June 28-30 1922, the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Pittsburgh. The Congress was attended by the vice-president of the Slovak National Party and the Rev. Anton Kompanek. The latter called uJ'on American Slovaks not to give up on the Pittsburgh Agreement. 4 His mission in the USA was to rally autonomist forces , both in America and in Slovakia. 50 The congress then split into two camps - autonomists and centralists. Nevertheless, the delegates supported the Pittsburgh Agreement almost unanimously and they ordered the Executive Board "to write to Prague."51 The Executive Board then sent a Memorandum to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic requesting that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution. They also demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia. 52 The 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was very important for the future orientation of this organization. In spite of expectations that the crisis within the League would deepen, the Congress became a new concentration of autonomist forces . However, the concentration was only reached with great effort. The June 29, 1922 debate about the Pittsburgh Agreement was long and lasted until 11 :00 p.m.53 The discussion on the Pittsburgh Agreement at the Congress was significantly influenced by Anton Kompanek. Once in America, he began to create a united front for the recognition of the Pittsburgh 48 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnfch vecf Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), f. rn. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, inventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report "Hlinkovci v Amerike" by M. Getting, director ofCSTK in Washington, DC, January 24, 1922. 49 Zapisnica XIV. Kongressu Slovenskej Lfgy vydi iavaneho v dnoch 28., 29. a 30. juna /922 v Moose Temple, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pittsburgh, 1922), 83. 50 Krajcovicova, 262. 51 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report " Slovenske veci v Amerike", July 1, 1922 by M . Getting, director of CSTK in Washington, DC, July 7, 1922; Archfv Krajanskeho muzea Matice slovenskej, Bratislava (hereinafter AKM MS), f. Ignac Gessay, fold. I. Telegram to I. Gessay (torso, without sender, undated). 52 See footnote 3 7. 53 Robert Letz, "Slovenska liga v Amerike a Slovenska liga na Slovensku," in Historicky zbornfk, 19 (No. 1, 2009), 65 ; Obrana, June 27, 1922, 3 and Jul y 4, 1922, 1. �20 SLOVAKIA Agreement through his articles, which were published in the Slovak American press. In a series of articles in Obrana, Kompanek recommended that Slovak autonomy be achieved gradually, and only within the Czechoslovak Republic. As for American Slovaks, he was convinced that there was not as much disunity over the issue of autonomy as in the old country. He admitted, on the other hand, that there were also some personal antipathies (Bielek versus Husek, with the former favoring the Slovak National Party over the Slovak People's Party) .54 Anton Kompanek tried to eliminate these disagreements and he invited supporters of Slovak autonomy to a conference in Pittsburgh on October 12, 1922. At this conference, he stressed that the fate of the Pittsburgh Agreement was in the hands of American Slovaks. He stated that it was not enough to issue resolutions, but it was necessary to work systematically and support materially the movement for the autonomy of Slovakia directly in Slovakia. At the conference, a five-member committee was elected to coordinate the work on behalf of the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was named the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom and its members were Stefan Kocis, Jan Pankuch, Ivan Bielek, Jan Bibza and Jozef Husek. The latter was elected its president. The aim of the Committee was to unite all Slovak American organizations, their newspapers and public officials in the struggle for the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Another goal of the new organization was to try to create a coalition of all autonomist parties in Slovakia. 55 Even though Ivan Bielek had attended the conference in Pittsburgh as a private person, 56 once the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom was established, the "centralists" were expelled from the Slovak League of America. 57 This happened at the meeting of the Executive Committee with the Executive Board held on June 27-28 in Cleveland, 58 and was completed and approved at the 15th Con54 Krajcovicova, 262-263. Jednota, October 18, 1922, 4; Krajcovicova, 263 . 56 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0., 13. 57 Jednota, July 4, 1923, 4; Krajcovicova, 264. 58 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0 ., 73 . 55 �SLOVAKIA 21 gress of the League held on May 27-29, 1924 in Binghamton, New York. 59 In terms of the resolution of its 14th congress, the Slovak League of America reacted negatively to the new activities of Jozef Rudinsky in the USA in 1923. This time, contrary to his first mission among American Slovaks, Rudinsky, who had switched sides, and had become a major supporter of Milan Hodza, came to the USA in the service of the Czechoslovak government. The League also rejected a similar mission by Vavro Srobar and Vaclav Maule, a Czech professor and head of the branch of the Ministry of Education in Bratislava. They came in the same year to lecture on behalf of Czechoslovak national unity and against the autonomy of Slovakia.60 Their mission, however, failed among Slovak American autonomists. 61 Upon his return to Czechoslovakia in November of 1920, Jozef Rudinsky's relationship with Andrej Hlinka deteriorated and they eventually parted company.62 As early as the beginning of 1923, Rudinsky and Vavro Srobar began to talk. These conversations were probably initiated by Srobar, who was preparing for his own journey to the USA 63 in order to counteract the results of the 14th congress of the Slovak League of America. 64 Rudinsky and Srobar discussed Rudinsky' s planned new journey to America and concluded that the latter should use the contacts that he had made in his previous mission. They particularly counted upon Rudinsky's past friendship with Jozef Husek. To make his mission more successful, Rudinsky decided to depart alone, without Srobar. The latter would come after him and would finish what Rudinsky had started. 65 Rudinsky ' s and Srobar' s trips were intended to appear as two completely unrelated and independent initiatives. However, that same year bishop Vojtassak was also preparing for his journey to the USA. Vojtassak was not aware of Srobar' s and Rudinsky' s plans. If 59 Zapisnica XV. kongressu S/o venskej ligy vydri iavaneho v diioch 27., 28. a 29. maja / 924, v Bennett Hoteli, Binghamton, N. Y. (Pittsburgh), 16-17, 20. 60 Zap isnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v diioch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.M C.A ., Cleveland, 0 ., 14. 61 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864 - 1926), 504-505. 62 For a detailed analysis of their breakup see Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 334-337. 63 Ibid. , 33 7. 64 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 383. 65 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ...," 337. �22 SLOVAKIA he had gone, Vojtassak would have certainly strengthened the position of Slovak Catholics in the USA, as well as that of his friend Andrej Hlinka and the whole autonomist movement. Therefore, Rudinsky in his letters referring to Vojtassak' s planned journey to the USA, found it extremely undesirable. Upon his arrival in the USA, Rudinsky wrote to Srobar: "I was almost dejected by the news that Vojtassak was already aboard ship and was about to arrive any day. If it is true, there is nothing left but to pack my bags and return home. I will be not able to counteract his influence."66 Of course, bishop Vojtassak was not aboard the ship Majestic, which was to arrive in the USA on July 6, 1923. 67 However, the information that came to Rudinsky must have been based upon Vojtassak's planned arrival in America. In New York City, a reception had been prepared on that day to which representatives of the city council were invited. A welcome committee consisting of Catholic priests must have blushed with shame when Vojtassak did not arrive on the Majestic, . 68 nor on any ot h er sh 1ps. Thus, the main reason why the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. The refusal had to do with the timing of his journey. It was planned at exactly the time when the Czechoslovak government was preparing to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Vojtassak' s trip could have thwarted these plans. In addition, the Czechoslovak government harbored suspicions about Vojtassak as a supporter of the Slovak People's Party. It feared that he would make use of his journey to raise funds for the Party just before municipal and county elections (September, 1923) were to take place. They also speculated that Vojtassak' s trip might have helped the Eudova banka [People's Bank], since it was in financial difficulty.69 Slovak Catholics in the USA, on the other hand, looked upon Vojtassak's trip as a pastoral journey, and not a political one. They pointed this out in their press . Bishop Vojtassak had been invited by the Slovak Catholic Federation in America. The news of such a rude and offensive refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak caused 66 SNA, f. Vavro Srobar, fold . 4. J. Rudinsky to V. Srobar, July 5, 1923. 67 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 337-33 8. Obrana, July 17, 1923, 4. Letz, " Biskup ... ," 45 . 68 69 �SLOVAKIA 23 outrage among American Slovak Catholics. The Slovak Catholic Federation decided to call a meeting to discuss the affair and to take appropriate action. At this meeting, which was held in Pittsburgh on August 8, 1923, representatives of all Slovak American Catholic organizations, most of the clergy and Slovak American leaders resolved to send a complaint to the Congress of the Slovak Catholic Federation held in Lansford, PA, on October 9-11, 1923. At the Congress, the delegates unanimously decided to acquaint the world with the offensive step of Minister Malypeter and to launch an indictment against the President and government of the Czechoslovak Republic. 70 In response to the refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, the Slovak Catholic Federation issued a strong open letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk. In this letter, Slovak Catholics in America expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the President and government of Czechoslovakia, and even the sense of a threat to their national existence. Besides other matters, they pointed to the cause of bishop Jan Vojtassak. They directly charged the Czechoslovak government with trying to assimilate the Slovaks and to promote the spiritual genocide of the Slovak nation. 71 The open letter was sent to all representatives of the Allies, as well as to Bohemia and Slovakia. 72 In Czechoslovakia, however, it 10 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. TomM Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5-6. 71 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5, 8 - 9. The open letter was printed in Slovak (600 copies) and English (500 copies). For a copy of its English version see AMZV CR, f. Ill. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11 , 1924. For its Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi Tomasovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis Institutu hist6rie FF PU v Pre.save, 5 (No. 2, 2011 ), 79-82. 72 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. Milan Getting of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague that an English version of the open letter was sent particularly to the representatives of the Catholic Church in the USA, to editorial staffs of several American newspapers, to all leading Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and pastors, to university professors, as well as to the members of the foreign committee of the �24 SLOVAKIA was confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava prohibited the distribution of the letter through the mails and it was confiscated by the public prosecutor's office in Prague as well. 73 On behalf of all Slovak American Catholics, the Slovak Catholic Federation protested against this confiscation to the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC. They referred to the confiscation as vandalism and a new insult to Slovak Catholics in America.74 In their protest through the open letter, however, Slovak-American Catholics were not united. Jednota criticized the open letter. The editor considered it to be a tactical mistake. He declared the letter to be too radical and also criticized its timing.75 In an effort to weaken the impact of the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation and to prove that views expressed in it belonged to a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York agreed with the Rev. Klement Ihrisky, a representative of American Slovaks in New York, to issue an "anti-letter" addressed to the President of Czechoslovakia. 76 This "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department. It was also issued in the form of brochure and sent to the same addresses as the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation.77 Senate and Congress in Washington. In its Slovak version, the open letter was mosttr sent to Prague to the members of Parliament. 7 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Attachment of the letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 12, 1924; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 27, 1924. 74 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation to Frantisek Chvalkovsky, Ambassador of the CSR in Washington, DC, February 25 , 1924. 75 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. 76 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 rtAMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 7, 1924; Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda , 383. �SLOVAKIA 25 It should be apparent, therefore, that the main reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. Moreover, the rude refusal may be explained by the timing of his journey. After World War I, Slovaks in America, represented by their cover organization the Slovak League, underwent several changes of opinion regarding political developments in the newly-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the one hand, they struggled to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic as expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement. On the other hand, American Slovaks tried to remain neutral and not to get involved in the political infighting in Slovakia. With the personal metamorphosis of the president of the Slovak League of America, and with the Slovak League being hesitant concerning the matter of the autonomy promised by T. G. Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Agreement, Slovak Catholic organizations took the lead in the promotion of Slovak national demands after 1919. Due to the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia, as well as the activities of Anton Kompanek, the vice-president of the Slovak National Party, in the USA the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America concentrated the autonomist forces and it eventually provoked the Czechoslovak government to try to deliver a decisive blow to the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks in 1923. In response to the refusal of the Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, however, Slovak Catholics in America were not united. The scathing open letter (in stilted English) issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation was justifiably criticized by Jednota. To weaken the impact of this open letter and to try to prove that it represented only a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter (in perfect English) addressed to the president of Czechoslovakia. It was typical of the machinations of the then Czechoslovak government that the "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department and not by American Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 26 APPENDIX I Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 78 Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague Mr. President: In a critical time when fate was about to decide the turn of the world war, you and those loyal to you exerted all that was in your power that the result of the struggle might turn out in our mutual favor. Your appearance among the American Slovaks ignited unprecedented enthusiasm--your knocking at the hearts of our people found animated response - and your appeal for our assistance was crowned with success. Brother embraced brother and on the brightened horizon of acquired freedom and brotherhood smiled the sun towards our happy future ... Permit us, Mr. President, to remind you of the enthusiasm and the jubilation with which our Slovak people welcomed you wherever you appeared among them, unfolded your plans before them and assured them of your most sincere intentions. Permit us to remind you of the sacrifices in money and in blood which later were the seal of our loyalty to a work so noble and so sacred. The American Slovaks have kept their promise; we loyally stood, and to the present day, stand by your promise. Notwithstanding this, we note with some acerbity, for the past four years that your constituents who had sent you to us, and who cared so much for our alliance and our assistance never intended to fulfill that promise which they had placed into your mouth, and which you supported by this background in their name had promised. You came to us as an 78 This English version is a copy of the open letter available in AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650 . Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11, 1924. For the Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi TomMovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis lnstitutu hist6rie FF PU v Presove, 5 (No . 2, 2011 ), 79-82 . �SLOVAKIA 27 equal to equals; that was the way we associated with you and that was the way we drafted plans for the future with you. Not without our assistance, not without the efforts of the American Slovaks did you accomplish the fulfillment of your life's dreams - the liberation of the Czech Nation. Would we were not compelled to admit to you before the world that only (the liberation) of the Czech Nation; for the Slovak Nation, as a contrahent (contracting party) primarily recognized by you in the building of that republic at the head of which you now stand, does not feel under your aegis free in the sense of freedom as an independent nation has the right to vindicate for itself, particularly in the present epoch of self determination of nations. We have patiently waited for four years, whether the conscience of those cliques will move which had forced themselves upon us as brother, but today they treat us in stepmother fashion, nay, even like slaves. We see ourselves step by step betrayed, sold not only by compatriots of your strain and feelings, by your Government, but also by our own weaker compatriots, who for economic considerations lured into an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and even to us "ignorant" Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred. They are Slovak "Sviha's" pure and simple. While dwelling among us you spoke to us in the voice of a brother, plain and without bombast which is bountifully at the disposal of people of your profession. Today we desire to tell you in the same simple and plain manner that the Slovaks not only feel disappointed in you and in the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but directly endangered in their national existence. We do not desire to remind you of the recent acts by means of which the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic beyond any doubt manifested its desire of absorption respectively extermination of the Slovaks as a nation. These facts are sufficiently well known to you. We will show you the last incident which hardly has its parallel in the history of states which are only in the transitory stage of an experiment in democracy--an incident which startles any one who has sense for culture and democracy. Following the noble representatives of the World Powers there also came to America during the last few years representatives of the various religious denominations, in order to strengthen their adherents in their ways in which they de- �28 SLOVAKIA sire to reach eternal well-being in the post-terrestrial realm. What was more natural, but that also the Catholic Slovaks in America desired to welcome in their midst some one of these dignitaries with whom Rome has honored us after the revolution not without efforts on the part of your Government. The incident of Bishop Vojtassak is known to you (and how could it not be) whom we had invited here as our guest; from whom we expected good not only for ourselves, and for our church, but also for the welfare of your Republic. And here the system of government of the Czecho-Slovak republic showed up in its ugly and horrible nudity! Mr. President, the American Slovak Catholics identify themselves with the incident of Bishop Vojtassak. Your government has culminated by it the climax of its repressions, wrongfully committed for fully four years on Slovakia and the Slovaks. The refusal of a passport by your Minister caused such bitterness among us that we would be unworthy of our name and of our Credo, were we not to protest against it most emphatically. The Federation of Slovak Catholics called a council meeting to Pittsburgh which was held on August 8th, and at which the representatives of all Catholic organizations, a large number of Clergy and prominent exponents resolved to submit this grievance to the Congress of this Federation which was held on the days from the 9th to the 11th of October 1923, in Lansford, Pa., where we unanimously resolved to acquaint the educated world particularly with this outrage of your Minister and also submit to the world Powers and the leading representatives the following COMPLAINT against you and your Government. If you, as president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic according to law, are not responsible for your acts to the state authorities--and if your government does not honor your promise and your signature as President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, then we are taking you to task as a gentleman for that piece of cultural piracy which your Government and your ministers are committing on our Slovak nation from the first hour of the revolution-at the same time demanding from you as a gentleman to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised to us, the American Slovaks. This right we abrogate to ourselves as one of the parties contracting with you in the building of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. �SLOVAKIA 29 We are lodging this complaint against you and against your former factors in Paris before the conclusion of peace and after it, of having misled the peace delegates and the whole world in general, by claiming that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. To such a statement we Slovaks object most emphatically. This erroneous opinion of your Government was upset even by the Czech Academy, and prominent historians are convinced of its fallacy. For this reason do we, the American Slovak Catholics request that the respective provisions at Paris-Versailles and Trianon, be revised. We are lodging against you a complaint, for breach of contract entered into between us and you as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and contained in the so-called Pittsburgh Pact, the value of which you now disavow, bagatellize-on the fulfillment of which, however, we insist ascribing to it the significance of a National Bill of Rights. We complain against you and your Government for the undemocratic, unrepublican persecutions of newspapers of our party alignment and that of the opposition parties, which are not pulling the cart of Czecho-imperialistic aspirations, and which stand firmly by the principle that the Slovaks are an autochthone nation. We accuse you and your Government of the confiscation of Catholic institution[ s]-of the forcing of textbooks offensive to Catholics into the primary and higher schools, of the open favorizing of individuals and societies whose aims are the undermining of the Catholic spirit in our people. We complain against you and your Government before the civilized world for that barbarian monstrosity which you have sanctioned and which under the name "A law for the protection of the Republic" destroys the idea of democracy; which in reality exists [to silence us, the Slovaks, forever], and is, in our opinion, a cancerous growth upon the body of the Republic. We complain against you and your Government for the so-called "County Reform" so much lauded by you, which is equivalent to shackles for Slovakia as a national unit, which is white in Bohemia and black in Slovakia, and which impoverishes us economically and culturally, exposing us to the chicaneries of your centralist officials. For these and similar undeniable facts , we, American Slovak Catholics are accusing you and your Government before the world for the reason that the censorship (o, democracy, o republic, �30 SLOVAKIA o enlightened twentieth century of progress and free thought), the censorship of your Government does not permit in Slovakia a single manifestation of opposition against this madly raving autocracy by means of which your conscienceless compatriots and political adventurers keep Slovakia shackled. If the saying is correct that history repeats itself, let us be permitted to remind you that the entire Czech nation on one occasion resisted the Habsburgs for the reason that Francis Joseph did not keep the promise once made to the Czechs. You gave him the epithet of a perjurer-and that rightly so, and that regardless of the fact whether his promises were only "of historic value" or not. And we do not blame you or your adherents, that you built the foundations of the Republic on these unfulfilled promises of your former "sovereign". But now, out of consideration for this repetition in history, please do not forget, together with your Government, that "quod uni justum, alteri aequum"--what you had disliked in your oligarchs, that we are not obliged to like either and that the "Camarilla of Prague" directly compels the Slovaks to repay you and your regime in equal coin, if you should not desist in your anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic intentions, and should refuse to give the Slovaks that to which they are entitled. And the consequences? Let Prague be responsible for them--you Mr. President, and your Government. Mr. President, you know well, just as we do that powerful enemies of our young state are carrying on a propaganda in foreign countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is neither a natural state, nor a logical national, geographical, or resting upon a historical foundation; that it inherited all the weak points of the defunct monarchy, without having acquired one single good quality. Would there not be a necessity for internal unity, an internal understanding in accordance with your own motto "democracy is a discussion"? In opposition to this you with your Government, or that Government under your protection hamper and destroy even the slightest manifestation where the emphasizing of our national individuality is concerned. We, the Slovak Catholics in America, identify ourselves with the fate of our brethren across the ocean and the wrongs committed on them are also our wrongs, as Slovaks as well as Catholics; therefore, the disregard shown to Bishop Vojtassak affected us in a twofold manner. Your Government kicked him both for being a bishop (of �SLOVAKIA 31 course, a Catholic) and for being a patriotic Slovak who looks Prague straight in the eyes. And this double insult had for its consequence that also a preponderating majority of patriotic American Slovaks of other denominations joined our ranks, as brothers who are feeling with us our national wrong and our national disregard. What Prague has dared to do against us during the past four years, and what it recently dared to do with Bishop Vojtassak, would have ignited a scandal even among other nations; in our opinion it is so much greater, because you, Mr. President, instead of realizing the unprovoked insult and without regard to the abuse of jurisdiction of your minister, whose trammeling of the personal liberty of a free citizen exceeds all conceptions of democracy and humanity, whom you, as if trying to mock us, still tolerate in office. Of course, we admit that under the stress of circumstances, we Slovak Catholics cannot demand satisfaction from people whose life motto it had been "to square accounts with Rome", whose "programme is Tabor", who are provoking us that we should struggle for what we desire to preserve by right of heritage as Catholics, and as a deceived party of honest contrahents we cannot even demand it, but closing the list of our incriminations we solemnly declare to you, to your Government, and we shall not cease declaring to the whole world in spite of the opposing views of your regime that just as we are praying with our Catholic-Slovak brethren beneath the Tatra Mountains for the welfare of the young republic which had been won by our common sacrifices of blood, we wish you would take notice with your Government, and all its competent officials, that we are Slovaks, a self existing nation, homogenous and autochthone in origin and culture, as well as in history and language; that we desire to remain such without any artificial intermixture. Should the Czecho-Slovak Government hinder us in this either directly or indirectly, and not stop the wrongs cited in the above complaints--even if we were not able at once to put up against every "Metternich," "Bach," or "Schmerling" from Prague a Slovak "Palacky," "Rieger," or "Brauner," we shall yet find means and ways for the revelation of our wrongs; but we hope at the same time that God who will not let perish a nation trusting in Him, will awaken new "Viators" who will inform the world of our subjugated condition and that He will enthuse more "Bjornson[s]" who will tell you and your Czecho-Slovak �SLOVAKIA 32 Government such truths as you would least like to hear in this highly delicate situation. By authorization of the Slovak Catholic Federation in America, JOHN B. PASTORAK, Secretary, Schenectady, N. Y. ANDREW PA VLIS, President, Sheppton, Pa. APPENDIX II An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia79 MR. PRESIDENT: SOME time ago the Slovak Catholic Federation in America issued an Open Letter, addressed to you and signed by Father John B. Pastorak and Father Andrew Pavlis, in which complaints are being raised against you and your Government. A spirit of narrow sectarianism lurks behind every line of the Open Letter. You, Mr. President, and your Government are accused of desiring to "exterminate the Slovaks as a nation," of "cultural piracy," of having "misled the peace delegates," of "breach of faith," etc. In order that you may not have an erroneous idea as to the feelings and views of the American Slovaks, we, the undersigned, representatives of Slovak organizations in America, desire to point out that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America represents a very small part of our compatriots, and that the great majority of the American Slovaks are heart and soul with you. 79 Originally published in English, this open letter is available in MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 pp. �SLOVAKIA 33 Under your able leadership the Czechoslovak Republic has been most successful in piloting itself through the dangerous postwar period and it has been consolidated to such an extent that today it may be classed among the most ordered and prosperous States of Europe. In Slovakia, especially, great progress has been made as regards both cultural and economic development. We, therefore, are at a loss to understand the unjustified complaints made by the above-mentioned Slovak Catholic Federation against you and your Government. Permit us, Mr. President, to draw your attention to some of these complaints. The writers maintain that the Slovaks are "directly endangered in their national existence." How can this statement be reconciled with the progress which Slovakia has made in educational matters? As you are no doubt aware, under the Magyar regime all schools, whether elementary, secondary, or high schools, were in the hands of the Magyars. Properly speaking, there were no Slovak schools at all, with the exception of a few schools where the work was carried on by a handful of teachers who were evangelical for the greater part, the instruction was Magyar both in letter and spirit. Today, there are over four thousand elementary schools, over fifty secondary schools, besides commercial and technical institutes, and a university at Bratislava. The educational progress made since the liberation of Slovakia certainly does not prove the statement that the Slovaks are "endangered in their national existence." On the contrary, it proves, that the national existence and the cultural development of the Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic is fully assured. The Slovaks have three ministers in the Government and many officials in all branches of civil service. In certain cases, owing to lack of competent officials among the Slovaks, it was necessary to send Czechs to Slovakia but these are being withdrawn as soon as the Slovaks are able to fill these places with their own officials. There are, however, no proofs that Slovakia has been treated in "step-mother fashion ," nor do the writers offer any proofs of their vague generalization. The writers "object most emphatically" to the statement alleged to have been made by the Czechoslovak delegates at the Paris Peace Conference to the effect that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation". Assuming that this statement has really been made we should like to point out that we, too, are of the same opinion. Moreover, we �SLOVAKIA 34 may add that Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomists, himself held, and probably still holds, the same view. On May 4th, 1908, he made the following declaration before the Magyar court at Bratislava: " It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs, and up to quite recent times we had a language in common with the Czechs, and up to this day our evangelical ministers make use of the Czech language in their church service." And it was the same Father Hlinka who, on October 30, 1918, cordially associated himself with the manifesto of the Slovak nation which contains the following words : "In language, culture and historical traditions the Slovak nation forms a part of the single Czechoslovak nation." It may be disputed whether - from a strictly historical and ethnographical point of view - the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation or not. Their feeling and consciousness, however, is the deciding factor. If the Slovaks and Czechs feel themselves as one nation, no historian or ethnographist can alter that feeling or consciousness. The writers accuse you, Mr. President, of "breach of contract" known as the "Pittsburgh Agreement." As regards this agreement which was arrived at between the American Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918, we should like to point out in how far the provisions of this agreement have been carried out. For this purpose we are giving on one side the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement and on the other what has been done: 1. We accept the political program providing for a union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech territories and Slovakia. 1. Carried out 2. Slovakia will have its own administration, its diet and its courts. 2. In accordance with the Constitution the whole Republic is divided into 20 autonomous regions, 6 of which comprise Slovakia. These regions are administered by the Slovaks themselves by means of autonomous bodies containing about 40 members who are elected by the vote of all citizens, �SLOVAKIA 35 irrespective of sex, on a system of proportional representation. These zones thus have all the attributes of democratic local autonomy. From the representative bodies is elected an administrative council for the whole of Slovakia, also by proportional representation. This council is composed of 24 members, 8 of whom, under the presidency of Slovak administration, attend to the executive authority for Slovakia. 3. Slovak will be official language in schools, administration and in public life. 3. Both Czech and Slovak are official languages throughout the territory of the Republic. 4. The Czechoslovak State will be a Republic and its constitution will be democratic. 4. Carried out. 5. The organization of the co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will, according to the needs and to the changed situation, be broadened and regulated. 5. Left to be carried out by the American Slovaks and Czechs. 6. Concrete details concerning the administration of the CzechoSlovak State are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly elected representatives . 6. In accordance with this provision the present status of Slovakia (see article 2 of the agreement) has been elaborated. You will observe, Mr. President, that as a matter of fact the Pittsburgh Agreement has been substantially carried out. The aim of this agreement was to assure the future status and cultural development of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak State, and this aim has been achieved. The Czechoslovak Republic is the result of the work of both the Slovaks and Czechs. During the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they deman- �36 SLOVAKIA ded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks. Hence the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Nation. We, in America, are watching the development of events in Czechoslovakia very closely and we are not unmindful of the great progress the Republic has made. We are especially aware of the fact that your untiring efforts have in no small measure contributed to this progress . The good name of the Czechoslovak Republic abroad has been established, above all, by your indefatigable work and by the work of your able collaborator, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes. On behalf of the American Slovaks we thank you most heartily for your labor which has given to Slovakia her due place among the free nations of the world. We beg you to continue in your endeavors to make of Slovakia a happy land such as we have dreamt of while fighting in common for Czechoslovakia' s freedom and national independence. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest esteem and respect. JOHN KRAFCIK, President National Slovak Society. JOHN DVORSCAK, Secretary National Slovak Society. JOHN ZEMAN, President Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK OSLISLO, Secretary Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK ST AS , Treasurer Slovak League of America. JOHN MATLOCHA, President Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. JOHN L. ZAROVY, Secretary Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. NICHOLAS KOVAC, President District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. STEPHEN ERHARDT, Secretary District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. CLEMENT IHRISKY, President New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JANCEK, Secretary New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JOSCAK, Editor New Yorksky Dennik FRANK CELKO, Editor Slovensky Sokol STEPHEN HUSKA, Editor Nove Casy � SLOVAKIA 7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS: BISHOP JAN VOJTASSAK'S ABORTED JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1923 r V V r Stefan Kucik In 1923 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak, bishop of the diocese of Spis in Slovakia, decided to undertake a pastoral journey to Slovak Catholics in the United States of America. However, Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue him a passport. They considered his trip to be political. It turns out that Vojtassak's planned journey conflicted with Czechoslovak government plans to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Upon hearing of this refusal, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America published an open letter to Tomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the president and his government. To counteract the impact of this letter, the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter to the president, ostensibly by a group of American Slovaks who supported him and his government. Interestingly, this "anti-letter" was written by an official of Czechoslovak intelligence. While many scholars have dealt with the biography of bishop Jan Vojtassak, only Robert Letz has provided us with a thorough explanation of the reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant him passport in 1923 .1 In this context, however, no one has pointed to the open letters addressed to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation and the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York. The present article will try to fill this gap, as well as to put the matter into a broader context. I Robert Letz, "Bi skup Jan Vojtassak a slovenska politika V medzi vojnovom obdobi," in Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, Ivan Chalupecky, ed. (Spisska KapitulaSpisske Podhradie: Ki\azsky seminar biskupa Jana Vojtassaka, 2003 ), 25 -52. �8 SLOVAKIA After Jan Vojtassak had been appointed bishop of Spis towards the end of 1920,2 along with Marian Blaha for the diocese of Banska Bystrica and Karol Kmet'ko for the diocese of Nitra, American Slovaks rejoiced. As early as December 22, 1920, editor Jozef Husek wrote in the Catholic weekly Jednota : "Only those who look at the deep religious sentiment of our people, and their simple faith and devotion to the Holy Church, can understand what it means for Catholic Slovaks to have apostles of their own flesh and blood, of their national sentiment and outlook. " 3 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak was ordained a bishop in Nitra on February 13, 1921. In a fortnight he assumed his office in Spisska Kapitula. In his first pastoral letter, Vojtassak outlined a program of his future activities. He was aware of the negative consequences of the Great War. He realized that the war had caused many to lose their faith in God, and felt that the war's ravages threatened the very basis of love for one 's neighbours. It not only produced a lot of cripples, but largely devastated people' s spiritual values . At war's end materialism and the class struggle began to appear and hatred toward the Catholic Church grew. In Czechoslovakia, the strong anti-Catholic character of the new political system was evident right after the war. The Czechs did not show much consideration for the religiosity of Slovakia. They also tended to undervalue the contribution of the Slovak Catholic clergy in the creation of the common independent state,4 whether in Slovakia or in the USA, and tended to forget that Roman Catholics constituted the vast majority of both populations. The Czechoslovak government, however, was not satisfied with just the secularization of the new country. It also decided to transfer its anti-Catholicism to Czech and Slovak communities in America. In order to promote the newly established Czechoslovak Church among American compatriots, it sent a mission led by its first bishop Gorazd Pavlik to the USA. In connection with this mission, which 2 For the appointment, ordination and enthronement of bishop Jan Vojta~~ak see Ivan Chalupecky, "Obsadenie spi~skeho biskupskeho stolca po roku 19 18," in Chalupecky, Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, 7-24. 3 Jozef Paufo, 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, I 965), 165 . 4 Ivan Chalupecky, Biskup Jan Vojtassak: K jeho verejnej a politickej cinnosti (Rufo mberok: Katolicka univerzita v Rufo mberku, Filozofi cka fakulta, 2009), 2 1-25. �SLOVAKIA 9 was carried out between June 1922 and January 1923,5 an incident which became infamous in the history of the Slovak Catholic Church occurred. It filled both Slovak Catholics in Czechoslovakia and in America with much indignation. The incident lay behind the refusal of Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to the bishop of Spis. Jan Vojtassak had decided to travel to America as early as December of 1922. He had reached his decision on the basis of a circular letter issued by Antonin Cyril Stojan, Archbishop of Olomouc. Addressed to all ordinaries in Slovakia, the letter was based upon an earlier one sent by Czech Catholic priests in America on the basis of instructions received from the Czech episcopate. They had been asked to try to paralyze Gorazd Pavlik's activities, because some Slovak priests in America had begun to affiliate with the new Czechoslovak Church. The Czech priests emphasized that they had not succeeded in their work among American Slovaks because they were Czechs and not Slovaks. Had the episcopate sent Slovak priests among American Slovaks, these would have been more successful. 6 This circular letter, as well as reports published in Slovak-American newspapers and republished in Slovakia, plus a number of private letters received from individuals across the United States, led bishop Vojtassak to decide to lead a mission to the USA. 7 He was also aware that many Slovak Catholics in America came from his diocese. Vojtassak's mission was fully supported by the Czech mission of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the USA, as well as by Archbishop A. C. Stojan and other Slovak and Czech bishops, along with the former apostolic nuncio Clemente Micara. The Holy See also agreed with Vojtassak' s planned journey to America. 8 Bishop Vojtassak began to prepare for his trip in April of 1923. Slovak organizations in the USA were informed of his coming.9 In May of the same year, Vojtassak applied for a passport. Although at that time passports were usually granted by district authorities, Vojtassak's application was forwarded to the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava. Thence it was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, whence it was 5 Letz, " Bi skup ... ," 47 . Slovak (Bratislava), July 5, 1923, 1; Jednota (Middletown, PA), July 25 , 1923, 4. 7 Slovak, July 5, 1923, 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Letz, "Biskup ... ," 44. 6 �SLOVAKIA returned back to Bratislava. This kind of procrastination continued for a month. To try to expedite matters, Vojtassak travelled to Bratislava and even to Prague, but his efforts proved fruitless . The parliamentary deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party Vaclav Myslivec, as well as some parliamentary deputies of the Slovak People's Party, intervened with the Minister of the Interior Jan Malypetr. The latter, however, refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport with the comment that "he knows Catholic bishops who lie. " 10 In order to comprehend such a rude refusal, one needs to understand the situation in the Slovak-American community in the first years after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After Tomas G. Masaryk had left America in the fall 1918, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Cleveland to decide on sending a delegation to Slovakia. 11 According to Albert P. Mamatey, president of the League, 12 the delegates were to make contact with political leaders in the old country and to let them know about the Pittsburgh Agreement concluded with T. G. Masaryk in May of 1918. 13 Upon their arrival in Slovakia, the delegates acted impartially. In their Privet delegacie Slovenskej ligy v Amerike [Address of the Delegation of the Slovak League of America] dated April 9, 1919, they expressed their surprise at the growing political struggles in Slovakia. Therefore, they initially hesitated to give the Pittsburgh Agreement to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Responsible for Slovakia, or to Ferdis Juriga or Andrej Hlinka, the most popular priests and politicians in the Slovak People ' s Party. 14 They considered the political squabbles among the many new political parties a waste of energy for a small nation. 15 Upon their return to the USA, two of the delegates, Jozef Rusek, the editor of Jednota and Milan Getting, the editor of New Yorksky dennik, reported on the situation in Slovakia at the 12th Congress of the Slovak League held in Scranton, PA, on May 29, 1919. Jozef 10 Slowik, July 5, 1923, 1. Nave Slo vensko (Pittsburgh, PA), December 2, 19 18, 2-3. 12 Albert Pavo! Mamatey was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1911 to 1920. 13 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slav. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., dna 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, PA: Slovak League of America), 9. 14 Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1929), 226-227. 15 Slovak, May 3, 1919, I. 11 �SLOVAKIA 11 Husek advised American Slovaks to be careful in pressing for the autonomy of Slovakia as promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, because at that time it might help Magyar efforts to re-annex Slovakia to Hungary. However, he did not abandon his claim to the autonomy of Slovakia. He postponed it to a time when the situation in Slovakia would improve. 16 Milan Getting, on the other hand, did not even mention the autonomy of Slovakia. He reported on his plan of agitation against Magyarization in Slovakia. He worked out this plan on the basis of a suggestion made by Minister V. Srobar. Since Srobar was short of funds, Getting returned to the USA to ask American Slovaks to purchase a printing press for Minister Srobar's agitation. 17 Despite Jozef Husek's advice not to immediately press for the autonomy of Slovakia and Milan Getting's ignoring of the issue, American Slovaks began to very heatedly discuss this matter. 18 On July 31, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Pittsburgh and accepted the brochure Politicka nauka vzh/'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat [Political Perspective Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State] 19 as the basis of its future activities. The brochure stated that the Slovak League of America decided to support its program of autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. The final arrangement of the Czecho-Slovak state, however, it left to the Slovaks in the old country. 20 Another representative of the Slovak League of America, who reported on the situation in Slovakia right after the World War I, was Ignac Gessay. However, he did not belong to the above mentioned delegation. This renowned Slovak-American editor was sent to Slovakia somewhat later. The reason for his mission was a lack of reliable information from Europe at the beginning of 1919. 21 American 16 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slov. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., diia 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, 19 19), 24. 17 Ibid. , 30-31. 18 Sidor, Slovaci... , 231. 19 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Trnave, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 299K3. Zapisnica zo sch6dze Ustrednej spravy Slovenskej Ligy vydrziavanej di\a 31. jula 191 9 v Henry Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. The brochure was written by editor Jan A. Feriencik and published by the Slovak League of America in 19 19. Informally, it was called .. Politicky Katechismus " [Political Catechism]. 20 Jan A. Feriencik, Politicka nauka vzhl'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat (Pittsburgh: Slovenska liga v Amerike, 19 19), 7. 21 Dobry Pastier, April 19 19, 7. �12 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, therefore, decided to establish an information office, at first in Paris, and once regular postal service had been established between Czecho-Slovakia and the USA, in Slovakia too.22 This task was entrusted to lgnac Gessay, at that time an editor of Nave Slovensko, 23 official organ of the Slovak League of America.24 In his report to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on October 24, 1919, Gessay recommended that American Slovaks take a neutral stand on the issue of Slovak autonomy. He suggested a gradual implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement and warned radical Slovak-American autonomists that immediate autonomy would have been fatal for the new republic. 25 Both Gessay's and Husek's initial reports had a huge impact on the official stand of the Slovak League towards autonomy. Jozef Rusek, however, would gradually change his mind and then would support the autonomist movement in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League on October 24, 1919, two delegates of the Slovak People's Party, the Rev. Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala, also appeared. Jozef Rudinsky had been sent to the USA by several leaders of the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka in August of 1919. He had been chosen as a trustworthy person whose task it was to defend the idea of Slovak autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic among American Slovaks, and to inform them of the Party's activities. In addition, Rudinsky was supposed to raise funds for the autonomist movement. On the suggestion of the Rev. Frantisek Jehlicska, Jozef Kubala, a merchant from Vrbove, joined Rudinsky before his departure to the USA. In Poland, however, they both joined the Rev. Hlinka's delegation to Paris, in an attempt to have autonomy for Slovakia included in the Paris Peace Treaties. After a week's stay in the capital of France and the delegation's expulsion from that country, Ru- 22 Slovensky narodny archiv, Brati slava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter SNA), fund (hereinafter f.) Slovenska liga v Amerike [Slovak League of America], folder (hereinafter fold .) 2. Albert Mamatey to Frantisek Stas, April 17, 191 9. 23 Nave Slovensko, official organ of the Slovak League of America in 1918-1922. 24 Jgnac Gessay, S/ovensko po oslobodeni (Cleveland: Slovenska liga v Amerike), 4; ASSV, fasc . 236CI0. Authorization for Ignac Gessay, April 26, 1919. 25 Gessay, S/ovensko ... , 26-28, 37-38. �SLOVAKIA 13 dinsky and Kubala continued on their original journey to the United States, where they arrived on October 13, 1919. 26 At the time of the delegates' trip to the USA the majority of American Slovaks felt distaste for the policy of the Slovak People's Party.27 This aversion arose mainly from the reports of Jozef Husek and Ignac Gessay, as well as Andrej Hlinka' s faux pas in connection with his rash journey to the Paris Peace Conference. Another reason was the fact that the delegates arrived in America with Polish passports and Polish visas, and not Czecho-Slovak. 28 Having presented their credentials to the League, Jozef Rudinsky was asked to explain his mission to America. He clarified the position of the Slovak People's Party at length. Like the Slovak League of America, the People's Party demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. It also wanted autonomy for Slovakia to be included in the Paris Peace Treaties. Therefore, he had come to the USA, along with Jozef Kubala, to agitate for autonomy and to raise funds towards this end. 29 Although the Executive Committee of the Slovak League did not find anything contrary to its program in the Rudinsky mission, it nevertheless took a negative stand towards it. Rudinsky and Kubala did not have any credentials from the Czecho-Slovak government and the League did not agree with Hlinka's journey to the Paris Peace Conference. The League accused the delegates of driving a wedge between the Slovaks and Czechs in America, which might have had a negative impact on their coexistence in the USA, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. 30 On the other hand, the Executive Commit26 Robert Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky - vyznamna osobnost' Turzovky," in Turzovka kriiom-kraiom, Ivan Gajdiciar ed. (Turzovka: Spolok priatel'ov Turzovky, 2010), 328329. 27 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Rufomberok: Lev, 1921 ), 11 . 28 Karol Sidor, "Zasahy Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike do politickeho vyvinu slovenskeho (1914 - 1939)," in Slovenska liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna, Mikulas Sprinc, ed. (Scranton, PA : Slovenska liga v Amerike, 1947), 54. 29 ASSV, fasc . 299A6. Zapisnica zo schodze Ustredneho vyboru Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydrziavanej di\a 24. okt6bra I 919 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli v Pittsburgh, Penna. JO Masarykuv ustav a Archiv Akademie ved Ceske republiky, V. V. i., Archiv UTGM, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter MUA AV CR, AUTGM), f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 459. Rezolucia Slovenskej Ligy prijata na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednyrn vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., di\a 24. a 25. okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919. (For the letter without attachments see Slovenske �14 SLOVAKIA tee issued a memorandum, in which American Slovaks demanded the gradual implementation of the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement in the newly-created Czecho-Slovakia. 31The resolution against Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala and the League's subsequent memorandum expressed American Slovaks' efforts to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it also reflected their efforts to maintain their neutral stand and not to be drawn into political affairs in Slovakia. In such a situation, the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party could not rely on the authority of the Slovak League of America. They, therefore, approached two Slovak-American organizations which disagreed with the League 's stand: the Slovak Catholic Federation and the First Catholic Slovak Union. Jozef Rudinsky expressed his ideas mainly in the weekly Jednota , where he was assisted by Jozef Husek, and in the newspaper Obrana, which was edited by the Rev. Jan Metod Liscinsky.32 While Rudinsky and Kubala, assisted by Slovak-American Catholic organizations, were agitating in the USA for Slovak autonomy, Albert Mamatey left on a three-month journey (December 10, 1919 March 14, 1920) to Czecho-Slovakia. His intentions were very much the same as that of the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party in the USA, i.e. that the Pittsburgh Agreement should be incorporated into the future Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Upon his return to the United States, Mamatey reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee in Pittsburgh on April 8, 1920. 33 He had traveled to Czecho-Slovakia via France and Switzerland. In Paris, he had met with Stefan Osusky, the general secretary of the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Peace Conference and a vyst'ahovalectvo: Dokumenty 3, Frantisek Bielik, Elo Rakos, eds. (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1976), 165-172, document no. 325); ASSV, fasc . 299A9. Prehlas a verejne osvedcenie Slov. Ligy. 31 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R- republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 45 9. Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy Prijate na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednym vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., dna 24. a 25 . okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919; Jednota, October 29, 1919, I. 32 Sidor, Slovaci... , 235; Letz, "JozefRudinsky ...," 329-330. 33 ASSV, fasc . 299A4. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia ustr. a vyko. vyboru Slov. ligy 8. apr. 1920 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli, Pittsburgh, Pa. �SLOVAKIA 15 delegate of the Slovak League of America to Masaryk in 1916. 34 When Mamatey suggested that the Slovaks should have been contractually guaranteed their home rule at the Paris Peace Conference in the same way as had the Ruthenians, Osusky offered the following explanation: "During the whole war, we cooperated and worked with our brothers the Czechs for our independence as a UNIT, as two branches of one nation that belong together. Thanks to this UNIFIED stand with our brothers the Czechs, the Allies recognized our independence, our separation from the Magyars and our joining with the Czechs. "35 Osusky, however, was not worried about the future of the Slovaks. He promised that they would get everything that they asked for and that they wished, except for things that might be detrimental to them: "Because what we do not want, what would be detrimental or destructive for Slovakia, as for instance, a separate Diet at this time, nobody from the outside wi 11 force upon us nor put into our minds." 36 After this meeting, the intervention of Albert Mamatey on behalf of the autonomy of Slovakia sounded unconvincing. He had met with T. G. Masaryk, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, with Edvard Benes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Vavro Srobar, the Minister with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia, and others. In February of 1920, Mamatey had also taken part in the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies. Almost all with whom he had negotiated, had agreed with the view that at that time the autonomy of Slovakia with a separate Diet would have been fatal for Slovakia. Mamatey, however, had negotiated only with the members of 34 For more on Osusky, his earlier life in America and his mission to Europe, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia," Slovak Studies, 8 (1968), 27-30 and 57-66. 35 Zprava Predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana Ustrednemu Vyboru Slov. ligy v Pittsburghu, Pa. dna 8. aprila 1920 o Jeho ceste a missi v Cesko-slovenskej republike (Pittsburgh, 1920), 8. 36 Ibid. �16 SLOVAKIA the centralist Czechoslovak political parties and opponents of the legislative autonomy of Slovakia. In connection with the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies a regrettable incident occurred. The Club had passed a resolution which was supposed to confirm that in the draft Constitution there be included everything that had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, except for a separate Diet. However, the signatures of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party (Alois Kalisek, Jan Kovalik, Stefan Onderco, Jozef Sivak and Florian Tomanek) on the resolution had been forged. This affair came to light only after the resolution had been cited in full in the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America addressed to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1922.37 Even if the resolution significantly influenced the future attitudes of American Slovaks to the issue of the autonomy of Slovakia, it seems that it did not have a great impact on the views of Albert Mamatey. On February 28, 1920, one day before he left Czecho-Slovakia, Albert Mamatey received a letter from Milan Hodza, the Minister for the Unification of Laws and one of the main Slovak political leaders. In this letter, Hodza had also rejected a separate Slovak Diet. Despite the unwillingness of the main political representatives to accept the claim to a Slovak Diet, Albert Mamatey did not hesitate to conclude his report with the words: "Slovakia may look forward to a great future," although he added that "it would take some time." 38 However, it is well-known how important a separate Diet was for American Slovaks. Jozef Rusek expressed their outlook very clearly: "Autonomy without a Diet, without legislation, is no autonomy. Indeed, autonomy is a Diet and a Diet is autonomy! Without a Diet there is no autonomy!" 39 Albert Mamatey must have been aware of the importance of a separate Slovak Diet to fulfill the promise of autonomy. He must have also known that if the requirement of a separate Slovak Diet had been deleted from the Pittsburgh Agreement, the latter would have been worthless. His attitude on the issue of the autonomy of 37 Memorandum Slovenskej ligy v Amerike upravene na vladu a Narodne Shromaidenie Cesko-Slovenskej Republiky v zaujime vtelenia Pittsburghskej Dohody do iistavy C-S Republiky (Pittsburgh : Slovak League of America, 1922). 38 Ibid. , 26. 39 Jednota, February 18, 1920, 4. �SLOVAKIA 17 Slovakia began to change by the beginning of 1919. In one of his letters addressed to Dr. Miloslav Francisci of Cleveland, son of a famous Slovak revolutionary hero of 1848, Mamatey wrote: "I have been fighting for the national individuality of the Slovak nation for over four years. I have insisted that the Slovaks are not just an "appendix" of the Czech nation, but the Slovaks are as independent a nation as the Czechs. However, I have gotten tired of the constant fighting. Anyways, the fate of the Slovak nation will not be determined by us from America, but by those back home. - You, I and hundreds of others here in America have done our duty. " 40 In accordance with his changed attitude towards autonomy for Slovakia and his hardly concealable inclination towards government policy, which was fuelled by the promise of the office of Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, Albert Mamatey decided to paralyze the agitation of Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala among American Slovaks. To this end he arranged that two delegates of the Czechoslovak government were sent to America. The mission of the Roman Catholic priest Ladislav Moys and the social democrat Jan Pocisk, did not bear fruit. They failed to persuade American Slovaks to approve of the Czechoslovak Constitution and their activities in the USA were deplored by the "Response" [Ohlas] of the Slovak Catholic Federation. 41 In response to the steps taken by Albert Mamatey and by the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek announced his resignation from the League. He accused the leading League officials of having knowingly and intentionally missed the opportunity to have Slovakia constitutionally guaranteed the right to 40 Aibert Mamatey to M . Francisci, January 22, 1919. It was published in Konstantin Culen, "Zo zaviatych listov (Z korespondencie A. Mamateya s Dr. M. Franciscim)," in Literarny almanach Slovaka v Amerike na rok 1962 (Middletown, Pa.: Hrobak Publications), 147. 41 Dobry Pastier (Middletown, PA), April 1920, 14-15; Jan Pankuch, Dejiny clevelandskych a lakewoodskych Slovakov (Cleveland, 1930), 188; Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Andreja, 1937), 274; Paufo, 162163; Natalia Krajfovicova, "Americki Slovaci a slovenski autonomisti v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR," in Miroslav Peknik et al. , Ferdinand Juriga: /'udovy smer slovenskej politiky (Bratislava: VEDA, 2009), 260. �18 SLOVAKIA home rule and individual national, cultural and economic life within the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, he accused the League's officials of morally and financially supporting agitation against the Pittsburgh Agreement. 42 As a result, no Slovak-American Catholic organization attended the 13th Congress of the Slovak League held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 24-25, 1920. 43 After the Congress, the Slovak League of America was subjected to a lot of criticism by Jozef Husek. The latter concluded that the League "ceases to be the moral and official representative of the Slovak-American colony."44 As a result, the role that had been played in the promotion of Slovak national demands by the Slovak League of America began to be played by representatives of Slovak American Catholics led by the Slovak Catholic Federation and those organizations with which the Federation closely co-operated.45 However, after the Slovak National Party had split from the Slovak National and Agrarian Party in March of 192 I in order to be able more vigorously to demand the legislative autonomy of Slovakia, the Slovak League of America, led by its new president Ivan Bielek,46 began to change its stand. One of the first consequences of the creation of the Slovak National Party was the adoption of a compromise declaration requesting the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement at the conference of the representatives of American Slovaks in Washington, DC, on May 21 , 1921 . In this declaration, American Slovaks demanded that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also requested the gradual autonomy of Slovakia. 47 Another event that influenced the Slovak League of America was the secession of the Slovak People's 42 Jednota, June 19, 1920, 4. Pauco, 160. 44 Jednota , Jul y 7, 1920, 4. 45 Pauco, 160. 46 Ivan Bielek, a fo rmer newspaper editor, was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1920 to 1934. As the first vice-president of the League, Bielek became its president after Albert Mamatey resigned in September of 1920 due to his appointment as a consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Pittsburgh. Jednota, September 22, 1920, 2; Slovak Institute and Reference Library in Cleveland (hereinafter SIRL), fasc. Mamatey, Albert 1870 - 1923. "Pan Mamatey sa vzdava predsednictva Slov. Ligy," newspaper clipping, September 17, 1920. 47 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 317, 320. 43 �SLOVAKIA 19 Party from the common parliamentary club of the Czechoslovak People 's Party in November of 1921. 48 On June 28-30 1922, the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Pittsburgh. The Congress was attended by the vice-president of the Slovak National Party and the Rev. Anton Kompanek. The latter called uJ'on American Slovaks not to give up on the Pittsburgh Agreement. 4 His mission in the USA was to rally autonomist forces , both in America and in Slovakia. 50 The congress then split into two camps - autonomists and centralists. Nevertheless, the delegates supported the Pittsburgh Agreement almost unanimously and they ordered the Executive Board "to write to Prague."51 The Executive Board then sent a Memorandum to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic requesting that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution. They also demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia. 52 The 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was very important for the future orientation of this organization. In spite of expectations that the crisis within the League would deepen, the Congress became a new concentration of autonomist forces . However, the concentration was only reached with great effort. The June 29, 1922 debate about the Pittsburgh Agreement was long and lasted until 11 :00 p.m.53 The discussion on the Pittsburgh Agreement at the Congress was significantly influenced by Anton Kompanek. Once in America, he began to create a united front for the recognition of the Pittsburgh 48 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnfch vecf Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), f. rn. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, inventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report "Hlinkovci v Amerike" by M. Getting, director ofCSTK in Washington, DC, January 24, 1922. 49 Zapisnica XIV. Kongressu Slovenskej Lfgy vydi iavaneho v dnoch 28., 29. a 30. juna /922 v Moose Temple, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pittsburgh, 1922), 83. 50 Krajcovicova, 262. 51 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report " Slovenske veci v Amerike", July 1, 1922 by M . Getting, director of CSTK in Washington, DC, July 7, 1922; Archfv Krajanskeho muzea Matice slovenskej, Bratislava (hereinafter AKM MS), f. Ignac Gessay, fold. I. Telegram to I. Gessay (torso, without sender, undated). 52 See footnote 3 7. 53 Robert Letz, "Slovenska liga v Amerike a Slovenska liga na Slovensku," in Historicky zbornfk, 19 (No. 1, 2009), 65 ; Obrana, June 27, 1922, 3 and Jul y 4, 1922, 1. �20 SLOVAKIA Agreement through his articles, which were published in the Slovak American press. In a series of articles in Obrana, Kompanek recommended that Slovak autonomy be achieved gradually, and only within the Czechoslovak Republic. As for American Slovaks, he was convinced that there was not as much disunity over the issue of autonomy as in the old country. He admitted, on the other hand, that there were also some personal antipathies (Bielek versus Husek, with the former favoring the Slovak National Party over the Slovak People's Party) .54 Anton Kompanek tried to eliminate these disagreements and he invited supporters of Slovak autonomy to a conference in Pittsburgh on October 12, 1922. At this conference, he stressed that the fate of the Pittsburgh Agreement was in the hands of American Slovaks. He stated that it was not enough to issue resolutions, but it was necessary to work systematically and support materially the movement for the autonomy of Slovakia directly in Slovakia. At the conference, a five-member committee was elected to coordinate the work on behalf of the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was named the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom and its members were Stefan Kocis, Jan Pankuch, Ivan Bielek, Jan Bibza and Jozef Husek. The latter was elected its president. The aim of the Committee was to unite all Slovak American organizations, their newspapers and public officials in the struggle for the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Another goal of the new organization was to try to create a coalition of all autonomist parties in Slovakia. 55 Even though Ivan Bielek had attended the conference in Pittsburgh as a private person, 56 once the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom was established, the "centralists" were expelled from the Slovak League of America. 57 This happened at the meeting of the Executive Committee with the Executive Board held on June 27-28 in Cleveland, 58 and was completed and approved at the 15th Con54 Krajcovicova, 262-263. Jednota, October 18, 1922, 4; Krajcovicova, 263 . 56 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0., 13. 57 Jednota, July 4, 1923, 4; Krajcovicova, 264. 58 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0 ., 73 . 55 �SLOVAKIA 21 gress of the League held on May 27-29, 1924 in Binghamton, New York. 59 In terms of the resolution of its 14th congress, the Slovak League of America reacted negatively to the new activities of Jozef Rudinsky in the USA in 1923. This time, contrary to his first mission among American Slovaks, Rudinsky, who had switched sides, and had become a major supporter of Milan Hodza, came to the USA in the service of the Czechoslovak government. The League also rejected a similar mission by Vavro Srobar and Vaclav Maule, a Czech professor and head of the branch of the Ministry of Education in Bratislava. They came in the same year to lecture on behalf of Czechoslovak national unity and against the autonomy of Slovakia.60 Their mission, however, failed among Slovak American autonomists. 61 Upon his return to Czechoslovakia in November of 1920, Jozef Rudinsky's relationship with Andrej Hlinka deteriorated and they eventually parted company.62 As early as the beginning of 1923, Rudinsky and Vavro Srobar began to talk. These conversations were probably initiated by Srobar, who was preparing for his own journey to the USA 63 in order to counteract the results of the 14th congress of the Slovak League of America. 64 Rudinsky and Srobar discussed Rudinsky' s planned new journey to America and concluded that the latter should use the contacts that he had made in his previous mission. They particularly counted upon Rudinsky's past friendship with Jozef Husek. To make his mission more successful, Rudinsky decided to depart alone, without Srobar. The latter would come after him and would finish what Rudinsky had started. 65 Rudinsky ' s and Srobar' s trips were intended to appear as two completely unrelated and independent initiatives. However, that same year bishop Vojtassak was also preparing for his journey to the USA. Vojtassak was not aware of Srobar' s and Rudinsky' s plans. If 59 Zapisnica XV. kongressu S/o venskej ligy vydri iavaneho v diioch 27., 28. a 29. maja / 924, v Bennett Hoteli, Binghamton, N. Y. (Pittsburgh), 16-17, 20. 60 Zap isnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v diioch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.M C.A ., Cleveland, 0 ., 14. 61 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864 - 1926), 504-505. 62 For a detailed analysis of their breakup see Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 334-337. 63 Ibid. , 33 7. 64 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 383. 65 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ...," 337. �22 SLOVAKIA he had gone, Vojtassak would have certainly strengthened the position of Slovak Catholics in the USA, as well as that of his friend Andrej Hlinka and the whole autonomist movement. Therefore, Rudinsky in his letters referring to Vojtassak' s planned journey to the USA, found it extremely undesirable. Upon his arrival in the USA, Rudinsky wrote to Srobar: "I was almost dejected by the news that Vojtassak was already aboard ship and was about to arrive any day. If it is true, there is nothing left but to pack my bags and return home. I will be not able to counteract his influence."66 Of course, bishop Vojtassak was not aboard the ship Majestic, which was to arrive in the USA on July 6, 1923. 67 However, the information that came to Rudinsky must have been based upon Vojtassak's planned arrival in America. In New York City, a reception had been prepared on that day to which representatives of the city council were invited. A welcome committee consisting of Catholic priests must have blushed with shame when Vojtassak did not arrive on the Majestic, . 68 nor on any ot h er sh 1ps. Thus, the main reason why the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. The refusal had to do with the timing of his journey. It was planned at exactly the time when the Czechoslovak government was preparing to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Vojtassak' s trip could have thwarted these plans. In addition, the Czechoslovak government harbored suspicions about Vojtassak as a supporter of the Slovak People's Party. It feared that he would make use of his journey to raise funds for the Party just before municipal and county elections (September, 1923) were to take place. They also speculated that Vojtassak' s trip might have helped the Eudova banka [People's Bank], since it was in financial difficulty.69 Slovak Catholics in the USA, on the other hand, looked upon Vojtassak's trip as a pastoral journey, and not a political one. They pointed this out in their press . Bishop Vojtassak had been invited by the Slovak Catholic Federation in America. The news of such a rude and offensive refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak caused 66 SNA, f. Vavro Srobar, fold . 4. J. Rudinsky to V. Srobar, July 5, 1923. 67 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 337-33 8. Obrana, July 17, 1923, 4. Letz, " Biskup ... ," 45 . 68 69 �SLOVAKIA 23 outrage among American Slovak Catholics. The Slovak Catholic Federation decided to call a meeting to discuss the affair and to take appropriate action. At this meeting, which was held in Pittsburgh on August 8, 1923, representatives of all Slovak American Catholic organizations, most of the clergy and Slovak American leaders resolved to send a complaint to the Congress of the Slovak Catholic Federation held in Lansford, PA, on October 9-11, 1923. At the Congress, the delegates unanimously decided to acquaint the world with the offensive step of Minister Malypeter and to launch an indictment against the President and government of the Czechoslovak Republic. 70 In response to the refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, the Slovak Catholic Federation issued a strong open letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk. In this letter, Slovak Catholics in America expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the President and government of Czechoslovakia, and even the sense of a threat to their national existence. Besides other matters, they pointed to the cause of bishop Jan Vojtassak. They directly charged the Czechoslovak government with trying to assimilate the Slovaks and to promote the spiritual genocide of the Slovak nation. 71 The open letter was sent to all representatives of the Allies, as well as to Bohemia and Slovakia. 72 In Czechoslovakia, however, it 10 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. TomM Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5-6. 71 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5, 8 - 9. The open letter was printed in Slovak (600 copies) and English (500 copies). For a copy of its English version see AMZV CR, f. Ill. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11 , 1924. For its Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi Tomasovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis Institutu hist6rie FF PU v Pre.save, 5 (No. 2, 2011 ), 79-82. 72 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. Milan Getting of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague that an English version of the open letter was sent particularly to the representatives of the Catholic Church in the USA, to editorial staffs of several American newspapers, to all leading Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and pastors, to university professors, as well as to the members of the foreign committee of the �24 SLOVAKIA was confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava prohibited the distribution of the letter through the mails and it was confiscated by the public prosecutor's office in Prague as well. 73 On behalf of all Slovak American Catholics, the Slovak Catholic Federation protested against this confiscation to the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC. They referred to the confiscation as vandalism and a new insult to Slovak Catholics in America.74 In their protest through the open letter, however, Slovak-American Catholics were not united. Jednota criticized the open letter. The editor considered it to be a tactical mistake. He declared the letter to be too radical and also criticized its timing.75 In an effort to weaken the impact of the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation and to prove that views expressed in it belonged to a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York agreed with the Rev. Klement Ihrisky, a representative of American Slovaks in New York, to issue an "anti-letter" addressed to the President of Czechoslovakia. 76 This "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department. It was also issued in the form of brochure and sent to the same addresses as the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation.77 Senate and Congress in Washington. In its Slovak version, the open letter was mosttr sent to Prague to the members of Parliament. 7 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Attachment of the letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 12, 1924; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 27, 1924. 74 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation to Frantisek Chvalkovsky, Ambassador of the CSR in Washington, DC, February 25 , 1924. 75 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. 76 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 rtAMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 7, 1924; Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda , 383. �SLOVAKIA 25 It should be apparent, therefore, that the main reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. Moreover, the rude refusal may be explained by the timing of his journey. After World War I, Slovaks in America, represented by their cover organization the Slovak League, underwent several changes of opinion regarding political developments in the newly-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the one hand, they struggled to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic as expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement. On the other hand, American Slovaks tried to remain neutral and not to get involved in the political infighting in Slovakia. With the personal metamorphosis of the president of the Slovak League of America, and with the Slovak League being hesitant concerning the matter of the autonomy promised by T. G. Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Agreement, Slovak Catholic organizations took the lead in the promotion of Slovak national demands after 1919. Due to the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia, as well as the activities of Anton Kompanek, the vice-president of the Slovak National Party, in the USA the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America concentrated the autonomist forces and it eventually provoked the Czechoslovak government to try to deliver a decisive blow to the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks in 1923. In response to the refusal of the Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, however, Slovak Catholics in America were not united. The scathing open letter (in stilted English) issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation was justifiably criticized by Jednota. To weaken the impact of this open letter and to try to prove that it represented only a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter (in perfect English) addressed to the president of Czechoslovakia. It was typical of the machinations of the then Czechoslovak government that the "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department and not by American Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 26 APPENDIX I Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 78 Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague Mr. President: In a critical time when fate was about to decide the turn of the world war, you and those loyal to you exerted all that was in your power that the result of the struggle might turn out in our mutual favor. Your appearance among the American Slovaks ignited unprecedented enthusiasm--your knocking at the hearts of our people found animated response - and your appeal for our assistance was crowned with success. Brother embraced brother and on the brightened horizon of acquired freedom and brotherhood smiled the sun towards our happy future ... Permit us, Mr. President, to remind you of the enthusiasm and the jubilation with which our Slovak people welcomed you wherever you appeared among them, unfolded your plans before them and assured them of your most sincere intentions. Permit us to remind you of the sacrifices in money and in blood which later were the seal of our loyalty to a work so noble and so sacred. The American Slovaks have kept their promise; we loyally stood, and to the present day, stand by your promise. Notwithstanding this, we note with some acerbity, for the past four years that your constituents who had sent you to us, and who cared so much for our alliance and our assistance never intended to fulfill that promise which they had placed into your mouth, and which you supported by this background in their name had promised. You came to us as an 78 This English version is a copy of the open letter available in AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650 . Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11, 1924. For the Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi TomMovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis lnstitutu hist6rie FF PU v Presove, 5 (No . 2, 2011 ), 79-82 . �SLOVAKIA 27 equal to equals; that was the way we associated with you and that was the way we drafted plans for the future with you. Not without our assistance, not without the efforts of the American Slovaks did you accomplish the fulfillment of your life's dreams - the liberation of the Czech Nation. Would we were not compelled to admit to you before the world that only (the liberation) of the Czech Nation; for the Slovak Nation, as a contrahent (contracting party) primarily recognized by you in the building of that republic at the head of which you now stand, does not feel under your aegis free in the sense of freedom as an independent nation has the right to vindicate for itself, particularly in the present epoch of self determination of nations. We have patiently waited for four years, whether the conscience of those cliques will move which had forced themselves upon us as brother, but today they treat us in stepmother fashion, nay, even like slaves. We see ourselves step by step betrayed, sold not only by compatriots of your strain and feelings, by your Government, but also by our own weaker compatriots, who for economic considerations lured into an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and even to us "ignorant" Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred. They are Slovak "Sviha's" pure and simple. While dwelling among us you spoke to us in the voice of a brother, plain and without bombast which is bountifully at the disposal of people of your profession. Today we desire to tell you in the same simple and plain manner that the Slovaks not only feel disappointed in you and in the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but directly endangered in their national existence. We do not desire to remind you of the recent acts by means of which the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic beyond any doubt manifested its desire of absorption respectively extermination of the Slovaks as a nation. These facts are sufficiently well known to you. We will show you the last incident which hardly has its parallel in the history of states which are only in the transitory stage of an experiment in democracy--an incident which startles any one who has sense for culture and democracy. Following the noble representatives of the World Powers there also came to America during the last few years representatives of the various religious denominations, in order to strengthen their adherents in their ways in which they de- �28 SLOVAKIA sire to reach eternal well-being in the post-terrestrial realm. What was more natural, but that also the Catholic Slovaks in America desired to welcome in their midst some one of these dignitaries with whom Rome has honored us after the revolution not without efforts on the part of your Government. The incident of Bishop Vojtassak is known to you (and how could it not be) whom we had invited here as our guest; from whom we expected good not only for ourselves, and for our church, but also for the welfare of your Republic. And here the system of government of the Czecho-Slovak republic showed up in its ugly and horrible nudity! Mr. President, the American Slovak Catholics identify themselves with the incident of Bishop Vojtassak. Your government has culminated by it the climax of its repressions, wrongfully committed for fully four years on Slovakia and the Slovaks. The refusal of a passport by your Minister caused such bitterness among us that we would be unworthy of our name and of our Credo, were we not to protest against it most emphatically. The Federation of Slovak Catholics called a council meeting to Pittsburgh which was held on August 8th, and at which the representatives of all Catholic organizations, a large number of Clergy and prominent exponents resolved to submit this grievance to the Congress of this Federation which was held on the days from the 9th to the 11th of October 1923, in Lansford, Pa., where we unanimously resolved to acquaint the educated world particularly with this outrage of your Minister and also submit to the world Powers and the leading representatives the following COMPLAINT against you and your Government. If you, as president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic according to law, are not responsible for your acts to the state authorities--and if your government does not honor your promise and your signature as President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, then we are taking you to task as a gentleman for that piece of cultural piracy which your Government and your ministers are committing on our Slovak nation from the first hour of the revolution-at the same time demanding from you as a gentleman to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised to us, the American Slovaks. This right we abrogate to ourselves as one of the parties contracting with you in the building of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. �SLOVAKIA 29 We are lodging this complaint against you and against your former factors in Paris before the conclusion of peace and after it, of having misled the peace delegates and the whole world in general, by claiming that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. To such a statement we Slovaks object most emphatically. This erroneous opinion of your Government was upset even by the Czech Academy, and prominent historians are convinced of its fallacy. For this reason do we, the American Slovak Catholics request that the respective provisions at Paris-Versailles and Trianon, be revised. We are lodging against you a complaint, for breach of contract entered into between us and you as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and contained in the so-called Pittsburgh Pact, the value of which you now disavow, bagatellize-on the fulfillment of which, however, we insist ascribing to it the significance of a National Bill of Rights. We complain against you and your Government for the undemocratic, unrepublican persecutions of newspapers of our party alignment and that of the opposition parties, which are not pulling the cart of Czecho-imperialistic aspirations, and which stand firmly by the principle that the Slovaks are an autochthone nation. We accuse you and your Government of the confiscation of Catholic institution[ s]-of the forcing of textbooks offensive to Catholics into the primary and higher schools, of the open favorizing of individuals and societies whose aims are the undermining of the Catholic spirit in our people. We complain against you and your Government before the civilized world for that barbarian monstrosity which you have sanctioned and which under the name "A law for the protection of the Republic" destroys the idea of democracy; which in reality exists [to silence us, the Slovaks, forever], and is, in our opinion, a cancerous growth upon the body of the Republic. We complain against you and your Government for the so-called "County Reform" so much lauded by you, which is equivalent to shackles for Slovakia as a national unit, which is white in Bohemia and black in Slovakia, and which impoverishes us economically and culturally, exposing us to the chicaneries of your centralist officials. For these and similar undeniable facts , we, American Slovak Catholics are accusing you and your Government before the world for the reason that the censorship (o, democracy, o republic, �30 SLOVAKIA o enlightened twentieth century of progress and free thought), the censorship of your Government does not permit in Slovakia a single manifestation of opposition against this madly raving autocracy by means of which your conscienceless compatriots and political adventurers keep Slovakia shackled. If the saying is correct that history repeats itself, let us be permitted to remind you that the entire Czech nation on one occasion resisted the Habsburgs for the reason that Francis Joseph did not keep the promise once made to the Czechs. You gave him the epithet of a perjurer-and that rightly so, and that regardless of the fact whether his promises were only "of historic value" or not. And we do not blame you or your adherents, that you built the foundations of the Republic on these unfulfilled promises of your former "sovereign". But now, out of consideration for this repetition in history, please do not forget, together with your Government, that "quod uni justum, alteri aequum"--what you had disliked in your oligarchs, that we are not obliged to like either and that the "Camarilla of Prague" directly compels the Slovaks to repay you and your regime in equal coin, if you should not desist in your anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic intentions, and should refuse to give the Slovaks that to which they are entitled. And the consequences? Let Prague be responsible for them--you Mr. President, and your Government. Mr. President, you know well, just as we do that powerful enemies of our young state are carrying on a propaganda in foreign countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is neither a natural state, nor a logical national, geographical, or resting upon a historical foundation; that it inherited all the weak points of the defunct monarchy, without having acquired one single good quality. Would there not be a necessity for internal unity, an internal understanding in accordance with your own motto "democracy is a discussion"? In opposition to this you with your Government, or that Government under your protection hamper and destroy even the slightest manifestation where the emphasizing of our national individuality is concerned. We, the Slovak Catholics in America, identify ourselves with the fate of our brethren across the ocean and the wrongs committed on them are also our wrongs, as Slovaks as well as Catholics; therefore, the disregard shown to Bishop Vojtassak affected us in a twofold manner. Your Government kicked him both for being a bishop (of �SLOVAKIA 31 course, a Catholic) and for being a patriotic Slovak who looks Prague straight in the eyes. And this double insult had for its consequence that also a preponderating majority of patriotic American Slovaks of other denominations joined our ranks, as brothers who are feeling with us our national wrong and our national disregard. What Prague has dared to do against us during the past four years, and what it recently dared to do with Bishop Vojtassak, would have ignited a scandal even among other nations; in our opinion it is so much greater, because you, Mr. President, instead of realizing the unprovoked insult and without regard to the abuse of jurisdiction of your minister, whose trammeling of the personal liberty of a free citizen exceeds all conceptions of democracy and humanity, whom you, as if trying to mock us, still tolerate in office. Of course, we admit that under the stress of circumstances, we Slovak Catholics cannot demand satisfaction from people whose life motto it had been "to square accounts with Rome", whose "programme is Tabor", who are provoking us that we should struggle for what we desire to preserve by right of heritage as Catholics, and as a deceived party of honest contrahents we cannot even demand it, but closing the list of our incriminations we solemnly declare to you, to your Government, and we shall not cease declaring to the whole world in spite of the opposing views of your regime that just as we are praying with our Catholic-Slovak brethren beneath the Tatra Mountains for the welfare of the young republic which had been won by our common sacrifices of blood, we wish you would take notice with your Government, and all its competent officials, that we are Slovaks, a self existing nation, homogenous and autochthone in origin and culture, as well as in history and language; that we desire to remain such without any artificial intermixture. Should the Czecho-Slovak Government hinder us in this either directly or indirectly, and not stop the wrongs cited in the above complaints--even if we were not able at once to put up against every "Metternich," "Bach," or "Schmerling" from Prague a Slovak "Palacky," "Rieger," or "Brauner," we shall yet find means and ways for the revelation of our wrongs; but we hope at the same time that God who will not let perish a nation trusting in Him, will awaken new "Viators" who will inform the world of our subjugated condition and that He will enthuse more "Bjornson[s]" who will tell you and your Czecho-Slovak �SLOVAKIA 32 Government such truths as you would least like to hear in this highly delicate situation. By authorization of the Slovak Catholic Federation in America, JOHN B. PASTORAK, Secretary, Schenectady, N. Y. ANDREW PA VLIS, President, Sheppton, Pa. APPENDIX II An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia79 MR. PRESIDENT: SOME time ago the Slovak Catholic Federation in America issued an Open Letter, addressed to you and signed by Father John B. Pastorak and Father Andrew Pavlis, in which complaints are being raised against you and your Government. A spirit of narrow sectarianism lurks behind every line of the Open Letter. You, Mr. President, and your Government are accused of desiring to "exterminate the Slovaks as a nation," of "cultural piracy," of having "misled the peace delegates," of "breach of faith," etc. In order that you may not have an erroneous idea as to the feelings and views of the American Slovaks, we, the undersigned, representatives of Slovak organizations in America, desire to point out that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America represents a very small part of our compatriots, and that the great majority of the American Slovaks are heart and soul with you. 79 Originally published in English, this open letter is available in MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 pp. �SLOVAKIA 33 Under your able leadership the Czechoslovak Republic has been most successful in piloting itself through the dangerous postwar period and it has been consolidated to such an extent that today it may be classed among the most ordered and prosperous States of Europe. In Slovakia, especially, great progress has been made as regards both cultural and economic development. We, therefore, are at a loss to understand the unjustified complaints made by the above-mentioned Slovak Catholic Federation against you and your Government. Permit us, Mr. President, to draw your attention to some of these complaints. The writers maintain that the Slovaks are "directly endangered in their national existence." How can this statement be reconciled with the progress which Slovakia has made in educational matters? As you are no doubt aware, under the Magyar regime all schools, whether elementary, secondary, or high schools, were in the hands of the Magyars. Properly speaking, there were no Slovak schools at all, with the exception of a few schools where the work was carried on by a handful of teachers who were evangelical for the greater part, the instruction was Magyar both in letter and spirit. Today, there are over four thousand elementary schools, over fifty secondary schools, besides commercial and technical institutes, and a university at Bratislava. The educational progress made since the liberation of Slovakia certainly does not prove the statement that the Slovaks are "endangered in their national existence." On the contrary, it proves, that the national existence and the cultural development of the Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic is fully assured. The Slovaks have three ministers in the Government and many officials in all branches of civil service. In certain cases, owing to lack of competent officials among the Slovaks, it was necessary to send Czechs to Slovakia but these are being withdrawn as soon as the Slovaks are able to fill these places with their own officials. There are, however, no proofs that Slovakia has been treated in "step-mother fashion ," nor do the writers offer any proofs of their vague generalization. The writers "object most emphatically" to the statement alleged to have been made by the Czechoslovak delegates at the Paris Peace Conference to the effect that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation". Assuming that this statement has really been made we should like to point out that we, too, are of the same opinion. Moreover, we �SLOVAKIA 34 may add that Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomists, himself held, and probably still holds, the same view. On May 4th, 1908, he made the following declaration before the Magyar court at Bratislava: " It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs, and up to quite recent times we had a language in common with the Czechs, and up to this day our evangelical ministers make use of the Czech language in their church service." And it was the same Father Hlinka who, on October 30, 1918, cordially associated himself with the manifesto of the Slovak nation which contains the following words : "In language, culture and historical traditions the Slovak nation forms a part of the single Czechoslovak nation." It may be disputed whether - from a strictly historical and ethnographical point of view - the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation or not. Their feeling and consciousness, however, is the deciding factor. If the Slovaks and Czechs feel themselves as one nation, no historian or ethnographist can alter that feeling or consciousness. The writers accuse you, Mr. President, of "breach of contract" known as the "Pittsburgh Agreement." As regards this agreement which was arrived at between the American Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918, we should like to point out in how far the provisions of this agreement have been carried out. For this purpose we are giving on one side the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement and on the other what has been done: 1. We accept the political program providing for a union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech territories and Slovakia. 1. Carried out 2. Slovakia will have its own administration, its diet and its courts. 2. In accordance with the Constitution the whole Republic is divided into 20 autonomous regions, 6 of which comprise Slovakia. These regions are administered by the Slovaks themselves by means of autonomous bodies containing about 40 members who are elected by the vote of all citizens, �SLOVAKIA 35 irrespective of sex, on a system of proportional representation. These zones thus have all the attributes of democratic local autonomy. From the representative bodies is elected an administrative council for the whole of Slovakia, also by proportional representation. This council is composed of 24 members, 8 of whom, under the presidency of Slovak administration, attend to the executive authority for Slovakia. 3. Slovak will be official language in schools, administration and in public life. 3. Both Czech and Slovak are official languages throughout the territory of the Republic. 4. The Czechoslovak State will be a Republic and its constitution will be democratic. 4. Carried out. 5. The organization of the co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will, according to the needs and to the changed situation, be broadened and regulated. 5. Left to be carried out by the American Slovaks and Czechs. 6. Concrete details concerning the administration of the CzechoSlovak State are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly elected representatives . 6. In accordance with this provision the present status of Slovakia (see article 2 of the agreement) has been elaborated. You will observe, Mr. President, that as a matter of fact the Pittsburgh Agreement has been substantially carried out. The aim of this agreement was to assure the future status and cultural development of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak State, and this aim has been achieved. The Czechoslovak Republic is the result of the work of both the Slovaks and Czechs. During the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they deman- �36 SLOVAKIA ded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks. Hence the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Nation. We, in America, are watching the development of events in Czechoslovakia very closely and we are not unmindful of the great progress the Republic has made. We are especially aware of the fact that your untiring efforts have in no small measure contributed to this progress . The good name of the Czechoslovak Republic abroad has been established, above all, by your indefatigable work and by the work of your able collaborator, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes. On behalf of the American Slovaks we thank you most heartily for your labor which has given to Slovakia her due place among the free nations of the world. We beg you to continue in your endeavors to make of Slovakia a happy land such as we have dreamt of while fighting in common for Czechoslovakia' s freedom and national independence. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest esteem and respect. JOHN KRAFCIK, President National Slovak Society. JOHN DVORSCAK, Secretary National Slovak Society. JOHN ZEMAN, President Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK OSLISLO, Secretary Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK ST AS , Treasurer Slovak League of America. JOHN MATLOCHA, President Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. JOHN L. ZAROVY, Secretary Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. NICHOLAS KOVAC, President District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. STEPHEN ERHARDT, Secretary District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. CLEMENT IHRISKY, President New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JANCEK, Secretary New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JOSCAK, Editor New Yorksky Dennik FRANK CELKO, Editor Slovensky Sokol STEPHEN HUSKA, Editor Nove Casy � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS: BISHOP JAN VOJTASSAK'S ABORTED JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1923 r V V r Stefan Kucik In 1923 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak, bishop of the diocese of Spis in Slovakia, decided to undertake a pastoral journey to Slovak Catholics in the United States of America. However, Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue him a passport. They considered his trip to be political. It turns out that Vojtassak's planned journey conflicted with Czechoslovak government plans to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Upon hearing of this refusal, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America published an open letter to Tomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the president and his government. To counteract the impact of this letter, the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter to the president, ostensibly by a group of American Slovaks who supported him and his government. Interestingly, this "anti-letter" was written by an official of Czechoslovak intelligence. While many scholars have dealt with the biography of bishop Jan Vojtassak, only Robert Letz has provided us with a thorough explanation of the reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant him passport in 1923 .1 In this context, however, no one has pointed to the open letters addressed to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation and the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York. The present article will try to fill this gap, as well as to put the matter into a broader context. I Robert Letz, "Bi skup Jan Vojtassak a slovenska politika V medzi vojnovom obdobi," in Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, Ivan Chalupecky, ed. (Spisska KapitulaSpisske Podhradie: Ki\azsky seminar biskupa Jana Vojtassaka, 2003 ), 25 -52. 8 SLOVAKIA After Jan Vojtassak had been appointed bishop of Spis towards the end of 1920,2 along with Marian Blaha for the diocese of Banska Bystrica and Karol Kmet'ko for the diocese of Nitra, American Slovaks rejoiced. As early as December 22, 1920, editor Jozef Husek wrote in the Catholic weekly Jednota : "Only those who look at the deep religious sentiment of our people, and their simple faith and devotion to the Holy Church, can understand what it means for Catholic Slovaks to have apostles of their own flesh and blood, of their national sentiment and outlook. " 3 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak was ordained a bishop in Nitra on February 13, 1921. In a fortnight he assumed his office in Spisska Kapitula. In his first pastoral letter, Vojtassak outlined a program of his future activities. He was aware of the negative consequences of the Great War. He realized that the war had caused many to lose their faith in God, and felt that the war's ravages threatened the very basis of love for one 's neighbours. It not only produced a lot of cripples, but largely devastated people' s spiritual values . At war's end materialism and the class struggle began to appear and hatred toward the Catholic Church grew. In Czechoslovakia, the strong anti-Catholic character of the new political system was evident right after the war. The Czechs did not show much consideration for the religiosity of Slovakia. They also tended to undervalue the contribution of the Slovak Catholic clergy in the creation of the common independent state,4 whether in Slovakia or in the USA, and tended to forget that Roman Catholics constituted the vast majority of both populations. The Czechoslovak government, however, was not satisfied with just the secularization of the new country. It also decided to transfer its anti-Catholicism to Czech and Slovak communities in America. In order to promote the newly established Czechoslovak Church among American compatriots, it sent a mission led by its first bishop Gorazd Pavlik to the USA. In connection with this mission, which 2 For the appointment, ordination and enthronement of bishop Jan Vojta~~ak see Ivan Chalupecky, "Obsadenie spi~skeho biskupskeho stolca po roku 19 18," in Chalupecky, Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, 7-24. 3 Jozef Paufo, 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, I 965), 165 . 4 Ivan Chalupecky, Biskup Jan Vojtassak: K jeho verejnej a politickej cinnosti (Rufo mberok: Katolicka univerzita v Rufo mberku, Filozofi cka fakulta, 2009), 2 1-25. SLOVAKIA 9 was carried out between June 1922 and January 1923,5 an incident which became infamous in the history of the Slovak Catholic Church occurred. It filled both Slovak Catholics in Czechoslovakia and in America with much indignation. The incident lay behind the refusal of Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to the bishop of Spis. Jan Vojtassak had decided to travel to America as early as December of 1922. He had reached his decision on the basis of a circular letter issued by Antonin Cyril Stojan, Archbishop of Olomouc. Addressed to all ordinaries in Slovakia, the letter was based upon an earlier one sent by Czech Catholic priests in America on the basis of instructions received from the Czech episcopate. They had been asked to try to paralyze Gorazd Pavlik's activities, because some Slovak priests in America had begun to affiliate with the new Czechoslovak Church. The Czech priests emphasized that they had not succeeded in their work among American Slovaks because they were Czechs and not Slovaks. Had the episcopate sent Slovak priests among American Slovaks, these would have been more successful. 6 This circular letter, as well as reports published in Slovak-American newspapers and republished in Slovakia, plus a number of private letters received from individuals across the United States, led bishop Vojtassak to decide to lead a mission to the USA. 7 He was also aware that many Slovak Catholics in America came from his diocese. Vojtassak's mission was fully supported by the Czech mission of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the USA, as well as by Archbishop A. C. Stojan and other Slovak and Czech bishops, along with the former apostolic nuncio Clemente Micara. The Holy See also agreed with Vojtassak' s planned journey to America. 8 Bishop Vojtassak began to prepare for his trip in April of 1923. Slovak organizations in the USA were informed of his coming.9 In May of the same year, Vojtassak applied for a passport. Although at that time passports were usually granted by district authorities, Vojtassak's application was forwarded to the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava. Thence it was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, whence it was 5 Letz, " Bi skup ... ," 47 . Slovak (Bratislava), July 5, 1923, 1; Jednota (Middletown, PA), July 25 , 1923, 4. 7 Slovak, July 5, 1923, 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Letz, "Biskup ... ," 44. 6 SLOVAKIA returned back to Bratislava. This kind of procrastination continued for a month. To try to expedite matters, Vojtassak travelled to Bratislava and even to Prague, but his efforts proved fruitless . The parliamentary deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party Vaclav Myslivec, as well as some parliamentary deputies of the Slovak People's Party, intervened with the Minister of the Interior Jan Malypetr. The latter, however, refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport with the comment that "he knows Catholic bishops who lie. " 10 In order to comprehend such a rude refusal, one needs to understand the situation in the Slovak-American community in the first years after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After Tomas G. Masaryk had left America in the fall 1918, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Cleveland to decide on sending a delegation to Slovakia. 11 According to Albert P. Mamatey, president of the League, 12 the delegates were to make contact with political leaders in the old country and to let them know about the Pittsburgh Agreement concluded with T. G. Masaryk in May of 1918. 13 Upon their arrival in Slovakia, the delegates acted impartially. In their Privet delegacie Slovenskej ligy v Amerike [Address of the Delegation of the Slovak League of America] dated April 9, 1919, they expressed their surprise at the growing political struggles in Slovakia. Therefore, they initially hesitated to give the Pittsburgh Agreement to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Responsible for Slovakia, or to Ferdis Juriga or Andrej Hlinka, the most popular priests and politicians in the Slovak People ' s Party. 14 They considered the political squabbles among the many new political parties a waste of energy for a small nation. 15 Upon their return to the USA, two of the delegates, Jozef Rusek, the editor of Jednota and Milan Getting, the editor of New Yorksky dennik, reported on the situation in Slovakia at the 12th Congress of the Slovak League held in Scranton, PA, on May 29, 1919. Jozef 10 Slowik, July 5, 1923, 1. Nave Slo vensko (Pittsburgh, PA), December 2, 19 18, 2-3. 12 Albert Pavo! Mamatey was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1911 to 1920. 13 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slav. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., dna 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, PA: Slovak League of America), 9. 14 Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1929), 226-227. 15 Slovak, May 3, 1919, I. 11 SLOVAKIA 11 Husek advised American Slovaks to be careful in pressing for the autonomy of Slovakia as promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, because at that time it might help Magyar efforts to re-annex Slovakia to Hungary. However, he did not abandon his claim to the autonomy of Slovakia. He postponed it to a time when the situation in Slovakia would improve. 16 Milan Getting, on the other hand, did not even mention the autonomy of Slovakia. He reported on his plan of agitation against Magyarization in Slovakia. He worked out this plan on the basis of a suggestion made by Minister V. Srobar. Since Srobar was short of funds, Getting returned to the USA to ask American Slovaks to purchase a printing press for Minister Srobar's agitation. 17 Despite Jozef Husek's advice not to immediately press for the autonomy of Slovakia and Milan Getting's ignoring of the issue, American Slovaks began to very heatedly discuss this matter. 18 On July 31, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Pittsburgh and accepted the brochure Politicka nauka vzh/'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat [Political Perspective Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State] 19 as the basis of its future activities. The brochure stated that the Slovak League of America decided to support its program of autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. The final arrangement of the Czecho-Slovak state, however, it left to the Slovaks in the old country. 20 Another representative of the Slovak League of America, who reported on the situation in Slovakia right after the World War I, was Ignac Gessay. However, he did not belong to the above mentioned delegation. This renowned Slovak-American editor was sent to Slovakia somewhat later. The reason for his mission was a lack of reliable information from Europe at the beginning of 1919. 21 American 16 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slov. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., diia 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, 19 19), 24. 17 Ibid. , 30-31. 18 Sidor, Slovaci... , 231. 19 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Trnave, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 299K3. Zapisnica zo sch6dze Ustrednej spravy Slovenskej Ligy vydrziavanej di\a 31. jula 191 9 v Henry Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. The brochure was written by editor Jan A. Feriencik and published by the Slovak League of America in 19 19. Informally, it was called .. Politicky Katechismus " [Political Catechism]. 20 Jan A. Feriencik, Politicka nauka vzhl'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat (Pittsburgh: Slovenska liga v Amerike, 19 19), 7. 21 Dobry Pastier, April 19 19, 7. 12 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, therefore, decided to establish an information office, at first in Paris, and once regular postal service had been established between Czecho-Slovakia and the USA, in Slovakia too.22 This task was entrusted to lgnac Gessay, at that time an editor of Nave Slovensko, 23 official organ of the Slovak League of America.24 In his report to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on October 24, 1919, Gessay recommended that American Slovaks take a neutral stand on the issue of Slovak autonomy. He suggested a gradual implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement and warned radical Slovak-American autonomists that immediate autonomy would have been fatal for the new republic. 25 Both Gessay's and Husek's initial reports had a huge impact on the official stand of the Slovak League towards autonomy. Jozef Rusek, however, would gradually change his mind and then would support the autonomist movement in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League on October 24, 1919, two delegates of the Slovak People's Party, the Rev. Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala, also appeared. Jozef Rudinsky had been sent to the USA by several leaders of the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka in August of 1919. He had been chosen as a trustworthy person whose task it was to defend the idea of Slovak autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic among American Slovaks, and to inform them of the Party's activities. In addition, Rudinsky was supposed to raise funds for the autonomist movement. On the suggestion of the Rev. Frantisek Jehlicska, Jozef Kubala, a merchant from Vrbove, joined Rudinsky before his departure to the USA. In Poland, however, they both joined the Rev. Hlinka's delegation to Paris, in an attempt to have autonomy for Slovakia included in the Paris Peace Treaties. After a week's stay in the capital of France and the delegation's expulsion from that country, Ru- 22 Slovensky narodny archiv, Brati slava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter SNA), fund (hereinafter f.) Slovenska liga v Amerike [Slovak League of America], folder (hereinafter fold .) 2. Albert Mamatey to Frantisek Stas, April 17, 191 9. 23 Nave Slovensko, official organ of the Slovak League of America in 1918-1922. 24 Jgnac Gessay, S/ovensko po oslobodeni (Cleveland: Slovenska liga v Amerike), 4; ASSV, fasc . 236CI0. Authorization for Ignac Gessay, April 26, 1919. 25 Gessay, S/ovensko ... , 26-28, 37-38. SLOVAKIA 13 dinsky and Kubala continued on their original journey to the United States, where they arrived on October 13, 1919. 26 At the time of the delegates' trip to the USA the majority of American Slovaks felt distaste for the policy of the Slovak People's Party.27 This aversion arose mainly from the reports of Jozef Husek and Ignac Gessay, as well as Andrej Hlinka' s faux pas in connection with his rash journey to the Paris Peace Conference. Another reason was the fact that the delegates arrived in America with Polish passports and Polish visas, and not Czecho-Slovak. 28 Having presented their credentials to the League, Jozef Rudinsky was asked to explain his mission to America. He clarified the position of the Slovak People's Party at length. Like the Slovak League of America, the People's Party demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. It also wanted autonomy for Slovakia to be included in the Paris Peace Treaties. Therefore, he had come to the USA, along with Jozef Kubala, to agitate for autonomy and to raise funds towards this end. 29 Although the Executive Committee of the Slovak League did not find anything contrary to its program in the Rudinsky mission, it nevertheless took a negative stand towards it. Rudinsky and Kubala did not have any credentials from the Czecho-Slovak government and the League did not agree with Hlinka's journey to the Paris Peace Conference. The League accused the delegates of driving a wedge between the Slovaks and Czechs in America, which might have had a negative impact on their coexistence in the USA, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. 30 On the other hand, the Executive Commit26 Robert Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky - vyznamna osobnost' Turzovky," in Turzovka kriiom-kraiom, Ivan Gajdiciar ed. (Turzovka: Spolok priatel'ov Turzovky, 2010), 328329. 27 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Rufomberok: Lev, 1921 ), 11 . 28 Karol Sidor, "Zasahy Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike do politickeho vyvinu slovenskeho (1914 - 1939)," in Slovenska liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna, Mikulas Sprinc, ed. (Scranton, PA : Slovenska liga v Amerike, 1947), 54. 29 ASSV, fasc . 299A6. Zapisnica zo schodze Ustredneho vyboru Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydrziavanej di\a 24. okt6bra I 919 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli v Pittsburgh, Penna. JO Masarykuv ustav a Archiv Akademie ved Ceske republiky, V. V. i., Archiv UTGM, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter MUA AV CR, AUTGM), f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 459. Rezolucia Slovenskej Ligy prijata na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednyrn vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., di\a 24. a 25. okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919. (For the letter without attachments see Slovenske 14 SLOVAKIA tee issued a memorandum, in which American Slovaks demanded the gradual implementation of the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement in the newly-created Czecho-Slovakia. 31The resolution against Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala and the League's subsequent memorandum expressed American Slovaks' efforts to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it also reflected their efforts to maintain their neutral stand and not to be drawn into political affairs in Slovakia. In such a situation, the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party could not rely on the authority of the Slovak League of America. They, therefore, approached two Slovak-American organizations which disagreed with the League 's stand: the Slovak Catholic Federation and the First Catholic Slovak Union. Jozef Rudinsky expressed his ideas mainly in the weekly Jednota , where he was assisted by Jozef Husek, and in the newspaper Obrana, which was edited by the Rev. Jan Metod Liscinsky.32 While Rudinsky and Kubala, assisted by Slovak-American Catholic organizations, were agitating in the USA for Slovak autonomy, Albert Mamatey left on a three-month journey (December 10, 1919 March 14, 1920) to Czecho-Slovakia. His intentions were very much the same as that of the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party in the USA, i.e. that the Pittsburgh Agreement should be incorporated into the future Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Upon his return to the United States, Mamatey reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee in Pittsburgh on April 8, 1920. 33 He had traveled to Czecho-Slovakia via France and Switzerland. In Paris, he had met with Stefan Osusky, the general secretary of the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Peace Conference and a vyst'ahovalectvo: Dokumenty 3, Frantisek Bielik, Elo Rakos, eds. (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1976), 165-172, document no. 325); ASSV, fasc . 299A9. Prehlas a verejne osvedcenie Slov. Ligy. 31 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R- republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 45 9. Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy Prijate na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednym vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., dna 24. a 25 . okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919; Jednota, October 29, 1919, I. 32 Sidor, Slovaci... , 235; Letz, "JozefRudinsky ...," 329-330. 33 ASSV, fasc . 299A4. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia ustr. a vyko. vyboru Slov. ligy 8. apr. 1920 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli, Pittsburgh, Pa. SLOVAKIA 15 delegate of the Slovak League of America to Masaryk in 1916. 34 When Mamatey suggested that the Slovaks should have been contractually guaranteed their home rule at the Paris Peace Conference in the same way as had the Ruthenians, Osusky offered the following explanation: "During the whole war, we cooperated and worked with our brothers the Czechs for our independence as a UNIT, as two branches of one nation that belong together. Thanks to this UNIFIED stand with our brothers the Czechs, the Allies recognized our independence, our separation from the Magyars and our joining with the Czechs. "35 Osusky, however, was not worried about the future of the Slovaks. He promised that they would get everything that they asked for and that they wished, except for things that might be detrimental to them: "Because what we do not want, what would be detrimental or destructive for Slovakia, as for instance, a separate Diet at this time, nobody from the outside wi 11 force upon us nor put into our minds." 36 After this meeting, the intervention of Albert Mamatey on behalf of the autonomy of Slovakia sounded unconvincing. He had met with T. G. Masaryk, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, with Edvard Benes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Vavro Srobar, the Minister with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia, and others. In February of 1920, Mamatey had also taken part in the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies. Almost all with whom he had negotiated, had agreed with the view that at that time the autonomy of Slovakia with a separate Diet would have been fatal for Slovakia. Mamatey, however, had negotiated only with the members of 34 For more on Osusky, his earlier life in America and his mission to Europe, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia," Slovak Studies, 8 (1968), 27-30 and 57-66. 35 Zprava Predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana Ustrednemu Vyboru Slov. ligy v Pittsburghu, Pa. dna 8. aprila 1920 o Jeho ceste a missi v Cesko-slovenskej republike (Pittsburgh, 1920), 8. 36 Ibid. 16 SLOVAKIA the centralist Czechoslovak political parties and opponents of the legislative autonomy of Slovakia. In connection with the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies a regrettable incident occurred. The Club had passed a resolution which was supposed to confirm that in the draft Constitution there be included everything that had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, except for a separate Diet. However, the signatures of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party (Alois Kalisek, Jan Kovalik, Stefan Onderco, Jozef Sivak and Florian Tomanek) on the resolution had been forged. This affair came to light only after the resolution had been cited in full in the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America addressed to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1922.37 Even if the resolution significantly influenced the future attitudes of American Slovaks to the issue of the autonomy of Slovakia, it seems that it did not have a great impact on the views of Albert Mamatey. On February 28, 1920, one day before he left Czecho-Slovakia, Albert Mamatey received a letter from Milan Hodza, the Minister for the Unification of Laws and one of the main Slovak political leaders. In this letter, Hodza had also rejected a separate Slovak Diet. Despite the unwillingness of the main political representatives to accept the claim to a Slovak Diet, Albert Mamatey did not hesitate to conclude his report with the words: "Slovakia may look forward to a great future," although he added that "it would take some time." 38 However, it is well-known how important a separate Diet was for American Slovaks. Jozef Rusek expressed their outlook very clearly: "Autonomy without a Diet, without legislation, is no autonomy. Indeed, autonomy is a Diet and a Diet is autonomy! Without a Diet there is no autonomy!" 39 Albert Mamatey must have been aware of the importance of a separate Slovak Diet to fulfill the promise of autonomy. He must have also known that if the requirement of a separate Slovak Diet had been deleted from the Pittsburgh Agreement, the latter would have been worthless. His attitude on the issue of the autonomy of 37 Memorandum Slovenskej ligy v Amerike upravene na vladu a Narodne Shromaidenie Cesko-Slovenskej Republiky v zaujime vtelenia Pittsburghskej Dohody do iistavy C-S Republiky (Pittsburgh : Slovak League of America, 1922). 38 Ibid. , 26. 39 Jednota, February 18, 1920, 4. SLOVAKIA 17 Slovakia began to change by the beginning of 1919. In one of his letters addressed to Dr. Miloslav Francisci of Cleveland, son of a famous Slovak revolutionary hero of 1848, Mamatey wrote: "I have been fighting for the national individuality of the Slovak nation for over four years. I have insisted that the Slovaks are not just an "appendix" of the Czech nation, but the Slovaks are as independent a nation as the Czechs. However, I have gotten tired of the constant fighting. Anyways, the fate of the Slovak nation will not be determined by us from America, but by those back home. - You, I and hundreds of others here in America have done our duty. " 40 In accordance with his changed attitude towards autonomy for Slovakia and his hardly concealable inclination towards government policy, which was fuelled by the promise of the office of Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, Albert Mamatey decided to paralyze the agitation of Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala among American Slovaks. To this end he arranged that two delegates of the Czechoslovak government were sent to America. The mission of the Roman Catholic priest Ladislav Moys and the social democrat Jan Pocisk, did not bear fruit. They failed to persuade American Slovaks to approve of the Czechoslovak Constitution and their activities in the USA were deplored by the "Response" [Ohlas] of the Slovak Catholic Federation. 41 In response to the steps taken by Albert Mamatey and by the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek announced his resignation from the League. He accused the leading League officials of having knowingly and intentionally missed the opportunity to have Slovakia constitutionally guaranteed the right to 40 Aibert Mamatey to M . Francisci, January 22, 1919. It was published in Konstantin Culen, "Zo zaviatych listov (Z korespondencie A. Mamateya s Dr. M. Franciscim)," in Literarny almanach Slovaka v Amerike na rok 1962 (Middletown, Pa.: Hrobak Publications), 147. 41 Dobry Pastier (Middletown, PA), April 1920, 14-15; Jan Pankuch, Dejiny clevelandskych a lakewoodskych Slovakov (Cleveland, 1930), 188; Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Andreja, 1937), 274; Paufo, 162163; Natalia Krajfovicova, "Americki Slovaci a slovenski autonomisti v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR," in Miroslav Peknik et al. , Ferdinand Juriga: /'udovy smer slovenskej politiky (Bratislava: VEDA, 2009), 260. 18 SLOVAKIA home rule and individual national, cultural and economic life within the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, he accused the League's officials of morally and financially supporting agitation against the Pittsburgh Agreement. 42 As a result, no Slovak-American Catholic organization attended the 13th Congress of the Slovak League held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 24-25, 1920. 43 After the Congress, the Slovak League of America was subjected to a lot of criticism by Jozef Husek. The latter concluded that the League "ceases to be the moral and official representative of the Slovak-American colony."44 As a result, the role that had been played in the promotion of Slovak national demands by the Slovak League of America began to be played by representatives of Slovak American Catholics led by the Slovak Catholic Federation and those organizations with which the Federation closely co-operated.45 However, after the Slovak National Party had split from the Slovak National and Agrarian Party in March of 192 I in order to be able more vigorously to demand the legislative autonomy of Slovakia, the Slovak League of America, led by its new president Ivan Bielek,46 began to change its stand. One of the first consequences of the creation of the Slovak National Party was the adoption of a compromise declaration requesting the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement at the conference of the representatives of American Slovaks in Washington, DC, on May 21 , 1921 . In this declaration, American Slovaks demanded that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also requested the gradual autonomy of Slovakia. 47 Another event that influenced the Slovak League of America was the secession of the Slovak People's 42 Jednota, June 19, 1920, 4. Pauco, 160. 44 Jednota , Jul y 7, 1920, 4. 45 Pauco, 160. 46 Ivan Bielek, a fo rmer newspaper editor, was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1920 to 1934. As the first vice-president of the League, Bielek became its president after Albert Mamatey resigned in September of 1920 due to his appointment as a consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Pittsburgh. Jednota, September 22, 1920, 2; Slovak Institute and Reference Library in Cleveland (hereinafter SIRL), fasc. Mamatey, Albert 1870 - 1923. "Pan Mamatey sa vzdava predsednictva Slov. Ligy," newspaper clipping, September 17, 1920. 47 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 317, 320. 43 SLOVAKIA 19 Party from the common parliamentary club of the Czechoslovak People 's Party in November of 1921. 48 On June 28-30 1922, the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Pittsburgh. The Congress was attended by the vice-president of the Slovak National Party and the Rev. Anton Kompanek. The latter called uJ'on American Slovaks not to give up on the Pittsburgh Agreement. 4 His mission in the USA was to rally autonomist forces , both in America and in Slovakia. 50 The congress then split into two camps - autonomists and centralists. Nevertheless, the delegates supported the Pittsburgh Agreement almost unanimously and they ordered the Executive Board "to write to Prague."51 The Executive Board then sent a Memorandum to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic requesting that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution. They also demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia. 52 The 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was very important for the future orientation of this organization. In spite of expectations that the crisis within the League would deepen, the Congress became a new concentration of autonomist forces . However, the concentration was only reached with great effort. The June 29, 1922 debate about the Pittsburgh Agreement was long and lasted until 11 :00 p.m.53 The discussion on the Pittsburgh Agreement at the Congress was significantly influenced by Anton Kompanek. Once in America, he began to create a united front for the recognition of the Pittsburgh 48 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnfch vecf Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), f. rn. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, inventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report "Hlinkovci v Amerike" by M. Getting, director ofCSTK in Washington, DC, January 24, 1922. 49 Zapisnica XIV. Kongressu Slovenskej Lfgy vydi iavaneho v dnoch 28., 29. a 30. juna /922 v Moose Temple, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pittsburgh, 1922), 83. 50 Krajcovicova, 262. 51 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report " Slovenske veci v Amerike", July 1, 1922 by M . Getting, director of CSTK in Washington, DC, July 7, 1922; Archfv Krajanskeho muzea Matice slovenskej, Bratislava (hereinafter AKM MS), f. Ignac Gessay, fold. I. Telegram to I. Gessay (torso, without sender, undated). 52 See footnote 3 7. 53 Robert Letz, "Slovenska liga v Amerike a Slovenska liga na Slovensku," in Historicky zbornfk, 19 (No. 1, 2009), 65 ; Obrana, June 27, 1922, 3 and Jul y 4, 1922, 1. 20 SLOVAKIA Agreement through his articles, which were published in the Slovak American press. In a series of articles in Obrana, Kompanek recommended that Slovak autonomy be achieved gradually, and only within the Czechoslovak Republic. As for American Slovaks, he was convinced that there was not as much disunity over the issue of autonomy as in the old country. He admitted, on the other hand, that there were also some personal antipathies (Bielek versus Husek, with the former favoring the Slovak National Party over the Slovak People's Party) .54 Anton Kompanek tried to eliminate these disagreements and he invited supporters of Slovak autonomy to a conference in Pittsburgh on October 12, 1922. At this conference, he stressed that the fate of the Pittsburgh Agreement was in the hands of American Slovaks. He stated that it was not enough to issue resolutions, but it was necessary to work systematically and support materially the movement for the autonomy of Slovakia directly in Slovakia. At the conference, a five-member committee was elected to coordinate the work on behalf of the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was named the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom and its members were Stefan Kocis, Jan Pankuch, Ivan Bielek, Jan Bibza and Jozef Husek. The latter was elected its president. The aim of the Committee was to unite all Slovak American organizations, their newspapers and public officials in the struggle for the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Another goal of the new organization was to try to create a coalition of all autonomist parties in Slovakia. 55 Even though Ivan Bielek had attended the conference in Pittsburgh as a private person, 56 once the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom was established, the "centralists" were expelled from the Slovak League of America. 57 This happened at the meeting of the Executive Committee with the Executive Board held on June 27-28 in Cleveland, 58 and was completed and approved at the 15th Con54 Krajcovicova, 262-263. Jednota, October 18, 1922, 4; Krajcovicova, 263 . 56 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0., 13. 57 Jednota, July 4, 1923, 4; Krajcovicova, 264. 58 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0 ., 73 . 55 SLOVAKIA 21 gress of the League held on May 27-29, 1924 in Binghamton, New York. 59 In terms of the resolution of its 14th congress, the Slovak League of America reacted negatively to the new activities of Jozef Rudinsky in the USA in 1923. This time, contrary to his first mission among American Slovaks, Rudinsky, who had switched sides, and had become a major supporter of Milan Hodza, came to the USA in the service of the Czechoslovak government. The League also rejected a similar mission by Vavro Srobar and Vaclav Maule, a Czech professor and head of the branch of the Ministry of Education in Bratislava. They came in the same year to lecture on behalf of Czechoslovak national unity and against the autonomy of Slovakia.60 Their mission, however, failed among Slovak American autonomists. 61 Upon his return to Czechoslovakia in November of 1920, Jozef Rudinsky's relationship with Andrej Hlinka deteriorated and they eventually parted company.62 As early as the beginning of 1923, Rudinsky and Vavro Srobar began to talk. These conversations were probably initiated by Srobar, who was preparing for his own journey to the USA 63 in order to counteract the results of the 14th congress of the Slovak League of America. 64 Rudinsky and Srobar discussed Rudinsky' s planned new journey to America and concluded that the latter should use the contacts that he had made in his previous mission. They particularly counted upon Rudinsky's past friendship with Jozef Husek. To make his mission more successful, Rudinsky decided to depart alone, without Srobar. The latter would come after him and would finish what Rudinsky had started. 65 Rudinsky ' s and Srobar' s trips were intended to appear as two completely unrelated and independent initiatives. However, that same year bishop Vojtassak was also preparing for his journey to the USA. Vojtassak was not aware of Srobar' s and Rudinsky' s plans. If 59 Zapisnica XV. kongressu S/o venskej ligy vydri iavaneho v diioch 27., 28. a 29. maja / 924, v Bennett Hoteli, Binghamton, N. Y. (Pittsburgh), 16-17, 20. 60 Zap isnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v diioch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.M C.A ., Cleveland, 0 ., 14. 61 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864 - 1926), 504-505. 62 For a detailed analysis of their breakup see Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 334-337. 63 Ibid. , 33 7. 64 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 383. 65 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ...," 337. 22 SLOVAKIA he had gone, Vojtassak would have certainly strengthened the position of Slovak Catholics in the USA, as well as that of his friend Andrej Hlinka and the whole autonomist movement. Therefore, Rudinsky in his letters referring to Vojtassak' s planned journey to the USA, found it extremely undesirable. Upon his arrival in the USA, Rudinsky wrote to Srobar: "I was almost dejected by the news that Vojtassak was already aboard ship and was about to arrive any day. If it is true, there is nothing left but to pack my bags and return home. I will be not able to counteract his influence."66 Of course, bishop Vojtassak was not aboard the ship Majestic, which was to arrive in the USA on July 6, 1923. 67 However, the information that came to Rudinsky must have been based upon Vojtassak's planned arrival in America. In New York City, a reception had been prepared on that day to which representatives of the city council were invited. A welcome committee consisting of Catholic priests must have blushed with shame when Vojtassak did not arrive on the Majestic, . 68 nor on any ot h er sh 1ps. Thus, the main reason why the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. The refusal had to do with the timing of his journey. It was planned at exactly the time when the Czechoslovak government was preparing to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Vojtassak' s trip could have thwarted these plans. In addition, the Czechoslovak government harbored suspicions about Vojtassak as a supporter of the Slovak People's Party. It feared that he would make use of his journey to raise funds for the Party just before municipal and county elections (September, 1923) were to take place. They also speculated that Vojtassak' s trip might have helped the Eudova banka [People's Bank], since it was in financial difficulty.69 Slovak Catholics in the USA, on the other hand, looked upon Vojtassak's trip as a pastoral journey, and not a political one. They pointed this out in their press . Bishop Vojtassak had been invited by the Slovak Catholic Federation in America. The news of such a rude and offensive refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak caused 66 SNA, f. Vavro Srobar, fold . 4. J. Rudinsky to V. Srobar, July 5, 1923. 67 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 337-33 8. Obrana, July 17, 1923, 4. Letz, " Biskup ... ," 45 . 68 69 SLOVAKIA 23 outrage among American Slovak Catholics. The Slovak Catholic Federation decided to call a meeting to discuss the affair and to take appropriate action. At this meeting, which was held in Pittsburgh on August 8, 1923, representatives of all Slovak American Catholic organizations, most of the clergy and Slovak American leaders resolved to send a complaint to the Congress of the Slovak Catholic Federation held in Lansford, PA, on October 9-11, 1923. At the Congress, the delegates unanimously decided to acquaint the world with the offensive step of Minister Malypeter and to launch an indictment against the President and government of the Czechoslovak Republic. 70 In response to the refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, the Slovak Catholic Federation issued a strong open letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk. In this letter, Slovak Catholics in America expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the President and government of Czechoslovakia, and even the sense of a threat to their national existence. Besides other matters, they pointed to the cause of bishop Jan Vojtassak. They directly charged the Czechoslovak government with trying to assimilate the Slovaks and to promote the spiritual genocide of the Slovak nation. 71 The open letter was sent to all representatives of the Allies, as well as to Bohemia and Slovakia. 72 In Czechoslovakia, however, it 10 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. TomM Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5-6. 71 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5, 8 - 9. The open letter was printed in Slovak (600 copies) and English (500 copies). For a copy of its English version see AMZV CR, f. Ill. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11 , 1924. For its Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi Tomasovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis Institutu hist6rie FF PU v Pre.save, 5 (No. 2, 2011 ), 79-82. 72 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. Milan Getting of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague that an English version of the open letter was sent particularly to the representatives of the Catholic Church in the USA, to editorial staffs of several American newspapers, to all leading Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and pastors, to university professors, as well as to the members of the foreign committee of the 24 SLOVAKIA was confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava prohibited the distribution of the letter through the mails and it was confiscated by the public prosecutor's office in Prague as well. 73 On behalf of all Slovak American Catholics, the Slovak Catholic Federation protested against this confiscation to the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC. They referred to the confiscation as vandalism and a new insult to Slovak Catholics in America.74 In their protest through the open letter, however, Slovak-American Catholics were not united. Jednota criticized the open letter. The editor considered it to be a tactical mistake. He declared the letter to be too radical and also criticized its timing.75 In an effort to weaken the impact of the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation and to prove that views expressed in it belonged to a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York agreed with the Rev. Klement Ihrisky, a representative of American Slovaks in New York, to issue an "anti-letter" addressed to the President of Czechoslovakia. 76 This "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department. It was also issued in the form of brochure and sent to the same addresses as the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation.77 Senate and Congress in Washington. In its Slovak version, the open letter was mosttr sent to Prague to the members of Parliament. 7 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Attachment of the letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 12, 1924; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 27, 1924. 74 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation to Frantisek Chvalkovsky, Ambassador of the CSR in Washington, DC, February 25 , 1924. 75 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. 76 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 rtAMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 7, 1924; Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda , 383. SLOVAKIA 25 It should be apparent, therefore, that the main reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. Moreover, the rude refusal may be explained by the timing of his journey. After World War I, Slovaks in America, represented by their cover organization the Slovak League, underwent several changes of opinion regarding political developments in the newly-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the one hand, they struggled to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic as expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement. On the other hand, American Slovaks tried to remain neutral and not to get involved in the political infighting in Slovakia. With the personal metamorphosis of the president of the Slovak League of America, and with the Slovak League being hesitant concerning the matter of the autonomy promised by T. G. Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Agreement, Slovak Catholic organizations took the lead in the promotion of Slovak national demands after 1919. Due to the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia, as well as the activities of Anton Kompanek, the vice-president of the Slovak National Party, in the USA the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America concentrated the autonomist forces and it eventually provoked the Czechoslovak government to try to deliver a decisive blow to the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks in 1923. In response to the refusal of the Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, however, Slovak Catholics in America were not united. The scathing open letter (in stilted English) issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation was justifiably criticized by Jednota. To weaken the impact of this open letter and to try to prove that it represented only a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter (in perfect English) addressed to the president of Czechoslovakia. It was typical of the machinations of the then Czechoslovak government that the "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department and not by American Slovaks. SLOVAKIA 26 APPENDIX I Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 78 Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague Mr. President: In a critical time when fate was about to decide the turn of the world war, you and those loyal to you exerted all that was in your power that the result of the struggle might turn out in our mutual favor. Your appearance among the American Slovaks ignited unprecedented enthusiasm--your knocking at the hearts of our people found animated response - and your appeal for our assistance was crowned with success. Brother embraced brother and on the brightened horizon of acquired freedom and brotherhood smiled the sun towards our happy future ... Permit us, Mr. President, to remind you of the enthusiasm and the jubilation with which our Slovak people welcomed you wherever you appeared among them, unfolded your plans before them and assured them of your most sincere intentions. Permit us to remind you of the sacrifices in money and in blood which later were the seal of our loyalty to a work so noble and so sacred. The American Slovaks have kept their promise; we loyally stood, and to the present day, stand by your promise. Notwithstanding this, we note with some acerbity, for the past four years that your constituents who had sent you to us, and who cared so much for our alliance and our assistance never intended to fulfill that promise which they had placed into your mouth, and which you supported by this background in their name had promised. You came to us as an 78 This English version is a copy of the open letter available in AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650 . Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11, 1924. For the Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi TomMovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis lnstitutu hist6rie FF PU v Presove, 5 (No . 2, 2011 ), 79-82 . SLOVAKIA 27 equal to equals; that was the way we associated with you and that was the way we drafted plans for the future with you. Not without our assistance, not without the efforts of the American Slovaks did you accomplish the fulfillment of your life's dreams - the liberation of the Czech Nation. Would we were not compelled to admit to you before the world that only (the liberation) of the Czech Nation; for the Slovak Nation, as a contrahent (contracting party) primarily recognized by you in the building of that republic at the head of which you now stand, does not feel under your aegis free in the sense of freedom as an independent nation has the right to vindicate for itself, particularly in the present epoch of self determination of nations. We have patiently waited for four years, whether the conscience of those cliques will move which had forced themselves upon us as brother, but today they treat us in stepmother fashion, nay, even like slaves. We see ourselves step by step betrayed, sold not only by compatriots of your strain and feelings, by your Government, but also by our own weaker compatriots, who for economic considerations lured into an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and even to us "ignorant" Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred. They are Slovak "Sviha's" pure and simple. While dwelling among us you spoke to us in the voice of a brother, plain and without bombast which is bountifully at the disposal of people of your profession. Today we desire to tell you in the same simple and plain manner that the Slovaks not only feel disappointed in you and in the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but directly endangered in their national existence. We do not desire to remind you of the recent acts by means of which the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic beyond any doubt manifested its desire of absorption respectively extermination of the Slovaks as a nation. These facts are sufficiently well known to you. We will show you the last incident which hardly has its parallel in the history of states which are only in the transitory stage of an experiment in democracy--an incident which startles any one who has sense for culture and democracy. Following the noble representatives of the World Powers there also came to America during the last few years representatives of the various religious denominations, in order to strengthen their adherents in their ways in which they de- 28 SLOVAKIA sire to reach eternal well-being in the post-terrestrial realm. What was more natural, but that also the Catholic Slovaks in America desired to welcome in their midst some one of these dignitaries with whom Rome has honored us after the revolution not without efforts on the part of your Government. The incident of Bishop Vojtassak is known to you (and how could it not be) whom we had invited here as our guest; from whom we expected good not only for ourselves, and for our church, but also for the welfare of your Republic. And here the system of government of the Czecho-Slovak republic showed up in its ugly and horrible nudity! Mr. President, the American Slovak Catholics identify themselves with the incident of Bishop Vojtassak. Your government has culminated by it the climax of its repressions, wrongfully committed for fully four years on Slovakia and the Slovaks. The refusal of a passport by your Minister caused such bitterness among us that we would be unworthy of our name and of our Credo, were we not to protest against it most emphatically. The Federation of Slovak Catholics called a council meeting to Pittsburgh which was held on August 8th, and at which the representatives of all Catholic organizations, a large number of Clergy and prominent exponents resolved to submit this grievance to the Congress of this Federation which was held on the days from the 9th to the 11th of October 1923, in Lansford, Pa., where we unanimously resolved to acquaint the educated world particularly with this outrage of your Minister and also submit to the world Powers and the leading representatives the following COMPLAINT against you and your Government. If you, as president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic according to law, are not responsible for your acts to the state authorities--and if your government does not honor your promise and your signature as President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, then we are taking you to task as a gentleman for that piece of cultural piracy which your Government and your ministers are committing on our Slovak nation from the first hour of the revolution-at the same time demanding from you as a gentleman to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised to us, the American Slovaks. This right we abrogate to ourselves as one of the parties contracting with you in the building of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. SLOVAKIA 29 We are lodging this complaint against you and against your former factors in Paris before the conclusion of peace and after it, of having misled the peace delegates and the whole world in general, by claiming that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. To such a statement we Slovaks object most emphatically. This erroneous opinion of your Government was upset even by the Czech Academy, and prominent historians are convinced of its fallacy. For this reason do we, the American Slovak Catholics request that the respective provisions at Paris-Versailles and Trianon, be revised. We are lodging against you a complaint, for breach of contract entered into between us and you as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and contained in the so-called Pittsburgh Pact, the value of which you now disavow, bagatellize-on the fulfillment of which, however, we insist ascribing to it the significance of a National Bill of Rights. We complain against you and your Government for the undemocratic, unrepublican persecutions of newspapers of our party alignment and that of the opposition parties, which are not pulling the cart of Czecho-imperialistic aspirations, and which stand firmly by the principle that the Slovaks are an autochthone nation. We accuse you and your Government of the confiscation of Catholic institution[ s]-of the forcing of textbooks offensive to Catholics into the primary and higher schools, of the open favorizing of individuals and societies whose aims are the undermining of the Catholic spirit in our people. We complain against you and your Government before the civilized world for that barbarian monstrosity which you have sanctioned and which under the name "A law for the protection of the Republic" destroys the idea of democracy; which in reality exists [to silence us, the Slovaks, forever], and is, in our opinion, a cancerous growth upon the body of the Republic. We complain against you and your Government for the so-called "County Reform" so much lauded by you, which is equivalent to shackles for Slovakia as a national unit, which is white in Bohemia and black in Slovakia, and which impoverishes us economically and culturally, exposing us to the chicaneries of your centralist officials. For these and similar undeniable facts , we, American Slovak Catholics are accusing you and your Government before the world for the reason that the censorship (o, democracy, o republic, 30 SLOVAKIA o enlightened twentieth century of progress and free thought), the censorship of your Government does not permit in Slovakia a single manifestation of opposition against this madly raving autocracy by means of which your conscienceless compatriots and political adventurers keep Slovakia shackled. If the saying is correct that history repeats itself, let us be permitted to remind you that the entire Czech nation on one occasion resisted the Habsburgs for the reason that Francis Joseph did not keep the promise once made to the Czechs. You gave him the epithet of a perjurer-and that rightly so, and that regardless of the fact whether his promises were only "of historic value" or not. And we do not blame you or your adherents, that you built the foundations of the Republic on these unfulfilled promises of your former "sovereign". But now, out of consideration for this repetition in history, please do not forget, together with your Government, that "quod uni justum, alteri aequum"--what you had disliked in your oligarchs, that we are not obliged to like either and that the "Camarilla of Prague" directly compels the Slovaks to repay you and your regime in equal coin, if you should not desist in your anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic intentions, and should refuse to give the Slovaks that to which they are entitled. And the consequences? Let Prague be responsible for them--you Mr. President, and your Government. Mr. President, you know well, just as we do that powerful enemies of our young state are carrying on a propaganda in foreign countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is neither a natural state, nor a logical national, geographical, or resting upon a historical foundation; that it inherited all the weak points of the defunct monarchy, without having acquired one single good quality. Would there not be a necessity for internal unity, an internal understanding in accordance with your own motto "democracy is a discussion"? In opposition to this you with your Government, or that Government under your protection hamper and destroy even the slightest manifestation where the emphasizing of our national individuality is concerned. We, the Slovak Catholics in America, identify ourselves with the fate of our brethren across the ocean and the wrongs committed on them are also our wrongs, as Slovaks as well as Catholics; therefore, the disregard shown to Bishop Vojtassak affected us in a twofold manner. Your Government kicked him both for being a bishop (of SLOVAKIA 31 course, a Catholic) and for being a patriotic Slovak who looks Prague straight in the eyes. And this double insult had for its consequence that also a preponderating majority of patriotic American Slovaks of other denominations joined our ranks, as brothers who are feeling with us our national wrong and our national disregard. What Prague has dared to do against us during the past four years, and what it recently dared to do with Bishop Vojtassak, would have ignited a scandal even among other nations; in our opinion it is so much greater, because you, Mr. President, instead of realizing the unprovoked insult and without regard to the abuse of jurisdiction of your minister, whose trammeling of the personal liberty of a free citizen exceeds all conceptions of democracy and humanity, whom you, as if trying to mock us, still tolerate in office. Of course, we admit that under the stress of circumstances, we Slovak Catholics cannot demand satisfaction from people whose life motto it had been "to square accounts with Rome", whose "programme is Tabor", who are provoking us that we should struggle for what we desire to preserve by right of heritage as Catholics, and as a deceived party of honest contrahents we cannot even demand it, but closing the list of our incriminations we solemnly declare to you, to your Government, and we shall not cease declaring to the whole world in spite of the opposing views of your regime that just as we are praying with our Catholic-Slovak brethren beneath the Tatra Mountains for the welfare of the young republic which had been won by our common sacrifices of blood, we wish you would take notice with your Government, and all its competent officials, that we are Slovaks, a self existing nation, homogenous and autochthone in origin and culture, as well as in history and language; that we desire to remain such without any artificial intermixture. Should the Czecho-Slovak Government hinder us in this either directly or indirectly, and not stop the wrongs cited in the above complaints--even if we were not able at once to put up against every "Metternich," "Bach," or "Schmerling" from Prague a Slovak "Palacky," "Rieger," or "Brauner," we shall yet find means and ways for the revelation of our wrongs; but we hope at the same time that God who will not let perish a nation trusting in Him, will awaken new "Viators" who will inform the world of our subjugated condition and that He will enthuse more "Bjornson[s]" who will tell you and your Czecho-Slovak SLOVAKIA 32 Government such truths as you would least like to hear in this highly delicate situation. By authorization of the Slovak Catholic Federation in America, JOHN B. PASTORAK, Secretary, Schenectady, N. Y. ANDREW PA VLIS, President, Sheppton, Pa. APPENDIX II An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia79 MR. PRESIDENT: SOME time ago the Slovak Catholic Federation in America issued an Open Letter, addressed to you and signed by Father John B. Pastorak and Father Andrew Pavlis, in which complaints are being raised against you and your Government. A spirit of narrow sectarianism lurks behind every line of the Open Letter. You, Mr. President, and your Government are accused of desiring to "exterminate the Slovaks as a nation," of "cultural piracy," of having "misled the peace delegates," of "breach of faith," etc. In order that you may not have an erroneous idea as to the feelings and views of the American Slovaks, we, the undersigned, representatives of Slovak organizations in America, desire to point out that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America represents a very small part of our compatriots, and that the great majority of the American Slovaks are heart and soul with you. 79 Originally published in English, this open letter is available in MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 pp. SLOVAKIA 33 Under your able leadership the Czechoslovak Republic has been most successful in piloting itself through the dangerous postwar period and it has been consolidated to such an extent that today it may be classed among the most ordered and prosperous States of Europe. In Slovakia, especially, great progress has been made as regards both cultural and economic development. We, therefore, are at a loss to understand the unjustified complaints made by the above-mentioned Slovak Catholic Federation against you and your Government. Permit us, Mr. President, to draw your attention to some of these complaints. The writers maintain that the Slovaks are "directly endangered in their national existence." How can this statement be reconciled with the progress which Slovakia has made in educational matters? As you are no doubt aware, under the Magyar regime all schools, whether elementary, secondary, or high schools, were in the hands of the Magyars. Properly speaking, there were no Slovak schools at all, with the exception of a few schools where the work was carried on by a handful of teachers who were evangelical for the greater part, the instruction was Magyar both in letter and spirit. Today, there are over four thousand elementary schools, over fifty secondary schools, besides commercial and technical institutes, and a university at Bratislava. The educational progress made since the liberation of Slovakia certainly does not prove the statement that the Slovaks are "endangered in their national existence." On the contrary, it proves, that the national existence and the cultural development of the Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic is fully assured. The Slovaks have three ministers in the Government and many officials in all branches of civil service. In certain cases, owing to lack of competent officials among the Slovaks, it was necessary to send Czechs to Slovakia but these are being withdrawn as soon as the Slovaks are able to fill these places with their own officials. There are, however, no proofs that Slovakia has been treated in "step-mother fashion ," nor do the writers offer any proofs of their vague generalization. The writers "object most emphatically" to the statement alleged to have been made by the Czechoslovak delegates at the Paris Peace Conference to the effect that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation". Assuming that this statement has really been made we should like to point out that we, too, are of the same opinion. Moreover, we SLOVAKIA 34 may add that Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomists, himself held, and probably still holds, the same view. On May 4th, 1908, he made the following declaration before the Magyar court at Bratislava: " It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs, and up to quite recent times we had a language in common with the Czechs, and up to this day our evangelical ministers make use of the Czech language in their church service." And it was the same Father Hlinka who, on October 30, 1918, cordially associated himself with the manifesto of the Slovak nation which contains the following words : "In language, culture and historical traditions the Slovak nation forms a part of the single Czechoslovak nation." It may be disputed whether - from a strictly historical and ethnographical point of view - the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation or not. Their feeling and consciousness, however, is the deciding factor. If the Slovaks and Czechs feel themselves as one nation, no historian or ethnographist can alter that feeling or consciousness. The writers accuse you, Mr. President, of "breach of contract" known as the "Pittsburgh Agreement." As regards this agreement which was arrived at between the American Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918, we should like to point out in how far the provisions of this agreement have been carried out. For this purpose we are giving on one side the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement and on the other what has been done: 1. We accept the political program providing for a union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech territories and Slovakia. 1. Carried out 2. Slovakia will have its own administration, its diet and its courts. 2. In accordance with the Constitution the whole Republic is divided into 20 autonomous regions, 6 of which comprise Slovakia. These regions are administered by the Slovaks themselves by means of autonomous bodies containing about 40 members who are elected by the vote of all citizens, SLOVAKIA 35 irrespective of sex, on a system of proportional representation. These zones thus have all the attributes of democratic local autonomy. From the representative bodies is elected an administrative council for the whole of Slovakia, also by proportional representation. This council is composed of 24 members, 8 of whom, under the presidency of Slovak administration, attend to the executive authority for Slovakia. 3. Slovak will be official language in schools, administration and in public life. 3. Both Czech and Slovak are official languages throughout the territory of the Republic. 4. The Czechoslovak State will be a Republic and its constitution will be democratic. 4. Carried out. 5. The organization of the co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will, according to the needs and to the changed situation, be broadened and regulated. 5. Left to be carried out by the American Slovaks and Czechs. 6. Concrete details concerning the administration of the CzechoSlovak State are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly elected representatives . 6. In accordance with this provision the present status of Slovakia (see article 2 of the agreement) has been elaborated. You will observe, Mr. President, that as a matter of fact the Pittsburgh Agreement has been substantially carried out. The aim of this agreement was to assure the future status and cultural development of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak State, and this aim has been achieved. The Czechoslovak Republic is the result of the work of both the Slovaks and Czechs. During the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they deman- 36 SLOVAKIA ded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks. Hence the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Nation. We, in America, are watching the development of events in Czechoslovakia very closely and we are not unmindful of the great progress the Republic has made. We are especially aware of the fact that your untiring efforts have in no small measure contributed to this progress . The good name of the Czechoslovak Republic abroad has been established, above all, by your indefatigable work and by the work of your able collaborator, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes. On behalf of the American Slovaks we thank you most heartily for your labor which has given to Slovakia her due place among the free nations of the world. We beg you to continue in your endeavors to make of Slovakia a happy land such as we have dreamt of while fighting in common for Czechoslovakia' s freedom and national independence. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest esteem and respect. JOHN KRAFCIK, President National Slovak Society. JOHN DVORSCAK, Secretary National Slovak Society. JOHN ZEMAN, President Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK OSLISLO, Secretary Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK ST AS , Treasurer Slovak League of America. JOHN MATLOCHA, President Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. JOHN L. ZAROVY, Secretary Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. NICHOLAS KOVAC, President District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. STEPHEN ERHARDT, Secretary District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. CLEMENT IHRISKY, President New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JANCEK, Secretary New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JOSCAK, Editor New Yorksky Dennik FRANK CELKO, Editor Slovensky Sokol STEPHEN HUSKA, Editor Nove Casy  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Ján Vojtaššák's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923 Description An account of the resource Štefan Kucík Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 7-36 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucík, Štefan, 1979- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73f1cba28d10c7548fc3abdd7abba16e.pdf e7c785da5610033cef20d5b3ecab1907 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA-2015 35 THE JOURNEY OFFOUR SLOVAK CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO THE USA IN 1926 1 Stefan Kucik In 1926, the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in the United States of America. This "country of unlimited possibilities" was generally expected to prepare a Congress that would surpass all previous International Eucharistic Congresses, both in terms of the number of participants and its grandiosity. The Congress itself was expected to become a forum to manifest the strength of American Catholicism. For Slovak-American Catholics, however, the forthcoming Congress had a significant added value. The four new Slovak Catholics bishops were to participate in it. While many authors have dealt with various aspects of the lives and activities of Slovak Catholic bishops in the interwar period, no one has yet provided us with a detailed account on their journey to the USA in 1926. This article will try to fill this gap. At the time of the International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, there were six Catholic bishops in Slovakia: Marian Blaha of Banska Bystrica, Jan Vojtassak of Spis, and Karol Kmet'ko of Nitra (all ordained on February 13, I 921 ); Jozef Carsky of Kos ice and Pavo I Jantausch of Trnava (both ordained on June 14, 1925); and Michal Bubnic of Roziiava (ordained on December 8, 1925). However, only four of them finally departed for America: Blaha, Vojtassak, Jantausch and Carsky. The number of Slovak Catholic bishops who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago initially fluctuated . On April 8, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague that all Slovak bishops would make the trip to the USA. 2 On April 14, 1926, the American Catholic 1 This is an English and slightly modified and updated version of my previous article entitled "Cesta slovenskych katolickych biskupov do slovenskej Ameriky v roku 1926," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 21-31 . 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), fond (hereinafter f.) Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, inventory �36 SLOV AKIA-2015 weekly Jednota published an article in which it announced the arrival of bishops Vojtassak, Kmet'ko, Blaha, Jantausch and, perhaps, Carsky as well, while bishop Bubnic was likely to stay at home due to his illness. 3 On May 16, 1926, the Bratislava daily Slowik men4 tioned five bishops, leaving Marian Blaha in Slovakia. The final decision on the number of bishops,who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress was made by the Bishop 's Conference only a few days before their planned departure. The Conference decided that the bishops of Nitra and Roziiava would remain at home. 5 The reason was the wish of the Papal Nuncio in Prague to have some representatives of the Slovak episcopate at his disposal. This was a time of tense negotiations with Czechoslovakia after the so-called "Marmaggi Affair." The Nuncio wanted Czech and Slovak bishops to submit a memorandum to Czechoslovak officials on the eve of Jan Hus Day (July 6). As a matter of fact, the memorandum was prepared by the Vatican's State Secretary in Rome and it demanded that the Czechoslovak government and President Masaryk refrain from participating in the Hus celebrations and from insulting Czechoslovakia's Catholics.6 Another reason for a part of the Slovak episcopate 's remaining at home was the preparation of an important law on 7 clergy salaries in Czechoslovakia. For the Slovak Catholic bishops it was the first, as well as the last, trip to America. Their requests for issuing or extending passports to the USA were met with no major obstructions, 8 even though in the case of bishop Blaha, as he said himself, the authorities exnumber (hereinafter i. no.) 22, folder (hereinafter fold .) 650. Letter of the Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 8, 1926. 3 Jednota (Middletown, PA), April 14, 1926, 4. 4 Slovak (Bratislava), May 16, 1926, 3. 5 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. 6Emilia Hrabovec, "Sviita stolica a slovenski biskupi v medzivojnovom obdobi," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 8. 7 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. The law was passed on June 25, 1926 . Zakon kongruovy c. 122/ 1926 Sb. z. an. zakon ze dne 25. cervna 1926 o uprave platu duchovenstva cirkvi a naboienskych spolecnosti statem uznanych, pfip. recipovanych [online]. Available at: http ://spcp.prf.cuni .cz/lex/ 122-26.htm. 8 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, April 8, 1926. �SLOV AKIA-2015 37 pressed "a strange sort of caution. " 9 Thus, the situation of 1923, when the Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue a passport to bishop Vojtassak for his intended journey to America, was not repeated. 10 In 1926 there were 228 Slovak Catholic parishes with 236 priests in the USA. 11 Therefore, the Slovak bishops intended to not only attend the Eucharistic Congress, but also to make a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. It was supposed to strengthen their Catholic identity which was threatened by the secularization influences of the American environment and the propaganda of the Czechoslovak Church 12 supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as to raise some funds for Catholic institutions in Slovakia. 13 Czechoslovak representative offices in the USA, however, began to collect information on the plans of Slovak-American autonomists, largely consisting of the Catholic element, to make use of the presence of the Slovak Catholic bishops for their political goals. Indeed, Slovak bishops travelled to America at a time when the idea of Slovak autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement was supported by most American Slovaks, represented by the Slovak League of America (hereinafter SLA). Information on the intended political actions of SlovakAmerican autonomists on the occasion of the Slovak bishops ' visit raised fears in the offices of Czechoslovak representatives in the USA. Therefore, the anti-autonomist circles in America sought to 9 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 19 I 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Presidium of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, May 17, 1926. 10 For more on Jan Vojtassak's case, see Stefan Kucik, "The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923," in Slovakia 41 (Nos. 76-77, 2013), 7-36. 11 Jednota : Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 1927 (Middletown, PA), 161-72. 12 The Czechoslovak Church (after 1971 the Czechoslovak Hussite Church) is a Christian Church which separated from the Roman Catholic Church after World War I (January 8, 1920) in the former Czechoslovakia. Originally a Czech national church, its activities are now almost entirely limited to today's Czech and Slovak Republics. One such church existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1926 and 1967. See Joseph P. Budd, "We do Know English: Philadelphia' s Czechoslovak Presbyterian Church of Jan Hus, 1926-1967," M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 2009. I am grateful to M. Mark Stolarik for this citation. There may have been other such Czechoslovak churches in the USA, but so far no-one has studied them. 13 Hrabovec, 8. �38 SLOV AKIA-2015 blunt the political edge of these actions. For instance, the Rev. Jozef Murgas of Wilkes-Barre, PA, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, to question Slovak priests at their upcoming conference in eastern Pennsylvania whether they were interested in politics or in religion. According to Murgas, the Czech bishops travelling to the Eucharistic Congress allegedly called upon the Slovak bishops to represent themselves in the USA as Czechoslovak bishops. Reportedly, bishop Jan Vojtassak: replied on behalf of the Slovak episcopate that they would go to America as Slovak bishops. 14 Of greater concern to the Slovak-American "Czechoslovak" camp was the fact that the president of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Andrej Hlinka himself, was also going to attend the Eucharistic Congress. Besides his trip to the Congress, Hlinka planned to use his stay in the USA to agitate for Slovak autonomy, fundraising and internationalization of the Slovak cause. 15 He also intended to settle personal disputes among Slovak-American Catholics. 16 On the initiative of the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, the Rev. Murgas decided to organize in his parish in Wilkes-Barre on June 27, 1926 a Cyrilo-Methodian ceremony on the occasion of the consecration of the new local school. He invited the whole Czech and Ruthenian episcopates, as well as the Slovak bishops Marian Blaha and Jozef Carsky. The ceremony was also to be held to commemorate the Order of the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, of which Rev. Murgas was a co-founder. The preparations were made in such a manner that Andrej Hlinka would not be present. Moreover, the occasion was to become a place where the Czech and Slovak bishops could demonstrate "Czechoslovak" solidarity. The organizers invited the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington as well. 17 14 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Pra~ue, Marc5120, 1926. 5 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 30, 1926. 16 S!owik, May 23, 1926, 1. 17 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, March 20, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650 . Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs �SLOVAKIA-2015 39 However, Getting and Murgas were disappointed. Even Murgas' personal intercession with bishop Carsky immediately upon the arrival of Slovak bishops in New York ended in vain. 18 Bishop Blaha gave priority to attendance at the Slovak Day in St. Louis, Missouri on June 27, I 926 19 and bishop Carsky went to Cudahy, Wisconsin, to administer the sacrament of confirmation. 20 On the other hand, the Slovak bishops did visit the Sacred Heart of Jesus parish in WilkesBarre on different occasions, bishop Carsky even twice.21 The four Slovak bishops set out on their journey to the USA on May 31, 192622 and arrived in New York City on the steamship Aquitania on June 11, 1926. When they docked, they were welcomed by Slovak-American priests, representatives of Slovak-American organizations and newspapers, a representative of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, J. Lavicka, and other individuals. Accompanied by several dozen cars, the bishops were driven to the Slovak st Church of St. John Nepomucene at the comer 66 th Street and 1 Avenue. Its pastor since 1916 was the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. After a short prayer in the church, there was a banquet in the Commodore Hotel, hosted by Slovak priests in honor of the Slovak bishops. The banquet was chaired by Msgr. Viktor B lahunka of Chicago (originally from Lucky near Ruzomberok). 23 He also headed the committee 24 charged with the care of the Slovak bishops while in America. of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651 . Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 22, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 18 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 19 Jednota , July 7, 1926, I. 20 Jednota , July 14, 1926, I. 21 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 22 Slowik, June 1, 1926, I. 23 Jednota , June 16, 1926, 1; Slowik, July 2, 1926, 3. 24 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. �40 SLOV AKIA-2015 After greetings and words of welcome, bishop Marian Blaha addressed the audience. He said that they had arrived in America to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, the second very important goal of their journey was to visit and strengthen the faith of Slovak-American Catholics. He expressed pleasure at the fact that the Slovak Catholics in America had preserved both their faith and their Slovak language. Bishop Blaha informed the audience that they had brought a gift to the Slovak-American Catholics - the modem Slovak translation of the Bible. He did not forget to remark that the main credit for publishing it belonged to Andrej Hlinka, who was also present at the banquet. 25 In 1926 the first translation of the Bible into modem Slovak was completed. It was published by the Society of St. Adalbert (Spolok sv. Vojtecha) in Tmava. The preparatory phase had lasted for more than four decades. It was published between the years 1913 and 1926, with a long break due to World War I. The translation consisted of ten chapters: two for the New and eight for the Old Testament. After the whole first translation of the Bible appeared, Narodnie noviny in Turciansky Svaty Martin published a review (copied by other Slovak newspapers as well) that only the revision of the translation, done by the Rev. Frantisek R. Osvald, took a full eight years.26 After the Great War, the large amount of money needed by the Society of St. Adalbert to publish the Slovak translation of the bible was hard to raise in Slovakia. In 1920 generous gifts from America began to flow into Slovakia. Especially generous were the donations given by the Slovak bishops Karol Kmet'ko, Marian Blaha and Jan Vojtassak and Andrej Hlinka (100,000 crowns each). All this money was put into the shares of the Society of St. Adalbert for publishing purposes. In the critical situation (in 1923), the Society sent a threemember delegation, led by its director Jan Postenyi-Kysucky, to the USA. Within two and half months, the delegation visited more than one hundred Slovak-American parishes. At the very first meeting with the Slovak-American editors and the presidents of Slovak25 Jednota, June I 6, 1926, I. Jan Debnar, "Hist6ria prekladu a vydania prveho svatovojtesskeho Svateho pisma," in O prekladoch Biblie do slovenciny a do inych slovanskych j azykov, Jan Dorul'a, ed. (Bratislava: Slavisticky kabinet SA V, 1997), 247, 276-278 ; Jednota, June 16, 1926, 5. 26 �SLOVAKIA-2015 41 American Catholic organizations in Pittsburgh, $1,072 was collected and 2,156 new members joined the Society (the membership fee was $4 but twenty-five founding members contributed $100 each, while the American-Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak gave $600). 27 In 1926, the Society of St. Adalbert also sent its delegation to the USA. It consisted of the director Jan Postenyi, Alexander Sindelar, Stefan Zlatos and Robert Pobozny .28 The proposition to send a delegation to the USA during the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago was made by director Jan Postenyi at the meeting of the executive board in April of 1926. As a matter of fact, the Society issued the Slovak edition of the Bible at its own expense of 800,000 crowns. If the Society was not to fall into new debt (in Slovakia an expected interest in the Slovak bible failed to materialize), it had to turn to the SlovakAmerican Catholics. Moreover, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America still held 116,000 crowns belonging to the Society of St. Adalbert, which could be claimed only in person. 29 In the USA, the delegates sold 3,800 copies of the bible for $10 .00 each . At the same time, 1,500 new members joined the Society.30 The center of the mission of the Society of St. Adalbert in the USA was its own branch in Youngstown, Ohio, which since 1922 had been administered by the Rev . Stefan Kocis.31 Eventually, American Slovaks bought 6,800 copies of the Slovak bible.32 Bishop Marian Blaha's remarks on Andrej Hlinka's contribution to the publishing of the Slovak Bible were justified. Indeed, it is often referred to as the Hlinka translation or the Hlinka and Donoval translation, because both Andrej Hlinka and Jan Donoval greatly contributed to this work. It is shocking how little attention has been given to these two priests and their role in the translation of the bible and to their contribution to the development of Slovak spiritual, linguistic and national enlightenment. Andrej Hlinka also played a major role in publishing the bible by the Society of St. Adalbert, which 27 Debnar, 282. Jan Postenyi, Dejiny Spo/ku sv. Vojte cha (Tmava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930), 79. 29 ASSV. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia vyboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha konaneho 26. aprila r. 1926 . 30 Debnar, 283. 31 Postenyi, 80. 32 Debnar, 283 . 28 �42 SLOV AKIA-2015 he led as its president from November 14, 1920, together with director Jan Postenyi and secretary Juraj Hoda! (since 1923). 33 After attending the welcoming and gala dinner in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, the Slovak bishops went their own ways: Jan Vojtassak proceeded to Rev. Anton Gracik's St. Stephen's parish in Newark, New Jersey Pavol Jantausch joined Rev. Jan Kubasek at his Holy Trinity parish in Yonkers, New York; Jozef Carsky went to administer the sacrament of confirmation (we do not know to which parish) and Marian Blaha remained at Rev. Stefan Krasul'a's . h .34 pans On Sunday, June 13 , 1926, the four Slovak bishops attended a reception for the papal nuncio to the Eucharistic Congress, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. In the evening of the same day, the Slovak bishops were guests at a banquet hosted in their honor by the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. 35 The next day the Slovak bishops attended the first graduation ceremony at Danville Academy for Girls, founded by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Danville, Pennsylvania. 36 The order is the first and only Slovak religious order founded in honor of the Apostles of the Slavs. It was established on September 11, 1909 by four Slovak-American Roman-Catholic priests: Matus Jankola, Andrej Pavco, Alexander Dianiska and Jozef Murgas. The idea of a high school for Slovak girls originated in 1922, the same year as when the Slovak Benedictines in the USA decided to establish a high school for boys in Cleveland, Ohio. In the school year 1925-26, the girl's high school already had all four grades. Therefore, the Sisters asked the state authorities for accreditation. The latter was granted to the school on June 10, 1926. 37 So only four days later the first graduation ceremony of the first ten students was held in the presence of five bishops, three monsignors, fifty-one priests and a large number of spectators. 38 33 Jbid. , 280-28 I. Slowi k, July 2, 1926, 3. 35 Ibid. 36 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 1-2. 37 Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Cleveland, OH.: Slovensky ustav pri Opatstve sv. Andreja-Svorada, 1955), 186-7, 202-03 . 38 "Prva Katolicka Slovenska Vyss ia Dievcenska Skola," in Pamatnica slovenskeho dna newyorkskych a new j erseyskych Slowikov: 5. jula, 1926. J. C. Sciranka, ed. (New York City: Vybor slovenskeho dila, s. d.), no pagination. 34 �SLOVAKIA-2015 43 On the same day, accompanied by Philip R. McDevitt, Bishop of Harrisburg, the Slovak bishops moved on to the Jednota Estates of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania.39 The First Catholic Slovak Union, a fraternal-benefit society, was founded in Cleveland in 1890 by the Reverend Stefan Furdek. On April 30, 1926, it had 629 active branches with 55 ,091 members . Established in 1906 to organize the youth, its Youth Division (Mladenecke oddelenie) had 446 active branches with 35,535 members . Altogether, the FCSU had 1,075 branches with 90,626 members . In 1926, the market value of the FCSU 's assets was $5,012,880.53 and its Youth Division 's assets totaled $157,202 .96, for a grand total of $5,170,083.65. It was the largest and strongest Slovak Catholic fraternal benefit society in the world. It also cared for orphaned children of its deceased members in an orphanage established in 1906 (opened in 1914) to this end in Middletown .40 Its editorial offices and printery were also located there.4 1 The next day, bishop Jozef Carsky left the group and went to administer the sacrament of confirmation to parishes in Houtzdale and Windburn, Pennsylvania. On June 16, 1926, the bishops left for Harrisburg, from whence they continued to 42 the Eucharistic Congress. In Chicago the bishops were officially welcomed by representatives of Slovak-American Catholic societies. Before the formal opening of the Congress, the Slovak bishops received visits by their countrymen and toured the city. In the Slovak Catholic parishes, they celebrated masses and held missionary sermons. The latter were purely apolitical. Only bishop Vojtassak complained in one of them that he could not come to America sooner, because in 1923 the Czechoslo43 vak authorities refused to issue him a passport. The Eucharistic Congress opened in the morning of June 20, 1926 with the reading of a papal bull and lasted until June 24, 1926 . 39 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I . 4-0Pamdtnik rimsko-katolickych slovenskych osad v zapad. Pennsylvanii vydany vyborom slovenskeho dna z prileiitosti navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska: v stredu dna 7. Ju/a 1926 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Vybor slovenskeho dna, s. d.), 122-3. 41 Jednota, June 23, 1926, 2. 42 /bid. 43 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People' s Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, July 30, 1926. �44 SLOV AKIA-2015 It was hosted by George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. The Holy See was represented by the papal nuncio Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano. The Congress took place in the local churches and auditoriums and in the recently opened Soldier Field Stadium. 44 On the last day of the Congress there was a pilgrimage to the city of Mundelein, Illinois, forty miles north of Chicago. The Congress was attended by representatives from all continents and thus it manifested the universality of the Catholic Church. In addition, it was the greatest pilgrimage in American history. The Chicago Daily News reported that the final mass in Mundelein was attended by an estimated half a million to a million of the faithful. 45 In addition, the Daily News reported interesting details on the pilgrimage to Mundelein, such as the consumption of ten tons of hot dogs by the pilgrims and the crush of passengers on the trains, which began running at two-minute intervals from 4 a.m. that day. It also rained, which then turned into hail, and the Daily News boasted that it managed to print photographs from Mundelein in its papers and got them on the street within two hours, thanks to swift delivery by airplane. 46 The choir during the opening of the mass consisted of 60,000 children. The Fox Film Corporation, which created a 96-minute film of the Congress (it premiered in New York on November 8, 1926), refused to accept any remuneration for its participation. An estimated 100,000 Slovaks attended the Eucharistic Congress (approximately sixty from Slovakia, including the bishops).47 The latter actively participated in the Congress by celebrating masses and delivering sermons. 48 Even though American newspapers did not pay any attention to the Slovak pilgrims at the Eucharistic Congress, 44 Soldier Field Stadium in Chicago serves as a memorial to American soldiers who died in past wars. It was designed in 1919 and opened on October 9, 1924 on the 53 rd anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire as Municipal Grant Park Stadium, changing its name to Soldier Field on November 11 , 1925. Its design is modeled on the Greco-Roman architectural tradition, with Doric columns rising above the entrance. After subsequent reconstructions, the modem grandstands diminish the impression of these columns. 45 The Chicago Daily News, June 24, 1926, I [online] . Available at: http ://encyclo£edia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ 11319.htm1. 6 Eucharistic Congress, Chicago Daily News, 1926 [online]. Available at: http: //enc clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ I 1319 .html. 4 Jednota. Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7, 43-44. 48 Slovak, July 8, 1926, 3. 1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 45 in the program of church services, published in all newspapers by the organizational board of the Congress, the Slovaks were listed as a separate group. 49 After the Eucharistic Congress, the Slovak Catholic bishops stayed in the USA until August 4, 1926. In the meantime, they visited all the major and several minor Slovak Catholic parishes. They held missionary services and sermons and administered the sacrament of confirmation. They also attended Slovak Days, gatherings and meetings.50 On July 1, 1926, they were hosted by Michal Bosak in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 51 In their speeches, the Slovak bishops avoided political issues. The representatives of Slovak-American autonomists (Ivan Bielek, President of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota and others), however, made use of the Slovak Days for agitation for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops were very popular with the people. 52 For instance, the Jednota and Slowik newspapers reported an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people at the 3rd Slovak Day in Pittsburgh on July 7, 1926. 53 On July 28, 1926, the weekly Jednota published an appeal by bishop Jozef Carsky, to Slovak-American Catholics from eastern Slovakia. The bishop stressed the importance of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, which, however, still had very few members in the east. He decided, therefore, to appeal to their countrymen in America to pay the membership fees in the Society of St. Adalbert for them . Bishop Carsky also made an appeal to the Slovak49 AMZV CR, f. Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. Interestingly enough, June Granatir Alexander, in her Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jnterwar Era (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), fails to mention Slovak participation in the Eucharistic Congress. 50 Pauco, 209. 51 ASSV, fasc. 338/2. Jozef J. Dulik, Na pamiatku Vecierka usporiadaneho na pocest' osvietenych panov Biskupov zo Slovenska Micha/om Bosakom 1-ho ju/a 1926 v Scranton, Pa. The brochure reads that the bishops were treated to caviar, green turtle soup, cuts of Virginia ham, filet of beef, vanilla ice-cream and other specialties. 52 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 53 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 2; Slovak, August 4, 1926, 5. �46 SLOVAKIA-2015 American priests to raise public awareness of this issue or to set aside one Sunday for fundraising to create a branch of the Society of St. Adalbert in Kos ice.54 All four Slovak bishops made a similar speech on July 29, 1926. In their address, the bishops, as the protectors of the Society of St. Adalbert, stressed its importance for all Slovaks. They thanked Slovak-American Catholics for their support of the Society in the past and invited them to become members, to purchase its books, especially the bible, as well as to register their countrymen in Slovakia as its members. 55 On July 30, 1926, the Slovak bishops paid an official visit to the Czechoslovak legation in Washington. Since ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger had departed, they were received by proxy. At the embassy , the bishops expressed great satisfaction with the Slovak colony in the USA and noted that everywhere they had gained an impression of real national awareness and reliability. At the same time, they expressed the belief that, in terms of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, factual judgment refined by the school of life, acumen, as well as inborn skepticism, protected American Slovaks from excesses. 56 The Slovak bishops also visited the papal nuncio to the United States. 57 Before departure, the Slovak bishops addressed to SlovakAmerican Catholics a farewell letter in which they thanked them for their receptions and hospitality. They expressed admiration for what Slovak Catholics in America had achieved in a relatively short period of time, despite various difficulties. The proverbial Slovak tenaciousness in the national and religious fields had transformed itself into Slovak churches, schools and fraternal-benefit-societies and halls. The bishops wished the Slovak Catholics in America a good life with no obstacles in the future .58 On August 3, 1926, there was a farewell banquet for the bishops in the Astoria Hotel in New York City. The representative of the 54 Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. 55 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 56 ' AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 191 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 57 Pietro Fumasoni Biondi (1872- 1960) - papal legate in the USA from December 14, 1922 to March 16, 1933. 58Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. �SLOVAKIA-2015 47 Czechoslovak legation in Washington, J. Lavicka (otherwise the Czechoslovak Consul General in New York), also came to officially say farewell to the bishops. The main theme of the bishops' final speeches was an appeal to American Slovaks to save their youth because thus they would save the nation.59 The Slovak bishops left America on the steamship Aquitania on August 4, 1926.60 Therefore, it is apparent that the four Slovak Catholic bishops used their trip to the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago for a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. During their almost two-month stay in the USA (June I I- August 4, 1926), they visited many Slovak-American Catholic parishes. To visit all of them was physically impossible, because within one day they would have had to visit more than four. For the SlovakAmerican Catholics the Slovak bishops' journey had a certain specificity . Many of them, especially Catholic priests, had had a personal experience with the chauvinism of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, which was in many cases the main reason for their departure oversees. That is why they welcomed the Slovak bishops after the creation of Czechoslovakia. As to Andrej Hlinka's agitation tour, he and the bishops, except for the latter' s reception in New York City, never appeared together. After the Eucharistic Congress they parted ways. However, the bishops' presence in America, even if apolitical, significantly increased interest among American Slovaks in Andrej Hlinka's lectures. The authority of the Slovak bishops helped Hlinka in another respect as well. His lecture tour in the USA occurred in the atmosphere of numerous minor personal arguments in the Slovak Catholic community. The presence of the Slovak bishops helped to overcome these aversions and staved off the danger of public controversy.61 On the 59 Pauco, 209; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 60 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 61 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. For a detailed account on A. Hlinka's journey to the USA in 1926, see my "Andrej Hlinka' s Journey to the USA in 1926," in Slovakia, 40 (Nos. 74-75 , 2010), 32-46. �48 SLOV AKIA-2015 other hand, the Slovak-American autonomists did not hesitate to make use of the presence of the bishops to agitate for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops often expressed their surprise at and admiration for what they saw in the centers of Slovak Catholic life in America. At the graduation ceremony in Danville, Pennsylvania, bishop Blaha rejoiced at the fact that there was a Slovak girls' high school so far from home. 62 Similarly, on the farm of the FCSU in Middletown, he admired what the society had achieved and said that in Slovakia something similar would not be possible.63 Finally, at the Slovak Day in Pittsburgh he said that, on the basis of what he had seen and experienced in Slovak America, American Slovaks would nationally and culturally survive in the USA for another hundred years.64 The Slovak bishops used their trip to America to advertise the Society of St. Adalbert and its newly-released Slovak edition of the bible. The success of this mission was more than clear and for the Society of St. Adalbert it meant a high return on its investment in publishing the Slovak bible. Part of the Slovak bishops' goals, as well as that of Andrej Hlinka, in the USA was fund-raising. For the bishops it was organized by a committee headed by Monsignor Viktor Blahunka. 65 As early as in April of 1926, Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, turned to the Slovak-American Catholics and asked them for funds for the Society of the Divine Word. 66 According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the FCSU's head office gave each of the bishops during their journey to the USA $1,000. 67 Unfortunately, we do not know how much money the Slovak bishops raised in America. Despite the fact that, according to the reports of the Czech62Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 2. Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I. 64 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 1. 65ASSV, fasc. 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 66 AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prafue, April 15, 1926. 1 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 63 �SLOV AKIA-2015 49 oslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the committees of festivals on the occasion of the visit of the Slovak Catholic bishops at some places showed a financial deficit, 68 the amount the bishops raised must have been relatively large. This is suggested by the letter of Andrej Hlinka to Jan Postenyi upon their return from America: "As you know, I have returned with fame, pennants and rings- but not many dollars . Business is business and I am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 69 68 /bid. ASSV, fasc. 156112b. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 69 � SLOV AKIA-2015 35 THE JOURNEY OFFOUR SLOVAK CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO THE USA IN 1926 1 Stefan Kucik In 1926, the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in the United States of America. This "country of unlimited possibilities" was generally expected to prepare a Congress that would surpass all previous International Eucharistic Congresses, both in terms of the number of participants and its grandiosity. The Congress itself was expected to become a forum to manifest the strength of American Catholicism. For Slovak-American Catholics, however, the forthcoming Congress had a significant added value. The four new Slovak Catholics bishops were to participate in it. While many authors have dealt with various aspects of the lives and activities of Slovak Catholic bishops in the interwar period, no one has yet provided us with a detailed account on their journey to the USA in 1926. This article will try to fill this gap. At the time of the International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, there were six Catholic bishops in Slovakia: Marian Blaha of Banska Bystrica, Jan Vojtassak of Spis, and Karol Kmet'ko of Nitra (all ordained on February 13, I 921 ); Jozef Carsky of Kos ice and Pavo I Jantausch of Trnava (both ordained on June 14, 1925); and Michal Bubnic of Roziiava (ordained on December 8, 1925). However, only four of them finally departed for America: Blaha, Vojtassak, Jantausch and Carsky. The number of Slovak Catholic bishops who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago initially fluctuated . On April 8, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague that all Slovak bishops would make the trip to the USA. 2 On April 14, 1926, the American Catholic 1 This is an English and slightly modified and updated version of my previous article entitled "Cesta slovenskych katolickych biskupov do slovenskej Ameriky v roku 1926," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 21-31 . 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), fond (hereinafter f.) Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, inventory �36 SLOV AKIA-2015 weekly Jednota published an article in which it announced the arrival of bishops Vojtassak, Kmet'ko, Blaha, Jantausch and, perhaps, Carsky as well, while bishop Bubnic was likely to stay at home due to his illness. 3 On May 16, 1926, the Bratislava daily Slowik men4 tioned five bishops, leaving Marian Blaha in Slovakia. The final decision on the number of bishops,who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress was made by the Bishop 's Conference only a few days before their planned departure. The Conference decided that the bishops of Nitra and Roziiava would remain at home. 5 The reason was the wish of the Papal Nuncio in Prague to have some representatives of the Slovak episcopate at his disposal. This was a time of tense negotiations with Czechoslovakia after the so-called "Marmaggi Affair." The Nuncio wanted Czech and Slovak bishops to submit a memorandum to Czechoslovak officials on the eve of Jan Hus Day (July 6). As a matter of fact, the memorandum was prepared by the Vatican's State Secretary in Rome and it demanded that the Czechoslovak government and President Masaryk refrain from participating in the Hus celebrations and from insulting Czechoslovakia's Catholics.6 Another reason for a part of the Slovak episcopate 's remaining at home was the preparation of an important law on 7 clergy salaries in Czechoslovakia. For the Slovak Catholic bishops it was the first, as well as the last, trip to America. Their requests for issuing or extending passports to the USA were met with no major obstructions, 8 even though in the case of bishop Blaha, as he said himself, the authorities exnumber (hereinafter i. no.) 22, folder (hereinafter fold .) 650. Letter of the Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 8, 1926. 3 Jednota (Middletown, PA), April 14, 1926, 4. 4 Slovak (Bratislava), May 16, 1926, 3. 5 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. 6Emilia Hrabovec, "Sviita stolica a slovenski biskupi v medzivojnovom obdobi," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 8. 7 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. The law was passed on June 25, 1926 . Zakon kongruovy c. 122/ 1926 Sb. z. an. zakon ze dne 25. cervna 1926 o uprave platu duchovenstva cirkvi a naboienskych spolecnosti statem uznanych, pfip. recipovanych [online]. Available at: http ://spcp.prf.cuni .cz/lex/ 122-26.htm. 8 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, April 8, 1926. �SLOV AKIA-2015 37 pressed "a strange sort of caution. " 9 Thus, the situation of 1923, when the Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue a passport to bishop Vojtassak for his intended journey to America, was not repeated. 10 In 1926 there were 228 Slovak Catholic parishes with 236 priests in the USA. 11 Therefore, the Slovak bishops intended to not only attend the Eucharistic Congress, but also to make a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. It was supposed to strengthen their Catholic identity which was threatened by the secularization influences of the American environment and the propaganda of the Czechoslovak Church 12 supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as to raise some funds for Catholic institutions in Slovakia. 13 Czechoslovak representative offices in the USA, however, began to collect information on the plans of Slovak-American autonomists, largely consisting of the Catholic element, to make use of the presence of the Slovak Catholic bishops for their political goals. Indeed, Slovak bishops travelled to America at a time when the idea of Slovak autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement was supported by most American Slovaks, represented by the Slovak League of America (hereinafter SLA). Information on the intended political actions of SlovakAmerican autonomists on the occasion of the Slovak bishops ' visit raised fears in the offices of Czechoslovak representatives in the USA. Therefore, the anti-autonomist circles in America sought to 9 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 19 I 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Presidium of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, May 17, 1926. 10 For more on Jan Vojtassak's case, see Stefan Kucik, "The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923," in Slovakia 41 (Nos. 76-77, 2013), 7-36. 11 Jednota : Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 1927 (Middletown, PA), 161-72. 12 The Czechoslovak Church (after 1971 the Czechoslovak Hussite Church) is a Christian Church which separated from the Roman Catholic Church after World War I (January 8, 1920) in the former Czechoslovakia. Originally a Czech national church, its activities are now almost entirely limited to today's Czech and Slovak Republics. One such church existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1926 and 1967. See Joseph P. Budd, "We do Know English: Philadelphia' s Czechoslovak Presbyterian Church of Jan Hus, 1926-1967," M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 2009. I am grateful to M. Mark Stolarik for this citation. There may have been other such Czechoslovak churches in the USA, but so far no-one has studied them. 13 Hrabovec, 8. �38 SLOV AKIA-2015 blunt the political edge of these actions. For instance, the Rev. Jozef Murgas of Wilkes-Barre, PA, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, to question Slovak priests at their upcoming conference in eastern Pennsylvania whether they were interested in politics or in religion. According to Murgas, the Czech bishops travelling to the Eucharistic Congress allegedly called upon the Slovak bishops to represent themselves in the USA as Czechoslovak bishops. Reportedly, bishop Jan Vojtassak: replied on behalf of the Slovak episcopate that they would go to America as Slovak bishops. 14 Of greater concern to the Slovak-American "Czechoslovak" camp was the fact that the president of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Andrej Hlinka himself, was also going to attend the Eucharistic Congress. Besides his trip to the Congress, Hlinka planned to use his stay in the USA to agitate for Slovak autonomy, fundraising and internationalization of the Slovak cause. 15 He also intended to settle personal disputes among Slovak-American Catholics. 16 On the initiative of the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, the Rev. Murgas decided to organize in his parish in Wilkes-Barre on June 27, 1926 a Cyrilo-Methodian ceremony on the occasion of the consecration of the new local school. He invited the whole Czech and Ruthenian episcopates, as well as the Slovak bishops Marian Blaha and Jozef Carsky. The ceremony was also to be held to commemorate the Order of the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, of which Rev. Murgas was a co-founder. The preparations were made in such a manner that Andrej Hlinka would not be present. Moreover, the occasion was to become a place where the Czech and Slovak bishops could demonstrate "Czechoslovak" solidarity. The organizers invited the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington as well. 17 14 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Pra~ue, Marc5120, 1926. 5 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 30, 1926. 16 S!owik, May 23, 1926, 1. 17 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, March 20, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650 . Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs �SLOVAKIA-2015 39 However, Getting and Murgas were disappointed. Even Murgas' personal intercession with bishop Carsky immediately upon the arrival of Slovak bishops in New York ended in vain. 18 Bishop Blaha gave priority to attendance at the Slovak Day in St. Louis, Missouri on June 27, I 926 19 and bishop Carsky went to Cudahy, Wisconsin, to administer the sacrament of confirmation. 20 On the other hand, the Slovak bishops did visit the Sacred Heart of Jesus parish in WilkesBarre on different occasions, bishop Carsky even twice.21 The four Slovak bishops set out on their journey to the USA on May 31, 192622 and arrived in New York City on the steamship Aquitania on June 11, 1926. When they docked, they were welcomed by Slovak-American priests, representatives of Slovak-American organizations and newspapers, a representative of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, J. Lavicka, and other individuals. Accompanied by several dozen cars, the bishops were driven to the Slovak st Church of St. John Nepomucene at the comer 66 th Street and 1 Avenue. Its pastor since 1916 was the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. After a short prayer in the church, there was a banquet in the Commodore Hotel, hosted by Slovak priests in honor of the Slovak bishops. The banquet was chaired by Msgr. Viktor B lahunka of Chicago (originally from Lucky near Ruzomberok). 23 He also headed the committee 24 charged with the care of the Slovak bishops while in America. of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651 . Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 22, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 18 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 19 Jednota , July 7, 1926, I. 20 Jednota , July 14, 1926, I. 21 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 22 Slowik, June 1, 1926, I. 23 Jednota , June 16, 1926, 1; Slowik, July 2, 1926, 3. 24 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. �40 SLOV AKIA-2015 After greetings and words of welcome, bishop Marian Blaha addressed the audience. He said that they had arrived in America to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, the second very important goal of their journey was to visit and strengthen the faith of Slovak-American Catholics. He expressed pleasure at the fact that the Slovak Catholics in America had preserved both their faith and their Slovak language. Bishop Blaha informed the audience that they had brought a gift to the Slovak-American Catholics - the modem Slovak translation of the Bible. He did not forget to remark that the main credit for publishing it belonged to Andrej Hlinka, who was also present at the banquet. 25 In 1926 the first translation of the Bible into modem Slovak was completed. It was published by the Society of St. Adalbert (Spolok sv. Vojtecha) in Tmava. The preparatory phase had lasted for more than four decades. It was published between the years 1913 and 1926, with a long break due to World War I. The translation consisted of ten chapters: two for the New and eight for the Old Testament. After the whole first translation of the Bible appeared, Narodnie noviny in Turciansky Svaty Martin published a review (copied by other Slovak newspapers as well) that only the revision of the translation, done by the Rev. Frantisek R. Osvald, took a full eight years.26 After the Great War, the large amount of money needed by the Society of St. Adalbert to publish the Slovak translation of the bible was hard to raise in Slovakia. In 1920 generous gifts from America began to flow into Slovakia. Especially generous were the donations given by the Slovak bishops Karol Kmet'ko, Marian Blaha and Jan Vojtassak and Andrej Hlinka (100,000 crowns each). All this money was put into the shares of the Society of St. Adalbert for publishing purposes. In the critical situation (in 1923), the Society sent a threemember delegation, led by its director Jan Postenyi-Kysucky, to the USA. Within two and half months, the delegation visited more than one hundred Slovak-American parishes. At the very first meeting with the Slovak-American editors and the presidents of Slovak25 Jednota, June I 6, 1926, I. Jan Debnar, "Hist6ria prekladu a vydania prveho svatovojtesskeho Svateho pisma," in O prekladoch Biblie do slovenciny a do inych slovanskych j azykov, Jan Dorul'a, ed. (Bratislava: Slavisticky kabinet SA V, 1997), 247, 276-278 ; Jednota, June 16, 1926, 5. 26 �SLOVAKIA-2015 41 American Catholic organizations in Pittsburgh, $1,072 was collected and 2,156 new members joined the Society (the membership fee was $4 but twenty-five founding members contributed $100 each, while the American-Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak gave $600). 27 In 1926, the Society of St. Adalbert also sent its delegation to the USA. It consisted of the director Jan Postenyi, Alexander Sindelar, Stefan Zlatos and Robert Pobozny .28 The proposition to send a delegation to the USA during the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago was made by director Jan Postenyi at the meeting of the executive board in April of 1926. As a matter of fact, the Society issued the Slovak edition of the Bible at its own expense of 800,000 crowns. If the Society was not to fall into new debt (in Slovakia an expected interest in the Slovak bible failed to materialize), it had to turn to the SlovakAmerican Catholics. Moreover, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America still held 116,000 crowns belonging to the Society of St. Adalbert, which could be claimed only in person. 29 In the USA, the delegates sold 3,800 copies of the bible for $10 .00 each . At the same time, 1,500 new members joined the Society.30 The center of the mission of the Society of St. Adalbert in the USA was its own branch in Youngstown, Ohio, which since 1922 had been administered by the Rev . Stefan Kocis.31 Eventually, American Slovaks bought 6,800 copies of the Slovak bible.32 Bishop Marian Blaha's remarks on Andrej Hlinka's contribution to the publishing of the Slovak Bible were justified. Indeed, it is often referred to as the Hlinka translation or the Hlinka and Donoval translation, because both Andrej Hlinka and Jan Donoval greatly contributed to this work. It is shocking how little attention has been given to these two priests and their role in the translation of the bible and to their contribution to the development of Slovak spiritual, linguistic and national enlightenment. Andrej Hlinka also played a major role in publishing the bible by the Society of St. Adalbert, which 27 Debnar, 282. Jan Postenyi, Dejiny Spo/ku sv. Vojte cha (Tmava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930), 79. 29 ASSV. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia vyboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha konaneho 26. aprila r. 1926 . 30 Debnar, 283. 31 Postenyi, 80. 32 Debnar, 283 . 28 �42 SLOV AKIA-2015 he led as its president from November 14, 1920, together with director Jan Postenyi and secretary Juraj Hoda! (since 1923). 33 After attending the welcoming and gala dinner in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, the Slovak bishops went their own ways: Jan Vojtassak proceeded to Rev. Anton Gracik's St. Stephen's parish in Newark, New Jersey Pavol Jantausch joined Rev. Jan Kubasek at his Holy Trinity parish in Yonkers, New York; Jozef Carsky went to administer the sacrament of confirmation (we do not know to which parish) and Marian Blaha remained at Rev. Stefan Krasul'a's . h .34 pans On Sunday, June 13 , 1926, the four Slovak bishops attended a reception for the papal nuncio to the Eucharistic Congress, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. In the evening of the same day, the Slovak bishops were guests at a banquet hosted in their honor by the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. 35 The next day the Slovak bishops attended the first graduation ceremony at Danville Academy for Girls, founded by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Danville, Pennsylvania. 36 The order is the first and only Slovak religious order founded in honor of the Apostles of the Slavs. It was established on September 11, 1909 by four Slovak-American Roman-Catholic priests: Matus Jankola, Andrej Pavco, Alexander Dianiska and Jozef Murgas. The idea of a high school for Slovak girls originated in 1922, the same year as when the Slovak Benedictines in the USA decided to establish a high school for boys in Cleveland, Ohio. In the school year 1925-26, the girl's high school already had all four grades. Therefore, the Sisters asked the state authorities for accreditation. The latter was granted to the school on June 10, 1926. 37 So only four days later the first graduation ceremony of the first ten students was held in the presence of five bishops, three monsignors, fifty-one priests and a large number of spectators. 38 33 Jbid. , 280-28 I. Slowi k, July 2, 1926, 3. 35 Ibid. 36 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 1-2. 37 Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Cleveland, OH.: Slovensky ustav pri Opatstve sv. Andreja-Svorada, 1955), 186-7, 202-03 . 38 "Prva Katolicka Slovenska Vyss ia Dievcenska Skola," in Pamatnica slovenskeho dna newyorkskych a new j erseyskych Slowikov: 5. jula, 1926. J. C. Sciranka, ed. (New York City: Vybor slovenskeho dila, s. d.), no pagination. 34 �SLOVAKIA-2015 43 On the same day, accompanied by Philip R. McDevitt, Bishop of Harrisburg, the Slovak bishops moved on to the Jednota Estates of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania.39 The First Catholic Slovak Union, a fraternal-benefit society, was founded in Cleveland in 1890 by the Reverend Stefan Furdek. On April 30, 1926, it had 629 active branches with 55 ,091 members . Established in 1906 to organize the youth, its Youth Division (Mladenecke oddelenie) had 446 active branches with 35,535 members . Altogether, the FCSU had 1,075 branches with 90,626 members . In 1926, the market value of the FCSU 's assets was $5,012,880.53 and its Youth Division 's assets totaled $157,202 .96, for a grand total of $5,170,083.65. It was the largest and strongest Slovak Catholic fraternal benefit society in the world. It also cared for orphaned children of its deceased members in an orphanage established in 1906 (opened in 1914) to this end in Middletown .40 Its editorial offices and printery were also located there.4 1 The next day, bishop Jozef Carsky left the group and went to administer the sacrament of confirmation to parishes in Houtzdale and Windburn, Pennsylvania. On June 16, 1926, the bishops left for Harrisburg, from whence they continued to 42 the Eucharistic Congress. In Chicago the bishops were officially welcomed by representatives of Slovak-American Catholic societies. Before the formal opening of the Congress, the Slovak bishops received visits by their countrymen and toured the city. In the Slovak Catholic parishes, they celebrated masses and held missionary sermons. The latter were purely apolitical. Only bishop Vojtassak complained in one of them that he could not come to America sooner, because in 1923 the Czechoslo43 vak authorities refused to issue him a passport. The Eucharistic Congress opened in the morning of June 20, 1926 with the reading of a papal bull and lasted until June 24, 1926 . 39 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I . 4-0Pamdtnik rimsko-katolickych slovenskych osad v zapad. Pennsylvanii vydany vyborom slovenskeho dna z prileiitosti navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska: v stredu dna 7. Ju/a 1926 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Vybor slovenskeho dna, s. d.), 122-3. 41 Jednota, June 23, 1926, 2. 42 /bid. 43 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People' s Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, July 30, 1926. �44 SLOV AKIA-2015 It was hosted by George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. The Holy See was represented by the papal nuncio Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano. The Congress took place in the local churches and auditoriums and in the recently opened Soldier Field Stadium. 44 On the last day of the Congress there was a pilgrimage to the city of Mundelein, Illinois, forty miles north of Chicago. The Congress was attended by representatives from all continents and thus it manifested the universality of the Catholic Church. In addition, it was the greatest pilgrimage in American history. The Chicago Daily News reported that the final mass in Mundelein was attended by an estimated half a million to a million of the faithful. 45 In addition, the Daily News reported interesting details on the pilgrimage to Mundelein, such as the consumption of ten tons of hot dogs by the pilgrims and the crush of passengers on the trains, which began running at two-minute intervals from 4 a.m. that day. It also rained, which then turned into hail, and the Daily News boasted that it managed to print photographs from Mundelein in its papers and got them on the street within two hours, thanks to swift delivery by airplane. 46 The choir during the opening of the mass consisted of 60,000 children. The Fox Film Corporation, which created a 96-minute film of the Congress (it premiered in New York on November 8, 1926), refused to accept any remuneration for its participation. An estimated 100,000 Slovaks attended the Eucharistic Congress (approximately sixty from Slovakia, including the bishops).47 The latter actively participated in the Congress by celebrating masses and delivering sermons. 48 Even though American newspapers did not pay any attention to the Slovak pilgrims at the Eucharistic Congress, 44 Soldier Field Stadium in Chicago serves as a memorial to American soldiers who died in past wars. It was designed in 1919 and opened on October 9, 1924 on the 53 rd anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire as Municipal Grant Park Stadium, changing its name to Soldier Field on November 11 , 1925. Its design is modeled on the Greco-Roman architectural tradition, with Doric columns rising above the entrance. After subsequent reconstructions, the modem grandstands diminish the impression of these columns. 45 The Chicago Daily News, June 24, 1926, I [online] . Available at: http ://encyclo£edia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ 11319.htm1. 6 Eucharistic Congress, Chicago Daily News, 1926 [online]. Available at: http: //enc clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ I 1319 .html. 4 Jednota. Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7, 43-44. 48 Slovak, July 8, 1926, 3. 1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 45 in the program of church services, published in all newspapers by the organizational board of the Congress, the Slovaks were listed as a separate group. 49 After the Eucharistic Congress, the Slovak Catholic bishops stayed in the USA until August 4, 1926. In the meantime, they visited all the major and several minor Slovak Catholic parishes. They held missionary services and sermons and administered the sacrament of confirmation. They also attended Slovak Days, gatherings and meetings.50 On July 1, 1926, they were hosted by Michal Bosak in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 51 In their speeches, the Slovak bishops avoided political issues. The representatives of Slovak-American autonomists (Ivan Bielek, President of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota and others), however, made use of the Slovak Days for agitation for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops were very popular with the people. 52 For instance, the Jednota and Slowik newspapers reported an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people at the 3rd Slovak Day in Pittsburgh on July 7, 1926. 53 On July 28, 1926, the weekly Jednota published an appeal by bishop Jozef Carsky, to Slovak-American Catholics from eastern Slovakia. The bishop stressed the importance of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, which, however, still had very few members in the east. He decided, therefore, to appeal to their countrymen in America to pay the membership fees in the Society of St. Adalbert for them . Bishop Carsky also made an appeal to the Slovak49 AMZV CR, f. Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. Interestingly enough, June Granatir Alexander, in her Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jnterwar Era (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), fails to mention Slovak participation in the Eucharistic Congress. 50 Pauco, 209. 51 ASSV, fasc. 338/2. Jozef J. Dulik, Na pamiatku Vecierka usporiadaneho na pocest' osvietenych panov Biskupov zo Slovenska Micha/om Bosakom 1-ho ju/a 1926 v Scranton, Pa. The brochure reads that the bishops were treated to caviar, green turtle soup, cuts of Virginia ham, filet of beef, vanilla ice-cream and other specialties. 52 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 53 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 2; Slovak, August 4, 1926, 5. �46 SLOVAKIA-2015 American priests to raise public awareness of this issue or to set aside one Sunday for fundraising to create a branch of the Society of St. Adalbert in Kos ice.54 All four Slovak bishops made a similar speech on July 29, 1926. In their address, the bishops, as the protectors of the Society of St. Adalbert, stressed its importance for all Slovaks. They thanked Slovak-American Catholics for their support of the Society in the past and invited them to become members, to purchase its books, especially the bible, as well as to register their countrymen in Slovakia as its members. 55 On July 30, 1926, the Slovak bishops paid an official visit to the Czechoslovak legation in Washington. Since ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger had departed, they were received by proxy. At the embassy , the bishops expressed great satisfaction with the Slovak colony in the USA and noted that everywhere they had gained an impression of real national awareness and reliability. At the same time, they expressed the belief that, in terms of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, factual judgment refined by the school of life, acumen, as well as inborn skepticism, protected American Slovaks from excesses. 56 The Slovak bishops also visited the papal nuncio to the United States. 57 Before departure, the Slovak bishops addressed to SlovakAmerican Catholics a farewell letter in which they thanked them for their receptions and hospitality. They expressed admiration for what Slovak Catholics in America had achieved in a relatively short period of time, despite various difficulties. The proverbial Slovak tenaciousness in the national and religious fields had transformed itself into Slovak churches, schools and fraternal-benefit-societies and halls. The bishops wished the Slovak Catholics in America a good life with no obstacles in the future .58 On August 3, 1926, there was a farewell banquet for the bishops in the Astoria Hotel in New York City. The representative of the 54 Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. 55 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 56 ' AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 191 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 57 Pietro Fumasoni Biondi (1872- 1960) - papal legate in the USA from December 14, 1922 to March 16, 1933. 58Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. �SLOVAKIA-2015 47 Czechoslovak legation in Washington, J. Lavicka (otherwise the Czechoslovak Consul General in New York), also came to officially say farewell to the bishops. The main theme of the bishops' final speeches was an appeal to American Slovaks to save their youth because thus they would save the nation.59 The Slovak bishops left America on the steamship Aquitania on August 4, 1926.60 Therefore, it is apparent that the four Slovak Catholic bishops used their trip to the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago for a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. During their almost two-month stay in the USA (June I I- August 4, 1926), they visited many Slovak-American Catholic parishes. To visit all of them was physically impossible, because within one day they would have had to visit more than four. For the SlovakAmerican Catholics the Slovak bishops' journey had a certain specificity . Many of them, especially Catholic priests, had had a personal experience with the chauvinism of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, which was in many cases the main reason for their departure oversees. That is why they welcomed the Slovak bishops after the creation of Czechoslovakia. As to Andrej Hlinka's agitation tour, he and the bishops, except for the latter' s reception in New York City, never appeared together. After the Eucharistic Congress they parted ways. However, the bishops' presence in America, even if apolitical, significantly increased interest among American Slovaks in Andrej Hlinka's lectures. The authority of the Slovak bishops helped Hlinka in another respect as well. His lecture tour in the USA occurred in the atmosphere of numerous minor personal arguments in the Slovak Catholic community. The presence of the Slovak bishops helped to overcome these aversions and staved off the danger of public controversy.61 On the 59 Pauco, 209; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 60 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 61 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. For a detailed account on A. Hlinka's journey to the USA in 1926, see my "Andrej Hlinka' s Journey to the USA in 1926," in Slovakia, 40 (Nos. 74-75 , 2010), 32-46. �48 SLOV AKIA-2015 other hand, the Slovak-American autonomists did not hesitate to make use of the presence of the bishops to agitate for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops often expressed their surprise at and admiration for what they saw in the centers of Slovak Catholic life in America. At the graduation ceremony in Danville, Pennsylvania, bishop Blaha rejoiced at the fact that there was a Slovak girls' high school so far from home. 62 Similarly, on the farm of the FCSU in Middletown, he admired what the society had achieved and said that in Slovakia something similar would not be possible.63 Finally, at the Slovak Day in Pittsburgh he said that, on the basis of what he had seen and experienced in Slovak America, American Slovaks would nationally and culturally survive in the USA for another hundred years.64 The Slovak bishops used their trip to America to advertise the Society of St. Adalbert and its newly-released Slovak edition of the bible. The success of this mission was more than clear and for the Society of St. Adalbert it meant a high return on its investment in publishing the Slovak bible. Part of the Slovak bishops' goals, as well as that of Andrej Hlinka, in the USA was fund-raising. For the bishops it was organized by a committee headed by Monsignor Viktor Blahunka. 65 As early as in April of 1926, Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, turned to the Slovak-American Catholics and asked them for funds for the Society of the Divine Word. 66 According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the FCSU's head office gave each of the bishops during their journey to the USA $1,000. 67 Unfortunately, we do not know how much money the Slovak bishops raised in America. Despite the fact that, according to the reports of the Czech62Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 2. Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I. 64 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 1. 65ASSV, fasc. 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 66 AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prafue, April 15, 1926. 1 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 63 �SLOV AKIA-2015 49 oslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the committees of festivals on the occasion of the visit of the Slovak Catholic bishops at some places showed a financial deficit, 68 the amount the bishops raised must have been relatively large. This is suggested by the letter of Andrej Hlinka to Jan Postenyi upon their return from America: "As you know, I have returned with fame, pennants and rings- but not many dollars . Business is business and I am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 69 68 /bid. ASSV, fasc. 156112b. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 69 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA-2015 35 THE JOURNEY OFFOUR SLOVAK CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO THE USA IN 1926 1 Stefan Kucik In 1926, the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in the United States of America. This "country of unlimited possibilities" was generally expected to prepare a Congress that would surpass all previous International Eucharistic Congresses, both in terms of the number of participants and its grandiosity. The Congress itself was expected to become a forum to manifest the strength of American Catholicism. For Slovak-American Catholics, however, the forthcoming Congress had a significant added value. The four new Slovak Catholics bishops were to participate in it. While many authors have dealt with various aspects of the lives and activities of Slovak Catholic bishops in the interwar period, no one has yet provided us with a detailed account on their journey to the USA in 1926. This article will try to fill this gap. At the time of the International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, there were six Catholic bishops in Slovakia: Marian Blaha of Banska Bystrica, Jan Vojtassak of Spis, and Karol Kmet'ko of Nitra (all ordained on February 13, I 921 ); Jozef Carsky of Kos ice and Pavo I Jantausch of Trnava (both ordained on June 14, 1925); and Michal Bubnic of Roziiava (ordained on December 8, 1925). However, only four of them finally departed for America: Blaha, Vojtassak, Jantausch and Carsky. The number of Slovak Catholic bishops who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago initially fluctuated . On April 8, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague that all Slovak bishops would make the trip to the USA. 2 On April 14, 1926, the American Catholic 1 This is an English and slightly modified and updated version of my previous article entitled "Cesta slovenskych katolickych biskupov do slovenskej Ameriky v roku 1926," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 21-31 . 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), fond (hereinafter f.) Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, inventory 36 SLOV AKIA-2015 weekly Jednota published an article in which it announced the arrival of bishops Vojtassak, Kmet'ko, Blaha, Jantausch and, perhaps, Carsky as well, while bishop Bubnic was likely to stay at home due to his illness. 3 On May 16, 1926, the Bratislava daily Slowik men4 tioned five bishops, leaving Marian Blaha in Slovakia. The final decision on the number of bishops,who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress was made by the Bishop 's Conference only a few days before their planned departure. The Conference decided that the bishops of Nitra and Roziiava would remain at home. 5 The reason was the wish of the Papal Nuncio in Prague to have some representatives of the Slovak episcopate at his disposal. This was a time of tense negotiations with Czechoslovakia after the so-called "Marmaggi Affair." The Nuncio wanted Czech and Slovak bishops to submit a memorandum to Czechoslovak officials on the eve of Jan Hus Day (July 6). As a matter of fact, the memorandum was prepared by the Vatican's State Secretary in Rome and it demanded that the Czechoslovak government and President Masaryk refrain from participating in the Hus celebrations and from insulting Czechoslovakia's Catholics.6 Another reason for a part of the Slovak episcopate 's remaining at home was the preparation of an important law on 7 clergy salaries in Czechoslovakia. For the Slovak Catholic bishops it was the first, as well as the last, trip to America. Their requests for issuing or extending passports to the USA were met with no major obstructions, 8 even though in the case of bishop Blaha, as he said himself, the authorities exnumber (hereinafter i. no.) 22, folder (hereinafter fold .) 650. Letter of the Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 8, 1926. 3 Jednota (Middletown, PA), April 14, 1926, 4. 4 Slovak (Bratislava), May 16, 1926, 3. 5 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. 6Emilia Hrabovec, "Sviita stolica a slovenski biskupi v medzivojnovom obdobi," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 8. 7 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. The law was passed on June 25, 1926 . Zakon kongruovy c. 122/ 1926 Sb. z. an. zakon ze dne 25. cervna 1926 o uprave platu duchovenstva cirkvi a naboienskych spolecnosti statem uznanych, pfip. recipovanych [online]. Available at: http ://spcp.prf.cuni .cz/lex/ 122-26.htm. 8 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, April 8, 1926. SLOV AKIA-2015 37 pressed "a strange sort of caution. " 9 Thus, the situation of 1923, when the Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue a passport to bishop Vojtassak for his intended journey to America, was not repeated. 10 In 1926 there were 228 Slovak Catholic parishes with 236 priests in the USA. 11 Therefore, the Slovak bishops intended to not only attend the Eucharistic Congress, but also to make a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. It was supposed to strengthen their Catholic identity which was threatened by the secularization influences of the American environment and the propaganda of the Czechoslovak Church 12 supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as to raise some funds for Catholic institutions in Slovakia. 13 Czechoslovak representative offices in the USA, however, began to collect information on the plans of Slovak-American autonomists, largely consisting of the Catholic element, to make use of the presence of the Slovak Catholic bishops for their political goals. Indeed, Slovak bishops travelled to America at a time when the idea of Slovak autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement was supported by most American Slovaks, represented by the Slovak League of America (hereinafter SLA). Information on the intended political actions of SlovakAmerican autonomists on the occasion of the Slovak bishops ' visit raised fears in the offices of Czechoslovak representatives in the USA. Therefore, the anti-autonomist circles in America sought to 9 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 19 I 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Presidium of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, May 17, 1926. 10 For more on Jan Vojtassak's case, see Stefan Kucik, "The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923," in Slovakia 41 (Nos. 76-77, 2013), 7-36. 11 Jednota : Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 1927 (Middletown, PA), 161-72. 12 The Czechoslovak Church (after 1971 the Czechoslovak Hussite Church) is a Christian Church which separated from the Roman Catholic Church after World War I (January 8, 1920) in the former Czechoslovakia. Originally a Czech national church, its activities are now almost entirely limited to today's Czech and Slovak Republics. One such church existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1926 and 1967. See Joseph P. Budd, "We do Know English: Philadelphia' s Czechoslovak Presbyterian Church of Jan Hus, 1926-1967," M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 2009. I am grateful to M. Mark Stolarik for this citation. There may have been other such Czechoslovak churches in the USA, but so far no-one has studied them. 13 Hrabovec, 8. 38 SLOV AKIA-2015 blunt the political edge of these actions. For instance, the Rev. Jozef Murgas of Wilkes-Barre, PA, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, to question Slovak priests at their upcoming conference in eastern Pennsylvania whether they were interested in politics or in religion. According to Murgas, the Czech bishops travelling to the Eucharistic Congress allegedly called upon the Slovak bishops to represent themselves in the USA as Czechoslovak bishops. Reportedly, bishop Jan Vojtassak: replied on behalf of the Slovak episcopate that they would go to America as Slovak bishops. 14 Of greater concern to the Slovak-American "Czechoslovak" camp was the fact that the president of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Andrej Hlinka himself, was also going to attend the Eucharistic Congress. Besides his trip to the Congress, Hlinka planned to use his stay in the USA to agitate for Slovak autonomy, fundraising and internationalization of the Slovak cause. 15 He also intended to settle personal disputes among Slovak-American Catholics. 16 On the initiative of the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, the Rev. Murgas decided to organize in his parish in Wilkes-Barre on June 27, 1926 a Cyrilo-Methodian ceremony on the occasion of the consecration of the new local school. He invited the whole Czech and Ruthenian episcopates, as well as the Slovak bishops Marian Blaha and Jozef Carsky. The ceremony was also to be held to commemorate the Order of the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, of which Rev. Murgas was a co-founder. The preparations were made in such a manner that Andrej Hlinka would not be present. Moreover, the occasion was to become a place where the Czech and Slovak bishops could demonstrate "Czechoslovak" solidarity. The organizers invited the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington as well. 17 14 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Pra~ue, Marc5120, 1926. 5 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 30, 1926. 16 S!owik, May 23, 1926, 1. 17 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, March 20, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650 . Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs SLOVAKIA-2015 39 However, Getting and Murgas were disappointed. Even Murgas' personal intercession with bishop Carsky immediately upon the arrival of Slovak bishops in New York ended in vain. 18 Bishop Blaha gave priority to attendance at the Slovak Day in St. Louis, Missouri on June 27, I 926 19 and bishop Carsky went to Cudahy, Wisconsin, to administer the sacrament of confirmation. 20 On the other hand, the Slovak bishops did visit the Sacred Heart of Jesus parish in WilkesBarre on different occasions, bishop Carsky even twice.21 The four Slovak bishops set out on their journey to the USA on May 31, 192622 and arrived in New York City on the steamship Aquitania on June 11, 1926. When they docked, they were welcomed by Slovak-American priests, representatives of Slovak-American organizations and newspapers, a representative of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, J. Lavicka, and other individuals. Accompanied by several dozen cars, the bishops were driven to the Slovak st Church of St. John Nepomucene at the comer 66 th Street and 1 Avenue. Its pastor since 1916 was the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. After a short prayer in the church, there was a banquet in the Commodore Hotel, hosted by Slovak priests in honor of the Slovak bishops. The banquet was chaired by Msgr. Viktor B lahunka of Chicago (originally from Lucky near Ruzomberok). 23 He also headed the committee 24 charged with the care of the Slovak bishops while in America. of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651 . Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 22, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 18 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 19 Jednota , July 7, 1926, I. 20 Jednota , July 14, 1926, I. 21 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 22 Slowik, June 1, 1926, I. 23 Jednota , June 16, 1926, 1; Slowik, July 2, 1926, 3. 24 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 40 SLOV AKIA-2015 After greetings and words of welcome, bishop Marian Blaha addressed the audience. He said that they had arrived in America to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, the second very important goal of their journey was to visit and strengthen the faith of Slovak-American Catholics. He expressed pleasure at the fact that the Slovak Catholics in America had preserved both their faith and their Slovak language. Bishop Blaha informed the audience that they had brought a gift to the Slovak-American Catholics - the modem Slovak translation of the Bible. He did not forget to remark that the main credit for publishing it belonged to Andrej Hlinka, who was also present at the banquet. 25 In 1926 the first translation of the Bible into modem Slovak was completed. It was published by the Society of St. Adalbert (Spolok sv. Vojtecha) in Tmava. The preparatory phase had lasted for more than four decades. It was published between the years 1913 and 1926, with a long break due to World War I. The translation consisted of ten chapters: two for the New and eight for the Old Testament. After the whole first translation of the Bible appeared, Narodnie noviny in Turciansky Svaty Martin published a review (copied by other Slovak newspapers as well) that only the revision of the translation, done by the Rev. Frantisek R. Osvald, took a full eight years.26 After the Great War, the large amount of money needed by the Society of St. Adalbert to publish the Slovak translation of the bible was hard to raise in Slovakia. In 1920 generous gifts from America began to flow into Slovakia. Especially generous were the donations given by the Slovak bishops Karol Kmet'ko, Marian Blaha and Jan Vojtassak and Andrej Hlinka (100,000 crowns each). All this money was put into the shares of the Society of St. Adalbert for publishing purposes. In the critical situation (in 1923), the Society sent a threemember delegation, led by its director Jan Postenyi-Kysucky, to the USA. Within two and half months, the delegation visited more than one hundred Slovak-American parishes. At the very first meeting with the Slovak-American editors and the presidents of Slovak25 Jednota, June I 6, 1926, I. Jan Debnar, "Hist6ria prekladu a vydania prveho svatovojtesskeho Svateho pisma," in O prekladoch Biblie do slovenciny a do inych slovanskych j azykov, Jan Dorul'a, ed. (Bratislava: Slavisticky kabinet SA V, 1997), 247, 276-278 ; Jednota, June 16, 1926, 5. 26 SLOVAKIA-2015 41 American Catholic organizations in Pittsburgh, $1,072 was collected and 2,156 new members joined the Society (the membership fee was $4 but twenty-five founding members contributed $100 each, while the American-Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak gave $600). 27 In 1926, the Society of St. Adalbert also sent its delegation to the USA. It consisted of the director Jan Postenyi, Alexander Sindelar, Stefan Zlatos and Robert Pobozny .28 The proposition to send a delegation to the USA during the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago was made by director Jan Postenyi at the meeting of the executive board in April of 1926. As a matter of fact, the Society issued the Slovak edition of the Bible at its own expense of 800,000 crowns. If the Society was not to fall into new debt (in Slovakia an expected interest in the Slovak bible failed to materialize), it had to turn to the SlovakAmerican Catholics. Moreover, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America still held 116,000 crowns belonging to the Society of St. Adalbert, which could be claimed only in person. 29 In the USA, the delegates sold 3,800 copies of the bible for $10 .00 each . At the same time, 1,500 new members joined the Society.30 The center of the mission of the Society of St. Adalbert in the USA was its own branch in Youngstown, Ohio, which since 1922 had been administered by the Rev . Stefan Kocis.31 Eventually, American Slovaks bought 6,800 copies of the Slovak bible.32 Bishop Marian Blaha's remarks on Andrej Hlinka's contribution to the publishing of the Slovak Bible were justified. Indeed, it is often referred to as the Hlinka translation or the Hlinka and Donoval translation, because both Andrej Hlinka and Jan Donoval greatly contributed to this work. It is shocking how little attention has been given to these two priests and their role in the translation of the bible and to their contribution to the development of Slovak spiritual, linguistic and national enlightenment. Andrej Hlinka also played a major role in publishing the bible by the Society of St. Adalbert, which 27 Debnar, 282. Jan Postenyi, Dejiny Spo/ku sv. Vojte cha (Tmava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930), 79. 29 ASSV. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia vyboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha konaneho 26. aprila r. 1926 . 30 Debnar, 283. 31 Postenyi, 80. 32 Debnar, 283 . 28 42 SLOV AKIA-2015 he led as its president from November 14, 1920, together with director Jan Postenyi and secretary Juraj Hoda! (since 1923). 33 After attending the welcoming and gala dinner in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, the Slovak bishops went their own ways: Jan Vojtassak proceeded to Rev. Anton Gracik's St. Stephen's parish in Newark, New Jersey Pavol Jantausch joined Rev. Jan Kubasek at his Holy Trinity parish in Yonkers, New York; Jozef Carsky went to administer the sacrament of confirmation (we do not know to which parish) and Marian Blaha remained at Rev. Stefan Krasul'a's . h .34 pans On Sunday, June 13 , 1926, the four Slovak bishops attended a reception for the papal nuncio to the Eucharistic Congress, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. In the evening of the same day, the Slovak bishops were guests at a banquet hosted in their honor by the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. 35 The next day the Slovak bishops attended the first graduation ceremony at Danville Academy for Girls, founded by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Danville, Pennsylvania. 36 The order is the first and only Slovak religious order founded in honor of the Apostles of the Slavs. It was established on September 11, 1909 by four Slovak-American Roman-Catholic priests: Matus Jankola, Andrej Pavco, Alexander Dianiska and Jozef Murgas. The idea of a high school for Slovak girls originated in 1922, the same year as when the Slovak Benedictines in the USA decided to establish a high school for boys in Cleveland, Ohio. In the school year 1925-26, the girl's high school already had all four grades. Therefore, the Sisters asked the state authorities for accreditation. The latter was granted to the school on June 10, 1926. 37 So only four days later the first graduation ceremony of the first ten students was held in the presence of five bishops, three monsignors, fifty-one priests and a large number of spectators. 38 33 Jbid. , 280-28 I. Slowi k, July 2, 1926, 3. 35 Ibid. 36 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 1-2. 37 Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Cleveland, OH.: Slovensky ustav pri Opatstve sv. Andreja-Svorada, 1955), 186-7, 202-03 . 38 "Prva Katolicka Slovenska Vyss ia Dievcenska Skola," in Pamatnica slovenskeho dna newyorkskych a new j erseyskych Slowikov: 5. jula, 1926. J. C. Sciranka, ed. (New York City: Vybor slovenskeho dila, s. d.), no pagination. 34 SLOVAKIA-2015 43 On the same day, accompanied by Philip R. McDevitt, Bishop of Harrisburg, the Slovak bishops moved on to the Jednota Estates of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania.39 The First Catholic Slovak Union, a fraternal-benefit society, was founded in Cleveland in 1890 by the Reverend Stefan Furdek. On April 30, 1926, it had 629 active branches with 55 ,091 members . Established in 1906 to organize the youth, its Youth Division (Mladenecke oddelenie) had 446 active branches with 35,535 members . Altogether, the FCSU had 1,075 branches with 90,626 members . In 1926, the market value of the FCSU 's assets was $5,012,880.53 and its Youth Division 's assets totaled $157,202 .96, for a grand total of $5,170,083.65. It was the largest and strongest Slovak Catholic fraternal benefit society in the world. It also cared for orphaned children of its deceased members in an orphanage established in 1906 (opened in 1914) to this end in Middletown .40 Its editorial offices and printery were also located there.4 1 The next day, bishop Jozef Carsky left the group and went to administer the sacrament of confirmation to parishes in Houtzdale and Windburn, Pennsylvania. On June 16, 1926, the bishops left for Harrisburg, from whence they continued to 42 the Eucharistic Congress. In Chicago the bishops were officially welcomed by representatives of Slovak-American Catholic societies. Before the formal opening of the Congress, the Slovak bishops received visits by their countrymen and toured the city. In the Slovak Catholic parishes, they celebrated masses and held missionary sermons. The latter were purely apolitical. Only bishop Vojtassak complained in one of them that he could not come to America sooner, because in 1923 the Czechoslo43 vak authorities refused to issue him a passport. The Eucharistic Congress opened in the morning of June 20, 1926 with the reading of a papal bull and lasted until June 24, 1926 . 39 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I . 4-0Pamdtnik rimsko-katolickych slovenskych osad v zapad. Pennsylvanii vydany vyborom slovenskeho dna z prileiitosti navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska: v stredu dna 7. Ju/a 1926 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Vybor slovenskeho dna, s. d.), 122-3. 41 Jednota, June 23, 1926, 2. 42 /bid. 43 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People' s Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, July 30, 1926. 44 SLOV AKIA-2015 It was hosted by George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. The Holy See was represented by the papal nuncio Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano. The Congress took place in the local churches and auditoriums and in the recently opened Soldier Field Stadium. 44 On the last day of the Congress there was a pilgrimage to the city of Mundelein, Illinois, forty miles north of Chicago. The Congress was attended by representatives from all continents and thus it manifested the universality of the Catholic Church. In addition, it was the greatest pilgrimage in American history. The Chicago Daily News reported that the final mass in Mundelein was attended by an estimated half a million to a million of the faithful. 45 In addition, the Daily News reported interesting details on the pilgrimage to Mundelein, such as the consumption of ten tons of hot dogs by the pilgrims and the crush of passengers on the trains, which began running at two-minute intervals from 4 a.m. that day. It also rained, which then turned into hail, and the Daily News boasted that it managed to print photographs from Mundelein in its papers and got them on the street within two hours, thanks to swift delivery by airplane. 46 The choir during the opening of the mass consisted of 60,000 children. The Fox Film Corporation, which created a 96-minute film of the Congress (it premiered in New York on November 8, 1926), refused to accept any remuneration for its participation. An estimated 100,000 Slovaks attended the Eucharistic Congress (approximately sixty from Slovakia, including the bishops).47 The latter actively participated in the Congress by celebrating masses and delivering sermons. 48 Even though American newspapers did not pay any attention to the Slovak pilgrims at the Eucharistic Congress, 44 Soldier Field Stadium in Chicago serves as a memorial to American soldiers who died in past wars. It was designed in 1919 and opened on October 9, 1924 on the 53 rd anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire as Municipal Grant Park Stadium, changing its name to Soldier Field on November 11 , 1925. Its design is modeled on the Greco-Roman architectural tradition, with Doric columns rising above the entrance. After subsequent reconstructions, the modem grandstands diminish the impression of these columns. 45 The Chicago Daily News, June 24, 1926, I [online] . Available at: http ://encyclo£edia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ 11319.htm1. 6 Eucharistic Congress, Chicago Daily News, 1926 [online]. Available at: http: //enc clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ I 1319 .html. 4 Jednota. Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7, 43-44. 48 Slovak, July 8, 1926, 3. 1 SLOV AKIA-2015 45 in the program of church services, published in all newspapers by the organizational board of the Congress, the Slovaks were listed as a separate group. 49 After the Eucharistic Congress, the Slovak Catholic bishops stayed in the USA until August 4, 1926. In the meantime, they visited all the major and several minor Slovak Catholic parishes. They held missionary services and sermons and administered the sacrament of confirmation. They also attended Slovak Days, gatherings and meetings.50 On July 1, 1926, they were hosted by Michal Bosak in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 51 In their speeches, the Slovak bishops avoided political issues. The representatives of Slovak-American autonomists (Ivan Bielek, President of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota and others), however, made use of the Slovak Days for agitation for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops were very popular with the people. 52 For instance, the Jednota and Slowik newspapers reported an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people at the 3rd Slovak Day in Pittsburgh on July 7, 1926. 53 On July 28, 1926, the weekly Jednota published an appeal by bishop Jozef Carsky, to Slovak-American Catholics from eastern Slovakia. The bishop stressed the importance of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, which, however, still had very few members in the east. He decided, therefore, to appeal to their countrymen in America to pay the membership fees in the Society of St. Adalbert for them . Bishop Carsky also made an appeal to the Slovak49 AMZV CR, f. Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. Interestingly enough, June Granatir Alexander, in her Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jnterwar Era (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), fails to mention Slovak participation in the Eucharistic Congress. 50 Pauco, 209. 51 ASSV, fasc. 338/2. Jozef J. Dulik, Na pamiatku Vecierka usporiadaneho na pocest' osvietenych panov Biskupov zo Slovenska Micha/om Bosakom 1-ho ju/a 1926 v Scranton, Pa. The brochure reads that the bishops were treated to caviar, green turtle soup, cuts of Virginia ham, filet of beef, vanilla ice-cream and other specialties. 52 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 53 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 2; Slovak, August 4, 1926, 5. 46 SLOVAKIA-2015 American priests to raise public awareness of this issue or to set aside one Sunday for fundraising to create a branch of the Society of St. Adalbert in Kos ice.54 All four Slovak bishops made a similar speech on July 29, 1926. In their address, the bishops, as the protectors of the Society of St. Adalbert, stressed its importance for all Slovaks. They thanked Slovak-American Catholics for their support of the Society in the past and invited them to become members, to purchase its books, especially the bible, as well as to register their countrymen in Slovakia as its members. 55 On July 30, 1926, the Slovak bishops paid an official visit to the Czechoslovak legation in Washington. Since ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger had departed, they were received by proxy. At the embassy , the bishops expressed great satisfaction with the Slovak colony in the USA and noted that everywhere they had gained an impression of real national awareness and reliability. At the same time, they expressed the belief that, in terms of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, factual judgment refined by the school of life, acumen, as well as inborn skepticism, protected American Slovaks from excesses. 56 The Slovak bishops also visited the papal nuncio to the United States. 57 Before departure, the Slovak bishops addressed to SlovakAmerican Catholics a farewell letter in which they thanked them for their receptions and hospitality. They expressed admiration for what Slovak Catholics in America had achieved in a relatively short period of time, despite various difficulties. The proverbial Slovak tenaciousness in the national and religious fields had transformed itself into Slovak churches, schools and fraternal-benefit-societies and halls. The bishops wished the Slovak Catholics in America a good life with no obstacles in the future .58 On August 3, 1926, there was a farewell banquet for the bishops in the Astoria Hotel in New York City. The representative of the 54 Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. 55 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 56 ' AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 191 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 57 Pietro Fumasoni Biondi (1872- 1960) - papal legate in the USA from December 14, 1922 to March 16, 1933. 58Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. SLOVAKIA-2015 47 Czechoslovak legation in Washington, J. Lavicka (otherwise the Czechoslovak Consul General in New York), also came to officially say farewell to the bishops. The main theme of the bishops' final speeches was an appeal to American Slovaks to save their youth because thus they would save the nation.59 The Slovak bishops left America on the steamship Aquitania on August 4, 1926.60 Therefore, it is apparent that the four Slovak Catholic bishops used their trip to the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago for a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. During their almost two-month stay in the USA (June I I- August 4, 1926), they visited many Slovak-American Catholic parishes. To visit all of them was physically impossible, because within one day they would have had to visit more than four. For the SlovakAmerican Catholics the Slovak bishops' journey had a certain specificity . Many of them, especially Catholic priests, had had a personal experience with the chauvinism of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, which was in many cases the main reason for their departure oversees. That is why they welcomed the Slovak bishops after the creation of Czechoslovakia. As to Andrej Hlinka's agitation tour, he and the bishops, except for the latter' s reception in New York City, never appeared together. After the Eucharistic Congress they parted ways. However, the bishops' presence in America, even if apolitical, significantly increased interest among American Slovaks in Andrej Hlinka's lectures. The authority of the Slovak bishops helped Hlinka in another respect as well. His lecture tour in the USA occurred in the atmosphere of numerous minor personal arguments in the Slovak Catholic community. The presence of the Slovak bishops helped to overcome these aversions and staved off the danger of public controversy.61 On the 59 Pauco, 209; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 60 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 61 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. For a detailed account on A. Hlinka's journey to the USA in 1926, see my "Andrej Hlinka' s Journey to the USA in 1926," in Slovakia, 40 (Nos. 74-75 , 2010), 32-46. 48 SLOV AKIA-2015 other hand, the Slovak-American autonomists did not hesitate to make use of the presence of the bishops to agitate for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops often expressed their surprise at and admiration for what they saw in the centers of Slovak Catholic life in America. At the graduation ceremony in Danville, Pennsylvania, bishop Blaha rejoiced at the fact that there was a Slovak girls' high school so far from home. 62 Similarly, on the farm of the FCSU in Middletown, he admired what the society had achieved and said that in Slovakia something similar would not be possible.63 Finally, at the Slovak Day in Pittsburgh he said that, on the basis of what he had seen and experienced in Slovak America, American Slovaks would nationally and culturally survive in the USA for another hundred years.64 The Slovak bishops used their trip to America to advertise the Society of St. Adalbert and its newly-released Slovak edition of the bible. The success of this mission was more than clear and for the Society of St. Adalbert it meant a high return on its investment in publishing the Slovak bible. Part of the Slovak bishops' goals, as well as that of Andrej Hlinka, in the USA was fund-raising. For the bishops it was organized by a committee headed by Monsignor Viktor Blahunka. 65 As early as in April of 1926, Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, turned to the Slovak-American Catholics and asked them for funds for the Society of the Divine Word. 66 According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the FCSU's head office gave each of the bishops during their journey to the USA $1,000. 67 Unfortunately, we do not know how much money the Slovak bishops raised in America. Despite the fact that, according to the reports of the Czech62Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 2. Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I. 64 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 1. 65ASSV, fasc. 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 66 AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prafue, April 15, 1926. 1 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 63 SLOV AKIA-2015 49 oslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the committees of festivals on the occasion of the visit of the Slovak Catholic bishops at some places showed a financial deficit, 68 the amount the bishops raised must have been relatively large. This is suggested by the letter of Andrej Hlinka to Jan Postenyi upon their return from America: "As you know, I have returned with fame, pennants and rings- but not many dollars . Business is business and I am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 69 68 /bid. ASSV, fasc. 156112b. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 69  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Journey of Four Slovak Catholic Bishops to the USA in 1926 Description An account of the resource Štefan Kucík Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 35-49 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucík, Štefan, 1979- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a5c6cc732827ec9522ab7d3b1d052402.pdf 68bf469ebbb26599233137aedddc8107 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA MOSOOW'S SMOKE SCREEN IN SWVAKIA Heinrich Kuhn Slovakia and .the Sudetenland were ever a thorn in the side of the Prague government. After the Sudeten German problem appeared to have been settled by the expulsions of 1945-46, Slovakia striving for autonomy remained the only threat to the integrity of a Communist-ruled CzechoSlovakia. It is obvious from the Soviet Union's plans for Slovakia for 1961 to 1965 that the question of a Slovak Soviet Republic is no utopian dream. Even prior to the implementation of this plan an industrial potential is supposed to arise in Slovakia, designed to overshadow the economic and industrial supremacy of the historic Bohemian countries as they relate to Slovakia. All this is at the express behest of Moscow. Dr. Henrick Kuhn is Secret,a,ry-General of the Sudeten German Archive in Munich and Associate Editor of the "Sudeten Bulletin," a monthly central European review. In East Slovakia a steel and iron coittbinate is planned, near Trnava an atomic energy plant, on the Vah River a large petroleum refinery, and a nitrogen plant based on natural gas in the south Slovakian town of Sara. It is noteworthy in this connection that natural gas is to be piped in from the gas field of Zwerndorf on the AustrianCzecho-Slovak border. It is a known fact that only 1/ 7 of the natural gas supplies lie within Czech territory. This means that the proposed nitrogen plant will of necessity draw on supplies of natural gas that are actually reserved for use by Austria. Of extreme economic importance is the iron and steel combinate in East Slovakia, known in the West as the Huko Project. Steel production here should reach - according to plan - more than three million tons by 1965. The struggle for this project has long been going on for ten long years. In 1948 under the first secretary of the Communist Party, Rudolf Slansky, work was begun on · �SLOVAKIA 19 this gigantic project with the setting up of a housing project completed in 1952. With Slansky's arrest in 1950 the work was suspended, Slansky was even accused in the course of a mock trial of a "utopian plan" namely, the erecting of the steel and iron combinate which was termed responsible for the disorganization of the Czecho-Slovak economy. Moscow instructions for forced economic development in Slovakia have led to violent discord within leading circles of the Communist Party in Prague. Moscow has officially justified these plans by saying it chose Slovakia for economic expansion because of that country's advantageous traffic connections with .the rest of the east block States, in particular with the Soviet Union, and because of a greater Slovak labor reservoir. The "Czechoslovak" wing within the Communist Party is very skeptical as to the Moscow proposition, fearing rightly that this intensive expansion of Slovakia will mean the beginning of the end of Czecho-Slovakia and the first step toward a Slovak Soviet Republic. Czecho-Slovakia is the only StaJte in the people's democratic sphere with two Communist parties - the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Slovak Communist Party - which are united only at a top echelon level. There has been autonomist and separatist agitation Slovakia ever since ,t he founding of Czecho-Slovakia and these tendencies have not decreased. They have continued on through the Hlinka and Tiso era and "glorified memories of a Slovak uprising," down to the present. Not until very recent times has Prague voiced severe opposition to this Slovak agitation. During the Christmas season of 1957 a group of Slovak Communists, while calling on party general-secretary Antonin Novotny at the Hradcany in Prague, simply disappeared. No trace of them has been found to this very day. Even Karel Bacilek, a Czech, presently secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, let loose such a barrage of deprecatory remarks against his separatist compatriots that one might have thought Slovak revolution was imminent. Another sign of the Prague government's fear of Slovak popular opposi- �20 SLOVAKIA tion is reflected in the earlier mentioned mock trials against "Slovak fascists" accused of having murdered Communist partisans thiriteen years previously. To be sure Prague has accepted without visible opposition the economic instructions handed them by Moscow, but at the same time has intensified the developmenit of nuclear industries which serves at least as an economic coun:terpoise to a strongly growing Slovak industrial potential. A series of atomic energy plants are planned by 1967 with a capacity capable of pushing heavy industry to such a point that Czecho-Slovakia will become the second most important industrial factor within the Soviet sphere nexit to China. Evidence of the progress being made by Czecho-Slovak nuclear research is mirrored in the fact that Czech nuclear physicists have devised a new industrially practical method of isolating natural uranium. They make use of ionic exchange in highly molecular insoluble matter which was developed in the Institute for Synthetic Resins and Varnishes in Pardubice. The purity of the uranium derived by this method is said to be even greater. The uranium slated for use for the new atomic energy plants is derived from the native mines of St. Joachimsthal and Pfibram. First, however, it goes to the Soviet Union where Moscow decides how much shall stay there and how much shall go abroad, including Czecho-Slovakia. Thus Prague is kept under constant economic pressure, with Moscow's political plans becoming more and more obvious despite the smoke screen of economic camouflage . • • • WHO SAID IT? "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia CaJD exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the evenis of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - (The late Dr. Hubert Ripka, right-hand man of Dr. Edward Benes, FIGARO, Paris, April 4, 1949.) � 18 SLOVAKIA MOSOOW'S SMOKE SCREEN IN SWVAKIA Heinrich Kuhn Slovakia and .the Sudetenland were ever a thorn in the side of the Prague government. After the Sudeten German problem appeared to have been settled by the expulsions of 1945-46, Slovakia striving for autonomy remained the only threat to the integrity of a Communist-ruled CzechoSlovakia. It is obvious from the Soviet Union's plans for Slovakia for 1961 to 1965 that the question of a Slovak Soviet Republic is no utopian dream. Even prior to the implementation of this plan an industrial potential is supposed to arise in Slovakia, designed to overshadow the economic and industrial supremacy of the historic Bohemian countries as they relate to Slovakia. All this is at the express behest of Moscow. Dr. Henrick Kuhn is Secret,a,ry-General of the Sudeten German Archive in Munich and Associate Editor of the "Sudeten Bulletin," a monthly central European review. In East Slovakia a steel and iron coittbinate is planned, near Trnava an atomic energy plant, on the Vah River a large petroleum refinery, and a nitrogen plant based on natural gas in the south Slovakian town of Sara. It is noteworthy in this connection that natural gas is to be piped in from the gas field of Zwerndorf on the AustrianCzecho-Slovak border. It is a known fact that only 1/ 7 of the natural gas supplies lie within Czech territory. This means that the proposed nitrogen plant will of necessity draw on supplies of natural gas that are actually reserved for use by Austria. Of extreme economic importance is the iron and steel combinate in East Slovakia, known in the West as the Huko Project. Steel production here should reach - according to plan - more than three million tons by 1965. The struggle for this project has long been going on for ten long years. In 1948 under the first secretary of the Communist Party, Rudolf Slansky, work was begun on · �SLOVAKIA 19 this gigantic project with the setting up of a housing project completed in 1952. With Slansky's arrest in 1950 the work was suspended, Slansky was even accused in the course of a mock trial of a "utopian plan" namely, the erecting of the steel and iron combinate which was termed responsible for the disorganization of the Czecho-Slovak economy. Moscow instructions for forced economic development in Slovakia have led to violent discord within leading circles of the Communist Party in Prague. Moscow has officially justified these plans by saying it chose Slovakia for economic expansion because of that country's advantageous traffic connections with .the rest of the east block States, in particular with the Soviet Union, and because of a greater Slovak labor reservoir. The "Czechoslovak" wing within the Communist Party is very skeptical as to the Moscow proposition, fearing rightly that this intensive expansion of Slovakia will mean the beginning of the end of Czecho-Slovakia and the first step toward a Slovak Soviet Republic. Czecho-Slovakia is the only StaJte in the people's democratic sphere with two Communist parties - the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Slovak Communist Party - which are united only at a top echelon level. There has been autonomist and separatist agitation Slovakia ever since ,t he founding of Czecho-Slovakia and these tendencies have not decreased. They have continued on through the Hlinka and Tiso era and "glorified memories of a Slovak uprising," down to the present. Not until very recent times has Prague voiced severe opposition to this Slovak agitation. During the Christmas season of 1957 a group of Slovak Communists, while calling on party general-secretary Antonin Novotny at the Hradcany in Prague, simply disappeared. No trace of them has been found to this very day. Even Karel Bacilek, a Czech, presently secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, let loose such a barrage of deprecatory remarks against his separatist compatriots that one might have thought Slovak revolution was imminent. Another sign of the Prague government's fear of Slovak popular opposi- �20 SLOVAKIA tion is reflected in the earlier mentioned mock trials against "Slovak fascists" accused of having murdered Communist partisans thiriteen years previously. To be sure Prague has accepted without visible opposition the economic instructions handed them by Moscow, but at the same time has intensified the developmenit of nuclear industries which serves at least as an economic coun:terpoise to a strongly growing Slovak industrial potential. A series of atomic energy plants are planned by 1967 with a capacity capable of pushing heavy industry to such a point that Czecho-Slovakia will become the second most important industrial factor within the Soviet sphere nexit to China. Evidence of the progress being made by Czecho-Slovak nuclear research is mirrored in the fact that Czech nuclear physicists have devised a new industrially practical method of isolating natural uranium. They make use of ionic exchange in highly molecular insoluble matter which was developed in the Institute for Synthetic Resins and Varnishes in Pardubice. The purity of the uranium derived by this method is said to be even greater. The uranium slated for use for the new atomic energy plants is derived from the native mines of St. Joachimsthal and Pfibram. First, however, it goes to the Soviet Union where Moscow decides how much shall stay there and how much shall go abroad, including Czecho-Slovakia. Thus Prague is kept under constant economic pressure, with Moscow's political plans becoming more and more obvious despite the smoke screen of economic camouflage . • • • WHO SAID IT? "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia CaJD exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the evenis of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - (The late Dr. Hubert Ripka, right-hand man of Dr. Edward Benes, FIGARO, Paris, April 4, 1949.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA MOSOOW'S SMOKE SCREEN IN SWVAKIA Heinrich Kuhn Slovakia and .the Sudetenland were ever a thorn in the side of the Prague government. After the Sudeten German problem appeared to have been settled by the expulsions of 1945-46, Slovakia striving for autonomy remained the only threat to the integrity of a Communist-ruled CzechoSlovakia. It is obvious from the Soviet Union's plans for Slovakia for 1961 to 1965 that the question of a Slovak Soviet Republic is no utopian dream. Even prior to the implementation of this plan an industrial potential is supposed to arise in Slovakia, designed to overshadow the economic and industrial supremacy of the historic Bohemian countries as they relate to Slovakia. All this is at the express behest of Moscow. Dr. Henrick Kuhn is Secret,a,ry-General of the Sudeten German Archive in Munich and Associate Editor of the "Sudeten Bulletin," a monthly central European review. In East Slovakia a steel and iron coittbinate is planned, near Trnava an atomic energy plant, on the Vah River a large petroleum refinery, and a nitrogen plant based on natural gas in the south Slovakian town of Sara. It is noteworthy in this connection that natural gas is to be piped in from the gas field of Zwerndorf on the AustrianCzecho-Slovak border. It is a known fact that only 1/ 7 of the natural gas supplies lie within Czech territory. This means that the proposed nitrogen plant will of necessity draw on supplies of natural gas that are actually reserved for use by Austria. Of extreme economic importance is the iron and steel combinate in East Slovakia, known in the West as the Huko Project. Steel production here should reach - according to plan - more than three million tons by 1965. The struggle for this project has long been going on for ten long years. In 1948 under the first secretary of the Communist Party, Rudolf Slansky, work was begun on · SLOVAKIA 19 this gigantic project with the setting up of a housing project completed in 1952. With Slansky's arrest in 1950 the work was suspended, Slansky was even accused in the course of a mock trial of a "utopian plan" namely, the erecting of the steel and iron combinate which was termed responsible for the disorganization of the Czecho-Slovak economy. Moscow instructions for forced economic development in Slovakia have led to violent discord within leading circles of the Communist Party in Prague. Moscow has officially justified these plans by saying it chose Slovakia for economic expansion because of that country's advantageous traffic connections with .the rest of the east block States, in particular with the Soviet Union, and because of a greater Slovak labor reservoir. The "Czechoslovak" wing within the Communist Party is very skeptical as to the Moscow proposition, fearing rightly that this intensive expansion of Slovakia will mean the beginning of the end of Czecho-Slovakia and the first step toward a Slovak Soviet Republic. Czecho-Slovakia is the only StaJte in the people's democratic sphere with two Communist parties - the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Slovak Communist Party - which are united only at a top echelon level. There has been autonomist and separatist agitation Slovakia ever since ,t he founding of Czecho-Slovakia and these tendencies have not decreased. They have continued on through the Hlinka and Tiso era and "glorified memories of a Slovak uprising," down to the present. Not until very recent times has Prague voiced severe opposition to this Slovak agitation. During the Christmas season of 1957 a group of Slovak Communists, while calling on party general-secretary Antonin Novotny at the Hradcany in Prague, simply disappeared. No trace of them has been found to this very day. Even Karel Bacilek, a Czech, presently secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, let loose such a barrage of deprecatory remarks against his separatist compatriots that one might have thought Slovak revolution was imminent. Another sign of the Prague government's fear of Slovak popular opposi- 20 SLOVAKIA tion is reflected in the earlier mentioned mock trials against "Slovak fascists" accused of having murdered Communist partisans thiriteen years previously. To be sure Prague has accepted without visible opposition the economic instructions handed them by Moscow, but at the same time has intensified the developmenit of nuclear industries which serves at least as an economic coun:terpoise to a strongly growing Slovak industrial potential. A series of atomic energy plants are planned by 1967 with a capacity capable of pushing heavy industry to such a point that Czecho-Slovakia will become the second most important industrial factor within the Soviet sphere nexit to China. Evidence of the progress being made by Czecho-Slovak nuclear research is mirrored in the fact that Czech nuclear physicists have devised a new industrially practical method of isolating natural uranium. They make use of ionic exchange in highly molecular insoluble matter which was developed in the Institute for Synthetic Resins and Varnishes in Pardubice. The purity of the uranium derived by this method is said to be even greater. The uranium slated for use for the new atomic energy plants is derived from the native mines of St. Joachimsthal and Pfibram. First, however, it goes to the Soviet Union where Moscow decides how much shall stay there and how much shall go abroad, including Czecho-Slovakia. Thus Prague is kept under constant economic pressure, with Moscow's political plans becoming more and more obvious despite the smoke screen of economic camouflage . • • • WHO SAID IT? "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia CaJD exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the evenis of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - (The late Dr. Hubert Ripka, right-hand man of Dr. Edward Benes, FIGARO, Paris, April 4, 1949.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Moscow's Smoke Screen in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Heinrich Kuhn Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 6 (31), March-June 1960 pp. 18-20 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kuhn, Heinrich, 1922-1997 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1960 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/72ae2df1d1cdf5152db9c5f89f2ed7a7.pdf d9c4a0a36a86f95851b02290cdc71713 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 83 PRAGUE BETWEEN MOSOOW AND BERLIN By Heinrich Kuhn Politically speaking, Czecho-Slovakia is a product of World War I. At its very creation the State was handicapped by the German problem: internally by more than three and a half million Germans who were incorporated into it against their will by the peace treaty of St. Germain, and foreign politically as well as geopolitically by the fact that it was born of decisions made by the Great Powers and directed against Germany. Between the two world wars Czecho-Slovakia was a strategic spearhead aimed at Germany even long before Hitler became head of the German State. It was of strategic importance to France, and the foreign-political conception Czecho-Slovakia, linked for all time with the name of Benes, was based on the irrelevant idea that it could amount to anything if it played the role of mediator between East and West, between Paris and Moscow. As a result of the second world war, Czecho-Slovakia was divested of the internal problem of "its Germans." They were ruthlessly expelled from their native homes. Czecho-Slovakia's geopolitical situation had likewise undergone a critical change. The "strategic spearhead," until then encircled by the German language area as if by a pincers, had lost its original significance as a foreign-political factor. Germany had been completely defeated. Soviet Army troops stood at the Elbe, the Danube, in the north and in the south, troops of a State to which CzechoSlovakia had sold its-:!lf lock, stock and barrel. Sold out primarily in the sense that the Soviet Union had not only "liberated" Czecho-Slovakia but, by its resolute attitude, had made possible the "cleansing of the State of its German minority." With that move the switches were set, from the standpoint of foreign policy, for the future. No longer was there a road open to Paris, to the West, but only to Moscow. This fact makes it possible to understand the tactical attitude of Czecho-Slovak foreign policy within recent years as regards the German question. Czecho-Slovakia and tnbricht's State, the Soviet Zone of Germany, are the only �84 SLOVAKIA countries of the East Block that border on the free part of Germany. No amount of barbed-wire is capable of relieving the Czechs of the danger that - despite the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans - the German people are still their immediate neighbor. The psychological factor of guilt has become the main driving force behind Prague's foreign policy. Since 1945, fear has been the primary factor involved. For approximately ten years the "fight against German revengism" has really been at the bottom of Prague's policy toward Germany. As long as Moscow could still hope to win the population of West Germany in some form or other for the East (as has happened in the "solution of the Ulbricht State"), or at least to neutralize the German Federal Republic as a political power, these trends in Czecho-Slovak policy toward Germany remained chiefly in the background. To the degree, however, to which the Ulbricht State became an important card in Moscow's foreign-political game, Moscow's and Prague's foreign~political goals grew closer and closer. Ulbricht's State became, just as Prague's former ambassador to Pankov, Dr. Ota Klicka, described on television, a bastion of Czecho-Slovak security. As long as the "GDR" (German Democratic Republic) existed, no aggression against Czecho-Slovakia would be possible. State President Antonin Novotny stated in similar terms, at his very first international appearance before the General Assembly of the UN, in the fall of 1960, that GDR was a guarantee of Czecho-Slovak security. Paralleling the deeping bond between Prague and Pankov was a common incitement of both Satellite States against the German Federal Republic. Some 400,000 foreignlanguage propaganda pamphlets have been sent from Prague to Western countries within the past years in order to spread abroad a frightful picture of German militarism coupled with anti-Czech revengism. When Khrushchev triggered the German question last year with his Berlin ultimatum, the CSSR warmly welcomed his initiative. At the time the Czech Communist Party politicians, in keeping with Khrushchev's political line, were still talking of the two German States with equal �SLOVAKIA 85 rights. The world at large ha.s scarcely noticed· that Prague and Pankov have meanwhile reached beyond this political line. Even during the visit to Prague of Ulbricht's president of the People's Chamber, Dr. Dieckmann, in April 1961, an attempt was made to forge a new policy according to which the "GDR would be the only legally valid German State because, in conformance with the Potsdam Agreement, the roots of German militarism" have been removed. This new tactic as to Prague's policy on Germany, which has become more pronounced ever since April of last year, dovetails nicely with Khrushchev's strategic concept a.s to policy on Germany. It enables him now and again to appear before the international public a.s a moderating factor, meanwhile pursuing with even greater intensity his immediate goal in the German issue: Making a free city of West Berlin, concluding a peace treaty between "all interested States" and Ulbricht's State in order to bring about the de facto recognition of the conditions established within Central Europe by World War II. In the coming weeks and months it will be left to Prague to make new tactical moves with roles assigned to different players in the drama that is directed from Moscow, thus reaching out beyond the issues that are important to Moscow and Ulbricht. Details as to Prague's new tactical role within Moscow's broader strategic plan as to Germany were revealed at an international press conference in July of last year by Vaclav Kathy, head of the department of Socialist States in Prague's Institute for International Politics and Economy. The tenor of this role is, that since the German Federal Government is virtually the main source of "political revengism," the "change in the social and economic structure of the German Federal Republic by the signing of a German peace treaty," would be a timely move. This, it claimed, is the only possibility for peaceful coexistence in Europe, since these changes alone would guarantee the liquidation of "German militarism and revengism." This alone would be the actual and ultimate aim of CzechoSlovakia's foreign-political endeavors. Indeed, one can hardly describe that country's foreignpolicy aims more clearly. � SLOVAKIA 83 PRAGUE BETWEEN MOSOOW AND BERLIN By Heinrich Kuhn Politically speaking, Czecho-Slovakia is a product of World War I. At its very creation the State was handicapped by the German problem: internally by more than three and a half million Germans who were incorporated into it against their will by the peace treaty of St. Germain, and foreign politically as well as geopolitically by the fact that it was born of decisions made by the Great Powers and directed against Germany. Between the two world wars Czecho-Slovakia was a strategic spearhead aimed at Germany even long before Hitler became head of the German State. It was of strategic importance to France, and the foreign-political conception Czecho-Slovakia, linked for all time with the name of Benes, was based on the irrelevant idea that it could amount to anything if it played the role of mediator between East and West, between Paris and Moscow. As a result of the second world war, Czecho-Slovakia was divested of the internal problem of "its Germans." They were ruthlessly expelled from their native homes. Czecho-Slovakia's geopolitical situation had likewise undergone a critical change. The "strategic spearhead," until then encircled by the German language area as if by a pincers, had lost its original significance as a foreign-political factor. Germany had been completely defeated. Soviet Army troops stood at the Elbe, the Danube, in the north and in the south, troops of a State to which CzechoSlovakia had sold its-:!lf lock, stock and barrel. Sold out primarily in the sense that the Soviet Union had not only "liberated" Czecho-Slovakia but, by its resolute attitude, had made possible the "cleansing of the State of its German minority." With that move the switches were set, from the standpoint of foreign policy, for the future. No longer was there a road open to Paris, to the West, but only to Moscow. This fact makes it possible to understand the tactical attitude of Czecho-Slovak foreign policy within recent years as regards the German question. Czecho-Slovakia and tnbricht's State, the Soviet Zone of Germany, are the only �84 SLOVAKIA countries of the East Block that border on the free part of Germany. No amount of barbed-wire is capable of relieving the Czechs of the danger that - despite the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans - the German people are still their immediate neighbor. The psychological factor of guilt has become the main driving force behind Prague's foreign policy. Since 1945, fear has been the primary factor involved. For approximately ten years the "fight against German revengism" has really been at the bottom of Prague's policy toward Germany. As long as Moscow could still hope to win the population of West Germany in some form or other for the East (as has happened in the "solution of the Ulbricht State"), or at least to neutralize the German Federal Republic as a political power, these trends in Czecho-Slovak policy toward Germany remained chiefly in the background. To the degree, however, to which the Ulbricht State became an important card in Moscow's foreign-political game, Moscow's and Prague's foreign~political goals grew closer and closer. Ulbricht's State became, just as Prague's former ambassador to Pankov, Dr. Ota Klicka, described on television, a bastion of Czecho-Slovak security. As long as the "GDR" (German Democratic Republic) existed, no aggression against Czecho-Slovakia would be possible. State President Antonin Novotny stated in similar terms, at his very first international appearance before the General Assembly of the UN, in the fall of 1960, that GDR was a guarantee of Czecho-Slovak security. Paralleling the deeping bond between Prague and Pankov was a common incitement of both Satellite States against the German Federal Republic. Some 400,000 foreignlanguage propaganda pamphlets have been sent from Prague to Western countries within the past years in order to spread abroad a frightful picture of German militarism coupled with anti-Czech revengism. When Khrushchev triggered the German question last year with his Berlin ultimatum, the CSSR warmly welcomed his initiative. At the time the Czech Communist Party politicians, in keeping with Khrushchev's political line, were still talking of the two German States with equal �SLOVAKIA 85 rights. The world at large ha.s scarcely noticed· that Prague and Pankov have meanwhile reached beyond this political line. Even during the visit to Prague of Ulbricht's president of the People's Chamber, Dr. Dieckmann, in April 1961, an attempt was made to forge a new policy according to which the "GDR would be the only legally valid German State because, in conformance with the Potsdam Agreement, the roots of German militarism" have been removed. This new tactic as to Prague's policy on Germany, which has become more pronounced ever since April of last year, dovetails nicely with Khrushchev's strategic concept a.s to policy on Germany. It enables him now and again to appear before the international public a.s a moderating factor, meanwhile pursuing with even greater intensity his immediate goal in the German issue: Making a free city of West Berlin, concluding a peace treaty between "all interested States" and Ulbricht's State in order to bring about the de facto recognition of the conditions established within Central Europe by World War II. In the coming weeks and months it will be left to Prague to make new tactical moves with roles assigned to different players in the drama that is directed from Moscow, thus reaching out beyond the issues that are important to Moscow and Ulbricht. Details as to Prague's new tactical role within Moscow's broader strategic plan as to Germany were revealed at an international press conference in July of last year by Vaclav Kathy, head of the department of Socialist States in Prague's Institute for International Politics and Economy. The tenor of this role is, that since the German Federal Government is virtually the main source of "political revengism," the "change in the social and economic structure of the German Federal Republic by the signing of a German peace treaty," would be a timely move. This, it claimed, is the only possibility for peaceful coexistence in Europe, since these changes alone would guarantee the liquidation of "German militarism and revengism." This alone would be the actual and ultimate aim of CzechoSlovakia's foreign-political endeavors. Indeed, one can hardly describe that country's foreignpolicy aims more clearly. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 83 PRAGUE BETWEEN MOSOOW AND BERLIN By Heinrich Kuhn Politically speaking, Czecho-Slovakia is a product of World War I. At its very creation the State was handicapped by the German problem: internally by more than three and a half million Germans who were incorporated into it against their will by the peace treaty of St. Germain, and foreign politically as well as geopolitically by the fact that it was born of decisions made by the Great Powers and directed against Germany. Between the two world wars Czecho-Slovakia was a strategic spearhead aimed at Germany even long before Hitler became head of the German State. It was of strategic importance to France, and the foreign-political conception Czecho-Slovakia, linked for all time with the name of Benes, was based on the irrelevant idea that it could amount to anything if it played the role of mediator between East and West, between Paris and Moscow. As a result of the second world war, Czecho-Slovakia was divested of the internal problem of "its Germans." They were ruthlessly expelled from their native homes. Czecho-Slovakia's geopolitical situation had likewise undergone a critical change. The "strategic spearhead," until then encircled by the German language area as if by a pincers, had lost its original significance as a foreign-political factor. Germany had been completely defeated. Soviet Army troops stood at the Elbe, the Danube, in the north and in the south, troops of a State to which CzechoSlovakia had sold its-:!lf lock, stock and barrel. Sold out primarily in the sense that the Soviet Union had not only "liberated" Czecho-Slovakia but, by its resolute attitude, had made possible the "cleansing of the State of its German minority." With that move the switches were set, from the standpoint of foreign policy, for the future. No longer was there a road open to Paris, to the West, but only to Moscow. This fact makes it possible to understand the tactical attitude of Czecho-Slovak foreign policy within recent years as regards the German question. Czecho-Slovakia and tnbricht's State, the Soviet Zone of Germany, are the only 84 SLOVAKIA countries of the East Block that border on the free part of Germany. No amount of barbed-wire is capable of relieving the Czechs of the danger that - despite the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans - the German people are still their immediate neighbor. The psychological factor of guilt has become the main driving force behind Prague's foreign policy. Since 1945, fear has been the primary factor involved. For approximately ten years the "fight against German revengism" has really been at the bottom of Prague's policy toward Germany. As long as Moscow could still hope to win the population of West Germany in some form or other for the East (as has happened in the "solution of the Ulbricht State"), or at least to neutralize the German Federal Republic as a political power, these trends in Czecho-Slovak policy toward Germany remained chiefly in the background. To the degree, however, to which the Ulbricht State became an important card in Moscow's foreign-political game, Moscow's and Prague's foreign~political goals grew closer and closer. Ulbricht's State became, just as Prague's former ambassador to Pankov, Dr. Ota Klicka, described on television, a bastion of Czecho-Slovak security. As long as the "GDR" (German Democratic Republic) existed, no aggression against Czecho-Slovakia would be possible. State President Antonin Novotny stated in similar terms, at his very first international appearance before the General Assembly of the UN, in the fall of 1960, that GDR was a guarantee of Czecho-Slovak security. Paralleling the deeping bond between Prague and Pankov was a common incitement of both Satellite States against the German Federal Republic. Some 400,000 foreignlanguage propaganda pamphlets have been sent from Prague to Western countries within the past years in order to spread abroad a frightful picture of German militarism coupled with anti-Czech revengism. When Khrushchev triggered the German question last year with his Berlin ultimatum, the CSSR warmly welcomed his initiative. At the time the Czech Communist Party politicians, in keeping with Khrushchev's political line, were still talking of the two German States with equal SLOVAKIA 85 rights. The world at large ha.s scarcely noticed· that Prague and Pankov have meanwhile reached beyond this political line. Even during the visit to Prague of Ulbricht's president of the People's Chamber, Dr. Dieckmann, in April 1961, an attempt was made to forge a new policy according to which the "GDR would be the only legally valid German State because, in conformance with the Potsdam Agreement, the roots of German militarism" have been removed. This new tactic as to Prague's policy on Germany, which has become more pronounced ever since April of last year, dovetails nicely with Khrushchev's strategic concept a.s to policy on Germany. It enables him now and again to appear before the international public a.s a moderating factor, meanwhile pursuing with even greater intensity his immediate goal in the German issue: Making a free city of West Berlin, concluding a peace treaty between "all interested States" and Ulbricht's State in order to bring about the de facto recognition of the conditions established within Central Europe by World War II. In the coming weeks and months it will be left to Prague to make new tactical moves with roles assigned to different players in the drama that is directed from Moscow, thus reaching out beyond the issues that are important to Moscow and Ulbricht. Details as to Prague's new tactical role within Moscow's broader strategic plan as to Germany were revealed at an international press conference in July of last year by Vaclav Kathy, head of the department of Socialist States in Prague's Institute for International Politics and Economy. The tenor of this role is, that since the German Federal Government is virtually the main source of "political revengism," the "change in the social and economic structure of the German Federal Republic by the signing of a German peace treaty," would be a timely move. This, it claimed, is the only possibility for peaceful coexistence in Europe, since these changes alone would guarantee the liquidation of "German militarism and revengism." This alone would be the actual and ultimate aim of CzechoSlovakia's foreign-political endeavors. Indeed, one can hardly describe that country's foreignpolicy aims more clearly.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Prague Between Moscow and Berlin Description An account of the resource Heinrich Kuhn Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 83-85 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kuhn, Heinrich, 1922-1997 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7b28796157f335b7485f91e81b9a5d80.pdf 4ea3688ccc978289b70d269be7047464 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 The Slovak National Catholic Church, Passaic, New Jersey, and the Jeczusko Affair RAYMOND J. KUPKE INTRODUCTION In the Dundee section of Passaic, New Jersey there are four churches in an area of nine city blocks : Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Cathedral, St. Mary 's Roman Catholic Church, St. Michael the Archangel Ruthenian Catholic Cathedral , and Sts. Peter and Paul Russian Orthodox Cathedral. Although this listing represents four diverse denominations, the members of the four parishes are descended from immigrants from the same villages in what are today Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic , and indeed family ties run across all four congregations. 1 Commenting on an article about Our Lady of Mercy Slovak Parish in Cleveland, Ohio, which existed in a schismatic state from the Roman Catholic Church from 1917 to 1922 , Slovak historian Mark Stolarik observes, It is interesting to note that in the spirit of "consensus" history a recent article infednota (January 19, 1972 , p. 1) about Our Lady of Mercy Church, makes no mention of this schism. Contemporary Slovak editors avoid religious controversy at all costs. 2 When one delves into the Slovak religious history of Passaic , Stolarik's observation is amply born out. Upon reading the available jubilee books 3 one hardly notices a mention of the year 1922. Yet in 1922 , just as the rupture in Cleveland's Slovak community was being healed, a schism developed in Passaic's Slovak �64 SLOVAKIA community which would effect a permanent division in the community, and create an unusual footnote in American religious history - a cathedral without a diocese, a one-parish "denomination'' with Roman Catholic usages and Polish National Catholic affiliation. 4 The religious history of Passaic is amazingly complex. It is caught up in currents on both sides of the Atlantic and involves merchants and politicians, popes and bishops, patriarchs and czars. This study attempts to examine one facet of that history, the dispute in the Slovak community of Passaic which divided St. Mary's Parish and led to the formation of Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Church. THE SETTING Located on the Passaic River fifteen miles upstream from Newark, Passaic was first settled by the Dutch in 1678. It remained a small commercial village until after the Civil War when railroads and the textile industry began to change its character. Incorporated as a city in 18 73, Passaic welcomed its first Eastern European immigrants six years later. They were brought in by George B. Waterhouse to work in the Waterhouse Brothers Mills . The initial seven immigrants recruited by Waterhouse in 1879 soon turned into a flood from Eastern and Southern Europe. The 1910 census showed Passaic's foreign born comprising 52 % of the total population. 5 The 1920 census registered a population of 63,824 with 74% o( that total being foreign born, the greatest percentage of any city (over 50,000) in the United States. 6 The Slovak population at the time was estimated to be 7,400.7 The WPA Guide to New Jersey describes the area: East of Main Avenue , a progressively shabbier area stretches down to the river. Here the streets are narrow , with frame swellings and congested tenements crowded beside huge factories . This is the " Dundee Section," where one-half the population is crammed into one-sixth of the city' s area. Living in this section are most of the foreign-born who comprise about one-third of the total population. Numerically the Poles are first , followed in �SLOVAKIA 65 turn by the Italians, Russians , Hungarians , Slovaks, Germans , Austrians, Dutch, Scotch, English and Irish. 8 The initial seven Eastern Europeans whom George Waterhouse brought from Castle Garden to Passaic in December 1879 were all from the Eastern part of Slovakia. They were: Andrew Pastor, John Socha, John Kostisin, and George Slivka from Saris County; John Pochlod and John Salasovic from Zemplin County; and Edward Geiger from Spis County. 9 The initial seven immigrants were quickly joined by their fellow countrymen from Slovakia. When asked what was the inducement to come to America , one of the original seven Slovak immigrants quickly answered "money. " 1 Certainly the poor economic conditions in Eastern Europe were a major inducement for European emigrati~n. But Slovaks had another incentive as well . Beginning in the 1870's the government of Hungary, which included Slovakia, embarked on a program of "Magyarization" in the non-Magyar parts of the kingdom. The three Slovak ''gymnasia'' (high schools) were closed, and most of the religious primary schools were nationalized. The use of Slovak was prohibited in the schools and teachers were awarded a bonus if they were successful Magyarizers. 11 Even to study for the priesthood a Slovak must pass through the Magyar seminary, and there any study of the language of the future flock is treated as ground for expulsion.12 This process created divisions among Slovaks in America between those who were educated by the Hungarians and those who were not. A dispute broke out in 1902 at St. Stephen's Slovak Parish in Newark between the non-Magyarized parishioners and their pastor, Father Alexander Kovacs. In a solicited letter (Written in Latin) , Father Emery ("Imrich" in Slovak, " Imre " in Magyar) Haitinger, Slovak pastor in Passaic , attempted to explain the distinction between the two groups to a confused Bishop John J. O'Connor of Newark. SLAVICS are a peaceful people, who have built the church and maintain it well: they are the basis of the Slavonic congregation because they pay their debts; SLOVAKS are an ambitious people who desire to lead , ° �66 SLOVAKIA to rule, but they do not like to pay debts, nor will they pay them, as their custom is in the free manner of the Italians ... These Slovaks are a troublesome people, POLITICAL AGITATORS against the Hungarian fatherland, whose political machinations are not needed in America. 13 Because of these economic and cultural reasons the number of Slovak immigrants grew rapidly. In 1880 there were 292 foreignborn "Hungarians" in New Jersey. By 1900 that figure grew to 8,404 just in the seven northern counties that comprised the Newark Catholic Diocese.1 4 Most of the immigrants to Passaic were Catholic and between 1890 and 1920 the territorial "Irish" parish of St. Nicholas was joined by nine new "national" parishes for Polish, Italian, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Ruthenian immigrants. 15 The first of the national churches to be organized was St. Michael the Archangel in 1890. This church served Catholics of the Byzantine Rite who were in communion with Rome. Since many of these Ruthenians or "Rusins" lived in the same villages as the Latin Rite Slovaks, the Passaic Slovaks assisted their neighbors in building St. Michael's. This experience may have provided the spark the Slovak community needed for the following year St. Mary's Slovak Parish was organized on April 1. 16 Initially the congregation met in the basement of St. Nicholas' Church, but by 1893 they were able to construct a church of their own on the corner of Monroe and Second Streets. The absence of a stable Slovak clergy in th~ United States hampered the growth of the new parish. Between 1891 and 1898 the parish was served by a rapid succession of pastors including Fathers Samuel Belja, Bernard Skulik, Benjamin Kwiatkowski, Joseph Ligday, John Pollakovics, and Ignatius Jaskovits, with Father John Sheppard of St. Nicholas often filling in the gaps. On September 2, 1898 Bishop Winand Wigger of Newark appointed Father Emery A. Haitinger, recently arrived in the diocese, as pastor of St.Mary's and he remained for nearly a quarter of a century.17 Father Haitinger supervised the construction of a new stone church which was completed in 1904. By 1920 the parish numbered between 1200 and 1500 families comprising about 600 individuals. 18 �SLOVAKIA 67 Passaic was not free from strife in those years. Many Passaic workers participated in the "Great Strike of 1913 " in which 25 ,000 mill workers organized by the Industrial Workers of the World struck throughout northern New Jersey.19 Religious dissension was also not unheard of. In 1910 Sts. Peter and Paul Byzantine Catholic Parish, which had developed from St. Michael's in 1902, defected from the Catholic Church and embraced Russian Orthodoxy. Also in 1918, a rupture in Our Lady of Mt. Carmel Italian parish resulted in the formation of St. Anthony of Padua Independent Italian Catholic Church.20 On March 13, 1921, Bishop O'Connor, at Father Haitinger's request, appointed Father Emery Jeczusko, recently arrived from Europe, to be curate at St. Mary's .21 This would seem to have been a routine assignment, but in the highly charged atmosphere of Passaic it was an appointment that would have far-reaching consequences . THE DISPUTE Emery A. Haitinger was born in Slovakia, then a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1873 just at the time that the government's Magyarization policy was beginning. Haitinger began his seminary training at Arad in the southeastern part of Hungary in what is today Romania, but he emigrated to the United States during his seminary years and completed his training at St. Bonaventure's Seminary in Allegheny, New York. He was ordained a priest by Bishop Michael Hoban at Scranton, Pennsylvania in 1896. For two years Haitinger worked as a missionary among Slovak immigrants in northeastern Pennsylvania. In 1898 Bishop Winand Wigger accepted him for service in the Newark Diocese , and on September 2 of that year the twenty-five year old priest was appointed pastor of St. Mary's Parish in Passaic. 22 Doubtless Haitinger was considered a great asset to a diocese hard pressed to deal with a rapidly growing ethnic group . He was the first stable Slovak priest to work in the diocese , and he was pastorally effective in six languages. He not only supervised the construction of a new church in Passaic , but also was instrumental in the development of new parishes in Boonton, Rockaway, Elizabeth, and Linden. Through his connections in Europe he was �68 SLOVAKIA able to bring other Slovak priests to work in the Newark Diocese . However, Father Haitinger's twenty-four years in Passaic were not entirely peaceful. He considered himself a "gr6f" or member of the aristocracy , and sometimes styled himself " van Haitinger," as did his doctor brother.23 He did nothing to hide his bias for the Magyarized elements of his congregation and his parishioners called him a "Magyarone ," a title used for those who supported the Magyarizing of Slovak language and culture .24 There were also more serious charges of moral misconduct and of diverting church funds , particularly for the purchase of property for himself and his family. 25 While it is impossible to document these charges , there is a letter from Bishop John Duffy , then Chancellor of the Newark Diocese, to Haitinger on May 20, 1925 indicating some confusion between the personal property of Haitinger and the parish property. I am writing in reference to the lot owned by you adjoining the school of St. Mary's Parish, Passaic. I am sure that when the lot was purchased by you that you had in mind the future needs of St. Mary's Parish. Conditions there now require that the lot should belong to the church property. I remember hearing that the purchase price at which you bought this peace of property was very small, and I have heard that your present price is extremely large. In the interest of the Church for which you feel as deeply concerned as I do , I would suggest that you fix a price for this property within reason, and let me know what the amount is .26 Haitinger's reply is also interesting. In my first reply I wrote that I do not possess any lot in Passaic , and I emphasize it again. The pastor of St. Mary's knows it; he rented the lot in 1922 not from me , but from Miss Julia Tereschak, who is the owner since 1907. Before I disposed of the lot, I gave a preference to my congregation; but in a stormy meeting they refused to buy it. 27 �SLOVAKIA 69 These controversies about Haiting er' s pastorate festered for at least a decade prior to 1922. 2a Emery A. Jeczusko was born on February 18 , 1888 at Presov in Slovakia, but he came from Vel'ky Saris, the same town that three of the original Slovak immigrants and many of their successors hailed from . Jeczusko attended the seminary at Kosice and was ordained there by Bishop Augustine Fischer-Colbrie on November 30, 1911. Bishop Fischer-Colbrie released him to come to America and work among the Slovaks on November 30, 1920 , 29 and on Father Haitinger's request , Bishop O'Connor of Newark received him and assigned him as curate at St. Mary's, Passaic on March 13 , 1921.30 · Father Jeczusko was well received in Passaic. He is described as an eloquent orator, who was able to sight translate Latin into Slovak. 31 He endeared himself to the people not only by his brilliant sermons , but also by his ability to sing High Mass. 32 " Anything happen, the people want to see Father Jeczusko .. . and Father Haitinger didn't like that.' ' 33 Father Jeczusko was also socially attached to his parishioners . Unable to speak English, he naturally gravitated to people from his native area. He would often visit the Hungarian Social Club, a few blocks from the rectory, to play cards and have a few beers with his friends. 34 On March 11, 1922, Haitinger wrote the following letter to Bishop O'Connor, Herewith is enclosed my financial statement of 1921. Also in these lines I ask Your Lordship to be so kind as to renew the Faculties of my Assistant , the Rev. Emery Jeczusko, which expires within the coming few days. 35 O'Connor replied immediately on March 14. From what I have learned of Father Jeczusko's habits, I do not wish to renew his faculties in this diocese. Tell him he must seek some other diocese . I enclose a letter testifying that he is not under censure. I will write to Father Miklus and tell him to go to you. 36 Meanwhile on April 19, O'Connor received a letter from Bishop Fischer-Colbrie in Kos ice. �70 SLO VAKIA I received the telegram of Your Excellency, and by your request I recall my priest Emery Jeczusko . .. I also ask that Your Excellency favor me by communicating the causes of your desire , that I may have direction in my agenda with Emery Jeczusko .37 On April 20 O'Connor again communicated with Haitinger. The enclosed letter for Father Jeczusko is from Bishop Fischer-Colbrie of Cassovia recalling him to his diocese. Oblige me by handing it to him. The Bishop requires him to return at once. It is the result of the cablegram sent sometime ago. 38 Bishop O'Connor does not elaborate on the offensive habits of Father Jeczusko , but presumably he did not find it acceptable for priests to fraternize with the laity in social clubs. He also does not elaborate on where he received the information on Father Jeczusko's habits. Popular opinion held that Haitinger himself, and his friends, had informed O 'Connor. While there is no conclusive evidence of this , it would appear from O'Connor's second communication to Haitinger that Haitinger was previously aware of the cablegram sent to Europe. On Sunday, April 23 , 1922, Father Jeczusko mounted the pulpit during the 10:30 A.M. Mass and explained his recall and bade the people farewell. He was followed by Father Haitinger who expressed his sorrow at Jeczusko 's recall. It appears that this announcement was not a surprise because a demonstration took place outside the church after Mass , and handbills were circulated calling for a mass meeting that night at Hama's Hall in Passaic. 39 The hall was filled to capacity, and the meeting was chaired by John J. Labash, an undertaker, and Steven Kollar, a cobbler. Demands were made for Jeczusko's reinstatement and the removal of Hai ting er. Even at this early date, the organizers of the dispute were talking about the possibility of a new parish. Messrs. Labash and Kollar speaking to a Daily News man said that the people were going to carry the fight to the bitter end. They felt that they were justified in even organizing an independent parish, if only to carry out what they figured was right .40 �SLOVAKIA 71 A second meeting was held on April 27 at Mokrai's Hall in Passaic, and as a result of this meeting ten parish organizations forwarded identical petitions to Bishop O 'Connor over the signatures of their officers: ... adopted a resolution seeking for the reinstatement of Father Emery Jeczusko in our church of St. Marie's of the Assumption, of Passaic, N.J. and that: The Rev. Emery A. Haitinger, now rector of the church be removed at once for the future good of our parish. This action is based on the wish of more than 600 people who attended a Mass meeting on Sunday, April 23, in a public hall at 108 Third Street, of our city. It is felt that a great deal of harm to our church, Faith and religion has come from the procrastinated action, or deferred action in this regard on your part. More than 90% of the people of our parish have literally refused to further attend the services of our church and we fear that a separation within the parish and a possible establishment of an Independent Church is threatening. It is honestly felt by most of the members of our parish that Father Haitinger must go. 41 The societies claimed a combined membership of 1200. The arguments against Haitinger centered around three issues: jealousy, finances , and patriotism. Mr. Kollar, a former trustee of the parish, claimed to have proof of serious discrepancies between the amount of money collected in the parish, the amount spent on parish expenses, and the amount in parish accounts.42 The patriotism charges were on two different levels. On the one hand Haiting er was accused of ''un-Americanism'' because he was alleged to have preached in favor of Austria-Hungary during World War I, and also that he had greeted the Hungarian Premier Husar as a Hungarian. 43 On the other hand Haitinger was also accused of "Magyarone" tendencies opposed to Slovak culture. 44 Haitinger's supporters countered by claiming that Haitinger was a true American, while Jeczusko was a retrogressive force in the community . . . . he was progressive in the matter of organizing a Slavish Federation which carried with it a spirit of the �72 SLOVAKIA fatherland and did not conform with the more modern spirit of working for things American. 45 All through April and May charges and countercharges were exchanged in the local newspapers, meetings were held , petitions were circulated. The atmosphere was further charged by an article in New Yorksky Dennfk, a Slovak newspaper in New York entitled "Battle of Slovak Catholics in Passaic." The article, widely circulated in Passaic, vilified Haitinger, and both the Hungarian and American hierarchy. Describing Haitinger the article commented: With abuse , cursings, laughter, lies and force more and more the Slovak people were literally chased from God's church merely that he might attain his aim and to make foreign the parish and bring it to the bishop , so to speak, on a silver platter, saying, "Here you have, august dictator, a new Irish parish." This hellish thought of Rev . Haitinger's has found a strong set-back in the face of the Slovak curate. The parson became afraid of his Judas recompense, and the bishop was afraid he would soon lose the Irished parish, which was builded through for Slovak blisters , and so the parson and the bishop got together and in short adjudged the Slovak curate to exile he must go.46 The tension was further heightened when one of the dissidents , a Mrs. Theresa Sisko, went to the rectory after Mass on Sunday, May 7 to reclaim at last a portion of a previous donation of $4,000 . Haitinger told her she would have to sue the parish, told her to get out, and then forcibly evicted her from the rectory, causing her to fall down the stairs and sustain many bruises. 47 Within a few days Mrs. Sisko brought suit against Haitinger for $30,000. The reports of the Sisko incident circulating through the ciy brought out a record crowd of 2,000 to a meeting that same night at Mokrai's Hall. During the meeting Labash and Kollar reiterated the history of their grievances. They claimed that petitions to the bishop in previous years had been destroyed before reaching him, that a committee sent to the bishop and the Apostolic Delegate in 1919 had failed to get a hearing, and that each time Bishop �SLOVAKIA 73 O'Connor was approached "he always sent us away with a promise to consider the matter.' ' 48 They then told the assembly of the bishop's final decision not allow Jenczusko to remain in the diocese. The allegations of financial mismanagement were repeated , and Mrs. Frank Matisovsky produced laughter among the audience when she related incidents of Haitinger's improprieties and her lack of satisfaction when these were related to the bishop .49 The assembly was unanimous in its· determination to replace Haitinger with another priest, have Jeczusko reinstated , and if necessary , form a new parish and even secede from the Catholic Church. For the first time the finances of a new church were discussed, and the name "Holy Name Parish" was used. 50 On Saturday the committee went to South Orange to approach Bishop O'Connor. This time they took Mrs. Sisko with them and she spoke to the bishop's secretary. Also during the week the committee met with Msgr. John A. Sheppard of Jersey City, formerly pastor of St. Nicholas, Passaic, and later Vicar General of the diocese. Acting on Sheppard's advice the committee formally presented a request to Haitinger to resign the pastorate with a copy of the request sent to O'Connor. 51 Rumors of Haitinger's removal were rampant in the city when he did not appear at Masses on Sunday, May 21. Instead the Masses were celebrated by Father John Salamon, a native son of the parish, and curate at St. Joseph's Parish in Elizabeth. It was reported that Haitinger had celebrated Mass in Elizabeth and returned to Passaic in the afternoon. The Saturday edition of the Passaic Daily News for May 27 carried the following article: As forecast by The Daily News Monday evening, the Rev. Father John D. Salamon, rector of St. Joseph's Church in Elizabeth, and formerly a pupil at St. Marie's Parochial School , of this city, has been designated as the new rector for the local Slovak Catholic Church, thus ending the controversy which threatened for a time to disrupt the entire St. Marie's Parish. Announcement was made by the Right Rev. Monsignor John A. Duffy, chancellor of the Catholic diocese of Newark, Thursday evening, to the effect that the Right Rev. Bishop John �74 SLOVAKIA J. O'Connor had decided upon the change being made. Meanwhile the Rev. Father Emery A. Haitinger, rector of St. Marie's Church since 1898, will be unattached for a while. He will visit temporarily with the Rev. Father Andrew Adzima, his former curate , and now rector of St. Joseph's in Bayonne.52 However the happy conclusion to the controversy forecast by the Passaic Daily News was premature. Having accomplished the first of their goals, the committee pressed on to insist on the reinstatement of Father Jeczusko as curate . The dissidents crystallized around Labash, Kollar, Marcel Sherman, a painter, Victor Chirip , a former locksmith in the Austrian royal palace , and Paul Skvarla, an architect. 53 The committee continued to treat with O'Connor about Jeczusko throughout the summer, but O'Connor was adamant. Jeczusko himself meanwhile did not participate in the controversy, but stayed with his brother in Connecticut. He did not reappear in Pasaaic until the middle of August. 54 The committee enlisted the help of Father Salamon to intervene with the bishop on Jeczusko's behalf, but this was to no avail. During the first week of August the committee met with O'Connor in Newark and was once again told that Jeczusko would not be reinstated. The mood of the committee can be summed up in the comment of Marcel Sherman, "We're not going to have that Irish bishop telling us what to do. " 55 At a mass meeting on Monday, August 6, the committee reported the bishop's refusal to the parishioners and the break with St. Mary's was made final. Labash and Kollar were elected chairman and vice chairman respectively of the new parish. Pledges were received for $14,000 and $550 was collected that first night. Still, Labash held out the possibility of reconciliation: The new church, it was explained, would not necessarily become detached from the Roman Catholic Church in this country, provided, of course, Bishop O 'Connor accepted their action as being a logical expression of the feelings of a people who were hurt, and agreed to treat them on a par with the other congregations within his �SLOVAKIA 75 diocese , but with the understanding that Father Jeczusko would be rector of the church and the mode of carrying on the business affairs of the parish put in the hands of the parishioners rather than the clergymen. 56 At a mass meeting on Saturday, August 20 at Hama's Hall with Father Jeczusko present, the priest was formally offered the post of pastor of Holy Name Slovak Church. Jeczusko's reply is indicative of his personal turmoil in this situation: "I am facing a difficult situation, my friends," he stated, ''having my passpost all ready, I have merely to engage passage to leave for my home country. Your apparent sincerity of purpose, however, and your zeal in the endeavor to carry out the true significance of Catholicism, prompt me to heed your call. ' ' He then asked that the people not try to set aside the Roman Catholic authority. He intimated that serious things might happen to him. "And after all ," he exclaimed, '' our work is in the name of God above , the name of our newly formed parish implies that, and with His aid we shall conquer all things. By the memory of my sweet little mother , whose greatest ambition in life was to see me at the Altar of the Almighty, serving with honor, serving with a dignified fear of Him above , and fulfilling all that is prescribed by the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, I accept this call to serve you, my people. But I implore you not to give up your traditions, the traditions of the Roman Catholic Church. Let us call unto ourselves the leadership of this great church with its authority. "57 Father Jeczusko celebrated the first Mass for the new parish on Sunday , August 27 , 1922 at Hama's Hall where many of the organizational meetings had been held. 58 On August 29 Bishop O'Connor wrote to Father Salamon explaining Father Jeczusko's excommunicated status and the fact that the new congregation was not a Catholic church.59 He asked that this letter be read at all Masses the following Sunday, September 2 . Approximately one third of the parishioners of St. Mary's �SLOVAKIA 76 joined Holy Name Parish. In his 1922 report to the diocese, Haitinger listed 1260 men, 1810 women, and 2600 children at St. Mary's for a total of 5760. This report was signed by trustees Michael Novak and Steven Kollar, both of whom would later join Holy Name Parish. The 1924 report submitted by Father Salamon showed a drop in all three categories, for a total decrease of 1323 people. However these figures are approximations. The 1922 Sunday and Holyday Collections amounted to $9,794,67 , while the same collections in the 1926 report amounted to $6 ,621.22 60 Perhaps the best guage for the extent of the split are the baptismal and marriage records for both churches. 61 BAPTISMS St. Mary's Holy Name 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1920 1921 192·2 1923 1924 1925 1926 108 149 160 105 111 104 99 21 58 34 55 36 MARRIAGES St. Mary's Holy Name 36 40 31 40 45 37 34 2 15 25 12 19 If St. Mary's listed between 1200 and 1500 families in its 1922 report, Holy Name in its 1937 report to the parish listed 517 contributing families. 62 From all these sources the figure of one third of the Slovak community of Passaic belonging to Holy Name Parish seems reliable. The parishioners set about the task of securing property on Fourth Street, five blocks away from St. Mary's and contracted for the erection of a new church and rectory costing $100,000. �SLOVAKIA 77 Father Jeczusko , meanwhile , stayed at the home of Andrew Singlary on Fourth Street. In the Spring of 1925 the cornerstone was ready to be blessed. On May 5 , 1925 Steven Kollar wrote to Bishop O 'Connor on behalf of the parish committee to request a meeting with the bishop .63 The chancellor of the Newark Diocese, Msgr. John A. Duffy, responded to the letter and the meeting was held on May 11. This appears to be the one time that Father Jeczusko was present for a meeting of this type. 64 The committee asked that Bishop O'Connor come to bless the cornerstone of the new church. Monsignor Duffy agreed to present the proposal to O'Connor. In the meantime Duffy requested Fathe:r Salamon to send a letter to Bishop Fischer-Colbrie in Slovakia asking him to send Jeczusko a specific "mandatum" to return to Slovakia. 65 On May 20 , 1925 , Monsignor Duffy responded to Kollar in the name of Bishop O'Connor. In very blunt terms Duffy informed Kollar that the church would have to be turned directly over to the bishop, who would then have it incorporated under New Jersey law with himself as the president, the pastor as secretary-treasurer, and with two lay trustees appointed by the bishop. The pastor would administer the parish and its temporalities. With regard to Father Jeczusko , he would have to submit to Canon Law, reject his schism, and his future status would have to be decided by Rome. Nothing could be promised for him. Duffy concluded, ''It will be impossible therefore , for us to negotiate with you any further except on the terms laid down above,' ' 66 and exhorted them to abandon their schism. On May 30 , 1925 the cornerstone of Holy Name Church was solemnly blessed by the Right Rev. Monsignor Louis Rusko of Philadelphia, 67 in the presence of many clergymen of the area. The newspapers reported the fact that the parish committee had " waited on the Rt. Rev. Bishop John O'Connor of the Catholic Diocese of Newark in an effort to have him send a representative to take part in the ceremonies. " 68 No Catholic representative was present at the ceremonies, and that marked the effective end of the relationship between Holy Name Slovak Church and the Roman Catholic Church. On November 27 , 1925, the Right Rev. Bishop Francis Hodur of Scranton, Pennsylvania, founder of the Polish National Catholic Church, solemnly blessed Holy Name �78 SLOVAKIA Church. 69 From that time on Holy Name Parish held its ecclesial communion with the Polish National Catholic Church. THE AFTERMATH In 1926 , now nearing the end of his lengthy episcopate, O'Connor responded to an inquiry about Holy Name Church from the Apostolic Delegate , Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi: Through one of the Slovak priests I have requested Father Jeczusko 's bishop , who will be here for the Eucharistic Congress , to visit Passaic and see his subject personally. I hope that as a result of this visit Father Jeczusko will return to his diocese and that the financial difficulties of the Holy Name Parish will force the remaining members to turn the property over to legitimate authority. I beg to assure Your Excellency that this matter is settling itself and within a short time the so called Independent Church will be but a name.7° Whether the visit from the Bishop of Kosice took place is unknown. However , the situation did not settle itself. A year later the chancellor of the Newark Diocese wrote to Father Jeczusko on behalf of Bishop O'Connor to correct a statement that Jeczusko had made in a court case alleging that he was not an excommunicated priest.1 1 In the ensuing years a number of inquiries and attempts at reconciliation were initiated , primarily by Slovak priests , but nothing came of them . In the summer of 1938 Father Jeczusko died , just a matter of weeks after the installation of the Most Rev . Thomas H. McLaughlin as first Bishop of Paterson, a new diocese cut off from Newark and including the city of Passaic . A committee including Marcel Sherman, John Tomecko, George Nemec and John Rusnak approached Bishop McLaughlin concerning a reconciliation. McLaughlin was hopeful and asked the Apostolic Delegate for instructions in handling the matter.7 2 However, nothing came of the discussion principally because of the diocesan requirement to have the church incorporated with the bishop as president. The trustees were unwilling to turn over the property to the bishop , even a new friendly bishop .7 3 The committee engaged as their new pastor the Reverend Eugene Magyar, a native �SLOVAKIA 79 of Palmerton, Pennsylvania, and a Slovak despite his name, who had been assisting Father Jeczusko. In 1945 a new pastor, Andrew J. Romanak, was named for St. Mary's Parish after Father Salamon's death. Through his offices another attempt at reconciliation was made late in 1946 just a few months before Bishop McLaughlin's death. McLaughlin received instructions and assurances from the Apostolic Delegate concerning proceeding in the various questions concerning reconciliation, and McLaughlin addressed a letter to the congregation through its president Stephen Matthias in January, 1947.74 However, again nothing came of the attempt.7 5 In 1963 Father Magyar was ordained by the Polish National Catholic Church as a bishop for the Slovak National Catholics. At this time Holy Name acquired the title ''cathedra), '' although it is not the see church of a specific diocese. Bishop·Magyar died in 1968 and was briefly succeeded by a priest of the Polish National Catholic Church, Father John Hrencewicz. After Father Hrencewicz's departure, Father William Chromey, a Polish National Catholic priest of Slovak descent, who had served previously as an associate to Bishop Magyar, came to Holy Name and remains pastor there to this day. From the beginning there have been defections from Holy Name back to St. Mary's. Many of these occurred on an individual basis over the years. As it became apparent that the split was going to be a permanent one, the people faced various hardships. The split cut across family lines, and no longer considered "Catholic," members of Holy Name were denied burial in St. Mary's Cemetery where their parents and other relatives were buried. No longer considered ''Catholic,'' the Holy Name parishioners were dropped from membership in the First Catholic Slovak Union and subsequently lost its benefits. 76 Sometimes the occasion of a marriage to a Roman Catholic provided the opportunity to return to that faith. After the ever-popular Father Jeczusko's death in 1938, still more members of the congregation returned to St. Mary's. The financial obligations incurred by the congregation too, were a factor in inducing some members to leave. 77 Eventually both John Labash and Steven Kollar, as well �80 SLOVAKIA as a number of the other early organizers , returned to St. Mary 's and the Roman Catholic Church. 78 However, a sizeable number of families remained faithful to the parish. The ideals for which the congregation had fought: independence from hierarchical control , and lay control of parish affairs; remained an attractive reality to many of the people . Today Holy Name Parish continues to be supported by some 250 families .79 The parish that Father Jeczusko shepherded remained, as he promised in his acceptance speech, faithful to its Catholic traditions . While embracing Polish National Catholicism in an organizational sense, the parish never severed its ties with Roman Catholic usages. While the Polish National Church introduced the vernacular at an early date, both Father Jeczusko and Bishop Magyar continued to use Latin until a few months before the Roman Catholic church changed to the vernacular. 80 The liturgical books of the Roman Church were used and Father Jecuszko continued to pray his Divine Office in the church each day. 81 At Mass he prayed for the pope and the bishop of Newark , and on Good Friday he joined the rest of the Roman Catholic Church in its solemn orations "for schismatics and heretics," even if the rest of the Church felt it was praying for him. 82 The Baltimore Catechism continued to be in use throughout Father Jeczusko 's pastorate. 83 The people were adamant in their desire for a celibate clergy in the manner of the Roman Church, even though the Polish National Church has had a married clergy for years. Part of the impetus for the 1947 reconciliation attempt was the suspicion among many parishioners that Father Magyar was married. 84 Father Jeczusko himself seems to have become something of a pathetic figure toward the end of his life. As it became apparent · that the split was permanent, he seemed to some to become more despondent. Although happy with his situation among his beloved people, he was not content with his situation in the wider Church. "I know I didn 't do right. I'll pay for it somewhere ," he commented to a friend .85 Unable to speak English even at the end of his life, Jeczusko was in some ways a hostage of his congregation, dependent on them for his dealings with the wider world, including medical attention. He died in the summer of 1938, not �SLOVAKIA 81 yet fifty-one years old, perhaps of a heart attack brought on by emphysema. 86 Perhaps his real state of mind is best revealed by his will, which , after a few bequests to close friends, left his entire estate to the seminary at Kos ice. 8 7 After leaving Passaic Emery Haitinger was named pastor of the much smaller parish of St. Joseph in Elizabeth. He remained there for the rest of his life, dying on November 14 , 1959 at the age of eighty-six. 88 There is no documentary evidence that any responsibility was ever attached to him for the debacle is Passaic in 1922, except for the Duffy letter and one other incident that occurred much later in his life. On April 10, 1946, Pope Pius XII honored Haitinger by making him a monsignor at the request of his seminary classmate, Thomas J. Walsh, who was now the Archbishop of Newark. This occurred on the fiftieth anniversary of Haitinger's ordination. For the senior Slovak pastor in an ethnically conscious diocese, who had built two churches and actively participated in the formation of at least four congregations, this was an unusually long time to wait for that honor. CONCLUSION Bishop Thomas H. McLaughlin, the first Bishop of Paterson perhaps best summed up the situation that led to Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Church in several observations made over the years: Investigations which were made by me . . . have led me to the conclusion that the differences existing among the Slovak people of Passaic and Clifton have been and were due to misunderstandings . . . 89 I often felt , even before becoming Bishop of Paterson, that this man (Father Jeczusko) unfamiliar with the English language and American customs was to some extent the unwitting victim of a situation that got out of control. 90 I have always felt that the congregation as a whole was not completely at fault , and that good Father Jeczusko, not being familiar with American legal conditions and canonical procedure, erred somewhat through misunderstanding rather than through malice. 91 �82 SLOVAKIA At the time of the 1922 conflict McLaughlin was president of Seton Hall College and rector of the Newark-diocesan theologate , and therefore not totally removed from the situation. That he should maintain such an opinion puts him in stark contrast to Bishop O'Connor. Another observer commented from a different viewpoint: ''The trustees were feeling their oats. If the bishop had cooperated it could have been different. But he always felt 'I'm the boss.' '' 92 Certainly Bishop McLaughlin's observations of Father Jeczusko seem accurate . He was more a catalyst for the revolt, rather than a cause for it. The dissatisfaction in St. Mary's had been festering for years. At the same time the Slovak community in Passaic was becoming more and more successful and less willing to be treated with the Old World domination of Father Haitinger or the paternalism of Bishop O'Connor. In this sense Father Jeczusko 's popularity was more a lightning rod for the fire to strike. Mr. Labash 's comments on Bishop O'Connor also seem accurate. He certainly was an unwavering figure in the controversy , preferring to back up established authority (Haitinger) even when his position was untenable, and even then refusing to compromise on any point. It must be remembered that the dissidents never asked for Jeczusko to replace Haitinger, but merely to be able to remain at St. Mary's. Certainly by 1922 there was enough evidence from situations around the country over the years that Slovak and other eastern European congregations were capable of carrying disputes to the point of schism. 93 Perhaps his successful handling of a similar situation among the Italians earlier in his administration made O 'Connor feel that this situation could be similarly handled from a position of strength.94 Bishop O'Connor was also something of a distant figure in this dispute, preferring to deal through Salamon and Duffy. Indeed there is no evidence that O'Connor and Jeczusko ever met face to face through the whole five years they were both involved in the controversy. Whatever O 'Connor's reasons for his handling of the affair, his methods were unsuccessful and things did not " settle down." Holy Name Church still stands today within what was once the Newark Diocese of Bishop O'Connor, one of the only two surviv- �SLOVAKIA 83 ing Slovak National Catholic Churches in the United States , an unusual monument to the unwavering determination of many people. NOTES 1 Holy Trinity Slovak Lutheran Church, a short distance across the river in Garfield, N.J. could easily be a fifth partner in this description. 2 Mark Stolarik, "Lay Initiative in American-Slovak Parishes : 1880-1930," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia , 83 (1972) p . 158 . 3 See Tenth Anniversary of the Holy Name Slovak Catholic Church (1932). Diamond Jubilee Journal, St . Mary 's Church (1968). and Slovaks in America (Middletown , Pa.: Slovak League of America, 1978.) 4 There is a Sts. Cyril and Methodius Slovak National Catholic Church in Perth Amboy , N.J. but the two congregations are not directly connected , nor has Holy Name ever been connected with the Czechoslovak National Church which developed in Europe . 5 Rudolph J. Vecoli , The People of New Jersey (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. , 1965) , p. 213 . 6 William W. Scott, Passaic and Its Environs (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co ., 1922). p . 496. 7 Ibid .• p . 496. 8 Works Progress Administration, New Jersey: A Guide to its Present and Past (New York: Hastings House , 1946), pp. 345-346. 9 10 11 Scott, Op. cit., p. 494. Ibid. M. Mark Stolarik, "Immigration, Education and the Social Mobility of Slovaks, 1870-1930, " in Immigrants and Religion in Urban America, Randall M. Miller and Thomas D. Marzik, eds. (Philadelphia : Temple University Press , 1977) pp. 105-106. 12 Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee , 1910). p. 111 . 13 Rev. Emery Haitinger to Bishop John O'Connor, Feast of St. Emery, 1902, Archives of the Archdiocese of Newark (hereafter AAN), Haitinger Personnel File. Accused of being a "Magyarone" himself, Haitinger in this letter sets down his own biases two decades before the similar controversy which would engulf him. 14 New Jersey Catholic Historical Records Commission, The Bishops of Newark 1853-1978 (South Orange , N.J.: Seton Hall University Press , 1978). p. 64 . 15 In 1954 an eleventh parish would be added in Passaic with the establishment of Our Lady of Fatima Church for the new wave of Hispanic immigrants . 16 The parish is variously referred to as St . Mary's , St. Marie's (an affectation that seems to have developed after the construction of the " French Gothic" new church) , and Assumpion. The incorporated name of the parish is ' •Slavonian Catholic Church of the Assumption. '' �SLOVAKIA 84 17 Elizabeth Daily Journal , November 14 , 1959 , AAN, Haitinger Personnel File . 18 AAN , Parish Reports , 1922 . 19 Vecoli, op. cit., p. 196. 20 Archives of the Diocese of Paterson (hereafter ADP), St. Anthony 's , Passaic fil e . This schism was resolved in 1924. 21 ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church file . 22 For background information on Haitinger see AAN , Haitinger Personnel File. 23 Interview with Albin Stolarik , November 23 , 1983 , ADP. Ibid . 24 25 Interview with John Labash , October 31, 1983, ADP. 26 AAN , John A. Duffy to Emery A. Haitinger May 20 , 1925 , Haitinger Personnel File . 27 Emery Haitinger to John Duffy , 1925 , AAN. Miss Julia Tereschak was Haitinger's housekeeper. 28 Passaic Daily News, August 7, 1922 . p. 1. 29 Testimonial of Bishop Augustine Fischer-Colbrie, November 30, 1920, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File . 30 Personnel Record, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 31 Albin Stolarik, Op . cit. 32 Labash , Op. cit. 33 Interview with Stephen Matthias , November 7, 1983 , ADP. Ibid., and Labash , Op . cit. 34 35 John O'Connor to Emery Haitinger, March 14, 1922, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 37 Augustine Fischer-Colbrie to John O 'Connor, April 1, 1922 , APO, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 38 John O'Conno~.to Emery Haitinger, April 20 , 1922 , ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 39 Passaic Daily News, April 24 , 1922 , p. 1. 40 Passaic Daily News , April 24 , 1922 , p. 2. 41 Petition of Branch 192 of the First Catholic Slovak Union , and Branch 2 of the Slovak Union of Passaic , N.J., April 29, 1922 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File . 42 Passaic Daily Herald, April 24, 1922 , p. 1. 43 Passaic Daily News , April 28, 1922 , p. 1. 44 Passaic Daily News , April 29 , 1922, p. 1. 45 Passaic Daily News , April 24, 1922 , p . 1. 46 Passaic Daily News , May 1, 1922, p . 2. 47 Passaic Daily N ews, May 8 , 1922 , p. 1. 48 Passaic Daily Herald, May 8, 1922, pp . 1-2 . Passaic Daily Herald, May 8, 1922, pp. 1-2 . Mrs . Matisovsky related that Haitinger had offered her money to accompany him to Coney Island . 50 One of the complaints against Haitinger was his inattention to the needs of the 49 �SLOVAKIA 85 parishioners , particularly his refusal to allow the formation of a Holy Name Society for the men of the parish. 51 Passaic Daily News , May 25 , 1922, p. 1. 52 Passaic Daily News, May 27, 1922 , p. 1. Both Kollar 's son and Skvarla 's nephew would eventually become Roman Catholic priests . 53 54 Passaic Daily News, August 15, 1922, pp . 1-2. 55 Albin Stolarik, Op. cit. 56 Passaic Daily News , August 7, 1922 , p . 1. 57 Passaic Daily News , August 21, 1922 , pp. 1, 3. 58 The fact that Hama 's Hall was attached to a tavern was constantly brought up by the opposition as an indication of the dissidents' lack of religiosity. 59 John O'Connor to John Salamon, August 29 , 1922, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 60 AAN, Parish Reports , 1922 , 1924, 1926. 61 Father Haitinger kept poor sacramental records , with baptisms and marriages being recorded in batches , and some years later. 62 Financial Report of the Holy Name Slovak Catholic Church of Passaic, N .J. for the year 1937 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 63 Steven Kollar to John O'Connor, May 5, 1925, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 64 Duffy and Jeczusko were unable to communicate directly, since Jeczusko could not speak English , and Dufy was unable to communicate in Latin when Jeczusko tried that language. Matthias , Op. cit. 65 John Salamon to Augustine Fischer-Colbrie, May 14, 1925 , ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. Salamon was unaware that Fischer-Colbrie had already died . 66 John Duffy to Steven Kollar, May 20, 1925, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 67 There is some confusion about Msgr. Rusko's status . He is described as a Roman Catholic and "Apostolic Visitator" for Slovaks in America. However his name does not appear in any Catholic Directories in the 1920's . Another source said he was actually an Anglican. See Albin Stolarik, Op. cit. 68 Passaic Daily News, May 29 , 1925, p . 1. 69 Passaic Daily News, November 27 , 1925, p . 1. This was not Bishop Hodur's first visit to Passaic. He had previously presided at the cornerstone blessing and Confirmation for St. Anthony of Padua Independent Italian Catholic Church on May 11, 1919. 70 John O'Connor to Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi, June 16, 1926, ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 71 John Duffy to Emery Jeczusko , March 11, 1927, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 72 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , August 11 , 1938, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 73 Labash, Op . cit. 14 Thomas McLaughlin to Stephen Matthias et al., January 16, 1947, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 75 This time the difficulty centered around the fate of Father Magyar. The trustees real- �86 SLOVAKIA ized that he would have to leave ifreconciliation was accomp lished , but they did not wish to s imply "abandon " Magyar. They felt that it was necessary to find some work or provide some financial se ttlement for him . Bishop McLaughlin balked at this , and before the matter could be settled , McLaughlin died on March 17, 1947. Labash, Op . cit. 76 John Salamon to Augustine Fisc her-Colbri e , May 14, 1925 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. See also M. Mark Stolarik, " Building Slovak Co mmunities in America " in Ke ith P. Dyrud , et al. Th e Other Ca th olics (New York : Arno Press, 1978), p . 106. n Matthias, Op . cit. 78 Ibid. 79 Interview with William Chromey, October 14, 1983, ADP. 80 81 Matthias , Op. cit. Ibid . 82 Albin Stolarik, Op . cit. 83 Ibid. 84 Andrew Romanak to Thomas McLaughlin, July 23 , 1946, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. It was not until Magyar's will was probated in 1968 that the congregation at large finall y learned that he was indeed married to his housekeeper , Isabelle. 85 Labash , Op . cit. as Matthias , Op . cit. 87 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , December 13, 1946, APO, Holy Name Slovak Church File . 88 AAN , Haitinger Personnel Fi le. 89 Thomas McLaughlin to Stephen Matthias et al. , January 16, 1947, ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 90 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , December 13 , 1946, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 91 Thomas McLaughlin to Andrew Romanak , May 28 , 1946, ADP, Hol y Name Slovak Church File. 92 Labash , Op . cit. 93 M. Mark Stolarik, " Lay Initiative ... " Op . cit. 94 ADP, St. Anthony, Passaic , Parish File. � SLOVAKIA 63 The Slovak National Catholic Church, Passaic, New Jersey, and the Jeczusko Affair RAYMOND J. KUPKE INTRODUCTION In the Dundee section of Passaic, New Jersey there are four churches in an area of nine city blocks : Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Cathedral, St. Mary 's Roman Catholic Church, St. Michael the Archangel Ruthenian Catholic Cathedral , and Sts. Peter and Paul Russian Orthodox Cathedral. Although this listing represents four diverse denominations, the members of the four parishes are descended from immigrants from the same villages in what are today Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic , and indeed family ties run across all four congregations. 1 Commenting on an article about Our Lady of Mercy Slovak Parish in Cleveland, Ohio, which existed in a schismatic state from the Roman Catholic Church from 1917 to 1922 , Slovak historian Mark Stolarik observes, It is interesting to note that in the spirit of "consensus" history a recent article infednota (January 19, 1972 , p. 1) about Our Lady of Mercy Church, makes no mention of this schism. Contemporary Slovak editors avoid religious controversy at all costs. 2 When one delves into the Slovak religious history of Passaic , Stolarik's observation is amply born out. Upon reading the available jubilee books 3 one hardly notices a mention of the year 1922. Yet in 1922 , just as the rupture in Cleveland's Slovak community was being healed, a schism developed in Passaic's Slovak �64 SLOVAKIA community which would effect a permanent division in the community, and create an unusual footnote in American religious history - a cathedral without a diocese, a one-parish "denomination'' with Roman Catholic usages and Polish National Catholic affiliation. 4 The religious history of Passaic is amazingly complex. It is caught up in currents on both sides of the Atlantic and involves merchants and politicians, popes and bishops, patriarchs and czars. This study attempts to examine one facet of that history, the dispute in the Slovak community of Passaic which divided St. Mary's Parish and led to the formation of Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Church. THE SETTING Located on the Passaic River fifteen miles upstream from Newark, Passaic was first settled by the Dutch in 1678. It remained a small commercial village until after the Civil War when railroads and the textile industry began to change its character. Incorporated as a city in 18 73, Passaic welcomed its first Eastern European immigrants six years later. They were brought in by George B. Waterhouse to work in the Waterhouse Brothers Mills . The initial seven immigrants recruited by Waterhouse in 1879 soon turned into a flood from Eastern and Southern Europe. The 1910 census showed Passaic's foreign born comprising 52 % of the total population. 5 The 1920 census registered a population of 63,824 with 74% o( that total being foreign born, the greatest percentage of any city (over 50,000) in the United States. 6 The Slovak population at the time was estimated to be 7,400.7 The WPA Guide to New Jersey describes the area: East of Main Avenue , a progressively shabbier area stretches down to the river. Here the streets are narrow , with frame swellings and congested tenements crowded beside huge factories . This is the " Dundee Section," where one-half the population is crammed into one-sixth of the city' s area. Living in this section are most of the foreign-born who comprise about one-third of the total population. Numerically the Poles are first , followed in �SLOVAKIA 65 turn by the Italians, Russians , Hungarians , Slovaks, Germans , Austrians, Dutch, Scotch, English and Irish. 8 The initial seven Eastern Europeans whom George Waterhouse brought from Castle Garden to Passaic in December 1879 were all from the Eastern part of Slovakia. They were: Andrew Pastor, John Socha, John Kostisin, and George Slivka from Saris County; John Pochlod and John Salasovic from Zemplin County; and Edward Geiger from Spis County. 9 The initial seven immigrants were quickly joined by their fellow countrymen from Slovakia. When asked what was the inducement to come to America , one of the original seven Slovak immigrants quickly answered "money. " 1 Certainly the poor economic conditions in Eastern Europe were a major inducement for European emigrati~n. But Slovaks had another incentive as well . Beginning in the 1870's the government of Hungary, which included Slovakia, embarked on a program of "Magyarization" in the non-Magyar parts of the kingdom. The three Slovak ''gymnasia'' (high schools) were closed, and most of the religious primary schools were nationalized. The use of Slovak was prohibited in the schools and teachers were awarded a bonus if they were successful Magyarizers. 11 Even to study for the priesthood a Slovak must pass through the Magyar seminary, and there any study of the language of the future flock is treated as ground for expulsion.12 This process created divisions among Slovaks in America between those who were educated by the Hungarians and those who were not. A dispute broke out in 1902 at St. Stephen's Slovak Parish in Newark between the non-Magyarized parishioners and their pastor, Father Alexander Kovacs. In a solicited letter (Written in Latin) , Father Emery ("Imrich" in Slovak, " Imre " in Magyar) Haitinger, Slovak pastor in Passaic , attempted to explain the distinction between the two groups to a confused Bishop John J. O'Connor of Newark. SLAVICS are a peaceful people, who have built the church and maintain it well: they are the basis of the Slavonic congregation because they pay their debts; SLOVAKS are an ambitious people who desire to lead , ° �66 SLOVAKIA to rule, but they do not like to pay debts, nor will they pay them, as their custom is in the free manner of the Italians ... These Slovaks are a troublesome people, POLITICAL AGITATORS against the Hungarian fatherland, whose political machinations are not needed in America. 13 Because of these economic and cultural reasons the number of Slovak immigrants grew rapidly. In 1880 there were 292 foreignborn "Hungarians" in New Jersey. By 1900 that figure grew to 8,404 just in the seven northern counties that comprised the Newark Catholic Diocese.1 4 Most of the immigrants to Passaic were Catholic and between 1890 and 1920 the territorial "Irish" parish of St. Nicholas was joined by nine new "national" parishes for Polish, Italian, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Ruthenian immigrants. 15 The first of the national churches to be organized was St. Michael the Archangel in 1890. This church served Catholics of the Byzantine Rite who were in communion with Rome. Since many of these Ruthenians or "Rusins" lived in the same villages as the Latin Rite Slovaks, the Passaic Slovaks assisted their neighbors in building St. Michael's. This experience may have provided the spark the Slovak community needed for the following year St. Mary's Slovak Parish was organized on April 1. 16 Initially the congregation met in the basement of St. Nicholas' Church, but by 1893 they were able to construct a church of their own on the corner of Monroe and Second Streets. The absence of a stable Slovak clergy in th~ United States hampered the growth of the new parish. Between 1891 and 1898 the parish was served by a rapid succession of pastors including Fathers Samuel Belja, Bernard Skulik, Benjamin Kwiatkowski, Joseph Ligday, John Pollakovics, and Ignatius Jaskovits, with Father John Sheppard of St. Nicholas often filling in the gaps. On September 2, 1898 Bishop Winand Wigger of Newark appointed Father Emery A. Haitinger, recently arrived in the diocese, as pastor of St.Mary's and he remained for nearly a quarter of a century.17 Father Haitinger supervised the construction of a new stone church which was completed in 1904. By 1920 the parish numbered between 1200 and 1500 families comprising about 600 individuals. 18 �SLOVAKIA 67 Passaic was not free from strife in those years. Many Passaic workers participated in the "Great Strike of 1913 " in which 25 ,000 mill workers organized by the Industrial Workers of the World struck throughout northern New Jersey.19 Religious dissension was also not unheard of. In 1910 Sts. Peter and Paul Byzantine Catholic Parish, which had developed from St. Michael's in 1902, defected from the Catholic Church and embraced Russian Orthodoxy. Also in 1918, a rupture in Our Lady of Mt. Carmel Italian parish resulted in the formation of St. Anthony of Padua Independent Italian Catholic Church.20 On March 13, 1921, Bishop O'Connor, at Father Haitinger's request, appointed Father Emery Jeczusko, recently arrived from Europe, to be curate at St. Mary's .21 This would seem to have been a routine assignment, but in the highly charged atmosphere of Passaic it was an appointment that would have far-reaching consequences . THE DISPUTE Emery A. Haitinger was born in Slovakia, then a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1873 just at the time that the government's Magyarization policy was beginning. Haitinger began his seminary training at Arad in the southeastern part of Hungary in what is today Romania, but he emigrated to the United States during his seminary years and completed his training at St. Bonaventure's Seminary in Allegheny, New York. He was ordained a priest by Bishop Michael Hoban at Scranton, Pennsylvania in 1896. For two years Haitinger worked as a missionary among Slovak immigrants in northeastern Pennsylvania. In 1898 Bishop Winand Wigger accepted him for service in the Newark Diocese , and on September 2 of that year the twenty-five year old priest was appointed pastor of St. Mary's Parish in Passaic. 22 Doubtless Haitinger was considered a great asset to a diocese hard pressed to deal with a rapidly growing ethnic group . He was the first stable Slovak priest to work in the diocese , and he was pastorally effective in six languages. He not only supervised the construction of a new church in Passaic , but also was instrumental in the development of new parishes in Boonton, Rockaway, Elizabeth, and Linden. Through his connections in Europe he was �68 SLOVAKIA able to bring other Slovak priests to work in the Newark Diocese . However, Father Haitinger's twenty-four years in Passaic were not entirely peaceful. He considered himself a "gr6f" or member of the aristocracy , and sometimes styled himself " van Haitinger," as did his doctor brother.23 He did nothing to hide his bias for the Magyarized elements of his congregation and his parishioners called him a "Magyarone ," a title used for those who supported the Magyarizing of Slovak language and culture .24 There were also more serious charges of moral misconduct and of diverting church funds , particularly for the purchase of property for himself and his family. 25 While it is impossible to document these charges , there is a letter from Bishop John Duffy , then Chancellor of the Newark Diocese, to Haitinger on May 20, 1925 indicating some confusion between the personal property of Haitinger and the parish property. I am writing in reference to the lot owned by you adjoining the school of St. Mary's Parish, Passaic. I am sure that when the lot was purchased by you that you had in mind the future needs of St. Mary's Parish. Conditions there now require that the lot should belong to the church property. I remember hearing that the purchase price at which you bought this peace of property was very small, and I have heard that your present price is extremely large. In the interest of the Church for which you feel as deeply concerned as I do , I would suggest that you fix a price for this property within reason, and let me know what the amount is .26 Haitinger's reply is also interesting. In my first reply I wrote that I do not possess any lot in Passaic , and I emphasize it again. The pastor of St. Mary's knows it; he rented the lot in 1922 not from me , but from Miss Julia Tereschak, who is the owner since 1907. Before I disposed of the lot, I gave a preference to my congregation; but in a stormy meeting they refused to buy it. 27 �SLOVAKIA 69 These controversies about Haiting er' s pastorate festered for at least a decade prior to 1922. 2a Emery A. Jeczusko was born on February 18 , 1888 at Presov in Slovakia, but he came from Vel'ky Saris, the same town that three of the original Slovak immigrants and many of their successors hailed from . Jeczusko attended the seminary at Kosice and was ordained there by Bishop Augustine Fischer-Colbrie on November 30, 1911. Bishop Fischer-Colbrie released him to come to America and work among the Slovaks on November 30, 1920 , 29 and on Father Haitinger's request , Bishop O'Connor of Newark received him and assigned him as curate at St. Mary's, Passaic on March 13 , 1921.30 · Father Jeczusko was well received in Passaic. He is described as an eloquent orator, who was able to sight translate Latin into Slovak. 31 He endeared himself to the people not only by his brilliant sermons , but also by his ability to sing High Mass. 32 " Anything happen, the people want to see Father Jeczusko .. . and Father Haitinger didn't like that.' ' 33 Father Jeczusko was also socially attached to his parishioners . Unable to speak English, he naturally gravitated to people from his native area. He would often visit the Hungarian Social Club, a few blocks from the rectory, to play cards and have a few beers with his friends. 34 On March 11, 1922, Haitinger wrote the following letter to Bishop O'Connor, Herewith is enclosed my financial statement of 1921. Also in these lines I ask Your Lordship to be so kind as to renew the Faculties of my Assistant , the Rev. Emery Jeczusko, which expires within the coming few days. 35 O'Connor replied immediately on March 14. From what I have learned of Father Jeczusko's habits, I do not wish to renew his faculties in this diocese. Tell him he must seek some other diocese . I enclose a letter testifying that he is not under censure. I will write to Father Miklus and tell him to go to you. 36 Meanwhile on April 19, O'Connor received a letter from Bishop Fischer-Colbrie in Kos ice. �70 SLO VAKIA I received the telegram of Your Excellency, and by your request I recall my priest Emery Jeczusko . .. I also ask that Your Excellency favor me by communicating the causes of your desire , that I may have direction in my agenda with Emery Jeczusko .37 On April 20 O'Connor again communicated with Haitinger. The enclosed letter for Father Jeczusko is from Bishop Fischer-Colbrie of Cassovia recalling him to his diocese. Oblige me by handing it to him. The Bishop requires him to return at once. It is the result of the cablegram sent sometime ago. 38 Bishop O'Connor does not elaborate on the offensive habits of Father Jeczusko , but presumably he did not find it acceptable for priests to fraternize with the laity in social clubs. He also does not elaborate on where he received the information on Father Jeczusko's habits. Popular opinion held that Haitinger himself, and his friends, had informed O 'Connor. While there is no conclusive evidence of this , it would appear from O'Connor's second communication to Haitinger that Haitinger was previously aware of the cablegram sent to Europe. On Sunday, April 23 , 1922, Father Jeczusko mounted the pulpit during the 10:30 A.M. Mass and explained his recall and bade the people farewell. He was followed by Father Haitinger who expressed his sorrow at Jeczusko 's recall. It appears that this announcement was not a surprise because a demonstration took place outside the church after Mass , and handbills were circulated calling for a mass meeting that night at Hama's Hall in Passaic. 39 The hall was filled to capacity, and the meeting was chaired by John J. Labash, an undertaker, and Steven Kollar, a cobbler. Demands were made for Jeczusko's reinstatement and the removal of Hai ting er. Even at this early date, the organizers of the dispute were talking about the possibility of a new parish. Messrs. Labash and Kollar speaking to a Daily News man said that the people were going to carry the fight to the bitter end. They felt that they were justified in even organizing an independent parish, if only to carry out what they figured was right .40 �SLOVAKIA 71 A second meeting was held on April 27 at Mokrai's Hall in Passaic, and as a result of this meeting ten parish organizations forwarded identical petitions to Bishop O 'Connor over the signatures of their officers: ... adopted a resolution seeking for the reinstatement of Father Emery Jeczusko in our church of St. Marie's of the Assumption, of Passaic, N.J. and that: The Rev. Emery A. Haitinger, now rector of the church be removed at once for the future good of our parish. This action is based on the wish of more than 600 people who attended a Mass meeting on Sunday, April 23, in a public hall at 108 Third Street, of our city. It is felt that a great deal of harm to our church, Faith and religion has come from the procrastinated action, or deferred action in this regard on your part. More than 90% of the people of our parish have literally refused to further attend the services of our church and we fear that a separation within the parish and a possible establishment of an Independent Church is threatening. It is honestly felt by most of the members of our parish that Father Haitinger must go. 41 The societies claimed a combined membership of 1200. The arguments against Haitinger centered around three issues: jealousy, finances , and patriotism. Mr. Kollar, a former trustee of the parish, claimed to have proof of serious discrepancies between the amount of money collected in the parish, the amount spent on parish expenses, and the amount in parish accounts.42 The patriotism charges were on two different levels. On the one hand Haiting er was accused of ''un-Americanism'' because he was alleged to have preached in favor of Austria-Hungary during World War I, and also that he had greeted the Hungarian Premier Husar as a Hungarian. 43 On the other hand Haitinger was also accused of "Magyarone" tendencies opposed to Slovak culture. 44 Haitinger's supporters countered by claiming that Haitinger was a true American, while Jeczusko was a retrogressive force in the community . . . . he was progressive in the matter of organizing a Slavish Federation which carried with it a spirit of the �72 SLOVAKIA fatherland and did not conform with the more modern spirit of working for things American. 45 All through April and May charges and countercharges were exchanged in the local newspapers, meetings were held , petitions were circulated. The atmosphere was further charged by an article in New Yorksky Dennfk, a Slovak newspaper in New York entitled "Battle of Slovak Catholics in Passaic." The article, widely circulated in Passaic, vilified Haitinger, and both the Hungarian and American hierarchy. Describing Haitinger the article commented: With abuse , cursings, laughter, lies and force more and more the Slovak people were literally chased from God's church merely that he might attain his aim and to make foreign the parish and bring it to the bishop , so to speak, on a silver platter, saying, "Here you have, august dictator, a new Irish parish." This hellish thought of Rev . Haitinger's has found a strong set-back in the face of the Slovak curate. The parson became afraid of his Judas recompense, and the bishop was afraid he would soon lose the Irished parish, which was builded through for Slovak blisters , and so the parson and the bishop got together and in short adjudged the Slovak curate to exile he must go.46 The tension was further heightened when one of the dissidents , a Mrs. Theresa Sisko, went to the rectory after Mass on Sunday, May 7 to reclaim at last a portion of a previous donation of $4,000 . Haitinger told her she would have to sue the parish, told her to get out, and then forcibly evicted her from the rectory, causing her to fall down the stairs and sustain many bruises. 47 Within a few days Mrs. Sisko brought suit against Haitinger for $30,000. The reports of the Sisko incident circulating through the ciy brought out a record crowd of 2,000 to a meeting that same night at Mokrai's Hall. During the meeting Labash and Kollar reiterated the history of their grievances. They claimed that petitions to the bishop in previous years had been destroyed before reaching him, that a committee sent to the bishop and the Apostolic Delegate in 1919 had failed to get a hearing, and that each time Bishop �SLOVAKIA 73 O'Connor was approached "he always sent us away with a promise to consider the matter.' ' 48 They then told the assembly of the bishop's final decision not allow Jenczusko to remain in the diocese. The allegations of financial mismanagement were repeated , and Mrs. Frank Matisovsky produced laughter among the audience when she related incidents of Haitinger's improprieties and her lack of satisfaction when these were related to the bishop .49 The assembly was unanimous in its· determination to replace Haitinger with another priest, have Jeczusko reinstated , and if necessary , form a new parish and even secede from the Catholic Church. For the first time the finances of a new church were discussed, and the name "Holy Name Parish" was used. 50 On Saturday the committee went to South Orange to approach Bishop O'Connor. This time they took Mrs. Sisko with them and she spoke to the bishop's secretary. Also during the week the committee met with Msgr. John A. Sheppard of Jersey City, formerly pastor of St. Nicholas, Passaic, and later Vicar General of the diocese. Acting on Sheppard's advice the committee formally presented a request to Haitinger to resign the pastorate with a copy of the request sent to O'Connor. 51 Rumors of Haitinger's removal were rampant in the city when he did not appear at Masses on Sunday, May 21. Instead the Masses were celebrated by Father John Salamon, a native son of the parish, and curate at St. Joseph's Parish in Elizabeth. It was reported that Haitinger had celebrated Mass in Elizabeth and returned to Passaic in the afternoon. The Saturday edition of the Passaic Daily News for May 27 carried the following article: As forecast by The Daily News Monday evening, the Rev. Father John D. Salamon, rector of St. Joseph's Church in Elizabeth, and formerly a pupil at St. Marie's Parochial School , of this city, has been designated as the new rector for the local Slovak Catholic Church, thus ending the controversy which threatened for a time to disrupt the entire St. Marie's Parish. Announcement was made by the Right Rev. Monsignor John A. Duffy, chancellor of the Catholic diocese of Newark, Thursday evening, to the effect that the Right Rev. Bishop John �74 SLOVAKIA J. O'Connor had decided upon the change being made. Meanwhile the Rev. Father Emery A. Haitinger, rector of St. Marie's Church since 1898, will be unattached for a while. He will visit temporarily with the Rev. Father Andrew Adzima, his former curate , and now rector of St. Joseph's in Bayonne.52 However the happy conclusion to the controversy forecast by the Passaic Daily News was premature. Having accomplished the first of their goals, the committee pressed on to insist on the reinstatement of Father Jeczusko as curate . The dissidents crystallized around Labash, Kollar, Marcel Sherman, a painter, Victor Chirip , a former locksmith in the Austrian royal palace , and Paul Skvarla, an architect. 53 The committee continued to treat with O'Connor about Jeczusko throughout the summer, but O'Connor was adamant. Jeczusko himself meanwhile did not participate in the controversy, but stayed with his brother in Connecticut. He did not reappear in Pasaaic until the middle of August. 54 The committee enlisted the help of Father Salamon to intervene with the bishop on Jeczusko's behalf, but this was to no avail. During the first week of August the committee met with O'Connor in Newark and was once again told that Jeczusko would not be reinstated. The mood of the committee can be summed up in the comment of Marcel Sherman, "We're not going to have that Irish bishop telling us what to do. " 55 At a mass meeting on Monday, August 6, the committee reported the bishop's refusal to the parishioners and the break with St. Mary's was made final. Labash and Kollar were elected chairman and vice chairman respectively of the new parish. Pledges were received for $14,000 and $550 was collected that first night. Still, Labash held out the possibility of reconciliation: The new church, it was explained, would not necessarily become detached from the Roman Catholic Church in this country, provided, of course, Bishop O 'Connor accepted their action as being a logical expression of the feelings of a people who were hurt, and agreed to treat them on a par with the other congregations within his �SLOVAKIA 75 diocese , but with the understanding that Father Jeczusko would be rector of the church and the mode of carrying on the business affairs of the parish put in the hands of the parishioners rather than the clergymen. 56 At a mass meeting on Saturday, August 20 at Hama's Hall with Father Jeczusko present, the priest was formally offered the post of pastor of Holy Name Slovak Church. Jeczusko's reply is indicative of his personal turmoil in this situation: "I am facing a difficult situation, my friends," he stated, ''having my passpost all ready, I have merely to engage passage to leave for my home country. Your apparent sincerity of purpose, however, and your zeal in the endeavor to carry out the true significance of Catholicism, prompt me to heed your call. ' ' He then asked that the people not try to set aside the Roman Catholic authority. He intimated that serious things might happen to him. "And after all ," he exclaimed, '' our work is in the name of God above , the name of our newly formed parish implies that, and with His aid we shall conquer all things. By the memory of my sweet little mother , whose greatest ambition in life was to see me at the Altar of the Almighty, serving with honor, serving with a dignified fear of Him above , and fulfilling all that is prescribed by the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, I accept this call to serve you, my people. But I implore you not to give up your traditions, the traditions of the Roman Catholic Church. Let us call unto ourselves the leadership of this great church with its authority. "57 Father Jeczusko celebrated the first Mass for the new parish on Sunday , August 27 , 1922 at Hama's Hall where many of the organizational meetings had been held. 58 On August 29 Bishop O'Connor wrote to Father Salamon explaining Father Jeczusko's excommunicated status and the fact that the new congregation was not a Catholic church.59 He asked that this letter be read at all Masses the following Sunday, September 2 . Approximately one third of the parishioners of St. Mary's �SLOVAKIA 76 joined Holy Name Parish. In his 1922 report to the diocese, Haitinger listed 1260 men, 1810 women, and 2600 children at St. Mary's for a total of 5760. This report was signed by trustees Michael Novak and Steven Kollar, both of whom would later join Holy Name Parish. The 1924 report submitted by Father Salamon showed a drop in all three categories, for a total decrease of 1323 people. However these figures are approximations. The 1922 Sunday and Holyday Collections amounted to $9,794,67 , while the same collections in the 1926 report amounted to $6 ,621.22 60 Perhaps the best guage for the extent of the split are the baptismal and marriage records for both churches. 61 BAPTISMS St. Mary's Holy Name 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1920 1921 192·2 1923 1924 1925 1926 108 149 160 105 111 104 99 21 58 34 55 36 MARRIAGES St. Mary's Holy Name 36 40 31 40 45 37 34 2 15 25 12 19 If St. Mary's listed between 1200 and 1500 families in its 1922 report, Holy Name in its 1937 report to the parish listed 517 contributing families. 62 From all these sources the figure of one third of the Slovak community of Passaic belonging to Holy Name Parish seems reliable. The parishioners set about the task of securing property on Fourth Street, five blocks away from St. Mary's and contracted for the erection of a new church and rectory costing $100,000. �SLOVAKIA 77 Father Jeczusko , meanwhile , stayed at the home of Andrew Singlary on Fourth Street. In the Spring of 1925 the cornerstone was ready to be blessed. On May 5 , 1925 Steven Kollar wrote to Bishop O 'Connor on behalf of the parish committee to request a meeting with the bishop .63 The chancellor of the Newark Diocese, Msgr. John A. Duffy, responded to the letter and the meeting was held on May 11. This appears to be the one time that Father Jeczusko was present for a meeting of this type. 64 The committee asked that Bishop O'Connor come to bless the cornerstone of the new church. Monsignor Duffy agreed to present the proposal to O'Connor. In the meantime Duffy requested Fathe:r Salamon to send a letter to Bishop Fischer-Colbrie in Slovakia asking him to send Jeczusko a specific "mandatum" to return to Slovakia. 65 On May 20 , 1925 , Monsignor Duffy responded to Kollar in the name of Bishop O'Connor. In very blunt terms Duffy informed Kollar that the church would have to be turned directly over to the bishop, who would then have it incorporated under New Jersey law with himself as the president, the pastor as secretary-treasurer, and with two lay trustees appointed by the bishop. The pastor would administer the parish and its temporalities. With regard to Father Jeczusko , he would have to submit to Canon Law, reject his schism, and his future status would have to be decided by Rome. Nothing could be promised for him. Duffy concluded, ''It will be impossible therefore , for us to negotiate with you any further except on the terms laid down above,' ' 66 and exhorted them to abandon their schism. On May 30 , 1925 the cornerstone of Holy Name Church was solemnly blessed by the Right Rev. Monsignor Louis Rusko of Philadelphia, 67 in the presence of many clergymen of the area. The newspapers reported the fact that the parish committee had " waited on the Rt. Rev. Bishop John O'Connor of the Catholic Diocese of Newark in an effort to have him send a representative to take part in the ceremonies. " 68 No Catholic representative was present at the ceremonies, and that marked the effective end of the relationship between Holy Name Slovak Church and the Roman Catholic Church. On November 27 , 1925, the Right Rev. Bishop Francis Hodur of Scranton, Pennsylvania, founder of the Polish National Catholic Church, solemnly blessed Holy Name �78 SLOVAKIA Church. 69 From that time on Holy Name Parish held its ecclesial communion with the Polish National Catholic Church. THE AFTERMATH In 1926 , now nearing the end of his lengthy episcopate, O'Connor responded to an inquiry about Holy Name Church from the Apostolic Delegate , Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi: Through one of the Slovak priests I have requested Father Jeczusko 's bishop , who will be here for the Eucharistic Congress , to visit Passaic and see his subject personally. I hope that as a result of this visit Father Jeczusko will return to his diocese and that the financial difficulties of the Holy Name Parish will force the remaining members to turn the property over to legitimate authority. I beg to assure Your Excellency that this matter is settling itself and within a short time the so called Independent Church will be but a name.7° Whether the visit from the Bishop of Kosice took place is unknown. However , the situation did not settle itself. A year later the chancellor of the Newark Diocese wrote to Father Jeczusko on behalf of Bishop O'Connor to correct a statement that Jeczusko had made in a court case alleging that he was not an excommunicated priest.1 1 In the ensuing years a number of inquiries and attempts at reconciliation were initiated , primarily by Slovak priests , but nothing came of them . In the summer of 1938 Father Jeczusko died , just a matter of weeks after the installation of the Most Rev . Thomas H. McLaughlin as first Bishop of Paterson, a new diocese cut off from Newark and including the city of Passaic . A committee including Marcel Sherman, John Tomecko, George Nemec and John Rusnak approached Bishop McLaughlin concerning a reconciliation. McLaughlin was hopeful and asked the Apostolic Delegate for instructions in handling the matter.7 2 However, nothing came of the discussion principally because of the diocesan requirement to have the church incorporated with the bishop as president. The trustees were unwilling to turn over the property to the bishop , even a new friendly bishop .7 3 The committee engaged as their new pastor the Reverend Eugene Magyar, a native �SLOVAKIA 79 of Palmerton, Pennsylvania, and a Slovak despite his name, who had been assisting Father Jeczusko. In 1945 a new pastor, Andrew J. Romanak, was named for St. Mary's Parish after Father Salamon's death. Through his offices another attempt at reconciliation was made late in 1946 just a few months before Bishop McLaughlin's death. McLaughlin received instructions and assurances from the Apostolic Delegate concerning proceeding in the various questions concerning reconciliation, and McLaughlin addressed a letter to the congregation through its president Stephen Matthias in January, 1947.74 However, again nothing came of the attempt.7 5 In 1963 Father Magyar was ordained by the Polish National Catholic Church as a bishop for the Slovak National Catholics. At this time Holy Name acquired the title ''cathedra), '' although it is not the see church of a specific diocese. Bishop·Magyar died in 1968 and was briefly succeeded by a priest of the Polish National Catholic Church, Father John Hrencewicz. After Father Hrencewicz's departure, Father William Chromey, a Polish National Catholic priest of Slovak descent, who had served previously as an associate to Bishop Magyar, came to Holy Name and remains pastor there to this day. From the beginning there have been defections from Holy Name back to St. Mary's. Many of these occurred on an individual basis over the years. As it became apparent that the split was going to be a permanent one, the people faced various hardships. The split cut across family lines, and no longer considered "Catholic," members of Holy Name were denied burial in St. Mary's Cemetery where their parents and other relatives were buried. No longer considered ''Catholic,'' the Holy Name parishioners were dropped from membership in the First Catholic Slovak Union and subsequently lost its benefits. 76 Sometimes the occasion of a marriage to a Roman Catholic provided the opportunity to return to that faith. After the ever-popular Father Jeczusko's death in 1938, still more members of the congregation returned to St. Mary's. The financial obligations incurred by the congregation too, were a factor in inducing some members to leave. 77 Eventually both John Labash and Steven Kollar, as well �80 SLOVAKIA as a number of the other early organizers , returned to St. Mary 's and the Roman Catholic Church. 78 However, a sizeable number of families remained faithful to the parish. The ideals for which the congregation had fought: independence from hierarchical control , and lay control of parish affairs; remained an attractive reality to many of the people . Today Holy Name Parish continues to be supported by some 250 families .79 The parish that Father Jeczusko shepherded remained, as he promised in his acceptance speech, faithful to its Catholic traditions . While embracing Polish National Catholicism in an organizational sense, the parish never severed its ties with Roman Catholic usages. While the Polish National Church introduced the vernacular at an early date, both Father Jeczusko and Bishop Magyar continued to use Latin until a few months before the Roman Catholic church changed to the vernacular. 80 The liturgical books of the Roman Church were used and Father Jecuszko continued to pray his Divine Office in the church each day. 81 At Mass he prayed for the pope and the bishop of Newark , and on Good Friday he joined the rest of the Roman Catholic Church in its solemn orations "for schismatics and heretics," even if the rest of the Church felt it was praying for him. 82 The Baltimore Catechism continued to be in use throughout Father Jeczusko 's pastorate. 83 The people were adamant in their desire for a celibate clergy in the manner of the Roman Church, even though the Polish National Church has had a married clergy for years. Part of the impetus for the 1947 reconciliation attempt was the suspicion among many parishioners that Father Magyar was married. 84 Father Jeczusko himself seems to have become something of a pathetic figure toward the end of his life. As it became apparent · that the split was permanent, he seemed to some to become more despondent. Although happy with his situation among his beloved people, he was not content with his situation in the wider Church. "I know I didn 't do right. I'll pay for it somewhere ," he commented to a friend .85 Unable to speak English even at the end of his life, Jeczusko was in some ways a hostage of his congregation, dependent on them for his dealings with the wider world, including medical attention. He died in the summer of 1938, not �SLOVAKIA 81 yet fifty-one years old, perhaps of a heart attack brought on by emphysema. 86 Perhaps his real state of mind is best revealed by his will, which , after a few bequests to close friends, left his entire estate to the seminary at Kos ice. 8 7 After leaving Passaic Emery Haitinger was named pastor of the much smaller parish of St. Joseph in Elizabeth. He remained there for the rest of his life, dying on November 14 , 1959 at the age of eighty-six. 88 There is no documentary evidence that any responsibility was ever attached to him for the debacle is Passaic in 1922, except for the Duffy letter and one other incident that occurred much later in his life. On April 10, 1946, Pope Pius XII honored Haitinger by making him a monsignor at the request of his seminary classmate, Thomas J. Walsh, who was now the Archbishop of Newark. This occurred on the fiftieth anniversary of Haitinger's ordination. For the senior Slovak pastor in an ethnically conscious diocese, who had built two churches and actively participated in the formation of at least four congregations, this was an unusually long time to wait for that honor. CONCLUSION Bishop Thomas H. McLaughlin, the first Bishop of Paterson perhaps best summed up the situation that led to Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Church in several observations made over the years: Investigations which were made by me . . . have led me to the conclusion that the differences existing among the Slovak people of Passaic and Clifton have been and were due to misunderstandings . . . 89 I often felt , even before becoming Bishop of Paterson, that this man (Father Jeczusko) unfamiliar with the English language and American customs was to some extent the unwitting victim of a situation that got out of control. 90 I have always felt that the congregation as a whole was not completely at fault , and that good Father Jeczusko, not being familiar with American legal conditions and canonical procedure, erred somewhat through misunderstanding rather than through malice. 91 �82 SLOVAKIA At the time of the 1922 conflict McLaughlin was president of Seton Hall College and rector of the Newark-diocesan theologate , and therefore not totally removed from the situation. That he should maintain such an opinion puts him in stark contrast to Bishop O'Connor. Another observer commented from a different viewpoint: ''The trustees were feeling their oats. If the bishop had cooperated it could have been different. But he always felt 'I'm the boss.' '' 92 Certainly Bishop McLaughlin's observations of Father Jeczusko seem accurate . He was more a catalyst for the revolt, rather than a cause for it. The dissatisfaction in St. Mary's had been festering for years. At the same time the Slovak community in Passaic was becoming more and more successful and less willing to be treated with the Old World domination of Father Haitinger or the paternalism of Bishop O'Connor. In this sense Father Jeczusko 's popularity was more a lightning rod for the fire to strike. Mr. Labash 's comments on Bishop O'Connor also seem accurate. He certainly was an unwavering figure in the controversy , preferring to back up established authority (Haitinger) even when his position was untenable, and even then refusing to compromise on any point. It must be remembered that the dissidents never asked for Jeczusko to replace Haitinger, but merely to be able to remain at St. Mary's. Certainly by 1922 there was enough evidence from situations around the country over the years that Slovak and other eastern European congregations were capable of carrying disputes to the point of schism. 93 Perhaps his successful handling of a similar situation among the Italians earlier in his administration made O 'Connor feel that this situation could be similarly handled from a position of strength.94 Bishop O'Connor was also something of a distant figure in this dispute, preferring to deal through Salamon and Duffy. Indeed there is no evidence that O'Connor and Jeczusko ever met face to face through the whole five years they were both involved in the controversy. Whatever O 'Connor's reasons for his handling of the affair, his methods were unsuccessful and things did not " settle down." Holy Name Church still stands today within what was once the Newark Diocese of Bishop O'Connor, one of the only two surviv- �SLOVAKIA 83 ing Slovak National Catholic Churches in the United States , an unusual monument to the unwavering determination of many people. NOTES 1 Holy Trinity Slovak Lutheran Church, a short distance across the river in Garfield, N.J. could easily be a fifth partner in this description. 2 Mark Stolarik, "Lay Initiative in American-Slovak Parishes : 1880-1930," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia , 83 (1972) p . 158 . 3 See Tenth Anniversary of the Holy Name Slovak Catholic Church (1932). Diamond Jubilee Journal, St . Mary 's Church (1968). and Slovaks in America (Middletown , Pa.: Slovak League of America, 1978.) 4 There is a Sts. Cyril and Methodius Slovak National Catholic Church in Perth Amboy , N.J. but the two congregations are not directly connected , nor has Holy Name ever been connected with the Czechoslovak National Church which developed in Europe . 5 Rudolph J. Vecoli , The People of New Jersey (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. , 1965) , p. 213 . 6 William W. Scott, Passaic and Its Environs (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co ., 1922). p . 496. 7 Ibid .• p . 496. 8 Works Progress Administration, New Jersey: A Guide to its Present and Past (New York: Hastings House , 1946), pp. 345-346. 9 10 11 Scott, Op. cit., p. 494. Ibid. M. Mark Stolarik, "Immigration, Education and the Social Mobility of Slovaks, 1870-1930, " in Immigrants and Religion in Urban America, Randall M. Miller and Thomas D. Marzik, eds. (Philadelphia : Temple University Press , 1977) pp. 105-106. 12 Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee , 1910). p. 111 . 13 Rev. Emery Haitinger to Bishop John O'Connor, Feast of St. Emery, 1902, Archives of the Archdiocese of Newark (hereafter AAN), Haitinger Personnel File. Accused of being a "Magyarone" himself, Haitinger in this letter sets down his own biases two decades before the similar controversy which would engulf him. 14 New Jersey Catholic Historical Records Commission, The Bishops of Newark 1853-1978 (South Orange , N.J.: Seton Hall University Press , 1978). p. 64 . 15 In 1954 an eleventh parish would be added in Passaic with the establishment of Our Lady of Fatima Church for the new wave of Hispanic immigrants . 16 The parish is variously referred to as St . Mary's , St. Marie's (an affectation that seems to have developed after the construction of the " French Gothic" new church) , and Assumpion. The incorporated name of the parish is ' •Slavonian Catholic Church of the Assumption. '' �SLOVAKIA 84 17 Elizabeth Daily Journal , November 14 , 1959 , AAN, Haitinger Personnel File . 18 AAN , Parish Reports , 1922 . 19 Vecoli, op. cit., p. 196. 20 Archives of the Diocese of Paterson (hereafter ADP), St. Anthony 's , Passaic fil e . This schism was resolved in 1924. 21 ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church file . 22 For background information on Haitinger see AAN , Haitinger Personnel File. 23 Interview with Albin Stolarik , November 23 , 1983 , ADP. Ibid . 24 25 Interview with John Labash , October 31, 1983, ADP. 26 AAN , John A. Duffy to Emery A. Haitinger May 20 , 1925 , Haitinger Personnel File . 27 Emery Haitinger to John Duffy , 1925 , AAN. Miss Julia Tereschak was Haitinger's housekeeper. 28 Passaic Daily News, August 7, 1922 . p. 1. 29 Testimonial of Bishop Augustine Fischer-Colbrie, November 30, 1920, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File . 30 Personnel Record, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 31 Albin Stolarik, Op . cit. 32 Labash , Op. cit. 33 Interview with Stephen Matthias , November 7, 1983 , ADP. Ibid., and Labash , Op . cit. 34 35 John O'Connor to Emery Haitinger, March 14, 1922, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 37 Augustine Fischer-Colbrie to John O 'Connor, April 1, 1922 , APO, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 38 John O'Conno~.to Emery Haitinger, April 20 , 1922 , ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 39 Passaic Daily News, April 24 , 1922 , p. 1. 40 Passaic Daily News , April 24 , 1922 , p. 2. 41 Petition of Branch 192 of the First Catholic Slovak Union , and Branch 2 of the Slovak Union of Passaic , N.J., April 29, 1922 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File . 42 Passaic Daily Herald, April 24, 1922 , p. 1. 43 Passaic Daily News , April 28, 1922 , p. 1. 44 Passaic Daily News , April 29 , 1922, p. 1. 45 Passaic Daily News , April 24, 1922 , p . 1. 46 Passaic Daily News , May 1, 1922, p . 2. 47 Passaic Daily N ews, May 8 , 1922 , p. 1. 48 Passaic Daily Herald, May 8, 1922, pp . 1-2 . Passaic Daily Herald, May 8, 1922, pp. 1-2 . Mrs . Matisovsky related that Haitinger had offered her money to accompany him to Coney Island . 50 One of the complaints against Haitinger was his inattention to the needs of the 49 �SLOVAKIA 85 parishioners , particularly his refusal to allow the formation of a Holy Name Society for the men of the parish. 51 Passaic Daily News , May 25 , 1922, p. 1. 52 Passaic Daily News, May 27, 1922 , p. 1. Both Kollar 's son and Skvarla 's nephew would eventually become Roman Catholic priests . 53 54 Passaic Daily News, August 15, 1922, pp . 1-2. 55 Albin Stolarik, Op. cit. 56 Passaic Daily News , August 7, 1922 , p . 1. 57 Passaic Daily News , August 21, 1922 , pp. 1, 3. 58 The fact that Hama 's Hall was attached to a tavern was constantly brought up by the opposition as an indication of the dissidents' lack of religiosity. 59 John O'Connor to John Salamon, August 29 , 1922, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 60 AAN, Parish Reports , 1922 , 1924, 1926. 61 Father Haitinger kept poor sacramental records , with baptisms and marriages being recorded in batches , and some years later. 62 Financial Report of the Holy Name Slovak Catholic Church of Passaic, N .J. for the year 1937 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 63 Steven Kollar to John O'Connor, May 5, 1925, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 64 Duffy and Jeczusko were unable to communicate directly, since Jeczusko could not speak English , and Dufy was unable to communicate in Latin when Jeczusko tried that language. Matthias , Op. cit. 65 John Salamon to Augustine Fischer-Colbrie, May 14, 1925 , ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. Salamon was unaware that Fischer-Colbrie had already died . 66 John Duffy to Steven Kollar, May 20, 1925, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 67 There is some confusion about Msgr. Rusko's status . He is described as a Roman Catholic and "Apostolic Visitator" for Slovaks in America. However his name does not appear in any Catholic Directories in the 1920's . Another source said he was actually an Anglican. See Albin Stolarik, Op. cit. 68 Passaic Daily News, May 29 , 1925, p . 1. 69 Passaic Daily News, November 27 , 1925, p . 1. This was not Bishop Hodur's first visit to Passaic. He had previously presided at the cornerstone blessing and Confirmation for St. Anthony of Padua Independent Italian Catholic Church on May 11, 1919. 70 John O'Connor to Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi, June 16, 1926, ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 71 John Duffy to Emery Jeczusko , March 11, 1927, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 72 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , August 11 , 1938, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 73 Labash, Op . cit. 14 Thomas McLaughlin to Stephen Matthias et al., January 16, 1947, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 75 This time the difficulty centered around the fate of Father Magyar. The trustees real- �86 SLOVAKIA ized that he would have to leave ifreconciliation was accomp lished , but they did not wish to s imply "abandon " Magyar. They felt that it was necessary to find some work or provide some financial se ttlement for him . Bishop McLaughlin balked at this , and before the matter could be settled , McLaughlin died on March 17, 1947. Labash, Op . cit. 76 John Salamon to Augustine Fisc her-Colbri e , May 14, 1925 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. See also M. Mark Stolarik, " Building Slovak Co mmunities in America " in Ke ith P. Dyrud , et al. Th e Other Ca th olics (New York : Arno Press, 1978), p . 106. n Matthias, Op . cit. 78 Ibid. 79 Interview with William Chromey, October 14, 1983, ADP. 80 81 Matthias , Op. cit. Ibid . 82 Albin Stolarik, Op . cit. 83 Ibid. 84 Andrew Romanak to Thomas McLaughlin, July 23 , 1946, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. It was not until Magyar's will was probated in 1968 that the congregation at large finall y learned that he was indeed married to his housekeeper , Isabelle. 85 Labash , Op . cit. as Matthias , Op . cit. 87 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , December 13, 1946, APO, Holy Name Slovak Church File . 88 AAN , Haitinger Personnel Fi le. 89 Thomas McLaughlin to Stephen Matthias et al. , January 16, 1947, ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 90 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , December 13 , 1946, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 91 Thomas McLaughlin to Andrew Romanak , May 28 , 1946, ADP, Hol y Name Slovak Church File. 92 Labash , Op . cit. 93 M. Mark Stolarik, " Lay Initiative ... " Op . cit. 94 ADP, St. Anthony, Passaic , Parish File. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1987-88, Vol. 33 Description An account of the resource Vol. 33 (No. 60-61), 1987-88. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1987-88 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 The Slovak National Catholic Church, Passaic, New Jersey, and the Jeczusko Affair RAYMOND J. KUPKE INTRODUCTION In the Dundee section of Passaic, New Jersey there are four churches in an area of nine city blocks : Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Cathedral, St. Mary 's Roman Catholic Church, St. Michael the Archangel Ruthenian Catholic Cathedral , and Sts. Peter and Paul Russian Orthodox Cathedral. Although this listing represents four diverse denominations, the members of the four parishes are descended from immigrants from the same villages in what are today Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic , and indeed family ties run across all four congregations. 1 Commenting on an article about Our Lady of Mercy Slovak Parish in Cleveland, Ohio, which existed in a schismatic state from the Roman Catholic Church from 1917 to 1922 , Slovak historian Mark Stolarik observes, It is interesting to note that in the spirit of "consensus" history a recent article infednota (January 19, 1972 , p. 1) about Our Lady of Mercy Church, makes no mention of this schism. Contemporary Slovak editors avoid religious controversy at all costs. 2 When one delves into the Slovak religious history of Passaic , Stolarik's observation is amply born out. Upon reading the available jubilee books 3 one hardly notices a mention of the year 1922. Yet in 1922 , just as the rupture in Cleveland's Slovak community was being healed, a schism developed in Passaic's Slovak 64 SLOVAKIA community which would effect a permanent division in the community, and create an unusual footnote in American religious history - a cathedral without a diocese, a one-parish "denomination'' with Roman Catholic usages and Polish National Catholic affiliation. 4 The religious history of Passaic is amazingly complex. It is caught up in currents on both sides of the Atlantic and involves merchants and politicians, popes and bishops, patriarchs and czars. This study attempts to examine one facet of that history, the dispute in the Slovak community of Passaic which divided St. Mary's Parish and led to the formation of Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Church. THE SETTING Located on the Passaic River fifteen miles upstream from Newark, Passaic was first settled by the Dutch in 1678. It remained a small commercial village until after the Civil War when railroads and the textile industry began to change its character. Incorporated as a city in 18 73, Passaic welcomed its first Eastern European immigrants six years later. They were brought in by George B. Waterhouse to work in the Waterhouse Brothers Mills . The initial seven immigrants recruited by Waterhouse in 1879 soon turned into a flood from Eastern and Southern Europe. The 1910 census showed Passaic's foreign born comprising 52 % of the total population. 5 The 1920 census registered a population of 63,824 with 74% o( that total being foreign born, the greatest percentage of any city (over 50,000) in the United States. 6 The Slovak population at the time was estimated to be 7,400.7 The WPA Guide to New Jersey describes the area: East of Main Avenue , a progressively shabbier area stretches down to the river. Here the streets are narrow , with frame swellings and congested tenements crowded beside huge factories . This is the " Dundee Section," where one-half the population is crammed into one-sixth of the city' s area. Living in this section are most of the foreign-born who comprise about one-third of the total population. Numerically the Poles are first , followed in SLOVAKIA 65 turn by the Italians, Russians , Hungarians , Slovaks, Germans , Austrians, Dutch, Scotch, English and Irish. 8 The initial seven Eastern Europeans whom George Waterhouse brought from Castle Garden to Passaic in December 1879 were all from the Eastern part of Slovakia. They were: Andrew Pastor, John Socha, John Kostisin, and George Slivka from Saris County; John Pochlod and John Salasovic from Zemplin County; and Edward Geiger from Spis County. 9 The initial seven immigrants were quickly joined by their fellow countrymen from Slovakia. When asked what was the inducement to come to America , one of the original seven Slovak immigrants quickly answered "money. " 1 Certainly the poor economic conditions in Eastern Europe were a major inducement for European emigrati~n. But Slovaks had another incentive as well . Beginning in the 1870's the government of Hungary, which included Slovakia, embarked on a program of "Magyarization" in the non-Magyar parts of the kingdom. The three Slovak ''gymnasia'' (high schools) were closed, and most of the religious primary schools were nationalized. The use of Slovak was prohibited in the schools and teachers were awarded a bonus if they were successful Magyarizers. 11 Even to study for the priesthood a Slovak must pass through the Magyar seminary, and there any study of the language of the future flock is treated as ground for expulsion.12 This process created divisions among Slovaks in America between those who were educated by the Hungarians and those who were not. A dispute broke out in 1902 at St. Stephen's Slovak Parish in Newark between the non-Magyarized parishioners and their pastor, Father Alexander Kovacs. In a solicited letter (Written in Latin) , Father Emery ("Imrich" in Slovak, " Imre " in Magyar) Haitinger, Slovak pastor in Passaic , attempted to explain the distinction between the two groups to a confused Bishop John J. O'Connor of Newark. SLAVICS are a peaceful people, who have built the church and maintain it well: they are the basis of the Slavonic congregation because they pay their debts; SLOVAKS are an ambitious people who desire to lead , ° 66 SLOVAKIA to rule, but they do not like to pay debts, nor will they pay them, as their custom is in the free manner of the Italians ... These Slovaks are a troublesome people, POLITICAL AGITATORS against the Hungarian fatherland, whose political machinations are not needed in America. 13 Because of these economic and cultural reasons the number of Slovak immigrants grew rapidly. In 1880 there were 292 foreignborn "Hungarians" in New Jersey. By 1900 that figure grew to 8,404 just in the seven northern counties that comprised the Newark Catholic Diocese.1 4 Most of the immigrants to Passaic were Catholic and between 1890 and 1920 the territorial "Irish" parish of St. Nicholas was joined by nine new "national" parishes for Polish, Italian, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Ruthenian immigrants. 15 The first of the national churches to be organized was St. Michael the Archangel in 1890. This church served Catholics of the Byzantine Rite who were in communion with Rome. Since many of these Ruthenians or "Rusins" lived in the same villages as the Latin Rite Slovaks, the Passaic Slovaks assisted their neighbors in building St. Michael's. This experience may have provided the spark the Slovak community needed for the following year St. Mary's Slovak Parish was organized on April 1. 16 Initially the congregation met in the basement of St. Nicholas' Church, but by 1893 they were able to construct a church of their own on the corner of Monroe and Second Streets. The absence of a stable Slovak clergy in th~ United States hampered the growth of the new parish. Between 1891 and 1898 the parish was served by a rapid succession of pastors including Fathers Samuel Belja, Bernard Skulik, Benjamin Kwiatkowski, Joseph Ligday, John Pollakovics, and Ignatius Jaskovits, with Father John Sheppard of St. Nicholas often filling in the gaps. On September 2, 1898 Bishop Winand Wigger of Newark appointed Father Emery A. Haitinger, recently arrived in the diocese, as pastor of St.Mary's and he remained for nearly a quarter of a century.17 Father Haitinger supervised the construction of a new stone church which was completed in 1904. By 1920 the parish numbered between 1200 and 1500 families comprising about 600 individuals. 18 SLOVAKIA 67 Passaic was not free from strife in those years. Many Passaic workers participated in the "Great Strike of 1913 " in which 25 ,000 mill workers organized by the Industrial Workers of the World struck throughout northern New Jersey.19 Religious dissension was also not unheard of. In 1910 Sts. Peter and Paul Byzantine Catholic Parish, which had developed from St. Michael's in 1902, defected from the Catholic Church and embraced Russian Orthodoxy. Also in 1918, a rupture in Our Lady of Mt. Carmel Italian parish resulted in the formation of St. Anthony of Padua Independent Italian Catholic Church.20 On March 13, 1921, Bishop O'Connor, at Father Haitinger's request, appointed Father Emery Jeczusko, recently arrived from Europe, to be curate at St. Mary's .21 This would seem to have been a routine assignment, but in the highly charged atmosphere of Passaic it was an appointment that would have far-reaching consequences . THE DISPUTE Emery A. Haitinger was born in Slovakia, then a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1873 just at the time that the government's Magyarization policy was beginning. Haitinger began his seminary training at Arad in the southeastern part of Hungary in what is today Romania, but he emigrated to the United States during his seminary years and completed his training at St. Bonaventure's Seminary in Allegheny, New York. He was ordained a priest by Bishop Michael Hoban at Scranton, Pennsylvania in 1896. For two years Haitinger worked as a missionary among Slovak immigrants in northeastern Pennsylvania. In 1898 Bishop Winand Wigger accepted him for service in the Newark Diocese , and on September 2 of that year the twenty-five year old priest was appointed pastor of St. Mary's Parish in Passaic. 22 Doubtless Haitinger was considered a great asset to a diocese hard pressed to deal with a rapidly growing ethnic group . He was the first stable Slovak priest to work in the diocese , and he was pastorally effective in six languages. He not only supervised the construction of a new church in Passaic , but also was instrumental in the development of new parishes in Boonton, Rockaway, Elizabeth, and Linden. Through his connections in Europe he was 68 SLOVAKIA able to bring other Slovak priests to work in the Newark Diocese . However, Father Haitinger's twenty-four years in Passaic were not entirely peaceful. He considered himself a "gr6f" or member of the aristocracy , and sometimes styled himself " van Haitinger," as did his doctor brother.23 He did nothing to hide his bias for the Magyarized elements of his congregation and his parishioners called him a "Magyarone ," a title used for those who supported the Magyarizing of Slovak language and culture .24 There were also more serious charges of moral misconduct and of diverting church funds , particularly for the purchase of property for himself and his family. 25 While it is impossible to document these charges , there is a letter from Bishop John Duffy , then Chancellor of the Newark Diocese, to Haitinger on May 20, 1925 indicating some confusion between the personal property of Haitinger and the parish property. I am writing in reference to the lot owned by you adjoining the school of St. Mary's Parish, Passaic. I am sure that when the lot was purchased by you that you had in mind the future needs of St. Mary's Parish. Conditions there now require that the lot should belong to the church property. I remember hearing that the purchase price at which you bought this peace of property was very small, and I have heard that your present price is extremely large. In the interest of the Church for which you feel as deeply concerned as I do , I would suggest that you fix a price for this property within reason, and let me know what the amount is .26 Haitinger's reply is also interesting. In my first reply I wrote that I do not possess any lot in Passaic , and I emphasize it again. The pastor of St. Mary's knows it; he rented the lot in 1922 not from me , but from Miss Julia Tereschak, who is the owner since 1907. Before I disposed of the lot, I gave a preference to my congregation; but in a stormy meeting they refused to buy it. 27 SLOVAKIA 69 These controversies about Haiting er' s pastorate festered for at least a decade prior to 1922. 2a Emery A. Jeczusko was born on February 18 , 1888 at Presov in Slovakia, but he came from Vel'ky Saris, the same town that three of the original Slovak immigrants and many of their successors hailed from . Jeczusko attended the seminary at Kosice and was ordained there by Bishop Augustine Fischer-Colbrie on November 30, 1911. Bishop Fischer-Colbrie released him to come to America and work among the Slovaks on November 30, 1920 , 29 and on Father Haitinger's request , Bishop O'Connor of Newark received him and assigned him as curate at St. Mary's, Passaic on March 13 , 1921.30 · Father Jeczusko was well received in Passaic. He is described as an eloquent orator, who was able to sight translate Latin into Slovak. 31 He endeared himself to the people not only by his brilliant sermons , but also by his ability to sing High Mass. 32 " Anything happen, the people want to see Father Jeczusko .. . and Father Haitinger didn't like that.' ' 33 Father Jeczusko was also socially attached to his parishioners . Unable to speak English, he naturally gravitated to people from his native area. He would often visit the Hungarian Social Club, a few blocks from the rectory, to play cards and have a few beers with his friends. 34 On March 11, 1922, Haitinger wrote the following letter to Bishop O'Connor, Herewith is enclosed my financial statement of 1921. Also in these lines I ask Your Lordship to be so kind as to renew the Faculties of my Assistant , the Rev. Emery Jeczusko, which expires within the coming few days. 35 O'Connor replied immediately on March 14. From what I have learned of Father Jeczusko's habits, I do not wish to renew his faculties in this diocese. Tell him he must seek some other diocese . I enclose a letter testifying that he is not under censure. I will write to Father Miklus and tell him to go to you. 36 Meanwhile on April 19, O'Connor received a letter from Bishop Fischer-Colbrie in Kos ice. 70 SLO VAKIA I received the telegram of Your Excellency, and by your request I recall my priest Emery Jeczusko . .. I also ask that Your Excellency favor me by communicating the causes of your desire , that I may have direction in my agenda with Emery Jeczusko .37 On April 20 O'Connor again communicated with Haitinger. The enclosed letter for Father Jeczusko is from Bishop Fischer-Colbrie of Cassovia recalling him to his diocese. Oblige me by handing it to him. The Bishop requires him to return at once. It is the result of the cablegram sent sometime ago. 38 Bishop O'Connor does not elaborate on the offensive habits of Father Jeczusko , but presumably he did not find it acceptable for priests to fraternize with the laity in social clubs. He also does not elaborate on where he received the information on Father Jeczusko's habits. Popular opinion held that Haitinger himself, and his friends, had informed O 'Connor. While there is no conclusive evidence of this , it would appear from O'Connor's second communication to Haitinger that Haitinger was previously aware of the cablegram sent to Europe. On Sunday, April 23 , 1922, Father Jeczusko mounted the pulpit during the 10:30 A.M. Mass and explained his recall and bade the people farewell. He was followed by Father Haitinger who expressed his sorrow at Jeczusko 's recall. It appears that this announcement was not a surprise because a demonstration took place outside the church after Mass , and handbills were circulated calling for a mass meeting that night at Hama's Hall in Passaic. 39 The hall was filled to capacity, and the meeting was chaired by John J. Labash, an undertaker, and Steven Kollar, a cobbler. Demands were made for Jeczusko's reinstatement and the removal of Hai ting er. Even at this early date, the organizers of the dispute were talking about the possibility of a new parish. Messrs. Labash and Kollar speaking to a Daily News man said that the people were going to carry the fight to the bitter end. They felt that they were justified in even organizing an independent parish, if only to carry out what they figured was right .40 SLOVAKIA 71 A second meeting was held on April 27 at Mokrai's Hall in Passaic, and as a result of this meeting ten parish organizations forwarded identical petitions to Bishop O 'Connor over the signatures of their officers: ... adopted a resolution seeking for the reinstatement of Father Emery Jeczusko in our church of St. Marie's of the Assumption, of Passaic, N.J. and that: The Rev. Emery A. Haitinger, now rector of the church be removed at once for the future good of our parish. This action is based on the wish of more than 600 people who attended a Mass meeting on Sunday, April 23, in a public hall at 108 Third Street, of our city. It is felt that a great deal of harm to our church, Faith and religion has come from the procrastinated action, or deferred action in this regard on your part. More than 90% of the people of our parish have literally refused to further attend the services of our church and we fear that a separation within the parish and a possible establishment of an Independent Church is threatening. It is honestly felt by most of the members of our parish that Father Haitinger must go. 41 The societies claimed a combined membership of 1200. The arguments against Haitinger centered around three issues: jealousy, finances , and patriotism. Mr. Kollar, a former trustee of the parish, claimed to have proof of serious discrepancies between the amount of money collected in the parish, the amount spent on parish expenses, and the amount in parish accounts.42 The patriotism charges were on two different levels. On the one hand Haiting er was accused of ''un-Americanism'' because he was alleged to have preached in favor of Austria-Hungary during World War I, and also that he had greeted the Hungarian Premier Husar as a Hungarian. 43 On the other hand Haitinger was also accused of "Magyarone" tendencies opposed to Slovak culture. 44 Haitinger's supporters countered by claiming that Haitinger was a true American, while Jeczusko was a retrogressive force in the community . . . . he was progressive in the matter of organizing a Slavish Federation which carried with it a spirit of the 72 SLOVAKIA fatherland and did not conform with the more modern spirit of working for things American. 45 All through April and May charges and countercharges were exchanged in the local newspapers, meetings were held , petitions were circulated. The atmosphere was further charged by an article in New Yorksky Dennfk, a Slovak newspaper in New York entitled "Battle of Slovak Catholics in Passaic." The article, widely circulated in Passaic, vilified Haitinger, and both the Hungarian and American hierarchy. Describing Haitinger the article commented: With abuse , cursings, laughter, lies and force more and more the Slovak people were literally chased from God's church merely that he might attain his aim and to make foreign the parish and bring it to the bishop , so to speak, on a silver platter, saying, "Here you have, august dictator, a new Irish parish." This hellish thought of Rev . Haitinger's has found a strong set-back in the face of the Slovak curate. The parson became afraid of his Judas recompense, and the bishop was afraid he would soon lose the Irished parish, which was builded through for Slovak blisters , and so the parson and the bishop got together and in short adjudged the Slovak curate to exile he must go.46 The tension was further heightened when one of the dissidents , a Mrs. Theresa Sisko, went to the rectory after Mass on Sunday, May 7 to reclaim at last a portion of a previous donation of $4,000 . Haitinger told her she would have to sue the parish, told her to get out, and then forcibly evicted her from the rectory, causing her to fall down the stairs and sustain many bruises. 47 Within a few days Mrs. Sisko brought suit against Haitinger for $30,000. The reports of the Sisko incident circulating through the ciy brought out a record crowd of 2,000 to a meeting that same night at Mokrai's Hall. During the meeting Labash and Kollar reiterated the history of their grievances. They claimed that petitions to the bishop in previous years had been destroyed before reaching him, that a committee sent to the bishop and the Apostolic Delegate in 1919 had failed to get a hearing, and that each time Bishop SLOVAKIA 73 O'Connor was approached "he always sent us away with a promise to consider the matter.' ' 48 They then told the assembly of the bishop's final decision not allow Jenczusko to remain in the diocese. The allegations of financial mismanagement were repeated , and Mrs. Frank Matisovsky produced laughter among the audience when she related incidents of Haitinger's improprieties and her lack of satisfaction when these were related to the bishop .49 The assembly was unanimous in its· determination to replace Haitinger with another priest, have Jeczusko reinstated , and if necessary , form a new parish and even secede from the Catholic Church. For the first time the finances of a new church were discussed, and the name "Holy Name Parish" was used. 50 On Saturday the committee went to South Orange to approach Bishop O'Connor. This time they took Mrs. Sisko with them and she spoke to the bishop's secretary. Also during the week the committee met with Msgr. John A. Sheppard of Jersey City, formerly pastor of St. Nicholas, Passaic, and later Vicar General of the diocese. Acting on Sheppard's advice the committee formally presented a request to Haitinger to resign the pastorate with a copy of the request sent to O'Connor. 51 Rumors of Haitinger's removal were rampant in the city when he did not appear at Masses on Sunday, May 21. Instead the Masses were celebrated by Father John Salamon, a native son of the parish, and curate at St. Joseph's Parish in Elizabeth. It was reported that Haitinger had celebrated Mass in Elizabeth and returned to Passaic in the afternoon. The Saturday edition of the Passaic Daily News for May 27 carried the following article: As forecast by The Daily News Monday evening, the Rev. Father John D. Salamon, rector of St. Joseph's Church in Elizabeth, and formerly a pupil at St. Marie's Parochial School , of this city, has been designated as the new rector for the local Slovak Catholic Church, thus ending the controversy which threatened for a time to disrupt the entire St. Marie's Parish. Announcement was made by the Right Rev. Monsignor John A. Duffy, chancellor of the Catholic diocese of Newark, Thursday evening, to the effect that the Right Rev. Bishop John 74 SLOVAKIA J. O'Connor had decided upon the change being made. Meanwhile the Rev. Father Emery A. Haitinger, rector of St. Marie's Church since 1898, will be unattached for a while. He will visit temporarily with the Rev. Father Andrew Adzima, his former curate , and now rector of St. Joseph's in Bayonne.52 However the happy conclusion to the controversy forecast by the Passaic Daily News was premature. Having accomplished the first of their goals, the committee pressed on to insist on the reinstatement of Father Jeczusko as curate . The dissidents crystallized around Labash, Kollar, Marcel Sherman, a painter, Victor Chirip , a former locksmith in the Austrian royal palace , and Paul Skvarla, an architect. 53 The committee continued to treat with O'Connor about Jeczusko throughout the summer, but O'Connor was adamant. Jeczusko himself meanwhile did not participate in the controversy, but stayed with his brother in Connecticut. He did not reappear in Pasaaic until the middle of August. 54 The committee enlisted the help of Father Salamon to intervene with the bishop on Jeczusko's behalf, but this was to no avail. During the first week of August the committee met with O'Connor in Newark and was once again told that Jeczusko would not be reinstated. The mood of the committee can be summed up in the comment of Marcel Sherman, "We're not going to have that Irish bishop telling us what to do. " 55 At a mass meeting on Monday, August 6, the committee reported the bishop's refusal to the parishioners and the break with St. Mary's was made final. Labash and Kollar were elected chairman and vice chairman respectively of the new parish. Pledges were received for $14,000 and $550 was collected that first night. Still, Labash held out the possibility of reconciliation: The new church, it was explained, would not necessarily become detached from the Roman Catholic Church in this country, provided, of course, Bishop O 'Connor accepted their action as being a logical expression of the feelings of a people who were hurt, and agreed to treat them on a par with the other congregations within his SLOVAKIA 75 diocese , but with the understanding that Father Jeczusko would be rector of the church and the mode of carrying on the business affairs of the parish put in the hands of the parishioners rather than the clergymen. 56 At a mass meeting on Saturday, August 20 at Hama's Hall with Father Jeczusko present, the priest was formally offered the post of pastor of Holy Name Slovak Church. Jeczusko's reply is indicative of his personal turmoil in this situation: "I am facing a difficult situation, my friends," he stated, ''having my passpost all ready, I have merely to engage passage to leave for my home country. Your apparent sincerity of purpose, however, and your zeal in the endeavor to carry out the true significance of Catholicism, prompt me to heed your call. ' ' He then asked that the people not try to set aside the Roman Catholic authority. He intimated that serious things might happen to him. "And after all ," he exclaimed, '' our work is in the name of God above , the name of our newly formed parish implies that, and with His aid we shall conquer all things. By the memory of my sweet little mother , whose greatest ambition in life was to see me at the Altar of the Almighty, serving with honor, serving with a dignified fear of Him above , and fulfilling all that is prescribed by the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, I accept this call to serve you, my people. But I implore you not to give up your traditions, the traditions of the Roman Catholic Church. Let us call unto ourselves the leadership of this great church with its authority. "57 Father Jeczusko celebrated the first Mass for the new parish on Sunday , August 27 , 1922 at Hama's Hall where many of the organizational meetings had been held. 58 On August 29 Bishop O'Connor wrote to Father Salamon explaining Father Jeczusko's excommunicated status and the fact that the new congregation was not a Catholic church.59 He asked that this letter be read at all Masses the following Sunday, September 2 . Approximately one third of the parishioners of St. Mary's SLOVAKIA 76 joined Holy Name Parish. In his 1922 report to the diocese, Haitinger listed 1260 men, 1810 women, and 2600 children at St. Mary's for a total of 5760. This report was signed by trustees Michael Novak and Steven Kollar, both of whom would later join Holy Name Parish. The 1924 report submitted by Father Salamon showed a drop in all three categories, for a total decrease of 1323 people. However these figures are approximations. The 1922 Sunday and Holyday Collections amounted to $9,794,67 , while the same collections in the 1926 report amounted to $6 ,621.22 60 Perhaps the best guage for the extent of the split are the baptismal and marriage records for both churches. 61 BAPTISMS St. Mary's Holy Name 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1920 1921 192·2 1923 1924 1925 1926 108 149 160 105 111 104 99 21 58 34 55 36 MARRIAGES St. Mary's Holy Name 36 40 31 40 45 37 34 2 15 25 12 19 If St. Mary's listed between 1200 and 1500 families in its 1922 report, Holy Name in its 1937 report to the parish listed 517 contributing families. 62 From all these sources the figure of one third of the Slovak community of Passaic belonging to Holy Name Parish seems reliable. The parishioners set about the task of securing property on Fourth Street, five blocks away from St. Mary's and contracted for the erection of a new church and rectory costing $100,000. SLOVAKIA 77 Father Jeczusko , meanwhile , stayed at the home of Andrew Singlary on Fourth Street. In the Spring of 1925 the cornerstone was ready to be blessed. On May 5 , 1925 Steven Kollar wrote to Bishop O 'Connor on behalf of the parish committee to request a meeting with the bishop .63 The chancellor of the Newark Diocese, Msgr. John A. Duffy, responded to the letter and the meeting was held on May 11. This appears to be the one time that Father Jeczusko was present for a meeting of this type. 64 The committee asked that Bishop O'Connor come to bless the cornerstone of the new church. Monsignor Duffy agreed to present the proposal to O'Connor. In the meantime Duffy requested Fathe:r Salamon to send a letter to Bishop Fischer-Colbrie in Slovakia asking him to send Jeczusko a specific "mandatum" to return to Slovakia. 65 On May 20 , 1925 , Monsignor Duffy responded to Kollar in the name of Bishop O'Connor. In very blunt terms Duffy informed Kollar that the church would have to be turned directly over to the bishop, who would then have it incorporated under New Jersey law with himself as the president, the pastor as secretary-treasurer, and with two lay trustees appointed by the bishop. The pastor would administer the parish and its temporalities. With regard to Father Jeczusko , he would have to submit to Canon Law, reject his schism, and his future status would have to be decided by Rome. Nothing could be promised for him. Duffy concluded, ''It will be impossible therefore , for us to negotiate with you any further except on the terms laid down above,' ' 66 and exhorted them to abandon their schism. On May 30 , 1925 the cornerstone of Holy Name Church was solemnly blessed by the Right Rev. Monsignor Louis Rusko of Philadelphia, 67 in the presence of many clergymen of the area. The newspapers reported the fact that the parish committee had " waited on the Rt. Rev. Bishop John O'Connor of the Catholic Diocese of Newark in an effort to have him send a representative to take part in the ceremonies. " 68 No Catholic representative was present at the ceremonies, and that marked the effective end of the relationship between Holy Name Slovak Church and the Roman Catholic Church. On November 27 , 1925, the Right Rev. Bishop Francis Hodur of Scranton, Pennsylvania, founder of the Polish National Catholic Church, solemnly blessed Holy Name 78 SLOVAKIA Church. 69 From that time on Holy Name Parish held its ecclesial communion with the Polish National Catholic Church. THE AFTERMATH In 1926 , now nearing the end of his lengthy episcopate, O'Connor responded to an inquiry about Holy Name Church from the Apostolic Delegate , Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi: Through one of the Slovak priests I have requested Father Jeczusko 's bishop , who will be here for the Eucharistic Congress , to visit Passaic and see his subject personally. I hope that as a result of this visit Father Jeczusko will return to his diocese and that the financial difficulties of the Holy Name Parish will force the remaining members to turn the property over to legitimate authority. I beg to assure Your Excellency that this matter is settling itself and within a short time the so called Independent Church will be but a name.7° Whether the visit from the Bishop of Kosice took place is unknown. However , the situation did not settle itself. A year later the chancellor of the Newark Diocese wrote to Father Jeczusko on behalf of Bishop O'Connor to correct a statement that Jeczusko had made in a court case alleging that he was not an excommunicated priest.1 1 In the ensuing years a number of inquiries and attempts at reconciliation were initiated , primarily by Slovak priests , but nothing came of them . In the summer of 1938 Father Jeczusko died , just a matter of weeks after the installation of the Most Rev . Thomas H. McLaughlin as first Bishop of Paterson, a new diocese cut off from Newark and including the city of Passaic . A committee including Marcel Sherman, John Tomecko, George Nemec and John Rusnak approached Bishop McLaughlin concerning a reconciliation. McLaughlin was hopeful and asked the Apostolic Delegate for instructions in handling the matter.7 2 However, nothing came of the discussion principally because of the diocesan requirement to have the church incorporated with the bishop as president. The trustees were unwilling to turn over the property to the bishop , even a new friendly bishop .7 3 The committee engaged as their new pastor the Reverend Eugene Magyar, a native SLOVAKIA 79 of Palmerton, Pennsylvania, and a Slovak despite his name, who had been assisting Father Jeczusko. In 1945 a new pastor, Andrew J. Romanak, was named for St. Mary's Parish after Father Salamon's death. Through his offices another attempt at reconciliation was made late in 1946 just a few months before Bishop McLaughlin's death. McLaughlin received instructions and assurances from the Apostolic Delegate concerning proceeding in the various questions concerning reconciliation, and McLaughlin addressed a letter to the congregation through its president Stephen Matthias in January, 1947.74 However, again nothing came of the attempt.7 5 In 1963 Father Magyar was ordained by the Polish National Catholic Church as a bishop for the Slovak National Catholics. At this time Holy Name acquired the title ''cathedra), '' although it is not the see church of a specific diocese. Bishop·Magyar died in 1968 and was briefly succeeded by a priest of the Polish National Catholic Church, Father John Hrencewicz. After Father Hrencewicz's departure, Father William Chromey, a Polish National Catholic priest of Slovak descent, who had served previously as an associate to Bishop Magyar, came to Holy Name and remains pastor there to this day. From the beginning there have been defections from Holy Name back to St. Mary's. Many of these occurred on an individual basis over the years. As it became apparent that the split was going to be a permanent one, the people faced various hardships. The split cut across family lines, and no longer considered "Catholic," members of Holy Name were denied burial in St. Mary's Cemetery where their parents and other relatives were buried. No longer considered ''Catholic,'' the Holy Name parishioners were dropped from membership in the First Catholic Slovak Union and subsequently lost its benefits. 76 Sometimes the occasion of a marriage to a Roman Catholic provided the opportunity to return to that faith. After the ever-popular Father Jeczusko's death in 1938, still more members of the congregation returned to St. Mary's. The financial obligations incurred by the congregation too, were a factor in inducing some members to leave. 77 Eventually both John Labash and Steven Kollar, as well 80 SLOVAKIA as a number of the other early organizers , returned to St. Mary 's and the Roman Catholic Church. 78 However, a sizeable number of families remained faithful to the parish. The ideals for which the congregation had fought: independence from hierarchical control , and lay control of parish affairs; remained an attractive reality to many of the people . Today Holy Name Parish continues to be supported by some 250 families .79 The parish that Father Jeczusko shepherded remained, as he promised in his acceptance speech, faithful to its Catholic traditions . While embracing Polish National Catholicism in an organizational sense, the parish never severed its ties with Roman Catholic usages. While the Polish National Church introduced the vernacular at an early date, both Father Jeczusko and Bishop Magyar continued to use Latin until a few months before the Roman Catholic church changed to the vernacular. 80 The liturgical books of the Roman Church were used and Father Jecuszko continued to pray his Divine Office in the church each day. 81 At Mass he prayed for the pope and the bishop of Newark , and on Good Friday he joined the rest of the Roman Catholic Church in its solemn orations "for schismatics and heretics," even if the rest of the Church felt it was praying for him. 82 The Baltimore Catechism continued to be in use throughout Father Jeczusko 's pastorate. 83 The people were adamant in their desire for a celibate clergy in the manner of the Roman Church, even though the Polish National Church has had a married clergy for years. Part of the impetus for the 1947 reconciliation attempt was the suspicion among many parishioners that Father Magyar was married. 84 Father Jeczusko himself seems to have become something of a pathetic figure toward the end of his life. As it became apparent · that the split was permanent, he seemed to some to become more despondent. Although happy with his situation among his beloved people, he was not content with his situation in the wider Church. "I know I didn 't do right. I'll pay for it somewhere ," he commented to a friend .85 Unable to speak English even at the end of his life, Jeczusko was in some ways a hostage of his congregation, dependent on them for his dealings with the wider world, including medical attention. He died in the summer of 1938, not SLOVAKIA 81 yet fifty-one years old, perhaps of a heart attack brought on by emphysema. 86 Perhaps his real state of mind is best revealed by his will, which , after a few bequests to close friends, left his entire estate to the seminary at Kos ice. 8 7 After leaving Passaic Emery Haitinger was named pastor of the much smaller parish of St. Joseph in Elizabeth. He remained there for the rest of his life, dying on November 14 , 1959 at the age of eighty-six. 88 There is no documentary evidence that any responsibility was ever attached to him for the debacle is Passaic in 1922, except for the Duffy letter and one other incident that occurred much later in his life. On April 10, 1946, Pope Pius XII honored Haitinger by making him a monsignor at the request of his seminary classmate, Thomas J. Walsh, who was now the Archbishop of Newark. This occurred on the fiftieth anniversary of Haitinger's ordination. For the senior Slovak pastor in an ethnically conscious diocese, who had built two churches and actively participated in the formation of at least four congregations, this was an unusually long time to wait for that honor. CONCLUSION Bishop Thomas H. McLaughlin, the first Bishop of Paterson perhaps best summed up the situation that led to Holy Name Slovak National Catholic Church in several observations made over the years: Investigations which were made by me . . . have led me to the conclusion that the differences existing among the Slovak people of Passaic and Clifton have been and were due to misunderstandings . . . 89 I often felt , even before becoming Bishop of Paterson, that this man (Father Jeczusko) unfamiliar with the English language and American customs was to some extent the unwitting victim of a situation that got out of control. 90 I have always felt that the congregation as a whole was not completely at fault , and that good Father Jeczusko, not being familiar with American legal conditions and canonical procedure, erred somewhat through misunderstanding rather than through malice. 91 82 SLOVAKIA At the time of the 1922 conflict McLaughlin was president of Seton Hall College and rector of the Newark-diocesan theologate , and therefore not totally removed from the situation. That he should maintain such an opinion puts him in stark contrast to Bishop O'Connor. Another observer commented from a different viewpoint: ''The trustees were feeling their oats. If the bishop had cooperated it could have been different. But he always felt 'I'm the boss.' '' 92 Certainly Bishop McLaughlin's observations of Father Jeczusko seem accurate . He was more a catalyst for the revolt, rather than a cause for it. The dissatisfaction in St. Mary's had been festering for years. At the same time the Slovak community in Passaic was becoming more and more successful and less willing to be treated with the Old World domination of Father Haitinger or the paternalism of Bishop O'Connor. In this sense Father Jeczusko 's popularity was more a lightning rod for the fire to strike. Mr. Labash 's comments on Bishop O'Connor also seem accurate. He certainly was an unwavering figure in the controversy , preferring to back up established authority (Haitinger) even when his position was untenable, and even then refusing to compromise on any point. It must be remembered that the dissidents never asked for Jeczusko to replace Haitinger, but merely to be able to remain at St. Mary's. Certainly by 1922 there was enough evidence from situations around the country over the years that Slovak and other eastern European congregations were capable of carrying disputes to the point of schism. 93 Perhaps his successful handling of a similar situation among the Italians earlier in his administration made O 'Connor feel that this situation could be similarly handled from a position of strength.94 Bishop O'Connor was also something of a distant figure in this dispute, preferring to deal through Salamon and Duffy. Indeed there is no evidence that O'Connor and Jeczusko ever met face to face through the whole five years they were both involved in the controversy. Whatever O 'Connor's reasons for his handling of the affair, his methods were unsuccessful and things did not " settle down." Holy Name Church still stands today within what was once the Newark Diocese of Bishop O'Connor, one of the only two surviv- SLOVAKIA 83 ing Slovak National Catholic Churches in the United States , an unusual monument to the unwavering determination of many people. NOTES 1 Holy Trinity Slovak Lutheran Church, a short distance across the river in Garfield, N.J. could easily be a fifth partner in this description. 2 Mark Stolarik, "Lay Initiative in American-Slovak Parishes : 1880-1930," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia , 83 (1972) p . 158 . 3 See Tenth Anniversary of the Holy Name Slovak Catholic Church (1932). Diamond Jubilee Journal, St . Mary 's Church (1968). and Slovaks in America (Middletown , Pa.: Slovak League of America, 1978.) 4 There is a Sts. Cyril and Methodius Slovak National Catholic Church in Perth Amboy , N.J. but the two congregations are not directly connected , nor has Holy Name ever been connected with the Czechoslovak National Church which developed in Europe . 5 Rudolph J. Vecoli , The People of New Jersey (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. , 1965) , p. 213 . 6 William W. Scott, Passaic and Its Environs (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co ., 1922). p . 496. 7 Ibid .• p . 496. 8 Works Progress Administration, New Jersey: A Guide to its Present and Past (New York: Hastings House , 1946), pp. 345-346. 9 10 11 Scott, Op. cit., p. 494. Ibid. M. Mark Stolarik, "Immigration, Education and the Social Mobility of Slovaks, 1870-1930, " in Immigrants and Religion in Urban America, Randall M. Miller and Thomas D. Marzik, eds. (Philadelphia : Temple University Press , 1977) pp. 105-106. 12 Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee , 1910). p. 111 . 13 Rev. Emery Haitinger to Bishop John O'Connor, Feast of St. Emery, 1902, Archives of the Archdiocese of Newark (hereafter AAN), Haitinger Personnel File. Accused of being a "Magyarone" himself, Haitinger in this letter sets down his own biases two decades before the similar controversy which would engulf him. 14 New Jersey Catholic Historical Records Commission, The Bishops of Newark 1853-1978 (South Orange , N.J.: Seton Hall University Press , 1978). p. 64 . 15 In 1954 an eleventh parish would be added in Passaic with the establishment of Our Lady of Fatima Church for the new wave of Hispanic immigrants . 16 The parish is variously referred to as St . Mary's , St. Marie's (an affectation that seems to have developed after the construction of the " French Gothic" new church) , and Assumpion. The incorporated name of the parish is ' •Slavonian Catholic Church of the Assumption. '' SLOVAKIA 84 17 Elizabeth Daily Journal , November 14 , 1959 , AAN, Haitinger Personnel File . 18 AAN , Parish Reports , 1922 . 19 Vecoli, op. cit., p. 196. 20 Archives of the Diocese of Paterson (hereafter ADP), St. Anthony 's , Passaic fil e . This schism was resolved in 1924. 21 ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church file . 22 For background information on Haitinger see AAN , Haitinger Personnel File. 23 Interview with Albin Stolarik , November 23 , 1983 , ADP. Ibid . 24 25 Interview with John Labash , October 31, 1983, ADP. 26 AAN , John A. Duffy to Emery A. Haitinger May 20 , 1925 , Haitinger Personnel File . 27 Emery Haitinger to John Duffy , 1925 , AAN. Miss Julia Tereschak was Haitinger's housekeeper. 28 Passaic Daily News, August 7, 1922 . p. 1. 29 Testimonial of Bishop Augustine Fischer-Colbrie, November 30, 1920, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File . 30 Personnel Record, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 31 Albin Stolarik, Op . cit. 32 Labash , Op. cit. 33 Interview with Stephen Matthias , November 7, 1983 , ADP. Ibid., and Labash , Op . cit. 34 35 John O'Connor to Emery Haitinger, March 14, 1922, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 37 Augustine Fischer-Colbrie to John O 'Connor, April 1, 1922 , APO, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 38 John O'Conno~.to Emery Haitinger, April 20 , 1922 , ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 39 Passaic Daily News, April 24 , 1922 , p. 1. 40 Passaic Daily News , April 24 , 1922 , p. 2. 41 Petition of Branch 192 of the First Catholic Slovak Union , and Branch 2 of the Slovak Union of Passaic , N.J., April 29, 1922 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File . 42 Passaic Daily Herald, April 24, 1922 , p. 1. 43 Passaic Daily News , April 28, 1922 , p. 1. 44 Passaic Daily News , April 29 , 1922, p. 1. 45 Passaic Daily News , April 24, 1922 , p . 1. 46 Passaic Daily News , May 1, 1922, p . 2. 47 Passaic Daily N ews, May 8 , 1922 , p. 1. 48 Passaic Daily Herald, May 8, 1922, pp . 1-2 . Passaic Daily Herald, May 8, 1922, pp. 1-2 . Mrs . Matisovsky related that Haitinger had offered her money to accompany him to Coney Island . 50 One of the complaints against Haitinger was his inattention to the needs of the 49 SLOVAKIA 85 parishioners , particularly his refusal to allow the formation of a Holy Name Society for the men of the parish. 51 Passaic Daily News , May 25 , 1922, p. 1. 52 Passaic Daily News, May 27, 1922 , p. 1. Both Kollar 's son and Skvarla 's nephew would eventually become Roman Catholic priests . 53 54 Passaic Daily News, August 15, 1922, pp . 1-2. 55 Albin Stolarik, Op. cit. 56 Passaic Daily News , August 7, 1922 , p . 1. 57 Passaic Daily News , August 21, 1922 , pp. 1, 3. 58 The fact that Hama 's Hall was attached to a tavern was constantly brought up by the opposition as an indication of the dissidents' lack of religiosity. 59 John O'Connor to John Salamon, August 29 , 1922, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 60 AAN, Parish Reports , 1922 , 1924, 1926. 61 Father Haitinger kept poor sacramental records , with baptisms and marriages being recorded in batches , and some years later. 62 Financial Report of the Holy Name Slovak Catholic Church of Passaic, N .J. for the year 1937 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 63 Steven Kollar to John O'Connor, May 5, 1925, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 64 Duffy and Jeczusko were unable to communicate directly, since Jeczusko could not speak English , and Dufy was unable to communicate in Latin when Jeczusko tried that language. Matthias , Op. cit. 65 John Salamon to Augustine Fischer-Colbrie, May 14, 1925 , ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. Salamon was unaware that Fischer-Colbrie had already died . 66 John Duffy to Steven Kollar, May 20, 1925, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 67 There is some confusion about Msgr. Rusko's status . He is described as a Roman Catholic and "Apostolic Visitator" for Slovaks in America. However his name does not appear in any Catholic Directories in the 1920's . Another source said he was actually an Anglican. See Albin Stolarik, Op. cit. 68 Passaic Daily News, May 29 , 1925, p . 1. 69 Passaic Daily News, November 27 , 1925, p . 1. This was not Bishop Hodur's first visit to Passaic. He had previously presided at the cornerstone blessing and Confirmation for St. Anthony of Padua Independent Italian Catholic Church on May 11, 1919. 70 John O'Connor to Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi, June 16, 1926, ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 71 John Duffy to Emery Jeczusko , March 11, 1927, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 72 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , August 11 , 1938, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 73 Labash, Op . cit. 14 Thomas McLaughlin to Stephen Matthias et al., January 16, 1947, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 75 This time the difficulty centered around the fate of Father Magyar. The trustees real- 86 SLOVAKIA ized that he would have to leave ifreconciliation was accomp lished , but they did not wish to s imply "abandon " Magyar. They felt that it was necessary to find some work or provide some financial se ttlement for him . Bishop McLaughlin balked at this , and before the matter could be settled , McLaughlin died on March 17, 1947. Labash, Op . cit. 76 John Salamon to Augustine Fisc her-Colbri e , May 14, 1925 , ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. See also M. Mark Stolarik, " Building Slovak Co mmunities in America " in Ke ith P. Dyrud , et al. Th e Other Ca th olics (New York : Arno Press, 1978), p . 106. n Matthias, Op . cit. 78 Ibid. 79 Interview with William Chromey, October 14, 1983, ADP. 80 81 Matthias , Op. cit. Ibid . 82 Albin Stolarik, Op . cit. 83 Ibid. 84 Andrew Romanak to Thomas McLaughlin, July 23 , 1946, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. It was not until Magyar's will was probated in 1968 that the congregation at large finall y learned that he was indeed married to his housekeeper , Isabelle. 85 Labash , Op . cit. as Matthias , Op . cit. 87 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , December 13, 1946, APO, Holy Name Slovak Church File . 88 AAN , Haitinger Personnel Fi le. 89 Thomas McLaughlin to Stephen Matthias et al. , January 16, 1947, ADP , Holy Name Slovak Church File. 90 Thomas McLaughlin to Amleto Cicognani , December 13 , 1946, ADP, Holy Name Slovak Church File. 91 Thomas McLaughlin to Andrew Romanak , May 28 , 1946, ADP, Hol y Name Slovak Church File. 92 Labash , Op . cit. 93 M. Mark Stolarik, " Lay Initiative ... " Op . cit. 94 ADP, St. Anthony, Passaic , Parish File.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak National Catholic Church, Passaic, New Jersey, and the Jeczusko Affair Description An account of the resource Raymond J. Kupke Slovakia, Vol. 33 (No. 60-61), 1987-88 pp. 63-86 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kupke, Raymond J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1987-88 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f0889b6e509447fe7e5207ea74a376f2.pdf f3ee84cb470dfeb7c01a92045869edf1 PDF Text Text 58 SLOVAKIA SS. Cyril And Methodius: Tl.lEIR FIRST TRIP TO ROME MIC.HAEIL LACKO, S. J. After forty months in Great Moravia, why did SS. Cyril and Methodius go to Rome? Another question that has puzzled many in past centuries: Did they set out for Rome or Constantinople (By,zantium) ? In the 1aTIE (biography) of Constantine-Cyril, written in Old Slovaik, it is noted that "after 40 months in Mora'V'ia, they (Cyril and Methodius) set out to ha,ve their disctples ordained" 1 . It is rather clear then that we are here concerned with their first journey to Rome. The Italian version of the ZITIE, referring to this journey, says: '4Manserunt autem in Moravia per annos quattuor et dim.idium ... " 2 • The la,tter version tells us that the trip to Rome was under.taken by the saintly brathers after they had spent four and a half years in the land of Rastislav, while the Old Slova!k text relates that they went to Rome after a:bout three and a half years in Great Moravia. F. Grivec explained this difference excellently: in the Old Slovak text only the time spent in Great Moravia is considered, while in the Italian text we have included also the time Cyril and Methodius spent with Kocel' (Pribina's son) and in Venice, as well as the time spent on their journey to Rome3 • The SloV'ak Arpostles came to Rome with their group shortly after the election of Pope Adrian IL that is, after December 14, 867. Therefore, they came to Great Moravia four and a half years prior to that date, that is, about the .b eginning of the summer of 863, and set out for Rome at the end of 866 or the beginning of 867. Why did they saintly brothers go to Rome at that time? To have their disciples ordained to the priesthood is the simple and usual reply of many authors. Some authors, however, claim that Pope Nicholas I called them directly to R'Ome when he had learned of their missionary activity. But from the Old SlovaJk text of the filTIE. it ie very much more probably that Pope Nicholas sent them an invitation (litteras aipostolicas) after they had arrived �SLOVAKIA 59 in Venice. Could there be any other reason why Cyril and fMethodius went to Rome just at that time ? l see an indirect reply to this question in one document which seems to have escaped the attention of historians: the "Responsa Papae Nicolai I ad consultationes Ludovici regis Germaniae per Salomonem episcopum Constantiensem translatas" 4 • The manuscript containing the "responsa" is not dated5 but the text allows us to conclude that Salomon, a messenger or representative of King Louis, came to Rome about Easter Day, 864, and, therefore, the "responsa" were issued shortly thereafter. The ninth point of this document is generally well known: it mentions Louis's preparations for war with Rastislav and his plans to meet with the Bulgarian King Boris at Tulln on the Danube. Point four, however, appears to be less known and even still less mentioned, though I think it throws much light on the question before us. Bishop Hartwig of Passau, according to the tex:t:,6 suffered from a stroke since 8l60 and could neither talk nor manage his diocese. Salomon therefore requested that a new bishop be appointed in Hartwig's place7 • The Pope replied that, according to ecclesiastical law, Hartwig should resign from his bishopric ("saltem scriipto") if he really cannot administer it. OtheIWise, the iPope continues, a new bishop cannot be appointed, but only a temporary administrator chosen by the clergy. We might ask why there was now suddenly expressed so much concern about getting a new bishop since Hartwig suffered the effects of the stroke for 4 years? It appears to me that the e~lanation may be found in the conditions prevailing in Great Moravia at that time. Salomon came to Rome about Easter Day of 864, that is, about eight months after SS. Cyril and Methodius began their :missionary activity in Great Moravia, the land of the Rast:islav Slovaks. He came to Rome to lodge a protest against their presence and their mission. The Slovak Apostles soon gained the love and trust of Rastislav's people, but at the same time also the enmity of the German missionaries whom they ha,d displaced. The latter said that the new missionaries from Byzantium came into the territory without the approval of the bishop of Passau; furthermore that they were using Slovak for liturgical servkes and following the Byzantium rite. The German mis- �60 SLOVAKIA inonaries resented being pushed out of the land of the Slovaks. This territory was under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Passau since 8219. Bishop Hartwig, how~r, was not able to intervene in the matter, because he had suffered a stroke. Pope Nicholas I, as we have seen above, could not appoint a new bishop as long as the old bishop did not r~sign9. History tells us that Hartwig did not resign; he remained bishop of Passau until his death at the end of 865 or the beginning of 86610 • In 866 a new bishop was elected, the agile and energetic H.ermanric (866-Dec. 26, 874). The new ordinary, however, could not tackle the Great Moravian problem at once, because shortly after his elevation he led a German missionary e~tion to Bulgaria. When he arrived there a:nd found a similar mission from Rome led by · Bishop Formosus, Hernnanric returned to Passau the same year. In all probability, Hermanric sojourned in Great Moravia, at the end of 866, on his return trip to Passau to ascertain just what was happenning there since the advent of the missionaries from Byzantium. SS. Cyril and Methodius, because of Bishop Hartwig's condition, performed their missionary work in the land of Rastislav without hindrance since 863. When Bishop Hermanric met with the saintly brothers, he undoubtedly asked them on whose authority were they in Great Moravia. Most likely the brothers replied that they came at the request of RastislaJV and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. Hermanric then told them that the territory already for several decades had been under the jurisdiction of the Pa.ssau bishopric and, therefore, under the authority of the patriarchate of Rome; they were there unla.'Wfully and should leave the territory as soon as possible. Now we can understand why SS. Cyril and Methodius soon thereafter, but not later than the beginning of 867, set out on their journey in 867: to straighten out the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the land of the Slovaks. With the aibove in mind, let us now analyze the question whether SS. Cyril and Methodius and their retinue went to Rome or Constantinople. Much has been written about this question. The thesis that they set out for Con- �SLOVAKIA 61 stantinople is defended by the Slavists: Novotny, Hauptmann, Teodorov-Balan, Ohienko, Weingart, Stanislav, and especially Dvornik11 • The intention to journey to Rome is claimed by Pastrne'.k, Lavrov, Hudeeek, Perels, Hrusovsky, and especially Grivec 12 • The first group bases its claim mainly on the words in the ":Zitie Metodovo" which state that the brothers "returned fr-om Moravia" (vyzvratistasja iz Moravy) 13, while the second group analyzes particularly the purpose of the trip: to settle the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the territory of Great Moravia which belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. I rum inclined to the opinion of the latter: the saintly brothers' prior intention was to travel to Rome. From the bove, it appears to be logical that Cyril and Methodius set out for Rome in 867. The territory of Great Moravia, ruled by Rastislav, belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. Constantinople had no authority over that territory; the saintly brothers could not defend their claims against the claims of the bishop of Passau in Constantinople. And when they decided to introduce the Slavak lan,g uage even into the liturgy of the Western Rite, they needed the approval of Rome and not of Constantinople. Similarly their disciples had to be ordained by the authority of the patriarchate on whose territory they were to labor and that was Rome and not Constantinople. There are other sources that clearly indicate the original intention of Cyril and Methodius to mruke their first trip to Rome; some of them come from their disciples, who probably made that trip with them and, hence, are sufficiently authentic. Because they are usually not considered by many writers, I mention them here: 1. Pochvalnoje slovo Kyrillu i Methodiju14 ; 2. Pochvala blazennago otca nasego i ucitera slovenskago Kyrila filosofa15; 3. Proloznoje Zitie Konstantina i Methodija16 ; 4. Zitie Nauma17 ; 5. Grooke Zitie sv. Klimenta18 . Because they knew that even Paul used to announce his glad tidings to the apostles, so Cyril and Methodius, too, hurried to Rome to show the Pope their translaJtion of the Holy Writ. Their trip was successful; they did not go there in vain19 • �62 SLOVAKIA These texts, which represent the original Cyrilo-Methodius tradition, clearly bear witness to the j-Ourney of the saintly brothers to Rome. The only text, which allegedly notes that St. Methodius was consecrated Bishop of Pannonia by the Patriarch of Constantinople, is in cuntradiction to all other sources and, hence, has no value in this respect20 • The phrase "return to Constantinople" (Navrat do Carihradu) refers to their return from the Kha.zar mission, before their departure to Great Moravia. When Cyril and Methodius left Moravia in 867, they were headed for Rome and not for Constantinople. REFERSNCE NOTES 1. IP. A. Lavrov: Materialy po istoriji vozniknovenija drevnejiej slavjanskoj pismennoati, Leningrad, 1930, p. 29. 2. P. iMeyvaert-P. Devos: Trois enigmes Cyrilo-Methodiennes de un document inedit. "Analecta la "Legende ltalique" resolues grace a Bolland1ana," IJXXlIIII (Bruxelles, 1955), p. 459. 3. F. Grivec: Vitae Constantini et Methodli. "Acta Academiae Velehradensis," X,V!N (IO!omouc, 1941), p. 89. 4. 1Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, Vol. Vil, pp. 290-293. 5. Coder Parisie11.sis latinus 10402. 6. 'I'he text in MGH, Ep., p. 292, reads: "De Hartwigo Pazzowensis civitatis episcopo, quem asseritis ante annos quattuor paralysi percussum, ita ut nil valeat loqui et ecclesia sibi commissa dissipetur et ad nihih.un r ed1gatur, du,m et omni pastorali cura destituta et nulla episcopali providentia circumspecta, si ita est, debet idem epi· scopus saltem scripto profiter! se officium lllud non posse peragere ... " 7. ]bidem Nr. 3. 8. Ibidem Nr. 4: 'ISit ergo cura rerum ecclesiasticarum oeconomo electo de proprlo clero iuxta sacros canones." 9. cA.rchbishop Adalwin of Salzburg was infoflmed of Pope Nicholas's reply: MGH, Eplstolae, Vol. VI, pp. 630-631. 10. .P. B. Gama (Series episcoporum Eccfesiae Catholica~, Ratis1bonae, 1873, p. 301) •s tates that Hartwig died on May 18, 866. A. Hauck, on the other hand, notes (Kirchengeschichte •Deutschlands, Bd . .FI, Leipzig, 193·5, Appendix) that Hartwig died in 864 or 865 •s ince it is not known whether he became bishop in 838 or 840. 11. .Frantisek. Dvornik: Les Legendes de Constantin et de Methode vues de Byzance, Prague, 1933, p. 234: ''111 est remar,quable que !es deux Legendes ne disent pas un mot du but du voyage et fassent intervenir le pape apres avoir indique le devlacement des deux freres et leur sejour a Venise. Cela indique qu'ils avaient bien l'intenttion de se rendr e a Constantinople et qu e c'est vral:ment !'intervention ponttficale qui !es empecha d'iexec1tter leur dessin et !es decida a aller a Rome." 12. 1F. Grivec: Konstantin und Method, Lehrer der Slaven, Wies/baden, 1960; par. 18, pp. 70-73: Nach Rom oder nach Konstant!nopel? 13, Lavrov, op. cit., p. 72. 14. 1libedem, PP. 84-86. 1 �SLOVAKIA 63 16. 16. 17. 18. lbid~, p . 97. IDbidem, p. 100. :l!bidem, p. 185. fN. L. Tunickij: Materialy dra istorii iizni i dejate.rnosti ucenikov svv. Kirilla i Methodija, Sergiev Posad, 1918, p. 70. 19. ¼n Stanislav: Osudy Cyrila a Methoda a ich ucenfkov v Zivote Klimentovom, Bratislava, 19-50, p. 68. 20. 1Proloznoje iitie sv. Methodija: Vy1,vrativsj.u sja Methodijn v Konstantin grady, patrijarchy ze svjati jego jeplskopa, posLa vy !Moravu v grady Kaan (=IPannonia) i tu mnoga stvori cudesa. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 103. OUR CONTRIBUTORS Jozef Cincik: emi.nent ~lovak artis,t a.nd dnterlor decorator. For• merly of Bratislava U.nivemity f ·r om which he holds a Ph. D. in philo• sophy. Cincfk makes hi,s home in Bedford, Ohio. P. A. Hrobak: Educator, lecturer, writer on Slovakia and Czecho• Slovakia; editor o·f the JEDNOTA, the official organ of the First Cath• olic Slovak Union, the past 2'5 years. lmrich Kruiliak: Slovak ihiistar:ian; former secretary-general of the Slovak League, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. - Brait<J.slava University. Heinrich Kuhn is secretairy•general of the Sudeten Germa.n Archives in Munich. Rev. Michael Lacko, S. J., :professor at the Gregorian University, Rome, i<s an expert on the Byzanhlne •rite rund the author of The Life and Work of SS Cyril and Metihodlus. Frantisek Lanak: s,Iovak eduoator; held a key ,position in the Department of Education, Bratislava, Slovakia. Philosophy, Ph.D. Eberhart Mahner is a staff w,rlter for the "Sudetendeutscher Arti- keldienst," Munich. Jozef Pauco: Ph.D. - University of Bratislava, Slovakia; author of ei.g,ht book>s and many articles ,relating to Slovaks in America a.nd in Slovakia; former ediitor-in•chief of -the SLOVAK dally of Brati,slava; a,ssistant editor of the JEIDNOTA, Middletown, Pa., the ,prust 13 years. Mary Piroch: active in Slovak religious and cultuTa.l affai<rs; lives in Emlen tO'll, Pa. Anton F. Wuschek is the editor of the Centra.l European review SUDET:IDN BULLE'DIN, Munich, Germany. � 58 SLOVAKIA SS. Cyril And Methodius: Tl.lEIR FIRST TRIP TO ROME MIC.HAEIL LACKO, S. J. After forty months in Great Moravia, why did SS. Cyril and Methodius go to Rome? Another question that has puzzled many in past centuries: Did they set out for Rome or Constantinople (By,zantium) ? In the 1aTIE (biography) of Constantine-Cyril, written in Old Slovaik, it is noted that "after 40 months in Mora'V'ia, they (Cyril and Methodius) set out to ha,ve their disctples ordained" 1 . It is rather clear then that we are here concerned with their first journey to Rome. The Italian version of the ZITIE, referring to this journey, says: '4Manserunt autem in Moravia per annos quattuor et dim.idium ... " 2 • The la,tter version tells us that the trip to Rome was under.taken by the saintly brathers after they had spent four and a half years in the land of Rastislav, while the Old Slova!k text relates that they went to Rome after a:bout three and a half years in Great Moravia. F. Grivec explained this difference excellently: in the Old Slovak text only the time spent in Great Moravia is considered, while in the Italian text we have included also the time Cyril and Methodius spent with Kocel' (Pribina's son) and in Venice, as well as the time spent on their journey to Rome3 • The SloV'ak Arpostles came to Rome with their group shortly after the election of Pope Adrian IL that is, after December 14, 867. Therefore, they came to Great Moravia four and a half years prior to that date, that is, about the .b eginning of the summer of 863, and set out for Rome at the end of 866 or the beginning of 867. Why did they saintly brothers go to Rome at that time? To have their disciples ordained to the priesthood is the simple and usual reply of many authors. Some authors, however, claim that Pope Nicholas I called them directly to R'Ome when he had learned of their missionary activity. But from the Old SlovaJk text of the filTIE. it ie very much more probably that Pope Nicholas sent them an invitation (litteras aipostolicas) after they had arrived �SLOVAKIA 59 in Venice. Could there be any other reason why Cyril and fMethodius went to Rome just at that time ? l see an indirect reply to this question in one document which seems to have escaped the attention of historians: the "Responsa Papae Nicolai I ad consultationes Ludovici regis Germaniae per Salomonem episcopum Constantiensem translatas" 4 • The manuscript containing the "responsa" is not dated5 but the text allows us to conclude that Salomon, a messenger or representative of King Louis, came to Rome about Easter Day, 864, and, therefore, the "responsa" were issued shortly thereafter. The ninth point of this document is generally well known: it mentions Louis's preparations for war with Rastislav and his plans to meet with the Bulgarian King Boris at Tulln on the Danube. Point four, however, appears to be less known and even still less mentioned, though I think it throws much light on the question before us. Bishop Hartwig of Passau, according to the tex:t:,6 suffered from a stroke since 8l60 and could neither talk nor manage his diocese. Salomon therefore requested that a new bishop be appointed in Hartwig's place7 • The Pope replied that, according to ecclesiastical law, Hartwig should resign from his bishopric ("saltem scriipto") if he really cannot administer it. OtheIWise, the iPope continues, a new bishop cannot be appointed, but only a temporary administrator chosen by the clergy. We might ask why there was now suddenly expressed so much concern about getting a new bishop since Hartwig suffered the effects of the stroke for 4 years? It appears to me that the e~lanation may be found in the conditions prevailing in Great Moravia at that time. Salomon came to Rome about Easter Day of 864, that is, about eight months after SS. Cyril and Methodius began their :missionary activity in Great Moravia, the land of the Rast:islav Slovaks. He came to Rome to lodge a protest against their presence and their mission. The Slovak Apostles soon gained the love and trust of Rastislav's people, but at the same time also the enmity of the German missionaries whom they ha,d displaced. The latter said that the new missionaries from Byzantium came into the territory without the approval of the bishop of Passau; furthermore that they were using Slovak for liturgical servkes and following the Byzantium rite. The German mis- �60 SLOVAKIA inonaries resented being pushed out of the land of the Slovaks. This territory was under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Passau since 8219. Bishop Hartwig, how~r, was not able to intervene in the matter, because he had suffered a stroke. Pope Nicholas I, as we have seen above, could not appoint a new bishop as long as the old bishop did not r~sign9. History tells us that Hartwig did not resign; he remained bishop of Passau until his death at the end of 865 or the beginning of 86610 • In 866 a new bishop was elected, the agile and energetic H.ermanric (866-Dec. 26, 874). The new ordinary, however, could not tackle the Great Moravian problem at once, because shortly after his elevation he led a German missionary e~tion to Bulgaria. When he arrived there a:nd found a similar mission from Rome led by · Bishop Formosus, Hernnanric returned to Passau the same year. In all probability, Hermanric sojourned in Great Moravia, at the end of 866, on his return trip to Passau to ascertain just what was happenning there since the advent of the missionaries from Byzantium. SS. Cyril and Methodius, because of Bishop Hartwig's condition, performed their missionary work in the land of Rastislav without hindrance since 863. When Bishop Hermanric met with the saintly brothers, he undoubtedly asked them on whose authority were they in Great Moravia. Most likely the brothers replied that they came at the request of RastislaJV and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. Hermanric then told them that the territory already for several decades had been under the jurisdiction of the Pa.ssau bishopric and, therefore, under the authority of the patriarchate of Rome; they were there unla.'Wfully and should leave the territory as soon as possible. Now we can understand why SS. Cyril and Methodius soon thereafter, but not later than the beginning of 867, set out on their journey in 867: to straighten out the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the land of the Slovaks. With the aibove in mind, let us now analyze the question whether SS. Cyril and Methodius and their retinue went to Rome or Constantinople. Much has been written about this question. The thesis that they set out for Con- �SLOVAKIA 61 stantinople is defended by the Slavists: Novotny, Hauptmann, Teodorov-Balan, Ohienko, Weingart, Stanislav, and especially Dvornik11 • The intention to journey to Rome is claimed by Pastrne'.k, Lavrov, Hudeeek, Perels, Hrusovsky, and especially Grivec 12 • The first group bases its claim mainly on the words in the ":Zitie Metodovo" which state that the brothers "returned fr-om Moravia" (vyzvratistasja iz Moravy) 13, while the second group analyzes particularly the purpose of the trip: to settle the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the territory of Great Moravia which belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. I rum inclined to the opinion of the latter: the saintly brothers' prior intention was to travel to Rome. From the bove, it appears to be logical that Cyril and Methodius set out for Rome in 867. The territory of Great Moravia, ruled by Rastislav, belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. Constantinople had no authority over that territory; the saintly brothers could not defend their claims against the claims of the bishop of Passau in Constantinople. And when they decided to introduce the Slavak lan,g uage even into the liturgy of the Western Rite, they needed the approval of Rome and not of Constantinople. Similarly their disciples had to be ordained by the authority of the patriarchate on whose territory they were to labor and that was Rome and not Constantinople. There are other sources that clearly indicate the original intention of Cyril and Methodius to mruke their first trip to Rome; some of them come from their disciples, who probably made that trip with them and, hence, are sufficiently authentic. Because they are usually not considered by many writers, I mention them here: 1. Pochvalnoje slovo Kyrillu i Methodiju14 ; 2. Pochvala blazennago otca nasego i ucitera slovenskago Kyrila filosofa15; 3. Proloznoje Zitie Konstantina i Methodija16 ; 4. Zitie Nauma17 ; 5. Grooke Zitie sv. Klimenta18 . Because they knew that even Paul used to announce his glad tidings to the apostles, so Cyril and Methodius, too, hurried to Rome to show the Pope their translaJtion of the Holy Writ. Their trip was successful; they did not go there in vain19 • �62 SLOVAKIA These texts, which represent the original Cyrilo-Methodius tradition, clearly bear witness to the j-Ourney of the saintly brothers to Rome. The only text, which allegedly notes that St. Methodius was consecrated Bishop of Pannonia by the Patriarch of Constantinople, is in cuntradiction to all other sources and, hence, has no value in this respect20 • The phrase "return to Constantinople" (Navrat do Carihradu) refers to their return from the Kha.zar mission, before their departure to Great Moravia. When Cyril and Methodius left Moravia in 867, they were headed for Rome and not for Constantinople. REFERSNCE NOTES 1. IP. A. Lavrov: Materialy po istoriji vozniknovenija drevnejiej slavjanskoj pismennoati, Leningrad, 1930, p. 29. 2. P. iMeyvaert-P. Devos: Trois enigmes Cyrilo-Methodiennes de un document inedit. "Analecta la "Legende ltalique" resolues grace a Bolland1ana," IJXXlIIII (Bruxelles, 1955), p. 459. 3. F. Grivec: Vitae Constantini et Methodli. "Acta Academiae Velehradensis," X,V!N (IO!omouc, 1941), p. 89. 4. 1Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, Vol. Vil, pp. 290-293. 5. Coder Parisie11.sis latinus 10402. 6. 'I'he text in MGH, Ep., p. 292, reads: "De Hartwigo Pazzowensis civitatis episcopo, quem asseritis ante annos quattuor paralysi percussum, ita ut nil valeat loqui et ecclesia sibi commissa dissipetur et ad nihih.un r ed1gatur, du,m et omni pastorali cura destituta et nulla episcopali providentia circumspecta, si ita est, debet idem epi· scopus saltem scripto profiter! se officium lllud non posse peragere ... " 7. ]bidem Nr. 3. 8. Ibidem Nr. 4: 'ISit ergo cura rerum ecclesiasticarum oeconomo electo de proprlo clero iuxta sacros canones." 9. cA.rchbishop Adalwin of Salzburg was infoflmed of Pope Nicholas's reply: MGH, Eplstolae, Vol. VI, pp. 630-631. 10. .P. B. Gama (Series episcoporum Eccfesiae Catholica~, Ratis1bonae, 1873, p. 301) •s tates that Hartwig died on May 18, 866. A. Hauck, on the other hand, notes (Kirchengeschichte •Deutschlands, Bd . .FI, Leipzig, 193·5, Appendix) that Hartwig died in 864 or 865 •s ince it is not known whether he became bishop in 838 or 840. 11. .Frantisek. Dvornik: Les Legendes de Constantin et de Methode vues de Byzance, Prague, 1933, p. 234: ''111 est remar,quable que !es deux Legendes ne disent pas un mot du but du voyage et fassent intervenir le pape apres avoir indique le devlacement des deux freres et leur sejour a Venise. Cela indique qu'ils avaient bien l'intenttion de se rendr e a Constantinople et qu e c'est vral:ment !'intervention ponttficale qui !es empecha d'iexec1tter leur dessin et !es decida a aller a Rome." 12. 1F. Grivec: Konstantin und Method, Lehrer der Slaven, Wies/baden, 1960; par. 18, pp. 70-73: Nach Rom oder nach Konstant!nopel? 13, Lavrov, op. cit., p. 72. 14. 1libedem, PP. 84-86. 1 �SLOVAKIA 63 16. 16. 17. 18. lbid~, p . 97. IDbidem, p. 100. :l!bidem, p. 185. fN. L. Tunickij: Materialy dra istorii iizni i dejate.rnosti ucenikov svv. Kirilla i Methodija, Sergiev Posad, 1918, p. 70. 19. ¼n Stanislav: Osudy Cyrila a Methoda a ich ucenfkov v Zivote Klimentovom, Bratislava, 19-50, p. 68. 20. 1Proloznoje iitie sv. Methodija: Vy1,vrativsj.u sja Methodijn v Konstantin grady, patrijarchy ze svjati jego jeplskopa, posLa vy !Moravu v grady Kaan (=IPannonia) i tu mnoga stvori cudesa. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 103. OUR CONTRIBUTORS Jozef Cincik: emi.nent ~lovak artis,t a.nd dnterlor decorator. For• merly of Bratislava U.nivemity f ·r om which he holds a Ph. D. in philo• sophy. Cincfk makes hi,s home in Bedford, Ohio. P. A. Hrobak: Educator, lecturer, writer on Slovakia and Czecho• Slovakia; editor o·f the JEDNOTA, the official organ of the First Cath• olic Slovak Union, the past 2'5 years. lmrich Kruiliak: Slovak ihiistar:ian; former secretary-general of the Slovak League, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. - Brait<J.slava University. Heinrich Kuhn is secretairy•general of the Sudeten Germa.n Archives in Munich. Rev. Michael Lacko, S. J., :professor at the Gregorian University, Rome, i<s an expert on the Byzanhlne •rite rund the author of The Life and Work of SS Cyril and Metihodlus. Frantisek Lanak: s,Iovak eduoator; held a key ,position in the Department of Education, Bratislava, Slovakia. Philosophy, Ph.D. Eberhart Mahner is a staff w,rlter for the "Sudetendeutscher Arti- keldienst," Munich. Jozef Pauco: Ph.D. - University of Bratislava, Slovakia; author of ei.g,ht book>s and many articles ,relating to Slovaks in America a.nd in Slovakia; former ediitor-in•chief of -the SLOVAK dally of Brati,slava; a,ssistant editor of the JEIDNOTA, Middletown, Pa., the ,prust 13 years. Mary Piroch: active in Slovak religious and cultuTa.l affai<rs; lives in Emlen tO'll, Pa. Anton F. Wuschek is the editor of the Centra.l European review SUDET:IDN BULLE'DIN, Munich, Germany. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVAKIA SS. Cyril And Methodius: Tl.lEIR FIRST TRIP TO ROME MIC.HAEIL LACKO, S. J. After forty months in Great Moravia, why did SS. Cyril and Methodius go to Rome? Another question that has puzzled many in past centuries: Did they set out for Rome or Constantinople (By,zantium) ? In the 1aTIE (biography) of Constantine-Cyril, written in Old Slovaik, it is noted that "after 40 months in Mora'V'ia, they (Cyril and Methodius) set out to ha,ve their disctples ordained" 1 . It is rather clear then that we are here concerned with their first journey to Rome. The Italian version of the ZITIE, referring to this journey, says: '4Manserunt autem in Moravia per annos quattuor et dim.idium ... " 2 • The la,tter version tells us that the trip to Rome was under.taken by the saintly brathers after they had spent four and a half years in the land of Rastislav, while the Old Slova!k text relates that they went to Rome after a:bout three and a half years in Great Moravia. F. Grivec explained this difference excellently: in the Old Slovak text only the time spent in Great Moravia is considered, while in the Italian text we have included also the time Cyril and Methodius spent with Kocel' (Pribina's son) and in Venice, as well as the time spent on their journey to Rome3 • The SloV'ak Arpostles came to Rome with their group shortly after the election of Pope Adrian IL that is, after December 14, 867. Therefore, they came to Great Moravia four and a half years prior to that date, that is, about the .b eginning of the summer of 863, and set out for Rome at the end of 866 or the beginning of 867. Why did they saintly brothers go to Rome at that time? To have their disciples ordained to the priesthood is the simple and usual reply of many authors. Some authors, however, claim that Pope Nicholas I called them directly to R'Ome when he had learned of their missionary activity. But from the Old SlovaJk text of the filTIE. it ie very much more probably that Pope Nicholas sent them an invitation (litteras aipostolicas) after they had arrived SLOVAKIA 59 in Venice. Could there be any other reason why Cyril and fMethodius went to Rome just at that time ? l see an indirect reply to this question in one document which seems to have escaped the attention of historians: the "Responsa Papae Nicolai I ad consultationes Ludovici regis Germaniae per Salomonem episcopum Constantiensem translatas" 4 • The manuscript containing the "responsa" is not dated5 but the text allows us to conclude that Salomon, a messenger or representative of King Louis, came to Rome about Easter Day, 864, and, therefore, the "responsa" were issued shortly thereafter. The ninth point of this document is generally well known: it mentions Louis's preparations for war with Rastislav and his plans to meet with the Bulgarian King Boris at Tulln on the Danube. Point four, however, appears to be less known and even still less mentioned, though I think it throws much light on the question before us. Bishop Hartwig of Passau, according to the tex:t:,6 suffered from a stroke since 8l60 and could neither talk nor manage his diocese. Salomon therefore requested that a new bishop be appointed in Hartwig's place7 • The Pope replied that, according to ecclesiastical law, Hartwig should resign from his bishopric ("saltem scriipto") if he really cannot administer it. OtheIWise, the iPope continues, a new bishop cannot be appointed, but only a temporary administrator chosen by the clergy. We might ask why there was now suddenly expressed so much concern about getting a new bishop since Hartwig suffered the effects of the stroke for 4 years? It appears to me that the e~lanation may be found in the conditions prevailing in Great Moravia at that time. Salomon came to Rome about Easter Day of 864, that is, about eight months after SS. Cyril and Methodius began their :missionary activity in Great Moravia, the land of the Rast:islav Slovaks. He came to Rome to lodge a protest against their presence and their mission. The Slovak Apostles soon gained the love and trust of Rastislav's people, but at the same time also the enmity of the German missionaries whom they ha,d displaced. The latter said that the new missionaries from Byzantium came into the territory without the approval of the bishop of Passau; furthermore that they were using Slovak for liturgical servkes and following the Byzantium rite. The German mis- 60 SLOVAKIA inonaries resented being pushed out of the land of the Slovaks. This territory was under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Passau since 8219. Bishop Hartwig, how~r, was not able to intervene in the matter, because he had suffered a stroke. Pope Nicholas I, as we have seen above, could not appoint a new bishop as long as the old bishop did not r~sign9. History tells us that Hartwig did not resign; he remained bishop of Passau until his death at the end of 865 or the beginning of 86610 • In 866 a new bishop was elected, the agile and energetic H.ermanric (866-Dec. 26, 874). The new ordinary, however, could not tackle the Great Moravian problem at once, because shortly after his elevation he led a German missionary e~tion to Bulgaria. When he arrived there a:nd found a similar mission from Rome led by · Bishop Formosus, Hernnanric returned to Passau the same year. In all probability, Hermanric sojourned in Great Moravia, at the end of 866, on his return trip to Passau to ascertain just what was happenning there since the advent of the missionaries from Byzantium. SS. Cyril and Methodius, because of Bishop Hartwig's condition, performed their missionary work in the land of Rastislav without hindrance since 863. When Bishop Hermanric met with the saintly brothers, he undoubtedly asked them on whose authority were they in Great Moravia. Most likely the brothers replied that they came at the request of RastislaJV and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. Hermanric then told them that the territory already for several decades had been under the jurisdiction of the Pa.ssau bishopric and, therefore, under the authority of the patriarchate of Rome; they were there unla.'Wfully and should leave the territory as soon as possible. Now we can understand why SS. Cyril and Methodius soon thereafter, but not later than the beginning of 867, set out on their journey in 867: to straighten out the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the land of the Slovaks. With the aibove in mind, let us now analyze the question whether SS. Cyril and Methodius and their retinue went to Rome or Constantinople. Much has been written about this question. The thesis that they set out for Con- SLOVAKIA 61 stantinople is defended by the Slavists: Novotny, Hauptmann, Teodorov-Balan, Ohienko, Weingart, Stanislav, and especially Dvornik11 • The intention to journey to Rome is claimed by Pastrne'.k, Lavrov, Hudeeek, Perels, Hrusovsky, and especially Grivec 12 • The first group bases its claim mainly on the words in the ":Zitie Metodovo" which state that the brothers "returned fr-om Moravia" (vyzvratistasja iz Moravy) 13, while the second group analyzes particularly the purpose of the trip: to settle the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the territory of Great Moravia which belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. I rum inclined to the opinion of the latter: the saintly brothers' prior intention was to travel to Rome. From the bove, it appears to be logical that Cyril and Methodius set out for Rome in 867. The territory of Great Moravia, ruled by Rastislav, belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. Constantinople had no authority over that territory; the saintly brothers could not defend their claims against the claims of the bishop of Passau in Constantinople. And when they decided to introduce the Slavak lan,g uage even into the liturgy of the Western Rite, they needed the approval of Rome and not of Constantinople. Similarly their disciples had to be ordained by the authority of the patriarchate on whose territory they were to labor and that was Rome and not Constantinople. There are other sources that clearly indicate the original intention of Cyril and Methodius to mruke their first trip to Rome; some of them come from their disciples, who probably made that trip with them and, hence, are sufficiently authentic. Because they are usually not considered by many writers, I mention them here: 1. Pochvalnoje slovo Kyrillu i Methodiju14 ; 2. Pochvala blazennago otca nasego i ucitera slovenskago Kyrila filosofa15; 3. Proloznoje Zitie Konstantina i Methodija16 ; 4. Zitie Nauma17 ; 5. Grooke Zitie sv. Klimenta18 . Because they knew that even Paul used to announce his glad tidings to the apostles, so Cyril and Methodius, too, hurried to Rome to show the Pope their translaJtion of the Holy Writ. Their trip was successful; they did not go there in vain19 • 62 SLOVAKIA These texts, which represent the original Cyrilo-Methodius tradition, clearly bear witness to the j-Ourney of the saintly brothers to Rome. The only text, which allegedly notes that St. Methodius was consecrated Bishop of Pannonia by the Patriarch of Constantinople, is in cuntradiction to all other sources and, hence, has no value in this respect20 • The phrase "return to Constantinople" (Navrat do Carihradu) refers to their return from the Kha.zar mission, before their departure to Great Moravia. When Cyril and Methodius left Moravia in 867, they were headed for Rome and not for Constantinople. REFERSNCE NOTES 1. IP. A. Lavrov: Materialy po istoriji vozniknovenija drevnejiej slavjanskoj pismennoati, Leningrad, 1930, p. 29. 2. P. iMeyvaert-P. Devos: Trois enigmes Cyrilo-Methodiennes de un document inedit. "Analecta la "Legende ltalique" resolues grace a Bolland1ana," IJXXlIIII (Bruxelles, 1955), p. 459. 3. F. Grivec: Vitae Constantini et Methodli. "Acta Academiae Velehradensis," X,V!N (IO!omouc, 1941), p. 89. 4. 1Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, Vol. Vil, pp. 290-293. 5. Coder Parisie11.sis latinus 10402. 6. 'I'he text in MGH, Ep., p. 292, reads: "De Hartwigo Pazzowensis civitatis episcopo, quem asseritis ante annos quattuor paralysi percussum, ita ut nil valeat loqui et ecclesia sibi commissa dissipetur et ad nihih.un r ed1gatur, du,m et omni pastorali cura destituta et nulla episcopali providentia circumspecta, si ita est, debet idem epi· scopus saltem scripto profiter! se officium lllud non posse peragere ... " 7. ]bidem Nr. 3. 8. Ibidem Nr. 4: 'ISit ergo cura rerum ecclesiasticarum oeconomo electo de proprlo clero iuxta sacros canones." 9. cA.rchbishop Adalwin of Salzburg was infoflmed of Pope Nicholas's reply: MGH, Eplstolae, Vol. VI, pp. 630-631. 10. .P. B. Gama (Series episcoporum Eccfesiae Catholica~, Ratis1bonae, 1873, p. 301) •s tates that Hartwig died on May 18, 866. A. Hauck, on the other hand, notes (Kirchengeschichte •Deutschlands, Bd . .FI, Leipzig, 193·5, Appendix) that Hartwig died in 864 or 865 •s ince it is not known whether he became bishop in 838 or 840. 11. .Frantisek. Dvornik: Les Legendes de Constantin et de Methode vues de Byzance, Prague, 1933, p. 234: ''111 est remar,quable que !es deux Legendes ne disent pas un mot du but du voyage et fassent intervenir le pape apres avoir indique le devlacement des deux freres et leur sejour a Venise. Cela indique qu'ils avaient bien l'intenttion de se rendr e a Constantinople et qu e c'est vral:ment !'intervention ponttficale qui !es empecha d'iexec1tter leur dessin et !es decida a aller a Rome." 12. 1F. Grivec: Konstantin und Method, Lehrer der Slaven, Wies/baden, 1960; par. 18, pp. 70-73: Nach Rom oder nach Konstant!nopel? 13, Lavrov, op. cit., p. 72. 14. 1libedem, PP. 84-86. 1 SLOVAKIA 63 16. 16. 17. 18. lbid~, p . 97. IDbidem, p. 100. :l!bidem, p. 185. fN. L. Tunickij: Materialy dra istorii iizni i dejate.rnosti ucenikov svv. Kirilla i Methodija, Sergiev Posad, 1918, p. 70. 19. ¼n Stanislav: Osudy Cyrila a Methoda a ich ucenfkov v Zivote Klimentovom, Bratislava, 19-50, p. 68. 20. 1Proloznoje iitie sv. Methodija: Vy1,vrativsj.u sja Methodijn v Konstantin grady, patrijarchy ze svjati jego jeplskopa, posLa vy !Moravu v grady Kaan (=IPannonia) i tu mnoga stvori cudesa. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 103. OUR CONTRIBUTORS Jozef Cincik: emi.nent ~lovak artis,t a.nd dnterlor decorator. For• merly of Bratislava U.nivemity f ·r om which he holds a Ph. D. in philo• sophy. Cincfk makes hi,s home in Bedford, Ohio. P. A. Hrobak: Educator, lecturer, writer on Slovakia and Czecho• Slovakia; editor o·f the JEDNOTA, the official organ of the First Cath• olic Slovak Union, the past 2'5 years. lmrich Kruiliak: Slovak ihiistar:ian; former secretary-general of the Slovak League, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. - Brait<J.slava University. Heinrich Kuhn is secretairy•general of the Sudeten Germa.n Archives in Munich. Rev. Michael Lacko, S. J., :professor at the Gregorian University, Rome, i<s an expert on the Byzanhlne •rite rund the author of The Life and Work of SS Cyril and Metihodlus. Frantisek Lanak: s,Iovak eduoator; held a key ,position in the Department of Education, Bratislava, Slovakia. Philosophy, Ph.D. Eberhart Mahner is a staff w,rlter for the "Sudetendeutscher Arti- keldienst," Munich. Jozef Pauco: Ph.D. - University of Bratislava, Slovakia; author of ei.g,ht book>s and many articles ,relating to Slovaks in America a.nd in Slovakia; former ediitor-in•chief of -the SLOVAK dally of Brati,slava; a,ssistant editor of the JEIDNOTA, Middletown, Pa., the ,prust 13 years. Mary Piroch: active in Slovak religious and cultuTa.l affai<rs; lives in Emlen tO'll, Pa. Anton F. Wuschek is the editor of the Centra.l European review SUDET:IDN BULLE'DIN, Munich, Germany.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource SS. Cyril and Methodius: Their First Trip to Rome Description An account of the resource Michael Lacko, S.J. Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 58-63 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lacko, Michael, 1920-1982 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6af3069216b8f27a5e1eeaa8832ebcce.pdf 27e44e4b577a56f9ea866735ae1d64ca PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 9 mE MEANING OF THE CYRILO-METHODIAN JUBILEE FRANCIS LANAK The year 1963 marks the 1,100th anniversary of the advent of the Slovak apostles, Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, to Slovakia, after accepting invitation of Rastislav, the Slovak sovereign, to preach the Word of God in a language which was intelligible to his people. This solemn occasion of far-reac·h ing ecclesiastical, cultural, and national significance is being commemorated by Slovaks in the entire world, because eleven whole centuries have passed since the time that Slovakia recorded the event in the history of Europe. Let us delve into the history of the ancient Slovaks of the 9th century who had their freedom, their own state, and an honorable place in the Europe of that time. The first Slovak ruler, whose name history has recorded, had the first Christian church established in 830, in Nitra, and later himself became a Christian. That ruler was Pribina, who later ruled over the Slovaks in TransDanubian Pannonia for twenty years and had 32 churches consecrated. His son, Kocer, continued in this work, and, among other things, it was he wtho appealed to the Holy Father at that time to intervene for the freedom of St. Methodius who had been incarcerated by the Germans. Let us here recall Mojmir I , who for the first time united all Slovak tribes and thereby became the founder of the Slovak State. And in his successor, Rastislav, Slovakia had its first Slovak statesman and ruler of great stature, who purposively and on ,h is own initiative wanted to permanently secure Slovak independence with a separate Slovak ecclesiastical province, which would be headed by an archbishop and would be affiliated with and dependent only on Rome-the same arrangement as the Germans had. With this clearly in our minds, the significance of our CyriloMethodian jubilee becomes obvious. Already during the reign of the predecessors of Rastislav, the land of the Slovaks was the mission territory of the German missionaries of the Salzburg bishopric. With Christianity came the influence of the German empire, but �10 SLOVAKIA also of its imperialistic effo*. When Rastislav defeated the Germans in 855, he was seriously; concerned with the ,problem how he could best secure peace for his people and its own independent development. He decided that he could do this most effectively by requesting the Pope for a Slovak bishop and the establishment of a Slovak acclesiastical province, such as the German empire had. Thereby, he reckoned, he would limit the intervention of the German bishops into the affairs and interests of Slovak rulers. In 860, Rastislav sent a delegation to Rome, to Pope Nicholas I, with a request for missionaries who could speak the language of his people. When the Holy See made a lengthy study of it and did not decide favorably even after a year, Rastislav sent another delegation, in 862, with the same request to Michael Ill in Constantinople, Emperor of the East Roman Empire. The Emperor granted Rastislav's request and sent two teachers and saintly brothers, Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, to the homeland of the Slovaks. Before they set out on their mission to Slovakia, the brothers invented an alphabet for the ancient Slovaks and translated parts of the Holy Writ and liturgical texts into ancient Slovak. They came to Slovakia in 863. After three years, on Rastislav's advice, they went to Rome with a large delegation, including some of their students, as well as with the remains of St. Clement, the martyr, there to defend the usage of old Slovak as a liturgical language and to repudiate the charges the Gennan clergy had lodged against them. They were successful in their mission. Adrian IT approved the use of Slovak in the liturgy and consecrated Methodius bishop for the territory of the ancient Slovaks, dispatching letters to princes Pribina, Rastislav, and Svatopluk to let them know directly of the action he had taken. Thus it was that the Slovaik rulers for the first time in history entered into direct diplomatic contact with the highest spiritual and political authorities of the world of that time as independent sovereigns. The German bishops protested, had Methodius seized in Pannonia and taken into Bavaria. A diplomatic struggle, lasting five years, ensued �SLOVAKIA 11 between the Holy See and the German emperor. In the end the Slovaks were victorious, and the papal legate inducted St. Methodius to the bisbop's seat in Nitra. In the meantime Svatopluk had succeeded Rastislav. Though Svatopluk did not fully understand the original idea of Rastislav and was under the influence of the hostility of the German clergy, who continued to oppose Slovak liturgy and Methodius, the latter developed an intensive missionary activity not only in Slovakia, but also in the ex:panded Great Moravian Empire of King Svatopluk. Among other things, St. Methodius baptized Bofivoj, the Czech Prince, after Svatopluk had conquered the Czechs, and spread Christianity among the Vislanians (the present Poles) who also W',ere a part of Svatopluk's realm. Methodius then made another diplomatic mission to Rome to gain more recognition for the land of the Slovaks and their sovereign. The Holy See took the great empire of Svatopluk under its -p rotection, placing it on the same footing as the German empire, and St. Methodius was named archbishop by the Holy Father with the right to name Slovak bishops. The Germans, of course, highly resented this recognition by the Holy See and attacked Svatopluk repeatedly only to be repulsed by him. The Slovak Sviitopluk remained unconquered by the Germans for the entire 25 years of his reign. After St. Methodius died in 885, the Germans convinced Pape Stephen V to such an extent that he forbade the use of the ancient Slovak liturgy, and the disciples of Methocilus were forced to seek asylum in neighboring Bulgaria. It was from Bulgaria that the ancient Slovak liturgy spread into Russia where Russian literature then developed from the original ancient Slovak of St. Cyril and Methodius. The successoc of .Svatopluk, Mojmir II, sent a delegation to Rome requesting that his territory be given the recognition of an independent ecclesiastical province. The mission was successful, Po~ John IX granting the request. After the experiences of his predecessors, Mojmir II did not ask for a renewal of the Slovak liturgy, so that the Latin became domesticated in the land of the Slovaks and with it Slovakia was definij:ely bound to Rome and western Europe. �12 SLOVAKIA From this hurried glance into the Slovak past we see that our ancient Slovak language became, alongside Latin and Greek, the third language in which Christian liturgical services were conducted; thait the Slovaks were first among the Slovanic peoples who as an entire state accepted Christianity and thus recorded themselves as the first Slovanic people into the cultural history of Europe; we see that they were the first among the Slovanic nations to have their own archbishop and bishops, and that they were the first to propagate Christianity 3.100ng the other Slovanic peoples and therefore were in the cultural forefront of Europe already in the ninth century after Christ, and were indirectly responsible for the introduction of letters among the Bulgarians and Russians. Furthermore, we see that the Slovaks had their own political state in the ninth century and were ruled by leaders of vision and wisdom who were able to retain their independence on the most important crossroads of Europe for almost a whole century under the most difficult circumstances. When the independence of -t he ancient empire of the Slovaks was finally lost in about 904 after repeated and concentrated attacks by the combined forces of the Magyars, Germ.ans, and Czechs - the Slovaks of Rastislav, Pribina, Svatopluk and Mojmir II never gave up hope of regaining their independence, their freedom to worship God in their own fashion and the right to rule themselves and be masters of their own destiny in their ancient homeland - Slovakia. Martin Kukucin's noveJs are being translated into Russian by Jurija Bogdanov. Foor of the eminent Slovak n-0velist's works were pulblished in 1-961• under the title "Novelly." The first edition consls.ted of 30,000 oopies. X X X Jan and Bernard Kurudr, meJI11bers of the religious order of the Comforters cxf Christ, re<:ently were sentenced to prison by the Red Court of Bratislava "for illlegal contacts with the West." In Nitra, Slovakia, 118 priests and brothers o:f the Society cxf the Divine Word weire sentenced to priscm on charges of d•istriibuting "illegal pulblications" and p e ,r f o rim i n g churCth services unlawfully. l!!! l!E( iJg wellkn-own SloV'ak composer otf minor musical scores, celebrated his seventieth birthda,y on February 15. He devoted much of his life to coJlectitng and arrangi<n,g Slovak popular songs . John Valalt'an-Oolinsky, � SLOVAKIA 9 mE MEANING OF THE CYRILO-METHODIAN JUBILEE FRANCIS LANAK The year 1963 marks the 1,100th anniversary of the advent of the Slovak apostles, Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, to Slovakia, after accepting invitation of Rastislav, the Slovak sovereign, to preach the Word of God in a language which was intelligible to his people. This solemn occasion of far-reac·h ing ecclesiastical, cultural, and national significance is being commemorated by Slovaks in the entire world, because eleven whole centuries have passed since the time that Slovakia recorded the event in the history of Europe. Let us delve into the history of the ancient Slovaks of the 9th century who had their freedom, their own state, and an honorable place in the Europe of that time. The first Slovak ruler, whose name history has recorded, had the first Christian church established in 830, in Nitra, and later himself became a Christian. That ruler was Pribina, who later ruled over the Slovaks in TransDanubian Pannonia for twenty years and had 32 churches consecrated. His son, Kocer, continued in this work, and, among other things, it was he wtho appealed to the Holy Father at that time to intervene for the freedom of St. Methodius who had been incarcerated by the Germans. Let us here recall Mojmir I , who for the first time united all Slovak tribes and thereby became the founder of the Slovak State. And in his successor, Rastislav, Slovakia had its first Slovak statesman and ruler of great stature, who purposively and on ,h is own initiative wanted to permanently secure Slovak independence with a separate Slovak ecclesiastical province, which would be headed by an archbishop and would be affiliated with and dependent only on Rome-the same arrangement as the Germans had. With this clearly in our minds, the significance of our CyriloMethodian jubilee becomes obvious. Already during the reign of the predecessors of Rastislav, the land of the Slovaks was the mission territory of the German missionaries of the Salzburg bishopric. With Christianity came the influence of the German empire, but �10 SLOVAKIA also of its imperialistic effo*. When Rastislav defeated the Germans in 855, he was seriously; concerned with the ,problem how he could best secure peace for his people and its own independent development. He decided that he could do this most effectively by requesting the Pope for a Slovak bishop and the establishment of a Slovak acclesiastical province, such as the German empire had. Thereby, he reckoned, he would limit the intervention of the German bishops into the affairs and interests of Slovak rulers. In 860, Rastislav sent a delegation to Rome, to Pope Nicholas I, with a request for missionaries who could speak the language of his people. When the Holy See made a lengthy study of it and did not decide favorably even after a year, Rastislav sent another delegation, in 862, with the same request to Michael Ill in Constantinople, Emperor of the East Roman Empire. The Emperor granted Rastislav's request and sent two teachers and saintly brothers, Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, to the homeland of the Slovaks. Before they set out on their mission to Slovakia, the brothers invented an alphabet for the ancient Slovaks and translated parts of the Holy Writ and liturgical texts into ancient Slovak. They came to Slovakia in 863. After three years, on Rastislav's advice, they went to Rome with a large delegation, including some of their students, as well as with the remains of St. Clement, the martyr, there to defend the usage of old Slovak as a liturgical language and to repudiate the charges the Gennan clergy had lodged against them. They were successful in their mission. Adrian IT approved the use of Slovak in the liturgy and consecrated Methodius bishop for the territory of the ancient Slovaks, dispatching letters to princes Pribina, Rastislav, and Svatopluk to let them know directly of the action he had taken. Thus it was that the Slovaik rulers for the first time in history entered into direct diplomatic contact with the highest spiritual and political authorities of the world of that time as independent sovereigns. The German bishops protested, had Methodius seized in Pannonia and taken into Bavaria. A diplomatic struggle, lasting five years, ensued �SLOVAKIA 11 between the Holy See and the German emperor. In the end the Slovaks were victorious, and the papal legate inducted St. Methodius to the bisbop's seat in Nitra. In the meantime Svatopluk had succeeded Rastislav. Though Svatopluk did not fully understand the original idea of Rastislav and was under the influence of the hostility of the German clergy, who continued to oppose Slovak liturgy and Methodius, the latter developed an intensive missionary activity not only in Slovakia, but also in the ex:panded Great Moravian Empire of King Svatopluk. Among other things, St. Methodius baptized Bofivoj, the Czech Prince, after Svatopluk had conquered the Czechs, and spread Christianity among the Vislanians (the present Poles) who also W',ere a part of Svatopluk's realm. Methodius then made another diplomatic mission to Rome to gain more recognition for the land of the Slovaks and their sovereign. The Holy See took the great empire of Svatopluk under its -p rotection, placing it on the same footing as the German empire, and St. Methodius was named archbishop by the Holy Father with the right to name Slovak bishops. The Germans, of course, highly resented this recognition by the Holy See and attacked Svatopluk repeatedly only to be repulsed by him. The Slovak Sviitopluk remained unconquered by the Germans for the entire 25 years of his reign. After St. Methodius died in 885, the Germans convinced Pape Stephen V to such an extent that he forbade the use of the ancient Slovak liturgy, and the disciples of Methocilus were forced to seek asylum in neighboring Bulgaria. It was from Bulgaria that the ancient Slovak liturgy spread into Russia where Russian literature then developed from the original ancient Slovak of St. Cyril and Methodius. The successoc of .Svatopluk, Mojmir II, sent a delegation to Rome requesting that his territory be given the recognition of an independent ecclesiastical province. The mission was successful, Po~ John IX granting the request. After the experiences of his predecessors, Mojmir II did not ask for a renewal of the Slovak liturgy, so that the Latin became domesticated in the land of the Slovaks and with it Slovakia was definij:ely bound to Rome and western Europe. �12 SLOVAKIA From this hurried glance into the Slovak past we see that our ancient Slovak language became, alongside Latin and Greek, the third language in which Christian liturgical services were conducted; thait the Slovaks were first among the Slovanic peoples who as an entire state accepted Christianity and thus recorded themselves as the first Slovanic people into the cultural history of Europe; we see that they were the first among the Slovanic nations to have their own archbishop and bishops, and that they were the first to propagate Christianity 3.100ng the other Slovanic peoples and therefore were in the cultural forefront of Europe already in the ninth century after Christ, and were indirectly responsible for the introduction of letters among the Bulgarians and Russians. Furthermore, we see that the Slovaks had their own political state in the ninth century and were ruled by leaders of vision and wisdom who were able to retain their independence on the most important crossroads of Europe for almost a whole century under the most difficult circumstances. When the independence of -t he ancient empire of the Slovaks was finally lost in about 904 after repeated and concentrated attacks by the combined forces of the Magyars, Germ.ans, and Czechs - the Slovaks of Rastislav, Pribina, Svatopluk and Mojmir II never gave up hope of regaining their independence, their freedom to worship God in their own fashion and the right to rule themselves and be masters of their own destiny in their ancient homeland - Slovakia. Martin Kukucin's noveJs are being translated into Russian by Jurija Bogdanov. Foor of the eminent Slovak n-0velist's works were pulblished in 1-961• under the title "Novelly." The first edition consls.ted of 30,000 oopies. X X X Jan and Bernard Kurudr, meJI11bers of the religious order of the Comforters cxf Christ, re<:ently were sentenced to prison by the Red Court of Bratislava "for illlegal contacts with the West." In Nitra, Slovakia, 118 priests and brothers o:f the Society cxf the Divine Word weire sentenced to priscm on charges of d•istriibuting "illegal pulblications" and p e ,r f o rim i n g churCth services unlawfully. l!!! l!E( iJg wellkn-own SloV'ak composer otf minor musical scores, celebrated his seventieth birthda,y on February 15. He devoted much of his life to coJlectitng and arrangi<n,g Slovak popular songs . John Valalt'an-Oolinsky, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 9 mE MEANING OF THE CYRILO-METHODIAN JUBILEE FRANCIS LANAK The year 1963 marks the 1,100th anniversary of the advent of the Slovak apostles, Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, to Slovakia, after accepting invitation of Rastislav, the Slovak sovereign, to preach the Word of God in a language which was intelligible to his people. This solemn occasion of far-reac·h ing ecclesiastical, cultural, and national significance is being commemorated by Slovaks in the entire world, because eleven whole centuries have passed since the time that Slovakia recorded the event in the history of Europe. Let us delve into the history of the ancient Slovaks of the 9th century who had their freedom, their own state, and an honorable place in the Europe of that time. The first Slovak ruler, whose name history has recorded, had the first Christian church established in 830, in Nitra, and later himself became a Christian. That ruler was Pribina, who later ruled over the Slovaks in TransDanubian Pannonia for twenty years and had 32 churches consecrated. His son, Kocer, continued in this work, and, among other things, it was he wtho appealed to the Holy Father at that time to intervene for the freedom of St. Methodius who had been incarcerated by the Germans. Let us here recall Mojmir I , who for the first time united all Slovak tribes and thereby became the founder of the Slovak State. And in his successor, Rastislav, Slovakia had its first Slovak statesman and ruler of great stature, who purposively and on ,h is own initiative wanted to permanently secure Slovak independence with a separate Slovak ecclesiastical province, which would be headed by an archbishop and would be affiliated with and dependent only on Rome-the same arrangement as the Germans had. With this clearly in our minds, the significance of our CyriloMethodian jubilee becomes obvious. Already during the reign of the predecessors of Rastislav, the land of the Slovaks was the mission territory of the German missionaries of the Salzburg bishopric. With Christianity came the influence of the German empire, but 10 SLOVAKIA also of its imperialistic effo*. When Rastislav defeated the Germans in 855, he was seriously; concerned with the ,problem how he could best secure peace for his people and its own independent development. He decided that he could do this most effectively by requesting the Pope for a Slovak bishop and the establishment of a Slovak acclesiastical province, such as the German empire had. Thereby, he reckoned, he would limit the intervention of the German bishops into the affairs and interests of Slovak rulers. In 860, Rastislav sent a delegation to Rome, to Pope Nicholas I, with a request for missionaries who could speak the language of his people. When the Holy See made a lengthy study of it and did not decide favorably even after a year, Rastislav sent another delegation, in 862, with the same request to Michael Ill in Constantinople, Emperor of the East Roman Empire. The Emperor granted Rastislav's request and sent two teachers and saintly brothers, Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, to the homeland of the Slovaks. Before they set out on their mission to Slovakia, the brothers invented an alphabet for the ancient Slovaks and translated parts of the Holy Writ and liturgical texts into ancient Slovak. They came to Slovakia in 863. After three years, on Rastislav's advice, they went to Rome with a large delegation, including some of their students, as well as with the remains of St. Clement, the martyr, there to defend the usage of old Slovak as a liturgical language and to repudiate the charges the Gennan clergy had lodged against them. They were successful in their mission. Adrian IT approved the use of Slovak in the liturgy and consecrated Methodius bishop for the territory of the ancient Slovaks, dispatching letters to princes Pribina, Rastislav, and Svatopluk to let them know directly of the action he had taken. Thus it was that the Slovaik rulers for the first time in history entered into direct diplomatic contact with the highest spiritual and political authorities of the world of that time as independent sovereigns. The German bishops protested, had Methodius seized in Pannonia and taken into Bavaria. A diplomatic struggle, lasting five years, ensued SLOVAKIA 11 between the Holy See and the German emperor. In the end the Slovaks were victorious, and the papal legate inducted St. Methodius to the bisbop's seat in Nitra. In the meantime Svatopluk had succeeded Rastislav. Though Svatopluk did not fully understand the original idea of Rastislav and was under the influence of the hostility of the German clergy, who continued to oppose Slovak liturgy and Methodius, the latter developed an intensive missionary activity not only in Slovakia, but also in the ex:panded Great Moravian Empire of King Svatopluk. Among other things, St. Methodius baptized Bofivoj, the Czech Prince, after Svatopluk had conquered the Czechs, and spread Christianity among the Vislanians (the present Poles) who also W',ere a part of Svatopluk's realm. Methodius then made another diplomatic mission to Rome to gain more recognition for the land of the Slovaks and their sovereign. The Holy See took the great empire of Svatopluk under its -p rotection, placing it on the same footing as the German empire, and St. Methodius was named archbishop by the Holy Father with the right to name Slovak bishops. The Germans, of course, highly resented this recognition by the Holy See and attacked Svatopluk repeatedly only to be repulsed by him. The Slovak Sviitopluk remained unconquered by the Germans for the entire 25 years of his reign. After St. Methodius died in 885, the Germans convinced Pape Stephen V to such an extent that he forbade the use of the ancient Slovak liturgy, and the disciples of Methocilus were forced to seek asylum in neighboring Bulgaria. It was from Bulgaria that the ancient Slovak liturgy spread into Russia where Russian literature then developed from the original ancient Slovak of St. Cyril and Methodius. The successoc of .Svatopluk, Mojmir II, sent a delegation to Rome requesting that his territory be given the recognition of an independent ecclesiastical province. The mission was successful, Po~ John IX granting the request. After the experiences of his predecessors, Mojmir II did not ask for a renewal of the Slovak liturgy, so that the Latin became domesticated in the land of the Slovaks and with it Slovakia was definij:ely bound to Rome and western Europe. 12 SLOVAKIA From this hurried glance into the Slovak past we see that our ancient Slovak language became, alongside Latin and Greek, the third language in which Christian liturgical services were conducted; thait the Slovaks were first among the Slovanic peoples who as an entire state accepted Christianity and thus recorded themselves as the first Slovanic people into the cultural history of Europe; we see that they were the first among the Slovanic nations to have their own archbishop and bishops, and that they were the first to propagate Christianity 3.100ng the other Slovanic peoples and therefore were in the cultural forefront of Europe already in the ninth century after Christ, and were indirectly responsible for the introduction of letters among the Bulgarians and Russians. Furthermore, we see that the Slovaks had their own political state in the ninth century and were ruled by leaders of vision and wisdom who were able to retain their independence on the most important crossroads of Europe for almost a whole century under the most difficult circumstances. When the independence of -t he ancient empire of the Slovaks was finally lost in about 904 after repeated and concentrated attacks by the combined forces of the Magyars, Germ.ans, and Czechs - the Slovaks of Rastislav, Pribina, Svatopluk and Mojmir II never gave up hope of regaining their independence, their freedom to worship God in their own fashion and the right to rule themselves and be masters of their own destiny in their ancient homeland - Slovakia. Martin Kukucin's noveJs are being translated into Russian by Jurija Bogdanov. Foor of the eminent Slovak n-0velist's works were pulblished in 1-961• under the title "Novelly." The first edition consls.ted of 30,000 oopies. X X X Jan and Bernard Kurudr, meJI11bers of the religious order of the Comforters cxf Christ, re<:ently were sentenced to prison by the Red Court of Bratislava "for illlegal contacts with the West." In Nitra, Slovakia, 118 priests and brothers o:f the Society cxf the Divine Word weire sentenced to priscm on charges of d•istriibuting "illegal pulblications" and p e ,r f o rim i n g churCth services unlawfully. l!!! l!E( iJg wellkn-own SloV'ak composer otf minor musical scores, celebrated his seventieth birthda,y on February 15. He devoted much of his life to coJlectitng and arrangi<n,g Slovak popular songs . John Valalt'an-Oolinsky,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Meaning of the Cyril-Methodian Jubilee Description An account of the resource Francis Lanák Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 9-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lanák, Francis Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7dc170348b1d1a6659e0e439571dabde.pdf f9c3aa85e2df22ad286ed5861f4ee185 PDF Text Text SLOVA KIA 101 My Grandfather's Silence Patricia Ondek Laurence* Before m y current academic interest in Slovaks and their view of work - gleaned from books - arose, there was " Dzedo ," my grandfather. H e died fourteen years ago, leaving only other people 's stories about him . Joseph P ancurak was a m an possessed with a quality that often characterizes immigrant Slovaks with their ability to shrug, to live to themselves; he offered little ancestral help with words, preferring to reap hi s life in silence . This stoical ability was not passed on to m e , and my eager questions about life in Slovakia and Pennsylvania in the first half of this century were m et with a stubborn silence. Or, the splat of tobacco juice in the spittoon near hi s favorite wicker chair which he used to ward off still the miner's thirst' and now the curious new-world children . " Butz tzicho," " be quiet , " he invariably said . But how could I learn from what had largely been a silent tradition ? Silent becau se of the distance between a grandfather and a granddau ghter who could barely speak each other's languages; silent because , by the time I had grown to articulate my own questions about m y grandparents' lives , they were too tired to answer with anything but a sigh and " ah, jaj, jaj, Maticka, " " Mother of God"; silent becau se of a tradition of quiet suffering more exp ressive of its endurance than articulate of compla int. From others, I had heard stories about my grandfather , who, they say, was a teller of tales when youn g. From them, I learned about his enterprisin g, inventive, and colorful ways. Never having spent a day in school, D zedo would always make a point of "rem emberin g, " and • I would like to th a nk my moth er , Ann Pancurak Ondek of Sa nj ose, California ; m y uncle, George Pence r of Palm Springs, C aliforni a; a nd m y aunt , M ary Pancurak Stetts of Linden , New J ersey, for telling me stories about m y gra ndfather. �102 SLOVAKIA would tell stories to his " krajania ," close friends and relatives, for hours . Uncle George remembers : Here is one thing Dad had . Something he had that we don't. We'd say, "Dad, tell us a story," and he would settle down with his pipe and tell us the most beautiful story. He could go on and on and fit the story to the occasion. A story about a mule giving a farmer a problem, or he would sing us a song about the neighborhood cat: "Oh, don't get married, who's going to catch our mice . ... '' Dzedo would tell them of Ruska Nova Yes, Slovakia, where he lived on a farm and worked in the forests, logging for the squire of the town, to earn money toward the yearned-for trip to America. Starting out across central Europe at the age of twenty-three in 1905 with John Hrobak, they walked three days and nights (fortified by a slab of bacon and a bottle of whiskey) through hills and mountains to escape the Austrian draft. Dzedo wore out a pair of new shoes, only to miss the boat from Hamburg, Germany, to America. A few weeks later, he found passage on another ship, and arrived, finally, in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, a booming town with a population of 18,000, the heart of the anthracite coal region. Here he went to work in the Reading Coal Company mines - hazardous and strenuous work in 1906. During these years, Dzedo lived with a bruised , lacerated back earned as he crawled through narrow mining spaces, a back that ''Baba,'' my grandmother, would bathe each day as he sat in a wooden tub in the basement , a back that "never seemed to heal ." Dzedo earned $5.50 a day . He also worked part-time for a butcher, Mr . Gablik, who was crushed to death one day while loosening a log on a large timber pile . Purchase of the butcher business enabled Dzedo to escape the mines and "miner' s asthma," now called black lung disease, which, along with mining accidents, killed most of his mining friends before they were fifty . Always enterprising, he expanded the business in a short time by delivering meat to the outlying patches of houses in Gilberton, Maze! , and Frankfurt with a horse and buggy. Business flourished . One day his temper flared when a woman questioned the price and quality ofa slab of meat. Dzedo raised his large butcher's knife , slashed open a one-hundred pound sack of flour standing nearby, and created �SLOVAKIA 103 a cloud of dust and fear which sent the women customers flying. That made his prices stick. His business continued to expand, and his family grew . But tragedy struck. His young wife, Anna , had a heart condition and was rushed off to Ashland Hospital where she died a few weeks later. After a home wake - the deceased was packed in ice and placed on view in the home parlor for rel atives and fri ends - and a decent interval of time , Dzedo, according to Eastern European custom, married his wife's sister, Ilona . She cared for his two sons, George and Joe, and bore him nine children in her lifetime . Aunt Mary always says, " Boze moj!," "oh, my God!" "Dzedo had ideas and was always handy with machines ." When he could afford it , about 1916, he bought a Model-T Ford. He loved cars and would . proudly ride to church on Sundays in a carefully ironed , starched white shirt with his growing family beside him . But one d ay when putting gasoline in his Model-T , under the front seat, the car caught fire and all of the upholstery was burned. Instead of rebuilding the car , Dzedo decided to put a butcher wagon fram e over the chassis , and inventively converted the car into a butcher truck for his business and retired his horses to pasture . My mother says, " There wasn't anything that he couldn't do ." The day before the christening of my Aunt Mary in 1914, Baba told Dzedo that a larger table was needed for the specially prepared foods and the forty expected guests. That night Dzedo made a twenty-foot table , which was fill ed the next day with klobasy and ham from the butcher shop , and m y grandmother's piroh y, halusky, and kolace the u sual Slovak generosity with food. But in 1919 during a miner's strike when people seldom paid in cash , my grandfather overexte nded credit to cu stom ers in the butcher shop; he lost everythin g. Next, Dzedo bought a fifteen-acre farm in Locu st Valley, P ennsylvan ia, which had no barn and no running water. Uncle G eo rge rem embers this period from 191 9- 1925 v ividly a nd d esc ribes Dzedo as a master craftsman who rebu ilt the barn: H e was a master with hi s ha nd s, a nd could take a log, a tree, a nd with a double bit ax , just mark it a nd what we call hew it , a nd cut one sid e as if he cut it with a saw - th at's how accurate he was. �104 SLOVAKIA Dzedo was a patient man . One d ay when my grandfather and my Uncle George ("Jurko") were taking some timber to the saw mill to be cut into boards, the horse trailed off the road. The wheel of the wagon broke, and all the timber fell into a ditch . Uncle George, then eight years old , was upset , but my grandfather patiently explained that they would pick some of the timber and carry it to the mill and pick up the rest over the next few days . Dzedo told his son, in his broken English, " R emember, Jurko , through your lifetime you have many days like this. " After the barn was rebuilt , Dzedo bought two horses from Kayser 's Brewery and taught them how to plow. H e set up a small forge in the basement of the house, and made chains for the horses ' halters which were attached to the plow. Using the same forge, he also repaired a used furnace he found and installed pipes to heat the house for his family and pipes to irrigate his crops. Harvesting wheat, rye, and hay, and tending his cherry trees , he successfully built up the farm, but then , as the Depression approached, he was forced from his farm into industry. He returned to the mines and took part in the organization of the unions outside of Mahanoy City with Mr. Maholage. D zedo stayed until the late 1930s when most of the mines closed because the nation began using gas and oil for fuel. Then, looking for new work, he moved to New Jersey, and there, at the age of sixty-eight, became the last smithy in Linden , something he h ad always wanted to be . He forged horseshoes for fire, sanitation , and police department horses : a new trade for this logger, farmer, inventor , butcher, miner , union organizer, and now father of eleven n ew-world children . As a child , I remember trailing after Dzedo, somehow always watching him from behind . H e would enter Baba's warm kitchen , heated by the large cast-iron stove, where the chicken soup with the homem ade noodles and the piroh y were steaming. I see him stamping his feet from the cold , the cuffs of his baggy pants dragging; I hear the splat of tobacco in the spittoon near the door. H e reaches out to take the shot of whiskey and then the glass of beer that Ba ba hands him . Then he looks at me and says gruffly, " Dones moje susi," "get me my slippers," a phrase that my mother has duly taught m e sin ce D zedo had scolded her for not teachin g m e Slovak. I bring hi s slippers. H e si ts down in his wicker ch air and takes out his handkerchi ef. H e twi sts it and makes it jump for m e. It 's a rabbit . H e teaches me to watch his silent hands. �SLOVAKIA 105 NOTE Grandfather was a coal miner , and chewing a quid of tobacco was a habit in the mines and at home . Because of the amount of coal dust in the air in the mines, miners had dusty throats and were always thirsty: Chewing tobacco helped them to clear their throats, salivate, and expectorate . �� SLOVA KIA 101 My Grandfather's Silence Patricia Ondek Laurence* Before m y current academic interest in Slovaks and their view of work - gleaned from books - arose, there was " Dzedo ," my grandfather. H e died fourteen years ago, leaving only other people 's stories about him . Joseph P ancurak was a m an possessed with a quality that often characterizes immigrant Slovaks with their ability to shrug, to live to themselves; he offered little ancestral help with words, preferring to reap hi s life in silence . This stoical ability was not passed on to m e , and my eager questions about life in Slovakia and Pennsylvania in the first half of this century were m et with a stubborn silence. Or, the splat of tobacco juice in the spittoon near hi s favorite wicker chair which he used to ward off still the miner's thirst' and now the curious new-world children . " Butz tzicho," " be quiet , " he invariably said . But how could I learn from what had largely been a silent tradition ? Silent becau se of the distance between a grandfather and a granddau ghter who could barely speak each other's languages; silent because , by the time I had grown to articulate my own questions about m y grandparents' lives , they were too tired to answer with anything but a sigh and " ah, jaj, jaj, Maticka, " " Mother of God"; silent becau se of a tradition of quiet suffering more exp ressive of its endurance than articulate of compla int. From others, I had heard stories about my grandfather , who, they say, was a teller of tales when youn g. From them, I learned about his enterprisin g, inventive, and colorful ways. Never having spent a day in school, D zedo would always make a point of "rem emberin g, " and • I would like to th a nk my moth er , Ann Pancurak Ondek of Sa nj ose, California ; m y uncle, George Pence r of Palm Springs, C aliforni a; a nd m y aunt , M ary Pancurak Stetts of Linden , New J ersey, for telling me stories about m y gra ndfather. �102 SLOVAKIA would tell stories to his " krajania ," close friends and relatives, for hours . Uncle George remembers : Here is one thing Dad had . Something he had that we don't. We'd say, "Dad, tell us a story," and he would settle down with his pipe and tell us the most beautiful story. He could go on and on and fit the story to the occasion. A story about a mule giving a farmer a problem, or he would sing us a song about the neighborhood cat: "Oh, don't get married, who's going to catch our mice . ... '' Dzedo would tell them of Ruska Nova Yes, Slovakia, where he lived on a farm and worked in the forests, logging for the squire of the town, to earn money toward the yearned-for trip to America. Starting out across central Europe at the age of twenty-three in 1905 with John Hrobak, they walked three days and nights (fortified by a slab of bacon and a bottle of whiskey) through hills and mountains to escape the Austrian draft. Dzedo wore out a pair of new shoes, only to miss the boat from Hamburg, Germany, to America. A few weeks later, he found passage on another ship, and arrived, finally, in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, a booming town with a population of 18,000, the heart of the anthracite coal region. Here he went to work in the Reading Coal Company mines - hazardous and strenuous work in 1906. During these years, Dzedo lived with a bruised , lacerated back earned as he crawled through narrow mining spaces, a back that ''Baba,'' my grandmother, would bathe each day as he sat in a wooden tub in the basement , a back that "never seemed to heal ." Dzedo earned $5.50 a day . He also worked part-time for a butcher, Mr . Gablik, who was crushed to death one day while loosening a log on a large timber pile . Purchase of the butcher business enabled Dzedo to escape the mines and "miner' s asthma," now called black lung disease, which, along with mining accidents, killed most of his mining friends before they were fifty . Always enterprising, he expanded the business in a short time by delivering meat to the outlying patches of houses in Gilberton, Maze! , and Frankfurt with a horse and buggy. Business flourished . One day his temper flared when a woman questioned the price and quality ofa slab of meat. Dzedo raised his large butcher's knife , slashed open a one-hundred pound sack of flour standing nearby, and created �SLOVAKIA 103 a cloud of dust and fear which sent the women customers flying. That made his prices stick. His business continued to expand, and his family grew . But tragedy struck. His young wife, Anna , had a heart condition and was rushed off to Ashland Hospital where she died a few weeks later. After a home wake - the deceased was packed in ice and placed on view in the home parlor for rel atives and fri ends - and a decent interval of time , Dzedo, according to Eastern European custom, married his wife's sister, Ilona . She cared for his two sons, George and Joe, and bore him nine children in her lifetime . Aunt Mary always says, " Boze moj!," "oh, my God!" "Dzedo had ideas and was always handy with machines ." When he could afford it , about 1916, he bought a Model-T Ford. He loved cars and would . proudly ride to church on Sundays in a carefully ironed , starched white shirt with his growing family beside him . But one d ay when putting gasoline in his Model-T , under the front seat, the car caught fire and all of the upholstery was burned. Instead of rebuilding the car , Dzedo decided to put a butcher wagon fram e over the chassis , and inventively converted the car into a butcher truck for his business and retired his horses to pasture . My mother says, " There wasn't anything that he couldn't do ." The day before the christening of my Aunt Mary in 1914, Baba told Dzedo that a larger table was needed for the specially prepared foods and the forty expected guests. That night Dzedo made a twenty-foot table , which was fill ed the next day with klobasy and ham from the butcher shop , and m y grandmother's piroh y, halusky, and kolace the u sual Slovak generosity with food. But in 1919 during a miner's strike when people seldom paid in cash , my grandfather overexte nded credit to cu stom ers in the butcher shop; he lost everythin g. Next, Dzedo bought a fifteen-acre farm in Locu st Valley, P ennsylvan ia, which had no barn and no running water. Uncle G eo rge rem embers this period from 191 9- 1925 v ividly a nd d esc ribes Dzedo as a master craftsman who rebu ilt the barn: H e was a master with hi s ha nd s, a nd could take a log, a tree, a nd with a double bit ax , just mark it a nd what we call hew it , a nd cut one sid e as if he cut it with a saw - th at's how accurate he was. �104 SLOVAKIA Dzedo was a patient man . One d ay when my grandfather and my Uncle George ("Jurko") were taking some timber to the saw mill to be cut into boards, the horse trailed off the road. The wheel of the wagon broke, and all the timber fell into a ditch . Uncle George, then eight years old , was upset , but my grandfather patiently explained that they would pick some of the timber and carry it to the mill and pick up the rest over the next few days . Dzedo told his son, in his broken English, " R emember, Jurko , through your lifetime you have many days like this. " After the barn was rebuilt , Dzedo bought two horses from Kayser 's Brewery and taught them how to plow. H e set up a small forge in the basement of the house, and made chains for the horses ' halters which were attached to the plow. Using the same forge, he also repaired a used furnace he found and installed pipes to heat the house for his family and pipes to irrigate his crops. Harvesting wheat, rye, and hay, and tending his cherry trees , he successfully built up the farm, but then , as the Depression approached, he was forced from his farm into industry. He returned to the mines and took part in the organization of the unions outside of Mahanoy City with Mr. Maholage. D zedo stayed until the late 1930s when most of the mines closed because the nation began using gas and oil for fuel. Then, looking for new work, he moved to New Jersey, and there, at the age of sixty-eight, became the last smithy in Linden , something he h ad always wanted to be . He forged horseshoes for fire, sanitation , and police department horses : a new trade for this logger, farmer, inventor , butcher, miner , union organizer, and now father of eleven n ew-world children . As a child , I remember trailing after Dzedo, somehow always watching him from behind . H e would enter Baba's warm kitchen , heated by the large cast-iron stove, where the chicken soup with the homem ade noodles and the piroh y were steaming. I see him stamping his feet from the cold , the cuffs of his baggy pants dragging; I hear the splat of tobacco in the spittoon near the door. H e reaches out to take the shot of whiskey and then the glass of beer that Ba ba hands him . Then he looks at me and says gruffly, " Dones moje susi," "get me my slippers," a phrase that my mother has duly taught m e sin ce D zedo had scolded her for not teachin g m e Slovak. I bring hi s slippers. H e si ts down in his wicker ch air and takes out his handkerchi ef. H e twi sts it and makes it jump for m e. It 's a rabbit . H e teaches me to watch his silent hands. �SLOVAKIA 105 NOTE Grandfather was a coal miner , and chewing a quid of tobacco was a habit in the mines and at home . Because of the amount of coal dust in the air in the mines, miners had dusty throats and were always thirsty: Chewing tobacco helped them to clear their throats, salivate, and expectorate . �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1984, Vol. 31 Description An account of the resource Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVA KIA 101 My Grandfather's Silence Patricia Ondek Laurence* Before m y current academic interest in Slovaks and their view of work - gleaned from books - arose, there was " Dzedo ," my grandfather. H e died fourteen years ago, leaving only other people 's stories about him . Joseph P ancurak was a m an possessed with a quality that often characterizes immigrant Slovaks with their ability to shrug, to live to themselves; he offered little ancestral help with words, preferring to reap hi s life in silence . This stoical ability was not passed on to m e , and my eager questions about life in Slovakia and Pennsylvania in the first half of this century were m et with a stubborn silence. Or, the splat of tobacco juice in the spittoon near hi s favorite wicker chair which he used to ward off still the miner's thirst' and now the curious new-world children . " Butz tzicho," " be quiet , " he invariably said . But how could I learn from what had largely been a silent tradition ? Silent becau se of the distance between a grandfather and a granddau ghter who could barely speak each other's languages; silent because , by the time I had grown to articulate my own questions about m y grandparents' lives , they were too tired to answer with anything but a sigh and " ah, jaj, jaj, Maticka, " " Mother of God"; silent becau se of a tradition of quiet suffering more exp ressive of its endurance than articulate of compla int. From others, I had heard stories about my grandfather , who, they say, was a teller of tales when youn g. From them, I learned about his enterprisin g, inventive, and colorful ways. Never having spent a day in school, D zedo would always make a point of "rem emberin g, " and • I would like to th a nk my moth er , Ann Pancurak Ondek of Sa nj ose, California ; m y uncle, George Pence r of Palm Springs, C aliforni a; a nd m y aunt , M ary Pancurak Stetts of Linden , New J ersey, for telling me stories about m y gra ndfather. 102 SLOVAKIA would tell stories to his " krajania ," close friends and relatives, for hours . Uncle George remembers : Here is one thing Dad had . Something he had that we don't. We'd say, "Dad, tell us a story," and he would settle down with his pipe and tell us the most beautiful story. He could go on and on and fit the story to the occasion. A story about a mule giving a farmer a problem, or he would sing us a song about the neighborhood cat: "Oh, don't get married, who's going to catch our mice . ... '' Dzedo would tell them of Ruska Nova Yes, Slovakia, where he lived on a farm and worked in the forests, logging for the squire of the town, to earn money toward the yearned-for trip to America. Starting out across central Europe at the age of twenty-three in 1905 with John Hrobak, they walked three days and nights (fortified by a slab of bacon and a bottle of whiskey) through hills and mountains to escape the Austrian draft. Dzedo wore out a pair of new shoes, only to miss the boat from Hamburg, Germany, to America. A few weeks later, he found passage on another ship, and arrived, finally, in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, a booming town with a population of 18,000, the heart of the anthracite coal region. Here he went to work in the Reading Coal Company mines - hazardous and strenuous work in 1906. During these years, Dzedo lived with a bruised , lacerated back earned as he crawled through narrow mining spaces, a back that ''Baba,'' my grandmother, would bathe each day as he sat in a wooden tub in the basement , a back that "never seemed to heal ." Dzedo earned $5.50 a day . He also worked part-time for a butcher, Mr . Gablik, who was crushed to death one day while loosening a log on a large timber pile . Purchase of the butcher business enabled Dzedo to escape the mines and "miner' s asthma," now called black lung disease, which, along with mining accidents, killed most of his mining friends before they were fifty . Always enterprising, he expanded the business in a short time by delivering meat to the outlying patches of houses in Gilberton, Maze! , and Frankfurt with a horse and buggy. Business flourished . One day his temper flared when a woman questioned the price and quality ofa slab of meat. Dzedo raised his large butcher's knife , slashed open a one-hundred pound sack of flour standing nearby, and created SLOVAKIA 103 a cloud of dust and fear which sent the women customers flying. That made his prices stick. His business continued to expand, and his family grew . But tragedy struck. His young wife, Anna , had a heart condition and was rushed off to Ashland Hospital where she died a few weeks later. After a home wake - the deceased was packed in ice and placed on view in the home parlor for rel atives and fri ends - and a decent interval of time , Dzedo, according to Eastern European custom, married his wife's sister, Ilona . She cared for his two sons, George and Joe, and bore him nine children in her lifetime . Aunt Mary always says, " Boze moj!," "oh, my God!" "Dzedo had ideas and was always handy with machines ." When he could afford it , about 1916, he bought a Model-T Ford. He loved cars and would . proudly ride to church on Sundays in a carefully ironed , starched white shirt with his growing family beside him . But one d ay when putting gasoline in his Model-T , under the front seat, the car caught fire and all of the upholstery was burned. Instead of rebuilding the car , Dzedo decided to put a butcher wagon fram e over the chassis , and inventively converted the car into a butcher truck for his business and retired his horses to pasture . My mother says, " There wasn't anything that he couldn't do ." The day before the christening of my Aunt Mary in 1914, Baba told Dzedo that a larger table was needed for the specially prepared foods and the forty expected guests. That night Dzedo made a twenty-foot table , which was fill ed the next day with klobasy and ham from the butcher shop , and m y grandmother's piroh y, halusky, and kolace the u sual Slovak generosity with food. But in 1919 during a miner's strike when people seldom paid in cash , my grandfather overexte nded credit to cu stom ers in the butcher shop; he lost everythin g. Next, Dzedo bought a fifteen-acre farm in Locu st Valley, P ennsylvan ia, which had no barn and no running water. Uncle G eo rge rem embers this period from 191 9- 1925 v ividly a nd d esc ribes Dzedo as a master craftsman who rebu ilt the barn: H e was a master with hi s ha nd s, a nd could take a log, a tree, a nd with a double bit ax , just mark it a nd what we call hew it , a nd cut one sid e as if he cut it with a saw - th at's how accurate he was. 104 SLOVAKIA Dzedo was a patient man . One d ay when my grandfather and my Uncle George ("Jurko") were taking some timber to the saw mill to be cut into boards, the horse trailed off the road. The wheel of the wagon broke, and all the timber fell into a ditch . Uncle George, then eight years old , was upset , but my grandfather patiently explained that they would pick some of the timber and carry it to the mill and pick up the rest over the next few days . Dzedo told his son, in his broken English, " R emember, Jurko , through your lifetime you have many days like this. " After the barn was rebuilt , Dzedo bought two horses from Kayser 's Brewery and taught them how to plow. H e set up a small forge in the basement of the house, and made chains for the horses ' halters which were attached to the plow. Using the same forge, he also repaired a used furnace he found and installed pipes to heat the house for his family and pipes to irrigate his crops. Harvesting wheat, rye, and hay, and tending his cherry trees , he successfully built up the farm, but then , as the Depression approached, he was forced from his farm into industry. He returned to the mines and took part in the organization of the unions outside of Mahanoy City with Mr. Maholage. D zedo stayed until the late 1930s when most of the mines closed because the nation began using gas and oil for fuel. Then, looking for new work, he moved to New Jersey, and there, at the age of sixty-eight, became the last smithy in Linden , something he h ad always wanted to be . He forged horseshoes for fire, sanitation , and police department horses : a new trade for this logger, farmer, inventor , butcher, miner , union organizer, and now father of eleven n ew-world children . As a child , I remember trailing after Dzedo, somehow always watching him from behind . H e would enter Baba's warm kitchen , heated by the large cast-iron stove, where the chicken soup with the homem ade noodles and the piroh y were steaming. I see him stamping his feet from the cold , the cuffs of his baggy pants dragging; I hear the splat of tobacco in the spittoon near the door. H e reaches out to take the shot of whiskey and then the glass of beer that Ba ba hands him . Then he looks at me and says gruffly, " Dones moje susi," "get me my slippers," a phrase that my mother has duly taught m e sin ce D zedo had scolded her for not teachin g m e Slovak. I bring hi s slippers. H e si ts down in his wicker ch air and takes out his handkerchi ef. H e twi sts it and makes it jump for m e. It 's a rabbit . H e teaches me to watch his silent hands. SLOVAKIA 105 NOTE Grandfather was a coal miner , and chewing a quid of tobacco was a habit in the mines and at home . Because of the amount of coal dust in the air in the mines, miners had dusty throats and were always thirsty: Chewing tobacco helped them to clear their throats, salivate, and expectorate .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource My Grandfather's Silence Description An account of the resource Patricia Ondek Laurence Slovakia, Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984 pp. 101-105 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Laurence, Patricia Ondek, 1942- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/98d25410d7f2879689d22a97cd1b2861.pdf d34c88dd6703b4521ac3630ddf0631b9 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 109 Slovak-Czech Relations: An assessment CAROL SKALNIK LEFF An often quoted aphorism in the literature on democratization is the caveat of a British statesman: "The people cannot decide until it is first decided who is the people." In varying forms it is precisely that question that has plagued Czech-Slovak relations over the past century. Although the essays in this forum were organized to survey the Czech-Slovak relationship in historically distinct periods, each analysis sheds light on the concrete manifestations of a persistent failure to reach a consensus on who the "people" are (Czech, Slovak or Czechoslovak citizens), and what institutional framework would be appropriate to orchestrate their decisions. Moreover, each of the essays contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical roots of the Czech-Slovak divorce proceedings of 1992. In these comments, I will try to integrate the periodized analysis of the assessments just offered, and to cull from them patterns in the CzechSlovak relationship that denote a permanent imbalance in perceptions of national identity and national interest, an imbalance that culminated in the abandonment of the joint statehood enterprise. In reviewing the period before the founding of the state, Edita Bosak defines a number of central features of Czech-Slovak relations , all of which establish a context for the tensions that persisted after 1918. Above all, she documents the essentially cultural character of the relationship during the Habsburg period, a focus that is important for two reasons. First, the tensions in that cultural nexus go to the core of the identity problem that would plague the joint �110 SLOVAKIA Czech-Slovak state into the 1990s . The centrality of the language question, from the outset, pointed to the larger issue - on whose terms would Czechs and Slovaks establish a working relationship? Slovak protectiveness regarding language was fundamentally a protection of besieged identity ,67 and Czech laments over the separation of the two languages reflected a failure to take seriously the distinctiveness of two cultures, a failure that would mark subsequent failures to acknowledge distinct Slovak interests in a range of issues from politics and economics to religion. Second, the essentially cultural character of the Czech-Slovak relationship before 1918 points to its converse - the limited political dialogue and collaboration, which Edita Bosak rightly defines as a function of Czech orientation toward the doctrine of historical rights to its ethnically mixed territory, and of the political sensitivity of any challenge to the structure of dualism. The paucity of political interaction meant an ill-constructed foundation for the edifice of joint statehood after 1918, and the carryover of unresolved ambiguities and tensions into the new state. The stakes in the inconclusive debate over identity mounted after independence, as cultural relations perforce became political and constitutional as well. Susan Mikula builds from precisely this important point to trace a pattern of political stasis in the interwar period that essentially excluded reformulation of the position of Slovaks within the state. She gives particularly cogent attention to the operation of a complex parliamentary system, a delicate balancing act dependent less of shifting electoral outcomes than on tight elite coordination and control. Stanislav Kirschbaum traces a consistent pattern of Slovak interests endplayed by Czech dominance of both the state apparatus and of the formulation of stateness itself. Through each of these analyses one can discern patterns that transcend historical eras. The Czech-Slovak relationship, in its sue67 It would have been helpful had Edita Bosak addressed more specifically the Hlasist position on the language issue; even avowed Czechoslovaks were not necessarily "linguistic" Czechoslovaks, and the distinction would contribute to a fuller understanding of the ambiguities of the "Czechoslovak" idea itself, ambiguities that heightened the probability of mutual misunderstanding and suspicion. �SLOVAKIA 111 cessive forms, was fundamentally a pragmatic alliance of small nations, brought together by the exgencies of external forces and constrained by internal structures . External threats to national survival were rooted in a usually hostile international environment, where larger and more powerful political entities were able to define the limits of national sovereignty and also to shape the character of CzechSlovak accommodation. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries , Czechs and Slovaks were hostage to the stabilities and instabilities of the larger continental balance of power, such that their encasement in the Habsburg order was broken only by World War I and postwar "high diplomacy," their joint experiment in statehood was destroyed by Nazi intervention, and the reincarnation of the state after 1945 was defined by Soviet power. In each of these successive periods , broader forces therefore set the parameters for the Czech-Slovak relationship, and it is hardly coincidental that the experiment in statehood fell apart precisely when the international constraints that had long circumscribed political negotiation loosened dramatically. Before 1989, the climate of international threat and coercion had been a decisive factor in setting political boundaries . Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 forged a common state to reinforce their respective boundaries with former German and Hungarian overlords, who survived the dissolution of empire in substantial minorities on Czech and Slovak territory . Tellingly, the consequence of that strategic alliance was not merely, or even accurately, a "joint" state, but rather a centralized state, centralized precisely on the logic of fending off the claims of neighbors and resident minorities. This was an inhospitable environment for the resolution of Czech-Slovak differences , with raison d'Etat presented to foreclose negotiation, particularly after the Hungarian incursion of 1919. Nor was the subsequent crisis of Nazi intervention a favorable climate for a Slovak definition of national interests that Czechs would regard as the betrayal of superior state interests. Finally the defeat of Nazi power left a Slovak state legacy tarnished by its genesis and the reinstatement of Czechoslovakia as the only exit from the opprobrium of association with the Axis camp. The new postwar Czech-Slovak bargain was therefore encumbered by recent history, and further encumbered by a commu- �112 SLOVAKIA nist political schema that infused Pragocentrism with a new layer of ideological meaning. Slovak claims to political definition as people, therefore, were consistently either contaminated by international intervention (as World War II), or immobilized by politics as usual. It must therefore be recognized that a central feature of the Czech-Slovak relationship , the centralist strait jacket that frustrated Slovak attempts to attain institutional recognitionn for Slovak identity, was on balance rationalized by the character of the international context, which provided a series of ready rationales to forestall a mutually acceptable constitutional bargain. Another persistent impediment to consensus was the economic context of the Czech-Slovak relationship, a factor that all the essays incorporate into their assessments with varying emphasis. From the inception of the state in 1918, the economics of national benefit was a source of dissonance between the two nations. Economic policy is never ethnically neutral. It hardly proved so in Czechoslovakia. Differentials in economic development meant that market forces and government economic policy that worked well for the Czech lands were unlikely, uncorrected, to have a similar salutary impact in Slovakia. Hence, we see the partial "deindustrialization" of Slovakia in the interwar period, documented by Mikula in the face of Czech competition and government policy being insensitive to the political impact of such differentials. The divergent economic needs of the two areas set the pattern for longstanding conflict of perceptions of regime benevolence. From Prague, Slovaks appeared consistently ungrateful for the benefits of common statehood; from Bratislava, the perception was frequently of a negligent, even exploitative or colonial economic policy. The Communist priority attached to investment in Slovakia after 1948 did little to realign these perceptions, particularly inasmuch as a Soviet economic model continued to concentrate effective economic decisionmaking power in the center. It is notable that the federal design of 1968 was retrenched in 1970 precisely in the area of economic autonomy. Even more consequential in the long run was the character of communist era investment in Slovakia. Even as it may have narrowed the gap in production as long as the communist state �SLOVAKIA 113 system endured, the pattern of investment was skewed toward the demands of a larger regional communist system (especially with regard to military production.) When that economic system dissolved, so did the benefits to Slovakia, leaving it to suffer disproportionately in unemployment and production declines in the course of the dislocations attendant on remarketization. Deeprooted economic grievances thus resurfaced to reinforce the political case for recognizing Slovak nationhood in maximally decentralized form, as a political means of protecting Slovak interests against the disruptions of the market. Finally, all the essays present a profile of successive political systems in disequilibria with the multinational character of the state, prospectively or in practice. Whether one defines this disequilibrium as a conscious decision by a larger Czech entity to preserve a constitutional structure that preserved maximum control at the center, or whether one defines important ambiguities in the mutual perceptions of the two nations, ambiguities that imposed ideological blinders, the net result is the same: a series of states that functioned without feeling impelled to respond to the unsettled problem of the fit between the common state and the national subgroups that inhabited it. How then are we to understand the disintegration of the state in the course of 1992? At one level, this outcome appears perverse; following the 1992 elections, democratically elected politicians pursued a policy of disconnection despite the absence of public consensus (an anomaly noted by Stanislav Kirschbaum) for independence in either of the two republics. Part of the answer to this conundrum lies in decoding the electoral paradox that led voters to support political parties whose agendas were so clearly destined to clash. On closer inspection, this may be less paradoxical that it first appears. Both Vladimir Meciar's HZDS and Vaclav Klaus's ODC ran on platforms that reiterated a commitment to joint statehood, albeit in very different institutional forms. For voters then, the issue in each republic was not necessarily the continuance of the state, but rather support for the party that seemed to offer the best prospects for pursuing broader, but nonetheless nationally distinct, agendas - in the Czech lands, �114 SLOVAKIA rapid economic transformation - and in Slovakia, a strong defense of Slovak interests that need not in many cases have entailed a desire for separation. What electoral politics cannot reflect then, is the dissonance of views on the character of the state project that lay behind the apparent consensus on continued joint statehood. Since polls show the Czech public aligned on the spectrum of constitutional alternatives toward the unitary or federal end, and Slovaks on the other end tilting toward confederation or separation, it is not unfair to argue that the joint state preferred by Czechs was not in fact the same animal that the Slovak public espoused when expressing preference for a joint state. The election results and postelectoral negotiations, therefore, are not so paradoxical when one thinks about the dissonant concepts of statehood in the two republics. What had occurred was a political deadlock, a deadlock that reflected clear differences in the acceptability of alternative constitutional bargains for both leaders and publics in the two republics. This understanding leads us back to the point that all contributors to this forum have emphasized in different periods, that the Czech-Slovak division ran far deeper than the momentary clash of interests between two headstrong politicians. Differing conceptions of the preferred character of the state were underpinned by a long history of divergent conceptions of the beneficiaries of the state, each nation in fact harboring the perception, also validated in poll data, that the other had gained disproportionately from common statehood. What differentiated 1992 from earlier attempts to resolve the question was, perhaps, not merely the functioning of a democratic system, contigent on electoral outcomes, but rather two additional features of the political context. First, the international environment posed a lesser threat to national survival than earlier in the twentieth century. (Note however, that Slovaks see the Czech lands as vulnerable to German domination, while Czechs warn Slovaks of subordination to the benighted east). Second, for all its dubious relevance under communism, the federal structure of the state inherited by the Velvet Revolution was subsequently infused with institutional meaning through the electoral process. In contrast with the past, Slovaks possessed a constitutional �SLOVAKIA 115 veto in the bicameral federal assembly and could claim an electorally-validated seat at the bargaining table. In fact, no constitutional design could be accepted without the acquiescence of the Slovak government. Contrast this with the vivid, and I think, accurate picture sketched by Susan Mikula of the interwar politics of symbolic Slovak leadership inclusion and practical powerlessness to set the agenda. Given institutional bases that provided leverage for Czech and Slovak negotiators alike, the outcome of the postcommunist negotiations was certain to run a different course than had previous such attempts. It is also the case that the negotiators proceeded from the premise that a renegotiated national settlement was a necessary component of democratization (it was not initially clear that no settlement would be forthcoming). Here it should be noted that the Czech agenda of what came to be called "functional federalism" probably should be recognized as according certain concessions to the Slovak position. The December 1990 provisional agreement and subsequent bargaining did provide for greater decentralization of authority than past institutional arrangements. I am therefore inclined to be more sympathetic than Stanislav Kirschbaum in discerning Czech movement on the question of constitutional reconfiguration. But the crux of the matter is that the final attempted bargain, struck in February 1992, was insufficiently decentralized to pass muster with the Slovak National Council, but at the same time as decentralized a framework as the Czechs were likely to countenance. In this sense, the 1992 electoral outcome only crystalized two years of failure to reach consensus. In some senses, the dissolution of the state in the course of the 1992 negotiations can be regarded as a failure of leadership. If so, the leadership failure in question is not merely that of the endgame period of 1992, but of the full experience of joint statehood, in which two nations coexisted without ever reaching consensus on a common destiny or on the institutional design that would secure such a vision. ��REVIEW ESSAY �� SLOVAKIA 109 Slovak-Czech Relations: An assessment CAROL SKALNIK LEFF An often quoted aphorism in the literature on democratization is the caveat of a British statesman: "The people cannot decide until it is first decided who is the people." In varying forms it is precisely that question that has plagued Czech-Slovak relations over the past century. Although the essays in this forum were organized to survey the Czech-Slovak relationship in historically distinct periods, each analysis sheds light on the concrete manifestations of a persistent failure to reach a consensus on who the "people" are (Czech, Slovak or Czechoslovak citizens), and what institutional framework would be appropriate to orchestrate their decisions. Moreover, each of the essays contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical roots of the Czech-Slovak divorce proceedings of 1992. In these comments, I will try to integrate the periodized analysis of the assessments just offered, and to cull from them patterns in the CzechSlovak relationship that denote a permanent imbalance in perceptions of national identity and national interest, an imbalance that culminated in the abandonment of the joint statehood enterprise. In reviewing the period before the founding of the state, Edita Bosak defines a number of central features of Czech-Slovak relations , all of which establish a context for the tensions that persisted after 1918. Above all, she documents the essentially cultural character of the relationship during the Habsburg period, a focus that is important for two reasons. First, the tensions in that cultural nexus go to the core of the identity problem that would plague the joint �110 SLOVAKIA Czech-Slovak state into the 1990s . The centrality of the language question, from the outset, pointed to the larger issue - on whose terms would Czechs and Slovaks establish a working relationship? Slovak protectiveness regarding language was fundamentally a protection of besieged identity ,67 and Czech laments over the separation of the two languages reflected a failure to take seriously the distinctiveness of two cultures, a failure that would mark subsequent failures to acknowledge distinct Slovak interests in a range of issues from politics and economics to religion. Second, the essentially cultural character of the Czech-Slovak relationship before 1918 points to its converse - the limited political dialogue and collaboration, which Edita Bosak rightly defines as a function of Czech orientation toward the doctrine of historical rights to its ethnically mixed territory, and of the political sensitivity of any challenge to the structure of dualism. The paucity of political interaction meant an ill-constructed foundation for the edifice of joint statehood after 1918, and the carryover of unresolved ambiguities and tensions into the new state. The stakes in the inconclusive debate over identity mounted after independence, as cultural relations perforce became political and constitutional as well. Susan Mikula builds from precisely this important point to trace a pattern of political stasis in the interwar period that essentially excluded reformulation of the position of Slovaks within the state. She gives particularly cogent attention to the operation of a complex parliamentary system, a delicate balancing act dependent less of shifting electoral outcomes than on tight elite coordination and control. Stanislav Kirschbaum traces a consistent pattern of Slovak interests endplayed by Czech dominance of both the state apparatus and of the formulation of stateness itself. Through each of these analyses one can discern patterns that transcend historical eras. The Czech-Slovak relationship, in its sue67 It would have been helpful had Edita Bosak addressed more specifically the Hlasist position on the language issue; even avowed Czechoslovaks were not necessarily "linguistic" Czechoslovaks, and the distinction would contribute to a fuller understanding of the ambiguities of the "Czechoslovak" idea itself, ambiguities that heightened the probability of mutual misunderstanding and suspicion. �SLOVAKIA 111 cessive forms, was fundamentally a pragmatic alliance of small nations, brought together by the exgencies of external forces and constrained by internal structures . External threats to national survival were rooted in a usually hostile international environment, where larger and more powerful political entities were able to define the limits of national sovereignty and also to shape the character of CzechSlovak accommodation. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries , Czechs and Slovaks were hostage to the stabilities and instabilities of the larger continental balance of power, such that their encasement in the Habsburg order was broken only by World War I and postwar "high diplomacy," their joint experiment in statehood was destroyed by Nazi intervention, and the reincarnation of the state after 1945 was defined by Soviet power. In each of these successive periods , broader forces therefore set the parameters for the Czech-Slovak relationship, and it is hardly coincidental that the experiment in statehood fell apart precisely when the international constraints that had long circumscribed political negotiation loosened dramatically. Before 1989, the climate of international threat and coercion had been a decisive factor in setting political boundaries . Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 forged a common state to reinforce their respective boundaries with former German and Hungarian overlords, who survived the dissolution of empire in substantial minorities on Czech and Slovak territory . Tellingly, the consequence of that strategic alliance was not merely, or even accurately, a "joint" state, but rather a centralized state, centralized precisely on the logic of fending off the claims of neighbors and resident minorities. This was an inhospitable environment for the resolution of Czech-Slovak differences , with raison d'Etat presented to foreclose negotiation, particularly after the Hungarian incursion of 1919. Nor was the subsequent crisis of Nazi intervention a favorable climate for a Slovak definition of national interests that Czechs would regard as the betrayal of superior state interests. Finally the defeat of Nazi power left a Slovak state legacy tarnished by its genesis and the reinstatement of Czechoslovakia as the only exit from the opprobrium of association with the Axis camp. The new postwar Czech-Slovak bargain was therefore encumbered by recent history, and further encumbered by a commu- �112 SLOVAKIA nist political schema that infused Pragocentrism with a new layer of ideological meaning. Slovak claims to political definition as people, therefore, were consistently either contaminated by international intervention (as World War II), or immobilized by politics as usual. It must therefore be recognized that a central feature of the Czech-Slovak relationship , the centralist strait jacket that frustrated Slovak attempts to attain institutional recognitionn for Slovak identity, was on balance rationalized by the character of the international context, which provided a series of ready rationales to forestall a mutually acceptable constitutional bargain. Another persistent impediment to consensus was the economic context of the Czech-Slovak relationship, a factor that all the essays incorporate into their assessments with varying emphasis. From the inception of the state in 1918, the economics of national benefit was a source of dissonance between the two nations. Economic policy is never ethnically neutral. It hardly proved so in Czechoslovakia. Differentials in economic development meant that market forces and government economic policy that worked well for the Czech lands were unlikely, uncorrected, to have a similar salutary impact in Slovakia. Hence, we see the partial "deindustrialization" of Slovakia in the interwar period, documented by Mikula in the face of Czech competition and government policy being insensitive to the political impact of such differentials. The divergent economic needs of the two areas set the pattern for longstanding conflict of perceptions of regime benevolence. From Prague, Slovaks appeared consistently ungrateful for the benefits of common statehood; from Bratislava, the perception was frequently of a negligent, even exploitative or colonial economic policy. The Communist priority attached to investment in Slovakia after 1948 did little to realign these perceptions, particularly inasmuch as a Soviet economic model continued to concentrate effective economic decisionmaking power in the center. It is notable that the federal design of 1968 was retrenched in 1970 precisely in the area of economic autonomy. Even more consequential in the long run was the character of communist era investment in Slovakia. Even as it may have narrowed the gap in production as long as the communist state �SLOVAKIA 113 system endured, the pattern of investment was skewed toward the demands of a larger regional communist system (especially with regard to military production.) When that economic system dissolved, so did the benefits to Slovakia, leaving it to suffer disproportionately in unemployment and production declines in the course of the dislocations attendant on remarketization. Deeprooted economic grievances thus resurfaced to reinforce the political case for recognizing Slovak nationhood in maximally decentralized form, as a political means of protecting Slovak interests against the disruptions of the market. Finally, all the essays present a profile of successive political systems in disequilibria with the multinational character of the state, prospectively or in practice. Whether one defines this disequilibrium as a conscious decision by a larger Czech entity to preserve a constitutional structure that preserved maximum control at the center, or whether one defines important ambiguities in the mutual perceptions of the two nations, ambiguities that imposed ideological blinders, the net result is the same: a series of states that functioned without feeling impelled to respond to the unsettled problem of the fit between the common state and the national subgroups that inhabited it. How then are we to understand the disintegration of the state in the course of 1992? At one level, this outcome appears perverse; following the 1992 elections, democratically elected politicians pursued a policy of disconnection despite the absence of public consensus (an anomaly noted by Stanislav Kirschbaum) for independence in either of the two republics. Part of the answer to this conundrum lies in decoding the electoral paradox that led voters to support political parties whose agendas were so clearly destined to clash. On closer inspection, this may be less paradoxical that it first appears. Both Vladimir Meciar's HZDS and Vaclav Klaus's ODC ran on platforms that reiterated a commitment to joint statehood, albeit in very different institutional forms. For voters then, the issue in each republic was not necessarily the continuance of the state, but rather support for the party that seemed to offer the best prospects for pursuing broader, but nonetheless nationally distinct, agendas - in the Czech lands, �114 SLOVAKIA rapid economic transformation - and in Slovakia, a strong defense of Slovak interests that need not in many cases have entailed a desire for separation. What electoral politics cannot reflect then, is the dissonance of views on the character of the state project that lay behind the apparent consensus on continued joint statehood. Since polls show the Czech public aligned on the spectrum of constitutional alternatives toward the unitary or federal end, and Slovaks on the other end tilting toward confederation or separation, it is not unfair to argue that the joint state preferred by Czechs was not in fact the same animal that the Slovak public espoused when expressing preference for a joint state. The election results and postelectoral negotiations, therefore, are not so paradoxical when one thinks about the dissonant concepts of statehood in the two republics. What had occurred was a political deadlock, a deadlock that reflected clear differences in the acceptability of alternative constitutional bargains for both leaders and publics in the two republics. This understanding leads us back to the point that all contributors to this forum have emphasized in different periods, that the Czech-Slovak division ran far deeper than the momentary clash of interests between two headstrong politicians. Differing conceptions of the preferred character of the state were underpinned by a long history of divergent conceptions of the beneficiaries of the state, each nation in fact harboring the perception, also validated in poll data, that the other had gained disproportionately from common statehood. What differentiated 1992 from earlier attempts to resolve the question was, perhaps, not merely the functioning of a democratic system, contigent on electoral outcomes, but rather two additional features of the political context. First, the international environment posed a lesser threat to national survival than earlier in the twentieth century. (Note however, that Slovaks see the Czech lands as vulnerable to German domination, while Czechs warn Slovaks of subordination to the benighted east). Second, for all its dubious relevance under communism, the federal structure of the state inherited by the Velvet Revolution was subsequently infused with institutional meaning through the electoral process. In contrast with the past, Slovaks possessed a constitutional �SLOVAKIA 115 veto in the bicameral federal assembly and could claim an electorally-validated seat at the bargaining table. In fact, no constitutional design could be accepted without the acquiescence of the Slovak government. Contrast this with the vivid, and I think, accurate picture sketched by Susan Mikula of the interwar politics of symbolic Slovak leadership inclusion and practical powerlessness to set the agenda. Given institutional bases that provided leverage for Czech and Slovak negotiators alike, the outcome of the postcommunist negotiations was certain to run a different course than had previous such attempts. It is also the case that the negotiators proceeded from the premise that a renegotiated national settlement was a necessary component of democratization (it was not initially clear that no settlement would be forthcoming). Here it should be noted that the Czech agenda of what came to be called "functional federalism" probably should be recognized as according certain concessions to the Slovak position. The December 1990 provisional agreement and subsequent bargaining did provide for greater decentralization of authority than past institutional arrangements. I am therefore inclined to be more sympathetic than Stanislav Kirschbaum in discerning Czech movement on the question of constitutional reconfiguration. But the crux of the matter is that the final attempted bargain, struck in February 1992, was insufficiently decentralized to pass muster with the Slovak National Council, but at the same time as decentralized a framework as the Czechs were likely to countenance. In this sense, the 1992 electoral outcome only crystalized two years of failure to reach consensus. In some senses, the dissolution of the state in the course of the 1992 negotiations can be regarded as a failure of leadership. If so, the leadership failure in question is not merely that of the endgame period of 1992, but of the full experience of joint statehood, in which two nations coexisted without ever reaching consensus on a common destiny or on the institutional design that would secure such a vision. ��REVIEW ESSAY �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1991-92, Vol. 35 Description An account of the resource Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The Slovak League of America Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available 1991-92 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 109 Slovak-Czech Relations: An assessment CAROL SKALNIK LEFF An often quoted aphorism in the literature on democratization is the caveat of a British statesman: "The people cannot decide until it is first decided who is the people." In varying forms it is precisely that question that has plagued Czech-Slovak relations over the past century. Although the essays in this forum were organized to survey the Czech-Slovak relationship in historically distinct periods, each analysis sheds light on the concrete manifestations of a persistent failure to reach a consensus on who the "people" are (Czech, Slovak or Czechoslovak citizens), and what institutional framework would be appropriate to orchestrate their decisions. Moreover, each of the essays contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical roots of the Czech-Slovak divorce proceedings of 1992. In these comments, I will try to integrate the periodized analysis of the assessments just offered, and to cull from them patterns in the CzechSlovak relationship that denote a permanent imbalance in perceptions of national identity and national interest, an imbalance that culminated in the abandonment of the joint statehood enterprise. In reviewing the period before the founding of the state, Edita Bosak defines a number of central features of Czech-Slovak relations , all of which establish a context for the tensions that persisted after 1918. Above all, she documents the essentially cultural character of the relationship during the Habsburg period, a focus that is important for two reasons. First, the tensions in that cultural nexus go to the core of the identity problem that would plague the joint 110 SLOVAKIA Czech-Slovak state into the 1990s . The centrality of the language question, from the outset, pointed to the larger issue - on whose terms would Czechs and Slovaks establish a working relationship? Slovak protectiveness regarding language was fundamentally a protection of besieged identity ,67 and Czech laments over the separation of the two languages reflected a failure to take seriously the distinctiveness of two cultures, a failure that would mark subsequent failures to acknowledge distinct Slovak interests in a range of issues from politics and economics to religion. Second, the essentially cultural character of the Czech-Slovak relationship before 1918 points to its converse - the limited political dialogue and collaboration, which Edita Bosak rightly defines as a function of Czech orientation toward the doctrine of historical rights to its ethnically mixed territory, and of the political sensitivity of any challenge to the structure of dualism. The paucity of political interaction meant an ill-constructed foundation for the edifice of joint statehood after 1918, and the carryover of unresolved ambiguities and tensions into the new state. The stakes in the inconclusive debate over identity mounted after independence, as cultural relations perforce became political and constitutional as well. Susan Mikula builds from precisely this important point to trace a pattern of political stasis in the interwar period that essentially excluded reformulation of the position of Slovaks within the state. She gives particularly cogent attention to the operation of a complex parliamentary system, a delicate balancing act dependent less of shifting electoral outcomes than on tight elite coordination and control. Stanislav Kirschbaum traces a consistent pattern of Slovak interests endplayed by Czech dominance of both the state apparatus and of the formulation of stateness itself. Through each of these analyses one can discern patterns that transcend historical eras. The Czech-Slovak relationship, in its sue67 It would have been helpful had Edita Bosak addressed more specifically the Hlasist position on the language issue; even avowed Czechoslovaks were not necessarily "linguistic" Czechoslovaks, and the distinction would contribute to a fuller understanding of the ambiguities of the "Czechoslovak" idea itself, ambiguities that heightened the probability of mutual misunderstanding and suspicion. SLOVAKIA 111 cessive forms, was fundamentally a pragmatic alliance of small nations, brought together by the exgencies of external forces and constrained by internal structures . External threats to national survival were rooted in a usually hostile international environment, where larger and more powerful political entities were able to define the limits of national sovereignty and also to shape the character of CzechSlovak accommodation. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries , Czechs and Slovaks were hostage to the stabilities and instabilities of the larger continental balance of power, such that their encasement in the Habsburg order was broken only by World War I and postwar "high diplomacy," their joint experiment in statehood was destroyed by Nazi intervention, and the reincarnation of the state after 1945 was defined by Soviet power. In each of these successive periods , broader forces therefore set the parameters for the Czech-Slovak relationship, and it is hardly coincidental that the experiment in statehood fell apart precisely when the international constraints that had long circumscribed political negotiation loosened dramatically. Before 1989, the climate of international threat and coercion had been a decisive factor in setting political boundaries . Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 forged a common state to reinforce their respective boundaries with former German and Hungarian overlords, who survived the dissolution of empire in substantial minorities on Czech and Slovak territory . Tellingly, the consequence of that strategic alliance was not merely, or even accurately, a "joint" state, but rather a centralized state, centralized precisely on the logic of fending off the claims of neighbors and resident minorities. This was an inhospitable environment for the resolution of Czech-Slovak differences , with raison d'Etat presented to foreclose negotiation, particularly after the Hungarian incursion of 1919. Nor was the subsequent crisis of Nazi intervention a favorable climate for a Slovak definition of national interests that Czechs would regard as the betrayal of superior state interests. Finally the defeat of Nazi power left a Slovak state legacy tarnished by its genesis and the reinstatement of Czechoslovakia as the only exit from the opprobrium of association with the Axis camp. The new postwar Czech-Slovak bargain was therefore encumbered by recent history, and further encumbered by a commu- 112 SLOVAKIA nist political schema that infused Pragocentrism with a new layer of ideological meaning. Slovak claims to political definition as people, therefore, were consistently either contaminated by international intervention (as World War II), or immobilized by politics as usual. It must therefore be recognized that a central feature of the Czech-Slovak relationship , the centralist strait jacket that frustrated Slovak attempts to attain institutional recognitionn for Slovak identity, was on balance rationalized by the character of the international context, which provided a series of ready rationales to forestall a mutually acceptable constitutional bargain. Another persistent impediment to consensus was the economic context of the Czech-Slovak relationship, a factor that all the essays incorporate into their assessments with varying emphasis. From the inception of the state in 1918, the economics of national benefit was a source of dissonance between the two nations. Economic policy is never ethnically neutral. It hardly proved so in Czechoslovakia. Differentials in economic development meant that market forces and government economic policy that worked well for the Czech lands were unlikely, uncorrected, to have a similar salutary impact in Slovakia. Hence, we see the partial "deindustrialization" of Slovakia in the interwar period, documented by Mikula in the face of Czech competition and government policy being insensitive to the political impact of such differentials. The divergent economic needs of the two areas set the pattern for longstanding conflict of perceptions of regime benevolence. From Prague, Slovaks appeared consistently ungrateful for the benefits of common statehood; from Bratislava, the perception was frequently of a negligent, even exploitative or colonial economic policy. The Communist priority attached to investment in Slovakia after 1948 did little to realign these perceptions, particularly inasmuch as a Soviet economic model continued to concentrate effective economic decisionmaking power in the center. It is notable that the federal design of 1968 was retrenched in 1970 precisely in the area of economic autonomy. Even more consequential in the long run was the character of communist era investment in Slovakia. Even as it may have narrowed the gap in production as long as the communist state SLOVAKIA 113 system endured, the pattern of investment was skewed toward the demands of a larger regional communist system (especially with regard to military production.) When that economic system dissolved, so did the benefits to Slovakia, leaving it to suffer disproportionately in unemployment and production declines in the course of the dislocations attendant on remarketization. Deeprooted economic grievances thus resurfaced to reinforce the political case for recognizing Slovak nationhood in maximally decentralized form, as a political means of protecting Slovak interests against the disruptions of the market. Finally, all the essays present a profile of successive political systems in disequilibria with the multinational character of the state, prospectively or in practice. Whether one defines this disequilibrium as a conscious decision by a larger Czech entity to preserve a constitutional structure that preserved maximum control at the center, or whether one defines important ambiguities in the mutual perceptions of the two nations, ambiguities that imposed ideological blinders, the net result is the same: a series of states that functioned without feeling impelled to respond to the unsettled problem of the fit between the common state and the national subgroups that inhabited it. How then are we to understand the disintegration of the state in the course of 1992? At one level, this outcome appears perverse; following the 1992 elections, democratically elected politicians pursued a policy of disconnection despite the absence of public consensus (an anomaly noted by Stanislav Kirschbaum) for independence in either of the two republics. Part of the answer to this conundrum lies in decoding the electoral paradox that led voters to support political parties whose agendas were so clearly destined to clash. On closer inspection, this may be less paradoxical that it first appears. Both Vladimir Meciar's HZDS and Vaclav Klaus's ODC ran on platforms that reiterated a commitment to joint statehood, albeit in very different institutional forms. For voters then, the issue in each republic was not necessarily the continuance of the state, but rather support for the party that seemed to offer the best prospects for pursuing broader, but nonetheless nationally distinct, agendas - in the Czech lands, 114 SLOVAKIA rapid economic transformation - and in Slovakia, a strong defense of Slovak interests that need not in many cases have entailed a desire for separation. What electoral politics cannot reflect then, is the dissonance of views on the character of the state project that lay behind the apparent consensus on continued joint statehood. Since polls show the Czech public aligned on the spectrum of constitutional alternatives toward the unitary or federal end, and Slovaks on the other end tilting toward confederation or separation, it is not unfair to argue that the joint state preferred by Czechs was not in fact the same animal that the Slovak public espoused when expressing preference for a joint state. The election results and postelectoral negotiations, therefore, are not so paradoxical when one thinks about the dissonant concepts of statehood in the two republics. What had occurred was a political deadlock, a deadlock that reflected clear differences in the acceptability of alternative constitutional bargains for both leaders and publics in the two republics. This understanding leads us back to the point that all contributors to this forum have emphasized in different periods, that the Czech-Slovak division ran far deeper than the momentary clash of interests between two headstrong politicians. Differing conceptions of the preferred character of the state were underpinned by a long history of divergent conceptions of the beneficiaries of the state, each nation in fact harboring the perception, also validated in poll data, that the other had gained disproportionately from common statehood. What differentiated 1992 from earlier attempts to resolve the question was, perhaps, not merely the functioning of a democratic system, contigent on electoral outcomes, but rather two additional features of the political context. First, the international environment posed a lesser threat to national survival than earlier in the twentieth century. (Note however, that Slovaks see the Czech lands as vulnerable to German domination, while Czechs warn Slovaks of subordination to the benighted east). Second, for all its dubious relevance under communism, the federal structure of the state inherited by the Velvet Revolution was subsequently infused with institutional meaning through the electoral process. In contrast with the past, Slovaks possessed a constitutional SLOVAKIA 115 veto in the bicameral federal assembly and could claim an electorally-validated seat at the bargaining table. In fact, no constitutional design could be accepted without the acquiescence of the Slovak government. Contrast this with the vivid, and I think, accurate picture sketched by Susan Mikula of the interwar politics of symbolic Slovak leadership inclusion and practical powerlessness to set the agenda. Given institutional bases that provided leverage for Czech and Slovak negotiators alike, the outcome of the postcommunist negotiations was certain to run a different course than had previous such attempts. It is also the case that the negotiators proceeded from the premise that a renegotiated national settlement was a necessary component of democratization (it was not initially clear that no settlement would be forthcoming). Here it should be noted that the Czech agenda of what came to be called "functional federalism" probably should be recognized as according certain concessions to the Slovak position. The December 1990 provisional agreement and subsequent bargaining did provide for greater decentralization of authority than past institutional arrangements. I am therefore inclined to be more sympathetic than Stanislav Kirschbaum in discerning Czech movement on the question of constitutional reconfiguration. But the crux of the matter is that the final attempted bargain, struck in February 1992, was insufficiently decentralized to pass muster with the Slovak National Council, but at the same time as decentralized a framework as the Czechs were likely to countenance. In this sense, the 1992 electoral outcome only crystalized two years of failure to reach consensus. In some senses, the dissolution of the state in the course of the 1992 negotiations can be regarded as a failure of leadership. If so, the leadership failure in question is not merely that of the endgame period of 1992, but of the full experience of joint statehood, in which two nations coexisted without ever reaching consensus on a common destiny or on the institutional design that would secure such a vision. REVIEW ESSAY  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak-Czech Relations: An Assessment Description An account of the resource Carol Skalnik Leff Slovakia, Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92 pp. 109-115 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Leff, Carol Skalnik, 1947- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991-92 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9b964b756148f0d55292194851d3aff0.pdf 63a27c69236b127e82f6d929b6bdf47f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 145 HUNGARIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA: UNDER FICO, AFTER EU ACCESSION Carol Skalnik Leff Many scholars of European integration have shown keen interest in the behavior of new members after the pressures of "conditionality" have been lifted, and the political and policy constraints of qualifying for membership have abated. The 2006 election in Slovakia, won by Robert Fico's SMER, was the first contested after Slovakia's EU accession, and offers a useful case study of one of the EU's desiderata- the treatment of ethnic minorities. In this article, I analyze the Fico era's impact on the minority rights agenda by focusing on two points. The first is the Fico government's record in the sphere of minority politics and policy. The second, and in some respects potentially more consequential, is the way the Slovak party system' s identity politics dimension was reconfigured during his term of office. I contextualize this analysis by noting the Fico government's positioning in the evolution of the "two-level game" on minority rights issues played out under successive Slovak governments with the European Union. During the pre-accession period, external pressures to conform to European concerns seemed less important for Slovak responsiveness than the composition of the government in power. The postaccession period analyzed here seems to follow the same pattern, with the Fico government relatively resistant to external initiatives and the successor Radicova government more aligned with EU norms and expectations. The Context: 2006 witnessed the first Slovak elections following the country's accession to the European Union. Slovakia's two previous national elections had been fought in the shadow of EU membership prospects. Both the 1998 and 2002 elections immediately preceded critical moments in the accession process- the choice of candidate states in 1998 and the final decisions on membership invitations in 2002. Karen Henderson made the point most strongly: "While it has been argued that referendums sometimes fulfill the function of second �146 SLOVAKIA order national elections ... Slovakia had twice experienced something approaching the reverse: national elections, in 1998 and 2002 , that were in part referendums about whether Slovakia should join the EU ." 1 Given the strength of pro-integration sentiment, which was rising toward the eightieth percentiles by the late 1990s, I would rephrase this formulation to suggest that the referendum quality of these elections consisted of the question of whether Slovakia would be able to join the EU, or which party could best deliver on membership. As Henderson noted, "the vital question was not whether [Slovaks] wanted the EU, but whether the EU wanted them." 2 In 1998 Vladimir Meciar lost the election and hence the key impediment to EU acceptance of Slovakia was removed. The 2002 results secured the conditions for a final push.3 The two right-of-center coalition governments under SDKU leader Mikulas Dzurinda that served from 1998 to 2006 strove, successfully, to cement Slovakia's case for inclusion in the 2004 EU enlargement. Tactically, one of the centerpiece components of that effort was the inclusion of the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK) in both governments. The alignment strategy to please Europe in the case is quite evident, and noticeable in Romania and Bulgaria as well; for the EU, ethnic minority parties were the preferred coalition partners, and radical nationalist participation a source of EU concern . Lacking its own minority rights acquis at the collapse of Com4 munism, the European Union's expectations about respect for minority rights protection was often ad hoc, and rested on the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 rather than on developed community law. 1 Karen Henderson, " EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus," West European Politics 27:4 (September, 2004), 653 . 2 Henderson, 656. 3 By 2002, the incumbent government urged voters to let it "fini sh what we started" and take that last "one more step (one last step is needed to the EU and NA TO... with us you' ll make it). The SDKU, in its famous peaceable kingdom billboard (a cat and dog entwined together) reminded voters that the party had managed to maintain a fract ious coalition : "Thanks to that, we are on the threshold of NATO and the EU." 4 The European Union was still the European Economic Communities in 1989, but for simplicity 's sake, I will refer to the "European Union" throughout. For a critique of the EU's minority rights conditionality, see Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionali ty: Minority Ri ghts in Slovakia," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe I (2003), 20-29. �SLOVAKIA 147 However, all states with substantial minorities were well aware that minority treatment by the government was under scrutiny; hence, the elevation of the SMK to a coalition partner was accompanied by policy adjustments in the eroded minority rights regime of the Meciar period. The 2006 elections that brought Fico to power, however, occurred in a very different international strategic context, one in which Slovakia's European fate no longer depended on electoral outcomes and government composition. "We got you into Europe" lacked the resonance of SDKU's (Slovak Christian Democratic Party) 2002 appeal "You need us to get into Europe." 5 However, the economy that had earned Slovakia the epithet "Tatra Tiger" had not benefited all; Slovakia's unemployment rate of 15% in 2006 was one of the highest in Europe (and that was an improvement over the peak of 19% in 2000-2002). Small wonder, then, that Robert Fico 's populist critique of the reform era found powerful electoral resonance in 2006. His new government, however constituted, would face different international and domestic constraints than had been true for the previous decade. For the purpose of this analysis, the most salient point is that the externally-induced incentives for minority inclusion, and for adherence to minority-tolerant policies, were less pronounced than in the past. One thing, however, remained constant. It was generally impossible to form a majority coalition without including one of the two key parties aligned on the identity dimension of the party system: either the SMK or the Slovak National Party (SNS). 6 The choice between them had been definitive for the tenor of the government's minority relations policy after past elections. The question wasn't simply, therefore, whether the SMK was in or out, but rather that its exclusion likely meant the inclusion of the SNS. SMER's leadership chose the latter option (a choice that will be discussed below), with 5 In 2002, the incumbent anti- Meciar parties urged voters to let them "finish what we started" and take that last "one more step." (the billboard message: one last step is needed to the EU and NATO ... with us you'll make it). 6 In 1998, the inclusion of the SMK produced an over-sized coalition . SMK was not necessary for a parliamentary majority. It was, however, necessary, for agenda control and constitutional change, including the transition to a directly elected presidency that was virtually the first order of business of the Dzurinda government that formed the coalition. �148 SLOVAKIA consequences that shaped the minority rights agenda for the Fico government. Minority Policy Dimensions of the Fico Government: Policy relevant to minorities in Slovakia has followed the trajectory of government change. Meciar's second and third governments in the l 990 's had ruled with the support of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and pursued minority-relevant policies that evoked European criticism, either because of overt actions (language and education laws) or omissions (the failure to pass a minority-language law to clarify and codify the language rights of non-Slovaks). By contrast, the three right-of-center governments, led by Jozef Moravcik and twice by Dzurinda, ruled with the support of the Hungarian minority coalition and proved responsive to the European push for stronger minority protections. The coalition pattern continued under Fico and his successor lveta Radicova, with Fico's left-of-center government incorporating the SNS and Radicova's right-of-center coalition including the new Hungarian-Slovak Most-Hid formation (Note that Slovakia's predictable pattern of coalition alliances is by no means characteristic: in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia-the three other East and Central European countries with established and governmentally salient minority parties- both right-and left-of-center governments have ruled with minority party support. In Slovakia, the SMK has not changed sides). Policy initiatives cannot fully capture the almost immediate change of tone in Hungarian-Slovak relations, marked by patriotic football hooliganism and the virulent controversy over the Malina/ Malinova affair.7 The core of Fico' s minority policy-making, however, was a re-balancing toward Slovak language rights in uradny (official) communication, and correspondingly greater ambiguity about the security of minority language rights. The first controversy emerged over the potentially restrictive impact of the 2008 amendments 7 Hedvig Malina was a Hungarian student in Nitra who in 2006 reported to the police that she had been assaulted for speaking Hungarian in public. The complaint generated a mini-Dreyfus affa ir, with one' s political orientation determining whether or not to give credence to her claims. The government ultimately sided against her, and lodged perjury charges. The Fico government charged Hungary with unacceptable interference in the case. See also "Slovakia and Hungary: Trouble in Felvidek," Transitions Online, September 5, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 149 to the education law regarding Hungarian language education. In the spring of 2009, the focus was on Hungarian language textbooks, with the government seeking to supplant minority-produced course materials with translations of Slovak texts. This was accompanied by a protracted disagreement about the rendering of Slovak place names. For example, the government wanted the Danube river in Slovak (Dunaj) rather than Hungarian (Duna), even in Hungarian texts. The compromise, reached in February of 2009, appears to allow the previous practice of using "deep-rooted" geographical place names in Hungarian with the Slovak names in parentheses. Additional concern was generated by the restriction of Hungarian minority Radio Patria broadcasts to short wave transmitters that did not reach Bratislava or eastern Slovakia.8 The Language Law But the most internationally visible and resonant initiative was a revisiting of the language laws of the 1990s, as amended in 1999 under the Dzurinda government. As Martin Votruba has pointed out, a major thrust of the 1999 amendment (Act on the Use of Minority Language) had been to remove the penalties (fines) that Meciar's government had enacted for violations of the 1995 law establishing the primacy of the Slovak language. 9 Hastily drafted to meet EU expectations and, therefore, imprecise in some passages, the 1999 amendment did establish rights to the use of minority language in official communications.10 In response to the status quo, the coalition program of the Fico government in 2006 included commitments to safeguard the state language and in particular the "promotion of Slovak culture in the mixed regions ." Legislation fulfilling this pledge by privileging the use of the Slovak language in official communications passed in 8 See Kata Eplenyi, "The Language Rights of Hungarian Communities in Slovakia and Romania: The Impacts and Perspectives of EU-Membership," Masters Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Nationalism Studies Program, 2009. 9 Votruba 's analysis of the provisions of the law is the most comprehensive I have found. Martin Votruba, "The Uncommon Language: Bratislava, Budapest, and Brussels," Slovak Studies Association Newsletter, volume 33 (2009). See also Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gal, "The New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics?" ECMI Working paper #8, September 2000. http ://www.ecmi.de/download/working paper 8.pdf. 10 Eplenyi, "Language Rights. " �150 SLOVAKIA 2009, and provoked an immediate storm of international protest, largely centered on the hefty penalties (up to 5,000 euros) that could be imposed for violations. Media commentary tended to paint the legislation with a broad brush, whether in praise or blame, and thus to obfuscate the actual provisions. It would appear for example, that vivid scenarios of fines for an ethnically Hungarian patient speaking the native tongue to his ethnically Hungarian doctor in Hungarian are inapt, since the government maintained that only legal entities and not individuals were slated to be fined for violations . 11 Nor were the frequently invoked foreign-language church services under threat. However, in protecting Slovak language use, the law clearly appeared to have a chilling effect on minority language rights, and aroused vehement criticism from both the Hungarian minority and from neighboring Hungary, as well as from critics in the European Parliament. For its part, the government tended to make somewhat misleading claims about international approval (a familiar pattern in the Meciar years as well) . Emblematic of suspicion about those claims was the opposition demand that the OSCE advisory opinion on the law be published in full , without abridgement. A slightly exasperated Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, visited Slovakia by invitation during the controversy, and chastised both sides for exaggerating the OSCE position. He reiterated the OSCE conclusion that the law met international standards, but added "that doesn't mean that I necessarily think it's a good law;" he said that the High Commission would like to see the fines omitted from the legislation, and warned that the normative validity of some provisions would depend on their implementation. 12 The ongoing engagement of external arbiters was evident in this contra11 Nonetheless, the successor Radicova government introduced legislation in September of 2010 to lower fines and to explicitly lift their imposition on individuals except where citizen safety and property ri ghts were in question, to permit nonSlovak records in minority schools, and to exempt transport, communications and postal employees. Catherine McNally, "Are Relations between Hungary and Slovakia beginning to thaw?" CS!S, October 5, 2010, http ://csis.org. 12 OSCE Envoy Proffers 'Advice' On Language Law, European Dialogue, September 30, 2009, http://eurodialogue.org/osce/OSCE-Envoy-Proffers-Advice-On-Language-Law; Zuzana Vaskova, "Slovakia's Controversial Language Law," EU Reporter, September 28, 2009, http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/slovakias-controversial-language-law. �SLOVAKIA 151 versy, although Slovakia was no longer constrained by mandatory monitoring. A second feature of policy during the Fico administration was an exchange of symbolic and substantive rebuffs between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, implicitly or usually explicitly targeting the issue of loyalties to state or nation. An official state visit between Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, the first such in eight years, was cancelled after the language law controversy . 13 Another unfortunate incident surrounded the unveiling of a statue of St. Stephen in the city of Komarno in August of 2009. Hungary's president Laszlo S6lyom planned to attend this event as a private citizen, but was stopped from crossing the bridge between Hungary and Slovakia after a diplomatic exchange confirmed that he would not be permitted to enter Slovakia for this purpose. The Slovak government considered this event a provocation, noting that no high Slovak official had been invited to the unveiling. In July of 2010, the newly-installed nationalist FIDESZ government in Hungary further roiled the waters by taking the incident to the European Court of Justice. (Ex-president S6lyom returned to lay a wreath at the statue without incident in August of 2010). 14 The most sensitive development in Slovak-Hungarian relations occurred in the interval between the April Hungarian elections of 2010 and the June Slovak elections. A few days after its installation, the FIDESZ government, led by Viktor Orban, lobbed a political grenade into the Slovak election campaign by approving a new law on dual citizenship. By a crushing vote of 344-3 with five abstentions, the Hungarian parliament sanctioned measures that would allow ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship as of January, 2011 even without the intention of residing in Hungary (they would not have voting rights in Hungary itself) . The Fico government recalled its ambassador from Budapest, called a session of the security council, and retaliated with legislation forfeiting Slovak citizenship 13 Lubos Palata "Slovak Language Law: Slap in the Face," Transitions Online, July 13, 2009. http :ijwww.ceeo1 .com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=f3bblacd-4a304701-9d6f-6889e003d4bc&articleld=3fa741b5-2f9f-4663-9824-a43e09e 7fe4b. 14 "Mad'arsky exprezident S6lyom presiel do Komama bez problemov," SME, August 22, 2010. �152 SLOVAKIA to those taking additional Hungarian citizenship. 15 Orban 's somewhat baffling timing would appear likely to damage the electoral prospects of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and to bolster Slovak nationalist voting. The European community could only watch ineffectively, urge a negotiated settlement to the question, and ponder what citizenship norms might be appropriate to cross-border minorities. 16 Overall, the Fico government's minority rights initiatives bear a pronounced resemblance to those of the Meciar era, the last time the SNS was in government and the governmental orientation stressed the risks to Slovak identity of a multi-ethnic state. As in the case of the Meciar governments, external concerns seemed largely ineffectual in modifying the course of policy-making or ameliorating relations with Hungary. The policy-making dynamics, however, are less complex than the partisan political dynamics, to which I now tum. The Fico Government and Its Impact on the Identity Dimension of the Party System. Although minority relations may appear to be only a delimited segment of the larger political picture, in two important respects they were arguably central to Fico's governance because of the impact they have had on coalition formation in 2006 and 2010 and on coalition politics in between. Indeed, Fico 's government notably shaped the party system itself, but not only in terms of its national identity dimension. In both respects the impact had international ramifications. I now want to focus on this larger picture. 15 Previous Slovak law allowed for dual citizenship, but with certain provisions that could be adapted to bar dual citizenship in this particular instance. See Dagmar Kusa, "The Slovak Question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship during the Quest for National Self-Determination and after," in Rainer Baubock, Bernhard Perching and Wiebke Sievers, eds ., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), 275-303. Note that Romania remained silent over Orban 's move, although it equally affected Romania' s large Hungarian minority. The Romanian government had previously used Orban 's ploy in extending citizenship rights to ethnically Romanian Moldovans in 2009, and so could hardly complain about a similar law in Hungary. See Slovak Sfectator, August 10, 2010. 1 See for example, Rainer Baubock, ed., "Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to Respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat," EU Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/75 (2010, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy). �SLOVAKIA 153 Government formation in post-communist states has consistently proved challenging, although the challenges have varied systematically from state to state. A common thread through most of the postcommunist era to date, however, has been the Euro-relevance of coalition choices. In the 2002 election campaign, SMER's inaugural effort, Fico refused to name preferred coalition partners or to rule out the HZDS (although he emphatically rejected a cabinet shared with either Meciar or Dzurinda, leaders he styled as representative of an 17 old, corrupt generation). Some analysts have plausibly suggested that his failure to exclude the HZDS raised voter doubts about a Fico-led government's capacity to complete the EU integration project and helped to account for his last minute sag in the polls. 18 The coalition formation process after the 2006 elections was undoubtedly critical to the subsequent pattern of party system dynamics in ways I will investigate below. Frontrunner Fico had promised a coalition that Europe could approve. In the late stages of the campaign, some analysts dismissed the possibility of a SMER-HZDSSNS coalition (including two political formations most unpopular in Europe because of their perceived demagogic, authoritarian and nationalist leadership) as a product of incumbent Dzurinda's fear-mongering. SMER derided this as a bogey-man. Fico characterized the coalition as a "specter" created by Dzurinda. 19 SMER's Vice President Robert Kalinak told reporters , "Smer will not be part of any government that is not internationally accepted, and I think that's a pretty clear statement that you can deduce all kinds of things from." 20 .... But apparently not the coalition that actually emerged in 2006. In the event, the "worst case scenario" was not merely a scare tactic. The victorious Smer did indeed invite the HZDS and the SNS into a coalition, albeit explicitly without either of their leaders, in cabinet positions. And Fico assured the public, at home and abroad, that the presence of the SNS in government did not dilute existing commitments to minority and human rights, again signaling that minority parties were not pariahs . The Bratislava daily Novy cas dub17 Fico was born in 1964, Dzurinda in 1955 and Meciar in 1942. Tim Haughton, "We Will finish What We've Started: The 2002 Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4 (December, 2003), 65-90. 19 Transitions Online, June 19, 2006; TASR, June 12, 2006. 20 Interview with Robert Kalinak, Slovak Spectator, June 12, 2006. 18 �154 SLOVAKIA bed this the "you can't be serious" coalition-and it prompted an immediate external response. The European Union cannot dictate who is eligible to govern a member state. This issue was clarified with the case of Austria, a neutral state that joined the EU in 1995, once membership ceased to be associated with the divisions of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, the use of conditionality after accession to membership received a major setback. In 2000, Austria breached a long-standing but informal West European consensus against the inclusion of the radical right in democratic governments- a so-called "cordon sanitaire" against extremist parties--when Austria's Christian Democrats accepted Jorg Haider and his Freedom Party as junior coalition partners. Appalled that a party led by a man who attended SS reunions was included in a member government, the EU created an impromptu and awkward state of "diplomatic isolation" that proved largely counterproductive, and embarrassing in its implication that the European Union, riddled with its own democratic deficits, had the right to judge the democratically elected governments of its members. The EU backed down after seven months.21 If the EU wouldn't act, the European party formation in which SMER was an observing member- the Party of European Socialists (PES)--was not similarly constrained, although ultimately equally ineffectual. PES publicly expressed "concern and deep misgivings" over Fico's coalition choices, as well as "shock" and "deep disgust," for good measure. Club deputy chair Johannes Swoboda expressed doubt that such a government could uphold European values; 22 and the Belgian socialist MEP asked "Don't you feel ashamed as a social 21 EU concern persists. The long-term legacy of the abortive effort to assert European values in the Austrian case, and to provide for response to future democratic deviations is Article 7 of both the Nice Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a so-called "emergency brake," a decision-making mechanism to impose sanctions on member states that manifest a "serious breach" of European values specified in the treaty under Article 2. Approving the Lisbon Treaty thus does provide a new conditionality mechanism; it remains to be seen how badly it is needed and whether it will have any practical utility. See http ://register.consilium.europa.eu/gdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf 2 "Evropsti socialiste znepokojeni vznikajici koalici na Slovensku," CTK, June 29, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 155 democrat of forming a coalition with a party known for its xenophobia?"23 In October 2006, PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced: The PES resolution refers specifically to the Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states "all PES parties adhere to the following principles .. . to refrain from any form ofpolitical alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred. " 24 Only in 2008 was SMER 'S membership application conditionally reinstated after both SMER and SNS submitted letters confirming their commitment to minority rights, a largely declarative gesture. But this so-called "nightmare coalition" with the HZDS and SNS was not inevitable. The contrasting case of Bulgaria is instructive. The victorious Borisov party in 2009 ruled out a coalition with the Turkish minority MRF during the election campaign as part of the incumbent government he attacked. Like Fico, candidate Borisov employed a populist discourse-what Pop-Eleches would call the new centrist populism 25- and an appeal that, while taking pot shots at minorities, was not radically nationalist. His "outsider" strategy, however, dictated a rejection of all the status quo parties, and particularly the incumbents. Fico, on the other hand, although not loath to criticize minorities, had moderated his populist appeals and reoriented to social democracy by the 2006 election. 26 Fico gave serious consideration to a KDH/MKP coalition, but could not get agreement on it-Miroslav Kusy notes that the KDH leadership was badly and bitterly split on the possibility, with some insisting on a set of moral issues (such as ban23 24 25 Slovak Spectator, September 11 , 2006. http ://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family. Pop-Eleches, "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism," World Politics 62 (2010), 221-60. 26 See Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia," Politics and Policy 37:4 (2009), 82 1-41 . �156 SLOVAKIA ning same-sex marriage and contraception); KDH deliberations were so protracted that Fico ultimately gave up. 27 KDH's hesitation was the mostly widely cited reason for the sinking of the alternative SMER-SMK-KDH coalition, both by media and coalition partners. 28 Despite the programmatic dissonances with SMER, such an alignment had the attraction for KDH and SMK of averting the coalition that did in fact emerge. In any case, Fico is a clever politician, and he realized that the SNS and HZDS would be easier to undercut. Fico could and did steal some of the SNS political clothes and a bit of its electorate by annexing the nationalist issue-a kind of electoral poaching that would have been impossible against the KDH and SMK--and in Meciar's HZDS he had an aging and politically dying junior partner. Fico is also something of a control freak- he immediately sidelined Monika Flasikova-Benova, a public critic of his coalition choice, at the next party congress by stripping her and others of leadership roles-(he was also canny in avoiding the appointment of too many MPs as ministers, who if discarded, might return to parliament and defect from the party). His final coalition choices therefore, would be more malleable, provided he could manage the public response, in particular, to SNS outbursts. In the new government, Meciar's party alarmingly claimed the Justice portfolio. SNS portfolios included Agriculture, Regional Development and Education, all highly salient policy domains for minorities. Agriculture and Regional Development, previously held by SMK, are germane to economic conditions in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia, which are generally more rural and less developed than the north or west. And putting education policy in the hands of SNS raised concerns that minority issues would get short shrift. 27 Miroslav Kusy, "Catastrophic Scenario in Bratislava," The Analyst: Central and Eastern European Review 2 (2006), 37. The KDH division was so pronounced as to cause a leadership crisis and resignations from the party leadership in its aftermath. 28 See for example the comments by Ivan Miklos in Hospodtirske noviny, June 29, 2006: "The European Peoples Party won't understand very well, how it is possible that these three EPP member parties weren't able to reach agreement. In this sense, I think that the responsibility for this situation lies especially on the KDH. " In this case, Miklos blamed the KDH for balking at bringing the HZDS into a SDKUKDH-SMK coalition. �SLOVAKIA 157 Two related effects of this government's tenure on party system dynamics are worth noting. At the majority nationalist end of the identity continuum, one can visualize Fico as a political vampire, draining his coalition partners of standing and voters. Fico preempted the national issue from his more volatile and extremist coalition colleague, Jan Slota of the SNS, by challenging the national sentiment of historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, as well as of the media, both of whom he accused of exhibiting "un-Slovak" tendencies. Fico proclaimed 2008 as the "Year of the Slovak Nation." He re-constructed pre-national history with a claim on the Great Moravian Empire having consisted of "ancient Slovaks"29 and commissioned a statue of warrior King (Prince) Svatopluk for the Bratislava Castle courtyard-an equestrian monument installed just before the elections in 2010 amid great controversy about the historicity of the claims made about his ethnicity, the Byzantine cross on his shield, and even whether he was actually a king.30 From the outset, Fico tended to overlook rather than to chastise the SNS and its incendiary leader. He was content to let Slota's outrageous statements pillory his own credibility. A case in point: Slota apparently sought to launch his party's electoral campaign in early 2010 with the pronouncement that Hungary was planning a military 31 invasion of Slovakia to revise the Treaty of Trianon. Fico did chastise the spectacular SNS corruption in office. Both in the 1990s and in the Fico government, the SNS has been noted for ministerial corruption. The SNS held two portfolios-Construction and Regional development and Environment--in the Fico government, in addition to a deputy prime-ministership. Both incumbents at Construction and Regional Development were dismissed in quick succession over the so-called "Bulletin-Board" tender, in which public procurement procedures were violated in favor of an in-house 29 "Fico's Revisionist History," Transitions Online, February 29, 2008. ° Fico expressed the hope that the statue would become a national pilgrimage site, 3 but the statue immediately became politicized as the extremist group "Our Slovakia" came to its rescue (a commission on its dissolution has been formed) without an assembly permit. As of November 2010, the party's website has youtube video of riot police blocking the pilgrimage. Meanwhile, anti-racist groups mobilized to challenge the party. Fico also appropriated the 18 th century social bandit Jano~ik as a Social Democrat. 31 The Slovak Spectator, March 24, 2010. �158 SLOVAKIA process that awarded contracts to two firms with close ties to the SNS leader Jan Slota. SNS Environment Minister Jaroslav Izak, who was asked to resign for his ministry's mishandling of EU environmental funds , was followed by Jan Chrbet, whose forced resignation was triggered by a scandal surrounding the awarding of carbon emissions contracts on terms unfavorable to the government. When his successor from the SNS, Viliam Tursky, was also removed for murky contract awards, Prime Minister Fico announced that it was time to take the environmental portfolio away from the SNS.32 (Startlingly, Slota demanded the human and minority rights portfolio in exchange for the lost environmental slot.) Hence, by the end of his term in office, Fico had succeeded not only in pre-empting Slota with a more respectable nationalism, but also in discrediting him and his party on the politically winning issue of anti-corruption (a useful diversion from SMER 's own corruption problems).33 By 2010, the debilitated SNS squeaked into the subsequent parliament by only a tenth of a percentage point over the electoral threshold and lost more than half of its previous seats (down from twenty to nine )- a voting hemorrhage that pre-election opinion polls suggest went to Fico. 34 Tibor Kis concludes that Fico "offered voters a European alternative to Vladimir Meciar's nationalist L'S-HZDS and a social and ' Slovak' alternative relative to centre-right organiza- 32 See The Slovak Spectator, August 31, 2009. http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11 /people often get what they want n ot what they need.html. 33 SNS corruption problems might have been predicted from its previous term in office, and by the general trends in ministerial corruption region-wide. In the overall universe of cabinet ministers in 13 post-communist EU members and candidate members serving between 1990 and 2009, minority politicians were just about exactly average in their involvement in corruption scandals (13%). The majority nationalist party ministers, by contrast, were close to twice as likely to be scandal prone (23%) as the norm, and thereby more embarrassing as coalition partners. Involvement in corruption scandals as used here does not imply eventually proven guilt in a court of law. (Corruption Involvement is coded if the minister is formally investigated by law enforcement agencies or parliament, arrested and tried, or documented as engaging in suspect behavior by a corruption agency). 34 See Kevin Deegan-Krause 's Pozorblog, 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Post-Election Report, July 14, 2010, http://www.pozorb1og. com/ . �SLOVAKIA 159 tions."35 Fico appears, indeed, to have been too successful in this regard: As Mesik notes, "By attracting SNS as well as HZDS voters, Fico successfully cannibalized his partners in the government and only woke up to the day when his by far strongest party did not have partners to form a government with." Hungarian Minority Politics If Fico proved effective (and somewhat self-defeating) in absorbing votes from his coalition partners in the 2010 elections, the exclusion of the SMK from government also had ramifications for minority party politics. At first, the SMK' s position on the opposition benches had some echoes of the 1990s. Amidst a general disarray after losing power, it was striking that the Fico era started with the failure of the ethnic Slovak opposition parties to back the SMK on issues like the Hedviga Malinova /Malina Hedvig case. The three opposition parties did not meet for four months until the controversy regarding Deputy Agriculture Minister Marian Zahumensky. Second, the transition to opposition acerbated longstanding tensions within the SMK. As long as the SMK was in government, tensions within the party could be curbed. Going into opposition meant not only a loss of policy influence, but also a time of reckoning. In March of 2007, the popular and moderate Bela Bugar moved on his less moderate vice-chair- the venerable communist-era dissident Miklos Duray--by seeking to abolish the vice-chair position; the effort rebounded, leading to an upset victory for the party leadership by Pal Csaky. The new SMK was ever more closely identified with Hungary and particularly with FIDESZ, a stance that proved an excellent foil for Slota and the SNS . The SMK was "increasingly perceived and portrayed by Slovak politicians as an extraterritorial branch of FIDESZ." 36 35 Tibor Kis, "Smer: Success Story or Scandal?" The Analyst-Central and Eastern European Review I (2008), 67 . 36 Mesik, Juraj , Slovakia 2010: An Election with Only Limited Choice (Prague: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), p. I. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache :NXmv IM538AJ :www.boell.cz/downloads/slovakia-20 I 0( I ).pdf+Slovakia+20 I 0:+An+Election+with+Only+Limited+Choice&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEE SjAbC2uqap66j5MK3mL54uKxbdb6uwiyAnKG8PdcOnGr7TN3cTV4UToaJbphV Dhh Wjlam VNsCTq DriBh Yin WQ4wn6V9PW9qn WFarJSCkyf Jho VJx2g9JpgEj7MPq-DXaaQb&sig=AHIEtbQZam6lz-BjubssUvDtT73Na95dzA �160 SLOVAKIA Csaky 's orientation to the protection of Hungarian interests was to look outward. An example was his meeting with Laszlo Tokes, a central figure of the hard-line wing of Romania' s minority party UDMR, and Csaky's attendance as an observer at the Carpathian Autonomy Council that Tokes had founded. The two leaders apparently discussed the idea of a cross-national mini-minority parliament. Nothing could have been better calculated to play to ethnic Slovak fears about Slovak Hungarian loyalties.37 In 2008, Bugar left the SMK and founded his own party- one that signaled its moderation on national issues with the name MostHid (bridge in Slovak and Hungarian). Csaky professed to believe, along with Slota, that Most-Hid was a stalking horse (actually a Trojan horse) created and funded by SMER. Beyond that, he refused to discuss future cooperation with Most-Hid on the grounds that it wouldn't make it into parliament. 38 Csaky was quite wrong. Defying the pre-election polls, Most-Hid polled over eight percent, nearly doubling the vote of Csaky's SMK, and replacing it in parliament. What did the 2010 vote mean? Were Hungarian voters seeking moderation, as some media analysts said? Or was it a coordination failure , with Hungarians in Slovakia voting strategically in hopes of getting both SMK and Most-Hid into parliament? (This view would explain why Most-Hid did so much better than the last pre-election polls suggested-ethnic Hungarian voters, seeing that SMK was comfortably over the threshold, may have diverted votes to MostHid/ 9 As in the case of many party schisms, then, the upshot was a crippling of Hungarian minority representation in parliament. 40 37 "Csaky naru~il tabu," SME, September 29, 2008. "Csaky: Nep6jdeme do vlady za kazdu cenu," SME, May 7, 20 10, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanok_ tlac.asp?cl=5363302 39 The Slovak Spectator June 21, 20 IO ; some SMK leaders embraced this theory. "Csaky konti, SMK hl'ada ~efa" SME, June 14, 20 I 0, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanoktlac.asp?cl=5421864. 40 A pre-election poll in 20 IO indicated that Most-Hid was drawing almost 60% of its supporters from SMK, 18% from first time voters, 5% from former non-voters and the rest from other parties. The Slovak Spectator, June 3, 20 I 0. The number of Hungarians in the Most-Hid delegation itself was also lowered by the preferential voting of supporters of OKS (Civic Conservative Party), with whom Most-Hid fo rmed a joint candidate slate. See Viera Zuborova, Viera (2011 ), Marketizacia vonkaj~ej reklamy v parlamentnych vol'bach 20 IO v Slovenskej republike," Acta Politologica 3: I (2011 ):7; statistics at "Vysledky preferenfoeo hlasovania: Vys38 �SLOVAKIA 161 Conclusion: Is there reason to expect a durable effect of the Fico era for identity politics in Slovakia? The policy footprint was not especially deep, and the succeeding Radicova government mitigated some of its impact on Hungarian minority relations. The Fico language law was partially modified in December of 2010, restricting its use, but disappointing minorities-who deemed the amendment "less bad"-by its retention of the penalties for improper language use.41 2011 saw an initiative to resolve the dual citizenship issue by joint agreement with the Hungarian government, although to date without a favorable response from the Orban government. 42 The long-term party system effects are less predictable. For example, while Meciar's slide into oblivion even deepened in the 2012 election, sliding to a mere percentage point of the electorate, it is less obvious that Slota's SNS is on the brink of extinction despite the narrow escape in 2010 and the failure to return to parliament in 2012. Earlier, the SNS had survived a schism (in some respects the mirror image of what happened to SMK after 2006) that actually knocked it out of parliament in 2002; it reconsolidated and returned. In 2012, as well, the party was fractured by the expulsion of deputy leader Anna Belousova, who contested the 2012 election with her own party Nation and Justice. Despite the SNS record of corruption and outrageousness, yet another reunion of the party leadership might resuscitate it, although service in Fico 's government was definitely a poisoned chalice. In the 2010 election, the shrinkage of the SNS deprived Fico of a coalition partner and the prime ministership. As a result of the March, 2012 elections, Fico no longer needed that assistance, since his SMER became the first Slovak party since indeledky volieb do NR SR: 12.06.2010," Most-Hid website, http://www.most-hidke.sk/sk/vo1by-nrsr20 I 0-preferencne-hlasy. 41 "Language Act takes a "less bad" form," Minority Report, Monthly Bulletin on the Hungarian Community in Slovakia, Issue 12-2010, http://www.freeweb.hu/mkdsz l/pdf/MR-Ol-2011.pdf. 42 "Hungary: "Nern! " to Slovak Dual Citizenship Proposal," The Daily.sk, posted 12 July 20 11 , http://www.thedaily.sk/2011 /07 /12/top-news/hungary-nem-to-slovak-dualcitizensh ip-proposal/. The Fico government, elected in March of 2012, signaled that it would slightly modify its earlier draconian response by allowing dual citizenship to Slovaks actually residing in the other country. �162 SLOVAKIA pendence to win an outright majority of the parliamentary seats (83 out of 150).43 As for the emergence of two major partisan competitors for the Hungarian electorate, the ambiguities in interpreting Most-Hid's victory over the SMK stand in the way of a clear prediction. Past electoral outcomes show that being in power has not previously eroded the support of the minority electorate, either in Slovakia or in the parallel cases of Bulgaria and Romania. On that basis, it might be possible to argue for Most-Hid to further consolidate its position. However, what Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia also had in common until this election was the dominance of a single minority party or electoral coalition. 44 The story may be quite different with an alternative and established minority-based party challenging each decision, even from outside parliament. The municipal elections of November 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, which showed the two Hungarian parties splitting their vote, did not clarify the picture. Although an extraparliamentary party like the SMK could not promise influence at the center to woo voters, the SMK retained its established organizational base and its government subsidy and thus retains a presence in politics (it also retains its representation in the European parliament). Local party organizations generally hold the decision-making power to run joint candidates with other parties or to cooperate in local coalitions after elections, and there was indeed some limited cooperation, but also cases, as in the Komarno mayor's race, where dividing the Hungarian vote opened the way to victory for an independent Slovak candidate. The basis for cooperation, however, is shaky. The SMK has grown ever closer to the nationalist Fidesz party in Hungary, and proudly announced in March 2011 that Hungary had incorporated three SMK proposals into its new constitution. Moreover, the SMK party chair, Joszef Berenyi, actually announced in January of 2011 that he was applying for Hungarian citizenship under the controversial new law. These maneuvers only underline the SMK' s distance from the more moderate Most-Hid. During the winter of 2011, de43 Sme, March 11 , 2012. It is true that before 1998, the SMK was not a single entity; rather, it was a group of Hungarian parties which ran on a single slate, not as competitors. 44 �SLOVAKIA 163 spite the clear electoral incentives to do so, the two parties failed to reach any agreement on electoral cooperation in 2012, and contested the parliamentary elections completely separately. Once again, SMK barely missed parliamentary representation, while Most-Hid survived, although it lost more than a percentage point and one MP in the 2012 elections. In closing, it would appear that electoral outcomes and coalition choices matter more than external pressures for normative conformity on minority rights issues, just as they did in the pre-accession period before 2004. Government policies on minorities in Slovakia respond primarily to partisan domestic constituencies, and vary according to the government in power. Even though minority inclusion in government was known to be desirable to Brussels, once Slovakia was safely in the European Union, minority inclusion was not jettisoned, but rather subject to the same kinds of political logic and choices that determined which identity-based party would be included in government before 2004. � SLOVAKIA 145 HUNGARIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA: UNDER FICO, AFTER EU ACCESSION Carol Skalnik Leff Many scholars of European integration have shown keen interest in the behavior of new members after the pressures of "conditionality" have been lifted, and the political and policy constraints of qualifying for membership have abated. The 2006 election in Slovakia, won by Robert Fico's SMER, was the first contested after Slovakia's EU accession, and offers a useful case study of one of the EU's desiderata- the treatment of ethnic minorities. In this article, I analyze the Fico era's impact on the minority rights agenda by focusing on two points. The first is the Fico government's record in the sphere of minority politics and policy. The second, and in some respects potentially more consequential, is the way the Slovak party system' s identity politics dimension was reconfigured during his term of office. I contextualize this analysis by noting the Fico government's positioning in the evolution of the "two-level game" on minority rights issues played out under successive Slovak governments with the European Union. During the pre-accession period, external pressures to conform to European concerns seemed less important for Slovak responsiveness than the composition of the government in power. The postaccession period analyzed here seems to follow the same pattern, with the Fico government relatively resistant to external initiatives and the successor Radicova government more aligned with EU norms and expectations. The Context: 2006 witnessed the first Slovak elections following the country's accession to the European Union. Slovakia's two previous national elections had been fought in the shadow of EU membership prospects. Both the 1998 and 2002 elections immediately preceded critical moments in the accession process- the choice of candidate states in 1998 and the final decisions on membership invitations in 2002. Karen Henderson made the point most strongly: "While it has been argued that referendums sometimes fulfill the function of second �146 SLOVAKIA order national elections ... Slovakia had twice experienced something approaching the reverse: national elections, in 1998 and 2002 , that were in part referendums about whether Slovakia should join the EU ." 1 Given the strength of pro-integration sentiment, which was rising toward the eightieth percentiles by the late 1990s, I would rephrase this formulation to suggest that the referendum quality of these elections consisted of the question of whether Slovakia would be able to join the EU, or which party could best deliver on membership. As Henderson noted, "the vital question was not whether [Slovaks] wanted the EU, but whether the EU wanted them." 2 In 1998 Vladimir Meciar lost the election and hence the key impediment to EU acceptance of Slovakia was removed. The 2002 results secured the conditions for a final push.3 The two right-of-center coalition governments under SDKU leader Mikulas Dzurinda that served from 1998 to 2006 strove, successfully, to cement Slovakia's case for inclusion in the 2004 EU enlargement. Tactically, one of the centerpiece components of that effort was the inclusion of the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK) in both governments. The alignment strategy to please Europe in the case is quite evident, and noticeable in Romania and Bulgaria as well; for the EU, ethnic minority parties were the preferred coalition partners, and radical nationalist participation a source of EU concern . Lacking its own minority rights acquis at the collapse of Com4 munism, the European Union's expectations about respect for minority rights protection was often ad hoc, and rested on the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 rather than on developed community law. 1 Karen Henderson, " EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus," West European Politics 27:4 (September, 2004), 653 . 2 Henderson, 656. 3 By 2002, the incumbent government urged voters to let it "fini sh what we started" and take that last "one more step (one last step is needed to the EU and NA TO... with us you' ll make it). The SDKU, in its famous peaceable kingdom billboard (a cat and dog entwined together) reminded voters that the party had managed to maintain a fract ious coalition : "Thanks to that, we are on the threshold of NATO and the EU." 4 The European Union was still the European Economic Communities in 1989, but for simplicity 's sake, I will refer to the "European Union" throughout. For a critique of the EU's minority rights conditionality, see Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionali ty: Minority Ri ghts in Slovakia," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe I (2003), 20-29. �SLOVAKIA 147 However, all states with substantial minorities were well aware that minority treatment by the government was under scrutiny; hence, the elevation of the SMK to a coalition partner was accompanied by policy adjustments in the eroded minority rights regime of the Meciar period. The 2006 elections that brought Fico to power, however, occurred in a very different international strategic context, one in which Slovakia's European fate no longer depended on electoral outcomes and government composition. "We got you into Europe" lacked the resonance of SDKU's (Slovak Christian Democratic Party) 2002 appeal "You need us to get into Europe." 5 However, the economy that had earned Slovakia the epithet "Tatra Tiger" had not benefited all; Slovakia's unemployment rate of 15% in 2006 was one of the highest in Europe (and that was an improvement over the peak of 19% in 2000-2002). Small wonder, then, that Robert Fico 's populist critique of the reform era found powerful electoral resonance in 2006. His new government, however constituted, would face different international and domestic constraints than had been true for the previous decade. For the purpose of this analysis, the most salient point is that the externally-induced incentives for minority inclusion, and for adherence to minority-tolerant policies, were less pronounced than in the past. One thing, however, remained constant. It was generally impossible to form a majority coalition without including one of the two key parties aligned on the identity dimension of the party system: either the SMK or the Slovak National Party (SNS). 6 The choice between them had been definitive for the tenor of the government's minority relations policy after past elections. The question wasn't simply, therefore, whether the SMK was in or out, but rather that its exclusion likely meant the inclusion of the SNS. SMER's leadership chose the latter option (a choice that will be discussed below), with 5 In 2002, the incumbent anti- Meciar parties urged voters to let them "finish what we started" and take that last "one more step." (the billboard message: one last step is needed to the EU and NATO ... with us you'll make it). 6 In 1998, the inclusion of the SMK produced an over-sized coalition . SMK was not necessary for a parliamentary majority. It was, however, necessary, for agenda control and constitutional change, including the transition to a directly elected presidency that was virtually the first order of business of the Dzurinda government that formed the coalition. �148 SLOVAKIA consequences that shaped the minority rights agenda for the Fico government. Minority Policy Dimensions of the Fico Government: Policy relevant to minorities in Slovakia has followed the trajectory of government change. Meciar's second and third governments in the l 990 's had ruled with the support of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and pursued minority-relevant policies that evoked European criticism, either because of overt actions (language and education laws) or omissions (the failure to pass a minority-language law to clarify and codify the language rights of non-Slovaks). By contrast, the three right-of-center governments, led by Jozef Moravcik and twice by Dzurinda, ruled with the support of the Hungarian minority coalition and proved responsive to the European push for stronger minority protections. The coalition pattern continued under Fico and his successor lveta Radicova, with Fico's left-of-center government incorporating the SNS and Radicova's right-of-center coalition including the new Hungarian-Slovak Most-Hid formation (Note that Slovakia's predictable pattern of coalition alliances is by no means characteristic: in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia-the three other East and Central European countries with established and governmentally salient minority parties- both right-and left-of-center governments have ruled with minority party support. In Slovakia, the SMK has not changed sides). Policy initiatives cannot fully capture the almost immediate change of tone in Hungarian-Slovak relations, marked by patriotic football hooliganism and the virulent controversy over the Malina/ Malinova affair.7 The core of Fico' s minority policy-making, however, was a re-balancing toward Slovak language rights in uradny (official) communication, and correspondingly greater ambiguity about the security of minority language rights. The first controversy emerged over the potentially restrictive impact of the 2008 amendments 7 Hedvig Malina was a Hungarian student in Nitra who in 2006 reported to the police that she had been assaulted for speaking Hungarian in public. The complaint generated a mini-Dreyfus affa ir, with one' s political orientation determining whether or not to give credence to her claims. The government ultimately sided against her, and lodged perjury charges. The Fico government charged Hungary with unacceptable interference in the case. See also "Slovakia and Hungary: Trouble in Felvidek," Transitions Online, September 5, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 149 to the education law regarding Hungarian language education. In the spring of 2009, the focus was on Hungarian language textbooks, with the government seeking to supplant minority-produced course materials with translations of Slovak texts. This was accompanied by a protracted disagreement about the rendering of Slovak place names. For example, the government wanted the Danube river in Slovak (Dunaj) rather than Hungarian (Duna), even in Hungarian texts. The compromise, reached in February of 2009, appears to allow the previous practice of using "deep-rooted" geographical place names in Hungarian with the Slovak names in parentheses. Additional concern was generated by the restriction of Hungarian minority Radio Patria broadcasts to short wave transmitters that did not reach Bratislava or eastern Slovakia.8 The Language Law But the most internationally visible and resonant initiative was a revisiting of the language laws of the 1990s, as amended in 1999 under the Dzurinda government. As Martin Votruba has pointed out, a major thrust of the 1999 amendment (Act on the Use of Minority Language) had been to remove the penalties (fines) that Meciar's government had enacted for violations of the 1995 law establishing the primacy of the Slovak language. 9 Hastily drafted to meet EU expectations and, therefore, imprecise in some passages, the 1999 amendment did establish rights to the use of minority language in official communications.10 In response to the status quo, the coalition program of the Fico government in 2006 included commitments to safeguard the state language and in particular the "promotion of Slovak culture in the mixed regions ." Legislation fulfilling this pledge by privileging the use of the Slovak language in official communications passed in 8 See Kata Eplenyi, "The Language Rights of Hungarian Communities in Slovakia and Romania: The Impacts and Perspectives of EU-Membership," Masters Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Nationalism Studies Program, 2009. 9 Votruba 's analysis of the provisions of the law is the most comprehensive I have found. Martin Votruba, "The Uncommon Language: Bratislava, Budapest, and Brussels," Slovak Studies Association Newsletter, volume 33 (2009). See also Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gal, "The New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics?" ECMI Working paper #8, September 2000. http ://www.ecmi.de/download/working paper 8.pdf. 10 Eplenyi, "Language Rights. " �150 SLOVAKIA 2009, and provoked an immediate storm of international protest, largely centered on the hefty penalties (up to 5,000 euros) that could be imposed for violations. Media commentary tended to paint the legislation with a broad brush, whether in praise or blame, and thus to obfuscate the actual provisions. It would appear for example, that vivid scenarios of fines for an ethnically Hungarian patient speaking the native tongue to his ethnically Hungarian doctor in Hungarian are inapt, since the government maintained that only legal entities and not individuals were slated to be fined for violations . 11 Nor were the frequently invoked foreign-language church services under threat. However, in protecting Slovak language use, the law clearly appeared to have a chilling effect on minority language rights, and aroused vehement criticism from both the Hungarian minority and from neighboring Hungary, as well as from critics in the European Parliament. For its part, the government tended to make somewhat misleading claims about international approval (a familiar pattern in the Meciar years as well) . Emblematic of suspicion about those claims was the opposition demand that the OSCE advisory opinion on the law be published in full , without abridgement. A slightly exasperated Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, visited Slovakia by invitation during the controversy, and chastised both sides for exaggerating the OSCE position. He reiterated the OSCE conclusion that the law met international standards, but added "that doesn't mean that I necessarily think it's a good law;" he said that the High Commission would like to see the fines omitted from the legislation, and warned that the normative validity of some provisions would depend on their implementation. 12 The ongoing engagement of external arbiters was evident in this contra11 Nonetheless, the successor Radicova government introduced legislation in September of 2010 to lower fines and to explicitly lift their imposition on individuals except where citizen safety and property ri ghts were in question, to permit nonSlovak records in minority schools, and to exempt transport, communications and postal employees. Catherine McNally, "Are Relations between Hungary and Slovakia beginning to thaw?" CS!S, October 5, 2010, http ://csis.org. 12 OSCE Envoy Proffers 'Advice' On Language Law, European Dialogue, September 30, 2009, http://eurodialogue.org/osce/OSCE-Envoy-Proffers-Advice-On-Language-Law; Zuzana Vaskova, "Slovakia's Controversial Language Law," EU Reporter, September 28, 2009, http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/slovakias-controversial-language-law. �SLOVAKIA 151 versy, although Slovakia was no longer constrained by mandatory monitoring. A second feature of policy during the Fico administration was an exchange of symbolic and substantive rebuffs between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, implicitly or usually explicitly targeting the issue of loyalties to state or nation. An official state visit between Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, the first such in eight years, was cancelled after the language law controversy . 13 Another unfortunate incident surrounded the unveiling of a statue of St. Stephen in the city of Komarno in August of 2009. Hungary's president Laszlo S6lyom planned to attend this event as a private citizen, but was stopped from crossing the bridge between Hungary and Slovakia after a diplomatic exchange confirmed that he would not be permitted to enter Slovakia for this purpose. The Slovak government considered this event a provocation, noting that no high Slovak official had been invited to the unveiling. In July of 2010, the newly-installed nationalist FIDESZ government in Hungary further roiled the waters by taking the incident to the European Court of Justice. (Ex-president S6lyom returned to lay a wreath at the statue without incident in August of 2010). 14 The most sensitive development in Slovak-Hungarian relations occurred in the interval between the April Hungarian elections of 2010 and the June Slovak elections. A few days after its installation, the FIDESZ government, led by Viktor Orban, lobbed a political grenade into the Slovak election campaign by approving a new law on dual citizenship. By a crushing vote of 344-3 with five abstentions, the Hungarian parliament sanctioned measures that would allow ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship as of January, 2011 even without the intention of residing in Hungary (they would not have voting rights in Hungary itself) . The Fico government recalled its ambassador from Budapest, called a session of the security council, and retaliated with legislation forfeiting Slovak citizenship 13 Lubos Palata "Slovak Language Law: Slap in the Face," Transitions Online, July 13, 2009. http :ijwww.ceeo1 .com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=f3bblacd-4a304701-9d6f-6889e003d4bc&articleld=3fa741b5-2f9f-4663-9824-a43e09e 7fe4b. 14 "Mad'arsky exprezident S6lyom presiel do Komama bez problemov," SME, August 22, 2010. �152 SLOVAKIA to those taking additional Hungarian citizenship. 15 Orban 's somewhat baffling timing would appear likely to damage the electoral prospects of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and to bolster Slovak nationalist voting. The European community could only watch ineffectively, urge a negotiated settlement to the question, and ponder what citizenship norms might be appropriate to cross-border minorities. 16 Overall, the Fico government's minority rights initiatives bear a pronounced resemblance to those of the Meciar era, the last time the SNS was in government and the governmental orientation stressed the risks to Slovak identity of a multi-ethnic state. As in the case of the Meciar governments, external concerns seemed largely ineffectual in modifying the course of policy-making or ameliorating relations with Hungary. The policy-making dynamics, however, are less complex than the partisan political dynamics, to which I now tum. The Fico Government and Its Impact on the Identity Dimension of the Party System. Although minority relations may appear to be only a delimited segment of the larger political picture, in two important respects they were arguably central to Fico's governance because of the impact they have had on coalition formation in 2006 and 2010 and on coalition politics in between. Indeed, Fico 's government notably shaped the party system itself, but not only in terms of its national identity dimension. In both respects the impact had international ramifications. I now want to focus on this larger picture. 15 Previous Slovak law allowed for dual citizenship, but with certain provisions that could be adapted to bar dual citizenship in this particular instance. See Dagmar Kusa, "The Slovak Question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship during the Quest for National Self-Determination and after," in Rainer Baubock, Bernhard Perching and Wiebke Sievers, eds ., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), 275-303. Note that Romania remained silent over Orban 's move, although it equally affected Romania' s large Hungarian minority. The Romanian government had previously used Orban 's ploy in extending citizenship rights to ethnically Romanian Moldovans in 2009, and so could hardly complain about a similar law in Hungary. See Slovak Sfectator, August 10, 2010. 1 See for example, Rainer Baubock, ed., "Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to Respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat," EU Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/75 (2010, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy). �SLOVAKIA 153 Government formation in post-communist states has consistently proved challenging, although the challenges have varied systematically from state to state. A common thread through most of the postcommunist era to date, however, has been the Euro-relevance of coalition choices. In the 2002 election campaign, SMER's inaugural effort, Fico refused to name preferred coalition partners or to rule out the HZDS (although he emphatically rejected a cabinet shared with either Meciar or Dzurinda, leaders he styled as representative of an 17 old, corrupt generation). Some analysts have plausibly suggested that his failure to exclude the HZDS raised voter doubts about a Fico-led government's capacity to complete the EU integration project and helped to account for his last minute sag in the polls. 18 The coalition formation process after the 2006 elections was undoubtedly critical to the subsequent pattern of party system dynamics in ways I will investigate below. Frontrunner Fico had promised a coalition that Europe could approve. In the late stages of the campaign, some analysts dismissed the possibility of a SMER-HZDSSNS coalition (including two political formations most unpopular in Europe because of their perceived demagogic, authoritarian and nationalist leadership) as a product of incumbent Dzurinda's fear-mongering. SMER derided this as a bogey-man. Fico characterized the coalition as a "specter" created by Dzurinda. 19 SMER's Vice President Robert Kalinak told reporters , "Smer will not be part of any government that is not internationally accepted, and I think that's a pretty clear statement that you can deduce all kinds of things from." 20 .... But apparently not the coalition that actually emerged in 2006. In the event, the "worst case scenario" was not merely a scare tactic. The victorious Smer did indeed invite the HZDS and the SNS into a coalition, albeit explicitly without either of their leaders, in cabinet positions. And Fico assured the public, at home and abroad, that the presence of the SNS in government did not dilute existing commitments to minority and human rights, again signaling that minority parties were not pariahs . The Bratislava daily Novy cas dub17 Fico was born in 1964, Dzurinda in 1955 and Meciar in 1942. Tim Haughton, "We Will finish What We've Started: The 2002 Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4 (December, 2003), 65-90. 19 Transitions Online, June 19, 2006; TASR, June 12, 2006. 20 Interview with Robert Kalinak, Slovak Spectator, June 12, 2006. 18 �154 SLOVAKIA bed this the "you can't be serious" coalition-and it prompted an immediate external response. The European Union cannot dictate who is eligible to govern a member state. This issue was clarified with the case of Austria, a neutral state that joined the EU in 1995, once membership ceased to be associated with the divisions of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, the use of conditionality after accession to membership received a major setback. In 2000, Austria breached a long-standing but informal West European consensus against the inclusion of the radical right in democratic governments- a so-called "cordon sanitaire" against extremist parties--when Austria's Christian Democrats accepted Jorg Haider and his Freedom Party as junior coalition partners. Appalled that a party led by a man who attended SS reunions was included in a member government, the EU created an impromptu and awkward state of "diplomatic isolation" that proved largely counterproductive, and embarrassing in its implication that the European Union, riddled with its own democratic deficits, had the right to judge the democratically elected governments of its members. The EU backed down after seven months.21 If the EU wouldn't act, the European party formation in which SMER was an observing member- the Party of European Socialists (PES)--was not similarly constrained, although ultimately equally ineffectual. PES publicly expressed "concern and deep misgivings" over Fico's coalition choices, as well as "shock" and "deep disgust," for good measure. Club deputy chair Johannes Swoboda expressed doubt that such a government could uphold European values; 22 and the Belgian socialist MEP asked "Don't you feel ashamed as a social 21 EU concern persists. The long-term legacy of the abortive effort to assert European values in the Austrian case, and to provide for response to future democratic deviations is Article 7 of both the Nice Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a so-called "emergency brake," a decision-making mechanism to impose sanctions on member states that manifest a "serious breach" of European values specified in the treaty under Article 2. Approving the Lisbon Treaty thus does provide a new conditionality mechanism; it remains to be seen how badly it is needed and whether it will have any practical utility. See http ://register.consilium.europa.eu/gdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf 2 "Evropsti socialiste znepokojeni vznikajici koalici na Slovensku," CTK, June 29, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 155 democrat of forming a coalition with a party known for its xenophobia?"23 In October 2006, PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced: The PES resolution refers specifically to the Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states "all PES parties adhere to the following principles .. . to refrain from any form ofpolitical alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred. " 24 Only in 2008 was SMER 'S membership application conditionally reinstated after both SMER and SNS submitted letters confirming their commitment to minority rights, a largely declarative gesture. But this so-called "nightmare coalition" with the HZDS and SNS was not inevitable. The contrasting case of Bulgaria is instructive. The victorious Borisov party in 2009 ruled out a coalition with the Turkish minority MRF during the election campaign as part of the incumbent government he attacked. Like Fico, candidate Borisov employed a populist discourse-what Pop-Eleches would call the new centrist populism 25- and an appeal that, while taking pot shots at minorities, was not radically nationalist. His "outsider" strategy, however, dictated a rejection of all the status quo parties, and particularly the incumbents. Fico, on the other hand, although not loath to criticize minorities, had moderated his populist appeals and reoriented to social democracy by the 2006 election. 26 Fico gave serious consideration to a KDH/MKP coalition, but could not get agreement on it-Miroslav Kusy notes that the KDH leadership was badly and bitterly split on the possibility, with some insisting on a set of moral issues (such as ban23 24 25 Slovak Spectator, September 11 , 2006. http ://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family. Pop-Eleches, "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism," World Politics 62 (2010), 221-60. 26 See Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia," Politics and Policy 37:4 (2009), 82 1-41 . �156 SLOVAKIA ning same-sex marriage and contraception); KDH deliberations were so protracted that Fico ultimately gave up. 27 KDH's hesitation was the mostly widely cited reason for the sinking of the alternative SMER-SMK-KDH coalition, both by media and coalition partners. 28 Despite the programmatic dissonances with SMER, such an alignment had the attraction for KDH and SMK of averting the coalition that did in fact emerge. In any case, Fico is a clever politician, and he realized that the SNS and HZDS would be easier to undercut. Fico could and did steal some of the SNS political clothes and a bit of its electorate by annexing the nationalist issue-a kind of electoral poaching that would have been impossible against the KDH and SMK--and in Meciar's HZDS he had an aging and politically dying junior partner. Fico is also something of a control freak- he immediately sidelined Monika Flasikova-Benova, a public critic of his coalition choice, at the next party congress by stripping her and others of leadership roles-(he was also canny in avoiding the appointment of too many MPs as ministers, who if discarded, might return to parliament and defect from the party). His final coalition choices therefore, would be more malleable, provided he could manage the public response, in particular, to SNS outbursts. In the new government, Meciar's party alarmingly claimed the Justice portfolio. SNS portfolios included Agriculture, Regional Development and Education, all highly salient policy domains for minorities. Agriculture and Regional Development, previously held by SMK, are germane to economic conditions in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia, which are generally more rural and less developed than the north or west. And putting education policy in the hands of SNS raised concerns that minority issues would get short shrift. 27 Miroslav Kusy, "Catastrophic Scenario in Bratislava," The Analyst: Central and Eastern European Review 2 (2006), 37. The KDH division was so pronounced as to cause a leadership crisis and resignations from the party leadership in its aftermath. 28 See for example the comments by Ivan Miklos in Hospodtirske noviny, June 29, 2006: "The European Peoples Party won't understand very well, how it is possible that these three EPP member parties weren't able to reach agreement. In this sense, I think that the responsibility for this situation lies especially on the KDH. " In this case, Miklos blamed the KDH for balking at bringing the HZDS into a SDKUKDH-SMK coalition. �SLOVAKIA 157 Two related effects of this government's tenure on party system dynamics are worth noting. At the majority nationalist end of the identity continuum, one can visualize Fico as a political vampire, draining his coalition partners of standing and voters. Fico preempted the national issue from his more volatile and extremist coalition colleague, Jan Slota of the SNS, by challenging the national sentiment of historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, as well as of the media, both of whom he accused of exhibiting "un-Slovak" tendencies. Fico proclaimed 2008 as the "Year of the Slovak Nation." He re-constructed pre-national history with a claim on the Great Moravian Empire having consisted of "ancient Slovaks"29 and commissioned a statue of warrior King (Prince) Svatopluk for the Bratislava Castle courtyard-an equestrian monument installed just before the elections in 2010 amid great controversy about the historicity of the claims made about his ethnicity, the Byzantine cross on his shield, and even whether he was actually a king.30 From the outset, Fico tended to overlook rather than to chastise the SNS and its incendiary leader. He was content to let Slota's outrageous statements pillory his own credibility. A case in point: Slota apparently sought to launch his party's electoral campaign in early 2010 with the pronouncement that Hungary was planning a military 31 invasion of Slovakia to revise the Treaty of Trianon. Fico did chastise the spectacular SNS corruption in office. Both in the 1990s and in the Fico government, the SNS has been noted for ministerial corruption. The SNS held two portfolios-Construction and Regional development and Environment--in the Fico government, in addition to a deputy prime-ministership. Both incumbents at Construction and Regional Development were dismissed in quick succession over the so-called "Bulletin-Board" tender, in which public procurement procedures were violated in favor of an in-house 29 "Fico's Revisionist History," Transitions Online, February 29, 2008. ° Fico expressed the hope that the statue would become a national pilgrimage site, 3 but the statue immediately became politicized as the extremist group "Our Slovakia" came to its rescue (a commission on its dissolution has been formed) without an assembly permit. As of November 2010, the party's website has youtube video of riot police blocking the pilgrimage. Meanwhile, anti-racist groups mobilized to challenge the party. Fico also appropriated the 18 th century social bandit Jano~ik as a Social Democrat. 31 The Slovak Spectator, March 24, 2010. �158 SLOVAKIA process that awarded contracts to two firms with close ties to the SNS leader Jan Slota. SNS Environment Minister Jaroslav Izak, who was asked to resign for his ministry's mishandling of EU environmental funds , was followed by Jan Chrbet, whose forced resignation was triggered by a scandal surrounding the awarding of carbon emissions contracts on terms unfavorable to the government. When his successor from the SNS, Viliam Tursky, was also removed for murky contract awards, Prime Minister Fico announced that it was time to take the environmental portfolio away from the SNS.32 (Startlingly, Slota demanded the human and minority rights portfolio in exchange for the lost environmental slot.) Hence, by the end of his term in office, Fico had succeeded not only in pre-empting Slota with a more respectable nationalism, but also in discrediting him and his party on the politically winning issue of anti-corruption (a useful diversion from SMER 's own corruption problems).33 By 2010, the debilitated SNS squeaked into the subsequent parliament by only a tenth of a percentage point over the electoral threshold and lost more than half of its previous seats (down from twenty to nine )- a voting hemorrhage that pre-election opinion polls suggest went to Fico. 34 Tibor Kis concludes that Fico "offered voters a European alternative to Vladimir Meciar's nationalist L'S-HZDS and a social and ' Slovak' alternative relative to centre-right organiza- 32 See The Slovak Spectator, August 31, 2009. http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11 /people often get what they want n ot what they need.html. 33 SNS corruption problems might have been predicted from its previous term in office, and by the general trends in ministerial corruption region-wide. In the overall universe of cabinet ministers in 13 post-communist EU members and candidate members serving between 1990 and 2009, minority politicians were just about exactly average in their involvement in corruption scandals (13%). The majority nationalist party ministers, by contrast, were close to twice as likely to be scandal prone (23%) as the norm, and thereby more embarrassing as coalition partners. Involvement in corruption scandals as used here does not imply eventually proven guilt in a court of law. (Corruption Involvement is coded if the minister is formally investigated by law enforcement agencies or parliament, arrested and tried, or documented as engaging in suspect behavior by a corruption agency). 34 See Kevin Deegan-Krause 's Pozorblog, 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Post-Election Report, July 14, 2010, http://www.pozorb1og. com/ . �SLOVAKIA 159 tions."35 Fico appears, indeed, to have been too successful in this regard: As Mesik notes, "By attracting SNS as well as HZDS voters, Fico successfully cannibalized his partners in the government and only woke up to the day when his by far strongest party did not have partners to form a government with." Hungarian Minority Politics If Fico proved effective (and somewhat self-defeating) in absorbing votes from his coalition partners in the 2010 elections, the exclusion of the SMK from government also had ramifications for minority party politics. At first, the SMK' s position on the opposition benches had some echoes of the 1990s. Amidst a general disarray after losing power, it was striking that the Fico era started with the failure of the ethnic Slovak opposition parties to back the SMK on issues like the Hedviga Malinova /Malina Hedvig case. The three opposition parties did not meet for four months until the controversy regarding Deputy Agriculture Minister Marian Zahumensky. Second, the transition to opposition acerbated longstanding tensions within the SMK. As long as the SMK was in government, tensions within the party could be curbed. Going into opposition meant not only a loss of policy influence, but also a time of reckoning. In March of 2007, the popular and moderate Bela Bugar moved on his less moderate vice-chair- the venerable communist-era dissident Miklos Duray--by seeking to abolish the vice-chair position; the effort rebounded, leading to an upset victory for the party leadership by Pal Csaky. The new SMK was ever more closely identified with Hungary and particularly with FIDESZ, a stance that proved an excellent foil for Slota and the SNS . The SMK was "increasingly perceived and portrayed by Slovak politicians as an extraterritorial branch of FIDESZ." 36 35 Tibor Kis, "Smer: Success Story or Scandal?" The Analyst-Central and Eastern European Review I (2008), 67 . 36 Mesik, Juraj , Slovakia 2010: An Election with Only Limited Choice (Prague: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), p. I. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache :NXmv IM538AJ :www.boell.cz/downloads/slovakia-20 I 0( I ).pdf+Slovakia+20 I 0:+An+Election+with+Only+Limited+Choice&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEE SjAbC2uqap66j5MK3mL54uKxbdb6uwiyAnKG8PdcOnGr7TN3cTV4UToaJbphV Dhh Wjlam VNsCTq DriBh Yin WQ4wn6V9PW9qn WFarJSCkyf Jho VJx2g9JpgEj7MPq-DXaaQb&sig=AHIEtbQZam6lz-BjubssUvDtT73Na95dzA �160 SLOVAKIA Csaky 's orientation to the protection of Hungarian interests was to look outward. An example was his meeting with Laszlo Tokes, a central figure of the hard-line wing of Romania' s minority party UDMR, and Csaky's attendance as an observer at the Carpathian Autonomy Council that Tokes had founded. The two leaders apparently discussed the idea of a cross-national mini-minority parliament. Nothing could have been better calculated to play to ethnic Slovak fears about Slovak Hungarian loyalties.37 In 2008, Bugar left the SMK and founded his own party- one that signaled its moderation on national issues with the name MostHid (bridge in Slovak and Hungarian). Csaky professed to believe, along with Slota, that Most-Hid was a stalking horse (actually a Trojan horse) created and funded by SMER. Beyond that, he refused to discuss future cooperation with Most-Hid on the grounds that it wouldn't make it into parliament. 38 Csaky was quite wrong. Defying the pre-election polls, Most-Hid polled over eight percent, nearly doubling the vote of Csaky's SMK, and replacing it in parliament. What did the 2010 vote mean? Were Hungarian voters seeking moderation, as some media analysts said? Or was it a coordination failure , with Hungarians in Slovakia voting strategically in hopes of getting both SMK and Most-Hid into parliament? (This view would explain why Most-Hid did so much better than the last pre-election polls suggested-ethnic Hungarian voters, seeing that SMK was comfortably over the threshold, may have diverted votes to MostHid/ 9 As in the case of many party schisms, then, the upshot was a crippling of Hungarian minority representation in parliament. 40 37 "Csaky naru~il tabu," SME, September 29, 2008. "Csaky: Nep6jdeme do vlady za kazdu cenu," SME, May 7, 20 10, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanok_ tlac.asp?cl=5363302 39 The Slovak Spectator June 21, 20 IO ; some SMK leaders embraced this theory. "Csaky konti, SMK hl'ada ~efa" SME, June 14, 20 I 0, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanoktlac.asp?cl=5421864. 40 A pre-election poll in 20 IO indicated that Most-Hid was drawing almost 60% of its supporters from SMK, 18% from first time voters, 5% from former non-voters and the rest from other parties. The Slovak Spectator, June 3, 20 I 0. The number of Hungarians in the Most-Hid delegation itself was also lowered by the preferential voting of supporters of OKS (Civic Conservative Party), with whom Most-Hid fo rmed a joint candidate slate. See Viera Zuborova, Viera (2011 ), Marketizacia vonkaj~ej reklamy v parlamentnych vol'bach 20 IO v Slovenskej republike," Acta Politologica 3: I (2011 ):7; statistics at "Vysledky preferenfoeo hlasovania: Vys38 �SLOVAKIA 161 Conclusion: Is there reason to expect a durable effect of the Fico era for identity politics in Slovakia? The policy footprint was not especially deep, and the succeeding Radicova government mitigated some of its impact on Hungarian minority relations. The Fico language law was partially modified in December of 2010, restricting its use, but disappointing minorities-who deemed the amendment "less bad"-by its retention of the penalties for improper language use.41 2011 saw an initiative to resolve the dual citizenship issue by joint agreement with the Hungarian government, although to date without a favorable response from the Orban government. 42 The long-term party system effects are less predictable. For example, while Meciar's slide into oblivion even deepened in the 2012 election, sliding to a mere percentage point of the electorate, it is less obvious that Slota's SNS is on the brink of extinction despite the narrow escape in 2010 and the failure to return to parliament in 2012. Earlier, the SNS had survived a schism (in some respects the mirror image of what happened to SMK after 2006) that actually knocked it out of parliament in 2002; it reconsolidated and returned. In 2012, as well, the party was fractured by the expulsion of deputy leader Anna Belousova, who contested the 2012 election with her own party Nation and Justice. Despite the SNS record of corruption and outrageousness, yet another reunion of the party leadership might resuscitate it, although service in Fico 's government was definitely a poisoned chalice. In the 2010 election, the shrinkage of the SNS deprived Fico of a coalition partner and the prime ministership. As a result of the March, 2012 elections, Fico no longer needed that assistance, since his SMER became the first Slovak party since indeledky volieb do NR SR: 12.06.2010," Most-Hid website, http://www.most-hidke.sk/sk/vo1by-nrsr20 I 0-preferencne-hlasy. 41 "Language Act takes a "less bad" form," Minority Report, Monthly Bulletin on the Hungarian Community in Slovakia, Issue 12-2010, http://www.freeweb.hu/mkdsz l/pdf/MR-Ol-2011.pdf. 42 "Hungary: "Nern! " to Slovak Dual Citizenship Proposal," The Daily.sk, posted 12 July 20 11 , http://www.thedaily.sk/2011 /07 /12/top-news/hungary-nem-to-slovak-dualcitizensh ip-proposal/. The Fico government, elected in March of 2012, signaled that it would slightly modify its earlier draconian response by allowing dual citizenship to Slovaks actually residing in the other country. �162 SLOVAKIA pendence to win an outright majority of the parliamentary seats (83 out of 150).43 As for the emergence of two major partisan competitors for the Hungarian electorate, the ambiguities in interpreting Most-Hid's victory over the SMK stand in the way of a clear prediction. Past electoral outcomes show that being in power has not previously eroded the support of the minority electorate, either in Slovakia or in the parallel cases of Bulgaria and Romania. On that basis, it might be possible to argue for Most-Hid to further consolidate its position. However, what Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia also had in common until this election was the dominance of a single minority party or electoral coalition. 44 The story may be quite different with an alternative and established minority-based party challenging each decision, even from outside parliament. The municipal elections of November 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, which showed the two Hungarian parties splitting their vote, did not clarify the picture. Although an extraparliamentary party like the SMK could not promise influence at the center to woo voters, the SMK retained its established organizational base and its government subsidy and thus retains a presence in politics (it also retains its representation in the European parliament). Local party organizations generally hold the decision-making power to run joint candidates with other parties or to cooperate in local coalitions after elections, and there was indeed some limited cooperation, but also cases, as in the Komarno mayor's race, where dividing the Hungarian vote opened the way to victory for an independent Slovak candidate. The basis for cooperation, however, is shaky. The SMK has grown ever closer to the nationalist Fidesz party in Hungary, and proudly announced in March 2011 that Hungary had incorporated three SMK proposals into its new constitution. Moreover, the SMK party chair, Joszef Berenyi, actually announced in January of 2011 that he was applying for Hungarian citizenship under the controversial new law. These maneuvers only underline the SMK' s distance from the more moderate Most-Hid. During the winter of 2011, de43 Sme, March 11 , 2012. It is true that before 1998, the SMK was not a single entity; rather, it was a group of Hungarian parties which ran on a single slate, not as competitors. 44 �SLOVAKIA 163 spite the clear electoral incentives to do so, the two parties failed to reach any agreement on electoral cooperation in 2012, and contested the parliamentary elections completely separately. Once again, SMK barely missed parliamentary representation, while Most-Hid survived, although it lost more than a percentage point and one MP in the 2012 elections. In closing, it would appear that electoral outcomes and coalition choices matter more than external pressures for normative conformity on minority rights issues, just as they did in the pre-accession period before 2004. Government policies on minorities in Slovakia respond primarily to partisan domestic constituencies, and vary according to the government in power. Even though minority inclusion in government was known to be desirable to Brussels, once Slovakia was safely in the European Union, minority inclusion was not jettisoned, but rather subject to the same kinds of political logic and choices that determined which identity-based party would be included in government before 2004. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 145 HUNGARIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA: UNDER FICO, AFTER EU ACCESSION Carol Skalnik Leff Many scholars of European integration have shown keen interest in the behavior of new members after the pressures of "conditionality" have been lifted, and the political and policy constraints of qualifying for membership have abated. The 2006 election in Slovakia, won by Robert Fico's SMER, was the first contested after Slovakia's EU accession, and offers a useful case study of one of the EU's desiderata- the treatment of ethnic minorities. In this article, I analyze the Fico era's impact on the minority rights agenda by focusing on two points. The first is the Fico government's record in the sphere of minority politics and policy. The second, and in some respects potentially more consequential, is the way the Slovak party system' s identity politics dimension was reconfigured during his term of office. I contextualize this analysis by noting the Fico government's positioning in the evolution of the "two-level game" on minority rights issues played out under successive Slovak governments with the European Union. During the pre-accession period, external pressures to conform to European concerns seemed less important for Slovak responsiveness than the composition of the government in power. The postaccession period analyzed here seems to follow the same pattern, with the Fico government relatively resistant to external initiatives and the successor Radicova government more aligned with EU norms and expectations. The Context: 2006 witnessed the first Slovak elections following the country's accession to the European Union. Slovakia's two previous national elections had been fought in the shadow of EU membership prospects. Both the 1998 and 2002 elections immediately preceded critical moments in the accession process- the choice of candidate states in 1998 and the final decisions on membership invitations in 2002. Karen Henderson made the point most strongly: "While it has been argued that referendums sometimes fulfill the function of second 146 SLOVAKIA order national elections ... Slovakia had twice experienced something approaching the reverse: national elections, in 1998 and 2002 , that were in part referendums about whether Slovakia should join the EU ." 1 Given the strength of pro-integration sentiment, which was rising toward the eightieth percentiles by the late 1990s, I would rephrase this formulation to suggest that the referendum quality of these elections consisted of the question of whether Slovakia would be able to join the EU, or which party could best deliver on membership. As Henderson noted, "the vital question was not whether [Slovaks] wanted the EU, but whether the EU wanted them." 2 In 1998 Vladimir Meciar lost the election and hence the key impediment to EU acceptance of Slovakia was removed. The 2002 results secured the conditions for a final push.3 The two right-of-center coalition governments under SDKU leader Mikulas Dzurinda that served from 1998 to 2006 strove, successfully, to cement Slovakia's case for inclusion in the 2004 EU enlargement. Tactically, one of the centerpiece components of that effort was the inclusion of the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK) in both governments. The alignment strategy to please Europe in the case is quite evident, and noticeable in Romania and Bulgaria as well; for the EU, ethnic minority parties were the preferred coalition partners, and radical nationalist participation a source of EU concern . Lacking its own minority rights acquis at the collapse of Com4 munism, the European Union's expectations about respect for minority rights protection was often ad hoc, and rested on the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 rather than on developed community law. 1 Karen Henderson, " EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus," West European Politics 27:4 (September, 2004), 653 . 2 Henderson, 656. 3 By 2002, the incumbent government urged voters to let it "fini sh what we started" and take that last "one more step (one last step is needed to the EU and NA TO... with us you' ll make it). The SDKU, in its famous peaceable kingdom billboard (a cat and dog entwined together) reminded voters that the party had managed to maintain a fract ious coalition : "Thanks to that, we are on the threshold of NATO and the EU." 4 The European Union was still the European Economic Communities in 1989, but for simplicity 's sake, I will refer to the "European Union" throughout. For a critique of the EU's minority rights conditionality, see Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionali ty: Minority Ri ghts in Slovakia," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe I (2003), 20-29. SLOVAKIA 147 However, all states with substantial minorities were well aware that minority treatment by the government was under scrutiny; hence, the elevation of the SMK to a coalition partner was accompanied by policy adjustments in the eroded minority rights regime of the Meciar period. The 2006 elections that brought Fico to power, however, occurred in a very different international strategic context, one in which Slovakia's European fate no longer depended on electoral outcomes and government composition. "We got you into Europe" lacked the resonance of SDKU's (Slovak Christian Democratic Party) 2002 appeal "You need us to get into Europe." 5 However, the economy that had earned Slovakia the epithet "Tatra Tiger" had not benefited all; Slovakia's unemployment rate of 15% in 2006 was one of the highest in Europe (and that was an improvement over the peak of 19% in 2000-2002). Small wonder, then, that Robert Fico 's populist critique of the reform era found powerful electoral resonance in 2006. His new government, however constituted, would face different international and domestic constraints than had been true for the previous decade. For the purpose of this analysis, the most salient point is that the externally-induced incentives for minority inclusion, and for adherence to minority-tolerant policies, were less pronounced than in the past. One thing, however, remained constant. It was generally impossible to form a majority coalition without including one of the two key parties aligned on the identity dimension of the party system: either the SMK or the Slovak National Party (SNS). 6 The choice between them had been definitive for the tenor of the government's minority relations policy after past elections. The question wasn't simply, therefore, whether the SMK was in or out, but rather that its exclusion likely meant the inclusion of the SNS. SMER's leadership chose the latter option (a choice that will be discussed below), with 5 In 2002, the incumbent anti- Meciar parties urged voters to let them "finish what we started" and take that last "one more step." (the billboard message: one last step is needed to the EU and NATO ... with us you'll make it). 6 In 1998, the inclusion of the SMK produced an over-sized coalition . SMK was not necessary for a parliamentary majority. It was, however, necessary, for agenda control and constitutional change, including the transition to a directly elected presidency that was virtually the first order of business of the Dzurinda government that formed the coalition. 148 SLOVAKIA consequences that shaped the minority rights agenda for the Fico government. Minority Policy Dimensions of the Fico Government: Policy relevant to minorities in Slovakia has followed the trajectory of government change. Meciar's second and third governments in the l 990 's had ruled with the support of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and pursued minority-relevant policies that evoked European criticism, either because of overt actions (language and education laws) or omissions (the failure to pass a minority-language law to clarify and codify the language rights of non-Slovaks). By contrast, the three right-of-center governments, led by Jozef Moravcik and twice by Dzurinda, ruled with the support of the Hungarian minority coalition and proved responsive to the European push for stronger minority protections. The coalition pattern continued under Fico and his successor lveta Radicova, with Fico's left-of-center government incorporating the SNS and Radicova's right-of-center coalition including the new Hungarian-Slovak Most-Hid formation (Note that Slovakia's predictable pattern of coalition alliances is by no means characteristic: in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia-the three other East and Central European countries with established and governmentally salient minority parties- both right-and left-of-center governments have ruled with minority party support. In Slovakia, the SMK has not changed sides). Policy initiatives cannot fully capture the almost immediate change of tone in Hungarian-Slovak relations, marked by patriotic football hooliganism and the virulent controversy over the Malina/ Malinova affair.7 The core of Fico' s minority policy-making, however, was a re-balancing toward Slovak language rights in uradny (official) communication, and correspondingly greater ambiguity about the security of minority language rights. The first controversy emerged over the potentially restrictive impact of the 2008 amendments 7 Hedvig Malina was a Hungarian student in Nitra who in 2006 reported to the police that she had been assaulted for speaking Hungarian in public. The complaint generated a mini-Dreyfus affa ir, with one' s political orientation determining whether or not to give credence to her claims. The government ultimately sided against her, and lodged perjury charges. The Fico government charged Hungary with unacceptable interference in the case. See also "Slovakia and Hungary: Trouble in Felvidek," Transitions Online, September 5, 2006. SLOVAKIA 149 to the education law regarding Hungarian language education. In the spring of 2009, the focus was on Hungarian language textbooks, with the government seeking to supplant minority-produced course materials with translations of Slovak texts. This was accompanied by a protracted disagreement about the rendering of Slovak place names. For example, the government wanted the Danube river in Slovak (Dunaj) rather than Hungarian (Duna), even in Hungarian texts. The compromise, reached in February of 2009, appears to allow the previous practice of using "deep-rooted" geographical place names in Hungarian with the Slovak names in parentheses. Additional concern was generated by the restriction of Hungarian minority Radio Patria broadcasts to short wave transmitters that did not reach Bratislava or eastern Slovakia.8 The Language Law But the most internationally visible and resonant initiative was a revisiting of the language laws of the 1990s, as amended in 1999 under the Dzurinda government. As Martin Votruba has pointed out, a major thrust of the 1999 amendment (Act on the Use of Minority Language) had been to remove the penalties (fines) that Meciar's government had enacted for violations of the 1995 law establishing the primacy of the Slovak language. 9 Hastily drafted to meet EU expectations and, therefore, imprecise in some passages, the 1999 amendment did establish rights to the use of minority language in official communications.10 In response to the status quo, the coalition program of the Fico government in 2006 included commitments to safeguard the state language and in particular the "promotion of Slovak culture in the mixed regions ." Legislation fulfilling this pledge by privileging the use of the Slovak language in official communications passed in 8 See Kata Eplenyi, "The Language Rights of Hungarian Communities in Slovakia and Romania: The Impacts and Perspectives of EU-Membership," Masters Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Nationalism Studies Program, 2009. 9 Votruba 's analysis of the provisions of the law is the most comprehensive I have found. Martin Votruba, "The Uncommon Language: Bratislava, Budapest, and Brussels," Slovak Studies Association Newsletter, volume 33 (2009). See also Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gal, "The New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics?" ECMI Working paper #8, September 2000. http ://www.ecmi.de/download/working paper 8.pdf. 10 Eplenyi, "Language Rights. " 150 SLOVAKIA 2009, and provoked an immediate storm of international protest, largely centered on the hefty penalties (up to 5,000 euros) that could be imposed for violations. Media commentary tended to paint the legislation with a broad brush, whether in praise or blame, and thus to obfuscate the actual provisions. It would appear for example, that vivid scenarios of fines for an ethnically Hungarian patient speaking the native tongue to his ethnically Hungarian doctor in Hungarian are inapt, since the government maintained that only legal entities and not individuals were slated to be fined for violations . 11 Nor were the frequently invoked foreign-language church services under threat. However, in protecting Slovak language use, the law clearly appeared to have a chilling effect on minority language rights, and aroused vehement criticism from both the Hungarian minority and from neighboring Hungary, as well as from critics in the European Parliament. For its part, the government tended to make somewhat misleading claims about international approval (a familiar pattern in the Meciar years as well) . Emblematic of suspicion about those claims was the opposition demand that the OSCE advisory opinion on the law be published in full , without abridgement. A slightly exasperated Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, visited Slovakia by invitation during the controversy, and chastised both sides for exaggerating the OSCE position. He reiterated the OSCE conclusion that the law met international standards, but added "that doesn't mean that I necessarily think it's a good law;" he said that the High Commission would like to see the fines omitted from the legislation, and warned that the normative validity of some provisions would depend on their implementation. 12 The ongoing engagement of external arbiters was evident in this contra11 Nonetheless, the successor Radicova government introduced legislation in September of 2010 to lower fines and to explicitly lift their imposition on individuals except where citizen safety and property ri ghts were in question, to permit nonSlovak records in minority schools, and to exempt transport, communications and postal employees. Catherine McNally, "Are Relations between Hungary and Slovakia beginning to thaw?" CS!S, October 5, 2010, http ://csis.org. 12 OSCE Envoy Proffers 'Advice' On Language Law, European Dialogue, September 30, 2009, http://eurodialogue.org/osce/OSCE-Envoy-Proffers-Advice-On-Language-Law; Zuzana Vaskova, "Slovakia's Controversial Language Law," EU Reporter, September 28, 2009, http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/slovakias-controversial-language-law. SLOVAKIA 151 versy, although Slovakia was no longer constrained by mandatory monitoring. A second feature of policy during the Fico administration was an exchange of symbolic and substantive rebuffs between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, implicitly or usually explicitly targeting the issue of loyalties to state or nation. An official state visit between Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, the first such in eight years, was cancelled after the language law controversy . 13 Another unfortunate incident surrounded the unveiling of a statue of St. Stephen in the city of Komarno in August of 2009. Hungary's president Laszlo S6lyom planned to attend this event as a private citizen, but was stopped from crossing the bridge between Hungary and Slovakia after a diplomatic exchange confirmed that he would not be permitted to enter Slovakia for this purpose. The Slovak government considered this event a provocation, noting that no high Slovak official had been invited to the unveiling. In July of 2010, the newly-installed nationalist FIDESZ government in Hungary further roiled the waters by taking the incident to the European Court of Justice. (Ex-president S6lyom returned to lay a wreath at the statue without incident in August of 2010). 14 The most sensitive development in Slovak-Hungarian relations occurred in the interval between the April Hungarian elections of 2010 and the June Slovak elections. A few days after its installation, the FIDESZ government, led by Viktor Orban, lobbed a political grenade into the Slovak election campaign by approving a new law on dual citizenship. By a crushing vote of 344-3 with five abstentions, the Hungarian parliament sanctioned measures that would allow ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship as of January, 2011 even without the intention of residing in Hungary (they would not have voting rights in Hungary itself) . The Fico government recalled its ambassador from Budapest, called a session of the security council, and retaliated with legislation forfeiting Slovak citizenship 13 Lubos Palata "Slovak Language Law: Slap in the Face," Transitions Online, July 13, 2009. http :ijwww.ceeo1 .com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=f3bblacd-4a304701-9d6f-6889e003d4bc&articleld=3fa741b5-2f9f-4663-9824-a43e09e 7fe4b. 14 "Mad'arsky exprezident S6lyom presiel do Komama bez problemov," SME, August 22, 2010. 152 SLOVAKIA to those taking additional Hungarian citizenship. 15 Orban 's somewhat baffling timing would appear likely to damage the electoral prospects of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and to bolster Slovak nationalist voting. The European community could only watch ineffectively, urge a negotiated settlement to the question, and ponder what citizenship norms might be appropriate to cross-border minorities. 16 Overall, the Fico government's minority rights initiatives bear a pronounced resemblance to those of the Meciar era, the last time the SNS was in government and the governmental orientation stressed the risks to Slovak identity of a multi-ethnic state. As in the case of the Meciar governments, external concerns seemed largely ineffectual in modifying the course of policy-making or ameliorating relations with Hungary. The policy-making dynamics, however, are less complex than the partisan political dynamics, to which I now tum. The Fico Government and Its Impact on the Identity Dimension of the Party System. Although minority relations may appear to be only a delimited segment of the larger political picture, in two important respects they were arguably central to Fico's governance because of the impact they have had on coalition formation in 2006 and 2010 and on coalition politics in between. Indeed, Fico 's government notably shaped the party system itself, but not only in terms of its national identity dimension. In both respects the impact had international ramifications. I now want to focus on this larger picture. 15 Previous Slovak law allowed for dual citizenship, but with certain provisions that could be adapted to bar dual citizenship in this particular instance. See Dagmar Kusa, "The Slovak Question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship during the Quest for National Self-Determination and after," in Rainer Baubock, Bernhard Perching and Wiebke Sievers, eds ., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), 275-303. Note that Romania remained silent over Orban 's move, although it equally affected Romania' s large Hungarian minority. The Romanian government had previously used Orban 's ploy in extending citizenship rights to ethnically Romanian Moldovans in 2009, and so could hardly complain about a similar law in Hungary. See Slovak Sfectator, August 10, 2010. 1 See for example, Rainer Baubock, ed., "Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to Respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat," EU Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/75 (2010, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy). SLOVAKIA 153 Government formation in post-communist states has consistently proved challenging, although the challenges have varied systematically from state to state. A common thread through most of the postcommunist era to date, however, has been the Euro-relevance of coalition choices. In the 2002 election campaign, SMER's inaugural effort, Fico refused to name preferred coalition partners or to rule out the HZDS (although he emphatically rejected a cabinet shared with either Meciar or Dzurinda, leaders he styled as representative of an 17 old, corrupt generation). Some analysts have plausibly suggested that his failure to exclude the HZDS raised voter doubts about a Fico-led government's capacity to complete the EU integration project and helped to account for his last minute sag in the polls. 18 The coalition formation process after the 2006 elections was undoubtedly critical to the subsequent pattern of party system dynamics in ways I will investigate below. Frontrunner Fico had promised a coalition that Europe could approve. In the late stages of the campaign, some analysts dismissed the possibility of a SMER-HZDSSNS coalition (including two political formations most unpopular in Europe because of their perceived demagogic, authoritarian and nationalist leadership) as a product of incumbent Dzurinda's fear-mongering. SMER derided this as a bogey-man. Fico characterized the coalition as a "specter" created by Dzurinda. 19 SMER's Vice President Robert Kalinak told reporters , "Smer will not be part of any government that is not internationally accepted, and I think that's a pretty clear statement that you can deduce all kinds of things from." 20 .... But apparently not the coalition that actually emerged in 2006. In the event, the "worst case scenario" was not merely a scare tactic. The victorious Smer did indeed invite the HZDS and the SNS into a coalition, albeit explicitly without either of their leaders, in cabinet positions. And Fico assured the public, at home and abroad, that the presence of the SNS in government did not dilute existing commitments to minority and human rights, again signaling that minority parties were not pariahs . The Bratislava daily Novy cas dub17 Fico was born in 1964, Dzurinda in 1955 and Meciar in 1942. Tim Haughton, "We Will finish What We've Started: The 2002 Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4 (December, 2003), 65-90. 19 Transitions Online, June 19, 2006; TASR, June 12, 2006. 20 Interview with Robert Kalinak, Slovak Spectator, June 12, 2006. 18 154 SLOVAKIA bed this the "you can't be serious" coalition-and it prompted an immediate external response. The European Union cannot dictate who is eligible to govern a member state. This issue was clarified with the case of Austria, a neutral state that joined the EU in 1995, once membership ceased to be associated with the divisions of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, the use of conditionality after accession to membership received a major setback. In 2000, Austria breached a long-standing but informal West European consensus against the inclusion of the radical right in democratic governments- a so-called "cordon sanitaire" against extremist parties--when Austria's Christian Democrats accepted Jorg Haider and his Freedom Party as junior coalition partners. Appalled that a party led by a man who attended SS reunions was included in a member government, the EU created an impromptu and awkward state of "diplomatic isolation" that proved largely counterproductive, and embarrassing in its implication that the European Union, riddled with its own democratic deficits, had the right to judge the democratically elected governments of its members. The EU backed down after seven months.21 If the EU wouldn't act, the European party formation in which SMER was an observing member- the Party of European Socialists (PES)--was not similarly constrained, although ultimately equally ineffectual. PES publicly expressed "concern and deep misgivings" over Fico's coalition choices, as well as "shock" and "deep disgust," for good measure. Club deputy chair Johannes Swoboda expressed doubt that such a government could uphold European values; 22 and the Belgian socialist MEP asked "Don't you feel ashamed as a social 21 EU concern persists. The long-term legacy of the abortive effort to assert European values in the Austrian case, and to provide for response to future democratic deviations is Article 7 of both the Nice Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a so-called "emergency brake," a decision-making mechanism to impose sanctions on member states that manifest a "serious breach" of European values specified in the treaty under Article 2. Approving the Lisbon Treaty thus does provide a new conditionality mechanism; it remains to be seen how badly it is needed and whether it will have any practical utility. See http ://register.consilium.europa.eu/gdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf 2 "Evropsti socialiste znepokojeni vznikajici koalici na Slovensku," CTK, June 29, 2006. SLOVAKIA 155 democrat of forming a coalition with a party known for its xenophobia?"23 In October 2006, PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced: The PES resolution refers specifically to the Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states "all PES parties adhere to the following principles .. . to refrain from any form ofpolitical alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred. " 24 Only in 2008 was SMER 'S membership application conditionally reinstated after both SMER and SNS submitted letters confirming their commitment to minority rights, a largely declarative gesture. But this so-called "nightmare coalition" with the HZDS and SNS was not inevitable. The contrasting case of Bulgaria is instructive. The victorious Borisov party in 2009 ruled out a coalition with the Turkish minority MRF during the election campaign as part of the incumbent government he attacked. Like Fico, candidate Borisov employed a populist discourse-what Pop-Eleches would call the new centrist populism 25- and an appeal that, while taking pot shots at minorities, was not radically nationalist. His "outsider" strategy, however, dictated a rejection of all the status quo parties, and particularly the incumbents. Fico, on the other hand, although not loath to criticize minorities, had moderated his populist appeals and reoriented to social democracy by the 2006 election. 26 Fico gave serious consideration to a KDH/MKP coalition, but could not get agreement on it-Miroslav Kusy notes that the KDH leadership was badly and bitterly split on the possibility, with some insisting on a set of moral issues (such as ban23 24 25 Slovak Spectator, September 11 , 2006. http ://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family. Pop-Eleches, "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism," World Politics 62 (2010), 221-60. 26 See Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia," Politics and Policy 37:4 (2009), 82 1-41 . 156 SLOVAKIA ning same-sex marriage and contraception); KDH deliberations were so protracted that Fico ultimately gave up. 27 KDH's hesitation was the mostly widely cited reason for the sinking of the alternative SMER-SMK-KDH coalition, both by media and coalition partners. 28 Despite the programmatic dissonances with SMER, such an alignment had the attraction for KDH and SMK of averting the coalition that did in fact emerge. In any case, Fico is a clever politician, and he realized that the SNS and HZDS would be easier to undercut. Fico could and did steal some of the SNS political clothes and a bit of its electorate by annexing the nationalist issue-a kind of electoral poaching that would have been impossible against the KDH and SMK--and in Meciar's HZDS he had an aging and politically dying junior partner. Fico is also something of a control freak- he immediately sidelined Monika Flasikova-Benova, a public critic of his coalition choice, at the next party congress by stripping her and others of leadership roles-(he was also canny in avoiding the appointment of too many MPs as ministers, who if discarded, might return to parliament and defect from the party). His final coalition choices therefore, would be more malleable, provided he could manage the public response, in particular, to SNS outbursts. In the new government, Meciar's party alarmingly claimed the Justice portfolio. SNS portfolios included Agriculture, Regional Development and Education, all highly salient policy domains for minorities. Agriculture and Regional Development, previously held by SMK, are germane to economic conditions in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia, which are generally more rural and less developed than the north or west. And putting education policy in the hands of SNS raised concerns that minority issues would get short shrift. 27 Miroslav Kusy, "Catastrophic Scenario in Bratislava," The Analyst: Central and Eastern European Review 2 (2006), 37. The KDH division was so pronounced as to cause a leadership crisis and resignations from the party leadership in its aftermath. 28 See for example the comments by Ivan Miklos in Hospodtirske noviny, June 29, 2006: "The European Peoples Party won't understand very well, how it is possible that these three EPP member parties weren't able to reach agreement. In this sense, I think that the responsibility for this situation lies especially on the KDH. " In this case, Miklos blamed the KDH for balking at bringing the HZDS into a SDKUKDH-SMK coalition. SLOVAKIA 157 Two related effects of this government's tenure on party system dynamics are worth noting. At the majority nationalist end of the identity continuum, one can visualize Fico as a political vampire, draining his coalition partners of standing and voters. Fico preempted the national issue from his more volatile and extremist coalition colleague, Jan Slota of the SNS, by challenging the national sentiment of historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, as well as of the media, both of whom he accused of exhibiting "un-Slovak" tendencies. Fico proclaimed 2008 as the "Year of the Slovak Nation." He re-constructed pre-national history with a claim on the Great Moravian Empire having consisted of "ancient Slovaks"29 and commissioned a statue of warrior King (Prince) Svatopluk for the Bratislava Castle courtyard-an equestrian monument installed just before the elections in 2010 amid great controversy about the historicity of the claims made about his ethnicity, the Byzantine cross on his shield, and even whether he was actually a king.30 From the outset, Fico tended to overlook rather than to chastise the SNS and its incendiary leader. He was content to let Slota's outrageous statements pillory his own credibility. A case in point: Slota apparently sought to launch his party's electoral campaign in early 2010 with the pronouncement that Hungary was planning a military 31 invasion of Slovakia to revise the Treaty of Trianon. Fico did chastise the spectacular SNS corruption in office. Both in the 1990s and in the Fico government, the SNS has been noted for ministerial corruption. The SNS held two portfolios-Construction and Regional development and Environment--in the Fico government, in addition to a deputy prime-ministership. Both incumbents at Construction and Regional Development were dismissed in quick succession over the so-called "Bulletin-Board" tender, in which public procurement procedures were violated in favor of an in-house 29 "Fico's Revisionist History," Transitions Online, February 29, 2008. ° Fico expressed the hope that the statue would become a national pilgrimage site, 3 but the statue immediately became politicized as the extremist group "Our Slovakia" came to its rescue (a commission on its dissolution has been formed) without an assembly permit. As of November 2010, the party's website has youtube video of riot police blocking the pilgrimage. Meanwhile, anti-racist groups mobilized to challenge the party. Fico also appropriated the 18 th century social bandit Jano~ik as a Social Democrat. 31 The Slovak Spectator, March 24, 2010. 158 SLOVAKIA process that awarded contracts to two firms with close ties to the SNS leader Jan Slota. SNS Environment Minister Jaroslav Izak, who was asked to resign for his ministry's mishandling of EU environmental funds , was followed by Jan Chrbet, whose forced resignation was triggered by a scandal surrounding the awarding of carbon emissions contracts on terms unfavorable to the government. When his successor from the SNS, Viliam Tursky, was also removed for murky contract awards, Prime Minister Fico announced that it was time to take the environmental portfolio away from the SNS.32 (Startlingly, Slota demanded the human and minority rights portfolio in exchange for the lost environmental slot.) Hence, by the end of his term in office, Fico had succeeded not only in pre-empting Slota with a more respectable nationalism, but also in discrediting him and his party on the politically winning issue of anti-corruption (a useful diversion from SMER 's own corruption problems).33 By 2010, the debilitated SNS squeaked into the subsequent parliament by only a tenth of a percentage point over the electoral threshold and lost more than half of its previous seats (down from twenty to nine )- a voting hemorrhage that pre-election opinion polls suggest went to Fico. 34 Tibor Kis concludes that Fico "offered voters a European alternative to Vladimir Meciar's nationalist L'S-HZDS and a social and ' Slovak' alternative relative to centre-right organiza- 32 See The Slovak Spectator, August 31, 2009. http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11 /people often get what they want n ot what they need.html. 33 SNS corruption problems might have been predicted from its previous term in office, and by the general trends in ministerial corruption region-wide. In the overall universe of cabinet ministers in 13 post-communist EU members and candidate members serving between 1990 and 2009, minority politicians were just about exactly average in their involvement in corruption scandals (13%). The majority nationalist party ministers, by contrast, were close to twice as likely to be scandal prone (23%) as the norm, and thereby more embarrassing as coalition partners. Involvement in corruption scandals as used here does not imply eventually proven guilt in a court of law. (Corruption Involvement is coded if the minister is formally investigated by law enforcement agencies or parliament, arrested and tried, or documented as engaging in suspect behavior by a corruption agency). 34 See Kevin Deegan-Krause 's Pozorblog, 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Post-Election Report, July 14, 2010, http://www.pozorb1og. com/ . SLOVAKIA 159 tions."35 Fico appears, indeed, to have been too successful in this regard: As Mesik notes, "By attracting SNS as well as HZDS voters, Fico successfully cannibalized his partners in the government and only woke up to the day when his by far strongest party did not have partners to form a government with." Hungarian Minority Politics If Fico proved effective (and somewhat self-defeating) in absorbing votes from his coalition partners in the 2010 elections, the exclusion of the SMK from government also had ramifications for minority party politics. At first, the SMK' s position on the opposition benches had some echoes of the 1990s. Amidst a general disarray after losing power, it was striking that the Fico era started with the failure of the ethnic Slovak opposition parties to back the SMK on issues like the Hedviga Malinova /Malina Hedvig case. The three opposition parties did not meet for four months until the controversy regarding Deputy Agriculture Minister Marian Zahumensky. Second, the transition to opposition acerbated longstanding tensions within the SMK. As long as the SMK was in government, tensions within the party could be curbed. Going into opposition meant not only a loss of policy influence, but also a time of reckoning. In March of 2007, the popular and moderate Bela Bugar moved on his less moderate vice-chair- the venerable communist-era dissident Miklos Duray--by seeking to abolish the vice-chair position; the effort rebounded, leading to an upset victory for the party leadership by Pal Csaky. The new SMK was ever more closely identified with Hungary and particularly with FIDESZ, a stance that proved an excellent foil for Slota and the SNS . The SMK was "increasingly perceived and portrayed by Slovak politicians as an extraterritorial branch of FIDESZ." 36 35 Tibor Kis, "Smer: Success Story or Scandal?" The Analyst-Central and Eastern European Review I (2008), 67 . 36 Mesik, Juraj , Slovakia 2010: An Election with Only Limited Choice (Prague: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), p. I. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache :NXmv IM538AJ :www.boell.cz/downloads/slovakia-20 I 0( I ).pdf+Slovakia+20 I 0:+An+Election+with+Only+Limited+Choice&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEE SjAbC2uqap66j5MK3mL54uKxbdb6uwiyAnKG8PdcOnGr7TN3cTV4UToaJbphV Dhh Wjlam VNsCTq DriBh Yin WQ4wn6V9PW9qn WFarJSCkyf Jho VJx2g9JpgEj7MPq-DXaaQb&sig=AHIEtbQZam6lz-BjubssUvDtT73Na95dzA 160 SLOVAKIA Csaky 's orientation to the protection of Hungarian interests was to look outward. An example was his meeting with Laszlo Tokes, a central figure of the hard-line wing of Romania' s minority party UDMR, and Csaky's attendance as an observer at the Carpathian Autonomy Council that Tokes had founded. The two leaders apparently discussed the idea of a cross-national mini-minority parliament. Nothing could have been better calculated to play to ethnic Slovak fears about Slovak Hungarian loyalties.37 In 2008, Bugar left the SMK and founded his own party- one that signaled its moderation on national issues with the name MostHid (bridge in Slovak and Hungarian). Csaky professed to believe, along with Slota, that Most-Hid was a stalking horse (actually a Trojan horse) created and funded by SMER. Beyond that, he refused to discuss future cooperation with Most-Hid on the grounds that it wouldn't make it into parliament. 38 Csaky was quite wrong. Defying the pre-election polls, Most-Hid polled over eight percent, nearly doubling the vote of Csaky's SMK, and replacing it in parliament. What did the 2010 vote mean? Were Hungarian voters seeking moderation, as some media analysts said? Or was it a coordination failure , with Hungarians in Slovakia voting strategically in hopes of getting both SMK and Most-Hid into parliament? (This view would explain why Most-Hid did so much better than the last pre-election polls suggested-ethnic Hungarian voters, seeing that SMK was comfortably over the threshold, may have diverted votes to MostHid/ 9 As in the case of many party schisms, then, the upshot was a crippling of Hungarian minority representation in parliament. 40 37 "Csaky naru~il tabu," SME, September 29, 2008. "Csaky: Nep6jdeme do vlady za kazdu cenu," SME, May 7, 20 10, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanok_ tlac.asp?cl=5363302 39 The Slovak Spectator June 21, 20 IO ; some SMK leaders embraced this theory. "Csaky konti, SMK hl'ada ~efa" SME, June 14, 20 I 0, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanoktlac.asp?cl=5421864. 40 A pre-election poll in 20 IO indicated that Most-Hid was drawing almost 60% of its supporters from SMK, 18% from first time voters, 5% from former non-voters and the rest from other parties. The Slovak Spectator, June 3, 20 I 0. The number of Hungarians in the Most-Hid delegation itself was also lowered by the preferential voting of supporters of OKS (Civic Conservative Party), with whom Most-Hid fo rmed a joint candidate slate. See Viera Zuborova, Viera (2011 ), Marketizacia vonkaj~ej reklamy v parlamentnych vol'bach 20 IO v Slovenskej republike," Acta Politologica 3: I (2011 ):7; statistics at "Vysledky preferenfoeo hlasovania: Vys38 SLOVAKIA 161 Conclusion: Is there reason to expect a durable effect of the Fico era for identity politics in Slovakia? The policy footprint was not especially deep, and the succeeding Radicova government mitigated some of its impact on Hungarian minority relations. The Fico language law was partially modified in December of 2010, restricting its use, but disappointing minorities-who deemed the amendment "less bad"-by its retention of the penalties for improper language use.41 2011 saw an initiative to resolve the dual citizenship issue by joint agreement with the Hungarian government, although to date without a favorable response from the Orban government. 42 The long-term party system effects are less predictable. For example, while Meciar's slide into oblivion even deepened in the 2012 election, sliding to a mere percentage point of the electorate, it is less obvious that Slota's SNS is on the brink of extinction despite the narrow escape in 2010 and the failure to return to parliament in 2012. Earlier, the SNS had survived a schism (in some respects the mirror image of what happened to SMK after 2006) that actually knocked it out of parliament in 2002; it reconsolidated and returned. In 2012, as well, the party was fractured by the expulsion of deputy leader Anna Belousova, who contested the 2012 election with her own party Nation and Justice. Despite the SNS record of corruption and outrageousness, yet another reunion of the party leadership might resuscitate it, although service in Fico 's government was definitely a poisoned chalice. In the 2010 election, the shrinkage of the SNS deprived Fico of a coalition partner and the prime ministership. As a result of the March, 2012 elections, Fico no longer needed that assistance, since his SMER became the first Slovak party since indeledky volieb do NR SR: 12.06.2010," Most-Hid website, http://www.most-hidke.sk/sk/vo1by-nrsr20 I 0-preferencne-hlasy. 41 "Language Act takes a "less bad" form," Minority Report, Monthly Bulletin on the Hungarian Community in Slovakia, Issue 12-2010, http://www.freeweb.hu/mkdsz l/pdf/MR-Ol-2011.pdf. 42 "Hungary: "Nern! " to Slovak Dual Citizenship Proposal," The Daily.sk, posted 12 July 20 11 , http://www.thedaily.sk/2011 /07 /12/top-news/hungary-nem-to-slovak-dualcitizensh ip-proposal/. The Fico government, elected in March of 2012, signaled that it would slightly modify its earlier draconian response by allowing dual citizenship to Slovaks actually residing in the other country. 162 SLOVAKIA pendence to win an outright majority of the parliamentary seats (83 out of 150).43 As for the emergence of two major partisan competitors for the Hungarian electorate, the ambiguities in interpreting Most-Hid's victory over the SMK stand in the way of a clear prediction. Past electoral outcomes show that being in power has not previously eroded the support of the minority electorate, either in Slovakia or in the parallel cases of Bulgaria and Romania. On that basis, it might be possible to argue for Most-Hid to further consolidate its position. However, what Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia also had in common until this election was the dominance of a single minority party or electoral coalition. 44 The story may be quite different with an alternative and established minority-based party challenging each decision, even from outside parliament. The municipal elections of November 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, which showed the two Hungarian parties splitting their vote, did not clarify the picture. Although an extraparliamentary party like the SMK could not promise influence at the center to woo voters, the SMK retained its established organizational base and its government subsidy and thus retains a presence in politics (it also retains its representation in the European parliament). Local party organizations generally hold the decision-making power to run joint candidates with other parties or to cooperate in local coalitions after elections, and there was indeed some limited cooperation, but also cases, as in the Komarno mayor's race, where dividing the Hungarian vote opened the way to victory for an independent Slovak candidate. The basis for cooperation, however, is shaky. The SMK has grown ever closer to the nationalist Fidesz party in Hungary, and proudly announced in March 2011 that Hungary had incorporated three SMK proposals into its new constitution. Moreover, the SMK party chair, Joszef Berenyi, actually announced in January of 2011 that he was applying for Hungarian citizenship under the controversial new law. These maneuvers only underline the SMK' s distance from the more moderate Most-Hid. During the winter of 2011, de43 Sme, March 11 , 2012. It is true that before 1998, the SMK was not a single entity; rather, it was a group of Hungarian parties which ran on a single slate, not as competitors. 44 SLOVAKIA 163 spite the clear electoral incentives to do so, the two parties failed to reach any agreement on electoral cooperation in 2012, and contested the parliamentary elections completely separately. Once again, SMK barely missed parliamentary representation, while Most-Hid survived, although it lost more than a percentage point and one MP in the 2012 elections. In closing, it would appear that electoral outcomes and coalition choices matter more than external pressures for normative conformity on minority rights issues, just as they did in the pre-accession period before 2004. Government policies on minorities in Slovakia respond primarily to partisan domestic constituencies, and vary according to the government in power. Even though minority inclusion in government was known to be desirable to Brussels, once Slovakia was safely in the European Union, minority inclusion was not jettisoned, but rather subject to the same kinds of political logic and choices that determined which identity-based party would be included in government before 2004.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hungarian Minority Politics in Slovakia: Under Fico, After EU Accession Description An account of the resource Carol Skalnik Leff Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 145-163 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Leff, Carol Skalnik, 1947- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d023ccaeedb74cebe19168dfd1930829.pdf eb5a622a7a925213cb2adf3b3c0ef1cb PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 37 AN UNWELCOME GUEST: MILAN HODZA IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS BETWEEN 1941 AND 1944 V Roman Licko In December of 1938 Milan Hodza, a Slovak politician and the last prime minister of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, went into exile in France. There, along with Stefan Osusky, another Slovak statesman and diplomat, he became the leading figure of Slovak democratic exiles before 1 the outbreak of WW II. Towards the end of 1939 Rodia established the Slovak National Council, which, under his auspices, was reorganized in early 1940 into the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Both political bodies subscribed to the democratic ideals of pre-war Czechoslovakia, as well as to the belief in a continuation of Czechoslovak statehood.2 However, in stark 1 Before Hodfa' s arrival in Paris in November of 1939, Ambassador Stefan Osusky had been the leading figure of the Czechoslovak resistance movement operating from France. His greatest achievement was the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement concerning the creation of a new Czechoslovak army in France by which the French government recognised de fa cto the continued existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period Osusky and Hodza shared similar ideas about Slovakia' s future . They both unequivocally supported the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. However, they strongly opposed the centralism of the inter-war Prague governments. Osusky favoured a federal constitutional arrangement between Czechs and Slovaks. Hodza spoke of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored ' CzechoSlovakia'. Osusky maintained close contact with Hodza, who was, at that time, in London. The two men even cooperated in the preparation of a memorandum of Slovak demands in the lead-up to the establishment of the Benes-led Czechoslovak National Committee in France. Interestingly enough, Osusky did not become a member of any of the resistance organizations established by Hodza after his arrival in Paris. For more on the Hodfa-Osusky co-operation during this period see Slavomir Michalek, "Hodza a Osusky, nazory a pozicie v rokoch 1939- 1941 ," in Milan Hodia-statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 301- 18. 2 This paper uses the more widely accepted spellings ' Czechoslovakia' and 'Czechoslovak'. In reference to Hodza' s ideas, however, the spellings 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak' have been retained as these were the forms preferred by Hodfa himself. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 adopted the unhyphenated spelling of the name. In November of 1938 the country officially returned to the hyphenated spelling 'Czecho-Slovakia' in recognition of the fact that Slovakia had been declared an autonomous region. The use of the one name or the other, by both Czechs and Slovaks throughout the war, had political connotations. Generally speaking, the Slovaks who favoured the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after WW II but op- �38 SLOVAKIA opposetion to Edward Benes, the leading figure of the Czech democratic exiles, Hodza advocated a thoroughly decentralized model of a new Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement, with self-governing status for Slovakia. After the failure to find common ground on this issue with Benes, who consistently refused to allow any political representation of Slovak federalists in his exile government-to-be, Hodza moved to London. The German occupation of France in the summer of 1940 and the ensuing Battle of Britain in September of 1940 speeded up Britain' s recognition ofBenes's government-in-exile. Feeling powerless and marginalised, Hodza saw no purpose in participating in any government headed by Benes. By the autumn of 1941 he decided to leave Britain and in October of that year he arrived in the United States. There he pursued two political objectives: he intended to convince politically-minded Slovak Americans to support his programme of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, he attempted to lobby the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind the creation of a federation of Central European states. This paper, which draws primarily on research in United States government archives, attempts to trace Hodza ' s political campaign among Slovak Americans from the point of view of the Roosevelt administration. At the same time, it follows Hodza ' s efforts to engage the American government in a dialogue concerning a comprehensive post-war peace settlement in Central Europe. With the help of secondary literature on the subject, the study assesses the success of these attempts, and how they were viewed by the chief foreign policy makers in the Roosevelt administration. 3 posed the pre-war unitary constitutional arrangement between the two nations preferred the hyphenated designation. 3 The first attempt to document the activities of Milan Hodfa in the USA was made by his close associate, Michal Mudry Sebik, in his book Milan Hodia v Amerike. (Chicago :Geringer Press, Inc., 1949). The author published a number of articles in the periodicals of Slovak democratic exiles in the USA after WW II, e.g. Michal Mudry, "Svedectvo historickej doby. Bullitovo a Hodzovo memorandum," Nase snahy, 6, no. 9 (May - June 1970). In 1965 Susan Mikula, an American of Slovak descent, wrote a dissertation on Hodza's activities in the USA. However, it was not until 1992, at a conference in Bratislava, that she presented her work in Slovakia: Susan Mikula, " Dr. Milan Hodfa vo svelte archivnych dokumentov z archivov v USA," in : Milan Hodia - statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 345- 50. Czech historians have also dealt with Hodfa 's stay in the USA . For instance J. Kuklik and J. Nemecek, Hodia versus Benes. Milan Hodia a slovenska otazka v zahranicnim odboji za druhe svetove valky (Praha: Karolinum, 1999). The most comprehensive account yet of Hodfa's political activities in the USA. , including some views of the Roosevelt administration, was written by the late Slovak historian Pavol Luklic, "Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii v USA a reakcie na jeho federalisticke plany, Historicky casopis 51 , no. 4 (2003), pp. 497- 515 . As Lukac himself observed, however, Kuklik' s and Nemecek's book only traced �SLOVAKIA 39 Apart from the Slovak League of America (hereafter SLA), which favoured independence for Slovakia, there was no other Slovak organization in the USA in 1941 that had a clear idea about Slovakia' s political future after the war. 4 The leaders of the opposition organization - the Slovak National Alliance (hereafter SNA) - stuck to the policy of a reinstated Czechoslovakia, but were unwelling to commit themselves to negotiating a more specific settlement on this issue. In line with the official policy of President Edvard Benes, they maintained that Slovakia's future should be resolved after the war by a democratic vote. Despite their uncommitted attitude, Slovakia's political future was as sensitive an issue among the individual leaders of the SNA as it was for the leadership of the SLA. As long as there was no political leader in the United States who was able to offer a political alternative to the League-promulgated Slovak independence, the issue was bound to remain unresolved. This situation changed after the arrival of Milan Hodfa in the United States in October of 1941. During the three years of his American stay, Hodfa devoted his energies to political campaigning and lobbying. Like Slovak-American leaders, he too wanted to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards Slovakia. As a former Czechoslovak statesman, Hodfa had access to the United States Department of State. He was allowed to discuss the Slovak question with high-ranking government officials. Hodfa ' s political campaign in the USA aroused the interest of the American media, as well as that of federal authorities. Right up to his death in 1944, his activities were closely followed by the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) and its subordinate department, the Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter FNB). Hodfa's arrival in the United States generated interest, not only among Slovak Americans, but also in the American media. Almost immediately, a number of speculative pieces about Hodfa's political objectives appeared in Hodfa's political campaign in the USA on the basis of secondary archival materials left by Hodfa 's contemporaries, and not from the documents of the U.S. Department of State. The present study draws upon the following primary sources: 1. an independent investigation of the documents of the Department of State; 2. the hitherto unpublished documents of the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate department - the Foreign Nationalities Branch (both housed in the National Archives in Washington), the archival documentation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (released to the author under the Freedom oflnformation - Privacy Acts); and 3. the documents issued by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy collected and published by Polish historians JozefLaptos and Marius Misztal in 2002 . 4 For the activities of the Slovak League of America on behalf of Slovak independence during and after the war, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia 39, nos. 72-73 (2007), 19-34. �40 SLOVAKIA the press. One OSS report from 1942 read that the former Czechoslovak prime minister had come as a private citizen. 5 Hodza himself said that the main reason for his arrival was for reasons of health. In the USA he planned to undergo a series of medical treatments.6 This is well attested in the Hodfa family correspondence of the period. 7 On the other hand, the former Czechoslovak prime minister did hope to achieve in the United States some well-defined political goals. 8 In his first interview with The New York Tim es, Hodfa stated that he intended to "test out American opinion regarding Central Europe" and, at the same time, he wanted to "inform it of the trend of opinion there."9 Not all American media reported on Hodza's intentions impartially. On November 7, the Overseas News Agency issued a press release which assessed Hodfa 's pre-war political career in an unflattering light. According to this source, Hodfa's Agrarian Party was only a little less reactionary than the pro-fascist Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. The release went on to claim that Hodfa's arrival also shed a negative light on Slovak Americans. The authors of the release dubbed their political mindset as "isolationist and pro-fascist," referring to some of the Slovak fraternal press in America as evidence. 10 It is clear that the primary motivation of the author must have been to damage Hodfa's political reputation . According to 5 National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 6 1. This information was acquired by the OSS from the New York Times interview with Hodza conducted by Frederick T. Birchall. 6 M. Mudry, Hodza's assoc iate in America, later wrote: "An American journalist who visited and interviewed Hodza claimed that in response to the question about his plans Hodfa took out a bottle of medication and said that what he wanted, first and foremost, was a recovery." Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike .. ., 20. 7 John Palka, Milan Hodfa's grandson, mentions two bouts of pneumonia that his grandfather suffered from shortly after his arrival. See John Palka, Maje S/ovensko, moja rodina (Bratislava: Kalli gram, 2010), 57. 8 Kuklik and Nemecek argue: " It cannot be ruled out that the former Prime Minister could have been driven by his effort to shore up support among his expatriates especially Slovak Americans, with whom he could attempt, with new energy, to stage a comeback in the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. So far his departure was seen, perhaps with some oversimplification, as his resignation to the attempts to advance his Slovak national programme in emigration, " Hodia versus Benes..., 142.The view that Hodfa sought the leading position in the resistance is also supported by Lukac, " Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii ... ", 605 . 9 The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 1 °Kuklik and Nemecek quote from Overseas News Agency release No. 400, July 11, 1941: " Hodfa's presence sheds light on the political tendencies of Slovak Americans. Apparently, the majority of Slovaks living in the United States are isolationist and pro-fascist and this has been reflected in the Slovak press here as well." The Czech authors say that Hodfa sued the ONA for libel, claiming $600,000 in damages, Hodia versus Benes.. ., 144. �SLOVAKIA 41 Hodza's close associate in the USA, Michal Mudry, unfounded attacks like these were frequent and their authors were mainly Slovak-American Communists, supported by Czechoslovak authorities in the USA. 11 The sources of the anti-Hodfa campaign remain obscure. We contend, however, that for President Benes and his government-in-exile, Hodfa's presence in the country posed a serious political problem. The main reason was that Hodfa was determined to call on Slovak Americans to actively participate in the discussions about the future of Slovakia. The Roosevelt administration's attitudes towards Hodfa's political activities were shaped gradually and drew upon several sources. One of them was Hodfa himself. Almost immediately after his arrival, the former Czechoslovak prime minister made contact with the Department of State, and during his stay visited it several times. It can be argued that Hodfa was the only Slovak who discussed the Slovak question with United States government officials during WW II. From its inception in the summer of 1942, the OSS kept an eye on Hodfa 's activities, and from December of that year his political campaign was scrutinized by the officers of the FNB. The OSS analysed Hodfa 's activities by scanning his articles in the Slovak-American media, as well as in the American press in general. In addition to that, Hodza attracted the close attention of the FBI, which since I 940 had been investigating the activities of the Slovak League and the Slovak National Alliance. All the sources at the U.S . government' s disposal indicated that Hodfa pursued very specific political objectives in the United States. Sometime around mid-1942, an OSS report noted that: "Dr. Hodza' s visits to the State Department, his public speeches, interviews granted by him, and his article in The Nation (May 16, 1942) have demonstrated his willingness to express his ideas, whatever may be the extent of his actual political activity. ,, 12 Hodfa' s approach to the Slovak question differed from all other political plans which had been discussed among Slovak Americans to date. The crucial difference was that in Hod:fa' s view, the Slovak question was not to be solved in isolation, but as part of the security, economic and strategic 11 "Various groups, more or less under the influence of leftist elements and the Czechoslovak Information Service, take pot shots at Hodfa and where possible, in connection with his person, they attack Slovak Americans as well. These groups are often made up of the active Czech and Slovak communists such as Hoffmeister, Weisskopf Benau [a social democrat - author's note) and others, at that time undoubtedly under the influence and in favour with Czechoslovak authorities in America." According to Mudry, the most malicious attack upon Hodfa was the pamphlet entitled " Persona non grata". It contained a scathing criticism of Hodfa 's efforts to create a federation , which, among other things, was to constitute a buffer against the Russian Bolsheviks. See Mudry, Milan Hodia v Ameriike .. . , 37. 12 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS , RG 226 E 100, Box 3, p. 47 . �42 SLOVAKIA issues concerning the whole of Central Europe. At that time, Hodza's ideas and political thought may have been known to the public as well as the OSS from his book Federation in Central Europe. 13 Hodza was convinced that federation was the only political arrangement capable of harnessing nationnal forces while preserving the freedom of nations and of individuals. Federation would enable Central Europe to become a viable system of production and consumption on the basis of which a New Europe could be built. The liberated and reinstated countries of Central Europe would conclude a treaty that would become the basic framework for a federal constitution. The treaty was supposed to be the result of spontaneous decisions made by Central European countries, which, bearing in mind their common goals, would identify common interests and mutual commitments. Powers concerning mutual affairs were to be delegated to federal bodies, and their exercise entrusted to a federal govemment. 14 It would be headed by a federal Chancellor, who would be nominated by the President of the federation . The legislative body would be made up of a federal Congress, which was to oversee the legislative process as well as the federal budget. The Federal Court was to be the highest judicial body, which would decide on matters raised by the federal government or by the governments of the constituent countries. The federalization of Central Europe was envisaged as the key to solving the Slovak question and Slovak-Czech relations. Hodza believed that the freedom and security of small nations could be guaranteed only through a supranational federation . If small states were to merge their sovereignties, thereby creating a stronger unit, it would clearly mean more to them than to be in permanent danger of losing their sovereignties. Slovakia, however, was not to enter the Central European federation as a separate state. According to Hodza, the political coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks was not only feasible, but also inevitable. For Czechs, Slovakia represented an important connection with Central Europe. Self-government would satisfy Slovakia to the extent that it would never be a source of weakness for the new republic, but the reverse - it would become the source of its stability and strength. However, Hodza warned, certain mistakes from the past should be avoided. "Stubborn centralism as well as mischievous separatism have to disappear," he argued. Hodza did not support Slovak independence and never sympathized with the representatives of the Slovak regime at home. In his book, he unequivocally dissociated himself from the "Slovakian Quisling regime" 13 Federation in Central Europe (London and New York: Jarrolds Publishers, 1942). Hodza proposed the creation of the following federal ministries: I . finance, 2. International trade, 3. foreign affairs, 4. defence, 5. postal services and communications, 6. and 7. air and naval transport, 8. federal legislation, 9. federal cooperation. Federation in Central Europe ... , 172 - 7. 14 �SLOVAKIA 43 and made it clear that its political representatives did not represent the will of the people. As far as the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London was concerned, Hodza claimed he respected it and was willing to cooperate with it. In his opinion, though, the real leaders of the Slovaks existed not only in London, but also in the USA. He was convinced that in the settling of the Slovak question, Slovak Americans should take an active part. By emphasising the importance of Slovak Americans, Hodza underlined how much hope he pinned on them in deciding the political future of Slovakia after the war. 15 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Hodza presented his vision to the American press. On December 7, 1941 The New York Times published an interview with him entitled "Hope Put in Union of Central Europe," which the former Czechoslovak statesman had granted to American journalist Frederick T. Birchall. The subheading of the article informed the American reader that federation was the goal of 110 million Central Europeans. 16 In the introduction, the author informed the reader that Hodza arrived in the USA unofficially, but with the approval of the Czechoslovak government in London. In fact, the second part of this statement was not true. President Benes could not prevent Hodza from leaving for the United States, but he was far from pleased with the prospect of his greatest political rival in exile campaigning among Slovak Americans. In the Birchall interview Hodza outlined some of the constitutional mechanisms of the proposed federation, and expressed his conviction that the prevailing political tendency in exile was "wholly in the direction of such a federation." As proof, Hodza pointed to the recent rapprochement of two old foes - Czechoslovakia and Poland. 17 These two countries, he believed, should form the nucleus of the future federation . It should then be joined by Romania, and subsequently also by a democratized Hungary, provided that the latter gave up its "imperialistic policy of coercing non-Magyar regions." According to 15 "Most of the Slovak leaders now stay in this country [United Kingdom] and in the USA ." Hodza, Federation in Central Europe . .. , 94. 16 The other two subheadings read: "For Common Government" and "He Explains Plan Will Not Deal in Half Measures, Such as the Old Little Entente," The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 17 Hodza alluded here to the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of a possible confederation between the exiled governments of both countries in London. The outcome of these negotiations, which took place between 1940 and 1942, were two joint declarations - one in November 11 , 1940 and the other on January 23, 1942. The negotiations did not, however, lead to any specific action. In 1943 they ended for good as a result of the new pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, as well as Moscow 's negative attitude towards such a confederation. For details see, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). �44 SLOVAKIA Hodza, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had already been working out their own idea of a federation . Hodza touched on the issue of the relations of Central Europe with Germany and Russia. He considered Russian Bolshevism as great a threat to Europe as German fascism. That was also the reason why the proposed federation should act as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviki." 18 Peasants, representing the conservative values of Central Europe, would, according to Hodza, be a stabilising force in the proposed federation . Their conservative influence would be of significant importance, since it would be necessary to "maintain a conservative democratic entity between the two subversive influences of Nazism and Bolshevism". Having talked to some lower-level officials of the U.S. Department of State, Hodfa met Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle on December 9, 1941. 19 On the same day Hodfa dined informally with DeWitt C. Poole, a high-ranking OSS officer and future head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch.20 During his meeting with the Assistant Secretary, Hodza presented Berle with a memorandum in which he outlined the development of Slovak affairs in Czechoslovakia and in subsequent exile between 1918 and 1939.21 In the memorandum, Hodfa pointed out that the Czechoslovak Cabinet in 1938, under his premiership, approved proposed legislation on decentralization - which, among other things, granted Slovakia its regional parliament. That was the last valid legal arrangement made before the Munich Pact, and it was recognized even by Jan Lichner, a minister of the exiled government. This view, Hodfa claimed, was subscribed to by the absolute majority of public opinion in Slovakia in late 1939. He admits that later on, in Paris, Czechoslovak leaders agreed that such constitutional issues as Slovakia's 18 Quoting Hodfa, the author goes on to say: "With a solid bloc of I 00, 000, 000 people separating them, a successful democracy operating next door would be a continuing object lesson of a better and more profitable way of life." The New York Times, December 9, 1941. 19 Prior to the meeting with Berle, Hodfa held talks with C. W. Cannon and H. Hoskins, as well as the head of the Coordination of Information, William J. Donovan. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle (author H. Hoskins), December 9, 1941. 20 According to Kuklik and Nemecek, Hodza maintained that his first visit to the Department of State was a response to an invitation by C. W. Cannon, R. Atherton and A. Berle. The aim was to discuss the memorandum of Slovak-American separatist Gustav Kosik presented to the Department at an earlier date. 21 P. Lukac also suggested that Hodfa's visit to the State Department and his memorandum was a reaction to the memorandum of Gustav Kosik (Memorandum for His Excellency the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America). NARA signature 860f.01 /429- l/2, Roll 30. Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 612. �SLOVAKIA 45 future should be decided by democratic majorities of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Hodfa was willing to adhere to this agreement, provided that the exiled Czechoslovak National Council included representatives of Slovak federalists. In the posited post-war settlement, Hodfa emphasized the importance of a Czecho-Slovak restoration, but with a provision for Slovak self-government. He argued that Slovakia would not be able to maintain its sovereignty even as a separate member of the Central European federation. In the conclusion to the memorandum, Hodza condemned the Slovak puppet regime and hazarded a guess that its support among Slovaks did not exceed I 0%. As for Slovak Americans, he believed that the majority of them had never stopped supporting Czecho-Slovakia. The rest of them, in Hodza 's opinion, would soon change their political views. The official reaction to Hodfa' s memorandum of December 9, 1941 is not known, but it appears that he made a good impression during his first visit to the State Department. The report written for the Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed that, "Dr. Hodza gave the impression of an able patriot with qualities of sincerity and vision that might be with advantage put to constructive work in the post-war period in Central Europe." 22 In his later conversation with Poole, Hodfa himself assessed his meeting with Berle in a similar vein.23 It was intimated to Hodfa that, in the future, he might be received by Secretary Hull himself. Moreover, the State Department did not seem to have any objections to Hodfa's intention of lecturing at American universities and colleges. It was even suggested that Poole might be able to help by making the necessary arrangements.24 Hodfa expected that he would once again be in communication with the Department of State as early as January, 1942. His deteriorating health, however, forced him to stay in American sanatoria for several months, where he recuperated until April of 1942. 25 22 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle, H. Hoskins, December 9, 1941 , p. 3. 23 In his report Poole wrote: "He [Hodza] said that he had explained to Mr. Berle his views on the future political organization of Central Europe, and Mr. Berle seemed to be favourably impressed." D. C. Poole later checked Hodfa's impressions against those of H. Hoskins: "Following my talk with Dr. Hodza, I spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hoskins, and gathered from him that Dr .Hodza had given a substantially accurate account of his reception at the Department of State and Mr. Berle' s attitude. " NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 24 During the conversation at the Department of State, C. Cannon suggested that D. C. Poole "might be in the best position to bring this about." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 25 Lukac writes that Hodza recuperated from chronic bronchitis in a sanatorium at Lake Placid, New York and Hot Springs, Arkansas. Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. ., 612 . �46 SLOVAKIA In Hodfa 's plans, 1942 should have marked a turning-point in his political campaign. After a modest recovery of his health, Hodfa launched his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and began publishing in American scholarly journals. On May 16 he outlined his federalization plans to the politically-minded American public in The Nation. The reactions of Czech and Slovak Americans to his article, A Central European Federation, were collected in two OSS reports from June. Both reports assessed the attitudes of American "Czechoslovaks" towards Hodza as predominantly negative. 26 The first one, dated June 1, 1942, pointed out that Czechoslovak Americans had missed the article because they did not regularly read The Nation. Still, the OSS observer admitted that Hodza's ideas were, in general, favourably received by many Central Europeans because they were in line with their own post-war plans.27 The other report from June 11 portrays Hodza's arrival in America, his political past and goals in the USA in a very negative light. In the introduction, the author alleged that Czechoslovak Americans received the article with considerable mistrust. Claiming that he had researched the Czechoslovak American press and talked to "a number of leading Czechoslovak Americans as well as Czechoslovak exiles," the OSS observer contended that the article was "not a bona fide piece of political thinking, but that it rather serves as a cloak for its author' s ambition to become the exclusive or most important spokesman for the Slovaks (American and otherwise), regardless of cost in terms of Czechoslovak unity here and abroad." 28 It may be argued that the negative tone of the report was influenced by its author's very selective approach to sources. For example, he claimed that he had read reactions in the "Czechoslovak press," but he did not give any specific titles. The only sources he acknowledged were J. Papanek, professor J. B. Kozak and D. Benau. 29Jan Papanek, head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA and Benes's right-hand man, referred to Hodfa as an " unfortunate incident."30 He maintained that Hod26 Neither of the reports makes any distinction between American Slovaks and American Czechs. They refer to both groups collectively as "Czechoslovak Americans." 27 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-47, June I, 1942, p. I. 28 Ibid. The author of the report signed himself"Ivan Ivanovitch ." 29 At the time, Professor Kozak was lecturing at Oberlin College in Ohio. Prior to his arrival in the USA he was a member of the Czechoslovak State Council, a legislative-executive body ofBenes's government-in-exile in London. 30 J. Papanek' s negative attitude towards Hodza 's political views was widely known. Papanek disagreed with decentralisation to the extent advocated by Hodza. The head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA expressed his attitude towards Hodza in one of his letters to Benes in January of 1942: "I do not agree with the policy of decentralization or self-government on the scale suggested by Lichner and Hodfa. I am convinced that this would lead to a new Zilina [agreement on Slova- �SLOVAKIA 47 fa's goal was to split the ranks of Slovak Americans, who had been, until his arrival, predominantly in full support of the Czechoslovak government headed by Bene~. Professor Kozak, a former member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, called Hodfa 's Central European Agrarian Bloc a reactionary body which collaborated with non-democrats. Benau, editor of the "Czechoslovak" New Yorksky dennik, added that Hodfa had a dubious financial past. Hodfa's entree into Slovak-American politics was facilitated by his long-time friend and associate Michal Mudry Sebik. With his assistance, Hodfa first approached the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance. On May 22, 1942, during the meeting of the SNA's Central Committee in Detroit, which discussed Hodfa 's lecture tour, the majority of the Committee expressed their support for Hodfa's political programme.31 At that time, Hodza formulated his position on the Slovak question as follows : 1. A Slovak Parliament and Slovak judiciary; 2. Slovak self-government, 3. Slovak as the only official language in Slovakia. With this political aim he launched a series of lectures at local branches of the SNA. However, the decision of the Central Committee was strongly challenged by the conservative wing of the SNA leadership. At the June meeting of the Executive Board, the president, secretary and treasurer of the organization announced their opposition to the decision taken by the Central Committee on May 22. According to these leaders, Hodfa's demands were a mere repetition of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which concerned the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The leaders proclaimed that, as American citizens, they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, because that was against the SNA programme as well as American law. In addition to that, the proclamation of the Executive Board pointed out that, it was thanks to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that Slovaks were not considered enemies of the Allies. Discussions about Slovakia's political future were destroying the unity of the SNA and threatened the future of the Slovak people. In the final part of the proclamation, the three members of the Executive Board issued a warning: "Disputes over things which do not concern us as American citizens - among these disputes is the question of selfgovernment of the Slovak nation - harm our country, harm all of us, and kia's autonomy, signed Oct. 6, 1938) and all that followed." Slavomir Michalek, Jan Papanek za vojny Bene.fovi. Vyber z dokumentov 1939 - 1945 (Bratislava: VEDA, 1997), 97. 31 Fifteen members of the Central Committee were in favour of Hodza' s lectures, twelve were against. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT9CZ-82. Later M. Mudry observed: "The meeting of the SNA ' s Central Committee in Detroit was especially important in the history of Slovaks. It showed that the great majority of Slovak Americans, in favour of the Czechoslovak Republic, preferred the Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement as it was outlined by Dr. M. Hodza." Mudry, Milan Hodi a v Amerike ..., 32. �48 SLOVAKIA only help the enemy!" 32 The position proclaimed by the Executive Board on June 29 confused other SNA leaders, as well as its rank-and-file. At the same time, it spurred a new wave of discussion about the position of the organization on the Slovak question, which continued throughout 1942. Several days before his second visit to the Department of State, Hodza had an appointment with Poole and J. C. Wiley of the OSS. After the SNA meeting in Detroit, Hodfa expressed his views openly, and his criticism of his opponents was sharper, on occasion turning into personal attacks. He told the OSS officers that his goals were to mobilize Slovak Americans and win their support for a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. He reiterated that the Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement, agreed upon by the Czechoslovak cabinet in July of 1938, was legally valid and politically binding. During one conversation, the OSS officers noted, Hodfa "disclosed a determined opposition to what he called the centralism in the Czechoslovakian constitutional practice of Benes and his entourage." 33 He criticized Benes, who, during their London talks in 1939, had been deliberately evasive and noncommittal regarding discussion of Slovakia's constitutional status. In talks with American government officials, Hodfa maintained that the campaign against himself in the USA had been masterminded by Papanek. The head of the CIS was not, in Hodfa' s words, to any degree a political figure, but merely an agent and intriguer for Benes.34 Apart from the members of the SNA, Hodfa was also planning to address the Slovak American Catholics associated within the Slovak League of America. As Hodfa put it bluntly in his conversation with Poole, he intended to "destroy this organisation" by winning over its popular support, leaving its leaders without any following, which he believed was very weak. 35 Meeting the OSS officers provided Hodfa with an opportunity to get some feedback on how his political activities were viewed by the administration. On this, the position of the OSS and the government was clear and unequivocal. American authorities were anxious not to see American 32 The Proclamation of the SNA Executive Board was signed by its President, Jaroslav Pelikan, Secretary Jan W. Golosinec and Treasurer Vaclav Hovorka. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-82. 33 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. I. 34 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. On this occasion Hodfa also expressed his firm belief in winning the forthcoming trial against the Overseas News Agency. He was convinced that the ONA had obtained its libellous information against him from Pap{mek, who was to be identified as the true culprit. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. 35 Hodfa told the OSS that the local branch of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, NJ, came out in open support of his programme, as did the First Catholic Slovak Union in Wilkes-Barre, PA. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1/2 Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. �SLOVAKIA 49 citizens and alien residents fighting over European political issues on American soil. 36 The concerns of the American government about the unity of Slovak Americans were aired once again during Hodza's second visit to the Department of State on June 18, 1942.37 Hodza met H. Hoskins and C. Cannon. On the same day he spoke on the telephone to Assistant Secretary Berle. Hoskins and Cannon were interested in Hodfa's ongoing lecture tour among Slovak Americans. The former Czechoslovak premier did not hide his optimism and spoke extremely positively about his campaign.38 He was keen to ascertain how his activities were viewed by the Department of State. In response to his query, Assistant Secretary Berle told Hodfa that he thought that his "efforts had been in the right direction. "39 He made it clear, though, that the American government did not wish American unity to be disturbed by conflicts among Americans of foreign descent. Apparently, what the Assistant Secretary had in mind under "efforts in the right direction" were activities that would strengthen Czechoslovak unity in the USA. It was obvious that Slovakia's political future per se played a secondary role, if any, in the Department of State's post-war strategic planning. We can only wonder whether the Department of State had been informed about the results of the SNA' s Detroit meeting at the time of Hodza 's telephone conversation with Berle. It can be argued that, if it had been the case, the Assistant Secretary would not have so favorably assessed Hodza's activities. At any rate, Hodfa took Berle's statement as an expression of approval of his American campaign. He told this to Poole two days later while travelling with him on the train to New York. 40 During this conversation, Hodza reiterated that he was determined to get on with his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and to work on the project of the Central European Federa36 Hodza reacted to this open allusion to his political activities in the USA by assuring the OSS officers that in this respect there could be no objections to his campaign, since his primary aim was to unite, not to divide all Slovak Americans. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. 37 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910- 1944. 38 Lukac quotes from the Memorandum of conversation of June 18 : "Since then he has been in touch with various Slovak groups in this country and felt he had made progress in his efforts to convince them that Slovakia should work out its problem within the framework of the present republic, not as a small independent state". Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 613. 39 Lukac points out that the original memorandum contains the following handwritten note beside the word "efforts": "This related only to his effort to reduce the controversies between Czechs and Slovaks and similar peacemaking attempts." Ibid., 614. 40 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0 1/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Author of report D. C. Poole, June 20, 1942. Poole observed Hodfa's satisfaction with his visit to the Department of State. �50 SLOVAKIA tion.41 He suggested to Poole that American authorities could get in touch with some of his Hungarian and Yugoslav friends who were in favour of such a federation. 42 In return, the OSS officer promised to put him in touch with another academic institution, which would enable him to lecture at universities in his capacity as a former history professor. 43 While lecturing to Slovak Americans during the summer of 1942, Hodza found himself yet again the target of unwanted publicity. This time, Hodza ' s political opponents broadcast their views on New York-based radio station WMCA. Though the statements made by the radio commentator are not known, we do know that they drew an indignant response from Hodza. Following the broadcast by WMCA on July 28th, 1942, Hodza contacted Dr. Morris D. Forkosch, his New York-based lawyer, with a view to bringing legal action against the radio commentator. Hodza was adamant that Johannes Steele, the radio presenter in question, as well as his "sponsors," by which Hodza meant the people who supplied him with the slanderous information, should be sued for libel. This, however, was not to be. Four months later, Hodza abruptly asked his lawyer to drop the suit. In one of his telegrams to Forkosch in mid-October, Hodza wrote: "It is imperative that you immediately and explicitly advise the new sponsors of the radio commentator and others you approached that you acted upon mistaken instructions and to withdraw steps [sic.]."44 From Hodza's correspondence with Forkosch we learn that the defendants (Steele, the WMCA, the Terminal Shops) accepted some sort of "settlement," though it is not at all clear what this arrangement was. What remains baffling is what made Hodza change his mind. Money may have been part of it. Hodza had been dogged by financial problems since his arrival in the United States. On the other hand, Hodza 41 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /446-l /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 2. Hodfa referred specifically to a Hungarian, John Polonyi, and a Yugoslav, Bof olyub Jeftich. 3 During this conversation Hodfa expressed his interest in giving informal talks and participating in conferences as a historian of the 19th century. Poole had facilitated academic contacts for Hodza before. In the autumn of 1941 he introduced him to Dr. Duggan, Director of the International Institute of Education and later to Malcolm Davis, who was to assist in Hodfa 's cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 44 In his letter to Hodfa from October 28, 1942, Forkosch recounted all the telegraphic communications between him and Hodfa related to the libel suit. He did this, presumably, to clarify all possible misunderstandings as to what Hodfa really wanted and what his instructions to Forkosch were. Forkosch, however, did not provide any reasons for his client 's decision to drop the case. NARS, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129. Copy of M. D. Forkosch 's letter to Hodfa, October 28, 1942, p. I. 42 �SLOVAKIA 51 would hardly have initiated a costly new lawsuit if he had not been convinced that he stood a fair chance of having his name cleared and his political detractors exposed. 45 The FNB files remain silent as to who supplied the WMCA with the information or what motivation drove its commentator to attack Hodza over the airwaves. Michal Mudry Sebik had little doubt that public attacks against Hodza were masterminded by Jan Papanek, and condoned by Benes's Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Hurban. This view has not been contested by any Hodza historians. So far, however, there has been no reliable evidence to prove that this was indeed the case. As far as the American government was concerned, it knew all about the perpetrators of the anti-Hodza smear campaign since June of 1943. The ideological split in the Slovak-American community, partially caused by Hodfa' s political campaign, was a source of growing concern to the American government. Amidst fears for the unity of Slovak Americans, the Department of State, in co-operation with several other government agencies, decided to take action. On September 14, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) organized in Pittsburgh a conference of Slovak newspaper editors and presidents of Slovak organizations.46 The intention of the OWI organizers was to unify Slovak-American organizations and persuade their leaders to sign a joint declaration expressing Slovak support for the U.S. government and, at the same time, condemning its enemies, including the Slovak Republic. At the actual conference two resolutions were passed. According to the OSS, on the previous day the members of the Resolution Committee had consulted the wording of both resolutions with Hodza, who had arrived earlier in Pittsburgh.47 The first resolution pledged allegiance to the government of the United States and its president. The second one outlined the principles concerning Slovakia's political future, in line with the Atlantic Charter. It stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should be "recreated on a basis of equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and equal obligations."48 This passage, however, elicited strong objections 45 Hodza's libel suit against the Overseas News Agency had been dragging on and off since November of 1941. The case was finally closed in June of 1943. 46 The conference was held at the William Penn Hotel. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. OSS, V. P. Backora to Dr. Kelso, September 16, 1942. 47 NARS, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. In the lead-up to the conference, Hodza met with Vendelin Platek, president of the National Slovak Society (NSS), Emil Stankoviansky, editor of Slovensky h/asnik [Slovak Herald] , the organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and J. Willo (NSS), chairman of the Resolution Committee. 48 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-143 . A photocopy of the September 14 resolution was published in Slovensky hlasnik on Octo- �52 SLOVAKIA from the "Czechoslovak" hardliners and followers of Benes under the leadership of Jaroslav Pelikan. The text of the second resolution had to be rephrased, and the controversial part concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was eventually omitted. In this form, the resolutions did not please any of the participants. The outcome of the conference left both sides unhappy. The OWI had received a token expression of Slovak allegiance, but the disgruntled Slovak leaders, seeking more definite commitments regarding Slovakia' s future, remained dissatisfied.49 The efforts of the Department of State and the OSS to direct Hodza's activities in favour of Slovak-American unity continued after the unsuccessful conference in Pittsburgh. On September 17, 1942 Assistant Secretary Berle wrote a letter to the OSS in which he asked Poole to settle the ongoing arguments between Papanek and Hodza. In this letter he reiterated the stance of the U.S. government as it was set out in June of 1942. The priorities of the Department did not lie in the various merits and demerits of the argument about the Slovak question, but in the need for unity and peace among Slovak Americans, which would contribute to victory in the war. 50 The concerns of the U.S . government were further exacerbated about two months later when the leaders of Slovak organizations and Hodza 's followers called a new conference with the intention of rallying the Slovak Americans behind Hodza's political programme. A new umbrella organization was established - the Council of Slovak American Organizations and Newspapers (hereafter CASON). This organization later succeeded in encouraging cooperation with some of the Catholic fraternal organizations. Politically, it subscribed to the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but in contrast to Benes's government-in-exile, it demanded a more definite commitment on Slovakia's status after the war. 51 This development was highly undesirable from the standpoint of the U.S . administration, which had only recently confirmed its definitive recognition of Benes's government in Lon- her I, 1942. The resolution was signed by twenty-four Slovak leaders and newspa£er editors. 9 As the OSS observer put it: "The compromise resolution satisfies no one but it is at least a step forward . Hodza is still causing disunity among the American Slovaks." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. 50 "The State Department is not at present interested in the merits of the controversy, but it has, of course, a very distinct interest in preserving that harmony and unity which best contributes towards winning the war." Quoted from the letter of A. Berle to D. C. Poole (NARA 860f. 00/993). See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodi u .. ., 617,note44. 51 The main figures behind the establishment of CASON were the President of the NSS, V. Platek, the President of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Michal Vargovich, and Jan Bradac, at that time the Honorary President of the SNA. �SLOVAKIA 53 don.52 Hodfa 's campaign among Slovak Americans was becoming an ever more pressing political problem for the U.S. administration. In its March report, the OSS recommended that the State Department step in: "It would be of great value and benefit all around, if our State Department would speak nicely to Mr .Hodja [sic.] and advise him to apply his talents towards unity and not disruption among the Slovak Americans." 53 Throughout 1943, apart from campaigning among Slovak Americans, Hodfa was occupied with, and increasingly alarmed by, the developments in Czechoslovak foreign policy under Benes's leadership. In May - June, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile came on an official visit of the United States, where he was met by the highest officials in the country, including the Secretary of State. One of the primary objectives of the president's visit was to gain American approval for his planned journey to Moscow towards the end of the year. There, Benes was planning to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. This diplomatic initiative was the pinnacle of Benes's efforts to change the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy during WW II. From then on, the international security of the country was no longer to be guaranteed by military alliances with the Western Powers. Instead, it was to be safeguarded through close cooperation and coordination of its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether, in the summer of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt voiced their approval of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. According to Benes's personal secretary, Edvard Taborsky, Berle said that the United States followed no specific plans in relation to Central Europe, nor did they have any intention of negotiating with Hodfa on this issue.54 It appears that the ill-defined position of the Roosevelt administration in 1943 confirmed Benes's conviction that the United States did not hold any objections to Czechoslovakia's new Soviet-oriented foreign policy. Hodza, by contrast, regarded the conclusion of the treaty in December 1943 as a very dangerous step on the road to creating a new Soviet sphere of influence. He also feared that, after the war, the Soviet Union would try to impose on Czechoslovakia a political system similar to its own. Moreover, Hodfa was deeply convinced that Slovaks had not a scintilla of sympa- 52 The definiti ve American recognition of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile was granted on October 28, 1942. 53 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E 142, Box 3. Re: Recent Slovak Affairs, Milan Hodia, Jozef Hu~ek, Fedor Salva, etc., April 3, 1942. 54 According to Taborsky, Berle felt the need to defend himself against allegations that he sympathized with Hodia. "Hodfa was your prime minister and now he is a refugee. We respect him as such, but we will make no political deals with him, I can say this categorically." See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 620. Document quoted: NARA, 860F. 00/1009. �54 SLOVAKIA thy for Russian Bolshevism. He objected vigorously to the treaty, and made his criticism heard. Benes's visit to the United States presented the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch with a perfect opportunity to cut troublesome Hodza down to size. Hodza ' s long-standing legal feud with the Overseas News Agency (ONA) carried potential risks not only for the news agency itself, but for the whole of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Back in December of I 941 , Hodza had complained to the Office of the Coordination of Information that the ONA had been spreading word that he was a fascist collaborating with Otto von Habsburg and Tibor Eckhardt in a plot hatched by German generals to eliminate Hitler with a view to negotiating a separate peace.55 The same source branded the majority of Slovak Americans as isolationist and pro-fascist. Hodza was convinced that if the ONA was made to disclose its source, some of the top Czechoslovak authorities in the USA would be implicated. In June of 1943, the American court which was investigating the libel suit, required the ONA to answer a set of questions contained in a bill of particulars. One of them inquired about the source the ONA drew upon in its news release of November 7, 1941 . Shortly before the deadline by which the ONA was to comply, the case took an unexpected turn. On June 1st, Jacob Landau, the agency's managing director, paid a visit to Poole in his Washington office. He briefed the FNB boss about the case and discussed the questions in the bill of particulars. Later on, in his report of the meeting, Poole noted: "If ONA had to answer, Mr. Landau asserted, one of the sources to be named would be the Czechoslovak Ambassador [in the United States] ." Such a development was, from the perspective of the U.S. government, highly undesirable. Not only would it expose its wartime ally - the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - as the source of the anti-Hodza smear campaign, it would also fan the flames of the Benes-Hodza controversy among Slovak Americans. Although the head of the FNB felt he was not in a position to "interfere in an official way," he promised Landau that he would talk to Hodfa in order to make him "freely desi st" from the libel suit. Three days later in New York, Poole broached the subject of anti-Hodza propaganda in his conversation with Jan Papanek, the head of the Czechoslovak Information Service (hereafter CIS) in the United States. Without telling him what he knew from Landau, Poole received from the CIS head a resolute denial of any involvement on the part of the Czechoslovak government. Nevertheless, Papanek was very pleased with Poole 's intention to convince Hodza to desist from the case. On his part, the Czechoslovak propaganda boss promised he would do his utmost 55 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-9CZ-22, p. I. Memorandum of conversation between John. C. Wiley and Milan Hodia, December 4, I 94 I. �SLOVAKIA 55 to prevent further escalation of the Hodza-Benes controversy. He also mentioned to Poole that during his visit in the States, Benes held a long private conversation with Jan Palka, Hodfa's son-in-law. This information, whether imparted casually or by design, presented the head of the FNB with the bargaining leverage he so much needed in his dealings with Hodfa. Although Papanek did not tell Poole what Palka had discussed with Benes, it was not difficult to surmise. Hodfa's dire financial situation was an open secret in Czechoslovak circles, and the OSS knew about it. Until his death in 1944, Hodfa struggled to keep his political campaign in America financially afloat. In October of 1942, for example, he asked the Polish government-in-exile for $650. 56 In May of the following year, Hodfa asked Slovak-American leader Vendelin Platek to help him out financially. The only regular income Hod.fa had was a monthly salary of $250 received from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile for his absentee membership in the London-based State Council. The money was payable to the account of Hodfa 's wife, who, at that time, resided in Chicago. Being well-informed of Hodfa's financial woes, Poole decided to use this information in the name of national interest. On June 5th, he telephoned Hodza, who was convalescing in Clearwater, Florida. The subject of the conversation was the ONA libel suit. According to Poole's account, Hodfa was tired of the longstanding legal battle and "had really lost interest in the matter." 57 This was borne out by David Karr, who had been following the case at the Office of War Information He informed Poole in November of 1942 that Hodza had indeed tried to drop his lawsuit, but this had not happened because of some misunderstanding between him and his lawyers. 58 As the secret memorandum of the telephone conversation between the two men suggests, Poole pressured Hodza to discontinue his campaign among Slovak Americans. During the conversation he hinted that both he and President Benes had been well aware of his financial difficulties. Poole then played his trump 56 Dusan Seges, "Ohlas sudobej krajanskej tlace na politicke posobenie Milana Hodzu v USA v rokoch 1941 - 1944," in Milan Hodia politik a i urnalista, ed. M. Peknik (Bratislava: Veda, 2008), 185 . In his article, Seges writes that Hodza wanted to use the money to gain a dominant influence on the Slovak-American newspaper Slovensky Hlasnik. Seges maintains that in the end Hodza succeeded in getting some of the money. 57 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943. 58 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129, November 18, 1942. In his report, D. C. Poole clarified: "He [David Karr] thought that there had been some misunderstanding, in consequence probably of Dr. Hodza's imperfect command of English. Specifically, Mr. Karr gained the impression that Dr. Hodza had instructed his attorneys 'to settle,' meaning come to a final friendly adjustment; but the attorneys interpreted this to refer to obtaining a 'settlement' ." �56 SLOVAKIA card. He reassured his interlocutor that he had "obtained satisfactory assurances from Dr. Benes that Dr. Hodza's personal situation would not be disturbed."59 To make himself absolutely clear, the head of the FNB pointed out to Hodfa that "It would seem unfortunate if by pressing the suit against the Overseas News Agency at this time he should bring on a change."60 Though elegantly phrased, to Hodfa 's ears Poole's talk must have sounded like nothing more than political blackmail. There is little doubt that Hodfa took his words at face value. In the following days he contacted his lawyer. In order to find out whether he had really done so, Poole telephoned Hodza again on June 10th. Hodfa confirmed that he had instructed his lawyer via telegraph to terminate the suit. Fear for the post-war scenario in Central Europe prompted Hodza to draw up a document - Europe at the Crossroads - which he sent to the State Department in March of 1944.6 1 This memorandum analyzed the political situation in Central Europe within the context of its states' relations with the Soviet Union. Hodfa pointed to the undemocratic character of the Soviet political system, and warned against its application in any form . He challenged Benes's arguments, according to which the new foreign policy realignment with the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Hodza argued that by signing the treaty, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile willingly entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus became an instrument of the Russian Drang nach dem Westen. He rejected the policy of creating a "special sphere," the necessity of which Benes justified by the failure of the Western Powers and the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" in 1938. He contended that no sphere of influence was able to guarantee the sovereignty of small countries. The only guarantee of security, Hodza maintained, was a system of collective security similar to the one promulgated by the Ameri59 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943 . 60 Tbid. 61 Some historians doubt whether or not the Department of State actually received the memorandum. Lukac, who did not have a copy of the document at his disposal, claimed that "Despite the fact that several authors claim the memorandum was sent to the Department, including the author of this article, there is no copy of Europe at the Crossroads in the State Department archives. We can only speculate what fate it met, whether it was sent at all or "got lost" in American archives. " Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. . , 622. The author of this study (R. Licko) can confirm that a copy of this 22-page-long memorandum is kept in the National Archives in Washington, in the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch section with signature INT-32A-75. Moreover, there is also firm evidence that the memorandum was read at the State Department. D. C. Poole, chief of the FNB, summarised its contents in his report of March 8, 1944. �SLOVAKIA 57 cans and the British in the form of the United Nations. The final victory was achievable only as a "collective victory," with collective war aims. He went on to write, with bitter regret, that the "official Czecho-Slovak policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all alliances." 62 Hod.fa expressed his belief that "Czecho-Slovakia surely deserves a better fate than to become the victim of any personal rule or of any kind of soviet system."63 The memorandum also touches upon the position of the U.S. government, which chose not to reject the treaty. Hod.fa respected this view. However, the American position did not, in his opinion, change the simple fact that the treaty had contributed significantly to the creation of spheres of influence, whose catastrophic consequences would have to be dealt with after the war through a system of collective security. Part V of the memorandum was devoted to the Slovak question. According to Hodfa, the majority of Slovaks, with only a handful of opponents, demanded fair self-government for Slovakia. This demand was in stark contrast to the stubborn centralism of Benes and his political supporters in exile. Hodza's disapproval of the Soviet Union ' s influence, in relation to Slovakia's future, was based upon his conviction that the Soviet political system was incompatible with the political and cultural traditions of Slovaks. Hodza vehemently denied that Slovaks had ever sympathized with Communism. He also reminded the State Department that Slovaks had been fighting against Nazism on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts. Moreover, the majority of the Slovak soldiers who had defected from the Slovak army were, in Hod.fa ' s opinion, anti-Communists, with whom he had maintained radio contact. They desired, on the whole, a "Slovakia administered by Slovaks." Hodfa vigorously denied the allegations, current at the time, that Slovaks had not fought against Fascism. According to his information, as many as 75% of the Czecho-Slovak Army personnel in France between 1939 and 1940 were Slovaks.64 Europe at the Crossroads was Hod.fa' s last attempt to influence the U.S. administration. His memorandum was thoroughly analyzed by the OSS. The political analyst who studied it related its content to his superior DeWitt Poole.65 In the introduction of the report, its author noted: "It confirms my impression of him as a man of a high degree of peasant shrewdness." The OSS shared Hod.fa's concerns about the future of small Central European nations after the war: "The European peoples, more particularly, the East European nationnalities, will be potter's clay in the coming interplay of forces." The author fully sanctioned Hodza' s proposal to hold plebi62 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, I 942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75 , p. 15. lbid., p. 19. 64 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75. 65 Julian Towster to D. C. Poole, March 8, 1944. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, fNT-3 2A-75 . 63 �58 SLOVAKIA scites in Central Europe, ideally under the auspices of the United Nations. 66 Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to respect the free will of Central Europeans was to be a clear indication of how far this country intended to go in improving its relations with the Western Allies in the post-war period. The OSS report did not pay any particular attention to the issue of Slovakia's future after the war. At the time when the State Department received the OSS report, Hodza had been undergoing medical treatment in a holiday resort in Florida. Despite several periods of improvement during his stay in the United States, Hodza never recovered from his illness. On June 27, 1944, after an operation in Clearwater, Hodza succumbed to his illness. 67 His death was an immense loss, primarily to the advocates of Slovak self-government. Moreover, there was a general opinion among Slovak-American leaders that, apart from Stefan Osusky, there was no other political leader at that time who would have been able to unite the politically fragmented Slovak Americans.68 Having been a prominent Central European politician and statesman throughout his life, Hodza's death elicited obituaries in a number of leading dailies around the world. 69 His life-long political contribution to politics was acknowledged by the Czechoslovak government, and even by his political enemies, including Edvard Benes. Belatedly, the U.S. government paid 66 "Hodza is perfectly right in emphasizing the plebiscite angle. Plebiscites may not always have been the best yardstick of true national sentiment, but the principle of unhindered expression of such sentiment and of consultation between the leading United Nations members in regard to securing such expression goes to the heart of the problem." 67 Hodfa suffered from cancer of the large intestine. According to the autopsy report, the immediate cause of death was a complication - internal obturation during the operation . Hodza never regained consciousness. See Lukac, "Posledne chvile Milana Hodzu," in Obcianska spolocnost', no. 8 (August, 2000), I 0. 68 The Slovak leaders, especially those associated in the CASON, suggested Stefan Osusky as Hodfa's possible successor, because they did not regard Hodfa' s aide, Mudry Sebik, as a "strong and effective" leader. FBI, Chicago File No. 100-15744, January 25 , 1945 . Report: Slovak National Alliance, p. 7. Another FBI report written by its director on July 1, 1944, advised the Department of State of Osusky' s intention to ask for permission to enter the United States. In addition to giving a brief account ofOsusky's political career, the report states that V. Platek, the leader of the National Slovak Society, wrote a letter to Osusky as early as in June of 1943 . In it, Platek asked Osusky to come to the United States and to assume the leadership of Slovak Americans together with Hodfa. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.202 l l/71844 PSNL, Roll 31, 1940 - 1944. Memorandum of J. E. Hoover to A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. Subject: Milan Hodza and Stefan (Stephen) Osusky, July I, 1944. 69 The New York Times published Hodfa 's obituary on June 29, 1944. On July 4, 1944 the newspaper reported on Hodfa's funeral in Chicago. �SLOVAKIA 59 tribute to this outstanding Czechoslovak statesman. In 1951 , U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles praised Hodfa's understanding of the mutual interdependence of sovereign and equal peoples, and acknowledged Hodfa's contribution to the cause of European unity.70 Given the scope of Hodfa's plans and activities in the United States during WW II, one has to ask oneself: what did the Roosevelt administration's foreign policymakers make of Hodfa's federalization plans, and what solution, if any, did they think desirable in the dispute about Slovakia's post-war future? What significance did Hodfa's plans play in American strategic planning in Central Europe? Were these in line with the existing American blueprint for the overall European peace settlement, or did they contradict it? To what extent were Hodfa's plans for a Central European federation examined, and what political will was there to intervene in the debate on the post-war status of Slovakia? American and European historians more or less share the same view that Central Europe, throughout WW II, was not an area of priority in the United States' strategic planning. United States foreign policy in Central Europe was the outcome of a variety of factors, domestic and international, and on the whole it could be characterized as unsystematic.71 Another characteristic of this policy was the fact that the United States' attitudes towards Eastern Europe went through several changes during WW IL To a large extent, these changes were the result of the personal influence of key political figures in the White House, as well as in the Department of State. It is commonly known that, at the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt was an advocate of the doctrine of the Four Policemen, according to which the four greatest powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - were expected to take over the responsibility for the post-war political organization of the territories subjected to their influence. In Central Europe, this would mean an unprecedented increase in Soviet influence, given that Germany was to be disarmed after the war and its influence eliminated for good. From the standpoint ofHodfa's political plans, this represented an undesirable return to spheres of influence against which he so persistently warned. 70 Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 625 . The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad summarizes the non-systematic nature of this policy as follows: "So tenuous was the coherence of the many diverse elements in these policies, fluctuating in response to political and economic forces within the US itself, to local events in Eastern Europe, and to the challenges inherent in Great Power rivalry, that I have chosen the term the American non-policy to describe the end result of the various influencing factors . American policy-makers were never quite able to make up their minds about the importance of Eastern Europe to the United States." Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo : Universitets forlaget, 1978), 34. 71 �60 SLOVAKIA Quite a different view of the post-war world order was held by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He advocated a vision of a globalized world, in which economic and political conflicts among sovereign countries were to be solved through a world organization.72 However, the idea of resurrecting a world organization on the principle of the interwar League of Nations was extremely unpopular in the United States. Warming up to such an idea took some time and was a gradual process.73 After the resignation of Sumner Welles from the position of Under Secretary of State in 1943, Cordell Hull finally succeeded in convincing the conservative-minded Department of State to accept the idea of a new United Nations. In relation to Central Europe, the new line in foreign policy resulted in the conviction that the reformed system of collective security would prevent the recreation of old spheres of influence. This was also the reason why the State Department was very reluctant to give its views on the various integration schemes of the Central European governments in exile. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in this area was a worrying development for the Roosevelt administration, but did not lead to a significant shift in the established policy of non-intervention.74 Surprisingly enough, despite the negative attitude towards European integration in general, the archival documents of the Department of State suggest that the U.S. foreign policy makers devoted con72 This track of American foreign policy in the 20th century is frequently referred to as "globalism," or, "universalism." See Michael Lind, "The Twilight of the U.N.," The New Republic, October 30, 1995, p. 28 . 73 The League of Nations, created in 1920, was part of the peace initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, generally known as the "Fourteen Points." In terms of conflict resolution and international security, the organization's philosophy was based upon the principle of collective security, which stood in opposition to the notion of the balance of power and advancement of national interests. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to ratify the League' s Covenant. Wilson ' s peace initiative is often criticized and branded as an example of American political idealism. From the point of view of international relations, Wilson's plan stemmed from "idealistic and liberal dissatisfaction with the international anarchy, balance of power and the concept of self-help which had hitherto characterized the state-system." Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin books, 1998), p. 300. 74 In the introduction to his book The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 , Bennett Kovrig described American idealism in relation to Central Europe in the words of A. J. P. Taylor: "democratic foreign policy must be idealistic, or at the very least it has to be justified in terms of great general principles ". Kovrig added, "Yet the reader will find few villains and even fewer heroes, for seldom in the history of America 's foreign relations have good intentions reaped such a bitter harvest". Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 194! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), x. �SLOVAKIA 61 siderable time to various integration schemes such as those proposed by Hodza. 75 The duties of investigating and assessing these plans, as well as drawing up recommendations which were to serve as guidelines in American post-war foreign policy, were entrusted to the Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.76 Browsing through the minutes of the Advisory Committee between May 1942 and March 1944 gives one some idea of how much time and space the Department of State devoted to federalization plans for Central Europe and what attitudes towards them various committee members maintained. On May 9, the Committee's agenda included the so-called Danubian Federation 77 The discussions focused on two plans drawn up by politicians in exile. One of these plans was the proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish union, put forward in the United States by the exiled Polish Prime Minister 75 Documentary sources from the American archives relating to the U.S. attitudes towards Central European integration were collected and annotated by the Polish authors J. Laptos and M. Misztal Marius, American Debates on Central European Unio n, 1942 - 1944. Documents of the American State Department (Brussels & New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2002). 76 F. D. Roosevelt approved of the establishment of the Advisory Committee three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1941 . It included academics as well as leading officers of the Department of State. The Committee reported directly to the State Secretary. At that time, the position of vice-chairman was held by Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Everyday activities were overseen by Leo Pasvolsky. The Advisory Committee had six subcommittees, the most important of which were those dedicated to political, economic and territorial issues. Other key figures on the Committee who specialised in Central Europe were Hamilton Fish Armstrong ( 1893 - 1973) and Adolf A. Berle. It was the latter who was often believed by Czech and Slovak emigres to have harboured sympathies for Hodza's plans. The Committee 's job was to draw up general guidelines for the United States in peace negotiations. The official activity of this Committee was ended in the summer of 1943, but many of its members continued their work on other committees until the end of the war. The Committee 's research team drew up hundreds of reports, situational analyses and recommendations, which became a blueprint for the discussions and proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees. Regular minutes of the subcommittees' discussions were kept. The documentation produced by the Advisory Committee is deposited in the National Archives in the Notter File. See Ignac Romcis, "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942 - 1944" Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, [online] , 1992, 30, no. 77 . [Quoted: 2008-06-05] . Available at: <http ://www.hungarianhistory.hu> 77 The term "Danubian Federation" was chosen by the Advisory Committee to refer to the integration efforts of the Central European countries in the Danubian region. The discussions of the Advisory Committee on the "Danubian Federation" included possible membership for Poland and Austria. �62 SLOVAKIA Wladyslaw Sikorski. 78 The other was the Danubian Federation, championed by exiled Hungarian politicians Tibor Eckhardt and Janos Pelenyi.79 Hodfa's federation plan was not included. It was referred to only marginally by a member of the Committee, Anne McCormick. 80 She mentioned Hodfa as an agrarian politician who had been involved in solving agrarian problems.81 The foreign policy analyst went on to inform the Committee, quite misleadingly, that Hod:fa 's plan limited itself to the Danubian region.82 This ignorance of the details of Hodza's plan is interesting, because by that time Hodfa had already spoken about his plans to The New York Times and, more importantly, must have made his views known at the State Department during his first visit. 83 Hodfa 's plan was almost completely 78 Laptos and Mizstal pointed out that Sikorski 's plan for federation was dealt with only briefly. According to the information available to the Committee, Sikorski's federation was to comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The plan envisaged the complete economic federation and eventual political federation of its constituent countries. According to the Advisory Committee, Polish influence in the thus-constituted federation was obvious, though the sheer scale of the supranational state ruled out complete Polish domination. Laptos and Mizstal, .American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 74. 79 Tibor Eckhardt was a Hungarian politician of the interwar period. In 1938 he represented Hungary at the League of Nations Assembly. In 1941 he was sent on a mission to the USA by Miklos Horthy in order to approach the Allies and the Hungarian democratic opposition. Eckhardt's federation was brought to the attention of the Committee by Under Secretary of State Welles. According to this plan, Central Europe was to be divided into three parts: a Polish-Baltic bloc, a Balkan bloc and a "Danubian" union,comprising Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Slovakia and Transylvania, with the possibility of the later admission of Croatia. The unifying element of the federation was to be their common history as part of the Habsburg monarchy. NARCS Notter File, Department of State. Minutes P - I 0, Danubian Federation, May 9, 1942. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 74. 80 Anne O ' Hare McCormick (1882 - 1954), a member of the Advisory Committee, was a foreign policy analyst for The New York Times. 81 The minutes of the meeting captured McCormick's information on Hodza and his plan as follows: " Mrs. McCormick said that mention might also be made of the Hodfa plan, which confines itself to the Danubian area. Mr. Hodfa, she pointed out, being a peasant, is chiefly concerned with the agricultural problem. His plan expresses the aspirations of the Green International." Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 75. 82 In Hodza's plan the core of the proposed federation was to be formed by CzechoSlovakia and Poland, who were to be joined by other countries in the south of Central Europe. 83 See Hope Put in Union of Central Europe, the OSS report on the interview with M. Hodza. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-1 , December 7, 1941 . �SLOVAKIA 63 ignored. It was mentioned in passing in connection with the association of agrarian parties known as the Green International. American foreign policy advisors again failed to include Hodza's plan when they discussed the so-called East European Union as one of the issues related to the Department of State's plans to create a world organization. 84 The members of the Division of Special Research discussed, among other things, the results of the negotiations between the exiled governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland on the creation of a joint union .85 In mid-June of 1942, the Department of State presented to the Advisory Committee the first draft of American recommendations which any supranational organization in Central Europe should comply with. One of the main differences, in comparison with Hodza's plan, was that the United States preferred a union to a federation. This preference reflected the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to sanction political integration. What the Department of State recommended was a loose organization of free sovereign states, which would be able to advance their interests through joint, non-legislative institutions. Such an economic union was to comprise all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including countries as far apart as Estonia, Austria and Greece.86 The establishment of this union would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations. The main rationale was that the establishment of such a union would solve the existing security problems and bring with it economic advantages as a result of regional cooperation. The territorial integrity of the union was to be safeguarded by the United Nations, and the security forces of the union were to act in concordance with the security system of the United Nations. After the war, the world organization was to facilitate the creation of the union by adjusting all outstanding border claims. What is most striking to the European reader about the attitudes of the American government are its views on the armed forces of member 84 The meeting of the Division of Special Research, which prepared reports for the Advisory Committee, took place on June 6, I 942. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P 14, June 6, I 942 . NARA, Notter File, Box 65 ., Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 96 - 103. 85 For the history of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations on uniting, including the attitudes of the United States and the other great powers, see Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943. 86 " The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through common non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany from and including Estonia in the North to Austria in the West and Greece in the South." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P Document 24, June 19, 1942. NARA, Notter File, box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 110. �64 SLOVAKIA countries, as well as on the military of the union as a whole. Every constituent country would have to contribute a designated contingent of troops for the international armed forces (under the command of the UN), but no member state was to have its own armed forces . This recommendation testified to the distrust with which the American foreign policymakers looked upon the nations of Central Europe. The Advisory Committee's analysis of the factors which were thought to be conducive to, or had disintegrating effects upon, the creation of a Central European Union offers an interesting insight into the mindset of the American foreign policy advisors of that time. In the beginning the majority of the Committee members seemed to be in favour of one large Central European union from the Baltic to the Balkans.87 It was argued that a larger union was more advantageous to the United States, because it would be better able to eliminate the destructive forces of nationalism, mutual antagonisms and the land disputes of the Central European nations. 88 An analysis of the economic benefits failed to persuade American foreign policy advisors that economic prosperity was in itself motivationally adequate for unification . In the American view, the history of integration efforts in the interwar period showed that political interests in the area had often been given priority over economic ones. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was pointed out as an example. According to L. Pasvolsky, Masaryk and Bene~ were willing to accept any economic disadvantages in order to achieve political and cultural unity after WW I. 89 It was nationalism, however, that elicited the greatest fears in the members of the Committee. The issue was frequently raised during the discussions, and the Department of State believed that nationalism was one of the five main obstacles to Central European integration.90 As the feasibility study for the Department of State from 87 This notion was supported most enthusiastically by S. Welles and H. F. Armstrong. 88 From the economic point of view, a larger union appeared to offer better prospects of strengthening the commercial position of member states in trade with the rest of Europe. As for the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the gravest concerns at the Department of State were aroused by Hungarian nationalism, with some criticism also levelled at the former Czechoslovakia. 89 "Mr. Bowman observed that in the case of the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks the main emphasis had been on the achievement of political and cultural unity from the beginning. Economic considerations had played a decidedly minor £iart." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943 . Apart from nationalism, the list of five disintegrative forces comprised the absence of common roots, cultural di versity, external political influences and diversity in regional economic development. Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943. NARA , NARA, Notter File, �SLOVAKIA 65 February, 1943 observed, "Since the present war began, the animosity between several of the states, e.g., between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Hungary and Romania, has been greatly increased and the conflicts between ethnic groups within one state e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks, between Serbs and Croats, have become bitter."9 1 Where the State Department seemed to be in agreement with Hodfa was the belief that the peasantry could play a positive role in the process of Central European integration. In the inter-war period, peasant parties in Central Europe had engaged in mutual cooperation and shared a similar political agenda. 92 A member of the Committee, J. T. Shotwell, also sympathised with this opinion, but expressed reservations about the role of agrarian leaders, who, in his view, had nationalistic tendencies which might prove distractive. 93 The discussion about the cohesive and destructive forces of unification eventually prompted the members of the Committee to break the proposed union into two parts. With regard to the attitudes of the exiled governments, Berle pointed out that, surprisingly, none of these su£ported a large union, with the exception of the Czechoslovak government. 4 Strictly speaking, however, this was no longer the case. By that time, the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Czechoslovak Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 187 - 88. 91 Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943 . NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 92 State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part III: Movements Tending Toward Unity, February 19, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 93 According to Shotwell, the majority of Central European leaders were nationalists of the 19th century type. As an example he pointed to Count Apponyi, who owned land in Slovakia, a fact which had a great deal of influence on his political outlook. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P I 7, June 27, 1942. Milan Hodza himself often mentioned the agrarian problems in Hungary. That was also why he laid down conditions on the membership of Hungary in a Central European Federation, stressing first the necessity of agrarian reform in that country. 94 Laptos and Mistal put Berle 's incorrect information down to the skilfulness of the Czechoslovak propaganda. "The question was asked whether Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle had talked with representatives of these countries on this matter. Mr. Berle said that no one of that group had the concept of a single union. Mr. Welles said he had never found one who had the conception of one union, most favoring three unions; some, two. Mr. Berle said that the Czechs were the only ones who had offered any support for a single union." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union . .., 129 - 30. �66 SLOVAKIA government was getting increasingly cold feet about any union with its northern neighbour. At the end of June, the members of the Committee agreed that for the sake of further discussions about Central European integration they would consider two options- the so-called Northern East European Group and a Balkan Group. 95 Another key issue to which the Advisory Committee devoted its attention was the problem of how viable the proposed union would be and what attitudes the great powers would adopt in dealing with this supranational state. According to the above-mentioned feasibility study, the political will of the member states alone was insufficient for the union's long-term survival. American foreign policymakers understood perfectly well that in order for the union to survive, it had to secure the support of the victorious powers, including that of the United States. 96 The advantages from the American point of view seemed palpable enough: a solution to questions of security in relation to Germany and Russia, pacification of the space between the Baltic and the Aegean seas in an area inaccessible to the naval powers, and the protection of Eastern European countries against possible German expansion. The most important question, of course, was how such a union would be viewed by the geographically closest of the powers - the Soviet Union. In the October Memorandum on Russia and the East European Federation, drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations, an expert on Soviet affairs informed the Committee that the reasons for Soviet opposition were far stronger than those which might induce the Soviet Union to support such a scheme. 97 The first and the most decisive reason for Soviet 95 The proposal to break up the union was put forward by Under Secretary of State Welles at the meeting of the Division of Special Research on June 27, 1942 . The main reason was the diverse character of the member states of the union, which might lead to its disintegration. On the issue of breaking up the union, the members of the Committee were by no means united. Welles was in principle in favour of a single union, but practical considerations compelled him to opt for two smaller ones. The key problem of the two-union solution was Austria and Hungary. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA , Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 119 - 20. 96 See Part IV: Steps Necessary to make Union Effective: "In view of the fact that Eastern Europe has felt the impact of virtually none of those dynamic forces that would aid in creating a unity out of this di versity of peoples, the creation of a union and its maintenance for an indefinite period would have to be in large measure the work of the great victorious powers or of the international organization. " State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part IV: NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 19 1. 97 The author of the memorandum was Isaiah Bowman. The Counci l on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, �SLOVAKIA 67 opposition was the assumption that the establishment of a union would prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its policy of divide et impera. Moscow was also worried that the political orientation of the Central European countries within the proposed union would lead to the weakening of the existing pro-Russian orientation in some of them. 98 There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia was one of those countries. Its president-in-exile Edward Benes had indicated that Czechoslovak foreign policy after the war would be oriented towards the east. The Soviet attitude towards integration in Central Europe was yet again referred to by American foreign policy advisors as "apparently hostile" in February of 1943. 99 The report made it clear that Moscow was in no mood to support federalization plans of a lesser scope, such as the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish or Greek-Yugoslav unions. The Department of State reached this conclusion on the basis of the information obtained directly from representatives of the Czechoslovak government-inexile. The negative attitude of Moscow was also identified as the main rea- October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 176. 98 The author continues: "The possibilities of supporting Czechoslovakia against Poland, Hungary against Rumania, Yugoslavia against Hungary and so forth, present an almost limitless field for maneuver by Russia to make its influence strong and even preponderant among the disunited states of East Central Europe." Other Soviet objections could be summarized as follows: 2. the united states of Central Europe would find it easier to advance their territorial claims against Russia, 3. the political system of the member countries would unify, but become very likely hostile to that of the Soviet Union, 4. the union 's armed forces would be stronger in defence, which would weaken Soviet military position, 5. the exports of such a federation would compete in world markets with Soviet exports; Soviet exports into the union would be disadvantaged, since Russia would have to deal with the union as a whole rather than trading with countries separately, 6. the union would curb the revived pan-Slav sentiment, because it would include non-Slav countries and the pro-Russian orientation of the Slav countries would thus be weakened. The Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 177. 99 "On the basis of information at present available in the Political Section, the Soviet Government is apparently hostile to the idea of the creation of an all-embracing East European Union, unless, perhaps, such a Union were established under the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union. An examination of the Soviet press and periodicals has disclosed no discussions of such projects for an Eastern European Union as have been put forward from time to time in Britain and the United States." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Document P 206, February 18, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. LAPTOS, Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 196. �68 SLOVAKIA son why the Czechoslovak §ovemment broke off its negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile. 1 0 The work of the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy officially ended in July of 1943, though some of its subcommittees continued their work on Central European integration plans until the spring of 1944. 101 The issue of Slovakia's post-war political status never came up. Neither was it discussed by any of the Committee's numerous subcommittees. The abandonment of American discussions of the Central European integration plans raises two questions: what were the reasons for this decision and what political future did the Roosevelt administration envisage for the Central European nations? The answer to the first question should be looked for in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy for this period. Drawing on the latest historical research, one finds, more or less, consensus on this issue. The dominant factor in American strategic planning was the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe, which went hand in hand with its increasing political influence. It became clear, towards the end of 1943, that the Red Army would liberate a substantial part of Central Europe, a fact which would inevitably increase the role of the Soviet Union in the post-war political organization of the area. Regardless of their original plans, President Roosevelt and the Department of State had to constantly adjust to these developments. In 1943, under pressure of the events on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt was forced to review his erstwhi le concept of an "Anglo-American world police force" and extend it into the well-known "Four Policemen" theory. This had to take the Soviet Union into account as an equal partner in the political organization of territories within its own sphere of influence. From this point of view it 100 "Mr. Berle remarked that when the Polish-Czech confederation was agreed upon, both parties had believed that the Russians were not opposed to the idea. The worsening of relations between Russia and the Polish government-in-exile, however, has since resulted in a change in the Russian position. The Czechs have withdrawn from their discussions with the Poles, ostensibly because the Poles were unwilling to abandon their claim to the Teschen area, but in reality because of Russian opposition to the combination." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 217. 101 Secretary of State Cordell Hull ended the work of the Committee in a letter of July 12, 1943 . Mary E. Bradshaw, "Congress and Foreign Policy Since 1900," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 289 (September, 1953), 45 . The last minutes of the Political Subcommittee dealing with the Central European union were those of March 15- 17, 1944, NARA, Notter File, Box 84. The last meeting of the Economic Subcommittee took place on March 31 , 1944. Advisory Committee, Economic Subcommittee, R Minutes 16, March 31, 1944 NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Unio n ... , 243 . �SLOVAKIA 69 can be understood why any American position on a Central European federation or union had to be approved by Moscow. The absence of a Soviet stance on the issue throughout 1942 kept the idea of integration alive among the exiled politicians of Central Europe, and occupied the minds of American foreign policy advisors on the Advisory Committee. Doubts about Moscow's priorities were finally ended in October of 1943, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, officially confirmed the negative position of the USSR. 102 The answer to the second question, namely what the Americans desired as the political future for Central Europe, is more complicated. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the views of the Roosevelt administration on this issue were not unanimous. Significant differences of opinion existed in Washington, which divided even the chief foreign policy makers, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. American historians' interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Europe during this period have gone through several developments since WW II. 103 The more recent research emphasizes the importance of Roosevelt's role in the process of foreign policymaking, and interprets his apparent lack of determination and unsystematic approach as misleading. According to this interpretation, Roosevelt, from the beginning of the war, pursued a clear goal in relation to Continental Europe: to reduce its international standing and marginalize it as the most effective way of preventing future conflicts in the area. Roosevelt intended to achieve this marginalization through fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and wherever possible, ethnically homogenous states. These states should in no case possess any armed forces, and after disarmament they should be placed within the sphere of influ102 This information was imparted to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who asked V. Molotov about the Soviet view on Central European integration efforts at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19 - 29, 1943. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 63 . 103 The oldest interpretation of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe maintains that the Roosevelt administration favoured active involvement in the rebuilding of European democracies and in strengthening the position of European states. Roosevelt is criticised, however, because he was unable to see through Stalin's empty promises at Yalta. The second, "revisionist" theory contends that the post-war division of Europe was afait accompli long before Yalta, because the Red Anny would occupy the whole of Eastern Europe and the United States had to respect this fact. ." Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos. A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 26 (no. 2, 1996), 73 . Lundestad, who reviewed both of the above theories, characterized U.S. foreign policy towards Central Europe as a policy of "modified universalism in the area of non-essential interest for the USA." For the lack of internal coherence in this policy he chose to refer to it as a "non-policy." G. Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe .. . , 34. �70 SLOVAKIA ence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. 104 Such a vision of the future of Central European nations was incompatible with Hodza 's federalization. He feared the political influence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, called for concerted efforts to strengthen the position of Central Europe. As far as Slovakia's future was concerned, Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention, whether intentional or inadvertent, played more into the hands of Slovak separatists than those of the proponents of federative integration.' 05 Roosevelt's concept of new spheres of influence, however, stood in contrast to the universalistic vision of Secretary of State Hull, who was advocating global cooperation among nations on the basis of a renewed world organization. The key moment, which resulted in the adoption of the universalistic approach as the main guideline in U.S. foreign policy, is usually thought to be the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 106 After Welles's resignation, Secretary of State Hull and his department advanced the concept of collective security within the framework of a restored world organization under a new name. ' 07 The new line in American foreign policy, however, did not make the Roosevelt administration take a more active role in suppressing the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Roosevelt continued to count on Soviet assistance as a decisive political force in the post-war reorganization of Central Europe. What he and his foreign policy advisors got wrong was the belief that Stalin's Russia would sooner or later discard its system of central planning, return to the market economy and join the rest of the democratic world. 104 "As he [Roosevelt] told the British Foreign Minister in March 1943, 'armaments after the war in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of the policing powers Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller powers might have rifles but nothing more dangerous than this' .. .These two great powers had to maintain order over other disarmed European countries, if necessary by force." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", 72 . 105 "He [Roosevelt] also envisioned splitting up multiethnic countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," 70. On another occasion, when meeting representtatives of the Slovak League in 1940, Roosevelt remarked: "I believe that every nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its nationhood." Ever since then, the Slovak League interpreted the president's statement as approval of the establishment of an independent Slovak state. NARA, Washington D. C., 860F.0l /446. Reverend C. Mlynarovich to C. Manion of the Office for Government Refcort, Indiana, May 11, 1942. 06 Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's closest ally in the Department of State, was a strong supporter of the president's concept of the "Four Policemen." Roosevelt did not trust Hull. In 1943 the president accepted Welles 's resignation in connection with his alleged homosexual activities. 107 In the field of international relations, Hull 's approach to foreign affairs is often associated with the principles of universalism, globalism and political idealism . �SLOVAKIA 71 Thus we have seen that, between 1941 and 1944, the American authorities closely followed the political activities of exiled Slovak politician Milan Hodfa. His political goal in the United States was twofold. First, he intended to influence Roosevelt's foreign policy makers in favour of the creation of a supranational federation of Central European states, which he saw as a political panacea for the area' s many unresolved problems. According to this plan, a restored Czechoslovakia was to be one of the founding members of such a federation . Slovakia was to be part of Czechoslovakia again, but with a new constitutional arrangement stipulating its equal political status with the Czech lands. Secondly, Hodza planned to lead a political campaign among Slovak Americans. In particular, he hoped to win the endorsement of the leaders of their organizations for his programme of a self-governing Slovakia. Various federal agencies' keen interest in Hodza, however, was not motivated by the desire of the U.S. government to support the creation of a central European federation . It rather stemmed from the fact that U.S. governmental agencies had deep misgivings about the effects of Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans. Thus, for the American government, Hodfa soon emerged as an unwelcome guest as the OSS began in mid-1942 supplying various U.S. departments with reports about the ideological split within the Slovak-American community. The fears frequently expressed in the OSS reports were motivated by the perceived possible consequences of Hodza ' s campaign on the home front as well as the on the American war effort in general. Foremost among these fears was that the Hodfa-inspired opposition to the Benes-led government-in-exile would not only undermine the standing of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - one of the war-time allies of the United States - but would also have a deleterious effect on the morale of the hundreds of thousands of Slovak Americans employed in key American heavy industries. Hodza's political campaign among Slovak Americans targeted two deeply antagonistic camps. He attempted to win the support of the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance, who had originally supported Benes's government-in-exile. At the same time, he tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Slovak League of America, several of whom offered their organizations' support for his programme. However, Hodfa failed to eliminate the powerful influence of the hard-liners in these umbrella organizations. The Czechoslovak Information Service in the United States, a propaganda tool of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile, severely criticized Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans, constantly challenging his right to discuss Slovakia' s future on American soil and running a smear campaign against him. The U.S. administration viewed Hodfa 's activities with growing alarm. The most worrying development from the American point of view was the ideological split in the Slovak National Alliance which devel- �72 SLOVAKIA oped as a result of Hodza ' s lecture tour. The OSS repeatedly called on the Department of State to intervene in order to mend the rift among the proCzechoslovak fraternal leaders. Hodza ' s attempts to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards the future organization of Central Europe had little impact on American foreign policy. lndeed, his plan for a Central European federation was never discussed by the American foreign policy advisors. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State and its agencies devoted considerable time to weighing the pros and cons of Central European integration from the point of view of American interests. The Department of State tended to favour an economic union rather than a political federation. Moreover, it feared the destructive forces of Central European nationalisms, not excluding the Slovak and Czech ones. However, the major American objection to any form of Central European integration stemmed from the strong opposition to it from the United States' chief war ally in Eastern Europe - the Soviet Union. Stalin had no intention of supporting any integration plans in the area. He preferred a fragmented Central Europe made up of weak states, which would strengthen the negotiating position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis these countries. Roosevelt ' s policy of deliberate non-intervention in Central Europe, coupled with the American belief in a new world organization, resulted after the war in a gradual Sovietization of Central Europe and the creation of a new sphere of influence. Given the pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from December of 1943 onwards, the Roosevelt administration refrained from publicly expressing any of its views on Slovakia's post-war future. � SLOVAKIA 37 AN UNWELCOME GUEST: MILAN HODZA IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS BETWEEN 1941 AND 1944 V Roman Licko In December of 1938 Milan Hodza, a Slovak politician and the last prime minister of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, went into exile in France. There, along with Stefan Osusky, another Slovak statesman and diplomat, he became the leading figure of Slovak democratic exiles before 1 the outbreak of WW II. Towards the end of 1939 Rodia established the Slovak National Council, which, under his auspices, was reorganized in early 1940 into the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Both political bodies subscribed to the democratic ideals of pre-war Czechoslovakia, as well as to the belief in a continuation of Czechoslovak statehood.2 However, in stark 1 Before Hodfa' s arrival in Paris in November of 1939, Ambassador Stefan Osusky had been the leading figure of the Czechoslovak resistance movement operating from France. His greatest achievement was the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement concerning the creation of a new Czechoslovak army in France by which the French government recognised de fa cto the continued existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period Osusky and Hodza shared similar ideas about Slovakia' s future . They both unequivocally supported the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. However, they strongly opposed the centralism of the inter-war Prague governments. Osusky favoured a federal constitutional arrangement between Czechs and Slovaks. Hodza spoke of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored ' CzechoSlovakia'. Osusky maintained close contact with Hodza, who was, at that time, in London. The two men even cooperated in the preparation of a memorandum of Slovak demands in the lead-up to the establishment of the Benes-led Czechoslovak National Committee in France. Interestingly enough, Osusky did not become a member of any of the resistance organizations established by Hodza after his arrival in Paris. For more on the Hodfa-Osusky co-operation during this period see Slavomir Michalek, "Hodza a Osusky, nazory a pozicie v rokoch 1939- 1941 ," in Milan Hodia-statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 301- 18. 2 This paper uses the more widely accepted spellings ' Czechoslovakia' and 'Czechoslovak'. In reference to Hodza' s ideas, however, the spellings 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak' have been retained as these were the forms preferred by Hodfa himself. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 adopted the unhyphenated spelling of the name. In November of 1938 the country officially returned to the hyphenated spelling 'Czecho-Slovakia' in recognition of the fact that Slovakia had been declared an autonomous region. The use of the one name or the other, by both Czechs and Slovaks throughout the war, had political connotations. Generally speaking, the Slovaks who favoured the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after WW II but op- �38 SLOVAKIA opposetion to Edward Benes, the leading figure of the Czech democratic exiles, Hodza advocated a thoroughly decentralized model of a new Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement, with self-governing status for Slovakia. After the failure to find common ground on this issue with Benes, who consistently refused to allow any political representation of Slovak federalists in his exile government-to-be, Hodza moved to London. The German occupation of France in the summer of 1940 and the ensuing Battle of Britain in September of 1940 speeded up Britain' s recognition ofBenes's government-in-exile. Feeling powerless and marginalised, Hodza saw no purpose in participating in any government headed by Benes. By the autumn of 1941 he decided to leave Britain and in October of that year he arrived in the United States. There he pursued two political objectives: he intended to convince politically-minded Slovak Americans to support his programme of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, he attempted to lobby the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind the creation of a federation of Central European states. This paper, which draws primarily on research in United States government archives, attempts to trace Hodza ' s political campaign among Slovak Americans from the point of view of the Roosevelt administration. At the same time, it follows Hodza ' s efforts to engage the American government in a dialogue concerning a comprehensive post-war peace settlement in Central Europe. With the help of secondary literature on the subject, the study assesses the success of these attempts, and how they were viewed by the chief foreign policy makers in the Roosevelt administration. 3 posed the pre-war unitary constitutional arrangement between the two nations preferred the hyphenated designation. 3 The first attempt to document the activities of Milan Hodfa in the USA was made by his close associate, Michal Mudry Sebik, in his book Milan Hodia v Amerike. (Chicago :Geringer Press, Inc., 1949). The author published a number of articles in the periodicals of Slovak democratic exiles in the USA after WW II, e.g. Michal Mudry, "Svedectvo historickej doby. Bullitovo a Hodzovo memorandum," Nase snahy, 6, no. 9 (May - June 1970). In 1965 Susan Mikula, an American of Slovak descent, wrote a dissertation on Hodza's activities in the USA. However, it was not until 1992, at a conference in Bratislava, that she presented her work in Slovakia: Susan Mikula, " Dr. Milan Hodfa vo svelte archivnych dokumentov z archivov v USA," in : Milan Hodia - statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 345- 50. Czech historians have also dealt with Hodfa 's stay in the USA . For instance J. Kuklik and J. Nemecek, Hodia versus Benes. Milan Hodia a slovenska otazka v zahranicnim odboji za druhe svetove valky (Praha: Karolinum, 1999). The most comprehensive account yet of Hodfa's political activities in the USA. , including some views of the Roosevelt administration, was written by the late Slovak historian Pavol Luklic, "Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii v USA a reakcie na jeho federalisticke plany, Historicky casopis 51 , no. 4 (2003), pp. 497- 515 . As Lukac himself observed, however, Kuklik' s and Nemecek's book only traced �SLOVAKIA 39 Apart from the Slovak League of America (hereafter SLA), which favoured independence for Slovakia, there was no other Slovak organization in the USA in 1941 that had a clear idea about Slovakia' s political future after the war. 4 The leaders of the opposition organization - the Slovak National Alliance (hereafter SNA) - stuck to the policy of a reinstated Czechoslovakia, but were unwelling to commit themselves to negotiating a more specific settlement on this issue. In line with the official policy of President Edvard Benes, they maintained that Slovakia's future should be resolved after the war by a democratic vote. Despite their uncommitted attitude, Slovakia's political future was as sensitive an issue among the individual leaders of the SNA as it was for the leadership of the SLA. As long as there was no political leader in the United States who was able to offer a political alternative to the League-promulgated Slovak independence, the issue was bound to remain unresolved. This situation changed after the arrival of Milan Hodfa in the United States in October of 1941. During the three years of his American stay, Hodfa devoted his energies to political campaigning and lobbying. Like Slovak-American leaders, he too wanted to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards Slovakia. As a former Czechoslovak statesman, Hodfa had access to the United States Department of State. He was allowed to discuss the Slovak question with high-ranking government officials. Hodfa ' s political campaign in the USA aroused the interest of the American media, as well as that of federal authorities. Right up to his death in 1944, his activities were closely followed by the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) and its subordinate department, the Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter FNB). Hodfa's arrival in the United States generated interest, not only among Slovak Americans, but also in the American media. Almost immediately, a number of speculative pieces about Hodfa's political objectives appeared in Hodfa's political campaign in the USA on the basis of secondary archival materials left by Hodfa 's contemporaries, and not from the documents of the U.S. Department of State. The present study draws upon the following primary sources: 1. an independent investigation of the documents of the Department of State; 2. the hitherto unpublished documents of the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate department - the Foreign Nationalities Branch (both housed in the National Archives in Washington), the archival documentation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (released to the author under the Freedom oflnformation - Privacy Acts); and 3. the documents issued by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy collected and published by Polish historians JozefLaptos and Marius Misztal in 2002 . 4 For the activities of the Slovak League of America on behalf of Slovak independence during and after the war, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia 39, nos. 72-73 (2007), 19-34. �40 SLOVAKIA the press. One OSS report from 1942 read that the former Czechoslovak prime minister had come as a private citizen. 5 Hodza himself said that the main reason for his arrival was for reasons of health. In the USA he planned to undergo a series of medical treatments.6 This is well attested in the Hodfa family correspondence of the period. 7 On the other hand, the former Czechoslovak prime minister did hope to achieve in the United States some well-defined political goals. 8 In his first interview with The New York Tim es, Hodfa stated that he intended to "test out American opinion regarding Central Europe" and, at the same time, he wanted to "inform it of the trend of opinion there."9 Not all American media reported on Hodza's intentions impartially. On November 7, the Overseas News Agency issued a press release which assessed Hodfa 's pre-war political career in an unflattering light. According to this source, Hodfa's Agrarian Party was only a little less reactionary than the pro-fascist Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. The release went on to claim that Hodfa's arrival also shed a negative light on Slovak Americans. The authors of the release dubbed their political mindset as "isolationist and pro-fascist," referring to some of the Slovak fraternal press in America as evidence. 10 It is clear that the primary motivation of the author must have been to damage Hodfa's political reputation . According to 5 National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 6 1. This information was acquired by the OSS from the New York Times interview with Hodza conducted by Frederick T. Birchall. 6 M. Mudry, Hodza's assoc iate in America, later wrote: "An American journalist who visited and interviewed Hodza claimed that in response to the question about his plans Hodfa took out a bottle of medication and said that what he wanted, first and foremost, was a recovery." Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike .. ., 20. 7 John Palka, Milan Hodfa's grandson, mentions two bouts of pneumonia that his grandfather suffered from shortly after his arrival. See John Palka, Maje S/ovensko, moja rodina (Bratislava: Kalli gram, 2010), 57. 8 Kuklik and Nemecek argue: " It cannot be ruled out that the former Prime Minister could have been driven by his effort to shore up support among his expatriates especially Slovak Americans, with whom he could attempt, with new energy, to stage a comeback in the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. So far his departure was seen, perhaps with some oversimplification, as his resignation to the attempts to advance his Slovak national programme in emigration, " Hodia versus Benes..., 142.The view that Hodfa sought the leading position in the resistance is also supported by Lukac, " Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii ... ", 605 . 9 The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 1 °Kuklik and Nemecek quote from Overseas News Agency release No. 400, July 11, 1941: " Hodfa's presence sheds light on the political tendencies of Slovak Americans. Apparently, the majority of Slovaks living in the United States are isolationist and pro-fascist and this has been reflected in the Slovak press here as well." The Czech authors say that Hodfa sued the ONA for libel, claiming $600,000 in damages, Hodia versus Benes.. ., 144. �SLOVAKIA 41 Hodza's close associate in the USA, Michal Mudry, unfounded attacks like these were frequent and their authors were mainly Slovak-American Communists, supported by Czechoslovak authorities in the USA. 11 The sources of the anti-Hodfa campaign remain obscure. We contend, however, that for President Benes and his government-in-exile, Hodfa's presence in the country posed a serious political problem. The main reason was that Hodfa was determined to call on Slovak Americans to actively participate in the discussions about the future of Slovakia. The Roosevelt administration's attitudes towards Hodfa's political activities were shaped gradually and drew upon several sources. One of them was Hodfa himself. Almost immediately after his arrival, the former Czechoslovak prime minister made contact with the Department of State, and during his stay visited it several times. It can be argued that Hodfa was the only Slovak who discussed the Slovak question with United States government officials during WW II. From its inception in the summer of 1942, the OSS kept an eye on Hodfa 's activities, and from December of that year his political campaign was scrutinized by the officers of the FNB. The OSS analysed Hodfa 's activities by scanning his articles in the Slovak-American media, as well as in the American press in general. In addition to that, Hodza attracted the close attention of the FBI, which since I 940 had been investigating the activities of the Slovak League and the Slovak National Alliance. All the sources at the U.S . government' s disposal indicated that Hodfa pursued very specific political objectives in the United States. Sometime around mid-1942, an OSS report noted that: "Dr. Hodza' s visits to the State Department, his public speeches, interviews granted by him, and his article in The Nation (May 16, 1942) have demonstrated his willingness to express his ideas, whatever may be the extent of his actual political activity. ,, 12 Hodfa' s approach to the Slovak question differed from all other political plans which had been discussed among Slovak Americans to date. The crucial difference was that in Hod:fa' s view, the Slovak question was not to be solved in isolation, but as part of the security, economic and strategic 11 "Various groups, more or less under the influence of leftist elements and the Czechoslovak Information Service, take pot shots at Hodfa and where possible, in connection with his person, they attack Slovak Americans as well. These groups are often made up of the active Czech and Slovak communists such as Hoffmeister, Weisskopf Benau [a social democrat - author's note) and others, at that time undoubtedly under the influence and in favour with Czechoslovak authorities in America." According to Mudry, the most malicious attack upon Hodfa was the pamphlet entitled " Persona non grata". It contained a scathing criticism of Hodfa 's efforts to create a federation , which, among other things, was to constitute a buffer against the Russian Bolsheviks. See Mudry, Milan Hodia v Ameriike .. . , 37. 12 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS , RG 226 E 100, Box 3, p. 47 . �42 SLOVAKIA issues concerning the whole of Central Europe. At that time, Hodza's ideas and political thought may have been known to the public as well as the OSS from his book Federation in Central Europe. 13 Hodza was convinced that federation was the only political arrangement capable of harnessing nationnal forces while preserving the freedom of nations and of individuals. Federation would enable Central Europe to become a viable system of production and consumption on the basis of which a New Europe could be built. The liberated and reinstated countries of Central Europe would conclude a treaty that would become the basic framework for a federal constitution. The treaty was supposed to be the result of spontaneous decisions made by Central European countries, which, bearing in mind their common goals, would identify common interests and mutual commitments. Powers concerning mutual affairs were to be delegated to federal bodies, and their exercise entrusted to a federal govemment. 14 It would be headed by a federal Chancellor, who would be nominated by the President of the federation . The legislative body would be made up of a federal Congress, which was to oversee the legislative process as well as the federal budget. The Federal Court was to be the highest judicial body, which would decide on matters raised by the federal government or by the governments of the constituent countries. The federalization of Central Europe was envisaged as the key to solving the Slovak question and Slovak-Czech relations. Hodza believed that the freedom and security of small nations could be guaranteed only through a supranational federation . If small states were to merge their sovereignties, thereby creating a stronger unit, it would clearly mean more to them than to be in permanent danger of losing their sovereignties. Slovakia, however, was not to enter the Central European federation as a separate state. According to Hodza, the political coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks was not only feasible, but also inevitable. For Czechs, Slovakia represented an important connection with Central Europe. Self-government would satisfy Slovakia to the extent that it would never be a source of weakness for the new republic, but the reverse - it would become the source of its stability and strength. However, Hodza warned, certain mistakes from the past should be avoided. "Stubborn centralism as well as mischievous separatism have to disappear," he argued. Hodza did not support Slovak independence and never sympathized with the representatives of the Slovak regime at home. In his book, he unequivocally dissociated himself from the "Slovakian Quisling regime" 13 Federation in Central Europe (London and New York: Jarrolds Publishers, 1942). Hodza proposed the creation of the following federal ministries: I . finance, 2. International trade, 3. foreign affairs, 4. defence, 5. postal services and communications, 6. and 7. air and naval transport, 8. federal legislation, 9. federal cooperation. Federation in Central Europe ... , 172 - 7. 14 �SLOVAKIA 43 and made it clear that its political representatives did not represent the will of the people. As far as the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London was concerned, Hodza claimed he respected it and was willing to cooperate with it. In his opinion, though, the real leaders of the Slovaks existed not only in London, but also in the USA. He was convinced that in the settling of the Slovak question, Slovak Americans should take an active part. By emphasising the importance of Slovak Americans, Hodza underlined how much hope he pinned on them in deciding the political future of Slovakia after the war. 15 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Hodza presented his vision to the American press. On December 7, 1941 The New York Times published an interview with him entitled "Hope Put in Union of Central Europe," which the former Czechoslovak statesman had granted to American journalist Frederick T. Birchall. The subheading of the article informed the American reader that federation was the goal of 110 million Central Europeans. 16 In the introduction, the author informed the reader that Hodza arrived in the USA unofficially, but with the approval of the Czechoslovak government in London. In fact, the second part of this statement was not true. President Benes could not prevent Hodza from leaving for the United States, but he was far from pleased with the prospect of his greatest political rival in exile campaigning among Slovak Americans. In the Birchall interview Hodza outlined some of the constitutional mechanisms of the proposed federation, and expressed his conviction that the prevailing political tendency in exile was "wholly in the direction of such a federation." As proof, Hodza pointed to the recent rapprochement of two old foes - Czechoslovakia and Poland. 17 These two countries, he believed, should form the nucleus of the future federation . It should then be joined by Romania, and subsequently also by a democratized Hungary, provided that the latter gave up its "imperialistic policy of coercing non-Magyar regions." According to 15 "Most of the Slovak leaders now stay in this country [United Kingdom] and in the USA ." Hodza, Federation in Central Europe . .. , 94. 16 The other two subheadings read: "For Common Government" and "He Explains Plan Will Not Deal in Half Measures, Such as the Old Little Entente," The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 17 Hodza alluded here to the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of a possible confederation between the exiled governments of both countries in London. The outcome of these negotiations, which took place between 1940 and 1942, were two joint declarations - one in November 11 , 1940 and the other on January 23, 1942. The negotiations did not, however, lead to any specific action. In 1943 they ended for good as a result of the new pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, as well as Moscow 's negative attitude towards such a confederation. For details see, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). �44 SLOVAKIA Hodza, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had already been working out their own idea of a federation . Hodza touched on the issue of the relations of Central Europe with Germany and Russia. He considered Russian Bolshevism as great a threat to Europe as German fascism. That was also the reason why the proposed federation should act as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviki." 18 Peasants, representing the conservative values of Central Europe, would, according to Hodza, be a stabilising force in the proposed federation . Their conservative influence would be of significant importance, since it would be necessary to "maintain a conservative democratic entity between the two subversive influences of Nazism and Bolshevism". Having talked to some lower-level officials of the U.S. Department of State, Hodfa met Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle on December 9, 1941. 19 On the same day Hodfa dined informally with DeWitt C. Poole, a high-ranking OSS officer and future head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch.20 During his meeting with the Assistant Secretary, Hodza presented Berle with a memorandum in which he outlined the development of Slovak affairs in Czechoslovakia and in subsequent exile between 1918 and 1939.21 In the memorandum, Hodfa pointed out that the Czechoslovak Cabinet in 1938, under his premiership, approved proposed legislation on decentralization - which, among other things, granted Slovakia its regional parliament. That was the last valid legal arrangement made before the Munich Pact, and it was recognized even by Jan Lichner, a minister of the exiled government. This view, Hodfa claimed, was subscribed to by the absolute majority of public opinion in Slovakia in late 1939. He admits that later on, in Paris, Czechoslovak leaders agreed that such constitutional issues as Slovakia's 18 Quoting Hodfa, the author goes on to say: "With a solid bloc of I 00, 000, 000 people separating them, a successful democracy operating next door would be a continuing object lesson of a better and more profitable way of life." The New York Times, December 9, 1941. 19 Prior to the meeting with Berle, Hodfa held talks with C. W. Cannon and H. Hoskins, as well as the head of the Coordination of Information, William J. Donovan. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle (author H. Hoskins), December 9, 1941. 20 According to Kuklik and Nemecek, Hodza maintained that his first visit to the Department of State was a response to an invitation by C. W. Cannon, R. Atherton and A. Berle. The aim was to discuss the memorandum of Slovak-American separatist Gustav Kosik presented to the Department at an earlier date. 21 P. Lukac also suggested that Hodfa's visit to the State Department and his memorandum was a reaction to the memorandum of Gustav Kosik (Memorandum for His Excellency the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America). NARA signature 860f.01 /429- l/2, Roll 30. Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 612. �SLOVAKIA 45 future should be decided by democratic majorities of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Hodfa was willing to adhere to this agreement, provided that the exiled Czechoslovak National Council included representatives of Slovak federalists. In the posited post-war settlement, Hodfa emphasized the importance of a Czecho-Slovak restoration, but with a provision for Slovak self-government. He argued that Slovakia would not be able to maintain its sovereignty even as a separate member of the Central European federation. In the conclusion to the memorandum, Hodza condemned the Slovak puppet regime and hazarded a guess that its support among Slovaks did not exceed I 0%. As for Slovak Americans, he believed that the majority of them had never stopped supporting Czecho-Slovakia. The rest of them, in Hodza 's opinion, would soon change their political views. The official reaction to Hodfa' s memorandum of December 9, 1941 is not known, but it appears that he made a good impression during his first visit to the State Department. The report written for the Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed that, "Dr. Hodza gave the impression of an able patriot with qualities of sincerity and vision that might be with advantage put to constructive work in the post-war period in Central Europe." 22 In his later conversation with Poole, Hodfa himself assessed his meeting with Berle in a similar vein.23 It was intimated to Hodfa that, in the future, he might be received by Secretary Hull himself. Moreover, the State Department did not seem to have any objections to Hodfa's intention of lecturing at American universities and colleges. It was even suggested that Poole might be able to help by making the necessary arrangements.24 Hodfa expected that he would once again be in communication with the Department of State as early as January, 1942. His deteriorating health, however, forced him to stay in American sanatoria for several months, where he recuperated until April of 1942. 25 22 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle, H. Hoskins, December 9, 1941 , p. 3. 23 In his report Poole wrote: "He [Hodza] said that he had explained to Mr. Berle his views on the future political organization of Central Europe, and Mr. Berle seemed to be favourably impressed." D. C. Poole later checked Hodfa's impressions against those of H. Hoskins: "Following my talk with Dr. Hodza, I spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hoskins, and gathered from him that Dr .Hodza had given a substantially accurate account of his reception at the Department of State and Mr. Berle' s attitude. " NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 24 During the conversation at the Department of State, C. Cannon suggested that D. C. Poole "might be in the best position to bring this about." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 25 Lukac writes that Hodza recuperated from chronic bronchitis in a sanatorium at Lake Placid, New York and Hot Springs, Arkansas. Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. ., 612 . �46 SLOVAKIA In Hodfa 's plans, 1942 should have marked a turning-point in his political campaign. After a modest recovery of his health, Hodfa launched his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and began publishing in American scholarly journals. On May 16 he outlined his federalization plans to the politically-minded American public in The Nation. The reactions of Czech and Slovak Americans to his article, A Central European Federation, were collected in two OSS reports from June. Both reports assessed the attitudes of American "Czechoslovaks" towards Hodza as predominantly negative. 26 The first one, dated June 1, 1942, pointed out that Czechoslovak Americans had missed the article because they did not regularly read The Nation. Still, the OSS observer admitted that Hodza's ideas were, in general, favourably received by many Central Europeans because they were in line with their own post-war plans.27 The other report from June 11 portrays Hodza's arrival in America, his political past and goals in the USA in a very negative light. In the introduction, the author alleged that Czechoslovak Americans received the article with considerable mistrust. Claiming that he had researched the Czechoslovak American press and talked to "a number of leading Czechoslovak Americans as well as Czechoslovak exiles," the OSS observer contended that the article was "not a bona fide piece of political thinking, but that it rather serves as a cloak for its author' s ambition to become the exclusive or most important spokesman for the Slovaks (American and otherwise), regardless of cost in terms of Czechoslovak unity here and abroad." 28 It may be argued that the negative tone of the report was influenced by its author's very selective approach to sources. For example, he claimed that he had read reactions in the "Czechoslovak press," but he did not give any specific titles. The only sources he acknowledged were J. Papanek, professor J. B. Kozak and D. Benau. 29Jan Papanek, head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA and Benes's right-hand man, referred to Hodfa as an " unfortunate incident."30 He maintained that Hod26 Neither of the reports makes any distinction between American Slovaks and American Czechs. They refer to both groups collectively as "Czechoslovak Americans." 27 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-47, June I, 1942, p. I. 28 Ibid. The author of the report signed himself"Ivan Ivanovitch ." 29 At the time, Professor Kozak was lecturing at Oberlin College in Ohio. Prior to his arrival in the USA he was a member of the Czechoslovak State Council, a legislative-executive body ofBenes's government-in-exile in London. 30 J. Papanek' s negative attitude towards Hodza 's political views was widely known. Papanek disagreed with decentralisation to the extent advocated by Hodza. The head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA expressed his attitude towards Hodza in one of his letters to Benes in January of 1942: "I do not agree with the policy of decentralization or self-government on the scale suggested by Lichner and Hodfa. I am convinced that this would lead to a new Zilina [agreement on Slova- �SLOVAKIA 47 fa's goal was to split the ranks of Slovak Americans, who had been, until his arrival, predominantly in full support of the Czechoslovak government headed by Bene~. Professor Kozak, a former member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, called Hodfa 's Central European Agrarian Bloc a reactionary body which collaborated with non-democrats. Benau, editor of the "Czechoslovak" New Yorksky dennik, added that Hodfa had a dubious financial past. Hodfa's entree into Slovak-American politics was facilitated by his long-time friend and associate Michal Mudry Sebik. With his assistance, Hodfa first approached the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance. On May 22, 1942, during the meeting of the SNA's Central Committee in Detroit, which discussed Hodfa 's lecture tour, the majority of the Committee expressed their support for Hodfa's political programme.31 At that time, Hodza formulated his position on the Slovak question as follows : 1. A Slovak Parliament and Slovak judiciary; 2. Slovak self-government, 3. Slovak as the only official language in Slovakia. With this political aim he launched a series of lectures at local branches of the SNA. However, the decision of the Central Committee was strongly challenged by the conservative wing of the SNA leadership. At the June meeting of the Executive Board, the president, secretary and treasurer of the organization announced their opposition to the decision taken by the Central Committee on May 22. According to these leaders, Hodfa's demands were a mere repetition of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which concerned the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The leaders proclaimed that, as American citizens, they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, because that was against the SNA programme as well as American law. In addition to that, the proclamation of the Executive Board pointed out that, it was thanks to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that Slovaks were not considered enemies of the Allies. Discussions about Slovakia's political future were destroying the unity of the SNA and threatened the future of the Slovak people. In the final part of the proclamation, the three members of the Executive Board issued a warning: "Disputes over things which do not concern us as American citizens - among these disputes is the question of selfgovernment of the Slovak nation - harm our country, harm all of us, and kia's autonomy, signed Oct. 6, 1938) and all that followed." Slavomir Michalek, Jan Papanek za vojny Bene.fovi. Vyber z dokumentov 1939 - 1945 (Bratislava: VEDA, 1997), 97. 31 Fifteen members of the Central Committee were in favour of Hodza' s lectures, twelve were against. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT9CZ-82. Later M. Mudry observed: "The meeting of the SNA ' s Central Committee in Detroit was especially important in the history of Slovaks. It showed that the great majority of Slovak Americans, in favour of the Czechoslovak Republic, preferred the Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement as it was outlined by Dr. M. Hodza." Mudry, Milan Hodi a v Amerike ..., 32. �48 SLOVAKIA only help the enemy!" 32 The position proclaimed by the Executive Board on June 29 confused other SNA leaders, as well as its rank-and-file. At the same time, it spurred a new wave of discussion about the position of the organization on the Slovak question, which continued throughout 1942. Several days before his second visit to the Department of State, Hodza had an appointment with Poole and J. C. Wiley of the OSS. After the SNA meeting in Detroit, Hodfa expressed his views openly, and his criticism of his opponents was sharper, on occasion turning into personal attacks. He told the OSS officers that his goals were to mobilize Slovak Americans and win their support for a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. He reiterated that the Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement, agreed upon by the Czechoslovak cabinet in July of 1938, was legally valid and politically binding. During one conversation, the OSS officers noted, Hodfa "disclosed a determined opposition to what he called the centralism in the Czechoslovakian constitutional practice of Benes and his entourage." 33 He criticized Benes, who, during their London talks in 1939, had been deliberately evasive and noncommittal regarding discussion of Slovakia's constitutional status. In talks with American government officials, Hodfa maintained that the campaign against himself in the USA had been masterminded by Papanek. The head of the CIS was not, in Hodfa' s words, to any degree a political figure, but merely an agent and intriguer for Benes.34 Apart from the members of the SNA, Hodfa was also planning to address the Slovak American Catholics associated within the Slovak League of America. As Hodfa put it bluntly in his conversation with Poole, he intended to "destroy this organisation" by winning over its popular support, leaving its leaders without any following, which he believed was very weak. 35 Meeting the OSS officers provided Hodfa with an opportunity to get some feedback on how his political activities were viewed by the administration. On this, the position of the OSS and the government was clear and unequivocal. American authorities were anxious not to see American 32 The Proclamation of the SNA Executive Board was signed by its President, Jaroslav Pelikan, Secretary Jan W. Golosinec and Treasurer Vaclav Hovorka. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-82. 33 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. I. 34 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. On this occasion Hodfa also expressed his firm belief in winning the forthcoming trial against the Overseas News Agency. He was convinced that the ONA had obtained its libellous information against him from Pap{mek, who was to be identified as the true culprit. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. 35 Hodfa told the OSS that the local branch of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, NJ, came out in open support of his programme, as did the First Catholic Slovak Union in Wilkes-Barre, PA. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1/2 Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. �SLOVAKIA 49 citizens and alien residents fighting over European political issues on American soil. 36 The concerns of the American government about the unity of Slovak Americans were aired once again during Hodza's second visit to the Department of State on June 18, 1942.37 Hodza met H. Hoskins and C. Cannon. On the same day he spoke on the telephone to Assistant Secretary Berle. Hoskins and Cannon were interested in Hodfa's ongoing lecture tour among Slovak Americans. The former Czechoslovak premier did not hide his optimism and spoke extremely positively about his campaign.38 He was keen to ascertain how his activities were viewed by the Department of State. In response to his query, Assistant Secretary Berle told Hodfa that he thought that his "efforts had been in the right direction. "39 He made it clear, though, that the American government did not wish American unity to be disturbed by conflicts among Americans of foreign descent. Apparently, what the Assistant Secretary had in mind under "efforts in the right direction" were activities that would strengthen Czechoslovak unity in the USA. It was obvious that Slovakia's political future per se played a secondary role, if any, in the Department of State's post-war strategic planning. We can only wonder whether the Department of State had been informed about the results of the SNA' s Detroit meeting at the time of Hodza 's telephone conversation with Berle. It can be argued that, if it had been the case, the Assistant Secretary would not have so favorably assessed Hodza's activities. At any rate, Hodfa took Berle's statement as an expression of approval of his American campaign. He told this to Poole two days later while travelling with him on the train to New York. 40 During this conversation, Hodza reiterated that he was determined to get on with his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and to work on the project of the Central European Federa36 Hodza reacted to this open allusion to his political activities in the USA by assuring the OSS officers that in this respect there could be no objections to his campaign, since his primary aim was to unite, not to divide all Slovak Americans. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. 37 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910- 1944. 38 Lukac quotes from the Memorandum of conversation of June 18 : "Since then he has been in touch with various Slovak groups in this country and felt he had made progress in his efforts to convince them that Slovakia should work out its problem within the framework of the present republic, not as a small independent state". Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 613. 39 Lukac points out that the original memorandum contains the following handwritten note beside the word "efforts": "This related only to his effort to reduce the controversies between Czechs and Slovaks and similar peacemaking attempts." Ibid., 614. 40 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0 1/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Author of report D. C. Poole, June 20, 1942. Poole observed Hodfa's satisfaction with his visit to the Department of State. �50 SLOVAKIA tion.41 He suggested to Poole that American authorities could get in touch with some of his Hungarian and Yugoslav friends who were in favour of such a federation. 42 In return, the OSS officer promised to put him in touch with another academic institution, which would enable him to lecture at universities in his capacity as a former history professor. 43 While lecturing to Slovak Americans during the summer of 1942, Hodza found himself yet again the target of unwanted publicity. This time, Hodza ' s political opponents broadcast their views on New York-based radio station WMCA. Though the statements made by the radio commentator are not known, we do know that they drew an indignant response from Hodza. Following the broadcast by WMCA on July 28th, 1942, Hodza contacted Dr. Morris D. Forkosch, his New York-based lawyer, with a view to bringing legal action against the radio commentator. Hodza was adamant that Johannes Steele, the radio presenter in question, as well as his "sponsors," by which Hodza meant the people who supplied him with the slanderous information, should be sued for libel. This, however, was not to be. Four months later, Hodza abruptly asked his lawyer to drop the suit. In one of his telegrams to Forkosch in mid-October, Hodza wrote: "It is imperative that you immediately and explicitly advise the new sponsors of the radio commentator and others you approached that you acted upon mistaken instructions and to withdraw steps [sic.]."44 From Hodza's correspondence with Forkosch we learn that the defendants (Steele, the WMCA, the Terminal Shops) accepted some sort of "settlement," though it is not at all clear what this arrangement was. What remains baffling is what made Hodza change his mind. Money may have been part of it. Hodza had been dogged by financial problems since his arrival in the United States. On the other hand, Hodza 41 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /446-l /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 2. Hodfa referred specifically to a Hungarian, John Polonyi, and a Yugoslav, Bof olyub Jeftich. 3 During this conversation Hodfa expressed his interest in giving informal talks and participating in conferences as a historian of the 19th century. Poole had facilitated academic contacts for Hodza before. In the autumn of 1941 he introduced him to Dr. Duggan, Director of the International Institute of Education and later to Malcolm Davis, who was to assist in Hodfa 's cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 44 In his letter to Hodfa from October 28, 1942, Forkosch recounted all the telegraphic communications between him and Hodfa related to the libel suit. He did this, presumably, to clarify all possible misunderstandings as to what Hodfa really wanted and what his instructions to Forkosch were. Forkosch, however, did not provide any reasons for his client 's decision to drop the case. NARS, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129. Copy of M. D. Forkosch 's letter to Hodfa, October 28, 1942, p. I. 42 �SLOVAKIA 51 would hardly have initiated a costly new lawsuit if he had not been convinced that he stood a fair chance of having his name cleared and his political detractors exposed. 45 The FNB files remain silent as to who supplied the WMCA with the information or what motivation drove its commentator to attack Hodza over the airwaves. Michal Mudry Sebik had little doubt that public attacks against Hodza were masterminded by Jan Papanek, and condoned by Benes's Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Hurban. This view has not been contested by any Hodza historians. So far, however, there has been no reliable evidence to prove that this was indeed the case. As far as the American government was concerned, it knew all about the perpetrators of the anti-Hodza smear campaign since June of 1943. The ideological split in the Slovak-American community, partially caused by Hodfa' s political campaign, was a source of growing concern to the American government. Amidst fears for the unity of Slovak Americans, the Department of State, in co-operation with several other government agencies, decided to take action. On September 14, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) organized in Pittsburgh a conference of Slovak newspaper editors and presidents of Slovak organizations.46 The intention of the OWI organizers was to unify Slovak-American organizations and persuade their leaders to sign a joint declaration expressing Slovak support for the U.S. government and, at the same time, condemning its enemies, including the Slovak Republic. At the actual conference two resolutions were passed. According to the OSS, on the previous day the members of the Resolution Committee had consulted the wording of both resolutions with Hodza, who had arrived earlier in Pittsburgh.47 The first resolution pledged allegiance to the government of the United States and its president. The second one outlined the principles concerning Slovakia's political future, in line with the Atlantic Charter. It stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should be "recreated on a basis of equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and equal obligations."48 This passage, however, elicited strong objections 45 Hodza's libel suit against the Overseas News Agency had been dragging on and off since November of 1941. The case was finally closed in June of 1943. 46 The conference was held at the William Penn Hotel. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. OSS, V. P. Backora to Dr. Kelso, September 16, 1942. 47 NARS, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. In the lead-up to the conference, Hodza met with Vendelin Platek, president of the National Slovak Society (NSS), Emil Stankoviansky, editor of Slovensky h/asnik [Slovak Herald] , the organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and J. Willo (NSS), chairman of the Resolution Committee. 48 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-143 . A photocopy of the September 14 resolution was published in Slovensky hlasnik on Octo- �52 SLOVAKIA from the "Czechoslovak" hardliners and followers of Benes under the leadership of Jaroslav Pelikan. The text of the second resolution had to be rephrased, and the controversial part concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was eventually omitted. In this form, the resolutions did not please any of the participants. The outcome of the conference left both sides unhappy. The OWI had received a token expression of Slovak allegiance, but the disgruntled Slovak leaders, seeking more definite commitments regarding Slovakia' s future, remained dissatisfied.49 The efforts of the Department of State and the OSS to direct Hodza's activities in favour of Slovak-American unity continued after the unsuccessful conference in Pittsburgh. On September 17, 1942 Assistant Secretary Berle wrote a letter to the OSS in which he asked Poole to settle the ongoing arguments between Papanek and Hodza. In this letter he reiterated the stance of the U.S. government as it was set out in June of 1942. The priorities of the Department did not lie in the various merits and demerits of the argument about the Slovak question, but in the need for unity and peace among Slovak Americans, which would contribute to victory in the war. 50 The concerns of the U.S . government were further exacerbated about two months later when the leaders of Slovak organizations and Hodza 's followers called a new conference with the intention of rallying the Slovak Americans behind Hodza's political programme. A new umbrella organization was established - the Council of Slovak American Organizations and Newspapers (hereafter CASON). This organization later succeeded in encouraging cooperation with some of the Catholic fraternal organizations. Politically, it subscribed to the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but in contrast to Benes's government-in-exile, it demanded a more definite commitment on Slovakia's status after the war. 51 This development was highly undesirable from the standpoint of the U.S . administration, which had only recently confirmed its definitive recognition of Benes's government in Lon- her I, 1942. The resolution was signed by twenty-four Slovak leaders and newspa£er editors. 9 As the OSS observer put it: "The compromise resolution satisfies no one but it is at least a step forward . Hodza is still causing disunity among the American Slovaks." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. 50 "The State Department is not at present interested in the merits of the controversy, but it has, of course, a very distinct interest in preserving that harmony and unity which best contributes towards winning the war." Quoted from the letter of A. Berle to D. C. Poole (NARA 860f. 00/993). See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodi u .. ., 617,note44. 51 The main figures behind the establishment of CASON were the President of the NSS, V. Platek, the President of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Michal Vargovich, and Jan Bradac, at that time the Honorary President of the SNA. �SLOVAKIA 53 don.52 Hodfa 's campaign among Slovak Americans was becoming an ever more pressing political problem for the U.S. administration. In its March report, the OSS recommended that the State Department step in: "It would be of great value and benefit all around, if our State Department would speak nicely to Mr .Hodja [sic.] and advise him to apply his talents towards unity and not disruption among the Slovak Americans." 53 Throughout 1943, apart from campaigning among Slovak Americans, Hodfa was occupied with, and increasingly alarmed by, the developments in Czechoslovak foreign policy under Benes's leadership. In May - June, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile came on an official visit of the United States, where he was met by the highest officials in the country, including the Secretary of State. One of the primary objectives of the president's visit was to gain American approval for his planned journey to Moscow towards the end of the year. There, Benes was planning to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. This diplomatic initiative was the pinnacle of Benes's efforts to change the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy during WW II. From then on, the international security of the country was no longer to be guaranteed by military alliances with the Western Powers. Instead, it was to be safeguarded through close cooperation and coordination of its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether, in the summer of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt voiced their approval of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. According to Benes's personal secretary, Edvard Taborsky, Berle said that the United States followed no specific plans in relation to Central Europe, nor did they have any intention of negotiating with Hodfa on this issue.54 It appears that the ill-defined position of the Roosevelt administration in 1943 confirmed Benes's conviction that the United States did not hold any objections to Czechoslovakia's new Soviet-oriented foreign policy. Hodza, by contrast, regarded the conclusion of the treaty in December 1943 as a very dangerous step on the road to creating a new Soviet sphere of influence. He also feared that, after the war, the Soviet Union would try to impose on Czechoslovakia a political system similar to its own. Moreover, Hodfa was deeply convinced that Slovaks had not a scintilla of sympa- 52 The definiti ve American recognition of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile was granted on October 28, 1942. 53 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E 142, Box 3. Re: Recent Slovak Affairs, Milan Hodia, Jozef Hu~ek, Fedor Salva, etc., April 3, 1942. 54 According to Taborsky, Berle felt the need to defend himself against allegations that he sympathized with Hodia. "Hodfa was your prime minister and now he is a refugee. We respect him as such, but we will make no political deals with him, I can say this categorically." See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 620. Document quoted: NARA, 860F. 00/1009. �54 SLOVAKIA thy for Russian Bolshevism. He objected vigorously to the treaty, and made his criticism heard. Benes's visit to the United States presented the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch with a perfect opportunity to cut troublesome Hodza down to size. Hodza ' s long-standing legal feud with the Overseas News Agency (ONA) carried potential risks not only for the news agency itself, but for the whole of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Back in December of I 941 , Hodza had complained to the Office of the Coordination of Information that the ONA had been spreading word that he was a fascist collaborating with Otto von Habsburg and Tibor Eckhardt in a plot hatched by German generals to eliminate Hitler with a view to negotiating a separate peace.55 The same source branded the majority of Slovak Americans as isolationist and pro-fascist. Hodza was convinced that if the ONA was made to disclose its source, some of the top Czechoslovak authorities in the USA would be implicated. In June of 1943, the American court which was investigating the libel suit, required the ONA to answer a set of questions contained in a bill of particulars. One of them inquired about the source the ONA drew upon in its news release of November 7, 1941 . Shortly before the deadline by which the ONA was to comply, the case took an unexpected turn. On June 1st, Jacob Landau, the agency's managing director, paid a visit to Poole in his Washington office. He briefed the FNB boss about the case and discussed the questions in the bill of particulars. Later on, in his report of the meeting, Poole noted: "If ONA had to answer, Mr. Landau asserted, one of the sources to be named would be the Czechoslovak Ambassador [in the United States] ." Such a development was, from the perspective of the U.S. government, highly undesirable. Not only would it expose its wartime ally - the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - as the source of the anti-Hodza smear campaign, it would also fan the flames of the Benes-Hodza controversy among Slovak Americans. Although the head of the FNB felt he was not in a position to "interfere in an official way," he promised Landau that he would talk to Hodfa in order to make him "freely desi st" from the libel suit. Three days later in New York, Poole broached the subject of anti-Hodza propaganda in his conversation with Jan Papanek, the head of the Czechoslovak Information Service (hereafter CIS) in the United States. Without telling him what he knew from Landau, Poole received from the CIS head a resolute denial of any involvement on the part of the Czechoslovak government. Nevertheless, Papanek was very pleased with Poole 's intention to convince Hodza to desist from the case. On his part, the Czechoslovak propaganda boss promised he would do his utmost 55 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-9CZ-22, p. I. Memorandum of conversation between John. C. Wiley and Milan Hodia, December 4, I 94 I. �SLOVAKIA 55 to prevent further escalation of the Hodza-Benes controversy. He also mentioned to Poole that during his visit in the States, Benes held a long private conversation with Jan Palka, Hodfa's son-in-law. This information, whether imparted casually or by design, presented the head of the FNB with the bargaining leverage he so much needed in his dealings with Hodfa. Although Papanek did not tell Poole what Palka had discussed with Benes, it was not difficult to surmise. Hodfa's dire financial situation was an open secret in Czechoslovak circles, and the OSS knew about it. Until his death in 1944, Hodfa struggled to keep his political campaign in America financially afloat. In October of 1942, for example, he asked the Polish government-in-exile for $650. 56 In May of the following year, Hodfa asked Slovak-American leader Vendelin Platek to help him out financially. The only regular income Hod.fa had was a monthly salary of $250 received from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile for his absentee membership in the London-based State Council. The money was payable to the account of Hodfa 's wife, who, at that time, resided in Chicago. Being well-informed of Hodfa's financial woes, Poole decided to use this information in the name of national interest. On June 5th, he telephoned Hodza, who was convalescing in Clearwater, Florida. The subject of the conversation was the ONA libel suit. According to Poole's account, Hodfa was tired of the longstanding legal battle and "had really lost interest in the matter." 57 This was borne out by David Karr, who had been following the case at the Office of War Information He informed Poole in November of 1942 that Hodza had indeed tried to drop his lawsuit, but this had not happened because of some misunderstanding between him and his lawyers. 58 As the secret memorandum of the telephone conversation between the two men suggests, Poole pressured Hodza to discontinue his campaign among Slovak Americans. During the conversation he hinted that both he and President Benes had been well aware of his financial difficulties. Poole then played his trump 56 Dusan Seges, "Ohlas sudobej krajanskej tlace na politicke posobenie Milana Hodzu v USA v rokoch 1941 - 1944," in Milan Hodia politik a i urnalista, ed. M. Peknik (Bratislava: Veda, 2008), 185 . In his article, Seges writes that Hodza wanted to use the money to gain a dominant influence on the Slovak-American newspaper Slovensky Hlasnik. Seges maintains that in the end Hodza succeeded in getting some of the money. 57 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943. 58 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129, November 18, 1942. In his report, D. C. Poole clarified: "He [David Karr] thought that there had been some misunderstanding, in consequence probably of Dr. Hodza's imperfect command of English. Specifically, Mr. Karr gained the impression that Dr. Hodza had instructed his attorneys 'to settle,' meaning come to a final friendly adjustment; but the attorneys interpreted this to refer to obtaining a 'settlement' ." �56 SLOVAKIA card. He reassured his interlocutor that he had "obtained satisfactory assurances from Dr. Benes that Dr. Hodza's personal situation would not be disturbed."59 To make himself absolutely clear, the head of the FNB pointed out to Hodfa that "It would seem unfortunate if by pressing the suit against the Overseas News Agency at this time he should bring on a change."60 Though elegantly phrased, to Hodfa 's ears Poole's talk must have sounded like nothing more than political blackmail. There is little doubt that Hodfa took his words at face value. In the following days he contacted his lawyer. In order to find out whether he had really done so, Poole telephoned Hodza again on June 10th. Hodfa confirmed that he had instructed his lawyer via telegraph to terminate the suit. Fear for the post-war scenario in Central Europe prompted Hodza to draw up a document - Europe at the Crossroads - which he sent to the State Department in March of 1944.6 1 This memorandum analyzed the political situation in Central Europe within the context of its states' relations with the Soviet Union. Hodfa pointed to the undemocratic character of the Soviet political system, and warned against its application in any form . He challenged Benes's arguments, according to which the new foreign policy realignment with the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Hodza argued that by signing the treaty, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile willingly entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus became an instrument of the Russian Drang nach dem Westen. He rejected the policy of creating a "special sphere," the necessity of which Benes justified by the failure of the Western Powers and the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" in 1938. He contended that no sphere of influence was able to guarantee the sovereignty of small countries. The only guarantee of security, Hodza maintained, was a system of collective security similar to the one promulgated by the Ameri59 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943 . 60 Tbid. 61 Some historians doubt whether or not the Department of State actually received the memorandum. Lukac, who did not have a copy of the document at his disposal, claimed that "Despite the fact that several authors claim the memorandum was sent to the Department, including the author of this article, there is no copy of Europe at the Crossroads in the State Department archives. We can only speculate what fate it met, whether it was sent at all or "got lost" in American archives. " Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. . , 622. The author of this study (R. Licko) can confirm that a copy of this 22-page-long memorandum is kept in the National Archives in Washington, in the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch section with signature INT-32A-75. Moreover, there is also firm evidence that the memorandum was read at the State Department. D. C. Poole, chief of the FNB, summarised its contents in his report of March 8, 1944. �SLOVAKIA 57 cans and the British in the form of the United Nations. The final victory was achievable only as a "collective victory," with collective war aims. He went on to write, with bitter regret, that the "official Czecho-Slovak policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all alliances." 62 Hod.fa expressed his belief that "Czecho-Slovakia surely deserves a better fate than to become the victim of any personal rule or of any kind of soviet system."63 The memorandum also touches upon the position of the U.S. government, which chose not to reject the treaty. Hod.fa respected this view. However, the American position did not, in his opinion, change the simple fact that the treaty had contributed significantly to the creation of spheres of influence, whose catastrophic consequences would have to be dealt with after the war through a system of collective security. Part V of the memorandum was devoted to the Slovak question. According to Hodfa, the majority of Slovaks, with only a handful of opponents, demanded fair self-government for Slovakia. This demand was in stark contrast to the stubborn centralism of Benes and his political supporters in exile. Hodza's disapproval of the Soviet Union ' s influence, in relation to Slovakia's future, was based upon his conviction that the Soviet political system was incompatible with the political and cultural traditions of Slovaks. Hodza vehemently denied that Slovaks had ever sympathized with Communism. He also reminded the State Department that Slovaks had been fighting against Nazism on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts. Moreover, the majority of the Slovak soldiers who had defected from the Slovak army were, in Hod.fa ' s opinion, anti-Communists, with whom he had maintained radio contact. They desired, on the whole, a "Slovakia administered by Slovaks." Hodfa vigorously denied the allegations, current at the time, that Slovaks had not fought against Fascism. According to his information, as many as 75% of the Czecho-Slovak Army personnel in France between 1939 and 1940 were Slovaks.64 Europe at the Crossroads was Hod.fa' s last attempt to influence the U.S. administration. His memorandum was thoroughly analyzed by the OSS. The political analyst who studied it related its content to his superior DeWitt Poole.65 In the introduction of the report, its author noted: "It confirms my impression of him as a man of a high degree of peasant shrewdness." The OSS shared Hod.fa's concerns about the future of small Central European nations after the war: "The European peoples, more particularly, the East European nationnalities, will be potter's clay in the coming interplay of forces." The author fully sanctioned Hodza' s proposal to hold plebi62 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, I 942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75 , p. 15. lbid., p. 19. 64 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75. 65 Julian Towster to D. C. Poole, March 8, 1944. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, fNT-3 2A-75 . 63 �58 SLOVAKIA scites in Central Europe, ideally under the auspices of the United Nations. 66 Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to respect the free will of Central Europeans was to be a clear indication of how far this country intended to go in improving its relations with the Western Allies in the post-war period. The OSS report did not pay any particular attention to the issue of Slovakia's future after the war. At the time when the State Department received the OSS report, Hodza had been undergoing medical treatment in a holiday resort in Florida. Despite several periods of improvement during his stay in the United States, Hodza never recovered from his illness. On June 27, 1944, after an operation in Clearwater, Hodza succumbed to his illness. 67 His death was an immense loss, primarily to the advocates of Slovak self-government. Moreover, there was a general opinion among Slovak-American leaders that, apart from Stefan Osusky, there was no other political leader at that time who would have been able to unite the politically fragmented Slovak Americans.68 Having been a prominent Central European politician and statesman throughout his life, Hodza's death elicited obituaries in a number of leading dailies around the world. 69 His life-long political contribution to politics was acknowledged by the Czechoslovak government, and even by his political enemies, including Edvard Benes. Belatedly, the U.S. government paid 66 "Hodza is perfectly right in emphasizing the plebiscite angle. Plebiscites may not always have been the best yardstick of true national sentiment, but the principle of unhindered expression of such sentiment and of consultation between the leading United Nations members in regard to securing such expression goes to the heart of the problem." 67 Hodfa suffered from cancer of the large intestine. According to the autopsy report, the immediate cause of death was a complication - internal obturation during the operation . Hodza never regained consciousness. See Lukac, "Posledne chvile Milana Hodzu," in Obcianska spolocnost', no. 8 (August, 2000), I 0. 68 The Slovak leaders, especially those associated in the CASON, suggested Stefan Osusky as Hodfa's possible successor, because they did not regard Hodfa' s aide, Mudry Sebik, as a "strong and effective" leader. FBI, Chicago File No. 100-15744, January 25 , 1945 . Report: Slovak National Alliance, p. 7. Another FBI report written by its director on July 1, 1944, advised the Department of State of Osusky' s intention to ask for permission to enter the United States. In addition to giving a brief account ofOsusky's political career, the report states that V. Platek, the leader of the National Slovak Society, wrote a letter to Osusky as early as in June of 1943 . In it, Platek asked Osusky to come to the United States and to assume the leadership of Slovak Americans together with Hodfa. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.202 l l/71844 PSNL, Roll 31, 1940 - 1944. Memorandum of J. E. Hoover to A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. Subject: Milan Hodza and Stefan (Stephen) Osusky, July I, 1944. 69 The New York Times published Hodfa 's obituary on June 29, 1944. On July 4, 1944 the newspaper reported on Hodfa's funeral in Chicago. �SLOVAKIA 59 tribute to this outstanding Czechoslovak statesman. In 1951 , U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles praised Hodfa's understanding of the mutual interdependence of sovereign and equal peoples, and acknowledged Hodfa's contribution to the cause of European unity.70 Given the scope of Hodfa's plans and activities in the United States during WW II, one has to ask oneself: what did the Roosevelt administration's foreign policymakers make of Hodfa's federalization plans, and what solution, if any, did they think desirable in the dispute about Slovakia's post-war future? What significance did Hodfa's plans play in American strategic planning in Central Europe? Were these in line with the existing American blueprint for the overall European peace settlement, or did they contradict it? To what extent were Hodfa's plans for a Central European federation examined, and what political will was there to intervene in the debate on the post-war status of Slovakia? American and European historians more or less share the same view that Central Europe, throughout WW II, was not an area of priority in the United States' strategic planning. United States foreign policy in Central Europe was the outcome of a variety of factors, domestic and international, and on the whole it could be characterized as unsystematic.71 Another characteristic of this policy was the fact that the United States' attitudes towards Eastern Europe went through several changes during WW IL To a large extent, these changes were the result of the personal influence of key political figures in the White House, as well as in the Department of State. It is commonly known that, at the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt was an advocate of the doctrine of the Four Policemen, according to which the four greatest powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - were expected to take over the responsibility for the post-war political organization of the territories subjected to their influence. In Central Europe, this would mean an unprecedented increase in Soviet influence, given that Germany was to be disarmed after the war and its influence eliminated for good. From the standpoint ofHodfa's political plans, this represented an undesirable return to spheres of influence against which he so persistently warned. 70 Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 625 . The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad summarizes the non-systematic nature of this policy as follows: "So tenuous was the coherence of the many diverse elements in these policies, fluctuating in response to political and economic forces within the US itself, to local events in Eastern Europe, and to the challenges inherent in Great Power rivalry, that I have chosen the term the American non-policy to describe the end result of the various influencing factors . American policy-makers were never quite able to make up their minds about the importance of Eastern Europe to the United States." Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo : Universitets forlaget, 1978), 34. 71 �60 SLOVAKIA Quite a different view of the post-war world order was held by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He advocated a vision of a globalized world, in which economic and political conflicts among sovereign countries were to be solved through a world organization.72 However, the idea of resurrecting a world organization on the principle of the interwar League of Nations was extremely unpopular in the United States. Warming up to such an idea took some time and was a gradual process.73 After the resignation of Sumner Welles from the position of Under Secretary of State in 1943, Cordell Hull finally succeeded in convincing the conservative-minded Department of State to accept the idea of a new United Nations. In relation to Central Europe, the new line in foreign policy resulted in the conviction that the reformed system of collective security would prevent the recreation of old spheres of influence. This was also the reason why the State Department was very reluctant to give its views on the various integration schemes of the Central European governments in exile. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in this area was a worrying development for the Roosevelt administration, but did not lead to a significant shift in the established policy of non-intervention.74 Surprisingly enough, despite the negative attitude towards European integration in general, the archival documents of the Department of State suggest that the U.S. foreign policy makers devoted con72 This track of American foreign policy in the 20th century is frequently referred to as "globalism," or, "universalism." See Michael Lind, "The Twilight of the U.N.," The New Republic, October 30, 1995, p. 28 . 73 The League of Nations, created in 1920, was part of the peace initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, generally known as the "Fourteen Points." In terms of conflict resolution and international security, the organization's philosophy was based upon the principle of collective security, which stood in opposition to the notion of the balance of power and advancement of national interests. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to ratify the League' s Covenant. Wilson ' s peace initiative is often criticized and branded as an example of American political idealism. From the point of view of international relations, Wilson's plan stemmed from "idealistic and liberal dissatisfaction with the international anarchy, balance of power and the concept of self-help which had hitherto characterized the state-system." Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin books, 1998), p. 300. 74 In the introduction to his book The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 , Bennett Kovrig described American idealism in relation to Central Europe in the words of A. J. P. Taylor: "democratic foreign policy must be idealistic, or at the very least it has to be justified in terms of great general principles ". Kovrig added, "Yet the reader will find few villains and even fewer heroes, for seldom in the history of America 's foreign relations have good intentions reaped such a bitter harvest". Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 194! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), x. �SLOVAKIA 61 siderable time to various integration schemes such as those proposed by Hodza. 75 The duties of investigating and assessing these plans, as well as drawing up recommendations which were to serve as guidelines in American post-war foreign policy, were entrusted to the Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.76 Browsing through the minutes of the Advisory Committee between May 1942 and March 1944 gives one some idea of how much time and space the Department of State devoted to federalization plans for Central Europe and what attitudes towards them various committee members maintained. On May 9, the Committee's agenda included the so-called Danubian Federation 77 The discussions focused on two plans drawn up by politicians in exile. One of these plans was the proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish union, put forward in the United States by the exiled Polish Prime Minister 75 Documentary sources from the American archives relating to the U.S. attitudes towards Central European integration were collected and annotated by the Polish authors J. Laptos and M. Misztal Marius, American Debates on Central European Unio n, 1942 - 1944. Documents of the American State Department (Brussels & New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2002). 76 F. D. Roosevelt approved of the establishment of the Advisory Committee three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1941 . It included academics as well as leading officers of the Department of State. The Committee reported directly to the State Secretary. At that time, the position of vice-chairman was held by Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Everyday activities were overseen by Leo Pasvolsky. The Advisory Committee had six subcommittees, the most important of which were those dedicated to political, economic and territorial issues. Other key figures on the Committee who specialised in Central Europe were Hamilton Fish Armstrong ( 1893 - 1973) and Adolf A. Berle. It was the latter who was often believed by Czech and Slovak emigres to have harboured sympathies for Hodza's plans. The Committee 's job was to draw up general guidelines for the United States in peace negotiations. The official activity of this Committee was ended in the summer of 1943, but many of its members continued their work on other committees until the end of the war. The Committee 's research team drew up hundreds of reports, situational analyses and recommendations, which became a blueprint for the discussions and proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees. Regular minutes of the subcommittees' discussions were kept. The documentation produced by the Advisory Committee is deposited in the National Archives in the Notter File. See Ignac Romcis, "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942 - 1944" Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, [online] , 1992, 30, no. 77 . [Quoted: 2008-06-05] . Available at: <http ://www.hungarianhistory.hu> 77 The term "Danubian Federation" was chosen by the Advisory Committee to refer to the integration efforts of the Central European countries in the Danubian region. The discussions of the Advisory Committee on the "Danubian Federation" included possible membership for Poland and Austria. �62 SLOVAKIA Wladyslaw Sikorski. 78 The other was the Danubian Federation, championed by exiled Hungarian politicians Tibor Eckhardt and Janos Pelenyi.79 Hodfa's federation plan was not included. It was referred to only marginally by a member of the Committee, Anne McCormick. 80 She mentioned Hodfa as an agrarian politician who had been involved in solving agrarian problems.81 The foreign policy analyst went on to inform the Committee, quite misleadingly, that Hod:fa 's plan limited itself to the Danubian region.82 This ignorance of the details of Hodza's plan is interesting, because by that time Hodfa had already spoken about his plans to The New York Times and, more importantly, must have made his views known at the State Department during his first visit. 83 Hodfa 's plan was almost completely 78 Laptos and Mizstal pointed out that Sikorski 's plan for federation was dealt with only briefly. According to the information available to the Committee, Sikorski's federation was to comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The plan envisaged the complete economic federation and eventual political federation of its constituent countries. According to the Advisory Committee, Polish influence in the thus-constituted federation was obvious, though the sheer scale of the supranational state ruled out complete Polish domination. Laptos and Mizstal, .American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 74. 79 Tibor Eckhardt was a Hungarian politician of the interwar period. In 1938 he represented Hungary at the League of Nations Assembly. In 1941 he was sent on a mission to the USA by Miklos Horthy in order to approach the Allies and the Hungarian democratic opposition. Eckhardt's federation was brought to the attention of the Committee by Under Secretary of State Welles. According to this plan, Central Europe was to be divided into three parts: a Polish-Baltic bloc, a Balkan bloc and a "Danubian" union,comprising Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Slovakia and Transylvania, with the possibility of the later admission of Croatia. The unifying element of the federation was to be their common history as part of the Habsburg monarchy. NARCS Notter File, Department of State. Minutes P - I 0, Danubian Federation, May 9, 1942. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 74. 80 Anne O ' Hare McCormick (1882 - 1954), a member of the Advisory Committee, was a foreign policy analyst for The New York Times. 81 The minutes of the meeting captured McCormick's information on Hodza and his plan as follows: " Mrs. McCormick said that mention might also be made of the Hodfa plan, which confines itself to the Danubian area. Mr. Hodfa, she pointed out, being a peasant, is chiefly concerned with the agricultural problem. His plan expresses the aspirations of the Green International." Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 75. 82 In Hodza's plan the core of the proposed federation was to be formed by CzechoSlovakia and Poland, who were to be joined by other countries in the south of Central Europe. 83 See Hope Put in Union of Central Europe, the OSS report on the interview with M. Hodza. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-1 , December 7, 1941 . �SLOVAKIA 63 ignored. It was mentioned in passing in connection with the association of agrarian parties known as the Green International. American foreign policy advisors again failed to include Hodza's plan when they discussed the so-called East European Union as one of the issues related to the Department of State's plans to create a world organization. 84 The members of the Division of Special Research discussed, among other things, the results of the negotiations between the exiled governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland on the creation of a joint union .85 In mid-June of 1942, the Department of State presented to the Advisory Committee the first draft of American recommendations which any supranational organization in Central Europe should comply with. One of the main differences, in comparison with Hodza's plan, was that the United States preferred a union to a federation. This preference reflected the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to sanction political integration. What the Department of State recommended was a loose organization of free sovereign states, which would be able to advance their interests through joint, non-legislative institutions. Such an economic union was to comprise all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including countries as far apart as Estonia, Austria and Greece.86 The establishment of this union would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations. The main rationale was that the establishment of such a union would solve the existing security problems and bring with it economic advantages as a result of regional cooperation. The territorial integrity of the union was to be safeguarded by the United Nations, and the security forces of the union were to act in concordance with the security system of the United Nations. After the war, the world organization was to facilitate the creation of the union by adjusting all outstanding border claims. What is most striking to the European reader about the attitudes of the American government are its views on the armed forces of member 84 The meeting of the Division of Special Research, which prepared reports for the Advisory Committee, took place on June 6, I 942. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P 14, June 6, I 942 . NARA, Notter File, Box 65 ., Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 96 - 103. 85 For the history of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations on uniting, including the attitudes of the United States and the other great powers, see Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943. 86 " The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through common non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany from and including Estonia in the North to Austria in the West and Greece in the South." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P Document 24, June 19, 1942. NARA, Notter File, box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 110. �64 SLOVAKIA countries, as well as on the military of the union as a whole. Every constituent country would have to contribute a designated contingent of troops for the international armed forces (under the command of the UN), but no member state was to have its own armed forces . This recommendation testified to the distrust with which the American foreign policymakers looked upon the nations of Central Europe. The Advisory Committee's analysis of the factors which were thought to be conducive to, or had disintegrating effects upon, the creation of a Central European Union offers an interesting insight into the mindset of the American foreign policy advisors of that time. In the beginning the majority of the Committee members seemed to be in favour of one large Central European union from the Baltic to the Balkans.87 It was argued that a larger union was more advantageous to the United States, because it would be better able to eliminate the destructive forces of nationalism, mutual antagonisms and the land disputes of the Central European nations. 88 An analysis of the economic benefits failed to persuade American foreign policy advisors that economic prosperity was in itself motivationally adequate for unification . In the American view, the history of integration efforts in the interwar period showed that political interests in the area had often been given priority over economic ones. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was pointed out as an example. According to L. Pasvolsky, Masaryk and Bene~ were willing to accept any economic disadvantages in order to achieve political and cultural unity after WW I. 89 It was nationalism, however, that elicited the greatest fears in the members of the Committee. The issue was frequently raised during the discussions, and the Department of State believed that nationalism was one of the five main obstacles to Central European integration.90 As the feasibility study for the Department of State from 87 This notion was supported most enthusiastically by S. Welles and H. F. Armstrong. 88 From the economic point of view, a larger union appeared to offer better prospects of strengthening the commercial position of member states in trade with the rest of Europe. As for the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the gravest concerns at the Department of State were aroused by Hungarian nationalism, with some criticism also levelled at the former Czechoslovakia. 89 "Mr. Bowman observed that in the case of the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks the main emphasis had been on the achievement of political and cultural unity from the beginning. Economic considerations had played a decidedly minor £iart." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943 . Apart from nationalism, the list of five disintegrative forces comprised the absence of common roots, cultural di versity, external political influences and diversity in regional economic development. Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943. NARA , NARA, Notter File, �SLOVAKIA 65 February, 1943 observed, "Since the present war began, the animosity between several of the states, e.g., between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Hungary and Romania, has been greatly increased and the conflicts between ethnic groups within one state e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks, between Serbs and Croats, have become bitter."9 1 Where the State Department seemed to be in agreement with Hodfa was the belief that the peasantry could play a positive role in the process of Central European integration. In the inter-war period, peasant parties in Central Europe had engaged in mutual cooperation and shared a similar political agenda. 92 A member of the Committee, J. T. Shotwell, also sympathised with this opinion, but expressed reservations about the role of agrarian leaders, who, in his view, had nationalistic tendencies which might prove distractive. 93 The discussion about the cohesive and destructive forces of unification eventually prompted the members of the Committee to break the proposed union into two parts. With regard to the attitudes of the exiled governments, Berle pointed out that, surprisingly, none of these su£ported a large union, with the exception of the Czechoslovak government. 4 Strictly speaking, however, this was no longer the case. By that time, the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Czechoslovak Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 187 - 88. 91 Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943 . NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 92 State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part III: Movements Tending Toward Unity, February 19, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 93 According to Shotwell, the majority of Central European leaders were nationalists of the 19th century type. As an example he pointed to Count Apponyi, who owned land in Slovakia, a fact which had a great deal of influence on his political outlook. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P I 7, June 27, 1942. Milan Hodza himself often mentioned the agrarian problems in Hungary. That was also why he laid down conditions on the membership of Hungary in a Central European Federation, stressing first the necessity of agrarian reform in that country. 94 Laptos and Mistal put Berle 's incorrect information down to the skilfulness of the Czechoslovak propaganda. "The question was asked whether Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle had talked with representatives of these countries on this matter. Mr. Berle said that no one of that group had the concept of a single union. Mr. Welles said he had never found one who had the conception of one union, most favoring three unions; some, two. Mr. Berle said that the Czechs were the only ones who had offered any support for a single union." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union . .., 129 - 30. �66 SLOVAKIA government was getting increasingly cold feet about any union with its northern neighbour. At the end of June, the members of the Committee agreed that for the sake of further discussions about Central European integration they would consider two options- the so-called Northern East European Group and a Balkan Group. 95 Another key issue to which the Advisory Committee devoted its attention was the problem of how viable the proposed union would be and what attitudes the great powers would adopt in dealing with this supranational state. According to the above-mentioned feasibility study, the political will of the member states alone was insufficient for the union's long-term survival. American foreign policymakers understood perfectly well that in order for the union to survive, it had to secure the support of the victorious powers, including that of the United States. 96 The advantages from the American point of view seemed palpable enough: a solution to questions of security in relation to Germany and Russia, pacification of the space between the Baltic and the Aegean seas in an area inaccessible to the naval powers, and the protection of Eastern European countries against possible German expansion. The most important question, of course, was how such a union would be viewed by the geographically closest of the powers - the Soviet Union. In the October Memorandum on Russia and the East European Federation, drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations, an expert on Soviet affairs informed the Committee that the reasons for Soviet opposition were far stronger than those which might induce the Soviet Union to support such a scheme. 97 The first and the most decisive reason for Soviet 95 The proposal to break up the union was put forward by Under Secretary of State Welles at the meeting of the Division of Special Research on June 27, 1942 . The main reason was the diverse character of the member states of the union, which might lead to its disintegration. On the issue of breaking up the union, the members of the Committee were by no means united. Welles was in principle in favour of a single union, but practical considerations compelled him to opt for two smaller ones. The key problem of the two-union solution was Austria and Hungary. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA , Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 119 - 20. 96 See Part IV: Steps Necessary to make Union Effective: "In view of the fact that Eastern Europe has felt the impact of virtually none of those dynamic forces that would aid in creating a unity out of this di versity of peoples, the creation of a union and its maintenance for an indefinite period would have to be in large measure the work of the great victorious powers or of the international organization. " State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part IV: NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 19 1. 97 The author of the memorandum was Isaiah Bowman. The Counci l on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, �SLOVAKIA 67 opposition was the assumption that the establishment of a union would prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its policy of divide et impera. Moscow was also worried that the political orientation of the Central European countries within the proposed union would lead to the weakening of the existing pro-Russian orientation in some of them. 98 There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia was one of those countries. Its president-in-exile Edward Benes had indicated that Czechoslovak foreign policy after the war would be oriented towards the east. The Soviet attitude towards integration in Central Europe was yet again referred to by American foreign policy advisors as "apparently hostile" in February of 1943. 99 The report made it clear that Moscow was in no mood to support federalization plans of a lesser scope, such as the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish or Greek-Yugoslav unions. The Department of State reached this conclusion on the basis of the information obtained directly from representatives of the Czechoslovak government-inexile. The negative attitude of Moscow was also identified as the main rea- October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 176. 98 The author continues: "The possibilities of supporting Czechoslovakia against Poland, Hungary against Rumania, Yugoslavia against Hungary and so forth, present an almost limitless field for maneuver by Russia to make its influence strong and even preponderant among the disunited states of East Central Europe." Other Soviet objections could be summarized as follows: 2. the united states of Central Europe would find it easier to advance their territorial claims against Russia, 3. the political system of the member countries would unify, but become very likely hostile to that of the Soviet Union, 4. the union 's armed forces would be stronger in defence, which would weaken Soviet military position, 5. the exports of such a federation would compete in world markets with Soviet exports; Soviet exports into the union would be disadvantaged, since Russia would have to deal with the union as a whole rather than trading with countries separately, 6. the union would curb the revived pan-Slav sentiment, because it would include non-Slav countries and the pro-Russian orientation of the Slav countries would thus be weakened. The Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 177. 99 "On the basis of information at present available in the Political Section, the Soviet Government is apparently hostile to the idea of the creation of an all-embracing East European Union, unless, perhaps, such a Union were established under the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union. An examination of the Soviet press and periodicals has disclosed no discussions of such projects for an Eastern European Union as have been put forward from time to time in Britain and the United States." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Document P 206, February 18, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. LAPTOS, Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 196. �68 SLOVAKIA son why the Czechoslovak §ovemment broke off its negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile. 1 0 The work of the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy officially ended in July of 1943, though some of its subcommittees continued their work on Central European integration plans until the spring of 1944. 101 The issue of Slovakia's post-war political status never came up. Neither was it discussed by any of the Committee's numerous subcommittees. The abandonment of American discussions of the Central European integration plans raises two questions: what were the reasons for this decision and what political future did the Roosevelt administration envisage for the Central European nations? The answer to the first question should be looked for in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy for this period. Drawing on the latest historical research, one finds, more or less, consensus on this issue. The dominant factor in American strategic planning was the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe, which went hand in hand with its increasing political influence. It became clear, towards the end of 1943, that the Red Army would liberate a substantial part of Central Europe, a fact which would inevitably increase the role of the Soviet Union in the post-war political organization of the area. Regardless of their original plans, President Roosevelt and the Department of State had to constantly adjust to these developments. In 1943, under pressure of the events on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt was forced to review his erstwhi le concept of an "Anglo-American world police force" and extend it into the well-known "Four Policemen" theory. This had to take the Soviet Union into account as an equal partner in the political organization of territories within its own sphere of influence. From this point of view it 100 "Mr. Berle remarked that when the Polish-Czech confederation was agreed upon, both parties had believed that the Russians were not opposed to the idea. The worsening of relations between Russia and the Polish government-in-exile, however, has since resulted in a change in the Russian position. The Czechs have withdrawn from their discussions with the Poles, ostensibly because the Poles were unwilling to abandon their claim to the Teschen area, but in reality because of Russian opposition to the combination." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 217. 101 Secretary of State Cordell Hull ended the work of the Committee in a letter of July 12, 1943 . Mary E. Bradshaw, "Congress and Foreign Policy Since 1900," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 289 (September, 1953), 45 . The last minutes of the Political Subcommittee dealing with the Central European union were those of March 15- 17, 1944, NARA, Notter File, Box 84. The last meeting of the Economic Subcommittee took place on March 31 , 1944. Advisory Committee, Economic Subcommittee, R Minutes 16, March 31, 1944 NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Unio n ... , 243 . �SLOVAKIA 69 can be understood why any American position on a Central European federation or union had to be approved by Moscow. The absence of a Soviet stance on the issue throughout 1942 kept the idea of integration alive among the exiled politicians of Central Europe, and occupied the minds of American foreign policy advisors on the Advisory Committee. Doubts about Moscow's priorities were finally ended in October of 1943, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, officially confirmed the negative position of the USSR. 102 The answer to the second question, namely what the Americans desired as the political future for Central Europe, is more complicated. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the views of the Roosevelt administration on this issue were not unanimous. Significant differences of opinion existed in Washington, which divided even the chief foreign policy makers, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. American historians' interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Europe during this period have gone through several developments since WW II. 103 The more recent research emphasizes the importance of Roosevelt's role in the process of foreign policymaking, and interprets his apparent lack of determination and unsystematic approach as misleading. According to this interpretation, Roosevelt, from the beginning of the war, pursued a clear goal in relation to Continental Europe: to reduce its international standing and marginalize it as the most effective way of preventing future conflicts in the area. Roosevelt intended to achieve this marginalization through fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and wherever possible, ethnically homogenous states. These states should in no case possess any armed forces, and after disarmament they should be placed within the sphere of influ102 This information was imparted to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who asked V. Molotov about the Soviet view on Central European integration efforts at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19 - 29, 1943. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 63 . 103 The oldest interpretation of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe maintains that the Roosevelt administration favoured active involvement in the rebuilding of European democracies and in strengthening the position of European states. Roosevelt is criticised, however, because he was unable to see through Stalin's empty promises at Yalta. The second, "revisionist" theory contends that the post-war division of Europe was afait accompli long before Yalta, because the Red Anny would occupy the whole of Eastern Europe and the United States had to respect this fact. ." Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos. A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 26 (no. 2, 1996), 73 . Lundestad, who reviewed both of the above theories, characterized U.S. foreign policy towards Central Europe as a policy of "modified universalism in the area of non-essential interest for the USA." For the lack of internal coherence in this policy he chose to refer to it as a "non-policy." G. Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe .. . , 34. �70 SLOVAKIA ence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. 104 Such a vision of the future of Central European nations was incompatible with Hodza 's federalization. He feared the political influence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, called for concerted efforts to strengthen the position of Central Europe. As far as Slovakia's future was concerned, Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention, whether intentional or inadvertent, played more into the hands of Slovak separatists than those of the proponents of federative integration.' 05 Roosevelt's concept of new spheres of influence, however, stood in contrast to the universalistic vision of Secretary of State Hull, who was advocating global cooperation among nations on the basis of a renewed world organization. The key moment, which resulted in the adoption of the universalistic approach as the main guideline in U.S. foreign policy, is usually thought to be the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 106 After Welles's resignation, Secretary of State Hull and his department advanced the concept of collective security within the framework of a restored world organization under a new name. ' 07 The new line in American foreign policy, however, did not make the Roosevelt administration take a more active role in suppressing the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Roosevelt continued to count on Soviet assistance as a decisive political force in the post-war reorganization of Central Europe. What he and his foreign policy advisors got wrong was the belief that Stalin's Russia would sooner or later discard its system of central planning, return to the market economy and join the rest of the democratic world. 104 "As he [Roosevelt] told the British Foreign Minister in March 1943, 'armaments after the war in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of the policing powers Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller powers might have rifles but nothing more dangerous than this' .. .These two great powers had to maintain order over other disarmed European countries, if necessary by force." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", 72 . 105 "He [Roosevelt] also envisioned splitting up multiethnic countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," 70. On another occasion, when meeting representtatives of the Slovak League in 1940, Roosevelt remarked: "I believe that every nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its nationhood." Ever since then, the Slovak League interpreted the president's statement as approval of the establishment of an independent Slovak state. NARA, Washington D. C., 860F.0l /446. Reverend C. Mlynarovich to C. Manion of the Office for Government Refcort, Indiana, May 11, 1942. 06 Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's closest ally in the Department of State, was a strong supporter of the president's concept of the "Four Policemen." Roosevelt did not trust Hull. In 1943 the president accepted Welles 's resignation in connection with his alleged homosexual activities. 107 In the field of international relations, Hull 's approach to foreign affairs is often associated with the principles of universalism, globalism and political idealism . �SLOVAKIA 71 Thus we have seen that, between 1941 and 1944, the American authorities closely followed the political activities of exiled Slovak politician Milan Hodfa. His political goal in the United States was twofold. First, he intended to influence Roosevelt's foreign policy makers in favour of the creation of a supranational federation of Central European states, which he saw as a political panacea for the area' s many unresolved problems. According to this plan, a restored Czechoslovakia was to be one of the founding members of such a federation . Slovakia was to be part of Czechoslovakia again, but with a new constitutional arrangement stipulating its equal political status with the Czech lands. Secondly, Hodza planned to lead a political campaign among Slovak Americans. In particular, he hoped to win the endorsement of the leaders of their organizations for his programme of a self-governing Slovakia. Various federal agencies' keen interest in Hodza, however, was not motivated by the desire of the U.S. government to support the creation of a central European federation . It rather stemmed from the fact that U.S. governmental agencies had deep misgivings about the effects of Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans. Thus, for the American government, Hodfa soon emerged as an unwelcome guest as the OSS began in mid-1942 supplying various U.S. departments with reports about the ideological split within the Slovak-American community. The fears frequently expressed in the OSS reports were motivated by the perceived possible consequences of Hodza ' s campaign on the home front as well as the on the American war effort in general. Foremost among these fears was that the Hodfa-inspired opposition to the Benes-led government-in-exile would not only undermine the standing of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - one of the war-time allies of the United States - but would also have a deleterious effect on the morale of the hundreds of thousands of Slovak Americans employed in key American heavy industries. Hodza's political campaign among Slovak Americans targeted two deeply antagonistic camps. He attempted to win the support of the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance, who had originally supported Benes's government-in-exile. At the same time, he tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Slovak League of America, several of whom offered their organizations' support for his programme. However, Hodfa failed to eliminate the powerful influence of the hard-liners in these umbrella organizations. The Czechoslovak Information Service in the United States, a propaganda tool of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile, severely criticized Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans, constantly challenging his right to discuss Slovakia' s future on American soil and running a smear campaign against him. The U.S. administration viewed Hodfa 's activities with growing alarm. The most worrying development from the American point of view was the ideological split in the Slovak National Alliance which devel- �72 SLOVAKIA oped as a result of Hodza ' s lecture tour. The OSS repeatedly called on the Department of State to intervene in order to mend the rift among the proCzechoslovak fraternal leaders. Hodza ' s attempts to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards the future organization of Central Europe had little impact on American foreign policy. lndeed, his plan for a Central European federation was never discussed by the American foreign policy advisors. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State and its agencies devoted considerable time to weighing the pros and cons of Central European integration from the point of view of American interests. The Department of State tended to favour an economic union rather than a political federation. Moreover, it feared the destructive forces of Central European nationalisms, not excluding the Slovak and Czech ones. However, the major American objection to any form of Central European integration stemmed from the strong opposition to it from the United States' chief war ally in Eastern Europe - the Soviet Union. Stalin had no intention of supporting any integration plans in the area. He preferred a fragmented Central Europe made up of weak states, which would strengthen the negotiating position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis these countries. Roosevelt ' s policy of deliberate non-intervention in Central Europe, coupled with the American belief in a new world organization, resulted after the war in a gradual Sovietization of Central Europe and the creation of a new sphere of influence. Given the pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from December of 1943 onwards, the Roosevelt administration refrained from publicly expressing any of its views on Slovakia's post-war future. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 37 AN UNWELCOME GUEST: MILAN HODZA IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS BETWEEN 1941 AND 1944 V Roman Licko In December of 1938 Milan Hodza, a Slovak politician and the last prime minister of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, went into exile in France. There, along with Stefan Osusky, another Slovak statesman and diplomat, he became the leading figure of Slovak democratic exiles before 1 the outbreak of WW II. Towards the end of 1939 Rodia established the Slovak National Council, which, under his auspices, was reorganized in early 1940 into the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Both political bodies subscribed to the democratic ideals of pre-war Czechoslovakia, as well as to the belief in a continuation of Czechoslovak statehood.2 However, in stark 1 Before Hodfa' s arrival in Paris in November of 1939, Ambassador Stefan Osusky had been the leading figure of the Czechoslovak resistance movement operating from France. His greatest achievement was the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement concerning the creation of a new Czechoslovak army in France by which the French government recognised de fa cto the continued existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period Osusky and Hodza shared similar ideas about Slovakia' s future . They both unequivocally supported the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. However, they strongly opposed the centralism of the inter-war Prague governments. Osusky favoured a federal constitutional arrangement between Czechs and Slovaks. Hodza spoke of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored ' CzechoSlovakia'. Osusky maintained close contact with Hodza, who was, at that time, in London. The two men even cooperated in the preparation of a memorandum of Slovak demands in the lead-up to the establishment of the Benes-led Czechoslovak National Committee in France. Interestingly enough, Osusky did not become a member of any of the resistance organizations established by Hodza after his arrival in Paris. For more on the Hodfa-Osusky co-operation during this period see Slavomir Michalek, "Hodza a Osusky, nazory a pozicie v rokoch 1939- 1941 ," in Milan Hodia-statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 301- 18. 2 This paper uses the more widely accepted spellings ' Czechoslovakia' and 'Czechoslovak'. In reference to Hodza' s ideas, however, the spellings 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak' have been retained as these were the forms preferred by Hodfa himself. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 adopted the unhyphenated spelling of the name. In November of 1938 the country officially returned to the hyphenated spelling 'Czecho-Slovakia' in recognition of the fact that Slovakia had been declared an autonomous region. The use of the one name or the other, by both Czechs and Slovaks throughout the war, had political connotations. Generally speaking, the Slovaks who favoured the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after WW II but op- 38 SLOVAKIA opposetion to Edward Benes, the leading figure of the Czech democratic exiles, Hodza advocated a thoroughly decentralized model of a new Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement, with self-governing status for Slovakia. After the failure to find common ground on this issue with Benes, who consistently refused to allow any political representation of Slovak federalists in his exile government-to-be, Hodza moved to London. The German occupation of France in the summer of 1940 and the ensuing Battle of Britain in September of 1940 speeded up Britain' s recognition ofBenes's government-in-exile. Feeling powerless and marginalised, Hodza saw no purpose in participating in any government headed by Benes. By the autumn of 1941 he decided to leave Britain and in October of that year he arrived in the United States. There he pursued two political objectives: he intended to convince politically-minded Slovak Americans to support his programme of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, he attempted to lobby the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind the creation of a federation of Central European states. This paper, which draws primarily on research in United States government archives, attempts to trace Hodza ' s political campaign among Slovak Americans from the point of view of the Roosevelt administration. At the same time, it follows Hodza ' s efforts to engage the American government in a dialogue concerning a comprehensive post-war peace settlement in Central Europe. With the help of secondary literature on the subject, the study assesses the success of these attempts, and how they were viewed by the chief foreign policy makers in the Roosevelt administration. 3 posed the pre-war unitary constitutional arrangement between the two nations preferred the hyphenated designation. 3 The first attempt to document the activities of Milan Hodfa in the USA was made by his close associate, Michal Mudry Sebik, in his book Milan Hodia v Amerike. (Chicago :Geringer Press, Inc., 1949). The author published a number of articles in the periodicals of Slovak democratic exiles in the USA after WW II, e.g. Michal Mudry, "Svedectvo historickej doby. Bullitovo a Hodzovo memorandum," Nase snahy, 6, no. 9 (May - June 1970). In 1965 Susan Mikula, an American of Slovak descent, wrote a dissertation on Hodza's activities in the USA. However, it was not until 1992, at a conference in Bratislava, that she presented her work in Slovakia: Susan Mikula, " Dr. Milan Hodfa vo svelte archivnych dokumentov z archivov v USA," in : Milan Hodia - statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 345- 50. Czech historians have also dealt with Hodfa 's stay in the USA . For instance J. Kuklik and J. Nemecek, Hodia versus Benes. Milan Hodia a slovenska otazka v zahranicnim odboji za druhe svetove valky (Praha: Karolinum, 1999). The most comprehensive account yet of Hodfa's political activities in the USA. , including some views of the Roosevelt administration, was written by the late Slovak historian Pavol Luklic, "Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii v USA a reakcie na jeho federalisticke plany, Historicky casopis 51 , no. 4 (2003), pp. 497- 515 . As Lukac himself observed, however, Kuklik' s and Nemecek's book only traced SLOVAKIA 39 Apart from the Slovak League of America (hereafter SLA), which favoured independence for Slovakia, there was no other Slovak organization in the USA in 1941 that had a clear idea about Slovakia' s political future after the war. 4 The leaders of the opposition organization - the Slovak National Alliance (hereafter SNA) - stuck to the policy of a reinstated Czechoslovakia, but were unwelling to commit themselves to negotiating a more specific settlement on this issue. In line with the official policy of President Edvard Benes, they maintained that Slovakia's future should be resolved after the war by a democratic vote. Despite their uncommitted attitude, Slovakia's political future was as sensitive an issue among the individual leaders of the SNA as it was for the leadership of the SLA. As long as there was no political leader in the United States who was able to offer a political alternative to the League-promulgated Slovak independence, the issue was bound to remain unresolved. This situation changed after the arrival of Milan Hodfa in the United States in October of 1941. During the three years of his American stay, Hodfa devoted his energies to political campaigning and lobbying. Like Slovak-American leaders, he too wanted to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards Slovakia. As a former Czechoslovak statesman, Hodfa had access to the United States Department of State. He was allowed to discuss the Slovak question with high-ranking government officials. Hodfa ' s political campaign in the USA aroused the interest of the American media, as well as that of federal authorities. Right up to his death in 1944, his activities were closely followed by the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) and its subordinate department, the Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter FNB). Hodfa's arrival in the United States generated interest, not only among Slovak Americans, but also in the American media. Almost immediately, a number of speculative pieces about Hodfa's political objectives appeared in Hodfa's political campaign in the USA on the basis of secondary archival materials left by Hodfa 's contemporaries, and not from the documents of the U.S. Department of State. The present study draws upon the following primary sources: 1. an independent investigation of the documents of the Department of State; 2. the hitherto unpublished documents of the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate department - the Foreign Nationalities Branch (both housed in the National Archives in Washington), the archival documentation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (released to the author under the Freedom oflnformation - Privacy Acts); and 3. the documents issued by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy collected and published by Polish historians JozefLaptos and Marius Misztal in 2002 . 4 For the activities of the Slovak League of America on behalf of Slovak independence during and after the war, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia 39, nos. 72-73 (2007), 19-34. 40 SLOVAKIA the press. One OSS report from 1942 read that the former Czechoslovak prime minister had come as a private citizen. 5 Hodza himself said that the main reason for his arrival was for reasons of health. In the USA he planned to undergo a series of medical treatments.6 This is well attested in the Hodfa family correspondence of the period. 7 On the other hand, the former Czechoslovak prime minister did hope to achieve in the United States some well-defined political goals. 8 In his first interview with The New York Tim es, Hodfa stated that he intended to "test out American opinion regarding Central Europe" and, at the same time, he wanted to "inform it of the trend of opinion there."9 Not all American media reported on Hodza's intentions impartially. On November 7, the Overseas News Agency issued a press release which assessed Hodfa 's pre-war political career in an unflattering light. According to this source, Hodfa's Agrarian Party was only a little less reactionary than the pro-fascist Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. The release went on to claim that Hodfa's arrival also shed a negative light on Slovak Americans. The authors of the release dubbed their political mindset as "isolationist and pro-fascist," referring to some of the Slovak fraternal press in America as evidence. 10 It is clear that the primary motivation of the author must have been to damage Hodfa's political reputation . According to 5 National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 6 1. This information was acquired by the OSS from the New York Times interview with Hodza conducted by Frederick T. Birchall. 6 M. Mudry, Hodza's assoc iate in America, later wrote: "An American journalist who visited and interviewed Hodza claimed that in response to the question about his plans Hodfa took out a bottle of medication and said that what he wanted, first and foremost, was a recovery." Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike .. ., 20. 7 John Palka, Milan Hodfa's grandson, mentions two bouts of pneumonia that his grandfather suffered from shortly after his arrival. See John Palka, Maje S/ovensko, moja rodina (Bratislava: Kalli gram, 2010), 57. 8 Kuklik and Nemecek argue: " It cannot be ruled out that the former Prime Minister could have been driven by his effort to shore up support among his expatriates especially Slovak Americans, with whom he could attempt, with new energy, to stage a comeback in the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. So far his departure was seen, perhaps with some oversimplification, as his resignation to the attempts to advance his Slovak national programme in emigration, " Hodia versus Benes..., 142.The view that Hodfa sought the leading position in the resistance is also supported by Lukac, " Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii ... ", 605 . 9 The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 1 °Kuklik and Nemecek quote from Overseas News Agency release No. 400, July 11, 1941: " Hodfa's presence sheds light on the political tendencies of Slovak Americans. Apparently, the majority of Slovaks living in the United States are isolationist and pro-fascist and this has been reflected in the Slovak press here as well." The Czech authors say that Hodfa sued the ONA for libel, claiming $600,000 in damages, Hodia versus Benes.. ., 144. SLOVAKIA 41 Hodza's close associate in the USA, Michal Mudry, unfounded attacks like these were frequent and their authors were mainly Slovak-American Communists, supported by Czechoslovak authorities in the USA. 11 The sources of the anti-Hodfa campaign remain obscure. We contend, however, that for President Benes and his government-in-exile, Hodfa's presence in the country posed a serious political problem. The main reason was that Hodfa was determined to call on Slovak Americans to actively participate in the discussions about the future of Slovakia. The Roosevelt administration's attitudes towards Hodfa's political activities were shaped gradually and drew upon several sources. One of them was Hodfa himself. Almost immediately after his arrival, the former Czechoslovak prime minister made contact with the Department of State, and during his stay visited it several times. It can be argued that Hodfa was the only Slovak who discussed the Slovak question with United States government officials during WW II. From its inception in the summer of 1942, the OSS kept an eye on Hodfa 's activities, and from December of that year his political campaign was scrutinized by the officers of the FNB. The OSS analysed Hodfa 's activities by scanning his articles in the Slovak-American media, as well as in the American press in general. In addition to that, Hodza attracted the close attention of the FBI, which since I 940 had been investigating the activities of the Slovak League and the Slovak National Alliance. All the sources at the U.S . government' s disposal indicated that Hodfa pursued very specific political objectives in the United States. Sometime around mid-1942, an OSS report noted that: "Dr. Hodza' s visits to the State Department, his public speeches, interviews granted by him, and his article in The Nation (May 16, 1942) have demonstrated his willingness to express his ideas, whatever may be the extent of his actual political activity. ,, 12 Hodfa' s approach to the Slovak question differed from all other political plans which had been discussed among Slovak Americans to date. The crucial difference was that in Hod:fa' s view, the Slovak question was not to be solved in isolation, but as part of the security, economic and strategic 11 "Various groups, more or less under the influence of leftist elements and the Czechoslovak Information Service, take pot shots at Hodfa and where possible, in connection with his person, they attack Slovak Americans as well. These groups are often made up of the active Czech and Slovak communists such as Hoffmeister, Weisskopf Benau [a social democrat - author's note) and others, at that time undoubtedly under the influence and in favour with Czechoslovak authorities in America." According to Mudry, the most malicious attack upon Hodfa was the pamphlet entitled " Persona non grata". It contained a scathing criticism of Hodfa 's efforts to create a federation , which, among other things, was to constitute a buffer against the Russian Bolsheviks. See Mudry, Milan Hodia v Ameriike .. . , 37. 12 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS , RG 226 E 100, Box 3, p. 47 . 42 SLOVAKIA issues concerning the whole of Central Europe. At that time, Hodza's ideas and political thought may have been known to the public as well as the OSS from his book Federation in Central Europe. 13 Hodza was convinced that federation was the only political arrangement capable of harnessing nationnal forces while preserving the freedom of nations and of individuals. Federation would enable Central Europe to become a viable system of production and consumption on the basis of which a New Europe could be built. The liberated and reinstated countries of Central Europe would conclude a treaty that would become the basic framework for a federal constitution. The treaty was supposed to be the result of spontaneous decisions made by Central European countries, which, bearing in mind their common goals, would identify common interests and mutual commitments. Powers concerning mutual affairs were to be delegated to federal bodies, and their exercise entrusted to a federal govemment. 14 It would be headed by a federal Chancellor, who would be nominated by the President of the federation . The legislative body would be made up of a federal Congress, which was to oversee the legislative process as well as the federal budget. The Federal Court was to be the highest judicial body, which would decide on matters raised by the federal government or by the governments of the constituent countries. The federalization of Central Europe was envisaged as the key to solving the Slovak question and Slovak-Czech relations. Hodza believed that the freedom and security of small nations could be guaranteed only through a supranational federation . If small states were to merge their sovereignties, thereby creating a stronger unit, it would clearly mean more to them than to be in permanent danger of losing their sovereignties. Slovakia, however, was not to enter the Central European federation as a separate state. According to Hodza, the political coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks was not only feasible, but also inevitable. For Czechs, Slovakia represented an important connection with Central Europe. Self-government would satisfy Slovakia to the extent that it would never be a source of weakness for the new republic, but the reverse - it would become the source of its stability and strength. However, Hodza warned, certain mistakes from the past should be avoided. "Stubborn centralism as well as mischievous separatism have to disappear," he argued. Hodza did not support Slovak independence and never sympathized with the representatives of the Slovak regime at home. In his book, he unequivocally dissociated himself from the "Slovakian Quisling regime" 13 Federation in Central Europe (London and New York: Jarrolds Publishers, 1942). Hodza proposed the creation of the following federal ministries: I . finance, 2. International trade, 3. foreign affairs, 4. defence, 5. postal services and communications, 6. and 7. air and naval transport, 8. federal legislation, 9. federal cooperation. Federation in Central Europe ... , 172 - 7. 14 SLOVAKIA 43 and made it clear that its political representatives did not represent the will of the people. As far as the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London was concerned, Hodza claimed he respected it and was willing to cooperate with it. In his opinion, though, the real leaders of the Slovaks existed not only in London, but also in the USA. He was convinced that in the settling of the Slovak question, Slovak Americans should take an active part. By emphasising the importance of Slovak Americans, Hodza underlined how much hope he pinned on them in deciding the political future of Slovakia after the war. 15 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Hodza presented his vision to the American press. On December 7, 1941 The New York Times published an interview with him entitled "Hope Put in Union of Central Europe," which the former Czechoslovak statesman had granted to American journalist Frederick T. Birchall. The subheading of the article informed the American reader that federation was the goal of 110 million Central Europeans. 16 In the introduction, the author informed the reader that Hodza arrived in the USA unofficially, but with the approval of the Czechoslovak government in London. In fact, the second part of this statement was not true. President Benes could not prevent Hodza from leaving for the United States, but he was far from pleased with the prospect of his greatest political rival in exile campaigning among Slovak Americans. In the Birchall interview Hodza outlined some of the constitutional mechanisms of the proposed federation, and expressed his conviction that the prevailing political tendency in exile was "wholly in the direction of such a federation." As proof, Hodza pointed to the recent rapprochement of two old foes - Czechoslovakia and Poland. 17 These two countries, he believed, should form the nucleus of the future federation . It should then be joined by Romania, and subsequently also by a democratized Hungary, provided that the latter gave up its "imperialistic policy of coercing non-Magyar regions." According to 15 "Most of the Slovak leaders now stay in this country [United Kingdom] and in the USA ." Hodza, Federation in Central Europe . .. , 94. 16 The other two subheadings read: "For Common Government" and "He Explains Plan Will Not Deal in Half Measures, Such as the Old Little Entente," The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 17 Hodza alluded here to the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of a possible confederation between the exiled governments of both countries in London. The outcome of these negotiations, which took place between 1940 and 1942, were two joint declarations - one in November 11 , 1940 and the other on January 23, 1942. The negotiations did not, however, lead to any specific action. In 1943 they ended for good as a result of the new pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, as well as Moscow 's negative attitude towards such a confederation. For details see, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). 44 SLOVAKIA Hodza, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had already been working out their own idea of a federation . Hodza touched on the issue of the relations of Central Europe with Germany and Russia. He considered Russian Bolshevism as great a threat to Europe as German fascism. That was also the reason why the proposed federation should act as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviki." 18 Peasants, representing the conservative values of Central Europe, would, according to Hodza, be a stabilising force in the proposed federation . Their conservative influence would be of significant importance, since it would be necessary to "maintain a conservative democratic entity between the two subversive influences of Nazism and Bolshevism". Having talked to some lower-level officials of the U.S. Department of State, Hodfa met Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle on December 9, 1941. 19 On the same day Hodfa dined informally with DeWitt C. Poole, a high-ranking OSS officer and future head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch.20 During his meeting with the Assistant Secretary, Hodza presented Berle with a memorandum in which he outlined the development of Slovak affairs in Czechoslovakia and in subsequent exile between 1918 and 1939.21 In the memorandum, Hodfa pointed out that the Czechoslovak Cabinet in 1938, under his premiership, approved proposed legislation on decentralization - which, among other things, granted Slovakia its regional parliament. That was the last valid legal arrangement made before the Munich Pact, and it was recognized even by Jan Lichner, a minister of the exiled government. This view, Hodfa claimed, was subscribed to by the absolute majority of public opinion in Slovakia in late 1939. He admits that later on, in Paris, Czechoslovak leaders agreed that such constitutional issues as Slovakia's 18 Quoting Hodfa, the author goes on to say: "With a solid bloc of I 00, 000, 000 people separating them, a successful democracy operating next door would be a continuing object lesson of a better and more profitable way of life." The New York Times, December 9, 1941. 19 Prior to the meeting with Berle, Hodfa held talks with C. W. Cannon and H. Hoskins, as well as the head of the Coordination of Information, William J. Donovan. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle (author H. Hoskins), December 9, 1941. 20 According to Kuklik and Nemecek, Hodza maintained that his first visit to the Department of State was a response to an invitation by C. W. Cannon, R. Atherton and A. Berle. The aim was to discuss the memorandum of Slovak-American separatist Gustav Kosik presented to the Department at an earlier date. 21 P. Lukac also suggested that Hodfa's visit to the State Department and his memorandum was a reaction to the memorandum of Gustav Kosik (Memorandum for His Excellency the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America). NARA signature 860f.01 /429- l/2, Roll 30. Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 612. SLOVAKIA 45 future should be decided by democratic majorities of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Hodfa was willing to adhere to this agreement, provided that the exiled Czechoslovak National Council included representatives of Slovak federalists. In the posited post-war settlement, Hodfa emphasized the importance of a Czecho-Slovak restoration, but with a provision for Slovak self-government. He argued that Slovakia would not be able to maintain its sovereignty even as a separate member of the Central European federation. In the conclusion to the memorandum, Hodza condemned the Slovak puppet regime and hazarded a guess that its support among Slovaks did not exceed I 0%. As for Slovak Americans, he believed that the majority of them had never stopped supporting Czecho-Slovakia. The rest of them, in Hodza 's opinion, would soon change their political views. The official reaction to Hodfa' s memorandum of December 9, 1941 is not known, but it appears that he made a good impression during his first visit to the State Department. The report written for the Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed that, "Dr. Hodza gave the impression of an able patriot with qualities of sincerity and vision that might be with advantage put to constructive work in the post-war period in Central Europe." 22 In his later conversation with Poole, Hodfa himself assessed his meeting with Berle in a similar vein.23 It was intimated to Hodfa that, in the future, he might be received by Secretary Hull himself. Moreover, the State Department did not seem to have any objections to Hodfa's intention of lecturing at American universities and colleges. It was even suggested that Poole might be able to help by making the necessary arrangements.24 Hodfa expected that he would once again be in communication with the Department of State as early as January, 1942. His deteriorating health, however, forced him to stay in American sanatoria for several months, where he recuperated until April of 1942. 25 22 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle, H. Hoskins, December 9, 1941 , p. 3. 23 In his report Poole wrote: "He [Hodza] said that he had explained to Mr. Berle his views on the future political organization of Central Europe, and Mr. Berle seemed to be favourably impressed." D. C. Poole later checked Hodfa's impressions against those of H. Hoskins: "Following my talk with Dr. Hodza, I spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hoskins, and gathered from him that Dr .Hodza had given a substantially accurate account of his reception at the Department of State and Mr. Berle' s attitude. " NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 24 During the conversation at the Department of State, C. Cannon suggested that D. C. Poole "might be in the best position to bring this about." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 25 Lukac writes that Hodza recuperated from chronic bronchitis in a sanatorium at Lake Placid, New York and Hot Springs, Arkansas. Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. ., 612 . 46 SLOVAKIA In Hodfa 's plans, 1942 should have marked a turning-point in his political campaign. After a modest recovery of his health, Hodfa launched his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and began publishing in American scholarly journals. On May 16 he outlined his federalization plans to the politically-minded American public in The Nation. The reactions of Czech and Slovak Americans to his article, A Central European Federation, were collected in two OSS reports from June. Both reports assessed the attitudes of American "Czechoslovaks" towards Hodza as predominantly negative. 26 The first one, dated June 1, 1942, pointed out that Czechoslovak Americans had missed the article because they did not regularly read The Nation. Still, the OSS observer admitted that Hodza's ideas were, in general, favourably received by many Central Europeans because they were in line with their own post-war plans.27 The other report from June 11 portrays Hodza's arrival in America, his political past and goals in the USA in a very negative light. In the introduction, the author alleged that Czechoslovak Americans received the article with considerable mistrust. Claiming that he had researched the Czechoslovak American press and talked to "a number of leading Czechoslovak Americans as well as Czechoslovak exiles," the OSS observer contended that the article was "not a bona fide piece of political thinking, but that it rather serves as a cloak for its author' s ambition to become the exclusive or most important spokesman for the Slovaks (American and otherwise), regardless of cost in terms of Czechoslovak unity here and abroad." 28 It may be argued that the negative tone of the report was influenced by its author's very selective approach to sources. For example, he claimed that he had read reactions in the "Czechoslovak press," but he did not give any specific titles. The only sources he acknowledged were J. Papanek, professor J. B. Kozak and D. Benau. 29Jan Papanek, head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA and Benes's right-hand man, referred to Hodfa as an " unfortunate incident."30 He maintained that Hod26 Neither of the reports makes any distinction between American Slovaks and American Czechs. They refer to both groups collectively as "Czechoslovak Americans." 27 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-47, June I, 1942, p. I. 28 Ibid. The author of the report signed himself"Ivan Ivanovitch ." 29 At the time, Professor Kozak was lecturing at Oberlin College in Ohio. Prior to his arrival in the USA he was a member of the Czechoslovak State Council, a legislative-executive body ofBenes's government-in-exile in London. 30 J. Papanek' s negative attitude towards Hodza 's political views was widely known. Papanek disagreed with decentralisation to the extent advocated by Hodza. The head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA expressed his attitude towards Hodza in one of his letters to Benes in January of 1942: "I do not agree with the policy of decentralization or self-government on the scale suggested by Lichner and Hodfa. I am convinced that this would lead to a new Zilina [agreement on Slova- SLOVAKIA 47 fa's goal was to split the ranks of Slovak Americans, who had been, until his arrival, predominantly in full support of the Czechoslovak government headed by Bene~. Professor Kozak, a former member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, called Hodfa 's Central European Agrarian Bloc a reactionary body which collaborated with non-democrats. Benau, editor of the "Czechoslovak" New Yorksky dennik, added that Hodfa had a dubious financial past. Hodfa's entree into Slovak-American politics was facilitated by his long-time friend and associate Michal Mudry Sebik. With his assistance, Hodfa first approached the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance. On May 22, 1942, during the meeting of the SNA's Central Committee in Detroit, which discussed Hodfa 's lecture tour, the majority of the Committee expressed their support for Hodfa's political programme.31 At that time, Hodza formulated his position on the Slovak question as follows : 1. A Slovak Parliament and Slovak judiciary; 2. Slovak self-government, 3. Slovak as the only official language in Slovakia. With this political aim he launched a series of lectures at local branches of the SNA. However, the decision of the Central Committee was strongly challenged by the conservative wing of the SNA leadership. At the June meeting of the Executive Board, the president, secretary and treasurer of the organization announced their opposition to the decision taken by the Central Committee on May 22. According to these leaders, Hodfa's demands were a mere repetition of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which concerned the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The leaders proclaimed that, as American citizens, they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, because that was against the SNA programme as well as American law. In addition to that, the proclamation of the Executive Board pointed out that, it was thanks to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that Slovaks were not considered enemies of the Allies. Discussions about Slovakia's political future were destroying the unity of the SNA and threatened the future of the Slovak people. In the final part of the proclamation, the three members of the Executive Board issued a warning: "Disputes over things which do not concern us as American citizens - among these disputes is the question of selfgovernment of the Slovak nation - harm our country, harm all of us, and kia's autonomy, signed Oct. 6, 1938) and all that followed." Slavomir Michalek, Jan Papanek za vojny Bene.fovi. Vyber z dokumentov 1939 - 1945 (Bratislava: VEDA, 1997), 97. 31 Fifteen members of the Central Committee were in favour of Hodza' s lectures, twelve were against. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT9CZ-82. Later M. Mudry observed: "The meeting of the SNA ' s Central Committee in Detroit was especially important in the history of Slovaks. It showed that the great majority of Slovak Americans, in favour of the Czechoslovak Republic, preferred the Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement as it was outlined by Dr. M. Hodza." Mudry, Milan Hodi a v Amerike ..., 32. 48 SLOVAKIA only help the enemy!" 32 The position proclaimed by the Executive Board on June 29 confused other SNA leaders, as well as its rank-and-file. At the same time, it spurred a new wave of discussion about the position of the organization on the Slovak question, which continued throughout 1942. Several days before his second visit to the Department of State, Hodza had an appointment with Poole and J. C. Wiley of the OSS. After the SNA meeting in Detroit, Hodfa expressed his views openly, and his criticism of his opponents was sharper, on occasion turning into personal attacks. He told the OSS officers that his goals were to mobilize Slovak Americans and win their support for a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. He reiterated that the Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement, agreed upon by the Czechoslovak cabinet in July of 1938, was legally valid and politically binding. During one conversation, the OSS officers noted, Hodfa "disclosed a determined opposition to what he called the centralism in the Czechoslovakian constitutional practice of Benes and his entourage." 33 He criticized Benes, who, during their London talks in 1939, had been deliberately evasive and noncommittal regarding discussion of Slovakia's constitutional status. In talks with American government officials, Hodfa maintained that the campaign against himself in the USA had been masterminded by Papanek. The head of the CIS was not, in Hodfa' s words, to any degree a political figure, but merely an agent and intriguer for Benes.34 Apart from the members of the SNA, Hodfa was also planning to address the Slovak American Catholics associated within the Slovak League of America. As Hodfa put it bluntly in his conversation with Poole, he intended to "destroy this organisation" by winning over its popular support, leaving its leaders without any following, which he believed was very weak. 35 Meeting the OSS officers provided Hodfa with an opportunity to get some feedback on how his political activities were viewed by the administration. On this, the position of the OSS and the government was clear and unequivocal. American authorities were anxious not to see American 32 The Proclamation of the SNA Executive Board was signed by its President, Jaroslav Pelikan, Secretary Jan W. Golosinec and Treasurer Vaclav Hovorka. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-82. 33 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. I. 34 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. On this occasion Hodfa also expressed his firm belief in winning the forthcoming trial against the Overseas News Agency. He was convinced that the ONA had obtained its libellous information against him from Pap{mek, who was to be identified as the true culprit. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. 35 Hodfa told the OSS that the local branch of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, NJ, came out in open support of his programme, as did the First Catholic Slovak Union in Wilkes-Barre, PA. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1/2 Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. SLOVAKIA 49 citizens and alien residents fighting over European political issues on American soil. 36 The concerns of the American government about the unity of Slovak Americans were aired once again during Hodza's second visit to the Department of State on June 18, 1942.37 Hodza met H. Hoskins and C. Cannon. On the same day he spoke on the telephone to Assistant Secretary Berle. Hoskins and Cannon were interested in Hodfa's ongoing lecture tour among Slovak Americans. The former Czechoslovak premier did not hide his optimism and spoke extremely positively about his campaign.38 He was keen to ascertain how his activities were viewed by the Department of State. In response to his query, Assistant Secretary Berle told Hodfa that he thought that his "efforts had been in the right direction. "39 He made it clear, though, that the American government did not wish American unity to be disturbed by conflicts among Americans of foreign descent. Apparently, what the Assistant Secretary had in mind under "efforts in the right direction" were activities that would strengthen Czechoslovak unity in the USA. It was obvious that Slovakia's political future per se played a secondary role, if any, in the Department of State's post-war strategic planning. We can only wonder whether the Department of State had been informed about the results of the SNA' s Detroit meeting at the time of Hodza 's telephone conversation with Berle. It can be argued that, if it had been the case, the Assistant Secretary would not have so favorably assessed Hodza's activities. At any rate, Hodfa took Berle's statement as an expression of approval of his American campaign. He told this to Poole two days later while travelling with him on the train to New York. 40 During this conversation, Hodza reiterated that he was determined to get on with his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and to work on the project of the Central European Federa36 Hodza reacted to this open allusion to his political activities in the USA by assuring the OSS officers that in this respect there could be no objections to his campaign, since his primary aim was to unite, not to divide all Slovak Americans. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. 37 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910- 1944. 38 Lukac quotes from the Memorandum of conversation of June 18 : "Since then he has been in touch with various Slovak groups in this country and felt he had made progress in his efforts to convince them that Slovakia should work out its problem within the framework of the present republic, not as a small independent state". Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 613. 39 Lukac points out that the original memorandum contains the following handwritten note beside the word "efforts": "This related only to his effort to reduce the controversies between Czechs and Slovaks and similar peacemaking attempts." Ibid., 614. 40 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0 1/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Author of report D. C. Poole, June 20, 1942. Poole observed Hodfa's satisfaction with his visit to the Department of State. 50 SLOVAKIA tion.41 He suggested to Poole that American authorities could get in touch with some of his Hungarian and Yugoslav friends who were in favour of such a federation. 42 In return, the OSS officer promised to put him in touch with another academic institution, which would enable him to lecture at universities in his capacity as a former history professor. 43 While lecturing to Slovak Americans during the summer of 1942, Hodza found himself yet again the target of unwanted publicity. This time, Hodza ' s political opponents broadcast their views on New York-based radio station WMCA. Though the statements made by the radio commentator are not known, we do know that they drew an indignant response from Hodza. Following the broadcast by WMCA on July 28th, 1942, Hodza contacted Dr. Morris D. Forkosch, his New York-based lawyer, with a view to bringing legal action against the radio commentator. Hodza was adamant that Johannes Steele, the radio presenter in question, as well as his "sponsors," by which Hodza meant the people who supplied him with the slanderous information, should be sued for libel. This, however, was not to be. Four months later, Hodza abruptly asked his lawyer to drop the suit. In one of his telegrams to Forkosch in mid-October, Hodza wrote: "It is imperative that you immediately and explicitly advise the new sponsors of the radio commentator and others you approached that you acted upon mistaken instructions and to withdraw steps [sic.]."44 From Hodza's correspondence with Forkosch we learn that the defendants (Steele, the WMCA, the Terminal Shops) accepted some sort of "settlement," though it is not at all clear what this arrangement was. What remains baffling is what made Hodza change his mind. Money may have been part of it. Hodza had been dogged by financial problems since his arrival in the United States. On the other hand, Hodza 41 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /446-l /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 2. Hodfa referred specifically to a Hungarian, John Polonyi, and a Yugoslav, Bof olyub Jeftich. 3 During this conversation Hodfa expressed his interest in giving informal talks and participating in conferences as a historian of the 19th century. Poole had facilitated academic contacts for Hodza before. In the autumn of 1941 he introduced him to Dr. Duggan, Director of the International Institute of Education and later to Malcolm Davis, who was to assist in Hodfa 's cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 44 In his letter to Hodfa from October 28, 1942, Forkosch recounted all the telegraphic communications between him and Hodfa related to the libel suit. He did this, presumably, to clarify all possible misunderstandings as to what Hodfa really wanted and what his instructions to Forkosch were. Forkosch, however, did not provide any reasons for his client 's decision to drop the case. NARS, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129. Copy of M. D. Forkosch 's letter to Hodfa, October 28, 1942, p. I. 42 SLOVAKIA 51 would hardly have initiated a costly new lawsuit if he had not been convinced that he stood a fair chance of having his name cleared and his political detractors exposed. 45 The FNB files remain silent as to who supplied the WMCA with the information or what motivation drove its commentator to attack Hodza over the airwaves. Michal Mudry Sebik had little doubt that public attacks against Hodza were masterminded by Jan Papanek, and condoned by Benes's Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Hurban. This view has not been contested by any Hodza historians. So far, however, there has been no reliable evidence to prove that this was indeed the case. As far as the American government was concerned, it knew all about the perpetrators of the anti-Hodza smear campaign since June of 1943. The ideological split in the Slovak-American community, partially caused by Hodfa' s political campaign, was a source of growing concern to the American government. Amidst fears for the unity of Slovak Americans, the Department of State, in co-operation with several other government agencies, decided to take action. On September 14, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) organized in Pittsburgh a conference of Slovak newspaper editors and presidents of Slovak organizations.46 The intention of the OWI organizers was to unify Slovak-American organizations and persuade their leaders to sign a joint declaration expressing Slovak support for the U.S. government and, at the same time, condemning its enemies, including the Slovak Republic. At the actual conference two resolutions were passed. According to the OSS, on the previous day the members of the Resolution Committee had consulted the wording of both resolutions with Hodza, who had arrived earlier in Pittsburgh.47 The first resolution pledged allegiance to the government of the United States and its president. The second one outlined the principles concerning Slovakia's political future, in line with the Atlantic Charter. It stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should be "recreated on a basis of equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and equal obligations."48 This passage, however, elicited strong objections 45 Hodza's libel suit against the Overseas News Agency had been dragging on and off since November of 1941. The case was finally closed in June of 1943. 46 The conference was held at the William Penn Hotel. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. OSS, V. P. Backora to Dr. Kelso, September 16, 1942. 47 NARS, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. In the lead-up to the conference, Hodza met with Vendelin Platek, president of the National Slovak Society (NSS), Emil Stankoviansky, editor of Slovensky h/asnik [Slovak Herald] , the organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and J. Willo (NSS), chairman of the Resolution Committee. 48 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-143 . A photocopy of the September 14 resolution was published in Slovensky hlasnik on Octo- 52 SLOVAKIA from the "Czechoslovak" hardliners and followers of Benes under the leadership of Jaroslav Pelikan. The text of the second resolution had to be rephrased, and the controversial part concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was eventually omitted. In this form, the resolutions did not please any of the participants. The outcome of the conference left both sides unhappy. The OWI had received a token expression of Slovak allegiance, but the disgruntled Slovak leaders, seeking more definite commitments regarding Slovakia' s future, remained dissatisfied.49 The efforts of the Department of State and the OSS to direct Hodza's activities in favour of Slovak-American unity continued after the unsuccessful conference in Pittsburgh. On September 17, 1942 Assistant Secretary Berle wrote a letter to the OSS in which he asked Poole to settle the ongoing arguments between Papanek and Hodza. In this letter he reiterated the stance of the U.S. government as it was set out in June of 1942. The priorities of the Department did not lie in the various merits and demerits of the argument about the Slovak question, but in the need for unity and peace among Slovak Americans, which would contribute to victory in the war. 50 The concerns of the U.S . government were further exacerbated about two months later when the leaders of Slovak organizations and Hodza 's followers called a new conference with the intention of rallying the Slovak Americans behind Hodza's political programme. A new umbrella organization was established - the Council of Slovak American Organizations and Newspapers (hereafter CASON). This organization later succeeded in encouraging cooperation with some of the Catholic fraternal organizations. Politically, it subscribed to the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but in contrast to Benes's government-in-exile, it demanded a more definite commitment on Slovakia's status after the war. 51 This development was highly undesirable from the standpoint of the U.S . administration, which had only recently confirmed its definitive recognition of Benes's government in Lon- her I, 1942. The resolution was signed by twenty-four Slovak leaders and newspa£er editors. 9 As the OSS observer put it: "The compromise resolution satisfies no one but it is at least a step forward . Hodza is still causing disunity among the American Slovaks." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. 50 "The State Department is not at present interested in the merits of the controversy, but it has, of course, a very distinct interest in preserving that harmony and unity which best contributes towards winning the war." Quoted from the letter of A. Berle to D. C. Poole (NARA 860f. 00/993). See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodi u .. ., 617,note44. 51 The main figures behind the establishment of CASON were the President of the NSS, V. Platek, the President of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Michal Vargovich, and Jan Bradac, at that time the Honorary President of the SNA. SLOVAKIA 53 don.52 Hodfa 's campaign among Slovak Americans was becoming an ever more pressing political problem for the U.S. administration. In its March report, the OSS recommended that the State Department step in: "It would be of great value and benefit all around, if our State Department would speak nicely to Mr .Hodja [sic.] and advise him to apply his talents towards unity and not disruption among the Slovak Americans." 53 Throughout 1943, apart from campaigning among Slovak Americans, Hodfa was occupied with, and increasingly alarmed by, the developments in Czechoslovak foreign policy under Benes's leadership. In May - June, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile came on an official visit of the United States, where he was met by the highest officials in the country, including the Secretary of State. One of the primary objectives of the president's visit was to gain American approval for his planned journey to Moscow towards the end of the year. There, Benes was planning to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. This diplomatic initiative was the pinnacle of Benes's efforts to change the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy during WW II. From then on, the international security of the country was no longer to be guaranteed by military alliances with the Western Powers. Instead, it was to be safeguarded through close cooperation and coordination of its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether, in the summer of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt voiced their approval of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. According to Benes's personal secretary, Edvard Taborsky, Berle said that the United States followed no specific plans in relation to Central Europe, nor did they have any intention of negotiating with Hodfa on this issue.54 It appears that the ill-defined position of the Roosevelt administration in 1943 confirmed Benes's conviction that the United States did not hold any objections to Czechoslovakia's new Soviet-oriented foreign policy. Hodza, by contrast, regarded the conclusion of the treaty in December 1943 as a very dangerous step on the road to creating a new Soviet sphere of influence. He also feared that, after the war, the Soviet Union would try to impose on Czechoslovakia a political system similar to its own. Moreover, Hodfa was deeply convinced that Slovaks had not a scintilla of sympa- 52 The definiti ve American recognition of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile was granted on October 28, 1942. 53 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E 142, Box 3. Re: Recent Slovak Affairs, Milan Hodia, Jozef Hu~ek, Fedor Salva, etc., April 3, 1942. 54 According to Taborsky, Berle felt the need to defend himself against allegations that he sympathized with Hodia. "Hodfa was your prime minister and now he is a refugee. We respect him as such, but we will make no political deals with him, I can say this categorically." See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 620. Document quoted: NARA, 860F. 00/1009. 54 SLOVAKIA thy for Russian Bolshevism. He objected vigorously to the treaty, and made his criticism heard. Benes's visit to the United States presented the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch with a perfect opportunity to cut troublesome Hodza down to size. Hodza ' s long-standing legal feud with the Overseas News Agency (ONA) carried potential risks not only for the news agency itself, but for the whole of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Back in December of I 941 , Hodza had complained to the Office of the Coordination of Information that the ONA had been spreading word that he was a fascist collaborating with Otto von Habsburg and Tibor Eckhardt in a plot hatched by German generals to eliminate Hitler with a view to negotiating a separate peace.55 The same source branded the majority of Slovak Americans as isolationist and pro-fascist. Hodza was convinced that if the ONA was made to disclose its source, some of the top Czechoslovak authorities in the USA would be implicated. In June of 1943, the American court which was investigating the libel suit, required the ONA to answer a set of questions contained in a bill of particulars. One of them inquired about the source the ONA drew upon in its news release of November 7, 1941 . Shortly before the deadline by which the ONA was to comply, the case took an unexpected turn. On June 1st, Jacob Landau, the agency's managing director, paid a visit to Poole in his Washington office. He briefed the FNB boss about the case and discussed the questions in the bill of particulars. Later on, in his report of the meeting, Poole noted: "If ONA had to answer, Mr. Landau asserted, one of the sources to be named would be the Czechoslovak Ambassador [in the United States] ." Such a development was, from the perspective of the U.S. government, highly undesirable. Not only would it expose its wartime ally - the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - as the source of the anti-Hodza smear campaign, it would also fan the flames of the Benes-Hodza controversy among Slovak Americans. Although the head of the FNB felt he was not in a position to "interfere in an official way," he promised Landau that he would talk to Hodfa in order to make him "freely desi st" from the libel suit. Three days later in New York, Poole broached the subject of anti-Hodza propaganda in his conversation with Jan Papanek, the head of the Czechoslovak Information Service (hereafter CIS) in the United States. Without telling him what he knew from Landau, Poole received from the CIS head a resolute denial of any involvement on the part of the Czechoslovak government. Nevertheless, Papanek was very pleased with Poole 's intention to convince Hodza to desist from the case. On his part, the Czechoslovak propaganda boss promised he would do his utmost 55 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-9CZ-22, p. I. Memorandum of conversation between John. C. Wiley and Milan Hodia, December 4, I 94 I. SLOVAKIA 55 to prevent further escalation of the Hodza-Benes controversy. He also mentioned to Poole that during his visit in the States, Benes held a long private conversation with Jan Palka, Hodfa's son-in-law. This information, whether imparted casually or by design, presented the head of the FNB with the bargaining leverage he so much needed in his dealings with Hodfa. Although Papanek did not tell Poole what Palka had discussed with Benes, it was not difficult to surmise. Hodfa's dire financial situation was an open secret in Czechoslovak circles, and the OSS knew about it. Until his death in 1944, Hodfa struggled to keep his political campaign in America financially afloat. In October of 1942, for example, he asked the Polish government-in-exile for $650. 56 In May of the following year, Hodfa asked Slovak-American leader Vendelin Platek to help him out financially. The only regular income Hod.fa had was a monthly salary of $250 received from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile for his absentee membership in the London-based State Council. The money was payable to the account of Hodfa 's wife, who, at that time, resided in Chicago. Being well-informed of Hodfa's financial woes, Poole decided to use this information in the name of national interest. On June 5th, he telephoned Hodza, who was convalescing in Clearwater, Florida. The subject of the conversation was the ONA libel suit. According to Poole's account, Hodfa was tired of the longstanding legal battle and "had really lost interest in the matter." 57 This was borne out by David Karr, who had been following the case at the Office of War Information He informed Poole in November of 1942 that Hodza had indeed tried to drop his lawsuit, but this had not happened because of some misunderstanding between him and his lawyers. 58 As the secret memorandum of the telephone conversation between the two men suggests, Poole pressured Hodza to discontinue his campaign among Slovak Americans. During the conversation he hinted that both he and President Benes had been well aware of his financial difficulties. Poole then played his trump 56 Dusan Seges, "Ohlas sudobej krajanskej tlace na politicke posobenie Milana Hodzu v USA v rokoch 1941 - 1944," in Milan Hodia politik a i urnalista, ed. M. Peknik (Bratislava: Veda, 2008), 185 . In his article, Seges writes that Hodza wanted to use the money to gain a dominant influence on the Slovak-American newspaper Slovensky Hlasnik. Seges maintains that in the end Hodza succeeded in getting some of the money. 57 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943. 58 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129, November 18, 1942. In his report, D. C. Poole clarified: "He [David Karr] thought that there had been some misunderstanding, in consequence probably of Dr. Hodza's imperfect command of English. Specifically, Mr. Karr gained the impression that Dr. Hodza had instructed his attorneys 'to settle,' meaning come to a final friendly adjustment; but the attorneys interpreted this to refer to obtaining a 'settlement' ." 56 SLOVAKIA card. He reassured his interlocutor that he had "obtained satisfactory assurances from Dr. Benes that Dr. Hodza's personal situation would not be disturbed."59 To make himself absolutely clear, the head of the FNB pointed out to Hodfa that "It would seem unfortunate if by pressing the suit against the Overseas News Agency at this time he should bring on a change."60 Though elegantly phrased, to Hodfa 's ears Poole's talk must have sounded like nothing more than political blackmail. There is little doubt that Hodfa took his words at face value. In the following days he contacted his lawyer. In order to find out whether he had really done so, Poole telephoned Hodza again on June 10th. Hodfa confirmed that he had instructed his lawyer via telegraph to terminate the suit. Fear for the post-war scenario in Central Europe prompted Hodza to draw up a document - Europe at the Crossroads - which he sent to the State Department in March of 1944.6 1 This memorandum analyzed the political situation in Central Europe within the context of its states' relations with the Soviet Union. Hodfa pointed to the undemocratic character of the Soviet political system, and warned against its application in any form . He challenged Benes's arguments, according to which the new foreign policy realignment with the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Hodza argued that by signing the treaty, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile willingly entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus became an instrument of the Russian Drang nach dem Westen. He rejected the policy of creating a "special sphere," the necessity of which Benes justified by the failure of the Western Powers and the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" in 1938. He contended that no sphere of influence was able to guarantee the sovereignty of small countries. The only guarantee of security, Hodza maintained, was a system of collective security similar to the one promulgated by the Ameri59 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943 . 60 Tbid. 61 Some historians doubt whether or not the Department of State actually received the memorandum. Lukac, who did not have a copy of the document at his disposal, claimed that "Despite the fact that several authors claim the memorandum was sent to the Department, including the author of this article, there is no copy of Europe at the Crossroads in the State Department archives. We can only speculate what fate it met, whether it was sent at all or "got lost" in American archives. " Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. . , 622. The author of this study (R. Licko) can confirm that a copy of this 22-page-long memorandum is kept in the National Archives in Washington, in the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch section with signature INT-32A-75. Moreover, there is also firm evidence that the memorandum was read at the State Department. D. C. Poole, chief of the FNB, summarised its contents in his report of March 8, 1944. SLOVAKIA 57 cans and the British in the form of the United Nations. The final victory was achievable only as a "collective victory," with collective war aims. He went on to write, with bitter regret, that the "official Czecho-Slovak policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all alliances." 62 Hod.fa expressed his belief that "Czecho-Slovakia surely deserves a better fate than to become the victim of any personal rule or of any kind of soviet system."63 The memorandum also touches upon the position of the U.S. government, which chose not to reject the treaty. Hod.fa respected this view. However, the American position did not, in his opinion, change the simple fact that the treaty had contributed significantly to the creation of spheres of influence, whose catastrophic consequences would have to be dealt with after the war through a system of collective security. Part V of the memorandum was devoted to the Slovak question. According to Hodfa, the majority of Slovaks, with only a handful of opponents, demanded fair self-government for Slovakia. This demand was in stark contrast to the stubborn centralism of Benes and his political supporters in exile. Hodza's disapproval of the Soviet Union ' s influence, in relation to Slovakia's future, was based upon his conviction that the Soviet political system was incompatible with the political and cultural traditions of Slovaks. Hodza vehemently denied that Slovaks had ever sympathized with Communism. He also reminded the State Department that Slovaks had been fighting against Nazism on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts. Moreover, the majority of the Slovak soldiers who had defected from the Slovak army were, in Hod.fa ' s opinion, anti-Communists, with whom he had maintained radio contact. They desired, on the whole, a "Slovakia administered by Slovaks." Hodfa vigorously denied the allegations, current at the time, that Slovaks had not fought against Fascism. According to his information, as many as 75% of the Czecho-Slovak Army personnel in France between 1939 and 1940 were Slovaks.64 Europe at the Crossroads was Hod.fa' s last attempt to influence the U.S. administration. His memorandum was thoroughly analyzed by the OSS. The political analyst who studied it related its content to his superior DeWitt Poole.65 In the introduction of the report, its author noted: "It confirms my impression of him as a man of a high degree of peasant shrewdness." The OSS shared Hod.fa's concerns about the future of small Central European nations after the war: "The European peoples, more particularly, the East European nationnalities, will be potter's clay in the coming interplay of forces." The author fully sanctioned Hodza' s proposal to hold plebi62 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, I 942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75 , p. 15. lbid., p. 19. 64 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75. 65 Julian Towster to D. C. Poole, March 8, 1944. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, fNT-3 2A-75 . 63 58 SLOVAKIA scites in Central Europe, ideally under the auspices of the United Nations. 66 Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to respect the free will of Central Europeans was to be a clear indication of how far this country intended to go in improving its relations with the Western Allies in the post-war period. The OSS report did not pay any particular attention to the issue of Slovakia's future after the war. At the time when the State Department received the OSS report, Hodza had been undergoing medical treatment in a holiday resort in Florida. Despite several periods of improvement during his stay in the United States, Hodza never recovered from his illness. On June 27, 1944, after an operation in Clearwater, Hodza succumbed to his illness. 67 His death was an immense loss, primarily to the advocates of Slovak self-government. Moreover, there was a general opinion among Slovak-American leaders that, apart from Stefan Osusky, there was no other political leader at that time who would have been able to unite the politically fragmented Slovak Americans.68 Having been a prominent Central European politician and statesman throughout his life, Hodza's death elicited obituaries in a number of leading dailies around the world. 69 His life-long political contribution to politics was acknowledged by the Czechoslovak government, and even by his political enemies, including Edvard Benes. Belatedly, the U.S. government paid 66 "Hodza is perfectly right in emphasizing the plebiscite angle. Plebiscites may not always have been the best yardstick of true national sentiment, but the principle of unhindered expression of such sentiment and of consultation between the leading United Nations members in regard to securing such expression goes to the heart of the problem." 67 Hodfa suffered from cancer of the large intestine. According to the autopsy report, the immediate cause of death was a complication - internal obturation during the operation . Hodza never regained consciousness. See Lukac, "Posledne chvile Milana Hodzu," in Obcianska spolocnost', no. 8 (August, 2000), I 0. 68 The Slovak leaders, especially those associated in the CASON, suggested Stefan Osusky as Hodfa's possible successor, because they did not regard Hodfa' s aide, Mudry Sebik, as a "strong and effective" leader. FBI, Chicago File No. 100-15744, January 25 , 1945 . Report: Slovak National Alliance, p. 7. Another FBI report written by its director on July 1, 1944, advised the Department of State of Osusky' s intention to ask for permission to enter the United States. In addition to giving a brief account ofOsusky's political career, the report states that V. Platek, the leader of the National Slovak Society, wrote a letter to Osusky as early as in June of 1943 . In it, Platek asked Osusky to come to the United States and to assume the leadership of Slovak Americans together with Hodfa. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.202 l l/71844 PSNL, Roll 31, 1940 - 1944. Memorandum of J. E. Hoover to A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. Subject: Milan Hodza and Stefan (Stephen) Osusky, July I, 1944. 69 The New York Times published Hodfa 's obituary on June 29, 1944. On July 4, 1944 the newspaper reported on Hodfa's funeral in Chicago. SLOVAKIA 59 tribute to this outstanding Czechoslovak statesman. In 1951 , U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles praised Hodfa's understanding of the mutual interdependence of sovereign and equal peoples, and acknowledged Hodfa's contribution to the cause of European unity.70 Given the scope of Hodfa's plans and activities in the United States during WW II, one has to ask oneself: what did the Roosevelt administration's foreign policymakers make of Hodfa's federalization plans, and what solution, if any, did they think desirable in the dispute about Slovakia's post-war future? What significance did Hodfa's plans play in American strategic planning in Central Europe? Were these in line with the existing American blueprint for the overall European peace settlement, or did they contradict it? To what extent were Hodfa's plans for a Central European federation examined, and what political will was there to intervene in the debate on the post-war status of Slovakia? American and European historians more or less share the same view that Central Europe, throughout WW II, was not an area of priority in the United States' strategic planning. United States foreign policy in Central Europe was the outcome of a variety of factors, domestic and international, and on the whole it could be characterized as unsystematic.71 Another characteristic of this policy was the fact that the United States' attitudes towards Eastern Europe went through several changes during WW IL To a large extent, these changes were the result of the personal influence of key political figures in the White House, as well as in the Department of State. It is commonly known that, at the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt was an advocate of the doctrine of the Four Policemen, according to which the four greatest powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - were expected to take over the responsibility for the post-war political organization of the territories subjected to their influence. In Central Europe, this would mean an unprecedented increase in Soviet influence, given that Germany was to be disarmed after the war and its influence eliminated for good. From the standpoint ofHodfa's political plans, this represented an undesirable return to spheres of influence against which he so persistently warned. 70 Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 625 . The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad summarizes the non-systematic nature of this policy as follows: "So tenuous was the coherence of the many diverse elements in these policies, fluctuating in response to political and economic forces within the US itself, to local events in Eastern Europe, and to the challenges inherent in Great Power rivalry, that I have chosen the term the American non-policy to describe the end result of the various influencing factors . American policy-makers were never quite able to make up their minds about the importance of Eastern Europe to the United States." Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo : Universitets forlaget, 1978), 34. 71 60 SLOVAKIA Quite a different view of the post-war world order was held by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He advocated a vision of a globalized world, in which economic and political conflicts among sovereign countries were to be solved through a world organization.72 However, the idea of resurrecting a world organization on the principle of the interwar League of Nations was extremely unpopular in the United States. Warming up to such an idea took some time and was a gradual process.73 After the resignation of Sumner Welles from the position of Under Secretary of State in 1943, Cordell Hull finally succeeded in convincing the conservative-minded Department of State to accept the idea of a new United Nations. In relation to Central Europe, the new line in foreign policy resulted in the conviction that the reformed system of collective security would prevent the recreation of old spheres of influence. This was also the reason why the State Department was very reluctant to give its views on the various integration schemes of the Central European governments in exile. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in this area was a worrying development for the Roosevelt administration, but did not lead to a significant shift in the established policy of non-intervention.74 Surprisingly enough, despite the negative attitude towards European integration in general, the archival documents of the Department of State suggest that the U.S. foreign policy makers devoted con72 This track of American foreign policy in the 20th century is frequently referred to as "globalism," or, "universalism." See Michael Lind, "The Twilight of the U.N.," The New Republic, October 30, 1995, p. 28 . 73 The League of Nations, created in 1920, was part of the peace initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, generally known as the "Fourteen Points." In terms of conflict resolution and international security, the organization's philosophy was based upon the principle of collective security, which stood in opposition to the notion of the balance of power and advancement of national interests. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to ratify the League' s Covenant. Wilson ' s peace initiative is often criticized and branded as an example of American political idealism. From the point of view of international relations, Wilson's plan stemmed from "idealistic and liberal dissatisfaction with the international anarchy, balance of power and the concept of self-help which had hitherto characterized the state-system." Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin books, 1998), p. 300. 74 In the introduction to his book The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 , Bennett Kovrig described American idealism in relation to Central Europe in the words of A. J. P. Taylor: "democratic foreign policy must be idealistic, or at the very least it has to be justified in terms of great general principles ". Kovrig added, "Yet the reader will find few villains and even fewer heroes, for seldom in the history of America 's foreign relations have good intentions reaped such a bitter harvest". Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 194! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), x. SLOVAKIA 61 siderable time to various integration schemes such as those proposed by Hodza. 75 The duties of investigating and assessing these plans, as well as drawing up recommendations which were to serve as guidelines in American post-war foreign policy, were entrusted to the Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.76 Browsing through the minutes of the Advisory Committee between May 1942 and March 1944 gives one some idea of how much time and space the Department of State devoted to federalization plans for Central Europe and what attitudes towards them various committee members maintained. On May 9, the Committee's agenda included the so-called Danubian Federation 77 The discussions focused on two plans drawn up by politicians in exile. One of these plans was the proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish union, put forward in the United States by the exiled Polish Prime Minister 75 Documentary sources from the American archives relating to the U.S. attitudes towards Central European integration were collected and annotated by the Polish authors J. Laptos and M. Misztal Marius, American Debates on Central European Unio n, 1942 - 1944. Documents of the American State Department (Brussels & New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2002). 76 F. D. Roosevelt approved of the establishment of the Advisory Committee three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1941 . It included academics as well as leading officers of the Department of State. The Committee reported directly to the State Secretary. At that time, the position of vice-chairman was held by Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Everyday activities were overseen by Leo Pasvolsky. The Advisory Committee had six subcommittees, the most important of which were those dedicated to political, economic and territorial issues. Other key figures on the Committee who specialised in Central Europe were Hamilton Fish Armstrong ( 1893 - 1973) and Adolf A. Berle. It was the latter who was often believed by Czech and Slovak emigres to have harboured sympathies for Hodza's plans. The Committee 's job was to draw up general guidelines for the United States in peace negotiations. The official activity of this Committee was ended in the summer of 1943, but many of its members continued their work on other committees until the end of the war. The Committee 's research team drew up hundreds of reports, situational analyses and recommendations, which became a blueprint for the discussions and proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees. Regular minutes of the subcommittees' discussions were kept. The documentation produced by the Advisory Committee is deposited in the National Archives in the Notter File. See Ignac Romcis, "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942 - 1944" Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, [online] , 1992, 30, no. 77 . [Quoted: 2008-06-05] . Available at: <http ://www.hungarianhistory.hu> 77 The term "Danubian Federation" was chosen by the Advisory Committee to refer to the integration efforts of the Central European countries in the Danubian region. The discussions of the Advisory Committee on the "Danubian Federation" included possible membership for Poland and Austria. 62 SLOVAKIA Wladyslaw Sikorski. 78 The other was the Danubian Federation, championed by exiled Hungarian politicians Tibor Eckhardt and Janos Pelenyi.79 Hodfa's federation plan was not included. It was referred to only marginally by a member of the Committee, Anne McCormick. 80 She mentioned Hodfa as an agrarian politician who had been involved in solving agrarian problems.81 The foreign policy analyst went on to inform the Committee, quite misleadingly, that Hod:fa 's plan limited itself to the Danubian region.82 This ignorance of the details of Hodza's plan is interesting, because by that time Hodfa had already spoken about his plans to The New York Times and, more importantly, must have made his views known at the State Department during his first visit. 83 Hodfa 's plan was almost completely 78 Laptos and Mizstal pointed out that Sikorski 's plan for federation was dealt with only briefly. According to the information available to the Committee, Sikorski's federation was to comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The plan envisaged the complete economic federation and eventual political federation of its constituent countries. According to the Advisory Committee, Polish influence in the thus-constituted federation was obvious, though the sheer scale of the supranational state ruled out complete Polish domination. Laptos and Mizstal, .American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 74. 79 Tibor Eckhardt was a Hungarian politician of the interwar period. In 1938 he represented Hungary at the League of Nations Assembly. In 1941 he was sent on a mission to the USA by Miklos Horthy in order to approach the Allies and the Hungarian democratic opposition. Eckhardt's federation was brought to the attention of the Committee by Under Secretary of State Welles. According to this plan, Central Europe was to be divided into three parts: a Polish-Baltic bloc, a Balkan bloc and a "Danubian" union,comprising Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Slovakia and Transylvania, with the possibility of the later admission of Croatia. The unifying element of the federation was to be their common history as part of the Habsburg monarchy. NARCS Notter File, Department of State. Minutes P - I 0, Danubian Federation, May 9, 1942. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 74. 80 Anne O ' Hare McCormick (1882 - 1954), a member of the Advisory Committee, was a foreign policy analyst for The New York Times. 81 The minutes of the meeting captured McCormick's information on Hodza and his plan as follows: " Mrs. McCormick said that mention might also be made of the Hodfa plan, which confines itself to the Danubian area. Mr. Hodfa, she pointed out, being a peasant, is chiefly concerned with the agricultural problem. His plan expresses the aspirations of the Green International." Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 75. 82 In Hodza's plan the core of the proposed federation was to be formed by CzechoSlovakia and Poland, who were to be joined by other countries in the south of Central Europe. 83 See Hope Put in Union of Central Europe, the OSS report on the interview with M. Hodza. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-1 , December 7, 1941 . SLOVAKIA 63 ignored. It was mentioned in passing in connection with the association of agrarian parties known as the Green International. American foreign policy advisors again failed to include Hodza's plan when they discussed the so-called East European Union as one of the issues related to the Department of State's plans to create a world organization. 84 The members of the Division of Special Research discussed, among other things, the results of the negotiations between the exiled governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland on the creation of a joint union .85 In mid-June of 1942, the Department of State presented to the Advisory Committee the first draft of American recommendations which any supranational organization in Central Europe should comply with. One of the main differences, in comparison with Hodza's plan, was that the United States preferred a union to a federation. This preference reflected the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to sanction political integration. What the Department of State recommended was a loose organization of free sovereign states, which would be able to advance their interests through joint, non-legislative institutions. Such an economic union was to comprise all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including countries as far apart as Estonia, Austria and Greece.86 The establishment of this union would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations. The main rationale was that the establishment of such a union would solve the existing security problems and bring with it economic advantages as a result of regional cooperation. The territorial integrity of the union was to be safeguarded by the United Nations, and the security forces of the union were to act in concordance with the security system of the United Nations. After the war, the world organization was to facilitate the creation of the union by adjusting all outstanding border claims. What is most striking to the European reader about the attitudes of the American government are its views on the armed forces of member 84 The meeting of the Division of Special Research, which prepared reports for the Advisory Committee, took place on June 6, I 942. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P 14, June 6, I 942 . NARA, Notter File, Box 65 ., Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 96 - 103. 85 For the history of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations on uniting, including the attitudes of the United States and the other great powers, see Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943. 86 " The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through common non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany from and including Estonia in the North to Austria in the West and Greece in the South." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P Document 24, June 19, 1942. NARA, Notter File, box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 110. 64 SLOVAKIA countries, as well as on the military of the union as a whole. Every constituent country would have to contribute a designated contingent of troops for the international armed forces (under the command of the UN), but no member state was to have its own armed forces . This recommendation testified to the distrust with which the American foreign policymakers looked upon the nations of Central Europe. The Advisory Committee's analysis of the factors which were thought to be conducive to, or had disintegrating effects upon, the creation of a Central European Union offers an interesting insight into the mindset of the American foreign policy advisors of that time. In the beginning the majority of the Committee members seemed to be in favour of one large Central European union from the Baltic to the Balkans.87 It was argued that a larger union was more advantageous to the United States, because it would be better able to eliminate the destructive forces of nationalism, mutual antagonisms and the land disputes of the Central European nations. 88 An analysis of the economic benefits failed to persuade American foreign policy advisors that economic prosperity was in itself motivationally adequate for unification . In the American view, the history of integration efforts in the interwar period showed that political interests in the area had often been given priority over economic ones. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was pointed out as an example. According to L. Pasvolsky, Masaryk and Bene~ were willing to accept any economic disadvantages in order to achieve political and cultural unity after WW I. 89 It was nationalism, however, that elicited the greatest fears in the members of the Committee. The issue was frequently raised during the discussions, and the Department of State believed that nationalism was one of the five main obstacles to Central European integration.90 As the feasibility study for the Department of State from 87 This notion was supported most enthusiastically by S. Welles and H. F. Armstrong. 88 From the economic point of view, a larger union appeared to offer better prospects of strengthening the commercial position of member states in trade with the rest of Europe. As for the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the gravest concerns at the Department of State were aroused by Hungarian nationalism, with some criticism also levelled at the former Czechoslovakia. 89 "Mr. Bowman observed that in the case of the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks the main emphasis had been on the achievement of political and cultural unity from the beginning. Economic considerations had played a decidedly minor £iart." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943 . Apart from nationalism, the list of five disintegrative forces comprised the absence of common roots, cultural di versity, external political influences and diversity in regional economic development. Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943. NARA , NARA, Notter File, SLOVAKIA 65 February, 1943 observed, "Since the present war began, the animosity between several of the states, e.g., between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Hungary and Romania, has been greatly increased and the conflicts between ethnic groups within one state e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks, between Serbs and Croats, have become bitter."9 1 Where the State Department seemed to be in agreement with Hodfa was the belief that the peasantry could play a positive role in the process of Central European integration. In the inter-war period, peasant parties in Central Europe had engaged in mutual cooperation and shared a similar political agenda. 92 A member of the Committee, J. T. Shotwell, also sympathised with this opinion, but expressed reservations about the role of agrarian leaders, who, in his view, had nationalistic tendencies which might prove distractive. 93 The discussion about the cohesive and destructive forces of unification eventually prompted the members of the Committee to break the proposed union into two parts. With regard to the attitudes of the exiled governments, Berle pointed out that, surprisingly, none of these su£ported a large union, with the exception of the Czechoslovak government. 4 Strictly speaking, however, this was no longer the case. By that time, the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Czechoslovak Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 187 - 88. 91 Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943 . NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 92 State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part III: Movements Tending Toward Unity, February 19, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 93 According to Shotwell, the majority of Central European leaders were nationalists of the 19th century type. As an example he pointed to Count Apponyi, who owned land in Slovakia, a fact which had a great deal of influence on his political outlook. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P I 7, June 27, 1942. Milan Hodza himself often mentioned the agrarian problems in Hungary. That was also why he laid down conditions on the membership of Hungary in a Central European Federation, stressing first the necessity of agrarian reform in that country. 94 Laptos and Mistal put Berle 's incorrect information down to the skilfulness of the Czechoslovak propaganda. "The question was asked whether Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle had talked with representatives of these countries on this matter. Mr. Berle said that no one of that group had the concept of a single union. Mr. Welles said he had never found one who had the conception of one union, most favoring three unions; some, two. Mr. Berle said that the Czechs were the only ones who had offered any support for a single union." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union . .., 129 - 30. 66 SLOVAKIA government was getting increasingly cold feet about any union with its northern neighbour. At the end of June, the members of the Committee agreed that for the sake of further discussions about Central European integration they would consider two options- the so-called Northern East European Group and a Balkan Group. 95 Another key issue to which the Advisory Committee devoted its attention was the problem of how viable the proposed union would be and what attitudes the great powers would adopt in dealing with this supranational state. According to the above-mentioned feasibility study, the political will of the member states alone was insufficient for the union's long-term survival. American foreign policymakers understood perfectly well that in order for the union to survive, it had to secure the support of the victorious powers, including that of the United States. 96 The advantages from the American point of view seemed palpable enough: a solution to questions of security in relation to Germany and Russia, pacification of the space between the Baltic and the Aegean seas in an area inaccessible to the naval powers, and the protection of Eastern European countries against possible German expansion. The most important question, of course, was how such a union would be viewed by the geographically closest of the powers - the Soviet Union. In the October Memorandum on Russia and the East European Federation, drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations, an expert on Soviet affairs informed the Committee that the reasons for Soviet opposition were far stronger than those which might induce the Soviet Union to support such a scheme. 97 The first and the most decisive reason for Soviet 95 The proposal to break up the union was put forward by Under Secretary of State Welles at the meeting of the Division of Special Research on June 27, 1942 . The main reason was the diverse character of the member states of the union, which might lead to its disintegration. On the issue of breaking up the union, the members of the Committee were by no means united. Welles was in principle in favour of a single union, but practical considerations compelled him to opt for two smaller ones. The key problem of the two-union solution was Austria and Hungary. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA , Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 119 - 20. 96 See Part IV: Steps Necessary to make Union Effective: "In view of the fact that Eastern Europe has felt the impact of virtually none of those dynamic forces that would aid in creating a unity out of this di versity of peoples, the creation of a union and its maintenance for an indefinite period would have to be in large measure the work of the great victorious powers or of the international organization. " State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part IV: NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 19 1. 97 The author of the memorandum was Isaiah Bowman. The Counci l on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, SLOVAKIA 67 opposition was the assumption that the establishment of a union would prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its policy of divide et impera. Moscow was also worried that the political orientation of the Central European countries within the proposed union would lead to the weakening of the existing pro-Russian orientation in some of them. 98 There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia was one of those countries. Its president-in-exile Edward Benes had indicated that Czechoslovak foreign policy after the war would be oriented towards the east. The Soviet attitude towards integration in Central Europe was yet again referred to by American foreign policy advisors as "apparently hostile" in February of 1943. 99 The report made it clear that Moscow was in no mood to support federalization plans of a lesser scope, such as the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish or Greek-Yugoslav unions. The Department of State reached this conclusion on the basis of the information obtained directly from representatives of the Czechoslovak government-inexile. The negative attitude of Moscow was also identified as the main rea- October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 176. 98 The author continues: "The possibilities of supporting Czechoslovakia against Poland, Hungary against Rumania, Yugoslavia against Hungary and so forth, present an almost limitless field for maneuver by Russia to make its influence strong and even preponderant among the disunited states of East Central Europe." Other Soviet objections could be summarized as follows: 2. the united states of Central Europe would find it easier to advance their territorial claims against Russia, 3. the political system of the member countries would unify, but become very likely hostile to that of the Soviet Union, 4. the union 's armed forces would be stronger in defence, which would weaken Soviet military position, 5. the exports of such a federation would compete in world markets with Soviet exports; Soviet exports into the union would be disadvantaged, since Russia would have to deal with the union as a whole rather than trading with countries separately, 6. the union would curb the revived pan-Slav sentiment, because it would include non-Slav countries and the pro-Russian orientation of the Slav countries would thus be weakened. The Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 177. 99 "On the basis of information at present available in the Political Section, the Soviet Government is apparently hostile to the idea of the creation of an all-embracing East European Union, unless, perhaps, such a Union were established under the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union. An examination of the Soviet press and periodicals has disclosed no discussions of such projects for an Eastern European Union as have been put forward from time to time in Britain and the United States." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Document P 206, February 18, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. LAPTOS, Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 196. 68 SLOVAKIA son why the Czechoslovak §ovemment broke off its negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile. 1 0 The work of the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy officially ended in July of 1943, though some of its subcommittees continued their work on Central European integration plans until the spring of 1944. 101 The issue of Slovakia's post-war political status never came up. Neither was it discussed by any of the Committee's numerous subcommittees. The abandonment of American discussions of the Central European integration plans raises two questions: what were the reasons for this decision and what political future did the Roosevelt administration envisage for the Central European nations? The answer to the first question should be looked for in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy for this period. Drawing on the latest historical research, one finds, more or less, consensus on this issue. The dominant factor in American strategic planning was the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe, which went hand in hand with its increasing political influence. It became clear, towards the end of 1943, that the Red Army would liberate a substantial part of Central Europe, a fact which would inevitably increase the role of the Soviet Union in the post-war political organization of the area. Regardless of their original plans, President Roosevelt and the Department of State had to constantly adjust to these developments. In 1943, under pressure of the events on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt was forced to review his erstwhi le concept of an "Anglo-American world police force" and extend it into the well-known "Four Policemen" theory. This had to take the Soviet Union into account as an equal partner in the political organization of territories within its own sphere of influence. From this point of view it 100 "Mr. Berle remarked that when the Polish-Czech confederation was agreed upon, both parties had believed that the Russians were not opposed to the idea. The worsening of relations between Russia and the Polish government-in-exile, however, has since resulted in a change in the Russian position. The Czechs have withdrawn from their discussions with the Poles, ostensibly because the Poles were unwilling to abandon their claim to the Teschen area, but in reality because of Russian opposition to the combination." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 217. 101 Secretary of State Cordell Hull ended the work of the Committee in a letter of July 12, 1943 . Mary E. Bradshaw, "Congress and Foreign Policy Since 1900," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 289 (September, 1953), 45 . The last minutes of the Political Subcommittee dealing with the Central European union were those of March 15- 17, 1944, NARA, Notter File, Box 84. The last meeting of the Economic Subcommittee took place on March 31 , 1944. Advisory Committee, Economic Subcommittee, R Minutes 16, March 31, 1944 NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Unio n ... , 243 . SLOVAKIA 69 can be understood why any American position on a Central European federation or union had to be approved by Moscow. The absence of a Soviet stance on the issue throughout 1942 kept the idea of integration alive among the exiled politicians of Central Europe, and occupied the minds of American foreign policy advisors on the Advisory Committee. Doubts about Moscow's priorities were finally ended in October of 1943, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, officially confirmed the negative position of the USSR. 102 The answer to the second question, namely what the Americans desired as the political future for Central Europe, is more complicated. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the views of the Roosevelt administration on this issue were not unanimous. Significant differences of opinion existed in Washington, which divided even the chief foreign policy makers, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. American historians' interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Europe during this period have gone through several developments since WW II. 103 The more recent research emphasizes the importance of Roosevelt's role in the process of foreign policymaking, and interprets his apparent lack of determination and unsystematic approach as misleading. According to this interpretation, Roosevelt, from the beginning of the war, pursued a clear goal in relation to Continental Europe: to reduce its international standing and marginalize it as the most effective way of preventing future conflicts in the area. Roosevelt intended to achieve this marginalization through fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and wherever possible, ethnically homogenous states. These states should in no case possess any armed forces, and after disarmament they should be placed within the sphere of influ102 This information was imparted to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who asked V. Molotov about the Soviet view on Central European integration efforts at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19 - 29, 1943. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 63 . 103 The oldest interpretation of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe maintains that the Roosevelt administration favoured active involvement in the rebuilding of European democracies and in strengthening the position of European states. Roosevelt is criticised, however, because he was unable to see through Stalin's empty promises at Yalta. The second, "revisionist" theory contends that the post-war division of Europe was afait accompli long before Yalta, because the Red Anny would occupy the whole of Eastern Europe and the United States had to respect this fact. ." Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos. A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 26 (no. 2, 1996), 73 . Lundestad, who reviewed both of the above theories, characterized U.S. foreign policy towards Central Europe as a policy of "modified universalism in the area of non-essential interest for the USA." For the lack of internal coherence in this policy he chose to refer to it as a "non-policy." G. Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe .. . , 34. 70 SLOVAKIA ence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. 104 Such a vision of the future of Central European nations was incompatible with Hodza 's federalization. He feared the political influence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, called for concerted efforts to strengthen the position of Central Europe. As far as Slovakia's future was concerned, Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention, whether intentional or inadvertent, played more into the hands of Slovak separatists than those of the proponents of federative integration.' 05 Roosevelt's concept of new spheres of influence, however, stood in contrast to the universalistic vision of Secretary of State Hull, who was advocating global cooperation among nations on the basis of a renewed world organization. The key moment, which resulted in the adoption of the universalistic approach as the main guideline in U.S. foreign policy, is usually thought to be the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 106 After Welles's resignation, Secretary of State Hull and his department advanced the concept of collective security within the framework of a restored world organization under a new name. ' 07 The new line in American foreign policy, however, did not make the Roosevelt administration take a more active role in suppressing the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Roosevelt continued to count on Soviet assistance as a decisive political force in the post-war reorganization of Central Europe. What he and his foreign policy advisors got wrong was the belief that Stalin's Russia would sooner or later discard its system of central planning, return to the market economy and join the rest of the democratic world. 104 "As he [Roosevelt] told the British Foreign Minister in March 1943, 'armaments after the war in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of the policing powers Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller powers might have rifles but nothing more dangerous than this' .. .These two great powers had to maintain order over other disarmed European countries, if necessary by force." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", 72 . 105 "He [Roosevelt] also envisioned splitting up multiethnic countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," 70. On another occasion, when meeting representtatives of the Slovak League in 1940, Roosevelt remarked: "I believe that every nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its nationhood." Ever since then, the Slovak League interpreted the president's statement as approval of the establishment of an independent Slovak state. NARA, Washington D. C., 860F.0l /446. Reverend C. Mlynarovich to C. Manion of the Office for Government Refcort, Indiana, May 11, 1942. 06 Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's closest ally in the Department of State, was a strong supporter of the president's concept of the "Four Policemen." Roosevelt did not trust Hull. In 1943 the president accepted Welles 's resignation in connection with his alleged homosexual activities. 107 In the field of international relations, Hull 's approach to foreign affairs is often associated with the principles of universalism, globalism and political idealism . SLOVAKIA 71 Thus we have seen that, between 1941 and 1944, the American authorities closely followed the political activities of exiled Slovak politician Milan Hodfa. His political goal in the United States was twofold. First, he intended to influence Roosevelt's foreign policy makers in favour of the creation of a supranational federation of Central European states, which he saw as a political panacea for the area' s many unresolved problems. According to this plan, a restored Czechoslovakia was to be one of the founding members of such a federation . Slovakia was to be part of Czechoslovakia again, but with a new constitutional arrangement stipulating its equal political status with the Czech lands. Secondly, Hodza planned to lead a political campaign among Slovak Americans. In particular, he hoped to win the endorsement of the leaders of their organizations for his programme of a self-governing Slovakia. Various federal agencies' keen interest in Hodza, however, was not motivated by the desire of the U.S. government to support the creation of a central European federation . It rather stemmed from the fact that U.S. governmental agencies had deep misgivings about the effects of Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans. Thus, for the American government, Hodfa soon emerged as an unwelcome guest as the OSS began in mid-1942 supplying various U.S. departments with reports about the ideological split within the Slovak-American community. The fears frequently expressed in the OSS reports were motivated by the perceived possible consequences of Hodza ' s campaign on the home front as well as the on the American war effort in general. Foremost among these fears was that the Hodfa-inspired opposition to the Benes-led government-in-exile would not only undermine the standing of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - one of the war-time allies of the United States - but would also have a deleterious effect on the morale of the hundreds of thousands of Slovak Americans employed in key American heavy industries. Hodza's political campaign among Slovak Americans targeted two deeply antagonistic camps. He attempted to win the support of the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance, who had originally supported Benes's government-in-exile. At the same time, he tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Slovak League of America, several of whom offered their organizations' support for his programme. However, Hodfa failed to eliminate the powerful influence of the hard-liners in these umbrella organizations. The Czechoslovak Information Service in the United States, a propaganda tool of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile, severely criticized Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans, constantly challenging his right to discuss Slovakia' s future on American soil and running a smear campaign against him. The U.S. administration viewed Hodfa 's activities with growing alarm. The most worrying development from the American point of view was the ideological split in the Slovak National Alliance which devel- 72 SLOVAKIA oped as a result of Hodza ' s lecture tour. The OSS repeatedly called on the Department of State to intervene in order to mend the rift among the proCzechoslovak fraternal leaders. Hodza ' s attempts to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards the future organization of Central Europe had little impact on American foreign policy. lndeed, his plan for a Central European federation was never discussed by the American foreign policy advisors. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State and its agencies devoted considerable time to weighing the pros and cons of Central European integration from the point of view of American interests. The Department of State tended to favour an economic union rather than a political federation. Moreover, it feared the destructive forces of Central European nationalisms, not excluding the Slovak and Czech ones. However, the major American objection to any form of Central European integration stemmed from the strong opposition to it from the United States' chief war ally in Eastern Europe - the Soviet Union. Stalin had no intention of supporting any integration plans in the area. He preferred a fragmented Central Europe made up of weak states, which would strengthen the negotiating position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis these countries. Roosevelt ' s policy of deliberate non-intervention in Central Europe, coupled with the American belief in a new world organization, resulted after the war in a gradual Sovietization of Central Europe and the creation of a new sphere of influence. Given the pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from December of 1943 onwards, the Roosevelt administration refrained from publicly expressing any of its views on Slovakia's post-war future.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An Unwelcome Guest: Milan Hodža in American Documents Between 1941 and 1944 Description An account of the resource Roman Ličko Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 37-72 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ličko, Roman Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d08701c8de6e3c1ea34737b7b5cef77e.pdf 2c4af5a0cc090f418b94aeb049bd6779 PDF Text Text 70 SLOVAKIA 2021 ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM: SLOVAKIA IN THE TURMOIL OF 1938 AS SEEN BY THE UNITED ST ATES FOREIGN SERVICE Roman Licko In the autumn of 2018 I set myself the task of assessing the significance of the year 1938 in Slovak hi story. This was in response to a conference call which invited scholars to address, among other themes, milestones in Czech and Slovak history in which the year happens to have a number eight in it. 1 When I set about preparing my presentation, I had two thoughts about the subj ect. First, I was struck by several historic parallels between 2018 and 1938. No attempt will be made in thi s paper to argue that 2018 was as fateful for Slovakia as the year 1938 was for the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. Yet, given the rise of far-right political extremism in Central Europe, tacitly encouraged by a large authoritarian neighbour to the east, it may be instructive to re-examine the rise of Slovak nationalism in the late 1930s. 2 Then, extreme Slovak nationalists had also been spurred on by an aggressive totalitari an neighbour. 3 The second idea that occurred to me was that 1938 has been somewhat neglected when it came to 1 The paper entitled "From Fledging Democracy to Nationalist Authoritarianism: Slovakia in the Tunnoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service" was presented at the 50th Convention of the Associati on for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies in December of 20 18 in Boston. 2 The large authoritarian neighbour is Russia. Its support for the far-right nationa lists in Centra l European cou ntri es is explained and well documented in Timothy Snyder's book The Road to Unfi·eedom. By supporti ng ex treme nationalist movements in coun tries such as Slovaki a, Russia hopes to weaken their resolve to stay w ithin the European Union. Putin's alternative to th e EU is the Eurasian Union, a trade and political bloc stretching from Chin a to the border of the EU. Timothy Snyder, Th e Road tu Unf,-eedom: Russia. Europe. America. (New York : Crown/ Archetype, 20 18), I 00. The reference to the extreme nationalists in today 's Slovakia is directed towards l 'udovri strana na.iie S/ovensko-The People's Party Our Slovakia. Just two months before Slovakia ' s parliamentary elections in February of 2020, the far-rig ht nationali st party came second in a popul ari ty poll cond ucted by the Focus polling Agency in December of 2019. Historically speaking, leaders of the party, including its leaderMarian Kotleba, subscribe to the ideology of the war-time Slovak Republic. 3 Then it was Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2021 71 turning points in Slovak history.4 By this, I don ' t mean the fact that Slovaks gained their autonomy in that year. What changed quite dramatically in 1938 was the way in which the country was governed. After a relatively brief experience with a democratic form of government in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak leaders set about dismantling the democratic institutions upon which the foundations of their state were built. By the end of the year Slovakia was well on the road to becoming a nationalist totalitarian state. This paper examines political developments in Slovakia in that year from the point of view of an independent observer- the United States Foreign Service. At that time, American diplomats in Czechoslovakia gathered and evaluated intelligence which in tum informed the United States' foreign policy towards Central Europe. Their reports and analyses, despite their limitations, help us understand what went wrong with the process of Slovak national emancipation in 1938. They may also serve as an insight into how easily a Central European democracy may tum into a totalitarian state if extreme nationalism becomes the dominant ideology of its political leaders. 1938 was a critical year in European history. Powerful forces of European nationalism were the driving engine of politics in both totalitarian Germany as well as democratic Czechoslovakia. Because of its large and restive German minority, Czechoslovakia had become vulnerable to the aggressive foreign policy of its large totalitarian neighbour to the west. Adolph Hitler's ambition in Central Europe was to annex ethnic Germans living in foreign territories into his Third Reich . In March of 1938 Germany had annexed Austria. In September, the Gen11an Chancellor achieved the pinnacle of his pre-war diplomatic offensive. As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia had to cede the German-speaking areas of Sudetenland to Germany. The rejection of the Versailles system and the intention by the Nazi s to destroy its eastern democratic neighbour brought the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia to a head in 1938. The issue had been simmering in Czechoslovak politics since the last parliamentary elections in 1935, whose results changed the political map of the republic. In Slovakia, an alliance of nationalist parties, known as the Autono4 1948 and 1968, of course, were more fateful. The former because the coup d 'etat in February brought about a complete regime change, the latter beca use the crushing of the Prague Spring in August was the res ult of a fo rei gn in vasion. �72 SLOVAKIA 2021 mist Bloc, emerged as the most powerful political force in the country.5 The Sudeten German Party became one of the strongest political parties in Czechoslovakia. 6 By the end of 1938, the problem of the constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks had been temporarily resolved. The Declaration of Slovak autonomy on October the 6th marked the beginning of the short-lived period known as the Second Czechoslovak Republic. It ended with the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. In 1938 the American government did not have a centralised agency that wou ld gather, coordinate and evaluate political intelligence from foreign countries. Instead, its main source of information about developments abroad came from the U.S. diplomatic missions based in countries' capital cities. Thus, the quality of political intelligence from Europe dispatched to Washington depended on the political acumen of individual diplomats, not all of whom were professionally trained. In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a notable exception. In June 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed the Department of State to appoint Wilbur John Carr as the new U.S. Minister in Prague. 7 As Assistant Secretary of State, Carr had been one of the most 5 In the electoral campa ign, the stron gest nationali st party in Slovakia - Hlinka 's Slovak People ' s Party - joined forces with the Slovak National Party. Both parties advocated autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic. They were backed by the parties of Ruthenian and Poli sh minorities, demandin g autonomy for thei r own regions. Collect ive ly the Autonomist Bloc secured 30.1 % of the Slovak vote. The coalition of Magyar parties in Slovakia gained 14.2%. Alena Bartl ova, " Posledne parlamen tn e vol'by v maj i 1935," in V Medzivojnovom Ceskoslovensku 1918- 1939, (Bratislava : Veda, 20 12), 439. 6 The Sudeten Party polled 15. 2% in the 1935 e lection . Natalia Kraj covifova, "Slovakia in Czechoslova kia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 I I), 154. 7 Wilbur John Carr is often refe rred to as the father of the American Foreign Service. He entered the Department of State as a young clerk in 1892 . He went on to serve in various capac ities, including Assistant Secretary of State between 1924 and 1937. Carr was th e driving force behind th e reform of th e U.S. Foreign Service in the interwar period. In his view, all American ambassadors and mini sters abroad should be professionals - i.e. career diplomats, not political appointees. In June 193 7, after fortyfive yea rs in Washington, Carr was called upon by the President to head the U.S. diplomatic mission in Prague. According to Cordell Hull , Carr was one of the most capable ass istant secretari es in th e history of the department. At the time of his appointment as U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, Carr was sixty-s ix years old . Peter �SLOVAKIA 2021 73 senior government officials ever to represent the United States in its foreign service. This reflected Washington's growing concerns about developments in Central Europe, at the heart of which lay the uneasy relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 8 In August of 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull decided to increase his diplomatic staff in Prague with the appointment of George Kennan.9 The choice was not coincidental. Kennan had been an experienced career diplomat and a specialist on Russian and East European affairs. His main task at the Prague legation was political reporting. Part of hi s duties consisted of making regular visits to Bratislava, where he gathered information about developments in Slovakia. Carr's diplomatic dispatches from Prague and Kennan 's reports on conditions in Slovakia shaped the views of American policymakers at the Department of State on the eve of WWII. 10 Their writings remained the only source of political intelligence from the region until the establishment of the OSS in 1942. 11 Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," American Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 20 19, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 1998/09/mr-carr-goes-to-prague/. 8 Bridges points out that Carr' s predecessor - Butler Wright - had underestimated German innuence on Czechoslovak affairs in 1930. This view was expressed by both Secretary of State Hull as well as Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Peter Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 9 Best known as an advocate of the U.S. policy of containment after WWII , George Frost Kennan spent 193 8 and 1939 as a diplomat at the American legation in Prague. He served as Secretary of the Legation until the breakout of war in September of 1939. He was nuent in Russian and German, and during his serv ice in Prague he learned to read Czech and Slovak as we ll. George Kennan, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938- 1940 (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1968), vi. 10 Wilbur J. Carr 's diplomatic correspondence from Prague is deposited in the Library of Congress, the Manuscript Division in Washington D.C. Some of Carr's reports are now part of the collections of the National Archives, entitled "Records of the U.S . Department of State Relating to the Interna l Affairs of Czechoslovakia I 9 10-1944". Some of Kennan ' s reports on the conditions in Slovak ia are in Decimal File 860f. Collecti ve ly, they were published in a book in 1968 . Kennan, From Prague A/ier Munich, 1968. 11 The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was establi shed by the military order issued by President Roosevelt on Jun e 13, 1942 . A predecessor of the modem CIA, the OSS mandate was to collect and ana lyse intelligence required by U.S. foreign-pol icy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barry M. Katz, "Office of Strategic Services," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed . I.C.B . Dear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650. �74 SLOVAKIA 2021 The road to totalitarianism in Slovak politics started in September of 1936. On the 19th of that month, the leaders of Hlinka 's Slovak Peop le's Party (Hlinkova slovenska /'udova strana, or HSL:S) met at a congress in Piest'any to discuss the polic ies and future direction of the party. 12 Leaders of the moderate wing, led by Monsignor Joseph Tiso, were tempted to join the ruling coalition in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Chances were not unreali stic, as the government was headed by Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's first Slovak Prime Minister, who was determined to solve the Slovak question once and for all. 13 In opposition to the moderates stood the young radicals, led by Karol Sidor. 14 For them, cooperation with Hodfa's cabinet was categorically rejected, unless the party's demands were met in full , without any reservations. 15 Whether moderate or radical , all members of the HSL:S were convinced that their party held the so le political mandate to represent Slovaks as a whole. Distrustful of the democratic government in Prague and increasingly authoritarian, the young nationalists had the ear of the old, but charismatic leader of the party - Andrej Hlinka. Hi s ambitions to lead Slovaks as a single nation found expression in one of hi s speeches at the congress, where Hlinka compared himself to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. As far as the future political 12 The Piest'any Congress has been described in detail by Robert Arpas. For a comprehensive accou nt of the party ' s policies in the interwa r period see Robert Arpas, Vitazsrvo alebo prehra: Vyvrcho lenie politickeho zapasu HSt.;S o alllonomiu S/ovenska. (Brati slava: Veda, 20 11 ). 13 Hodza was convi nced that settling Czechoslovak ia's nationality problem hin ged upon finding a solution to the Czech- Slovak question. Natalia Kraj covicova, "Slova kia in Czec hoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich , Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Ca mbridge University Press, 20 11 ). 155. 14 Apart from Sidor, the most prominent representatives of the youn g generation of Slovak nati onali sts were Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach . The views of these intellectuals and academics on society and government had been shaped by the risin g ri ght-wi ng nationalist ideologies of 1930s Europe. Ad mirers of nati onalist totalitaria ni sm, they questioned democracy, whi ch in thei r view was no longer capab le of offerin g solutions to the mountin g problems o f the time. The only remedy, according to them, was a unity of the nation coupl ed with un swerving loya lty to its omni scient leader. They were strongly anti -Se miti c . Robert Arpas, Vit"azstvo alebo prehra, 52 . 15 Sidor, alongs ide wi th Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach, pushed for complete autonomy, part of which was the demand to recogni ze the Slovaks as a separate nati on. Slova k was to become the o ffi c ial language in Slova kia, and the proposed Slovak Di et was to have broad legislative powers. �SLOVAKIA 2021 75 line of the party was concerned, the radicals he ld sway. Tiso's demand that the congress express loya lty to the embattled Czechoslovak Republic was swept away. Instead, the closing plenary adopted a resolution which condemned "representatives of international materialistic ideology" and "Jewi sh-Bol shev ik anarchy". 16 The following day, Tiso himself proclaimed the principle of"one nation , one leader, one party" to a public rally of party supporters in Piest'any. In 1938 Slovak Americans were once again about to play an active role in the politics of their mother country. For more than half a century, the Slovak diaspora in the United States had been an important voice in the country's plea for national self-determination. 17 One reason for that was the sheer scale of Slovak emigration to the New World. By 1914 as many as one fifth of Slovaks had come to reside in the United States. 18 The other reason was the completely different political and economic environment of their new home country. Unfettered by oppression from the state, politica lly minded and commerciall y successful Slovaks cultivated, in democratic America, a strong feeling of national identity outside Slovakia. 19 As leaders of fraternal societies they campaigned vigorously for Slovak self-dete1mination in the Old World. 20 The patriotic fervour of these Slovak Americans 16 Robert Arpas, " Piest'ansky zjazd ako medznik HSL'.S k totalite," Clovek a 5polocnost', no. 3, vo l 7 (2004): 166, http ://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocn ik-7rok-2004/3/studi e-a-c lanky/piestansky-zjazd-ako-medzn ik-na-ceste- hsls- k-tota lite/. 17 Sil via Mihalikova, " Slovakia Pathways to a Democrati c Community," in Democracv and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans- Dieter Klingeman n, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, Taylor & Franc is Group, 2006), 175. 18 Large-scale em igration of Slovaks to the United States bega n in the late 18 70s. On the eve of WWI , when the Slovak exodus to America peaked, the Slovak-America n comm unity was in per-capita term s the largest among the Centra l Europea n nations and second onl y to the community of Irish-Ameri ca ns among all immigrant peoples in the U.S. Mark Stolari k, "S lovaks in Canada and the United States, 1880- 1990, Similarities and Differences," in Chair in Slovak History and Culture Occasional Papers, no. I ( 1992): 14. 19 In Mark Stolarik 's words - "The principal centre of Slovak nationalism before and during World War I was not the Slovak homeland, but the United States of America." Mark Stolarik , "S lova ks in Ca nada and the United States," 14. 20 The primary reason why Slovaks in America estab li shed fratemals was mutual support. This often happened along confessional lines, reflecting the divi sions among religious denomin ati ons in Slovakia. Interest in mother-country politics was of secondary importance to Slovak Americans, and it was often the domain of a few politically mi nded fraterna l leaders and newspaper editors . �76 SLOVAKIA 2021 found expression first in the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and then in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. In these, Slovak and Czech expatriate communities in the United States pledged their support for the establishment of a common state on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. In the former, Slovak Americans sought the creation of a federative union with the Czechs. In the latter, they agreed that Slovakia would have home rule. 2 1 The reason why they settled for somewhat less at Pittsburgh was the opposition to the idea of federation from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the most important of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Thus, the Slovak-American nationalists, allied primarily in the Slovak League of America, supported the creation of their Czecho-Slovakia, in October 1918, albeit with caution .22 Despite some internal disagreements among the leaders of the League in the I 920s, demand for autonomy remained the League's top political priority in its dealings with the old country until October 1938. In late Apri l 1938, at the 20th convention of the Slovak League in Pittsburgh, a decision was made to send a delegation to Slovakia. The visit was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the delegation was to take the original copy of the agreement with them. 23 Peter Hletko, the President of the Slovak League, was appointed head of the American delegation and its official spokesman. Another notable member of the delegation was Jozef Husek, former editor-in-chief of the Slovak-American newspaper Jednota and one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The ori ginal idea for a visit by Slovak Americans came from the leadership of 21 The word home-rule itself was not used in the phrasing of th e agreement. Slovakia was to have " its own administration , its Diet and its courts". Slovak was to be " the officia l language in schools and in public life in general". Dav id Grinnell , "Land A Treasures: The Pittsburgh Agreement; Czecho-Slovak Agreement," Western Pennsylvania Hi story 90 (Winter 2007- 08): 8. 22 The Pittsburgh Agreement bore the signatures of members of two Slovak fraternal organ isations - the Slovak League of America and the Slovak Evange lical Society. In I 9 I 8, the Slovak League was an umbrella organisation, comprising the majority of fraternal-benefit societies in the United States, including both Catholics and Lutherans, though th e former predominated. 23 A year before, at th e meeting of the Hlinka Party in Ruzomberok in July, Andrej Hlinka had described th e Pittsburgh Agreement as the "Magna Carta of th e Slovak nation ." Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovak ia (June- August 1938) and their effort to implement the Pittsburgh Agreement into th e Czechoslovak Constitution ," Clo vek a spolocnos( 20, no. 3 (2017): 50. �SLOVAKIA 2021 77 the Hlinka Party, which was planning to hold a congress in Bratislava on June 4th. The intention of the party officials was to increase the pressure on the central government in Prague to implement the party 's demand for autonomy. The public showing of the Pittsburgh Agreement to a rally of loyal supporters the following day was part of the plan. 24 ln the atmosphere of heightened international tensions, ratcheted up by the Czechoslovak crisis earlier that month, the visit of the American delegation was closely followed by the pro-Czechoslovak press throughout the country. 25 A party of Slovak Americans about a hundred strong - arrived at the Polish port of Gdyni a on May 26th, 1938. 26 There, they were greeted by two separate delegations: one, headed by Karol Sidor, who was sent to Poland by the leaders of the Hlinka Party; the other was the diplomatic retinue of Juraj Slav ik, the Czechoslovak Minister to Poland.27 The Slovak Americans then proceeded to Warsaw, from where they were scheduled to travel to Prague. 28 At the instigation of Karol Sidor, however, four members of the League were persuaded to trave l to Rufomberok first , to pay a visit to the ai Iing leader of the party, Andrej Hlinka. 29 24 The party offic ials were thu s responding to various rumours, e.g. that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a fabricati on , or that Masaryk's signature on it was not genuine. Stefan Kucf k, "Americki Slovaci a autonom isti cke hnutie na Slovensku ( 19 181938)," Dvacate sto/eti, no. 2 (2013 ): I 06. 25 The May Cri sis was caused by fa lse reports of German troop movements on the 19th around Czechos lova ki a ' s western borders, raising fea rs th at the country was about to be attacked by Germany. A lthough the reports later proved unsubstantiated, the inc ident contributed to the subseque nt resolve by France and Britain to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to the Sudeten German Party. 26 Milan O lej nik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 51. 27 Although the two delegati ons had travelled to Gdynia by the sa me train, both part ies made the ir way to Gdynia separate ly, as Sidor' s party re fused to jo in the Czechoslovak delegation from Warsaw. Stefan Kucf k, " Americk i Slovac i a autonomi sticke hnutie," I 05 . 28 In Warsaw the Slovak Americans were g iven the red-carpet treatment by representat ives of the muni cipa l authoriti es. They never mention ed Czechoslovak ia in their speec hes. Stefan Kucfk , "Americki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnuti e," I 05. 29 Because of the di sagreements among the leaders of the League ' s delegation, on ly fo ur of them went to Ruzomberok . Andrej Ro lik, a Lutheran pastor fro m Johnstown, refused to trave l to Slovakia first. Stefan Kucik , "Americki Slovac i a autonomisticke hnutie," I 05 . �78 SLOVAKIA 2021 The U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia watched the developments from his legation in Prague.Jo On May 31st he informed the Secretary of State of the arrival of the League's representatives in the Czechoslovak capital and their intention to meet both the President and the Prime Minister.JI The day after their arrival in Prague, the leaders of the League paid a courtesy visit to the American Legation . Carr noted that the Slovak Americans stressed in one of their public announcements that their visit was "not to be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic".J 2 Having spoken to an official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, Carr came to the conclusion that Prague's government felt uneasy about the visit, wishing it had taken place at some other time.JJ This made the American diplomat feel that the red-carpet treatment accorded to the Slovak Americans in Prague somehow "lacked a ring of sinceri ty." The fee ling of skepticism in his mind was reinforced when he spoke privately to Hletko. According to Carr, the president of the League admitted that their visit to Prague was inopportune, regretting the fact that it had coincided with the minority dispute. In order to make his American readers appreciate the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the visit, Carr factored in the reactions of the press. He noted that the newspapers in Germany had been for some time speaking of the united front between the Hlinka Party and the Sudeten German Party aimed against the Czechs.J4 The pro-Czechoslovak press, for their part, had been accusing Slovak nationalists of collusion with the Germans.J 5 As to the specific results of the talks between the League's representatives 30 Since 1925, the United States' diplomatic mission in Prague had resided at the Schonbom Palace on Mala stran a. Peter Bridges, " Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 31 In mid-June Carr wrote to Washington again, giving a detailed account of the League's participation in th e Hlinka Party congress. 32 National Archives, Washington, 860f.00/5 I 0, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, May 31 , p. I . 33 This was told to Ca rr by an unspecified official from the Czechoslovak Mini stry of Fore ign Affairs on the 3 1st. The Czechoslovak government feared that the visit would be used by the minorities to advance their own political agendas. 860 f.00/589, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, p. 2. 34 NA, 860f.00/534, Di spatch No. 176, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, Jun e 6, p. 2. 35 According to the Police Directory in Bratislava, the Sudeten Party did send a congratulatory telegram to the HSL.:S on the occasion of its party congress on June the 4th. Milan Olej nik, "The visit of de legates of the American Slovak League to Slovaki a," 55. �SLOVAKIA 2021 79 and the Czechoslovak statesmen, Carr echoed Slovak, the press organ of the HSCS. 36 It reported that the discussions bore no concrete results, liut it was agreed that, after a month's study of the conditions in Slovakia, the League's representatives would return for more talks with the Prime Minister. 37 The public proclamations by the League ' s representati ves in support of Slovak autonomy prompted the U.S. Minister to examine the extent of popular support for the Slovak nationalists. In their plans 1938 was to be the crucial year, by the end of which the Slovak question in Czechoslovakia was to be settled once and for all. With the support of their American compatriots, the Slovak nationali sts claimed that the majority of Slovaks in 1938 - whether at home or abroad, were in favour of autonomy. To this purpose, Hletko repeatedly claimed that autonomy was supported by as many as 90% of Slovaks in the United States. 38 The proposed change in the status of Slovakia was also the main order of business at the Party Congress that convened on June 4th in Bratislava. With the League's delegates in attendance, the Party passed a resolution, setting out the details of the new Autonomy Bill. 39 Its text was published in full the following day in Slovak. Carr had it translated for his June 6th report and supplemented it with his commentary. The bid to amend the Czechoslovak Constitution was viewed critically by the U.S. Minister, hi s main reservation being the lack of political mandate to demand such a constitutional change. Drawing on the statistics from the last parliamentary election of 1936, he observed that the HSCS had only polled 30.1 % of the votes cast in Slovakia. 40 The right to speak for all Slovaks was further dimini shed, 36 Hletko and his party urged the Czechoslovak statesmen to recogni ze Slovaks as a sovereign nati on and to grant Slovak ia autonomy as it was sti pulated in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Both Hodza and Benes ex pressed their general agreement, but refused to talk about autonomy. What they wanted to promote, first and foremost, was Czechoslovak unity. Hletko later summarised the outcome of the talks in the phrase "Nothing positive was achi eved." Stefan Kucik, "Ameri cki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnutie na Slovensku," I 07 . 37 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 2. 38 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 7. 39 It demanded the creation of a separate Slovak Diet and governmen t, a long with the introduction of Slovak as the official language on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. 40 Of a ll the parliamentary votes cast in Czechos lovakia, Carr po ints out, this was 6.86%. NA , 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 4. �80 SLOVAKIA 2021 in Carr's view, by the fact that the party did not put up its own candidates, but campaigned as part of the Autonomist Bloc.41 Even the recent successes of the HSCS in the communal elections did not alter the fact that Slovak autonomists had never commanded the required 50% of the voting majority in Slovakia. Moreover, Carr argued, all of the HSCS 's former allies "now cooperate with the coalition parties." As far as the capability of the party to mobilise its supporters was concerned, the American estimate in June 1938 was slightly higher the one made by the Czechoslovak authorities. According to an American source, the turnout at the public rally on June 5th - the same day when the Autonomy Bill was published - was around 50,000.42 This was twice as much as the official figure given by the Bratislava police department. 43 To strike a balanced view, Carr devoted an equal amount of space in his reporting to those who opposed the Slovak autonomists. In 1938, this was a group of nationwide Czechoslovak parties - members of the ruling coalition which operated separate branches in Slovakia. The HSCS 's staunchest opponent was the Agrarian Party, led by Prime Minister Hodza. To solve the nationality problem his cabinet drafted, in the early summer of 1938, a constitutional amendment, referred to as the Nationality Statute. 44 Another Slovak in the government who opposed autonomists was Minister of Justice [van Derer, who was also head of the Slovak section of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers ' Party. 45 In 1938 both politicians rejected the idea of Slovaks as a sovereign nation, struggling to maintain Czechoslovak unity in 41 This consisted of the Rutheni an Soj uz Party, the Polish Socia list Party and the Slovak National Party. 42 This was based on th e estimate by Associated Press reporter 0. E. Werner. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. O lejnfk, referring to the police records, puts the number of participants at 25,000 at a maximum . 43 Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 55 . 44 The measure proposed to divide the republi c into four autonomous lands: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Eac h land was to be a legal entity in the eyes of public and private law. Land Diets with curias representing every nationality were envisaged, as was the creation of land governments. President Benes had actively participated in the preparation of the statute. The negotiations between the HSL.:S and President Benes about the Nationality Statute in September 1938 were unsuccessfu l. Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 19 I 8- 1938," 156. 45 Ivan Derer was the Minister of Justice of the Czechoslovak government from Jul y 193 7 until September 1938. �SLOVAKIA 2021 81 the face of mounting demands from the Sudeten Party. Carr reported on the activities of the pro-Czechoslovak movement, gauging its political clout and public support. On June I 0th he sent a di spatch in which he looked at the rally organized by the opponents of Slovak autonomy on June 6th . Agrarian Day, as it was officially called, followed close on the heels of the rally organised by th e Hlinka Party the previous day. According to Carr, the turnout at the Czechoslovak demonstration was I 00,000, about twice as large as the previous day 's demon stration.46 Hodza and Derer were among the main speakers, and the President of the Slovak League addressed the crowds in hi s turn. Judging by the American report, the tone of Hletko 's speec h was much less belligerent than hi s speech the day before. 47 Comparing the two rallies, Carr related in hi s report an interesting fact observed by an Associated Press journalist. It concerned the proclaimed loyalty to the common state - or rather the lack thereof, on th e part of Slovak autonomists. When the national anthem was sung at the Hlinka demonstration, there was practically no response from the crowd to the first, i.e. the Czech part of it. For the second - the Slovak part - however, the crowd joined in with " tremendous vigor". The emblems used at the rallies told the same story. The decorations used at Agrarian Day consisted entirely of Czechoslovak flags, while those used by Hlinka's supporters featured exc lusive ly the party's red double cross on a white background.48 The di smem berment of the last democratic state in Central Europe began on September 30th, 1938. At Munich, the European powers decided the fate of Czechoslovakia in her absence.49 The catastrophe 46 Carr 's estimate of th e tu rnout at the Hlinka' s ra ll y was 50,000. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. 47 According to 0. E. Wern er, " Hletk o declared that the Slovaks in the Un ited States wis h nothin g more than that the Slovaks defend th e Republic which they have he lped to establish and th at they remain true Slovaks in free, beautiful and prosperous Czechoslovak ia." NA, 860f. 00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 4. 48 The onl y exception was the use of the American fla g decorating the rostrum where, among oth er speakers, Hletko gave hi s speech. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 5. 49 The agreement was signed by the government leaders of Germany, France, th e United Kingdom and Ita ly. Czechoslova ki a's leaders were not invited, save two diplomats who we re summoned to receive what the great powers had negotiated. Michael R. D. Foot, " Munich agree ment," in The Oxford Companion to World War If, ed. I.C. B. Dea r (New York: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, I 995), 597. �82 SLOVAKIA 2021 could not have been averted by Czechoslovak leaders, but internal factors contributed to it.so What had played into Hitler's hands were the aspirations of the nationalist movements within the country. Democratic powers of the West had either looked on or followed a policy of active appeasement, so as to avoid a war with Germany.s 1 In an effort to satisfy Hitler's demands, Britain and France acquiesced to the annexation of the German-speaking territories of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, they sanctioned the principle whereby individuals exercised their rights in a state collectively, through belonging to a legally recognized national entity. Such recognition in law went hand-in-hand with the demand for a geographically defined national territory. This ran contrary to Czechoslovakia's liberal constitution, by which members of national minorities had their rights guaranteed as individual citizens. The Nationality Statute proposed by Hodza 's cabinet went a long way towards satisfying the demands of the nationalist movements. It attempted to solve the problem by giving Czechoslovak nationalities territorial and administrative autonomy, but it refused to recognise them as legal entities. In the run-up to Munich, Britain and France had stepped up the pressure on the Czechoslovak government not to implement the Nationality Statute. After the failure of negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak government, on September 22 nd the Slovak nationalists rejected the Nationality Statute.s2 In the wake of the Munich Agreement, in an atmosphere of heightened political uncertainty, leaders of the Hlinka Party summoned representatives of the other Slovak political parties to Zilina. The declaration of Slovak autonomy of October 6th was supported by all of them except the Communists and Social Democrats.s3 50 The genera l consensus among hi storians is that "the Czechs had to capitulate". Thomas Paterson, et al., eds. , Americanforeign relations. Vo lume 2. (Lexington MA : Heath and Company, 2014), 153. 51 On September 25th President Benes appealed to Roosevelt with a view to urging Britain and France to stand by Czechoslovaki a. Two days after that, Roosevelt wrote to Chancellor Hitler: "The government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Matilda Axton et al., eds., Foreign relations of the United States. 1938. Vo lume I, Washin gton : United States Government Printing Office, 1955. 52 Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," 156. 53 The result of the meeting was the Zilina Agreement, by which its signatories pledged their support for the passage of a constitutional act providing for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The next day Jozef Tiso was appointed head �SLOVAKIA 2021 83 By that time Poland had occupied a territory in the north of Czechoslovakia and Hungary had laid claims to Hungarian-speaking territories in the south of Slovakia. 54 After Munich the Czech Lands were perceived by the United States with considerable sympathy as a small democratic country in peril , resisting the pressures of a totalitarian aggressor. Looking back on the aftermath of Munich in December, Carr appreciated the grav ity of the situation in which the recently reconstructed Czechoslovak government found itself. He noted that after President Benes had resigned on October 5th, not only was the country left without its leader, but "the bottom dropped out of the entire political system through which it had been governed for twenty years." 55 The interim Prime Minister General Jan Syrovy faced the task of preserving "order and di scipline through a period of indescribable difficulty," having to " remake the constitution" so that "a wholly new civil regime may be set up to which power could be turned over. " 56 The appointment of Frantisek Chvalkovsky as Czechoslovak Foreign Mini ster drew particular praise from the American diplomat. With hi s friendly attitude towards the United States, the Czech Minister was considered a "strong advocate of democratic form of government" while, at the same time, "a reali st with regard to the necessity of a new orientation in the foreign affairs of hi s country." 57 Despite overt signs of the Czech political system of the Slovak autonomous govern ment. Valerian Bystricky, Od auton6mie k vzniku Slovenskeho statu (Bratislava: Prodama, 2008), 273. 54 Carpatho-U krai ne' s autonomy became a reality a lmost at the same time. On October 11th the Czechoslovak government in Prague appoi nted its first autonomous government. Frantisek Capka, "Leta prvni i druhe republiky a protektoratu," Dejiny zemi koruny ceske v datech, accessed Janua ry 16, 2020, http://www .libri.cz/databaze/dejiny/text/t84 .html. 55 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 2- 3. 56 NA, 860f.00/589, Ca rr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. 57 Carr's assessmen t of Chva lkovsky's political integrity and his attitudes towards Germany is particul arl y interesting in the light of his subseq uent acti ons and fu rther diplomatic career. Hi s last directive, as the Foreign Minister issued in the wake of the German occupat ion of Bohemia-Moravia in March of 1939, instructed the Czechoslovak ambassadors abroad to close their embassies and hand them over to the Nazis. Many patriotic Czechoslovak diplomats - some of them Slovak by birth - such as Stefa n Osusky, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris, or Juraj Slavik, head of the country's diplomatic mission in Po land, refused to do so. After the breakup of Czechoslova kia Chvalkovsk y became Envoy of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Ge m1any. He di ed during an allied ai r ra id on Berlin in 1945 . "Frantisek �84 SLOVAKIA 2021 leaning towards authoritarian rule, Carr had little doubt that the federal government would continue to be "a strictly democratic form of government," though admitting "it will undoubtedly incorporate such features of totalitarianism as are compatible with democracy. " Its main desire after Munich, thought the American diplomat, was to "dispel any idea that there is any 'Fascist' tinge to the state yet for obvious reason [they] do not wish to damn Fascist methods ." 58 The plight of Bohemia after Munich contrasted sharply with the American description of the situation in Slovakia. The political leaders of the autonomous region known as Slovenska krajina were seen by American diplomats as unpatriotic and irresponsible individuals who drove one nail after another into the coffin of Czechoslovak democracy. 59 Commenting on the immediate aftermath of Munich and the challenges faced by the Czechoslovak government, Carr expected Slovak leaders "out of common patriotism to set aside domestic political differences until these dangerous problems have been settled." Instead, he observed di sappointingly, "S lovaks - now represented exclusively by the Hlinka extremists - took advantage of the catastrophic difficulties of the Prague Government to demand complete autonomy."60 Questioning where the loyalty of Slovakia's leaders stood during the crisis, the American diplomat came to the conclusion that "S lovak sympathies have throughout this period appeared to lean more strongly toward the Germans, than toward the Czechs." From the American perspective, the unity of the Republic stood paramount, and in times of danger it should definitely prevail over local interest. Carr expressed this sentiment several times, in an unequivocal tone. " If the three principal component parts of the Czechoslovak Republic are linked together by any common bonds of loyalty and patriotism," he argued emphatically, " there has been nothing in the actions of the Chvalkovsky," Historie a osobnosti diplomacie. Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, accessed December 20, 20 19, https://www. mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/histori e_a_osobnosti_ ceske_ diplomacie/ministri_a_ ministerstvo_ v_ histori i/frantisek _ chva lkovsky .html . 58 NA, 860f.00/57 I, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, October 26, 1938, p. 3. 59 Slo venska krajina - in English ' the Slovak Land', was the official name used to refer to Slovakia during the First and Second Czechoslovak Republi cs, between 191 8 and 1939. 60 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 2021 85 Slovak leaders during the last few weeks to indicate it." The image of two different worlds - that of the brave Czechs struggling to save the Republic and the unpatriotic Slovaks sympathising with Nazi aggressors - created by the American Legation in Prague after Munich, persisted for a long time on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1942, when the OSS took over from the American foreign service as the primary intelligence gatherer, a report on Slovakia claimed that the pro-Nazi orientation of the Tiso-Tuka leadership had long been apparent before Munich. 61 After it, the report went on, "these leaders came out open ly against the republic, against democracy generally, and for a new world order in Europe. " 62 The pace and complexity of the developments in Czechoslovakia in the closing months of 1938 were overwhelming, and the American Legation in Prague struggled to keep the Department of State fully informed. Reports in this period were mostly factua l, and the U.S. Minister in Prague complained that they had little time to put the rapidly unfolding events into general perspective. Only in the latter part of December did his superiors in Washington receive a comprehensive report on the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. In the first weeks after Munich there was an "unavoidable preoccupation with the foreign" taking precedence over everything e lse. The whole country was in a state of utter turmoil. The report went on to recapitulate the challenges the country had to grapple with in an extremely short space of time. Satisfying the Polish territorial demands in the north was followed by the negotiations with Germany about Czechoslovakia's new borders in the west. The negotiations with Hungary about the cession 61 This was a com prehensive, I 06-page report on the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpath ian Rutheni ans. NA, Washington, Office of Strategic Servi ces, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 25. 62 Strictly speaki ng, thi s was not true. Throughout th e whole of 1938 the Party was led by Jozef Tiso. Tuka on ly came to prominence in 1940, when he became Foreign Minister of th e wartime Slovak Republic, following the Salzburg negotiations with Gem1any. As the principal representative of the moderate wing, Tiso became leader of the Party after Hlinka 's death in August of 1938. He spearheaded Slovak autonomy in October of 1938, but was opposed to the break up of Czechosl ovak ia in March of 1939. The probable reason why the OSS did not have more precise information about the period was the fact that the main source of its information on the situation in Slovakia during WWII was the Czechoslovak Information Service. This a was a special propaganda bureau set up in th e Un ited States by the Czechoslovak govemment-inex ile, controlled by ex- President Benes from London. �86 SLOVAKIA 2021 of Hungari an-speaking territories in Slovakia 's so uth came to nought, and the matter had to be resolved through international arbitration in early November. It was only then that the crippled Republic could turn its attention to its domesti c problems. What followed, according to the author of the report, was a " period of profound change and adjustment in the internal political life of Czechoslovakia." The most pressing of the problems, needing immediate attention in November, were the election of a new President and the passage of an enabling act. Progress in this direction, Carr noted, was " blocked by the Slovaks." They demanded that no presidential election could take place before the Constitution was amended to enact the proposed Autonomy Bill. The U.S. Mini ster in Prague believed that the conditions in the country were " hardly such as to make it a favourable time for the enactment of constitutional leg islation ." The Prague government, however, " had no other choice but to comply with it. " The Autonomy Act and the presidential elections of 1938 were both scrutini sed in the Legation 's report from December 2 1st. The Czechoslovak National Assembly passed the constitutional amendment on November 22nd and elected Czechoslovakia's new president on the 30th. 63 The constitutional arrangement provided, among other things, for an autonomous Slovak government and a Diet of the Slovak Land based in Bratislava. The new relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in the altered spelling of the country's name, which was changed to Czecho-Slovakia. Th e asymmetrical model of the state drew criticism from the U.S. Minister in Prague.64 According to him, " the privileges henceforth to be enjoyed by the Slovaks in the national parliament" were far too extensive and thus "entirel y disproportionate to the population and actual importance of Slovakia" as well as " its ability, thus far, unproven , to govern itself 63 Drafted by Ferdinand Durcansky, it was based on th e Autonomy Bill published by Hlinka 's Party on June 6th . 64 The Nati ona l Assembly in Prague retained legislative power fo r the whole of Czechoslovaki a wit h regard to matters of the constituti on, fo reign policy, nat ional defence, citizenship, currency, customs and some oth er areas. Since the Czech Lands did not have their ow n parliament, Czecho-Slovakia became in effect an asymmetrical federa l state. Valerian Bystricky, "Slovakia from the Munich Confere nce to the declaration of independence," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 20 11 ), I 60. �SLOVAKIA 2021 87 alone." 65 Slovaks were also criticised in another report for their approach to the election of the President. Originally, the parliament was to vote on an Enabling Act first, but "this was again blocked by the opposition of the Slovaks." who refused to do so " until they might know who the next president was to be."66 Alluding to the American tradition of presidential elections, Carr commented on the undemocratic nature of the procedure: "It is characteristic of political thought in this part of the world," he wrote sarcastically, "that it seems to have occurred to no one that it would have been possible to have a presidential election without all doubts as to its results having been removed well in advance." As for the candidate himself, Carr favoured Frantisek Chvalkovsky, preferred by most of the Czech deputies. In the end, however, the parliament elected Emil Hacha, former President of the Supreme Court. The American diplomat believed that Chvalkovsky's main disadvantages in the eyes of the Slovaks were his Protestantism, along with the fact that he was divorced.67 The Autonomy Act of November 22nd also provided for elections to the Slovak Diet in the following month . They were held on December 18th, 1938 and, historically, they were the first elections ever to take place in Slovakia for that country's self-governing legislative body. Judging by the Americans, however, it was a missed opportunity. The Legation's report from December 21st commented on a lack of democratic procedure as well the dubiousness of their results. As far as the former was concerned, the U.S. Minister in Prague saw "a pronounced Nazi influence."68 This was a reference to the fact that Slovak voters were presented with only one list of candidates. The sole political entity on the 1938 ballot - Hlinka 's Slovak People's Party, with a subtitle to its name - the Party of Slovak National Unity - was an amalgamation of the Agrarian, National Unity, National Socialist 65 Carr points out the Czechs had no say whatsoever in the Slovak Parliament. As a further example of the favoured position that Slovakia occupied in the matters of the Republi c was the provision according to which a motion of no confidence might be moved by one-thi rd of the Slovak deputies, i.e. 12 as compared with a total of 226 members of the chamber. NA, 860f.00/588, Dispatch No. 302, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 2- 3. 66 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7. 67 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7- 9. 68 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 4. �88 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Fascist Parties. 69 Carr had little doubt that the 98% of the votes cast in its favour was due to the fact that the voters were given no alternative. This bore "striking resemblance to the results achieved in recent German plebiscites." Here, the author of the report reminded the State Department that the bloc of Slovak Autonomists had polled as low as 30.1 % of the Slovak vote in the previous parliamentary elections of 1935. "Fear of recrimination", speculated Carr, may have had "a decided influence on the votes cast by many individuals." Gauging the reactions to the Slovak elections in Prague, Carr noticed a parliamentary objection raised by the former Minister of Social Welfare, then a deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The criticism was unlikely to be heeded in Bratislava, concluded Carr disparagingly "when the Slovaks are taking what resembles a child-like delight in playing with a new toy." 70 Part of the image of Slovakia created by the American Foreign Service in 1938 concerned Slovak attitudes towards the Jews. At that time U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia concentrated mainly on understanding the roots Slovak antisemitism, analysing its popular as we ll as political manifestations. Somewhat subjective - or even biased were the American comparisons of the anti-Jewish sentiments among the Czechs and the Slovaks. For a Czech, it was thought, nationality was a matter of language, rather than race. In other words, animosity was only likely to be felt towards the Jews who spoke German. Apart from a small minority, however, the mass of the Czech people had "very little interest in anti-Semitism." 7 1 In Slovakia, the popular resentment of the Jews was said to be widespread and "deep-seated." 72 The main reason for this was believed to be economic. According to George Kennan, then Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, the Jews of Bohemia li ved mainly in urban areas, whereas those 69 The Communist Party was banned by the autonomous govern ment on October 9th, the Social Democrats on November 16th. The destruction of the other political parties in Slovakia came about on November 8th, when they were all forced to merge with the HSL.:S . Representatives of the ama lgamated political entities did not receive any positions in the autonomous government, being left with a few seats in th e Slovak Diet. Valerian Bystricky, "S lovaki a from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence," 161. 70 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 21 , 1938, p. 4- 5. 71 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 45. 72 George Kennan , From Prague After Munich, 22 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 89 residing in Slovakia were more evenly spread throughout the country. 73 Slovak Jews plied their trades in smaller towns and the countryside as merchants, saloon keepers, druggists, or lawyers. In these professions, Kennan argued, the Jews "played a dominant part," largely because of their "superior intelligence." The Slovaks felt differently about this, being convinced that the Jews owed their success to their "trickiness, unscrupulousness, incurable clannishness and nepotism." This was not the case in in Bohemia, according to Kennan , because the " industry and shrewdness of the Czechs as petty traders and artisans" had been such that the Czech countryside " had never presented a Jew with such attractive possi bilities as the villages in Slovakia. 74 Finally, Kennan identified the lack of social assimilation as another factor why the cultural distinctiveness of the Slovak Jewry was more pronounced than it was in Bohemia. 75 From the American perspective, anti-Semitism in Slovak politics had both historic and religious origins. According to Kennan , many of the educated Jews " have traditionally looked to Budapest for cultural inspiration." In addition, there was a smaller, but influential community of Jews "with a German cultural orientation." In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both nationalities were associated with the ruling classes, whereas the Slovak-speaking population had been one of the oppressed nations. Thus, in the Slovak mind, the Jews had always sided with the oppressors. In other words, when the country was under Hungarian rule, "the Slovak Jews made common cause with the Hungarians in exploiting the Slovaks;" when the country found itself in Czechoslovakia, "the Jews joined with the more liberal Czechs in opposi ng Slovak autonomy." 76 To illustrate his theory, Kennan referred his American readership to the pogrom-like operation ordered by Tiso in early November. At that time, Slovak authorities attempted to deport 7,600 Slovak Jews to Hungary, following the announcement of 73 As Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, Kennan made severa l trips to Slovakia in late 1938. In January 1939 he wrote a special report on the conditions in Slovakia. This was followed by a comprehensive despatch in February on the Jewish problem in Czechoslovakia. 74 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 44. 75 Kennan mentions a greater degree of racial intermarriage in Bohemia, especia ll y in upper-class Czech society. 76 George Kennan, From Prague Ajier Munich, 23. �90 SLOVAKIA 2021 the First Vienna Award. 77 In order to establish how Slovakia's Jews were going to be treated in the future , Kennan approached Jozef Tiso. In a personal conversation with the American diplomat, Tiso said that "the Slovak government intended to take measures toward the solution of the Jewish question independently of Prague." The Slovak Prime Minister also expressed his conviction that the planned measures "would probably go farther in scope than any that might be taken by the Prague regime." 78 As far as the religious component of Slovak anti-Semitism was concerned, Kennan pointed out that an important factor in the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Jews was the position of the Catholi c Church . Tiso was himself a Catholic priest, and the Church had made its position on the matter clear through various officials. One of those, according to Kennan, was Father Rudolf Mikus, Provincial of the Jesuit Order in Slovakia. 79 Speaking for the newspaper Slovak, Mikus advocated elimination of the Jewish influence in political and economic life. This would include, among other things, public segregation. 80 The statements made by the Church convinced Kennan that the Slovak government wou ld face little opposition in the promulgation of its anti-Semitic policies in the future .8 1 As the momentous events of 1938 unfolded in Central Europe, diplomats of the American Foreign Service at the Legation in Prague watched the situation in Czechoslovakia, and took a close interest in political developments in Slovakia. Throughout 1938 the country was perceived by American diplomats as a politically vo latile province, 77 This was a pogrom-like operation ordered by HSI..:S to deport around 7,500 Jews to the territory ceded by Slovakia to Hungary. Kenn an argues that the forced ex pul sion took place as a retaliatory measure for an alleged petition by the leaders of the Bratislava Jews to incorporate the city of Bratislava into the ceded territory. The operation was accompanied by anti-Sem itic ri ots in Brati slava. James Mace Ward, "The 1938 First Vienna Award and the Holocaust in Slovakia," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29, no. I (2015): 92 . doi: I 0.1093/hgs/dcv004. ISSN 8756-65 83. 78 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51. 79 A full translation of the statement by Mikus was attached at the end of Kenn an' s report. 80 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51 - 52. 81 The institutional persecution of th e Jews in Slovakia began the following year, after Slovak ia gained its nominal independence. On April the 18th , the Slovak Parliament passed its first anti -Semitic law. This was Ordinance 63 which established a lega l definition of a Jew based on a religious principle. Ladislav Lipscher, "The Jews of Slovakia : 1939- 1945," in The Jews ofCzechoslovakia Volume Ill, ed . Avigdor Dagan et al. (Phi ladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 165. �SLOVAKIA 2021 91 one whose nationalist leaders took advantage of the central government's difficulties after Munich, driving the last democracy in the region into destruction. Slovakia's slide towards totalitarianism in 1938 was perceived by Americans as a consequence of that country's extreme nationalism and its disrespect for the values of the democratic republic established in 1918 . In contrast, tran sition to totalitarian rule in the Czech Lands was viewed by the Americans as a process of necessary accommodation, a sensible political reaction to the external pressures exerted by Nazi Germany. Although American observers did not deny the Slovak right to national self-determination in principle, they considered Slovak demands for autonomy in 1938 as inopportune and highly unpatriotic. They saw the rise of the autonomist movement as a function of Nazi foreign policy, whose sole intention was to use Slovak nationalism in its quest to dismember the Czechoslovak state. Against the backdrop of ri sing international tensions, the visit of the Slovak League of America in the summer appeared to American observers more as an embarrassment than an attempt to save the Republic. Watching the Hlinka Party's push for autonomy, the U.S. Minister in Prague kept reminding the Department of State that the Party lacked a democratic mandate to represent the Slovaks as a whole. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Americans openly scolded the behaviour of the Slovak nationalists, reproaching them for a lack of loyalty to the common state. The Slovak declaration of autonomy in October was not seen as a measure to consolidate the embattled state, but as another step to weaken it. American reports between November and December provide an account of the gradual dismantling of the multi-party political system by the government in Bratislava. In contrast to Bohemia, Americans saw anti-Semitism among the Slovak population as deep-seated, with specific - mainly economic - underpinnings. The anti-Semitic policies of the Slovak government, condoned by some representatives of the Catholic Church, were to become more severe and extensive in the foreseeable future . � 70 SLOVAKIA 2021 ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM: SLOVAKIA IN THE TURMOIL OF 1938 AS SEEN BY THE UNITED ST ATES FOREIGN SERVICE Roman Licko In the autumn of 2018 I set myself the task of assessing the significance of the year 1938 in Slovak hi story. This was in response to a conference call which invited scholars to address, among other themes, milestones in Czech and Slovak history in which the year happens to have a number eight in it. 1 When I set about preparing my presentation, I had two thoughts about the subj ect. First, I was struck by several historic parallels between 2018 and 1938. No attempt will be made in thi s paper to argue that 2018 was as fateful for Slovakia as the year 1938 was for the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. Yet, given the rise of far-right political extremism in Central Europe, tacitly encouraged by a large authoritarian neighbour to the east, it may be instructive to re-examine the rise of Slovak nationalism in the late 1930s. 2 Then, extreme Slovak nationalists had also been spurred on by an aggressive totalitari an neighbour. 3 The second idea that occurred to me was that 1938 has been somewhat neglected when it came to 1 The paper entitled "From Fledging Democracy to Nationalist Authoritarianism: Slovakia in the Tunnoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service" was presented at the 50th Convention of the Associati on for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies in December of 20 18 in Boston. 2 The large authoritarian neighbour is Russia. Its support for the far-right nationa lists in Centra l European cou ntri es is explained and well documented in Timothy Snyder's book The Road to Unfi·eedom. By supporti ng ex treme nationalist movements in coun tries such as Slovaki a, Russia hopes to weaken their resolve to stay w ithin the European Union. Putin's alternative to th e EU is the Eurasian Union, a trade and political bloc stretching from Chin a to the border of the EU. Timothy Snyder, Th e Road tu Unf,-eedom: Russia. Europe. America. (New York : Crown/ Archetype, 20 18), I 00. The reference to the extreme nationalists in today 's Slovakia is directed towards l 'udovri strana na.iie S/ovensko-The People's Party Our Slovakia. Just two months before Slovakia ' s parliamentary elections in February of 2020, the far-rig ht nationali st party came second in a popul ari ty poll cond ucted by the Focus polling Agency in December of 2019. Historically speaking, leaders of the party, including its leaderMarian Kotleba, subscribe to the ideology of the war-time Slovak Republic. 3 Then it was Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2021 71 turning points in Slovak history.4 By this, I don ' t mean the fact that Slovaks gained their autonomy in that year. What changed quite dramatically in 1938 was the way in which the country was governed. After a relatively brief experience with a democratic form of government in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak leaders set about dismantling the democratic institutions upon which the foundations of their state were built. By the end of the year Slovakia was well on the road to becoming a nationalist totalitarian state. This paper examines political developments in Slovakia in that year from the point of view of an independent observer- the United States Foreign Service. At that time, American diplomats in Czechoslovakia gathered and evaluated intelligence which in tum informed the United States' foreign policy towards Central Europe. Their reports and analyses, despite their limitations, help us understand what went wrong with the process of Slovak national emancipation in 1938. They may also serve as an insight into how easily a Central European democracy may tum into a totalitarian state if extreme nationalism becomes the dominant ideology of its political leaders. 1938 was a critical year in European history. Powerful forces of European nationalism were the driving engine of politics in both totalitarian Germany as well as democratic Czechoslovakia. Because of its large and restive German minority, Czechoslovakia had become vulnerable to the aggressive foreign policy of its large totalitarian neighbour to the west. Adolph Hitler's ambition in Central Europe was to annex ethnic Germans living in foreign territories into his Third Reich . In March of 1938 Germany had annexed Austria. In September, the Gen11an Chancellor achieved the pinnacle of his pre-war diplomatic offensive. As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia had to cede the German-speaking areas of Sudetenland to Germany. The rejection of the Versailles system and the intention by the Nazi s to destroy its eastern democratic neighbour brought the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia to a head in 1938. The issue had been simmering in Czechoslovak politics since the last parliamentary elections in 1935, whose results changed the political map of the republic. In Slovakia, an alliance of nationalist parties, known as the Autono4 1948 and 1968, of course, were more fateful. The former because the coup d 'etat in February brought about a complete regime change, the latter beca use the crushing of the Prague Spring in August was the res ult of a fo rei gn in vasion. �72 SLOVAKIA 2021 mist Bloc, emerged as the most powerful political force in the country.5 The Sudeten German Party became one of the strongest political parties in Czechoslovakia. 6 By the end of 1938, the problem of the constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks had been temporarily resolved. The Declaration of Slovak autonomy on October the 6th marked the beginning of the short-lived period known as the Second Czechoslovak Republic. It ended with the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. In 1938 the American government did not have a centralised agency that wou ld gather, coordinate and evaluate political intelligence from foreign countries. Instead, its main source of information about developments abroad came from the U.S. diplomatic missions based in countries' capital cities. Thus, the quality of political intelligence from Europe dispatched to Washington depended on the political acumen of individual diplomats, not all of whom were professionally trained. In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a notable exception. In June 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed the Department of State to appoint Wilbur John Carr as the new U.S. Minister in Prague. 7 As Assistant Secretary of State, Carr had been one of the most 5 In the electoral campa ign, the stron gest nationali st party in Slovakia - Hlinka 's Slovak People ' s Party - joined forces with the Slovak National Party. Both parties advocated autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic. They were backed by the parties of Ruthenian and Poli sh minorities, demandin g autonomy for thei r own regions. Collect ive ly the Autonomist Bloc secured 30.1 % of the Slovak vote. The coalition of Magyar parties in Slovakia gained 14.2%. Alena Bartl ova, " Posledne parlamen tn e vol'by v maj i 1935," in V Medzivojnovom Ceskoslovensku 1918- 1939, (Bratislava : Veda, 20 12), 439. 6 The Sudeten Party polled 15. 2% in the 1935 e lection . Natalia Kraj covifova, "Slovakia in Czechoslova kia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 I I), 154. 7 Wilbur John Carr is often refe rred to as the father of the American Foreign Service. He entered the Department of State as a young clerk in 1892 . He went on to serve in various capac ities, including Assistant Secretary of State between 1924 and 1937. Carr was th e driving force behind th e reform of th e U.S. Foreign Service in the interwar period. In his view, all American ambassadors and mini sters abroad should be professionals - i.e. career diplomats, not political appointees. In June 193 7, after fortyfive yea rs in Washington, Carr was called upon by the President to head the U.S. diplomatic mission in Prague. According to Cordell Hull , Carr was one of the most capable ass istant secretari es in th e history of the department. At the time of his appointment as U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, Carr was sixty-s ix years old . Peter �SLOVAKIA 2021 73 senior government officials ever to represent the United States in its foreign service. This reflected Washington's growing concerns about developments in Central Europe, at the heart of which lay the uneasy relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 8 In August of 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull decided to increase his diplomatic staff in Prague with the appointment of George Kennan.9 The choice was not coincidental. Kennan had been an experienced career diplomat and a specialist on Russian and East European affairs. His main task at the Prague legation was political reporting. Part of hi s duties consisted of making regular visits to Bratislava, where he gathered information about developments in Slovakia. Carr's diplomatic dispatches from Prague and Kennan 's reports on conditions in Slovakia shaped the views of American policymakers at the Department of State on the eve of WWII. 10 Their writings remained the only source of political intelligence from the region until the establishment of the OSS in 1942. 11 Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," American Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 20 19, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 1998/09/mr-carr-goes-to-prague/. 8 Bridges points out that Carr' s predecessor - Butler Wright - had underestimated German innuence on Czechoslovak affairs in 1930. This view was expressed by both Secretary of State Hull as well as Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Peter Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 9 Best known as an advocate of the U.S. policy of containment after WWII , George Frost Kennan spent 193 8 and 1939 as a diplomat at the American legation in Prague. He served as Secretary of the Legation until the breakout of war in September of 1939. He was nuent in Russian and German, and during his serv ice in Prague he learned to read Czech and Slovak as we ll. George Kennan, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938- 1940 (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1968), vi. 10 Wilbur J. Carr 's diplomatic correspondence from Prague is deposited in the Library of Congress, the Manuscript Division in Washington D.C. Some of Carr's reports are now part of the collections of the National Archives, entitled "Records of the U.S . Department of State Relating to the Interna l Affairs of Czechoslovakia I 9 10-1944". Some of Kennan ' s reports on the conditions in Slovak ia are in Decimal File 860f. Collecti ve ly, they were published in a book in 1968 . Kennan, From Prague A/ier Munich, 1968. 11 The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was establi shed by the military order issued by President Roosevelt on Jun e 13, 1942 . A predecessor of the modem CIA, the OSS mandate was to collect and ana lyse intelligence required by U.S. foreign-pol icy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barry M. Katz, "Office of Strategic Services," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed . I.C.B . Dear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650. �74 SLOVAKIA 2021 The road to totalitarianism in Slovak politics started in September of 1936. On the 19th of that month, the leaders of Hlinka 's Slovak Peop le's Party (Hlinkova slovenska /'udova strana, or HSL:S) met at a congress in Piest'any to discuss the polic ies and future direction of the party. 12 Leaders of the moderate wing, led by Monsignor Joseph Tiso, were tempted to join the ruling coalition in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Chances were not unreali stic, as the government was headed by Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's first Slovak Prime Minister, who was determined to solve the Slovak question once and for all. 13 In opposition to the moderates stood the young radicals, led by Karol Sidor. 14 For them, cooperation with Hodfa's cabinet was categorically rejected, unless the party's demands were met in full , without any reservations. 15 Whether moderate or radical , all members of the HSL:S were convinced that their party held the so le political mandate to represent Slovaks as a whole. Distrustful of the democratic government in Prague and increasingly authoritarian, the young nationalists had the ear of the old, but charismatic leader of the party - Andrej Hlinka. Hi s ambitions to lead Slovaks as a single nation found expression in one of hi s speeches at the congress, where Hlinka compared himself to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. As far as the future political 12 The Piest'any Congress has been described in detail by Robert Arpas. For a comprehensive accou nt of the party ' s policies in the interwa r period see Robert Arpas, Vitazsrvo alebo prehra: Vyvrcho lenie politickeho zapasu HSt.;S o alllonomiu S/ovenska. (Brati slava: Veda, 20 11 ). 13 Hodza was convi nced that settling Czechoslovak ia's nationality problem hin ged upon finding a solution to the Czech- Slovak question. Natalia Kraj covicova, "Slova kia in Czec hoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich , Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Ca mbridge University Press, 20 11 ). 155. 14 Apart from Sidor, the most prominent representatives of the youn g generation of Slovak nati onali sts were Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach . The views of these intellectuals and academics on society and government had been shaped by the risin g ri ght-wi ng nationalist ideologies of 1930s Europe. Ad mirers of nati onalist totalitaria ni sm, they questioned democracy, whi ch in thei r view was no longer capab le of offerin g solutions to the mountin g problems o f the time. The only remedy, according to them, was a unity of the nation coupl ed with un swerving loya lty to its omni scient leader. They were strongly anti -Se miti c . Robert Arpas, Vit"azstvo alebo prehra, 52 . 15 Sidor, alongs ide wi th Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach, pushed for complete autonomy, part of which was the demand to recogni ze the Slovaks as a separate nati on. Slova k was to become the o ffi c ial language in Slova kia, and the proposed Slovak Di et was to have broad legislative powers. �SLOVAKIA 2021 75 line of the party was concerned, the radicals he ld sway. Tiso's demand that the congress express loya lty to the embattled Czechoslovak Republic was swept away. Instead, the closing plenary adopted a resolution which condemned "representatives of international materialistic ideology" and "Jewi sh-Bol shev ik anarchy". 16 The following day, Tiso himself proclaimed the principle of"one nation , one leader, one party" to a public rally of party supporters in Piest'any. In 1938 Slovak Americans were once again about to play an active role in the politics of their mother country. For more than half a century, the Slovak diaspora in the United States had been an important voice in the country's plea for national self-determination. 17 One reason for that was the sheer scale of Slovak emigration to the New World. By 1914 as many as one fifth of Slovaks had come to reside in the United States. 18 The other reason was the completely different political and economic environment of their new home country. Unfettered by oppression from the state, politica lly minded and commerciall y successful Slovaks cultivated, in democratic America, a strong feeling of national identity outside Slovakia. 19 As leaders of fraternal societies they campaigned vigorously for Slovak self-dete1mination in the Old World. 20 The patriotic fervour of these Slovak Americans 16 Robert Arpas, " Piest'ansky zjazd ako medznik HSL'.S k totalite," Clovek a 5polocnost', no. 3, vo l 7 (2004): 166, http ://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocn ik-7rok-2004/3/studi e-a-c lanky/piestansky-zjazd-ako-medzn ik-na-ceste- hsls- k-tota lite/. 17 Sil via Mihalikova, " Slovakia Pathways to a Democrati c Community," in Democracv and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans- Dieter Klingeman n, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, Taylor & Franc is Group, 2006), 175. 18 Large-scale em igration of Slovaks to the United States bega n in the late 18 70s. On the eve of WWI , when the Slovak exodus to America peaked, the Slovak-America n comm unity was in per-capita term s the largest among the Centra l Europea n nations and second onl y to the community of Irish-Ameri ca ns among all immigrant peoples in the U.S. Mark Stolari k, "S lovaks in Canada and the United States, 1880- 1990, Similarities and Differences," in Chair in Slovak History and Culture Occasional Papers, no. I ( 1992): 14. 19 In Mark Stolarik 's words - "The principal centre of Slovak nationalism before and during World War I was not the Slovak homeland, but the United States of America." Mark Stolarik , "S lova ks in Ca nada and the United States," 14. 20 The primary reason why Slovaks in America estab li shed fratemals was mutual support. This often happened along confessional lines, reflecting the divi sions among religious denomin ati ons in Slovakia. Interest in mother-country politics was of secondary importance to Slovak Americans, and it was often the domain of a few politically mi nded fraterna l leaders and newspaper editors . �76 SLOVAKIA 2021 found expression first in the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and then in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. In these, Slovak and Czech expatriate communities in the United States pledged their support for the establishment of a common state on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. In the former, Slovak Americans sought the creation of a federative union with the Czechs. In the latter, they agreed that Slovakia would have home rule. 2 1 The reason why they settled for somewhat less at Pittsburgh was the opposition to the idea of federation from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the most important of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Thus, the Slovak-American nationalists, allied primarily in the Slovak League of America, supported the creation of their Czecho-Slovakia, in October 1918, albeit with caution .22 Despite some internal disagreements among the leaders of the League in the I 920s, demand for autonomy remained the League's top political priority in its dealings with the old country until October 1938. In late Apri l 1938, at the 20th convention of the Slovak League in Pittsburgh, a decision was made to send a delegation to Slovakia. The visit was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the delegation was to take the original copy of the agreement with them. 23 Peter Hletko, the President of the Slovak League, was appointed head of the American delegation and its official spokesman. Another notable member of the delegation was Jozef Husek, former editor-in-chief of the Slovak-American newspaper Jednota and one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The ori ginal idea for a visit by Slovak Americans came from the leadership of 21 The word home-rule itself was not used in the phrasing of th e agreement. Slovakia was to have " its own administration , its Diet and its courts". Slovak was to be " the officia l language in schools and in public life in general". Dav id Grinnell , "Land A Treasures: The Pittsburgh Agreement; Czecho-Slovak Agreement," Western Pennsylvania Hi story 90 (Winter 2007- 08): 8. 22 The Pittsburgh Agreement bore the signatures of members of two Slovak fraternal organ isations - the Slovak League of America and the Slovak Evange lical Society. In I 9 I 8, the Slovak League was an umbrella organisation, comprising the majority of fraternal-benefit societies in the United States, including both Catholics and Lutherans, though th e former predominated. 23 A year before, at th e meeting of the Hlinka Party in Ruzomberok in July, Andrej Hlinka had described th e Pittsburgh Agreement as the "Magna Carta of th e Slovak nation ." Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovak ia (June- August 1938) and their effort to implement the Pittsburgh Agreement into th e Czechoslovak Constitution ," Clo vek a spolocnos( 20, no. 3 (2017): 50. �SLOVAKIA 2021 77 the Hlinka Party, which was planning to hold a congress in Bratislava on June 4th. The intention of the party officials was to increase the pressure on the central government in Prague to implement the party 's demand for autonomy. The public showing of the Pittsburgh Agreement to a rally of loyal supporters the following day was part of the plan. 24 ln the atmosphere of heightened international tensions, ratcheted up by the Czechoslovak crisis earlier that month, the visit of the American delegation was closely followed by the pro-Czechoslovak press throughout the country. 25 A party of Slovak Americans about a hundred strong - arrived at the Polish port of Gdyni a on May 26th, 1938. 26 There, they were greeted by two separate delegations: one, headed by Karol Sidor, who was sent to Poland by the leaders of the Hlinka Party; the other was the diplomatic retinue of Juraj Slav ik, the Czechoslovak Minister to Poland.27 The Slovak Americans then proceeded to Warsaw, from where they were scheduled to travel to Prague. 28 At the instigation of Karol Sidor, however, four members of the League were persuaded to trave l to Rufomberok first , to pay a visit to the ai Iing leader of the party, Andrej Hlinka. 29 24 The party offic ials were thu s responding to various rumours, e.g. that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a fabricati on , or that Masaryk's signature on it was not genuine. Stefan Kucf k, "Americki Slovaci a autonom isti cke hnutie na Slovensku ( 19 181938)," Dvacate sto/eti, no. 2 (2013 ): I 06. 25 The May Cri sis was caused by fa lse reports of German troop movements on the 19th around Czechos lova ki a ' s western borders, raising fea rs th at the country was about to be attacked by Germany. A lthough the reports later proved unsubstantiated, the inc ident contributed to the subseque nt resolve by France and Britain to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to the Sudeten German Party. 26 Milan O lej nik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 51. 27 Although the two delegati ons had travelled to Gdynia by the sa me train, both part ies made the ir way to Gdynia separate ly, as Sidor' s party re fused to jo in the Czechoslovak delegation from Warsaw. Stefan Kucf k, " Americk i Slovac i a autonomi sticke hnutie," I 05 . 28 In Warsaw the Slovak Americans were g iven the red-carpet treatment by representat ives of the muni cipa l authoriti es. They never mention ed Czechoslovak ia in their speec hes. Stefan Kucfk , "Americki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnuti e," I 05. 29 Because of the di sagreements among the leaders of the League ' s delegation, on ly fo ur of them went to Ruzomberok . Andrej Ro lik, a Lutheran pastor fro m Johnstown, refused to trave l to Slovakia first. Stefan Kucik , "Americki Slovac i a autonomisticke hnutie," I 05 . �78 SLOVAKIA 2021 The U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia watched the developments from his legation in Prague.Jo On May 31st he informed the Secretary of State of the arrival of the League's representatives in the Czechoslovak capital and their intention to meet both the President and the Prime Minister.JI The day after their arrival in Prague, the leaders of the League paid a courtesy visit to the American Legation . Carr noted that the Slovak Americans stressed in one of their public announcements that their visit was "not to be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic".J 2 Having spoken to an official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, Carr came to the conclusion that Prague's government felt uneasy about the visit, wishing it had taken place at some other time.JJ This made the American diplomat feel that the red-carpet treatment accorded to the Slovak Americans in Prague somehow "lacked a ring of sinceri ty." The fee ling of skepticism in his mind was reinforced when he spoke privately to Hletko. According to Carr, the president of the League admitted that their visit to Prague was inopportune, regretting the fact that it had coincided with the minority dispute. In order to make his American readers appreciate the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the visit, Carr factored in the reactions of the press. He noted that the newspapers in Germany had been for some time speaking of the united front between the Hlinka Party and the Sudeten German Party aimed against the Czechs.J4 The pro-Czechoslovak press, for their part, had been accusing Slovak nationalists of collusion with the Germans.J 5 As to the specific results of the talks between the League's representatives 30 Since 1925, the United States' diplomatic mission in Prague had resided at the Schonbom Palace on Mala stran a. Peter Bridges, " Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 31 In mid-June Carr wrote to Washington again, giving a detailed account of the League's participation in th e Hlinka Party congress. 32 National Archives, Washington, 860f.00/5 I 0, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, May 31 , p. I . 33 This was told to Ca rr by an unspecified official from the Czechoslovak Mini stry of Fore ign Affairs on the 3 1st. The Czechoslovak government feared that the visit would be used by the minorities to advance their own political agendas. 860 f.00/589, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, p. 2. 34 NA, 860f.00/534, Di spatch No. 176, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, Jun e 6, p. 2. 35 According to the Police Directory in Bratislava, the Sudeten Party did send a congratulatory telegram to the HSL.:S on the occasion of its party congress on June the 4th. Milan Olej nik, "The visit of de legates of the American Slovak League to Slovaki a," 55. �SLOVAKIA 2021 79 and the Czechoslovak statesmen, Carr echoed Slovak, the press organ of the HSCS. 36 It reported that the discussions bore no concrete results, liut it was agreed that, after a month's study of the conditions in Slovakia, the League's representatives would return for more talks with the Prime Minister. 37 The public proclamations by the League ' s representati ves in support of Slovak autonomy prompted the U.S. Minister to examine the extent of popular support for the Slovak nationalists. In their plans 1938 was to be the crucial year, by the end of which the Slovak question in Czechoslovakia was to be settled once and for all. With the support of their American compatriots, the Slovak nationali sts claimed that the majority of Slovaks in 1938 - whether at home or abroad, were in favour of autonomy. To this purpose, Hletko repeatedly claimed that autonomy was supported by as many as 90% of Slovaks in the United States. 38 The proposed change in the status of Slovakia was also the main order of business at the Party Congress that convened on June 4th in Bratislava. With the League's delegates in attendance, the Party passed a resolution, setting out the details of the new Autonomy Bill. 39 Its text was published in full the following day in Slovak. Carr had it translated for his June 6th report and supplemented it with his commentary. The bid to amend the Czechoslovak Constitution was viewed critically by the U.S. Minister, hi s main reservation being the lack of political mandate to demand such a constitutional change. Drawing on the statistics from the last parliamentary election of 1936, he observed that the HSCS had only polled 30.1 % of the votes cast in Slovakia. 40 The right to speak for all Slovaks was further dimini shed, 36 Hletko and his party urged the Czechoslovak statesmen to recogni ze Slovaks as a sovereign nati on and to grant Slovak ia autonomy as it was sti pulated in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Both Hodza and Benes ex pressed their general agreement, but refused to talk about autonomy. What they wanted to promote, first and foremost, was Czechoslovak unity. Hletko later summarised the outcome of the talks in the phrase "Nothing positive was achi eved." Stefan Kucik, "Ameri cki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnutie na Slovensku," I 07 . 37 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 2. 38 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 7. 39 It demanded the creation of a separate Slovak Diet and governmen t, a long with the introduction of Slovak as the official language on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. 40 Of a ll the parliamentary votes cast in Czechos lovakia, Carr po ints out, this was 6.86%. NA , 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 4. �80 SLOVAKIA 2021 in Carr's view, by the fact that the party did not put up its own candidates, but campaigned as part of the Autonomist Bloc.41 Even the recent successes of the HSCS in the communal elections did not alter the fact that Slovak autonomists had never commanded the required 50% of the voting majority in Slovakia. Moreover, Carr argued, all of the HSCS 's former allies "now cooperate with the coalition parties." As far as the capability of the party to mobilise its supporters was concerned, the American estimate in June 1938 was slightly higher the one made by the Czechoslovak authorities. According to an American source, the turnout at the public rally on June 5th - the same day when the Autonomy Bill was published - was around 50,000.42 This was twice as much as the official figure given by the Bratislava police department. 43 To strike a balanced view, Carr devoted an equal amount of space in his reporting to those who opposed the Slovak autonomists. In 1938, this was a group of nationwide Czechoslovak parties - members of the ruling coalition which operated separate branches in Slovakia. The HSCS 's staunchest opponent was the Agrarian Party, led by Prime Minister Hodza. To solve the nationality problem his cabinet drafted, in the early summer of 1938, a constitutional amendment, referred to as the Nationality Statute. 44 Another Slovak in the government who opposed autonomists was Minister of Justice [van Derer, who was also head of the Slovak section of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers ' Party. 45 In 1938 both politicians rejected the idea of Slovaks as a sovereign nation, struggling to maintain Czechoslovak unity in 41 This consisted of the Rutheni an Soj uz Party, the Polish Socia list Party and the Slovak National Party. 42 This was based on th e estimate by Associated Press reporter 0. E. Werner. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. O lejnfk, referring to the police records, puts the number of participants at 25,000 at a maximum . 43 Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 55 . 44 The measure proposed to divide the republi c into four autonomous lands: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Eac h land was to be a legal entity in the eyes of public and private law. Land Diets with curias representing every nationality were envisaged, as was the creation of land governments. President Benes had actively participated in the preparation of the statute. The negotiations between the HSL.:S and President Benes about the Nationality Statute in September 1938 were unsuccessfu l. Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 19 I 8- 1938," 156. 45 Ivan Derer was the Minister of Justice of the Czechoslovak government from Jul y 193 7 until September 1938. �SLOVAKIA 2021 81 the face of mounting demands from the Sudeten Party. Carr reported on the activities of the pro-Czechoslovak movement, gauging its political clout and public support. On June I 0th he sent a di spatch in which he looked at the rally organized by the opponents of Slovak autonomy on June 6th . Agrarian Day, as it was officially called, followed close on the heels of the rally organised by th e Hlinka Party the previous day. According to Carr, the turnout at the Czechoslovak demonstration was I 00,000, about twice as large as the previous day 's demon stration.46 Hodza and Derer were among the main speakers, and the President of the Slovak League addressed the crowds in hi s turn. Judging by the American report, the tone of Hletko 's speec h was much less belligerent than hi s speech the day before. 47 Comparing the two rallies, Carr related in hi s report an interesting fact observed by an Associated Press journalist. It concerned the proclaimed loyalty to the common state - or rather the lack thereof, on th e part of Slovak autonomists. When the national anthem was sung at the Hlinka demonstration, there was practically no response from the crowd to the first, i.e. the Czech part of it. For the second - the Slovak part - however, the crowd joined in with " tremendous vigor". The emblems used at the rallies told the same story. The decorations used at Agrarian Day consisted entirely of Czechoslovak flags, while those used by Hlinka's supporters featured exc lusive ly the party's red double cross on a white background.48 The di smem berment of the last democratic state in Central Europe began on September 30th, 1938. At Munich, the European powers decided the fate of Czechoslovakia in her absence.49 The catastrophe 46 Carr 's estimate of th e tu rnout at the Hlinka' s ra ll y was 50,000. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. 47 According to 0. E. Wern er, " Hletk o declared that the Slovaks in the Un ited States wis h nothin g more than that the Slovaks defend th e Republic which they have he lped to establish and th at they remain true Slovaks in free, beautiful and prosperous Czechoslovak ia." NA, 860f. 00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 4. 48 The onl y exception was the use of the American fla g decorating the rostrum where, among oth er speakers, Hletko gave hi s speech. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 5. 49 The agreement was signed by the government leaders of Germany, France, th e United Kingdom and Ita ly. Czechoslova ki a's leaders were not invited, save two diplomats who we re summoned to receive what the great powers had negotiated. Michael R. D. Foot, " Munich agree ment," in The Oxford Companion to World War If, ed. I.C. B. Dea r (New York: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, I 995), 597. �82 SLOVAKIA 2021 could not have been averted by Czechoslovak leaders, but internal factors contributed to it.so What had played into Hitler's hands were the aspirations of the nationalist movements within the country. Democratic powers of the West had either looked on or followed a policy of active appeasement, so as to avoid a war with Germany.s 1 In an effort to satisfy Hitler's demands, Britain and France acquiesced to the annexation of the German-speaking territories of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, they sanctioned the principle whereby individuals exercised their rights in a state collectively, through belonging to a legally recognized national entity. Such recognition in law went hand-in-hand with the demand for a geographically defined national territory. This ran contrary to Czechoslovakia's liberal constitution, by which members of national minorities had their rights guaranteed as individual citizens. The Nationality Statute proposed by Hodza 's cabinet went a long way towards satisfying the demands of the nationalist movements. It attempted to solve the problem by giving Czechoslovak nationalities territorial and administrative autonomy, but it refused to recognise them as legal entities. In the run-up to Munich, Britain and France had stepped up the pressure on the Czechoslovak government not to implement the Nationality Statute. After the failure of negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak government, on September 22 nd the Slovak nationalists rejected the Nationality Statute.s2 In the wake of the Munich Agreement, in an atmosphere of heightened political uncertainty, leaders of the Hlinka Party summoned representatives of the other Slovak political parties to Zilina. The declaration of Slovak autonomy of October 6th was supported by all of them except the Communists and Social Democrats.s3 50 The genera l consensus among hi storians is that "the Czechs had to capitulate". Thomas Paterson, et al., eds. , Americanforeign relations. Vo lume 2. (Lexington MA : Heath and Company, 2014), 153. 51 On September 25th President Benes appealed to Roosevelt with a view to urging Britain and France to stand by Czechoslovaki a. Two days after that, Roosevelt wrote to Chancellor Hitler: "The government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Matilda Axton et al., eds., Foreign relations of the United States. 1938. Vo lume I, Washin gton : United States Government Printing Office, 1955. 52 Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," 156. 53 The result of the meeting was the Zilina Agreement, by which its signatories pledged their support for the passage of a constitutional act providing for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The next day Jozef Tiso was appointed head �SLOVAKIA 2021 83 By that time Poland had occupied a territory in the north of Czechoslovakia and Hungary had laid claims to Hungarian-speaking territories in the south of Slovakia. 54 After Munich the Czech Lands were perceived by the United States with considerable sympathy as a small democratic country in peril , resisting the pressures of a totalitarian aggressor. Looking back on the aftermath of Munich in December, Carr appreciated the grav ity of the situation in which the recently reconstructed Czechoslovak government found itself. He noted that after President Benes had resigned on October 5th, not only was the country left without its leader, but "the bottom dropped out of the entire political system through which it had been governed for twenty years." 55 The interim Prime Minister General Jan Syrovy faced the task of preserving "order and di scipline through a period of indescribable difficulty," having to " remake the constitution" so that "a wholly new civil regime may be set up to which power could be turned over. " 56 The appointment of Frantisek Chvalkovsky as Czechoslovak Foreign Mini ster drew particular praise from the American diplomat. With hi s friendly attitude towards the United States, the Czech Minister was considered a "strong advocate of democratic form of government" while, at the same time, "a reali st with regard to the necessity of a new orientation in the foreign affairs of hi s country." 57 Despite overt signs of the Czech political system of the Slovak autonomous govern ment. Valerian Bystricky, Od auton6mie k vzniku Slovenskeho statu (Bratislava: Prodama, 2008), 273. 54 Carpatho-U krai ne' s autonomy became a reality a lmost at the same time. On October 11th the Czechoslovak government in Prague appoi nted its first autonomous government. Frantisek Capka, "Leta prvni i druhe republiky a protektoratu," Dejiny zemi koruny ceske v datech, accessed Janua ry 16, 2020, http://www .libri.cz/databaze/dejiny/text/t84 .html. 55 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 2- 3. 56 NA, 860f.00/589, Ca rr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. 57 Carr's assessmen t of Chva lkovsky's political integrity and his attitudes towards Germany is particul arl y interesting in the light of his subseq uent acti ons and fu rther diplomatic career. Hi s last directive, as the Foreign Minister issued in the wake of the German occupat ion of Bohemia-Moravia in March of 1939, instructed the Czechoslovak ambassadors abroad to close their embassies and hand them over to the Nazis. Many patriotic Czechoslovak diplomats - some of them Slovak by birth - such as Stefa n Osusky, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris, or Juraj Slavik, head of the country's diplomatic mission in Po land, refused to do so. After the breakup of Czechoslova kia Chvalkovsk y became Envoy of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Ge m1any. He di ed during an allied ai r ra id on Berlin in 1945 . "Frantisek �84 SLOVAKIA 2021 leaning towards authoritarian rule, Carr had little doubt that the federal government would continue to be "a strictly democratic form of government," though admitting "it will undoubtedly incorporate such features of totalitarianism as are compatible with democracy. " Its main desire after Munich, thought the American diplomat, was to "dispel any idea that there is any 'Fascist' tinge to the state yet for obvious reason [they] do not wish to damn Fascist methods ." 58 The plight of Bohemia after Munich contrasted sharply with the American description of the situation in Slovakia. The political leaders of the autonomous region known as Slovenska krajina were seen by American diplomats as unpatriotic and irresponsible individuals who drove one nail after another into the coffin of Czechoslovak democracy. 59 Commenting on the immediate aftermath of Munich and the challenges faced by the Czechoslovak government, Carr expected Slovak leaders "out of common patriotism to set aside domestic political differences until these dangerous problems have been settled." Instead, he observed di sappointingly, "S lovaks - now represented exclusively by the Hlinka extremists - took advantage of the catastrophic difficulties of the Prague Government to demand complete autonomy."60 Questioning where the loyalty of Slovakia's leaders stood during the crisis, the American diplomat came to the conclusion that "S lovak sympathies have throughout this period appeared to lean more strongly toward the Germans, than toward the Czechs." From the American perspective, the unity of the Republic stood paramount, and in times of danger it should definitely prevail over local interest. Carr expressed this sentiment several times, in an unequivocal tone. " If the three principal component parts of the Czechoslovak Republic are linked together by any common bonds of loyalty and patriotism," he argued emphatically, " there has been nothing in the actions of the Chvalkovsky," Historie a osobnosti diplomacie. Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, accessed December 20, 20 19, https://www. mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/histori e_a_osobnosti_ ceske_ diplomacie/ministri_a_ ministerstvo_ v_ histori i/frantisek _ chva lkovsky .html . 58 NA, 860f.00/57 I, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, October 26, 1938, p. 3. 59 Slo venska krajina - in English ' the Slovak Land', was the official name used to refer to Slovakia during the First and Second Czechoslovak Republi cs, between 191 8 and 1939. 60 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 2021 85 Slovak leaders during the last few weeks to indicate it." The image of two different worlds - that of the brave Czechs struggling to save the Republic and the unpatriotic Slovaks sympathising with Nazi aggressors - created by the American Legation in Prague after Munich, persisted for a long time on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1942, when the OSS took over from the American foreign service as the primary intelligence gatherer, a report on Slovakia claimed that the pro-Nazi orientation of the Tiso-Tuka leadership had long been apparent before Munich. 61 After it, the report went on, "these leaders came out open ly against the republic, against democracy generally, and for a new world order in Europe. " 62 The pace and complexity of the developments in Czechoslovakia in the closing months of 1938 were overwhelming, and the American Legation in Prague struggled to keep the Department of State fully informed. Reports in this period were mostly factua l, and the U.S. Minister in Prague complained that they had little time to put the rapidly unfolding events into general perspective. Only in the latter part of December did his superiors in Washington receive a comprehensive report on the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. In the first weeks after Munich there was an "unavoidable preoccupation with the foreign" taking precedence over everything e lse. The whole country was in a state of utter turmoil. The report went on to recapitulate the challenges the country had to grapple with in an extremely short space of time. Satisfying the Polish territorial demands in the north was followed by the negotiations with Germany about Czechoslovakia's new borders in the west. The negotiations with Hungary about the cession 61 This was a com prehensive, I 06-page report on the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpath ian Rutheni ans. NA, Washington, Office of Strategic Servi ces, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 25. 62 Strictly speaki ng, thi s was not true. Throughout th e whole of 1938 the Party was led by Jozef Tiso. Tuka on ly came to prominence in 1940, when he became Foreign Minister of th e wartime Slovak Republic, following the Salzburg negotiations with Gem1any. As the principal representative of the moderate wing, Tiso became leader of the Party after Hlinka 's death in August of 1938. He spearheaded Slovak autonomy in October of 1938, but was opposed to the break up of Czechosl ovak ia in March of 1939. The probable reason why the OSS did not have more precise information about the period was the fact that the main source of its information on the situation in Slovakia during WWII was the Czechoslovak Information Service. This a was a special propaganda bureau set up in th e Un ited States by the Czechoslovak govemment-inex ile, controlled by ex- President Benes from London. �86 SLOVAKIA 2021 of Hungari an-speaking territories in Slovakia 's so uth came to nought, and the matter had to be resolved through international arbitration in early November. It was only then that the crippled Republic could turn its attention to its domesti c problems. What followed, according to the author of the report, was a " period of profound change and adjustment in the internal political life of Czechoslovakia." The most pressing of the problems, needing immediate attention in November, were the election of a new President and the passage of an enabling act. Progress in this direction, Carr noted, was " blocked by the Slovaks." They demanded that no presidential election could take place before the Constitution was amended to enact the proposed Autonomy Bill. The U.S. Mini ster in Prague believed that the conditions in the country were " hardly such as to make it a favourable time for the enactment of constitutional leg islation ." The Prague government, however, " had no other choice but to comply with it. " The Autonomy Act and the presidential elections of 1938 were both scrutini sed in the Legation 's report from December 2 1st. The Czechoslovak National Assembly passed the constitutional amendment on November 22nd and elected Czechoslovakia's new president on the 30th. 63 The constitutional arrangement provided, among other things, for an autonomous Slovak government and a Diet of the Slovak Land based in Bratislava. The new relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in the altered spelling of the country's name, which was changed to Czecho-Slovakia. Th e asymmetrical model of the state drew criticism from the U.S. Minister in Prague.64 According to him, " the privileges henceforth to be enjoyed by the Slovaks in the national parliament" were far too extensive and thus "entirel y disproportionate to the population and actual importance of Slovakia" as well as " its ability, thus far, unproven , to govern itself 63 Drafted by Ferdinand Durcansky, it was based on th e Autonomy Bill published by Hlinka 's Party on June 6th . 64 The Nati ona l Assembly in Prague retained legislative power fo r the whole of Czechoslovaki a wit h regard to matters of the constituti on, fo reign policy, nat ional defence, citizenship, currency, customs and some oth er areas. Since the Czech Lands did not have their ow n parliament, Czecho-Slovakia became in effect an asymmetrical federa l state. Valerian Bystricky, "Slovakia from the Munich Confere nce to the declaration of independence," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 20 11 ), I 60. �SLOVAKIA 2021 87 alone." 65 Slovaks were also criticised in another report for their approach to the election of the President. Originally, the parliament was to vote on an Enabling Act first, but "this was again blocked by the opposition of the Slovaks." who refused to do so " until they might know who the next president was to be."66 Alluding to the American tradition of presidential elections, Carr commented on the undemocratic nature of the procedure: "It is characteristic of political thought in this part of the world," he wrote sarcastically, "that it seems to have occurred to no one that it would have been possible to have a presidential election without all doubts as to its results having been removed well in advance." As for the candidate himself, Carr favoured Frantisek Chvalkovsky, preferred by most of the Czech deputies. In the end, however, the parliament elected Emil Hacha, former President of the Supreme Court. The American diplomat believed that Chvalkovsky's main disadvantages in the eyes of the Slovaks were his Protestantism, along with the fact that he was divorced.67 The Autonomy Act of November 22nd also provided for elections to the Slovak Diet in the following month . They were held on December 18th, 1938 and, historically, they were the first elections ever to take place in Slovakia for that country's self-governing legislative body. Judging by the Americans, however, it was a missed opportunity. The Legation's report from December 21st commented on a lack of democratic procedure as well the dubiousness of their results. As far as the former was concerned, the U.S. Minister in Prague saw "a pronounced Nazi influence."68 This was a reference to the fact that Slovak voters were presented with only one list of candidates. The sole political entity on the 1938 ballot - Hlinka 's Slovak People's Party, with a subtitle to its name - the Party of Slovak National Unity - was an amalgamation of the Agrarian, National Unity, National Socialist 65 Carr points out the Czechs had no say whatsoever in the Slovak Parliament. As a further example of the favoured position that Slovakia occupied in the matters of the Republi c was the provision according to which a motion of no confidence might be moved by one-thi rd of the Slovak deputies, i.e. 12 as compared with a total of 226 members of the chamber. NA, 860f.00/588, Dispatch No. 302, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 2- 3. 66 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7. 67 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7- 9. 68 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 4. �88 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Fascist Parties. 69 Carr had little doubt that the 98% of the votes cast in its favour was due to the fact that the voters were given no alternative. This bore "striking resemblance to the results achieved in recent German plebiscites." Here, the author of the report reminded the State Department that the bloc of Slovak Autonomists had polled as low as 30.1 % of the Slovak vote in the previous parliamentary elections of 1935. "Fear of recrimination", speculated Carr, may have had "a decided influence on the votes cast by many individuals." Gauging the reactions to the Slovak elections in Prague, Carr noticed a parliamentary objection raised by the former Minister of Social Welfare, then a deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The criticism was unlikely to be heeded in Bratislava, concluded Carr disparagingly "when the Slovaks are taking what resembles a child-like delight in playing with a new toy." 70 Part of the image of Slovakia created by the American Foreign Service in 1938 concerned Slovak attitudes towards the Jews. At that time U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia concentrated mainly on understanding the roots Slovak antisemitism, analysing its popular as we ll as political manifestations. Somewhat subjective - or even biased were the American comparisons of the anti-Jewish sentiments among the Czechs and the Slovaks. For a Czech, it was thought, nationality was a matter of language, rather than race. In other words, animosity was only likely to be felt towards the Jews who spoke German. Apart from a small minority, however, the mass of the Czech people had "very little interest in anti-Semitism." 7 1 In Slovakia, the popular resentment of the Jews was said to be widespread and "deep-seated." 72 The main reason for this was believed to be economic. According to George Kennan, then Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, the Jews of Bohemia li ved mainly in urban areas, whereas those 69 The Communist Party was banned by the autonomous govern ment on October 9th, the Social Democrats on November 16th. The destruction of the other political parties in Slovakia came about on November 8th, when they were all forced to merge with the HSL.:S . Representatives of the ama lgamated political entities did not receive any positions in the autonomous government, being left with a few seats in th e Slovak Diet. Valerian Bystricky, "S lovaki a from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence," 161. 70 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 21 , 1938, p. 4- 5. 71 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 45. 72 George Kennan , From Prague After Munich, 22 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 89 residing in Slovakia were more evenly spread throughout the country. 73 Slovak Jews plied their trades in smaller towns and the countryside as merchants, saloon keepers, druggists, or lawyers. In these professions, Kennan argued, the Jews "played a dominant part," largely because of their "superior intelligence." The Slovaks felt differently about this, being convinced that the Jews owed their success to their "trickiness, unscrupulousness, incurable clannishness and nepotism." This was not the case in in Bohemia, according to Kennan , because the " industry and shrewdness of the Czechs as petty traders and artisans" had been such that the Czech countryside " had never presented a Jew with such attractive possi bilities as the villages in Slovakia. 74 Finally, Kennan identified the lack of social assimilation as another factor why the cultural distinctiveness of the Slovak Jewry was more pronounced than it was in Bohemia. 75 From the American perspective, anti-Semitism in Slovak politics had both historic and religious origins. According to Kennan , many of the educated Jews " have traditionally looked to Budapest for cultural inspiration." In addition, there was a smaller, but influential community of Jews "with a German cultural orientation." In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both nationalities were associated with the ruling classes, whereas the Slovak-speaking population had been one of the oppressed nations. Thus, in the Slovak mind, the Jews had always sided with the oppressors. In other words, when the country was under Hungarian rule, "the Slovak Jews made common cause with the Hungarians in exploiting the Slovaks;" when the country found itself in Czechoslovakia, "the Jews joined with the more liberal Czechs in opposi ng Slovak autonomy." 76 To illustrate his theory, Kennan referred his American readership to the pogrom-like operation ordered by Tiso in early November. At that time, Slovak authorities attempted to deport 7,600 Slovak Jews to Hungary, following the announcement of 73 As Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, Kennan made severa l trips to Slovakia in late 1938. In January 1939 he wrote a special report on the conditions in Slovakia. This was followed by a comprehensive despatch in February on the Jewish problem in Czechoslovakia. 74 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 44. 75 Kennan mentions a greater degree of racial intermarriage in Bohemia, especia ll y in upper-class Czech society. 76 George Kennan, From Prague Ajier Munich, 23. �90 SLOVAKIA 2021 the First Vienna Award. 77 In order to establish how Slovakia's Jews were going to be treated in the future , Kennan approached Jozef Tiso. In a personal conversation with the American diplomat, Tiso said that "the Slovak government intended to take measures toward the solution of the Jewish question independently of Prague." The Slovak Prime Minister also expressed his conviction that the planned measures "would probably go farther in scope than any that might be taken by the Prague regime." 78 As far as the religious component of Slovak anti-Semitism was concerned, Kennan pointed out that an important factor in the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Jews was the position of the Catholi c Church . Tiso was himself a Catholic priest, and the Church had made its position on the matter clear through various officials. One of those, according to Kennan, was Father Rudolf Mikus, Provincial of the Jesuit Order in Slovakia. 79 Speaking for the newspaper Slovak, Mikus advocated elimination of the Jewish influence in political and economic life. This would include, among other things, public segregation. 80 The statements made by the Church convinced Kennan that the Slovak government wou ld face little opposition in the promulgation of its anti-Semitic policies in the future .8 1 As the momentous events of 1938 unfolded in Central Europe, diplomats of the American Foreign Service at the Legation in Prague watched the situation in Czechoslovakia, and took a close interest in political developments in Slovakia. Throughout 1938 the country was perceived by American diplomats as a politically vo latile province, 77 This was a pogrom-like operation ordered by HSI..:S to deport around 7,500 Jews to the territory ceded by Slovakia to Hungary. Kenn an argues that the forced ex pul sion took place as a retaliatory measure for an alleged petition by the leaders of the Bratislava Jews to incorporate the city of Bratislava into the ceded territory. The operation was accompanied by anti-Sem itic ri ots in Brati slava. James Mace Ward, "The 1938 First Vienna Award and the Holocaust in Slovakia," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29, no. I (2015): 92 . doi: I 0.1093/hgs/dcv004. ISSN 8756-65 83. 78 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51. 79 A full translation of the statement by Mikus was attached at the end of Kenn an' s report. 80 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51 - 52. 81 The institutional persecution of th e Jews in Slovakia began the following year, after Slovak ia gained its nominal independence. On April the 18th , the Slovak Parliament passed its first anti -Semitic law. This was Ordinance 63 which established a lega l definition of a Jew based on a religious principle. Ladislav Lipscher, "The Jews of Slovakia : 1939- 1945," in The Jews ofCzechoslovakia Volume Ill, ed . Avigdor Dagan et al. (Phi ladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 165. �SLOVAKIA 2021 91 one whose nationalist leaders took advantage of the central government's difficulties after Munich, driving the last democracy in the region into destruction. Slovakia's slide towards totalitarianism in 1938 was perceived by Americans as a consequence of that country's extreme nationalism and its disrespect for the values of the democratic republic established in 1918 . In contrast, tran sition to totalitarian rule in the Czech Lands was viewed by the Americans as a process of necessary accommodation, a sensible political reaction to the external pressures exerted by Nazi Germany. Although American observers did not deny the Slovak right to national self-determination in principle, they considered Slovak demands for autonomy in 1938 as inopportune and highly unpatriotic. They saw the rise of the autonomist movement as a function of Nazi foreign policy, whose sole intention was to use Slovak nationalism in its quest to dismember the Czechoslovak state. Against the backdrop of ri sing international tensions, the visit of the Slovak League of America in the summer appeared to American observers more as an embarrassment than an attempt to save the Republic. Watching the Hlinka Party's push for autonomy, the U.S. Minister in Prague kept reminding the Department of State that the Party lacked a democratic mandate to represent the Slovaks as a whole. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Americans openly scolded the behaviour of the Slovak nationalists, reproaching them for a lack of loyalty to the common state. The Slovak declaration of autonomy in October was not seen as a measure to consolidate the embattled state, but as another step to weaken it. American reports between November and December provide an account of the gradual dismantling of the multi-party political system by the government in Bratislava. In contrast to Bohemia, Americans saw anti-Semitism among the Slovak population as deep-seated, with specific - mainly economic - underpinnings. The anti-Semitic policies of the Slovak government, condoned by some representatives of the Catholic Church, were to become more severe and extensive in the foreseeable future . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 70 SLOVAKIA 2021 ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM: SLOVAKIA IN THE TURMOIL OF 1938 AS SEEN BY THE UNITED ST ATES FOREIGN SERVICE Roman Licko In the autumn of 2018 I set myself the task of assessing the significance of the year 1938 in Slovak hi story. This was in response to a conference call which invited scholars to address, among other themes, milestones in Czech and Slovak history in which the year happens to have a number eight in it. 1 When I set about preparing my presentation, I had two thoughts about the subj ect. First, I was struck by several historic parallels between 2018 and 1938. No attempt will be made in thi s paper to argue that 2018 was as fateful for Slovakia as the year 1938 was for the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. Yet, given the rise of far-right political extremism in Central Europe, tacitly encouraged by a large authoritarian neighbour to the east, it may be instructive to re-examine the rise of Slovak nationalism in the late 1930s. 2 Then, extreme Slovak nationalists had also been spurred on by an aggressive totalitari an neighbour. 3 The second idea that occurred to me was that 1938 has been somewhat neglected when it came to 1 The paper entitled "From Fledging Democracy to Nationalist Authoritarianism: Slovakia in the Tunnoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service" was presented at the 50th Convention of the Associati on for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies in December of 20 18 in Boston. 2 The large authoritarian neighbour is Russia. Its support for the far-right nationa lists in Centra l European cou ntri es is explained and well documented in Timothy Snyder's book The Road to Unfi·eedom. By supporti ng ex treme nationalist movements in coun tries such as Slovaki a, Russia hopes to weaken their resolve to stay w ithin the European Union. Putin's alternative to th e EU is the Eurasian Union, a trade and political bloc stretching from Chin a to the border of the EU. Timothy Snyder, Th e Road tu Unf,-eedom: Russia. Europe. America. (New York : Crown/ Archetype, 20 18), I 00. The reference to the extreme nationalists in today 's Slovakia is directed towards l 'udovri strana na.iie S/ovensko-The People's Party Our Slovakia. Just two months before Slovakia ' s parliamentary elections in February of 2020, the far-rig ht nationali st party came second in a popul ari ty poll cond ucted by the Focus polling Agency in December of 2019. Historically speaking, leaders of the party, including its leaderMarian Kotleba, subscribe to the ideology of the war-time Slovak Republic. 3 Then it was Nazi Germany. SLOVAKIA 2021 71 turning points in Slovak history.4 By this, I don ' t mean the fact that Slovaks gained their autonomy in that year. What changed quite dramatically in 1938 was the way in which the country was governed. After a relatively brief experience with a democratic form of government in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak leaders set about dismantling the democratic institutions upon which the foundations of their state were built. By the end of the year Slovakia was well on the road to becoming a nationalist totalitarian state. This paper examines political developments in Slovakia in that year from the point of view of an independent observer- the United States Foreign Service. At that time, American diplomats in Czechoslovakia gathered and evaluated intelligence which in tum informed the United States' foreign policy towards Central Europe. Their reports and analyses, despite their limitations, help us understand what went wrong with the process of Slovak national emancipation in 1938. They may also serve as an insight into how easily a Central European democracy may tum into a totalitarian state if extreme nationalism becomes the dominant ideology of its political leaders. 1938 was a critical year in European history. Powerful forces of European nationalism were the driving engine of politics in both totalitarian Germany as well as democratic Czechoslovakia. Because of its large and restive German minority, Czechoslovakia had become vulnerable to the aggressive foreign policy of its large totalitarian neighbour to the west. Adolph Hitler's ambition in Central Europe was to annex ethnic Germans living in foreign territories into his Third Reich . In March of 1938 Germany had annexed Austria. In September, the Gen11an Chancellor achieved the pinnacle of his pre-war diplomatic offensive. As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia had to cede the German-speaking areas of Sudetenland to Germany. The rejection of the Versailles system and the intention by the Nazi s to destroy its eastern democratic neighbour brought the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia to a head in 1938. The issue had been simmering in Czechoslovak politics since the last parliamentary elections in 1935, whose results changed the political map of the republic. In Slovakia, an alliance of nationalist parties, known as the Autono4 1948 and 1968, of course, were more fateful. The former because the coup d 'etat in February brought about a complete regime change, the latter beca use the crushing of the Prague Spring in August was the res ult of a fo rei gn in vasion. 72 SLOVAKIA 2021 mist Bloc, emerged as the most powerful political force in the country.5 The Sudeten German Party became one of the strongest political parties in Czechoslovakia. 6 By the end of 1938, the problem of the constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks had been temporarily resolved. The Declaration of Slovak autonomy on October the 6th marked the beginning of the short-lived period known as the Second Czechoslovak Republic. It ended with the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. In 1938 the American government did not have a centralised agency that wou ld gather, coordinate and evaluate political intelligence from foreign countries. Instead, its main source of information about developments abroad came from the U.S. diplomatic missions based in countries' capital cities. Thus, the quality of political intelligence from Europe dispatched to Washington depended on the political acumen of individual diplomats, not all of whom were professionally trained. In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a notable exception. In June 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed the Department of State to appoint Wilbur John Carr as the new U.S. Minister in Prague. 7 As Assistant Secretary of State, Carr had been one of the most 5 In the electoral campa ign, the stron gest nationali st party in Slovakia - Hlinka 's Slovak People ' s Party - joined forces with the Slovak National Party. Both parties advocated autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic. They were backed by the parties of Ruthenian and Poli sh minorities, demandin g autonomy for thei r own regions. Collect ive ly the Autonomist Bloc secured 30.1 % of the Slovak vote. The coalition of Magyar parties in Slovakia gained 14.2%. Alena Bartl ova, " Posledne parlamen tn e vol'by v maj i 1935," in V Medzivojnovom Ceskoslovensku 1918- 1939, (Bratislava : Veda, 20 12), 439. 6 The Sudeten Party polled 15. 2% in the 1935 e lection . Natalia Kraj covifova, "Slovakia in Czechoslova kia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 I I), 154. 7 Wilbur John Carr is often refe rred to as the father of the American Foreign Service. He entered the Department of State as a young clerk in 1892 . He went on to serve in various capac ities, including Assistant Secretary of State between 1924 and 1937. Carr was th e driving force behind th e reform of th e U.S. Foreign Service in the interwar period. In his view, all American ambassadors and mini sters abroad should be professionals - i.e. career diplomats, not political appointees. In June 193 7, after fortyfive yea rs in Washington, Carr was called upon by the President to head the U.S. diplomatic mission in Prague. According to Cordell Hull , Carr was one of the most capable ass istant secretari es in th e history of the department. At the time of his appointment as U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, Carr was sixty-s ix years old . Peter SLOVAKIA 2021 73 senior government officials ever to represent the United States in its foreign service. This reflected Washington's growing concerns about developments in Central Europe, at the heart of which lay the uneasy relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 8 In August of 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull decided to increase his diplomatic staff in Prague with the appointment of George Kennan.9 The choice was not coincidental. Kennan had been an experienced career diplomat and a specialist on Russian and East European affairs. His main task at the Prague legation was political reporting. Part of hi s duties consisted of making regular visits to Bratislava, where he gathered information about developments in Slovakia. Carr's diplomatic dispatches from Prague and Kennan 's reports on conditions in Slovakia shaped the views of American policymakers at the Department of State on the eve of WWII. 10 Their writings remained the only source of political intelligence from the region until the establishment of the OSS in 1942. 11 Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," American Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 20 19, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 1998/09/mr-carr-goes-to-prague/. 8 Bridges points out that Carr' s predecessor - Butler Wright - had underestimated German innuence on Czechoslovak affairs in 1930. This view was expressed by both Secretary of State Hull as well as Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Peter Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 9 Best known as an advocate of the U.S. policy of containment after WWII , George Frost Kennan spent 193 8 and 1939 as a diplomat at the American legation in Prague. He served as Secretary of the Legation until the breakout of war in September of 1939. He was nuent in Russian and German, and during his serv ice in Prague he learned to read Czech and Slovak as we ll. George Kennan, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938- 1940 (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1968), vi. 10 Wilbur J. Carr 's diplomatic correspondence from Prague is deposited in the Library of Congress, the Manuscript Division in Washington D.C. Some of Carr's reports are now part of the collections of the National Archives, entitled "Records of the U.S . Department of State Relating to the Interna l Affairs of Czechoslovakia I 9 10-1944". Some of Kennan ' s reports on the conditions in Slovak ia are in Decimal File 860f. Collecti ve ly, they were published in a book in 1968 . Kennan, From Prague A/ier Munich, 1968. 11 The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was establi shed by the military order issued by President Roosevelt on Jun e 13, 1942 . A predecessor of the modem CIA, the OSS mandate was to collect and ana lyse intelligence required by U.S. foreign-pol icy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barry M. Katz, "Office of Strategic Services," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed . I.C.B . Dear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650. 74 SLOVAKIA 2021 The road to totalitarianism in Slovak politics started in September of 1936. On the 19th of that month, the leaders of Hlinka 's Slovak Peop le's Party (Hlinkova slovenska /'udova strana, or HSL:S) met at a congress in Piest'any to discuss the polic ies and future direction of the party. 12 Leaders of the moderate wing, led by Monsignor Joseph Tiso, were tempted to join the ruling coalition in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Chances were not unreali stic, as the government was headed by Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's first Slovak Prime Minister, who was determined to solve the Slovak question once and for all. 13 In opposition to the moderates stood the young radicals, led by Karol Sidor. 14 For them, cooperation with Hodfa's cabinet was categorically rejected, unless the party's demands were met in full , without any reservations. 15 Whether moderate or radical , all members of the HSL:S were convinced that their party held the so le political mandate to represent Slovaks as a whole. Distrustful of the democratic government in Prague and increasingly authoritarian, the young nationalists had the ear of the old, but charismatic leader of the party - Andrej Hlinka. Hi s ambitions to lead Slovaks as a single nation found expression in one of hi s speeches at the congress, where Hlinka compared himself to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. As far as the future political 12 The Piest'any Congress has been described in detail by Robert Arpas. For a comprehensive accou nt of the party ' s policies in the interwa r period see Robert Arpas, Vitazsrvo alebo prehra: Vyvrcho lenie politickeho zapasu HSt.;S o alllonomiu S/ovenska. (Brati slava: Veda, 20 11 ). 13 Hodza was convi nced that settling Czechoslovak ia's nationality problem hin ged upon finding a solution to the Czech- Slovak question. Natalia Kraj covicova, "Slova kia in Czec hoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich , Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Ca mbridge University Press, 20 11 ). 155. 14 Apart from Sidor, the most prominent representatives of the youn g generation of Slovak nati onali sts were Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach . The views of these intellectuals and academics on society and government had been shaped by the risin g ri ght-wi ng nationalist ideologies of 1930s Europe. Ad mirers of nati onalist totalitaria ni sm, they questioned democracy, whi ch in thei r view was no longer capab le of offerin g solutions to the mountin g problems o f the time. The only remedy, according to them, was a unity of the nation coupl ed with un swerving loya lty to its omni scient leader. They were strongly anti -Se miti c . Robert Arpas, Vit"azstvo alebo prehra, 52 . 15 Sidor, alongs ide wi th Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach, pushed for complete autonomy, part of which was the demand to recogni ze the Slovaks as a separate nati on. Slova k was to become the o ffi c ial language in Slova kia, and the proposed Slovak Di et was to have broad legislative powers. SLOVAKIA 2021 75 line of the party was concerned, the radicals he ld sway. Tiso's demand that the congress express loya lty to the embattled Czechoslovak Republic was swept away. Instead, the closing plenary adopted a resolution which condemned "representatives of international materialistic ideology" and "Jewi sh-Bol shev ik anarchy". 16 The following day, Tiso himself proclaimed the principle of"one nation , one leader, one party" to a public rally of party supporters in Piest'any. In 1938 Slovak Americans were once again about to play an active role in the politics of their mother country. For more than half a century, the Slovak diaspora in the United States had been an important voice in the country's plea for national self-determination. 17 One reason for that was the sheer scale of Slovak emigration to the New World. By 1914 as many as one fifth of Slovaks had come to reside in the United States. 18 The other reason was the completely different political and economic environment of their new home country. Unfettered by oppression from the state, politica lly minded and commerciall y successful Slovaks cultivated, in democratic America, a strong feeling of national identity outside Slovakia. 19 As leaders of fraternal societies they campaigned vigorously for Slovak self-dete1mination in the Old World. 20 The patriotic fervour of these Slovak Americans 16 Robert Arpas, " Piest'ansky zjazd ako medznik HSL'.S k totalite," Clovek a 5polocnost', no. 3, vo l 7 (2004): 166, http ://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocn ik-7rok-2004/3/studi e-a-c lanky/piestansky-zjazd-ako-medzn ik-na-ceste- hsls- k-tota lite/. 17 Sil via Mihalikova, " Slovakia Pathways to a Democrati c Community," in Democracv and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans- Dieter Klingeman n, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, Taylor & Franc is Group, 2006), 175. 18 Large-scale em igration of Slovaks to the United States bega n in the late 18 70s. On the eve of WWI , when the Slovak exodus to America peaked, the Slovak-America n comm unity was in per-capita term s the largest among the Centra l Europea n nations and second onl y to the community of Irish-Ameri ca ns among all immigrant peoples in the U.S. Mark Stolari k, "S lovaks in Canada and the United States, 1880- 1990, Similarities and Differences," in Chair in Slovak History and Culture Occasional Papers, no. I ( 1992): 14. 19 In Mark Stolarik 's words - "The principal centre of Slovak nationalism before and during World War I was not the Slovak homeland, but the United States of America." Mark Stolarik , "S lova ks in Ca nada and the United States," 14. 20 The primary reason why Slovaks in America estab li shed fratemals was mutual support. This often happened along confessional lines, reflecting the divi sions among religious denomin ati ons in Slovakia. Interest in mother-country politics was of secondary importance to Slovak Americans, and it was often the domain of a few politically mi nded fraterna l leaders and newspaper editors . 76 SLOVAKIA 2021 found expression first in the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and then in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. In these, Slovak and Czech expatriate communities in the United States pledged their support for the establishment of a common state on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. In the former, Slovak Americans sought the creation of a federative union with the Czechs. In the latter, they agreed that Slovakia would have home rule. 2 1 The reason why they settled for somewhat less at Pittsburgh was the opposition to the idea of federation from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the most important of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Thus, the Slovak-American nationalists, allied primarily in the Slovak League of America, supported the creation of their Czecho-Slovakia, in October 1918, albeit with caution .22 Despite some internal disagreements among the leaders of the League in the I 920s, demand for autonomy remained the League's top political priority in its dealings with the old country until October 1938. In late Apri l 1938, at the 20th convention of the Slovak League in Pittsburgh, a decision was made to send a delegation to Slovakia. The visit was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the delegation was to take the original copy of the agreement with them. 23 Peter Hletko, the President of the Slovak League, was appointed head of the American delegation and its official spokesman. Another notable member of the delegation was Jozef Husek, former editor-in-chief of the Slovak-American newspaper Jednota and one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The ori ginal idea for a visit by Slovak Americans came from the leadership of 21 The word home-rule itself was not used in the phrasing of th e agreement. Slovakia was to have " its own administration , its Diet and its courts". Slovak was to be " the officia l language in schools and in public life in general". Dav id Grinnell , "Land A Treasures: The Pittsburgh Agreement; Czecho-Slovak Agreement," Western Pennsylvania Hi story 90 (Winter 2007- 08): 8. 22 The Pittsburgh Agreement bore the signatures of members of two Slovak fraternal organ isations - the Slovak League of America and the Slovak Evange lical Society. In I 9 I 8, the Slovak League was an umbrella organisation, comprising the majority of fraternal-benefit societies in the United States, including both Catholics and Lutherans, though th e former predominated. 23 A year before, at th e meeting of the Hlinka Party in Ruzomberok in July, Andrej Hlinka had described th e Pittsburgh Agreement as the "Magna Carta of th e Slovak nation ." Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovak ia (June- August 1938) and their effort to implement the Pittsburgh Agreement into th e Czechoslovak Constitution ," Clo vek a spolocnos( 20, no. 3 (2017): 50. SLOVAKIA 2021 77 the Hlinka Party, which was planning to hold a congress in Bratislava on June 4th. The intention of the party officials was to increase the pressure on the central government in Prague to implement the party 's demand for autonomy. The public showing of the Pittsburgh Agreement to a rally of loyal supporters the following day was part of the plan. 24 ln the atmosphere of heightened international tensions, ratcheted up by the Czechoslovak crisis earlier that month, the visit of the American delegation was closely followed by the pro-Czechoslovak press throughout the country. 25 A party of Slovak Americans about a hundred strong - arrived at the Polish port of Gdyni a on May 26th, 1938. 26 There, they were greeted by two separate delegations: one, headed by Karol Sidor, who was sent to Poland by the leaders of the Hlinka Party; the other was the diplomatic retinue of Juraj Slav ik, the Czechoslovak Minister to Poland.27 The Slovak Americans then proceeded to Warsaw, from where they were scheduled to travel to Prague. 28 At the instigation of Karol Sidor, however, four members of the League were persuaded to trave l to Rufomberok first , to pay a visit to the ai Iing leader of the party, Andrej Hlinka. 29 24 The party offic ials were thu s responding to various rumours, e.g. that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a fabricati on , or that Masaryk's signature on it was not genuine. Stefan Kucf k, "Americki Slovaci a autonom isti cke hnutie na Slovensku ( 19 181938)," Dvacate sto/eti, no. 2 (2013 ): I 06. 25 The May Cri sis was caused by fa lse reports of German troop movements on the 19th around Czechos lova ki a ' s western borders, raising fea rs th at the country was about to be attacked by Germany. A lthough the reports later proved unsubstantiated, the inc ident contributed to the subseque nt resolve by France and Britain to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to the Sudeten German Party. 26 Milan O lej nik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 51. 27 Although the two delegati ons had travelled to Gdynia by the sa me train, both part ies made the ir way to Gdynia separate ly, as Sidor' s party re fused to jo in the Czechoslovak delegation from Warsaw. Stefan Kucf k, " Americk i Slovac i a autonomi sticke hnutie," I 05 . 28 In Warsaw the Slovak Americans were g iven the red-carpet treatment by representat ives of the muni cipa l authoriti es. They never mention ed Czechoslovak ia in their speec hes. Stefan Kucfk , "Americki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnuti e," I 05. 29 Because of the di sagreements among the leaders of the League ' s delegation, on ly fo ur of them went to Ruzomberok . Andrej Ro lik, a Lutheran pastor fro m Johnstown, refused to trave l to Slovakia first. Stefan Kucik , "Americki Slovac i a autonomisticke hnutie," I 05 . 78 SLOVAKIA 2021 The U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia watched the developments from his legation in Prague.Jo On May 31st he informed the Secretary of State of the arrival of the League's representatives in the Czechoslovak capital and their intention to meet both the President and the Prime Minister.JI The day after their arrival in Prague, the leaders of the League paid a courtesy visit to the American Legation . Carr noted that the Slovak Americans stressed in one of their public announcements that their visit was "not to be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic".J 2 Having spoken to an official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, Carr came to the conclusion that Prague's government felt uneasy about the visit, wishing it had taken place at some other time.JJ This made the American diplomat feel that the red-carpet treatment accorded to the Slovak Americans in Prague somehow "lacked a ring of sinceri ty." The fee ling of skepticism in his mind was reinforced when he spoke privately to Hletko. According to Carr, the president of the League admitted that their visit to Prague was inopportune, regretting the fact that it had coincided with the minority dispute. In order to make his American readers appreciate the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the visit, Carr factored in the reactions of the press. He noted that the newspapers in Germany had been for some time speaking of the united front between the Hlinka Party and the Sudeten German Party aimed against the Czechs.J4 The pro-Czechoslovak press, for their part, had been accusing Slovak nationalists of collusion with the Germans.J 5 As to the specific results of the talks between the League's representatives 30 Since 1925, the United States' diplomatic mission in Prague had resided at the Schonbom Palace on Mala stran a. Peter Bridges, " Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 31 In mid-June Carr wrote to Washington again, giving a detailed account of the League's participation in th e Hlinka Party congress. 32 National Archives, Washington, 860f.00/5 I 0, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, May 31 , p. I . 33 This was told to Ca rr by an unspecified official from the Czechoslovak Mini stry of Fore ign Affairs on the 3 1st. The Czechoslovak government feared that the visit would be used by the minorities to advance their own political agendas. 860 f.00/589, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, p. 2. 34 NA, 860f.00/534, Di spatch No. 176, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, Jun e 6, p. 2. 35 According to the Police Directory in Bratislava, the Sudeten Party did send a congratulatory telegram to the HSL.:S on the occasion of its party congress on June the 4th. Milan Olej nik, "The visit of de legates of the American Slovak League to Slovaki a," 55. SLOVAKIA 2021 79 and the Czechoslovak statesmen, Carr echoed Slovak, the press organ of the HSCS. 36 It reported that the discussions bore no concrete results, liut it was agreed that, after a month's study of the conditions in Slovakia, the League's representatives would return for more talks with the Prime Minister. 37 The public proclamations by the League ' s representati ves in support of Slovak autonomy prompted the U.S. Minister to examine the extent of popular support for the Slovak nationalists. In their plans 1938 was to be the crucial year, by the end of which the Slovak question in Czechoslovakia was to be settled once and for all. With the support of their American compatriots, the Slovak nationali sts claimed that the majority of Slovaks in 1938 - whether at home or abroad, were in favour of autonomy. To this purpose, Hletko repeatedly claimed that autonomy was supported by as many as 90% of Slovaks in the United States. 38 The proposed change in the status of Slovakia was also the main order of business at the Party Congress that convened on June 4th in Bratislava. With the League's delegates in attendance, the Party passed a resolution, setting out the details of the new Autonomy Bill. 39 Its text was published in full the following day in Slovak. Carr had it translated for his June 6th report and supplemented it with his commentary. The bid to amend the Czechoslovak Constitution was viewed critically by the U.S. Minister, hi s main reservation being the lack of political mandate to demand such a constitutional change. Drawing on the statistics from the last parliamentary election of 1936, he observed that the HSCS had only polled 30.1 % of the votes cast in Slovakia. 40 The right to speak for all Slovaks was further dimini shed, 36 Hletko and his party urged the Czechoslovak statesmen to recogni ze Slovaks as a sovereign nati on and to grant Slovak ia autonomy as it was sti pulated in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Both Hodza and Benes ex pressed their general agreement, but refused to talk about autonomy. What they wanted to promote, first and foremost, was Czechoslovak unity. Hletko later summarised the outcome of the talks in the phrase "Nothing positive was achi eved." Stefan Kucik, "Ameri cki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnutie na Slovensku," I 07 . 37 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 2. 38 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 7. 39 It demanded the creation of a separate Slovak Diet and governmen t, a long with the introduction of Slovak as the official language on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. 40 Of a ll the parliamentary votes cast in Czechos lovakia, Carr po ints out, this was 6.86%. NA , 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 4. 80 SLOVAKIA 2021 in Carr's view, by the fact that the party did not put up its own candidates, but campaigned as part of the Autonomist Bloc.41 Even the recent successes of the HSCS in the communal elections did not alter the fact that Slovak autonomists had never commanded the required 50% of the voting majority in Slovakia. Moreover, Carr argued, all of the HSCS 's former allies "now cooperate with the coalition parties." As far as the capability of the party to mobilise its supporters was concerned, the American estimate in June 1938 was slightly higher the one made by the Czechoslovak authorities. According to an American source, the turnout at the public rally on June 5th - the same day when the Autonomy Bill was published - was around 50,000.42 This was twice as much as the official figure given by the Bratislava police department. 43 To strike a balanced view, Carr devoted an equal amount of space in his reporting to those who opposed the Slovak autonomists. In 1938, this was a group of nationwide Czechoslovak parties - members of the ruling coalition which operated separate branches in Slovakia. The HSCS 's staunchest opponent was the Agrarian Party, led by Prime Minister Hodza. To solve the nationality problem his cabinet drafted, in the early summer of 1938, a constitutional amendment, referred to as the Nationality Statute. 44 Another Slovak in the government who opposed autonomists was Minister of Justice [van Derer, who was also head of the Slovak section of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers ' Party. 45 In 1938 both politicians rejected the idea of Slovaks as a sovereign nation, struggling to maintain Czechoslovak unity in 41 This consisted of the Rutheni an Soj uz Party, the Polish Socia list Party and the Slovak National Party. 42 This was based on th e estimate by Associated Press reporter 0. E. Werner. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. O lejnfk, referring to the police records, puts the number of participants at 25,000 at a maximum . 43 Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 55 . 44 The measure proposed to divide the republi c into four autonomous lands: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Eac h land was to be a legal entity in the eyes of public and private law. Land Diets with curias representing every nationality were envisaged, as was the creation of land governments. President Benes had actively participated in the preparation of the statute. The negotiations between the HSL.:S and President Benes about the Nationality Statute in September 1938 were unsuccessfu l. Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 19 I 8- 1938," 156. 45 Ivan Derer was the Minister of Justice of the Czechoslovak government from Jul y 193 7 until September 1938. SLOVAKIA 2021 81 the face of mounting demands from the Sudeten Party. Carr reported on the activities of the pro-Czechoslovak movement, gauging its political clout and public support. On June I 0th he sent a di spatch in which he looked at the rally organized by the opponents of Slovak autonomy on June 6th . Agrarian Day, as it was officially called, followed close on the heels of the rally organised by th e Hlinka Party the previous day. According to Carr, the turnout at the Czechoslovak demonstration was I 00,000, about twice as large as the previous day 's demon stration.46 Hodza and Derer were among the main speakers, and the President of the Slovak League addressed the crowds in hi s turn. Judging by the American report, the tone of Hletko 's speec h was much less belligerent than hi s speech the day before. 47 Comparing the two rallies, Carr related in hi s report an interesting fact observed by an Associated Press journalist. It concerned the proclaimed loyalty to the common state - or rather the lack thereof, on th e part of Slovak autonomists. When the national anthem was sung at the Hlinka demonstration, there was practically no response from the crowd to the first, i.e. the Czech part of it. For the second - the Slovak part - however, the crowd joined in with " tremendous vigor". The emblems used at the rallies told the same story. The decorations used at Agrarian Day consisted entirely of Czechoslovak flags, while those used by Hlinka's supporters featured exc lusive ly the party's red double cross on a white background.48 The di smem berment of the last democratic state in Central Europe began on September 30th, 1938. At Munich, the European powers decided the fate of Czechoslovakia in her absence.49 The catastrophe 46 Carr 's estimate of th e tu rnout at the Hlinka' s ra ll y was 50,000. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. 47 According to 0. E. Wern er, " Hletk o declared that the Slovaks in the Un ited States wis h nothin g more than that the Slovaks defend th e Republic which they have he lped to establish and th at they remain true Slovaks in free, beautiful and prosperous Czechoslovak ia." NA, 860f. 00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 4. 48 The onl y exception was the use of the American fla g decorating the rostrum where, among oth er speakers, Hletko gave hi s speech. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 5. 49 The agreement was signed by the government leaders of Germany, France, th e United Kingdom and Ita ly. Czechoslova ki a's leaders were not invited, save two diplomats who we re summoned to receive what the great powers had negotiated. Michael R. D. Foot, " Munich agree ment," in The Oxford Companion to World War If, ed. I.C. B. Dea r (New York: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, I 995), 597. 82 SLOVAKIA 2021 could not have been averted by Czechoslovak leaders, but internal factors contributed to it.so What had played into Hitler's hands were the aspirations of the nationalist movements within the country. Democratic powers of the West had either looked on or followed a policy of active appeasement, so as to avoid a war with Germany.s 1 In an effort to satisfy Hitler's demands, Britain and France acquiesced to the annexation of the German-speaking territories of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, they sanctioned the principle whereby individuals exercised their rights in a state collectively, through belonging to a legally recognized national entity. Such recognition in law went hand-in-hand with the demand for a geographically defined national territory. This ran contrary to Czechoslovakia's liberal constitution, by which members of national minorities had their rights guaranteed as individual citizens. The Nationality Statute proposed by Hodza 's cabinet went a long way towards satisfying the demands of the nationalist movements. It attempted to solve the problem by giving Czechoslovak nationalities territorial and administrative autonomy, but it refused to recognise them as legal entities. In the run-up to Munich, Britain and France had stepped up the pressure on the Czechoslovak government not to implement the Nationality Statute. After the failure of negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak government, on September 22 nd the Slovak nationalists rejected the Nationality Statute.s2 In the wake of the Munich Agreement, in an atmosphere of heightened political uncertainty, leaders of the Hlinka Party summoned representatives of the other Slovak political parties to Zilina. The declaration of Slovak autonomy of October 6th was supported by all of them except the Communists and Social Democrats.s3 50 The genera l consensus among hi storians is that "the Czechs had to capitulate". Thomas Paterson, et al., eds. , Americanforeign relations. Vo lume 2. (Lexington MA : Heath and Company, 2014), 153. 51 On September 25th President Benes appealed to Roosevelt with a view to urging Britain and France to stand by Czechoslovaki a. Two days after that, Roosevelt wrote to Chancellor Hitler: "The government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Matilda Axton et al., eds., Foreign relations of the United States. 1938. Vo lume I, Washin gton : United States Government Printing Office, 1955. 52 Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," 156. 53 The result of the meeting was the Zilina Agreement, by which its signatories pledged their support for the passage of a constitutional act providing for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The next day Jozef Tiso was appointed head SLOVAKIA 2021 83 By that time Poland had occupied a territory in the north of Czechoslovakia and Hungary had laid claims to Hungarian-speaking territories in the south of Slovakia. 54 After Munich the Czech Lands were perceived by the United States with considerable sympathy as a small democratic country in peril , resisting the pressures of a totalitarian aggressor. Looking back on the aftermath of Munich in December, Carr appreciated the grav ity of the situation in which the recently reconstructed Czechoslovak government found itself. He noted that after President Benes had resigned on October 5th, not only was the country left without its leader, but "the bottom dropped out of the entire political system through which it had been governed for twenty years." 55 The interim Prime Minister General Jan Syrovy faced the task of preserving "order and di scipline through a period of indescribable difficulty," having to " remake the constitution" so that "a wholly new civil regime may be set up to which power could be turned over. " 56 The appointment of Frantisek Chvalkovsky as Czechoslovak Foreign Mini ster drew particular praise from the American diplomat. With hi s friendly attitude towards the United States, the Czech Minister was considered a "strong advocate of democratic form of government" while, at the same time, "a reali st with regard to the necessity of a new orientation in the foreign affairs of hi s country." 57 Despite overt signs of the Czech political system of the Slovak autonomous govern ment. Valerian Bystricky, Od auton6mie k vzniku Slovenskeho statu (Bratislava: Prodama, 2008), 273. 54 Carpatho-U krai ne' s autonomy became a reality a lmost at the same time. On October 11th the Czechoslovak government in Prague appoi nted its first autonomous government. Frantisek Capka, "Leta prvni i druhe republiky a protektoratu," Dejiny zemi koruny ceske v datech, accessed Janua ry 16, 2020, http://www .libri.cz/databaze/dejiny/text/t84 .html. 55 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 2- 3. 56 NA, 860f.00/589, Ca rr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. 57 Carr's assessmen t of Chva lkovsky's political integrity and his attitudes towards Germany is particul arl y interesting in the light of his subseq uent acti ons and fu rther diplomatic career. Hi s last directive, as the Foreign Minister issued in the wake of the German occupat ion of Bohemia-Moravia in March of 1939, instructed the Czechoslovak ambassadors abroad to close their embassies and hand them over to the Nazis. Many patriotic Czechoslovak diplomats - some of them Slovak by birth - such as Stefa n Osusky, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris, or Juraj Slavik, head of the country's diplomatic mission in Po land, refused to do so. After the breakup of Czechoslova kia Chvalkovsk y became Envoy of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Ge m1any. He di ed during an allied ai r ra id on Berlin in 1945 . "Frantisek 84 SLOVAKIA 2021 leaning towards authoritarian rule, Carr had little doubt that the federal government would continue to be "a strictly democratic form of government," though admitting "it will undoubtedly incorporate such features of totalitarianism as are compatible with democracy. " Its main desire after Munich, thought the American diplomat, was to "dispel any idea that there is any 'Fascist' tinge to the state yet for obvious reason [they] do not wish to damn Fascist methods ." 58 The plight of Bohemia after Munich contrasted sharply with the American description of the situation in Slovakia. The political leaders of the autonomous region known as Slovenska krajina were seen by American diplomats as unpatriotic and irresponsible individuals who drove one nail after another into the coffin of Czechoslovak democracy. 59 Commenting on the immediate aftermath of Munich and the challenges faced by the Czechoslovak government, Carr expected Slovak leaders "out of common patriotism to set aside domestic political differences until these dangerous problems have been settled." Instead, he observed di sappointingly, "S lovaks - now represented exclusively by the Hlinka extremists - took advantage of the catastrophic difficulties of the Prague Government to demand complete autonomy."60 Questioning where the loyalty of Slovakia's leaders stood during the crisis, the American diplomat came to the conclusion that "S lovak sympathies have throughout this period appeared to lean more strongly toward the Germans, than toward the Czechs." From the American perspective, the unity of the Republic stood paramount, and in times of danger it should definitely prevail over local interest. Carr expressed this sentiment several times, in an unequivocal tone. " If the three principal component parts of the Czechoslovak Republic are linked together by any common bonds of loyalty and patriotism," he argued emphatically, " there has been nothing in the actions of the Chvalkovsky," Historie a osobnosti diplomacie. Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, accessed December 20, 20 19, https://www. mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/histori e_a_osobnosti_ ceske_ diplomacie/ministri_a_ ministerstvo_ v_ histori i/frantisek _ chva lkovsky .html . 58 NA, 860f.00/57 I, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, October 26, 1938, p. 3. 59 Slo venska krajina - in English ' the Slovak Land', was the official name used to refer to Slovakia during the First and Second Czechoslovak Republi cs, between 191 8 and 1939. 60 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. SLOVAKIA 2021 85 Slovak leaders during the last few weeks to indicate it." The image of two different worlds - that of the brave Czechs struggling to save the Republic and the unpatriotic Slovaks sympathising with Nazi aggressors - created by the American Legation in Prague after Munich, persisted for a long time on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1942, when the OSS took over from the American foreign service as the primary intelligence gatherer, a report on Slovakia claimed that the pro-Nazi orientation of the Tiso-Tuka leadership had long been apparent before Munich. 61 After it, the report went on, "these leaders came out open ly against the republic, against democracy generally, and for a new world order in Europe. " 62 The pace and complexity of the developments in Czechoslovakia in the closing months of 1938 were overwhelming, and the American Legation in Prague struggled to keep the Department of State fully informed. Reports in this period were mostly factua l, and the U.S. Minister in Prague complained that they had little time to put the rapidly unfolding events into general perspective. Only in the latter part of December did his superiors in Washington receive a comprehensive report on the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. In the first weeks after Munich there was an "unavoidable preoccupation with the foreign" taking precedence over everything e lse. The whole country was in a state of utter turmoil. The report went on to recapitulate the challenges the country had to grapple with in an extremely short space of time. Satisfying the Polish territorial demands in the north was followed by the negotiations with Germany about Czechoslovakia's new borders in the west. The negotiations with Hungary about the cession 61 This was a com prehensive, I 06-page report on the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpath ian Rutheni ans. NA, Washington, Office of Strategic Servi ces, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 25. 62 Strictly speaki ng, thi s was not true. Throughout th e whole of 1938 the Party was led by Jozef Tiso. Tuka on ly came to prominence in 1940, when he became Foreign Minister of th e wartime Slovak Republic, following the Salzburg negotiations with Gem1any. As the principal representative of the moderate wing, Tiso became leader of the Party after Hlinka 's death in August of 1938. He spearheaded Slovak autonomy in October of 1938, but was opposed to the break up of Czechosl ovak ia in March of 1939. The probable reason why the OSS did not have more precise information about the period was the fact that the main source of its information on the situation in Slovakia during WWII was the Czechoslovak Information Service. This a was a special propaganda bureau set up in th e Un ited States by the Czechoslovak govemment-inex ile, controlled by ex- President Benes from London. 86 SLOVAKIA 2021 of Hungari an-speaking territories in Slovakia 's so uth came to nought, and the matter had to be resolved through international arbitration in early November. It was only then that the crippled Republic could turn its attention to its domesti c problems. What followed, according to the author of the report, was a " period of profound change and adjustment in the internal political life of Czechoslovakia." The most pressing of the problems, needing immediate attention in November, were the election of a new President and the passage of an enabling act. Progress in this direction, Carr noted, was " blocked by the Slovaks." They demanded that no presidential election could take place before the Constitution was amended to enact the proposed Autonomy Bill. The U.S. Mini ster in Prague believed that the conditions in the country were " hardly such as to make it a favourable time for the enactment of constitutional leg islation ." The Prague government, however, " had no other choice but to comply with it. " The Autonomy Act and the presidential elections of 1938 were both scrutini sed in the Legation 's report from December 2 1st. The Czechoslovak National Assembly passed the constitutional amendment on November 22nd and elected Czechoslovakia's new president on the 30th. 63 The constitutional arrangement provided, among other things, for an autonomous Slovak government and a Diet of the Slovak Land based in Bratislava. The new relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in the altered spelling of the country's name, which was changed to Czecho-Slovakia. Th e asymmetrical model of the state drew criticism from the U.S. Minister in Prague.64 According to him, " the privileges henceforth to be enjoyed by the Slovaks in the national parliament" were far too extensive and thus "entirel y disproportionate to the population and actual importance of Slovakia" as well as " its ability, thus far, unproven , to govern itself 63 Drafted by Ferdinand Durcansky, it was based on th e Autonomy Bill published by Hlinka 's Party on June 6th . 64 The Nati ona l Assembly in Prague retained legislative power fo r the whole of Czechoslovaki a wit h regard to matters of the constituti on, fo reign policy, nat ional defence, citizenship, currency, customs and some oth er areas. Since the Czech Lands did not have their ow n parliament, Czecho-Slovakia became in effect an asymmetrical federa l state. Valerian Bystricky, "Slovakia from the Munich Confere nce to the declaration of independence," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 20 11 ), I 60. SLOVAKIA 2021 87 alone." 65 Slovaks were also criticised in another report for their approach to the election of the President. Originally, the parliament was to vote on an Enabling Act first, but "this was again blocked by the opposition of the Slovaks." who refused to do so " until they might know who the next president was to be."66 Alluding to the American tradition of presidential elections, Carr commented on the undemocratic nature of the procedure: "It is characteristic of political thought in this part of the world," he wrote sarcastically, "that it seems to have occurred to no one that it would have been possible to have a presidential election without all doubts as to its results having been removed well in advance." As for the candidate himself, Carr favoured Frantisek Chvalkovsky, preferred by most of the Czech deputies. In the end, however, the parliament elected Emil Hacha, former President of the Supreme Court. The American diplomat believed that Chvalkovsky's main disadvantages in the eyes of the Slovaks were his Protestantism, along with the fact that he was divorced.67 The Autonomy Act of November 22nd also provided for elections to the Slovak Diet in the following month . They were held on December 18th, 1938 and, historically, they were the first elections ever to take place in Slovakia for that country's self-governing legislative body. Judging by the Americans, however, it was a missed opportunity. The Legation's report from December 21st commented on a lack of democratic procedure as well the dubiousness of their results. As far as the former was concerned, the U.S. Minister in Prague saw "a pronounced Nazi influence."68 This was a reference to the fact that Slovak voters were presented with only one list of candidates. The sole political entity on the 1938 ballot - Hlinka 's Slovak People's Party, with a subtitle to its name - the Party of Slovak National Unity - was an amalgamation of the Agrarian, National Unity, National Socialist 65 Carr points out the Czechs had no say whatsoever in the Slovak Parliament. As a further example of the favoured position that Slovakia occupied in the matters of the Republi c was the provision according to which a motion of no confidence might be moved by one-thi rd of the Slovak deputies, i.e. 12 as compared with a total of 226 members of the chamber. NA, 860f.00/588, Dispatch No. 302, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 2- 3. 66 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7. 67 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7- 9. 68 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 4. 88 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Fascist Parties. 69 Carr had little doubt that the 98% of the votes cast in its favour was due to the fact that the voters were given no alternative. This bore "striking resemblance to the results achieved in recent German plebiscites." Here, the author of the report reminded the State Department that the bloc of Slovak Autonomists had polled as low as 30.1 % of the Slovak vote in the previous parliamentary elections of 1935. "Fear of recrimination", speculated Carr, may have had "a decided influence on the votes cast by many individuals." Gauging the reactions to the Slovak elections in Prague, Carr noticed a parliamentary objection raised by the former Minister of Social Welfare, then a deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The criticism was unlikely to be heeded in Bratislava, concluded Carr disparagingly "when the Slovaks are taking what resembles a child-like delight in playing with a new toy." 70 Part of the image of Slovakia created by the American Foreign Service in 1938 concerned Slovak attitudes towards the Jews. At that time U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia concentrated mainly on understanding the roots Slovak antisemitism, analysing its popular as we ll as political manifestations. Somewhat subjective - or even biased were the American comparisons of the anti-Jewish sentiments among the Czechs and the Slovaks. For a Czech, it was thought, nationality was a matter of language, rather than race. In other words, animosity was only likely to be felt towards the Jews who spoke German. Apart from a small minority, however, the mass of the Czech people had "very little interest in anti-Semitism." 7 1 In Slovakia, the popular resentment of the Jews was said to be widespread and "deep-seated." 72 The main reason for this was believed to be economic. According to George Kennan, then Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, the Jews of Bohemia li ved mainly in urban areas, whereas those 69 The Communist Party was banned by the autonomous govern ment on October 9th, the Social Democrats on November 16th. The destruction of the other political parties in Slovakia came about on November 8th, when they were all forced to merge with the HSL.:S . Representatives of the ama lgamated political entities did not receive any positions in the autonomous government, being left with a few seats in th e Slovak Diet. Valerian Bystricky, "S lovaki a from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence," 161. 70 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 21 , 1938, p. 4- 5. 71 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 45. 72 George Kennan , From Prague After Munich, 22 . SLOVAKIA 2021 89 residing in Slovakia were more evenly spread throughout the country. 73 Slovak Jews plied their trades in smaller towns and the countryside as merchants, saloon keepers, druggists, or lawyers. In these professions, Kennan argued, the Jews "played a dominant part," largely because of their "superior intelligence." The Slovaks felt differently about this, being convinced that the Jews owed their success to their "trickiness, unscrupulousness, incurable clannishness and nepotism." This was not the case in in Bohemia, according to Kennan , because the " industry and shrewdness of the Czechs as petty traders and artisans" had been such that the Czech countryside " had never presented a Jew with such attractive possi bilities as the villages in Slovakia. 74 Finally, Kennan identified the lack of social assimilation as another factor why the cultural distinctiveness of the Slovak Jewry was more pronounced than it was in Bohemia. 75 From the American perspective, anti-Semitism in Slovak politics had both historic and religious origins. According to Kennan , many of the educated Jews " have traditionally looked to Budapest for cultural inspiration." In addition, there was a smaller, but influential community of Jews "with a German cultural orientation." In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both nationalities were associated with the ruling classes, whereas the Slovak-speaking population had been one of the oppressed nations. Thus, in the Slovak mind, the Jews had always sided with the oppressors. In other words, when the country was under Hungarian rule, "the Slovak Jews made common cause with the Hungarians in exploiting the Slovaks;" when the country found itself in Czechoslovakia, "the Jews joined with the more liberal Czechs in opposi ng Slovak autonomy." 76 To illustrate his theory, Kennan referred his American readership to the pogrom-like operation ordered by Tiso in early November. At that time, Slovak authorities attempted to deport 7,600 Slovak Jews to Hungary, following the announcement of 73 As Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, Kennan made severa l trips to Slovakia in late 1938. In January 1939 he wrote a special report on the conditions in Slovakia. This was followed by a comprehensive despatch in February on the Jewish problem in Czechoslovakia. 74 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 44. 75 Kennan mentions a greater degree of racial intermarriage in Bohemia, especia ll y in upper-class Czech society. 76 George Kennan, From Prague Ajier Munich, 23. 90 SLOVAKIA 2021 the First Vienna Award. 77 In order to establish how Slovakia's Jews were going to be treated in the future , Kennan approached Jozef Tiso. In a personal conversation with the American diplomat, Tiso said that "the Slovak government intended to take measures toward the solution of the Jewish question independently of Prague." The Slovak Prime Minister also expressed his conviction that the planned measures "would probably go farther in scope than any that might be taken by the Prague regime." 78 As far as the religious component of Slovak anti-Semitism was concerned, Kennan pointed out that an important factor in the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Jews was the position of the Catholi c Church . Tiso was himself a Catholic priest, and the Church had made its position on the matter clear through various officials. One of those, according to Kennan, was Father Rudolf Mikus, Provincial of the Jesuit Order in Slovakia. 79 Speaking for the newspaper Slovak, Mikus advocated elimination of the Jewish influence in political and economic life. This would include, among other things, public segregation. 80 The statements made by the Church convinced Kennan that the Slovak government wou ld face little opposition in the promulgation of its anti-Semitic policies in the future .8 1 As the momentous events of 1938 unfolded in Central Europe, diplomats of the American Foreign Service at the Legation in Prague watched the situation in Czechoslovakia, and took a close interest in political developments in Slovakia. Throughout 1938 the country was perceived by American diplomats as a politically vo latile province, 77 This was a pogrom-like operation ordered by HSI..:S to deport around 7,500 Jews to the territory ceded by Slovakia to Hungary. Kenn an argues that the forced ex pul sion took place as a retaliatory measure for an alleged petition by the leaders of the Bratislava Jews to incorporate the city of Bratislava into the ceded territory. The operation was accompanied by anti-Sem itic ri ots in Brati slava. James Mace Ward, "The 1938 First Vienna Award and the Holocaust in Slovakia," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29, no. I (2015): 92 . doi: I 0.1093/hgs/dcv004. ISSN 8756-65 83. 78 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51. 79 A full translation of the statement by Mikus was attached at the end of Kenn an' s report. 80 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51 - 52. 81 The institutional persecution of th e Jews in Slovakia began the following year, after Slovak ia gained its nominal independence. On April the 18th , the Slovak Parliament passed its first anti -Semitic law. This was Ordinance 63 which established a lega l definition of a Jew based on a religious principle. Ladislav Lipscher, "The Jews of Slovakia : 1939- 1945," in The Jews ofCzechoslovakia Volume Ill, ed . Avigdor Dagan et al. (Phi ladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 165. SLOVAKIA 2021 91 one whose nationalist leaders took advantage of the central government's difficulties after Munich, driving the last democracy in the region into destruction. Slovakia's slide towards totalitarianism in 1938 was perceived by Americans as a consequence of that country's extreme nationalism and its disrespect for the values of the democratic republic established in 1918 . In contrast, tran sition to totalitarian rule in the Czech Lands was viewed by the Americans as a process of necessary accommodation, a sensible political reaction to the external pressures exerted by Nazi Germany. Although American observers did not deny the Slovak right to national self-determination in principle, they considered Slovak demands for autonomy in 1938 as inopportune and highly unpatriotic. They saw the rise of the autonomist movement as a function of Nazi foreign policy, whose sole intention was to use Slovak nationalism in its quest to dismember the Czechoslovak state. Against the backdrop of ri sing international tensions, the visit of the Slovak League of America in the summer appeared to American observers more as an embarrassment than an attempt to save the Republic. Watching the Hlinka Party's push for autonomy, the U.S. Minister in Prague kept reminding the Department of State that the Party lacked a democratic mandate to represent the Slovaks as a whole. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Americans openly scolded the behaviour of the Slovak nationalists, reproaching them for a lack of loyalty to the common state. The Slovak declaration of autonomy in October was not seen as a measure to consolidate the embattled state, but as another step to weaken it. American reports between November and December provide an account of the gradual dismantling of the multi-party political system by the government in Bratislava. In contrast to Bohemia, Americans saw anti-Semitism among the Slovak population as deep-seated, with specific - mainly economic - underpinnings. The anti-Semitic policies of the Slovak government, condoned by some representatives of the Catholic Church, were to become more severe and extensive in the foreseeable future .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource On the Road to Nationalist Totalitarianism: Slovakia in the Turmoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service Description An account of the resource Roman Ličko Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 70-91 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ličko, Roman Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/225c67a1f19614b755cfcea0f49a34ca.pdf 4d472700766a1ce54206fca5d53c2688 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language 1 Konstantin V. Lifanov The history of the Slavic literary languages has developed rapidly over the last few decades as an independent linguistic discipline. Scholars have reviewed the objects of their study and defined them more precisely , and even attempted to develop optimal methods of research, all of which has made it possible for them to make adequate assessments of actual linguistic data, and to avoid imposing their contemporary perceptions on the past. For example, the use of socio1inguistic concepts has been very fruitful in the study of certain Sla- vic literary languages. However, many problems have so far remained uninvestigated. Thus Kretschmer, surveying the overall level of research into Slavic literary languages, declares that in spite of the amount of material that has already appeared, the processes whereby the Slavic literary languages emerged still remain to be worked out, as well as their regularities and specific features. 2 This conclusion also applies to the history of the Slovak literary language. Many texts written in Slovakia before the language was codified remain uninvestigated from the lingui stic point of view. There are hardly any comparative studies of texts of different ge nres or from different eras. Nevertheless , comparative study is the only 1 I deeply thank Professor Robert Orr and Professor M. Mark Stolarik for English corrections of this paper. 2 Anna Krechmer (Anna Kretschmer), " Sravnitel'naja istorija slavjanskich literatur- nych jazykov: Yoprosy metodologiji " , Vjestnik Moskovskogo uni vers iteta. Seria 9. Filologia. 3, I 998, p 48. �8 SLOVAKIA method that makes it poss ible to define the real status of co nc rete for ms a nd to determine, e.g., whether a give n for m is mere ly the result of a language error, because, e.g., a give n wri te r did not know the coeva l language norm , or of sty li stic variat ion arisin g from a g ive n genre of wri tin g, or a typical lin gui st ic feat ure characteristic of the Slovak written tradition as a whole. But if we cannot determine the status of concrete forms , we ca nnot qualify the essence of differe nt lang uage for mati o ns in the hi story of Slovak , a nd therefore we cannot compre he nd the process of the emergence and subseque nt deve lopme nt of the Slovak literary language eithe r. In its turn, this situation in the hi story of the Slovak literary language ope ns up the poss ibility of arbitrary interpretations, ofte n aris ing from extra lin gui st ic factors. Thus it is wide ly believed, mainly outside Slovakia, that the Slovak literary language emerged in the late 18 th century by differe ntiating itse lf from Czech , and that previous ly Slovaks had used Czech as their literary language. We may trace the sources of thi s beli ef to the concepts of some Czech lingui sts3, who did not recognize the di stinctiveness of Slovak and considered it merely a variant of a unitary Czechoslovak language. According to a seco nd view of thi s problem, which has been "official" in Slovak lingui stics since the mid- I 950 's, distinct languages - cultural West Slovak, Central Slovak, and perhaps East Slovak had emerged in Slovakia before the codificatio n of the Slovak literary language. Subsequently Bernolak 's 1787 codification was based o n c ultu ra l W est Slovak a nd Stur's ( I 840 's) on cultural Central Slovak. There is also a third view, accord in g to which the Slovak literary lang uage arose as a res ult of interact ion between the Czech literary language and Slovak (mainl y West Slovak) dialects. It was shared by ' See Albert Prazak , Dejiny spisovne slovenstiny po dobu Sturovu (Brati slava, 1922), A lbert Prazak , Cesi a Slovaci (Praha 1929) and Vaclav Yazny "Spisovny jazyk slove nsky", Ceskos lovenska vlasti veda , Rada 11, Sp isovny jazyk Cesky a s/ovensky (Praha 1936) pp. 145-2 15. �SLOVAKIA 9 many Slovak linguists from I 900-1950.4 We embarked upon the study of thi s problem without preconceptions, and intended to base all conc lusions so lely on the analysis of concrete lin gui stic material and modern literary language theory. We cannot outline our theoretical fram ework in thi s paper, and therefore we can only refer to the first chapter of our book.5 Research into the problem of the Slovak literary language should take as its starting point the 14 th century, when Old Czech began to develop into an interethnic literary lan guage in Central Europe. At the same time it also penetrated into Slovakia. Stani slav, Kiraly , & Pauliny 6 show that in Slovakia copiers of Czec h texts tried to adhere to Czech norms. Infrin gements of these norm s tended to be iso lated and accidental , and may be described as simple errors. But as early as CC 14 - 15 fo ur changes - three phonolog ical and one morpholog ical - are attested in texts quite regul arly: the loss of the phoneme Iii, the loss of jotation in labials before lel < *e, *r, the affrication oft; d ' > c, dz, and the repl ace ment of vocati ves by nominatives. These processes constitute the initial stage of development of Old Czec h in Slovaki a, and its iso lation from the language functionin g in the Czech heartland. In the first place, we studied the further deve lopme nts of th ese phenom e na in th e spiritu a l literature of Slovak Catholics. • See , for exa mple, J. Y lkolinsky (Czambel 's pseudon ym) "O '·prvej " knihe slovenskej ", Z i ve na, 2, 1885, pp 230-240 . Henri ch Bartek, "S pi sov ny j azyk slovensky", Slovenska rec. 6, 1937- 1938, pp 50-57 and l.'.udovft Novak. "Cestina na Slove nsk u a vzn ik spisovnej slovenciny ", Slovenske pohl'ady . 54, 1938, pp 105-111. 159- 173, 2 17-222, 28 1-287. 5 Konstantin V. Lifanov, Genezis slovackogo literaturnogo jazyka . LINCOM Stu - dies in Slavic Linguistics, 21 (Munich 200 I ), pp. 18-4 1. 6 Jan Stani slav . " Zur Frage der Slowazismen in den alttschechi schen Denkmalern ", Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik. Bd. I, Heft 4. 1956. pp. 58-70, Bd. II . Heft I , 1957, pp. 3751 , Peter Kiraly. Zur Frage der altesten slowak ischen Sprachdenkmdlern" , Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiaru m Hungaricae. 4, 1958, pp. I 13- 158 , Eugen Pauliny, "Zac iatky kulturneho jazyka slovenskej narod nos ti ", Jazykovedne stridie. 6, 196 1. pp. 28-39. �SLOVAKIA The re pl ace me nt of /f/ by Ir/ spread ra pidl y, alm ost over a ll S lovak wri tings , inc ludin g sp iritua l literature . By the time " Ol a.h 's Ritu a l" was tra ns lated (ca. I 550 - 1600) Iii was an obvio us, very irreg ul ar arc ha ism (proti nassy m mrskym hfJc hum ). In the re li gious treati ses of B. Smrtnik and A. Macsay , publi shed in 1697 and 171 8 res pecti ve ly, it is attes ted ma inl y in fo rm s of the ve rb ffc i , mos t probabl y as a pure ly orthographi ca l conve nti o n (Prosil ne kdy gedon Prite le sweho rikuce), but it is co mpletely absent in the manuscripts in vesti gated (the Ca ma ldul Bible ( 1756- 1759), and th e se rm ons of Mokos ( 1752- 1774), Vrabel ( I 766), and Bajan ( 1760- 177 1)). The deve lopme nt of /JI after labi a l co nso nants and before l e/ < *e, *~ was sli ghtl y di ffe re nt. The primary stages of thi s process were ide nti ca l to those in vo lved in the repl aceme nt of If/. Thus, according to Paulin /, exa mpl es of th at deve lopme nt still c lea rl y predominated in the I 5th century " Muni ch Confess ion al Formula" ( 16 fo rms with /j/ and three without), but they were refl ected incons iste ntl y as earl y as " Ol a.h 's Ritu al," as a rul e in the idi omati c fo rmul as at the end of verses (s stebau Bohe m Otcem y Duc he m Swatym bud ' cest y c hwa la na wieky wiekow. Amen). The di ffere nti ati o n betwee n genres based on the presence or absence of fo rms w ith or w itho ut /jl is characte ri sti c of later texts. Onl y fo rm s without /JI occ urred in the language of sermons, inc luding Baj an 's (tuto bude lakomec w Negwecsy potrebe), in spite of the situ ati on in hi s nati ve di a lect (Zahorsky), whe re fo rm s w ith /JI are still c urrent. However, fo rms w ith /JI re mained in the " hi ghe r" genres (in the " Bible" a nd re lig io us treati ses) and in Macsay 's la nguage they are used quite freque ntl y (T yto Pobudky ma clowek ws rdcy swem pilne vwafowati ; kri wdy net1pet1). Spec ial vocati ve for ms, and nom inati ves used as vocati ves, were lost in the maj ority of Sl ovak di alects. They were restri cted to animates in spiritual Catho li c literature (radu g se tec hd y Narod Uhersky 7 Eugen Paul iny, ·'Mnfchovska spovedna formu la" , Jazykovedny casopis. 10. no. I , 1959, p. 30. �SLOVAKIA 11 /Vrabel/ - A braham e, A braham e ne wsta hug ruky tweg na djte /Macsay/). In contrast to Literary Old Czech, anim ate noun s w ith palatal ste ms had the same endin gs as nouns with no n-palatal ste ms (chce m rect du sso kresta nska bludica /M okos/ ; Czec h du se!. It is inte resting that these were the very forms that Berno lak codi fied. The hi story of the affricates c and dz(< t'and d ') shows that new fo rm s did not always oust co mpe tin g o lde r fo rms as a res ult of the loss of the oppos ition " literary - non-literary." In thi s case the te ndency was c hanged and the literary language lost the affri cates. They were w ides pread in I 4'h - I S'h century writin gs, but o nl y iso lated examples appeared in I 8'h century Catho li c literature (strhel se weter, zrucil dom /Vrabel/) . Th ese fo ur phe no me na are c uri o us ly s imil ar: they occ urred in literary Old Czech, but onl y sporadi ca ll y, occ urring in tex ts as errors by Czec h copy ists. These fo rm s deve loped into competin g doubl ets in the Slovak writte n language. However, the affri cati on of t'and d' differed from the other phenome na, in th at it made the phonol og ica l syste m more compl ex (the phone mes ga ined an additi onal artic ul atory feature) , while the othe r phe nome na, on the contrary , s implified the system , because they in vol ved the loss of a ph one me, or a pos iti onal vari ant of a phoneme, or a gra mm ati ca l fo rm . He nce we mi ght sugges t th at ph e nome na simpli fy in g a syste m preva il in co mpetiti o n in th e earl y stage of deve lopme nt of a literary la nguage outs ide its core ethni c te rritory, but phe no me na complicatin g it do not. Thi s is also suggested by the fact that it was not until the mid- I 8'h century th at the ph one me dz < *dj pe netrated the la nguage of spiritua l li teratu re; prev io us ly it had been co nsiste ntl y repl aced by /z/, or rare ly by Id '/ (zretedlne p ot wrz uje [pa n- S lovak po twrdzuj e] to wssec ko Job; skrze pokanj z te ho sna se probud'uje [pan-Sl ovak prebudz uje] /Macsay/) . The re was an esse ntial di ffe re nce between sporadi c pheno me na and doubl ets in wri tten Old Czec h. T he latte r survived as vari ants fo r almost the who le hi story of the language of Slovak Cath o li c literature, e .g., the refl exes of so-ca ll ed regress ive uml aut, i.e., the deve- �SLOVAKIA 12 lopment of tautosyllabic -aj- to -ej- in Old Czec h, and the emerge nce of the co nso nant clu ster sr:. c haracterist ic of Old Czech and Central Slovak, from sc- (< *stj-, *skj- , a nd *sk- before fro nt vowe ls). The first phenomenon was subject to a degree of gra mmaticali zation , as may be deduced from the fac t that no n-uml au ted seq ue nces obviously predomin ated in imperati ve fo rm s (ne mess kag obratjtj se ku Pa.nu Bohu /Macsay/) , but variation in the superlati ve forms of adjectives and adverbs was maintain ed as late as the mid- 18 th century, and usage mai nl y depended on the indi vidu al taste of the respecti ve author (pod'te a pod mym stjnem odpocjwagte - eopustili nalezk i swe a cestu nagtwrdssu /the " Bible"/; krize a proti wenstwy trpezliwe znassagme - sa m Tyran ze swym negmlacssym sine m /Vrabel/). Forms w ith sc- a nd st: were used in re li g ious texts throu ghout the pe ri od covered by the research , regardl ess of the orig ins of their authors (gegjho pak narozenj cas gesste oppodal byl - Pridrzme se th gessce S. Paw la /Macsay/). It was onl y in mid- I 8 century sermon s that th e tendency towards regional differentiation of th ese forms e merged: Makos used on ly fo rms with st:, following hi s nati ve Cen- tral Slovak dial ect (kazani takow i mestiane bi zas lu zili ), while Bajan, from Western Slovakia, mostly used forms w ith sc- (kde tenkrat bude Utociisscie hri ssniku). The process of for mati on of lin gui stic norms, which mu st have ex isted , may be observed from the lin gui st ic mate ri al th at ca n be g leaned from the written records. The occ urre nce of nati ve Czech and nati ve Slovak for ms in texts was not random, but governed by certain rules: firstl y the primary literary and non-literary fo rms arose, the n the primary non-literary form usuall y ousted the primary literary one. These processes, however, were subject to the princ ipl e of flexibl e stability8, whereby they were impl e me nted sy nchroni ca ll y, and thu s co ntinuity was ma intain ed be tween th e written languages of diffe re nt epoc hs. Thus, the fo ll ow in g new phe nomena, untypi ca l of " Yi lem Matezius ( Yi lem Matesius), ·'O neobchodimosti stab il'nost i litera turnogo jazyka" . Praiskij lingvisticeskij krniok (Moskva. 1967). p. 38 1 �13 SLOVAKIA earlie r writings, are attested in the tran slation of the "Ol ah Ritual ": □ unco ntracted forms of the gen., dat. and loc. sg. of femi nine adjecti ves e ndin g in fun ctional non -pa lata l conso na nts o usted the corresponding co ntracted forms (podl e tagneg radd y otcowskeg a dobrotiweg wu le twey); □ there was vari ation betwee n the nati ve Czech in str. forms of the pronouns ty and seba with the root vowe l o, a nd the nat ive Slovak ones with the root vowe l e, but the native Slovak forms prevailed (s steba u Bohe m otcem y s Duchem Swatym - s tobou bohem Ot- cem s Duchem Swatym); □ both the short and lon g forms of participl es were used as predi cati ves (za hrj c hy nasse vcinen gest - kterjmz to byl zapaleny proti nassy m mrskym hrjchum), etc. Some phe nome na are first attested in the lang uage of Smrtnik's re li gious treati se: □ the an im ate ge n.-acc. plural (Wide l pyssycych se A nge luw; cf. "Olah Ritua l": ze sy pro nas lidj hrjssne vkri fo wany) ; □ a n epenthetic vowel in masc uline forms of the /-participl e of consonant ste ms (polozil ho na Oltari na hranjcy drew a wstahe / ru ku ; cf. a n examp le fro m " Olah 's Ritu a l": z nes / zuriwy hnew otce tweho wecneho) ; □ the gramm ati ca li zation of piehlask a9 , prese rved in so me form s and lost in others, e.g., it is preserved in participial and verba l adverbia l endings, but beginning to be lost in present verb forms (gako Rewy we wykwjtagicy Winnicy; smegjce se pobij za k bytwe; pred Ssediwinamj wassymj Ml ads sy hore powstawagj - Dijtky zros- 9 Pieh/iska denotes the series of comprehensive progressi ve vowe l changes, unique to earl y Czech within Slavic. which was ori ginall y manifested co nsisten tl y in the morphology. but later reduced due to analogical pre ssures. Basically, it involved the frontin g and raising of vowels after origin ally soft consona nts. e. g .. u/ice < * ulica. biicho < * br ·ucho. see. e. g .. Miroslav Komarek. Historicka mluvnica ceski. 1: Hlis k os l ovf (Praha. 1962). pp. 62-66, I 15-118 , 153; 1964: 17, 18. 54; Charl es Townsend & Laura Janda. Common and Comparati ve Slavic (Indi ana 1996), pp. 9 192. I 6 I. I 63 , 272. �SLOVAKIA 14 tie wchazagu do sklepu); □ the spread of the genitive of the pronoun onilony to the acc., with both forms used as variants (pi su ge y pro tebe - prikazal aby se zem otewrela a za ziwa gych pozrela), etc. The majority of the features peculiar to the language of spiritual literature spread in the first half of the 18 th century. These trends are shown in the lan guage of Macs ay's religious treatises, which a lso contains the following further innovation s: □ masculine loc. pl. forms in -och (zalezelo to znamenj na skut- koch geho zazracnych; cf. nenj wskutcych miloserdenstwj (Smrtnik)); □ the dat. , loc. and instr. pl. of noun s such as kost' fo ll ow the pattern of ulice/iena (pri ledagakyc h wecech se zabaw ugu - a w smetach hrjchuw lezite); □ the spread of the loss of sy llabic sonants in abso lute word- final position , apart from /-participles, where this process took place earlier (Ale o Swaty Otce wyswet li vmysl twug - gakz ty s wilozjl smyse/ geho), etc. However, some Czech elements were very stable and were used almost universally: □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position , in contrast to Slovak i- (gako by mluwil a prisahal gim ("The Bible"); □ velar/alternations in the dat/loc. sg. of feminine nouns (Zadag- jcymu wodi mleka dala a na ssalce knj zatskeg podala ("The Bible") and in the nom pl. of adjectives agreeing with animates (A le zase pocali synowe Yzrahelsty ciniti zle weci ("The Bible"), etc. These processes obviously demon strate the modification of Old Czech as it was transformed into a standardised written language. Its structure consisted of native Czech and native S lovak elements used according to fairly strict rules. Such phenomena, maintained in Slovak, but lost in contemporary Literary Czech, are direct evidence of its clear connection to Old Czech. Apart from analogical doublets in literary Old Czech and in the language of Slovak Catholics, these are as follows: �SLOVAKIA □ 15 the preservati o n of the auxili ary in 3rd person verb fo rm s of the /- parti c ipl e un til the mi d- I 8 th century (a kralostwy sweho nekoncene ho pocatek gest ucinil (Mokos); ze ges t guz pri dwerac h wibehei protj ne mu / Baja n/); suc h fo rm s were co mpl ete ly lost in S lovak di alec ts by abo ut the I 5th ce ntury1°, and they were very ra re in Czec h writings by the 16 th century; 11 □ the e ndin g -u/-ti in the inst. sg. of fe minine noun s and adjec- ti ves, and also so me personal pronouns, in all works of Catho lic literature, inc ludin g authors of Central Sl ovak o ri g in , altho ugh they do not ac tu all y occ ur in Central Slovak (S krotite le Sweta A lexand ra M ladeho kw itnu cj ho strilku swu ra nil a; Pod se mnu odegdi (S mrtni k)); □ no d iphthongs apart from uo in the "Ol ah Ritu al", partic ul arly in Smrtni k 's re li g io us treati se, whi c h co ntinu es th e s itu ati o n in Literary Old Czec h (Oleg obmekssuge kuoie (S mrtni k)); □ gemin ates in the same words as in Literary O ld Czech (podle tagneg raddy Otcows keg /Olah/), etc. The language of S lovak Catho li c literature, howeve r, was indepe nde nt. It deve loped accordin g to its ow n rul es, in co ntrast to those of Old Czec h and Slova k di alec ts. Spec ific processes e merged rapidly, e.g., th e above- me nti o ned grammati ca li zati on of piehlask a, plus the follow ing: □ most masc uline no un s have gen. pl. fo rm s in -u w, whi ch is absent fro m Slova k di alects, and was lost in literary Czech (odwede l od rodiczuw, od prateluw /Vrabel/); □ an oppos iti o n between fe minin e adj ectives with ste m-fin al no n-palata l a nd ste m-fi na l palatal co nso na nts, beca use th e latte r fo rm s also had contracted gen. , dat. a nd loc. fo rm s (V < *Vj V; Mlc zim , abi ch w dnessny (< *-j-) Reczy meg d luhy ne bil /Bajan/), whil e the fo rmer had uncontracted fo rms; □ Ill 11 the de limi tati on of gen. and acc. pl. fo rms of animate nouns as Rudolf K rajcov ic, Nacrt dejfn slovenskeho jazyka (Bratislava, 197 1) p. 143 A rn ost L amprec ht, Dusan Slosar & Jaros lav Bauer, Historicka mlu vnice cestiny (Praha, 1986), p. 244 �SLOVAKIA 16 observed in Macsay ' s lan guage, and in the language of the " Bible" (ge n.: okolo deset ti syc uw wseckych sy lnych a udatnych Muiuw; acc.: kdiz zachwatili dwoch mu iti s knjzat Madyanskych /th e " Bible"/); □ the appearance of spec ial gen. sg. forms of the pronouns ty and seba, with -o- in the root (a le podobne wecy pro sobe od druheho slissetj pohrdagj (S mrtnik)), etc. Many native Slovak elements in the language of Slovak Catholic literature were pan-Slovak, but some of them directly indicate the region of Slovakia which played the main role in the formation of the Slovak written tradition : West Slovak. This is espec iall y true of features that do not occur in other Slovak dialects, primarily Central Slovak, such as , e.g.: □ diphthongs tended to be lost; □ -e in the endings of adjectives with a ste m-fi nal pal atal (ni c nad neho neni twrdsseho /Mokos/; Czech t vrdsfho; North Central Slovak tvrdsieho, South tvrdsiho/tvrdsiho) ; □ non-contracted gen. , dat. , and acc . forms (in the latter case if agreeing with animate noun s) of masc uline and neuter possessive adjectives (abich guss kpredsewzeti mogemu mluwil /Mokos/; Czech memu; Central Slovak m 6jmu); □ epenthetic -e- in masculine /-part iciples (Ce ntral Slovak -o-; a do stawu sweg Boskeg milosti pren esel /Mokos/; Czech pienes /; Central Slovak preniesol) , etc. D moreover, many native Czech e lements remained unchan ged, because they also occur in West Slovak as a whole, or in its SouthWestern subdial ects, e.g.: D the sequence rot- as a reflex of Common Slavic c ircumflex *6rt- (aby rostlo nany Hlozj a Trnj (S mrtnik ); Czech and Wes t Slovak rostlo; Central Slovak nistlo); □ the vowel e as a refl ex of Common Slavic strong *b (a gedna zadruhu wen zkostola wichazali /Mo kos/ ; Czech and West Slovak ven; Central Slovak von ); D the ending -em in the loc. sg. of masc uline and neuter adjec- �17 SLOVAKIA ti ves (aby na hrobowem kamenj tyto slowa wy kresatj dali /M acsay/ ; Czech and West Slovak hrobovem ; Centra l S lovak hrobovom ); □ the endin gs -e and -owe in the no m. pl. of anim ate no un s (nadto y pry tele daleko od stupili od ne ho /the " Bible"/ ; mn ozy p atriarcho we, mnozy kni zata a w udcowe /V rabel/; Czech p hite le , patriarchove, vudcove; West S lovak prate/e, patriarchove, vodcove; Central Slovak priatelia, patriarchovia, vodcovia) , etc. The typical West Slovak elements occ urring in Catho li c literary texts were as fo ll ows: □ the lack o f sy ll abic sonants from ori gin al sequences of conso- nants plus b i b + I (iluc Draku w gest wino geg ich (Smrtnik); Czech i luc; Central Sl ovak i lc; the isogloss was located on the territory o f South-Western (Trnava) di alects); □ the instr. sg. e ndin g -e m in masc uline and ne uter no un s (A sed'e la pod strom em palmowym, ktery m enem gey m sa menowal /the " Bible"/ ; Czec h, Zahorak, and some adj acent Trn ava di alec ts stromem, jmeneml m enem ; Central Slova k and other Wes t S lovak di alects have -om : stromom , menom), etc. Althou gh thi s lin g ui stic form ati on does di splay territori a ll ybased di alect di vergences, mai nl y in sermons, di alectal fea tures have not totall y submerged its characteri sti c pan-di alectal elements. If we compare the lin gui stic structures of Slovak Catholic literature and Berno lak 's codifi cation, we may conc lude that the codi ficati on was not somethin g new in princ iple. Nati ve Czec h fea tures occurring in , e.g., both the language of Slovak Catho li c literature and Berno lak's codifi cati on, clearl y de mo nstrate the c lose co nnec ti on between the two. These features are as fo llows: □ contracted fo rm s of possess ive adjecti ves (m eho, etc.) ; □ dat. sg. fo rms of ori g in all y soft-stem neuter noun s, whi ch d is- pl ay the refl exes of the ceska p fehlask a, i.e., u>i (srdci); □ □ neuter noun s endin g in -nf (stawaiif); parti c ipl es and verba l ad verb s w ith pieh/aska in suffixes ( wolag icf, wolagic); □ the I" person subjuncti ve of by t' in -ch, incl ud in g co mpoun d �SLOVAKIA 18 conjunctions (e.g., abich); □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position (gim), etc. The material being analyzed shows that the language of Catholic literature had many features characteristic of a literary language. It was cultivated, selective, functionally homoge neous, and essentially supra-dialectal. For its definitive identification as such , it needs to be ascertained whether it was only a religious style or multifunctional , and whether it was widespread over the whole of Slovakia. In order to answer the first question we compared the language of Catholic literature to the language of secular baroque poetry , based on the following texts: P. Benickfs [original] "Slovak Verses" ( 1652), S.F. Selecky ' s " Pen Portrait of a Beautiful Lady" ( 170 I), and H. Gavlovic's "The Pastoral School " ( 1775). The language of secular baroque poetry generally coincides with the lan guage of Catholic literature. The linguistic differences in each genre are mainly based on the respective periods of composition ; and not the origins of the authors . In other words, secular baroque poetry may be grouped along with Catholic literature in accordance with its period of composition. The vowel system s of both genres may be characterised by their clear tendency to use long monophthongs instead of native Czech and Central Slovak diphthongs. The native Czech diphthong ou (orthographic au) , also attested in earlier spiritual literature, occurs only in Benicky (Spravedlivim gsaudem I Osemetnim !idem / Pracuje gich chitrost (Benicky); moudrost y cest geho /Olah/ ; Strach Saudu a Ostrost Sudce (Smrtnik)). It is absent from 18 th century works , however, regardless of genre. In contrast to Catholic literature, other diphthongs occur sporadically in the language of Benicky and Gavlovic : the former has two examples of -ia- , and the latter nearly ten of -ie-, and perhaps one example of -iu- (Neb size Rodiczke / Kliatby Materynske / Prinasegj pokuty (Benicky) ; Spiwala sy gedna baba : mam penazy dgessku, I su do zeme zakopane, / newim w kterem br- geiku /Gavlovic/; A gak pangu penezitu, / musiss geg sluziti , / Gak chudobnu budess w dome / dwe chudoby miti (Gavlovic). These phe- �SLOVAKIA 19 nomena may be described as deliberate violations of norm. 12 The wholesale remodelling of the front/back contrast in the vowel system due to the gradual reduction of pieh/aska provides another substantial feature common to secular baroque poetry and Catholic literature. The grammaticalization of piehJaska may also be observed in the language of secular baroque poetry, generally identical to similar processes in the language of Catholic literature. This convergence is manifest in the stability of some grammatical forms , variation in others, and even in the total loss of some forms with piehlaska Thus, participial and verbal adverb endings are the most stable (Had kuzy svu zvleka, / Orlyce z daleka / Letagicz pera pusty (Benicky); czistotu woniczy proto smim potwrdit (Selecky); Ktery mlcy , ku mluweni , / pricynu magice, I Wiceg cyni, nezli zwitas / zamky walagice (Gavlovic). In contrast, at an early stage 3 rd person forms without piehlas- ka began to be replaced by forms with piehlaska and a stage where forms both with and without coexist occurs in the language of Ben icky, which chronologically corresponds to the language of Smrtnik (Nebo u susedu / Pekagj chleb z medu, / Take pryslovy byva - Saty ozdobene, I Czinicz telo pisne / Molove prei iraju (Benicky)). As in the language of Catholic literature, forms with pieh/aska are absent from the language of F. Selecky and H. Gavlovic (Mnozy tez zadagu wzacznost smichu widjet (Selecky); Ne ze zeme, ale z Judi / wiros- tagu zlosti , / Puwod magu w marnych Srdcach I z nedobreg wlchkosti (Gavlovic). The convergence of the main linguistic features of Catholic literature and sec ular baroque poetry also affected the morphological system. The features which have changed are as follows: □ In the language of Benicky the development of animate gen.lace. forms in the plural of nouns is fixed at a stage where both nom./acc. and gen.lace. forms occur. The translation of "Olah ' s Ritual," in which the original nom ./acc. forms are still consistent, repre- 12 See Ian Muk arfovsk ii (Jan Mukai'ovsky), ·"Literaturn yj jazyk i poeticeskij jazy k", Praiskij lingvisticeskij kruiok (Moskva, 1967), pp. 407-408. �SLOVAKIA 20 sents an intermediate stage and the treati se of B. Smrtnik refl ects the e ndpoint of thi s process: the re are no nom ./acc. forms in Selecky and Gavlovic at all (Mas lj se so uditj , / Mu sis svedky mitj , / Tak bude vec vihrana - Yzlast gestlis na vogne / Drz vogak u v s ilne / Czastim napominanim (Benicky); Ked bi g ih ranjenych ona htje la hog it (Se lecky) ; A Kato mu odpowedel : / Nemluw mi nic wice, / bil by zazrak, kdyby zhryzly / Sswabuw nohaw ice (Gavlovi c); □ the loss of the spec ial acc. forms of the pe rso nal pronoun oni/ony (here both Benicky and Smrtnik have doubl ets, and they may be contrasted on the one ha nd with "Ola.h 's Ritual ," the point of departure, and on the other hand , to a ll other writin gs attesting to the e nd of the process (Magj peczet daty , / 0 to se staraty , / Aby ge ginsy stihat - Darmo konom hv yzdat / Kdyz g ich mas napagat / gestlj ze sam nepi ge (Benicky); Prirownam g ich k oczam soko la draheho (Selec ky); Proto wzacny karbunkulu s / y drahe kameni , / ze g ich zridka uhlidame, / w hognosti g ich ne ni (Gav lovic); □ the replace ment of primary forms of /-participles with ste m- fin a l sy ll a bic sonants by forms with epenthetic -e- (Benicky and " Ol a.h 's Ritual " have only forms with sy llabic sonants, they still predomin ate in Smrtnik , whi le 18 th century writings, including the works of Selec ky and Gavlovi c (Zes ze statku panskeho / Zbohatl, v kratky cas / vezme ti to Pan zas (Be nicky); jakbi u kralowneg lasku bil dosahel (Se lec ky ); A Pan os la se u/eke/, / osla dal zabiti, / Tak osel, chtic las ku ziskat, / strati I ziwobiti (Gav lovi c)) have only innovatio ns, etc . The following phenome na may be termed stabl e : □ The consiste nt preservation of alternations in nom . pl. adj ec- tives agree in g with animate noun s (Tak pansty dvorane I Yak nahl e pan vstane / Nec h zanim postupu g u (Benicky); ked by ta czi czerti pgek ni bil y w pe kl e (Se lecky); Nazy na Swet prich adzame / ze ziwota Matk i, / Neprinassame ze sebu / penize a statki (Gavlovic); □ masc uline a nd ne ute r in str. sg. forms in -em (Ne b czasta pri saha / Ciasem dopomaha / ze zustava lhar vetsy (Be ni c ky); nebo s ak samitem okrasle na bi wa (Se lec ky) ; Zena mu fov i ukl ady / z placem spu sob uge, / Geho mi se l vsse li ga kim / s pu s obe m probu ge �SLOVAKIA 21 (Gavl ov ic); bych (Chtje l bih mnihe m zostat, rad bih giste wgedj e l (Selecky); Y kosselu bych predala, / vssak se mu za bo□ th e subjun cti ve in gim, I Kdyz se trochu podnapi gem, / ce la neobstog im (Gav lov ic), etc. Sporadic phe nome na simil ar to those in the language of Catho li c literature may also be fo und in the language of sec ul ar baroque poetry: ge min ate consona nts (Trucow ity y neg le pss u / c udzu Raddu ha ni , I A teprw a gu c hce plnit, / kdyz se guss porani (Gav lov ic); 3d pe rson /-parti cipl es w ith overt a uxili aries (Z iwot ta k cz istotneg c hwa li ges t zas lu zil (Se lecky)), co ntrac ted fe minine loc. sg. Adj ecti ves w ith stem-fi nal palatals (Napomaha k pravde, / V negchitregsi zrade / Sv u ukazuge moc nost (Benicky)), etc. T he lingui sti c di ffe rences arising fro m c hrono log ica l d ive rgences betwee n sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c li teratu re onl y in vo lve detail s, mainl y in stances whe re poets use such language e le me nt s as had already bee n lost or had not yet e merged in Catho li c literature. Thus, fo r instance, H. Gav lov ic used both -om and -um as masc uline nomin al dat. pl. endings, although the latte r fo rm s had already been lost in Cath olic literature by around the l 750's (De n Sed/akom a Noc ia kom I negw ic pos luhu ge, / to Sowa w cy me ry zac ke m / slu ssne oznamuge - Prez ce ly de n Walac h chodi , / a malo spi w nocy, / By mohe l bit proti wlkum I owcam na pomocy) . The masc uline loc. pl. ending -och had already appea red by Beni cky's tim e, sli ghtl y ea rli er than in Catho li c literatu re (Kupcove, fl agnarkj , I V hostincoch krczmarky / Nemagf dluho spavat). Sometimes fo rm s were se lected based on the need fo r a rhy me. Thu s, in G av lov ic we do find 3rd person present forms with piehlaska, but onl y in cases where they are part of a rhyming sche me (Wssec ke wecy cas sw ug magu, / cas gest k fartovani , / Kdyz se zme ni ss c hwa litebne, / zaden te nezhani - Coko li w ge kre m potre by, / to guss stog i w zbytku , / Z bytek w sto loc h we Ike statki / vihana z pribitku). A lingui sti c analys is of sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c literature shows th at th e la nguage fo rmati on in these genres was ide nti ca l. In othe r words, the language of Catho lic lite rature was not onl y �22 SLOVAKIA religiou s. It has already been shown that the language of sec ular baroque poetry, specifically Gavlovic ' s " Pastoral School ", mostly coincides with the language of administrative-legal texts of South-Western origin. Hence it follows that comparing them with administrative- lega l texts from other regions involves in principle the comparison of different genres. And thi s in its turn makes it possible to determine whether thi s language formation was widespread in all region s of Slovakia, which is very important for its definitive identification. We studied thi s problem by comparing the concrete lin guistic features occurring in administrative- lega l texts. Then we also compared different sy nchronic stages of the "Jel sava Town Chronicle" of 15661710 (South Central Slovakia) and the 16 th - 19 th century "Levoca Formu las of Oaths" (East Slovakia) , in order to determine trends in the ir lingui stic development. A comparison of spec ific lin gui stic features from diverse admini strative-legal texts reveals interestin g features in the manifestation of linguistic processes and the di stribution of phenomena in texts of different origins. Thus, all phenomena involving the modification of the Old Czech base are manifested in different texts in the same positions, and therefore many of them were not due to the lingui stic factors contrasting all Slovak dialects with Czech. An examp le of loss is furnished by the history of the phoneme Ii i, which was re placed in all positions by the phoneme Ir/ in regional variants of admini strative-legal writings. An example of maintenance is furni shed by the old instr. sg. feminine ending -11 (- u), which began to be used in Slovak written texts as a component of Old Czech morphological structure , not only in West and East Slovak admin istrative-lega l documents, where it is supported by local dialect usage, but also in Central Slovak. This shows that processes manifested in the written language spread into other reg ions from an epicentre. This examp le is especially interesting, as the Central Slovak ending -ou is formally identical to the new Czech ending -ou from the diphthong ization of - 11 (mezi Mikulasem Kowacze[m] a druhu osobu Matronu Elzbetu �SLOVAKIA 23 Haylowich /1658, Dojc, W es t Slo vakia/; Roli czku ... zo psseniczu posal ( 1728, Spi s, East Slovaki a); vsak z mu matku na vinicu ko mne chodivala zvadzat ( 1728, Krupina, Central Slovakia) 13. Some instances of doublets occur in South-West Slovak admini strati ve -lega l tex ts. As a rule , one member of such pair occurs more frequently , and may be considered the unmarked form. All the invariant feature s of these texts occur in non-South-Western administrative-legal documents Features with doubl et forms show both variants in non-SouthWestern texts, or, less frequ e ntly , only the unmarked variant. " Reg ional variants" had the function of doublets, which differentiated indivisible lan guage formations , but did not separate them into inde pe ndent lingui stic units. Thus, for example, the masc uline and ne ute r oblique adjective case form s with -e- in the endings, the only poss ible variant in South-West Slovak administrative-legal texts (ze Sa czcinskeho trhu spolem issly ( 1725 , Skalica)), also occurred in NorthWest Slovak (ta cesta od kamenneho Snehu na Polianku ( 1633, Pruske)) , North Central Slovak (za Radu Slowutneho a Oppatrneho muze Pana Tomassa Sk/adaneho 11649, Rufomberok/) , South-Central Slovak (pana knam milostiweho a /askaweho ( 1570, Banska Stiavnica)) and East Slovak (stegto strany Yarku mlinskeho /1658 , Sari s - Zemplfn/) texts. Side by side with these form s, their regional variants are also used in non-South-Western texts, e.g., the diphthongs -ie- (pre sirotky zu stale nebohyeho Samuela /166 I , Rufomberok/), -f- (-i-; (Pozdraweni y g iniho mnoho dobriho /1622 , Ban ska Stiavnica/), -o(Agnieha Istvana Radomskoho sestra /1608, Sari s - Zemplfn/). These features, mainl y typical of South-Weste rn written texts, may be seen as invariants, based on their genera l di stribution . Invariants on the level of concrete linguistic elements are always attested in South-Western texts, and therefore the lan guage of South-West administrative- '-' A lthough the M odern Czech and Slovak - ou endings are forma ll y identica l , they constitute the endpoints of two different hi storica l processes : Czech -ou is the reflex of th e diphthongisation of *- u resulting from th e denazali za ti on. fo ll owed by contraction. of * -ojQ ( * -11 < * -oju < * -ojQ). whereas Slovak -ou is simply the refl ex of contracti on. wi th subsequent denazali zati on. of * -ojQ (-ou < * -OQ < * -ojQ). �SLOVAKIA 24 lega l tex ts is genera ll y in varia nt by com pari so n to texts from other reg ion s of Slovakia. The o bvious fact th at Catholic literature and sec ul ar baroque poetry were based o n South-West Slovak dialects shows th at the sa me lin g ui st ic fo rmat io n functioned in a ll kinds of writte n texts, and was widespread in a ll region s of Slovakia. Thu s, the so-ca ll ed c ultural la ng uages were not indepe nde nt lingui stic formations. Firstly , no compl ete li st of distinct features can be revealed for any of the m, because every indi vidu a l isog loss used to c lass ify tex ts of different ori g in s yie ld s different res ults, even of " regiona ll y- based variants" recorded in written tex ts. In other word s, the lang uage of ad mini strative-lega l texts amounts to th e sum of minor loca l var ia nts united into a who le, w itho ut any tran s iti o na l fo rm ation s (so-ca ll ed c ultu ra l lang uages). 14 An ana lys is of the deve lopment of the lang uage of the " Je lsava Town Chronicle" revea ls a number of facts, whi c h are extre me ly important fo r the e luc idati o n of the dynamics of the developme nt of thi s ling ui stic fo rmati o n. There were man y phe nomena in the ear li e r records, as earl y as the I 560's and I 570's , deviating from Czech norms. Firstly, we found pan-Sl ova k features , w hi c h mi g ht have penetra ted writte n tex ts in different reg ions of Slovak ia independently of o ne anothe r (the absence of the phone me Iii and the nati ve Czech diphthong ou, the jotation of lab ia l consona nts before e < *e, *~, etc.). Phe nome na on the th whole untypica l of writte n 16 century texts a lso occ urred (the consiste nt occ urre nce of th e phoneme dz < *dj, for ms bo th with and without j before i in word-initial position, etc .). A few features, howeve r, we re o bviously Centra l Slovak (the diphtho ngs -uo- and -ie-, o < stron g * b , masculine and neuter nomina l in str. sg . forms in -om, masc uline and ne uter possess ive adjecti ve gen. sg. fo rms in -ho, etc .). Adj ecti ves w ith -ie- in the ir endin gs are th e most important, because they simulta neo us ly de mo nstrate th e break w ith the Old Czech writ14 K.McCone and D. Mathews describe similar se ts of probl ems in defining Middle Iri sh and Middle Engli sh respec tively. See Kim McCone. The Early Irish Verb (M aynooth , 1987) , pp. 18 1- 183 and Dav id M atth ews , (U ni versity Park , PA , 2000), pp. 1- 14. �SLOVAKIA 25 ten tradition and show th at some standardi sation processes were carried through in the la nguage of written Central Slovak texts, because these forms have the monophthong iii in South Centra l Slovak dia lects, including Je lsava. At the same time, whi le generall y ac knowl edg ing the impl e mentation of standardi sation processes in the Central Slovak dialects, it should be stated that they were rather weak, due to the occ urre nce of a numbe r of loca l features in the written tex ts. These inc luded, e.g., the almost total loss of the sy llabi c so nant r, the c han ge of ou into 6, primarily attested in the instr. sg . forms of feminine noun s and adjectives, the c hange of c into s, and the appearance of a afte r ve lars, etc. Some features may be found in late 16 th a nd early I 7'h ce ntury texts, which may be described as the rea li sation of two contradictory te ndencies: the wea kness of the loca l c harac te r of record s, because dialectal ele me nt s were lost in the respec tive la nguages (the restoration of sy llabic r, the loss of Gerner features ia < ie and s < c, etc.), and the increas ing occurre nce of features from the Trnava written tradition (the losses of the phoneme /dz/, masc uline and neuter adjectival form s with e in the e ndin gs, a nd di alecta l forms of I-participle bel/biel, etc.). In the I 630 's - I 650's the popul ation of Je lsava accepted th e Counter-Refo rmation , whic h was reflected in the language of the town chronicle. The first te nde ncy we named was modified , because the occ urrence of most of the already exist in g Ce ntral Slovak features in creased , but no new feat ures of Central Slovak orig in appeared in the texts. The second te ndency - followin g the Trnava written tradition - was maintained. The second tendency predominated until the earl y I 8 th ce ntury. W e may therefore conclude that over the whole hi story of th e "Je lsava Town Chronicle", its lang uage gradually adapted to Be rnol ak 's codification of Slovak literary la nguage, and not to Stur' s, as we mi ght ex pect based on the Central Slovak origin �26 SLOVAKIA of th ese texts. 15 The development of the language of the " Levoca Formulas of Oaths" was essentiall y similar: there is an early stratum of Polish di alectal feature s in the texts (e.g., plosive g and the Poli sh reflexes of the *tort formula) , with a layer of East Slovak ones (e.g., the vowe l e < * and reflexes of assibilated t' and d) superimposed. Over time, however, they were lost, because they could not res ist competition from pan-Slovak and West Slovak feature s, which beca me obvious in the early 18 th century, not long after the Counter-Reformation . 16 It is very important to note th at the lan guage of administrativelega l texts was common for both Catholics and Lutherans, in contrast to Catholic literature and secular baroque poetry. The language of popular poetry was also common to both Catholics and Lutherans, and it was on the whole also based on the SouthWestern written tradition. Specifically, however, it was characterised by a very fluid structure, because thi s lin guistic formation in such writings was contrasted to Literary Czech or some Slovak dialect, depending on the genre or contents of the respective verses. Consequently , Czech feature s, atypica l of the Slovak written tradition , penetrated the language of hi storical verse (for instance , the " Book of Verses" (East Slovaki a, 1751 ), or J . Bruk ' s manuscript co ll ectio n (Orava, North Central Slovaki a, 1794) or occasional poetry (for in stance , congratulation from the J. Lany manu script co ll ec tion , late 18th century). And conversely, a number of dialectal features are found in styli sed folksongs (e.g., the D. Kubik collection (Priev idza, Central Slovakia, 1791 )). From the early l 800's a number of Central Slovak feat ures occur in a variety of verses (for examp le, in J. Koll ar 's " Folksongs", the M. M. Krizan collection (Trencfn County, North-West Slovakia, 1839, etc.), which we consider a s ign of the 15 See in detail K[ o nstantin] V. Li fa nov, "Evoljucia j azyka " Je lsavskoj gorodskoj kni g i" 1566- 17 10 gg. i t. naz. Kul\urnyj sred nes lov ac kij j azyk", Zeitschrift filr Sla- wische Philologie. Bd. 58 , Heft I, 1999, pp. 151 - 170. See Ko nsta ntin V Lifanov , Genezis slovatskogo literaturnogo iazyka. LIN CO M 16 St udi es in Slavic Lingui sti cs, 2 1 (Muenchen , 200 I). pp. 163- 170. �SLOVAKIA 27 emergence of a spec ific language , the Centra l Slovak folklore koine, based on North Centra l Slovak di alects. Another sign of thi s phenomenon is the nature of the lingui sti c changes whi ch we find in manuscript copies of the folk songs (for instance, in J. Boczko 's collections fro m Banska Sti av ni ca ( 1830-1 83 1) and J. Jamri ch Junior 's from Gerner ( 1832-1 833)). These copyists were South Central Slovaks by birth , but when they copied songs from the second part of Koll ar 's "Slovak Secul ar Fo lksongs fro m Hun gary" , they gave preference to North Central Sl ovak features. 17 The purest vari ety of the Central Slovak fo lkl ore koine fun ctioned in North Central Slovaki a, and a written form is fi xed in the S.B. Hrobo n manu sc ript collecti on (S ielni ca, Liptov County, No rth Central Slovaki a, 1841 ). Its penetrati on into South Central and West Slovaki a (it did not influence the language of East Slovak folk songs, or minimall y so) took the form of infiltration of some its features. Later the Central Slovak folklore koine turned into a poetic koine, when it began to used in popular poetry as we ll , over the who le territory of Slovaki a (e.g., the verses of J. Szent-Kereszty ( I 822, of So uth Central Slovak ori gin ), the "Samlungen" manu script collection (Trnava, West Slovaki a, 18 17), the Eastern Slovak lawye r F. Balogh's translation of Hungari an poet Y.M. Csokonai' s verse (earl y 1800 's), and not just in the styli zations of folksongs. The Central Slovak fo lkl ore ko ine also penetrated the " hi gh" poetry of Luthera n poets, who had prev iously written in Czec h. The fi rst such works - three verses by S. Chalupka - were published in G . Fejerpataky' s Alm anac in 1834. At first thi s process was also mani fested in the sty li zati ons of folk songs, but in contrast to the popular poetry, it totall y o usted the prev io us lin gui stic system (the Czec h language). Later on it spread into other genres of hi gh poetry (the hymnal song "Nitra, Dear Nitra" was publi shed in the first volume of 17 Konstantin Lifa nov . " Stredos love nske basni cke ko ine pred l.'.. Stu rom", Slovenska rec. 60. 11 0. 5-6. 1995. pp. 264-28 1. �28 SLOVAKIA " Nitra" Almanacs in 1842). 18 Some previously known facts, also ascertained in the process of our study and analyzed by using sociolingui stic concepts, have made it poss ible to offer a ne w view of the origin and the sub seq uent development of the Slovak literary language. Thus, the lingui stic formation functionin g in Catholic literature, sec ul ar baroque poetry, admini strati ve-l ega l tex ts, popular poetry , etc. had all the propert ies of a literary lang uage, and may be called the "Old Slovak Literary language." As the lin gui stic material shows, it had started to take shape from the 1630 's on as a result of its developing di vergence from Literary Old Czech. Its epicentre was West Slovaki a. After the Battl e of Mohacs ( 1526), the capital of Hun gary and the archbishop's res idence were tran sferred to West Slovaki a, to Brati slava and Trnava respectively. Later on, South-West Slovakia 's role in cultural life became even more important, because a university with its ow n printing- house was opened there. At first, lingui stic development among Catholics and Luthera ns was identical. Texts were created by adherents of both confessions according to the " review mechani sm." 19 The common deve lopment of the Old Slovak literary language, however, was ruptured in the early l 600's, when ling ui stic diverge nces among Catholics and Lutheran s arose as a result of an aggressive Counter-Reformation. 18 K[onstantin] V. Li fanov, "Formy proniknovenija sredneslovackogo folk lornogo ko ine v ste ru avtorskoj poezii (konec XVIII v. - pervaja polovi na XIX v.)" , Wiener Slawistiches Jahrbuch, Bd. 44, 1998, pp. 99- 113. 19 It is a free tran slation of the Russ ian term " mechanizm peresceta" used by V. M. Zivov. Its essence concludes in the fact th at rather strong associated bonds between elements gi ven (l iterary) bookish character to a text and corres ponding elementts of people (d ialec tal ) speec h ex isted in th e minds of creators of tex ts. In th e case of adopti on of •'foreign " literary language, its elements contrasted to elemen ts of people speech and were initiall y bookish. Thu s, the opposition between adopted literary language and nati ve dialects was only in the fu nctional sphere. See, for examp le, V . M. Zivov, " Roi] russkogo ce rkov noslavianskogo v istoriji slavjanski ch literaturn yc h jazykov" , Aktual'nyje problemy sla vjansk ogo jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1988), pp. 4998. �SLOVAKIA 29 The Old Slovak literary language continued to develop in a Catho lic environment. It went throu gh all the important stages, including a translation of the whole of the " Bible" ( 1750), th e first Slovak novel : the "Adventures and the Experiences of Young Rene" (1783) , by J.L. Bajza, and its codification by A. Bernolak. The Old Slovak literary language was studied at elementary and secondary school s in different parts of S lovakia, and even at two universities - in Trnava and Kosice.20 Slovak Catholics numbered 75 % of population when emperor Joseph II iss ued the Patent of Toleration ( 1781 ), and perceived Czech as a heretical language. In thi s connection there is no reason to assert that the literary language of S lovaks was Czech prior to Bernol ak 's codification. Slovak Lutherans yielded their positions and had to seek external support , and they found it in Czech reli gious books. As a result, they reverted to the norms of Literary Czech (more exactly, to norms of the " Kralice Bible"), but not in all genres, and di gloss ia 2 1 arose in their environment. In thi s situation Czech was perceived as the high , cultivated form of the native language , whereas Old Slovak literary lan g uage was perceived as " ordinary," and to be used only in administrative-legal texts and popular poetry . Literary Czech and Old Slovak functioned in parallel in the Lutheran and Catholic environments respectively , and Catholi cs contrasted both literary languages, and gradually perceived that some features belonged not just to different functional spheres, but to different languages. As a result a new mechanism - conversion - arose in their environment. In practice it resembled the " review mechani sm", but differed substantially, because so me features were contrasted on the nati ve rather than on the functional level. Thus, Slovak Catholics began to perce ive spec ific features of their language on the leve l of 20 See Izidor Kotulic. " Bernolakovcina a predbernolakovska kulturna slovenc in a··, Pamatnica A ntona Berno/aka (Martin 1992), pp. 81, 88. 21 See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia", Word, 15, 1959, no. 2, pp. 325-340 and Boris A. Uspenskij , Jazykovaia situacija Kijevskoj Rusi I jejo znacenije d!Ja istoriji russkogo literaturnogo jazyka (Moscow , 1983) , pp. 4-5. �SLOVAKIA 30 concrete phoneti c and morphological units, and so me fea tures as belonging to diffe rent periods. Th e situati on amon g Cath o li cs and Lutherans re ma in ed stable until the l 830 's, when the Centra l Slovak folkl ore ko ine penetrated into the sphere of hi gh poetry of Lutheran authors, and made it possible to codify a new literary language. r.. Stur made a major specific contribution by essenti all y changing the phoneti c and morpho logical syste ms of the literary language , but the lex icon fro m th e period of the Old Slovak literary language was maintained. Some features had reached the stage of con versati on (Catho lics perceived them as S lovak as opposed to Czech), and some were at the stage of rev iew (they were regarded as "booki sh/literary" (nati ve Czec h) or as ordin ary (native Slovak). The "ordinary" features codified by Stur were not accepted by Catholi cs, and they de manded that they be replaced by "booki sh" features, as was implemented in the codification of Hattala and Hodza ( 1852). SOURCES Catholic Literature P. Bajan, Sermones, 1760- 1771 (manuscript). Kamaldulska biblia, 1756-1759 (manu script). A. Macsay, Panes primatiarum aneb Chleby prwotjn (Trn ava , 171 8). D . Ma kos, Sermones, 1752- 1774 (manuscript). N. Ol ah, Ordo et ritus sanctae metropolitane ecc/esic Strigonien- sis, quibus parochi et a/ii animarum pastores in ecc/esiis suis uti debent. Viennae Austriae in aedibus Collegii caesarei, Societatis Jezu. Anno M.D.L.X. (manuscript). B. Smrtnik, Kunsst dobre umriti (Trnava, 1697). G. Vrabel, Sermones, 1766 (manuscript). �SLOVAKIA 31 Secular Baroque Poetry " Basne Petra Benickeho", Archiv starych cesko-s/oven skych /istfn , pfsomnostf a dejepisnych povodfn pre dejepis a literattiru Slovakov, Diel II. - Svazok I. (Tun::. sv . Martin, 1873), pp. 5-47. H. Gavlo vic, Wala sk a sskola mrawuw stodola (manuscript); Gerald J. Sabo, ed., Hugo/in 's Gavlo vic's Valaska skola (Co lumbus, Ohio, 1988). Stefan F Selecky, Obraz panye krasneg perem malowany, ktera maw Trnawe swoge prebiwany (manu script); Stefan F Selecky, "Obraz pani krasnej , perem malovany, ktera ma v Trnave svoje prebyvanf", Anto/6gia starsej slovenskej literattiry (Brati slava, 1981 ), pp. 522-530. Administrative-Legal Texts Inquisitiones, Skalica, 1616-1730 (manuscript). Darina Lehotska & Jozef Orlovsky , Najstarsia jelsavska mestska kniha 1566- 1710 (Martin , 1976). Listy Sta/ice IO kopijnfkov, Spis, XVII-XVIII storocie (manu- script). Mar ia Majtanova & Mil an Majtan, Krupin ski prfsne pravc (Bratislava, 1979). Missiles, Banska Stiavnica, XYI.-XYII. storocie (manu script). Obecna kniha obce Dojc, 1622-1836 (manu script). Panstvo Pruske, XVII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Pfsomnosti Sarisskej a Zemplfnskej iupy, XYII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Protocol/um mais mesta Ruiomberka, XYI.-XYII. storoc ie (ma- nuscript). Jozef Stoic, "Jazyk levocskych slovenskyc h prfsah zo XYI.-XIX. storocia", Jazyko vedny sbornfk, 5, l 951, pp. 197-247. Popular Poetry and Folksongs J. Csaplovics, Slowenske Wersse, (Pest, l 822). J. Jamrich ml. , Wselygake Rozlycne Rozprawky k zabawenf �32 SLOVAKIA zepsane, 1832- 1833 (manu script) Jan Koll ar, Narodnie spievanky, zvazok I, (Bratislava, 1953). Jan Misianik , Knii ka ry tmovni (Bratislava, 1952) . Samlungen, 18 17 (manu script). Spevnfk D. Boczka, 1830-183 1 (manu script). Lasz lo Sziklay, " Poznamky k Csokonaiho popularite v slove nskej literature," Sbornfk Filozofickej fak ulty Uni verzity Komen skeho. Philologica, 16, 1964, pp. 12 1-1 3 1. Pave l Josef Safarfk, Jan Kollar, Pjsne swetske lidu slawenskeho w Uhrach, swazek 2 (Pest, 1827). Jozef Skultety, " Literarno-hi storicke drobnost i", Slovenske pohl'ady, 17, 1897, pp. 125- 128. Zbornfk J. Bruka, 1794 (manuscript). Z bornfk M. M. Kriia na, 1839 (manuscript). Zbornfk D . Kubfka, 179 1 (manu sc ript). Zbornfk J. L any, koni ec XVIII . storocia (manu script). � SLOVAKIA 7 The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language 1 Konstantin V. Lifanov The history of the Slavic literary languages has developed rapidly over the last few decades as an independent linguistic discipline. Scholars have reviewed the objects of their study and defined them more precisely , and even attempted to develop optimal methods of research, all of which has made it possible for them to make adequate assessments of actual linguistic data, and to avoid imposing their contemporary perceptions on the past. For example, the use of socio1inguistic concepts has been very fruitful in the study of certain Sla- vic literary languages. However, many problems have so far remained uninvestigated. Thus Kretschmer, surveying the overall level of research into Slavic literary languages, declares that in spite of the amount of material that has already appeared, the processes whereby the Slavic literary languages emerged still remain to be worked out, as well as their regularities and specific features. 2 This conclusion also applies to the history of the Slovak literary language. Many texts written in Slovakia before the language was codified remain uninvestigated from the lingui stic point of view. There are hardly any comparative studies of texts of different ge nres or from different eras. Nevertheless , comparative study is the only 1 I deeply thank Professor Robert Orr and Professor M. Mark Stolarik for English corrections of this paper. 2 Anna Krechmer (Anna Kretschmer), " Sravnitel'naja istorija slavjanskich literatur- nych jazykov: Yoprosy metodologiji " , Vjestnik Moskovskogo uni vers iteta. Seria 9. Filologia. 3, I 998, p 48. �8 SLOVAKIA method that makes it poss ible to define the real status of co nc rete for ms a nd to determine, e.g., whether a give n for m is mere ly the result of a language error, because, e.g., a give n wri te r did not know the coeva l language norm , or of sty li stic variat ion arisin g from a g ive n genre of wri tin g, or a typical lin gui st ic feat ure characteristic of the Slovak written tradition as a whole. But if we cannot determine the status of concrete forms , we ca nnot qualify the essence of differe nt lang uage for mati o ns in the hi story of Slovak , a nd therefore we cannot compre he nd the process of the emergence and subseque nt deve lopme nt of the Slovak literary language eithe r. In its turn, this situation in the hi story of the Slovak literary language ope ns up the poss ibility of arbitrary interpretations, ofte n aris ing from extra lin gui st ic factors. Thus it is wide ly believed, mainly outside Slovakia, that the Slovak literary language emerged in the late 18 th century by differe ntiating itse lf from Czech , and that previous ly Slovaks had used Czech as their literary language. We may trace the sources of thi s beli ef to the concepts of some Czech lingui sts3, who did not recognize the di stinctiveness of Slovak and considered it merely a variant of a unitary Czechoslovak language. According to a seco nd view of thi s problem, which has been "official" in Slovak lingui stics since the mid- I 950 's, distinct languages - cultural West Slovak, Central Slovak, and perhaps East Slovak had emerged in Slovakia before the codificatio n of the Slovak literary language. Subsequently Bernolak 's 1787 codification was based o n c ultu ra l W est Slovak a nd Stur's ( I 840 's) on cultural Central Slovak. There is also a third view, accord in g to which the Slovak literary lang uage arose as a res ult of interact ion between the Czech literary language and Slovak (mainl y West Slovak) dialects. It was shared by ' See Albert Prazak , Dejiny spisovne slovenstiny po dobu Sturovu (Brati slava, 1922), A lbert Prazak , Cesi a Slovaci (Praha 1929) and Vaclav Yazny "Spisovny jazyk slove nsky", Ceskos lovenska vlasti veda , Rada 11, Sp isovny jazyk Cesky a s/ovensky (Praha 1936) pp. 145-2 15. �SLOVAKIA 9 many Slovak linguists from I 900-1950.4 We embarked upon the study of thi s problem without preconceptions, and intended to base all conc lusions so lely on the analysis of concrete lin gui stic material and modern literary language theory. We cannot outline our theoretical fram ework in thi s paper, and therefore we can only refer to the first chapter of our book.5 Research into the problem of the Slovak literary language should take as its starting point the 14 th century, when Old Czech began to develop into an interethnic literary lan guage in Central Europe. At the same time it also penetrated into Slovakia. Stani slav, Kiraly , & Pauliny 6 show that in Slovakia copiers of Czec h texts tried to adhere to Czech norms. Infrin gements of these norm s tended to be iso lated and accidental , and may be described as simple errors. But as early as CC 14 - 15 fo ur changes - three phonolog ical and one morpholog ical - are attested in texts quite regul arly: the loss of the phoneme Iii, the loss of jotation in labials before lel < *e, *r, the affrication oft; d ' > c, dz, and the repl ace ment of vocati ves by nominatives. These processes constitute the initial stage of development of Old Czec h in Slovaki a, and its iso lation from the language functionin g in the Czech heartland. In the first place, we studied the further deve lopme nts of th ese phenom e na in th e spiritu a l literature of Slovak Catholics. • See , for exa mple, J. Y lkolinsky (Czambel 's pseudon ym) "O '·prvej " knihe slovenskej ", Z i ve na, 2, 1885, pp 230-240 . Henri ch Bartek, "S pi sov ny j azyk slovensky", Slovenska rec. 6, 1937- 1938, pp 50-57 and l.'.udovft Novak. "Cestina na Slove nsk u a vzn ik spisovnej slovenciny ", Slovenske pohl'ady . 54, 1938, pp 105-111. 159- 173, 2 17-222, 28 1-287. 5 Konstantin V. Lifanov, Genezis slovackogo literaturnogo jazyka . LINCOM Stu - dies in Slavic Linguistics, 21 (Munich 200 I ), pp. 18-4 1. 6 Jan Stani slav . " Zur Frage der Slowazismen in den alttschechi schen Denkmalern ", Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik. Bd. I, Heft 4. 1956. pp. 58-70, Bd. II . Heft I , 1957, pp. 3751 , Peter Kiraly. Zur Frage der altesten slowak ischen Sprachdenkmdlern" , Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiaru m Hungaricae. 4, 1958, pp. I 13- 158 , Eugen Pauliny, "Zac iatky kulturneho jazyka slovenskej narod nos ti ", Jazykovedne stridie. 6, 196 1. pp. 28-39. �SLOVAKIA The re pl ace me nt of /f/ by Ir/ spread ra pidl y, alm ost over a ll S lovak wri tings , inc ludin g sp iritua l literature . By the time " Ol a.h 's Ritu a l" was tra ns lated (ca. I 550 - 1600) Iii was an obvio us, very irreg ul ar arc ha ism (proti nassy m mrskym hfJc hum ). In the re li gious treati ses of B. Smrtnik and A. Macsay , publi shed in 1697 and 171 8 res pecti ve ly, it is attes ted ma inl y in fo rm s of the ve rb ffc i , mos t probabl y as a pure ly orthographi ca l conve nti o n (Prosil ne kdy gedon Prite le sweho rikuce), but it is co mpletely absent in the manuscripts in vesti gated (the Ca ma ldul Bible ( 1756- 1759), and th e se rm ons of Mokos ( 1752- 1774), Vrabel ( I 766), and Bajan ( 1760- 177 1)). The deve lopme nt of /JI after labi a l co nso nants and before l e/ < *e, *~ was sli ghtl y di ffe re nt. The primary stages of thi s process were ide nti ca l to those in vo lved in the repl aceme nt of If/. Thus, according to Paulin /, exa mpl es of th at deve lopme nt still c lea rl y predominated in the I 5th century " Muni ch Confess ion al Formula" ( 16 fo rms with /j/ and three without), but they were refl ected incons iste ntl y as earl y as " Ol a.h 's Ritu al," as a rul e in the idi omati c fo rmul as at the end of verses (s stebau Bohe m Otcem y Duc he m Swatym bud ' cest y c hwa la na wieky wiekow. Amen). The di ffere nti ati o n betwee n genres based on the presence or absence of fo rms w ith or w itho ut /jl is characte ri sti c of later texts. Onl y fo rm s without /JI occ urred in the language of sermons, inc luding Baj an 's (tuto bude lakomec w Negwecsy potrebe), in spite of the situ ati on in hi s nati ve di a lect (Zahorsky), whe re fo rm s w ith /JI are still c urrent. However, fo rms w ith /JI re mained in the " hi ghe r" genres (in the " Bible" a nd re lig io us treati ses) and in Macsay 's la nguage they are used quite freque ntl y (T yto Pobudky ma clowek ws rdcy swem pilne vwafowati ; kri wdy net1pet1). Spec ial vocati ve for ms, and nom inati ves used as vocati ves, were lost in the maj ority of Sl ovak di alects. They were restri cted to animates in spiritual Catho li c literature (radu g se tec hd y Narod Uhersky 7 Eugen Paul iny, ·'Mnfchovska spovedna formu la" , Jazykovedny casopis. 10. no. I , 1959, p. 30. �SLOVAKIA 11 /Vrabel/ - A braham e, A braham e ne wsta hug ruky tweg na djte /Macsay/). In contrast to Literary Old Czech, anim ate noun s w ith palatal ste ms had the same endin gs as nouns with no n-palatal ste ms (chce m rect du sso kresta nska bludica /M okos/ ; Czec h du se!. It is inte resting that these were the very forms that Berno lak codi fied. The hi story of the affricates c and dz(< t'and d ') shows that new fo rm s did not always oust co mpe tin g o lde r fo rms as a res ult of the loss of the oppos ition " literary - non-literary." In thi s case the te ndency was c hanged and the literary language lost the affri cates. They were w ides pread in I 4'h - I S'h century writin gs, but o nl y iso lated examples appeared in I 8'h century Catho li c literature (strhel se weter, zrucil dom /Vrabel/) . Th ese fo ur phe no me na are c uri o us ly s imil ar: they occ urred in literary Old Czech, but onl y sporadi ca ll y, occ urring in tex ts as errors by Czec h copy ists. These fo rm s deve loped into competin g doubl ets in the Slovak writte n language. However, the affri cati on of t'and d' differed from the other phenome na, in th at it made the phonol og ica l syste m more compl ex (the phone mes ga ined an additi onal artic ul atory feature) , while the othe r phe nome na, on the contrary , s implified the system , because they in vol ved the loss of a ph one me, or a pos iti onal vari ant of a phoneme, or a gra mm ati ca l fo rm . He nce we mi ght sugges t th at ph e nome na simpli fy in g a syste m preva il in co mpetiti o n in th e earl y stage of deve lopme nt of a literary la nguage outs ide its core ethni c te rritory, but phe no me na complicatin g it do not. Thi s is also suggested by the fact that it was not until the mid- I 8'h century th at the ph one me dz < *dj pe netrated the la nguage of spiritua l li teratu re; prev io us ly it had been co nsiste ntl y repl aced by /z/, or rare ly by Id '/ (zretedlne p ot wrz uje [pa n- S lovak po twrdzuj e] to wssec ko Job; skrze pokanj z te ho sna se probud'uje [pan-Sl ovak prebudz uje] /Macsay/) . The re was an esse ntial di ffe re nce between sporadi c pheno me na and doubl ets in wri tten Old Czec h. T he latte r survived as vari ants fo r almost the who le hi story of the language of Slovak Cath o li c literature, e .g., the refl exes of so-ca ll ed regress ive uml aut, i.e., the deve- �SLOVAKIA 12 lopment of tautosyllabic -aj- to -ej- in Old Czec h, and the emerge nce of the co nso nant clu ster sr:. c haracterist ic of Old Czech and Central Slovak, from sc- (< *stj-, *skj- , a nd *sk- before fro nt vowe ls). The first phenomenon was subject to a degree of gra mmaticali zation , as may be deduced from the fac t that no n-uml au ted seq ue nces obviously predomin ated in imperati ve fo rm s (ne mess kag obratjtj se ku Pa.nu Bohu /Macsay/) , but variation in the superlati ve forms of adjectives and adverbs was maintain ed as late as the mid- 18 th century, and usage mai nl y depended on the indi vidu al taste of the respecti ve author (pod'te a pod mym stjnem odpocjwagte - eopustili nalezk i swe a cestu nagtwrdssu /the " Bible"/; krize a proti wenstwy trpezliwe znassagme - sa m Tyran ze swym negmlacssym sine m /Vrabel/). Forms w ith sc- a nd st: were used in re li g ious texts throu ghout the pe ri od covered by the research , regardl ess of the orig ins of their authors (gegjho pak narozenj cas gesste oppodal byl - Pridrzme se th gessce S. Paw la /Macsay/). It was onl y in mid- I 8 century sermon s that th e tendency towards regional differentiation of th ese forms e merged: Makos used on ly fo rms with st:, following hi s nati ve Cen- tral Slovak dial ect (kazani takow i mestiane bi zas lu zili ), while Bajan, from Western Slovakia, mostly used forms w ith sc- (kde tenkrat bude Utociisscie hri ssniku). The process of for mati on of lin gui stic norms, which mu st have ex isted , may be observed from the lin gui st ic mate ri al th at ca n be g leaned from the written records. The occ urre nce of nati ve Czech and nati ve Slovak for ms in texts was not random, but governed by certain rules: firstl y the primary literary and non-literary fo rms arose, the n the primary non-literary form usuall y ousted the primary literary one. These processes, however, were subject to the princ ipl e of flexibl e stability8, whereby they were impl e me nted sy nchroni ca ll y, and thu s co ntinuity was ma intain ed be tween th e written languages of diffe re nt epoc hs. Thus, the fo ll ow in g new phe nomena, untypi ca l of " Yi lem Matezius ( Yi lem Matesius), ·'O neobchodimosti stab il'nost i litera turnogo jazyka" . Praiskij lingvisticeskij krniok (Moskva. 1967). p. 38 1 �13 SLOVAKIA earlie r writings, are attested in the tran slation of the "Ol ah Ritual ": □ unco ntracted forms of the gen., dat. and loc. sg. of femi nine adjecti ves e ndin g in fun ctional non -pa lata l conso na nts o usted the corresponding co ntracted forms (podl e tagneg radd y otcowskeg a dobrotiweg wu le twey); □ there was vari ation betwee n the nati ve Czech in str. forms of the pronouns ty and seba with the root vowe l o, a nd the nat ive Slovak ones with the root vowe l e, but the native Slovak forms prevailed (s steba u Bohe m otcem y s Duchem Swatym - s tobou bohem Ot- cem s Duchem Swatym); □ both the short and lon g forms of participl es were used as predi cati ves (za hrj c hy nasse vcinen gest - kterjmz to byl zapaleny proti nassy m mrskym hrjchum), etc. Some phe nome na are first attested in the lang uage of Smrtnik's re li gious treati se: □ the an im ate ge n.-acc. plural (Wide l pyssycych se A nge luw; cf. "Olah Ritua l": ze sy pro nas lidj hrjssne vkri fo wany) ; □ a n epenthetic vowel in masc uline forms of the /-participl e of consonant ste ms (polozil ho na Oltari na hranjcy drew a wstahe / ru ku ; cf. a n examp le fro m " Olah 's Ritu a l": z nes / zuriwy hnew otce tweho wecneho) ; □ the gramm ati ca li zation of piehlask a9 , prese rved in so me form s and lost in others, e.g., it is preserved in participial and verba l adverbia l endings, but beginning to be lost in present verb forms (gako Rewy we wykwjtagicy Winnicy; smegjce se pobij za k bytwe; pred Ssediwinamj wassymj Ml ads sy hore powstawagj - Dijtky zros- 9 Pieh/iska denotes the series of comprehensive progressi ve vowe l changes, unique to earl y Czech within Slavic. which was ori ginall y manifested co nsisten tl y in the morphology. but later reduced due to analogical pre ssures. Basically, it involved the frontin g and raising of vowels after origin ally soft consona nts. e. g .. u/ice < * ulica. biicho < * br ·ucho. see. e. g .. Miroslav Komarek. Historicka mluvnica ceski. 1: Hlis k os l ovf (Praha. 1962). pp. 62-66, I 15-118 , 153; 1964: 17, 18. 54; Charl es Townsend & Laura Janda. Common and Comparati ve Slavic (Indi ana 1996), pp. 9 192. I 6 I. I 63 , 272. �SLOVAKIA 14 tie wchazagu do sklepu); □ the spread of the genitive of the pronoun onilony to the acc., with both forms used as variants (pi su ge y pro tebe - prikazal aby se zem otewrela a za ziwa gych pozrela), etc. The majority of the features peculiar to the language of spiritual literature spread in the first half of the 18 th century. These trends are shown in the lan guage of Macs ay's religious treatises, which a lso contains the following further innovation s: □ masculine loc. pl. forms in -och (zalezelo to znamenj na skut- koch geho zazracnych; cf. nenj wskutcych miloserdenstwj (Smrtnik)); □ the dat. , loc. and instr. pl. of noun s such as kost' fo ll ow the pattern of ulice/iena (pri ledagakyc h wecech se zabaw ugu - a w smetach hrjchuw lezite); □ the spread of the loss of sy llabic sonants in abso lute word- final position , apart from /-participles, where this process took place earlier (Ale o Swaty Otce wyswet li vmysl twug - gakz ty s wilozjl smyse/ geho), etc. However, some Czech elements were very stable and were used almost universally: □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position , in contrast to Slovak i- (gako by mluwil a prisahal gim ("The Bible"); □ velar/alternations in the dat/loc. sg. of feminine nouns (Zadag- jcymu wodi mleka dala a na ssalce knj zatskeg podala ("The Bible") and in the nom pl. of adjectives agreeing with animates (A le zase pocali synowe Yzrahelsty ciniti zle weci ("The Bible"), etc. These processes obviously demon strate the modification of Old Czech as it was transformed into a standardised written language. Its structure consisted of native Czech and native S lovak elements used according to fairly strict rules. Such phenomena, maintained in Slovak, but lost in contemporary Literary Czech, are direct evidence of its clear connection to Old Czech. Apart from analogical doublets in literary Old Czech and in the language of Slovak Catholics, these are as follows: �SLOVAKIA □ 15 the preservati o n of the auxili ary in 3rd person verb fo rm s of the /- parti c ipl e un til the mi d- I 8 th century (a kralostwy sweho nekoncene ho pocatek gest ucinil (Mokos); ze ges t guz pri dwerac h wibehei protj ne mu / Baja n/); suc h fo rm s were co mpl ete ly lost in S lovak di alec ts by abo ut the I 5th ce ntury1°, and they were very ra re in Czec h writings by the 16 th century; 11 □ the e ndin g -u/-ti in the inst. sg. of fe minine noun s and adjec- ti ves, and also so me personal pronouns, in all works of Catho lic literature, inc ludin g authors of Central Sl ovak o ri g in , altho ugh they do not ac tu all y occ ur in Central Slovak (S krotite le Sweta A lexand ra M ladeho kw itnu cj ho strilku swu ra nil a; Pod se mnu odegdi (S mrtni k)); □ no d iphthongs apart from uo in the "Ol ah Ritu al", partic ul arly in Smrtni k 's re li g io us treati se, whi c h co ntinu es th e s itu ati o n in Literary Old Czec h (Oleg obmekssuge kuoie (S mrtni k)); □ gemin ates in the same words as in Literary O ld Czech (podle tagneg raddy Otcows keg /Olah/), etc. The language of S lovak Catho li c literature, howeve r, was indepe nde nt. It deve loped accordin g to its ow n rul es, in co ntrast to those of Old Czec h and Slova k di alec ts. Spec ific processes e merged rapidly, e.g., th e above- me nti o ned grammati ca li zati on of piehlask a, plus the follow ing: □ most masc uline no un s have gen. pl. fo rm s in -u w, whi ch is absent fro m Slova k di alects, and was lost in literary Czech (odwede l od rodiczuw, od prateluw /Vrabel/); □ an oppos iti o n between fe minin e adj ectives with ste m-fin al no n-palata l a nd ste m-fi na l palatal co nso na nts, beca use th e latte r fo rm s also had contracted gen. , dat. a nd loc. fo rm s (V < *Vj V; Mlc zim , abi ch w dnessny (< *-j-) Reczy meg d luhy ne bil /Bajan/), whil e the fo rmer had uncontracted fo rms; □ Ill 11 the de limi tati on of gen. and acc. pl. fo rms of animate nouns as Rudolf K rajcov ic, Nacrt dejfn slovenskeho jazyka (Bratislava, 197 1) p. 143 A rn ost L amprec ht, Dusan Slosar & Jaros lav Bauer, Historicka mlu vnice cestiny (Praha, 1986), p. 244 �SLOVAKIA 16 observed in Macsay ' s lan guage, and in the language of the " Bible" (ge n.: okolo deset ti syc uw wseckych sy lnych a udatnych Muiuw; acc.: kdiz zachwatili dwoch mu iti s knjzat Madyanskych /th e " Bible"/); □ the appearance of spec ial gen. sg. forms of the pronouns ty and seba, with -o- in the root (a le podobne wecy pro sobe od druheho slissetj pohrdagj (S mrtnik)), etc. Many native Slovak elements in the language of Slovak Catholic literature were pan-Slovak, but some of them directly indicate the region of Slovakia which played the main role in the formation of the Slovak written tradition : West Slovak. This is espec iall y true of features that do not occur in other Slovak dialects, primarily Central Slovak, such as , e.g.: □ diphthongs tended to be lost; □ -e in the endings of adjectives with a ste m-fi nal pal atal (ni c nad neho neni twrdsseho /Mokos/; Czech t vrdsfho; North Central Slovak tvrdsieho, South tvrdsiho/tvrdsiho) ; □ non-contracted gen. , dat. , and acc . forms (in the latter case if agreeing with animate noun s) of masc uline and neuter possessive adjectives (abich guss kpredsewzeti mogemu mluwil /Mokos/; Czech memu; Central Slovak m 6jmu); □ epenthetic -e- in masculine /-part iciples (Ce ntral Slovak -o-; a do stawu sweg Boskeg milosti pren esel /Mokos/; Czech pienes /; Central Slovak preniesol) , etc. D moreover, many native Czech e lements remained unchan ged, because they also occur in West Slovak as a whole, or in its SouthWestern subdial ects, e.g.: D the sequence rot- as a reflex of Common Slavic c ircumflex *6rt- (aby rostlo nany Hlozj a Trnj (S mrtnik ); Czech and Wes t Slovak rostlo; Central Slovak nistlo); □ the vowel e as a refl ex of Common Slavic strong *b (a gedna zadruhu wen zkostola wichazali /Mo kos/ ; Czech and West Slovak ven; Central Slovak von ); D the ending -em in the loc. sg. of masc uline and neuter adjec- �17 SLOVAKIA ti ves (aby na hrobowem kamenj tyto slowa wy kresatj dali /M acsay/ ; Czech and West Slovak hrobovem ; Centra l S lovak hrobovom ); □ the endin gs -e and -owe in the no m. pl. of anim ate no un s (nadto y pry tele daleko od stupili od ne ho /the " Bible"/ ; mn ozy p atriarcho we, mnozy kni zata a w udcowe /V rabel/; Czech p hite le , patriarchove, vudcove; West S lovak prate/e, patriarchove, vodcove; Central Slovak priatelia, patriarchovia, vodcovia) , etc. The typical West Slovak elements occ urring in Catho li c literary texts were as fo ll ows: □ the lack o f sy ll abic sonants from ori gin al sequences of conso- nants plus b i b + I (iluc Draku w gest wino geg ich (Smrtnik); Czech i luc; Central Sl ovak i lc; the isogloss was located on the territory o f South-Western (Trnava) di alects); □ the instr. sg. e ndin g -e m in masc uline and ne uter no un s (A sed'e la pod strom em palmowym, ktery m enem gey m sa menowal /the " Bible"/ ; Czec h, Zahorak, and some adj acent Trn ava di alec ts stromem, jmeneml m enem ; Central Slova k and other Wes t S lovak di alects have -om : stromom , menom), etc. Althou gh thi s lin g ui stic form ati on does di splay territori a ll ybased di alect di vergences, mai nl y in sermons, di alectal fea tures have not totall y submerged its characteri sti c pan-di alectal elements. If we compare the lin gui stic structures of Slovak Catholic literature and Berno lak 's codifi cation, we may conc lude that the codi ficati on was not somethin g new in princ iple. Nati ve Czec h fea tures occurring in , e.g., both the language of Slovak Catho li c literature and Berno lak's codifi cati on, clearl y de mo nstrate the c lose co nnec ti on between the two. These features are as fo llows: □ contracted fo rm s of possess ive adjecti ves (m eho, etc.) ; □ dat. sg. fo rms of ori g in all y soft-stem neuter noun s, whi ch d is- pl ay the refl exes of the ceska p fehlask a, i.e., u>i (srdci); □ □ neuter noun s endin g in -nf (stawaiif); parti c ipl es and verba l ad verb s w ith pieh/aska in suffixes ( wolag icf, wolagic); □ the I" person subjuncti ve of by t' in -ch, incl ud in g co mpoun d �SLOVAKIA 18 conjunctions (e.g., abich); □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position (gim), etc. The material being analyzed shows that the language of Catholic literature had many features characteristic of a literary language. It was cultivated, selective, functionally homoge neous, and essentially supra-dialectal. For its definitive identification as such , it needs to be ascertained whether it was only a religious style or multifunctional , and whether it was widespread over the whole of Slovakia. In order to answer the first question we compared the language of Catholic literature to the language of secular baroque poetry , based on the following texts: P. Benickfs [original] "Slovak Verses" ( 1652), S.F. Selecky ' s " Pen Portrait of a Beautiful Lady" ( 170 I), and H. Gavlovic's "The Pastoral School " ( 1775). The language of secular baroque poetry generally coincides with the lan guage of Catholic literature. The linguistic differences in each genre are mainly based on the respective periods of composition ; and not the origins of the authors . In other words, secular baroque poetry may be grouped along with Catholic literature in accordance with its period of composition. The vowel system s of both genres may be characterised by their clear tendency to use long monophthongs instead of native Czech and Central Slovak diphthongs. The native Czech diphthong ou (orthographic au) , also attested in earlier spiritual literature, occurs only in Benicky (Spravedlivim gsaudem I Osemetnim !idem / Pracuje gich chitrost (Benicky); moudrost y cest geho /Olah/ ; Strach Saudu a Ostrost Sudce (Smrtnik)). It is absent from 18 th century works , however, regardless of genre. In contrast to Catholic literature, other diphthongs occur sporadically in the language of Benicky and Gavlovic : the former has two examples of -ia- , and the latter nearly ten of -ie-, and perhaps one example of -iu- (Neb size Rodiczke / Kliatby Materynske / Prinasegj pokuty (Benicky) ; Spiwala sy gedna baba : mam penazy dgessku, I su do zeme zakopane, / newim w kterem br- geiku /Gavlovic/; A gak pangu penezitu, / musiss geg sluziti , / Gak chudobnu budess w dome / dwe chudoby miti (Gavlovic). These phe- �SLOVAKIA 19 nomena may be described as deliberate violations of norm. 12 The wholesale remodelling of the front/back contrast in the vowel system due to the gradual reduction of pieh/aska provides another substantial feature common to secular baroque poetry and Catholic literature. The grammaticalization of piehJaska may also be observed in the language of secular baroque poetry, generally identical to similar processes in the language of Catholic literature. This convergence is manifest in the stability of some grammatical forms , variation in others, and even in the total loss of some forms with piehlaska Thus, participial and verbal adverb endings are the most stable (Had kuzy svu zvleka, / Orlyce z daleka / Letagicz pera pusty (Benicky); czistotu woniczy proto smim potwrdit (Selecky); Ktery mlcy , ku mluweni , / pricynu magice, I Wiceg cyni, nezli zwitas / zamky walagice (Gavlovic). In contrast, at an early stage 3 rd person forms without piehlas- ka began to be replaced by forms with piehlaska and a stage where forms both with and without coexist occurs in the language of Ben icky, which chronologically corresponds to the language of Smrtnik (Nebo u susedu / Pekagj chleb z medu, / Take pryslovy byva - Saty ozdobene, I Czinicz telo pisne / Molove prei iraju (Benicky)). As in the language of Catholic literature, forms with pieh/aska are absent from the language of F. Selecky and H. Gavlovic (Mnozy tez zadagu wzacznost smichu widjet (Selecky); Ne ze zeme, ale z Judi / wiros- tagu zlosti , / Puwod magu w marnych Srdcach I z nedobreg wlchkosti (Gavlovic). The convergence of the main linguistic features of Catholic literature and sec ular baroque poetry also affected the morphological system. The features which have changed are as follows: □ In the language of Benicky the development of animate gen.lace. forms in the plural of nouns is fixed at a stage where both nom./acc. and gen.lace. forms occur. The translation of "Olah ' s Ritual," in which the original nom ./acc. forms are still consistent, repre- 12 See Ian Muk arfovsk ii (Jan Mukai'ovsky), ·"Literaturn yj jazyk i poeticeskij jazy k", Praiskij lingvisticeskij kruiok (Moskva, 1967), pp. 407-408. �SLOVAKIA 20 sents an intermediate stage and the treati se of B. Smrtnik refl ects the e ndpoint of thi s process: the re are no nom ./acc. forms in Selecky and Gavlovic at all (Mas lj se so uditj , / Mu sis svedky mitj , / Tak bude vec vihrana - Yzlast gestlis na vogne / Drz vogak u v s ilne / Czastim napominanim (Benicky); Ked bi g ih ranjenych ona htje la hog it (Se lecky) ; A Kato mu odpowedel : / Nemluw mi nic wice, / bil by zazrak, kdyby zhryzly / Sswabuw nohaw ice (Gavlovi c); □ the loss of the spec ial acc. forms of the pe rso nal pronoun oni/ony (here both Benicky and Smrtnik have doubl ets, and they may be contrasted on the one ha nd with "Ola.h 's Ritual ," the point of departure, and on the other hand , to a ll other writin gs attesting to the e nd of the process (Magj peczet daty , / 0 to se staraty , / Aby ge ginsy stihat - Darmo konom hv yzdat / Kdyz g ich mas napagat / gestlj ze sam nepi ge (Benicky); Prirownam g ich k oczam soko la draheho (Selec ky); Proto wzacny karbunkulu s / y drahe kameni , / ze g ich zridka uhlidame, / w hognosti g ich ne ni (Gav lovic); □ the replace ment of primary forms of /-participles with ste m- fin a l sy ll a bic sonants by forms with epenthetic -e- (Benicky and " Ol a.h 's Ritual " have only forms with sy llabic sonants, they still predomin ate in Smrtnik , whi le 18 th century writings, including the works of Selec ky and Gavlovi c (Zes ze statku panskeho / Zbohatl, v kratky cas / vezme ti to Pan zas (Be nicky); jakbi u kralowneg lasku bil dosahel (Se lec ky ); A Pan os la se u/eke/, / osla dal zabiti, / Tak osel, chtic las ku ziskat, / strati I ziwobiti (Gav lovi c)) have only innovatio ns, etc . The following phenome na may be termed stabl e : □ The consiste nt preservation of alternations in nom . pl. adj ec- tives agree in g with animate noun s (Tak pansty dvorane I Yak nahl e pan vstane / Nec h zanim postupu g u (Benicky); ked by ta czi czerti pgek ni bil y w pe kl e (Se lecky); Nazy na Swet prich adzame / ze ziwota Matk i, / Neprinassame ze sebu / penize a statki (Gavlovic); □ masc uline a nd ne ute r in str. sg. forms in -em (Ne b czasta pri saha / Ciasem dopomaha / ze zustava lhar vetsy (Be ni c ky); nebo s ak samitem okrasle na bi wa (Se lec ky) ; Zena mu fov i ukl ady / z placem spu sob uge, / Geho mi se l vsse li ga kim / s pu s obe m probu ge �SLOVAKIA 21 (Gavl ov ic); bych (Chtje l bih mnihe m zostat, rad bih giste wgedj e l (Selecky); Y kosselu bych predala, / vssak se mu za bo□ th e subjun cti ve in gim, I Kdyz se trochu podnapi gem, / ce la neobstog im (Gav lov ic), etc. Sporadic phe nome na simil ar to those in the language of Catho li c literature may also be fo und in the language of sec ul ar baroque poetry: ge min ate consona nts (Trucow ity y neg le pss u / c udzu Raddu ha ni , I A teprw a gu c hce plnit, / kdyz se guss porani (Gav lov ic); 3d pe rson /-parti cipl es w ith overt a uxili aries (Z iwot ta k cz istotneg c hwa li ges t zas lu zil (Se lecky)), co ntrac ted fe minine loc. sg. Adj ecti ves w ith stem-fi nal palatals (Napomaha k pravde, / V negchitregsi zrade / Sv u ukazuge moc nost (Benicky)), etc. T he lingui sti c di ffe rences arising fro m c hrono log ica l d ive rgences betwee n sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c li teratu re onl y in vo lve detail s, mainl y in stances whe re poets use such language e le me nt s as had already bee n lost or had not yet e merged in Catho li c literature. Thus, fo r instance, H. Gav lov ic used both -om and -um as masc uline nomin al dat. pl. endings, although the latte r fo rm s had already been lost in Cath olic literature by around the l 750's (De n Sed/akom a Noc ia kom I negw ic pos luhu ge, / to Sowa w cy me ry zac ke m / slu ssne oznamuge - Prez ce ly de n Walac h chodi , / a malo spi w nocy, / By mohe l bit proti wlkum I owcam na pomocy) . The masc uline loc. pl. ending -och had already appea red by Beni cky's tim e, sli ghtl y ea rli er than in Catho li c literatu re (Kupcove, fl agnarkj , I V hostincoch krczmarky / Nemagf dluho spavat). Sometimes fo rm s were se lected based on the need fo r a rhy me. Thu s, in G av lov ic we do find 3rd person present forms with piehlaska, but onl y in cases where they are part of a rhyming sche me (Wssec ke wecy cas sw ug magu, / cas gest k fartovani , / Kdyz se zme ni ss c hwa litebne, / zaden te nezhani - Coko li w ge kre m potre by, / to guss stog i w zbytku , / Z bytek w sto loc h we Ike statki / vihana z pribitku). A lingui sti c analys is of sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c literature shows th at th e la nguage fo rmati on in these genres was ide nti ca l. In othe r words, the language of Catho lic lite rature was not onl y �22 SLOVAKIA religiou s. It has already been shown that the language of sec ular baroque poetry, specifically Gavlovic ' s " Pastoral School ", mostly coincides with the language of administrative-legal texts of South-Western origin. Hence it follows that comparing them with administrative- lega l texts from other regions involves in principle the comparison of different genres. And thi s in its turn makes it possible to determine whether thi s language formation was widespread in all region s of Slovakia, which is very important for its definitive identification. We studied thi s problem by comparing the concrete lin guistic features occurring in administrative- lega l texts. Then we also compared different sy nchronic stages of the "Jel sava Town Chronicle" of 15661710 (South Central Slovakia) and the 16 th - 19 th century "Levoca Formu las of Oaths" (East Slovakia) , in order to determine trends in the ir lingui stic development. A comparison of spec ific lin gui stic features from diverse admini strative-legal texts reveals interestin g features in the manifestation of linguistic processes and the di stribution of phenomena in texts of different origins. Thus, all phenomena involving the modification of the Old Czech base are manifested in different texts in the same positions, and therefore many of them were not due to the lingui stic factors contrasting all Slovak dialects with Czech. An examp le of loss is furnished by the history of the phoneme Ii i, which was re placed in all positions by the phoneme Ir/ in regional variants of admini strative-legal writings. An example of maintenance is furni shed by the old instr. sg. feminine ending -11 (- u), which began to be used in Slovak written texts as a component of Old Czech morphological structure , not only in West and East Slovak admin istrative-lega l documents, where it is supported by local dialect usage, but also in Central Slovak. This shows that processes manifested in the written language spread into other reg ions from an epicentre. This examp le is especially interesting, as the Central Slovak ending -ou is formally identical to the new Czech ending -ou from the diphthong ization of - 11 (mezi Mikulasem Kowacze[m] a druhu osobu Matronu Elzbetu �SLOVAKIA 23 Haylowich /1658, Dojc, W es t Slo vakia/; Roli czku ... zo psseniczu posal ( 1728, Spi s, East Slovaki a); vsak z mu matku na vinicu ko mne chodivala zvadzat ( 1728, Krupina, Central Slovakia) 13. Some instances of doublets occur in South-West Slovak admini strati ve -lega l tex ts. As a rule , one member of such pair occurs more frequently , and may be considered the unmarked form. All the invariant feature s of these texts occur in non-South-Western administrative-legal documents Features with doubl et forms show both variants in non-SouthWestern texts, or, less frequ e ntly , only the unmarked variant. " Reg ional variants" had the function of doublets, which differentiated indivisible lan guage formations , but did not separate them into inde pe ndent lingui stic units. Thus, for example, the masc uline and ne ute r oblique adjective case form s with -e- in the endings, the only poss ible variant in South-West Slovak administrative-legal texts (ze Sa czcinskeho trhu spolem issly ( 1725 , Skalica)), also occurred in NorthWest Slovak (ta cesta od kamenneho Snehu na Polianku ( 1633, Pruske)) , North Central Slovak (za Radu Slowutneho a Oppatrneho muze Pana Tomassa Sk/adaneho 11649, Rufomberok/) , South-Central Slovak (pana knam milostiweho a /askaweho ( 1570, Banska Stiavnica)) and East Slovak (stegto strany Yarku mlinskeho /1658 , Sari s - Zemplfn/) texts. Side by side with these form s, their regional variants are also used in non-South-Western texts, e.g., the diphthongs -ie- (pre sirotky zu stale nebohyeho Samuela /166 I , Rufomberok/), -f- (-i-; (Pozdraweni y g iniho mnoho dobriho /1622 , Ban ska Stiavnica/), -o(Agnieha Istvana Radomskoho sestra /1608, Sari s - Zemplfn/). These features, mainl y typical of South-Weste rn written texts, may be seen as invariants, based on their genera l di stribution . Invariants on the level of concrete linguistic elements are always attested in South-Western texts, and therefore the lan guage of South-West administrative- '-' A lthough the M odern Czech and Slovak - ou endings are forma ll y identica l , they constitute the endpoints of two different hi storica l processes : Czech -ou is the reflex of th e diphthongisation of *- u resulting from th e denazali za ti on. fo ll owed by contraction. of * -ojQ ( * -11 < * -oju < * -ojQ). whereas Slovak -ou is simply the refl ex of contracti on. wi th subsequent denazali zati on. of * -ojQ (-ou < * -OQ < * -ojQ). �SLOVAKIA 24 lega l tex ts is genera ll y in varia nt by com pari so n to texts from other reg ion s of Slovakia. The o bvious fact th at Catholic literature and sec ul ar baroque poetry were based o n South-West Slovak dialects shows th at the sa me lin g ui st ic fo rmat io n functioned in a ll kinds of writte n texts, and was widespread in a ll region s of Slovakia. Thu s, the so-ca ll ed c ultural la ng uages were not indepe nde nt lingui stic formations. Firstly , no compl ete li st of distinct features can be revealed for any of the m, because every indi vidu a l isog loss used to c lass ify tex ts of different ori g in s yie ld s different res ults, even of " regiona ll y- based variants" recorded in written tex ts. In other word s, the lang uage of ad mini strative-lega l texts amounts to th e sum of minor loca l var ia nts united into a who le, w itho ut any tran s iti o na l fo rm ation s (so-ca ll ed c ultu ra l lang uages). 14 An ana lys is of the deve lopment of the lang uage of the " Je lsava Town Chronicle" revea ls a number of facts, whi c h are extre me ly important fo r the e luc idati o n of the dynamics of the developme nt of thi s ling ui stic fo rmati o n. There were man y phe nomena in the ear li e r records, as earl y as the I 560's and I 570's , deviating from Czech norms. Firstly, we found pan-Sl ova k features , w hi c h mi g ht have penetra ted writte n tex ts in different reg ions of Slovak ia independently of o ne anothe r (the absence of the phone me Iii and the nati ve Czech diphthong ou, the jotation of lab ia l consona nts before e < *e, *~, etc.). Phe nome na on the th whole untypica l of writte n 16 century texts a lso occ urred (the consiste nt occ urre nce of th e phoneme dz < *dj, for ms bo th with and without j before i in word-initial position, etc .). A few features, howeve r, we re o bviously Centra l Slovak (the diphtho ngs -uo- and -ie-, o < stron g * b , masculine and neuter nomina l in str. sg . forms in -om, masc uline and ne uter possess ive adjecti ve gen. sg. fo rms in -ho, etc .). Adj ecti ves w ith -ie- in the ir endin gs are th e most important, because they simulta neo us ly de mo nstrate th e break w ith the Old Czech writ14 K.McCone and D. Mathews describe similar se ts of probl ems in defining Middle Iri sh and Middle Engli sh respec tively. See Kim McCone. The Early Irish Verb (M aynooth , 1987) , pp. 18 1- 183 and Dav id M atth ews , (U ni versity Park , PA , 2000), pp. 1- 14. �SLOVAKIA 25 ten tradition and show th at some standardi sation processes were carried through in the la nguage of written Central Slovak texts, because these forms have the monophthong iii in South Centra l Slovak dia lects, including Je lsava. At the same time, whi le generall y ac knowl edg ing the impl e mentation of standardi sation processes in the Central Slovak dialects, it should be stated that they were rather weak, due to the occ urre nce of a numbe r of loca l features in the written tex ts. These inc luded, e.g., the almost total loss of the sy llabi c so nant r, the c han ge of ou into 6, primarily attested in the instr. sg . forms of feminine noun s and adjectives, the c hange of c into s, and the appearance of a afte r ve lars, etc. Some features may be found in late 16 th a nd early I 7'h ce ntury texts, which may be described as the rea li sation of two contradictory te ndencies: the wea kness of the loca l c harac te r of record s, because dialectal ele me nt s were lost in the respec tive la nguages (the restoration of sy llabic r, the loss of Gerner features ia < ie and s < c, etc.), and the increas ing occurre nce of features from the Trnava written tradition (the losses of the phoneme /dz/, masc uline and neuter adjectival form s with e in the e ndin gs, a nd di alecta l forms of I-participle bel/biel, etc.). In the I 630 's - I 650's the popul ation of Je lsava accepted th e Counter-Refo rmation , whic h was reflected in the language of the town chronicle. The first te nde ncy we named was modified , because the occ urrence of most of the already exist in g Ce ntral Slovak features in creased , but no new feat ures of Central Slovak orig in appeared in the texts. The second te ndency - followin g the Trnava written tradition - was maintained. The second tendency predominated until the earl y I 8 th ce ntury. W e may therefore conclude that over the whole hi story of th e "Je lsava Town Chronicle", its lang uage gradually adapted to Be rnol ak 's codification of Slovak literary la nguage, and not to Stur' s, as we mi ght ex pect based on the Central Slovak origin �26 SLOVAKIA of th ese texts. 15 The development of the language of the " Levoca Formulas of Oaths" was essentiall y similar: there is an early stratum of Polish di alectal feature s in the texts (e.g., plosive g and the Poli sh reflexes of the *tort formula) , with a layer of East Slovak ones (e.g., the vowe l e < * and reflexes of assibilated t' and d) superimposed. Over time, however, they were lost, because they could not res ist competition from pan-Slovak and West Slovak feature s, which beca me obvious in the early 18 th century, not long after the Counter-Reformation . 16 It is very important to note th at the lan guage of administrativelega l texts was common for both Catholics and Lutherans, in contrast to Catholic literature and secular baroque poetry. The language of popular poetry was also common to both Catholics and Lutherans, and it was on the whole also based on the SouthWestern written tradition. Specifically, however, it was characterised by a very fluid structure, because thi s lin guistic formation in such writings was contrasted to Literary Czech or some Slovak dialect, depending on the genre or contents of the respective verses. Consequently , Czech feature s, atypica l of the Slovak written tradition , penetrated the language of hi storical verse (for instance , the " Book of Verses" (East Slovaki a, 1751 ), or J . Bruk ' s manuscript co ll ectio n (Orava, North Central Slovaki a, 1794) or occasional poetry (for in stance , congratulation from the J. Lany manu script co ll ec tion , late 18th century). And conversely, a number of dialectal features are found in styli sed folksongs (e.g., the D. Kubik collection (Priev idza, Central Slovakia, 1791 )). From the early l 800's a number of Central Slovak feat ures occur in a variety of verses (for examp le, in J. Koll ar 's " Folksongs", the M. M. Krizan collection (Trencfn County, North-West Slovakia, 1839, etc.), which we consider a s ign of the 15 See in detail K[ o nstantin] V. Li fa nov, "Evoljucia j azyka " Je lsavskoj gorodskoj kni g i" 1566- 17 10 gg. i t. naz. Kul\urnyj sred nes lov ac kij j azyk", Zeitschrift filr Sla- wische Philologie. Bd. 58 , Heft I, 1999, pp. 151 - 170. See Ko nsta ntin V Lifanov , Genezis slovatskogo literaturnogo iazyka. LIN CO M 16 St udi es in Slavic Lingui sti cs, 2 1 (Muenchen , 200 I). pp. 163- 170. �SLOVAKIA 27 emergence of a spec ific language , the Centra l Slovak folklore koine, based on North Centra l Slovak di alects. Another sign of thi s phenomenon is the nature of the lingui sti c changes whi ch we find in manuscript copies of the folk songs (for instance, in J. Boczko 's collections fro m Banska Sti av ni ca ( 1830-1 83 1) and J. Jamri ch Junior 's from Gerner ( 1832-1 833)). These copyists were South Central Slovaks by birth , but when they copied songs from the second part of Koll ar 's "Slovak Secul ar Fo lksongs fro m Hun gary" , they gave preference to North Central Sl ovak features. 17 The purest vari ety of the Central Slovak fo lkl ore koine fun ctioned in North Central Slovaki a, and a written form is fi xed in the S.B. Hrobo n manu sc ript collecti on (S ielni ca, Liptov County, No rth Central Slovaki a, 1841 ). Its penetrati on into South Central and West Slovaki a (it did not influence the language of East Slovak folk songs, or minimall y so) took the form of infiltration of some its features. Later the Central Slovak folklore koine turned into a poetic koine, when it began to used in popular poetry as we ll , over the who le territory of Slovaki a (e.g., the verses of J. Szent-Kereszty ( I 822, of So uth Central Slovak ori gin ), the "Samlungen" manu script collection (Trnava, West Slovaki a, 18 17), the Eastern Slovak lawye r F. Balogh's translation of Hungari an poet Y.M. Csokonai' s verse (earl y 1800 's), and not just in the styli zations of folksongs. The Central Slovak fo lkl ore ko ine also penetrated the " hi gh" poetry of Luthera n poets, who had prev iously written in Czec h. The fi rst such works - three verses by S. Chalupka - were published in G . Fejerpataky' s Alm anac in 1834. At first thi s process was also mani fested in the sty li zati ons of folk songs, but in contrast to the popular poetry, it totall y o usted the prev io us lin gui stic system (the Czec h language). Later on it spread into other genres of hi gh poetry (the hymnal song "Nitra, Dear Nitra" was publi shed in the first volume of 17 Konstantin Lifa nov . " Stredos love nske basni cke ko ine pred l.'.. Stu rom", Slovenska rec. 60. 11 0. 5-6. 1995. pp. 264-28 1. �28 SLOVAKIA " Nitra" Almanacs in 1842). 18 Some previously known facts, also ascertained in the process of our study and analyzed by using sociolingui stic concepts, have made it poss ible to offer a ne w view of the origin and the sub seq uent development of the Slovak literary language. Thus, the lingui stic formation functionin g in Catholic literature, sec ul ar baroque poetry, admini strati ve-l ega l tex ts, popular poetry , etc. had all the propert ies of a literary lang uage, and may be called the "Old Slovak Literary language." As the lin gui stic material shows, it had started to take shape from the 1630 's on as a result of its developing di vergence from Literary Old Czech. Its epicentre was West Slovaki a. After the Battl e of Mohacs ( 1526), the capital of Hun gary and the archbishop's res idence were tran sferred to West Slovaki a, to Brati slava and Trnava respectively. Later on, South-West Slovakia 's role in cultural life became even more important, because a university with its ow n printing- house was opened there. At first, lingui stic development among Catholics and Luthera ns was identical. Texts were created by adherents of both confessions according to the " review mechani sm." 19 The common deve lopment of the Old Slovak literary language, however, was ruptured in the early l 600's, when ling ui stic diverge nces among Catholics and Lutheran s arose as a result of an aggressive Counter-Reformation. 18 K[onstantin] V. Li fanov, "Formy proniknovenija sredneslovackogo folk lornogo ko ine v ste ru avtorskoj poezii (konec XVIII v. - pervaja polovi na XIX v.)" , Wiener Slawistiches Jahrbuch, Bd. 44, 1998, pp. 99- 113. 19 It is a free tran slation of the Russ ian term " mechanizm peresceta" used by V. M. Zivov. Its essence concludes in the fact th at rather strong associated bonds between elements gi ven (l iterary) bookish character to a text and corres ponding elementts of people (d ialec tal ) speec h ex isted in th e minds of creators of tex ts. In th e case of adopti on of •'foreign " literary language, its elements contrasted to elemen ts of people speech and were initiall y bookish. Thu s, the opposition between adopted literary language and nati ve dialects was only in the fu nctional sphere. See, for examp le, V . M. Zivov, " Roi] russkogo ce rkov noslavianskogo v istoriji slavjanski ch literaturn yc h jazykov" , Aktual'nyje problemy sla vjansk ogo jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1988), pp. 4998. �SLOVAKIA 29 The Old Slovak literary language continued to develop in a Catho lic environment. It went throu gh all the important stages, including a translation of the whole of the " Bible" ( 1750), th e first Slovak novel : the "Adventures and the Experiences of Young Rene" (1783) , by J.L. Bajza, and its codification by A. Bernolak. The Old Slovak literary language was studied at elementary and secondary school s in different parts of S lovakia, and even at two universities - in Trnava and Kosice.20 Slovak Catholics numbered 75 % of population when emperor Joseph II iss ued the Patent of Toleration ( 1781 ), and perceived Czech as a heretical language. In thi s connection there is no reason to assert that the literary language of S lovaks was Czech prior to Bernol ak 's codification. Slovak Lutherans yielded their positions and had to seek external support , and they found it in Czech reli gious books. As a result, they reverted to the norms of Literary Czech (more exactly, to norms of the " Kralice Bible"), but not in all genres, and di gloss ia 2 1 arose in their environment. In thi s situation Czech was perceived as the high , cultivated form of the native language , whereas Old Slovak literary lan g uage was perceived as " ordinary," and to be used only in administrative-legal texts and popular poetry . Literary Czech and Old Slovak functioned in parallel in the Lutheran and Catholic environments respectively , and Catholi cs contrasted both literary languages, and gradually perceived that some features belonged not just to different functional spheres, but to different languages. As a result a new mechanism - conversion - arose in their environment. In practice it resembled the " review mechani sm", but differed substantially, because so me features were contrasted on the nati ve rather than on the functional level. Thus, Slovak Catholics began to perce ive spec ific features of their language on the leve l of 20 See Izidor Kotulic. " Bernolakovcina a predbernolakovska kulturna slovenc in a··, Pamatnica A ntona Berno/aka (Martin 1992), pp. 81, 88. 21 See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia", Word, 15, 1959, no. 2, pp. 325-340 and Boris A. Uspenskij , Jazykovaia situacija Kijevskoj Rusi I jejo znacenije d!Ja istoriji russkogo literaturnogo jazyka (Moscow , 1983) , pp. 4-5. �SLOVAKIA 30 concrete phoneti c and morphological units, and so me fea tures as belonging to diffe rent periods. Th e situati on amon g Cath o li cs and Lutherans re ma in ed stable until the l 830 's, when the Centra l Slovak folkl ore ko ine penetrated into the sphere of hi gh poetry of Lutheran authors, and made it possible to codify a new literary language. r.. Stur made a major specific contribution by essenti all y changing the phoneti c and morpho logical syste ms of the literary language , but the lex icon fro m th e period of the Old Slovak literary language was maintained. Some features had reached the stage of con versati on (Catho lics perceived them as S lovak as opposed to Czech), and some were at the stage of rev iew (they were regarded as "booki sh/literary" (nati ve Czec h) or as ordin ary (native Slovak). The "ordinary" features codified by Stur were not accepted by Catholi cs, and they de manded that they be replaced by "booki sh" features, as was implemented in the codification of Hattala and Hodza ( 1852). SOURCES Catholic Literature P. Bajan, Sermones, 1760- 1771 (manuscript). Kamaldulska biblia, 1756-1759 (manu script). A. Macsay, Panes primatiarum aneb Chleby prwotjn (Trn ava , 171 8). D . Ma kos, Sermones, 1752- 1774 (manuscript). N. Ol ah, Ordo et ritus sanctae metropolitane ecc/esic Strigonien- sis, quibus parochi et a/ii animarum pastores in ecc/esiis suis uti debent. Viennae Austriae in aedibus Collegii caesarei, Societatis Jezu. Anno M.D.L.X. (manuscript). B. Smrtnik, Kunsst dobre umriti (Trnava, 1697). G. Vrabel, Sermones, 1766 (manuscript). �SLOVAKIA 31 Secular Baroque Poetry " Basne Petra Benickeho", Archiv starych cesko-s/oven skych /istfn , pfsomnostf a dejepisnych povodfn pre dejepis a literattiru Slovakov, Diel II. - Svazok I. (Tun::. sv . Martin, 1873), pp. 5-47. H. Gavlo vic, Wala sk a sskola mrawuw stodola (manuscript); Gerald J. Sabo, ed., Hugo/in 's Gavlo vic's Valaska skola (Co lumbus, Ohio, 1988). Stefan F Selecky, Obraz panye krasneg perem malowany, ktera maw Trnawe swoge prebiwany (manu script); Stefan F Selecky, "Obraz pani krasnej , perem malovany, ktera ma v Trnave svoje prebyvanf", Anto/6gia starsej slovenskej literattiry (Brati slava, 1981 ), pp. 522-530. Administrative-Legal Texts Inquisitiones, Skalica, 1616-1730 (manuscript). Darina Lehotska & Jozef Orlovsky , Najstarsia jelsavska mestska kniha 1566- 1710 (Martin , 1976). Listy Sta/ice IO kopijnfkov, Spis, XVII-XVIII storocie (manu- script). Mar ia Majtanova & Mil an Majtan, Krupin ski prfsne pravc (Bratislava, 1979). Missiles, Banska Stiavnica, XYI.-XYII. storocie (manu script). Obecna kniha obce Dojc, 1622-1836 (manu script). Panstvo Pruske, XVII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Pfsomnosti Sarisskej a Zemplfnskej iupy, XYII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Protocol/um mais mesta Ruiomberka, XYI.-XYII. storoc ie (ma- nuscript). Jozef Stoic, "Jazyk levocskych slovenskyc h prfsah zo XYI.-XIX. storocia", Jazyko vedny sbornfk, 5, l 951, pp. 197-247. Popular Poetry and Folksongs J. Csaplovics, Slowenske Wersse, (Pest, l 822). J. Jamrich ml. , Wselygake Rozlycne Rozprawky k zabawenf �32 SLOVAKIA zepsane, 1832- 1833 (manu script) Jan Koll ar, Narodnie spievanky, zvazok I, (Bratislava, 1953). Jan Misianik , Knii ka ry tmovni (Bratislava, 1952) . Samlungen, 18 17 (manu script). Spevnfk D. Boczka, 1830-183 1 (manu script). Lasz lo Sziklay, " Poznamky k Csokonaiho popularite v slove nskej literature," Sbornfk Filozofickej fak ulty Uni verzity Komen skeho. Philologica, 16, 1964, pp. 12 1-1 3 1. Pave l Josef Safarfk, Jan Kollar, Pjsne swetske lidu slawenskeho w Uhrach, swazek 2 (Pest, 1827). Jozef Skultety, " Literarno-hi storicke drobnost i", Slovenske pohl'ady, 17, 1897, pp. 125- 128. Zbornfk J. Bruka, 1794 (manuscript). Z bornfk M. M. Kriia na, 1839 (manuscript). Zbornfk D . Kubfka, 179 1 (manu sc ript). Zbornfk J. L any, koni ec XVIII . storocia (manu script). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language 1 Konstantin V. Lifanov The history of the Slavic literary languages has developed rapidly over the last few decades as an independent linguistic discipline. Scholars have reviewed the objects of their study and defined them more precisely , and even attempted to develop optimal methods of research, all of which has made it possible for them to make adequate assessments of actual linguistic data, and to avoid imposing their contemporary perceptions on the past. For example, the use of socio1inguistic concepts has been very fruitful in the study of certain Sla- vic literary languages. However, many problems have so far remained uninvestigated. Thus Kretschmer, surveying the overall level of research into Slavic literary languages, declares that in spite of the amount of material that has already appeared, the processes whereby the Slavic literary languages emerged still remain to be worked out, as well as their regularities and specific features. 2 This conclusion also applies to the history of the Slovak literary language. Many texts written in Slovakia before the language was codified remain uninvestigated from the lingui stic point of view. There are hardly any comparative studies of texts of different ge nres or from different eras. Nevertheless , comparative study is the only 1 I deeply thank Professor Robert Orr and Professor M. Mark Stolarik for English corrections of this paper. 2 Anna Krechmer (Anna Kretschmer), " Sravnitel'naja istorija slavjanskich literatur- nych jazykov: Yoprosy metodologiji " , Vjestnik Moskovskogo uni vers iteta. Seria 9. Filologia. 3, I 998, p 48. 8 SLOVAKIA method that makes it poss ible to define the real status of co nc rete for ms a nd to determine, e.g., whether a give n for m is mere ly the result of a language error, because, e.g., a give n wri te r did not know the coeva l language norm , or of sty li stic variat ion arisin g from a g ive n genre of wri tin g, or a typical lin gui st ic feat ure characteristic of the Slovak written tradition as a whole. But if we cannot determine the status of concrete forms , we ca nnot qualify the essence of differe nt lang uage for mati o ns in the hi story of Slovak , a nd therefore we cannot compre he nd the process of the emergence and subseque nt deve lopme nt of the Slovak literary language eithe r. In its turn, this situation in the hi story of the Slovak literary language ope ns up the poss ibility of arbitrary interpretations, ofte n aris ing from extra lin gui st ic factors. Thus it is wide ly believed, mainly outside Slovakia, that the Slovak literary language emerged in the late 18 th century by differe ntiating itse lf from Czech , and that previous ly Slovaks had used Czech as their literary language. We may trace the sources of thi s beli ef to the concepts of some Czech lingui sts3, who did not recognize the di stinctiveness of Slovak and considered it merely a variant of a unitary Czechoslovak language. According to a seco nd view of thi s problem, which has been "official" in Slovak lingui stics since the mid- I 950 's, distinct languages - cultural West Slovak, Central Slovak, and perhaps East Slovak had emerged in Slovakia before the codificatio n of the Slovak literary language. Subsequently Bernolak 's 1787 codification was based o n c ultu ra l W est Slovak a nd Stur's ( I 840 's) on cultural Central Slovak. There is also a third view, accord in g to which the Slovak literary lang uage arose as a res ult of interact ion between the Czech literary language and Slovak (mainl y West Slovak) dialects. It was shared by ' See Albert Prazak , Dejiny spisovne slovenstiny po dobu Sturovu (Brati slava, 1922), A lbert Prazak , Cesi a Slovaci (Praha 1929) and Vaclav Yazny "Spisovny jazyk slove nsky", Ceskos lovenska vlasti veda , Rada 11, Sp isovny jazyk Cesky a s/ovensky (Praha 1936) pp. 145-2 15. SLOVAKIA 9 many Slovak linguists from I 900-1950.4 We embarked upon the study of thi s problem without preconceptions, and intended to base all conc lusions so lely on the analysis of concrete lin gui stic material and modern literary language theory. We cannot outline our theoretical fram ework in thi s paper, and therefore we can only refer to the first chapter of our book.5 Research into the problem of the Slovak literary language should take as its starting point the 14 th century, when Old Czech began to develop into an interethnic literary lan guage in Central Europe. At the same time it also penetrated into Slovakia. Stani slav, Kiraly , & Pauliny 6 show that in Slovakia copiers of Czec h texts tried to adhere to Czech norms. Infrin gements of these norm s tended to be iso lated and accidental , and may be described as simple errors. But as early as CC 14 - 15 fo ur changes - three phonolog ical and one morpholog ical - are attested in texts quite regul arly: the loss of the phoneme Iii, the loss of jotation in labials before lel < *e, *r, the affrication oft; d ' > c, dz, and the repl ace ment of vocati ves by nominatives. These processes constitute the initial stage of development of Old Czec h in Slovaki a, and its iso lation from the language functionin g in the Czech heartland. In the first place, we studied the further deve lopme nts of th ese phenom e na in th e spiritu a l literature of Slovak Catholics. • See , for exa mple, J. Y lkolinsky (Czambel 's pseudon ym) "O '·prvej " knihe slovenskej ", Z i ve na, 2, 1885, pp 230-240 . Henri ch Bartek, "S pi sov ny j azyk slovensky", Slovenska rec. 6, 1937- 1938, pp 50-57 and l.'.udovft Novak. "Cestina na Slove nsk u a vzn ik spisovnej slovenciny ", Slovenske pohl'ady . 54, 1938, pp 105-111. 159- 173, 2 17-222, 28 1-287. 5 Konstantin V. Lifanov, Genezis slovackogo literaturnogo jazyka . LINCOM Stu - dies in Slavic Linguistics, 21 (Munich 200 I ), pp. 18-4 1. 6 Jan Stani slav . " Zur Frage der Slowazismen in den alttschechi schen Denkmalern ", Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik. Bd. I, Heft 4. 1956. pp. 58-70, Bd. II . Heft I , 1957, pp. 3751 , Peter Kiraly. Zur Frage der altesten slowak ischen Sprachdenkmdlern" , Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiaru m Hungaricae. 4, 1958, pp. I 13- 158 , Eugen Pauliny, "Zac iatky kulturneho jazyka slovenskej narod nos ti ", Jazykovedne stridie. 6, 196 1. pp. 28-39. SLOVAKIA The re pl ace me nt of /f/ by Ir/ spread ra pidl y, alm ost over a ll S lovak wri tings , inc ludin g sp iritua l literature . By the time " Ol a.h 's Ritu a l" was tra ns lated (ca. I 550 - 1600) Iii was an obvio us, very irreg ul ar arc ha ism (proti nassy m mrskym hfJc hum ). In the re li gious treati ses of B. Smrtnik and A. Macsay , publi shed in 1697 and 171 8 res pecti ve ly, it is attes ted ma inl y in fo rm s of the ve rb ffc i , mos t probabl y as a pure ly orthographi ca l conve nti o n (Prosil ne kdy gedon Prite le sweho rikuce), but it is co mpletely absent in the manuscripts in vesti gated (the Ca ma ldul Bible ( 1756- 1759), and th e se rm ons of Mokos ( 1752- 1774), Vrabel ( I 766), and Bajan ( 1760- 177 1)). The deve lopme nt of /JI after labi a l co nso nants and before l e/ < *e, *~ was sli ghtl y di ffe re nt. The primary stages of thi s process were ide nti ca l to those in vo lved in the repl aceme nt of If/. Thus, according to Paulin /, exa mpl es of th at deve lopme nt still c lea rl y predominated in the I 5th century " Muni ch Confess ion al Formula" ( 16 fo rms with /j/ and three without), but they were refl ected incons iste ntl y as earl y as " Ol a.h 's Ritu al," as a rul e in the idi omati c fo rmul as at the end of verses (s stebau Bohe m Otcem y Duc he m Swatym bud ' cest y c hwa la na wieky wiekow. Amen). The di ffere nti ati o n betwee n genres based on the presence or absence of fo rms w ith or w itho ut /jl is characte ri sti c of later texts. Onl y fo rm s without /JI occ urred in the language of sermons, inc luding Baj an 's (tuto bude lakomec w Negwecsy potrebe), in spite of the situ ati on in hi s nati ve di a lect (Zahorsky), whe re fo rm s w ith /JI are still c urrent. However, fo rms w ith /JI re mained in the " hi ghe r" genres (in the " Bible" a nd re lig io us treati ses) and in Macsay 's la nguage they are used quite freque ntl y (T yto Pobudky ma clowek ws rdcy swem pilne vwafowati ; kri wdy net1pet1). Spec ial vocati ve for ms, and nom inati ves used as vocati ves, were lost in the maj ority of Sl ovak di alects. They were restri cted to animates in spiritual Catho li c literature (radu g se tec hd y Narod Uhersky 7 Eugen Paul iny, ·'Mnfchovska spovedna formu la" , Jazykovedny casopis. 10. no. I , 1959, p. 30. SLOVAKIA 11 /Vrabel/ - A braham e, A braham e ne wsta hug ruky tweg na djte /Macsay/). In contrast to Literary Old Czech, anim ate noun s w ith palatal ste ms had the same endin gs as nouns with no n-palatal ste ms (chce m rect du sso kresta nska bludica /M okos/ ; Czec h du se!. It is inte resting that these were the very forms that Berno lak codi fied. The hi story of the affricates c and dz(< t'and d ') shows that new fo rm s did not always oust co mpe tin g o lde r fo rms as a res ult of the loss of the oppos ition " literary - non-literary." In thi s case the te ndency was c hanged and the literary language lost the affri cates. They were w ides pread in I 4'h - I S'h century writin gs, but o nl y iso lated examples appeared in I 8'h century Catho li c literature (strhel se weter, zrucil dom /Vrabel/) . Th ese fo ur phe no me na are c uri o us ly s imil ar: they occ urred in literary Old Czech, but onl y sporadi ca ll y, occ urring in tex ts as errors by Czec h copy ists. These fo rm s deve loped into competin g doubl ets in the Slovak writte n language. However, the affri cati on of t'and d' differed from the other phenome na, in th at it made the phonol og ica l syste m more compl ex (the phone mes ga ined an additi onal artic ul atory feature) , while the othe r phe nome na, on the contrary , s implified the system , because they in vol ved the loss of a ph one me, or a pos iti onal vari ant of a phoneme, or a gra mm ati ca l fo rm . He nce we mi ght sugges t th at ph e nome na simpli fy in g a syste m preva il in co mpetiti o n in th e earl y stage of deve lopme nt of a literary la nguage outs ide its core ethni c te rritory, but phe no me na complicatin g it do not. Thi s is also suggested by the fact that it was not until the mid- I 8'h century th at the ph one me dz < *dj pe netrated the la nguage of spiritua l li teratu re; prev io us ly it had been co nsiste ntl y repl aced by /z/, or rare ly by Id '/ (zretedlne p ot wrz uje [pa n- S lovak po twrdzuj e] to wssec ko Job; skrze pokanj z te ho sna se probud'uje [pan-Sl ovak prebudz uje] /Macsay/) . The re was an esse ntial di ffe re nce between sporadi c pheno me na and doubl ets in wri tten Old Czec h. T he latte r survived as vari ants fo r almost the who le hi story of the language of Slovak Cath o li c literature, e .g., the refl exes of so-ca ll ed regress ive uml aut, i.e., the deve- SLOVAKIA 12 lopment of tautosyllabic -aj- to -ej- in Old Czec h, and the emerge nce of the co nso nant clu ster sr:. c haracterist ic of Old Czech and Central Slovak, from sc- (< *stj-, *skj- , a nd *sk- before fro nt vowe ls). The first phenomenon was subject to a degree of gra mmaticali zation , as may be deduced from the fac t that no n-uml au ted seq ue nces obviously predomin ated in imperati ve fo rm s (ne mess kag obratjtj se ku Pa.nu Bohu /Macsay/) , but variation in the superlati ve forms of adjectives and adverbs was maintain ed as late as the mid- 18 th century, and usage mai nl y depended on the indi vidu al taste of the respecti ve author (pod'te a pod mym stjnem odpocjwagte - eopustili nalezk i swe a cestu nagtwrdssu /the " Bible"/; krize a proti wenstwy trpezliwe znassagme - sa m Tyran ze swym negmlacssym sine m /Vrabel/). Forms w ith sc- a nd st: were used in re li g ious texts throu ghout the pe ri od covered by the research , regardl ess of the orig ins of their authors (gegjho pak narozenj cas gesste oppodal byl - Pridrzme se th gessce S. Paw la /Macsay/). It was onl y in mid- I 8 century sermon s that th e tendency towards regional differentiation of th ese forms e merged: Makos used on ly fo rms with st:, following hi s nati ve Cen- tral Slovak dial ect (kazani takow i mestiane bi zas lu zili ), while Bajan, from Western Slovakia, mostly used forms w ith sc- (kde tenkrat bude Utociisscie hri ssniku). The process of for mati on of lin gui stic norms, which mu st have ex isted , may be observed from the lin gui st ic mate ri al th at ca n be g leaned from the written records. The occ urre nce of nati ve Czech and nati ve Slovak for ms in texts was not random, but governed by certain rules: firstl y the primary literary and non-literary fo rms arose, the n the primary non-literary form usuall y ousted the primary literary one. These processes, however, were subject to the princ ipl e of flexibl e stability8, whereby they were impl e me nted sy nchroni ca ll y, and thu s co ntinuity was ma intain ed be tween th e written languages of diffe re nt epoc hs. Thus, the fo ll ow in g new phe nomena, untypi ca l of " Yi lem Matezius ( Yi lem Matesius), ·'O neobchodimosti stab il'nost i litera turnogo jazyka" . Praiskij lingvisticeskij krniok (Moskva. 1967). p. 38 1 13 SLOVAKIA earlie r writings, are attested in the tran slation of the "Ol ah Ritual ": □ unco ntracted forms of the gen., dat. and loc. sg. of femi nine adjecti ves e ndin g in fun ctional non -pa lata l conso na nts o usted the corresponding co ntracted forms (podl e tagneg radd y otcowskeg a dobrotiweg wu le twey); □ there was vari ation betwee n the nati ve Czech in str. forms of the pronouns ty and seba with the root vowe l o, a nd the nat ive Slovak ones with the root vowe l e, but the native Slovak forms prevailed (s steba u Bohe m otcem y s Duchem Swatym - s tobou bohem Ot- cem s Duchem Swatym); □ both the short and lon g forms of participl es were used as predi cati ves (za hrj c hy nasse vcinen gest - kterjmz to byl zapaleny proti nassy m mrskym hrjchum), etc. Some phe nome na are first attested in the lang uage of Smrtnik's re li gious treati se: □ the an im ate ge n.-acc. plural (Wide l pyssycych se A nge luw; cf. "Olah Ritua l": ze sy pro nas lidj hrjssne vkri fo wany) ; □ a n epenthetic vowel in masc uline forms of the /-participl e of consonant ste ms (polozil ho na Oltari na hranjcy drew a wstahe / ru ku ; cf. a n examp le fro m " Olah 's Ritu a l": z nes / zuriwy hnew otce tweho wecneho) ; □ the gramm ati ca li zation of piehlask a9 , prese rved in so me form s and lost in others, e.g., it is preserved in participial and verba l adverbia l endings, but beginning to be lost in present verb forms (gako Rewy we wykwjtagicy Winnicy; smegjce se pobij za k bytwe; pred Ssediwinamj wassymj Ml ads sy hore powstawagj - Dijtky zros- 9 Pieh/iska denotes the series of comprehensive progressi ve vowe l changes, unique to earl y Czech within Slavic. which was ori ginall y manifested co nsisten tl y in the morphology. but later reduced due to analogical pre ssures. Basically, it involved the frontin g and raising of vowels after origin ally soft consona nts. e. g .. u/ice < * ulica. biicho < * br ·ucho. see. e. g .. Miroslav Komarek. Historicka mluvnica ceski. 1: Hlis k os l ovf (Praha. 1962). pp. 62-66, I 15-118 , 153; 1964: 17, 18. 54; Charl es Townsend & Laura Janda. Common and Comparati ve Slavic (Indi ana 1996), pp. 9 192. I 6 I. I 63 , 272. SLOVAKIA 14 tie wchazagu do sklepu); □ the spread of the genitive of the pronoun onilony to the acc., with both forms used as variants (pi su ge y pro tebe - prikazal aby se zem otewrela a za ziwa gych pozrela), etc. The majority of the features peculiar to the language of spiritual literature spread in the first half of the 18 th century. These trends are shown in the lan guage of Macs ay's religious treatises, which a lso contains the following further innovation s: □ masculine loc. pl. forms in -och (zalezelo to znamenj na skut- koch geho zazracnych; cf. nenj wskutcych miloserdenstwj (Smrtnik)); □ the dat. , loc. and instr. pl. of noun s such as kost' fo ll ow the pattern of ulice/iena (pri ledagakyc h wecech se zabaw ugu - a w smetach hrjchuw lezite); □ the spread of the loss of sy llabic sonants in abso lute word- final position , apart from /-participles, where this process took place earlier (Ale o Swaty Otce wyswet li vmysl twug - gakz ty s wilozjl smyse/ geho), etc. However, some Czech elements were very stable and were used almost universally: □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position , in contrast to Slovak i- (gako by mluwil a prisahal gim ("The Bible"); □ velar/alternations in the dat/loc. sg. of feminine nouns (Zadag- jcymu wodi mleka dala a na ssalce knj zatskeg podala ("The Bible") and in the nom pl. of adjectives agreeing with animates (A le zase pocali synowe Yzrahelsty ciniti zle weci ("The Bible"), etc. These processes obviously demon strate the modification of Old Czech as it was transformed into a standardised written language. Its structure consisted of native Czech and native S lovak elements used according to fairly strict rules. Such phenomena, maintained in Slovak, but lost in contemporary Literary Czech, are direct evidence of its clear connection to Old Czech. Apart from analogical doublets in literary Old Czech and in the language of Slovak Catholics, these are as follows: SLOVAKIA □ 15 the preservati o n of the auxili ary in 3rd person verb fo rm s of the /- parti c ipl e un til the mi d- I 8 th century (a kralostwy sweho nekoncene ho pocatek gest ucinil (Mokos); ze ges t guz pri dwerac h wibehei protj ne mu / Baja n/); suc h fo rm s were co mpl ete ly lost in S lovak di alec ts by abo ut the I 5th ce ntury1°, and they were very ra re in Czec h writings by the 16 th century; 11 □ the e ndin g -u/-ti in the inst. sg. of fe minine noun s and adjec- ti ves, and also so me personal pronouns, in all works of Catho lic literature, inc ludin g authors of Central Sl ovak o ri g in , altho ugh they do not ac tu all y occ ur in Central Slovak (S krotite le Sweta A lexand ra M ladeho kw itnu cj ho strilku swu ra nil a; Pod se mnu odegdi (S mrtni k)); □ no d iphthongs apart from uo in the "Ol ah Ritu al", partic ul arly in Smrtni k 's re li g io us treati se, whi c h co ntinu es th e s itu ati o n in Literary Old Czec h (Oleg obmekssuge kuoie (S mrtni k)); □ gemin ates in the same words as in Literary O ld Czech (podle tagneg raddy Otcows keg /Olah/), etc. The language of S lovak Catho li c literature, howeve r, was indepe nde nt. It deve loped accordin g to its ow n rul es, in co ntrast to those of Old Czec h and Slova k di alec ts. Spec ific processes e merged rapidly, e.g., th e above- me nti o ned grammati ca li zati on of piehlask a, plus the follow ing: □ most masc uline no un s have gen. pl. fo rm s in -u w, whi ch is absent fro m Slova k di alects, and was lost in literary Czech (odwede l od rodiczuw, od prateluw /Vrabel/); □ an oppos iti o n between fe minin e adj ectives with ste m-fin al no n-palata l a nd ste m-fi na l palatal co nso na nts, beca use th e latte r fo rm s also had contracted gen. , dat. a nd loc. fo rm s (V < *Vj V; Mlc zim , abi ch w dnessny (< *-j-) Reczy meg d luhy ne bil /Bajan/), whil e the fo rmer had uncontracted fo rms; □ Ill 11 the de limi tati on of gen. and acc. pl. fo rms of animate nouns as Rudolf K rajcov ic, Nacrt dejfn slovenskeho jazyka (Bratislava, 197 1) p. 143 A rn ost L amprec ht, Dusan Slosar & Jaros lav Bauer, Historicka mlu vnice cestiny (Praha, 1986), p. 244 SLOVAKIA 16 observed in Macsay ' s lan guage, and in the language of the " Bible" (ge n.: okolo deset ti syc uw wseckych sy lnych a udatnych Muiuw; acc.: kdiz zachwatili dwoch mu iti s knjzat Madyanskych /th e " Bible"/); □ the appearance of spec ial gen. sg. forms of the pronouns ty and seba, with -o- in the root (a le podobne wecy pro sobe od druheho slissetj pohrdagj (S mrtnik)), etc. Many native Slovak elements in the language of Slovak Catholic literature were pan-Slovak, but some of them directly indicate the region of Slovakia which played the main role in the formation of the Slovak written tradition : West Slovak. This is espec iall y true of features that do not occur in other Slovak dialects, primarily Central Slovak, such as , e.g.: □ diphthongs tended to be lost; □ -e in the endings of adjectives with a ste m-fi nal pal atal (ni c nad neho neni twrdsseho /Mokos/; Czech t vrdsfho; North Central Slovak tvrdsieho, South tvrdsiho/tvrdsiho) ; □ non-contracted gen. , dat. , and acc . forms (in the latter case if agreeing with animate noun s) of masc uline and neuter possessive adjectives (abich guss kpredsewzeti mogemu mluwil /Mokos/; Czech memu; Central Slovak m 6jmu); □ epenthetic -e- in masculine /-part iciples (Ce ntral Slovak -o-; a do stawu sweg Boskeg milosti pren esel /Mokos/; Czech pienes /; Central Slovak preniesol) , etc. D moreover, many native Czech e lements remained unchan ged, because they also occur in West Slovak as a whole, or in its SouthWestern subdial ects, e.g.: D the sequence rot- as a reflex of Common Slavic c ircumflex *6rt- (aby rostlo nany Hlozj a Trnj (S mrtnik ); Czech and Wes t Slovak rostlo; Central Slovak nistlo); □ the vowel e as a refl ex of Common Slavic strong *b (a gedna zadruhu wen zkostola wichazali /Mo kos/ ; Czech and West Slovak ven; Central Slovak von ); D the ending -em in the loc. sg. of masc uline and neuter adjec- 17 SLOVAKIA ti ves (aby na hrobowem kamenj tyto slowa wy kresatj dali /M acsay/ ; Czech and West Slovak hrobovem ; Centra l S lovak hrobovom ); □ the endin gs -e and -owe in the no m. pl. of anim ate no un s (nadto y pry tele daleko od stupili od ne ho /the " Bible"/ ; mn ozy p atriarcho we, mnozy kni zata a w udcowe /V rabel/; Czech p hite le , patriarchove, vudcove; West S lovak prate/e, patriarchove, vodcove; Central Slovak priatelia, patriarchovia, vodcovia) , etc. The typical West Slovak elements occ urring in Catho li c literary texts were as fo ll ows: □ the lack o f sy ll abic sonants from ori gin al sequences of conso- nants plus b i b + I (iluc Draku w gest wino geg ich (Smrtnik); Czech i luc; Central Sl ovak i lc; the isogloss was located on the territory o f South-Western (Trnava) di alects); □ the instr. sg. e ndin g -e m in masc uline and ne uter no un s (A sed'e la pod strom em palmowym, ktery m enem gey m sa menowal /the " Bible"/ ; Czec h, Zahorak, and some adj acent Trn ava di alec ts stromem, jmeneml m enem ; Central Slova k and other Wes t S lovak di alects have -om : stromom , menom), etc. Althou gh thi s lin g ui stic form ati on does di splay territori a ll ybased di alect di vergences, mai nl y in sermons, di alectal fea tures have not totall y submerged its characteri sti c pan-di alectal elements. If we compare the lin gui stic structures of Slovak Catholic literature and Berno lak 's codifi cation, we may conc lude that the codi ficati on was not somethin g new in princ iple. Nati ve Czec h fea tures occurring in , e.g., both the language of Slovak Catho li c literature and Berno lak's codifi cati on, clearl y de mo nstrate the c lose co nnec ti on between the two. These features are as fo llows: □ contracted fo rm s of possess ive adjecti ves (m eho, etc.) ; □ dat. sg. fo rms of ori g in all y soft-stem neuter noun s, whi ch d is- pl ay the refl exes of the ceska p fehlask a, i.e., u>i (srdci); □ □ neuter noun s endin g in -nf (stawaiif); parti c ipl es and verba l ad verb s w ith pieh/aska in suffixes ( wolag icf, wolagic); □ the I" person subjuncti ve of by t' in -ch, incl ud in g co mpoun d SLOVAKIA 18 conjunctions (e.g., abich); □ the sequence ji- in word-initial position (gim), etc. The material being analyzed shows that the language of Catholic literature had many features characteristic of a literary language. It was cultivated, selective, functionally homoge neous, and essentially supra-dialectal. For its definitive identification as such , it needs to be ascertained whether it was only a religious style or multifunctional , and whether it was widespread over the whole of Slovakia. In order to answer the first question we compared the language of Catholic literature to the language of secular baroque poetry , based on the following texts: P. Benickfs [original] "Slovak Verses" ( 1652), S.F. Selecky ' s " Pen Portrait of a Beautiful Lady" ( 170 I), and H. Gavlovic's "The Pastoral School " ( 1775). The language of secular baroque poetry generally coincides with the lan guage of Catholic literature. The linguistic differences in each genre are mainly based on the respective periods of composition ; and not the origins of the authors . In other words, secular baroque poetry may be grouped along with Catholic literature in accordance with its period of composition. The vowel system s of both genres may be characterised by their clear tendency to use long monophthongs instead of native Czech and Central Slovak diphthongs. The native Czech diphthong ou (orthographic au) , also attested in earlier spiritual literature, occurs only in Benicky (Spravedlivim gsaudem I Osemetnim !idem / Pracuje gich chitrost (Benicky); moudrost y cest geho /Olah/ ; Strach Saudu a Ostrost Sudce (Smrtnik)). It is absent from 18 th century works , however, regardless of genre. In contrast to Catholic literature, other diphthongs occur sporadically in the language of Benicky and Gavlovic : the former has two examples of -ia- , and the latter nearly ten of -ie-, and perhaps one example of -iu- (Neb size Rodiczke / Kliatby Materynske / Prinasegj pokuty (Benicky) ; Spiwala sy gedna baba : mam penazy dgessku, I su do zeme zakopane, / newim w kterem br- geiku /Gavlovic/; A gak pangu penezitu, / musiss geg sluziti , / Gak chudobnu budess w dome / dwe chudoby miti (Gavlovic). These phe- SLOVAKIA 19 nomena may be described as deliberate violations of norm. 12 The wholesale remodelling of the front/back contrast in the vowel system due to the gradual reduction of pieh/aska provides another substantial feature common to secular baroque poetry and Catholic literature. The grammaticalization of piehJaska may also be observed in the language of secular baroque poetry, generally identical to similar processes in the language of Catholic literature. This convergence is manifest in the stability of some grammatical forms , variation in others, and even in the total loss of some forms with piehlaska Thus, participial and verbal adverb endings are the most stable (Had kuzy svu zvleka, / Orlyce z daleka / Letagicz pera pusty (Benicky); czistotu woniczy proto smim potwrdit (Selecky); Ktery mlcy , ku mluweni , / pricynu magice, I Wiceg cyni, nezli zwitas / zamky walagice (Gavlovic). In contrast, at an early stage 3 rd person forms without piehlas- ka began to be replaced by forms with piehlaska and a stage where forms both with and without coexist occurs in the language of Ben icky, which chronologically corresponds to the language of Smrtnik (Nebo u susedu / Pekagj chleb z medu, / Take pryslovy byva - Saty ozdobene, I Czinicz telo pisne / Molove prei iraju (Benicky)). As in the language of Catholic literature, forms with pieh/aska are absent from the language of F. Selecky and H. Gavlovic (Mnozy tez zadagu wzacznost smichu widjet (Selecky); Ne ze zeme, ale z Judi / wiros- tagu zlosti , / Puwod magu w marnych Srdcach I z nedobreg wlchkosti (Gavlovic). The convergence of the main linguistic features of Catholic literature and sec ular baroque poetry also affected the morphological system. The features which have changed are as follows: □ In the language of Benicky the development of animate gen.lace. forms in the plural of nouns is fixed at a stage where both nom./acc. and gen.lace. forms occur. The translation of "Olah ' s Ritual," in which the original nom ./acc. forms are still consistent, repre- 12 See Ian Muk arfovsk ii (Jan Mukai'ovsky), ·"Literaturn yj jazyk i poeticeskij jazy k", Praiskij lingvisticeskij kruiok (Moskva, 1967), pp. 407-408. SLOVAKIA 20 sents an intermediate stage and the treati se of B. Smrtnik refl ects the e ndpoint of thi s process: the re are no nom ./acc. forms in Selecky and Gavlovic at all (Mas lj se so uditj , / Mu sis svedky mitj , / Tak bude vec vihrana - Yzlast gestlis na vogne / Drz vogak u v s ilne / Czastim napominanim (Benicky); Ked bi g ih ranjenych ona htje la hog it (Se lecky) ; A Kato mu odpowedel : / Nemluw mi nic wice, / bil by zazrak, kdyby zhryzly / Sswabuw nohaw ice (Gavlovi c); □ the loss of the spec ial acc. forms of the pe rso nal pronoun oni/ony (here both Benicky and Smrtnik have doubl ets, and they may be contrasted on the one ha nd with "Ola.h 's Ritual ," the point of departure, and on the other hand , to a ll other writin gs attesting to the e nd of the process (Magj peczet daty , / 0 to se staraty , / Aby ge ginsy stihat - Darmo konom hv yzdat / Kdyz g ich mas napagat / gestlj ze sam nepi ge (Benicky); Prirownam g ich k oczam soko la draheho (Selec ky); Proto wzacny karbunkulu s / y drahe kameni , / ze g ich zridka uhlidame, / w hognosti g ich ne ni (Gav lovic); □ the replace ment of primary forms of /-participles with ste m- fin a l sy ll a bic sonants by forms with epenthetic -e- (Benicky and " Ol a.h 's Ritual " have only forms with sy llabic sonants, they still predomin ate in Smrtnik , whi le 18 th century writings, including the works of Selec ky and Gavlovi c (Zes ze statku panskeho / Zbohatl, v kratky cas / vezme ti to Pan zas (Be nicky); jakbi u kralowneg lasku bil dosahel (Se lec ky ); A Pan os la se u/eke/, / osla dal zabiti, / Tak osel, chtic las ku ziskat, / strati I ziwobiti (Gav lovi c)) have only innovatio ns, etc . The following phenome na may be termed stabl e : □ The consiste nt preservation of alternations in nom . pl. adj ec- tives agree in g with animate noun s (Tak pansty dvorane I Yak nahl e pan vstane / Nec h zanim postupu g u (Benicky); ked by ta czi czerti pgek ni bil y w pe kl e (Se lecky); Nazy na Swet prich adzame / ze ziwota Matk i, / Neprinassame ze sebu / penize a statki (Gavlovic); □ masc uline a nd ne ute r in str. sg. forms in -em (Ne b czasta pri saha / Ciasem dopomaha / ze zustava lhar vetsy (Be ni c ky); nebo s ak samitem okrasle na bi wa (Se lec ky) ; Zena mu fov i ukl ady / z placem spu sob uge, / Geho mi se l vsse li ga kim / s pu s obe m probu ge SLOVAKIA 21 (Gavl ov ic); bych (Chtje l bih mnihe m zostat, rad bih giste wgedj e l (Selecky); Y kosselu bych predala, / vssak se mu za bo□ th e subjun cti ve in gim, I Kdyz se trochu podnapi gem, / ce la neobstog im (Gav lov ic), etc. Sporadic phe nome na simil ar to those in the language of Catho li c literature may also be fo und in the language of sec ul ar baroque poetry: ge min ate consona nts (Trucow ity y neg le pss u / c udzu Raddu ha ni , I A teprw a gu c hce plnit, / kdyz se guss porani (Gav lov ic); 3d pe rson /-parti cipl es w ith overt a uxili aries (Z iwot ta k cz istotneg c hwa li ges t zas lu zil (Se lecky)), co ntrac ted fe minine loc. sg. Adj ecti ves w ith stem-fi nal palatals (Napomaha k pravde, / V negchitregsi zrade / Sv u ukazuge moc nost (Benicky)), etc. T he lingui sti c di ffe rences arising fro m c hrono log ica l d ive rgences betwee n sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c li teratu re onl y in vo lve detail s, mainl y in stances whe re poets use such language e le me nt s as had already bee n lost or had not yet e merged in Catho li c literature. Thus, fo r instance, H. Gav lov ic used both -om and -um as masc uline nomin al dat. pl. endings, although the latte r fo rm s had already been lost in Cath olic literature by around the l 750's (De n Sed/akom a Noc ia kom I negw ic pos luhu ge, / to Sowa w cy me ry zac ke m / slu ssne oznamuge - Prez ce ly de n Walac h chodi , / a malo spi w nocy, / By mohe l bit proti wlkum I owcam na pomocy) . The masc uline loc. pl. ending -och had already appea red by Beni cky's tim e, sli ghtl y ea rli er than in Catho li c literatu re (Kupcove, fl agnarkj , I V hostincoch krczmarky / Nemagf dluho spavat). Sometimes fo rm s were se lected based on the need fo r a rhy me. Thu s, in G av lov ic we do find 3rd person present forms with piehlaska, but onl y in cases where they are part of a rhyming sche me (Wssec ke wecy cas sw ug magu, / cas gest k fartovani , / Kdyz se zme ni ss c hwa litebne, / zaden te nezhani - Coko li w ge kre m potre by, / to guss stog i w zbytku , / Z bytek w sto loc h we Ike statki / vihana z pribitku). A lingui sti c analys is of sec ul ar baroque poetry and Catho li c literature shows th at th e la nguage fo rmati on in these genres was ide nti ca l. In othe r words, the language of Catho lic lite rature was not onl y 22 SLOVAKIA religiou s. It has already been shown that the language of sec ular baroque poetry, specifically Gavlovic ' s " Pastoral School ", mostly coincides with the language of administrative-legal texts of South-Western origin. Hence it follows that comparing them with administrative- lega l texts from other regions involves in principle the comparison of different genres. And thi s in its turn makes it possible to determine whether thi s language formation was widespread in all region s of Slovakia, which is very important for its definitive identification. We studied thi s problem by comparing the concrete lin guistic features occurring in administrative- lega l texts. Then we also compared different sy nchronic stages of the "Jel sava Town Chronicle" of 15661710 (South Central Slovakia) and the 16 th - 19 th century "Levoca Formu las of Oaths" (East Slovakia) , in order to determine trends in the ir lingui stic development. A comparison of spec ific lin gui stic features from diverse admini strative-legal texts reveals interestin g features in the manifestation of linguistic processes and the di stribution of phenomena in texts of different origins. Thus, all phenomena involving the modification of the Old Czech base are manifested in different texts in the same positions, and therefore many of them were not due to the lingui stic factors contrasting all Slovak dialects with Czech. An examp le of loss is furnished by the history of the phoneme Ii i, which was re placed in all positions by the phoneme Ir/ in regional variants of admini strative-legal writings. An example of maintenance is furni shed by the old instr. sg. feminine ending -11 (- u), which began to be used in Slovak written texts as a component of Old Czech morphological structure , not only in West and East Slovak admin istrative-lega l documents, where it is supported by local dialect usage, but also in Central Slovak. This shows that processes manifested in the written language spread into other reg ions from an epicentre. This examp le is especially interesting, as the Central Slovak ending -ou is formally identical to the new Czech ending -ou from the diphthong ization of - 11 (mezi Mikulasem Kowacze[m] a druhu osobu Matronu Elzbetu SLOVAKIA 23 Haylowich /1658, Dojc, W es t Slo vakia/; Roli czku ... zo psseniczu posal ( 1728, Spi s, East Slovaki a); vsak z mu matku na vinicu ko mne chodivala zvadzat ( 1728, Krupina, Central Slovakia) 13. Some instances of doublets occur in South-West Slovak admini strati ve -lega l tex ts. As a rule , one member of such pair occurs more frequently , and may be considered the unmarked form. All the invariant feature s of these texts occur in non-South-Western administrative-legal documents Features with doubl et forms show both variants in non-SouthWestern texts, or, less frequ e ntly , only the unmarked variant. " Reg ional variants" had the function of doublets, which differentiated indivisible lan guage formations , but did not separate them into inde pe ndent lingui stic units. Thus, for example, the masc uline and ne ute r oblique adjective case form s with -e- in the endings, the only poss ible variant in South-West Slovak administrative-legal texts (ze Sa czcinskeho trhu spolem issly ( 1725 , Skalica)), also occurred in NorthWest Slovak (ta cesta od kamenneho Snehu na Polianku ( 1633, Pruske)) , North Central Slovak (za Radu Slowutneho a Oppatrneho muze Pana Tomassa Sk/adaneho 11649, Rufomberok/) , South-Central Slovak (pana knam milostiweho a /askaweho ( 1570, Banska Stiavnica)) and East Slovak (stegto strany Yarku mlinskeho /1658 , Sari s - Zemplfn/) texts. Side by side with these form s, their regional variants are also used in non-South-Western texts, e.g., the diphthongs -ie- (pre sirotky zu stale nebohyeho Samuela /166 I , Rufomberok/), -f- (-i-; (Pozdraweni y g iniho mnoho dobriho /1622 , Ban ska Stiavnica/), -o(Agnieha Istvana Radomskoho sestra /1608, Sari s - Zemplfn/). These features, mainl y typical of South-Weste rn written texts, may be seen as invariants, based on their genera l di stribution . Invariants on the level of concrete linguistic elements are always attested in South-Western texts, and therefore the lan guage of South-West administrative- '-' A lthough the M odern Czech and Slovak - ou endings are forma ll y identica l , they constitute the endpoints of two different hi storica l processes : Czech -ou is the reflex of th e diphthongisation of *- u resulting from th e denazali za ti on. fo ll owed by contraction. of * -ojQ ( * -11 < * -oju < * -ojQ). whereas Slovak -ou is simply the refl ex of contracti on. wi th subsequent denazali zati on. of * -ojQ (-ou < * -OQ < * -ojQ). SLOVAKIA 24 lega l tex ts is genera ll y in varia nt by com pari so n to texts from other reg ion s of Slovakia. The o bvious fact th at Catholic literature and sec ul ar baroque poetry were based o n South-West Slovak dialects shows th at the sa me lin g ui st ic fo rmat io n functioned in a ll kinds of writte n texts, and was widespread in a ll region s of Slovakia. Thu s, the so-ca ll ed c ultural la ng uages were not indepe nde nt lingui stic formations. Firstly , no compl ete li st of distinct features can be revealed for any of the m, because every indi vidu a l isog loss used to c lass ify tex ts of different ori g in s yie ld s different res ults, even of " regiona ll y- based variants" recorded in written tex ts. In other word s, the lang uage of ad mini strative-lega l texts amounts to th e sum of minor loca l var ia nts united into a who le, w itho ut any tran s iti o na l fo rm ation s (so-ca ll ed c ultu ra l lang uages). 14 An ana lys is of the deve lopment of the lang uage of the " Je lsava Town Chronicle" revea ls a number of facts, whi c h are extre me ly important fo r the e luc idati o n of the dynamics of the developme nt of thi s ling ui stic fo rmati o n. There were man y phe nomena in the ear li e r records, as earl y as the I 560's and I 570's , deviating from Czech norms. Firstly, we found pan-Sl ova k features , w hi c h mi g ht have penetra ted writte n tex ts in different reg ions of Slovak ia independently of o ne anothe r (the absence of the phone me Iii and the nati ve Czech diphthong ou, the jotation of lab ia l consona nts before e < *e, *~, etc.). Phe nome na on the th whole untypica l of writte n 16 century texts a lso occ urred (the consiste nt occ urre nce of th e phoneme dz < *dj, for ms bo th with and without j before i in word-initial position, etc .). A few features, howeve r, we re o bviously Centra l Slovak (the diphtho ngs -uo- and -ie-, o < stron g * b , masculine and neuter nomina l in str. sg . forms in -om, masc uline and ne uter possess ive adjecti ve gen. sg. fo rms in -ho, etc .). Adj ecti ves w ith -ie- in the ir endin gs are th e most important, because they simulta neo us ly de mo nstrate th e break w ith the Old Czech writ14 K.McCone and D. Mathews describe similar se ts of probl ems in defining Middle Iri sh and Middle Engli sh respec tively. See Kim McCone. The Early Irish Verb (M aynooth , 1987) , pp. 18 1- 183 and Dav id M atth ews , (U ni versity Park , PA , 2000), pp. 1- 14. SLOVAKIA 25 ten tradition and show th at some standardi sation processes were carried through in the la nguage of written Central Slovak texts, because these forms have the monophthong iii in South Centra l Slovak dia lects, including Je lsava. At the same time, whi le generall y ac knowl edg ing the impl e mentation of standardi sation processes in the Central Slovak dialects, it should be stated that they were rather weak, due to the occ urre nce of a numbe r of loca l features in the written tex ts. These inc luded, e.g., the almost total loss of the sy llabi c so nant r, the c han ge of ou into 6, primarily attested in the instr. sg . forms of feminine noun s and adjectives, the c hange of c into s, and the appearance of a afte r ve lars, etc. Some features may be found in late 16 th a nd early I 7'h ce ntury texts, which may be described as the rea li sation of two contradictory te ndencies: the wea kness of the loca l c harac te r of record s, because dialectal ele me nt s were lost in the respec tive la nguages (the restoration of sy llabic r, the loss of Gerner features ia < ie and s < c, etc.), and the increas ing occurre nce of features from the Trnava written tradition (the losses of the phoneme /dz/, masc uline and neuter adjectival form s with e in the e ndin gs, a nd di alecta l forms of I-participle bel/biel, etc.). In the I 630 's - I 650's the popul ation of Je lsava accepted th e Counter-Refo rmation , whic h was reflected in the language of the town chronicle. The first te nde ncy we named was modified , because the occ urrence of most of the already exist in g Ce ntral Slovak features in creased , but no new feat ures of Central Slovak orig in appeared in the texts. The second te ndency - followin g the Trnava written tradition - was maintained. The second tendency predominated until the earl y I 8 th ce ntury. W e may therefore conclude that over the whole hi story of th e "Je lsava Town Chronicle", its lang uage gradually adapted to Be rnol ak 's codification of Slovak literary la nguage, and not to Stur' s, as we mi ght ex pect based on the Central Slovak origin 26 SLOVAKIA of th ese texts. 15 The development of the language of the " Levoca Formulas of Oaths" was essentiall y similar: there is an early stratum of Polish di alectal feature s in the texts (e.g., plosive g and the Poli sh reflexes of the *tort formula) , with a layer of East Slovak ones (e.g., the vowe l e < * and reflexes of assibilated t' and d) superimposed. Over time, however, they were lost, because they could not res ist competition from pan-Slovak and West Slovak feature s, which beca me obvious in the early 18 th century, not long after the Counter-Reformation . 16 It is very important to note th at the lan guage of administrativelega l texts was common for both Catholics and Lutherans, in contrast to Catholic literature and secular baroque poetry. The language of popular poetry was also common to both Catholics and Lutherans, and it was on the whole also based on the SouthWestern written tradition. Specifically, however, it was characterised by a very fluid structure, because thi s lin guistic formation in such writings was contrasted to Literary Czech or some Slovak dialect, depending on the genre or contents of the respective verses. Consequently , Czech feature s, atypica l of the Slovak written tradition , penetrated the language of hi storical verse (for instance , the " Book of Verses" (East Slovaki a, 1751 ), or J . Bruk ' s manuscript co ll ectio n (Orava, North Central Slovaki a, 1794) or occasional poetry (for in stance , congratulation from the J. Lany manu script co ll ec tion , late 18th century). And conversely, a number of dialectal features are found in styli sed folksongs (e.g., the D. Kubik collection (Priev idza, Central Slovakia, 1791 )). From the early l 800's a number of Central Slovak feat ures occur in a variety of verses (for examp le, in J. Koll ar 's " Folksongs", the M. M. Krizan collection (Trencfn County, North-West Slovakia, 1839, etc.), which we consider a s ign of the 15 See in detail K[ o nstantin] V. Li fa nov, "Evoljucia j azyka " Je lsavskoj gorodskoj kni g i" 1566- 17 10 gg. i t. naz. Kul\urnyj sred nes lov ac kij j azyk", Zeitschrift filr Sla- wische Philologie. Bd. 58 , Heft I, 1999, pp. 151 - 170. See Ko nsta ntin V Lifanov , Genezis slovatskogo literaturnogo iazyka. LIN CO M 16 St udi es in Slavic Lingui sti cs, 2 1 (Muenchen , 200 I). pp. 163- 170. SLOVAKIA 27 emergence of a spec ific language , the Centra l Slovak folklore koine, based on North Centra l Slovak di alects. Another sign of thi s phenomenon is the nature of the lingui sti c changes whi ch we find in manuscript copies of the folk songs (for instance, in J. Boczko 's collections fro m Banska Sti av ni ca ( 1830-1 83 1) and J. Jamri ch Junior 's from Gerner ( 1832-1 833)). These copyists were South Central Slovaks by birth , but when they copied songs from the second part of Koll ar 's "Slovak Secul ar Fo lksongs fro m Hun gary" , they gave preference to North Central Sl ovak features. 17 The purest vari ety of the Central Slovak fo lkl ore koine fun ctioned in North Central Slovaki a, and a written form is fi xed in the S.B. Hrobo n manu sc ript collecti on (S ielni ca, Liptov County, No rth Central Slovaki a, 1841 ). Its penetrati on into South Central and West Slovaki a (it did not influence the language of East Slovak folk songs, or minimall y so) took the form of infiltration of some its features. Later the Central Slovak folklore koine turned into a poetic koine, when it began to used in popular poetry as we ll , over the who le territory of Slovaki a (e.g., the verses of J. Szent-Kereszty ( I 822, of So uth Central Slovak ori gin ), the "Samlungen" manu script collection (Trnava, West Slovaki a, 18 17), the Eastern Slovak lawye r F. Balogh's translation of Hungari an poet Y.M. Csokonai' s verse (earl y 1800 's), and not just in the styli zations of folksongs. The Central Slovak fo lkl ore ko ine also penetrated the " hi gh" poetry of Luthera n poets, who had prev iously written in Czec h. The fi rst such works - three verses by S. Chalupka - were published in G . Fejerpataky' s Alm anac in 1834. At first thi s process was also mani fested in the sty li zati ons of folk songs, but in contrast to the popular poetry, it totall y o usted the prev io us lin gui stic system (the Czec h language). Later on it spread into other genres of hi gh poetry (the hymnal song "Nitra, Dear Nitra" was publi shed in the first volume of 17 Konstantin Lifa nov . " Stredos love nske basni cke ko ine pred l.'.. Stu rom", Slovenska rec. 60. 11 0. 5-6. 1995. pp. 264-28 1. 28 SLOVAKIA " Nitra" Almanacs in 1842). 18 Some previously known facts, also ascertained in the process of our study and analyzed by using sociolingui stic concepts, have made it poss ible to offer a ne w view of the origin and the sub seq uent development of the Slovak literary language. Thus, the lingui stic formation functionin g in Catholic literature, sec ul ar baroque poetry, admini strati ve-l ega l tex ts, popular poetry , etc. had all the propert ies of a literary lang uage, and may be called the "Old Slovak Literary language." As the lin gui stic material shows, it had started to take shape from the 1630 's on as a result of its developing di vergence from Literary Old Czech. Its epicentre was West Slovaki a. After the Battl e of Mohacs ( 1526), the capital of Hun gary and the archbishop's res idence were tran sferred to West Slovaki a, to Brati slava and Trnava respectively. Later on, South-West Slovakia 's role in cultural life became even more important, because a university with its ow n printing- house was opened there. At first, lingui stic development among Catholics and Luthera ns was identical. Texts were created by adherents of both confessions according to the " review mechani sm." 19 The common deve lopment of the Old Slovak literary language, however, was ruptured in the early l 600's, when ling ui stic diverge nces among Catholics and Lutheran s arose as a result of an aggressive Counter-Reformation. 18 K[onstantin] V. Li fanov, "Formy proniknovenija sredneslovackogo folk lornogo ko ine v ste ru avtorskoj poezii (konec XVIII v. - pervaja polovi na XIX v.)" , Wiener Slawistiches Jahrbuch, Bd. 44, 1998, pp. 99- 113. 19 It is a free tran slation of the Russ ian term " mechanizm peresceta" used by V. M. Zivov. Its essence concludes in the fact th at rather strong associated bonds between elements gi ven (l iterary) bookish character to a text and corres ponding elementts of people (d ialec tal ) speec h ex isted in th e minds of creators of tex ts. In th e case of adopti on of •'foreign " literary language, its elements contrasted to elemen ts of people speech and were initiall y bookish. Thu s, the opposition between adopted literary language and nati ve dialects was only in the fu nctional sphere. See, for examp le, V . M. Zivov, " Roi] russkogo ce rkov noslavianskogo v istoriji slavjanski ch literaturn yc h jazykov" , Aktual'nyje problemy sla vjansk ogo jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1988), pp. 4998. SLOVAKIA 29 The Old Slovak literary language continued to develop in a Catho lic environment. It went throu gh all the important stages, including a translation of the whole of the " Bible" ( 1750), th e first Slovak novel : the "Adventures and the Experiences of Young Rene" (1783) , by J.L. Bajza, and its codification by A. Bernolak. The Old Slovak literary language was studied at elementary and secondary school s in different parts of S lovakia, and even at two universities - in Trnava and Kosice.20 Slovak Catholics numbered 75 % of population when emperor Joseph II iss ued the Patent of Toleration ( 1781 ), and perceived Czech as a heretical language. In thi s connection there is no reason to assert that the literary language of S lovaks was Czech prior to Bernol ak 's codification. Slovak Lutherans yielded their positions and had to seek external support , and they found it in Czech reli gious books. As a result, they reverted to the norms of Literary Czech (more exactly, to norms of the " Kralice Bible"), but not in all genres, and di gloss ia 2 1 arose in their environment. In thi s situation Czech was perceived as the high , cultivated form of the native language , whereas Old Slovak literary lan g uage was perceived as " ordinary," and to be used only in administrative-legal texts and popular poetry . Literary Czech and Old Slovak functioned in parallel in the Lutheran and Catholic environments respectively , and Catholi cs contrasted both literary languages, and gradually perceived that some features belonged not just to different functional spheres, but to different languages. As a result a new mechanism - conversion - arose in their environment. In practice it resembled the " review mechani sm", but differed substantially, because so me features were contrasted on the nati ve rather than on the functional level. Thus, Slovak Catholics began to perce ive spec ific features of their language on the leve l of 20 See Izidor Kotulic. " Bernolakovcina a predbernolakovska kulturna slovenc in a··, Pamatnica A ntona Berno/aka (Martin 1992), pp. 81, 88. 21 See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia", Word, 15, 1959, no. 2, pp. 325-340 and Boris A. Uspenskij , Jazykovaia situacija Kijevskoj Rusi I jejo znacenije d!Ja istoriji russkogo literaturnogo jazyka (Moscow , 1983) , pp. 4-5. SLOVAKIA 30 concrete phoneti c and morphological units, and so me fea tures as belonging to diffe rent periods. Th e situati on amon g Cath o li cs and Lutherans re ma in ed stable until the l 830 's, when the Centra l Slovak folkl ore ko ine penetrated into the sphere of hi gh poetry of Lutheran authors, and made it possible to codify a new literary language. r.. Stur made a major specific contribution by essenti all y changing the phoneti c and morpho logical syste ms of the literary language , but the lex icon fro m th e period of the Old Slovak literary language was maintained. Some features had reached the stage of con versati on (Catho lics perceived them as S lovak as opposed to Czech), and some were at the stage of rev iew (they were regarded as "booki sh/literary" (nati ve Czec h) or as ordin ary (native Slovak). The "ordinary" features codified by Stur were not accepted by Catholi cs, and they de manded that they be replaced by "booki sh" features, as was implemented in the codification of Hattala and Hodza ( 1852). SOURCES Catholic Literature P. Bajan, Sermones, 1760- 1771 (manuscript). Kamaldulska biblia, 1756-1759 (manu script). A. Macsay, Panes primatiarum aneb Chleby prwotjn (Trn ava , 171 8). D . Ma kos, Sermones, 1752- 1774 (manuscript). N. Ol ah, Ordo et ritus sanctae metropolitane ecc/esic Strigonien- sis, quibus parochi et a/ii animarum pastores in ecc/esiis suis uti debent. Viennae Austriae in aedibus Collegii caesarei, Societatis Jezu. Anno M.D.L.X. (manuscript). B. Smrtnik, Kunsst dobre umriti (Trnava, 1697). G. Vrabel, Sermones, 1766 (manuscript). SLOVAKIA 31 Secular Baroque Poetry " Basne Petra Benickeho", Archiv starych cesko-s/oven skych /istfn , pfsomnostf a dejepisnych povodfn pre dejepis a literattiru Slovakov, Diel II. - Svazok I. (Tun::. sv . Martin, 1873), pp. 5-47. H. Gavlo vic, Wala sk a sskola mrawuw stodola (manuscript); Gerald J. Sabo, ed., Hugo/in 's Gavlo vic's Valaska skola (Co lumbus, Ohio, 1988). Stefan F Selecky, Obraz panye krasneg perem malowany, ktera maw Trnawe swoge prebiwany (manu script); Stefan F Selecky, "Obraz pani krasnej , perem malovany, ktera ma v Trnave svoje prebyvanf", Anto/6gia starsej slovenskej literattiry (Brati slava, 1981 ), pp. 522-530. Administrative-Legal Texts Inquisitiones, Skalica, 1616-1730 (manuscript). Darina Lehotska & Jozef Orlovsky , Najstarsia jelsavska mestska kniha 1566- 1710 (Martin , 1976). Listy Sta/ice IO kopijnfkov, Spis, XVII-XVIII storocie (manu- script). Mar ia Majtanova & Mil an Majtan, Krupin ski prfsne pravc (Bratislava, 1979). Missiles, Banska Stiavnica, XYI.-XYII. storocie (manu script). Obecna kniha obce Dojc, 1622-1836 (manu script). Panstvo Pruske, XVII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Pfsomnosti Sarisskej a Zemplfnskej iupy, XYII.-XYIII. storocie (manuscript). Protocol/um mais mesta Ruiomberka, XYI.-XYII. storoc ie (ma- nuscript). Jozef Stoic, "Jazyk levocskych slovenskyc h prfsah zo XYI.-XIX. storocia", Jazyko vedny sbornfk, 5, l 951, pp. 197-247. Popular Poetry and Folksongs J. Csaplovics, Slowenske Wersse, (Pest, l 822). J. Jamrich ml. , Wselygake Rozlycne Rozprawky k zabawenf 32 SLOVAKIA zepsane, 1832- 1833 (manu script) Jan Koll ar, Narodnie spievanky, zvazok I, (Bratislava, 1953). Jan Misianik , Knii ka ry tmovni (Bratislava, 1952) . Samlungen, 18 17 (manu script). Spevnfk D. Boczka, 1830-183 1 (manu script). Lasz lo Sziklay, " Poznamky k Csokonaiho popularite v slove nskej literature," Sbornfk Filozofickej fak ulty Uni verzity Komen skeho. Philologica, 16, 1964, pp. 12 1-1 3 1. Pave l Josef Safarfk, Jan Kollar, Pjsne swetske lidu slawenskeho w Uhrach, swazek 2 (Pest, 1827). Jozef Skultety, " Literarno-hi storicke drobnost i", Slovenske pohl'ady, 17, 1897, pp. 125- 128. Zbornfk J. Bruka, 1794 (manuscript). Z bornfk M. M. Kriia na, 1839 (manuscript). Zbornfk D . Kubfka, 179 1 (manu sc ript). Zbornfk J. L any, koni ec XVIII . storocia (manu script).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Origin and Development of the Slovak Literary Language Description An account of the resource Konstantin V. Lifanov Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 7-32 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lifanov, Konstantin Vasilʹevich Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/bb502cc7f9fb360bcc24bbdbecb22db0.pdf 15dfe0aa7f47309abbd71a39d67376e8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 53 Youth In Search Of Slovak Identity And Pride Along with other youths, Americans of Slovak descent are seeking their ethnic identity, their pride, and their self-respect. Identity and pride in particular, are words that are menti<;>ned frequently by the college youth, still in search of its place in the world. Certainly, identity with a group that already possesses pride and self-respect enhances these same qualities in the individual who seeks them. But, in turn, self-respect and pride are normally achieved by an individual's own accomplishments, and his own personality, which he brings to the group he belongs to. A youth's identity with an ancestral group, particularly in America today, may be a bit difficult. to obtain. This is due in part to the fact that in our mobil society, children of ethnic oriented parents have tended to lose their ethnic identity and to forget their valuable heritage in order to forge their way that much quicker in American life. By fusing into the melting pot a.s rapidly as possible, the meltable ethnics, and many Slovaks among them, have been lost into the mainstream of American life. This melting away and fusion of the Slovaks with other ethnic groups occurred within the time span of only one generation. Slovaks are a particularly adaptable people. They have been very quick to assimilate to the melting pot and have scored phenomenal success in American life. They have become successful in sports, in the military services, in the professions, in politics, and in every phase of business. This success of the American Slovaks, and of their children, has fomented their personal pride and their self-respect. So successful has the assimilation of the American Slovaks been that many have all but forgotten their ancestral ethnic heritage. Yet, having acquired their pride through personal achievements in a world that was just a few short years ago a big and alien one to them, the families of American youths of Slovak ancestry are �54 SLOVAKIA now seeking their identity with their ancestral Slovak heritage. Though at some time in the past, identity with their ethnic group had been considered by some American youth to be a personal liability, today that identity with ethnic groups seems to be a necessity. The college youth feel this need more than any other in order to "discover their identity." This is only natural, for when the ethnic groups reach a point where they are proud of their own accomplishments, then they begin to lose the sense of inferiority which had plagued them before. With a sense of new pride in their own accomplishments they can look back and consider how long a road they have traveled, since the time that their families left the Old World. This, looking back with pride, is, in a sense, the reason for the tourism to Slovakia of so many children and grandchildren of American Slovak immigrants. They are interested in looking up the Old World homestead, because it proves to them concretely how far they have come. They thus begin to discover their roots, their sense of beginning. It is pride that urges them to seek these roots. With confidence in themselves they can look with joy at the humble beginning that gave shelter to their ancestor's lives. The bank president from Ohio, the chancellor of a university in Pennsylvania, the air force colonel from Virginia, the professor of political science from New York, the dentist from California, the physician from Florida, the restaurant owner from New Jersey, and the countless successful workers in every state who have been able to raise fine families and maintain tidy homes with manicured lawns and neat gardens-all these, with pride seek their ethnic Slovak heritage. Pride in one's own accomplishments and a search of one's identity has instigated much of the American tourism to SlovenskoSlovakia. When one is no longer running from his past, from his ethnic group, he can indeed face his origins and contemplate them with pride. Besides traveling to Slovakia, how else can the American youth of Slovak heritage find his identity and seek out his roots that give him a sense of belonging and security? Many Americans, including those of ethnic ancestry, have turned to antique collecting. In this way they try to identify with a past they have almost lost. But there �SLOVAKIA 55 are other ways of finding one's sense of belonging and identity. First of all, for the Slovak ethnic group there are the great American public libraries like those of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, to name just a few. These have extensive holdings in Slovak literature, magazines, newspapers, histories, etc. A visit to the public library will reveal to the youth of Slovak heritage a wealth of information to satisfy much of his curiosity about his ethnic ancestry, and it will give him added pride to see what the Slovak people have been able to produce culturally, despite enormous handicaps both in Europe and in the United States. Besides the public libraries, there are the great American university libraries. Most of these also have fine collections of books and histories of and by Slovaks. All state and private colleges and universities, such as Ohio State, Western Reserve, New York, Texas, Kentucky, Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Columbia (the list can be extended to over 2,000 colleges and universities all over the United States), all have some information on the Slovaks. A visit to university libraries will prove very rewarding for the identity seeker of Slovak heritage. Periodical reading rooms in Cleveland, New York, Pittsburgh, etc., provide newspapers both from the heritage country as well as from the organizations of Slovaks here in the United States. Thus, all that one has to do to discover his heritage is to locate the nearest college or university in his region and ask any librarian to help him find material on Slovaks. How else can pride be fostered in the Slovak ethnic heritage? This can be done by American journalists working on Slovak publications, such as the Floridian Slovak, the Ndrodne Noviny, the Jednota, Slovak v Amerike, etc., as well as by various Slovak organizations and the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. The Slovak lodge papers, church papers, almanacs, and magazines can attempt to reflect better the present day life among the Slovaks in America, in their cultural organizations, meetings, playgrounds, picnics, cultural and church affairs. Much of the American youth of Slovak heritage is interested in the Slovakia of today, with its soccer teams, its bustling stores, and market �56 SLOVAKIA places, with its crowded schools, universities, theaters, museums, its teeming railroad stations, its rivers, parks, and national monuments. The Slovak youth is interested not only in the High Tatras, but in life in the cities themselves, where the people are, where they act and react with each other. The Slovak youth is interested in life not only on the Danube and the Tatra.s, but as it is lived in the cities like Bratislava, Kosice, Banska Bystrica, Zvolen, Lucenec, Presov, Rimavska Sobota, etc. There are many things Americans with a Slovak heritage can be proud of, both in the United States and in Slovakia. The American journalists and cultural leaders can help the American youth of Slovak descent find its roots, its identity, pride and sense of belonging, which it so anxiously is trying to achieve. John Lihani, Ph.D. * * • 100th BIRTHDAY Sunday, July 16, 1972, Andrew Bucko, from Pittsburgh, Pa., commemorated his 100th birthday. Mr. Bucko was born in Slovakia, Spis County, on July 16, 1872. He came to this country as a young man in about 1890. Even though a teenager with no higher education, he saw the need of doing something for the bereaved, widowed and impoverished immigrants. Along with a few other thoughtful immigrants he founded St. Anthony's Beneficial Society whose program was to take care of families that had prematurely lost the breadwinner of the house. (In those days there was no Social Security, aid to widows, to orphans, etc.) This local society later on joined the First Catholic Slovak Union and became Branch 50 of the Jednota. This branch is still functioning. In 1903 Mr. Bucko became a co-founder of St. Matthew's Slovak Parish and was among the first to contribute and to lend money to the parish to buy the property on which St. Matthew's Church and Rectory stand to the present day. He is the only survivor of the "original" group of founders. � SLOVAKIA 53 Youth In Search Of Slovak Identity And Pride Along with other youths, Americans of Slovak descent are seeking their ethnic identity, their pride, and their self-respect. Identity and pride in particular, are words that are menti<;>ned frequently by the college youth, still in search of its place in the world. Certainly, identity with a group that already possesses pride and self-respect enhances these same qualities in the individual who seeks them. But, in turn, self-respect and pride are normally achieved by an individual's own accomplishments, and his own personality, which he brings to the group he belongs to. A youth's identity with an ancestral group, particularly in America today, may be a bit difficult. to obtain. This is due in part to the fact that in our mobil society, children of ethnic oriented parents have tended to lose their ethnic identity and to forget their valuable heritage in order to forge their way that much quicker in American life. By fusing into the melting pot a.s rapidly as possible, the meltable ethnics, and many Slovaks among them, have been lost into the mainstream of American life. This melting away and fusion of the Slovaks with other ethnic groups occurred within the time span of only one generation. Slovaks are a particularly adaptable people. They have been very quick to assimilate to the melting pot and have scored phenomenal success in American life. They have become successful in sports, in the military services, in the professions, in politics, and in every phase of business. This success of the American Slovaks, and of their children, has fomented their personal pride and their self-respect. So successful has the assimilation of the American Slovaks been that many have all but forgotten their ancestral ethnic heritage. Yet, having acquired their pride through personal achievements in a world that was just a few short years ago a big and alien one to them, the families of American youths of Slovak ancestry are �54 SLOVAKIA now seeking their identity with their ancestral Slovak heritage. Though at some time in the past, identity with their ethnic group had been considered by some American youth to be a personal liability, today that identity with ethnic groups seems to be a necessity. The college youth feel this need more than any other in order to "discover their identity." This is only natural, for when the ethnic groups reach a point where they are proud of their own accomplishments, then they begin to lose the sense of inferiority which had plagued them before. With a sense of new pride in their own accomplishments they can look back and consider how long a road they have traveled, since the time that their families left the Old World. This, looking back with pride, is, in a sense, the reason for the tourism to Slovakia of so many children and grandchildren of American Slovak immigrants. They are interested in looking up the Old World homestead, because it proves to them concretely how far they have come. They thus begin to discover their roots, their sense of beginning. It is pride that urges them to seek these roots. With confidence in themselves they can look with joy at the humble beginning that gave shelter to their ancestor's lives. The bank president from Ohio, the chancellor of a university in Pennsylvania, the air force colonel from Virginia, the professor of political science from New York, the dentist from California, the physician from Florida, the restaurant owner from New Jersey, and the countless successful workers in every state who have been able to raise fine families and maintain tidy homes with manicured lawns and neat gardens-all these, with pride seek their ethnic Slovak heritage. Pride in one's own accomplishments and a search of one's identity has instigated much of the American tourism to SlovenskoSlovakia. When one is no longer running from his past, from his ethnic group, he can indeed face his origins and contemplate them with pride. Besides traveling to Slovakia, how else can the American youth of Slovak heritage find his identity and seek out his roots that give him a sense of belonging and security? Many Americans, including those of ethnic ancestry, have turned to antique collecting. In this way they try to identify with a past they have almost lost. But there �SLOVAKIA 55 are other ways of finding one's sense of belonging and identity. First of all, for the Slovak ethnic group there are the great American public libraries like those of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, to name just a few. These have extensive holdings in Slovak literature, magazines, newspapers, histories, etc. A visit to the public library will reveal to the youth of Slovak heritage a wealth of information to satisfy much of his curiosity about his ethnic ancestry, and it will give him added pride to see what the Slovak people have been able to produce culturally, despite enormous handicaps both in Europe and in the United States. Besides the public libraries, there are the great American university libraries. Most of these also have fine collections of books and histories of and by Slovaks. All state and private colleges and universities, such as Ohio State, Western Reserve, New York, Texas, Kentucky, Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Columbia (the list can be extended to over 2,000 colleges and universities all over the United States), all have some information on the Slovaks. A visit to university libraries will prove very rewarding for the identity seeker of Slovak heritage. Periodical reading rooms in Cleveland, New York, Pittsburgh, etc., provide newspapers both from the heritage country as well as from the organizations of Slovaks here in the United States. Thus, all that one has to do to discover his heritage is to locate the nearest college or university in his region and ask any librarian to help him find material on Slovaks. How else can pride be fostered in the Slovak ethnic heritage? This can be done by American journalists working on Slovak publications, such as the Floridian Slovak, the Ndrodne Noviny, the Jednota, Slovak v Amerike, etc., as well as by various Slovak organizations and the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. The Slovak lodge papers, church papers, almanacs, and magazines can attempt to reflect better the present day life among the Slovaks in America, in their cultural organizations, meetings, playgrounds, picnics, cultural and church affairs. Much of the American youth of Slovak heritage is interested in the Slovakia of today, with its soccer teams, its bustling stores, and market �56 SLOVAKIA places, with its crowded schools, universities, theaters, museums, its teeming railroad stations, its rivers, parks, and national monuments. The Slovak youth is interested not only in the High Tatras, but in life in the cities themselves, where the people are, where they act and react with each other. The Slovak youth is interested in life not only on the Danube and the Tatra.s, but as it is lived in the cities like Bratislava, Kosice, Banska Bystrica, Zvolen, Lucenec, Presov, Rimavska Sobota, etc. There are many things Americans with a Slovak heritage can be proud of, both in the United States and in Slovakia. The American journalists and cultural leaders can help the American youth of Slovak descent find its roots, its identity, pride and sense of belonging, which it so anxiously is trying to achieve. John Lihani, Ph.D. * * • 100th BIRTHDAY Sunday, July 16, 1972, Andrew Bucko, from Pittsburgh, Pa., commemorated his 100th birthday. Mr. Bucko was born in Slovakia, Spis County, on July 16, 1872. He came to this country as a young man in about 1890. Even though a teenager with no higher education, he saw the need of doing something for the bereaved, widowed and impoverished immigrants. Along with a few other thoughtful immigrants he founded St. Anthony's Beneficial Society whose program was to take care of families that had prematurely lost the breadwinner of the house. (In those days there was no Social Security, aid to widows, to orphans, etc.) This local society later on joined the First Catholic Slovak Union and became Branch 50 of the Jednota. This branch is still functioning. In 1903 Mr. Bucko became a co-founder of St. Matthew's Slovak Parish and was among the first to contribute and to lend money to the parish to buy the property on which St. Matthew's Church and Rectory stand to the present day. He is the only survivor of the "original" group of founders. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 53 Youth In Search Of Slovak Identity And Pride Along with other youths, Americans of Slovak descent are seeking their ethnic identity, their pride, and their self-respect. Identity and pride in particular, are words that are menti<;>ned frequently by the college youth, still in search of its place in the world. Certainly, identity with a group that already possesses pride and self-respect enhances these same qualities in the individual who seeks them. But, in turn, self-respect and pride are normally achieved by an individual's own accomplishments, and his own personality, which he brings to the group he belongs to. A youth's identity with an ancestral group, particularly in America today, may be a bit difficult. to obtain. This is due in part to the fact that in our mobil society, children of ethnic oriented parents have tended to lose their ethnic identity and to forget their valuable heritage in order to forge their way that much quicker in American life. By fusing into the melting pot a.s rapidly as possible, the meltable ethnics, and many Slovaks among them, have been lost into the mainstream of American life. This melting away and fusion of the Slovaks with other ethnic groups occurred within the time span of only one generation. Slovaks are a particularly adaptable people. They have been very quick to assimilate to the melting pot and have scored phenomenal success in American life. They have become successful in sports, in the military services, in the professions, in politics, and in every phase of business. This success of the American Slovaks, and of their children, has fomented their personal pride and their self-respect. So successful has the assimilation of the American Slovaks been that many have all but forgotten their ancestral ethnic heritage. Yet, having acquired their pride through personal achievements in a world that was just a few short years ago a big and alien one to them, the families of American youths of Slovak ancestry are 54 SLOVAKIA now seeking their identity with their ancestral Slovak heritage. Though at some time in the past, identity with their ethnic group had been considered by some American youth to be a personal liability, today that identity with ethnic groups seems to be a necessity. The college youth feel this need more than any other in order to "discover their identity." This is only natural, for when the ethnic groups reach a point where they are proud of their own accomplishments, then they begin to lose the sense of inferiority which had plagued them before. With a sense of new pride in their own accomplishments they can look back and consider how long a road they have traveled, since the time that their families left the Old World. This, looking back with pride, is, in a sense, the reason for the tourism to Slovakia of so many children and grandchildren of American Slovak immigrants. They are interested in looking up the Old World homestead, because it proves to them concretely how far they have come. They thus begin to discover their roots, their sense of beginning. It is pride that urges them to seek these roots. With confidence in themselves they can look with joy at the humble beginning that gave shelter to their ancestor's lives. The bank president from Ohio, the chancellor of a university in Pennsylvania, the air force colonel from Virginia, the professor of political science from New York, the dentist from California, the physician from Florida, the restaurant owner from New Jersey, and the countless successful workers in every state who have been able to raise fine families and maintain tidy homes with manicured lawns and neat gardens-all these, with pride seek their ethnic Slovak heritage. Pride in one's own accomplishments and a search of one's identity has instigated much of the American tourism to SlovenskoSlovakia. When one is no longer running from his past, from his ethnic group, he can indeed face his origins and contemplate them with pride. Besides traveling to Slovakia, how else can the American youth of Slovak heritage find his identity and seek out his roots that give him a sense of belonging and security? Many Americans, including those of ethnic ancestry, have turned to antique collecting. In this way they try to identify with a past they have almost lost. But there SLOVAKIA 55 are other ways of finding one's sense of belonging and identity. First of all, for the Slovak ethnic group there are the great American public libraries like those of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, to name just a few. These have extensive holdings in Slovak literature, magazines, newspapers, histories, etc. A visit to the public library will reveal to the youth of Slovak heritage a wealth of information to satisfy much of his curiosity about his ethnic ancestry, and it will give him added pride to see what the Slovak people have been able to produce culturally, despite enormous handicaps both in Europe and in the United States. Besides the public libraries, there are the great American university libraries. Most of these also have fine collections of books and histories of and by Slovaks. All state and private colleges and universities, such as Ohio State, Western Reserve, New York, Texas, Kentucky, Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Columbia (the list can be extended to over 2,000 colleges and universities all over the United States), all have some information on the Slovaks. A visit to university libraries will prove very rewarding for the identity seeker of Slovak heritage. Periodical reading rooms in Cleveland, New York, Pittsburgh, etc., provide newspapers both from the heritage country as well as from the organizations of Slovaks here in the United States. Thus, all that one has to do to discover his heritage is to locate the nearest college or university in his region and ask any librarian to help him find material on Slovaks. How else can pride be fostered in the Slovak ethnic heritage? This can be done by American journalists working on Slovak publications, such as the Floridian Slovak, the Ndrodne Noviny, the Jednota, Slovak v Amerike, etc., as well as by various Slovak organizations and the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. The Slovak lodge papers, church papers, almanacs, and magazines can attempt to reflect better the present day life among the Slovaks in America, in their cultural organizations, meetings, playgrounds, picnics, cultural and church affairs. Much of the American youth of Slovak heritage is interested in the Slovakia of today, with its soccer teams, its bustling stores, and market 56 SLOVAKIA places, with its crowded schools, universities, theaters, museums, its teeming railroad stations, its rivers, parks, and national monuments. The Slovak youth is interested not only in the High Tatras, but in life in the cities themselves, where the people are, where they act and react with each other. The Slovak youth is interested in life not only on the Danube and the Tatra.s, but as it is lived in the cities like Bratislava, Kosice, Banska Bystrica, Zvolen, Lucenec, Presov, Rimavska Sobota, etc. There are many things Americans with a Slovak heritage can be proud of, both in the United States and in Slovakia. The American journalists and cultural leaders can help the American youth of Slovak descent find its roots, its identity, pride and sense of belonging, which it so anxiously is trying to achieve. John Lihani, Ph.D. * * • 100th BIRTHDAY Sunday, July 16, 1972, Andrew Bucko, from Pittsburgh, Pa., commemorated his 100th birthday. Mr. Bucko was born in Slovakia, Spis County, on July 16, 1872. He came to this country as a young man in about 1890. Even though a teenager with no higher education, he saw the need of doing something for the bereaved, widowed and impoverished immigrants. Along with a few other thoughtful immigrants he founded St. Anthony's Beneficial Society whose program was to take care of families that had prematurely lost the breadwinner of the house. (In those days there was no Social Security, aid to widows, to orphans, etc.) This local society later on joined the First Catholic Slovak Union and became Branch 50 of the Jednota. This branch is still functioning. In 1903 Mr. Bucko became a co-founder of St. Matthew's Slovak Parish and was among the first to contribute and to lend money to the parish to buy the property on which St. Matthew's Church and Rectory stand to the present day. He is the only survivor of the "original" group of founders.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Youth in Search of Slovak Identity and Pride Description An account of the resource John Lihani, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 53-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lihani, John Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/568464b43fc472446ee6cd783df5b5c9.pdf b656347b7ad1a0531248650d01bf3dd5 PDF Text Text SJ,..OVAKIA 51 A CRITICAL DECADE THE WHITE HOUSE .A.NiD 'l1HE SLOVAKS By Sister M. Evangela, SS. C. M . In a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles told the United States Ambassador in France, William Bullitt, that President Roosevelt did not intend to make a comment on the Slovak Declaration of Independence, proclaimed on March 14, 1939. 1 Hitler's invasion of Czecho-Slovakia the following day terminated all possibility of diplomatic negotiations. Minister Wilbur J. Carr informed the Secretary of State four days later that the Czecho-Slovak Foreign office had been closed. German military and civil authorities had assumed administrative power; as a result, there were no officials of the former Government with whom to maintain relations. 2 Although Dr. Bene~ had resigned his office as President of Czecho-Slovakia, he continued to use his past official signature in the telegrams of protest he sent to President Roosevelt, Chamberlain, Daladier, Litvinov, and to the President of the League of Nations' Council.3 He credits Roosevelt's attitude towards Hitler's occupation of Czecho-Slovakia to his foresight. "On the day of occupation I wired to President Roosevelt . . . The American Government immediately declined to recognize the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia and repudiated it. " 4 When the Czecho-Slovak Minister in France, Mr. Stephen Osusky, turned over the keys of the Czecho-Slovak Legation in Paris to the French Authorities, the United States invited Mr. Vladimir Hurban to do the same. But, as long as the United States did not recognize the disappearance of his country, Minister Hurban decided to stay on in his official former capacity while he hoped to enjoy the full and active support of the United States. In fact, he proposed to act as the Czecho-Slovak Government in order to safeguard, as he saw fit, the physical properties and assets of the CzechoSlovak Legation. Legally, of course, this was a questionable �52 SLOVAKIA procedure. He went so far as to suggest that Dr. Cervenka, the First Secretary of the Czecho-Slovak Degation in Washington, be recognized as Charge d' Affaires in the Minister's absence. In the interest of everyone concerned, President Roosevelt advised Benes, under the circumstances, not to come to Washington nor to seek an interview. 5 Earlier in the year, Dr. Benes had left London, where he had been staying since his resignation, for the United States. His purpose was "to inform it (the United States) of my intentions and plans and to draw its attention to what it was to expect and for what it had to prepare itself, the State and the Nation." 6 Accepting the Chair of Sociology, he lectured in the University of Chicago from February, 1939 to June, 1939. In the meantime, his friend from World War I days, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs and President Roosevelt's regular adviser in matters of foreign policy, arranged a meeting between the President and Dr. Benes at Hyde Park for May 28, 1939. 7 Of this visit, Mr. Benes wrote: "I was received by President Roosevelt in May (28), 1939 ... Even at that time he promised me the recognition of our independence and of our future government as far as developments and possibilities in his own country would permit." 8 "We have helped you once. We will help you again. Do remain in contact with me and let me know how your affairs progress," Roosevelt encouraged the former Czecho-Slovak President. He added, "You may be sure that in this war we will not do less for you than in the last war." 9 However, when World War II broke out, the United States remained neutral and reserved toward Benes, "this being in line with its general policy," explained the Czech leader. 10 During his stay at London, Benes, though an exile without authority, nominated a Czechoslovak State Council, and then had himself confirmed as President by that Council which then became the Provisional Government-in-exile. 11 Great Britain was the first to accord it recognition (July 21, 1940) and other Allied nations followed suit. Benes waited until June 4, 1941, before requesting the United States for a formal recognition of the Czechoslovak Government in London. On July 30, 1941, Roosevelt penned these words to �SLOVAKIA 53 him: "The American Government has decided to accredit an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in London for closer contact in the common interests of the two countries until the institutions of free government are re-estabHshed in Czechoslovakia." 12 The novel method by which Benes had again become President amazed many Slovaks who were of the opinion that the Allied recognition of this Provisional Czechoslovak Government was rather unique in political history. They became suspicious and uneasy when they discovered that the self-appointed President of a nonexistent State became one of the most influential counsellors to the Western Democracies on matters of European politics. 13 In the meantime, Slovaks in America had been urging the United States Government to recognize the Republic of Slovakia. The President of the Slovak League of America, Mr. Joseph Rusek, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 24 and again in August, 1939, concerning this matter. Iri his second letter, Mr. Rusek indicated very practical reasons for a reversal of the American policy on Slovakia. There a r e hundreds of Sl ovak American s who hol d property a nd h ave other mater ial inter ests i n Slovakia, w hich, due to th e u ncerta in conditi ons existing gener a ll y in E ur ope today, th ey a r e a nxious to liquidate. Since Slovakia h as no official r epresentative in the U nited States through w h om s uch matters could best b e handled, th ese Slovak Am ericans, w ho are citizen s of the U nited States, have already suffe r ed m uch anxiety a nd mater ial loss. If your Honor h a s r easons for n ot r econizing DE J UR!E this younges t of E ur opean ,s tates, I ask you to consider the m ater ial in terests of these America n citizens a nd again urge fo r y our consideration th e petition o f the Slovak L eague of America for, a t leas t DE FACTO r ecognition of 1Slova kia by th e U nited Stat es . .. 14 Mr. Hull treated this plea as he had the plea of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ferdinand Durcansky, filing it but not acknowledging it. Instead, the Secretary of State wrote to the Charge in Hungary, Mr. Howard K. Travers, that, despite the hardship suffered through a lack of American consular offices in Slovakia, the United States would not abandon its position of non-recognition of Slovakia because of German military occupation of parts of West~ ern and Northern Slovakia.15 �54 SLOVAKIA It seems that it had been Dr. Benes who was more or less responsible for the American position on Slovakia. On May 12, 1939, he had sent Dr. George Slavik to the Slovak League of America to influence it against the Slovak Republic. For the failure of Slavik's mission, the League was subjected to a propaganda barrage discrediting it in Washington, D. C. 16 In an effort to offset Benes's attacks, the Slovak League established an information chancery in Washington, D. C. for the purpose of exposing the falseness of various circulating reports. It also published factual works on the Slovak nation. It took steps to acquaint the Foreign Relation Committee with the desirability of recognizing Slovakia. Under its aegis, the members subscribed $52,632,224.45 in war bonds and purchased, through the Slovenska Obrana Newspaper and the Osadne Hlasy drives, three training airplanes called the "Spirit of the Slovak League of America." 17 To list all that the patriotic zeal and loyalty of this very active organization meant to the United States would be impossible. Yet, despite the evident sincerity of many Americans of Slovak descent, investigations of their membership in the League were frequent. 18 During his residence in London, Dr. Benes had made a radio statement on December 3, 1939, that injured the reputation of numerous Slovak American citizens. He said at the time, "The entire Czechoslovak America is with us except for a small group of paid Nazi helpers." 19 The Presidents of several influential Slovak organizations in America wrote to Mr. Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, requesting the Department of Justice for an investigation of the charge.20 The Slovak League also suffered accusations brought against it before the Dies Committee of the United States House of Representatives as a subversive organization. Twice Mr. Rusek (October 6 and October 28, 1939) asked Mr. Martin Dies, Chairman of the Committee, for an explanation of the circumstances which prompted the action of the Committee opposing the League. 21 None was given. To disprove the pro-Hitler accusations, "American-born, public-spirited, war-winning-minded Monsignor F. J. Dubosh of Cleveland, Ohio, leader of the Slovaks in America, offered to do this: to broadcast to the Slovaks in occupied �SLOVAKIA 55 Slovakia to rise against Hitler. He was turned down by Washington on this proposal. " 22 Finally, official Washington became convinced that the smears leveled against the League were unjustified since the FBI could produce no convicting evidence. The Department of Justice then assured the President of the League, "The fact that the Department of Justice instituted no prosecution against the Slovak League of America, would serve to disprove the accusations to which you refer. " 23 However, by that time, Benes's plan to discredit the League and Slovakia had fulfilled its purpose. As far as the United States was concerned, the Republic of Slovakia did not exist. President Roosevelt's will in this case was inflexible. Efforts on the part of Slovak Americans to foster a better understanding with him failed. One writer relates his sad experience as follows: . . . no amount of our effort could change the official position of our State Department and of our Government. I vi.sited F1DR In the White House on October 18, 1'940, along with a ,Slovak 'League delegation and, in discussing these matters, F1DR told us that President Benes was his friend and they were interested in the restoration of CzechoSlovakia.24 At this point, the question presents itself: Was Benes alone responsible for the non-recognition of the Republic of Slovakia, or was there another cause or influencing factor? In her research the · writer has come across another point of view. Unfortunately, the sources cannot be disclosed because of possible reprisals; however, this writer believes the new slant of sufficent importance to warrant inclusion in this present study on the role of Slovakia in the relations of the United States with Czecho-Slovakia. Persons having vested interests in a government would quite naturally wish to see its preservation. It is understandable why the Jews who had invested in the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia would be very interested in the perpetuation of the State at least until such a time as most of their money could be taken out safely. Slovakia posed a threat to their investment. Furthermore, because of past detrimental effects on the Catholic State of Slovakia, the newlyiounded Republic clamped down on all Freemason lodges, �56 SLOVAKIA clissolving Freemasonary in the country, and placing controls on the .Jews. 25 It is, therefore, not surprising that the nonCatholic elements in Slovakia and elsewhere would combine with the Freemasons and secretly but effectively prevent, if not the formation, then the recognition of a new State whose citizenry would be in vast majority Catholic.26 Oddly ,enough, Masonic influence in England, France and, perhaps in Scandinavia, is quite powerful, and yet these countries recognized the new Slovak State. In America, it appears that the influence of the Jews was added to that of the Freemasons, Communists, and Czechs. Together they formed a bloc strong enough to influence FDR's non-recognition policy, a fact further strengthened by the knowledge of President Roosevelt's membership in the Masonic fraternity. 27 President Benes paid another official visit to the United States in May, 1943. He talked with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Vice-President Henry Wallace, Secretaries Morgenthau, Knox, Stimson and many other political, military and economic leaders of this country. He addressed both Houses of Congress as well as numerous representative gatherings in Washington, D.C. , New York, and Chicago. 28 This second visit with President Roosevelt confirmed and consolidated Benes's official, international, and legal position in the United States.29 It was immediately after this second visit that the CzechoSlovak Legation was raised to an Embassy with the appointment of Colonel Vladimir Hurban as the first Czecho-Slovak Ambassador to the United States, June 28, 1943. On that historic occasion, Roosevelt asserted his feelings toward · the Czech leader thus: The elevation of our respective diplomatic missions to the r ank or Embassy r eaffirms the friendship whi ch has always uni ted our two peoples and emphasize li our common aim of working togethe r to destroy the evil forces w hich s ought t o impose u pon th e world their immoral d omination . .. I shall be gr ateful, Mr . Ambassador , if you will convey to His Excellency President Benes, whose r ecent visit was a fur th er la ndmark in our efforts t o achieve fi na l victory , my ,sincere goo d ,wishes for his welfa r e a nd for the early liber ation of th e people of iCzecho-i.SloTakia.30 On June 9 and September 28, 1942, the British and the Soviet Governments accorded the Czecho-Slovak Government the status of Ambassador to their Ministers.31 �SLOVAKIA 57 Leaving the United States with a sense of relief and satisfaction after his second visit, President Benes noted that both on the domestic and the international levels friendly cooperation between America and the Soviets was functioning well. 32 From this point on, one sees a somewhat quickening get-togetherness developing between Stalin and Benes. Long years before, Masaryk, who had looked upon the Communist seizure of power in Russia with evident satisfaction, had predicted: "The revolution in Russia will bring great changes politically, socially and culturally, so that in the future we shall come to a close cooperation and a national and political reapprochement with her." 33 Prominent Czechs had believed cooperation with Russia was not only possible but also desirable. 34 Benes himself stated in his Memoirs that after the Treaty of 1935 with P.msia, Czecho-Slovak cooperation with the Soviet Union was "normal, lasting, and consistent. " 35 Imitation is the greatest compliment. Creeping socialism began only a few years after the First Republic of CzechoS1ovakia came into existence. In 1938, a visitor noted with surprise a distinct progress toward social control of the nation's industries. Railroads, mines, hydro-electric plants, fisheries, smelting and radium works, Czech Postal Savings Bank were all in the hands of the Government. 315 Under pressure of leftist leaders, the Government-inexile initiated discussions for large-scale nationalization as early as 1943. No definite plan emerged until the Kosice Agreement of 1945. By then, it was too late to turn back from the road of socialism which was to end in total involvement with communism. 37 After Stalingrad, Benes concluded that Russia would escalade the apex of Europe's political power. He found it expedient to adjust Czecho-Slovakia to the eminent position of the Soviet Union, making his country the first to line itself up voluntarily on the side of the stronghold of communism. 38 Against British advice, Benes went to Moscow to make a new treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. 39 The SovietCzech Mutual Aid Treaty, a twenty years treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post was collaboration, was signed on �58 SLOVAKIA December 12, 1943. 40 London at first opposed the Pact and Washington did not react favorably to it because it veered away from a world security league. 41 The Treaty did not change Roosevelt's benevolent attitude toward Stalin and Benes. In fact, "according to his own account, Benes's influence on Roosevelt's ideas concerning Central and Eastern Europe was considerable at this time; and, though not present at Teheran, he cast a fatal shadow on it from the background. He strengthened Roosevelt's sublime trust in the men of Kremlin." 42 Benes supports this interpretation with the statement, "I think, therefore, that I am not wrong in supposing that the Moscow Conference (and by implication, Teheran) was the direct result or was .:.t least hastened by the negotiations for our treaty with :Moscow." Later he observed that the Moscow Conference laid the "foundations for real agreement and friendship between the three participating Powers." 43 How far his political friendships of this period were responsible for the debacle that was to follow after the War cannot be ascertained. The facts are that the Soviets showed li.ttle regard for their treaty obligations in May, 1944, when the Red, Army liberated Pilsen and Prague and seized Ruthenia; when the Allies, without consulting Benes or notifying him, made an agreement with the Russians regarding zones of occupation; when Benes suddenly realized that CzechoSlovakia was under the immediate control of the Red Army. 44 "The American Army's failure to liberate Prague in April, 1945, is considered by many Czechs the most fateful mistake of American policy." 45 It is the opinion of some that the United States Army could have saved Czecho-Slovakia for the West as it had Vienna and Berlin. 46 The Reds made propaganda out of this by telling the people of Czecho-Slovakia that America had refused to aid their country. 47 On this case, documentary evidence proves that No prior political agreements or commitments h ad been made with respect to Czecho-'Slovakia, and the Allied Command m ade perfectly clear its willi ngness to complete the des truction of the enemy in Czecho-Slovakia as well a:s in other areas. It was only at the specific request of the Soviet High Command, and a!ter assurances were received, that the Soviet Army was already in a position to delitroy �SLOVAKIA 59 the enemy in the Vltava Valley, in which Praha (Prague) is situated, that the advance beyond the Pilsen line was halted.48 Czecho-Slovakia was to become the victim of the aggressive foreign policy of the East and a negative policy of withdrawal by the West. 49 It could have profited to a great extent from the publishing of George Kennan's excellent advice on policy toward Russia. In his American Diplomacy, Kennan stresses the point that the United States must "regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner in the political arena." 50 Roosevelt and Benes both needed to be told this. The book, unfortunately, came out a few years too late for their benefit. On the other hand, Kurt Glaser concludes that "considering the entire record, ... the Western Powers had no reason to believe that the Czechs were in anyway dissatisfied with the prospect of Russian 'liberation'." 51 Certainly Benes could agree with that viewpoint inasmuch as he inked the following remarks in his Memoirs: I . . . regarded the Teheran Conference as a great success and I moulded all my further discussions in Moscow as .well as my later ones in London and our negotiations with :the Americans to fit the results of Teheran. This also covered the advance of the Soviet Army into ,Central ·E urope and on to our territory :which I regarded as a certainity - especially after Tehera n - though I did not exclude the possibility that the Western Allies would also try to reach it.52 The last sentence of the above quote clearly indicates Benes's thinking on the subject of liberation. The events following the liberation of Czecho-Slovakia were to be the saddest in its history. Preiident Roosevelt and the British War Cabinet approved a plan for the transfer of Sudeten Germans. The Czecho-Slovak Minister of Propaganda, Vaclav Kopecky, declared, "We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-nationalize ... the whole area ... " 53 At Potsdam, Truman, Attlee, aod their advisers, incorrectly informed, could not prevent the total expulsion of fifteen million Germans from their original homes. The Potsdam Agreement sanctioned their transfer "in an orderly and human way." 54 What followed was a barbaric resurgence. Meanwhile an uprising, Communist led and inspired, �60 SLOVAKIA occurred in Slovakia in 1944. The German Army crushed the improvised rebellion and the Soviet Army used the occasion to occupy Slovakia's territory by mid-April, 1945. Control of the Slovak Republic passed into hands of the Prague pro-communist government which initiated a reign of terror. 55 President Benes had organized a coalition government with the help of Moscow. Together with Premier Klement Gottwald, leader of the Czech Communists, he proclaimed the Kosice Program, April 5, 1945, for the new Government of the reestablished Czecho-Slovakia. Without any form of plebiscite, Slovakia was reintegrated into the State and promised equal rights. 56 The Kosice Program was the door to Communist seizure of power three years later. The Slovak National Council, an ligency of the communist-dominated central government of Prague, created several institutions of political justice on May 15, 1945. "The legal task of these courts was to judge war criminals, but their political purpose was to get rid of the political adversaries of the two factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with Germany." 57 President Jozef Tiso, with a majority of representatives of the Slovak Republic, placed himself in the hands of the military of the United States after the occupation of Slovakia by the Soviet Army. He remained in the American detention camp for a short time and then was surrendered to Benes who gave him to the Communists in charge of the "people's court" in Bratislava. 58 The international law expert, Dr. Fer.dinand Durcansky, declared that, "according to accepted principles of international law and traditional practices of civilized nations, a political refugee, politically guilty or not, is not to be given over to a government against which he worked, and certainly not when such a government is one from which he fled . . ." 59 His explanation demonstrates that the American officers had no legal basis for turning over Dr. Tiso and the Slovak representatives to the National Court of CzechoSlovakia. If these men had been suspected of some military crime, their trial properly belonged to the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal. 60 �SLOVAKIA Dr. Benes had made it clear to the Slovak National Council that sentence of death upon President Tiso was a matter of necessity. The National Court in Bratislava was, therefore, devoid of impartiality and objectivity. Since it was through the intrumentality of its Army of Occupation that Tiso was released to the Czech Government, the United States was bound to intervene.61 Why it did not do so, despite the earnest pleadings of Slovak Americans, will remain a secret in the confidential files of the State Department. Dr. Tiso died on the gallows at dawn on April 18, 1947.62 In his speech, "Murder in Slovakia," delivered in the House of Representatives on April 23, 1947, Congressman Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin emphasized that the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. "The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Deparment while this murder was going on." He decried the fact that our national leaders did not so much as file a protest against the execution of one "whose only crime was that he hated communism just as he hated nazism." 63 FOOTNOTES 1. FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. I (1 939), p. 41. 2. IBID., pp. 48-51 . 3. Eduard Benes, MEMOJJRS: FROM MUNICH TO NEW WAR AND NEW VICTORY (Boston, 1954), p . 19. 4. Eduard Benes, IN 'HDS OWIN WORDS (New York, 1944), p. 133. 5. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 56. 6. IBID., p. 54. 7. IBID., p . 75. 8. Benes, IN HIS OWN WORDS, p. 133. 9. Benes, MEMOIRS, pp. 79-80. 10. Benes. IN HIS OWN WORDS, p. 133. "The question of the recognition of the Czechoslovak Government was being examined carefully at Washington." Benes, MIDMOIRS, p. 176. 11. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 175. 12. IBID., pp. 176-77. 13 . Memorandum of the Slovak National Cottncil Abroad to His Excellency John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State (May 28, 1953), p.11. 14. Joseph Rusek to Cordell Hull, August 4, 1939. 15. FOREIGN IRElLATIONS, Vol. I (1939). pp. 69-71. �62 SLOVAKIA 16. Mikula§ i:§princ, ed., SLOViENSKA LIGA V AM1E RIKE ~TYRlDSA 'l'ROONA (Sc;ranton, 1947), pp. 70-71. 17. IBID., p. 84. 18. Correspondence in re Slova,kia. 19. IBID., The statement appeared in the Czech newspapars in the United States and was thus brought to the attention or many Americans of Slovak origin. 20. IBID. 21. J. Husak to Hon. Martin Dies, October 6 and 28, 1939. 22. Peter P. Yurchak, "Inside •CzechoJSlovak!a," THE CA'l1HOLIC WOO.Iill, CLIX (May, 1944). p. 162. 23. Frantisek J. Dubosh, "Slovenska Liga pofas vojny," (T-he Slovak League during the War), XXXV Congress of the Slovak League of America (May 26, 1957), p. 15. 24. tDr. Peter P. Hletko, President of the Slovak League or .America, to the writer, July 2, 1962. 25. CZEOHOSLOVAKIA F1IGH'DS BACK, A DOCUMENT OF THE ,CZEJOROS,L OVAK MLNILSTRY OF FOREIGN A1F1FAIRS with an Introduction by Jan Masaryk (1Washington, D. C., 1943), p. 158. 26. Dr. Tiso has sometimes been charged with persecuting the Jews, contrary to an official report of the International Committee or the Red Cross which recorded :that "at definite periods SloTakia was actually regarded as a relative asylum for Jews ... The Jews that remain ed in Slovakia were comparatively safe until the revolt which took place at the end of August, 1944." Cited by Kirschbaum from •R EVUE IN'DERNATIO::--rAL !DE LA CROIX ROUGE, 1947, iN. 348, pp. 957-9 59 in "The ,Politics of Hlinka's Party." S.IJO'VAKIA, I (May, 1951), 48. 27. ENCYCLiOPEtDIA AMEJRICANA (1958), XVIII, p. 888. 28. CZECHOSJ..JOVA.KiLA rnlGHiTS BA:OK, p. 1,9,4. 29. Benes, IN H.l!S OWN WlORDS, p. 133. 30. CZEOHiOSiLOVAKIA FIGHTS BAOK, p. 196. 31. IBID., p. 196. WORDS, p. 135. 32. Benes, IN HIS ow 33. Thomas G. -Masaryk, THE MAKING OF A STATE, New York, 1927), pp. 14-15. 34. FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. I (1935), p. 226. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 40. 35. 36. Harry W. Laidler, "The ,Czecho-Slovakia That Was," THE NEW REPUB!LIC, XCViIII (Ma.rch 29, 1939), 213. 37. Winifred Hadsel, "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism," FOREIGN BOLICY IRJEBORTS, XXIV (February 15, 1947), 271. 38. IBID., %73. 39. Wilhelm Turnwald, iRENAISCIDNCE OR iDEJOI.iINE OF CIDNTRAL EJUROPE (Munich, 1954), p. 60. 40. "American War Documents," OURREJNT HISTORY, VI (February, 1944), 15G. 41. "Russian Czech Pact Brings Up Puzzle Big Three Didn't Solve," NEWSWEEK, XXII (December 27, 1943), 30. 4!. Turnwald, IRIDNASCFl..'-.CE OR DECL]NE, p. 62. �SLOVAKIA 63 43 Benes, MEMOIRS, pp. 245-249. 44. Edward Taborsky, "Benes and the Soviets," F10REIGN AFFA!IRS, XXVH (January, 1949), 309-14. 45. Joseph Wechsberg, "They're Losing Faith in America," SATURDAY EVENING POST, CCXXIX (July 28, 1956), 93. 46. 1'BlD., 93. 47. Hubert Ripka, -CZECHOSLOVAKIA EJN5LAVED (London, 1950), p. 38. 48. UNITIDD ,STATES DEPA!RTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, XX (May 22, 19 49) , ti 65. 49. Andrew Gyorgy, GOVEJRNMEJNTS OF DANIUBIAN EUROPE (New York, 1949), p. 103. 50. George tF. Kennan, AMERICAN DIPLOMA!CY, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1952), p. 104. 51. Kurt Glaser, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA: A ORITIOAL HISTORY (Caldwell, Idaho, 1961), p. 109. From the Munich crisis on to the final ,t ragedy of communist takeover in 1948, Eduard Benes is a difficult character to understand. There is a bit of Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde about him as he proceeds from confussion to frustration during the declining decade of his years. 52. Benes, MEMO-IRS, p. 253. 53. TtRAGEDY OF A PEOBLE, RACIAl.JISM IN ,CZEJOHO-SLOVAKIA, n. a. (New York, 1946), p. 19. 5-4 . .Glasser, CZEGHO-SLO'VA>KIA: A CRITICAL HIS'I\ORY, p. 129. Since American troops still occupied part of Czecho-Slovakia, Truman could have demanded ,that the ,Czechs discontinue the persecution of Sudeten Germans or else risk the annexation of Western Bohemia to the United States' Zone of Germany. J:BID., p. 130. 55. Joseph Pauco, CHRISTIAJ..~ SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM (Valpa.raiso, Indiana, 1959), p. 15. · 56 . •COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Special Report No. 8. Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representives, 83rd Congress, Second Session, p. 15. 57. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, Tenth Interim !Report of Hearings, 83rd Congress, Second Session, p. 166. 58. Gilbert L. Oddo, SlJOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, 1960), p. 310. 59. Petition of the ,S lovak Action Committee to the United Nations in the Trial of Dr. Joseph Tiso, n. p. 60. IBlD., n. p. As late as 1963·, the State Department refused to give out any information that it has in its files on Dr. Tiso. "As far as can be ascertained, the State Depa11trnent of the United States ordered the surrender of President Tiso and members of the Slovak Government in its custody without even investigating their status." Oddo, SLCNAKIA ANtD ITS PEOPLE, p. 310. 61. IBID., n . p. 62. Oddo, SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE, p. 315. 63. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Proceedings and Debates, 80th CoRgress, First Session, Special Reprint, p. 2. � SJ,..OVAKIA 51 A CRITICAL DECADE THE WHITE HOUSE .A.NiD 'l1HE SLOVAKS By Sister M. Evangela, SS. C. M . In a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles told the United States Ambassador in France, William Bullitt, that President Roosevelt did not intend to make a comment on the Slovak Declaration of Independence, proclaimed on March 14, 1939. 1 Hitler's invasion of Czecho-Slovakia the following day terminated all possibility of diplomatic negotiations. Minister Wilbur J. Carr informed the Secretary of State four days later that the Czecho-Slovak Foreign office had been closed. German military and civil authorities had assumed administrative power; as a result, there were no officials of the former Government with whom to maintain relations. 2 Although Dr. Bene~ had resigned his office as President of Czecho-Slovakia, he continued to use his past official signature in the telegrams of protest he sent to President Roosevelt, Chamberlain, Daladier, Litvinov, and to the President of the League of Nations' Council.3 He credits Roosevelt's attitude towards Hitler's occupation of Czecho-Slovakia to his foresight. "On the day of occupation I wired to President Roosevelt . . . The American Government immediately declined to recognize the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia and repudiated it. " 4 When the Czecho-Slovak Minister in France, Mr. Stephen Osusky, turned over the keys of the Czecho-Slovak Legation in Paris to the French Authorities, the United States invited Mr. Vladimir Hurban to do the same. But, as long as the United States did not recognize the disappearance of his country, Minister Hurban decided to stay on in his official former capacity while he hoped to enjoy the full and active support of the United States. In fact, he proposed to act as the Czecho-Slovak Government in order to safeguard, as he saw fit, the physical properties and assets of the CzechoSlovak Legation. Legally, of course, this was a questionable �52 SLOVAKIA procedure. He went so far as to suggest that Dr. Cervenka, the First Secretary of the Czecho-Slovak Degation in Washington, be recognized as Charge d' Affaires in the Minister's absence. In the interest of everyone concerned, President Roosevelt advised Benes, under the circumstances, not to come to Washington nor to seek an interview. 5 Earlier in the year, Dr. Benes had left London, where he had been staying since his resignation, for the United States. His purpose was "to inform it (the United States) of my intentions and plans and to draw its attention to what it was to expect and for what it had to prepare itself, the State and the Nation." 6 Accepting the Chair of Sociology, he lectured in the University of Chicago from February, 1939 to June, 1939. In the meantime, his friend from World War I days, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs and President Roosevelt's regular adviser in matters of foreign policy, arranged a meeting between the President and Dr. Benes at Hyde Park for May 28, 1939. 7 Of this visit, Mr. Benes wrote: "I was received by President Roosevelt in May (28), 1939 ... Even at that time he promised me the recognition of our independence and of our future government as far as developments and possibilities in his own country would permit." 8 "We have helped you once. We will help you again. Do remain in contact with me and let me know how your affairs progress," Roosevelt encouraged the former Czecho-Slovak President. He added, "You may be sure that in this war we will not do less for you than in the last war." 9 However, when World War II broke out, the United States remained neutral and reserved toward Benes, "this being in line with its general policy," explained the Czech leader. 10 During his stay at London, Benes, though an exile without authority, nominated a Czechoslovak State Council, and then had himself confirmed as President by that Council which then became the Provisional Government-in-exile. 11 Great Britain was the first to accord it recognition (July 21, 1940) and other Allied nations followed suit. Benes waited until June 4, 1941, before requesting the United States for a formal recognition of the Czechoslovak Government in London. On July 30, 1941, Roosevelt penned these words to �SLOVAKIA 53 him: "The American Government has decided to accredit an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in London for closer contact in the common interests of the two countries until the institutions of free government are re-estabHshed in Czechoslovakia." 12 The novel method by which Benes had again become President amazed many Slovaks who were of the opinion that the Allied recognition of this Provisional Czechoslovak Government was rather unique in political history. They became suspicious and uneasy when they discovered that the self-appointed President of a nonexistent State became one of the most influential counsellors to the Western Democracies on matters of European politics. 13 In the meantime, Slovaks in America had been urging the United States Government to recognize the Republic of Slovakia. The President of the Slovak League of America, Mr. Joseph Rusek, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 24 and again in August, 1939, concerning this matter. Iri his second letter, Mr. Rusek indicated very practical reasons for a reversal of the American policy on Slovakia. There a r e hundreds of Sl ovak American s who hol d property a nd h ave other mater ial inter ests i n Slovakia, w hich, due to th e u ncerta in conditi ons existing gener a ll y in E ur ope today, th ey a r e a nxious to liquidate. Since Slovakia h as no official r epresentative in the U nited States through w h om s uch matters could best b e handled, th ese Slovak Am ericans, w ho are citizen s of the U nited States, have already suffe r ed m uch anxiety a nd mater ial loss. If your Honor h a s r easons for n ot r econizing DE J UR!E this younges t of E ur opean ,s tates, I ask you to consider the m ater ial in terests of these America n citizens a nd again urge fo r y our consideration th e petition o f the Slovak L eague of America for, a t leas t DE FACTO r ecognition of 1Slova kia by th e U nited Stat es . .. 14 Mr. Hull treated this plea as he had the plea of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ferdinand Durcansky, filing it but not acknowledging it. Instead, the Secretary of State wrote to the Charge in Hungary, Mr. Howard K. Travers, that, despite the hardship suffered through a lack of American consular offices in Slovakia, the United States would not abandon its position of non-recognition of Slovakia because of German military occupation of parts of West~ ern and Northern Slovakia.15 �54 SLOVAKIA It seems that it had been Dr. Benes who was more or less responsible for the American position on Slovakia. On May 12, 1939, he had sent Dr. George Slavik to the Slovak League of America to influence it against the Slovak Republic. For the failure of Slavik's mission, the League was subjected to a propaganda barrage discrediting it in Washington, D. C. 16 In an effort to offset Benes's attacks, the Slovak League established an information chancery in Washington, D. C. for the purpose of exposing the falseness of various circulating reports. It also published factual works on the Slovak nation. It took steps to acquaint the Foreign Relation Committee with the desirability of recognizing Slovakia. Under its aegis, the members subscribed $52,632,224.45 in war bonds and purchased, through the Slovenska Obrana Newspaper and the Osadne Hlasy drives, three training airplanes called the "Spirit of the Slovak League of America." 17 To list all that the patriotic zeal and loyalty of this very active organization meant to the United States would be impossible. Yet, despite the evident sincerity of many Americans of Slovak descent, investigations of their membership in the League were frequent. 18 During his residence in London, Dr. Benes had made a radio statement on December 3, 1939, that injured the reputation of numerous Slovak American citizens. He said at the time, "The entire Czechoslovak America is with us except for a small group of paid Nazi helpers." 19 The Presidents of several influential Slovak organizations in America wrote to Mr. Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, requesting the Department of Justice for an investigation of the charge.20 The Slovak League also suffered accusations brought against it before the Dies Committee of the United States House of Representatives as a subversive organization. Twice Mr. Rusek (October 6 and October 28, 1939) asked Mr. Martin Dies, Chairman of the Committee, for an explanation of the circumstances which prompted the action of the Committee opposing the League. 21 None was given. To disprove the pro-Hitler accusations, "American-born, public-spirited, war-winning-minded Monsignor F. J. Dubosh of Cleveland, Ohio, leader of the Slovaks in America, offered to do this: to broadcast to the Slovaks in occupied �SLOVAKIA 55 Slovakia to rise against Hitler. He was turned down by Washington on this proposal. " 22 Finally, official Washington became convinced that the smears leveled against the League were unjustified since the FBI could produce no convicting evidence. The Department of Justice then assured the President of the League, "The fact that the Department of Justice instituted no prosecution against the Slovak League of America, would serve to disprove the accusations to which you refer. " 23 However, by that time, Benes's plan to discredit the League and Slovakia had fulfilled its purpose. As far as the United States was concerned, the Republic of Slovakia did not exist. President Roosevelt's will in this case was inflexible. Efforts on the part of Slovak Americans to foster a better understanding with him failed. One writer relates his sad experience as follows: . . . no amount of our effort could change the official position of our State Department and of our Government. I vi.sited F1DR In the White House on October 18, 1'940, along with a ,Slovak 'League delegation and, in discussing these matters, F1DR told us that President Benes was his friend and they were interested in the restoration of CzechoSlovakia.24 At this point, the question presents itself: Was Benes alone responsible for the non-recognition of the Republic of Slovakia, or was there another cause or influencing factor? In her research the · writer has come across another point of view. Unfortunately, the sources cannot be disclosed because of possible reprisals; however, this writer believes the new slant of sufficent importance to warrant inclusion in this present study on the role of Slovakia in the relations of the United States with Czecho-Slovakia. Persons having vested interests in a government would quite naturally wish to see its preservation. It is understandable why the Jews who had invested in the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia would be very interested in the perpetuation of the State at least until such a time as most of their money could be taken out safely. Slovakia posed a threat to their investment. Furthermore, because of past detrimental effects on the Catholic State of Slovakia, the newlyiounded Republic clamped down on all Freemason lodges, �56 SLOVAKIA clissolving Freemasonary in the country, and placing controls on the .Jews. 25 It is, therefore, not surprising that the nonCatholic elements in Slovakia and elsewhere would combine with the Freemasons and secretly but effectively prevent, if not the formation, then the recognition of a new State whose citizenry would be in vast majority Catholic.26 Oddly ,enough, Masonic influence in England, France and, perhaps in Scandinavia, is quite powerful, and yet these countries recognized the new Slovak State. In America, it appears that the influence of the Jews was added to that of the Freemasons, Communists, and Czechs. Together they formed a bloc strong enough to influence FDR's non-recognition policy, a fact further strengthened by the knowledge of President Roosevelt's membership in the Masonic fraternity. 27 President Benes paid another official visit to the United States in May, 1943. He talked with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Vice-President Henry Wallace, Secretaries Morgenthau, Knox, Stimson and many other political, military and economic leaders of this country. He addressed both Houses of Congress as well as numerous representative gatherings in Washington, D.C. , New York, and Chicago. 28 This second visit with President Roosevelt confirmed and consolidated Benes's official, international, and legal position in the United States.29 It was immediately after this second visit that the CzechoSlovak Legation was raised to an Embassy with the appointment of Colonel Vladimir Hurban as the first Czecho-Slovak Ambassador to the United States, June 28, 1943. On that historic occasion, Roosevelt asserted his feelings toward · the Czech leader thus: The elevation of our respective diplomatic missions to the r ank or Embassy r eaffirms the friendship whi ch has always uni ted our two peoples and emphasize li our common aim of working togethe r to destroy the evil forces w hich s ought t o impose u pon th e world their immoral d omination . .. I shall be gr ateful, Mr . Ambassador , if you will convey to His Excellency President Benes, whose r ecent visit was a fur th er la ndmark in our efforts t o achieve fi na l victory , my ,sincere goo d ,wishes for his welfa r e a nd for the early liber ation of th e people of iCzecho-i.SloTakia.30 On June 9 and September 28, 1942, the British and the Soviet Governments accorded the Czecho-Slovak Government the status of Ambassador to their Ministers.31 �SLOVAKIA 57 Leaving the United States with a sense of relief and satisfaction after his second visit, President Benes noted that both on the domestic and the international levels friendly cooperation between America and the Soviets was functioning well. 32 From this point on, one sees a somewhat quickening get-togetherness developing between Stalin and Benes. Long years before, Masaryk, who had looked upon the Communist seizure of power in Russia with evident satisfaction, had predicted: "The revolution in Russia will bring great changes politically, socially and culturally, so that in the future we shall come to a close cooperation and a national and political reapprochement with her." 33 Prominent Czechs had believed cooperation with Russia was not only possible but also desirable. 34 Benes himself stated in his Memoirs that after the Treaty of 1935 with P.msia, Czecho-Slovak cooperation with the Soviet Union was "normal, lasting, and consistent. " 35 Imitation is the greatest compliment. Creeping socialism began only a few years after the First Republic of CzechoS1ovakia came into existence. In 1938, a visitor noted with surprise a distinct progress toward social control of the nation's industries. Railroads, mines, hydro-electric plants, fisheries, smelting and radium works, Czech Postal Savings Bank were all in the hands of the Government. 315 Under pressure of leftist leaders, the Government-inexile initiated discussions for large-scale nationalization as early as 1943. No definite plan emerged until the Kosice Agreement of 1945. By then, it was too late to turn back from the road of socialism which was to end in total involvement with communism. 37 After Stalingrad, Benes concluded that Russia would escalade the apex of Europe's political power. He found it expedient to adjust Czecho-Slovakia to the eminent position of the Soviet Union, making his country the first to line itself up voluntarily on the side of the stronghold of communism. 38 Against British advice, Benes went to Moscow to make a new treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. 39 The SovietCzech Mutual Aid Treaty, a twenty years treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post was collaboration, was signed on �58 SLOVAKIA December 12, 1943. 40 London at first opposed the Pact and Washington did not react favorably to it because it veered away from a world security league. 41 The Treaty did not change Roosevelt's benevolent attitude toward Stalin and Benes. In fact, "according to his own account, Benes's influence on Roosevelt's ideas concerning Central and Eastern Europe was considerable at this time; and, though not present at Teheran, he cast a fatal shadow on it from the background. He strengthened Roosevelt's sublime trust in the men of Kremlin." 42 Benes supports this interpretation with the statement, "I think, therefore, that I am not wrong in supposing that the Moscow Conference (and by implication, Teheran) was the direct result or was .:.t least hastened by the negotiations for our treaty with :Moscow." Later he observed that the Moscow Conference laid the "foundations for real agreement and friendship between the three participating Powers." 43 How far his political friendships of this period were responsible for the debacle that was to follow after the War cannot be ascertained. The facts are that the Soviets showed li.ttle regard for their treaty obligations in May, 1944, when the Red, Army liberated Pilsen and Prague and seized Ruthenia; when the Allies, without consulting Benes or notifying him, made an agreement with the Russians regarding zones of occupation; when Benes suddenly realized that CzechoSlovakia was under the immediate control of the Red Army. 44 "The American Army's failure to liberate Prague in April, 1945, is considered by many Czechs the most fateful mistake of American policy." 45 It is the opinion of some that the United States Army could have saved Czecho-Slovakia for the West as it had Vienna and Berlin. 46 The Reds made propaganda out of this by telling the people of Czecho-Slovakia that America had refused to aid their country. 47 On this case, documentary evidence proves that No prior political agreements or commitments h ad been made with respect to Czecho-'Slovakia, and the Allied Command m ade perfectly clear its willi ngness to complete the des truction of the enemy in Czecho-Slovakia as well a:s in other areas. It was only at the specific request of the Soviet High Command, and a!ter assurances were received, that the Soviet Army was already in a position to delitroy �SLOVAKIA 59 the enemy in the Vltava Valley, in which Praha (Prague) is situated, that the advance beyond the Pilsen line was halted.48 Czecho-Slovakia was to become the victim of the aggressive foreign policy of the East and a negative policy of withdrawal by the West. 49 It could have profited to a great extent from the publishing of George Kennan's excellent advice on policy toward Russia. In his American Diplomacy, Kennan stresses the point that the United States must "regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner in the political arena." 50 Roosevelt and Benes both needed to be told this. The book, unfortunately, came out a few years too late for their benefit. On the other hand, Kurt Glaser concludes that "considering the entire record, ... the Western Powers had no reason to believe that the Czechs were in anyway dissatisfied with the prospect of Russian 'liberation'." 51 Certainly Benes could agree with that viewpoint inasmuch as he inked the following remarks in his Memoirs: I . . . regarded the Teheran Conference as a great success and I moulded all my further discussions in Moscow as .well as my later ones in London and our negotiations with :the Americans to fit the results of Teheran. This also covered the advance of the Soviet Army into ,Central ·E urope and on to our territory :which I regarded as a certainity - especially after Tehera n - though I did not exclude the possibility that the Western Allies would also try to reach it.52 The last sentence of the above quote clearly indicates Benes's thinking on the subject of liberation. The events following the liberation of Czecho-Slovakia were to be the saddest in its history. Preiident Roosevelt and the British War Cabinet approved a plan for the transfer of Sudeten Germans. The Czecho-Slovak Minister of Propaganda, Vaclav Kopecky, declared, "We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-nationalize ... the whole area ... " 53 At Potsdam, Truman, Attlee, aod their advisers, incorrectly informed, could not prevent the total expulsion of fifteen million Germans from their original homes. The Potsdam Agreement sanctioned their transfer "in an orderly and human way." 54 What followed was a barbaric resurgence. Meanwhile an uprising, Communist led and inspired, �60 SLOVAKIA occurred in Slovakia in 1944. The German Army crushed the improvised rebellion and the Soviet Army used the occasion to occupy Slovakia's territory by mid-April, 1945. Control of the Slovak Republic passed into hands of the Prague pro-communist government which initiated a reign of terror. 55 President Benes had organized a coalition government with the help of Moscow. Together with Premier Klement Gottwald, leader of the Czech Communists, he proclaimed the Kosice Program, April 5, 1945, for the new Government of the reestablished Czecho-Slovakia. Without any form of plebiscite, Slovakia was reintegrated into the State and promised equal rights. 56 The Kosice Program was the door to Communist seizure of power three years later. The Slovak National Council, an ligency of the communist-dominated central government of Prague, created several institutions of political justice on May 15, 1945. "The legal task of these courts was to judge war criminals, but their political purpose was to get rid of the political adversaries of the two factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with Germany." 57 President Jozef Tiso, with a majority of representatives of the Slovak Republic, placed himself in the hands of the military of the United States after the occupation of Slovakia by the Soviet Army. He remained in the American detention camp for a short time and then was surrendered to Benes who gave him to the Communists in charge of the "people's court" in Bratislava. 58 The international law expert, Dr. Fer.dinand Durcansky, declared that, "according to accepted principles of international law and traditional practices of civilized nations, a political refugee, politically guilty or not, is not to be given over to a government against which he worked, and certainly not when such a government is one from which he fled . . ." 59 His explanation demonstrates that the American officers had no legal basis for turning over Dr. Tiso and the Slovak representatives to the National Court of CzechoSlovakia. If these men had been suspected of some military crime, their trial properly belonged to the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal. 60 �SLOVAKIA Dr. Benes had made it clear to the Slovak National Council that sentence of death upon President Tiso was a matter of necessity. The National Court in Bratislava was, therefore, devoid of impartiality and objectivity. Since it was through the intrumentality of its Army of Occupation that Tiso was released to the Czech Government, the United States was bound to intervene.61 Why it did not do so, despite the earnest pleadings of Slovak Americans, will remain a secret in the confidential files of the State Department. Dr. Tiso died on the gallows at dawn on April 18, 1947.62 In his speech, "Murder in Slovakia," delivered in the House of Representatives on April 23, 1947, Congressman Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin emphasized that the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. "The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Deparment while this murder was going on." He decried the fact that our national leaders did not so much as file a protest against the execution of one "whose only crime was that he hated communism just as he hated nazism." 63 FOOTNOTES 1. FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. I (1 939), p. 41. 2. IBID., pp. 48-51 . 3. Eduard Benes, MEMOJJRS: FROM MUNICH TO NEW WAR AND NEW VICTORY (Boston, 1954), p . 19. 4. Eduard Benes, IN 'HDS OWIN WORDS (New York, 1944), p. 133. 5. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 56. 6. IBID., p. 54. 7. IBID., p . 75. 8. Benes, IN HIS OWN WORDS, p. 133. 9. Benes, MEMOIRS, pp. 79-80. 10. Benes. IN HIS OWN WORDS, p. 133. "The question of the recognition of the Czechoslovak Government was being examined carefully at Washington." Benes, MIDMOIRS, p. 176. 11. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 175. 12. IBID., pp. 176-77. 13 . Memorandum of the Slovak National Cottncil Abroad to His Excellency John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State (May 28, 1953), p.11. 14. Joseph Rusek to Cordell Hull, August 4, 1939. 15. FOREIGN IRElLATIONS, Vol. I (1939). pp. 69-71. �62 SLOVAKIA 16. Mikula§ i:§princ, ed., SLOViENSKA LIGA V AM1E RIKE ~TYRlDSA 'l'ROONA (Sc;ranton, 1947), pp. 70-71. 17. IBID., p. 84. 18. Correspondence in re Slova,kia. 19. IBID., The statement appeared in the Czech newspapars in the United States and was thus brought to the attention or many Americans of Slovak origin. 20. IBID. 21. J. Husak to Hon. Martin Dies, October 6 and 28, 1939. 22. Peter P. Yurchak, "Inside •CzechoJSlovak!a," THE CA'l1HOLIC WOO.Iill, CLIX (May, 1944). p. 162. 23. Frantisek J. Dubosh, "Slovenska Liga pofas vojny," (T-he Slovak League during the War), XXXV Congress of the Slovak League of America (May 26, 1957), p. 15. 24. tDr. Peter P. Hletko, President of the Slovak League or .America, to the writer, July 2, 1962. 25. CZEOHOSLOVAKIA F1IGH'DS BACK, A DOCUMENT OF THE ,CZEJOROS,L OVAK MLNILSTRY OF FOREIGN A1F1FAIRS with an Introduction by Jan Masaryk (1Washington, D. C., 1943), p. 158. 26. Dr. Tiso has sometimes been charged with persecuting the Jews, contrary to an official report of the International Committee or the Red Cross which recorded :that "at definite periods SloTakia was actually regarded as a relative asylum for Jews ... The Jews that remain ed in Slovakia were comparatively safe until the revolt which took place at the end of August, 1944." Cited by Kirschbaum from •R EVUE IN'DERNATIO::--rAL !DE LA CROIX ROUGE, 1947, iN. 348, pp. 957-9 59 in "The ,Politics of Hlinka's Party." S.IJO'VAKIA, I (May, 1951), 48. 27. ENCYCLiOPEtDIA AMEJRICANA (1958), XVIII, p. 888. 28. CZECHOSJ..JOVA.KiLA rnlGHiTS BA:OK, p. 1,9,4. 29. Benes, IN H.l!S OWN WlORDS, p. 133. 30. CZEOHiOSiLOVAKIA FIGHTS BAOK, p. 196. 31. IBID., p. 196. WORDS, p. 135. 32. Benes, IN HIS ow 33. Thomas G. -Masaryk, THE MAKING OF A STATE, New York, 1927), pp. 14-15. 34. FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. I (1935), p. 226. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 40. 35. 36. Harry W. Laidler, "The ,Czecho-Slovakia That Was," THE NEW REPUB!LIC, XCViIII (Ma.rch 29, 1939), 213. 37. Winifred Hadsel, "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism," FOREIGN BOLICY IRJEBORTS, XXIV (February 15, 1947), 271. 38. IBID., %73. 39. Wilhelm Turnwald, iRENAISCIDNCE OR iDEJOI.iINE OF CIDNTRAL EJUROPE (Munich, 1954), p. 60. 40. "American War Documents," OURREJNT HISTORY, VI (February, 1944), 15G. 41. "Russian Czech Pact Brings Up Puzzle Big Three Didn't Solve," NEWSWEEK, XXII (December 27, 1943), 30. 4!. Turnwald, IRIDNASCFl..'-.CE OR DECL]NE, p. 62. �SLOVAKIA 63 43 Benes, MEMOIRS, pp. 245-249. 44. Edward Taborsky, "Benes and the Soviets," F10REIGN AFFA!IRS, XXVH (January, 1949), 309-14. 45. Joseph Wechsberg, "They're Losing Faith in America," SATURDAY EVENING POST, CCXXIX (July 28, 1956), 93. 46. 1'BlD., 93. 47. Hubert Ripka, -CZECHOSLOVAKIA EJN5LAVED (London, 1950), p. 38. 48. UNITIDD ,STATES DEPA!RTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, XX (May 22, 19 49) , ti 65. 49. Andrew Gyorgy, GOVEJRNMEJNTS OF DANIUBIAN EUROPE (New York, 1949), p. 103. 50. George tF. Kennan, AMERICAN DIPLOMA!CY, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1952), p. 104. 51. Kurt Glaser, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA: A ORITIOAL HISTORY (Caldwell, Idaho, 1961), p. 109. From the Munich crisis on to the final ,t ragedy of communist takeover in 1948, Eduard Benes is a difficult character to understand. There is a bit of Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde about him as he proceeds from confussion to frustration during the declining decade of his years. 52. Benes, MEMO-IRS, p. 253. 53. TtRAGEDY OF A PEOBLE, RACIAl.JISM IN ,CZEJOHO-SLOVAKIA, n. a. (New York, 1946), p. 19. 5-4 . .Glasser, CZEGHO-SLO'VA>KIA: A CRITICAL HIS'I\ORY, p. 129. Since American troops still occupied part of Czecho-Slovakia, Truman could have demanded ,that the ,Czechs discontinue the persecution of Sudeten Germans or else risk the annexation of Western Bohemia to the United States' Zone of Germany. J:BID., p. 130. 55. Joseph Pauco, CHRISTIAJ..~ SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM (Valpa.raiso, Indiana, 1959), p. 15. · 56 . •COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Special Report No. 8. Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representives, 83rd Congress, Second Session, p. 15. 57. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, Tenth Interim !Report of Hearings, 83rd Congress, Second Session, p. 166. 58. Gilbert L. Oddo, SlJOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, 1960), p. 310. 59. Petition of the ,S lovak Action Committee to the United Nations in the Trial of Dr. Joseph Tiso, n. p. 60. IBlD., n. p. As late as 1963·, the State Department refused to give out any information that it has in its files on Dr. Tiso. "As far as can be ascertained, the State Depa11trnent of the United States ordered the surrender of President Tiso and members of the Slovak Government in its custody without even investigating their status." Oddo, SLCNAKIA ANtD ITS PEOPLE, p. 310. 61. IBID., n . p. 62. Oddo, SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE, p. 315. 63. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Proceedings and Debates, 80th CoRgress, First Session, Special Reprint, p. 2. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1965, Vol. 15 Description An account of the resource Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SJ,..OVAKIA 51 A CRITICAL DECADE THE WHITE HOUSE .A.NiD 'l1HE SLOVAKS By Sister M. Evangela, SS. C. M . In a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles told the United States Ambassador in France, William Bullitt, that President Roosevelt did not intend to make a comment on the Slovak Declaration of Independence, proclaimed on March 14, 1939. 1 Hitler's invasion of Czecho-Slovakia the following day terminated all possibility of diplomatic negotiations. Minister Wilbur J. Carr informed the Secretary of State four days later that the Czecho-Slovak Foreign office had been closed. German military and civil authorities had assumed administrative power; as a result, there were no officials of the former Government with whom to maintain relations. 2 Although Dr. Bene~ had resigned his office as President of Czecho-Slovakia, he continued to use his past official signature in the telegrams of protest he sent to President Roosevelt, Chamberlain, Daladier, Litvinov, and to the President of the League of Nations' Council.3 He credits Roosevelt's attitude towards Hitler's occupation of Czecho-Slovakia to his foresight. "On the day of occupation I wired to President Roosevelt . . . The American Government immediately declined to recognize the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia and repudiated it. " 4 When the Czecho-Slovak Minister in France, Mr. Stephen Osusky, turned over the keys of the Czecho-Slovak Legation in Paris to the French Authorities, the United States invited Mr. Vladimir Hurban to do the same. But, as long as the United States did not recognize the disappearance of his country, Minister Hurban decided to stay on in his official former capacity while he hoped to enjoy the full and active support of the United States. In fact, he proposed to act as the Czecho-Slovak Government in order to safeguard, as he saw fit, the physical properties and assets of the CzechoSlovak Legation. Legally, of course, this was a questionable 52 SLOVAKIA procedure. He went so far as to suggest that Dr. Cervenka, the First Secretary of the Czecho-Slovak Degation in Washington, be recognized as Charge d' Affaires in the Minister's absence. In the interest of everyone concerned, President Roosevelt advised Benes, under the circumstances, not to come to Washington nor to seek an interview. 5 Earlier in the year, Dr. Benes had left London, where he had been staying since his resignation, for the United States. His purpose was "to inform it (the United States) of my intentions and plans and to draw its attention to what it was to expect and for what it had to prepare itself, the State and the Nation." 6 Accepting the Chair of Sociology, he lectured in the University of Chicago from February, 1939 to June, 1939. In the meantime, his friend from World War I days, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs and President Roosevelt's regular adviser in matters of foreign policy, arranged a meeting between the President and Dr. Benes at Hyde Park for May 28, 1939. 7 Of this visit, Mr. Benes wrote: "I was received by President Roosevelt in May (28), 1939 ... Even at that time he promised me the recognition of our independence and of our future government as far as developments and possibilities in his own country would permit." 8 "We have helped you once. We will help you again. Do remain in contact with me and let me know how your affairs progress," Roosevelt encouraged the former Czecho-Slovak President. He added, "You may be sure that in this war we will not do less for you than in the last war." 9 However, when World War II broke out, the United States remained neutral and reserved toward Benes, "this being in line with its general policy," explained the Czech leader. 10 During his stay at London, Benes, though an exile without authority, nominated a Czechoslovak State Council, and then had himself confirmed as President by that Council which then became the Provisional Government-in-exile. 11 Great Britain was the first to accord it recognition (July 21, 1940) and other Allied nations followed suit. Benes waited until June 4, 1941, before requesting the United States for a formal recognition of the Czechoslovak Government in London. On July 30, 1941, Roosevelt penned these words to SLOVAKIA 53 him: "The American Government has decided to accredit an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in London for closer contact in the common interests of the two countries until the institutions of free government are re-estabHshed in Czechoslovakia." 12 The novel method by which Benes had again become President amazed many Slovaks who were of the opinion that the Allied recognition of this Provisional Czechoslovak Government was rather unique in political history. They became suspicious and uneasy when they discovered that the self-appointed President of a nonexistent State became one of the most influential counsellors to the Western Democracies on matters of European politics. 13 In the meantime, Slovaks in America had been urging the United States Government to recognize the Republic of Slovakia. The President of the Slovak League of America, Mr. Joseph Rusek, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 24 and again in August, 1939, concerning this matter. Iri his second letter, Mr. Rusek indicated very practical reasons for a reversal of the American policy on Slovakia. There a r e hundreds of Sl ovak American s who hol d property a nd h ave other mater ial inter ests i n Slovakia, w hich, due to th e u ncerta in conditi ons existing gener a ll y in E ur ope today, th ey a r e a nxious to liquidate. Since Slovakia h as no official r epresentative in the U nited States through w h om s uch matters could best b e handled, th ese Slovak Am ericans, w ho are citizen s of the U nited States, have already suffe r ed m uch anxiety a nd mater ial loss. If your Honor h a s r easons for n ot r econizing DE J UR!E this younges t of E ur opean ,s tates, I ask you to consider the m ater ial in terests of these America n citizens a nd again urge fo r y our consideration th e petition o f the Slovak L eague of America for, a t leas t DE FACTO r ecognition of 1Slova kia by th e U nited Stat es . .. 14 Mr. Hull treated this plea as he had the plea of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ferdinand Durcansky, filing it but not acknowledging it. Instead, the Secretary of State wrote to the Charge in Hungary, Mr. Howard K. Travers, that, despite the hardship suffered through a lack of American consular offices in Slovakia, the United States would not abandon its position of non-recognition of Slovakia because of German military occupation of parts of West~ ern and Northern Slovakia.15 54 SLOVAKIA It seems that it had been Dr. Benes who was more or less responsible for the American position on Slovakia. On May 12, 1939, he had sent Dr. George Slavik to the Slovak League of America to influence it against the Slovak Republic. For the failure of Slavik's mission, the League was subjected to a propaganda barrage discrediting it in Washington, D. C. 16 In an effort to offset Benes's attacks, the Slovak League established an information chancery in Washington, D. C. for the purpose of exposing the falseness of various circulating reports. It also published factual works on the Slovak nation. It took steps to acquaint the Foreign Relation Committee with the desirability of recognizing Slovakia. Under its aegis, the members subscribed $52,632,224.45 in war bonds and purchased, through the Slovenska Obrana Newspaper and the Osadne Hlasy drives, three training airplanes called the "Spirit of the Slovak League of America." 17 To list all that the patriotic zeal and loyalty of this very active organization meant to the United States would be impossible. Yet, despite the evident sincerity of many Americans of Slovak descent, investigations of their membership in the League were frequent. 18 During his residence in London, Dr. Benes had made a radio statement on December 3, 1939, that injured the reputation of numerous Slovak American citizens. He said at the time, "The entire Czechoslovak America is with us except for a small group of paid Nazi helpers." 19 The Presidents of several influential Slovak organizations in America wrote to Mr. Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, requesting the Department of Justice for an investigation of the charge.20 The Slovak League also suffered accusations brought against it before the Dies Committee of the United States House of Representatives as a subversive organization. Twice Mr. Rusek (October 6 and October 28, 1939) asked Mr. Martin Dies, Chairman of the Committee, for an explanation of the circumstances which prompted the action of the Committee opposing the League. 21 None was given. To disprove the pro-Hitler accusations, "American-born, public-spirited, war-winning-minded Monsignor F. J. Dubosh of Cleveland, Ohio, leader of the Slovaks in America, offered to do this: to broadcast to the Slovaks in occupied SLOVAKIA 55 Slovakia to rise against Hitler. He was turned down by Washington on this proposal. " 22 Finally, official Washington became convinced that the smears leveled against the League were unjustified since the FBI could produce no convicting evidence. The Department of Justice then assured the President of the League, "The fact that the Department of Justice instituted no prosecution against the Slovak League of America, would serve to disprove the accusations to which you refer. " 23 However, by that time, Benes's plan to discredit the League and Slovakia had fulfilled its purpose. As far as the United States was concerned, the Republic of Slovakia did not exist. President Roosevelt's will in this case was inflexible. Efforts on the part of Slovak Americans to foster a better understanding with him failed. One writer relates his sad experience as follows: . . . no amount of our effort could change the official position of our State Department and of our Government. I vi.sited F1DR In the White House on October 18, 1'940, along with a ,Slovak 'League delegation and, in discussing these matters, F1DR told us that President Benes was his friend and they were interested in the restoration of CzechoSlovakia.24 At this point, the question presents itself: Was Benes alone responsible for the non-recognition of the Republic of Slovakia, or was there another cause or influencing factor? In her research the · writer has come across another point of view. Unfortunately, the sources cannot be disclosed because of possible reprisals; however, this writer believes the new slant of sufficent importance to warrant inclusion in this present study on the role of Slovakia in the relations of the United States with Czecho-Slovakia. Persons having vested interests in a government would quite naturally wish to see its preservation. It is understandable why the Jews who had invested in the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia would be very interested in the perpetuation of the State at least until such a time as most of their money could be taken out safely. Slovakia posed a threat to their investment. Furthermore, because of past detrimental effects on the Catholic State of Slovakia, the newlyiounded Republic clamped down on all Freemason lodges, 56 SLOVAKIA clissolving Freemasonary in the country, and placing controls on the .Jews. 25 It is, therefore, not surprising that the nonCatholic elements in Slovakia and elsewhere would combine with the Freemasons and secretly but effectively prevent, if not the formation, then the recognition of a new State whose citizenry would be in vast majority Catholic.26 Oddly ,enough, Masonic influence in England, France and, perhaps in Scandinavia, is quite powerful, and yet these countries recognized the new Slovak State. In America, it appears that the influence of the Jews was added to that of the Freemasons, Communists, and Czechs. Together they formed a bloc strong enough to influence FDR's non-recognition policy, a fact further strengthened by the knowledge of President Roosevelt's membership in the Masonic fraternity. 27 President Benes paid another official visit to the United States in May, 1943. He talked with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Vice-President Henry Wallace, Secretaries Morgenthau, Knox, Stimson and many other political, military and economic leaders of this country. He addressed both Houses of Congress as well as numerous representative gatherings in Washington, D.C. , New York, and Chicago. 28 This second visit with President Roosevelt confirmed and consolidated Benes's official, international, and legal position in the United States.29 It was immediately after this second visit that the CzechoSlovak Legation was raised to an Embassy with the appointment of Colonel Vladimir Hurban as the first Czecho-Slovak Ambassador to the United States, June 28, 1943. On that historic occasion, Roosevelt asserted his feelings toward · the Czech leader thus: The elevation of our respective diplomatic missions to the r ank or Embassy r eaffirms the friendship whi ch has always uni ted our two peoples and emphasize li our common aim of working togethe r to destroy the evil forces w hich s ought t o impose u pon th e world their immoral d omination . .. I shall be gr ateful, Mr . Ambassador , if you will convey to His Excellency President Benes, whose r ecent visit was a fur th er la ndmark in our efforts t o achieve fi na l victory , my ,sincere goo d ,wishes for his welfa r e a nd for the early liber ation of th e people of iCzecho-i.SloTakia.30 On June 9 and September 28, 1942, the British and the Soviet Governments accorded the Czecho-Slovak Government the status of Ambassador to their Ministers.31 SLOVAKIA 57 Leaving the United States with a sense of relief and satisfaction after his second visit, President Benes noted that both on the domestic and the international levels friendly cooperation between America and the Soviets was functioning well. 32 From this point on, one sees a somewhat quickening get-togetherness developing between Stalin and Benes. Long years before, Masaryk, who had looked upon the Communist seizure of power in Russia with evident satisfaction, had predicted: "The revolution in Russia will bring great changes politically, socially and culturally, so that in the future we shall come to a close cooperation and a national and political reapprochement with her." 33 Prominent Czechs had believed cooperation with Russia was not only possible but also desirable. 34 Benes himself stated in his Memoirs that after the Treaty of 1935 with P.msia, Czecho-Slovak cooperation with the Soviet Union was "normal, lasting, and consistent. " 35 Imitation is the greatest compliment. Creeping socialism began only a few years after the First Republic of CzechoS1ovakia came into existence. In 1938, a visitor noted with surprise a distinct progress toward social control of the nation's industries. Railroads, mines, hydro-electric plants, fisheries, smelting and radium works, Czech Postal Savings Bank were all in the hands of the Government. 315 Under pressure of leftist leaders, the Government-inexile initiated discussions for large-scale nationalization as early as 1943. No definite plan emerged until the Kosice Agreement of 1945. By then, it was too late to turn back from the road of socialism which was to end in total involvement with communism. 37 After Stalingrad, Benes concluded that Russia would escalade the apex of Europe's political power. He found it expedient to adjust Czecho-Slovakia to the eminent position of the Soviet Union, making his country the first to line itself up voluntarily on the side of the stronghold of communism. 38 Against British advice, Benes went to Moscow to make a new treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. 39 The SovietCzech Mutual Aid Treaty, a twenty years treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post was collaboration, was signed on 58 SLOVAKIA December 12, 1943. 40 London at first opposed the Pact and Washington did not react favorably to it because it veered away from a world security league. 41 The Treaty did not change Roosevelt's benevolent attitude toward Stalin and Benes. In fact, "according to his own account, Benes's influence on Roosevelt's ideas concerning Central and Eastern Europe was considerable at this time; and, though not present at Teheran, he cast a fatal shadow on it from the background. He strengthened Roosevelt's sublime trust in the men of Kremlin." 42 Benes supports this interpretation with the statement, "I think, therefore, that I am not wrong in supposing that the Moscow Conference (and by implication, Teheran) was the direct result or was .:.t least hastened by the negotiations for our treaty with :Moscow." Later he observed that the Moscow Conference laid the "foundations for real agreement and friendship between the three participating Powers." 43 How far his political friendships of this period were responsible for the debacle that was to follow after the War cannot be ascertained. The facts are that the Soviets showed li.ttle regard for their treaty obligations in May, 1944, when the Red, Army liberated Pilsen and Prague and seized Ruthenia; when the Allies, without consulting Benes or notifying him, made an agreement with the Russians regarding zones of occupation; when Benes suddenly realized that CzechoSlovakia was under the immediate control of the Red Army. 44 "The American Army's failure to liberate Prague in April, 1945, is considered by many Czechs the most fateful mistake of American policy." 45 It is the opinion of some that the United States Army could have saved Czecho-Slovakia for the West as it had Vienna and Berlin. 46 The Reds made propaganda out of this by telling the people of Czecho-Slovakia that America had refused to aid their country. 47 On this case, documentary evidence proves that No prior political agreements or commitments h ad been made with respect to Czecho-'Slovakia, and the Allied Command m ade perfectly clear its willi ngness to complete the des truction of the enemy in Czecho-Slovakia as well a:s in other areas. It was only at the specific request of the Soviet High Command, and a!ter assurances were received, that the Soviet Army was already in a position to delitroy SLOVAKIA 59 the enemy in the Vltava Valley, in which Praha (Prague) is situated, that the advance beyond the Pilsen line was halted.48 Czecho-Slovakia was to become the victim of the aggressive foreign policy of the East and a negative policy of withdrawal by the West. 49 It could have profited to a great extent from the publishing of George Kennan's excellent advice on policy toward Russia. In his American Diplomacy, Kennan stresses the point that the United States must "regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner in the political arena." 50 Roosevelt and Benes both needed to be told this. The book, unfortunately, came out a few years too late for their benefit. On the other hand, Kurt Glaser concludes that "considering the entire record, ... the Western Powers had no reason to believe that the Czechs were in anyway dissatisfied with the prospect of Russian 'liberation'." 51 Certainly Benes could agree with that viewpoint inasmuch as he inked the following remarks in his Memoirs: I . . . regarded the Teheran Conference as a great success and I moulded all my further discussions in Moscow as .well as my later ones in London and our negotiations with :the Americans to fit the results of Teheran. This also covered the advance of the Soviet Army into ,Central ·E urope and on to our territory :which I regarded as a certainity - especially after Tehera n - though I did not exclude the possibility that the Western Allies would also try to reach it.52 The last sentence of the above quote clearly indicates Benes's thinking on the subject of liberation. The events following the liberation of Czecho-Slovakia were to be the saddest in its history. Preiident Roosevelt and the British War Cabinet approved a plan for the transfer of Sudeten Germans. The Czecho-Slovak Minister of Propaganda, Vaclav Kopecky, declared, "We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-nationalize ... the whole area ... " 53 At Potsdam, Truman, Attlee, aod their advisers, incorrectly informed, could not prevent the total expulsion of fifteen million Germans from their original homes. The Potsdam Agreement sanctioned their transfer "in an orderly and human way." 54 What followed was a barbaric resurgence. Meanwhile an uprising, Communist led and inspired, 60 SLOVAKIA occurred in Slovakia in 1944. The German Army crushed the improvised rebellion and the Soviet Army used the occasion to occupy Slovakia's territory by mid-April, 1945. Control of the Slovak Republic passed into hands of the Prague pro-communist government which initiated a reign of terror. 55 President Benes had organized a coalition government with the help of Moscow. Together with Premier Klement Gottwald, leader of the Czech Communists, he proclaimed the Kosice Program, April 5, 1945, for the new Government of the reestablished Czecho-Slovakia. Without any form of plebiscite, Slovakia was reintegrated into the State and promised equal rights. 56 The Kosice Program was the door to Communist seizure of power three years later. The Slovak National Council, an ligency of the communist-dominated central government of Prague, created several institutions of political justice on May 15, 1945. "The legal task of these courts was to judge war criminals, but their political purpose was to get rid of the political adversaries of the two factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with Germany." 57 President Jozef Tiso, with a majority of representatives of the Slovak Republic, placed himself in the hands of the military of the United States after the occupation of Slovakia by the Soviet Army. He remained in the American detention camp for a short time and then was surrendered to Benes who gave him to the Communists in charge of the "people's court" in Bratislava. 58 The international law expert, Dr. Fer.dinand Durcansky, declared that, "according to accepted principles of international law and traditional practices of civilized nations, a political refugee, politically guilty or not, is not to be given over to a government against which he worked, and certainly not when such a government is one from which he fled . . ." 59 His explanation demonstrates that the American officers had no legal basis for turning over Dr. Tiso and the Slovak representatives to the National Court of CzechoSlovakia. If these men had been suspected of some military crime, their trial properly belonged to the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal. 60 SLOVAKIA Dr. Benes had made it clear to the Slovak National Council that sentence of death upon President Tiso was a matter of necessity. The National Court in Bratislava was, therefore, devoid of impartiality and objectivity. Since it was through the intrumentality of its Army of Occupation that Tiso was released to the Czech Government, the United States was bound to intervene.61 Why it did not do so, despite the earnest pleadings of Slovak Americans, will remain a secret in the confidential files of the State Department. Dr. Tiso died on the gallows at dawn on April 18, 1947.62 In his speech, "Murder in Slovakia," delivered in the House of Representatives on April 23, 1947, Congressman Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin emphasized that the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. "The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Deparment while this murder was going on." He decried the fact that our national leaders did not so much as file a protest against the execution of one "whose only crime was that he hated communism just as he hated nazism." 63 FOOTNOTES 1. FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. I (1 939), p. 41. 2. IBID., pp. 48-51 . 3. Eduard Benes, MEMOJJRS: FROM MUNICH TO NEW WAR AND NEW VICTORY (Boston, 1954), p . 19. 4. Eduard Benes, IN 'HDS OWIN WORDS (New York, 1944), p. 133. 5. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 56. 6. IBID., p. 54. 7. IBID., p . 75. 8. Benes, IN HIS OWN WORDS, p. 133. 9. Benes, MEMOIRS, pp. 79-80. 10. Benes. IN HIS OWN WORDS, p. 133. "The question of the recognition of the Czechoslovak Government was being examined carefully at Washington." Benes, MIDMOIRS, p. 176. 11. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 175. 12. IBID., pp. 176-77. 13 . Memorandum of the Slovak National Cottncil Abroad to His Excellency John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State (May 28, 1953), p.11. 14. Joseph Rusek to Cordell Hull, August 4, 1939. 15. FOREIGN IRElLATIONS, Vol. I (1939). pp. 69-71. 62 SLOVAKIA 16. Mikula§ i:§princ, ed., SLOViENSKA LIGA V AM1E RIKE ~TYRlDSA 'l'ROONA (Sc;ranton, 1947), pp. 70-71. 17. IBID., p. 84. 18. Correspondence in re Slova,kia. 19. IBID., The statement appeared in the Czech newspapars in the United States and was thus brought to the attention or many Americans of Slovak origin. 20. IBID. 21. J. Husak to Hon. Martin Dies, October 6 and 28, 1939. 22. Peter P. Yurchak, "Inside •CzechoJSlovak!a," THE CA'l1HOLIC WOO.Iill, CLIX (May, 1944). p. 162. 23. Frantisek J. Dubosh, "Slovenska Liga pofas vojny," (T-he Slovak League during the War), XXXV Congress of the Slovak League of America (May 26, 1957), p. 15. 24. tDr. Peter P. Hletko, President of the Slovak League or .America, to the writer, July 2, 1962. 25. CZEOHOSLOVAKIA F1IGH'DS BACK, A DOCUMENT OF THE ,CZEJOROS,L OVAK MLNILSTRY OF FOREIGN A1F1FAIRS with an Introduction by Jan Masaryk (1Washington, D. C., 1943), p. 158. 26. Dr. Tiso has sometimes been charged with persecuting the Jews, contrary to an official report of the International Committee or the Red Cross which recorded :that "at definite periods SloTakia was actually regarded as a relative asylum for Jews ... The Jews that remain ed in Slovakia were comparatively safe until the revolt which took place at the end of August, 1944." Cited by Kirschbaum from •R EVUE IN'DERNATIO::--rAL !DE LA CROIX ROUGE, 1947, iN. 348, pp. 957-9 59 in "The ,Politics of Hlinka's Party." S.IJO'VAKIA, I (May, 1951), 48. 27. ENCYCLiOPEtDIA AMEJRICANA (1958), XVIII, p. 888. 28. CZECHOSJ..JOVA.KiLA rnlGHiTS BA:OK, p. 1,9,4. 29. Benes, IN H.l!S OWN WlORDS, p. 133. 30. CZEOHiOSiLOVAKIA FIGHTS BAOK, p. 196. 31. IBID., p. 196. WORDS, p. 135. 32. Benes, IN HIS ow 33. Thomas G. -Masaryk, THE MAKING OF A STATE, New York, 1927), pp. 14-15. 34. FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. I (1935), p. 226. Benes, MEMOIRS, p. 40. 35. 36. Harry W. Laidler, "The ,Czecho-Slovakia That Was," THE NEW REPUB!LIC, XCViIII (Ma.rch 29, 1939), 213. 37. Winifred Hadsel, "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism," FOREIGN BOLICY IRJEBORTS, XXIV (February 15, 1947), 271. 38. IBID., %73. 39. Wilhelm Turnwald, iRENAISCIDNCE OR iDEJOI.iINE OF CIDNTRAL EJUROPE (Munich, 1954), p. 60. 40. "American War Documents," OURREJNT HISTORY, VI (February, 1944), 15G. 41. "Russian Czech Pact Brings Up Puzzle Big Three Didn't Solve," NEWSWEEK, XXII (December 27, 1943), 30. 4!. Turnwald, IRIDNASCFl..'-.CE OR DECL]NE, p. 62. SLOVAKIA 63 43 Benes, MEMOIRS, pp. 245-249. 44. Edward Taborsky, "Benes and the Soviets," F10REIGN AFFA!IRS, XXVH (January, 1949), 309-14. 45. Joseph Wechsberg, "They're Losing Faith in America," SATURDAY EVENING POST, CCXXIX (July 28, 1956), 93. 46. 1'BlD., 93. 47. Hubert Ripka, -CZECHOSLOVAKIA EJN5LAVED (London, 1950), p. 38. 48. UNITIDD ,STATES DEPA!RTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, XX (May 22, 19 49) , ti 65. 49. Andrew Gyorgy, GOVEJRNMEJNTS OF DANIUBIAN EUROPE (New York, 1949), p. 103. 50. George tF. Kennan, AMERICAN DIPLOMA!CY, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1952), p. 104. 51. Kurt Glaser, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA: A ORITIOAL HISTORY (Caldwell, Idaho, 1961), p. 109. From the Munich crisis on to the final ,t ragedy of communist takeover in 1948, Eduard Benes is a difficult character to understand. There is a bit of Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde about him as he proceeds from confussion to frustration during the declining decade of his years. 52. Benes, MEMO-IRS, p. 253. 53. TtRAGEDY OF A PEOBLE, RACIAl.JISM IN ,CZEJOHO-SLOVAKIA, n. a. (New York, 1946), p. 19. 5-4 . .Glasser, CZEGHO-SLO'VA>KIA: A CRITICAL HIS'I\ORY, p. 129. Since American troops still occupied part of Czecho-Slovakia, Truman could have demanded ,that the ,Czechs discontinue the persecution of Sudeten Germans or else risk the annexation of Western Bohemia to the United States' Zone of Germany. J:BID., p. 130. 55. Joseph Pauco, CHRISTIAJ..~ SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM (Valpa.raiso, Indiana, 1959), p. 15. · 56 . •COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Special Report No. 8. Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representives, 83rd Congress, Second Session, p. 15. 57. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, Tenth Interim !Report of Hearings, 83rd Congress, Second Session, p. 166. 58. Gilbert L. Oddo, SlJOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE (New York, 1960), p. 310. 59. Petition of the ,S lovak Action Committee to the United Nations in the Trial of Dr. Joseph Tiso, n. p. 60. IBlD., n. p. As late as 1963·, the State Department refused to give out any information that it has in its files on Dr. Tiso. "As far as can be ascertained, the State Depa11trnent of the United States ordered the surrender of President Tiso and members of the Slovak Government in its custody without even investigating their status." Oddo, SLCNAKIA ANtD ITS PEOPLE, p. 310. 61. IBID., n . p. 62. Oddo, SLOVAKIA AND ITS PEOPLE, p. 315. 63. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Proceedings and Debates, 80th CoRgress, First Session, Special Reprint, p. 2.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The White House and the Slovaks Description An account of the resource Sister M. Evangela, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965 pp. 51-63 Contributor notes in backmatter indicate that Sr. Evangela published the thesis at DePaul University in 1964 found at <a href="https://depaul.on.worldcat.org/oclc/4186612">https://depaul.on.worldcat.org/oclc/4186612</a> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lubek, Sister M. Evangela, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5b30d7c559730fe0284be847504b1c99.pdf e38a1fce9cdd2c89b02a9d4a53163b52 PDF Text Text 50 SLOVAKIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1945-1950: A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE Igor Lukes The outcome of the Czechoslovak political crisis from the end of World War II via the communist Machtergreifung in February 1948, and into the early fifties was not a preordained conclusion . It was not determined solely by the weight of the emerging blocs, it was not driven by the map, nor was it simply for the Kremlin to dictate. On the Czech side, it was mainly the product of unfounded hope (faith in an untested "socialism"), misplaced trust (deification of the Soviet Union and its leaders), and pathological fear of Germany. But the west also contributed to the communist victory by political blunders and amateurism in other field s. This papers focu ses on the U.S. intelligence community in postwar Prague. Looking at Czechoslovakia before the end of the war, and seeking to predict its political course in postwar Europe cou ld lead one to imagine a variety of scenarios. A minority saw the future in dark colors: they thought the country was destined to become a colony of the Soviet Union . They noted that the Czechoslovak political elite, punch-drunk from the Munich catastrophe, had taken steps that tied their country with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. No one in the west doubted that President Edvard Benes and most of his colleagues in London were ideologically on their side, but it was clear that they still felt deep resentment over the manner in which their diplomatic alliances were imploded by the western appeasers of the Third Reich. They moved closer toward the Soviet Union because of the Munich experience and in order to show the British Foreign Office that when it came to coalitions in the postwar setting they no longer depended exclusively on the west; they had the Soviet card and they wou ld play it as needed to prevent "another Munich". An even greater factor for the pessimists was the country's location on the map and the situation at the front. The Red Army crossed the Czechoslovak border on 6 October 1944, while the allies were recovering from the disastrous Operation Market-Garden . Stalin was inside Czechoslovakia, but the western allies were stil l far away �SLOVAKIA 51 (U.S. Army units would cross onto Czech territory only on 18 April 1945). This led Ambassador William C. Bullitt to predict that after the war the Kremlin would "domin ate Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland , Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia." Bullitt speculated that Moscow had learned from its defeat in Hungary after World War I and would therefore apply different strategies in different countries located in the space between Germany and Ru ssia. 1 The Soviet Union might come with cold steel into the Baltics and Poland, but with treaties and patience to Finland and Czechoslovakia. Two wartime U.S. intelligence analysts observed years later that after the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of December 1943 they had no illusions about the way Stalin was setting forth his policy toward all the countries of Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia. 2 The political course of Czechoslovakia inspired lots of optimists in the fall of 1944. The allied press was beaming with good new s, predicting that the country's postwar political life would simply pick up where "it was ruthlessly interrupted by the Munich Agreement of September 1938." Some American journalists celebrated a " pattern of cooperation" among the allied governments and proposed that the December 1943 Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement was a " model " for others to follow. 3 Some suggested that the May 1944 Dutch, Belgian, and Norwegian agreements with the British and the Americans regarding the restoration of their sovereign status after liberation followed in the path originally established by the exiled Czechoslovak government, which had signed half a year before a treaty with the Soviet Union addressing matters of sovereignty and postwar administration. 4 When the country 's President Edvard Benes turned sixty on 28 May 1944, he received telegrams from many leaders of the 1 Willi am C. Bullitt, "The World From Rome: The Ete rn al C ity Fears a Struggle Between Christianity and Comm uni sm," Life Magazine, 4 September 1944. For a Soviet reaction to Bullitt' s ana lysis, see K. Demidov, "Obankrotivshiisia razvedch ik, ,. Pra vda, 4 September 1944. Note the dates. 2 Interview wi th Spencer L. Taggart, Logan, Utah, 23 April 1999 and interview with Paul Zinner, 5 Apri l 2005 , Washington . 3 No au thor, "The Pattern of Cooperati on," New York Times, 18 May 1944. 4 J. Emlyn Williams, " Smaller Allies in Europe Differ in Peace Readiness," Christian Science Monitor. IO May 1944. �52 SLOVAKIA anti-Nazi alliance, and New York Times called him a " prophet of a great cause" and a "fine champion" of democracy.5 Among the optimists was the influential C. L. Sulzberger who summed up the geopolitical situation in the east at the end of August 1944. The future borders of Finland , the Baltic republics, Poland, Hungary and others were at the mercy of Joseph Stalin. But "Mr. Benes has already got - he obtained it three years ago - a Soviet guarantee that Czechoslovakia 's pre-Munich frontiers will be re-established." 6 No doubt, thi s flattered President Benes enormously and reaffirmed him in his determination to establish hi s country as a friend of both the blocs and a bridge between them. The optimistic view that Czechoslovakia, balancing precariously between east and west, would maintain its sovereignty persisted even in the face of hard evidence that its political scene was undergoing dramatic changes in the direction of a gloomy scenario. In early April 1945, when the composition of the new Czechoslovak Government became known, Paul Zinner, an OSS (Office of Strategic Services) analyst in Washington , took the list of its members to the Department of State. He hoped to explain that the new Prime Minister had gained a reputation for being an apologist for even the most odious Soviet foreign policy deci sions. Zinner was di sturbed that the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior was to be headed by a communist, and the same was true for the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Agriculture, and de facto, the Ministry of Defense . All in all, he thought that the government' s composition was a bad omen. But Zinner's State Department colleagues thou ght there was no reaso n to be concerned. They glanced at the list and learned that the country would have Edvard Benes as president and Jan Masaryk as foreign minister. " What could go wrong with such friends at the helm ?" they asked . " We have nothing to fear, " they concluded, di smisssed Zinner's concerns and turned their attention to other matters, including the imminent opening of the United States Embassy in Prague. Zinner recalls leaving the Czech affairs desk with a sense of foreboding and frustration: there seemed little he could do to 5 No author, "Benes at 60," New York Times, 28 May 1944. C. L. Sulzberger, " Frontier Policies of Russia Emerge," New York Times, 28 August 1944. 6 �SLOVAKIA 53 persuade the optimists that the Czechs might ultimately share the fate of the Poles, Hungarians and others in the region. 7 Finally, there were the reali sts, who staked out their territory in the space between the optimists and pessimists. They did not believe it was possible in 1944 to predict Czechoslovakia's future political orientation and course. But they were prepared to say that the country was the most important laboratory for testing east-west relations in the region. Charles E . Bohlen rejected the view expressed by his colleagues that Poland was the country to study in order to discern whether the west could coexist with Stalin. Poland's fate had been sealed, he thought. The real test, Bohlen went on to argue, was Czechoslovakia. Benes had signed the December 1943 treaty with Stalin despite opposition from his British hosts. " If the USSR really implemented that treaty and did not violate it then we would have an indication that it might be possible to get along with the Soviet Union after all. If the Soviet Union should break the treaty - the Czechs having gone as far as anybody could expect them to go - this might be an indication that cooperation with the Soviet Union would not be possible." 8 Other Americans, for instance, Averell Harrimann, shaed thi s view. 9 Bohlen ' s analysis carried the day. The United States would henceforth treat Prague as a testing ground and an observation post. Although it was in Eastern Europe and the spires of the Kremlin cast a shadow over it, the city had the atmosphere of a western outpost. It welcomed the Americans who came to reopen the United States Embassy in May 1945. And Washington reciprocated by building up its diplomatic and intelligence presence in postwar Czechoslovakia to unprecedented levels. In short order, the embassy at the Schoenborn Palace had a staff of more than two hundred employees. There were several reasons why U.S. intelligence in postwar Czechoslovakia could have performed well during the crisis leading up to the Communist Machtergreifung of February 1948. The first 7 Interview with Paul Zinner, 5 April 2005 , Washington. The Harry S. Truman Library . Harry N. Howard , "Oral Hi story Interview ," 7-8 October 1976. lnterview by Richard D. McKinzie. 9 Eduard Mark, "Charles Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: A Memorandum of 18 October 1945," Diplomatic History 3, 2 (Spring 1979): I05. 8 �54 SLOVAKIA has to do with time and opportunity to launch intelligence operations. The U.S. Army had not played any direct role in the liberation of Poland from Nazism, and the imposition of Soviet rule over the country was violent and rapid. The same was true - with significant regional variations - in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. When American diplomats and intelligence officers arrived in postwar Warsaw they had little or no time to get to know the terrain and to establish contacts to be exploited in the future. Right from the start they operated under significant or even extreme counterintelligence pressure from the domestic and Soviet special services. The opposite was true in Czechoslovakia, where the American intelligence community had plenty of time to prepare for the co ming crisis. Small elements of the U.S. Army had arrived in Prague some two days before the Russians, the U.S. military liberated several prominent Czech cities, and the G.l.s remained deployed in Western Bohemi a for seven months. During thi s time and later - until the spri ng of 1948 - Americans could freely travel in and out of Prague, and U.S. intelligence thus had countless opportunities to set down its roots in Czech soil. Moreover, the Czech co mmunists took until February 1948 to establish their dictatorship. Throughout thi s time each branch of the Prague government included individuals who were happy to provide confidential information to the Americans. President Edvard Benes set the tone when he met with such known U.S. intelligence officials as Allen Dulles, the Englishman Robert Bruce Lockhart, and others. Many other high-ranking government officials, including cabinet ministers, scores of military officers, policemen, secret police agents, and intellige nce service officials were willing to provide information to U.S. intelligence operatives in Prague. These individuals were not agents in the formal meaning of the word. They had not been formally recruited, handled in a clandestine manner, and paid. They provided the Americans with information from various denied areas of official life because there was a community of interest between the United States and their well positioned so urces in Czechoslovakia. From a spymaster's perspective a better environment was hard to imagine. American diplomats and intelligence officers came to postwar Poland and other East European countries only after Russian tanks �SLOVAKIA 55 had helped install a Moscow-vetted government in power. This relegated them to the role of observers. But United States intelligence operatives in postwar Czechoslovakia had had plenty of time to prepare for the Cold War milieu. How did they do in postwar Czechoslovakia? This is the question this paper seeks to address. The chief American diplomat in Prague was Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt, whose service in the Soviet Union included the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, and who had, as a result, a skeptical view of all things Soviet. The Kremlin bosses had snubbed him repeatedly, and he disliked them with passion. In Prague Steinhardt surrounded himself with such like-minded anti -Stalinists as Colonel (later General ) Joseph Anthony Michela, US Military Attache, and others . The U.S. Embassy in Prague under Steinhardt had no intention of accommodating any communist or Soviet schemes. The ambassador's ideology and hi s can-do attitude combined to provide a good working atmosphere for American intelligence in Prague. U.S. Intelligence in Prague after the end of World War II was organized around two separate pl atforms, the Military Mission and the United States Embassy. The United States Military Mission was established in Prague only a few weeks after the end of the war. Even in that most abnormal era it was a very unorthodox operation. The commaning officer of the Military Mission was Colonel Charles Katek. 10 He was the first among several larger-than-life Americans who descended upon Prague right after the war's end. When Katek joined the Army, his Ph.D. in hi story from Northwestern University and hi s Czech and German language skills did not go unnoticed. After an officer candidate course, the OSS was a logical destination . Katek and his team of OSS operatives reached Prague on IO May 1945, soon after the Red Army had arrived. In Prague Katek found a luxurious apartment on Loretanske Square, a most prestigious address. He and his colleagues developed it into a salon where so me of the most interesting and influential people gathered regularly. It was well known that Katek was keenly 10 Most of my infonnation is from the Prague archives and from Janet Edwards, Colone l Katek 's daughter, Interv iew, 19 Jul y 2000. The ori ginal name of the fami ly was Kotek; it was changed to Katek in Chicago. Since "Kotek" does not sound particul arly Czech, it remains unclear whether the fam il y had come from Bohemia or Slovakia. �56 SLOVAKIA interested in intelligence; he was remarkably open about it. Among his guests were members of various noble families, such as Schwarzenberg, Lobkowitz, Czernin, Kolowrat, and Nadherny ; government officials, for instance Minister Jan Masaryk, Minister Petr Zenk), Minister Jaroslav Stransky , Minister Adolf Prochazka, and Minister Frantisek Hala; at least a dozen members of parliament, including lvo Duchacek; countless personalities from business circles, and influential political journalists, such as Julius Firt, Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid. Visitors were attracted to the Military Mission by the prospect of friendly conversation and challenging political debates. Of course, no one should underestimate the importance in postwar Prague of good food, exotic alcohol, tobacco, and jazz records, all of which were made plentiful by Colonel Katek 's regular truck deliveries from a U.S. Army base in Nuremberg. Those who came and talked to the Americans at Loretanske Square knew full well that their words would be passed on to the authorities. Katek 's approach was to blur the line between dinner parties and espionage. It made his life both simple and pleasant. The Military Mission had a few sources who were not invited to join the parties on Loretanske Square. Even in such cases Colonel Katek made no attempt to practice the kind of tradecraft that is common in the world of intelligence. He met them durin g office hours at the Mission. The activities around the Military Miss ion in Prague were so notorious that other Americans who served in postwar Czechoslovakia were not quite sure what to think about the situation. 11 They were right to be concerned. The Czech authorities paid attention to what was happening around Colonel Katek. They quickly surmi sed that he was conducting military and political espionage. An StB document notes that in November 1945 thirty-eight Czechs were in the category of regular visitors at the Military Mission. In January 1946 the OBZ insisted that the Mission with its 10 US Army 11 Interview with Louise Schaffner, 30 January 1999. Mrs. Schaffner was a Foreign Service officer in the U. S. Embassy in Prague at the time of the communi st coup d ' etat. �SLOVAKIA 57 officers ran 109 agents. 12 On the basis of my interviews the claim appears to be signifycantly exaggerated. But the Military Mission under Colonel Katek 's direction was very active in gathering intelligence in postwar Prague. Its information came from willing and well-placed sources, not recruited agents. Though it seemed like a good idea at the time, the weakness of this manner of gathering intelligence would be revealed in February 1948. From the summer of 1945 to February 1948, the Military Mission reported information from an impressive array of well-placed sources: aristocrats, ministers, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mini stry of Interior, Ministry of Defense generals, high-ranking soldiers and pilots, security officials, and businessmen . It was easy to think that intelligence gathered from such knowledgeable and well-placed individuals was enough for analysts in Washington to create a true and accurate picture of the political crisis in Czechoslovakia. The intelligence section in the Embassy was led by Spencer Taggart. He arrived in Prague in the Spring of 1945 with a clear mission : "I was sent there with a long-term objective - to help the Czechs guard their independence and to promote western democracy." 13 Seen in thi s light, Taggart came to protect and promote the values that were agreeable to the majority of the political class and the population . Therefore, it was not difficult for him to gain access to a number of sources that were both knowledgeable and well informed - he was prepared to identify only four, Petr Zenk! , Major Jaromir Nechansky, Jan Stransky and lvo Duchacek, but there were others. For all their commitment, their well-placed so urces of information, and their knowledge of the terrain, the United States Embassy in Prague was consistently taken by surprise whenever a crisis developed. The first such occasion involved the May 1946 elections that resulted in a swee ping victory for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The OSS and State Department analysts took note of it, of course, but as one member of Katek 's team put it "were we smart enough to realize that thi s was the beginning of the end? I 12 Archives of the Ministry of Interi or, AMI Z-651, file 13. LT COL Bedrich Reicin and CPT Kare l Vas, Main Directorate, OBZ, Ministry of Defense, 302-592-1, no. 150.457/secret report -2c-/ 1946, 24 January 1946. 13 Interview with Spencer L. Taggart, Logan , Utah , 23 April 1999. �58 SLOVAKIA doubt it. " 14 Ambassador Steinhardt had predicted an entirel y different outcome and he adopted an ostrich-like posture when faced with the election results. Another event that clearly and unmi stakabl y indicated th at the Kremlin and the Czechoslovak communists were on the verge of seizing power took place in Ju ly 1947 . It involved the Marshall plan. The Soviets had made clear in early July 1947 that they would take part neither in the conference nor in the Marshall plan itself. But the Czechs, including the leaders of the CPC, were planning to go as late as 7 Jul y 1947. They were invited to the Kremlin , and two days later, an official delegation from Prague was in Moscow. On 10 July 1947 Czechoslovakia announced that it would not be represented in Paris. The American Embassy happened to be rudderless while the Prague Government was performing its backward so mersault on the Marshall Plan : the Ambassador and hi s Deputy Chief of Miss ion , John Bruins, were attending a boar hunt organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Katek and Taggart went with them. Two junior diplomats found out about the reversal and informed Washington . 15 But hav ing arrived from the desk of a junior diplomat it left no lasting footprint in the halls of the Department of State. The story was leaked also to the New York Times. An in-depth article described the Marshall Plan fiasco and the current tense situation in Prague realistically and accurately. But then it quoted "observers here," a reference to U.S. diplomats in Prague, as being skeptical that the Ru ssians would try to impose upon Czechoslovakia " the kind of communist state that preva il s in Rumani a, Bul garia and Poland. " 16 The hopeful view, the paper reported , was that in following its tradition the Kremlin might in fact decide to withdraw altogether back to Ru ssia, lest its people become contaminated with the west. This optimism was anchored in the views of the ambassador, his deputy , but also Katek and Taggart. The Embassy's record during the deci sive days of February 1948 is not impressive. Ambassador Steinhardt was in the United States attending to business at the law firm Guggenheimer, Untermyer & 14 Interview with Walter Taub, Salzburg. Austria. 6 March 2000 . Interview with George Bogardus, Washington, 3 June 1998. 16 James Reston, "Czechs Bow East Politicall y but Back West Inte llectuall y," New York Times, 5 August 1947. 15 �SLOVAKIA 59 Marshall on Pine Street in New York City. He had joined it in 1920 and remained an active partner even after he started, in 1933, his diplomatic career as U. S. Ambassador in Stockholm. Spencer Taggart was on a motoring tour of Italy with his wife. For the ambassador and for Spencer Taggart to be out of the country at the time of the coup was embarrassing. The game was lost now - when the opponent took to the field , the Americans were not even dressed to play. The ambassador and the upper echelons at the Embassy had surrounded themselves primarily with the titled and propertied classes. They failed to notice that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had won real support not only among the working class and trade unionists, but importantly among the intellectual s, traditionally a crucial social group in the Czech lands. Neither the Embassy nor the Military Mission had connections in those circles. The CPC had saturated the democratic parties with its agents; it could anticipate and neutralize their activities. The democrats had not imagined that such conduct was possible. Neither they nor their American friends at the Embassy or Mission had recruited any intelligence assets at the level of the CPC Politburo or even the Central Committee apparat. Steinhardt ' s optimism influenced others in the Embassy and some in the State Department. But leading American diplomats, such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, were not at all surprised by the Prague coup. As we have seen, this was not thanks to reports of the U. S. Embassy in Prague or thanks to information from U. S. intelligence. Among those who had been expecting a decisive communist move against Czechoslovakia was Secretary of State Marshall. In his November 1947 memorandum for President Truman he approached the iss ue like a military strategist examining the map. He found that Moscow " will probably have to clamp down on Czechoslovakia, for a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become a threatening salient in Moscow's political position. " 17 As it happened, the Prague coup d'etat was played out as an internal affair, and Moscow could remain in its comfortable position of a sympathetic observer. The result was exactly as Marshall had predicted. 17 The Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman , Files of the White House Nava l Aide, G. C. M., Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, 7 November 1947 . �60 SLOVAKIA Marshall 's analysis, based on common sense and years of military experience, offered more insight into the crisis in Prague than that provided by American diplomats and intelligence personnel based in the city. It is a serious indictment of U.S. intelligence performance in postwar Prague that the sec retary of state should have come up with a more accurate assessment of the evolving crisis than trained intelligence personnel with language skills and sources at the highest ranks of the Czechoslovak Government. Even if the communist coup d 'etat in Czechoslovakia did not surprise Secretary Marshall, like many others he considered it a watershed in east-west relations. On 10 March 1948 he stated that the situation in Europe was "very , very serious" and ten days later he called for " urgent and resolute action" if the United States was to defend the west. The United States Embassy in Prague was not in a position to contribute to the effort. The February coup d 'etat brutally revealed the weaknesses of the overt style of intelligence gathering employed by the Military Mission. Almost overnight, the former guests of Colonel Katek had lost their posts in government, security, the military, and the world of business. At least one was dead, some in prison, the majority seeking to escape; the lucky ones were already in the west; some of the prominent habitues of Loretanske Square were under house arrest. None had access to information that would be of interest to the Americans. Neither Katek nor Taggart had thought of putting in place an intelligence-gathering network that would become operational in case of a communist assumption of power. Building one now was next to imposs ible: no Czech with some official standing (except for StB agents) dared to come to the Embassy, and few were willing to risk speaking with American diplomats even in private. Yet this was the time when intelligence was most desperately needed. In June or July 1948, in the first weeks of the Berlin blockade, General Lucius Clay, Commanding General of U.S . Forces in Europe and Military Governor of Germany, summoned Taggart and told him to expect an outbreak of war with the Soviet Union within four months. The general asked him to build in Czechoslovakia a network of intelligence assets who would be equipped with radio stations. It was to remain inactive during peacetime but spring into action in case of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet �SLOVAKIA 61 bloc. Their mission was to gather military intelligence and transmit it to the Americans if the east-west tensions caused an evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Prague. Taggart was eager to carry out his orders, but he was scheduled to leave the Prague post in October 1948 at the latest. When he reviewed the list of people who might help him put together the kind of network General Clay wanted, he selected Major Jaromir Nechansky (born I 916). It was not a lucky choice. Nechansky was a brave, highly motivated , British-trained commando and intelligence officer, but his wartime service in the west, his activities in occupied Czechoslovakia from February to May 1945, and his frequent social contacts with the Americans before the communist take-over made him an obvious target of the Czechoslovak Military Counter Intelligence, Obranne zpravodajstvi, OBZ. In 1946 it concluded: "Nechansky is in frequent contact with Katek ; he most likely works for the Americans." 18 The Americans decided to recruit also Veleslav Wahl. This young man - he was born in 1922 - came from a well-known family that had already experienced more than its share of tragedy: his father, Veleslav, and uncle, Karel, were executed by the Nazis in 1942; his future wife ' s father, Josef Ruzicka, was killed at the Mauthausen concentration camp in 1943. It was unhelpful that Nechansky and Wahl were known to be very close friends since the war. The discovery of one would automatically lead to the arrest of the other. First Nechansky, then Wahl and all the other agents whom the two leaders had recruited on behalf of the Americans, were arrested in early September 1949. They never had a chance. All - men and women - were severely tortured; even the police photographer who took their pictures for the court did not bother to cover up this fact. The trial in April 1950 became an orgy of anti-American propaganda, played out in the communist daily Rude Pravo, but also in other papers. The names of Taggart, hi s assistant Samuel Meryn, and others from the Embassy appeared repeatedly in the manipulated press, accompanied by photographs of radio stations and weapons the StB uncovered in the houses of the would-be agents. The outcome of the tri al had been determined in advance. Nechansky and 18 AMI , Z-651 , fil e 13, OBZ (Main Directorate), Ministry of Defen se, Summary of Reports 302-592- 1. �62 SLOVAKIA Wahl were sentenced to death and executed on I 6 Jul y I 950. All other sentences were draconian. When American intelligence officers arrived in Czechoslovakia in May 1945 it see med th at the cause of western democracy was dealt a lucky hand. They were educated and motivated, they understood the country, its language and hi story , they had time to prepare for the comi ng confrontation with their Soviet opponent, and they enjoyed the unqualified support of Ambassador Steinhardt. Importantly, many in the Czech political and military elites, and significant numbers in the sec urity appara t were approachable by US intelligence personnel seeking classified information. The Americans who were in the business of collecting political, military, and comercial secrets in Prague had access to some of the highest ranking personalities in the Office of the President and Government, including the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior. Some Czechoslovak officials were eager to provide Americans with classified information. Leaking information to American officials was neither dishonorable nor unpatriotic. It was a contribution to the cause of democracy. It would be hard to imagine any other country where there existed such a harmony of interest between American intelligence collectors and their sources. All these factors put together make the swift defeat of democracy in Czechoslovakia and the totalitarian victory in February 1948 all the more humiliating. � 50 SLOVAKIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1945-1950: A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE Igor Lukes The outcome of the Czechoslovak political crisis from the end of World War II via the communist Machtergreifung in February 1948, and into the early fifties was not a preordained conclusion . It was not determined solely by the weight of the emerging blocs, it was not driven by the map, nor was it simply for the Kremlin to dictate. On the Czech side, it was mainly the product of unfounded hope (faith in an untested "socialism"), misplaced trust (deification of the Soviet Union and its leaders), and pathological fear of Germany. But the west also contributed to the communist victory by political blunders and amateurism in other field s. This papers focu ses on the U.S. intelligence community in postwar Prague. Looking at Czechoslovakia before the end of the war, and seeking to predict its political course in postwar Europe cou ld lead one to imagine a variety of scenarios. A minority saw the future in dark colors: they thought the country was destined to become a colony of the Soviet Union . They noted that the Czechoslovak political elite, punch-drunk from the Munich catastrophe, had taken steps that tied their country with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. No one in the west doubted that President Edvard Benes and most of his colleagues in London were ideologically on their side, but it was clear that they still felt deep resentment over the manner in which their diplomatic alliances were imploded by the western appeasers of the Third Reich. They moved closer toward the Soviet Union because of the Munich experience and in order to show the British Foreign Office that when it came to coalitions in the postwar setting they no longer depended exclusively on the west; they had the Soviet card and they wou ld play it as needed to prevent "another Munich". An even greater factor for the pessimists was the country's location on the map and the situation at the front. The Red Army crossed the Czechoslovak border on 6 October 1944, while the allies were recovering from the disastrous Operation Market-Garden . Stalin was inside Czechoslovakia, but the western allies were stil l far away �SLOVAKIA 51 (U.S. Army units would cross onto Czech territory only on 18 April 1945). This led Ambassador William C. Bullitt to predict that after the war the Kremlin would "domin ate Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland , Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia." Bullitt speculated that Moscow had learned from its defeat in Hungary after World War I and would therefore apply different strategies in different countries located in the space between Germany and Ru ssia. 1 The Soviet Union might come with cold steel into the Baltics and Poland, but with treaties and patience to Finland and Czechoslovakia. Two wartime U.S. intelligence analysts observed years later that after the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of December 1943 they had no illusions about the way Stalin was setting forth his policy toward all the countries of Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia. 2 The political course of Czechoslovakia inspired lots of optimists in the fall of 1944. The allied press was beaming with good new s, predicting that the country's postwar political life would simply pick up where "it was ruthlessly interrupted by the Munich Agreement of September 1938." Some American journalists celebrated a " pattern of cooperation" among the allied governments and proposed that the December 1943 Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement was a " model " for others to follow. 3 Some suggested that the May 1944 Dutch, Belgian, and Norwegian agreements with the British and the Americans regarding the restoration of their sovereign status after liberation followed in the path originally established by the exiled Czechoslovak government, which had signed half a year before a treaty with the Soviet Union addressing matters of sovereignty and postwar administration. 4 When the country 's President Edvard Benes turned sixty on 28 May 1944, he received telegrams from many leaders of the 1 Willi am C. Bullitt, "The World From Rome: The Ete rn al C ity Fears a Struggle Between Christianity and Comm uni sm," Life Magazine, 4 September 1944. For a Soviet reaction to Bullitt' s ana lysis, see K. Demidov, "Obankrotivshiisia razvedch ik, ,. Pra vda, 4 September 1944. Note the dates. 2 Interview wi th Spencer L. Taggart, Logan, Utah, 23 April 1999 and interview with Paul Zinner, 5 Apri l 2005 , Washington . 3 No au thor, "The Pattern of Cooperati on," New York Times, 18 May 1944. 4 J. Emlyn Williams, " Smaller Allies in Europe Differ in Peace Readiness," Christian Science Monitor. IO May 1944. �52 SLOVAKIA anti-Nazi alliance, and New York Times called him a " prophet of a great cause" and a "fine champion" of democracy.5 Among the optimists was the influential C. L. Sulzberger who summed up the geopolitical situation in the east at the end of August 1944. The future borders of Finland , the Baltic republics, Poland, Hungary and others were at the mercy of Joseph Stalin. But "Mr. Benes has already got - he obtained it three years ago - a Soviet guarantee that Czechoslovakia 's pre-Munich frontiers will be re-established." 6 No doubt, thi s flattered President Benes enormously and reaffirmed him in his determination to establish hi s country as a friend of both the blocs and a bridge between them. The optimistic view that Czechoslovakia, balancing precariously between east and west, would maintain its sovereignty persisted even in the face of hard evidence that its political scene was undergoing dramatic changes in the direction of a gloomy scenario. In early April 1945, when the composition of the new Czechoslovak Government became known, Paul Zinner, an OSS (Office of Strategic Services) analyst in Washington , took the list of its members to the Department of State. He hoped to explain that the new Prime Minister had gained a reputation for being an apologist for even the most odious Soviet foreign policy deci sions. Zinner was di sturbed that the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior was to be headed by a communist, and the same was true for the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Agriculture, and de facto, the Ministry of Defense . All in all, he thought that the government' s composition was a bad omen. But Zinner's State Department colleagues thou ght there was no reaso n to be concerned. They glanced at the list and learned that the country would have Edvard Benes as president and Jan Masaryk as foreign minister. " What could go wrong with such friends at the helm ?" they asked . " We have nothing to fear, " they concluded, di smisssed Zinner's concerns and turned their attention to other matters, including the imminent opening of the United States Embassy in Prague. Zinner recalls leaving the Czech affairs desk with a sense of foreboding and frustration: there seemed little he could do to 5 No author, "Benes at 60," New York Times, 28 May 1944. C. L. Sulzberger, " Frontier Policies of Russia Emerge," New York Times, 28 August 1944. 6 �SLOVAKIA 53 persuade the optimists that the Czechs might ultimately share the fate of the Poles, Hungarians and others in the region. 7 Finally, there were the reali sts, who staked out their territory in the space between the optimists and pessimists. They did not believe it was possible in 1944 to predict Czechoslovakia's future political orientation and course. But they were prepared to say that the country was the most important laboratory for testing east-west relations in the region. Charles E . Bohlen rejected the view expressed by his colleagues that Poland was the country to study in order to discern whether the west could coexist with Stalin. Poland's fate had been sealed, he thought. The real test, Bohlen went on to argue, was Czechoslovakia. Benes had signed the December 1943 treaty with Stalin despite opposition from his British hosts. " If the USSR really implemented that treaty and did not violate it then we would have an indication that it might be possible to get along with the Soviet Union after all. If the Soviet Union should break the treaty - the Czechs having gone as far as anybody could expect them to go - this might be an indication that cooperation with the Soviet Union would not be possible." 8 Other Americans, for instance, Averell Harrimann, shaed thi s view. 9 Bohlen ' s analysis carried the day. The United States would henceforth treat Prague as a testing ground and an observation post. Although it was in Eastern Europe and the spires of the Kremlin cast a shadow over it, the city had the atmosphere of a western outpost. It welcomed the Americans who came to reopen the United States Embassy in May 1945. And Washington reciprocated by building up its diplomatic and intelligence presence in postwar Czechoslovakia to unprecedented levels. In short order, the embassy at the Schoenborn Palace had a staff of more than two hundred employees. There were several reasons why U.S. intelligence in postwar Czechoslovakia could have performed well during the crisis leading up to the Communist Machtergreifung of February 1948. The first 7 Interview with Paul Zinner, 5 April 2005 , Washington. The Harry S. Truman Library . Harry N. Howard , "Oral Hi story Interview ," 7-8 October 1976. lnterview by Richard D. McKinzie. 9 Eduard Mark, "Charles Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: A Memorandum of 18 October 1945," Diplomatic History 3, 2 (Spring 1979): I05. 8 �54 SLOVAKIA has to do with time and opportunity to launch intelligence operations. The U.S. Army had not played any direct role in the liberation of Poland from Nazism, and the imposition of Soviet rule over the country was violent and rapid. The same was true - with significant regional variations - in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. When American diplomats and intelligence officers arrived in postwar Warsaw they had little or no time to get to know the terrain and to establish contacts to be exploited in the future. Right from the start they operated under significant or even extreme counterintelligence pressure from the domestic and Soviet special services. The opposite was true in Czechoslovakia, where the American intelligence community had plenty of time to prepare for the co ming crisis. Small elements of the U.S. Army had arrived in Prague some two days before the Russians, the U.S. military liberated several prominent Czech cities, and the G.l.s remained deployed in Western Bohemi a for seven months. During thi s time and later - until the spri ng of 1948 - Americans could freely travel in and out of Prague, and U.S. intelligence thus had countless opportunities to set down its roots in Czech soil. Moreover, the Czech co mmunists took until February 1948 to establish their dictatorship. Throughout thi s time each branch of the Prague government included individuals who were happy to provide confidential information to the Americans. President Edvard Benes set the tone when he met with such known U.S. intelligence officials as Allen Dulles, the Englishman Robert Bruce Lockhart, and others. Many other high-ranking government officials, including cabinet ministers, scores of military officers, policemen, secret police agents, and intellige nce service officials were willing to provide information to U.S. intelligence operatives in Prague. These individuals were not agents in the formal meaning of the word. They had not been formally recruited, handled in a clandestine manner, and paid. They provided the Americans with information from various denied areas of official life because there was a community of interest between the United States and their well positioned so urces in Czechoslovakia. From a spymaster's perspective a better environment was hard to imagine. American diplomats and intelligence officers came to postwar Poland and other East European countries only after Russian tanks �SLOVAKIA 55 had helped install a Moscow-vetted government in power. This relegated them to the role of observers. But United States intelligence operatives in postwar Czechoslovakia had had plenty of time to prepare for the Cold War milieu. How did they do in postwar Czechoslovakia? This is the question this paper seeks to address. The chief American diplomat in Prague was Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt, whose service in the Soviet Union included the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, and who had, as a result, a skeptical view of all things Soviet. The Kremlin bosses had snubbed him repeatedly, and he disliked them with passion. In Prague Steinhardt surrounded himself with such like-minded anti -Stalinists as Colonel (later General ) Joseph Anthony Michela, US Military Attache, and others . The U.S. Embassy in Prague under Steinhardt had no intention of accommodating any communist or Soviet schemes. The ambassador's ideology and hi s can-do attitude combined to provide a good working atmosphere for American intelligence in Prague. U.S. Intelligence in Prague after the end of World War II was organized around two separate pl atforms, the Military Mission and the United States Embassy. The United States Military Mission was established in Prague only a few weeks after the end of the war. Even in that most abnormal era it was a very unorthodox operation. The commaning officer of the Military Mission was Colonel Charles Katek. 10 He was the first among several larger-than-life Americans who descended upon Prague right after the war's end. When Katek joined the Army, his Ph.D. in hi story from Northwestern University and hi s Czech and German language skills did not go unnoticed. After an officer candidate course, the OSS was a logical destination . Katek and his team of OSS operatives reached Prague on IO May 1945, soon after the Red Army had arrived. In Prague Katek found a luxurious apartment on Loretanske Square, a most prestigious address. He and his colleagues developed it into a salon where so me of the most interesting and influential people gathered regularly. It was well known that Katek was keenly 10 Most of my infonnation is from the Prague archives and from Janet Edwards, Colone l Katek 's daughter, Interv iew, 19 Jul y 2000. The ori ginal name of the fami ly was Kotek; it was changed to Katek in Chicago. Since "Kotek" does not sound particul arly Czech, it remains unclear whether the fam il y had come from Bohemia or Slovakia. �56 SLOVAKIA interested in intelligence; he was remarkably open about it. Among his guests were members of various noble families, such as Schwarzenberg, Lobkowitz, Czernin, Kolowrat, and Nadherny ; government officials, for instance Minister Jan Masaryk, Minister Petr Zenk), Minister Jaroslav Stransky , Minister Adolf Prochazka, and Minister Frantisek Hala; at least a dozen members of parliament, including lvo Duchacek; countless personalities from business circles, and influential political journalists, such as Julius Firt, Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid. Visitors were attracted to the Military Mission by the prospect of friendly conversation and challenging political debates. Of course, no one should underestimate the importance in postwar Prague of good food, exotic alcohol, tobacco, and jazz records, all of which were made plentiful by Colonel Katek 's regular truck deliveries from a U.S. Army base in Nuremberg. Those who came and talked to the Americans at Loretanske Square knew full well that their words would be passed on to the authorities. Katek 's approach was to blur the line between dinner parties and espionage. It made his life both simple and pleasant. The Military Mission had a few sources who were not invited to join the parties on Loretanske Square. Even in such cases Colonel Katek made no attempt to practice the kind of tradecraft that is common in the world of intelligence. He met them durin g office hours at the Mission. The activities around the Military Miss ion in Prague were so notorious that other Americans who served in postwar Czechoslovakia were not quite sure what to think about the situation. 11 They were right to be concerned. The Czech authorities paid attention to what was happening around Colonel Katek. They quickly surmi sed that he was conducting military and political espionage. An StB document notes that in November 1945 thirty-eight Czechs were in the category of regular visitors at the Military Mission. In January 1946 the OBZ insisted that the Mission with its 10 US Army 11 Interview with Louise Schaffner, 30 January 1999. Mrs. Schaffner was a Foreign Service officer in the U. S. Embassy in Prague at the time of the communi st coup d ' etat. �SLOVAKIA 57 officers ran 109 agents. 12 On the basis of my interviews the claim appears to be signifycantly exaggerated. But the Military Mission under Colonel Katek 's direction was very active in gathering intelligence in postwar Prague. Its information came from willing and well-placed sources, not recruited agents. Though it seemed like a good idea at the time, the weakness of this manner of gathering intelligence would be revealed in February 1948. From the summer of 1945 to February 1948, the Military Mission reported information from an impressive array of well-placed sources: aristocrats, ministers, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mini stry of Interior, Ministry of Defense generals, high-ranking soldiers and pilots, security officials, and businessmen . It was easy to think that intelligence gathered from such knowledgeable and well-placed individuals was enough for analysts in Washington to create a true and accurate picture of the political crisis in Czechoslovakia. The intelligence section in the Embassy was led by Spencer Taggart. He arrived in Prague in the Spring of 1945 with a clear mission : "I was sent there with a long-term objective - to help the Czechs guard their independence and to promote western democracy." 13 Seen in thi s light, Taggart came to protect and promote the values that were agreeable to the majority of the political class and the population . Therefore, it was not difficult for him to gain access to a number of sources that were both knowledgeable and well informed - he was prepared to identify only four, Petr Zenk! , Major Jaromir Nechansky, Jan Stransky and lvo Duchacek, but there were others. For all their commitment, their well-placed so urces of information, and their knowledge of the terrain, the United States Embassy in Prague was consistently taken by surprise whenever a crisis developed. The first such occasion involved the May 1946 elections that resulted in a swee ping victory for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The OSS and State Department analysts took note of it, of course, but as one member of Katek 's team put it "were we smart enough to realize that thi s was the beginning of the end? I 12 Archives of the Ministry of Interi or, AMI Z-651, file 13. LT COL Bedrich Reicin and CPT Kare l Vas, Main Directorate, OBZ, Ministry of Defense, 302-592-1, no. 150.457/secret report -2c-/ 1946, 24 January 1946. 13 Interview with Spencer L. Taggart, Logan , Utah , 23 April 1999. �58 SLOVAKIA doubt it. " 14 Ambassador Steinhardt had predicted an entirel y different outcome and he adopted an ostrich-like posture when faced with the election results. Another event that clearly and unmi stakabl y indicated th at the Kremlin and the Czechoslovak communists were on the verge of seizing power took place in Ju ly 1947 . It involved the Marshall plan. The Soviets had made clear in early July 1947 that they would take part neither in the conference nor in the Marshall plan itself. But the Czechs, including the leaders of the CPC, were planning to go as late as 7 Jul y 1947. They were invited to the Kremlin , and two days later, an official delegation from Prague was in Moscow. On 10 July 1947 Czechoslovakia announced that it would not be represented in Paris. The American Embassy happened to be rudderless while the Prague Government was performing its backward so mersault on the Marshall Plan : the Ambassador and hi s Deputy Chief of Miss ion , John Bruins, were attending a boar hunt organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Katek and Taggart went with them. Two junior diplomats found out about the reversal and informed Washington . 15 But hav ing arrived from the desk of a junior diplomat it left no lasting footprint in the halls of the Department of State. The story was leaked also to the New York Times. An in-depth article described the Marshall Plan fiasco and the current tense situation in Prague realistically and accurately. But then it quoted "observers here," a reference to U.S. diplomats in Prague, as being skeptical that the Ru ssians would try to impose upon Czechoslovakia " the kind of communist state that preva il s in Rumani a, Bul garia and Poland. " 16 The hopeful view, the paper reported , was that in following its tradition the Kremlin might in fact decide to withdraw altogether back to Ru ssia, lest its people become contaminated with the west. This optimism was anchored in the views of the ambassador, his deputy , but also Katek and Taggart. The Embassy's record during the deci sive days of February 1948 is not impressive. Ambassador Steinhardt was in the United States attending to business at the law firm Guggenheimer, Untermyer & 14 Interview with Walter Taub, Salzburg. Austria. 6 March 2000 . Interview with George Bogardus, Washington, 3 June 1998. 16 James Reston, "Czechs Bow East Politicall y but Back West Inte llectuall y," New York Times, 5 August 1947. 15 �SLOVAKIA 59 Marshall on Pine Street in New York City. He had joined it in 1920 and remained an active partner even after he started, in 1933, his diplomatic career as U. S. Ambassador in Stockholm. Spencer Taggart was on a motoring tour of Italy with his wife. For the ambassador and for Spencer Taggart to be out of the country at the time of the coup was embarrassing. The game was lost now - when the opponent took to the field , the Americans were not even dressed to play. The ambassador and the upper echelons at the Embassy had surrounded themselves primarily with the titled and propertied classes. They failed to notice that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had won real support not only among the working class and trade unionists, but importantly among the intellectual s, traditionally a crucial social group in the Czech lands. Neither the Embassy nor the Military Mission had connections in those circles. The CPC had saturated the democratic parties with its agents; it could anticipate and neutralize their activities. The democrats had not imagined that such conduct was possible. Neither they nor their American friends at the Embassy or Mission had recruited any intelligence assets at the level of the CPC Politburo or even the Central Committee apparat. Steinhardt ' s optimism influenced others in the Embassy and some in the State Department. But leading American diplomats, such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, were not at all surprised by the Prague coup. As we have seen, this was not thanks to reports of the U. S. Embassy in Prague or thanks to information from U. S. intelligence. Among those who had been expecting a decisive communist move against Czechoslovakia was Secretary of State Marshall. In his November 1947 memorandum for President Truman he approached the iss ue like a military strategist examining the map. He found that Moscow " will probably have to clamp down on Czechoslovakia, for a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become a threatening salient in Moscow's political position. " 17 As it happened, the Prague coup d'etat was played out as an internal affair, and Moscow could remain in its comfortable position of a sympathetic observer. The result was exactly as Marshall had predicted. 17 The Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman , Files of the White House Nava l Aide, G. C. M., Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, 7 November 1947 . �60 SLOVAKIA Marshall 's analysis, based on common sense and years of military experience, offered more insight into the crisis in Prague than that provided by American diplomats and intelligence personnel based in the city. It is a serious indictment of U.S. intelligence performance in postwar Prague that the sec retary of state should have come up with a more accurate assessment of the evolving crisis than trained intelligence personnel with language skills and sources at the highest ranks of the Czechoslovak Government. Even if the communist coup d 'etat in Czechoslovakia did not surprise Secretary Marshall, like many others he considered it a watershed in east-west relations. On 10 March 1948 he stated that the situation in Europe was "very , very serious" and ten days later he called for " urgent and resolute action" if the United States was to defend the west. The United States Embassy in Prague was not in a position to contribute to the effort. The February coup d 'etat brutally revealed the weaknesses of the overt style of intelligence gathering employed by the Military Mission. Almost overnight, the former guests of Colonel Katek had lost their posts in government, security, the military, and the world of business. At least one was dead, some in prison, the majority seeking to escape; the lucky ones were already in the west; some of the prominent habitues of Loretanske Square were under house arrest. None had access to information that would be of interest to the Americans. Neither Katek nor Taggart had thought of putting in place an intelligence-gathering network that would become operational in case of a communist assumption of power. Building one now was next to imposs ible: no Czech with some official standing (except for StB agents) dared to come to the Embassy, and few were willing to risk speaking with American diplomats even in private. Yet this was the time when intelligence was most desperately needed. In June or July 1948, in the first weeks of the Berlin blockade, General Lucius Clay, Commanding General of U.S . Forces in Europe and Military Governor of Germany, summoned Taggart and told him to expect an outbreak of war with the Soviet Union within four months. The general asked him to build in Czechoslovakia a network of intelligence assets who would be equipped with radio stations. It was to remain inactive during peacetime but spring into action in case of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet �SLOVAKIA 61 bloc. Their mission was to gather military intelligence and transmit it to the Americans if the east-west tensions caused an evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Prague. Taggart was eager to carry out his orders, but he was scheduled to leave the Prague post in October 1948 at the latest. When he reviewed the list of people who might help him put together the kind of network General Clay wanted, he selected Major Jaromir Nechansky (born I 916). It was not a lucky choice. Nechansky was a brave, highly motivated , British-trained commando and intelligence officer, but his wartime service in the west, his activities in occupied Czechoslovakia from February to May 1945, and his frequent social contacts with the Americans before the communist take-over made him an obvious target of the Czechoslovak Military Counter Intelligence, Obranne zpravodajstvi, OBZ. In 1946 it concluded: "Nechansky is in frequent contact with Katek ; he most likely works for the Americans." 18 The Americans decided to recruit also Veleslav Wahl. This young man - he was born in 1922 - came from a well-known family that had already experienced more than its share of tragedy: his father, Veleslav, and uncle, Karel, were executed by the Nazis in 1942; his future wife ' s father, Josef Ruzicka, was killed at the Mauthausen concentration camp in 1943. It was unhelpful that Nechansky and Wahl were known to be very close friends since the war. The discovery of one would automatically lead to the arrest of the other. First Nechansky, then Wahl and all the other agents whom the two leaders had recruited on behalf of the Americans, were arrested in early September 1949. They never had a chance. All - men and women - were severely tortured; even the police photographer who took their pictures for the court did not bother to cover up this fact. The trial in April 1950 became an orgy of anti-American propaganda, played out in the communist daily Rude Pravo, but also in other papers. The names of Taggart, hi s assistant Samuel Meryn, and others from the Embassy appeared repeatedly in the manipulated press, accompanied by photographs of radio stations and weapons the StB uncovered in the houses of the would-be agents. The outcome of the tri al had been determined in advance. Nechansky and 18 AMI , Z-651 , fil e 13, OBZ (Main Directorate), Ministry of Defen se, Summary of Reports 302-592- 1. �62 SLOVAKIA Wahl were sentenced to death and executed on I 6 Jul y I 950. All other sentences were draconian. When American intelligence officers arrived in Czechoslovakia in May 1945 it see med th at the cause of western democracy was dealt a lucky hand. They were educated and motivated, they understood the country, its language and hi story , they had time to prepare for the comi ng confrontation with their Soviet opponent, and they enjoyed the unqualified support of Ambassador Steinhardt. Importantly, many in the Czech political and military elites, and significant numbers in the sec urity appara t were approachable by US intelligence personnel seeking classified information. The Americans who were in the business of collecting political, military, and comercial secrets in Prague had access to some of the highest ranking personalities in the Office of the President and Government, including the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior. Some Czechoslovak officials were eager to provide Americans with classified information. Leaking information to American officials was neither dishonorable nor unpatriotic. It was a contribution to the cause of democracy. It would be hard to imagine any other country where there existed such a harmony of interest between American intelligence collectors and their sources. All these factors put together make the swift defeat of democracy in Czechoslovakia and the totalitarian victory in February 1948 all the more humiliating. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2007, Vol. 39 Description An account of the resource Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOVAKIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1945-1950: A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE Igor Lukes The outcome of the Czechoslovak political crisis from the end of World War II via the communist Machtergreifung in February 1948, and into the early fifties was not a preordained conclusion . It was not determined solely by the weight of the emerging blocs, it was not driven by the map, nor was it simply for the Kremlin to dictate. On the Czech side, it was mainly the product of unfounded hope (faith in an untested "socialism"), misplaced trust (deification of the Soviet Union and its leaders), and pathological fear of Germany. But the west also contributed to the communist victory by political blunders and amateurism in other field s. This papers focu ses on the U.S. intelligence community in postwar Prague. Looking at Czechoslovakia before the end of the war, and seeking to predict its political course in postwar Europe cou ld lead one to imagine a variety of scenarios. A minority saw the future in dark colors: they thought the country was destined to become a colony of the Soviet Union . They noted that the Czechoslovak political elite, punch-drunk from the Munich catastrophe, had taken steps that tied their country with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. No one in the west doubted that President Edvard Benes and most of his colleagues in London were ideologically on their side, but it was clear that they still felt deep resentment over the manner in which their diplomatic alliances were imploded by the western appeasers of the Third Reich. They moved closer toward the Soviet Union because of the Munich experience and in order to show the British Foreign Office that when it came to coalitions in the postwar setting they no longer depended exclusively on the west; they had the Soviet card and they wou ld play it as needed to prevent "another Munich". An even greater factor for the pessimists was the country's location on the map and the situation at the front. The Red Army crossed the Czechoslovak border on 6 October 1944, while the allies were recovering from the disastrous Operation Market-Garden . Stalin was inside Czechoslovakia, but the western allies were stil l far away SLOVAKIA 51 (U.S. Army units would cross onto Czech territory only on 18 April 1945). This led Ambassador William C. Bullitt to predict that after the war the Kremlin would "domin ate Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland , Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia." Bullitt speculated that Moscow had learned from its defeat in Hungary after World War I and would therefore apply different strategies in different countries located in the space between Germany and Ru ssia. 1 The Soviet Union might come with cold steel into the Baltics and Poland, but with treaties and patience to Finland and Czechoslovakia. Two wartime U.S. intelligence analysts observed years later that after the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of December 1943 they had no illusions about the way Stalin was setting forth his policy toward all the countries of Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia. 2 The political course of Czechoslovakia inspired lots of optimists in the fall of 1944. The allied press was beaming with good new s, predicting that the country's postwar political life would simply pick up where "it was ruthlessly interrupted by the Munich Agreement of September 1938." Some American journalists celebrated a " pattern of cooperation" among the allied governments and proposed that the December 1943 Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement was a " model " for others to follow. 3 Some suggested that the May 1944 Dutch, Belgian, and Norwegian agreements with the British and the Americans regarding the restoration of their sovereign status after liberation followed in the path originally established by the exiled Czechoslovak government, which had signed half a year before a treaty with the Soviet Union addressing matters of sovereignty and postwar administration. 4 When the country 's President Edvard Benes turned sixty on 28 May 1944, he received telegrams from many leaders of the 1 Willi am C. Bullitt, "The World From Rome: The Ete rn al C ity Fears a Struggle Between Christianity and Comm uni sm," Life Magazine, 4 September 1944. For a Soviet reaction to Bullitt' s ana lysis, see K. Demidov, "Obankrotivshiisia razvedch ik, ,. Pra vda, 4 September 1944. Note the dates. 2 Interview wi th Spencer L. Taggart, Logan, Utah, 23 April 1999 and interview with Paul Zinner, 5 Apri l 2005 , Washington . 3 No au thor, "The Pattern of Cooperati on," New York Times, 18 May 1944. 4 J. Emlyn Williams, " Smaller Allies in Europe Differ in Peace Readiness," Christian Science Monitor. IO May 1944. 52 SLOVAKIA anti-Nazi alliance, and New York Times called him a " prophet of a great cause" and a "fine champion" of democracy.5 Among the optimists was the influential C. L. Sulzberger who summed up the geopolitical situation in the east at the end of August 1944. The future borders of Finland , the Baltic republics, Poland, Hungary and others were at the mercy of Joseph Stalin. But "Mr. Benes has already got - he obtained it three years ago - a Soviet guarantee that Czechoslovakia 's pre-Munich frontiers will be re-established." 6 No doubt, thi s flattered President Benes enormously and reaffirmed him in his determination to establish hi s country as a friend of both the blocs and a bridge between them. The optimistic view that Czechoslovakia, balancing precariously between east and west, would maintain its sovereignty persisted even in the face of hard evidence that its political scene was undergoing dramatic changes in the direction of a gloomy scenario. In early April 1945, when the composition of the new Czechoslovak Government became known, Paul Zinner, an OSS (Office of Strategic Services) analyst in Washington , took the list of its members to the Department of State. He hoped to explain that the new Prime Minister had gained a reputation for being an apologist for even the most odious Soviet foreign policy deci sions. Zinner was di sturbed that the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior was to be headed by a communist, and the same was true for the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Agriculture, and de facto, the Ministry of Defense . All in all, he thought that the government' s composition was a bad omen. But Zinner's State Department colleagues thou ght there was no reaso n to be concerned. They glanced at the list and learned that the country would have Edvard Benes as president and Jan Masaryk as foreign minister. " What could go wrong with such friends at the helm ?" they asked . " We have nothing to fear, " they concluded, di smisssed Zinner's concerns and turned their attention to other matters, including the imminent opening of the United States Embassy in Prague. Zinner recalls leaving the Czech affairs desk with a sense of foreboding and frustration: there seemed little he could do to 5 No author, "Benes at 60," New York Times, 28 May 1944. C. L. Sulzberger, " Frontier Policies of Russia Emerge," New York Times, 28 August 1944. 6 SLOVAKIA 53 persuade the optimists that the Czechs might ultimately share the fate of the Poles, Hungarians and others in the region. 7 Finally, there were the reali sts, who staked out their territory in the space between the optimists and pessimists. They did not believe it was possible in 1944 to predict Czechoslovakia's future political orientation and course. But they were prepared to say that the country was the most important laboratory for testing east-west relations in the region. Charles E . Bohlen rejected the view expressed by his colleagues that Poland was the country to study in order to discern whether the west could coexist with Stalin. Poland's fate had been sealed, he thought. The real test, Bohlen went on to argue, was Czechoslovakia. Benes had signed the December 1943 treaty with Stalin despite opposition from his British hosts. " If the USSR really implemented that treaty and did not violate it then we would have an indication that it might be possible to get along with the Soviet Union after all. If the Soviet Union should break the treaty - the Czechs having gone as far as anybody could expect them to go - this might be an indication that cooperation with the Soviet Union would not be possible." 8 Other Americans, for instance, Averell Harrimann, shaed thi s view. 9 Bohlen ' s analysis carried the day. The United States would henceforth treat Prague as a testing ground and an observation post. Although it was in Eastern Europe and the spires of the Kremlin cast a shadow over it, the city had the atmosphere of a western outpost. It welcomed the Americans who came to reopen the United States Embassy in May 1945. And Washington reciprocated by building up its diplomatic and intelligence presence in postwar Czechoslovakia to unprecedented levels. In short order, the embassy at the Schoenborn Palace had a staff of more than two hundred employees. There were several reasons why U.S. intelligence in postwar Czechoslovakia could have performed well during the crisis leading up to the Communist Machtergreifung of February 1948. The first 7 Interview with Paul Zinner, 5 April 2005 , Washington. The Harry S. Truman Library . Harry N. Howard , "Oral Hi story Interview ," 7-8 October 1976. lnterview by Richard D. McKinzie. 9 Eduard Mark, "Charles Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: A Memorandum of 18 October 1945," Diplomatic History 3, 2 (Spring 1979): I05. 8 54 SLOVAKIA has to do with time and opportunity to launch intelligence operations. The U.S. Army had not played any direct role in the liberation of Poland from Nazism, and the imposition of Soviet rule over the country was violent and rapid. The same was true - with significant regional variations - in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. When American diplomats and intelligence officers arrived in postwar Warsaw they had little or no time to get to know the terrain and to establish contacts to be exploited in the future. Right from the start they operated under significant or even extreme counterintelligence pressure from the domestic and Soviet special services. The opposite was true in Czechoslovakia, where the American intelligence community had plenty of time to prepare for the co ming crisis. Small elements of the U.S. Army had arrived in Prague some two days before the Russians, the U.S. military liberated several prominent Czech cities, and the G.l.s remained deployed in Western Bohemi a for seven months. During thi s time and later - until the spri ng of 1948 - Americans could freely travel in and out of Prague, and U.S. intelligence thus had countless opportunities to set down its roots in Czech soil. Moreover, the Czech co mmunists took until February 1948 to establish their dictatorship. Throughout thi s time each branch of the Prague government included individuals who were happy to provide confidential information to the Americans. President Edvard Benes set the tone when he met with such known U.S. intelligence officials as Allen Dulles, the Englishman Robert Bruce Lockhart, and others. Many other high-ranking government officials, including cabinet ministers, scores of military officers, policemen, secret police agents, and intellige nce service officials were willing to provide information to U.S. intelligence operatives in Prague. These individuals were not agents in the formal meaning of the word. They had not been formally recruited, handled in a clandestine manner, and paid. They provided the Americans with information from various denied areas of official life because there was a community of interest between the United States and their well positioned so urces in Czechoslovakia. From a spymaster's perspective a better environment was hard to imagine. American diplomats and intelligence officers came to postwar Poland and other East European countries only after Russian tanks SLOVAKIA 55 had helped install a Moscow-vetted government in power. This relegated them to the role of observers. But United States intelligence operatives in postwar Czechoslovakia had had plenty of time to prepare for the Cold War milieu. How did they do in postwar Czechoslovakia? This is the question this paper seeks to address. The chief American diplomat in Prague was Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt, whose service in the Soviet Union included the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, and who had, as a result, a skeptical view of all things Soviet. The Kremlin bosses had snubbed him repeatedly, and he disliked them with passion. In Prague Steinhardt surrounded himself with such like-minded anti -Stalinists as Colonel (later General ) Joseph Anthony Michela, US Military Attache, and others . The U.S. Embassy in Prague under Steinhardt had no intention of accommodating any communist or Soviet schemes. The ambassador's ideology and hi s can-do attitude combined to provide a good working atmosphere for American intelligence in Prague. U.S. Intelligence in Prague after the end of World War II was organized around two separate pl atforms, the Military Mission and the United States Embassy. The United States Military Mission was established in Prague only a few weeks after the end of the war. Even in that most abnormal era it was a very unorthodox operation. The commaning officer of the Military Mission was Colonel Charles Katek. 10 He was the first among several larger-than-life Americans who descended upon Prague right after the war's end. When Katek joined the Army, his Ph.D. in hi story from Northwestern University and hi s Czech and German language skills did not go unnoticed. After an officer candidate course, the OSS was a logical destination . Katek and his team of OSS operatives reached Prague on IO May 1945, soon after the Red Army had arrived. In Prague Katek found a luxurious apartment on Loretanske Square, a most prestigious address. He and his colleagues developed it into a salon where so me of the most interesting and influential people gathered regularly. It was well known that Katek was keenly 10 Most of my infonnation is from the Prague archives and from Janet Edwards, Colone l Katek 's daughter, Interv iew, 19 Jul y 2000. The ori ginal name of the fami ly was Kotek; it was changed to Katek in Chicago. Since "Kotek" does not sound particul arly Czech, it remains unclear whether the fam il y had come from Bohemia or Slovakia. 56 SLOVAKIA interested in intelligence; he was remarkably open about it. Among his guests were members of various noble families, such as Schwarzenberg, Lobkowitz, Czernin, Kolowrat, and Nadherny ; government officials, for instance Minister Jan Masaryk, Minister Petr Zenk), Minister Jaroslav Stransky , Minister Adolf Prochazka, and Minister Frantisek Hala; at least a dozen members of parliament, including lvo Duchacek; countless personalities from business circles, and influential political journalists, such as Julius Firt, Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid. Visitors were attracted to the Military Mission by the prospect of friendly conversation and challenging political debates. Of course, no one should underestimate the importance in postwar Prague of good food, exotic alcohol, tobacco, and jazz records, all of which were made plentiful by Colonel Katek 's regular truck deliveries from a U.S. Army base in Nuremberg. Those who came and talked to the Americans at Loretanske Square knew full well that their words would be passed on to the authorities. Katek 's approach was to blur the line between dinner parties and espionage. It made his life both simple and pleasant. The Military Mission had a few sources who were not invited to join the parties on Loretanske Square. Even in such cases Colonel Katek made no attempt to practice the kind of tradecraft that is common in the world of intelligence. He met them durin g office hours at the Mission. The activities around the Military Miss ion in Prague were so notorious that other Americans who served in postwar Czechoslovakia were not quite sure what to think about the situation. 11 They were right to be concerned. The Czech authorities paid attention to what was happening around Colonel Katek. They quickly surmi sed that he was conducting military and political espionage. An StB document notes that in November 1945 thirty-eight Czechs were in the category of regular visitors at the Military Mission. In January 1946 the OBZ insisted that the Mission with its 10 US Army 11 Interview with Louise Schaffner, 30 January 1999. Mrs. Schaffner was a Foreign Service officer in the U. S. Embassy in Prague at the time of the communi st coup d ' etat. SLOVAKIA 57 officers ran 109 agents. 12 On the basis of my interviews the claim appears to be signifycantly exaggerated. But the Military Mission under Colonel Katek 's direction was very active in gathering intelligence in postwar Prague. Its information came from willing and well-placed sources, not recruited agents. Though it seemed like a good idea at the time, the weakness of this manner of gathering intelligence would be revealed in February 1948. From the summer of 1945 to February 1948, the Military Mission reported information from an impressive array of well-placed sources: aristocrats, ministers, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mini stry of Interior, Ministry of Defense generals, high-ranking soldiers and pilots, security officials, and businessmen . It was easy to think that intelligence gathered from such knowledgeable and well-placed individuals was enough for analysts in Washington to create a true and accurate picture of the political crisis in Czechoslovakia. The intelligence section in the Embassy was led by Spencer Taggart. He arrived in Prague in the Spring of 1945 with a clear mission : "I was sent there with a long-term objective - to help the Czechs guard their independence and to promote western democracy." 13 Seen in thi s light, Taggart came to protect and promote the values that were agreeable to the majority of the political class and the population . Therefore, it was not difficult for him to gain access to a number of sources that were both knowledgeable and well informed - he was prepared to identify only four, Petr Zenk! , Major Jaromir Nechansky, Jan Stransky and lvo Duchacek, but there were others. For all their commitment, their well-placed so urces of information, and their knowledge of the terrain, the United States Embassy in Prague was consistently taken by surprise whenever a crisis developed. The first such occasion involved the May 1946 elections that resulted in a swee ping victory for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The OSS and State Department analysts took note of it, of course, but as one member of Katek 's team put it "were we smart enough to realize that thi s was the beginning of the end? I 12 Archives of the Ministry of Interi or, AMI Z-651, file 13. LT COL Bedrich Reicin and CPT Kare l Vas, Main Directorate, OBZ, Ministry of Defense, 302-592-1, no. 150.457/secret report -2c-/ 1946, 24 January 1946. 13 Interview with Spencer L. Taggart, Logan , Utah , 23 April 1999. 58 SLOVAKIA doubt it. " 14 Ambassador Steinhardt had predicted an entirel y different outcome and he adopted an ostrich-like posture when faced with the election results. Another event that clearly and unmi stakabl y indicated th at the Kremlin and the Czechoslovak communists were on the verge of seizing power took place in Ju ly 1947 . It involved the Marshall plan. The Soviets had made clear in early July 1947 that they would take part neither in the conference nor in the Marshall plan itself. But the Czechs, including the leaders of the CPC, were planning to go as late as 7 Jul y 1947. They were invited to the Kremlin , and two days later, an official delegation from Prague was in Moscow. On 10 July 1947 Czechoslovakia announced that it would not be represented in Paris. The American Embassy happened to be rudderless while the Prague Government was performing its backward so mersault on the Marshall Plan : the Ambassador and hi s Deputy Chief of Miss ion , John Bruins, were attending a boar hunt organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Katek and Taggart went with them. Two junior diplomats found out about the reversal and informed Washington . 15 But hav ing arrived from the desk of a junior diplomat it left no lasting footprint in the halls of the Department of State. The story was leaked also to the New York Times. An in-depth article described the Marshall Plan fiasco and the current tense situation in Prague realistically and accurately. But then it quoted "observers here," a reference to U.S. diplomats in Prague, as being skeptical that the Ru ssians would try to impose upon Czechoslovakia " the kind of communist state that preva il s in Rumani a, Bul garia and Poland. " 16 The hopeful view, the paper reported , was that in following its tradition the Kremlin might in fact decide to withdraw altogether back to Ru ssia, lest its people become contaminated with the west. This optimism was anchored in the views of the ambassador, his deputy , but also Katek and Taggart. The Embassy's record during the deci sive days of February 1948 is not impressive. Ambassador Steinhardt was in the United States attending to business at the law firm Guggenheimer, Untermyer & 14 Interview with Walter Taub, Salzburg. Austria. 6 March 2000 . Interview with George Bogardus, Washington, 3 June 1998. 16 James Reston, "Czechs Bow East Politicall y but Back West Inte llectuall y," New York Times, 5 August 1947. 15 SLOVAKIA 59 Marshall on Pine Street in New York City. He had joined it in 1920 and remained an active partner even after he started, in 1933, his diplomatic career as U. S. Ambassador in Stockholm. Spencer Taggart was on a motoring tour of Italy with his wife. For the ambassador and for Spencer Taggart to be out of the country at the time of the coup was embarrassing. The game was lost now - when the opponent took to the field , the Americans were not even dressed to play. The ambassador and the upper echelons at the Embassy had surrounded themselves primarily with the titled and propertied classes. They failed to notice that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had won real support not only among the working class and trade unionists, but importantly among the intellectual s, traditionally a crucial social group in the Czech lands. Neither the Embassy nor the Military Mission had connections in those circles. The CPC had saturated the democratic parties with its agents; it could anticipate and neutralize their activities. The democrats had not imagined that such conduct was possible. Neither they nor their American friends at the Embassy or Mission had recruited any intelligence assets at the level of the CPC Politburo or even the Central Committee apparat. Steinhardt ' s optimism influenced others in the Embassy and some in the State Department. But leading American diplomats, such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, were not at all surprised by the Prague coup. As we have seen, this was not thanks to reports of the U. S. Embassy in Prague or thanks to information from U. S. intelligence. Among those who had been expecting a decisive communist move against Czechoslovakia was Secretary of State Marshall. In his November 1947 memorandum for President Truman he approached the iss ue like a military strategist examining the map. He found that Moscow " will probably have to clamp down on Czechoslovakia, for a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become a threatening salient in Moscow's political position. " 17 As it happened, the Prague coup d'etat was played out as an internal affair, and Moscow could remain in its comfortable position of a sympathetic observer. The result was exactly as Marshall had predicted. 17 The Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman , Files of the White House Nava l Aide, G. C. M., Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, 7 November 1947 . 60 SLOVAKIA Marshall 's analysis, based on common sense and years of military experience, offered more insight into the crisis in Prague than that provided by American diplomats and intelligence personnel based in the city. It is a serious indictment of U.S. intelligence performance in postwar Prague that the sec retary of state should have come up with a more accurate assessment of the evolving crisis than trained intelligence personnel with language skills and sources at the highest ranks of the Czechoslovak Government. Even if the communist coup d 'etat in Czechoslovakia did not surprise Secretary Marshall, like many others he considered it a watershed in east-west relations. On 10 March 1948 he stated that the situation in Europe was "very , very serious" and ten days later he called for " urgent and resolute action" if the United States was to defend the west. The United States Embassy in Prague was not in a position to contribute to the effort. The February coup d 'etat brutally revealed the weaknesses of the overt style of intelligence gathering employed by the Military Mission. Almost overnight, the former guests of Colonel Katek had lost their posts in government, security, the military, and the world of business. At least one was dead, some in prison, the majority seeking to escape; the lucky ones were already in the west; some of the prominent habitues of Loretanske Square were under house arrest. None had access to information that would be of interest to the Americans. Neither Katek nor Taggart had thought of putting in place an intelligence-gathering network that would become operational in case of a communist assumption of power. Building one now was next to imposs ible: no Czech with some official standing (except for StB agents) dared to come to the Embassy, and few were willing to risk speaking with American diplomats even in private. Yet this was the time when intelligence was most desperately needed. In June or July 1948, in the first weeks of the Berlin blockade, General Lucius Clay, Commanding General of U.S . Forces in Europe and Military Governor of Germany, summoned Taggart and told him to expect an outbreak of war with the Soviet Union within four months. The general asked him to build in Czechoslovakia a network of intelligence assets who would be equipped with radio stations. It was to remain inactive during peacetime but spring into action in case of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet SLOVAKIA 61 bloc. Their mission was to gather military intelligence and transmit it to the Americans if the east-west tensions caused an evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Prague. Taggart was eager to carry out his orders, but he was scheduled to leave the Prague post in October 1948 at the latest. When he reviewed the list of people who might help him put together the kind of network General Clay wanted, he selected Major Jaromir Nechansky (born I 916). It was not a lucky choice. Nechansky was a brave, highly motivated , British-trained commando and intelligence officer, but his wartime service in the west, his activities in occupied Czechoslovakia from February to May 1945, and his frequent social contacts with the Americans before the communist take-over made him an obvious target of the Czechoslovak Military Counter Intelligence, Obranne zpravodajstvi, OBZ. In 1946 it concluded: "Nechansky is in frequent contact with Katek ; he most likely works for the Americans." 18 The Americans decided to recruit also Veleslav Wahl. This young man - he was born in 1922 - came from a well-known family that had already experienced more than its share of tragedy: his father, Veleslav, and uncle, Karel, were executed by the Nazis in 1942; his future wife ' s father, Josef Ruzicka, was killed at the Mauthausen concentration camp in 1943. It was unhelpful that Nechansky and Wahl were known to be very close friends since the war. The discovery of one would automatically lead to the arrest of the other. First Nechansky, then Wahl and all the other agents whom the two leaders had recruited on behalf of the Americans, were arrested in early September 1949. They never had a chance. All - men and women - were severely tortured; even the police photographer who took their pictures for the court did not bother to cover up this fact. The trial in April 1950 became an orgy of anti-American propaganda, played out in the communist daily Rude Pravo, but also in other papers. The names of Taggart, hi s assistant Samuel Meryn, and others from the Embassy appeared repeatedly in the manipulated press, accompanied by photographs of radio stations and weapons the StB uncovered in the houses of the would-be agents. The outcome of the tri al had been determined in advance. Nechansky and 18 AMI , Z-651 , fil e 13, OBZ (Main Directorate), Ministry of Defen se, Summary of Reports 302-592- 1. 62 SLOVAKIA Wahl were sentenced to death and executed on I 6 Jul y I 950. All other sentences were draconian. When American intelligence officers arrived in Czechoslovakia in May 1945 it see med th at the cause of western democracy was dealt a lucky hand. They were educated and motivated, they understood the country, its language and hi story , they had time to prepare for the comi ng confrontation with their Soviet opponent, and they enjoyed the unqualified support of Ambassador Steinhardt. Importantly, many in the Czech political and military elites, and significant numbers in the sec urity appara t were approachable by US intelligence personnel seeking classified information. The Americans who were in the business of collecting political, military, and comercial secrets in Prague had access to some of the highest ranking personalities in the Office of the President and Government, including the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior. Some Czechoslovak officials were eager to provide Americans with classified information. Leaking information to American officials was neither dishonorable nor unpatriotic. It was a contribution to the cause of democracy. It would be hard to imagine any other country where there existed such a harmony of interest between American intelligence collectors and their sources. All these factors put together make the swift defeat of democracy in Czechoslovakia and the totalitarian victory in February 1948 all the more humiliating.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czechoslovakia 1945-1950: A Failure of Intelligence Description An account of the resource Igor Lukes Slovakia, Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007 pp. 50-62 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lukes, Igor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cc5da19c756175994df02b515c92e008.pdf 6b86170de436bd3268e0d249815d2636 PDF Text Text 61 SLOVAKIA For the Slovak nation statehood is a vital question not so much because of the need to put an end to the injustices suffered at the hands of other nations in alien state formations, but largely because it is striving to attain a new political order suited to its own national individuality and mentality. Such a positive viewpoint prevails over negative arguments. Czech internationalism, Schweik opportunism, and the honoring of foreign prophets from Marx to Chruscev are all alien to the Slovak national character. The Slovaks did not go beyond the boundaries of Hungary so that they might get stuck in the swamps of Czech imperialism. The Slovak nation wants cultural and political freedom, because ultimately it wants to be itself - a national entity interested in its preservation. It is in this that the substance of Martin Razus's political message manifests itself to us for our generation. • • • Castles of Slovakia: HUBERT MACKO, 0.5.B. CASTLE GELNICA There is not much to tell about Gelnica; all that remains of it is a .pile of stone and the bare foundation of what was perhaps once the "ne:'bojsa v e z·a " (Do not be afraid Tower). 'Dhere can be ,f ound no authentic data aJbout the founder of hrad Gelnica. However, it is known for certain Juraj (George) Beibek, who also owned the neighboring and vastly more importaTut fortress "Krasna Horka" (Beautiful Mount) . In the year 1527 Zapofisky tooik Geinica from Bebeik by force. Later on Thurzo beeame its master, the same Thurzo whose family played such an important part in the early history of Slo;va:kia. During the very trying, uncertain, and bloody years of the great uprisings of Stephen Bocskay, Stephen Bethlen, GeoPge RaJk6czi, Imrich Th6kbly and Francis Ra!lrnczi , lasting upwards of 150 years, Gelnica changed hands many times. From each successive exchange, Gelnica suffered, and, since it was never too important strategically few re1 �62 SLOVAKIA pairs were made, finally it became uninh abitable and was abandoned to time and the elements. As about all other castles, so aibout Gelnica people wove a legend, which could be entitled: "The last days of Gelnica." The last owner of the castle people say, was a very beautiful widow. Her husband died a hero's death on the field of glory and left her with only a small garrison for protection. 1Soon wo.rd s.pread among the greedy soldiers of the king that Gelnica contained untold treasures - gold, silver, precious stones - and no soldiers to guard this treasure. Thin!king that no opposition would be met with, the king's army advanced on the fortress in a disorderly fashion. To their suriprise, a salvo of shots greeted them and moved down the advance guard. After reorganizing, the soldiers attacked. 'Ehe small garrison inside fortress Gelnica gave a good account of itself. Wave after wa'Ve of the enemy was thrown back with great losses. However, with each enemy onslaught, the ranks of the garrison dwindled. After many days of hard fighting, hungry and tired unto death, the garriJSon was over.powered. The castle was destroyed and every living creature in it killed. B efore the fatal hour, however, the beautiful wido,w, seeing that a11 was lost, had her valuables gathered and thrown into the castle's deep well. And lest a fate wors-e than death befall her, she jumped into the well. The king's army found neither treasure nor the beautiful widow. Not far from the castle flo,w s the sma:11 river Gelnica, which in some way was connected underground with the castle's deep well. After a time fishermen found the 1body of the owner of Gelnica and, in the presence of the people of the neighborhood , buried her under the ruins of the castle. These then, according to the legend. were the last days of Gelnica. From the pile of stones that was once fortress Gelnica, one has a fine view of the surrounding hills and valleys. And if one listens attentively when the wind is low, one can hear a soft sobbing. People will teU you it is the beautiful widow, sobbing for her beloved husband, who died on the field of g}ory. You will bless yourself and murmur a fervent: "Requiescant in peace!" �SLOVAKIA 63 HRAD BACKOV In the old Zemplin province, in a northwes terly direction from the beautiful town of Secovce, and not far from the small vallIDge of Backov, stood in the ancent fortress of Ba{!1kov. AH that we can S8iy about i,t is that it was once a fortress of some proportio ns. Now only a few ditches and small piles of lichened stone mark the spot. The only reason we write albout it is that Slovak people wove around it a legend from pre-sChristian times, when many of our forefathers still worshipp ed Parom, Morena, and the other Slav pagan gods. It is not known when the fortress was erected, but during the Tatar invasions , it was the prQPerty of the king. Many of the fortresse s in those hectic days were held in fief by so-called "hrnciari ", frontiersm en, who were in the service of the <king as guardsme n of the frontiers and were responsib le for the upikeep and repairs of the fo.rbress. Some times for outstandi ng services, the :king would grant to such a frontiersm an a smal[ ipiece of ground, conferrin g on him the questiona ble title of "zeman" (landown er), making him the boss of the fortress. When the "Order of Frontiers men" was aJbolished, the kings gave these fortresses , with much land, to individua ls usually as a compensa tion for services rendered. These services were either in money for the prosecuti on of war against neighbori ng !kings, or for military he'1p against the enemy. At the beginning of the 14th century, the king ga•ve Bacikov to a family named Petenovec . When, for some unrecoo-ded reason, the family fell from grace, the king confiscated the castle. Im the year 1321, King Robert Charles traded Bookov for another castle to a family named Macko. Ba,,okov then passed into the possessio n of the Bycksove c family and with the fortress the villages of Sefovce, Ve~' ky a Maly Backov, KerepYa, Tri ¥isnove, Kahainovce. Pol'anka, Petrusovc e, Parno, Albin, and many others. Members of this family divided the estate in the year 1329, Baokov with a few villages becoming the property �64 SLOVAKIA of Done. During the next 270 years the o·Nnership of Backov changed hands many times, becoming in the year 1598 the property of four men: Bockaj, Francis Rak6czi, Stephen Kecera, and Peter Sokol. In the 17th century we find as owners of Baakov: Fischer, Semer, Mari.as, Puky, Kolnas, and Forgac. The last name figured largely in the history of many Slovak castles, as also the name Rak6czi, and others. In the year 1688 BMkov was destroyed and abandoned. Its glory passed. forever. Where once was heard the clang of armor, jingle of the sword, the hoofbeats of the finest horses; where once the wealthy masters lived vigorously but riotously - today reigns a depressing emptiness and quiet, disturbed only by the raven and the oiwl. The people of the vicinity will tell you the following legend, S1Wearing by all that is holy that what they say is the truth. At one time the owner of the fortress was a certain DU'ke Draik. He was a cruel master to the hapless people who toiled in the fields for him. He was a miser and nothing could be hidden from him. Woe to the unfortunate who would take so much as a handful of grain from the field! Drak found everything and took everything, whether it belonged to him or not. Although e~tremely rich, he wais never satisfied. When merchants from other countries 1passed in the vicinity, Drak would swoop upon them like a bird of prey and they were fortunate if they got away with their lives. Consequently merchants gavE:r wide berth to BackOJV. People will tell you that when Drak was dying, lightning struck the fortress thirty times, as if the devil was impatient to carry off the soul of the tyrant Drak to the deepest pit in hell. When Drak finally died, the people sacked the fortress and carried away everything that could be carried. The devil was not satisfied merely with the soul of Dralk, the people will tell you, but he also wanted some of Drruk's possessions. Not knowing that the castle was sacked and destroyed, the devil returned one dark night to carry olff some of its treas,ures. He soon fiHed his sack with what he thought was gold, but in reality large pieces of stone from the destroyed castle. Since the stones were very heavy, the devil rested not far from the village of Vihorl'at �SLOVAKIA 66 and soon fell asleep. When the bright rays of the rising sun awalkened him, he was so startled that he jumped into the valley below. The ground where he fell, opened and swallowed him up, leaving a huge hole which soon filled with water. Even to this day the ,people of Vihorl'at wiU show the traveller the bottomless laike, "morsike oko," to them. • • • HRA.'D JELSAVA The Jelsava Castle was in reality two fortresses. The older one was ,probaJbly an ancient Slovak provincial fortress made of wood. Nothing remains of it except several large moats and there are no signs oif any stone. The first mention of the older Jelsava fortress is contained in a document of King Bela IV, in 1243, to Bebek whose holdings bordered on Jelsava, which belonged to the king. In the year 1283 the fortress was given to one Dezider Ra1boldi, whose family came from Ita,l y in 1109. The family name was later changed to Tisvai. Later the fortress was besieged by John Jisikra of Brandys, and since that time no other mention ,w as made of it. It was ,proba:bly destroyed during that rsiege and never rebuilt. In the chronicles of the Hussite wars, there is mention made of another "hrad Je1sava," situated about one half hour's journey from the town ,b earing the same name. This fortress was made of stone. It wais not a large fortress, but in places the walls were over two meters in thickness. It is not known exactly when this second fortress was built, but in 1299 it is referred to as a "destroyed" fortress. It was rebuilt and passed into possession of the Knights Templars. Eventually, for some unrecorded reason, the Templars were driven out. They built a monastery on the site where the Palace now stands. King Louis of Anjou gave the fortress as gift to his court-chancellor, Lestar of Jelsava, who repaired the fortress and moved into it, leaving the court of Louis, which did not please the king at all. Being a man of enterprising spirit, his motto being "nothing ventured, nothing gained," he invited tradesmen, businessmen, miners, and craftsmen �SLOVAKIA 66 to Je1sava. Soon Je1sava became a thriving community and Lestar became immensely wealthy. Upon Lestar's deaJth the fortress passed into the possession. of one George Jolsavy, a very fickle and scatterbrained bachelor, who cared more for a bottle of wine and gay company than he did for affairs of buisness. He was surrounded at all times with men and women of his ilk, who lived rioutously and spent friend Jolsavy's money in quick order. When the last gold piece was gone, Jolsvay mortgaged the fortress to Dominic Bebek for 7,707 pieces of mortgaged money. Since he died without heirs, the family name died with him, a name which played some very important roles in the early history of Slovakia. After Jolsvay's death, litigatio!l1 was started against Bebek by Perenyi, who also claimed possession of Jelsava. Queen :IDlizwbeth did not recognize the claims of Beibek or Perenyi and confiscated the fortress. Later she leased it to Perenyi for a yearly rental of 6,007 gold pieces. In 1440 John Jiskra conquered a greated part of Gerner and took control of aJ.l the fortresses on the territory he occupied. Among them was hrad Jelsava. In 1453, after Jiskra was defeated, King Ladislav V gave the fortress to Perenyi. Here the history of Jelsava is somewhat muddled. Although Perenyi is said to have rebuilt JelsaJVa in the year 1461, it is mentioned in the chronicles as a "castellum" belonging to Bebek. For five moire years the two families fought for the possession of the fortress. In 1466 Bebek won the suit, and the family remained in possession of J elsava until it died out. During the Turkish invasions, Jelsava was destroyed and never again rebuilt. The land passed into the possession of the owners of Muran Castle. In 1720, King Charles ID gave Muran and all the land to the Kohany family. By marriage the land passed into the ·p ossession of the present Coburg family. • • • WANT TO LEARN SLOVAK? Order the "-SLOVAK LESSONS" {$3.50) and the ENGLlSH-SLOVAK DICTIONARY {$4.00) by Hrobak today! � 61 SLOVAKIA For the Slovak nation statehood is a vital question not so much because of the need to put an end to the injustices suffered at the hands of other nations in alien state formations, but largely because it is striving to attain a new political order suited to its own national individuality and mentality. Such a positive viewpoint prevails over negative arguments. Czech internationalism, Schweik opportunism, and the honoring of foreign prophets from Marx to Chruscev are all alien to the Slovak national character. The Slovaks did not go beyond the boundaries of Hungary so that they might get stuck in the swamps of Czech imperialism. The Slovak nation wants cultural and political freedom, because ultimately it wants to be itself - a national entity interested in its preservation. It is in this that the substance of Martin Razus's political message manifests itself to us for our generation. • • • Castles of Slovakia: HUBERT MACKO, 0.5.B. CASTLE GELNICA There is not much to tell about Gelnica; all that remains of it is a .pile of stone and the bare foundation of what was perhaps once the "ne:'bojsa v e z·a " (Do not be afraid Tower). 'Dhere can be ,f ound no authentic data aJbout the founder of hrad Gelnica. However, it is known for certain Juraj (George) Beibek, who also owned the neighboring and vastly more importaTut fortress "Krasna Horka" (Beautiful Mount) . In the year 1527 Zapofisky tooik Geinica from Bebeik by force. Later on Thurzo beeame its master, the same Thurzo whose family played such an important part in the early history of Slo;va:kia. During the very trying, uncertain, and bloody years of the great uprisings of Stephen Bocskay, Stephen Bethlen, GeoPge RaJk6czi, Imrich Th6kbly and Francis Ra!lrnczi , lasting upwards of 150 years, Gelnica changed hands many times. From each successive exchange, Gelnica suffered, and, since it was never too important strategically few re1 �62 SLOVAKIA pairs were made, finally it became uninh abitable and was abandoned to time and the elements. As about all other castles, so aibout Gelnica people wove a legend, which could be entitled: "The last days of Gelnica." The last owner of the castle people say, was a very beautiful widow. Her husband died a hero's death on the field of glory and left her with only a small garrison for protection. 1Soon wo.rd s.pread among the greedy soldiers of the king that Gelnica contained untold treasures - gold, silver, precious stones - and no soldiers to guard this treasure. Thin!king that no opposition would be met with, the king's army advanced on the fortress in a disorderly fashion. To their suriprise, a salvo of shots greeted them and moved down the advance guard. After reorganizing, the soldiers attacked. 'Ehe small garrison inside fortress Gelnica gave a good account of itself. Wave after wa'Ve of the enemy was thrown back with great losses. However, with each enemy onslaught, the ranks of the garrison dwindled. After many days of hard fighting, hungry and tired unto death, the garriJSon was over.powered. The castle was destroyed and every living creature in it killed. B efore the fatal hour, however, the beautiful wido,w, seeing that a11 was lost, had her valuables gathered and thrown into the castle's deep well. And lest a fate wors-e than death befall her, she jumped into the well. The king's army found neither treasure nor the beautiful widow. Not far from the castle flo,w s the sma:11 river Gelnica, which in some way was connected underground with the castle's deep well. After a time fishermen found the 1body of the owner of Gelnica and, in the presence of the people of the neighborhood , buried her under the ruins of the castle. These then, according to the legend. were the last days of Gelnica. From the pile of stones that was once fortress Gelnica, one has a fine view of the surrounding hills and valleys. And if one listens attentively when the wind is low, one can hear a soft sobbing. People will teU you it is the beautiful widow, sobbing for her beloved husband, who died on the field of g}ory. You will bless yourself and murmur a fervent: "Requiescant in peace!" �SLOVAKIA 63 HRAD BACKOV In the old Zemplin province, in a northwes terly direction from the beautiful town of Secovce, and not far from the small vallIDge of Backov, stood in the ancent fortress of Ba{!1kov. AH that we can S8iy about i,t is that it was once a fortress of some proportio ns. Now only a few ditches and small piles of lichened stone mark the spot. The only reason we write albout it is that Slovak people wove around it a legend from pre-sChristian times, when many of our forefathers still worshipp ed Parom, Morena, and the other Slav pagan gods. It is not known when the fortress was erected, but during the Tatar invasions , it was the prQPerty of the king. Many of the fortresse s in those hectic days were held in fief by so-called "hrnciari ", frontiersm en, who were in the service of the <king as guardsme n of the frontiers and were responsib le for the upikeep and repairs of the fo.rbress. Some times for outstandi ng services, the :king would grant to such a frontiersm an a smal[ ipiece of ground, conferrin g on him the questiona ble title of "zeman" (landown er), making him the boss of the fortress. When the "Order of Frontiers men" was aJbolished, the kings gave these fortresses , with much land, to individua ls usually as a compensa tion for services rendered. These services were either in money for the prosecuti on of war against neighbori ng !kings, or for military he'1p against the enemy. At the beginning of the 14th century, the king ga•ve Bacikov to a family named Petenovec . When, for some unrecoo-ded reason, the family fell from grace, the king confiscated the castle. Im the year 1321, King Robert Charles traded Bookov for another castle to a family named Macko. Ba,,okov then passed into the possessio n of the Bycksove c family and with the fortress the villages of Sefovce, Ve~' ky a Maly Backov, KerepYa, Tri ¥isnove, Kahainovce. Pol'anka, Petrusovc e, Parno, Albin, and many others. Members of this family divided the estate in the year 1329, Baokov with a few villages becoming the property �64 SLOVAKIA of Done. During the next 270 years the o·Nnership of Backov changed hands many times, becoming in the year 1598 the property of four men: Bockaj, Francis Rak6czi, Stephen Kecera, and Peter Sokol. In the 17th century we find as owners of Baakov: Fischer, Semer, Mari.as, Puky, Kolnas, and Forgac. The last name figured largely in the history of many Slovak castles, as also the name Rak6czi, and others. In the year 1688 BMkov was destroyed and abandoned. Its glory passed. forever. Where once was heard the clang of armor, jingle of the sword, the hoofbeats of the finest horses; where once the wealthy masters lived vigorously but riotously - today reigns a depressing emptiness and quiet, disturbed only by the raven and the oiwl. The people of the vicinity will tell you the following legend, S1Wearing by all that is holy that what they say is the truth. At one time the owner of the fortress was a certain DU'ke Draik. He was a cruel master to the hapless people who toiled in the fields for him. He was a miser and nothing could be hidden from him. Woe to the unfortunate who would take so much as a handful of grain from the field! Drak found everything and took everything, whether it belonged to him or not. Although e~tremely rich, he wais never satisfied. When merchants from other countries 1passed in the vicinity, Drak would swoop upon them like a bird of prey and they were fortunate if they got away with their lives. Consequently merchants gavE:r wide berth to BackOJV. People will tell you that when Drak was dying, lightning struck the fortress thirty times, as if the devil was impatient to carry off the soul of the tyrant Drak to the deepest pit in hell. When Drak finally died, the people sacked the fortress and carried away everything that could be carried. The devil was not satisfied merely with the soul of Dralk, the people will tell you, but he also wanted some of Drruk's possessions. Not knowing that the castle was sacked and destroyed, the devil returned one dark night to carry olff some of its treas,ures. He soon fiHed his sack with what he thought was gold, but in reality large pieces of stone from the destroyed castle. Since the stones were very heavy, the devil rested not far from the village of Vihorl'at �SLOVAKIA 66 and soon fell asleep. When the bright rays of the rising sun awalkened him, he was so startled that he jumped into the valley below. The ground where he fell, opened and swallowed him up, leaving a huge hole which soon filled with water. Even to this day the ,people of Vihorl'at wiU show the traveller the bottomless laike, "morsike oko," to them. • • • HRA.'D JELSAVA The Jelsava Castle was in reality two fortresses. The older one was ,probaJbly an ancient Slovak provincial fortress made of wood. Nothing remains of it except several large moats and there are no signs oif any stone. The first mention of the older Jelsava fortress is contained in a document of King Bela IV, in 1243, to Bebek whose holdings bordered on Jelsava, which belonged to the king. In the year 1283 the fortress was given to one Dezider Ra1boldi, whose family came from Ita,l y in 1109. The family name was later changed to Tisvai. Later the fortress was besieged by John Jisikra of Brandys, and since that time no other mention ,w as made of it. It was ,proba:bly destroyed during that rsiege and never rebuilt. In the chronicles of the Hussite wars, there is mention made of another "hrad Je1sava," situated about one half hour's journey from the town ,b earing the same name. This fortress was made of stone. It wais not a large fortress, but in places the walls were over two meters in thickness. It is not known exactly when this second fortress was built, but in 1299 it is referred to as a "destroyed" fortress. It was rebuilt and passed into possession of the Knights Templars. Eventually, for some unrecorded reason, the Templars were driven out. They built a monastery on the site where the Palace now stands. King Louis of Anjou gave the fortress as gift to his court-chancellor, Lestar of Jelsava, who repaired the fortress and moved into it, leaving the court of Louis, which did not please the king at all. Being a man of enterprising spirit, his motto being "nothing ventured, nothing gained," he invited tradesmen, businessmen, miners, and craftsmen �SLOVAKIA 66 to Je1sava. Soon Je1sava became a thriving community and Lestar became immensely wealthy. Upon Lestar's deaJth the fortress passed into the possession. of one George Jolsavy, a very fickle and scatterbrained bachelor, who cared more for a bottle of wine and gay company than he did for affairs of buisness. He was surrounded at all times with men and women of his ilk, who lived rioutously and spent friend Jolsavy's money in quick order. When the last gold piece was gone, Jolsvay mortgaged the fortress to Dominic Bebek for 7,707 pieces of mortgaged money. Since he died without heirs, the family name died with him, a name which played some very important roles in the early history of Slovakia. After Jolsvay's death, litigatio!l1 was started against Bebek by Perenyi, who also claimed possession of Jelsava. Queen :IDlizwbeth did not recognize the claims of Beibek or Perenyi and confiscated the fortress. Later she leased it to Perenyi for a yearly rental of 6,007 gold pieces. In 1440 John Jiskra conquered a greated part of Gerner and took control of aJ.l the fortresses on the territory he occupied. Among them was hrad Jelsava. In 1453, after Jiskra was defeated, King Ladislav V gave the fortress to Perenyi. Here the history of Jelsava is somewhat muddled. Although Perenyi is said to have rebuilt JelsaJVa in the year 1461, it is mentioned in the chronicles as a "castellum" belonging to Bebek. For five moire years the two families fought for the possession of the fortress. In 1466 Bebek won the suit, and the family remained in possession of J elsava until it died out. During the Turkish invasions, Jelsava was destroyed and never again rebuilt. The land passed into the possession of the owners of Muran Castle. In 1720, King Charles ID gave Muran and all the land to the Kohany family. By marriage the land passed into the ·p ossession of the present Coburg family. • • • WANT TO LEARN SLOVAK? Order the "-SLOVAK LESSONS" {$3.50) and the ENGLlSH-SLOVAK DICTIONARY {$4.00) by Hrobak today! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1957, Vol. 7 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 22), March 1957.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 23), June 1957.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 24-25), September-December 1957.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 61 SLOVAKIA For the Slovak nation statehood is a vital question not so much because of the need to put an end to the injustices suffered at the hands of other nations in alien state formations, but largely because it is striving to attain a new political order suited to its own national individuality and mentality. Such a positive viewpoint prevails over negative arguments. Czech internationalism, Schweik opportunism, and the honoring of foreign prophets from Marx to Chruscev are all alien to the Slovak national character. The Slovaks did not go beyond the boundaries of Hungary so that they might get stuck in the swamps of Czech imperialism. The Slovak nation wants cultural and political freedom, because ultimately it wants to be itself - a national entity interested in its preservation. It is in this that the substance of Martin Razus's political message manifests itself to us for our generation. • • • Castles of Slovakia: HUBERT MACKO, 0.5.B. CASTLE GELNICA There is not much to tell about Gelnica; all that remains of it is a .pile of stone and the bare foundation of what was perhaps once the "ne:'bojsa v e z·a " (Do not be afraid Tower). 'Dhere can be ,f ound no authentic data aJbout the founder of hrad Gelnica. However, it is known for certain Juraj (George) Beibek, who also owned the neighboring and vastly more importaTut fortress "Krasna Horka" (Beautiful Mount) . In the year 1527 Zapofisky tooik Geinica from Bebeik by force. Later on Thurzo beeame its master, the same Thurzo whose family played such an important part in the early history of Slo;va:kia. During the very trying, uncertain, and bloody years of the great uprisings of Stephen Bocskay, Stephen Bethlen, GeoPge RaJk6czi, Imrich Th6kbly and Francis Ra!lrnczi , lasting upwards of 150 years, Gelnica changed hands many times. From each successive exchange, Gelnica suffered, and, since it was never too important strategically few re1 62 SLOVAKIA pairs were made, finally it became uninh abitable and was abandoned to time and the elements. As about all other castles, so aibout Gelnica people wove a legend, which could be entitled: "The last days of Gelnica." The last owner of the castle people say, was a very beautiful widow. Her husband died a hero's death on the field of glory and left her with only a small garrison for protection. 1Soon wo.rd s.pread among the greedy soldiers of the king that Gelnica contained untold treasures - gold, silver, precious stones - and no soldiers to guard this treasure. Thin!king that no opposition would be met with, the king's army advanced on the fortress in a disorderly fashion. To their suriprise, a salvo of shots greeted them and moved down the advance guard. After reorganizing, the soldiers attacked. 'Ehe small garrison inside fortress Gelnica gave a good account of itself. Wave after wa'Ve of the enemy was thrown back with great losses. However, with each enemy onslaught, the ranks of the garrison dwindled. After many days of hard fighting, hungry and tired unto death, the garriJSon was over.powered. The castle was destroyed and every living creature in it killed. B efore the fatal hour, however, the beautiful wido,w, seeing that a11 was lost, had her valuables gathered and thrown into the castle's deep well. And lest a fate wors-e than death befall her, she jumped into the well. The king's army found neither treasure nor the beautiful widow. Not far from the castle flo,w s the sma:11 river Gelnica, which in some way was connected underground with the castle's deep well. After a time fishermen found the 1body of the owner of Gelnica and, in the presence of the people of the neighborhood , buried her under the ruins of the castle. These then, according to the legend. were the last days of Gelnica. From the pile of stones that was once fortress Gelnica, one has a fine view of the surrounding hills and valleys. And if one listens attentively when the wind is low, one can hear a soft sobbing. People will teU you it is the beautiful widow, sobbing for her beloved husband, who died on the field of g}ory. You will bless yourself and murmur a fervent: "Requiescant in peace!" SLOVAKIA 63 HRAD BACKOV In the old Zemplin province, in a northwes terly direction from the beautiful town of Secovce, and not far from the small vallIDge of Backov, stood in the ancent fortress of Ba{!1kov. AH that we can S8iy about i,t is that it was once a fortress of some proportio ns. Now only a few ditches and small piles of lichened stone mark the spot. The only reason we write albout it is that Slovak people wove around it a legend from pre-sChristian times, when many of our forefathers still worshipp ed Parom, Morena, and the other Slav pagan gods. It is not known when the fortress was erected, but during the Tatar invasions , it was the prQPerty of the king. Many of the fortresse s in those hectic days were held in fief by so-called "hrnciari ", frontiersm en, who were in the service of the <king as guardsme n of the frontiers and were responsib le for the upikeep and repairs of the fo.rbress. Some times for outstandi ng services, the :king would grant to such a frontiersm an a smal[ ipiece of ground, conferrin g on him the questiona ble title of "zeman" (landown er), making him the boss of the fortress. When the "Order of Frontiers men" was aJbolished, the kings gave these fortresses , with much land, to individua ls usually as a compensa tion for services rendered. These services were either in money for the prosecuti on of war against neighbori ng !kings, or for military he'1p against the enemy. At the beginning of the 14th century, the king ga•ve Bacikov to a family named Petenovec . When, for some unrecoo-ded reason, the family fell from grace, the king confiscated the castle. Im the year 1321, King Robert Charles traded Bookov for another castle to a family named Macko. Ba,,okov then passed into the possessio n of the Bycksove c family and with the fortress the villages of Sefovce, Ve~' ky a Maly Backov, KerepYa, Tri ¥isnove, Kahainovce. Pol'anka, Petrusovc e, Parno, Albin, and many others. Members of this family divided the estate in the year 1329, Baokov with a few villages becoming the property 64 SLOVAKIA of Done. During the next 270 years the o·Nnership of Backov changed hands many times, becoming in the year 1598 the property of four men: Bockaj, Francis Rak6czi, Stephen Kecera, and Peter Sokol. In the 17th century we find as owners of Baakov: Fischer, Semer, Mari.as, Puky, Kolnas, and Forgac. The last name figured largely in the history of many Slovak castles, as also the name Rak6czi, and others. In the year 1688 BMkov was destroyed and abandoned. Its glory passed. forever. Where once was heard the clang of armor, jingle of the sword, the hoofbeats of the finest horses; where once the wealthy masters lived vigorously but riotously - today reigns a depressing emptiness and quiet, disturbed only by the raven and the oiwl. The people of the vicinity will tell you the following legend, S1Wearing by all that is holy that what they say is the truth. At one time the owner of the fortress was a certain DU'ke Draik. He was a cruel master to the hapless people who toiled in the fields for him. He was a miser and nothing could be hidden from him. Woe to the unfortunate who would take so much as a handful of grain from the field! Drak found everything and took everything, whether it belonged to him or not. Although e~tremely rich, he wais never satisfied. When merchants from other countries 1passed in the vicinity, Drak would swoop upon them like a bird of prey and they were fortunate if they got away with their lives. Consequently merchants gavE:r wide berth to BackOJV. People will tell you that when Drak was dying, lightning struck the fortress thirty times, as if the devil was impatient to carry off the soul of the tyrant Drak to the deepest pit in hell. When Drak finally died, the people sacked the fortress and carried away everything that could be carried. The devil was not satisfied merely with the soul of Dralk, the people will tell you, but he also wanted some of Drruk's possessions. Not knowing that the castle was sacked and destroyed, the devil returned one dark night to carry olff some of its treas,ures. He soon fiHed his sack with what he thought was gold, but in reality large pieces of stone from the destroyed castle. Since the stones were very heavy, the devil rested not far from the village of Vihorl'at SLOVAKIA 66 and soon fell asleep. When the bright rays of the rising sun awalkened him, he was so startled that he jumped into the valley below. The ground where he fell, opened and swallowed him up, leaving a huge hole which soon filled with water. Even to this day the ,people of Vihorl'at wiU show the traveller the bottomless laike, "morsike oko," to them. • • • HRA.'D JELSAVA The Jelsava Castle was in reality two fortresses. The older one was ,probaJbly an ancient Slovak provincial fortress made of wood. Nothing remains of it except several large moats and there are no signs oif any stone. The first mention of the older Jelsava fortress is contained in a document of King Bela IV, in 1243, to Bebek whose holdings bordered on Jelsava, which belonged to the king. In the year 1283 the fortress was given to one Dezider Ra1boldi, whose family came from Ita,l y in 1109. The family name was later changed to Tisvai. Later the fortress was besieged by John Jisikra of Brandys, and since that time no other mention ,w as made of it. It was ,proba:bly destroyed during that rsiege and never rebuilt. In the chronicles of the Hussite wars, there is mention made of another "hrad Je1sava," situated about one half hour's journey from the town ,b earing the same name. This fortress was made of stone. It wais not a large fortress, but in places the walls were over two meters in thickness. It is not known exactly when this second fortress was built, but in 1299 it is referred to as a "destroyed" fortress. It was rebuilt and passed into possession of the Knights Templars. Eventually, for some unrecorded reason, the Templars were driven out. They built a monastery on the site where the Palace now stands. King Louis of Anjou gave the fortress as gift to his court-chancellor, Lestar of Jelsava, who repaired the fortress and moved into it, leaving the court of Louis, which did not please the king at all. Being a man of enterprising spirit, his motto being "nothing ventured, nothing gained," he invited tradesmen, businessmen, miners, and craftsmen SLOVAKIA 66 to Je1sava. Soon Je1sava became a thriving community and Lestar became immensely wealthy. Upon Lestar's deaJth the fortress passed into the possession. of one George Jolsavy, a very fickle and scatterbrained bachelor, who cared more for a bottle of wine and gay company than he did for affairs of buisness. He was surrounded at all times with men and women of his ilk, who lived rioutously and spent friend Jolsavy's money in quick order. When the last gold piece was gone, Jolsvay mortgaged the fortress to Dominic Bebek for 7,707 pieces of mortgaged money. Since he died without heirs, the family name died with him, a name which played some very important roles in the early history of Slovakia. After Jolsvay's death, litigatio!l1 was started against Bebek by Perenyi, who also claimed possession of Jelsava. Queen :IDlizwbeth did not recognize the claims of Beibek or Perenyi and confiscated the fortress. Later she leased it to Perenyi for a yearly rental of 6,007 gold pieces. In 1440 John Jiskra conquered a greated part of Gerner and took control of aJ.l the fortresses on the territory he occupied. Among them was hrad Jelsava. In 1453, after Jiskra was defeated, King Ladislav V gave the fortress to Perenyi. Here the history of Jelsava is somewhat muddled. Although Perenyi is said to have rebuilt JelsaJVa in the year 1461, it is mentioned in the chronicles as a "castellum" belonging to Bebek. For five moire years the two families fought for the possession of the fortress. In 1466 Bebek won the suit, and the family remained in possession of J elsava until it died out. During the Turkish invasions, Jelsava was destroyed and never again rebuilt. The land passed into the possession of the owners of Muran Castle. In 1720, King Charles ID gave Muran and all the land to the Kohany family. By marriage the land passed into the ·p ossession of the present Coburg family. • • • WANT TO LEARN SLOVAK? Order the "-SLOVAK LESSONS" {$3.50) and the ENGLlSH-SLOVAK DICTIONARY {$4.00) by Hrobak today!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Castle Gelnica - Hrad Báčkov - Hrad Jelšava Description An account of the resource Hubert Macko, O.S.B. Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (24-25), September-December 1957 pp. 61-66 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Macko, Hubert Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1957 castles name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2d14e30f0105888799fed57587d3616e.pdf f630c65d43bdf6cc14322441540bc6e6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 44 there is every reason to believe that the Slovaks and Magyars shall be able to come to an understanding when the Iron Curtain is lifted for benefit of both nations and in the common interests of all free peoples. In Conclusion It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks always tried to get along with neighboring nations, at times even at the expense of Slovak interests. They realize that quarrels and chauvinistic desires settle nothing and simply cause trouble, not only for the nations concerned, but for all free nations. Today all the nations behind the Iron Curtain are, so to speak, in the same boat, suffering under the Red heel of communism. The Slovak nation as a whole has been adamantly opposed to the ideology of Marxistic socialism for over a hundred years. The Slovaks are a small nation, but as partners with other European nations they can do much to destroy the ,greatest evil of our time, the enemy of all humanity: Communism. Let's encourage them to do that! • • • (K. S.) CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA KRASNA HORKA By Hubert Macko, OSB. Krasna Horka (Mount Beautiful) is one of the few fortresses of Slovakia in a good state of preservation. As the name itself suggests, it is beautiful in its ancient splendor, standing atop a hill where the valleys of Sajava and Cermosne meet in Gerner. Perched on a steep hill in a very picturesque setting, proud and unconquered by time and the elements, it is indeed a jewel of the golden days that were. In Gerner they still sing: "Krasna Horka, pysny zamok ... " (Mount Beautiful, proud fortress). Of its beginning we have no record. It is mentioned in the annals of Slovak fortresses as early as 1341; it was called "Kastrum Krasnohorka" and was owned by the Bebek family. There seemed to be some dispute as to the ownership of the fortress, a dispute that lasted a full 50 �SLOVAKIA 45 years. Dominic Bebek must have won the dispute because he is mentioned as the owner in the year 1352. The family took good care of the fortress, kept it in good repair and, from time to time, added new buildings. In the year 1441 John of Brandys besieged the fortress as well as all surrounding fortresses, and held it for some twenty years. Then came the Czech Hussites, who took the fortress and made it impregnable. Later on the fortress became the property of Stephen Bebek. In 1514 Bebek and Zapofsky put down an insurrection of the peasants. When John Bebek fell in the famous battle of Mohac in 1526, Francis Bebek became the owner of Krasna Horka. He made counterfeit coins from the metal of bells that he stole from the surrounding churches. He was helped in this infamous work by the owner of Muran Castle. When Bebek felt the earth falling under his feet, he informed against Basa, the owner of Muran. The court ordered Basa apprehended and appointed Bebek as head of the expedition to carry out the order. Later on he was caught by a shepherd and brought to Bebek, who sentenced him to death. When Bebek tok over the fortress, he repaired and fortified it. Later on he again plied his nefarious trade as counterfeiter and cast his lot with John Zapofsky, an enemy of the emperor. When the emperor learned this, he sent his army against Bebek, but Bebek defeated the royal army. Not feeling safe in the fortress, Bebek left it and took up his residence at the Court of King Zigmund. The mother of King Zigmund, proving that Bebek was a traitor, had him killed in the year 1552. The fortress then became the property of the emperor's commander, Lazarus Schwendi. Bebek's son, George, casting his fortunes with the emperor, became the possessor of the fortress in 1557. In the year 1560 George Bebek was captured by the Turk, Hasan, and sent to Constantinople where he was a prisoner for five years. Enlisting the sympathy of King Zigmund and promising him life-long support, he was freed and became the commander-in-chief of all the armies of King Zigmund. It was not long after this that he gave up his high position and again began to worm himself �46 SLOVAKIA into the good graces of the emperor. He did not succeed. He died in Transylvania without issue; and with him died the last of the Bebek family, which owned Krasna Horka for some 300 years. In 1556 the fortress became the property of the crown, and to the year 1580 it was administered by various captains of the king. In that year the famous Peter Andrassy became its administrator. The Andrassy family is well known in Slovakia; some of its descendants are still liv• ing there. During the Rak6czi uprising, Stephen Andrassy helped Rak6czi, was named general of a part of the army that defeated the emperor's forces at Rab. The fortress was again repaired and fortified, but the management was turned over to Andrassy's wife, nee Seredi, and to his children. After a colorful career, full of intrigue, Stephen Andrassy died. His son, Francis, became owner, but leaving no direct descendants, the fortress passed into the possession of his nephew Charles, who became a general in the army of Maria Theresa with the title of Count. In 1847, when the fortress was destroyed by lightning and fire, it was completely repaired. Later on Dyonisius Andrassy became the owner of the fortress. He married a commoner, a Bohemian girl, Frances Hablavec. Both were very good to their subjects and showed great concern for the fortress , keeping it in very good repair. Today the fortress is a museum and contains many treasures of days gone by. • • • WHO SAID IT? Benes's trtp (to Moscow) is the Czechoslwak contribution to the struoture cxf world 1peace. Afl decent people are rejoidng, becaiuse it is a victory for democracy, the triumph of a good cause. . . The Soviet Czechoslo,vak Treaty is for him a great sati,s faotion. It is a great victory of the Czechoslov0Jk cause. It is a gigantic contrilbution to the structure of a happier Europe. It is the sollid foundation to lasting pea'Ce of the world. It is a great victory of Benes's politics." - Editorial, NEW YORK:SKY DENN1K Czechoslovak daily in Slovak language) , Dec. 15, 1943. � SLOVAKIA 44 there is every reason to believe that the Slovaks and Magyars shall be able to come to an understanding when the Iron Curtain is lifted for benefit of both nations and in the common interests of all free peoples. In Conclusion It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks always tried to get along with neighboring nations, at times even at the expense of Slovak interests. They realize that quarrels and chauvinistic desires settle nothing and simply cause trouble, not only for the nations concerned, but for all free nations. Today all the nations behind the Iron Curtain are, so to speak, in the same boat, suffering under the Red heel of communism. The Slovak nation as a whole has been adamantly opposed to the ideology of Marxistic socialism for over a hundred years. The Slovaks are a small nation, but as partners with other European nations they can do much to destroy the ,greatest evil of our time, the enemy of all humanity: Communism. Let's encourage them to do that! • • • (K. S.) CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA KRASNA HORKA By Hubert Macko, OSB. Krasna Horka (Mount Beautiful) is one of the few fortresses of Slovakia in a good state of preservation. As the name itself suggests, it is beautiful in its ancient splendor, standing atop a hill where the valleys of Sajava and Cermosne meet in Gerner. Perched on a steep hill in a very picturesque setting, proud and unconquered by time and the elements, it is indeed a jewel of the golden days that were. In Gerner they still sing: "Krasna Horka, pysny zamok ... " (Mount Beautiful, proud fortress). Of its beginning we have no record. It is mentioned in the annals of Slovak fortresses as early as 1341; it was called "Kastrum Krasnohorka" and was owned by the Bebek family. There seemed to be some dispute as to the ownership of the fortress, a dispute that lasted a full 50 �SLOVAKIA 45 years. Dominic Bebek must have won the dispute because he is mentioned as the owner in the year 1352. The family took good care of the fortress, kept it in good repair and, from time to time, added new buildings. In the year 1441 John of Brandys besieged the fortress as well as all surrounding fortresses, and held it for some twenty years. Then came the Czech Hussites, who took the fortress and made it impregnable. Later on the fortress became the property of Stephen Bebek. In 1514 Bebek and Zapofsky put down an insurrection of the peasants. When John Bebek fell in the famous battle of Mohac in 1526, Francis Bebek became the owner of Krasna Horka. He made counterfeit coins from the metal of bells that he stole from the surrounding churches. He was helped in this infamous work by the owner of Muran Castle. When Bebek felt the earth falling under his feet, he informed against Basa, the owner of Muran. The court ordered Basa apprehended and appointed Bebek as head of the expedition to carry out the order. Later on he was caught by a shepherd and brought to Bebek, who sentenced him to death. When Bebek tok over the fortress, he repaired and fortified it. Later on he again plied his nefarious trade as counterfeiter and cast his lot with John Zapofsky, an enemy of the emperor. When the emperor learned this, he sent his army against Bebek, but Bebek defeated the royal army. Not feeling safe in the fortress, Bebek left it and took up his residence at the Court of King Zigmund. The mother of King Zigmund, proving that Bebek was a traitor, had him killed in the year 1552. The fortress then became the property of the emperor's commander, Lazarus Schwendi. Bebek's son, George, casting his fortunes with the emperor, became the possessor of the fortress in 1557. In the year 1560 George Bebek was captured by the Turk, Hasan, and sent to Constantinople where he was a prisoner for five years. Enlisting the sympathy of King Zigmund and promising him life-long support, he was freed and became the commander-in-chief of all the armies of King Zigmund. It was not long after this that he gave up his high position and again began to worm himself �46 SLOVAKIA into the good graces of the emperor. He did not succeed. He died in Transylvania without issue; and with him died the last of the Bebek family, which owned Krasna Horka for some 300 years. In 1556 the fortress became the property of the crown, and to the year 1580 it was administered by various captains of the king. In that year the famous Peter Andrassy became its administrator. The Andrassy family is well known in Slovakia; some of its descendants are still liv• ing there. During the Rak6czi uprising, Stephen Andrassy helped Rak6czi, was named general of a part of the army that defeated the emperor's forces at Rab. The fortress was again repaired and fortified, but the management was turned over to Andrassy's wife, nee Seredi, and to his children. After a colorful career, full of intrigue, Stephen Andrassy died. His son, Francis, became owner, but leaving no direct descendants, the fortress passed into the possession of his nephew Charles, who became a general in the army of Maria Theresa with the title of Count. In 1847, when the fortress was destroyed by lightning and fire, it was completely repaired. Later on Dyonisius Andrassy became the owner of the fortress. He married a commoner, a Bohemian girl, Frances Hablavec. Both were very good to their subjects and showed great concern for the fortress , keeping it in very good repair. Today the fortress is a museum and contains many treasures of days gone by. • • • WHO SAID IT? Benes's trtp (to Moscow) is the Czechoslwak contribution to the struoture cxf world 1peace. Afl decent people are rejoidng, becaiuse it is a victory for democracy, the triumph of a good cause. . . The Soviet Czechoslo,vak Treaty is for him a great sati,s faotion. It is a great victory of the Czechoslov0Jk cause. It is a gigantic contrilbution to the structure of a happier Europe. It is the sollid foundation to lasting pea'Ce of the world. It is a great victory of Benes's politics." - Editorial, NEW YORK:SKY DENN1K Czechoslovak daily in Slovak language) , Dec. 15, 1943. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1958, Vol. 8 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 26), March 1958.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 27), June 1958.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 28), December 1958.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 44 there is every reason to believe that the Slovaks and Magyars shall be able to come to an understanding when the Iron Curtain is lifted for benefit of both nations and in the common interests of all free peoples. In Conclusion It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks always tried to get along with neighboring nations, at times even at the expense of Slovak interests. They realize that quarrels and chauvinistic desires settle nothing and simply cause trouble, not only for the nations concerned, but for all free nations. Today all the nations behind the Iron Curtain are, so to speak, in the same boat, suffering under the Red heel of communism. The Slovak nation as a whole has been adamantly opposed to the ideology of Marxistic socialism for over a hundred years. The Slovaks are a small nation, but as partners with other European nations they can do much to destroy the ,greatest evil of our time, the enemy of all humanity: Communism. Let's encourage them to do that! • • • (K. S.) CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA KRASNA HORKA By Hubert Macko, OSB. Krasna Horka (Mount Beautiful) is one of the few fortresses of Slovakia in a good state of preservation. As the name itself suggests, it is beautiful in its ancient splendor, standing atop a hill where the valleys of Sajava and Cermosne meet in Gerner. Perched on a steep hill in a very picturesque setting, proud and unconquered by time and the elements, it is indeed a jewel of the golden days that were. In Gerner they still sing: "Krasna Horka, pysny zamok ... " (Mount Beautiful, proud fortress). Of its beginning we have no record. It is mentioned in the annals of Slovak fortresses as early as 1341; it was called "Kastrum Krasnohorka" and was owned by the Bebek family. There seemed to be some dispute as to the ownership of the fortress, a dispute that lasted a full 50 SLOVAKIA 45 years. Dominic Bebek must have won the dispute because he is mentioned as the owner in the year 1352. The family took good care of the fortress, kept it in good repair and, from time to time, added new buildings. In the year 1441 John of Brandys besieged the fortress as well as all surrounding fortresses, and held it for some twenty years. Then came the Czech Hussites, who took the fortress and made it impregnable. Later on the fortress became the property of Stephen Bebek. In 1514 Bebek and Zapofsky put down an insurrection of the peasants. When John Bebek fell in the famous battle of Mohac in 1526, Francis Bebek became the owner of Krasna Horka. He made counterfeit coins from the metal of bells that he stole from the surrounding churches. He was helped in this infamous work by the owner of Muran Castle. When Bebek felt the earth falling under his feet, he informed against Basa, the owner of Muran. The court ordered Basa apprehended and appointed Bebek as head of the expedition to carry out the order. Later on he was caught by a shepherd and brought to Bebek, who sentenced him to death. When Bebek tok over the fortress, he repaired and fortified it. Later on he again plied his nefarious trade as counterfeiter and cast his lot with John Zapofsky, an enemy of the emperor. When the emperor learned this, he sent his army against Bebek, but Bebek defeated the royal army. Not feeling safe in the fortress, Bebek left it and took up his residence at the Court of King Zigmund. The mother of King Zigmund, proving that Bebek was a traitor, had him killed in the year 1552. The fortress then became the property of the emperor's commander, Lazarus Schwendi. Bebek's son, George, casting his fortunes with the emperor, became the possessor of the fortress in 1557. In the year 1560 George Bebek was captured by the Turk, Hasan, and sent to Constantinople where he was a prisoner for five years. Enlisting the sympathy of King Zigmund and promising him life-long support, he was freed and became the commander-in-chief of all the armies of King Zigmund. It was not long after this that he gave up his high position and again began to worm himself 46 SLOVAKIA into the good graces of the emperor. He did not succeed. He died in Transylvania without issue; and with him died the last of the Bebek family, which owned Krasna Horka for some 300 years. In 1556 the fortress became the property of the crown, and to the year 1580 it was administered by various captains of the king. In that year the famous Peter Andrassy became its administrator. The Andrassy family is well known in Slovakia; some of its descendants are still liv• ing there. During the Rak6czi uprising, Stephen Andrassy helped Rak6czi, was named general of a part of the army that defeated the emperor's forces at Rab. The fortress was again repaired and fortified, but the management was turned over to Andrassy's wife, nee Seredi, and to his children. After a colorful career, full of intrigue, Stephen Andrassy died. His son, Francis, became owner, but leaving no direct descendants, the fortress passed into the possession of his nephew Charles, who became a general in the army of Maria Theresa with the title of Count. In 1847, when the fortress was destroyed by lightning and fire, it was completely repaired. Later on Dyonisius Andrassy became the owner of the fortress. He married a commoner, a Bohemian girl, Frances Hablavec. Both were very good to their subjects and showed great concern for the fortress , keeping it in very good repair. Today the fortress is a museum and contains many treasures of days gone by. • • • WHO SAID IT? Benes's trtp (to Moscow) is the Czechoslwak contribution to the struoture cxf world 1peace. Afl decent people are rejoidng, becaiuse it is a victory for democracy, the triumph of a good cause. . . The Soviet Czechoslo,vak Treaty is for him a great sati,s faotion. It is a great victory of the Czechoslov0Jk cause. It is a gigantic contrilbution to the structure of a happier Europe. It is the sollid foundation to lasting pea'Ce of the world. It is a great victory of Benes's politics." - Editorial, NEW YORK:SKY DENN1K Czechoslovak daily in Slovak language) , Dec. 15, 1943.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Krásna Hôrka Description An account of the resource Hubert Macko, OSB. Slovakia, Vol. 8, No. 3 (28), December 1958 pp. 44-46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Macko, Hubert Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1958 castles name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a18dfa949f9139b796fb787da525bfe3.pdf 8ceabc1ae9653b3a3c11c0225762703a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 43 Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York have a goodly number of Slqvak residents, that is, citizens whose ethnic background is Slovak. The study of Slovak - for itself and as a preparation for the study of other Slovanic languages - should be given serious consideration by our educators. And Slovak parochial schools should place the study of Slovak on their curriculums. We suggest that the children be taught at least four years (5-8 grades), though the study can be offered earlier. Books are available. And teachers would have little difficulty in learning and presenting the subject. Interested? Write to: Philip A. Hrobak, Jednota Printery, Middletown, Pa . • • • Castles of Slovakia: CACHTICE By Hubert Maciko, 0.1S.B. We know that the history of Castle Cachtice begins with the 14th century because in a dooument, dated in 1319, there is mention of a certain Thomas Rufus as the administrator of Cachtice. In the year 13·92, King Zigmund gruve the fortress to Ctilbor "for faithful and generous services rendered.." What these services were we do not know, but we suppose they were of a military nature. The same document states that if Ct.i/b.or should die without children, the fortress automatically is to be inherited by hi.s two brothers, Nicholas and Andrew. In the same document it was stated that the fortress must be sold only to a fellow countryman, never to a stranger. Ctiibor died in 1414, and the fortress was inherited by his ,son, Ctibor n, who was at that time high- commissioner otf Nitra. In 1430 Ctibor II was a captain in the ami:y of King Zigmund which fought against the Czech Hussites. He died rather suddenly shortly after, and, not leaving a male descendant, the fortress was claimed by King Zigmund. OObor's daughter, Kathryn, inherited the fortress Beo'kov. �44 SLOVAKIA In 1436, King Zigmund gave Cachtice to the provincial txeasurer, Michael Orsagh, whose family held the fortress until 1567. The last of the Orsaghs was Christopher. During this period the Hussite leader Svehla was a prisoner in the fortress; he was later put to death in Kostelany. In 1569 King Maximilian rented the fortress for 50,000 Gold crowns to Ursula Kanifa:j and her son Francis Nadasdy, with the stipulation that in case the fortress would be put 111p for sa,Ie, Francis Nadasdy would have first option to buy. In the year 1602, N adasdy did buy the fortress from king Rudolph II. Nada sdy was the unfortunate husband of the infamous Alzbeta (Elizabeth) Bathoricka. The story of Alz,beta Bathoricka, sordid in every detail, is nevertheless true. It begins on a morning of a beautiful day in May. Alzbeta had many servants, girl servants, who took care of her every whim. She was a proud and haughty woman, but no,t beautiful. A young girl servant, com'bing her mistress's hair, accidentally pulled out a small tuft. Alzbeta became infuriated and struck the girl across the mouth, drawing blood. Few drops of the young girl's blood happened to fall on the uplifted face of the cruel mistress. Looking into the mirror, she imagined that where the drops of blood fell, the skin seemed much smoother and more youthful. Suddenly an insane idea began to germinate in her mind: if the drops of blood did maJke her skin smoother and younger loolking, why not enhance her beauty, by bathing in the blood of young girls? It could be that the blood of young maidens was the long sought for fountain of youth, she thought, and the more she thought rubout it, the stronger her dete:r,mination became to use the blood bath. She needed accomplices, but it was not di'5ficult to enlist the services of some of her serivants for a consiideraJble grant of money and special pri'Vileges. 1 BLOOD OF 600 SLOVAK GffiLS The serwants went out into the neighboring villages and towns and by means fair and foul, by promises and intimidations, brought many young girls to the Castle. The girls ,w ere treated ,very nicely for a time, and then mur- �SLOVAKIA 45 dered in the most cruel manner, their blood supplying the "fountain of yO'llth" for the ghou1ish mistress. It 1s said that some 600 young girls were murdered by the mistress of Cachtice. Of course the disruppearance of these girls could not be kept secret forever. Rumors began to circulate, but Bathorio'ka was a mighty lady. She was mistress not only of many thousand acres of land, but mistress of many thousands of lives. She had the power of life or death over her underlings. And so the people under her dared not e~press in words the fears that were in their hearts. They suffered mutely, seeing their daughters disappear one by one. Bathorioka had powerful connections; she was a favorite friend of the Palatine, being invited to the marriage feast af his daughter, Judith. The feast lasted for a whole year. But there was one person who did not fear the infamous woman. He was the parish priest of Cachtice. After dbtaining all the proof he could, he set out for Bratislava, where the court was then in session. The priest had little success at that time, but in the year 1610 the Palatine George Thurzo, due to pressure of public o,pinion, decided to investigate. With two nephews of Bathori cka, Zrinsky and Drugeth respectively, he set out for the fortress, where he learned the bitter truth. Entering the fortress unheralded, he caught Bathoricka in the act olf killing two young maidens. He found other corpses on a manure pile outside the fortress. He oroered the siezure of the castle and put Alzbeta in a dungeon together with her helpers John FickoUjvary, Helen Jo, Kathryn Benicka, and Dorothy Szentes. These last were taken to the Palatine's Castle and condemned to death. On January 7, 1611, the court in Bytca handed down this decree: "We, Theodosius Strmsky of Sul'oiv, the highest magistrate of his Majesty the King, Gaspar Orodoy of Trencin, John David of St. Peter, George Lehotsky, Nicholas Hrabovsky, John Zaturecky, John Borsic'ky, Grubriel Hlinidky, Michael Tusins:ky, Raiphael Kasoivsky, Benedict Kozar, Stephen Marsfovsky, Stephen Alkay, John 1 �46 SLOVAKIA MedNedky, all members of thl,s august court, maike public to a1l whom it may concern that we were called together by the Palatine George Thurzo to the city of Bytca this day, January 7, in the year 1611, to sit in judgment over the deeds of John Fidko and the women Helen, Kathryn, and Dorothy, and found the following to be true: Whereas it is known that Palatine George Thurzo has been constituted to guard the persons and the property of those under his care as Palatine of the county of Ora,,va, to punish the guilty and reward the deserving, amd wishing to do his duty, he could not be deaf and blind to the deeds of one AliJbeta Bathoric!ka., the widow of Flrancis Nadasdy, who was an honoraJble man, deserving much from his country, but whose widow committed deeds of tyranny unheard of since the birth of mran!kind, having done away with innumeralble young girls for the pur,pose of bathing in their blood, he, therefore, caused an investigation to be made of the deeds of one Alzbeta Bathorioka, the investigation based on evidence presented against her by the townsipoople. The truth of the accusations were subsequently sulbstantiated by her own servants, accomplices in her many crimes. Hearing of the cruelties, supposedJy committed in the Cachtice Castle; His Highness, Pafatine George Th1ll"IZo, returning from celebrations in Presporok (now Bratisla,,va) in company of the two nephews of Al2Jb.e ta Bathoricka, Nicholas Zrinsky and Juraj Drugeth, and a large following of friends and ~oldiers, unexpectedly visited Cachtice, and at the very entrance to the Castle was confronted by mute evidence in the form of the mutHated bodies of two young girls, prOIVing beyond the shadow of doubt that the rumors aJbout Cachtice were true. Alhta Bathoricka was immediately sentenced to life imprisonment in her own Castle. John Fidko, Helen, Dorothy, and Kathryn we,r e ordered to be tried elsewhere, and if proven guilty, to be given sentences commensurate with the hideousness of their crimes so that others may be deterred from committing the same. The accused confessed, particularly Dorothy, who was �SLOVAKIA 47 the chief offender next to her mistre,ss, that they took part in the awful deaths of innocent young girls. The court, finding them guilty imposed the foNowing sentences: Dorothy and Helen shall have their ringers pulled off their hands with burning pincers, then be burned at the staJke. John Ficko, who tOOlk a minor part in the bloody orgies and on account of his ad!vanced age, shall not be tortured, but shall be beheaded and his body burned at the stalke. And since Dorothy and Helen pleaded for Kathryn, and only John F'i.cko witnessed against her, she ~hall be put into prison until such time as her innocence or guilt shall be proven ,b eyond a possible doUJbt. These sentences to be carried out immediately." A~ta BMhorioka was not tried publicly. She was sentenced by George Thurzo to life imprisonment in the dungeons of the Cachtice castle where she died in the year 1614. After her death, the fortress was inherited by her two children, Paul Nadasdy and Kathryn, who was married to Jan Drugeth. A third child, Anna, wife of Nicholas Zrinsky inherited nothing. Paul Nadasdy received the title of Count in the year 1625. After the death of Paul and Anna Nadasdy, the fortress became the property of the many heirs. In the yerur 1703, the fortress was the property of Count Paul Forgaic. In 1707, for reasons not girven, the fortress was besieged by the army of the king and truken. The following year it was wrested from the king by the followers of Francis Rak6czi II. The fortress commanded a beautiful view of the Povazie and Zahorie area. Hrad Cachtice is classed among the larger fortresses of SloJVakia; it had two large towers and three courts. It has been uninhabita:ble since the beginning of the 18th ceI11tury. The people of the vicinity give the old ruins a wide berth. They are superstitious and will bless themselves when passing the ruins. They will tell you that if you listen on a summer's evening, ju.s-t before a sto:rm, you will hear the wailings of the young maidens who were sacrificed to a woman's vrunity. They whisper a ;prayer for them and utter a curse for Ambeta Bathorioka. � SLOVAKIA 43 Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York have a goodly number of Slqvak residents, that is, citizens whose ethnic background is Slovak. The study of Slovak - for itself and as a preparation for the study of other Slovanic languages - should be given serious consideration by our educators. And Slovak parochial schools should place the study of Slovak on their curriculums. We suggest that the children be taught at least four years (5-8 grades), though the study can be offered earlier. Books are available. And teachers would have little difficulty in learning and presenting the subject. Interested? Write to: Philip A. Hrobak, Jednota Printery, Middletown, Pa . • • • Castles of Slovakia: CACHTICE By Hubert Maciko, 0.1S.B. We know that the history of Castle Cachtice begins with the 14th century because in a dooument, dated in 1319, there is mention of a certain Thomas Rufus as the administrator of Cachtice. In the year 13·92, King Zigmund gruve the fortress to Ctilbor "for faithful and generous services rendered.." What these services were we do not know, but we suppose they were of a military nature. The same document states that if Ct.i/b.or should die without children, the fortress automatically is to be inherited by hi.s two brothers, Nicholas and Andrew. In the same document it was stated that the fortress must be sold only to a fellow countryman, never to a stranger. Ctiibor died in 1414, and the fortress was inherited by his ,son, Ctibor n, who was at that time high- commissioner otf Nitra. In 1430 Ctibor II was a captain in the ami:y of King Zigmund which fought against the Czech Hussites. He died rather suddenly shortly after, and, not leaving a male descendant, the fortress was claimed by King Zigmund. OObor's daughter, Kathryn, inherited the fortress Beo'kov. �44 SLOVAKIA In 1436, King Zigmund gave Cachtice to the provincial txeasurer, Michael Orsagh, whose family held the fortress until 1567. The last of the Orsaghs was Christopher. During this period the Hussite leader Svehla was a prisoner in the fortress; he was later put to death in Kostelany. In 1569 King Maximilian rented the fortress for 50,000 Gold crowns to Ursula Kanifa:j and her son Francis Nadasdy, with the stipulation that in case the fortress would be put 111p for sa,Ie, Francis Nadasdy would have first option to buy. In the year 1602, N adasdy did buy the fortress from king Rudolph II. Nada sdy was the unfortunate husband of the infamous Alzbeta (Elizabeth) Bathoricka. The story of Alz,beta Bathoricka, sordid in every detail, is nevertheless true. It begins on a morning of a beautiful day in May. Alzbeta had many servants, girl servants, who took care of her every whim. She was a proud and haughty woman, but no,t beautiful. A young girl servant, com'bing her mistress's hair, accidentally pulled out a small tuft. Alzbeta became infuriated and struck the girl across the mouth, drawing blood. Few drops of the young girl's blood happened to fall on the uplifted face of the cruel mistress. Looking into the mirror, she imagined that where the drops of blood fell, the skin seemed much smoother and more youthful. Suddenly an insane idea began to germinate in her mind: if the drops of blood did maJke her skin smoother and younger loolking, why not enhance her beauty, by bathing in the blood of young girls? It could be that the blood of young maidens was the long sought for fountain of youth, she thought, and the more she thought rubout it, the stronger her dete:r,mination became to use the blood bath. She needed accomplices, but it was not di'5ficult to enlist the services of some of her serivants for a consiideraJble grant of money and special pri'Vileges. 1 BLOOD OF 600 SLOVAK GffiLS The serwants went out into the neighboring villages and towns and by means fair and foul, by promises and intimidations, brought many young girls to the Castle. The girls ,w ere treated ,very nicely for a time, and then mur- �SLOVAKIA 45 dered in the most cruel manner, their blood supplying the "fountain of yO'llth" for the ghou1ish mistress. It 1s said that some 600 young girls were murdered by the mistress of Cachtice. Of course the disruppearance of these girls could not be kept secret forever. Rumors began to circulate, but Bathorio'ka was a mighty lady. She was mistress not only of many thousand acres of land, but mistress of many thousands of lives. She had the power of life or death over her underlings. And so the people under her dared not e~press in words the fears that were in their hearts. They suffered mutely, seeing their daughters disappear one by one. Bathorioka had powerful connections; she was a favorite friend of the Palatine, being invited to the marriage feast af his daughter, Judith. The feast lasted for a whole year. But there was one person who did not fear the infamous woman. He was the parish priest of Cachtice. After dbtaining all the proof he could, he set out for Bratislava, where the court was then in session. The priest had little success at that time, but in the year 1610 the Palatine George Thurzo, due to pressure of public o,pinion, decided to investigate. With two nephews of Bathori cka, Zrinsky and Drugeth respectively, he set out for the fortress, where he learned the bitter truth. Entering the fortress unheralded, he caught Bathoricka in the act olf killing two young maidens. He found other corpses on a manure pile outside the fortress. He oroered the siezure of the castle and put Alzbeta in a dungeon together with her helpers John FickoUjvary, Helen Jo, Kathryn Benicka, and Dorothy Szentes. These last were taken to the Palatine's Castle and condemned to death. On January 7, 1611, the court in Bytca handed down this decree: "We, Theodosius Strmsky of Sul'oiv, the highest magistrate of his Majesty the King, Gaspar Orodoy of Trencin, John David of St. Peter, George Lehotsky, Nicholas Hrabovsky, John Zaturecky, John Borsic'ky, Grubriel Hlinidky, Michael Tusins:ky, Raiphael Kasoivsky, Benedict Kozar, Stephen Marsfovsky, Stephen Alkay, John 1 �46 SLOVAKIA MedNedky, all members of thl,s august court, maike public to a1l whom it may concern that we were called together by the Palatine George Thurzo to the city of Bytca this day, January 7, in the year 1611, to sit in judgment over the deeds of John Fidko and the women Helen, Kathryn, and Dorothy, and found the following to be true: Whereas it is known that Palatine George Thurzo has been constituted to guard the persons and the property of those under his care as Palatine of the county of Ora,,va, to punish the guilty and reward the deserving, amd wishing to do his duty, he could not be deaf and blind to the deeds of one AliJbeta Bathoric!ka., the widow of Flrancis Nadasdy, who was an honoraJble man, deserving much from his country, but whose widow committed deeds of tyranny unheard of since the birth of mran!kind, having done away with innumeralble young girls for the pur,pose of bathing in their blood, he, therefore, caused an investigation to be made of the deeds of one Alzbeta Bathorioka, the investigation based on evidence presented against her by the townsipoople. The truth of the accusations were subsequently sulbstantiated by her own servants, accomplices in her many crimes. Hearing of the cruelties, supposedJy committed in the Cachtice Castle; His Highness, Pafatine George Th1ll"IZo, returning from celebrations in Presporok (now Bratisla,,va) in company of the two nephews of Al2Jb.e ta Bathoricka, Nicholas Zrinsky and Juraj Drugeth, and a large following of friends and ~oldiers, unexpectedly visited Cachtice, and at the very entrance to the Castle was confronted by mute evidence in the form of the mutHated bodies of two young girls, prOIVing beyond the shadow of doubt that the rumors aJbout Cachtice were true. Alhta Bathoricka was immediately sentenced to life imprisonment in her own Castle. John Fidko, Helen, Dorothy, and Kathryn we,r e ordered to be tried elsewhere, and if proven guilty, to be given sentences commensurate with the hideousness of their crimes so that others may be deterred from committing the same. The accused confessed, particularly Dorothy, who was �SLOVAKIA 47 the chief offender next to her mistre,ss, that they took part in the awful deaths of innocent young girls. The court, finding them guilty imposed the foNowing sentences: Dorothy and Helen shall have their ringers pulled off their hands with burning pincers, then be burned at the staJke. John Ficko, who tOOlk a minor part in the bloody orgies and on account of his ad!vanced age, shall not be tortured, but shall be beheaded and his body burned at the stalke. And since Dorothy and Helen pleaded for Kathryn, and only John F'i.cko witnessed against her, she ~hall be put into prison until such time as her innocence or guilt shall be proven ,b eyond a possible doUJbt. These sentences to be carried out immediately." A~ta BMhorioka was not tried publicly. She was sentenced by George Thurzo to life imprisonment in the dungeons of the Cachtice castle where she died in the year 1614. After her death, the fortress was inherited by her two children, Paul Nadasdy and Kathryn, who was married to Jan Drugeth. A third child, Anna, wife of Nicholas Zrinsky inherited nothing. Paul Nadasdy received the title of Count in the year 1625. After the death of Paul and Anna Nadasdy, the fortress became the property of the many heirs. In the yerur 1703, the fortress was the property of Count Paul Forgaic. In 1707, for reasons not girven, the fortress was besieged by the army of the king and truken. The following year it was wrested from the king by the followers of Francis Rak6czi II. The fortress commanded a beautiful view of the Povazie and Zahorie area. Hrad Cachtice is classed among the larger fortresses of SloJVakia; it had two large towers and three courts. It has been uninhabita:ble since the beginning of the 18th ceI11tury. The people of the vicinity give the old ruins a wide berth. They are superstitious and will bless themselves when passing the ruins. They will tell you that if you listen on a summer's evening, ju.s-t before a sto:rm, you will hear the wailings of the young maidens who were sacrificed to a woman's vrunity. They whisper a ;prayer for them and utter a curse for Ambeta Bathorioka. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 43 Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York have a goodly number of Slqvak residents, that is, citizens whose ethnic background is Slovak. The study of Slovak - for itself and as a preparation for the study of other Slovanic languages - should be given serious consideration by our educators. And Slovak parochial schools should place the study of Slovak on their curriculums. We suggest that the children be taught at least four years (5-8 grades), though the study can be offered earlier. Books are available. And teachers would have little difficulty in learning and presenting the subject. Interested? Write to: Philip A. Hrobak, Jednota Printery, Middletown, Pa . • • • Castles of Slovakia: CACHTICE By Hubert Maciko, 0.1S.B. We know that the history of Castle Cachtice begins with the 14th century because in a dooument, dated in 1319, there is mention of a certain Thomas Rufus as the administrator of Cachtice. In the year 13·92, King Zigmund gruve the fortress to Ctilbor "for faithful and generous services rendered.." What these services were we do not know, but we suppose they were of a military nature. The same document states that if Ct.i/b.or should die without children, the fortress automatically is to be inherited by hi.s two brothers, Nicholas and Andrew. In the same document it was stated that the fortress must be sold only to a fellow countryman, never to a stranger. Ctiibor died in 1414, and the fortress was inherited by his ,son, Ctibor n, who was at that time high- commissioner otf Nitra. In 1430 Ctibor II was a captain in the ami:y of King Zigmund which fought against the Czech Hussites. He died rather suddenly shortly after, and, not leaving a male descendant, the fortress was claimed by King Zigmund. OObor's daughter, Kathryn, inherited the fortress Beo'kov. 44 SLOVAKIA In 1436, King Zigmund gave Cachtice to the provincial txeasurer, Michael Orsagh, whose family held the fortress until 1567. The last of the Orsaghs was Christopher. During this period the Hussite leader Svehla was a prisoner in the fortress; he was later put to death in Kostelany. In 1569 King Maximilian rented the fortress for 50,000 Gold crowns to Ursula Kanifa:j and her son Francis Nadasdy, with the stipulation that in case the fortress would be put 111p for sa,Ie, Francis Nadasdy would have first option to buy. In the year 1602, N adasdy did buy the fortress from king Rudolph II. Nada sdy was the unfortunate husband of the infamous Alzbeta (Elizabeth) Bathoricka. The story of Alz,beta Bathoricka, sordid in every detail, is nevertheless true. It begins on a morning of a beautiful day in May. Alzbeta had many servants, girl servants, who took care of her every whim. She was a proud and haughty woman, but no,t beautiful. A young girl servant, com'bing her mistress's hair, accidentally pulled out a small tuft. Alzbeta became infuriated and struck the girl across the mouth, drawing blood. Few drops of the young girl's blood happened to fall on the uplifted face of the cruel mistress. Looking into the mirror, she imagined that where the drops of blood fell, the skin seemed much smoother and more youthful. Suddenly an insane idea began to germinate in her mind: if the drops of blood did maJke her skin smoother and younger loolking, why not enhance her beauty, by bathing in the blood of young girls? It could be that the blood of young maidens was the long sought for fountain of youth, she thought, and the more she thought rubout it, the stronger her dete:r,mination became to use the blood bath. She needed accomplices, but it was not di'5ficult to enlist the services of some of her serivants for a consiideraJble grant of money and special pri'Vileges. 1 BLOOD OF 600 SLOVAK GffiLS The serwants went out into the neighboring villages and towns and by means fair and foul, by promises and intimidations, brought many young girls to the Castle. The girls ,w ere treated ,very nicely for a time, and then mur- SLOVAKIA 45 dered in the most cruel manner, their blood supplying the "fountain of yO'llth" for the ghou1ish mistress. It 1s said that some 600 young girls were murdered by the mistress of Cachtice. Of course the disruppearance of these girls could not be kept secret forever. Rumors began to circulate, but Bathorio'ka was a mighty lady. She was mistress not only of many thousand acres of land, but mistress of many thousands of lives. She had the power of life or death over her underlings. And so the people under her dared not e~press in words the fears that were in their hearts. They suffered mutely, seeing their daughters disappear one by one. Bathorioka had powerful connections; she was a favorite friend of the Palatine, being invited to the marriage feast af his daughter, Judith. The feast lasted for a whole year. But there was one person who did not fear the infamous woman. He was the parish priest of Cachtice. After dbtaining all the proof he could, he set out for Bratislava, where the court was then in session. The priest had little success at that time, but in the year 1610 the Palatine George Thurzo, due to pressure of public o,pinion, decided to investigate. With two nephews of Bathori cka, Zrinsky and Drugeth respectively, he set out for the fortress, where he learned the bitter truth. Entering the fortress unheralded, he caught Bathoricka in the act olf killing two young maidens. He found other corpses on a manure pile outside the fortress. He oroered the siezure of the castle and put Alzbeta in a dungeon together with her helpers John FickoUjvary, Helen Jo, Kathryn Benicka, and Dorothy Szentes. These last were taken to the Palatine's Castle and condemned to death. On January 7, 1611, the court in Bytca handed down this decree: "We, Theodosius Strmsky of Sul'oiv, the highest magistrate of his Majesty the King, Gaspar Orodoy of Trencin, John David of St. Peter, George Lehotsky, Nicholas Hrabovsky, John Zaturecky, John Borsic'ky, Grubriel Hlinidky, Michael Tusins:ky, Raiphael Kasoivsky, Benedict Kozar, Stephen Marsfovsky, Stephen Alkay, John 1 46 SLOVAKIA MedNedky, all members of thl,s august court, maike public to a1l whom it may concern that we were called together by the Palatine George Thurzo to the city of Bytca this day, January 7, in the year 1611, to sit in judgment over the deeds of John Fidko and the women Helen, Kathryn, and Dorothy, and found the following to be true: Whereas it is known that Palatine George Thurzo has been constituted to guard the persons and the property of those under his care as Palatine of the county of Ora,,va, to punish the guilty and reward the deserving, amd wishing to do his duty, he could not be deaf and blind to the deeds of one AliJbeta Bathoric!ka., the widow of Flrancis Nadasdy, who was an honoraJble man, deserving much from his country, but whose widow committed deeds of tyranny unheard of since the birth of mran!kind, having done away with innumeralble young girls for the pur,pose of bathing in their blood, he, therefore, caused an investigation to be made of the deeds of one Alzbeta Bathorioka, the investigation based on evidence presented against her by the townsipoople. The truth of the accusations were subsequently sulbstantiated by her own servants, accomplices in her many crimes. Hearing of the cruelties, supposedJy committed in the Cachtice Castle; His Highness, Pafatine George Th1ll"IZo, returning from celebrations in Presporok (now Bratisla,,va) in company of the two nephews of Al2Jb.e ta Bathoricka, Nicholas Zrinsky and Juraj Drugeth, and a large following of friends and ~oldiers, unexpectedly visited Cachtice, and at the very entrance to the Castle was confronted by mute evidence in the form of the mutHated bodies of two young girls, prOIVing beyond the shadow of doubt that the rumors aJbout Cachtice were true. Alhta Bathoricka was immediately sentenced to life imprisonment in her own Castle. John Fidko, Helen, Dorothy, and Kathryn we,r e ordered to be tried elsewhere, and if proven guilty, to be given sentences commensurate with the hideousness of their crimes so that others may be deterred from committing the same. The accused confessed, particularly Dorothy, who was SLOVAKIA 47 the chief offender next to her mistre,ss, that they took part in the awful deaths of innocent young girls. The court, finding them guilty imposed the foNowing sentences: Dorothy and Helen shall have their ringers pulled off their hands with burning pincers, then be burned at the staJke. John Ficko, who tOOlk a minor part in the bloody orgies and on account of his ad!vanced age, shall not be tortured, but shall be beheaded and his body burned at the stalke. And since Dorothy and Helen pleaded for Kathryn, and only John F'i.cko witnessed against her, she ~hall be put into prison until such time as her innocence or guilt shall be proven ,b eyond a possible doUJbt. These sentences to be carried out immediately." A~ta BMhorioka was not tried publicly. She was sentenced by George Thurzo to life imprisonment in the dungeons of the Cachtice castle where she died in the year 1614. After her death, the fortress was inherited by her two children, Paul Nadasdy and Kathryn, who was married to Jan Drugeth. A third child, Anna, wife of Nicholas Zrinsky inherited nothing. Paul Nadasdy received the title of Count in the year 1625. After the death of Paul and Anna Nadasdy, the fortress became the property of the many heirs. In the yerur 1703, the fortress was the property of Count Paul Forgaic. In 1707, for reasons not girven, the fortress was besieged by the army of the king and truken. The following year it was wrested from the king by the followers of Francis Rak6czi II. The fortress commanded a beautiful view of the Povazie and Zahorie area. Hrad Cachtice is classed among the larger fortresses of SloJVakia; it had two large towers and three courts. It has been uninhabita:ble since the beginning of the 18th ceI11tury. The people of the vicinity give the old ruins a wide berth. They are superstitious and will bless themselves when passing the ruins. They will tell you that if you listen on a summer's evening, ju.s-t before a sto:rm, you will hear the wailings of the young maidens who were sacrificed to a woman's vrunity. They whisper a ;prayer for them and utter a curse for Ambeta Bathorioka.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Čachtice Description An account of the resource Hubert Macko, O.S.B. Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 7 (32), September-December 1960 pp. 43-47 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Macko, Hubert Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1960 castles name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/15031c10663fc3f090a16d5383329955.pdf 031657d391a1e38901fafc0f4f842c2a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 65 Castles of Slovakia: KREMNICA BY HUBERT MACKO, O.S.B. Rome was built on ,seive:n hiHs. Kremnica is situated in a valley surrounded by seiven hills and is cal•led .t he "queen of the mining cities," 1because of its gold and silver mines. The city has a mint, a Franciscan monastery, dating ba:clk to. the 1'7th century, and the famous fortress which is still in fair state of preservation. The history of the fortress is the history of the town of Kxemnica. It was built to jprotect the town and its gold and si!Jver mines. When the fortress was bui1lrt, no one can say. Some historians claim that the fortress dates from the time of the Romans, others say the Goths built it. But this we do know: in the time of King Charles Robert, in the year 1328, the fortress was important. Some historians claim that Kremnica was of Slovalk origin, built therefoTe in the 9th or 10th century. They ·b ase theiT claim on the name itself, whkh is deri1ved from the word "kremeii," meaning .flint or quartz. ln old documents, Kremnica is designated by V1arious names: Cremnychlbana, Cremnyc'Z, Kremnica, Cremnich, Cremic, Keormeocz and Cremnicha. The fortress, aside from protecting the town and the gold mines, also contained the mint, which made the money for twelve countries. It is difficult to believe, but there are no records either albout the town of Kremnioa or the fortress for about a hundred years, from about 1339 to the death of King ALbert in 1439. It has been estalblished, hoM1e1Ver, that at the dawn of the 15th century, after the death of Jan ~izka, Hussite armies began their depradations in Slovalkia. One :part of the army came through Poland as fa,r as Spis, thence through Liptov to Turciansky Svaty Martin, which was burned to the ground, thence toward Tekov and Kremnica. It i:s the opinion of many historians that Kremnioa was besieged •b y this arnny. However, there are no historical documents to support this claim. �66 SLOVAKIA After the death of King Albert (1439) his widow Elizaibeth, g3/Ve ibirth to a son, Ladislaiv V., caUed the ''Posthumous", whom only one part of the country acknowledged as king. He was crowned king, but the other faction acknowledged the Polish King Ladislav as king. Ladislav's chief supporter was Jan Hunady. It is understandalble that great confusion per:vaded the country with. two existing kings and two opposing armies. The widowed queen ElizaJbeth, to def'end the rights of her son, enlisted the support of the Hussite leader; John. Jiskra of Brandys. The importaint mining towns backed Elizalbeth's son; among these W8$ Kremnica. Jiskra was a great military leader and in a short time many towns and fortresses in Gerner county fell before his victorious army and pledged allegiance to young King Ladislav. Hasko of Schellendorf, the right hand man of Jislkra, became the caiptain in Kremnica. In the year 1442 the army orf Jan Hunady's •u nder the leadership of the hunter...bishop Simon Rozgon, laid siege to Kremnica. For four weeks the soldiers pillaged the neighiboring towns. When news reached Simon Rozgon that John Jiskra was hastening to help Kremnica, the hunter-bishop withdrew his army. Then in 1451, Hunady himself led an army against Kremnica, but he was no match for Jiskra and had to withdraw. In 1455 King Mathias Corvin made peace with Jiskra, and Kremnica beoome the property of the crown. After the death of King Louis IT. in the historic battle of Mohac, Kremnica became the property of Queen Mary. When she died Kremnica passed into the possession of her brother, Ferdinand I, exchequer of the king. Between the yeara 1528 and 1533 Kremnica was the scene of many 1battles. It was during those turbulent times that ibands of predatory ik,n ights were born. Raiphael Podmanicky and Mathias Baso attacked the gold city and stole much of its gold. To protect itself and its .gold, a meetin!g was called of the lords of all the suTTOunding fortresses, on October 4, 1537, where it was decided to outfit an army of 700 men. King Ferdinand I wais asked to .gilV'e his consent and to appoint a commander, 'but he �SLOVAKIA 67 saiw a threat to the cro!Wil from such a pooling of forces. He neither consented nor did he appoint a commander, leaving Kremnica to defend itself as best it could, which it prOm1ptly did by fortifying not only the fortress, but the town as well. H01Wever, in the year 1560 a fire destroyed much of the to1WI1 and the fortress. The fire was so hot that the very bells in the towers of the fortress and the canon on the walls melted like wax. The buHd.ing housing the airchi,ves ,w as destroyed completely. It took a long time and much effort to rebuild the town and the fortress. Du:rfag the Turkish invasion both the town and the fortress were besieged, but neiver taken. In 1604 Stefan Bockay besieged the town, succeeded in entering and burning pa;rt off it, but the fortre.ss proved impregnable. Since Bockay was a great menace to Kremnica, the town offered him 4000 pieces of gold to sign a treaty, which he accepted. In 1620 fortress Kremnica joined with Gabriel Bethlen, and in 1622 capitulated to King Ferdinand II. During Veselini's uprising in the neighboring fortress of Muran against King Leopold, the master of fortress Kremnica and the townspeople were accused by archbishop Juraj Szelepcsenyi of partisanship. Many were taken to Bratislava, tried, and convicted. Kremn!ica suffered much from fire.s. Besides the fires already mentioned, there were four other major fires: in 1690, 1707, 1716, and 1777. As the science of warfare became perfected fortress Kremnica lost much of its defense value foo- the town and consequently was left to the elements. However, even today a great deal of the fortress remains. It is one of the proud possessions of the town. Amidst its ruins there WatS until recently a chapel and a library of the Franciscan Fathers, connecting with the monastery itself. It is noteworthy to state that peacocks were a1ways raised in the fortress firom the time when one of them sounded the alwrm during the Turldsh invasion thus frustrating a sneak attack and :perh3lPS disaster, something akin to the geese of Rome, frustrating the attacks of the Gauls upon the capital of the Roman Empire. � SLOVAKIA 65 Castles of Slovakia: KREMNICA BY HUBERT MACKO, O.S.B. Rome was built on ,seive:n hiHs. Kremnica is situated in a valley surrounded by seiven hills and is cal•led .t he "queen of the mining cities," 1because of its gold and silver mines. The city has a mint, a Franciscan monastery, dating ba:clk to. the 1'7th century, and the famous fortress which is still in fair state of preservation. The history of the fortress is the history of the town of Kxemnica. It was built to jprotect the town and its gold and si!Jver mines. When the fortress was bui1lrt, no one can say. Some historians claim that the fortress dates from the time of the Romans, others say the Goths built it. But this we do know: in the time of King Charles Robert, in the year 1328, the fortress was important. Some historians claim that Kremnica was of Slovalk origin, built therefoTe in the 9th or 10th century. They ·b ase theiT claim on the name itself, whkh is deri1ved from the word "kremeii," meaning .flint or quartz. ln old documents, Kremnica is designated by V1arious names: Cremnychlbana, Cremnyc'Z, Kremnica, Cremnich, Cremic, Keormeocz and Cremnicha. The fortress, aside from protecting the town and the gold mines, also contained the mint, which made the money for twelve countries. It is difficult to believe, but there are no records either albout the town of Kremnioa or the fortress for about a hundred years, from about 1339 to the death of King ALbert in 1439. It has been estalblished, hoM1e1Ver, that at the dawn of the 15th century, after the death of Jan ~izka, Hussite armies began their depradations in Slovalkia. One :part of the army came through Poland as fa,r as Spis, thence through Liptov to Turciansky Svaty Martin, which was burned to the ground, thence toward Tekov and Kremnica. It i:s the opinion of many historians that Kremnioa was besieged •b y this arnny. However, there are no historical documents to support this claim. �66 SLOVAKIA After the death of King Albert (1439) his widow Elizaibeth, g3/Ve ibirth to a son, Ladislaiv V., caUed the ''Posthumous", whom only one part of the country acknowledged as king. He was crowned king, but the other faction acknowledged the Polish King Ladislav as king. Ladislav's chief supporter was Jan Hunady. It is understandalble that great confusion per:vaded the country with. two existing kings and two opposing armies. The widowed queen ElizaJbeth, to def'end the rights of her son, enlisted the support of the Hussite leader; John. Jiskra of Brandys. The importaint mining towns backed Elizalbeth's son; among these W8$ Kremnica. Jiskra was a great military leader and in a short time many towns and fortresses in Gerner county fell before his victorious army and pledged allegiance to young King Ladislav. Hasko of Schellendorf, the right hand man of Jislkra, became the caiptain in Kremnica. In the year 1442 the army orf Jan Hunady's •u nder the leadership of the hunter...bishop Simon Rozgon, laid siege to Kremnica. For four weeks the soldiers pillaged the neighiboring towns. When news reached Simon Rozgon that John Jiskra was hastening to help Kremnica, the hunter-bishop withdrew his army. Then in 1451, Hunady himself led an army against Kremnica, but he was no match for Jiskra and had to withdraw. In 1455 King Mathias Corvin made peace with Jiskra, and Kremnica beoome the property of the crown. After the death of King Louis IT. in the historic battle of Mohac, Kremnica became the property of Queen Mary. When she died Kremnica passed into the possession of her brother, Ferdinand I, exchequer of the king. Between the yeara 1528 and 1533 Kremnica was the scene of many 1battles. It was during those turbulent times that ibands of predatory ik,n ights were born. Raiphael Podmanicky and Mathias Baso attacked the gold city and stole much of its gold. To protect itself and its .gold, a meetin!g was called of the lords of all the suTTOunding fortresses, on October 4, 1537, where it was decided to outfit an army of 700 men. King Ferdinand I wais asked to .gilV'e his consent and to appoint a commander, 'but he �SLOVAKIA 67 saiw a threat to the cro!Wil from such a pooling of forces. He neither consented nor did he appoint a commander, leaving Kremnica to defend itself as best it could, which it prOm1ptly did by fortifying not only the fortress, but the town as well. H01Wever, in the year 1560 a fire destroyed much of the to1WI1 and the fortress. The fire was so hot that the very bells in the towers of the fortress and the canon on the walls melted like wax. The buHd.ing housing the airchi,ves ,w as destroyed completely. It took a long time and much effort to rebuild the town and the fortress. Du:rfag the Turkish invasion both the town and the fortress were besieged, but neiver taken. In 1604 Stefan Bockay besieged the town, succeeded in entering and burning pa;rt off it, but the fortre.ss proved impregnable. Since Bockay was a great menace to Kremnica, the town offered him 4000 pieces of gold to sign a treaty, which he accepted. In 1620 fortress Kremnica joined with Gabriel Bethlen, and in 1622 capitulated to King Ferdinand II. During Veselini's uprising in the neighboring fortress of Muran against King Leopold, the master of fortress Kremnica and the townspeople were accused by archbishop Juraj Szelepcsenyi of partisanship. Many were taken to Bratislava, tried, and convicted. Kremn!ica suffered much from fire.s. Besides the fires already mentioned, there were four other major fires: in 1690, 1707, 1716, and 1777. As the science of warfare became perfected fortress Kremnica lost much of its defense value foo- the town and consequently was left to the elements. However, even today a great deal of the fortress remains. It is one of the proud possessions of the town. Amidst its ruins there WatS until recently a chapel and a library of the Franciscan Fathers, connecting with the monastery itself. It is noteworthy to state that peacocks were a1ways raised in the fortress firom the time when one of them sounded the alwrm during the Turldsh invasion thus frustrating a sneak attack and :perh3lPS disaster, something akin to the geese of Rome, frustrating the attacks of the Gauls upon the capital of the Roman Empire. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1961, Vol. 11 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 33), March-June 1961.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 34), September-December June 1961.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 65 Castles of Slovakia: KREMNICA BY HUBERT MACKO, O.S.B. Rome was built on ,seive:n hiHs. Kremnica is situated in a valley surrounded by seiven hills and is cal•led .t he "queen of the mining cities," 1because of its gold and silver mines. The city has a mint, a Franciscan monastery, dating ba:clk to. the 1'7th century, and the famous fortress which is still in fair state of preservation. The history of the fortress is the history of the town of Kxemnica. It was built to jprotect the town and its gold and si!Jver mines. When the fortress was bui1lrt, no one can say. Some historians claim that the fortress dates from the time of the Romans, others say the Goths built it. But this we do know: in the time of King Charles Robert, in the year 1328, the fortress was important. Some historians claim that Kremnica was of Slovalk origin, built therefoTe in the 9th or 10th century. They ·b ase theiT claim on the name itself, whkh is deri1ved from the word "kremeii," meaning .flint or quartz. ln old documents, Kremnica is designated by V1arious names: Cremnychlbana, Cremnyc'Z, Kremnica, Cremnich, Cremic, Keormeocz and Cremnicha. The fortress, aside from protecting the town and the gold mines, also contained the mint, which made the money for twelve countries. It is difficult to believe, but there are no records either albout the town of Kremnioa or the fortress for about a hundred years, from about 1339 to the death of King ALbert in 1439. It has been estalblished, hoM1e1Ver, that at the dawn of the 15th century, after the death of Jan ~izka, Hussite armies began their depradations in Slovalkia. One :part of the army came through Poland as fa,r as Spis, thence through Liptov to Turciansky Svaty Martin, which was burned to the ground, thence toward Tekov and Kremnica. It i:s the opinion of many historians that Kremnioa was besieged •b y this arnny. However, there are no historical documents to support this claim. 66 SLOVAKIA After the death of King Albert (1439) his widow Elizaibeth, g3/Ve ibirth to a son, Ladislaiv V., caUed the ''Posthumous", whom only one part of the country acknowledged as king. He was crowned king, but the other faction acknowledged the Polish King Ladislav as king. Ladislav's chief supporter was Jan Hunady. It is understandalble that great confusion per:vaded the country with. two existing kings and two opposing armies. The widowed queen ElizaJbeth, to def'end the rights of her son, enlisted the support of the Hussite leader; John. Jiskra of Brandys. The importaint mining towns backed Elizalbeth's son; among these W8$ Kremnica. Jiskra was a great military leader and in a short time many towns and fortresses in Gerner county fell before his victorious army and pledged allegiance to young King Ladislav. Hasko of Schellendorf, the right hand man of Jislkra, became the caiptain in Kremnica. In the year 1442 the army orf Jan Hunady's •u nder the leadership of the hunter...bishop Simon Rozgon, laid siege to Kremnica. For four weeks the soldiers pillaged the neighiboring towns. When news reached Simon Rozgon that John Jiskra was hastening to help Kremnica, the hunter-bishop withdrew his army. Then in 1451, Hunady himself led an army against Kremnica, but he was no match for Jiskra and had to withdraw. In 1455 King Mathias Corvin made peace with Jiskra, and Kremnica beoome the property of the crown. After the death of King Louis IT. in the historic battle of Mohac, Kremnica became the property of Queen Mary. When she died Kremnica passed into the possession of her brother, Ferdinand I, exchequer of the king. Between the yeara 1528 and 1533 Kremnica was the scene of many 1battles. It was during those turbulent times that ibands of predatory ik,n ights were born. Raiphael Podmanicky and Mathias Baso attacked the gold city and stole much of its gold. To protect itself and its .gold, a meetin!g was called of the lords of all the suTTOunding fortresses, on October 4, 1537, where it was decided to outfit an army of 700 men. King Ferdinand I wais asked to .gilV'e his consent and to appoint a commander, 'but he SLOVAKIA 67 saiw a threat to the cro!Wil from such a pooling of forces. He neither consented nor did he appoint a commander, leaving Kremnica to defend itself as best it could, which it prOm1ptly did by fortifying not only the fortress, but the town as well. H01Wever, in the year 1560 a fire destroyed much of the to1WI1 and the fortress. The fire was so hot that the very bells in the towers of the fortress and the canon on the walls melted like wax. The buHd.ing housing the airchi,ves ,w as destroyed completely. It took a long time and much effort to rebuild the town and the fortress. Du:rfag the Turkish invasion both the town and the fortress were besieged, but neiver taken. In 1604 Stefan Bockay besieged the town, succeeded in entering and burning pa;rt off it, but the fortre.ss proved impregnable. Since Bockay was a great menace to Kremnica, the town offered him 4000 pieces of gold to sign a treaty, which he accepted. In 1620 fortress Kremnica joined with Gabriel Bethlen, and in 1622 capitulated to King Ferdinand II. During Veselini's uprising in the neighboring fortress of Muran against King Leopold, the master of fortress Kremnica and the townspeople were accused by archbishop Juraj Szelepcsenyi of partisanship. Many were taken to Bratislava, tried, and convicted. Kremn!ica suffered much from fire.s. Besides the fires already mentioned, there were four other major fires: in 1690, 1707, 1716, and 1777. As the science of warfare became perfected fortress Kremnica lost much of its defense value foo- the town and consequently was left to the elements. However, even today a great deal of the fortress remains. It is one of the proud possessions of the town. Amidst its ruins there WatS until recently a chapel and a library of the Franciscan Fathers, connecting with the monastery itself. It is noteworthy to state that peacocks were a1ways raised in the fortress firom the time when one of them sounded the alwrm during the Turldsh invasion thus frustrating a sneak attack and :perh3lPS disaster, something akin to the geese of Rome, frustrating the attacks of the Gauls upon the capital of the Roman Empire.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Kremnica Description An account of the resource Hubert Macko, O.S.B. Slovakia, Vol. 11, No. 2 (34), September-December 1961 pp. 65-67 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Macko, Hubert Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1961 castles name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cff79980f19d781e4cb2beea87219d55.pdf 418c4090d55ecc02637603f5431bf84c PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 52 EASTERN SLOVAK.IA INHABITED FOR CENTURIES BY GREAT SLOVAK MAJORITY Michael S. Macuga HistoricaJlly, Western Uikrainia, extending to the Eastern Canpa;tJhians, haJS no vaiid claim to the Slovaik lands which border on Ruthenia, or Carpathian Russia, the westernmost extension of the Russian racial element. In 1930 the national census of the repU!blic of Crecho~lovakia showed that in eastern Slovakia the counties, of Spis, Saris, Zemplin and Albauj had a population of 408,129 Slovaiks and 81,960 Rusins or Ruthenians (also known as Car,pathoRussians and Little Russians). Despite these significant figures there is a 1propaganda moivement, both here and aJbroad, wibich is designed to inco:nporate these SlolV'aik counties with their predominant Slov ak popuilations in the Soiviert Republic of Ukrainia on the pretext thait they belong to Riuthenia. There is nothing to sulbsta.ntiate this wild claim. Of course, the men of the Kremlin are more than willing to force not only the eastern part but the whole of Slovakia under their dominion, history and statistics no•lJWiithstand!ing. According to the 1930 national census the facts of the case of Eastern SlovaJkia against Ruthenia are confirmed without a doUJbt in S1orvalkia's favor. The figures tell us the nU!IDlber o;f 1SlovaJks and RuitheniaillS living in the various cities and towns. City~Town Bard!io;y HU!Inenne Gelniica Giraltovce Koomarok Levoca !Julbovna Medzilruborce Michailovce P.oprad SlOIViaks Ruthe:nli!ans 21,841 19,551 17,189 15,125 15,43Q 22,1\36 12,742 2,860 41,72,2 19,961 13,216 948 110 736 655 1,008 6,228 14,944 374 99 �53 SLOVAKIA 56,086 30,599 11,388 Snina 22,760 Solhrance 9,335 Stropkw 38,853 Trebisov 29,066 Spisska Nova Ves 7,145 Spissika Stara Ve.s VranOIV (nad To:pl'ou) 24,·594 Pre.sov .Srubinov 1 937 6,797 19,891 1,8!10 16,891 216 1,396 1,192 512 So much for statistics. Furtlhermore, no valid historical arguments exist to bacik Russian views in this matter. Polish philologists tried frequently to estaJblish the Polish origins of Eastern Slovrukian dialects but lin vain. Zd. Stieber of Cracow tried to build up a case for Poland there, as did Samo Ozamlbel, the Slovak linguist. But other philologists, such as the eminent Dutchman, Van Wijk, the Magya.T scholar, Kniesza, the Ozech linguists·, Pastrnek, TralVnii.cek, Smilauer and the .SlON•aJk scholar, Stanislav, rproved satisfaotorily that the Eastern dialects of Slovrukia have a SlOIVaJk origin and fo1mdation. M. Malecki, however, a Polish Slovanic scholar, tried to estaJblish Polish origins in the northern Trenicin area. The Ukrainian sruvants see, on the other hand, onliy Ruithenian and Ulrnamian origins of the dialects in the easiteril regions of Slowklia. These theories of the late nineteenth century rupply not only to Thstern Slovakia, 'but also to the areas near Backa and Sriem where many Greek-Catholi c Slovruks settled. They, too, speak an e<8JS!tern SiovaJk dialect. Vladimir lfuafjuk's views, namely, that the dfalects of eastetn Sl01Vakia were Ukrainian, were dlisproived by Siovaik and Czooh philologists, as well a:s by the Russian 1Slav scholar, Sobolevsiky, and the Norwegian Slavist, Olaf Broch, who knew that part olf the country as weH as Ruthenia. Hnafjwk conslidered even such fundamental Slovak words as biv~ (\byvaf), mae (miae), ocec (otec) dzen (day), hodzina {hodina), pajdzesat (paedesiaf), etc., as Ukrainian! Ewery eastern SlO!Vak uses such language with its peouliar locai flavor, or color. Lt is part of his natirve vocalbulary which is distinctly ~ovak, not Uikirainian. When attention was called �54 SLOVAKIA to this discrepancy, Rn:afju'k revised his analysis and chose the White Russi.am. language as his starting point in which dz is sulbstituted for d' ·a nd c for f, respectively, in conitrast to the Greater RU!SSii. an 1anguruge. But according to his conterntion the western SlovaJk versions, e.g., dzedzina and dzeci, etc., wmtld hruve to ibe explained in the same way. Obviously, such conclusions are fall.se. 1 Professor Fr,anrtisek Pastrnek, the renowned Czech phllologist from Prague, proved in his book Rusini Jazyka Slovenskeho ('Peitrograd, 1907) that these Eastern Slovak dialects were reall,y Slovak in origin and form, not Ruthenian or UJrna:iru·a n as Hnat'juk tried to dem:onstrate.. Jin 1935, Dr. Fr. Tichy, an authority on Slav languages, pointed out (Nas Ziivot, 1935, p. 133) that the la'Illguage of the Ru.sins in Bruoka and Sriem was actually Slovak, although a grammarian, Dr. G. Kostelnik, (his very name is Slov•a k, since the Russian word for church from which it is deri'Ved is cerkev, not kostol, as in SlOWlJk) termed it Russian. Olbse.I"Ve his w,riting: "Ked' se sceme nauoic dobre pisac, abo ked' sceme dobre naucic insi jazyk, ta spredz musime nauci.c hramatiku tej besedy, chtoru najlepse zname. A taka beseda tota, cos chton'i se od dzecinstva posluhujeme - macertiiska beseda." There is ha.roly an,y need orf philologica[ learning to deterun:ine that thiis ,s ample is not Russian at aJl, bu.rt Cilear type of an eastern SlovaJldan dialect. Question Solved Ages Ago Apparently, t'his problem was ironed out many years ago to the satisfaction of intel!ligent Slovanic scholars everywhere. Nevertheless, there are aJLways some who resurrect old errors based on prejudice and ftalse prem~. And it is unfortunate that such linguists get a hearing every time. Genuine scholars, howeiver, trealt their spurioUJS views wiith utter contempt. For politicians of a certain class in Eastern S1ovrukia these incontrovertilble conclusions, based on historical 0vidence and philological research, have no ivalue because they do not oonbri.bute to their selfish interests. But true politicrul policies must ultimate[y be detemiined and sUip- �SLOVAKIA 55 ported by incontestilble scientific data and geinuine historical facts. We are wefil aware of the fact th,a;t in the high forest areas of eastern SlovaJkiia Riuthenian (Rusin) settlements are foll!lld, ,b ut we also know that they are small and few in numlber and that their inhrubi;tanits migrated there recently. We are informed that their Ruthenian stam.d is too often political rather than. national or historical. At a.my rate the pred'OIIllinant popu[aJtiOIIl of Eastern Slovakia is SloV'alk. It is qU!i.te difficult, however, to establish a definite national boundary in the easteI1Illillost !Part of Slov.aJkia, because the Ruthenian and Ukrainiia.n elements harve blended with the Sllovak dialects there, and they haJVe all become closely allied after a period of time. Hence, we have heard U.krruinian,s remark, when they hear the eastern Slovak di·a lect spoken, t118Jt it is quite like their tonigue. And the Slo:vaJks there say the same when they hear the Ukrainian spoken on the !borderline of their country. Dialoots in that area of conflict a:re like lin!ks in a chain which is raised to white heat; ,t he lJinlk.s, fuse and unite, so that no politician, or philologist, can determine precisely where the Ru'thenirun begins and the Slo;vaJk ends, jUJSt as no saivant can estaJb11sh aoowrately the line of differentiation between the French and the Irtalian on their borders, and the German in contrast to the Dutch, or Danish, because these languages unite imperceptibly on their nationrul !boundaries. It is no secret therefore, that there exist some vill:ages alongside many Sllavalk towns in eastern Slovalkia, /but there are also Slovruk towns in Car,patho-Russia, e .g., in Marmaros County. ShouiJ.d we Slovaiks demand that the eastern boundary of their country be pushed as far eastward as Marnnaros COOlllty simply because a few Slovak settlements are foll!lld in the interior of Ruthenia? 'Historica:l evidence ·cOIIltradicts the views and suJbsequent actions of those political leaden; who desire to push the western !boundary of Carpa'tho-1Russian ~nsion to Poprad in SlolV'aiklia. A few Ruthenian colonists ruppeared in eastern Slovalcia in the thirteenth century. The Ruthenians; however, did not come there irn any consideraible numbers until �56 SJ,OVAKIA the si~teenth, seventeenth aJI1d eighteenth centuries. A Russian historian, Andrej Petrov, proved this in his bo()k "Drevnesilja Gr-amoty po Istorii Karpatslroj Rusi" (in the chapter: 0 Nacale Karp. Rusi, plllblrished by the Slavonic Institute, f>mgue, 1930) . Geographical Map - the Best Proof It is unnecessary to study the history of coloniization in Carpath04Rus sia and eastern Slovakia •i n order to show who were the original inha'b,itants there. The fact that the Ruthenian villa:ges are scattered. here ood there in the higher plateaus and forest areas shows them to be of later origin, because the earlier settlers, the Slovaks, already lived on the plains and in the fertile vialleys when the Ruthenians canne. Hence, the latter, as newcomers, had to move on; they went into the hills rund mountains and becaime foresters and sheepherders. Thus, thooe who wish to move the Car-patho-Rus sian bounx1ary-iline westward as far as Poprad do a grruve injustice to Slovrukia; they ignore ages..,old traditions, cultural, social and poliiti.tca;l fiaJOtors. By doing vii.ruence to. history these men are initiating forces which will inevitaJbly bring serious disorders in 1:lhe future. Eastern Slovruks, from St:rlba to Uzhorod, speak a distinct SlOViaJkian dialect whiich iis ahln. to the dialect of the western Slovaks. 'I"hey call -t heir langua;ge, Slovaik, and tha;t is not onil.y an important philological fact, but a sociologicail and political phenomenon that cannot be explained away by those who wish to expand at Slovakia's e~pense. Eastern Slovrukia has always been within the sphere of infiueI11Ce of Slmnalk oultUTe. Consequently, when Czech was adopted for a time 1by some Slo,v-aJks as a literary language, it was introduced into that part of the country, too. And when, finally, the Slovaiks agreed on a centrail SlovaJk literary medium, it became the language of literature of the land. Moreover, Slovak pulblications canne from E:osice as early as the seventeenth aJlld eighteenth centuries, for it was the center of Slovalk culture at that time. The Jesuirts maintained a Slovak press ast their college in Kosice. �SLOVAKIA 57 Art Confirms the Slovak Stand The historiy of art in Sl01Vakia shows the uniforniity of Slov1rl{ culture throughout the country from the earliest beginnings. The difference between Slovak and Ruthenian art is not merely superficial. SloviaJk art sihai,ply tontra:sts with Rutheniian art in origin amd fonm, and the former is a part of western ol.l!lture, while the latter definitely bel01I1gs to the East. This is manifest in the study of creative art. In Kosice and P.resov the churches a.re not Rluthenian or eastern in design, lbut definitely 'belong to the West. Who would dare to cut off that land which has been influenced by a traditional cwlture for a thousand years and p}aice it iruto another cu.!ltural sphere by foree? How tragic and confusing would such an act of fully be for Slova;kia. Strongly imlbedded traditions and customs are such powerrf.1.l!l and vital forces that any attempt to efface them OT diroot them into di.lfferent channels would meet with disaster and add to the comusion already developed lby Mosoow. : .V{tal issues are lbeling consibantrry confused 'by a misuse of terminology siuic:h as, Greek-Catholic 'bemg taken as synonymous with Ruthenian (Rusin). But it .pU12JZles only the people who ha,ve . little knowiedge of the sociologicM, ling,u1sti'C, cm tural and historical elements and the conditions whlch determine true concepts of nationhood. It is we11 known that the Greek-CathoJics in Vernar and Telgart, for example, do not know the Rusin language. The term "Nationa;I Magyar-Ca.1vin Church" has no meaning •b ecause there are Slovaik and Czech Calvinists. AU Ser1bs are not Orthodox; some are Roman Catholics - a fact which few people seem to know. Showl.d the German nation, which is mostly Protestant in its religion, lay claim to our lands because some of our citizenJS profess to be Protestants? Slovanic-!Byrziantine .(Greek-Catholic) lritur.gy is not a specific means of national identity for the Rusins, becaiuse many Slovaks profess the Greek-Cathoiic rite. Anyone who is at least somewhat informed on the subject of the history of church liturgy knows that even non-Slovanic nations arlopted the anoient liturgy of their ~ovanic neighibors. To use liturgy as the basis of political orientation is not in �58 SLOVAKIA keeping with the s3;cred spirit of religion. The Slovaks, therefore, regret to see the Slovanic.Byzantine Rite being employed for political puriposes, ·b ecause they have a warm regard for the Rruthenian nation which has so nobly preserved the ancient ldturgy of the Slovak Apostles, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who introduced this sacred rite to meet the needs of the Slawic nations. The Slwaims are not prejudiced 3;gaimst the Rusin nation which has lived in dose cont8!ct and harmony with the Slovaks for centuries. They wish them success in their social and national endeavors, but will not willingly submit to pressure from any political regime. The Slovaks realize thai this pressure does not have the S8;llction of true Ruthenians, and, therefore, they shall not lose faith in them, fw- they are their brothers. A third party, however, is endearvoring to spJ.it up the SlolV'8llic nations. The Slov8!ks and Ruthenians wiU do weH to remain calm and resolute and avoid useless arguments and misunderstandings. They can and must work together in peace and brotherhood for their common good a.g ainst theio:- common enemy. T}le abQIVe analysis of a crucia;l p11dblem should be sufficiently clear fro'In the facts presented; and it ought to discourage any further attempts to Rusin-ilze the Slovaks of eastern Slovakia. The Slovaks contributed ricltly to Rusin culture, and here, in America, many eminent Ruthenian leaders were Slovaks who did not try to denationalize them. Eastern Slovakia did not and does not belong to Ruthenia historicany. It belongs to the Slovak na,tion, as does the rest of the territory of Slovakia which has been occupied by the SlovaJks for at least the past 1'500 years. • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK NATION, one of the oldest Christian nations of central Europe, is a dis-tinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are Jistinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they no,~. a part o! the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called 'Cze• choslovaks'." - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., 11-18-51) � SLOVAKIA 52 EASTERN SLOVAK.IA INHABITED FOR CENTURIES BY GREAT SLOVAK MAJORITY Michael S. Macuga HistoricaJlly, Western Uikrainia, extending to the Eastern Canpa;tJhians, haJS no vaiid claim to the Slovaik lands which border on Ruthenia, or Carpathian Russia, the westernmost extension of the Russian racial element. In 1930 the national census of the repU!blic of Crecho~lovakia showed that in eastern Slovakia the counties, of Spis, Saris, Zemplin and Albauj had a population of 408,129 Slovaiks and 81,960 Rusins or Ruthenians (also known as Car,pathoRussians and Little Russians). Despite these significant figures there is a 1propaganda moivement, both here and aJbroad, wibich is designed to inco:nporate these SlolV'aik counties with their predominant Slov ak popuilations in the Soiviert Republic of Ukrainia on the pretext thait they belong to Riuthenia. There is nothing to sulbsta.ntiate this wild claim. Of course, the men of the Kremlin are more than willing to force not only the eastern part but the whole of Slovakia under their dominion, history and statistics no•lJWiithstand!ing. According to the 1930 national census the facts of the case of Eastern SlovaJkia against Ruthenia are confirmed without a doUJbt in S1orvalkia's favor. The figures tell us the nU!IDlber o;f 1SlovaJks and RuitheniaillS living in the various cities and towns. City~Town Bard!io;y HU!Inenne Gelniica Giraltovce Koomarok Levoca !Julbovna Medzilruborce Michailovce P.oprad SlOIViaks Ruthe:nli!ans 21,841 19,551 17,189 15,125 15,43Q 22,1\36 12,742 2,860 41,72,2 19,961 13,216 948 110 736 655 1,008 6,228 14,944 374 99 �53 SLOVAKIA 56,086 30,599 11,388 Snina 22,760 Solhrance 9,335 Stropkw 38,853 Trebisov 29,066 Spisska Nova Ves 7,145 Spissika Stara Ve.s VranOIV (nad To:pl'ou) 24,·594 Pre.sov .Srubinov 1 937 6,797 19,891 1,8!10 16,891 216 1,396 1,192 512 So much for statistics. Furtlhermore, no valid historical arguments exist to bacik Russian views in this matter. Polish philologists tried frequently to estaJblish the Polish origins of Eastern Slovrukian dialects but lin vain. Zd. Stieber of Cracow tried to build up a case for Poland there, as did Samo Ozamlbel, the Slovak linguist. But other philologists, such as the eminent Dutchman, Van Wijk, the Magya.T scholar, Kniesza, the Ozech linguists·, Pastrnek, TralVnii.cek, Smilauer and the .SlON•aJk scholar, Stanislav, rproved satisfaotorily that the Eastern dialects of Slovrukia have a SlOIVaJk origin and fo1mdation. M. Malecki, however, a Polish Slovanic scholar, tried to estaJblish Polish origins in the northern Trenicin area. The Ukrainian sruvants see, on the other hand, onliy Ruithenian and Ulrnamian origins of the dialects in the easiteril regions of Slowklia. These theories of the late nineteenth century rupply not only to Thstern Slovakia, 'but also to the areas near Backa and Sriem where many Greek-Catholi c Slovruks settled. They, too, speak an e<8JS!tern SiovaJk dialect. Vladimir lfuafjuk's views, namely, that the dfalects of eastetn Sl01Vakia were Ukrainian, were dlisproived by Siovaik and Czooh philologists, as well a:s by the Russian 1Slav scholar, Sobolevsiky, and the Norwegian Slavist, Olaf Broch, who knew that part olf the country as weH as Ruthenia. Hnafjwk conslidered even such fundamental Slovak words as biv~ (\byvaf), mae (miae), ocec (otec) dzen (day), hodzina {hodina), pajdzesat (paedesiaf), etc., as Ukrainian! Ewery eastern SlO!Vak uses such language with its peouliar locai flavor, or color. Lt is part of his natirve vocalbulary which is distinctly ~ovak, not Uikirainian. When attention was called �54 SLOVAKIA to this discrepancy, Rn:afju'k revised his analysis and chose the White Russi.am. language as his starting point in which dz is sulbstituted for d' ·a nd c for f, respectively, in conitrast to the Greater RU!SSii. an 1anguruge. But according to his conterntion the western SlovaJk versions, e.g., dzedzina and dzeci, etc., wmtld hruve to ibe explained in the same way. Obviously, such conclusions are fall.se. 1 Professor Fr,anrtisek Pastrnek, the renowned Czech phllologist from Prague, proved in his book Rusini Jazyka Slovenskeho ('Peitrograd, 1907) that these Eastern Slovak dialects were reall,y Slovak in origin and form, not Ruthenian or UJrna:iru·a n as Hnat'juk tried to dem:onstrate.. Jin 1935, Dr. Fr. Tichy, an authority on Slav languages, pointed out (Nas Ziivot, 1935, p. 133) that the la'Illguage of the Ru.sins in Bruoka and Sriem was actually Slovak, although a grammarian, Dr. G. Kostelnik, (his very name is Slov•a k, since the Russian word for church from which it is deri'Ved is cerkev, not kostol, as in SlOWlJk) termed it Russian. Olbse.I"Ve his w,riting: "Ked' se sceme nauoic dobre pisac, abo ked' sceme dobre naucic insi jazyk, ta spredz musime nauci.c hramatiku tej besedy, chtoru najlepse zname. A taka beseda tota, cos chton'i se od dzecinstva posluhujeme - macertiiska beseda." There is ha.roly an,y need orf philologica[ learning to deterun:ine that thiis ,s ample is not Russian at aJl, bu.rt Cilear type of an eastern SlovaJldan dialect. Question Solved Ages Ago Apparently, t'his problem was ironed out many years ago to the satisfaction of intel!ligent Slovanic scholars everywhere. Nevertheless, there are aJLways some who resurrect old errors based on prejudice and ftalse prem~. And it is unfortunate that such linguists get a hearing every time. Genuine scholars, howeiver, trealt their spurioUJS views wiith utter contempt. For politicians of a certain class in Eastern S1ovrukia these incontrovertilble conclusions, based on historical 0vidence and philological research, have no ivalue because they do not oonbri.bute to their selfish interests. But true politicrul policies must ultimate[y be detemiined and sUip- �SLOVAKIA 55 ported by incontestilble scientific data and geinuine historical facts. We are wefil aware of the fact th,a;t in the high forest areas of eastern SlovaJkiia Riuthenian (Rusin) settlements are foll!lld, ,b ut we also know that they are small and few in numlber and that their inhrubi;tanits migrated there recently. We are informed that their Ruthenian stam.d is too often political rather than. national or historical. At a.my rate the pred'OIIllinant popu[aJtiOIIl of Eastern Slovakia is SloV'alk. It is qU!i.te difficult, however, to establish a definite national boundary in the easteI1Illillost !Part of Slov.aJkia, because the Ruthenian and Ukrainiia.n elements harve blended with the Sllovak dialects there, and they haJVe all become closely allied after a period of time. Hence, we have heard U.krruinian,s remark, when they hear the eastern Slovak di·a lect spoken, t118Jt it is quite like their tonigue. And the Slo:vaJks there say the same when they hear the Ukrainian spoken on the !borderline of their country. Dialoots in that area of conflict a:re like lin!ks in a chain which is raised to white heat; ,t he lJinlk.s, fuse and unite, so that no politician, or philologist, can determine precisely where the Ru'thenirun begins and the Slo;vaJk ends, jUJSt as no saivant can estaJb11sh aoowrately the line of differentiation between the French and the Irtalian on their borders, and the German in contrast to the Dutch, or Danish, because these languages unite imperceptibly on their nationrul !boundaries. It is no secret therefore, that there exist some vill:ages alongside many Sllavalk towns in eastern Slovalkia, /but there are also Slovruk towns in Car,patho-Russia, e .g., in Marmaros County. ShouiJ.d we Slovaiks demand that the eastern boundary of their country be pushed as far eastward as Marnnaros COOlllty simply because a few Slovak settlements are foll!lld in the interior of Ruthenia? 'Historica:l evidence ·cOIIltradicts the views and suJbsequent actions of those political leaden; who desire to push the western !boundary of Carpa'tho-1Russian ~nsion to Poprad in SlolV'aiklia. A few Ruthenian colonists ruppeared in eastern Slovalcia in the thirteenth century. The Ruthenians; however, did not come there irn any consideraible numbers until �56 SJ,OVAKIA the si~teenth, seventeenth aJI1d eighteenth centuries. A Russian historian, Andrej Petrov, proved this in his bo()k "Drevnesilja Gr-amoty po Istorii Karpatslroj Rusi" (in the chapter: 0 Nacale Karp. Rusi, plllblrished by the Slavonic Institute, f>mgue, 1930) . Geographical Map - the Best Proof It is unnecessary to study the history of coloniization in Carpath04Rus sia and eastern Slovakia •i n order to show who were the original inha'b,itants there. The fact that the Ruthenian villa:ges are scattered. here ood there in the higher plateaus and forest areas shows them to be of later origin, because the earlier settlers, the Slovaks, already lived on the plains and in the fertile vialleys when the Ruthenians canne. Hence, the latter, as newcomers, had to move on; they went into the hills rund mountains and becaime foresters and sheepherders. Thus, thooe who wish to move the Car-patho-Rus sian bounx1ary-iline westward as far as Poprad do a grruve injustice to Slovrukia; they ignore ages..,old traditions, cultural, social and poliiti.tca;l fiaJOtors. By doing vii.ruence to. history these men are initiating forces which will inevitaJbly bring serious disorders in 1:lhe future. Eastern Slovruks, from St:rlba to Uzhorod, speak a distinct SlOViaJkian dialect whiich iis ahln. to the dialect of the western Slovaks. 'I"hey call -t heir langua;ge, Slovaik, and tha;t is not onil.y an important philological fact, but a sociologicail and political phenomenon that cannot be explained away by those who wish to expand at Slovakia's e~pense. Eastern Slovrukia has always been within the sphere of infiueI11Ce of Slmnalk oultUTe. Consequently, when Czech was adopted for a time 1by some Slo,v-aJks as a literary language, it was introduced into that part of the country, too. And when, finally, the Slovaiks agreed on a centrail SlovaJk literary medium, it became the language of literature of the land. Moreover, Slovak pulblications canne from E:osice as early as the seventeenth aJlld eighteenth centuries, for it was the center of Slovalk culture at that time. The Jesuirts maintained a Slovak press ast their college in Kosice. �SLOVAKIA 57 Art Confirms the Slovak Stand The historiy of art in Sl01Vakia shows the uniforniity of Slov1rl{ culture throughout the country from the earliest beginnings. The difference between Slovak and Ruthenian art is not merely superficial. SloviaJk art sihai,ply tontra:sts with Rutheniian art in origin amd fonm, and the former is a part of western ol.l!lture, while the latter definitely bel01I1gs to the East. This is manifest in the study of creative art. In Kosice and P.resov the churches a.re not Rluthenian or eastern in design, lbut definitely 'belong to the West. Who would dare to cut off that land which has been influenced by a traditional cwlture for a thousand years and p}aice it iruto another cu.!ltural sphere by foree? How tragic and confusing would such an act of fully be for Slova;kia. Strongly imlbedded traditions and customs are such powerrf.1.l!l and vital forces that any attempt to efface them OT diroot them into di.lfferent channels would meet with disaster and add to the comusion already developed lby Mosoow. : .V{tal issues are lbeling consibantrry confused 'by a misuse of terminology siuic:h as, Greek-Catholic 'bemg taken as synonymous with Ruthenian (Rusin). But it .pU12JZles only the people who ha,ve . little knowiedge of the sociologicM, ling,u1sti'C, cm tural and historical elements and the conditions whlch determine true concepts of nationhood. It is we11 known that the Greek-CathoJics in Vernar and Telgart, for example, do not know the Rusin language. The term "Nationa;I Magyar-Ca.1vin Church" has no meaning •b ecause there are Slovaik and Czech Calvinists. AU Ser1bs are not Orthodox; some are Roman Catholics - a fact which few people seem to know. Showl.d the German nation, which is mostly Protestant in its religion, lay claim to our lands because some of our citizenJS profess to be Protestants? Slovanic-!Byrziantine .(Greek-Catholic) lritur.gy is not a specific means of national identity for the Rusins, becaiuse many Slovaks profess the Greek-Cathoiic rite. Anyone who is at least somewhat informed on the subject of the history of church liturgy knows that even non-Slovanic nations arlopted the anoient liturgy of their ~ovanic neighibors. To use liturgy as the basis of political orientation is not in �58 SLOVAKIA keeping with the s3;cred spirit of religion. The Slovaks, therefore, regret to see the Slovanic.Byzantine Rite being employed for political puriposes, ·b ecause they have a warm regard for the Rruthenian nation which has so nobly preserved the ancient ldturgy of the Slovak Apostles, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who introduced this sacred rite to meet the needs of the Slawic nations. The Slwaims are not prejudiced 3;gaimst the Rusin nation which has lived in dose cont8!ct and harmony with the Slovaks for centuries. They wish them success in their social and national endeavors, but will not willingly submit to pressure from any political regime. The Slovaks realize thai this pressure does not have the S8;llction of true Ruthenians, and, therefore, they shall not lose faith in them, fw- they are their brothers. A third party, however, is endearvoring to spJ.it up the SlolV'8llic nations. The Slov8!ks and Ruthenians wiU do weH to remain calm and resolute and avoid useless arguments and misunderstandings. They can and must work together in peace and brotherhood for their common good a.g ainst theio:- common enemy. T}le abQIVe analysis of a crucia;l p11dblem should be sufficiently clear fro'In the facts presented; and it ought to discourage any further attempts to Rusin-ilze the Slovaks of eastern Slovakia. The Slovaks contributed ricltly to Rusin culture, and here, in America, many eminent Ruthenian leaders were Slovaks who did not try to denationalize them. Eastern Slovakia did not and does not belong to Ruthenia historicany. It belongs to the Slovak na,tion, as does the rest of the territory of Slovakia which has been occupied by the SlovaJks for at least the past 1'500 years. • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK NATION, one of the oldest Christian nations of central Europe, is a dis-tinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are Jistinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they no,~. a part o! the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called 'Cze• choslovaks'." - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., 11-18-51) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 52 EASTERN SLOVAK.IA INHABITED FOR CENTURIES BY GREAT SLOVAK MAJORITY Michael S. Macuga HistoricaJlly, Western Uikrainia, extending to the Eastern Canpa;tJhians, haJS no vaiid claim to the Slovaik lands which border on Ruthenia, or Carpathian Russia, the westernmost extension of the Russian racial element. In 1930 the national census of the repU!blic of Crecho~lovakia showed that in eastern Slovakia the counties, of Spis, Saris, Zemplin and Albauj had a population of 408,129 Slovaiks and 81,960 Rusins or Ruthenians (also known as Car,pathoRussians and Little Russians). Despite these significant figures there is a 1propaganda moivement, both here and aJbroad, wibich is designed to inco:nporate these SlolV'aik counties with their predominant Slov ak popuilations in the Soiviert Republic of Ukrainia on the pretext thait they belong to Riuthenia. There is nothing to sulbsta.ntiate this wild claim. Of course, the men of the Kremlin are more than willing to force not only the eastern part but the whole of Slovakia under their dominion, history and statistics no•lJWiithstand!ing. According to the 1930 national census the facts of the case of Eastern SlovaJkia against Ruthenia are confirmed without a doUJbt in S1orvalkia's favor. The figures tell us the nU!IDlber o;f 1SlovaJks and RuitheniaillS living in the various cities and towns. City~Town Bard!io;y HU!Inenne Gelniica Giraltovce Koomarok Levoca !Julbovna Medzilruborce Michailovce P.oprad SlOIViaks Ruthe:nli!ans 21,841 19,551 17,189 15,125 15,43Q 22,1\36 12,742 2,860 41,72,2 19,961 13,216 948 110 736 655 1,008 6,228 14,944 374 99 53 SLOVAKIA 56,086 30,599 11,388 Snina 22,760 Solhrance 9,335 Stropkw 38,853 Trebisov 29,066 Spisska Nova Ves 7,145 Spissika Stara Ve.s VranOIV (nad To:pl'ou) 24,·594 Pre.sov .Srubinov 1 937 6,797 19,891 1,8!10 16,891 216 1,396 1,192 512 So much for statistics. Furtlhermore, no valid historical arguments exist to bacik Russian views in this matter. Polish philologists tried frequently to estaJblish the Polish origins of Eastern Slovrukian dialects but lin vain. Zd. Stieber of Cracow tried to build up a case for Poland there, as did Samo Ozamlbel, the Slovak linguist. But other philologists, such as the eminent Dutchman, Van Wijk, the Magya.T scholar, Kniesza, the Ozech linguists·, Pastrnek, TralVnii.cek, Smilauer and the .SlON•aJk scholar, Stanislav, rproved satisfaotorily that the Eastern dialects of Slovrukia have a SlOIVaJk origin and fo1mdation. M. Malecki, however, a Polish Slovanic scholar, tried to estaJblish Polish origins in the northern Trenicin area. The Ukrainian sruvants see, on the other hand, onliy Ruithenian and Ulrnamian origins of the dialects in the easiteril regions of Slowklia. These theories of the late nineteenth century rupply not only to Thstern Slovakia, 'but also to the areas near Backa and Sriem where many Greek-Catholi c Slovruks settled. They, too, speak an e<8JS!tern SiovaJk dialect. Vladimir lfuafjuk's views, namely, that the dfalects of eastetn Sl01Vakia were Ukrainian, were dlisproived by Siovaik and Czooh philologists, as well a:s by the Russian 1Slav scholar, Sobolevsiky, and the Norwegian Slavist, Olaf Broch, who knew that part olf the country as weH as Ruthenia. Hnafjwk conslidered even such fundamental Slovak words as biv~ (\byvaf), mae (miae), ocec (otec) dzen (day), hodzina {hodina), pajdzesat (paedesiaf), etc., as Ukrainian! Ewery eastern SlO!Vak uses such language with its peouliar locai flavor, or color. Lt is part of his natirve vocalbulary which is distinctly ~ovak, not Uikirainian. When attention was called 54 SLOVAKIA to this discrepancy, Rn:afju'k revised his analysis and chose the White Russi.am. language as his starting point in which dz is sulbstituted for d' ·a nd c for f, respectively, in conitrast to the Greater RU!SSii. an 1anguruge. But according to his conterntion the western SlovaJk versions, e.g., dzedzina and dzeci, etc., wmtld hruve to ibe explained in the same way. Obviously, such conclusions are fall.se. 1 Professor Fr,anrtisek Pastrnek, the renowned Czech phllologist from Prague, proved in his book Rusini Jazyka Slovenskeho ('Peitrograd, 1907) that these Eastern Slovak dialects were reall,y Slovak in origin and form, not Ruthenian or UJrna:iru·a n as Hnat'juk tried to dem:onstrate.. Jin 1935, Dr. Fr. Tichy, an authority on Slav languages, pointed out (Nas Ziivot, 1935, p. 133) that the la'Illguage of the Ru.sins in Bruoka and Sriem was actually Slovak, although a grammarian, Dr. G. Kostelnik, (his very name is Slov•a k, since the Russian word for church from which it is deri'Ved is cerkev, not kostol, as in SlOWlJk) termed it Russian. Olbse.I"Ve his w,riting: "Ked' se sceme nauoic dobre pisac, abo ked' sceme dobre naucic insi jazyk, ta spredz musime nauci.c hramatiku tej besedy, chtoru najlepse zname. A taka beseda tota, cos chton'i se od dzecinstva posluhujeme - macertiiska beseda." There is ha.roly an,y need orf philologica[ learning to deterun:ine that thiis ,s ample is not Russian at aJl, bu.rt Cilear type of an eastern SlovaJldan dialect. Question Solved Ages Ago Apparently, t'his problem was ironed out many years ago to the satisfaction of intel!ligent Slovanic scholars everywhere. Nevertheless, there are aJLways some who resurrect old errors based on prejudice and ftalse prem~. And it is unfortunate that such linguists get a hearing every time. Genuine scholars, howeiver, trealt their spurioUJS views wiith utter contempt. For politicians of a certain class in Eastern S1ovrukia these incontrovertilble conclusions, based on historical 0vidence and philological research, have no ivalue because they do not oonbri.bute to their selfish interests. But true politicrul policies must ultimate[y be detemiined and sUip- SLOVAKIA 55 ported by incontestilble scientific data and geinuine historical facts. We are wefil aware of the fact th,a;t in the high forest areas of eastern SlovaJkiia Riuthenian (Rusin) settlements are foll!lld, ,b ut we also know that they are small and few in numlber and that their inhrubi;tanits migrated there recently. We are informed that their Ruthenian stam.d is too often political rather than. national or historical. At a.my rate the pred'OIIllinant popu[aJtiOIIl of Eastern Slovakia is SloV'alk. It is qU!i.te difficult, however, to establish a definite national boundary in the easteI1Illillost !Part of Slov.aJkia, because the Ruthenian and Ukrainiia.n elements harve blended with the Sllovak dialects there, and they haJVe all become closely allied after a period of time. Hence, we have heard U.krruinian,s remark, when they hear the eastern Slovak di·a lect spoken, t118Jt it is quite like their tonigue. And the Slo:vaJks there say the same when they hear the Ukrainian spoken on the !borderline of their country. Dialoots in that area of conflict a:re like lin!ks in a chain which is raised to white heat; ,t he lJinlk.s, fuse and unite, so that no politician, or philologist, can determine precisely where the Ru'thenirun begins and the Slo;vaJk ends, jUJSt as no saivant can estaJb11sh aoowrately the line of differentiation between the French and the Irtalian on their borders, and the German in contrast to the Dutch, or Danish, because these languages unite imperceptibly on their nationrul !boundaries. It is no secret therefore, that there exist some vill:ages alongside many Sllavalk towns in eastern Slovalkia, /but there are also Slovruk towns in Car,patho-Russia, e .g., in Marmaros County. ShouiJ.d we Slovaiks demand that the eastern boundary of their country be pushed as far eastward as Marnnaros COOlllty simply because a few Slovak settlements are foll!lld in the interior of Ruthenia? 'Historica:l evidence ·cOIIltradicts the views and suJbsequent actions of those political leaden; who desire to push the western !boundary of Carpa'tho-1Russian ~nsion to Poprad in SlolV'aiklia. A few Ruthenian colonists ruppeared in eastern Slovalcia in the thirteenth century. The Ruthenians; however, did not come there irn any consideraible numbers until 56 SJ,OVAKIA the si~teenth, seventeenth aJI1d eighteenth centuries. A Russian historian, Andrej Petrov, proved this in his bo()k "Drevnesilja Gr-amoty po Istorii Karpatslroj Rusi" (in the chapter: 0 Nacale Karp. Rusi, plllblrished by the Slavonic Institute, f>mgue, 1930) . Geographical Map - the Best Proof It is unnecessary to study the history of coloniization in Carpath04Rus sia and eastern Slovakia •i n order to show who were the original inha'b,itants there. The fact that the Ruthenian villa:ges are scattered. here ood there in the higher plateaus and forest areas shows them to be of later origin, because the earlier settlers, the Slovaks, already lived on the plains and in the fertile vialleys when the Ruthenians canne. Hence, the latter, as newcomers, had to move on; they went into the hills rund mountains and becaime foresters and sheepherders. Thus, thooe who wish to move the Car-patho-Rus sian bounx1ary-iline westward as far as Poprad do a grruve injustice to Slovrukia; they ignore ages..,old traditions, cultural, social and poliiti.tca;l fiaJOtors. By doing vii.ruence to. history these men are initiating forces which will inevitaJbly bring serious disorders in 1:lhe future. Eastern Slovruks, from St:rlba to Uzhorod, speak a distinct SlOViaJkian dialect whiich iis ahln. to the dialect of the western Slovaks. 'I"hey call -t heir langua;ge, Slovaik, and tha;t is not onil.y an important philological fact, but a sociologicail and political phenomenon that cannot be explained away by those who wish to expand at Slovakia's e~pense. Eastern Slovrukia has always been within the sphere of infiueI11Ce of Slmnalk oultUTe. Consequently, when Czech was adopted for a time 1by some Slo,v-aJks as a literary language, it was introduced into that part of the country, too. And when, finally, the Slovaiks agreed on a centrail SlovaJk literary medium, it became the language of literature of the land. Moreover, Slovak pulblications canne from E:osice as early as the seventeenth aJlld eighteenth centuries, for it was the center of Slovalk culture at that time. The Jesuirts maintained a Slovak press ast their college in Kosice. SLOVAKIA 57 Art Confirms the Slovak Stand The historiy of art in Sl01Vakia shows the uniforniity of Slov1rl{ culture throughout the country from the earliest beginnings. The difference between Slovak and Ruthenian art is not merely superficial. SloviaJk art sihai,ply tontra:sts with Rutheniian art in origin amd fonm, and the former is a part of western ol.l!lture, while the latter definitely bel01I1gs to the East. This is manifest in the study of creative art. In Kosice and P.resov the churches a.re not Rluthenian or eastern in design, lbut definitely 'belong to the West. Who would dare to cut off that land which has been influenced by a traditional cwlture for a thousand years and p}aice it iruto another cu.!ltural sphere by foree? How tragic and confusing would such an act of fully be for Slova;kia. Strongly imlbedded traditions and customs are such powerrf.1.l!l and vital forces that any attempt to efface them OT diroot them into di.lfferent channels would meet with disaster and add to the comusion already developed lby Mosoow. : .V{tal issues are lbeling consibantrry confused 'by a misuse of terminology siuic:h as, Greek-Catholic 'bemg taken as synonymous with Ruthenian (Rusin). But it .pU12JZles only the people who ha,ve . little knowiedge of the sociologicM, ling,u1sti'C, cm tural and historical elements and the conditions whlch determine true concepts of nationhood. It is we11 known that the Greek-CathoJics in Vernar and Telgart, for example, do not know the Rusin language. The term "Nationa;I Magyar-Ca.1vin Church" has no meaning •b ecause there are Slovaik and Czech Calvinists. AU Ser1bs are not Orthodox; some are Roman Catholics - a fact which few people seem to know. Showl.d the German nation, which is mostly Protestant in its religion, lay claim to our lands because some of our citizenJS profess to be Protestants? Slovanic-!Byrziantine .(Greek-Catholic) lritur.gy is not a specific means of national identity for the Rusins, becaiuse many Slovaks profess the Greek-Cathoiic rite. Anyone who is at least somewhat informed on the subject of the history of church liturgy knows that even non-Slovanic nations arlopted the anoient liturgy of their ~ovanic neighibors. To use liturgy as the basis of political orientation is not in 58 SLOVAKIA keeping with the s3;cred spirit of religion. The Slovaks, therefore, regret to see the Slovanic.Byzantine Rite being employed for political puriposes, ·b ecause they have a warm regard for the Rruthenian nation which has so nobly preserved the ancient ldturgy of the Slovak Apostles, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who introduced this sacred rite to meet the needs of the Slawic nations. The Slwaims are not prejudiced 3;gaimst the Rusin nation which has lived in dose cont8!ct and harmony with the Slovaks for centuries. They wish them success in their social and national endeavors, but will not willingly submit to pressure from any political regime. The Slovaks realize thai this pressure does not have the S8;llction of true Ruthenians, and, therefore, they shall not lose faith in them, fw- they are their brothers. A third party, however, is endearvoring to spJ.it up the SlolV'8llic nations. The Slov8!ks and Ruthenians wiU do weH to remain calm and resolute and avoid useless arguments and misunderstandings. They can and must work together in peace and brotherhood for their common good a.g ainst theio:- common enemy. T}le abQIVe analysis of a crucia;l p11dblem should be sufficiently clear fro'In the facts presented; and it ought to discourage any further attempts to Rusin-ilze the Slovaks of eastern Slovakia. The Slovaks contributed ricltly to Rusin culture, and here, in America, many eminent Ruthenian leaders were Slovaks who did not try to denationalize them. Eastern Slovakia did not and does not belong to Ruthenia historicany. It belongs to the Slovak na,tion, as does the rest of the territory of Slovakia which has been occupied by the SlovaJks for at least the past 1'500 years. • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK NATION, one of the oldest Christian nations of central Europe, is a dis-tinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are Jistinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they no,~. a part o! the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called 'Cze• choslovaks'." - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., 11-18-51)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Eastern Slovakia Inhabited for Centuries by Great Slovak Majority Description An account of the resource Michael S. Mačuga Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 52-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mačuga, Michael S. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4ec8e11c8b1fc6f94ef01661cfe32a13.pdf 52ccc3d69708367c24a03977de30ef70 PDF Text Text 36 SLOVAKIA - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - Murder in Slovakia SPEECH OF HON. ALVINE. O'KONSKI OF WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, April 23, 1947 Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czecho-Slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastly and shameful form. The brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso went the way of the immortal General Mihailovitch and the immortal Archbishop Stepinac, of Yugoslavia. On trumped-up charges, the Communists disposed of these brave men because they dared to oppose communism among their respective people. These murders will set the pattern of what will happen to all who have opposed communism wherever communism takes over. On trumped-up charges, they held a farce of a trial and sentenced Monsignor Tiso to be hanged. Imagine the joy in the hearts of the Communists when they succeeded and used the Czechoslovakian Government as a puppet to do their dirty murder for them. Yes; this is a modem tragedy, but there will be more like it as time goes on. But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going on. Our Government gave the Czecho-Slovak Government hundreds of millions of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them millions of dollars more. Yet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czecho-Slovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against the murder by the Soviets. All of this leads me to believe that the leaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term "honor". Monsignor Tiso is dead. He was murdered. While he was murdered America was silent. The day is not very distant when these American leaders will regret their �SLOVAKIA 37 silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent will be treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Archbishop Stepinac and General Mihailovitch were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it will be too late. Frankly, I do not think America could have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest - just for the record. By some miracle such a protest might have at least postponed the execution. Here in America our officials grant our basest criminals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done is file a plea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom - Monsignor Tiso - whose only crime was that he hated communism just as he hated nazism. But America remains silent and murder has free sway. SPEECH OF HON. RAY J. MADDEN OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, March 31, 1947 Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, America and all libertyloving nations should at this time concentrate against international situations which might bring about war in the future. I have, on several occasions, stated on the floor of Congress that the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter is our greatest antidote for future peace. Self-government, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion is as essential for smaller countries as it is for the larger nations. Our Nation, during World War II, spent billions of dollars and sacrificed in lives and casualties to preserve the above principles in order to insure liberty and future peace. Since VJ-day, aggression and tyranny has again been launched in certain areas of Europe. The latest example of persecution, unfair trial, and threatened execution for political belief is that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, former President of the Interim Republic of Slovakia. Dr. Tiso has been acclaimed a hero in the eyes of nearly all the people of Slovakia and the prevailing majority of Americans of Slovak ancestry. My attention has been called to the fact that over 80 percent of the Slovak American fraternal �38 SLOVAKIA organizations have forthrightly declared themselves to be of the opinion that Tiso was a hero in the defense of the best interests of the Slovak people. During his presidency, Slovakia thrived, progressed, and developed internally more than it had during any five years of the existence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The communistic control now over the country of Slovakia will execute Dr. Tiso, a political prisoner, 1,1nless our Government intervenes. This communistic control is inflicted upon the people of Slovakia in spite of the fact that the election of May 26, 1946, gave over 64 percent of the total vote cast against the present government. The press is likewise controlled, at least to the extent that the newspapers cannot publish what they think. This is evidenced in the fact that four American newpapers have been barred in Slovakia. The present communistic government will brook no freedom of political thought; though the people voted for Christian democracy, they received totalitarian communism. The archbishop of Slovakia testified at the trial of Dr . Tiso. He is and has been a respected member not only of the hierarchy in Czecho-Slovakia, but of the official family of Czecho-Slovakia, including its President, Edward Benes. Appearing as a witness for Dr. Tiso, the archbishop testified that: "Tiso acted and worked in the interest of Slovakia and was never a traitor, and that his election as President of Slovakia was the will of 90 percent of the Slovaks at that time and was acclaimed by the bishops, priests, and ministers of both the Catholic and Protestant churches." It is apparent that Czecho-Slovakia has been re-created with the aid of Moscow and that Moscow will unboubtedly demand the extinction of Slovak national leaders of ability and high intellect. The ways of the Communists are devious and it behooves us to understand more of the Slovakian situation. In the meantime, the least that freedom loving nations can aisk is that the so-called peoples courts in the Communist-dominated countries in eastern Europe, refrain from any further political executions or from liquidating political opposition by long-term imprisonment as in the case of Archbishop Stepinac. All of this adds up to the price we will have to pay to aid in the establishing of true democracy in the countries of eastern Europe to insure world peace. �SLOVAKIA 39 In supporting President Truman's International program, we cannot be unmindful of what is happening throughout this region in Europe, comprising over 100 million Christians who have nothing in common with communism. We have heard of political executions, imprisonment, and banishment of outstanding citizens in Poland, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and other small countries. Thousands of brave Polish soldiers who fought to stamp out fascism are now prohibited from returning to their native Poland by a communistic controlled government. Americans are asking the question "do we not have at least a moral obligation to voice our protest against such trials and executions?" The judge who presided at the .trial of Dr. Tiso, previous to the trial , vowed personal vengeance on Tiso and was provided the opportunity by being placed in charge of the case. These facts, though not appearing in the American press releases, are not disputed. Almost upanimously, the people of Slovak descent in America, are rising in protest to the impending execution of Dr. Tiso. I ask the Members of Congress to join with me in protesting this unjust conviction by interceding with President Truman and Secretary Marshall to use their good offices to prevent this. injustice. We might well apply the words of the Honorable Judge Robert H . Jackson: "All experience teaches that there are certain things you cannot do under the guise of judicial trial. • • • You must put no man on trial before anything that is called a court, if you are not prepared to establish his personal guilt. * * * If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for trial. The world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict." "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso of Slovakia is an attempt to execute the principles of Christian democracy. It is supposed to be the death knell :for Slovak freedom. Msgr. Tiso was executed for defending the inherent rights of his people. Tiso shall go down in history as a martyr and Dr. Bene~ as a modern Pilate." - Rt. Rev. Msgr. F. J . D u bosh, Lakewood , Ohio, April 30, 1947. � 36 SLOVAKIA - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - Murder in Slovakia SPEECH OF HON. ALVINE. O'KONSKI OF WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, April 23, 1947 Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czecho-Slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastly and shameful form. The brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso went the way of the immortal General Mihailovitch and the immortal Archbishop Stepinac, of Yugoslavia. On trumped-up charges, the Communists disposed of these brave men because they dared to oppose communism among their respective people. These murders will set the pattern of what will happen to all who have opposed communism wherever communism takes over. On trumped-up charges, they held a farce of a trial and sentenced Monsignor Tiso to be hanged. Imagine the joy in the hearts of the Communists when they succeeded and used the Czechoslovakian Government as a puppet to do their dirty murder for them. Yes; this is a modem tragedy, but there will be more like it as time goes on. But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going on. Our Government gave the Czecho-Slovak Government hundreds of millions of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them millions of dollars more. Yet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czecho-Slovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against the murder by the Soviets. All of this leads me to believe that the leaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term "honor". Monsignor Tiso is dead. He was murdered. While he was murdered America was silent. The day is not very distant when these American leaders will regret their �SLOVAKIA 37 silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent will be treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Archbishop Stepinac and General Mihailovitch were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it will be too late. Frankly, I do not think America could have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest - just for the record. By some miracle such a protest might have at least postponed the execution. Here in America our officials grant our basest criminals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done is file a plea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom - Monsignor Tiso - whose only crime was that he hated communism just as he hated nazism. But America remains silent and murder has free sway. SPEECH OF HON. RAY J. MADDEN OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, March 31, 1947 Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, America and all libertyloving nations should at this time concentrate against international situations which might bring about war in the future. I have, on several occasions, stated on the floor of Congress that the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter is our greatest antidote for future peace. Self-government, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion is as essential for smaller countries as it is for the larger nations. Our Nation, during World War II, spent billions of dollars and sacrificed in lives and casualties to preserve the above principles in order to insure liberty and future peace. Since VJ-day, aggression and tyranny has again been launched in certain areas of Europe. The latest example of persecution, unfair trial, and threatened execution for political belief is that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, former President of the Interim Republic of Slovakia. Dr. Tiso has been acclaimed a hero in the eyes of nearly all the people of Slovakia and the prevailing majority of Americans of Slovak ancestry. My attention has been called to the fact that over 80 percent of the Slovak American fraternal �38 SLOVAKIA organizations have forthrightly declared themselves to be of the opinion that Tiso was a hero in the defense of the best interests of the Slovak people. During his presidency, Slovakia thrived, progressed, and developed internally more than it had during any five years of the existence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The communistic control now over the country of Slovakia will execute Dr. Tiso, a political prisoner, 1,1nless our Government intervenes. This communistic control is inflicted upon the people of Slovakia in spite of the fact that the election of May 26, 1946, gave over 64 percent of the total vote cast against the present government. The press is likewise controlled, at least to the extent that the newspapers cannot publish what they think. This is evidenced in the fact that four American newpapers have been barred in Slovakia. The present communistic government will brook no freedom of political thought; though the people voted for Christian democracy, they received totalitarian communism. The archbishop of Slovakia testified at the trial of Dr . Tiso. He is and has been a respected member not only of the hierarchy in Czecho-Slovakia, but of the official family of Czecho-Slovakia, including its President, Edward Benes. Appearing as a witness for Dr. Tiso, the archbishop testified that: "Tiso acted and worked in the interest of Slovakia and was never a traitor, and that his election as President of Slovakia was the will of 90 percent of the Slovaks at that time and was acclaimed by the bishops, priests, and ministers of both the Catholic and Protestant churches." It is apparent that Czecho-Slovakia has been re-created with the aid of Moscow and that Moscow will unboubtedly demand the extinction of Slovak national leaders of ability and high intellect. The ways of the Communists are devious and it behooves us to understand more of the Slovakian situation. In the meantime, the least that freedom loving nations can aisk is that the so-called peoples courts in the Communist-dominated countries in eastern Europe, refrain from any further political executions or from liquidating political opposition by long-term imprisonment as in the case of Archbishop Stepinac. All of this adds up to the price we will have to pay to aid in the establishing of true democracy in the countries of eastern Europe to insure world peace. �SLOVAKIA 39 In supporting President Truman's International program, we cannot be unmindful of what is happening throughout this region in Europe, comprising over 100 million Christians who have nothing in common with communism. We have heard of political executions, imprisonment, and banishment of outstanding citizens in Poland, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and other small countries. Thousands of brave Polish soldiers who fought to stamp out fascism are now prohibited from returning to their native Poland by a communistic controlled government. Americans are asking the question "do we not have at least a moral obligation to voice our protest against such trials and executions?" The judge who presided at the .trial of Dr. Tiso, previous to the trial , vowed personal vengeance on Tiso and was provided the opportunity by being placed in charge of the case. These facts, though not appearing in the American press releases, are not disputed. Almost upanimously, the people of Slovak descent in America, are rising in protest to the impending execution of Dr. Tiso. I ask the Members of Congress to join with me in protesting this unjust conviction by interceding with President Truman and Secretary Marshall to use their good offices to prevent this. injustice. We might well apply the words of the Honorable Judge Robert H . Jackson: "All experience teaches that there are certain things you cannot do under the guise of judicial trial. • • • You must put no man on trial before anything that is called a court, if you are not prepared to establish his personal guilt. * * * If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for trial. The world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict." "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso of Slovakia is an attempt to execute the principles of Christian democracy. It is supposed to be the death knell :for Slovak freedom. Msgr. Tiso was executed for defending the inherent rights of his people. Tiso shall go down in history as a martyr and Dr. Bene~ as a modern Pilate." - Rt. Rev. Msgr. F. J . D u bosh, Lakewood , Ohio, April 30, 1947. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 36 SLOVAKIA - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - Murder in Slovakia SPEECH OF HON. ALVINE. O'KONSKI OF WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, April 23, 1947 Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czecho-Slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastly and shameful form. The brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso went the way of the immortal General Mihailovitch and the immortal Archbishop Stepinac, of Yugoslavia. On trumped-up charges, the Communists disposed of these brave men because they dared to oppose communism among their respective people. These murders will set the pattern of what will happen to all who have opposed communism wherever communism takes over. On trumped-up charges, they held a farce of a trial and sentenced Monsignor Tiso to be hanged. Imagine the joy in the hearts of the Communists when they succeeded and used the Czechoslovakian Government as a puppet to do their dirty murder for them. Yes; this is a modem tragedy, but there will be more like it as time goes on. But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going on. Our Government gave the Czecho-Slovak Government hundreds of millions of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them millions of dollars more. Yet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czecho-Slovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against the murder by the Soviets. All of this leads me to believe that the leaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term "honor". Monsignor Tiso is dead. He was murdered. While he was murdered America was silent. The day is not very distant when these American leaders will regret their SLOVAKIA 37 silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent will be treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Archbishop Stepinac and General Mihailovitch were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it will be too late. Frankly, I do not think America could have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest - just for the record. By some miracle such a protest might have at least postponed the execution. Here in America our officials grant our basest criminals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done is file a plea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom - Monsignor Tiso - whose only crime was that he hated communism just as he hated nazism. But America remains silent and murder has free sway. SPEECH OF HON. RAY J. MADDEN OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, March 31, 1947 Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, America and all libertyloving nations should at this time concentrate against international situations which might bring about war in the future. I have, on several occasions, stated on the floor of Congress that the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter is our greatest antidote for future peace. Self-government, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion is as essential for smaller countries as it is for the larger nations. Our Nation, during World War II, spent billions of dollars and sacrificed in lives and casualties to preserve the above principles in order to insure liberty and future peace. Since VJ-day, aggression and tyranny has again been launched in certain areas of Europe. The latest example of persecution, unfair trial, and threatened execution for political belief is that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, former President of the Interim Republic of Slovakia. Dr. Tiso has been acclaimed a hero in the eyes of nearly all the people of Slovakia and the prevailing majority of Americans of Slovak ancestry. My attention has been called to the fact that over 80 percent of the Slovak American fraternal 38 SLOVAKIA organizations have forthrightly declared themselves to be of the opinion that Tiso was a hero in the defense of the best interests of the Slovak people. During his presidency, Slovakia thrived, progressed, and developed internally more than it had during any five years of the existence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The communistic control now over the country of Slovakia will execute Dr. Tiso, a political prisoner, 1,1nless our Government intervenes. This communistic control is inflicted upon the people of Slovakia in spite of the fact that the election of May 26, 1946, gave over 64 percent of the total vote cast against the present government. The press is likewise controlled, at least to the extent that the newspapers cannot publish what they think. This is evidenced in the fact that four American newpapers have been barred in Slovakia. The present communistic government will brook no freedom of political thought; though the people voted for Christian democracy, they received totalitarian communism. The archbishop of Slovakia testified at the trial of Dr . Tiso. He is and has been a respected member not only of the hierarchy in Czecho-Slovakia, but of the official family of Czecho-Slovakia, including its President, Edward Benes. Appearing as a witness for Dr. Tiso, the archbishop testified that: "Tiso acted and worked in the interest of Slovakia and was never a traitor, and that his election as President of Slovakia was the will of 90 percent of the Slovaks at that time and was acclaimed by the bishops, priests, and ministers of both the Catholic and Protestant churches." It is apparent that Czecho-Slovakia has been re-created with the aid of Moscow and that Moscow will unboubtedly demand the extinction of Slovak national leaders of ability and high intellect. The ways of the Communists are devious and it behooves us to understand more of the Slovakian situation. In the meantime, the least that freedom loving nations can aisk is that the so-called peoples courts in the Communist-dominated countries in eastern Europe, refrain from any further political executions or from liquidating political opposition by long-term imprisonment as in the case of Archbishop Stepinac. All of this adds up to the price we will have to pay to aid in the establishing of true democracy in the countries of eastern Europe to insure world peace. SLOVAKIA 39 In supporting President Truman's International program, we cannot be unmindful of what is happening throughout this region in Europe, comprising over 100 million Christians who have nothing in common with communism. We have heard of political executions, imprisonment, and banishment of outstanding citizens in Poland, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and other small countries. Thousands of brave Polish soldiers who fought to stamp out fascism are now prohibited from returning to their native Poland by a communistic controlled government. Americans are asking the question "do we not have at least a moral obligation to voice our protest against such trials and executions?" The judge who presided at the .trial of Dr. Tiso, previous to the trial , vowed personal vengeance on Tiso and was provided the opportunity by being placed in charge of the case. These facts, though not appearing in the American press releases, are not disputed. Almost upanimously, the people of Slovak descent in America, are rising in protest to the impending execution of Dr. Tiso. I ask the Members of Congress to join with me in protesting this unjust conviction by interceding with President Truman and Secretary Marshall to use their good offices to prevent this. injustice. We might well apply the words of the Honorable Judge Robert H . Jackson: "All experience teaches that there are certain things you cannot do under the guise of judicial trial. • • • You must put no man on trial before anything that is called a court, if you are not prepared to establish his personal guilt. * * * If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for trial. The world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict." "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso of Slovakia is an attempt to execute the principles of Christian democracy. It is supposed to be the death knell :for Slovak freedom. Msgr. Tiso was executed for defending the inherent rights of his people. Tiso shall go down in history as a martyr and Dr. Bene~ as a modern Pilate." - Rt. Rev. Msgr. F. J . D u bosh, Lakewood , Ohio, April 30, 1947.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Murder in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Speech of Hon. Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin in the House of Representatives, April 23, 1947; Speech of Hon. Ray J. Madden of Indiana in the House of Representatives, March 31, 1947 Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 36-39 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource O'Konski, Alvin E. (Alvin Edward), 1904-1987 Madden, Ray J. (Ray John), 1892-1987 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0b6c68ad0818ec5fc3a9c1430d5a48e6.pdf fbaea4ee445f3de9f46cda610c0c5e13 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 39 Rusyns a'\d the Slovak State· PAULR. MAGOCSI The status of Rusyns living within the boundaries of the Slovak state between the years 1939 and 1944 was greatly influenced by developments during the interwar period and most especially during the period of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic in late 1938 and early 1939. The Rusyns, or as they are known today, Ukrainians, who inhabit the so-called Presov Region of present-day northeastern Slovakia, 1 had lived for centuries in harmony with neighboring Slovaks. Both groups were ruled by Hungary and both groups were characterized by general economic and social backwardness. 2 This situation changed after 1918 when Rusyns and Slovaks found themselves within the first Czechoslovak Republic. Both groups now had the opportunity to function as a political as well as cultural force whose demands had to be taken into consideration by the Czechoslovak state. This, however, led to friction between these otherwise friendly Slavic groups. Already toward the end of World War I Rusyn immigrants in the United States began to talk about autonomy, or even statehood, which they hoped to obtain for their Carpatho-Rusyn homeland at the close of the war. These leaders spoke of uniting all Rusyn-inhabited areas, including the northern portions of the old Hungarian counties of Spis, Saris, and Zemplin. This demand was opposed, however, by Slovak leaders who felt that all three of these counties should belong to Slovakia. 3 When the Rusyn province of Subcarpathian Rus' (Podkarpatska Rus) was established in 1919, its western border with Slovakia (along the Uz River) was initially only a provisional one, and Rusyn politicians both in Subcarpathian Rus' as well as in the Presov Region called upon the Prague administration to unite all Rusyn-inhabited areas into one autonomous province. But Slovaks adamantly opposed any proposed cession of Spis, Saris, and Zemplin counties. Finally in 1929, the • Paper presented as part of a panel on "14 March 1939 and the Slovak State," sponsored by the Slovak Studies Association in conjunction with the national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Haven, October, 1979. �40 SLOVAKIA boundary of Subcarpathian Rus' was moved slightly westward, still leaving more than 90,000 Rusyns as a minority within the province of Slovakia.4 Rusyn leaders in Subcarpathian Rus' continued to lay claim to what became their Presov Region irredenta, but it was not until late 1938 that a new drive toward Rusyn unification was undertaken in earnest. After the Munich Crisis and the establishment of a federalized Czecho-Slovakia in October 1938, Presov Region Rusyn parliamentary deputies Ivan P 'escak and Petr Zidovskij supported the demands of the Rusyn National Committee in Presov (est. 1937) , which called for unification with the autonomous Subcarpathian Rus'. These efforts lasted barely a month, however, because in November, after a Ukrainophile government led by Avhustyn Volosyn came to power in Subcarpathian Rl,ls', Presov Region Rusyns, who were traditionally Russophile in national orientation, wanted nothing to do with the Carpatho-Ukrainian government farther east. Instead, the Rusyn National Committee in Presov supported elections to the Slovak Provincial Diet (to which two Rusyns were chosen) in December.5 Within a few months the question of unity with Subcarpathian Rus' became a moot issue. On March 15, 1939, Hitler decided to liquidate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Third Reich; Slovakia (without its southern region annexed by Hungary in November, 1938) was allowed to become an independent but German-oriented state; and Subcarpathian Rus' was taken by Hungary. In late March, the anxious Hungarians sliced off a piece of land in eastern Slovakia leaving 36 Rusyn villages (20,000 people from the Presov Region) under Hungary for the duration of the war. As a result of these political changes, most Presov Region Rusyns were now under the control of a state governed by Slovaks in Bratislava. The Slovaks had struggled for more than two decades to gain greater autonomy from the Czech-dominated centralized Prague government. Now they finally had their own state, even if its existence depended on the good will of Hitler's German~. The new government in Bratislava was dominated by patriots whose goal was to Slovakize all aspects of the country. The Rusyns of the Presov Region were especially a target for discrimination, because just after the Munich Crisis they expressed a desire to unite with Subcarpathian Rus ' . Consequently, the Greek Catholic Church and especially its Bishop, Pavel Gojdic, were accused of disloyalty and pro-Hungarian feelings . For instance, in 1939 the President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso, and in 1940 the Minister of Propaganda, Sano Mach, visited Presov and on two �SLOVAKIA 41 separate occasions sligh_ted the Bishop in public and questioned his loyalty.6 Also in 1940, Apdrej Dudas was appointed to head the administrative district (Saris:.Zemplin iupa) for all of eastern Slovakia, a post he was to hold for the remainder of the war. Dudas was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, and in 1943 he wrote a book on the subject and concluded that the "socalled Rusyn people (rusinsky l 'ud) in the Carpathian Basin are by origin and character Slovak. "7 It was in such an atmosphere that Presov Region Rusyns now found themselves. In early 1939, the Rusyn National Committee and Carpatho-Rusyn National Council were banned, the newspaper Prja~evskaja Rus' (Presov, 1938-39) was closed, and the activity of the local Rusyn cultural Duchnovyc Society was restricted. Rusyns were allowed one more deputy, Mychal Bon'ko, who was appointed to the Slovak Diet in 1941, but like his elected predecessors (Simko and Hornjak), he was expected to support the government's policy.8 Only the Greek Catholic Church led by Bishop Gojdic could effectively defend Rusyn national interests. As a result of Gojdic' s efforts, the Slovak government passed a decree in 1940 making all Rusyn elementary schools the responsibility of the Greek Catholic Church. This allowed for the maintenance of Rusyn teaching, and for that purpose four new textbooks were published. Other cultural activity was limited. The Slovaks wanted to remove Presov as the cultural center for Rusyns, and in that regard tried, though unsuccessfully, to have Bishop Gojdic' s residence transferred from Presov northward to Medzilaborce. One newspaper was permitted, Novoe vremja (Medzilaborce, 1940-44), which like the Greek Catholic school system used the so-called ''traditional Carpatho-Rusyn language" (i.e., Russian with local dialectisms) and propagated a Russophile national orientation.9 Presov Region authors were generally isolated from each other during the war years, although some cultural activity took place among Rusyn university students in Bratislava through their student club, the Dobrianskij Society (Obscestvo Dobrianskogo) and publications: Studenfeskij iurnal (Bratislava, 194041) and Jar' (Bratislava, 1942-43).10 The economic situation of the mass of Rusyn peasantry did not change from what it was during the interwar years, even though a few thousand went to Germany to work and some who remained home were able to take advantage of the aryanization laws (September, 1941) and receive proprietorship over former Jewish land and shops. Moreover, Slovakia suffered little destruction until the last months of the war, and �42 SLOVAKIA some improvements, especially in roads and communications, took place. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to discuss the partisan movement in any detail. Suffice it to say that the first partisan unit in the Presov Region was organized already in 1943, and an underground movement, the Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for National Liberation (Karpatorusskij Avtonomnyj Sojuz Nacionafnogo Osvobozdenija - KRASNO), was formed in 1944. The latter maintained contacts both with the Slovak underground movement and with the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union. KRASNO was dedicated to the principle of a liberated Chzechoslovakia, and it welcomed the October, 1944 declaration of the underground Slovak National Council that the ''new republic must be ... a fraternal republic of three equal nations - Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns. "11 In summary, the close and often supportive relations that existed for centuries between Slovaks and Presov Region Rusyns were replaced in the twentieth century by friction often caused by the opposed political and cultural goals of the two groups. Neither the First nor Second Czechoslovak Republic, nor the Slovak state contributed in any way to a lessening of political friction between Slovaks and Presov Region Rusyns, a situation, I might add, which has only worsened since World War II.12 NOTES 1 Rusyns living south of the Carpathian Mountains (i.e. , in the present-day Transcarpathian Oblast' of the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Pre§ov Region) have been known by various names , such as Carpatho-Ruthenian, Carpatho-Russian, and CarpathoUkrainian. It was not until the twentieth century that the name Ukrainian came to be accepted by certain segments of the population; and with regard specifically to the inhabitants of the Pre§ov Region, this did not occur until as late as the 1960s. The historic name of the group has always been Rusyn (o~ Rusnak in the Pre§ov Region), and this is the term that will be used here. The Pre§ov Region takes its name from the city of Pre§ov, the traditional religious and cultural center of the group, which is, however, located outside of Rusyn ethnographic territory. For a discussion of nomenclature, see Paul R. Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 277-281. 2 For a survey of socioeconomic and cultural developments in the nineteenth century among Rusyns, see Magocsi, ibid, pp. 9-76 ; I. G. Kolomiets, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia i obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Zakarpat'e vo vtoroi polovine XIX, 2 vols. (Tomsk: lzd. Tomskogo universiteta, 1961-62) ; and Ivan Zeguc, Die national- �SLOVAKIA 43 politischem Bestrebungen der Karpato-Ruthenen 1848-1914 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965). On the Slovaks, see R. W .~Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908); and Franti§ek Bokes, Dejiny Slovdkov a Slovenska od najstarJfch i!ias al po oslobodenie; Slovenska vlastiveda , Vol. IV (Bratislava, 1946), esp. pp. 130-339. On Slovak-Rusyn relations before 1918, see Mykhailo Mofnar, Slovaky i Ukraintsi (Bratislava and Pre§ov, 1966); and Helen Rudlovi!akova, " K otazkam vzajomnych kultumych stykov Slovakov a zakarpatskych Ukrajincov v polovici minuleho storocia,'' Sbomtk Sevi!enskovskj Filozoficky fakulty Univ. P. J. Safdrika, V (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 149-166. 3 For further details on the immediate post-World War I developments, see Magocsi, Shaping of a National Identity , pp. 76-102 ; and Marian Mark Stolarik, " The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-1918, " Slovakia, VIIl (Cleveland and Rome, 1968), pp. 7-82 . 4 For details on the problem of the Slovak-Rusyn border during the interwar period, see the comprehensive recent monograph by Ivan Vanat, Narysy novitn 'oi istorii ukrain· tsiv Skhidnoi Slovachchyny , Vol. I: 1918-1988 (Bratislava and Pre§ov, 1979), pp. 103135 and 272-287. 5 There is controversy over the extent to which Rusyn leaders in the Pre§ov Region supported the call for unification with the autonomous Subcarpathian Rue'. Ukrainian writers in Pre§ov today, in an attempt to show that Rusyns in 1938 were in opposition to Slovak political activity at the same time that they were anxious to express solidarity with their " Carpatho-Ukrainian" brethren just to the east, argue that contemporary Slovak police reports revealed that support for unity with Subcarpathian Rue ' was widespread. Cf. Stefan Pazur, ''O vyvoji narodnostnych pomerov na vychodnom Slovensku v jesennych mesiacoch roku 1938," Nove obzory, X (Pre§ov, 1968), pp. 13-25. Indeed, this is true for the month of October and very early November. But I have read these same police reports (in the Statny Slovensky Ostredny Archiv - SSOA - in Bratislava), and they indicate by November a clear change in Pre§ov Region Rusyn public opinion against the idea of unity, because the "Ukrainian orientation is alien and in the end they (Pre§ov Region Rusyns) reject any kind of revision of borders in favor of Carpatho-Ukraine. " Prezidium Policajneho riaditel'stva v Pre§ove, January 11 , 1939 (SSOA , Fond Prezidium Krajinskeho uradu, carton 297, folder 310-1938). See · also carton 298, folder 62212-38. 6 These incidents are based on an unnamed eyewitness report and are given in Atanasii V. Pekar, Narysy istorii tserkvy Zakarpattia , Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I (Rome , 1967) , pp. 144-146; and Julius Kubinyi, The History of PrjaJiv Eparchy, Editiones Universitatis Catholicae Ucrainorum S. Clementia Papae, Vol. XXXII (Rome, 1970) , pp . 161-163. 7 Andrej DudltA,Rustnskaotdzkaajej uzadie (Buenos Aires: Zahranii!na Matica slovenska, 1971) , p. 25. The Slovak denial of the existence of Rusyns in the Pre§ov Region was widespread already during the interwar period: ''These people (in northern Sari§ and Zemplin counties) are our Slovaks, who only because of the Greek Catholic faith inadvertently call themselves Rusnaks or of the Rusnak faith . But teachenJ infect them by saying that they are also of Rusyn nationality. This is ridiculous, but it is happening .... There are no Rusyns up there, nor Rusnaks, only Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith. " Slovenska politika (Bratislava), September 2, 1928 - cited in Ivan Baji!ura, Ukrajinskaotdzka v CSSR (Ko§ice : Vychodoslovenske vyd. , 1967) , p. 44. The politically and emotionally charged questions of whether all Greek Catholics in eastern Slovakia are Rusyns or whether all or most are Slovaks has acquired an exten- �44 SLOVAKIA sive polemical and scholarly literature. Among the better works which present opposing views are: Volodymyr Hnatiuk, " Rusyny Priashivs'koi eparkhii i ikh hovory," Zapysky Nau.kouoho Touarystua im. Sheuchenka, XXXV (L'viv, 1900), pp. 1-25; and Ondrej R. Halaga, Slouanske osfdlenie potisia a uychodoslouenski greckokatolici (Ko§ice , 1947) . 8 For details on the policy of the Slovak autonomous government and later the Slovak state vis-a-vis the Pre§ov Region Rusyns, see Andrii Kovach, " Stanovyshche zakarpatis'kykh ukraintsiv (rusyniv) i zanepad pershoi ChSR," Nau.kouyi zbirnyk , VI, pt. 1 (Svidnik, Bratislava, and Pre§ov, 1972), esp. pp. 23-30 ; and his " Natsional'na polityka Slovats'koi Respubliky po vidnoshenniu do rusyniv-ukraintsiv (1939-1945 r.r.)," in Zhouten ' i ukrains'ka kul'tura (Pre§ov, 1968), pp. 132-143 . 9 Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century and continuing down to as recently as the early 1950s, most members of the Pre§ov Region Rusyn intelligentsia considered themselves part of one Russian nationality which lived from the Carpathian Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. 10 On cultural developments during the war years, see Andrii Kovach, ''Ukraintsi Priashivshchyny i deiaki pytannia kul 'turnoi polityky Slovats'koi Respubliky," Naukouyi zbirnyk, IV, pt. 1 (Svidnik, Pre§ov, and Bratislava, 1969), pp . 401-412; and his " Ukraintsi Skhidnoi Slovachchyny naperedodni slovats'koho narodnoho povstannia, " Z mynuloho i suchasnoho ukraintsiu Chekhoslouachchyny, Pedahohichnyi zbirnyk, No. 3 (Bratislava, 1973), pp . 196-215. 11 Cited in Edo Fri§ , My§lienka a tin: uuahy o Ceskoslouensku 1938-1948 (Bratislava, 1968) , p. 104. For details on the Rusyn underground and partisan movement, see the studies by Stepan Pazhur, Vasyl' Horkovych, Andrii Kovach, as well as several eyewitness recollections from the period contained in Shliakh do uoli , in Naukouyi zbirnyk , II (Svidnik, Pre§ov, and Bratislava, 1966) . 12 For a discussion of Slovak-Rusyn relations between 1945 and the mid-1960s, see Baj<'!ura , Ukrajinska. ota.zka u CSSR; on the worsening of those relations after the Dubrek era in 1968-69, see Pavel Maro, " National Assimilation: The Case of the RusynUkrainians of Czechoslovakia," East Central Europe, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, 1975), pp . 101132. � SLOVAKIA 39 Rusyns a'\d the Slovak State· PAULR. MAGOCSI The status of Rusyns living within the boundaries of the Slovak state between the years 1939 and 1944 was greatly influenced by developments during the interwar period and most especially during the period of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic in late 1938 and early 1939. The Rusyns, or as they are known today, Ukrainians, who inhabit the so-called Presov Region of present-day northeastern Slovakia, 1 had lived for centuries in harmony with neighboring Slovaks. Both groups were ruled by Hungary and both groups were characterized by general economic and social backwardness. 2 This situation changed after 1918 when Rusyns and Slovaks found themselves within the first Czechoslovak Republic. Both groups now had the opportunity to function as a political as well as cultural force whose demands had to be taken into consideration by the Czechoslovak state. This, however, led to friction between these otherwise friendly Slavic groups. Already toward the end of World War I Rusyn immigrants in the United States began to talk about autonomy, or even statehood, which they hoped to obtain for their Carpatho-Rusyn homeland at the close of the war. These leaders spoke of uniting all Rusyn-inhabited areas, including the northern portions of the old Hungarian counties of Spis, Saris, and Zemplin. This demand was opposed, however, by Slovak leaders who felt that all three of these counties should belong to Slovakia. 3 When the Rusyn province of Subcarpathian Rus' (Podkarpatska Rus) was established in 1919, its western border with Slovakia (along the Uz River) was initially only a provisional one, and Rusyn politicians both in Subcarpathian Rus' as well as in the Presov Region called upon the Prague administration to unite all Rusyn-inhabited areas into one autonomous province. But Slovaks adamantly opposed any proposed cession of Spis, Saris, and Zemplin counties. Finally in 1929, the • Paper presented as part of a panel on "14 March 1939 and the Slovak State," sponsored by the Slovak Studies Association in conjunction with the national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Haven, October, 1979. �40 SLOVAKIA boundary of Subcarpathian Rus' was moved slightly westward, still leaving more than 90,000 Rusyns as a minority within the province of Slovakia.4 Rusyn leaders in Subcarpathian Rus' continued to lay claim to what became their Presov Region irredenta, but it was not until late 1938 that a new drive toward Rusyn unification was undertaken in earnest. After the Munich Crisis and the establishment of a federalized Czecho-Slovakia in October 1938, Presov Region Rusyn parliamentary deputies Ivan P 'escak and Petr Zidovskij supported the demands of the Rusyn National Committee in Presov (est. 1937) , which called for unification with the autonomous Subcarpathian Rus'. These efforts lasted barely a month, however, because in November, after a Ukrainophile government led by Avhustyn Volosyn came to power in Subcarpathian Rl,ls', Presov Region Rusyns, who were traditionally Russophile in national orientation, wanted nothing to do with the Carpatho-Ukrainian government farther east. Instead, the Rusyn National Committee in Presov supported elections to the Slovak Provincial Diet (to which two Rusyns were chosen) in December.5 Within a few months the question of unity with Subcarpathian Rus' became a moot issue. On March 15, 1939, Hitler decided to liquidate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Third Reich; Slovakia (without its southern region annexed by Hungary in November, 1938) was allowed to become an independent but German-oriented state; and Subcarpathian Rus' was taken by Hungary. In late March, the anxious Hungarians sliced off a piece of land in eastern Slovakia leaving 36 Rusyn villages (20,000 people from the Presov Region) under Hungary for the duration of the war. As a result of these political changes, most Presov Region Rusyns were now under the control of a state governed by Slovaks in Bratislava. The Slovaks had struggled for more than two decades to gain greater autonomy from the Czech-dominated centralized Prague government. Now they finally had their own state, even if its existence depended on the good will of Hitler's German~. The new government in Bratislava was dominated by patriots whose goal was to Slovakize all aspects of the country. The Rusyns of the Presov Region were especially a target for discrimination, because just after the Munich Crisis they expressed a desire to unite with Subcarpathian Rus ' . Consequently, the Greek Catholic Church and especially its Bishop, Pavel Gojdic, were accused of disloyalty and pro-Hungarian feelings . For instance, in 1939 the President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso, and in 1940 the Minister of Propaganda, Sano Mach, visited Presov and on two �SLOVAKIA 41 separate occasions sligh_ted the Bishop in public and questioned his loyalty.6 Also in 1940, Apdrej Dudas was appointed to head the administrative district (Saris:.Zemplin iupa) for all of eastern Slovakia, a post he was to hold for the remainder of the war. Dudas was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, and in 1943 he wrote a book on the subject and concluded that the "socalled Rusyn people (rusinsky l 'ud) in the Carpathian Basin are by origin and character Slovak. "7 It was in such an atmosphere that Presov Region Rusyns now found themselves. In early 1939, the Rusyn National Committee and Carpatho-Rusyn National Council were banned, the newspaper Prja~evskaja Rus' (Presov, 1938-39) was closed, and the activity of the local Rusyn cultural Duchnovyc Society was restricted. Rusyns were allowed one more deputy, Mychal Bon'ko, who was appointed to the Slovak Diet in 1941, but like his elected predecessors (Simko and Hornjak), he was expected to support the government's policy.8 Only the Greek Catholic Church led by Bishop Gojdic could effectively defend Rusyn national interests. As a result of Gojdic' s efforts, the Slovak government passed a decree in 1940 making all Rusyn elementary schools the responsibility of the Greek Catholic Church. This allowed for the maintenance of Rusyn teaching, and for that purpose four new textbooks were published. Other cultural activity was limited. The Slovaks wanted to remove Presov as the cultural center for Rusyns, and in that regard tried, though unsuccessfully, to have Bishop Gojdic' s residence transferred from Presov northward to Medzilaborce. One newspaper was permitted, Novoe vremja (Medzilaborce, 1940-44), which like the Greek Catholic school system used the so-called ''traditional Carpatho-Rusyn language" (i.e., Russian with local dialectisms) and propagated a Russophile national orientation.9 Presov Region authors were generally isolated from each other during the war years, although some cultural activity took place among Rusyn university students in Bratislava through their student club, the Dobrianskij Society (Obscestvo Dobrianskogo) and publications: Studenfeskij iurnal (Bratislava, 194041) and Jar' (Bratislava, 1942-43).10 The economic situation of the mass of Rusyn peasantry did not change from what it was during the interwar years, even though a few thousand went to Germany to work and some who remained home were able to take advantage of the aryanization laws (September, 1941) and receive proprietorship over former Jewish land and shops. Moreover, Slovakia suffered little destruction until the last months of the war, and �42 SLOVAKIA some improvements, especially in roads and communications, took place. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to discuss the partisan movement in any detail. Suffice it to say that the first partisan unit in the Presov Region was organized already in 1943, and an underground movement, the Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for National Liberation (Karpatorusskij Avtonomnyj Sojuz Nacionafnogo Osvobozdenija - KRASNO), was formed in 1944. The latter maintained contacts both with the Slovak underground movement and with the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union. KRASNO was dedicated to the principle of a liberated Chzechoslovakia, and it welcomed the October, 1944 declaration of the underground Slovak National Council that the ''new republic must be ... a fraternal republic of three equal nations - Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns. "11 In summary, the close and often supportive relations that existed for centuries between Slovaks and Presov Region Rusyns were replaced in the twentieth century by friction often caused by the opposed political and cultural goals of the two groups. Neither the First nor Second Czechoslovak Republic, nor the Slovak state contributed in any way to a lessening of political friction between Slovaks and Presov Region Rusyns, a situation, I might add, which has only worsened since World War II.12 NOTES 1 Rusyns living south of the Carpathian Mountains (i.e. , in the present-day Transcarpathian Oblast' of the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Pre§ov Region) have been known by various names , such as Carpatho-Ruthenian, Carpatho-Russian, and CarpathoUkrainian. It was not until the twentieth century that the name Ukrainian came to be accepted by certain segments of the population; and with regard specifically to the inhabitants of the Pre§ov Region, this did not occur until as late as the 1960s. The historic name of the group has always been Rusyn (o~ Rusnak in the Pre§ov Region), and this is the term that will be used here. The Pre§ov Region takes its name from the city of Pre§ov, the traditional religious and cultural center of the group, which is, however, located outside of Rusyn ethnographic territory. For a discussion of nomenclature, see Paul R. Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 277-281. 2 For a survey of socioeconomic and cultural developments in the nineteenth century among Rusyns, see Magocsi, ibid, pp. 9-76 ; I. G. Kolomiets, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia i obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Zakarpat'e vo vtoroi polovine XIX, 2 vols. (Tomsk: lzd. Tomskogo universiteta, 1961-62) ; and Ivan Zeguc, Die national- �SLOVAKIA 43 politischem Bestrebungen der Karpato-Ruthenen 1848-1914 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965). On the Slovaks, see R. W .~Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908); and Franti§ek Bokes, Dejiny Slovdkov a Slovenska od najstarJfch i!ias al po oslobodenie; Slovenska vlastiveda , Vol. IV (Bratislava, 1946), esp. pp. 130-339. On Slovak-Rusyn relations before 1918, see Mykhailo Mofnar, Slovaky i Ukraintsi (Bratislava and Pre§ov, 1966); and Helen Rudlovi!akova, " K otazkam vzajomnych kultumych stykov Slovakov a zakarpatskych Ukrajincov v polovici minuleho storocia,'' Sbomtk Sevi!enskovskj Filozoficky fakulty Univ. P. J. Safdrika, V (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 149-166. 3 For further details on the immediate post-World War I developments, see Magocsi, Shaping of a National Identity , pp. 76-102 ; and Marian Mark Stolarik, " The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-1918, " Slovakia, VIIl (Cleveland and Rome, 1968), pp. 7-82 . 4 For details on the problem of the Slovak-Rusyn border during the interwar period, see the comprehensive recent monograph by Ivan Vanat, Narysy novitn 'oi istorii ukrain· tsiv Skhidnoi Slovachchyny , Vol. I: 1918-1988 (Bratislava and Pre§ov, 1979), pp. 103135 and 272-287. 5 There is controversy over the extent to which Rusyn leaders in the Pre§ov Region supported the call for unification with the autonomous Subcarpathian Rue'. Ukrainian writers in Pre§ov today, in an attempt to show that Rusyns in 1938 were in opposition to Slovak political activity at the same time that they were anxious to express solidarity with their " Carpatho-Ukrainian" brethren just to the east, argue that contemporary Slovak police reports revealed that support for unity with Subcarpathian Rue ' was widespread. Cf. Stefan Pazur, ''O vyvoji narodnostnych pomerov na vychodnom Slovensku v jesennych mesiacoch roku 1938," Nove obzory, X (Pre§ov, 1968), pp. 13-25. Indeed, this is true for the month of October and very early November. But I have read these same police reports (in the Statny Slovensky Ostredny Archiv - SSOA - in Bratislava), and they indicate by November a clear change in Pre§ov Region Rusyn public opinion against the idea of unity, because the "Ukrainian orientation is alien and in the end they (Pre§ov Region Rusyns) reject any kind of revision of borders in favor of Carpatho-Ukraine. " Prezidium Policajneho riaditel'stva v Pre§ove, January 11 , 1939 (SSOA , Fond Prezidium Krajinskeho uradu, carton 297, folder 310-1938). See · also carton 298, folder 62212-38. 6 These incidents are based on an unnamed eyewitness report and are given in Atanasii V. Pekar, Narysy istorii tserkvy Zakarpattia , Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I (Rome , 1967) , pp. 144-146; and Julius Kubinyi, The History of PrjaJiv Eparchy, Editiones Universitatis Catholicae Ucrainorum S. Clementia Papae, Vol. XXXII (Rome, 1970) , pp . 161-163. 7 Andrej DudltA,Rustnskaotdzkaajej uzadie (Buenos Aires: Zahranii!na Matica slovenska, 1971) , p. 25. The Slovak denial of the existence of Rusyns in the Pre§ov Region was widespread already during the interwar period: ''These people (in northern Sari§ and Zemplin counties) are our Slovaks, who only because of the Greek Catholic faith inadvertently call themselves Rusnaks or of the Rusnak faith . But teachenJ infect them by saying that they are also of Rusyn nationality. This is ridiculous, but it is happening .... There are no Rusyns up there, nor Rusnaks, only Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith. " Slovenska politika (Bratislava), September 2, 1928 - cited in Ivan Baji!ura, Ukrajinskaotdzka v CSSR (Ko§ice : Vychodoslovenske vyd. , 1967) , p. 44. The politically and emotionally charged questions of whether all Greek Catholics in eastern Slovakia are Rusyns or whether all or most are Slovaks has acquired an exten- �44 SLOVAKIA sive polemical and scholarly literature. Among the better works which present opposing views are: Volodymyr Hnatiuk, " Rusyny Priashivs'koi eparkhii i ikh hovory," Zapysky Nau.kouoho Touarystua im. Sheuchenka, XXXV (L'viv, 1900), pp. 1-25; and Ondrej R. Halaga, Slouanske osfdlenie potisia a uychodoslouenski greckokatolici (Ko§ice , 1947) . 8 For details on the policy of the Slovak autonomous government and later the Slovak state vis-a-vis the Pre§ov Region Rusyns, see Andrii Kovach, " Stanovyshche zakarpatis'kykh ukraintsiv (rusyniv) i zanepad pershoi ChSR," Nau.kouyi zbirnyk , VI, pt. 1 (Svidnik, Bratislava, and Pre§ov, 1972), esp. pp. 23-30 ; and his " Natsional'na polityka Slovats'koi Respubliky po vidnoshenniu do rusyniv-ukraintsiv (1939-1945 r.r.)," in Zhouten ' i ukrains'ka kul'tura (Pre§ov, 1968), pp. 132-143 . 9 Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century and continuing down to as recently as the early 1950s, most members of the Pre§ov Region Rusyn intelligentsia considered themselves part of one Russian nationality which lived from the Carpathian Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. 10 On cultural developments during the war years, see Andrii Kovach, ''Ukraintsi Priashivshchyny i deiaki pytannia kul 'turnoi polityky Slovats'koi Respubliky," Naukouyi zbirnyk, IV, pt. 1 (Svidnik, Pre§ov, and Bratislava, 1969), pp . 401-412; and his " Ukraintsi Skhidnoi Slovachchyny naperedodni slovats'koho narodnoho povstannia, " Z mynuloho i suchasnoho ukraintsiu Chekhoslouachchyny, Pedahohichnyi zbirnyk, No. 3 (Bratislava, 1973), pp . 196-215. 11 Cited in Edo Fri§ , My§lienka a tin: uuahy o Ceskoslouensku 1938-1948 (Bratislava, 1968) , p. 104. For details on the Rusyn underground and partisan movement, see the studies by Stepan Pazhur, Vasyl' Horkovych, Andrii Kovach, as well as several eyewitness recollections from the period contained in Shliakh do uoli , in Naukouyi zbirnyk , II (Svidnik, Pre§ov, and Bratislava, 1966) . 12 For a discussion of Slovak-Rusyn relations between 1945 and the mid-1960s, see Baj<'!ura , Ukrajinska. ota.zka u CSSR; on the worsening of those relations after the Dubrek era in 1968-69, see Pavel Maro, " National Assimilation: The Case of the RusynUkrainians of Czechoslovakia," East Central Europe, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, 1975), pp . 101132. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1980-81, Vol. 29 Description An account of the resource Vol. 29 (No. 53-54), 1980-81. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-81 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 39 Rusyns a'\d the Slovak State· PAULR. MAGOCSI The status of Rusyns living within the boundaries of the Slovak state between the years 1939 and 1944 was greatly influenced by developments during the interwar period and most especially during the period of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic in late 1938 and early 1939. The Rusyns, or as they are known today, Ukrainians, who inhabit the so-called Presov Region of present-day northeastern Slovakia, 1 had lived for centuries in harmony with neighboring Slovaks. Both groups were ruled by Hungary and both groups were characterized by general economic and social backwardness. 2 This situation changed after 1918 when Rusyns and Slovaks found themselves within the first Czechoslovak Republic. Both groups now had the opportunity to function as a political as well as cultural force whose demands had to be taken into consideration by the Czechoslovak state. This, however, led to friction between these otherwise friendly Slavic groups. Already toward the end of World War I Rusyn immigrants in the United States began to talk about autonomy, or even statehood, which they hoped to obtain for their Carpatho-Rusyn homeland at the close of the war. These leaders spoke of uniting all Rusyn-inhabited areas, including the northern portions of the old Hungarian counties of Spis, Saris, and Zemplin. This demand was opposed, however, by Slovak leaders who felt that all three of these counties should belong to Slovakia. 3 When the Rusyn province of Subcarpathian Rus' (Podkarpatska Rus) was established in 1919, its western border with Slovakia (along the Uz River) was initially only a provisional one, and Rusyn politicians both in Subcarpathian Rus' as well as in the Presov Region called upon the Prague administration to unite all Rusyn-inhabited areas into one autonomous province. But Slovaks adamantly opposed any proposed cession of Spis, Saris, and Zemplin counties. Finally in 1929, the • Paper presented as part of a panel on "14 March 1939 and the Slovak State," sponsored by the Slovak Studies Association in conjunction with the national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Haven, October, 1979. 40 SLOVAKIA boundary of Subcarpathian Rus' was moved slightly westward, still leaving more than 90,000 Rusyns as a minority within the province of Slovakia.4 Rusyn leaders in Subcarpathian Rus' continued to lay claim to what became their Presov Region irredenta, but it was not until late 1938 that a new drive toward Rusyn unification was undertaken in earnest. After the Munich Crisis and the establishment of a federalized Czecho-Slovakia in October 1938, Presov Region Rusyn parliamentary deputies Ivan P 'escak and Petr Zidovskij supported the demands of the Rusyn National Committee in Presov (est. 1937) , which called for unification with the autonomous Subcarpathian Rus'. These efforts lasted barely a month, however, because in November, after a Ukrainophile government led by Avhustyn Volosyn came to power in Subcarpathian Rl,ls', Presov Region Rusyns, who were traditionally Russophile in national orientation, wanted nothing to do with the Carpatho-Ukrainian government farther east. Instead, the Rusyn National Committee in Presov supported elections to the Slovak Provincial Diet (to which two Rusyns were chosen) in December.5 Within a few months the question of unity with Subcarpathian Rus' became a moot issue. On March 15, 1939, Hitler decided to liquidate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Third Reich; Slovakia (without its southern region annexed by Hungary in November, 1938) was allowed to become an independent but German-oriented state; and Subcarpathian Rus' was taken by Hungary. In late March, the anxious Hungarians sliced off a piece of land in eastern Slovakia leaving 36 Rusyn villages (20,000 people from the Presov Region) under Hungary for the duration of the war. As a result of these political changes, most Presov Region Rusyns were now under the control of a state governed by Slovaks in Bratislava. The Slovaks had struggled for more than two decades to gain greater autonomy from the Czech-dominated centralized Prague government. Now they finally had their own state, even if its existence depended on the good will of Hitler's German~. The new government in Bratislava was dominated by patriots whose goal was to Slovakize all aspects of the country. The Rusyns of the Presov Region were especially a target for discrimination, because just after the Munich Crisis they expressed a desire to unite with Subcarpathian Rus ' . Consequently, the Greek Catholic Church and especially its Bishop, Pavel Gojdic, were accused of disloyalty and pro-Hungarian feelings . For instance, in 1939 the President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso, and in 1940 the Minister of Propaganda, Sano Mach, visited Presov and on two SLOVAKIA 41 separate occasions sligh_ted the Bishop in public and questioned his loyalty.6 Also in 1940, Apdrej Dudas was appointed to head the administrative district (Saris:.Zemplin iupa) for all of eastern Slovakia, a post he was to hold for the remainder of the war. Dudas was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, and in 1943 he wrote a book on the subject and concluded that the "socalled Rusyn people (rusinsky l 'ud) in the Carpathian Basin are by origin and character Slovak. "7 It was in such an atmosphere that Presov Region Rusyns now found themselves. In early 1939, the Rusyn National Committee and Carpatho-Rusyn National Council were banned, the newspaper Prja~evskaja Rus' (Presov, 1938-39) was closed, and the activity of the local Rusyn cultural Duchnovyc Society was restricted. Rusyns were allowed one more deputy, Mychal Bon'ko, who was appointed to the Slovak Diet in 1941, but like his elected predecessors (Simko and Hornjak), he was expected to support the government's policy.8 Only the Greek Catholic Church led by Bishop Gojdic could effectively defend Rusyn national interests. As a result of Gojdic' s efforts, the Slovak government passed a decree in 1940 making all Rusyn elementary schools the responsibility of the Greek Catholic Church. This allowed for the maintenance of Rusyn teaching, and for that purpose four new textbooks were published. Other cultural activity was limited. The Slovaks wanted to remove Presov as the cultural center for Rusyns, and in that regard tried, though unsuccessfully, to have Bishop Gojdic' s residence transferred from Presov northward to Medzilaborce. One newspaper was permitted, Novoe vremja (Medzilaborce, 1940-44), which like the Greek Catholic school system used the so-called ''traditional Carpatho-Rusyn language" (i.e., Russian with local dialectisms) and propagated a Russophile national orientation.9 Presov Region authors were generally isolated from each other during the war years, although some cultural activity took place among Rusyn university students in Bratislava through their student club, the Dobrianskij Society (Obscestvo Dobrianskogo) and publications: Studenfeskij iurnal (Bratislava, 194041) and Jar' (Bratislava, 1942-43).10 The economic situation of the mass of Rusyn peasantry did not change from what it was during the interwar years, even though a few thousand went to Germany to work and some who remained home were able to take advantage of the aryanization laws (September, 1941) and receive proprietorship over former Jewish land and shops. Moreover, Slovakia suffered little destruction until the last months of the war, and 42 SLOVAKIA some improvements, especially in roads and communications, took place. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to discuss the partisan movement in any detail. Suffice it to say that the first partisan unit in the Presov Region was organized already in 1943, and an underground movement, the Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for National Liberation (Karpatorusskij Avtonomnyj Sojuz Nacionafnogo Osvobozdenija - KRASNO), was formed in 1944. The latter maintained contacts both with the Slovak underground movement and with the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union. KRASNO was dedicated to the principle of a liberated Chzechoslovakia, and it welcomed the October, 1944 declaration of the underground Slovak National Council that the ''new republic must be ... a fraternal republic of three equal nations - Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns. "11 In summary, the close and often supportive relations that existed for centuries between Slovaks and Presov Region Rusyns were replaced in the twentieth century by friction often caused by the opposed political and cultural goals of the two groups. Neither the First nor Second Czechoslovak Republic, nor the Slovak state contributed in any way to a lessening of political friction between Slovaks and Presov Region Rusyns, a situation, I might add, which has only worsened since World War II.12 NOTES 1 Rusyns living south of the Carpathian Mountains (i.e. , in the present-day Transcarpathian Oblast' of the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Pre§ov Region) have been known by various names , such as Carpatho-Ruthenian, Carpatho-Russian, and CarpathoUkrainian. It was not until the twentieth century that the name Ukrainian came to be accepted by certain segments of the population; and with regard specifically to the inhabitants of the Pre§ov Region, this did not occur until as late as the 1960s. The historic name of the group has always been Rusyn (o~ Rusnak in the Pre§ov Region), and this is the term that will be used here. The Pre§ov Region takes its name from the city of Pre§ov, the traditional religious and cultural center of the group, which is, however, located outside of Rusyn ethnographic territory. For a discussion of nomenclature, see Paul R. Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 277-281. 2 For a survey of socioeconomic and cultural developments in the nineteenth century among Rusyns, see Magocsi, ibid, pp. 9-76 ; I. G. Kolomiets, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia i obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Zakarpat'e vo vtoroi polovine XIX, 2 vols. (Tomsk: lzd. Tomskogo universiteta, 1961-62) ; and Ivan Zeguc, Die national- SLOVAKIA 43 politischem Bestrebungen der Karpato-Ruthenen 1848-1914 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965). On the Slovaks, see R. W .~Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908); and Franti§ek Bokes, Dejiny Slovdkov a Slovenska od najstarJfch i!ias al po oslobodenie; Slovenska vlastiveda , Vol. IV (Bratislava, 1946), esp. pp. 130-339. On Slovak-Rusyn relations before 1918, see Mykhailo Mofnar, Slovaky i Ukraintsi (Bratislava and Pre§ov, 1966); and Helen Rudlovi!akova, " K otazkam vzajomnych kultumych stykov Slovakov a zakarpatskych Ukrajincov v polovici minuleho storocia,'' Sbomtk Sevi!enskovskj Filozoficky fakulty Univ. P. J. Safdrika, V (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 149-166. 3 For further details on the immediate post-World War I developments, see Magocsi, Shaping of a National Identity , pp. 76-102 ; and Marian Mark Stolarik, " The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-1918, " Slovakia, VIIl (Cleveland and Rome, 1968), pp. 7-82 . 4 For details on the problem of the Slovak-Rusyn border during the interwar period, see the comprehensive recent monograph by Ivan Vanat, Narysy novitn 'oi istorii ukrain· tsiv Skhidnoi Slovachchyny , Vol. I: 1918-1988 (Bratislava and Pre§ov, 1979), pp. 103135 and 272-287. 5 There is controversy over the extent to which Rusyn leaders in the Pre§ov Region supported the call for unification with the autonomous Subcarpathian Rue'. Ukrainian writers in Pre§ov today, in an attempt to show that Rusyns in 1938 were in opposition to Slovak political activity at the same time that they were anxious to express solidarity with their " Carpatho-Ukrainian" brethren just to the east, argue that contemporary Slovak police reports revealed that support for unity with Subcarpathian Rue ' was widespread. Cf. Stefan Pazur, ''O vyvoji narodnostnych pomerov na vychodnom Slovensku v jesennych mesiacoch roku 1938," Nove obzory, X (Pre§ov, 1968), pp. 13-25. Indeed, this is true for the month of October and very early November. But I have read these same police reports (in the Statny Slovensky Ostredny Archiv - SSOA - in Bratislava), and they indicate by November a clear change in Pre§ov Region Rusyn public opinion against the idea of unity, because the "Ukrainian orientation is alien and in the end they (Pre§ov Region Rusyns) reject any kind of revision of borders in favor of Carpatho-Ukraine. " Prezidium Policajneho riaditel'stva v Pre§ove, January 11 , 1939 (SSOA , Fond Prezidium Krajinskeho uradu, carton 297, folder 310-1938). See · also carton 298, folder 62212-38. 6 These incidents are based on an unnamed eyewitness report and are given in Atanasii V. Pekar, Narysy istorii tserkvy Zakarpattia , Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I (Rome , 1967) , pp. 144-146; and Julius Kubinyi, The History of PrjaJiv Eparchy, Editiones Universitatis Catholicae Ucrainorum S. Clementia Papae, Vol. XXXII (Rome, 1970) , pp . 161-163. 7 Andrej DudltA,Rustnskaotdzkaajej uzadie (Buenos Aires: Zahranii!na Matica slovenska, 1971) , p. 25. The Slovak denial of the existence of Rusyns in the Pre§ov Region was widespread already during the interwar period: ''These people (in northern Sari§ and Zemplin counties) are our Slovaks, who only because of the Greek Catholic faith inadvertently call themselves Rusnaks or of the Rusnak faith . But teachenJ infect them by saying that they are also of Rusyn nationality. This is ridiculous, but it is happening .... There are no Rusyns up there, nor Rusnaks, only Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith. " Slovenska politika (Bratislava), September 2, 1928 - cited in Ivan Baji!ura, Ukrajinskaotdzka v CSSR (Ko§ice : Vychodoslovenske vyd. , 1967) , p. 44. The politically and emotionally charged questions of whether all Greek Catholics in eastern Slovakia are Rusyns or whether all or most are Slovaks has acquired an exten- 44 SLOVAKIA sive polemical and scholarly literature. Among the better works which present opposing views are: Volodymyr Hnatiuk, " Rusyny Priashivs'koi eparkhii i ikh hovory," Zapysky Nau.kouoho Touarystua im. Sheuchenka, XXXV (L'viv, 1900), pp. 1-25; and Ondrej R. Halaga, Slouanske osfdlenie potisia a uychodoslouenski greckokatolici (Ko§ice , 1947) . 8 For details on the policy of the Slovak autonomous government and later the Slovak state vis-a-vis the Pre§ov Region Rusyns, see Andrii Kovach, " Stanovyshche zakarpatis'kykh ukraintsiv (rusyniv) i zanepad pershoi ChSR," Nau.kouyi zbirnyk , VI, pt. 1 (Svidnik, Bratislava, and Pre§ov, 1972), esp. pp. 23-30 ; and his " Natsional'na polityka Slovats'koi Respubliky po vidnoshenniu do rusyniv-ukraintsiv (1939-1945 r.r.)," in Zhouten ' i ukrains'ka kul'tura (Pre§ov, 1968), pp. 132-143 . 9 Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century and continuing down to as recently as the early 1950s, most members of the Pre§ov Region Rusyn intelligentsia considered themselves part of one Russian nationality which lived from the Carpathian Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. 10 On cultural developments during the war years, see Andrii Kovach, ''Ukraintsi Priashivshchyny i deiaki pytannia kul 'turnoi polityky Slovats'koi Respubliky," Naukouyi zbirnyk, IV, pt. 1 (Svidnik, Pre§ov, and Bratislava, 1969), pp . 401-412; and his " Ukraintsi Skhidnoi Slovachchyny naperedodni slovats'koho narodnoho povstannia, " Z mynuloho i suchasnoho ukraintsiu Chekhoslouachchyny, Pedahohichnyi zbirnyk, No. 3 (Bratislava, 1973), pp . 196-215. 11 Cited in Edo Fri§ , My§lienka a tin: uuahy o Ceskoslouensku 1938-1948 (Bratislava, 1968) , p. 104. For details on the Rusyn underground and partisan movement, see the studies by Stepan Pazhur, Vasyl' Horkovych, Andrii Kovach, as well as several eyewitness recollections from the period contained in Shliakh do uoli , in Naukouyi zbirnyk , II (Svidnik, Pre§ov, and Bratislava, 1966) . 12 For a discussion of Slovak-Rusyn relations between 1945 and the mid-1960s, see Baj<'!ura , Ukrajinska. ota.zka u CSSR; on the worsening of those relations after the Dubrek era in 1968-69, see Pavel Maro, " National Assimilation: The Case of the RusynUkrainians of Czechoslovakia," East Central Europe, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, 1975), pp . 101132.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Rusyns and the Slovak State Description An account of the resource Paul R. Magocsi Slovakia, Vol. 29 (No. 53-54), 1980-81 pp. 39-44 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Magocsi, Paul Robert, 1945- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-81 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/28dd9c150f56b57e1a28fba02d689b94.pdf 4815fd154d5ccf07abafc0563bd4d893 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 36 Carpatho-Rusyns: Their Current Status And Future Perspectives PAUL ROBERT MAGOSCI Who Are The Rusyns? In 1875, geographers from the old Hungarian Kingdom erected a monument in a remote region of their country that carried the following inscription: "Precise instruments have confirmed this point where the latitude and longitude lines meet as the center of Europe." 1 Just over a century later, in 1977, the former Soviet authorities, who had by then ruled the area, erected a second monument to mark the center of the continent that stretches from the Arctic shores of Norway in the north to the beaches of Crete in the south, and from the coast of Ireland in the west to the Ural Mountains in the east. The precise center where the monuments are located is near the village of Dilove (formerly Trebusany) in the foothills of the northcentral Carpathian Mountains that from time immemorial has been inhabited by an East Slavic people called Carpatho-Rusyns, or simply Rusyns (sometimes in English: Ruthenians). Thus, in geographic terms, the Rusyns are not a peripheral group, but rather one whose homeland - Carpathian Rus 1 - is located literally in the heart of Europe. According to present day international boundaries, Rusyns live in more or less compact territory within the boundaries of four 1For a description, see Fedor Korecki, "Stredok Evropi-na Homjici," Nova dumka , VIII (21] (Vukovar, Yugoslavia, 1979), pp . 101-102. �SLOVAKIA 37 countries: Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania. There is also a small group of Rusyns in Yugoslavia, descendants of immigrants who left the Carpathian homeland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Statistical data on Rusyns is, depending on the country, inadequate or completely unavailable. Therefore, we can only speak in theoretical terms when discussing numbers . In theory, the number of Rusyns could be as high as 1.2 million people: 977 ,000 in the Transcarpathian oblast (former Subcarpathian Rus') of the Ukraine; 130,000 in the Presov Region of northeastern Slovakia; 60,000 in the Lemko Region of southeastern Poland as well as in other parts of that country; and 30,000 in the Vojvodina (Backa) and the Croatian republic of former Yugoslavia.2 The Problem of Nomenclature It is important to keep in mind what is meant by the term Rusyn. Traditionally, the name Rusyn, or its local variant Rusnak, has been used by the East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian region to describe themselves. However, by the twentieth century, in particular its second half, the historic names Rusyn/Rusnak were replaced by others, such as Ukrainian in Soviet Transcarpathia and the Presov Region of Slovakia, or Lemko in Poland . There are also Rusyns who have given up identifying with any East Slavic group, and instead associate with the dominant nationality of the country in which 2Since World War II, Rusyns were recorded in official statistics only in Yugoslavia (21,000 in 1991) , Romania (1,000 in 1977), and most recently in Slovakia (17 ,000 in 1991) . "Vojvodina u tisloch i slovoch," Ruski kalendar 1992 (Novi Sad , 1991), p. 38; Anuarul statistic al Romaniei 1990 (Bucharest, 1990), p. 64; Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Preliminary Results of Population and Housing Census (Prague, 1991), pp . 30-3 I. There are also unconfirmed reports that the final published version of the 1991 Czecho-Slovak statistics will indicate 49,000 persons in Slovakia who reported Rusyn as their mother tongue . As for the estimates given here, the figure for the Transcarpathian oblast refers to persons in that region who in the 1991 Ukrainian census were reported as Ukrainian (the term Rusyn when given by a respondant is recorded as Ukrainian). The estimates for Slovakia and Poland are from: Paul Robert Magocsi , The Rusyns of Slovakia (New York, 1993), p. 1-2 and 111-112; and his Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (Seattle , 1993) , p. 131. �38 SLOVAKIA they live, such as Polish in Poland or Slovak in Slovakia. These changes in national self-designation have in some cases come gradually , prompted either by intellectual conviction or by national assimilation, especially among families of nationally-mixed parentage. In the latter case, children often choose to identify - or are identified by their parents - with the dominant state nationality, Slovak or Polish. More often, however, the change in nomenclature has been the result of governmental decree in which the name Rusyn was banned from official usage, as was the case after 1945 in Soviet Transcarpathia and Poland and by the early 1950s in Czechoslovakia. The result is that today one can find within the same ethnolinguistic group, within the same village, in some cases even within the same family, people who will identify as a Rusyn, or a Lemko, or a Ukrainian, or a Slovak, or a Pole. Moreover, in the case of the East Slavic designations - Rusyn/Rusnak, Lemko, Ukrainian - some people consider these as synonyms, others as mutually-exclusive terms. In other words, some people will say that Rusyn is simply the older historic name for Ukrainian, and that Lemko is a regional name of Ukrainian, while others are convinced that the names Lemko or Rusnak are regional forms for Rusyn which, in tum, designates a people that is distinct from the Ukrainian and every other surrounding nationality. It should be noted that the estimated figure of 1.2 million Rusyns given above refers to all people of the same linguistic and ethnographic origin, regardless of how they designate themselves on documents such as internal identity papers, passports, or decennial censuses. Our concern here will be primarily with the present-day Rusyn movement or with that portion of the group (the precise numbers are unknown) that considers Rusyns to comprise a distinct people. Historical Background It is neither possible nor appropriate to provide here an extensive outline of Rusyn history. It is necessary, however, to keep a few historical factors in mind in order to comprehend the current �SLOVAKIA 39 situation. Rusyns never had their own state or political independence. Since the Middle Ages, the Rusyn homeland was ruled by Hungary and Poland or Austria. Nonetheless, during the past century and a half, they have at various times been recognized by neighboring or ruling states as having the right to a territorial entity whose existence was justified on the grounds that it was somehow of and for Rusyns and that it would have some degree of automony or self-rule. 3 The first experience in this regard came in late 1849, when in the wake of the failure of the Hungarian revolution, the Austrian government divided Hungary into five military and several civil districts. One of the civil districts (Ungvar/Uzhorod) was based in the Subcarpathian region and administered by local Rusyn political and cultural activists . This experiment was to last only a few months. Much more important was the period of political upheaval that followed World War I. At that time, in an effort to retain Rusyninhabited lands within Hungary, the new government in Budapest created, in December 1918, an autonomous Rusyn Land (Rus'ka Krajina) that continued to function even after a pro-Soviet Communist regime came to power in March 1919.4 Simultaneously, the recently-founded Czechoslovak government was also courting the Rusyns, offering them a self-governing province to be called Rusinsko (Rusinia), or Subcarpathian Rus' (Podkarpatska Rus), if they would join the Czechs and Slovaks in their new state. In May 1919, the Rusyns accepted the Czechoslovak offer. Most significantly, the Rusyn issue had reached the international political forum , so that "the fullest degree of self-government" for "Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians" was guaranteed by two international treaties at the Paris Peace Conference (St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 3 For further details on Rusyn political entities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus' 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1978) . pp 46-47, 93-95 , and 237-245. 4soviet-Marxist literature is fond of elaborating upon the 40 days of Soviet rule in Transcarpathia. Cf. Borys Spivak and Mychajlo Trojan, 40 nezabutnich dniv: z istoriji borot'by za vladu Rad na Zakarpatti v 1919 roci (Uzhorod: Karpaty, 1967). �40 SLOVAKIA 1919, and Trianon, June 4, 1920) and by the Czechoslovak constitution (February 29, 1920). For the next two decades the vast majority of Rusyns - approximately three-fourths the total number at the time - lived in Subcarpathian Rus, a territory that was Rusyn in name, that had its own Rusyn schools, and that had all the trappings of self-rule including a governor, a partially-elected diet, a national anthem, and a national theater. Finally, in late 1938, actual autonomy was granted to Subcarpathian Rus' (by then renamed Carpatho-Ukraine). Not only had autonomy been demanded by local politicians, it was also one of the provisions of the infamous Munich Pact, which led to the restructuring of Czechoslovakia. The Carpatho-Ukraine was to function for nearly half a year until the complete liquidation of what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The twentieth century also witnessed three short-lived efforts at Rusyn independence. The first of these came in 1919, when after being unsuccessful in their bid to join fellow Rusyns south of the mountains, the Lernkos living in the former Austrian province of Galicia created an independent republic that functioned for sixteen months before its government was arrested in March 1920, by the authorities of Poland, which became the new ruler over Rusyn lands north of the Carpathians.5 At the same time, along the eastern edge of Subcarpathian territory a regional ethnic group known as Hutsuls established their own republic which lasted four months (FebruaryJune 1919) before being driven out by troops from Romania. The last unsuccessful attempt came two decades later, when the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous government declared symbolically its independence on the last day of Czechoslovakia's existence (March 15, 1939) before the province was invaded and reannexed to Hungary .6 The point is that although Rusyns may never have had their 5 On the little-known Lemko Republic and its relationship to political thought in the western Ukrainian lands, see Paul Robert Magocsi,"The Ukrainian Question Between Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Lernko Rusyn Republic (1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus'-Ukraine," Nationalities Papers (New York, forthcoming) . 6 Ukrainian-oriented emigres from Carpatho-Ukraine have put great stress on the �SLOVAKIA 41 own state, they did have for a significant period of time in the twentieth century the experience - and therefore historical memory - of their own political entity, Subcarpathian Rus', which was recognized both by the state in which they lived (Czechoslovakia) and by the international community (Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations). Although the Rusyn homeland is located in the geographical center of Europe, it is at the same time along a cultural borderland. It is along that great divide between the Catholic West and Orthodox East, what Riccardo Picchio has classified in the broadest cultural terms as Slavia romana and Slavia orthodoxa.7 Located where they are, this division has had a profound effect on the Rusyn psyche. The very language or series of dialects that Rusyns speak reflect the influences of both cultural spheres. Thus, while their speech clearly belongs to the realm of East Slavic languages, much of their vocabulary, pronounciational stress, and even syntax is West Slavic. The cultural divide is most graphically evident in what is for traditional Rusyn culture the all-important factor of religion. Some Rusyns are Orthodox, but the majority, at least during the past two centuries, is Catholic, or more precisely Greek Catholic. These confessional differences reflect a whole mind-set that is either western - or eastern-oriented. The eastern mind-set tends to surrender the self to fate in the hope that the Christian God and his intercessors, Christ and the Virgin Mary, might somehow alleviate the burdens of this earthly life. In contrast, the western mind-set seems March I 5, I 939 declaration of independence, arguing that it revealed how the Ukrainian orientation had supposedly won the hearts and minds of the entire population even before the Soviets arrived in the region in late 1944 . Cf. Peter G. Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho- Ukraine , 1919-1939 (New York: Carpathian Research Centre , 1971) . This view is also being promoted in the Ukraine since the onset of the Gorbachev era. See the minutes of the RUCH meeting held in the former Carpathi-Ukrainian capitol of Chust to coincide with the 52nd anniversary of the one-day of independence: "4 sesija Velykoji Rady Ruchu," Visnyk Ruchu, no . 4 (Kiev, 1990). 7Riccardo Picchio, "Guidelines for the Comparative Study of the Language Question Among the Slavs," in Aspects of the Slavic Language Question, Vol.I, ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (New Haven , Conn .: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), pp. 1-42. �42 SLOVAKIA to feel that if an individual receives education or political training, he or she can somehow put their lives in order and, therefore, be able to have some control over destiny . The east-west dichotomy in the Rusyn psyche also impinges on attitudes toward nationai identity. The eastern orientation tends to think in universalistic terms and be satisfied with viewing Rusyns as part of a single East Slavic Orthodox religious and cultural world. The western orientation - epitomized by the very distinctiveness of Greek Catholics from other Catholics - accepts the idea of national and linguistic particularity. Universalism versus particularism are attitudes that greatly influenced Rusyn political and cultural leaders , especially regarding the nationality question. Being a stateless people, Rusyns have had, at least until the second half of the twentieth century , to depend on their leaders, the intelligentsia, to determine the precise direction of their national revival . The Rusyn national revival began during the second half of the nineteenth century and culminated during the interwar years, by which time it had evolved into a comprehensive movement concerned with political, cultural, and social issues. Most of the nationalist intelligentsia did agree on one basic premise: that Rusyns are East Slavs and that their linguistic and cultural traditions were based in the east, albeit with pronounced western influences. What they could not agree upon, however, was whether Rusyns were a branch of the Russian nationality, or of the Ukrainian nationality, or whether they formed a distinct fourth East Slavic Rusyn nationality. Not surprisingly, debates about national and linguistic orientation quickly became caught up in local partisan politics. Politicians had their own agendas, and they more often than not made opportunistic use of the nationality question in order to promote party or other ideological interests. As for the nationalist intelligentsia, they easily fulfilled the precepts of all activists in the formative stages of national movements. Namely, they had no difficulty using history to formulate an ideology that was able to convince people they were either Russian, �SLOVAKIA 43 Ukrainian, or Rusyn. 8 The debate over the national orientation of the Rusyns was not yet resolved before the outbreak of World War II, despite the achievements during the interwar years of the Ukrainian orientation in the largest Rusyn territory , Subcarpathian Rus' (Carpath~Ukraine). In a sense, the year 1939 marked an end to the natural evolution of discussions about a Rusyn nationality. This is because beginning in that year and lasting for half a century, the nationality debate was effectively stifled by state intervention. This happened first under fascist regimes in Hungary(which reannexed Subcarpathian Rus'), in Slovakia (which retained the Presov Region), and in the Germanruled Generalgouvernement (which ruled the Lemko Region); and then as a result of Soviet rule after 1945, whether directly in Subcarpathian Rus' (renamed Transcarpathian Ukraine) or through proSoviet Communist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As is well known, the Communist era with its anti-democratic approach to the nationality question was to last until the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. The only exception was the case of the small group of Rusyns in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia. Although a Communist regime was installed in their land as well, the Yugoslav government allowed the Vojvodinian Rusyns to decide their own national orientation. This was not to be the case for the Rusyns living in the Carpathian homeland. In short, the Soviet regime declared that further debate was unnecessary because the nationality question had supposedly been resolved long ago. Based on a decision made by the Communist party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine taken in December 8Generally, the Russian-oriented intelligentsia, or Russophiles, were Orthodox adherents or sympathizers who believed in the unity of Eastern Slavic Christian culture represented by three branches of the East Slavs - Great Russians , Belorussians, and Little Russians (including Carpatho-Rusyns) - all considered to be part of one common Russian (ob§cerusskiJ) nationality . The Ukrainian--0riented and Rusyn--0riented intelligentsias were western--0riented Greek Catholics who believed in various degrees of national and/or regional differentiation - the Ukrainophiles arguing for the unity of one people that stretched "from the Carpathians to the Caucasus"; the Rusynophiles arguing that the Rus' population in the Carpathians (from the Poprad to Tysa rivers) comprises a separate people. �44 SLOVAKIA 1925, all Rusyns , regardless what they may have called themselves, were declared to be Ukrainians. Any who opposed the Ukrainian viewpoint were accused of having "anti-historical" and, therefore, "anti-Soviet" opinions; they often were removed from their jobs; and they might even have been arrested as "counterrevolutionaries." Closely connected with these developments was the liquidation first in Soviet Transcarpathia (1949) and then in Czechoslovakia (1950) of the Greek Catholic Church, which by the mid-twentieth century had become the stronghold of the Rusyn orientation. When Communist regimes were established in Poland (1945) and Czechoslovakia (1948), they adapted the Soviet line and decreed that the Ru syn minorities within their borders were Ukrainians. They forbade Rusyn publications and the use of the name Rusyn in official documents. The situation was particularly bad in Poland. Not only were the Lemko Rusyns declared to be Ukrainians, they were forcibly deported en masse from their Carpathian homeland in 1947 and scattered throughout the former German lands of post-1945 western and northern Poland.9 It is ironic to note the advantages that accrued to the governments in question through their use - or, more properly, misuse - of the name Ukrainian. For example, by declaring that the population was Ukrainian, this allowed the Soviet Union to justify the annexation in 1945 of Subcarpathian Rus', a territory that throughout the war it had agreed should be returned to Czechoslovakia. Nationalist ideology could now conveniently serve Stalin's political designs on the international stage. In any case, how could the Soviet worker's state refuse the request of fellow "Ukrainian workers" in Transcarpathia who "voluntarily" were demanding to be united with the "Mother Ukraine"? 9 The actual deportations took place in two phases. Between 1945 and 1946, about 200,000 Lemko Rusyns "voluntarily" took up the offer to resettle eastward in the Ukraine in exchange for Poles who moved west within the new postwar boundaries of Poland . The remaining 80,000 Lemko Rusyns , mostly in the western Lemko region , were forcibly deported in 1947 . For details, see Kazimierz Pudlo , Lemkowie: process wrastania w ~rodowisko Dolnego Sl{lska, 1947-1985 (Wroclaw: Polskie Towarszystwo Ludoznawcze, 1987), esp . pp. 24-34. �SLOVAKIA 45 In neighboring Poland, identification of Lemkos as Ukrainians made it easier for the government to deport them, since the Communist Polish government argued that, as "Ukrainians," the Lemkos were helping the anti-Communist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) under Stepan Bandera, which was held up in the Carpathians and still fighting the Polish and Soviet authorities after the end of World War II. South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, the administrative imposition of a Ukrainian identity beginning in 1952 proved to be advantageous to those Slovaks who had always claimed that "their Rusnaks" were really "Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith. 1110 In essence, forced Ukrainianization (combined with the liquidation of the local Greek Catholic Church and forced collectivization of peasant land) led during the 1950s and 1960s to the most rapid degree of Slovakization and national assimilation that Rusyns had ever experienced. It is nonetheless true that during this same period, the Czechoslovak government provided extensive funding to create a wide range of cultural organizations that were Ukrainian in national form but socialist in content. A well-paid local Ukrainian intelligentsia was even able to attain several significant scholarly and literary achievements. However, this had little real effect upon the Rusyn peasant masses in Slovakia. For them, the choice was simple: if one could not be a Rusyn, better declare oneself a Slovak than a Ukrainian (which among other things was associated with the hated East). Once again Yugoslavia was the exception. The government there provided both funding and legal guarantees, while the local intelligentsia decided to adopt a Rusyn orientation and to develop the local speech into a sociologically-complete Rusyn literary language. In fact, Rusyns became one of the five official nationalities in the lO Beginning already in 1945, new Rusyn political and cultural organizations carried the name Ukrainian . However, despite their name, they paradoxically functioned using Russian or vernacular Rusyn as the language of instruction and communication. In 1952, a decree of the Communist Party of Slovakia initiated a policy of Ukrainianization that banned use of the term Rusyn and replaced Russian with Ukrainian as the language of instruction in schools . For details, see Pavel Macu, "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia," East-Central Europe, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, 1975), pp. 101-131. �46 SLOVAKIA autonomous province of the Vojvodina. Yet Yugoslavia was the exception that proved the rule. And the rule was that after 1945, Rusyns ceased to exist. All Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish documents and publications referred to the population only as Ukrainian.1 1 Publications in the West, both by Ukrainian emigre and North American Soviet and East European specialists, also accepted the view that Rusyns did not exist, or to quote the New Columbia Encyclopedia (1975): "There is no ethnic or linguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Ruthenians [Rusyns] ." "The majority of the population [of Transcarpathia] is Ukrainian." 12 The Current Situation Then came the 1980s. The first signs of change came in Poland, where the Lemko Rusyns - both those who were dispersed in the "West" of that country as well as about 10,000 who had managed to return to the Carpathian homeland - began to gather at annual cultural festivals. These "unofficial" festivals received no government financial support, but by the same token they were not under any ideological control. As a result, the Lemkos began to revive the idea that they were neither Poles nor Ukrainians, but rather part of a distinct Slavic people closely related to Rusyns living south of the mountains in Slovakia. The Lemkos seemed to be acting in isolation and for several years that was , indeed, the case.1 3 Later came the changes brought about by the November 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. New initiative committees were founded that were often dominated by individuals who had not 11 Whereas the idea of a Rusyn nationality in the Carpathians was not recognized by schools and official circles in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, they have recognized the Rusyns (Rusnaks) of Yugoslavia as a distinct ethnic group with its own literary language . Cf. A.E. Suprun and A .M. Kaljuta, Vvedenie v slavjanskuju filologiju (Minsk: Vy§ej§aja §kola, 1981), pp . 137-139. 12 "Ruthenia," in the New Columbia Encyclopedia , ed. William H. Harris and Judith S. Levey, eds. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 2383. l3 On the Lemko-Rusyn revival, see the series of articles in the Carpatho-Rusyn American, X and XI (Fairview, NJ ., 1987-88). �SLOVAKIA 47 been associated with the Communist regime. At first, the initiative committees tried to transform (they would say democratize) the older Ukrainian organizations, but when that failed they established their own Rusyn organizations and publications. At the very same time, in neighboring Transcarpathia, the first Rusyn-oriented organization to exist anywhere in Carpathian Rus' since World War II was established in February 1990 in the oblast's administrative center of Uzhorod. Known as the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns (Tovarystvo Karpats'kych Rusyniv) and with branches throughout Transcarpathia, its goals were at first of a cultural and ecological nature - to promote and preserve knowledge of local history and customs. But before long, the Society moved on to political demands, in particular the recognition of Rusyn as a distinct nationality and the return of the autonomous status of Subcarpathian Rus', a status which they argued was illegally taken away in 1945. Before 1990 came to a close, a total of five new Rusyn organizations had come into existence where Rusyns live. Aside from the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns in Ukrainian Transcarpathia were the Rusyn Renaissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda) in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia (est. March 1990); the Lemko Association (Stovarysynja Lemkiv) in Legnica, Poland (est. April 1990); the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' (Spolecnost pratel Podkarpatske Rusi) in Prague (est. October 1990); and the Ruska Matka (Rusyn Matka) in Ruski Kerestur, Yugoslavia (est. December 1990). By the spring of 1991, a sixth one was established, this time in Hungary: the Rusyn Organization in Hungary (Magyarorszagi Ruszinok Szervezete) in Budapest (est. May 1991). Most of these organizations have their own Rusyn-language newspaper or magazine, 14 or they have access to existing publications. All five organizations have put forth basically the same demands: that Rusyns be recognized as a distinct nationality; that a Rusyn literary language be codified and eventually be used in schools as a medium of instruction; and that 14 These include: Besida (Legnica, Poland, 1989-present); Otcyj chram (Uzhorod, 1990-91); Podkarpatski Rus (Prague, 1991-present); Rusyn (Medzilaborce , Czechoslovakia, 1990-present); Narodny novyntj (Pre§ov, 1991-present). �48 SLOVAKIA Rusyns be guaranteed full rights as a national minority in the countries where they live or, in the case of Transcarpathia, that Rusyns be recognized as the dominant indigenous nationality. As in all new or revived movements, the Rusyn orientation must first be able to make itself known to the constituency it purports to represent. This is inherently problematic, because with the exception of Yugoslavia, nowhere do Rusyns control the local media. Their message, or at least an awareness of their movement's existence, has been helped less by their own publications than by the fierce polemics that have filled the non-Rusyn press in Poland, former Czechoslovakia, and most especially former Soviet Transcarpathia. This is because from the moment the first Rusyn activity began, local pro-Ukrainian activists attacked the Rusyn orientation as "anachronistic," "ahistorical," "unenlightened," "in the service of American imperialists," and "treacherous" to the Ukrainian nation. 15 As a result, more attention of a semi-sensationalist journalistic nature was given the Rusyn problem than might otherwise have been the case. The Czech and Slovak press also paid much - although more rational - attention to the Rusyn-Ukrainian debate, especially in the context of the nationality question that concerned Czechoslovak society as a whole. Whatever latent isolation Rusyn leaders in their respective countries may have still felt was overcome in March 1991, when, at the initiative of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, the first World Congress of Rusyns was convened in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia. Indeed, despite a history of interaction between Rusyn communities in the homeland as well as the immigration in America during the twentieth century, this was, in fact, the first time representatives from all countries where Rusyns live (Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, 15 The best (or worst) examples of the anti-Rusyn polemical attacks comes from scholars in the former Soviet Ukrainian intellectual establishment: Pavlo Cucka, "Kak rusiny stali ukraincami," Zakarpatskaja pravda (U:lhorod), September 12-16, 1989; Vasyl' Mel'nyk, "Neorusynstvo i joho interpretatory," Zakarpats'ka pravda (U:lhorod), August 18, 21, 22, 24, 1990; Jurij Balega, "Rusynstvo: ideolohy i pokrovyteli," ibid., September 6,7 ,9, 1990; and Oleksa Myfanyc, "To chto :le vony?: do idejnych vytokiv novitn'oho 'karpatorusynstva'," Literatuma Ukrajina (Kiev), January 17, 1991. �SLOVAKIA 49 Yugoslavia, the United States) gathered together in one place. The congress constituted itself as a permanent umbrella organization, and its very existence had an enormous impact on instilling Rusyn national pride in the over 300 persons who attended, not to mention innumerable others who read about it through the generally widespread press coverage.1 6 It is interesting to note that one week after the congress took place, Czechoslovakia conducted its decennial census in which people for the first time since World War II had the right to answer that they were of Rusyn nationality. Despite problems with the manner in which the nationality questionwas asked and subsequently classified, in Slovakia 17,000 persons responded they were Rusyns as compared to 14,000 Ukrainians. 17 This raises the question of numbers. Observers will legitimately ask just how many people identify as Rusyns? And even among those who do respond Rusyn, does use of such a term necessarily mean they are denying a possible simultaneous identification as Ukrainians? At this point, there is no way to know the precise answers to those questions. All we know is that in Slovakia, when given a chance in March 1991, of those people of East Slavic background who did not identify as Slovak and who had the choice between a Rusyn or Ukrainian identity, 55 percent chose Rusyn. As for the number of Rusyns in Poland and Ukrainian Transcarpathia, we simply do not know at this stage, nor do we have any indications, such as census data, scientific polling, or membership in political parties, that might help to provide a reasonable estimate. What we can be certain of, however, is that after forty years of Communist rule, Rusyns have not gone away. Today, there are Rusyn organizations, Rusyn publications, and a relatively wide range of writers, teachers, professionals, and peasants who continue to articulate in the press and at public manifestations their belonging 16 Information on the First World Congress as well as its official declaration are found in the Carpatho--Rusyn American , XIV, 2 and 3 (Fairview, NJ., 1991). pp . 7-9 and 8-9. 17 Mykola Mu§ynka, "Skil'ky rusyniv-ukrajinciv u Slovaccyni? ," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ.), July 19, 1991. �50 SLOVAKIA to a distinct Rusyn people.1 8 Protection for Rusyns in the Future As with many minorities, the future of their survival depends on the willingness of the governments in the states where they live to provide them with adequate legal protection and perhaps financial assistance for their national development. In this regard, the Rusyns need to inform and constantly to remind the international community that they exist. In tum, Rusyns should be able to expect that the international community will monitor their status and, if necessary, put pressure on the governments of the Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in order to ensure that their national rights are protected. In fact, all four states in which Rusyns live have already ratified several agreements pertaining to national minorities at recent meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Of particular importance for Rusyns were the decisions reached in·June 1990 at the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE .. At Copenhagen it was agreed that "to belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." Moreover, "persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group. 1119 This means that regardless how scholars or governments might define Rusyns, if there are individuals and/or groups who call themselves by that name and who believe they constitute a distinct natio18 Among the best known of these to date are: in Transcarpathia , the writers Volodymyr Fedyny§ynec', Ivan Petrovcij, and Vasylij Socka, and the political activists Mychajlo Tomcanij, Petro Hodma§, and Vasyl' Zajac; in Czechoslovakia, the head of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, Vasyl' Turok, and the advisor to the Slovak government on nationality affairs, Ivan Bicko, and the editor Aleksander Zozuljak; in Poland, the poets Petro Trochanovskij and Olena Due , and the head of the Lemko Association , Andrij Kopca; and in Yugoslavia, the director of the Ruske Slovo publishing house, Ljubomir Medje§i, and the writers Djura Papharhaj and Natalja Duda§. 19 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Copenhagen, 1990), pp. 40--41, paragraphs 32 and 32.6. �SLOVAKIA 51 nality , they have a right to do so and to be recognized as Rusyns by the governments of the countries in which they live. The Copenhagen agreement also recognized the role of non-governmental organizations in promoting the interests of national minorities, and it called on the participating states to assure that the teaching of history and culture in the educational establishments "will also take account of the history and culture of national minorities. 1120 At a follow-up CSCE meeting in Geneva (July 1991), member states accepted the provisions of a special report which guaranteed the right of national minorities to participate in non-governmental organizations outside their country of residence. The report reaffirmed as well the principle that individuals or organizations representing national minorities be allowed "unimpeded contacts ... across frontiers ... with persons with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin." 21 Finally, at the most recent CSCE meeting held in Moscow (September-October 1991), member states reaffirmed the agreements reached at all previous meetings and agreed further that "commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE [including those pertaining to national minorities] are matters of direct legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concemed." 22 Before looking specifically at what Rusyns need in each country to protect and guarantee their future existence, it is necessary to clarify the issue of international boundaries. In the Carpathian homeland, Rusyns live within the borders of three states, and at least until late 1992 there was discussion in the Czech , Slovak, and Transcarpathian press about certain political activists who demanded the return of Ukraine's Transcarpathian oblast (historic Subcarpathian Rus') to Czechoslovakia. 23 There was even talk that Transcarpathia 20 Ibid., p. 41 , paragraph 34. 21 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (Geneva , 1991) , p. 10 . 22 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow, 1991 ), p. 2. 23 The Republican party in Czechoslovakia led by Dr. Miroslav SIMek had as one of its goals the "return of Subcarpathian Rus"' to Czechoslovakia. "Zpl!t do Ceskoslovenska," Republika (Prague), October 18-24, 1990; "Rozhovor s pi'edsedou SPR- �52 SLOVAKIA might be returned to Hungary or divided between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In fact, most of these propositions were little more than the speculations of individuals that were blown out of proportion by political rivals and by journalists seeking to report a good story .24 The Czecho--Slovak federal government publicly declared that it "cannot be concerned with the fate" of Transcarpathia.25 With the end of Czechoslovakia in December 1992, the question of unification has become moot. As for the Rusyn organizations that have come into existence in 1990, none of them nor the World Congress of Rusyns that met in 1991 has ever voiced any demand for border changes. On the contrary, all the new organizations as well as· the vast majority of Rusyn spokespersons wherever they live warn against tampering with existing international boundaries. On the other hand, the Society of Carpatho--Rusyns in Transcarpathia has called openly for the return of the status of automony that Subcarpathian Rus' did enjoy during the interwar years. 26 In order to determine the views of the local population, the society, joined by other minority organizations, called for a question on Transcarpathian autonomy to be added to the referendum on Ukrainian indeRS, Ph Dr. Miroslavem Shidkem," ibid., August, 1991. The head of the National Socialist party, C. Cejka, stated that Czechoslovak jurisdiction still applies to Subcarpathian Rus' . "NSS chtc!jf Podkarpatskou Rus, "Lidova demokracie (Prague), September 3, 1991. 24 Jaromfr Hoi'ec of the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' in Prague and wellknown publicist has written about the recent political activism in Transcarpathia in numerous articles in the Czech press, which imply that the local population would be sympathetic to re-unification with Czechoslovakia. Cf. his recent articles in Lidova demokracie (Prague): "Freedom for Subcarpathian Rus"' (September 7, 1991); "Czechs in Subcarpathia" (September 18, 1991); and "Subcarpathia Calls For an Independent Republic" (September 20, 1991). The Hungarian press has also followed closely the demands for Transcarpathian autonomy: "Ruszin koztlirsaslig Klirplitaljlin, "Magyar hfrlap (Budapest), September 10, 1991; "A ruszinok kovetelese: Jegyen Klirplitalja koztlirsaslig! , "Nap/6 (Debrecen), September 3, 1991. 25 The quote is attributed to Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, Jiff Dienstbier, in "Svobodu pro Podkarpatskou Rus," Lidova demokracie, September 9, 1991. 26 The text of the declaration, which was sent to the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev , to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and to the United Nations, appeared first in the Society's newspaper, Otey} chram (SeptemberOctober, 1990) . It is available in English translation in the Carpatho-Rusyn American, XIV, 1 (Fairview , NJ., 1991), pp 4-5 . �SLOVAKIA 53 pendence that was held on December 1, 1991 .27 There was a large voter tum-out, with 92.6 percent favoring Ukrainian independence and 78 percent self-rule for Transcarpathia. 28 The issue of Transcarpathian autonomy elicited great interest in neighboring countries, although this is, in fact, an internal issue for whatever kind of government and state structure is finally established in what until recently was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In short, Transcarpathia has been and should for the foreseeable future remain a part of Ukraine. However, as a sovereign member of the international community, Ukraine must, in tum, guarantee the individual and corporate rights of Rusyns - or those citizens of Ukraine who wish to call themselves Rusyns. It is true that the Ukrainian government has already provided guarantees for national minorities living on its territory: Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Tatars, etc. To this list must be added Rusyns. This would mean that the "official," or one might say traditional, Ukrainian view of the Rusyns has to change. Namely, Ukrainian authorities must accept the fact that within its boundaries, primarily in its Transcarpathian oblast, there are people who define themselves as Rusyns in the sense of a nationality distinct from Ukrainians. Such people should have the right to declare themselves in their passports and internal documents as Rusyns, and the state census bureau should publish data on the number of persons who identify as Rusyns and not simply classify them - as has been done until now - as Ukrainians. 29 If such guarantees are 27 "Rezoljucija mityngu Tovarystva Karpats'kych Rusyniv z pytannja nacional'noho vidrod!ennja rusyns'koho narodu i vidnovlennja statusu Pidkarpats'koho kraju , Mukacevo, 01.09.1991," Molod' Zakarpattja (Uzhorod), September 14, 1991, p. 4. 28 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Rusyns Regain Their Autonomy," Ukrainian Canadian Herald (Toronto), March 16, 1992, p. 7. 29 Soviet guidelines used by the State Committee for Statistics in order to classify answers in the census reports were determined largely on recommendations from authorities in individual republics as well as from the Institute of Ethnography and the Institute of Linguistics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. SeeSJovari nacional'nostej i jazykov dlja kodirovanija otvetov na 8 i 9 voprosy perepisnych Jistov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyj komitet SSSR po statistike, 1988). It is interesting to note that a recent report by the Institute of Ethnography (No. 14110/2171, dated February 6, 1990) stated: "It is theoretically possible to con- �54 SLOVAKIA provided, there is no reason why Rusyns in Transcarpathia could not remain Rusyns as well as function as full-fledged citizens of a sovereign and democratic Ukrainian state. Indeed, independent Ukraine has recently become a member of the Conference in Security and Cooperation in Europe, which obliges it to accept and implement the principles of the Copenhagen and other agreements on national minorities outlined above. Following the trend that has taken hold in the former Soviet Union, it would seem desirable that the new Ukrainian state become a decentralized entity in which each of its component regions would have a large degree of automony in economic and cultural matters .30 Thus, questions such as what language might be taught in elementary schools, or what kind of national orientation should be adopted by regional cultural and educational institutions, or what amount of funding might be given to Rusyn-oriented groups, are all decisions that would be made by the people's assembly in Uzhorod and not in Kiev. Of course, it goes without saying that the free movement of peoples across borders with neighboring Rusyn regions in Slovakia and Poland must be guaranteed. Fortunately, this possibility exists already, albeit with a waiting time at border crossings that every day of the week averages between 15 and 20 hours. As for neighboring Slovakia, the situation of Rusyns, especially since the November 1989 Velvet Revolution, is much better than in either Ukrainian Transcarpathia or Poland. Initially, the Slovak government (generally through its Ministry of Culture) and the former Czecho-Slovak federal government (through allotment of discretionary funds) provided only ad hoc grants to the new Rusyn organizations and publications. Normal budgetary allotments of the Slovak government intended for its East Slavic Rusyn/Ukrainian elude that Rusyns can be considered at the same level as Russians , Ukrainians , and Belorussians, and that they are not a part of any of those groups ." (document in the author's possession) . 30 Discussions regarding the restructuring of the Ukraine have been going on for the past few years . Neighbouring Galicia as well as Transcarpathia feel confident that each could do much better economically if it were independent of the centre in Kiev . Cf. Ivan Hrancak, "Vidnovleni haluzky karpats'koho kraju : Ukrajina federatyvna?," No vyny Zakarpattja (Uzhorod), February 6, 1991 . �SLOVAKIA 55 minority continued to go to the Union of Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia (SRUC), that is, to the Ukrainian-oriented cultural organization that is the direct descendant (still with largely the same leadership) as the formerly Communist-dominated Cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (KSUT). Slovak government funding through other ministries also supported in Presov several Ukrainian university departments and institutes at Safarik University , a Ukrainian radio station, and a Ukrainian publishing house, as well as the Museum of Ukrainian Culture (recently renamed the Aleksander Pavlovy Regional Museum) in Svidnik. As of 1993 , two Rusyn-oriented organizations also receive a normal budgetary allotment. These include the Aleksander Duchnovyc Theater (formerly the Ukrainian National Theater) which is of a Rusyn orientation and the Rusyn Renasissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda), both based in Presov. The Slovak government now recognizes that there are two clearly-defined national orientations - Rusyn and Ukrainian - and that if support for national minorities is to continue in Slovakia, then funding should be provided to Rusyn as well as Ukrainian organizations. But how should the government divide a financial allotment among its East Slavic minority, which until recently has been designated only as Ukrainian? The Slovak government has opted for what seems the most reasonable solution. It has accepted the percentages revealed in the results of the 1991 census, and, therefore, has provided roughly 50 percent financial support to Rusyn cultural organizations and media and 50 percent to Ukrainian cultural organizations, schools, and its media. The question of schools in Slovakia is particularly problematic, because beginning in the 1960s the language of instruction in the vast majority of Rusyn-inhabited villages was changed - at the request of parents themselves - from Ukrainian to Slovak. Moreover, as part of a consolidation process during the past two decades, many small elementary schools in Rusyn-inhabited villages were closed. Even if private or public elementary schools will be reopened in Rusyn villages, it is likely that Slovak will be the language of instruction. The Slovak ministry of education, however, should �56 SLOVAKIA provide teachers and textbooks in Rusyn or in Ukrainian for those villages that may submit such requests. Most important, the standard Slovak-language history textbooks used throughout Slovakia should include an adequate discussion of the history and culture of Rusyns and other minorities which will be of benefit to all students. This would be in keeping with the CSCE agreement reached in Copenhagen, which - along with other "international treaties on human rights and freedoms" - are, according to the new consitution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, "universally binding on its territory and supercede its own laws."31 The Rusyns, or Lemko Rusyns of Poland perhaps need the most help. Not only is the majority of Lemko Rusyns scattered throughout the western and northern regions of Poland, but their fledgling pro-Rusyn organization, the Lemko Association with its amateur theatrical troupe, and the older Lemkovyna folk ensemble receive no financial support at all from the Polish government, either in the form of an annual budgetary allotment or ad hoc grants. Whatever government funds assigned to national minority cultural activity are given, they invariably go to the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (Ob'jednannja Ukrajinciv Pollsci), the direct descendant of the Communist-dominated Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Society (USKT). Support for the new Union of Ukrainians must continue, especially since most Ukrainians in Poland are not originally from nor do they live in the Carpathian region. On the otherhand, Lemko Rusyns must also be recognized as a distinct national minority and receive a fair share of funding. How to determine what is a "fair share" will, of course, be difficult, since Poland does not even have nationality as a category on its decennial census questionnaires. Perhaps a referendum attached to the next national vote could include a question that lists all the national groups in Poland and asks the respondent to which one he/she would wish to assign a portion of their taxes for cultural 31 Cf. Section 2 of the Constitutional Act of January 9, 1991, instituting the charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a Constitutional Act of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic . �SLOVAK.IA 57 activity. This would be somewhat similar to municipalities in Canada that ask their residents to indicate whether they want their tax dollars to be assigned to public schools or to separate (Catholic) schools. Whatever the mechanism decided upon, in keeping with its commitments as a member state of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Polish government is obliged to recognize Lernko Rusyns as a distinct national minority and to provide funding for Lernko cultural organizations and Lernko-language schools in those communities that demand them. Lastly, we turn to the situation in Yugoslavia. Ever since World War II, the Yugoslav policy of equality for its six component republics and support for the national minorities that live within them has encouraged the Croatian Republic and, in particular, the Vojvodina Autonomous Region of the Serbian Republic to finance liberally Rusyn cultural and educational activity. It is to be expected that when the republics of Yugoslavia sort out their present difficulties, the republics of Croatia and, in particular, Serbia will continue their judicious support and protection of their respective Rusyn minorities. Conclusion The Rusyns are one example of the many groups who suffered under the totalitarian regimes imposed on East Central Europe during the past four decades. Now that those regimes no longer exist, there is a real opportunity to correct past injustices and to assure the future survival of the Rusyns. It is, after all, in the interest of all four countries where Rusyns live - Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia - to become part of the larger European community. The way in which those countries resolve the Rusyn issue will, in part, determine to what degree they are ready for membership in the new Europe. ��SYMPOSIUM �� SLOVAKIA 36 Carpatho-Rusyns: Their Current Status And Future Perspectives PAUL ROBERT MAGOSCI Who Are The Rusyns? In 1875, geographers from the old Hungarian Kingdom erected a monument in a remote region of their country that carried the following inscription: "Precise instruments have confirmed this point where the latitude and longitude lines meet as the center of Europe." 1 Just over a century later, in 1977, the former Soviet authorities, who had by then ruled the area, erected a second monument to mark the center of the continent that stretches from the Arctic shores of Norway in the north to the beaches of Crete in the south, and from the coast of Ireland in the west to the Ural Mountains in the east. The precise center where the monuments are located is near the village of Dilove (formerly Trebusany) in the foothills of the northcentral Carpathian Mountains that from time immemorial has been inhabited by an East Slavic people called Carpatho-Rusyns, or simply Rusyns (sometimes in English: Ruthenians). Thus, in geographic terms, the Rusyns are not a peripheral group, but rather one whose homeland - Carpathian Rus 1 - is located literally in the heart of Europe. According to present day international boundaries, Rusyns live in more or less compact territory within the boundaries of four 1For a description, see Fedor Korecki, "Stredok Evropi-na Homjici," Nova dumka , VIII (21] (Vukovar, Yugoslavia, 1979), pp . 101-102. �SLOVAKIA 37 countries: Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania. There is also a small group of Rusyns in Yugoslavia, descendants of immigrants who left the Carpathian homeland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Statistical data on Rusyns is, depending on the country, inadequate or completely unavailable. Therefore, we can only speak in theoretical terms when discussing numbers . In theory, the number of Rusyns could be as high as 1.2 million people: 977 ,000 in the Transcarpathian oblast (former Subcarpathian Rus') of the Ukraine; 130,000 in the Presov Region of northeastern Slovakia; 60,000 in the Lemko Region of southeastern Poland as well as in other parts of that country; and 30,000 in the Vojvodina (Backa) and the Croatian republic of former Yugoslavia.2 The Problem of Nomenclature It is important to keep in mind what is meant by the term Rusyn. Traditionally, the name Rusyn, or its local variant Rusnak, has been used by the East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian region to describe themselves. However, by the twentieth century, in particular its second half, the historic names Rusyn/Rusnak were replaced by others, such as Ukrainian in Soviet Transcarpathia and the Presov Region of Slovakia, or Lemko in Poland . There are also Rusyns who have given up identifying with any East Slavic group, and instead associate with the dominant nationality of the country in which 2Since World War II, Rusyns were recorded in official statistics only in Yugoslavia (21,000 in 1991) , Romania (1,000 in 1977), and most recently in Slovakia (17 ,000 in 1991) . "Vojvodina u tisloch i slovoch," Ruski kalendar 1992 (Novi Sad , 1991), p. 38; Anuarul statistic al Romaniei 1990 (Bucharest, 1990), p. 64; Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Preliminary Results of Population and Housing Census (Prague, 1991), pp . 30-3 I. There are also unconfirmed reports that the final published version of the 1991 Czecho-Slovak statistics will indicate 49,000 persons in Slovakia who reported Rusyn as their mother tongue . As for the estimates given here, the figure for the Transcarpathian oblast refers to persons in that region who in the 1991 Ukrainian census were reported as Ukrainian (the term Rusyn when given by a respondant is recorded as Ukrainian). The estimates for Slovakia and Poland are from: Paul Robert Magocsi , The Rusyns of Slovakia (New York, 1993), p. 1-2 and 111-112; and his Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (Seattle , 1993) , p. 131. �38 SLOVAKIA they live, such as Polish in Poland or Slovak in Slovakia. These changes in national self-designation have in some cases come gradually , prompted either by intellectual conviction or by national assimilation, especially among families of nationally-mixed parentage. In the latter case, children often choose to identify - or are identified by their parents - with the dominant state nationality, Slovak or Polish. More often, however, the change in nomenclature has been the result of governmental decree in which the name Rusyn was banned from official usage, as was the case after 1945 in Soviet Transcarpathia and Poland and by the early 1950s in Czechoslovakia. The result is that today one can find within the same ethnolinguistic group, within the same village, in some cases even within the same family, people who will identify as a Rusyn, or a Lemko, or a Ukrainian, or a Slovak, or a Pole. Moreover, in the case of the East Slavic designations - Rusyn/Rusnak, Lemko, Ukrainian - some people consider these as synonyms, others as mutually-exclusive terms. In other words, some people will say that Rusyn is simply the older historic name for Ukrainian, and that Lemko is a regional name of Ukrainian, while others are convinced that the names Lemko or Rusnak are regional forms for Rusyn which, in tum, designates a people that is distinct from the Ukrainian and every other surrounding nationality. It should be noted that the estimated figure of 1.2 million Rusyns given above refers to all people of the same linguistic and ethnographic origin, regardless of how they designate themselves on documents such as internal identity papers, passports, or decennial censuses. Our concern here will be primarily with the present-day Rusyn movement or with that portion of the group (the precise numbers are unknown) that considers Rusyns to comprise a distinct people. Historical Background It is neither possible nor appropriate to provide here an extensive outline of Rusyn history. It is necessary, however, to keep a few historical factors in mind in order to comprehend the current �SLOVAKIA 39 situation. Rusyns never had their own state or political independence. Since the Middle Ages, the Rusyn homeland was ruled by Hungary and Poland or Austria. Nonetheless, during the past century and a half, they have at various times been recognized by neighboring or ruling states as having the right to a territorial entity whose existence was justified on the grounds that it was somehow of and for Rusyns and that it would have some degree of automony or self-rule. 3 The first experience in this regard came in late 1849, when in the wake of the failure of the Hungarian revolution, the Austrian government divided Hungary into five military and several civil districts. One of the civil districts (Ungvar/Uzhorod) was based in the Subcarpathian region and administered by local Rusyn political and cultural activists . This experiment was to last only a few months. Much more important was the period of political upheaval that followed World War I. At that time, in an effort to retain Rusyninhabited lands within Hungary, the new government in Budapest created, in December 1918, an autonomous Rusyn Land (Rus'ka Krajina) that continued to function even after a pro-Soviet Communist regime came to power in March 1919.4 Simultaneously, the recently-founded Czechoslovak government was also courting the Rusyns, offering them a self-governing province to be called Rusinsko (Rusinia), or Subcarpathian Rus' (Podkarpatska Rus), if they would join the Czechs and Slovaks in their new state. In May 1919, the Rusyns accepted the Czechoslovak offer. Most significantly, the Rusyn issue had reached the international political forum , so that "the fullest degree of self-government" for "Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians" was guaranteed by two international treaties at the Paris Peace Conference (St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 3 For further details on Rusyn political entities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus' 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1978) . pp 46-47, 93-95 , and 237-245. 4soviet-Marxist literature is fond of elaborating upon the 40 days of Soviet rule in Transcarpathia. Cf. Borys Spivak and Mychajlo Trojan, 40 nezabutnich dniv: z istoriji borot'by za vladu Rad na Zakarpatti v 1919 roci (Uzhorod: Karpaty, 1967). �40 SLOVAKIA 1919, and Trianon, June 4, 1920) and by the Czechoslovak constitution (February 29, 1920). For the next two decades the vast majority of Rusyns - approximately three-fourths the total number at the time - lived in Subcarpathian Rus, a territory that was Rusyn in name, that had its own Rusyn schools, and that had all the trappings of self-rule including a governor, a partially-elected diet, a national anthem, and a national theater. Finally, in late 1938, actual autonomy was granted to Subcarpathian Rus' (by then renamed Carpatho-Ukraine). Not only had autonomy been demanded by local politicians, it was also one of the provisions of the infamous Munich Pact, which led to the restructuring of Czechoslovakia. The Carpatho-Ukraine was to function for nearly half a year until the complete liquidation of what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The twentieth century also witnessed three short-lived efforts at Rusyn independence. The first of these came in 1919, when after being unsuccessful in their bid to join fellow Rusyns south of the mountains, the Lernkos living in the former Austrian province of Galicia created an independent republic that functioned for sixteen months before its government was arrested in March 1920, by the authorities of Poland, which became the new ruler over Rusyn lands north of the Carpathians.5 At the same time, along the eastern edge of Subcarpathian territory a regional ethnic group known as Hutsuls established their own republic which lasted four months (FebruaryJune 1919) before being driven out by troops from Romania. The last unsuccessful attempt came two decades later, when the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous government declared symbolically its independence on the last day of Czechoslovakia's existence (March 15, 1939) before the province was invaded and reannexed to Hungary .6 The point is that although Rusyns may never have had their 5 On the little-known Lemko Republic and its relationship to political thought in the western Ukrainian lands, see Paul Robert Magocsi,"The Ukrainian Question Between Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Lernko Rusyn Republic (1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus'-Ukraine," Nationalities Papers (New York, forthcoming) . 6 Ukrainian-oriented emigres from Carpatho-Ukraine have put great stress on the �SLOVAKIA 41 own state, they did have for a significant period of time in the twentieth century the experience - and therefore historical memory - of their own political entity, Subcarpathian Rus', which was recognized both by the state in which they lived (Czechoslovakia) and by the international community (Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations). Although the Rusyn homeland is located in the geographical center of Europe, it is at the same time along a cultural borderland. It is along that great divide between the Catholic West and Orthodox East, what Riccardo Picchio has classified in the broadest cultural terms as Slavia romana and Slavia orthodoxa.7 Located where they are, this division has had a profound effect on the Rusyn psyche. The very language or series of dialects that Rusyns speak reflect the influences of both cultural spheres. Thus, while their speech clearly belongs to the realm of East Slavic languages, much of their vocabulary, pronounciational stress, and even syntax is West Slavic. The cultural divide is most graphically evident in what is for traditional Rusyn culture the all-important factor of religion. Some Rusyns are Orthodox, but the majority, at least during the past two centuries, is Catholic, or more precisely Greek Catholic. These confessional differences reflect a whole mind-set that is either western - or eastern-oriented. The eastern mind-set tends to surrender the self to fate in the hope that the Christian God and his intercessors, Christ and the Virgin Mary, might somehow alleviate the burdens of this earthly life. In contrast, the western mind-set seems March I 5, I 939 declaration of independence, arguing that it revealed how the Ukrainian orientation had supposedly won the hearts and minds of the entire population even before the Soviets arrived in the region in late 1944 . Cf. Peter G. Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho- Ukraine , 1919-1939 (New York: Carpathian Research Centre , 1971) . This view is also being promoted in the Ukraine since the onset of the Gorbachev era. See the minutes of the RUCH meeting held in the former Carpathi-Ukrainian capitol of Chust to coincide with the 52nd anniversary of the one-day of independence: "4 sesija Velykoji Rady Ruchu," Visnyk Ruchu, no . 4 (Kiev, 1990). 7Riccardo Picchio, "Guidelines for the Comparative Study of the Language Question Among the Slavs," in Aspects of the Slavic Language Question, Vol.I, ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (New Haven , Conn .: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), pp. 1-42. �42 SLOVAKIA to feel that if an individual receives education or political training, he or she can somehow put their lives in order and, therefore, be able to have some control over destiny . The east-west dichotomy in the Rusyn psyche also impinges on attitudes toward nationai identity. The eastern orientation tends to think in universalistic terms and be satisfied with viewing Rusyns as part of a single East Slavic Orthodox religious and cultural world. The western orientation - epitomized by the very distinctiveness of Greek Catholics from other Catholics - accepts the idea of national and linguistic particularity. Universalism versus particularism are attitudes that greatly influenced Rusyn political and cultural leaders , especially regarding the nationality question. Being a stateless people, Rusyns have had, at least until the second half of the twentieth century , to depend on their leaders, the intelligentsia, to determine the precise direction of their national revival . The Rusyn national revival began during the second half of the nineteenth century and culminated during the interwar years, by which time it had evolved into a comprehensive movement concerned with political, cultural, and social issues. Most of the nationalist intelligentsia did agree on one basic premise: that Rusyns are East Slavs and that their linguistic and cultural traditions were based in the east, albeit with pronounced western influences. What they could not agree upon, however, was whether Rusyns were a branch of the Russian nationality, or of the Ukrainian nationality, or whether they formed a distinct fourth East Slavic Rusyn nationality. Not surprisingly, debates about national and linguistic orientation quickly became caught up in local partisan politics. Politicians had their own agendas, and they more often than not made opportunistic use of the nationality question in order to promote party or other ideological interests. As for the nationalist intelligentsia, they easily fulfilled the precepts of all activists in the formative stages of national movements. Namely, they had no difficulty using history to formulate an ideology that was able to convince people they were either Russian, �SLOVAKIA 43 Ukrainian, or Rusyn. 8 The debate over the national orientation of the Rusyns was not yet resolved before the outbreak of World War II, despite the achievements during the interwar years of the Ukrainian orientation in the largest Rusyn territory , Subcarpathian Rus' (Carpath~Ukraine). In a sense, the year 1939 marked an end to the natural evolution of discussions about a Rusyn nationality. This is because beginning in that year and lasting for half a century, the nationality debate was effectively stifled by state intervention. This happened first under fascist regimes in Hungary(which reannexed Subcarpathian Rus'), in Slovakia (which retained the Presov Region), and in the Germanruled Generalgouvernement (which ruled the Lemko Region); and then as a result of Soviet rule after 1945, whether directly in Subcarpathian Rus' (renamed Transcarpathian Ukraine) or through proSoviet Communist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As is well known, the Communist era with its anti-democratic approach to the nationality question was to last until the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. The only exception was the case of the small group of Rusyns in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia. Although a Communist regime was installed in their land as well, the Yugoslav government allowed the Vojvodinian Rusyns to decide their own national orientation. This was not to be the case for the Rusyns living in the Carpathian homeland. In short, the Soviet regime declared that further debate was unnecessary because the nationality question had supposedly been resolved long ago. Based on a decision made by the Communist party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine taken in December 8Generally, the Russian-oriented intelligentsia, or Russophiles, were Orthodox adherents or sympathizers who believed in the unity of Eastern Slavic Christian culture represented by three branches of the East Slavs - Great Russians , Belorussians, and Little Russians (including Carpatho-Rusyns) - all considered to be part of one common Russian (ob§cerusskiJ) nationality . The Ukrainian--0riented and Rusyn--0riented intelligentsias were western--0riented Greek Catholics who believed in various degrees of national and/or regional differentiation - the Ukrainophiles arguing for the unity of one people that stretched "from the Carpathians to the Caucasus"; the Rusynophiles arguing that the Rus' population in the Carpathians (from the Poprad to Tysa rivers) comprises a separate people. �44 SLOVAKIA 1925, all Rusyns , regardless what they may have called themselves, were declared to be Ukrainians. Any who opposed the Ukrainian viewpoint were accused of having "anti-historical" and, therefore, "anti-Soviet" opinions; they often were removed from their jobs; and they might even have been arrested as "counterrevolutionaries." Closely connected with these developments was the liquidation first in Soviet Transcarpathia (1949) and then in Czechoslovakia (1950) of the Greek Catholic Church, which by the mid-twentieth century had become the stronghold of the Rusyn orientation. When Communist regimes were established in Poland (1945) and Czechoslovakia (1948), they adapted the Soviet line and decreed that the Ru syn minorities within their borders were Ukrainians. They forbade Rusyn publications and the use of the name Rusyn in official documents. The situation was particularly bad in Poland. Not only were the Lemko Rusyns declared to be Ukrainians, they were forcibly deported en masse from their Carpathian homeland in 1947 and scattered throughout the former German lands of post-1945 western and northern Poland.9 It is ironic to note the advantages that accrued to the governments in question through their use - or, more properly, misuse - of the name Ukrainian. For example, by declaring that the population was Ukrainian, this allowed the Soviet Union to justify the annexation in 1945 of Subcarpathian Rus', a territory that throughout the war it had agreed should be returned to Czechoslovakia. Nationalist ideology could now conveniently serve Stalin's political designs on the international stage. In any case, how could the Soviet worker's state refuse the request of fellow "Ukrainian workers" in Transcarpathia who "voluntarily" were demanding to be united with the "Mother Ukraine"? 9 The actual deportations took place in two phases. Between 1945 and 1946, about 200,000 Lemko Rusyns "voluntarily" took up the offer to resettle eastward in the Ukraine in exchange for Poles who moved west within the new postwar boundaries of Poland . The remaining 80,000 Lemko Rusyns , mostly in the western Lemko region , were forcibly deported in 1947 . For details, see Kazimierz Pudlo , Lemkowie: process wrastania w ~rodowisko Dolnego Sl{lska, 1947-1985 (Wroclaw: Polskie Towarszystwo Ludoznawcze, 1987), esp . pp. 24-34. �SLOVAKIA 45 In neighboring Poland, identification of Lemkos as Ukrainians made it easier for the government to deport them, since the Communist Polish government argued that, as "Ukrainians," the Lemkos were helping the anti-Communist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) under Stepan Bandera, which was held up in the Carpathians and still fighting the Polish and Soviet authorities after the end of World War II. South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, the administrative imposition of a Ukrainian identity beginning in 1952 proved to be advantageous to those Slovaks who had always claimed that "their Rusnaks" were really "Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith. 1110 In essence, forced Ukrainianization (combined with the liquidation of the local Greek Catholic Church and forced collectivization of peasant land) led during the 1950s and 1960s to the most rapid degree of Slovakization and national assimilation that Rusyns had ever experienced. It is nonetheless true that during this same period, the Czechoslovak government provided extensive funding to create a wide range of cultural organizations that were Ukrainian in national form but socialist in content. A well-paid local Ukrainian intelligentsia was even able to attain several significant scholarly and literary achievements. However, this had little real effect upon the Rusyn peasant masses in Slovakia. For them, the choice was simple: if one could not be a Rusyn, better declare oneself a Slovak than a Ukrainian (which among other things was associated with the hated East). Once again Yugoslavia was the exception. The government there provided both funding and legal guarantees, while the local intelligentsia decided to adopt a Rusyn orientation and to develop the local speech into a sociologically-complete Rusyn literary language. In fact, Rusyns became one of the five official nationalities in the lO Beginning already in 1945, new Rusyn political and cultural organizations carried the name Ukrainian . However, despite their name, they paradoxically functioned using Russian or vernacular Rusyn as the language of instruction and communication. In 1952, a decree of the Communist Party of Slovakia initiated a policy of Ukrainianization that banned use of the term Rusyn and replaced Russian with Ukrainian as the language of instruction in schools . For details, see Pavel Macu, "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia," East-Central Europe, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, 1975), pp. 101-131. �46 SLOVAKIA autonomous province of the Vojvodina. Yet Yugoslavia was the exception that proved the rule. And the rule was that after 1945, Rusyns ceased to exist. All Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish documents and publications referred to the population only as Ukrainian.1 1 Publications in the West, both by Ukrainian emigre and North American Soviet and East European specialists, also accepted the view that Rusyns did not exist, or to quote the New Columbia Encyclopedia (1975): "There is no ethnic or linguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Ruthenians [Rusyns] ." "The majority of the population [of Transcarpathia] is Ukrainian." 12 The Current Situation Then came the 1980s. The first signs of change came in Poland, where the Lemko Rusyns - both those who were dispersed in the "West" of that country as well as about 10,000 who had managed to return to the Carpathian homeland - began to gather at annual cultural festivals. These "unofficial" festivals received no government financial support, but by the same token they were not under any ideological control. As a result, the Lemkos began to revive the idea that they were neither Poles nor Ukrainians, but rather part of a distinct Slavic people closely related to Rusyns living south of the mountains in Slovakia. The Lemkos seemed to be acting in isolation and for several years that was , indeed, the case.1 3 Later came the changes brought about by the November 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. New initiative committees were founded that were often dominated by individuals who had not 11 Whereas the idea of a Rusyn nationality in the Carpathians was not recognized by schools and official circles in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, they have recognized the Rusyns (Rusnaks) of Yugoslavia as a distinct ethnic group with its own literary language . Cf. A.E. Suprun and A .M. Kaljuta, Vvedenie v slavjanskuju filologiju (Minsk: Vy§ej§aja §kola, 1981), pp . 137-139. 12 "Ruthenia," in the New Columbia Encyclopedia , ed. William H. Harris and Judith S. Levey, eds. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 2383. l3 On the Lemko-Rusyn revival, see the series of articles in the Carpatho-Rusyn American, X and XI (Fairview, NJ ., 1987-88). �SLOVAKIA 47 been associated with the Communist regime. At first, the initiative committees tried to transform (they would say democratize) the older Ukrainian organizations, but when that failed they established their own Rusyn organizations and publications. At the very same time, in neighboring Transcarpathia, the first Rusyn-oriented organization to exist anywhere in Carpathian Rus' since World War II was established in February 1990 in the oblast's administrative center of Uzhorod. Known as the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns (Tovarystvo Karpats'kych Rusyniv) and with branches throughout Transcarpathia, its goals were at first of a cultural and ecological nature - to promote and preserve knowledge of local history and customs. But before long, the Society moved on to political demands, in particular the recognition of Rusyn as a distinct nationality and the return of the autonomous status of Subcarpathian Rus', a status which they argued was illegally taken away in 1945. Before 1990 came to a close, a total of five new Rusyn organizations had come into existence where Rusyns live. Aside from the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns in Ukrainian Transcarpathia were the Rusyn Renaissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda) in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia (est. March 1990); the Lemko Association (Stovarysynja Lemkiv) in Legnica, Poland (est. April 1990); the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' (Spolecnost pratel Podkarpatske Rusi) in Prague (est. October 1990); and the Ruska Matka (Rusyn Matka) in Ruski Kerestur, Yugoslavia (est. December 1990). By the spring of 1991, a sixth one was established, this time in Hungary: the Rusyn Organization in Hungary (Magyarorszagi Ruszinok Szervezete) in Budapest (est. May 1991). Most of these organizations have their own Rusyn-language newspaper or magazine, 14 or they have access to existing publications. All five organizations have put forth basically the same demands: that Rusyns be recognized as a distinct nationality; that a Rusyn literary language be codified and eventually be used in schools as a medium of instruction; and that 14 These include: Besida (Legnica, Poland, 1989-present); Otcyj chram (Uzhorod, 1990-91); Podkarpatski Rus (Prague, 1991-present); Rusyn (Medzilaborce , Czechoslovakia, 1990-present); Narodny novyntj (Pre§ov, 1991-present). �48 SLOVAKIA Rusyns be guaranteed full rights as a national minority in the countries where they live or, in the case of Transcarpathia, that Rusyns be recognized as the dominant indigenous nationality. As in all new or revived movements, the Rusyn orientation must first be able to make itself known to the constituency it purports to represent. This is inherently problematic, because with the exception of Yugoslavia, nowhere do Rusyns control the local media. Their message, or at least an awareness of their movement's existence, has been helped less by their own publications than by the fierce polemics that have filled the non-Rusyn press in Poland, former Czechoslovakia, and most especially former Soviet Transcarpathia. This is because from the moment the first Rusyn activity began, local pro-Ukrainian activists attacked the Rusyn orientation as "anachronistic," "ahistorical," "unenlightened," "in the service of American imperialists," and "treacherous" to the Ukrainian nation. 15 As a result, more attention of a semi-sensationalist journalistic nature was given the Rusyn problem than might otherwise have been the case. The Czech and Slovak press also paid much - although more rational - attention to the Rusyn-Ukrainian debate, especially in the context of the nationality question that concerned Czechoslovak society as a whole. Whatever latent isolation Rusyn leaders in their respective countries may have still felt was overcome in March 1991, when, at the initiative of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, the first World Congress of Rusyns was convened in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia. Indeed, despite a history of interaction between Rusyn communities in the homeland as well as the immigration in America during the twentieth century, this was, in fact, the first time representatives from all countries where Rusyns live (Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, 15 The best (or worst) examples of the anti-Rusyn polemical attacks comes from scholars in the former Soviet Ukrainian intellectual establishment: Pavlo Cucka, "Kak rusiny stali ukraincami," Zakarpatskaja pravda (U:lhorod), September 12-16, 1989; Vasyl' Mel'nyk, "Neorusynstvo i joho interpretatory," Zakarpats'ka pravda (U:lhorod), August 18, 21, 22, 24, 1990; Jurij Balega, "Rusynstvo: ideolohy i pokrovyteli," ibid., September 6,7 ,9, 1990; and Oleksa Myfanyc, "To chto :le vony?: do idejnych vytokiv novitn'oho 'karpatorusynstva'," Literatuma Ukrajina (Kiev), January 17, 1991. �SLOVAKIA 49 Yugoslavia, the United States) gathered together in one place. The congress constituted itself as a permanent umbrella organization, and its very existence had an enormous impact on instilling Rusyn national pride in the over 300 persons who attended, not to mention innumerable others who read about it through the generally widespread press coverage.1 6 It is interesting to note that one week after the congress took place, Czechoslovakia conducted its decennial census in which people for the first time since World War II had the right to answer that they were of Rusyn nationality. Despite problems with the manner in which the nationality questionwas asked and subsequently classified, in Slovakia 17,000 persons responded they were Rusyns as compared to 14,000 Ukrainians. 17 This raises the question of numbers. Observers will legitimately ask just how many people identify as Rusyns? And even among those who do respond Rusyn, does use of such a term necessarily mean they are denying a possible simultaneous identification as Ukrainians? At this point, there is no way to know the precise answers to those questions. All we know is that in Slovakia, when given a chance in March 1991, of those people of East Slavic background who did not identify as Slovak and who had the choice between a Rusyn or Ukrainian identity, 55 percent chose Rusyn. As for the number of Rusyns in Poland and Ukrainian Transcarpathia, we simply do not know at this stage, nor do we have any indications, such as census data, scientific polling, or membership in political parties, that might help to provide a reasonable estimate. What we can be certain of, however, is that after forty years of Communist rule, Rusyns have not gone away. Today, there are Rusyn organizations, Rusyn publications, and a relatively wide range of writers, teachers, professionals, and peasants who continue to articulate in the press and at public manifestations their belonging 16 Information on the First World Congress as well as its official declaration are found in the Carpatho--Rusyn American , XIV, 2 and 3 (Fairview, NJ., 1991). pp . 7-9 and 8-9. 17 Mykola Mu§ynka, "Skil'ky rusyniv-ukrajinciv u Slovaccyni? ," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ.), July 19, 1991. �50 SLOVAKIA to a distinct Rusyn people.1 8 Protection for Rusyns in the Future As with many minorities, the future of their survival depends on the willingness of the governments in the states where they live to provide them with adequate legal protection and perhaps financial assistance for their national development. In this regard, the Rusyns need to inform and constantly to remind the international community that they exist. In tum, Rusyns should be able to expect that the international community will monitor their status and, if necessary, put pressure on the governments of the Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in order to ensure that their national rights are protected. In fact, all four states in which Rusyns live have already ratified several agreements pertaining to national minorities at recent meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Of particular importance for Rusyns were the decisions reached in·June 1990 at the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE .. At Copenhagen it was agreed that "to belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." Moreover, "persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group. 1119 This means that regardless how scholars or governments might define Rusyns, if there are individuals and/or groups who call themselves by that name and who believe they constitute a distinct natio18 Among the best known of these to date are: in Transcarpathia , the writers Volodymyr Fedyny§ynec', Ivan Petrovcij, and Vasylij Socka, and the political activists Mychajlo Tomcanij, Petro Hodma§, and Vasyl' Zajac; in Czechoslovakia, the head of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, Vasyl' Turok, and the advisor to the Slovak government on nationality affairs, Ivan Bicko, and the editor Aleksander Zozuljak; in Poland, the poets Petro Trochanovskij and Olena Due , and the head of the Lemko Association , Andrij Kopca; and in Yugoslavia, the director of the Ruske Slovo publishing house, Ljubomir Medje§i, and the writers Djura Papharhaj and Natalja Duda§. 19 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Copenhagen, 1990), pp. 40--41, paragraphs 32 and 32.6. �SLOVAKIA 51 nality , they have a right to do so and to be recognized as Rusyns by the governments of the countries in which they live. The Copenhagen agreement also recognized the role of non-governmental organizations in promoting the interests of national minorities, and it called on the participating states to assure that the teaching of history and culture in the educational establishments "will also take account of the history and culture of national minorities. 1120 At a follow-up CSCE meeting in Geneva (July 1991), member states accepted the provisions of a special report which guaranteed the right of national minorities to participate in non-governmental organizations outside their country of residence. The report reaffirmed as well the principle that individuals or organizations representing national minorities be allowed "unimpeded contacts ... across frontiers ... with persons with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin." 21 Finally, at the most recent CSCE meeting held in Moscow (September-October 1991), member states reaffirmed the agreements reached at all previous meetings and agreed further that "commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE [including those pertaining to national minorities] are matters of direct legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concemed." 22 Before looking specifically at what Rusyns need in each country to protect and guarantee their future existence, it is necessary to clarify the issue of international boundaries. In the Carpathian homeland, Rusyns live within the borders of three states, and at least until late 1992 there was discussion in the Czech , Slovak, and Transcarpathian press about certain political activists who demanded the return of Ukraine's Transcarpathian oblast (historic Subcarpathian Rus') to Czechoslovakia. 23 There was even talk that Transcarpathia 20 Ibid., p. 41 , paragraph 34. 21 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (Geneva , 1991) , p. 10 . 22 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow, 1991 ), p. 2. 23 The Republican party in Czechoslovakia led by Dr. Miroslav SIMek had as one of its goals the "return of Subcarpathian Rus"' to Czechoslovakia. "Zpl!t do Ceskoslovenska," Republika (Prague), October 18-24, 1990; "Rozhovor s pi'edsedou SPR- �52 SLOVAKIA might be returned to Hungary or divided between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In fact, most of these propositions were little more than the speculations of individuals that were blown out of proportion by political rivals and by journalists seeking to report a good story .24 The Czecho--Slovak federal government publicly declared that it "cannot be concerned with the fate" of Transcarpathia.25 With the end of Czechoslovakia in December 1992, the question of unification has become moot. As for the Rusyn organizations that have come into existence in 1990, none of them nor the World Congress of Rusyns that met in 1991 has ever voiced any demand for border changes. On the contrary, all the new organizations as well as· the vast majority of Rusyn spokespersons wherever they live warn against tampering with existing international boundaries. On the other hand, the Society of Carpatho--Rusyns in Transcarpathia has called openly for the return of the status of automony that Subcarpathian Rus' did enjoy during the interwar years. 26 In order to determine the views of the local population, the society, joined by other minority organizations, called for a question on Transcarpathian autonomy to be added to the referendum on Ukrainian indeRS, Ph Dr. Miroslavem Shidkem," ibid., August, 1991. The head of the National Socialist party, C. Cejka, stated that Czechoslovak jurisdiction still applies to Subcarpathian Rus' . "NSS chtc!jf Podkarpatskou Rus, "Lidova demokracie (Prague), September 3, 1991. 24 Jaromfr Hoi'ec of the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' in Prague and wellknown publicist has written about the recent political activism in Transcarpathia in numerous articles in the Czech press, which imply that the local population would be sympathetic to re-unification with Czechoslovakia. Cf. his recent articles in Lidova demokracie (Prague): "Freedom for Subcarpathian Rus"' (September 7, 1991); "Czechs in Subcarpathia" (September 18, 1991); and "Subcarpathia Calls For an Independent Republic" (September 20, 1991). The Hungarian press has also followed closely the demands for Transcarpathian autonomy: "Ruszin koztlirsaslig Klirplitaljlin, "Magyar hfrlap (Budapest), September 10, 1991; "A ruszinok kovetelese: Jegyen Klirplitalja koztlirsaslig! , "Nap/6 (Debrecen), September 3, 1991. 25 The quote is attributed to Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, Jiff Dienstbier, in "Svobodu pro Podkarpatskou Rus," Lidova demokracie, September 9, 1991. 26 The text of the declaration, which was sent to the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev , to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and to the United Nations, appeared first in the Society's newspaper, Otey} chram (SeptemberOctober, 1990) . It is available in English translation in the Carpatho-Rusyn American, XIV, 1 (Fairview , NJ., 1991), pp 4-5 . �SLOVAKIA 53 pendence that was held on December 1, 1991 .27 There was a large voter tum-out, with 92.6 percent favoring Ukrainian independence and 78 percent self-rule for Transcarpathia. 28 The issue of Transcarpathian autonomy elicited great interest in neighboring countries, although this is, in fact, an internal issue for whatever kind of government and state structure is finally established in what until recently was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In short, Transcarpathia has been and should for the foreseeable future remain a part of Ukraine. However, as a sovereign member of the international community, Ukraine must, in tum, guarantee the individual and corporate rights of Rusyns - or those citizens of Ukraine who wish to call themselves Rusyns. It is true that the Ukrainian government has already provided guarantees for national minorities living on its territory: Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Tatars, etc. To this list must be added Rusyns. This would mean that the "official," or one might say traditional, Ukrainian view of the Rusyns has to change. Namely, Ukrainian authorities must accept the fact that within its boundaries, primarily in its Transcarpathian oblast, there are people who define themselves as Rusyns in the sense of a nationality distinct from Ukrainians. Such people should have the right to declare themselves in their passports and internal documents as Rusyns, and the state census bureau should publish data on the number of persons who identify as Rusyns and not simply classify them - as has been done until now - as Ukrainians. 29 If such guarantees are 27 "Rezoljucija mityngu Tovarystva Karpats'kych Rusyniv z pytannja nacional'noho vidrod!ennja rusyns'koho narodu i vidnovlennja statusu Pidkarpats'koho kraju , Mukacevo, 01.09.1991," Molod' Zakarpattja (Uzhorod), September 14, 1991, p. 4. 28 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Rusyns Regain Their Autonomy," Ukrainian Canadian Herald (Toronto), March 16, 1992, p. 7. 29 Soviet guidelines used by the State Committee for Statistics in order to classify answers in the census reports were determined largely on recommendations from authorities in individual republics as well as from the Institute of Ethnography and the Institute of Linguistics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. SeeSJovari nacional'nostej i jazykov dlja kodirovanija otvetov na 8 i 9 voprosy perepisnych Jistov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyj komitet SSSR po statistike, 1988). It is interesting to note that a recent report by the Institute of Ethnography (No. 14110/2171, dated February 6, 1990) stated: "It is theoretically possible to con- �54 SLOVAKIA provided, there is no reason why Rusyns in Transcarpathia could not remain Rusyns as well as function as full-fledged citizens of a sovereign and democratic Ukrainian state. Indeed, independent Ukraine has recently become a member of the Conference in Security and Cooperation in Europe, which obliges it to accept and implement the principles of the Copenhagen and other agreements on national minorities outlined above. Following the trend that has taken hold in the former Soviet Union, it would seem desirable that the new Ukrainian state become a decentralized entity in which each of its component regions would have a large degree of automony in economic and cultural matters .30 Thus, questions such as what language might be taught in elementary schools, or what kind of national orientation should be adopted by regional cultural and educational institutions, or what amount of funding might be given to Rusyn-oriented groups, are all decisions that would be made by the people's assembly in Uzhorod and not in Kiev. Of course, it goes without saying that the free movement of peoples across borders with neighboring Rusyn regions in Slovakia and Poland must be guaranteed. Fortunately, this possibility exists already, albeit with a waiting time at border crossings that every day of the week averages between 15 and 20 hours. As for neighboring Slovakia, the situation of Rusyns, especially since the November 1989 Velvet Revolution, is much better than in either Ukrainian Transcarpathia or Poland. Initially, the Slovak government (generally through its Ministry of Culture) and the former Czecho-Slovak federal government (through allotment of discretionary funds) provided only ad hoc grants to the new Rusyn organizations and publications. Normal budgetary allotments of the Slovak government intended for its East Slavic Rusyn/Ukrainian elude that Rusyns can be considered at the same level as Russians , Ukrainians , and Belorussians, and that they are not a part of any of those groups ." (document in the author's possession) . 30 Discussions regarding the restructuring of the Ukraine have been going on for the past few years . Neighbouring Galicia as well as Transcarpathia feel confident that each could do much better economically if it were independent of the centre in Kiev . Cf. Ivan Hrancak, "Vidnovleni haluzky karpats'koho kraju : Ukrajina federatyvna?," No vyny Zakarpattja (Uzhorod), February 6, 1991 . �SLOVAKIA 55 minority continued to go to the Union of Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia (SRUC), that is, to the Ukrainian-oriented cultural organization that is the direct descendant (still with largely the same leadership) as the formerly Communist-dominated Cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (KSUT). Slovak government funding through other ministries also supported in Presov several Ukrainian university departments and institutes at Safarik University , a Ukrainian radio station, and a Ukrainian publishing house, as well as the Museum of Ukrainian Culture (recently renamed the Aleksander Pavlovy Regional Museum) in Svidnik. As of 1993 , two Rusyn-oriented organizations also receive a normal budgetary allotment. These include the Aleksander Duchnovyc Theater (formerly the Ukrainian National Theater) which is of a Rusyn orientation and the Rusyn Renasissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda), both based in Presov. The Slovak government now recognizes that there are two clearly-defined national orientations - Rusyn and Ukrainian - and that if support for national minorities is to continue in Slovakia, then funding should be provided to Rusyn as well as Ukrainian organizations. But how should the government divide a financial allotment among its East Slavic minority, which until recently has been designated only as Ukrainian? The Slovak government has opted for what seems the most reasonable solution. It has accepted the percentages revealed in the results of the 1991 census, and, therefore, has provided roughly 50 percent financial support to Rusyn cultural organizations and media and 50 percent to Ukrainian cultural organizations, schools, and its media. The question of schools in Slovakia is particularly problematic, because beginning in the 1960s the language of instruction in the vast majority of Rusyn-inhabited villages was changed - at the request of parents themselves - from Ukrainian to Slovak. Moreover, as part of a consolidation process during the past two decades, many small elementary schools in Rusyn-inhabited villages were closed. Even if private or public elementary schools will be reopened in Rusyn villages, it is likely that Slovak will be the language of instruction. The Slovak ministry of education, however, should �56 SLOVAKIA provide teachers and textbooks in Rusyn or in Ukrainian for those villages that may submit such requests. Most important, the standard Slovak-language history textbooks used throughout Slovakia should include an adequate discussion of the history and culture of Rusyns and other minorities which will be of benefit to all students. This would be in keeping with the CSCE agreement reached in Copenhagen, which - along with other "international treaties on human rights and freedoms" - are, according to the new consitution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, "universally binding on its territory and supercede its own laws."31 The Rusyns, or Lemko Rusyns of Poland perhaps need the most help. Not only is the majority of Lemko Rusyns scattered throughout the western and northern regions of Poland, but their fledgling pro-Rusyn organization, the Lemko Association with its amateur theatrical troupe, and the older Lemkovyna folk ensemble receive no financial support at all from the Polish government, either in the form of an annual budgetary allotment or ad hoc grants. Whatever government funds assigned to national minority cultural activity are given, they invariably go to the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (Ob'jednannja Ukrajinciv Pollsci), the direct descendant of the Communist-dominated Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Society (USKT). Support for the new Union of Ukrainians must continue, especially since most Ukrainians in Poland are not originally from nor do they live in the Carpathian region. On the otherhand, Lemko Rusyns must also be recognized as a distinct national minority and receive a fair share of funding. How to determine what is a "fair share" will, of course, be difficult, since Poland does not even have nationality as a category on its decennial census questionnaires. Perhaps a referendum attached to the next national vote could include a question that lists all the national groups in Poland and asks the respondent to which one he/she would wish to assign a portion of their taxes for cultural 31 Cf. Section 2 of the Constitutional Act of January 9, 1991, instituting the charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a Constitutional Act of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic . �SLOVAK.IA 57 activity. This would be somewhat similar to municipalities in Canada that ask their residents to indicate whether they want their tax dollars to be assigned to public schools or to separate (Catholic) schools. Whatever the mechanism decided upon, in keeping with its commitments as a member state of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Polish government is obliged to recognize Lernko Rusyns as a distinct national minority and to provide funding for Lernko cultural organizations and Lernko-language schools in those communities that demand them. Lastly, we turn to the situation in Yugoslavia. Ever since World War II, the Yugoslav policy of equality for its six component republics and support for the national minorities that live within them has encouraged the Croatian Republic and, in particular, the Vojvodina Autonomous Region of the Serbian Republic to finance liberally Rusyn cultural and educational activity. It is to be expected that when the republics of Yugoslavia sort out their present difficulties, the republics of Croatia and, in particular, Serbia will continue their judicious support and protection of their respective Rusyn minorities. Conclusion The Rusyns are one example of the many groups who suffered under the totalitarian regimes imposed on East Central Europe during the past four decades. Now that those regimes no longer exist, there is a real opportunity to correct past injustices and to assure the future survival of the Rusyns. It is, after all, in the interest of all four countries where Rusyns live - Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia - to become part of the larger European community. The way in which those countries resolve the Rusyn issue will, in part, determine to what degree they are ready for membership in the new Europe. ��SYMPOSIUM �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1991-92, Vol. 35 Description An account of the resource Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The Slovak League of America Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available 1991-92 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 36 Carpatho-Rusyns: Their Current Status And Future Perspectives PAUL ROBERT MAGOSCI Who Are The Rusyns? In 1875, geographers from the old Hungarian Kingdom erected a monument in a remote region of their country that carried the following inscription: "Precise instruments have confirmed this point where the latitude and longitude lines meet as the center of Europe." 1 Just over a century later, in 1977, the former Soviet authorities, who had by then ruled the area, erected a second monument to mark the center of the continent that stretches from the Arctic shores of Norway in the north to the beaches of Crete in the south, and from the coast of Ireland in the west to the Ural Mountains in the east. The precise center where the monuments are located is near the village of Dilove (formerly Trebusany) in the foothills of the northcentral Carpathian Mountains that from time immemorial has been inhabited by an East Slavic people called Carpatho-Rusyns, or simply Rusyns (sometimes in English: Ruthenians). Thus, in geographic terms, the Rusyns are not a peripheral group, but rather one whose homeland - Carpathian Rus 1 - is located literally in the heart of Europe. According to present day international boundaries, Rusyns live in more or less compact territory within the boundaries of four 1For a description, see Fedor Korecki, "Stredok Evropi-na Homjici," Nova dumka , VIII (21] (Vukovar, Yugoslavia, 1979), pp . 101-102. SLOVAKIA 37 countries: Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania. There is also a small group of Rusyns in Yugoslavia, descendants of immigrants who left the Carpathian homeland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Statistical data on Rusyns is, depending on the country, inadequate or completely unavailable. Therefore, we can only speak in theoretical terms when discussing numbers . In theory, the number of Rusyns could be as high as 1.2 million people: 977 ,000 in the Transcarpathian oblast (former Subcarpathian Rus') of the Ukraine; 130,000 in the Presov Region of northeastern Slovakia; 60,000 in the Lemko Region of southeastern Poland as well as in other parts of that country; and 30,000 in the Vojvodina (Backa) and the Croatian republic of former Yugoslavia.2 The Problem of Nomenclature It is important to keep in mind what is meant by the term Rusyn. Traditionally, the name Rusyn, or its local variant Rusnak, has been used by the East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian region to describe themselves. However, by the twentieth century, in particular its second half, the historic names Rusyn/Rusnak were replaced by others, such as Ukrainian in Soviet Transcarpathia and the Presov Region of Slovakia, or Lemko in Poland . There are also Rusyns who have given up identifying with any East Slavic group, and instead associate with the dominant nationality of the country in which 2Since World War II, Rusyns were recorded in official statistics only in Yugoslavia (21,000 in 1991) , Romania (1,000 in 1977), and most recently in Slovakia (17 ,000 in 1991) . "Vojvodina u tisloch i slovoch," Ruski kalendar 1992 (Novi Sad , 1991), p. 38; Anuarul statistic al Romaniei 1990 (Bucharest, 1990), p. 64; Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Preliminary Results of Population and Housing Census (Prague, 1991), pp . 30-3 I. There are also unconfirmed reports that the final published version of the 1991 Czecho-Slovak statistics will indicate 49,000 persons in Slovakia who reported Rusyn as their mother tongue . As for the estimates given here, the figure for the Transcarpathian oblast refers to persons in that region who in the 1991 Ukrainian census were reported as Ukrainian (the term Rusyn when given by a respondant is recorded as Ukrainian). The estimates for Slovakia and Poland are from: Paul Robert Magocsi , The Rusyns of Slovakia (New York, 1993), p. 1-2 and 111-112; and his Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (Seattle , 1993) , p. 131. 38 SLOVAKIA they live, such as Polish in Poland or Slovak in Slovakia. These changes in national self-designation have in some cases come gradually , prompted either by intellectual conviction or by national assimilation, especially among families of nationally-mixed parentage. In the latter case, children often choose to identify - or are identified by their parents - with the dominant state nationality, Slovak or Polish. More often, however, the change in nomenclature has been the result of governmental decree in which the name Rusyn was banned from official usage, as was the case after 1945 in Soviet Transcarpathia and Poland and by the early 1950s in Czechoslovakia. The result is that today one can find within the same ethnolinguistic group, within the same village, in some cases even within the same family, people who will identify as a Rusyn, or a Lemko, or a Ukrainian, or a Slovak, or a Pole. Moreover, in the case of the East Slavic designations - Rusyn/Rusnak, Lemko, Ukrainian - some people consider these as synonyms, others as mutually-exclusive terms. In other words, some people will say that Rusyn is simply the older historic name for Ukrainian, and that Lemko is a regional name of Ukrainian, while others are convinced that the names Lemko or Rusnak are regional forms for Rusyn which, in tum, designates a people that is distinct from the Ukrainian and every other surrounding nationality. It should be noted that the estimated figure of 1.2 million Rusyns given above refers to all people of the same linguistic and ethnographic origin, regardless of how they designate themselves on documents such as internal identity papers, passports, or decennial censuses. Our concern here will be primarily with the present-day Rusyn movement or with that portion of the group (the precise numbers are unknown) that considers Rusyns to comprise a distinct people. Historical Background It is neither possible nor appropriate to provide here an extensive outline of Rusyn history. It is necessary, however, to keep a few historical factors in mind in order to comprehend the current SLOVAKIA 39 situation. Rusyns never had their own state or political independence. Since the Middle Ages, the Rusyn homeland was ruled by Hungary and Poland or Austria. Nonetheless, during the past century and a half, they have at various times been recognized by neighboring or ruling states as having the right to a territorial entity whose existence was justified on the grounds that it was somehow of and for Rusyns and that it would have some degree of automony or self-rule. 3 The first experience in this regard came in late 1849, when in the wake of the failure of the Hungarian revolution, the Austrian government divided Hungary into five military and several civil districts. One of the civil districts (Ungvar/Uzhorod) was based in the Subcarpathian region and administered by local Rusyn political and cultural activists . This experiment was to last only a few months. Much more important was the period of political upheaval that followed World War I. At that time, in an effort to retain Rusyninhabited lands within Hungary, the new government in Budapest created, in December 1918, an autonomous Rusyn Land (Rus'ka Krajina) that continued to function even after a pro-Soviet Communist regime came to power in March 1919.4 Simultaneously, the recently-founded Czechoslovak government was also courting the Rusyns, offering them a self-governing province to be called Rusinsko (Rusinia), or Subcarpathian Rus' (Podkarpatska Rus), if they would join the Czechs and Slovaks in their new state. In May 1919, the Rusyns accepted the Czechoslovak offer. Most significantly, the Rusyn issue had reached the international political forum , so that "the fullest degree of self-government" for "Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians" was guaranteed by two international treaties at the Paris Peace Conference (St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 3 For further details on Rusyn political entities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus' 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1978) . pp 46-47, 93-95 , and 237-245. 4soviet-Marxist literature is fond of elaborating upon the 40 days of Soviet rule in Transcarpathia. Cf. Borys Spivak and Mychajlo Trojan, 40 nezabutnich dniv: z istoriji borot'by za vladu Rad na Zakarpatti v 1919 roci (Uzhorod: Karpaty, 1967). 40 SLOVAKIA 1919, and Trianon, June 4, 1920) and by the Czechoslovak constitution (February 29, 1920). For the next two decades the vast majority of Rusyns - approximately three-fourths the total number at the time - lived in Subcarpathian Rus, a territory that was Rusyn in name, that had its own Rusyn schools, and that had all the trappings of self-rule including a governor, a partially-elected diet, a national anthem, and a national theater. Finally, in late 1938, actual autonomy was granted to Subcarpathian Rus' (by then renamed Carpatho-Ukraine). Not only had autonomy been demanded by local politicians, it was also one of the provisions of the infamous Munich Pact, which led to the restructuring of Czechoslovakia. The Carpatho-Ukraine was to function for nearly half a year until the complete liquidation of what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The twentieth century also witnessed three short-lived efforts at Rusyn independence. The first of these came in 1919, when after being unsuccessful in their bid to join fellow Rusyns south of the mountains, the Lernkos living in the former Austrian province of Galicia created an independent republic that functioned for sixteen months before its government was arrested in March 1920, by the authorities of Poland, which became the new ruler over Rusyn lands north of the Carpathians.5 At the same time, along the eastern edge of Subcarpathian territory a regional ethnic group known as Hutsuls established their own republic which lasted four months (FebruaryJune 1919) before being driven out by troops from Romania. The last unsuccessful attempt came two decades later, when the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous government declared symbolically its independence on the last day of Czechoslovakia's existence (March 15, 1939) before the province was invaded and reannexed to Hungary .6 The point is that although Rusyns may never have had their 5 On the little-known Lemko Republic and its relationship to political thought in the western Ukrainian lands, see Paul Robert Magocsi,"The Ukrainian Question Between Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Lernko Rusyn Republic (1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus'-Ukraine," Nationalities Papers (New York, forthcoming) . 6 Ukrainian-oriented emigres from Carpatho-Ukraine have put great stress on the SLOVAKIA 41 own state, they did have for a significant period of time in the twentieth century the experience - and therefore historical memory - of their own political entity, Subcarpathian Rus', which was recognized both by the state in which they lived (Czechoslovakia) and by the international community (Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations). Although the Rusyn homeland is located in the geographical center of Europe, it is at the same time along a cultural borderland. It is along that great divide between the Catholic West and Orthodox East, what Riccardo Picchio has classified in the broadest cultural terms as Slavia romana and Slavia orthodoxa.7 Located where they are, this division has had a profound effect on the Rusyn psyche. The very language or series of dialects that Rusyns speak reflect the influences of both cultural spheres. Thus, while their speech clearly belongs to the realm of East Slavic languages, much of their vocabulary, pronounciational stress, and even syntax is West Slavic. The cultural divide is most graphically evident in what is for traditional Rusyn culture the all-important factor of religion. Some Rusyns are Orthodox, but the majority, at least during the past two centuries, is Catholic, or more precisely Greek Catholic. These confessional differences reflect a whole mind-set that is either western - or eastern-oriented. The eastern mind-set tends to surrender the self to fate in the hope that the Christian God and his intercessors, Christ and the Virgin Mary, might somehow alleviate the burdens of this earthly life. In contrast, the western mind-set seems March I 5, I 939 declaration of independence, arguing that it revealed how the Ukrainian orientation had supposedly won the hearts and minds of the entire population even before the Soviets arrived in the region in late 1944 . Cf. Peter G. Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho- Ukraine , 1919-1939 (New York: Carpathian Research Centre , 1971) . This view is also being promoted in the Ukraine since the onset of the Gorbachev era. See the minutes of the RUCH meeting held in the former Carpathi-Ukrainian capitol of Chust to coincide with the 52nd anniversary of the one-day of independence: "4 sesija Velykoji Rady Ruchu," Visnyk Ruchu, no . 4 (Kiev, 1990). 7Riccardo Picchio, "Guidelines for the Comparative Study of the Language Question Among the Slavs," in Aspects of the Slavic Language Question, Vol.I, ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (New Haven , Conn .: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), pp. 1-42. 42 SLOVAKIA to feel that if an individual receives education or political training, he or she can somehow put their lives in order and, therefore, be able to have some control over destiny . The east-west dichotomy in the Rusyn psyche also impinges on attitudes toward nationai identity. The eastern orientation tends to think in universalistic terms and be satisfied with viewing Rusyns as part of a single East Slavic Orthodox religious and cultural world. The western orientation - epitomized by the very distinctiveness of Greek Catholics from other Catholics - accepts the idea of national and linguistic particularity. Universalism versus particularism are attitudes that greatly influenced Rusyn political and cultural leaders , especially regarding the nationality question. Being a stateless people, Rusyns have had, at least until the second half of the twentieth century , to depend on their leaders, the intelligentsia, to determine the precise direction of their national revival . The Rusyn national revival began during the second half of the nineteenth century and culminated during the interwar years, by which time it had evolved into a comprehensive movement concerned with political, cultural, and social issues. Most of the nationalist intelligentsia did agree on one basic premise: that Rusyns are East Slavs and that their linguistic and cultural traditions were based in the east, albeit with pronounced western influences. What they could not agree upon, however, was whether Rusyns were a branch of the Russian nationality, or of the Ukrainian nationality, or whether they formed a distinct fourth East Slavic Rusyn nationality. Not surprisingly, debates about national and linguistic orientation quickly became caught up in local partisan politics. Politicians had their own agendas, and they more often than not made opportunistic use of the nationality question in order to promote party or other ideological interests. As for the nationalist intelligentsia, they easily fulfilled the precepts of all activists in the formative stages of national movements. Namely, they had no difficulty using history to formulate an ideology that was able to convince people they were either Russian, SLOVAKIA 43 Ukrainian, or Rusyn. 8 The debate over the national orientation of the Rusyns was not yet resolved before the outbreak of World War II, despite the achievements during the interwar years of the Ukrainian orientation in the largest Rusyn territory , Subcarpathian Rus' (Carpath~Ukraine). In a sense, the year 1939 marked an end to the natural evolution of discussions about a Rusyn nationality. This is because beginning in that year and lasting for half a century, the nationality debate was effectively stifled by state intervention. This happened first under fascist regimes in Hungary(which reannexed Subcarpathian Rus'), in Slovakia (which retained the Presov Region), and in the Germanruled Generalgouvernement (which ruled the Lemko Region); and then as a result of Soviet rule after 1945, whether directly in Subcarpathian Rus' (renamed Transcarpathian Ukraine) or through proSoviet Communist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As is well known, the Communist era with its anti-democratic approach to the nationality question was to last until the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. The only exception was the case of the small group of Rusyns in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia. Although a Communist regime was installed in their land as well, the Yugoslav government allowed the Vojvodinian Rusyns to decide their own national orientation. This was not to be the case for the Rusyns living in the Carpathian homeland. In short, the Soviet regime declared that further debate was unnecessary because the nationality question had supposedly been resolved long ago. Based on a decision made by the Communist party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine taken in December 8Generally, the Russian-oriented intelligentsia, or Russophiles, were Orthodox adherents or sympathizers who believed in the unity of Eastern Slavic Christian culture represented by three branches of the East Slavs - Great Russians , Belorussians, and Little Russians (including Carpatho-Rusyns) - all considered to be part of one common Russian (ob§cerusskiJ) nationality . The Ukrainian--0riented and Rusyn--0riented intelligentsias were western--0riented Greek Catholics who believed in various degrees of national and/or regional differentiation - the Ukrainophiles arguing for the unity of one people that stretched "from the Carpathians to the Caucasus"; the Rusynophiles arguing that the Rus' population in the Carpathians (from the Poprad to Tysa rivers) comprises a separate people. 44 SLOVAKIA 1925, all Rusyns , regardless what they may have called themselves, were declared to be Ukrainians. Any who opposed the Ukrainian viewpoint were accused of having "anti-historical" and, therefore, "anti-Soviet" opinions; they often were removed from their jobs; and they might even have been arrested as "counterrevolutionaries." Closely connected with these developments was the liquidation first in Soviet Transcarpathia (1949) and then in Czechoslovakia (1950) of the Greek Catholic Church, which by the mid-twentieth century had become the stronghold of the Rusyn orientation. When Communist regimes were established in Poland (1945) and Czechoslovakia (1948), they adapted the Soviet line and decreed that the Ru syn minorities within their borders were Ukrainians. They forbade Rusyn publications and the use of the name Rusyn in official documents. The situation was particularly bad in Poland. Not only were the Lemko Rusyns declared to be Ukrainians, they were forcibly deported en masse from their Carpathian homeland in 1947 and scattered throughout the former German lands of post-1945 western and northern Poland.9 It is ironic to note the advantages that accrued to the governments in question through their use - or, more properly, misuse - of the name Ukrainian. For example, by declaring that the population was Ukrainian, this allowed the Soviet Union to justify the annexation in 1945 of Subcarpathian Rus', a territory that throughout the war it had agreed should be returned to Czechoslovakia. Nationalist ideology could now conveniently serve Stalin's political designs on the international stage. In any case, how could the Soviet worker's state refuse the request of fellow "Ukrainian workers" in Transcarpathia who "voluntarily" were demanding to be united with the "Mother Ukraine"? 9 The actual deportations took place in two phases. Between 1945 and 1946, about 200,000 Lemko Rusyns "voluntarily" took up the offer to resettle eastward in the Ukraine in exchange for Poles who moved west within the new postwar boundaries of Poland . The remaining 80,000 Lemko Rusyns , mostly in the western Lemko region , were forcibly deported in 1947 . For details, see Kazimierz Pudlo , Lemkowie: process wrastania w ~rodowisko Dolnego Sl{lska, 1947-1985 (Wroclaw: Polskie Towarszystwo Ludoznawcze, 1987), esp . pp. 24-34. SLOVAKIA 45 In neighboring Poland, identification of Lemkos as Ukrainians made it easier for the government to deport them, since the Communist Polish government argued that, as "Ukrainians," the Lemkos were helping the anti-Communist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) under Stepan Bandera, which was held up in the Carpathians and still fighting the Polish and Soviet authorities after the end of World War II. South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, the administrative imposition of a Ukrainian identity beginning in 1952 proved to be advantageous to those Slovaks who had always claimed that "their Rusnaks" were really "Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith. 1110 In essence, forced Ukrainianization (combined with the liquidation of the local Greek Catholic Church and forced collectivization of peasant land) led during the 1950s and 1960s to the most rapid degree of Slovakization and national assimilation that Rusyns had ever experienced. It is nonetheless true that during this same period, the Czechoslovak government provided extensive funding to create a wide range of cultural organizations that were Ukrainian in national form but socialist in content. A well-paid local Ukrainian intelligentsia was even able to attain several significant scholarly and literary achievements. However, this had little real effect upon the Rusyn peasant masses in Slovakia. For them, the choice was simple: if one could not be a Rusyn, better declare oneself a Slovak than a Ukrainian (which among other things was associated with the hated East). Once again Yugoslavia was the exception. The government there provided both funding and legal guarantees, while the local intelligentsia decided to adopt a Rusyn orientation and to develop the local speech into a sociologically-complete Rusyn literary language. In fact, Rusyns became one of the five official nationalities in the lO Beginning already in 1945, new Rusyn political and cultural organizations carried the name Ukrainian . However, despite their name, they paradoxically functioned using Russian or vernacular Rusyn as the language of instruction and communication. In 1952, a decree of the Communist Party of Slovakia initiated a policy of Ukrainianization that banned use of the term Rusyn and replaced Russian with Ukrainian as the language of instruction in schools . For details, see Pavel Macu, "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia," East-Central Europe, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, 1975), pp. 101-131. 46 SLOVAKIA autonomous province of the Vojvodina. Yet Yugoslavia was the exception that proved the rule. And the rule was that after 1945, Rusyns ceased to exist. All Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish documents and publications referred to the population only as Ukrainian.1 1 Publications in the West, both by Ukrainian emigre and North American Soviet and East European specialists, also accepted the view that Rusyns did not exist, or to quote the New Columbia Encyclopedia (1975): "There is no ethnic or linguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Ruthenians [Rusyns] ." "The majority of the population [of Transcarpathia] is Ukrainian." 12 The Current Situation Then came the 1980s. The first signs of change came in Poland, where the Lemko Rusyns - both those who were dispersed in the "West" of that country as well as about 10,000 who had managed to return to the Carpathian homeland - began to gather at annual cultural festivals. These "unofficial" festivals received no government financial support, but by the same token they were not under any ideological control. As a result, the Lemkos began to revive the idea that they were neither Poles nor Ukrainians, but rather part of a distinct Slavic people closely related to Rusyns living south of the mountains in Slovakia. The Lemkos seemed to be acting in isolation and for several years that was , indeed, the case.1 3 Later came the changes brought about by the November 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. New initiative committees were founded that were often dominated by individuals who had not 11 Whereas the idea of a Rusyn nationality in the Carpathians was not recognized by schools and official circles in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, they have recognized the Rusyns (Rusnaks) of Yugoslavia as a distinct ethnic group with its own literary language . Cf. A.E. Suprun and A .M. Kaljuta, Vvedenie v slavjanskuju filologiju (Minsk: Vy§ej§aja §kola, 1981), pp . 137-139. 12 "Ruthenia," in the New Columbia Encyclopedia , ed. William H. Harris and Judith S. Levey, eds. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 2383. l3 On the Lemko-Rusyn revival, see the series of articles in the Carpatho-Rusyn American, X and XI (Fairview, NJ ., 1987-88). SLOVAKIA 47 been associated with the Communist regime. At first, the initiative committees tried to transform (they would say democratize) the older Ukrainian organizations, but when that failed they established their own Rusyn organizations and publications. At the very same time, in neighboring Transcarpathia, the first Rusyn-oriented organization to exist anywhere in Carpathian Rus' since World War II was established in February 1990 in the oblast's administrative center of Uzhorod. Known as the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns (Tovarystvo Karpats'kych Rusyniv) and with branches throughout Transcarpathia, its goals were at first of a cultural and ecological nature - to promote and preserve knowledge of local history and customs. But before long, the Society moved on to political demands, in particular the recognition of Rusyn as a distinct nationality and the return of the autonomous status of Subcarpathian Rus', a status which they argued was illegally taken away in 1945. Before 1990 came to a close, a total of five new Rusyn organizations had come into existence where Rusyns live. Aside from the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns in Ukrainian Transcarpathia were the Rusyn Renaissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda) in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia (est. March 1990); the Lemko Association (Stovarysynja Lemkiv) in Legnica, Poland (est. April 1990); the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' (Spolecnost pratel Podkarpatske Rusi) in Prague (est. October 1990); and the Ruska Matka (Rusyn Matka) in Ruski Kerestur, Yugoslavia (est. December 1990). By the spring of 1991, a sixth one was established, this time in Hungary: the Rusyn Organization in Hungary (Magyarorszagi Ruszinok Szervezete) in Budapest (est. May 1991). Most of these organizations have their own Rusyn-language newspaper or magazine, 14 or they have access to existing publications. All five organizations have put forth basically the same demands: that Rusyns be recognized as a distinct nationality; that a Rusyn literary language be codified and eventually be used in schools as a medium of instruction; and that 14 These include: Besida (Legnica, Poland, 1989-present); Otcyj chram (Uzhorod, 1990-91); Podkarpatski Rus (Prague, 1991-present); Rusyn (Medzilaborce , Czechoslovakia, 1990-present); Narodny novyntj (Pre§ov, 1991-present). 48 SLOVAKIA Rusyns be guaranteed full rights as a national minority in the countries where they live or, in the case of Transcarpathia, that Rusyns be recognized as the dominant indigenous nationality. As in all new or revived movements, the Rusyn orientation must first be able to make itself known to the constituency it purports to represent. This is inherently problematic, because with the exception of Yugoslavia, nowhere do Rusyns control the local media. Their message, or at least an awareness of their movement's existence, has been helped less by their own publications than by the fierce polemics that have filled the non-Rusyn press in Poland, former Czechoslovakia, and most especially former Soviet Transcarpathia. This is because from the moment the first Rusyn activity began, local pro-Ukrainian activists attacked the Rusyn orientation as "anachronistic," "ahistorical," "unenlightened," "in the service of American imperialists," and "treacherous" to the Ukrainian nation. 15 As a result, more attention of a semi-sensationalist journalistic nature was given the Rusyn problem than might otherwise have been the case. The Czech and Slovak press also paid much - although more rational - attention to the Rusyn-Ukrainian debate, especially in the context of the nationality question that concerned Czechoslovak society as a whole. Whatever latent isolation Rusyn leaders in their respective countries may have still felt was overcome in March 1991, when, at the initiative of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, the first World Congress of Rusyns was convened in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia. Indeed, despite a history of interaction between Rusyn communities in the homeland as well as the immigration in America during the twentieth century, this was, in fact, the first time representatives from all countries where Rusyns live (Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, 15 The best (or worst) examples of the anti-Rusyn polemical attacks comes from scholars in the former Soviet Ukrainian intellectual establishment: Pavlo Cucka, "Kak rusiny stali ukraincami," Zakarpatskaja pravda (U:lhorod), September 12-16, 1989; Vasyl' Mel'nyk, "Neorusynstvo i joho interpretatory," Zakarpats'ka pravda (U:lhorod), August 18, 21, 22, 24, 1990; Jurij Balega, "Rusynstvo: ideolohy i pokrovyteli," ibid., September 6,7 ,9, 1990; and Oleksa Myfanyc, "To chto :le vony?: do idejnych vytokiv novitn'oho 'karpatorusynstva'," Literatuma Ukrajina (Kiev), January 17, 1991. SLOVAKIA 49 Yugoslavia, the United States) gathered together in one place. The congress constituted itself as a permanent umbrella organization, and its very existence had an enormous impact on instilling Rusyn national pride in the over 300 persons who attended, not to mention innumerable others who read about it through the generally widespread press coverage.1 6 It is interesting to note that one week after the congress took place, Czechoslovakia conducted its decennial census in which people for the first time since World War II had the right to answer that they were of Rusyn nationality. Despite problems with the manner in which the nationality questionwas asked and subsequently classified, in Slovakia 17,000 persons responded they were Rusyns as compared to 14,000 Ukrainians. 17 This raises the question of numbers. Observers will legitimately ask just how many people identify as Rusyns? And even among those who do respond Rusyn, does use of such a term necessarily mean they are denying a possible simultaneous identification as Ukrainians? At this point, there is no way to know the precise answers to those questions. All we know is that in Slovakia, when given a chance in March 1991, of those people of East Slavic background who did not identify as Slovak and who had the choice between a Rusyn or Ukrainian identity, 55 percent chose Rusyn. As for the number of Rusyns in Poland and Ukrainian Transcarpathia, we simply do not know at this stage, nor do we have any indications, such as census data, scientific polling, or membership in political parties, that might help to provide a reasonable estimate. What we can be certain of, however, is that after forty years of Communist rule, Rusyns have not gone away. Today, there are Rusyn organizations, Rusyn publications, and a relatively wide range of writers, teachers, professionals, and peasants who continue to articulate in the press and at public manifestations their belonging 16 Information on the First World Congress as well as its official declaration are found in the Carpatho--Rusyn American , XIV, 2 and 3 (Fairview, NJ., 1991). pp . 7-9 and 8-9. 17 Mykola Mu§ynka, "Skil'ky rusyniv-ukrajinciv u Slovaccyni? ," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ.), July 19, 1991. 50 SLOVAKIA to a distinct Rusyn people.1 8 Protection for Rusyns in the Future As with many minorities, the future of their survival depends on the willingness of the governments in the states where they live to provide them with adequate legal protection and perhaps financial assistance for their national development. In this regard, the Rusyns need to inform and constantly to remind the international community that they exist. In tum, Rusyns should be able to expect that the international community will monitor their status and, if necessary, put pressure on the governments of the Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in order to ensure that their national rights are protected. In fact, all four states in which Rusyns live have already ratified several agreements pertaining to national minorities at recent meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Of particular importance for Rusyns were the decisions reached in·June 1990 at the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE .. At Copenhagen it was agreed that "to belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." Moreover, "persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group. 1119 This means that regardless how scholars or governments might define Rusyns, if there are individuals and/or groups who call themselves by that name and who believe they constitute a distinct natio18 Among the best known of these to date are: in Transcarpathia , the writers Volodymyr Fedyny§ynec', Ivan Petrovcij, and Vasylij Socka, and the political activists Mychajlo Tomcanij, Petro Hodma§, and Vasyl' Zajac; in Czechoslovakia, the head of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, Vasyl' Turok, and the advisor to the Slovak government on nationality affairs, Ivan Bicko, and the editor Aleksander Zozuljak; in Poland, the poets Petro Trochanovskij and Olena Due , and the head of the Lemko Association , Andrij Kopca; and in Yugoslavia, the director of the Ruske Slovo publishing house, Ljubomir Medje§i, and the writers Djura Papharhaj and Natalja Duda§. 19 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Copenhagen, 1990), pp. 40--41, paragraphs 32 and 32.6. SLOVAKIA 51 nality , they have a right to do so and to be recognized as Rusyns by the governments of the countries in which they live. The Copenhagen agreement also recognized the role of non-governmental organizations in promoting the interests of national minorities, and it called on the participating states to assure that the teaching of history and culture in the educational establishments "will also take account of the history and culture of national minorities. 1120 At a follow-up CSCE meeting in Geneva (July 1991), member states accepted the provisions of a special report which guaranteed the right of national minorities to participate in non-governmental organizations outside their country of residence. The report reaffirmed as well the principle that individuals or organizations representing national minorities be allowed "unimpeded contacts ... across frontiers ... with persons with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin." 21 Finally, at the most recent CSCE meeting held in Moscow (September-October 1991), member states reaffirmed the agreements reached at all previous meetings and agreed further that "commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE [including those pertaining to national minorities] are matters of direct legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concemed." 22 Before looking specifically at what Rusyns need in each country to protect and guarantee their future existence, it is necessary to clarify the issue of international boundaries. In the Carpathian homeland, Rusyns live within the borders of three states, and at least until late 1992 there was discussion in the Czech , Slovak, and Transcarpathian press about certain political activists who demanded the return of Ukraine's Transcarpathian oblast (historic Subcarpathian Rus') to Czechoslovakia. 23 There was even talk that Transcarpathia 20 Ibid., p. 41 , paragraph 34. 21 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (Geneva , 1991) , p. 10 . 22 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow, 1991 ), p. 2. 23 The Republican party in Czechoslovakia led by Dr. Miroslav SIMek had as one of its goals the "return of Subcarpathian Rus"' to Czechoslovakia. "Zpl!t do Ceskoslovenska," Republika (Prague), October 18-24, 1990; "Rozhovor s pi'edsedou SPR- 52 SLOVAKIA might be returned to Hungary or divided between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In fact, most of these propositions were little more than the speculations of individuals that were blown out of proportion by political rivals and by journalists seeking to report a good story .24 The Czecho--Slovak federal government publicly declared that it "cannot be concerned with the fate" of Transcarpathia.25 With the end of Czechoslovakia in December 1992, the question of unification has become moot. As for the Rusyn organizations that have come into existence in 1990, none of them nor the World Congress of Rusyns that met in 1991 has ever voiced any demand for border changes. On the contrary, all the new organizations as well as· the vast majority of Rusyn spokespersons wherever they live warn against tampering with existing international boundaries. On the other hand, the Society of Carpatho--Rusyns in Transcarpathia has called openly for the return of the status of automony that Subcarpathian Rus' did enjoy during the interwar years. 26 In order to determine the views of the local population, the society, joined by other minority organizations, called for a question on Transcarpathian autonomy to be added to the referendum on Ukrainian indeRS, Ph Dr. Miroslavem Shidkem," ibid., August, 1991. The head of the National Socialist party, C. Cejka, stated that Czechoslovak jurisdiction still applies to Subcarpathian Rus' . "NSS chtc!jf Podkarpatskou Rus, "Lidova demokracie (Prague), September 3, 1991. 24 Jaromfr Hoi'ec of the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' in Prague and wellknown publicist has written about the recent political activism in Transcarpathia in numerous articles in the Czech press, which imply that the local population would be sympathetic to re-unification with Czechoslovakia. Cf. his recent articles in Lidova demokracie (Prague): "Freedom for Subcarpathian Rus"' (September 7, 1991); "Czechs in Subcarpathia" (September 18, 1991); and "Subcarpathia Calls For an Independent Republic" (September 20, 1991). The Hungarian press has also followed closely the demands for Transcarpathian autonomy: "Ruszin koztlirsaslig Klirplitaljlin, "Magyar hfrlap (Budapest), September 10, 1991; "A ruszinok kovetelese: Jegyen Klirplitalja koztlirsaslig! , "Nap/6 (Debrecen), September 3, 1991. 25 The quote is attributed to Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, Jiff Dienstbier, in "Svobodu pro Podkarpatskou Rus," Lidova demokracie, September 9, 1991. 26 The text of the declaration, which was sent to the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev , to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and to the United Nations, appeared first in the Society's newspaper, Otey} chram (SeptemberOctober, 1990) . It is available in English translation in the Carpatho-Rusyn American, XIV, 1 (Fairview , NJ., 1991), pp 4-5 . SLOVAKIA 53 pendence that was held on December 1, 1991 .27 There was a large voter tum-out, with 92.6 percent favoring Ukrainian independence and 78 percent self-rule for Transcarpathia. 28 The issue of Transcarpathian autonomy elicited great interest in neighboring countries, although this is, in fact, an internal issue for whatever kind of government and state structure is finally established in what until recently was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In short, Transcarpathia has been and should for the foreseeable future remain a part of Ukraine. However, as a sovereign member of the international community, Ukraine must, in tum, guarantee the individual and corporate rights of Rusyns - or those citizens of Ukraine who wish to call themselves Rusyns. It is true that the Ukrainian government has already provided guarantees for national minorities living on its territory: Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Tatars, etc. To this list must be added Rusyns. This would mean that the "official," or one might say traditional, Ukrainian view of the Rusyns has to change. Namely, Ukrainian authorities must accept the fact that within its boundaries, primarily in its Transcarpathian oblast, there are people who define themselves as Rusyns in the sense of a nationality distinct from Ukrainians. Such people should have the right to declare themselves in their passports and internal documents as Rusyns, and the state census bureau should publish data on the number of persons who identify as Rusyns and not simply classify them - as has been done until now - as Ukrainians. 29 If such guarantees are 27 "Rezoljucija mityngu Tovarystva Karpats'kych Rusyniv z pytannja nacional'noho vidrod!ennja rusyns'koho narodu i vidnovlennja statusu Pidkarpats'koho kraju , Mukacevo, 01.09.1991," Molod' Zakarpattja (Uzhorod), September 14, 1991, p. 4. 28 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Rusyns Regain Their Autonomy," Ukrainian Canadian Herald (Toronto), March 16, 1992, p. 7. 29 Soviet guidelines used by the State Committee for Statistics in order to classify answers in the census reports were determined largely on recommendations from authorities in individual republics as well as from the Institute of Ethnography and the Institute of Linguistics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. SeeSJovari nacional'nostej i jazykov dlja kodirovanija otvetov na 8 i 9 voprosy perepisnych Jistov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyj komitet SSSR po statistike, 1988). It is interesting to note that a recent report by the Institute of Ethnography (No. 14110/2171, dated February 6, 1990) stated: "It is theoretically possible to con- 54 SLOVAKIA provided, there is no reason why Rusyns in Transcarpathia could not remain Rusyns as well as function as full-fledged citizens of a sovereign and democratic Ukrainian state. Indeed, independent Ukraine has recently become a member of the Conference in Security and Cooperation in Europe, which obliges it to accept and implement the principles of the Copenhagen and other agreements on national minorities outlined above. Following the trend that has taken hold in the former Soviet Union, it would seem desirable that the new Ukrainian state become a decentralized entity in which each of its component regions would have a large degree of automony in economic and cultural matters .30 Thus, questions such as what language might be taught in elementary schools, or what kind of national orientation should be adopted by regional cultural and educational institutions, or what amount of funding might be given to Rusyn-oriented groups, are all decisions that would be made by the people's assembly in Uzhorod and not in Kiev. Of course, it goes without saying that the free movement of peoples across borders with neighboring Rusyn regions in Slovakia and Poland must be guaranteed. Fortunately, this possibility exists already, albeit with a waiting time at border crossings that every day of the week averages between 15 and 20 hours. As for neighboring Slovakia, the situation of Rusyns, especially since the November 1989 Velvet Revolution, is much better than in either Ukrainian Transcarpathia or Poland. Initially, the Slovak government (generally through its Ministry of Culture) and the former Czecho-Slovak federal government (through allotment of discretionary funds) provided only ad hoc grants to the new Rusyn organizations and publications. Normal budgetary allotments of the Slovak government intended for its East Slavic Rusyn/Ukrainian elude that Rusyns can be considered at the same level as Russians , Ukrainians , and Belorussians, and that they are not a part of any of those groups ." (document in the author's possession) . 30 Discussions regarding the restructuring of the Ukraine have been going on for the past few years . Neighbouring Galicia as well as Transcarpathia feel confident that each could do much better economically if it were independent of the centre in Kiev . Cf. Ivan Hrancak, "Vidnovleni haluzky karpats'koho kraju : Ukrajina federatyvna?," No vyny Zakarpattja (Uzhorod), February 6, 1991 . SLOVAKIA 55 minority continued to go to the Union of Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia (SRUC), that is, to the Ukrainian-oriented cultural organization that is the direct descendant (still with largely the same leadership) as the formerly Communist-dominated Cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (KSUT). Slovak government funding through other ministries also supported in Presov several Ukrainian university departments and institutes at Safarik University , a Ukrainian radio station, and a Ukrainian publishing house, as well as the Museum of Ukrainian Culture (recently renamed the Aleksander Pavlovy Regional Museum) in Svidnik. As of 1993 , two Rusyn-oriented organizations also receive a normal budgetary allotment. These include the Aleksander Duchnovyc Theater (formerly the Ukrainian National Theater) which is of a Rusyn orientation and the Rusyn Renasissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda), both based in Presov. The Slovak government now recognizes that there are two clearly-defined national orientations - Rusyn and Ukrainian - and that if support for national minorities is to continue in Slovakia, then funding should be provided to Rusyn as well as Ukrainian organizations. But how should the government divide a financial allotment among its East Slavic minority, which until recently has been designated only as Ukrainian? The Slovak government has opted for what seems the most reasonable solution. It has accepted the percentages revealed in the results of the 1991 census, and, therefore, has provided roughly 50 percent financial support to Rusyn cultural organizations and media and 50 percent to Ukrainian cultural organizations, schools, and its media. The question of schools in Slovakia is particularly problematic, because beginning in the 1960s the language of instruction in the vast majority of Rusyn-inhabited villages was changed - at the request of parents themselves - from Ukrainian to Slovak. Moreover, as part of a consolidation process during the past two decades, many small elementary schools in Rusyn-inhabited villages were closed. Even if private or public elementary schools will be reopened in Rusyn villages, it is likely that Slovak will be the language of instruction. The Slovak ministry of education, however, should 56 SLOVAKIA provide teachers and textbooks in Rusyn or in Ukrainian for those villages that may submit such requests. Most important, the standard Slovak-language history textbooks used throughout Slovakia should include an adequate discussion of the history and culture of Rusyns and other minorities which will be of benefit to all students. This would be in keeping with the CSCE agreement reached in Copenhagen, which - along with other "international treaties on human rights and freedoms" - are, according to the new consitution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, "universally binding on its territory and supercede its own laws."31 The Rusyns, or Lemko Rusyns of Poland perhaps need the most help. Not only is the majority of Lemko Rusyns scattered throughout the western and northern regions of Poland, but their fledgling pro-Rusyn organization, the Lemko Association with its amateur theatrical troupe, and the older Lemkovyna folk ensemble receive no financial support at all from the Polish government, either in the form of an annual budgetary allotment or ad hoc grants. Whatever government funds assigned to national minority cultural activity are given, they invariably go to the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (Ob'jednannja Ukrajinciv Pollsci), the direct descendant of the Communist-dominated Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Society (USKT). Support for the new Union of Ukrainians must continue, especially since most Ukrainians in Poland are not originally from nor do they live in the Carpathian region. On the otherhand, Lemko Rusyns must also be recognized as a distinct national minority and receive a fair share of funding. How to determine what is a "fair share" will, of course, be difficult, since Poland does not even have nationality as a category on its decennial census questionnaires. Perhaps a referendum attached to the next national vote could include a question that lists all the national groups in Poland and asks the respondent to which one he/she would wish to assign a portion of their taxes for cultural 31 Cf. Section 2 of the Constitutional Act of January 9, 1991, instituting the charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a Constitutional Act of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic . SLOVAK.IA 57 activity. This would be somewhat similar to municipalities in Canada that ask their residents to indicate whether they want their tax dollars to be assigned to public schools or to separate (Catholic) schools. Whatever the mechanism decided upon, in keeping with its commitments as a member state of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Polish government is obliged to recognize Lernko Rusyns as a distinct national minority and to provide funding for Lernko cultural organizations and Lernko-language schools in those communities that demand them. Lastly, we turn to the situation in Yugoslavia. Ever since World War II, the Yugoslav policy of equality for its six component republics and support for the national minorities that live within them has encouraged the Croatian Republic and, in particular, the Vojvodina Autonomous Region of the Serbian Republic to finance liberally Rusyn cultural and educational activity. It is to be expected that when the republics of Yugoslavia sort out their present difficulties, the republics of Croatia and, in particular, Serbia will continue their judicious support and protection of their respective Rusyn minorities. Conclusion The Rusyns are one example of the many groups who suffered under the totalitarian regimes imposed on East Central Europe during the past four decades. Now that those regimes no longer exist, there is a real opportunity to correct past injustices and to assure the future survival of the Rusyns. It is, after all, in the interest of all four countries where Rusyns live - Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia - to become part of the larger European community. The way in which those countries resolve the Rusyn issue will, in part, determine to what degree they are ready for membership in the new Europe. SYMPOSIUM  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Carpatho-Rusyns: Their Current Status and Future Perspectives Description An account of the resource Paul Robert Magosci Slovakia, Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92 pp. 36-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Magocsi, Paul Robert, 1945- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991-92 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e042cae3d975eba92d39991df47aace0.pdf 0f326f309d067af6ab96aeb8a67372ed PDF Text Text REVIEW ESSAYS ��SLOVAKIA 119 SUBCARPATHIAN RUS' AND THE NEW SLOVAK HISTORIOGRAPHY: Peter Mosny. Podkarpatska Rus ': nerealizovana auton6mia. Bratislava: Slovak Academic Press, 2001 , 2 I 6 pp. Index. Paper. Peter Svorc. Krajinska hranica medzi Sloven skom a Podkarpatskou Rusou, 1919-1939. Presov: Vydavatel'stvo Universum , 2003, 424 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index . cloth. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto As we move further and further into the twenty-first century, the former Czechoslovakia is rapidly being transformed into little more than a hi stori c memory. The first phase of memory loss about the concept of Czechoslovakia began just after World War II, when the country was reco nstituted but without its far eastern reg ion, Subcarpathian Ru s', which was formally annexed to the Soviet Union. After 1945 the concept of Czechoslovakia became one in which for all intents and purposes Subcarpathian Ru s' did not exist. Now that we are in the second stage of memory loss, which could be said to have begun with the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it is not difficult to foresee a time when the inhabitants of the Czech Republic and Slovakia will at best have only some vague recollection that their two countries once formed a single sociopolitical entity. The second stage of memory loss will be like the first, which occurred between 1945 and 1993 , when the public-at-large and sc hol ars (who should have known better) forgot that the country was founded as a state of three, not two , Slavic peoples-Czec hs, Slovaks, and CarpathoRusyns. It is interesting to note that even during the first Czechoslovak Republic (19 I 9-1938) , let alone post-World War II Socialist Czechoslovakia (1948-1989) , Slovak sc hol arl y interest in the region of Subcarpathian Ru s' and its majority population , Carpatho-Rusyns , was virtually non-ex istent. For example, during the First Republic there was a whole host of Czech scholars (Vac lav Chaloupecky, Frantisek Gabriel , Antonfn Hartl , Jiri Kral, Frantisek Tichy, among �120 SLOVAKIA others), not to mention belletrists (Karel Capek, Ivan Olbracht, Jaromfr Tomecek, Vladislav Vancura), who studied Subcarpathian Rus' or who were inspired by its landscape and people. One would be hard-pressed to find a few Slovaks who during that period evinced any interest in their Slavic brethren to the east. One could speculate about the reasons for thi s lack of interest: at the time Slovak intellectual s had enough of a challenge to demonstrate that they themselves represented a culture and people distinct from the Czechs. Moreover, in contrast to the largely urbanized Czechs, interwar Slovak intellectuals-removed from the village at best by one generation-did not have to seek, nor were they particularly interested in , an undeveloped rural area like Subcarpathian Rus' , no matter how exotic its peop le and landscape may have seemed. During the post-World War II Communist decades, neither Czechs nor Slovaks (in the unlikely case that they wanted) were able to publish about their country 's former eastern province, since Subcarpathian Rus ', or the Transcarpathian oblast' of Ukraine, was by then part of the Soviet workers' state, whose scholarly and literary circles were allowed to remember only that once their homeland had been "occupied" by "bourgeois Czechoslovakia." In short, Subcarpathian Ru s' as a subject was a taboo for Czechs and Slovaks, who in popular parlance referred to everything east of the Slovak border, including the Transcarpathian oblast' of Ukraine, as Rusko-Russia. As for the handful of Slovak scholars who during the Communist era were allowed to publish on Rusyn topics (the historian I.:udovft Haraksim, the ethnographer Jan Podolak), they were forced to focus solely on the "Ukrainian minority" (i. e., Rusyns) living in northeastern Slovakia. The political and intellectual environment has certainly changed in Slovakia since the collapse of Communist rule in l 989 and the establishment of independent Slovakia three years later. The old Soviet taboo has been lifted, and Rusyns, not only in eastern Slovakia, but also in Subcarpathian Rus ', have finally become legitimate topics of scholarly inquiry. Among the new generation of Slovak scholars who have turned their attention to Carpatho-Rusyns are the sociologist Marian Gajdos, the historian Stanislav Konecny, the political scientist Alexander Duleba, and the authors of the two books under review, Peter Mosny and Peter Svorc. �SLOVAKIA 121 Both authors examine different but related aspects of Subcarpathia' s relationship to Czechoslovakia during the period 1919 to 1945. In contrast to the Czech lands and Slovakia, Subcarpathian Rus' had joined Czechoslovakia in 1919 under the specific condition that it would granted "the widest degree of autonomy compatible with the Czechoslovak state." The proviso on autonomy was spelled out in two of the treaties (St. Germain and Trianon) signed within the framework of the Paris Peace Conference ( 1919 and 1920) and it was incorporated into the Czechoslovak Con stitution adopted in February of 1920. Mosny 's monograph focuses on three themes: the reluctance of Czechoslovakia's authorities to implement autonomy in Subcarpathian Rus' during the years of the First Republic; the form of autonomy that finally came into being in post-Munich Czechoslovakia (October 1938-March I 939); and the promises that were again made to Rusyns during World War II, when it was expected that Czechoslovakia was to be recreated according to its pre-Munich boundaries as "a state comprised of three Slavic peoples: Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns/Ukrainians" (p. 162). Mosny provides an incredible amount of documented detail for those who wish to know of Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus ' from the standpoint of the regime in Prague. His legalistic and often tediously dry account says virtually nothing, however, about the activity of Rusyn civic and political leaders to attain the autonomy their province was promised at the close of World War I. Mosny 's onesided approach to the problem may be explained by the fact that he used only Czech- and Slovak-language sources, a serious shortcoming for anyone interested in studying a region in which knowledge of Ukrainian, Russian, and Hungarian is essential. Far more ambitious and intellectually satisfying is the monograph by Peter Svorc. His ostensible focus is the question of the regional border between Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus' during the First Czechoslovak Republic. In fact, the book provides a wide-ranging discussion of Slovak national activists toward Rusy ns beginning already in the nineteenth century, as well as the key political issues faced by Subcarpathia' s leaders from the end of World War I to the end of World War II. Svorc is not only a specialist and widelypublished historian of eastern Slovakia in the twentieth century, but �122 SLOVAKIA he has also published several studies on specific aspects of Ru syn history, as well as the first survey of Subcarpathian Rus' in the first half of the twentieth century to appear in Slovak: Zakliata krajina: Podkarpatska Rus, 1918-1946 (Presov, 1996). The book by Svorc under review here reflects his close familiarity with the secondary literature in a wide variety of languages. Svorc has made use of materials from archives in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, and Slovakia, but not in Hungary or Ukraine. Particularly valuable are several historic photographs and maps that accompany the heavily-footnoted text, although considering the author's approach to the subject, it is surprising not to find a map that compares the various proposals put forth by Slovak and non-Slovak scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the traditional ethnolinguistic boundary between Slovaks and Rusyns. Svorc's monograph comprises 24 chapters. Several of them provide a detailed description of the views put forth by Slovak, Czech, and Ru syn authors-Pavo! Jozef Safarik, Josef Skultety, Stefan Misik, Lubor Niederle, Samuel Czambel, Jan Husek, and Nikolaj Beskid-who in their writings tried to define the ethnolinguistic border between Slovaks and Rusyns. Svorc also deals at length with Slovak and Rusyn immigrants in the United States and their impact on homeland politics, with the Rusyn question at the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations, with Czechoslovak administrative policy in Subcarpathian Rus ' and the efforts of Rusyn activists to attain autonomy, and with the controversy in eastern Slovakia among Slovaks and Rusyns regarding the possible unification of all or part of that region with Subcarpathian Rus '. The latter topic is only one of many in which Svorc provides new or previously littleknown information. For example, a bilateral Slovak-Rusyn governmental commission met as early as September 1919 to propose a Slovak-Subcarpathian boundary. The Slovak negotiators, who included Igor Hrusovsky, Jozef Skultety, Karel Chotek, and Yiktor Dvorsky proposed that the following "Rusyn-inhabited" areas should be united with Subcarpathian Rus ' : northeastern Saris county (including the town of Svidnfk and surrounding villages), northeastern Zemplfn county (beyond the line connecting Hanusovce and Snina), and parts of Uh county west of the Uh River (below the Vihorlat �123 SLOVAKIA ridge). The Rusyn delegation , however, refused to compromise on its demand that all of Uh and Zemplfn counties, most of Saris county, and northern Spis county around Stani r.ubovna should be included within Subcarpathian Rus '. As a result of the impasse, Subcarpathian Rus' was in the end reduced to territory east of the Uh River and eventually (after 1928) along a parallel line just west of the river that was to become an international border that remains in place to this day. Slovak-Rusyn political (as opposed to cultural) relations could be said to have begun in 1918, when the land s within the Danubian Bas in were being reconfi gured to accord with the new post-World War I international order. Since that time Slovak scholars have been very slow in coming to grips with the Rusy n lands just to the east. When Czechoslovakia existed, whether in the form of the First Republic or the post-World War II socialist state, Slovak researchers showed little or no interest in their neighbors to the east. It is only from the last decade of the twentieth century that one can finally speak of a Slovak historiography about Rusyn s and Subcarpathian Rus ' . This new tradition has certainly gotten off to a good start with serious and impartial writings by sc holars like Peter Mosny and, in particular, Peter Svare. Eighty Years of English Studies at the Faculty of Arts, ed. by Alojz Kenfz. PHILOLOGICA LX , Zbornfk Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Komenskeho Bratislava: FFUK, 2004; 406 pages. JA.N SIMKO Washington, DC A SHORT HISTORY In 1924 English studies began at the Comenius University in Bratislava. The first professor, Otakar Yocadlo, however, resigned in February 1939 during the turbulent political developments rocking Czecho-Slovakia . The continuation of English studies was, nevertheless, secured thanks to the appointment of both one lecturer taking over the instruction of the older periods of English language and literature and the other one to teach the modern period. �124 SLOVAKIA Following the communist seizure of political power in February 1948, hotheads began urging the total elimination of English from FFUK, and, in the early I 950 ' s, no new students were admitted for three consecutive years. Fortunately, the argument prevailed that the only Slovak University in existence needed to have its own Department of English . For several years thereafter, on ly three new students were enrolled per year. In the 1960s this number was raised to 20, and later even more. So much so that, when it was later renamed the Department of English and American Studies, it was in a good position to commemorate its eighty years of existence with the publication of this festive, anniversary volume of Ang listic contributions. The total of forty-nine articles includes nine by foreign contributors and forty by domestic authors. All "guest" contributors are current or retired professors of English and are leading world experts in their respective fields of specialization. Their inclusion in this volume is justified by their positive personal relations with Slovakia and the Slovaks as attested by these facts : not only have they been for many years colleagues and friends of this reviewer but, three of them: S. Berkner, S. Noguchi, R. Quirk, and Y. Nakao's son, have paid individual visits to Slovakia, while K. Fukuda has extended his effective help to the FFUK's new Department of Japanese Studies! LANGUAGE STUDIES (1) Sergey Berkner of Voronezh University in Russia spent eight months in 1994 at Ohio State University on a Fu lbright grant. His topical contribution: "Language as an Instrument of Politics: the Role of Cliches and Ideological Lexicon," characterizes the use of language of propaganda as a strong instrument of persuasion, as illustrated by examples from Ru ssian , English , and German. (2) Shunichi Noguchi (b.1933), since 1996 an Emeritus from Osaka University of Education, sent in: "How Can We Not Mismetre Chaucer's Troilus?" He argues that Chaucer had very few specialized terms at his disposal referring to poetry. In classifying the variety of verse patterns used in Troilus, Noguchi has adopted my methods applied to the study of the word-order patterns in 15th century English, namely: "simplification and abstraction" as implemented in my 1957 book. Many typographical errors mar �SLOVAKIA 125 this valuable article. S. Noguchi is one of the world's foremost Malory scholars. The discussion of his article here has been found preferable with regard to the following: (3) Yuji Nakao (b.1935), since March 2007 an Emeritus from both Nagoya and Chubu Universities. He had spent 1967-68 at Brown University in Providence, R.I. , while I was at the same time a Folger Shakespeare Library scholar in Washington, D.C., with neither of us knowing "aught" of the other! His contribution: "On Negative Disjunctive Connectives" in Malory and Caxton of the 15th century, deals with the same material as did I in my 1957 book. While, however, I had been studying the "larger picture," that is, the word-order, he studied the small connectives: nother, neuther, neyther, nor. In the 15th century, they were interchangeable. While of an inconspicuous personal appearance, Y. Nakao is a giant in Arthurian studies. (4) Kazuo Fukuda (b. 1947), of Niigata University, sent in an article: "Theme-Rheme Articulation: A View Based on a Comparison of English and Japanese." He examines the various definitions of these terms well-known to Slovak linguists. He emphasizes the need of a functional , rather than a formalistic view of language. He has extended his generous help to the new Slovak Japanists at FFUK. LITERARY STUDIES (1) Paul Miller (b. 1926), is an Emeritus of Wittenberg University of Springfield, Ohio, where he had taught from 1961 to 1991. In his article: "In Theodore Roosevelt's Footsteps: Midwestern Writers Hunt Lion in East Africa," he offers a fascinating insight into the positive evolution of the African safari wild animal hunter and killer into a wild animal photographer. (2) David George, of Urbana University in Ohio, has, since 1986, been working on a monumental New Yariorum edition of Shakespeare's Roman tragedy CORIOLANUS (1608), to be ready at the end of 2007. In his contribution: "Coriolanus: Narrative and Mythic Sources, " he aims at establishing that, rather than having read Livy in Latin, Shakespeare consulted Livy and Plutarch in English translation. In his meticulous, "clinical" dissection, the author demonstrates that Shakespeare not only followed Plutarch �126 SLOVAKIA but also improved upon his sources, thus exemplifying the Bard's amazing mastery of Roman and Greek history and mythology. (3) Robert Fleissner retired, after 38 years of service (1967-2006), from the Central State University of Springfield, Ohio. He is an unusually prolific author, with fourteen books and 585 published articles (by 2006). Nor does he shun controversy with startling statements, such as, the ones of, respectively, 2000 and 2006 (in the Publications of the Modern Language Association of America), suggesting that Shakespeare could have studied, or spent some time, at Oxford! In his article: "Richard II in His Own Way: An Intertextual Study," he debates the question "whether the play is more of a historical play or a tragedy." He inclines to the opinion that it is "a history play with a tragic hero manque" (that is: might have been but is not). (4) The eminent Shakespearean Soji Iwasaki (b.1929) has been, among others, also a professor at Nagoya University. It is surprising that his mentor and supervisor at Cambridge (1964-66), the late eminent Shakespearean, Muriel C. Bradbrook, was, by family connections, related to Professor 0. Vocadlo, through 1939 at FFUK! Also surprisingly but significantly, the two of us have found common ground in each of us having devoted some related unconventional insights into Shakespeare's masterful comedy As You Like It (c . 1599) : he, in his contribution : "Transvestism and Social Reformation in A YLI;" and, as to me, in " W. Shakespeare's A YLI and Slovakia" (Almanac of the National Slovak Society, Pittsburgh 1999). The latter article compares the situation in the former Czecho-Slovakia, both after WW II in May 1945 and to the demise of Communism on November 17, 1989, to the situation following the usurper Duke Frederick's abdication in A YLI. (5) Jan Simko was, from 1945 to 1967 at FFUK, then in the U.S .A. In his contribution: "A Possible Parallel to 'Shall I Die?' A Poem Attributed to Shakespeare?" he compares this poem to English poetry of the 1590s, finding it highly unlikely for it to be by Shakespeare. �SLOVAKIA 127 These contributions by mainly foreign, outstanding Anglicists , have added both luster and prestige to thi s commemorative volume published by Slovak Anglicists. Contributions by Domestic, that is, Slovak Anglicists LANGUAGE STUDIES Seventeen articles deal with the following areas: syntax; wordformation; semantics; style and stylistics; language and culture; language teaching (this is to be grouped with methodology below) ; translation (also to be grouped with translation below). Missing are articles on historical linguistics, varieties of English, etc, Seven (c.42%) of these articles quote A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (London: Longman, 1985), a seminal , monumental work created by Lord Quirk (and collaborators) of the University College, London. Although, for health reasons, he was unable to send in a contribution, his keen interest in the progress of Slovak studies of English and his April 1966 lecture at FFUK deserve special recognition. LITERARY STUDIES Out of eight contributions, English literature is di sc ussed in three; one each disc usses Canadian literature, women's iss ues, theory (realism: modified, and magic; tragedy). No article is devoted to Shakespeare or to American literature. TEACHING METHODOLOGY Nine articles di scuss various topics: the use of storytelling and drama; novels; on-line tutoring; innovative approaches; learning strategies; foreign-language teaching training. Eva Tandlichova (author of the introductory article) advocates, in her contribution: "More Autonomy ... The Need for Real LearnerCentred Teaching and Leaming." BRITISH STUDIES (2 contributions) �128 SLOVAKIA TRANSLATIONS (4 contributions) The emphasis is on quality philological preparation and a good memory. Jan Vilikovsky (former Czecho-Slovak and after 1993 Slovak Republic's first Ambassador to London) di sc usses, in his fundamental contribution: "Orwell, Politics and Translation - Notes of a Translator." He emphasizes the need to evaluate Orwell's texts with a view to the political situation in which they were written. CONCLUSION Even if considering the empty spaces in its overall coverage of the wide field of Anglistics, PHILOLOGICA LX of 2004 cannot but be evaluated as an obvious quantitative and qualitative advance of Slovak studies of English. � REVIEW ESSAYS ��SLOVAKIA 119 SUBCARPATHIAN RUS' AND THE NEW SLOVAK HISTORIOGRAPHY: Peter Mosny. Podkarpatska Rus ': nerealizovana auton6mia. Bratislava: Slovak Academic Press, 2001 , 2 I 6 pp. Index. Paper. Peter Svorc. Krajinska hranica medzi Sloven skom a Podkarpatskou Rusou, 1919-1939. Presov: Vydavatel'stvo Universum , 2003, 424 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index . cloth. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto As we move further and further into the twenty-first century, the former Czechoslovakia is rapidly being transformed into little more than a hi stori c memory. The first phase of memory loss about the concept of Czechoslovakia began just after World War II, when the country was reco nstituted but without its far eastern reg ion, Subcarpathian Ru s', which was formally annexed to the Soviet Union. After 1945 the concept of Czechoslovakia became one in which for all intents and purposes Subcarpathian Ru s' did not exist. Now that we are in the second stage of memory loss, which could be said to have begun with the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it is not difficult to foresee a time when the inhabitants of the Czech Republic and Slovakia will at best have only some vague recollection that their two countries once formed a single sociopolitical entity. The second stage of memory loss will be like the first, which occurred between 1945 and 1993 , when the public-at-large and sc hol ars (who should have known better) forgot that the country was founded as a state of three, not two , Slavic peoples-Czec hs, Slovaks, and CarpathoRusyns. It is interesting to note that even during the first Czechoslovak Republic (19 I 9-1938) , let alone post-World War II Socialist Czechoslovakia (1948-1989) , Slovak sc hol arl y interest in the region of Subcarpathian Ru s' and its majority population , Carpatho-Rusyns , was virtually non-ex istent. For example, during the First Republic there was a whole host of Czech scholars (Vac lav Chaloupecky, Frantisek Gabriel , Antonfn Hartl , Jiri Kral, Frantisek Tichy, among �120 SLOVAKIA others), not to mention belletrists (Karel Capek, Ivan Olbracht, Jaromfr Tomecek, Vladislav Vancura), who studied Subcarpathian Rus' or who were inspired by its landscape and people. One would be hard-pressed to find a few Slovaks who during that period evinced any interest in their Slavic brethren to the east. One could speculate about the reasons for thi s lack of interest: at the time Slovak intellectual s had enough of a challenge to demonstrate that they themselves represented a culture and people distinct from the Czechs. Moreover, in contrast to the largely urbanized Czechs, interwar Slovak intellectuals-removed from the village at best by one generation-did not have to seek, nor were they particularly interested in , an undeveloped rural area like Subcarpathian Rus' , no matter how exotic its peop le and landscape may have seemed. During the post-World War II Communist decades, neither Czechs nor Slovaks (in the unlikely case that they wanted) were able to publish about their country 's former eastern province, since Subcarpathian Rus ', or the Transcarpathian oblast' of Ukraine, was by then part of the Soviet workers' state, whose scholarly and literary circles were allowed to remember only that once their homeland had been "occupied" by "bourgeois Czechoslovakia." In short, Subcarpathian Ru s' as a subject was a taboo for Czechs and Slovaks, who in popular parlance referred to everything east of the Slovak border, including the Transcarpathian oblast' of Ukraine, as Rusko-Russia. As for the handful of Slovak scholars who during the Communist era were allowed to publish on Rusyn topics (the historian I.:udovft Haraksim, the ethnographer Jan Podolak), they were forced to focus solely on the "Ukrainian minority" (i. e., Rusyns) living in northeastern Slovakia. The political and intellectual environment has certainly changed in Slovakia since the collapse of Communist rule in l 989 and the establishment of independent Slovakia three years later. The old Soviet taboo has been lifted, and Rusyns, not only in eastern Slovakia, but also in Subcarpathian Rus ', have finally become legitimate topics of scholarly inquiry. Among the new generation of Slovak scholars who have turned their attention to Carpatho-Rusyns are the sociologist Marian Gajdos, the historian Stanislav Konecny, the political scientist Alexander Duleba, and the authors of the two books under review, Peter Mosny and Peter Svorc. �SLOVAKIA 121 Both authors examine different but related aspects of Subcarpathia' s relationship to Czechoslovakia during the period 1919 to 1945. In contrast to the Czech lands and Slovakia, Subcarpathian Rus' had joined Czechoslovakia in 1919 under the specific condition that it would granted "the widest degree of autonomy compatible with the Czechoslovak state." The proviso on autonomy was spelled out in two of the treaties (St. Germain and Trianon) signed within the framework of the Paris Peace Conference ( 1919 and 1920) and it was incorporated into the Czechoslovak Con stitution adopted in February of 1920. Mosny 's monograph focuses on three themes: the reluctance of Czechoslovakia's authorities to implement autonomy in Subcarpathian Rus' during the years of the First Republic; the form of autonomy that finally came into being in post-Munich Czechoslovakia (October 1938-March I 939); and the promises that were again made to Rusyns during World War II, when it was expected that Czechoslovakia was to be recreated according to its pre-Munich boundaries as "a state comprised of three Slavic peoples: Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns/Ukrainians" (p. 162). Mosny provides an incredible amount of documented detail for those who wish to know of Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus ' from the standpoint of the regime in Prague. His legalistic and often tediously dry account says virtually nothing, however, about the activity of Rusyn civic and political leaders to attain the autonomy their province was promised at the close of World War I. Mosny 's onesided approach to the problem may be explained by the fact that he used only Czech- and Slovak-language sources, a serious shortcoming for anyone interested in studying a region in which knowledge of Ukrainian, Russian, and Hungarian is essential. Far more ambitious and intellectually satisfying is the monograph by Peter Svorc. His ostensible focus is the question of the regional border between Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus' during the First Czechoslovak Republic. In fact, the book provides a wide-ranging discussion of Slovak national activists toward Rusy ns beginning already in the nineteenth century, as well as the key political issues faced by Subcarpathia' s leaders from the end of World War I to the end of World War II. Svorc is not only a specialist and widelypublished historian of eastern Slovakia in the twentieth century, but �122 SLOVAKIA he has also published several studies on specific aspects of Ru syn history, as well as the first survey of Subcarpathian Rus' in the first half of the twentieth century to appear in Slovak: Zakliata krajina: Podkarpatska Rus, 1918-1946 (Presov, 1996). The book by Svorc under review here reflects his close familiarity with the secondary literature in a wide variety of languages. Svorc has made use of materials from archives in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, and Slovakia, but not in Hungary or Ukraine. Particularly valuable are several historic photographs and maps that accompany the heavily-footnoted text, although considering the author's approach to the subject, it is surprising not to find a map that compares the various proposals put forth by Slovak and non-Slovak scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the traditional ethnolinguistic boundary between Slovaks and Rusyns. Svorc's monograph comprises 24 chapters. Several of them provide a detailed description of the views put forth by Slovak, Czech, and Ru syn authors-Pavo! Jozef Safarik, Josef Skultety, Stefan Misik, Lubor Niederle, Samuel Czambel, Jan Husek, and Nikolaj Beskid-who in their writings tried to define the ethnolinguistic border between Slovaks and Rusyns. Svorc also deals at length with Slovak and Rusyn immigrants in the United States and their impact on homeland politics, with the Rusyn question at the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations, with Czechoslovak administrative policy in Subcarpathian Rus ' and the efforts of Rusyn activists to attain autonomy, and with the controversy in eastern Slovakia among Slovaks and Rusyns regarding the possible unification of all or part of that region with Subcarpathian Rus '. The latter topic is only one of many in which Svorc provides new or previously littleknown information. For example, a bilateral Slovak-Rusyn governmental commission met as early as September 1919 to propose a Slovak-Subcarpathian boundary. The Slovak negotiators, who included Igor Hrusovsky, Jozef Skultety, Karel Chotek, and Yiktor Dvorsky proposed that the following "Rusyn-inhabited" areas should be united with Subcarpathian Rus ' : northeastern Saris county (including the town of Svidnfk and surrounding villages), northeastern Zemplfn county (beyond the line connecting Hanusovce and Snina), and parts of Uh county west of the Uh River (below the Vihorlat �123 SLOVAKIA ridge). The Rusyn delegation , however, refused to compromise on its demand that all of Uh and Zemplfn counties, most of Saris county, and northern Spis county around Stani r.ubovna should be included within Subcarpathian Rus '. As a result of the impasse, Subcarpathian Rus' was in the end reduced to territory east of the Uh River and eventually (after 1928) along a parallel line just west of the river that was to become an international border that remains in place to this day. Slovak-Rusyn political (as opposed to cultural) relations could be said to have begun in 1918, when the land s within the Danubian Bas in were being reconfi gured to accord with the new post-World War I international order. Since that time Slovak scholars have been very slow in coming to grips with the Rusy n lands just to the east. When Czechoslovakia existed, whether in the form of the First Republic or the post-World War II socialist state, Slovak researchers showed little or no interest in their neighbors to the east. It is only from the last decade of the twentieth century that one can finally speak of a Slovak historiography about Rusyn s and Subcarpathian Rus ' . This new tradition has certainly gotten off to a good start with serious and impartial writings by sc holars like Peter Mosny and, in particular, Peter Svare. Eighty Years of English Studies at the Faculty of Arts, ed. by Alojz Kenfz. PHILOLOGICA LX , Zbornfk Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Komenskeho Bratislava: FFUK, 2004; 406 pages. JA.N SIMKO Washington, DC A SHORT HISTORY In 1924 English studies began at the Comenius University in Bratislava. The first professor, Otakar Yocadlo, however, resigned in February 1939 during the turbulent political developments rocking Czecho-Slovakia . The continuation of English studies was, nevertheless, secured thanks to the appointment of both one lecturer taking over the instruction of the older periods of English language and literature and the other one to teach the modern period. �124 SLOVAKIA Following the communist seizure of political power in February 1948, hotheads began urging the total elimination of English from FFUK, and, in the early I 950 ' s, no new students were admitted for three consecutive years. Fortunately, the argument prevailed that the only Slovak University in existence needed to have its own Department of English . For several years thereafter, on ly three new students were enrolled per year. In the 1960s this number was raised to 20, and later even more. So much so that, when it was later renamed the Department of English and American Studies, it was in a good position to commemorate its eighty years of existence with the publication of this festive, anniversary volume of Ang listic contributions. The total of forty-nine articles includes nine by foreign contributors and forty by domestic authors. All "guest" contributors are current or retired professors of English and are leading world experts in their respective fields of specialization. Their inclusion in this volume is justified by their positive personal relations with Slovakia and the Slovaks as attested by these facts : not only have they been for many years colleagues and friends of this reviewer but, three of them: S. Berkner, S. Noguchi, R. Quirk, and Y. Nakao's son, have paid individual visits to Slovakia, while K. Fukuda has extended his effective help to the FFUK's new Department of Japanese Studies! LANGUAGE STUDIES (1) Sergey Berkner of Voronezh University in Russia spent eight months in 1994 at Ohio State University on a Fu lbright grant. His topical contribution: "Language as an Instrument of Politics: the Role of Cliches and Ideological Lexicon," characterizes the use of language of propaganda as a strong instrument of persuasion, as illustrated by examples from Ru ssian , English , and German. (2) Shunichi Noguchi (b.1933), since 1996 an Emeritus from Osaka University of Education, sent in: "How Can We Not Mismetre Chaucer's Troilus?" He argues that Chaucer had very few specialized terms at his disposal referring to poetry. In classifying the variety of verse patterns used in Troilus, Noguchi has adopted my methods applied to the study of the word-order patterns in 15th century English, namely: "simplification and abstraction" as implemented in my 1957 book. Many typographical errors mar �SLOVAKIA 125 this valuable article. S. Noguchi is one of the world's foremost Malory scholars. The discussion of his article here has been found preferable with regard to the following: (3) Yuji Nakao (b.1935), since March 2007 an Emeritus from both Nagoya and Chubu Universities. He had spent 1967-68 at Brown University in Providence, R.I. , while I was at the same time a Folger Shakespeare Library scholar in Washington, D.C., with neither of us knowing "aught" of the other! His contribution: "On Negative Disjunctive Connectives" in Malory and Caxton of the 15th century, deals with the same material as did I in my 1957 book. While, however, I had been studying the "larger picture," that is, the word-order, he studied the small connectives: nother, neuther, neyther, nor. In the 15th century, they were interchangeable. While of an inconspicuous personal appearance, Y. Nakao is a giant in Arthurian studies. (4) Kazuo Fukuda (b. 1947), of Niigata University, sent in an article: "Theme-Rheme Articulation: A View Based on a Comparison of English and Japanese." He examines the various definitions of these terms well-known to Slovak linguists. He emphasizes the need of a functional , rather than a formalistic view of language. He has extended his generous help to the new Slovak Japanists at FFUK. LITERARY STUDIES (1) Paul Miller (b. 1926), is an Emeritus of Wittenberg University of Springfield, Ohio, where he had taught from 1961 to 1991. In his article: "In Theodore Roosevelt's Footsteps: Midwestern Writers Hunt Lion in East Africa," he offers a fascinating insight into the positive evolution of the African safari wild animal hunter and killer into a wild animal photographer. (2) David George, of Urbana University in Ohio, has, since 1986, been working on a monumental New Yariorum edition of Shakespeare's Roman tragedy CORIOLANUS (1608), to be ready at the end of 2007. In his contribution: "Coriolanus: Narrative and Mythic Sources, " he aims at establishing that, rather than having read Livy in Latin, Shakespeare consulted Livy and Plutarch in English translation. In his meticulous, "clinical" dissection, the author demonstrates that Shakespeare not only followed Plutarch �126 SLOVAKIA but also improved upon his sources, thus exemplifying the Bard's amazing mastery of Roman and Greek history and mythology. (3) Robert Fleissner retired, after 38 years of service (1967-2006), from the Central State University of Springfield, Ohio. He is an unusually prolific author, with fourteen books and 585 published articles (by 2006). Nor does he shun controversy with startling statements, such as, the ones of, respectively, 2000 and 2006 (in the Publications of the Modern Language Association of America), suggesting that Shakespeare could have studied, or spent some time, at Oxford! In his article: "Richard II in His Own Way: An Intertextual Study," he debates the question "whether the play is more of a historical play or a tragedy." He inclines to the opinion that it is "a history play with a tragic hero manque" (that is: might have been but is not). (4) The eminent Shakespearean Soji Iwasaki (b.1929) has been, among others, also a professor at Nagoya University. It is surprising that his mentor and supervisor at Cambridge (1964-66), the late eminent Shakespearean, Muriel C. Bradbrook, was, by family connections, related to Professor 0. Vocadlo, through 1939 at FFUK! Also surprisingly but significantly, the two of us have found common ground in each of us having devoted some related unconventional insights into Shakespeare's masterful comedy As You Like It (c . 1599) : he, in his contribution : "Transvestism and Social Reformation in A YLI;" and, as to me, in " W. Shakespeare's A YLI and Slovakia" (Almanac of the National Slovak Society, Pittsburgh 1999). The latter article compares the situation in the former Czecho-Slovakia, both after WW II in May 1945 and to the demise of Communism on November 17, 1989, to the situation following the usurper Duke Frederick's abdication in A YLI. (5) Jan Simko was, from 1945 to 1967 at FFUK, then in the U.S .A. In his contribution: "A Possible Parallel to 'Shall I Die?' A Poem Attributed to Shakespeare?" he compares this poem to English poetry of the 1590s, finding it highly unlikely for it to be by Shakespeare. �SLOVAKIA 127 These contributions by mainly foreign, outstanding Anglicists , have added both luster and prestige to thi s commemorative volume published by Slovak Anglicists. Contributions by Domestic, that is, Slovak Anglicists LANGUAGE STUDIES Seventeen articles deal with the following areas: syntax; wordformation; semantics; style and stylistics; language and culture; language teaching (this is to be grouped with methodology below) ; translation (also to be grouped with translation below). Missing are articles on historical linguistics, varieties of English, etc, Seven (c.42%) of these articles quote A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (London: Longman, 1985), a seminal , monumental work created by Lord Quirk (and collaborators) of the University College, London. Although, for health reasons, he was unable to send in a contribution, his keen interest in the progress of Slovak studies of English and his April 1966 lecture at FFUK deserve special recognition. LITERARY STUDIES Out of eight contributions, English literature is di sc ussed in three; one each disc usses Canadian literature, women's iss ues, theory (realism: modified, and magic; tragedy). No article is devoted to Shakespeare or to American literature. TEACHING METHODOLOGY Nine articles di scuss various topics: the use of storytelling and drama; novels; on-line tutoring; innovative approaches; learning strategies; foreign-language teaching training. Eva Tandlichova (author of the introductory article) advocates, in her contribution: "More Autonomy ... The Need for Real LearnerCentred Teaching and Leaming." BRITISH STUDIES (2 contributions) �128 SLOVAKIA TRANSLATIONS (4 contributions) The emphasis is on quality philological preparation and a good memory. Jan Vilikovsky (former Czecho-Slovak and after 1993 Slovak Republic's first Ambassador to London) di sc usses, in his fundamental contribution: "Orwell, Politics and Translation - Notes of a Translator." He emphasizes the need to evaluate Orwell's texts with a view to the political situation in which they were written. CONCLUSION Even if considering the empty spaces in its overall coverage of the wide field of Anglistics, PHILOLOGICA LX of 2004 cannot but be evaluated as an obvious quantitative and qualitative advance of Slovak studies of English. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2007, Vol. 39 Description An account of the resource Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEW ESSAYS SLOVAKIA 119 SUBCARPATHIAN RUS' AND THE NEW SLOVAK HISTORIOGRAPHY: Peter Mosny. Podkarpatska Rus ': nerealizovana auton6mia. Bratislava: Slovak Academic Press, 2001 , 2 I 6 pp. Index. Paper. Peter Svorc. Krajinska hranica medzi Sloven skom a Podkarpatskou Rusou, 1919-1939. Presov: Vydavatel'stvo Universum , 2003, 424 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index . cloth. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto As we move further and further into the twenty-first century, the former Czechoslovakia is rapidly being transformed into little more than a hi stori c memory. The first phase of memory loss about the concept of Czechoslovakia began just after World War II, when the country was reco nstituted but without its far eastern reg ion, Subcarpathian Ru s', which was formally annexed to the Soviet Union. After 1945 the concept of Czechoslovakia became one in which for all intents and purposes Subcarpathian Ru s' did not exist. Now that we are in the second stage of memory loss, which could be said to have begun with the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it is not difficult to foresee a time when the inhabitants of the Czech Republic and Slovakia will at best have only some vague recollection that their two countries once formed a single sociopolitical entity. The second stage of memory loss will be like the first, which occurred between 1945 and 1993 , when the public-at-large and sc hol ars (who should have known better) forgot that the country was founded as a state of three, not two , Slavic peoples-Czec hs, Slovaks, and CarpathoRusyns. It is interesting to note that even during the first Czechoslovak Republic (19 I 9-1938) , let alone post-World War II Socialist Czechoslovakia (1948-1989) , Slovak sc hol arl y interest in the region of Subcarpathian Ru s' and its majority population , Carpatho-Rusyns , was virtually non-ex istent. For example, during the First Republic there was a whole host of Czech scholars (Vac lav Chaloupecky, Frantisek Gabriel , Antonfn Hartl , Jiri Kral, Frantisek Tichy, among 120 SLOVAKIA others), not to mention belletrists (Karel Capek, Ivan Olbracht, Jaromfr Tomecek, Vladislav Vancura), who studied Subcarpathian Rus' or who were inspired by its landscape and people. One would be hard-pressed to find a few Slovaks who during that period evinced any interest in their Slavic brethren to the east. One could speculate about the reasons for thi s lack of interest: at the time Slovak intellectual s had enough of a challenge to demonstrate that they themselves represented a culture and people distinct from the Czechs. Moreover, in contrast to the largely urbanized Czechs, interwar Slovak intellectuals-removed from the village at best by one generation-did not have to seek, nor were they particularly interested in , an undeveloped rural area like Subcarpathian Rus' , no matter how exotic its peop le and landscape may have seemed. During the post-World War II Communist decades, neither Czechs nor Slovaks (in the unlikely case that they wanted) were able to publish about their country 's former eastern province, since Subcarpathian Rus ', or the Transcarpathian oblast' of Ukraine, was by then part of the Soviet workers' state, whose scholarly and literary circles were allowed to remember only that once their homeland had been "occupied" by "bourgeois Czechoslovakia." In short, Subcarpathian Ru s' as a subject was a taboo for Czechs and Slovaks, who in popular parlance referred to everything east of the Slovak border, including the Transcarpathian oblast' of Ukraine, as Rusko-Russia. As for the handful of Slovak scholars who during the Communist era were allowed to publish on Rusyn topics (the historian I.:udovft Haraksim, the ethnographer Jan Podolak), they were forced to focus solely on the "Ukrainian minority" (i. e., Rusyns) living in northeastern Slovakia. The political and intellectual environment has certainly changed in Slovakia since the collapse of Communist rule in l 989 and the establishment of independent Slovakia three years later. The old Soviet taboo has been lifted, and Rusyns, not only in eastern Slovakia, but also in Subcarpathian Rus ', have finally become legitimate topics of scholarly inquiry. Among the new generation of Slovak scholars who have turned their attention to Carpatho-Rusyns are the sociologist Marian Gajdos, the historian Stanislav Konecny, the political scientist Alexander Duleba, and the authors of the two books under review, Peter Mosny and Peter Svorc. SLOVAKIA 121 Both authors examine different but related aspects of Subcarpathia' s relationship to Czechoslovakia during the period 1919 to 1945. In contrast to the Czech lands and Slovakia, Subcarpathian Rus' had joined Czechoslovakia in 1919 under the specific condition that it would granted "the widest degree of autonomy compatible with the Czechoslovak state." The proviso on autonomy was spelled out in two of the treaties (St. Germain and Trianon) signed within the framework of the Paris Peace Conference ( 1919 and 1920) and it was incorporated into the Czechoslovak Con stitution adopted in February of 1920. Mosny 's monograph focuses on three themes: the reluctance of Czechoslovakia's authorities to implement autonomy in Subcarpathian Rus' during the years of the First Republic; the form of autonomy that finally came into being in post-Munich Czechoslovakia (October 1938-March I 939); and the promises that were again made to Rusyns during World War II, when it was expected that Czechoslovakia was to be recreated according to its pre-Munich boundaries as "a state comprised of three Slavic peoples: Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns/Ukrainians" (p. 162). Mosny provides an incredible amount of documented detail for those who wish to know of Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus ' from the standpoint of the regime in Prague. His legalistic and often tediously dry account says virtually nothing, however, about the activity of Rusyn civic and political leaders to attain the autonomy their province was promised at the close of World War I. Mosny 's onesided approach to the problem may be explained by the fact that he used only Czech- and Slovak-language sources, a serious shortcoming for anyone interested in studying a region in which knowledge of Ukrainian, Russian, and Hungarian is essential. Far more ambitious and intellectually satisfying is the monograph by Peter Svorc. His ostensible focus is the question of the regional border between Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus' during the First Czechoslovak Republic. In fact, the book provides a wide-ranging discussion of Slovak national activists toward Rusy ns beginning already in the nineteenth century, as well as the key political issues faced by Subcarpathia' s leaders from the end of World War I to the end of World War II. Svorc is not only a specialist and widelypublished historian of eastern Slovakia in the twentieth century, but 122 SLOVAKIA he has also published several studies on specific aspects of Ru syn history, as well as the first survey of Subcarpathian Rus' in the first half of the twentieth century to appear in Slovak: Zakliata krajina: Podkarpatska Rus, 1918-1946 (Presov, 1996). The book by Svorc under review here reflects his close familiarity with the secondary literature in a wide variety of languages. Svorc has made use of materials from archives in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, and Slovakia, but not in Hungary or Ukraine. Particularly valuable are several historic photographs and maps that accompany the heavily-footnoted text, although considering the author's approach to the subject, it is surprising not to find a map that compares the various proposals put forth by Slovak and non-Slovak scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the traditional ethnolinguistic boundary between Slovaks and Rusyns. Svorc's monograph comprises 24 chapters. Several of them provide a detailed description of the views put forth by Slovak, Czech, and Ru syn authors-Pavo! Jozef Safarik, Josef Skultety, Stefan Misik, Lubor Niederle, Samuel Czambel, Jan Husek, and Nikolaj Beskid-who in their writings tried to define the ethnolinguistic border between Slovaks and Rusyns. Svorc also deals at length with Slovak and Rusyn immigrants in the United States and their impact on homeland politics, with the Rusyn question at the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations, with Czechoslovak administrative policy in Subcarpathian Rus ' and the efforts of Rusyn activists to attain autonomy, and with the controversy in eastern Slovakia among Slovaks and Rusyns regarding the possible unification of all or part of that region with Subcarpathian Rus '. The latter topic is only one of many in which Svorc provides new or previously littleknown information. For example, a bilateral Slovak-Rusyn governmental commission met as early as September 1919 to propose a Slovak-Subcarpathian boundary. The Slovak negotiators, who included Igor Hrusovsky, Jozef Skultety, Karel Chotek, and Yiktor Dvorsky proposed that the following "Rusyn-inhabited" areas should be united with Subcarpathian Rus ' : northeastern Saris county (including the town of Svidnfk and surrounding villages), northeastern Zemplfn county (beyond the line connecting Hanusovce and Snina), and parts of Uh county west of the Uh River (below the Vihorlat 123 SLOVAKIA ridge). The Rusyn delegation , however, refused to compromise on its demand that all of Uh and Zemplfn counties, most of Saris county, and northern Spis county around Stani r.ubovna should be included within Subcarpathian Rus '. As a result of the impasse, Subcarpathian Rus' was in the end reduced to territory east of the Uh River and eventually (after 1928) along a parallel line just west of the river that was to become an international border that remains in place to this day. Slovak-Rusyn political (as opposed to cultural) relations could be said to have begun in 1918, when the land s within the Danubian Bas in were being reconfi gured to accord with the new post-World War I international order. Since that time Slovak scholars have been very slow in coming to grips with the Rusy n lands just to the east. When Czechoslovakia existed, whether in the form of the First Republic or the post-World War II socialist state, Slovak researchers showed little or no interest in their neighbors to the east. It is only from the last decade of the twentieth century that one can finally speak of a Slovak historiography about Rusyn s and Subcarpathian Rus ' . This new tradition has certainly gotten off to a good start with serious and impartial writings by sc holars like Peter Mosny and, in particular, Peter Svare. Eighty Years of English Studies at the Faculty of Arts, ed. by Alojz Kenfz. PHILOLOGICA LX , Zbornfk Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Komenskeho Bratislava: FFUK, 2004; 406 pages. JA.N SIMKO Washington, DC A SHORT HISTORY In 1924 English studies began at the Comenius University in Bratislava. The first professor, Otakar Yocadlo, however, resigned in February 1939 during the turbulent political developments rocking Czecho-Slovakia . The continuation of English studies was, nevertheless, secured thanks to the appointment of both one lecturer taking over the instruction of the older periods of English language and literature and the other one to teach the modern period. 124 SLOVAKIA Following the communist seizure of political power in February 1948, hotheads began urging the total elimination of English from FFUK, and, in the early I 950 ' s, no new students were admitted for three consecutive years. Fortunately, the argument prevailed that the only Slovak University in existence needed to have its own Department of English . For several years thereafter, on ly three new students were enrolled per year. In the 1960s this number was raised to 20, and later even more. So much so that, when it was later renamed the Department of English and American Studies, it was in a good position to commemorate its eighty years of existence with the publication of this festive, anniversary volume of Ang listic contributions. The total of forty-nine articles includes nine by foreign contributors and forty by domestic authors. All "guest" contributors are current or retired professors of English and are leading world experts in their respective fields of specialization. Their inclusion in this volume is justified by their positive personal relations with Slovakia and the Slovaks as attested by these facts : not only have they been for many years colleagues and friends of this reviewer but, three of them: S. Berkner, S. Noguchi, R. Quirk, and Y. Nakao's son, have paid individual visits to Slovakia, while K. Fukuda has extended his effective help to the FFUK's new Department of Japanese Studies! LANGUAGE STUDIES (1) Sergey Berkner of Voronezh University in Russia spent eight months in 1994 at Ohio State University on a Fu lbright grant. His topical contribution: "Language as an Instrument of Politics: the Role of Cliches and Ideological Lexicon," characterizes the use of language of propaganda as a strong instrument of persuasion, as illustrated by examples from Ru ssian , English , and German. (2) Shunichi Noguchi (b.1933), since 1996 an Emeritus from Osaka University of Education, sent in: "How Can We Not Mismetre Chaucer's Troilus?" He argues that Chaucer had very few specialized terms at his disposal referring to poetry. In classifying the variety of verse patterns used in Troilus, Noguchi has adopted my methods applied to the study of the word-order patterns in 15th century English, namely: "simplification and abstraction" as implemented in my 1957 book. Many typographical errors mar SLOVAKIA 125 this valuable article. S. Noguchi is one of the world's foremost Malory scholars. The discussion of his article here has been found preferable with regard to the following: (3) Yuji Nakao (b.1935), since March 2007 an Emeritus from both Nagoya and Chubu Universities. He had spent 1967-68 at Brown University in Providence, R.I. , while I was at the same time a Folger Shakespeare Library scholar in Washington, D.C., with neither of us knowing "aught" of the other! His contribution: "On Negative Disjunctive Connectives" in Malory and Caxton of the 15th century, deals with the same material as did I in my 1957 book. While, however, I had been studying the "larger picture," that is, the word-order, he studied the small connectives: nother, neuther, neyther, nor. In the 15th century, they were interchangeable. While of an inconspicuous personal appearance, Y. Nakao is a giant in Arthurian studies. (4) Kazuo Fukuda (b. 1947), of Niigata University, sent in an article: "Theme-Rheme Articulation: A View Based on a Comparison of English and Japanese." He examines the various definitions of these terms well-known to Slovak linguists. He emphasizes the need of a functional , rather than a formalistic view of language. He has extended his generous help to the new Slovak Japanists at FFUK. LITERARY STUDIES (1) Paul Miller (b. 1926), is an Emeritus of Wittenberg University of Springfield, Ohio, where he had taught from 1961 to 1991. In his article: "In Theodore Roosevelt's Footsteps: Midwestern Writers Hunt Lion in East Africa," he offers a fascinating insight into the positive evolution of the African safari wild animal hunter and killer into a wild animal photographer. (2) David George, of Urbana University in Ohio, has, since 1986, been working on a monumental New Yariorum edition of Shakespeare's Roman tragedy CORIOLANUS (1608), to be ready at the end of 2007. In his contribution: "Coriolanus: Narrative and Mythic Sources, " he aims at establishing that, rather than having read Livy in Latin, Shakespeare consulted Livy and Plutarch in English translation. In his meticulous, "clinical" dissection, the author demonstrates that Shakespeare not only followed Plutarch 126 SLOVAKIA but also improved upon his sources, thus exemplifying the Bard's amazing mastery of Roman and Greek history and mythology. (3) Robert Fleissner retired, after 38 years of service (1967-2006), from the Central State University of Springfield, Ohio. He is an unusually prolific author, with fourteen books and 585 published articles (by 2006). Nor does he shun controversy with startling statements, such as, the ones of, respectively, 2000 and 2006 (in the Publications of the Modern Language Association of America), suggesting that Shakespeare could have studied, or spent some time, at Oxford! In his article: "Richard II in His Own Way: An Intertextual Study," he debates the question "whether the play is more of a historical play or a tragedy." He inclines to the opinion that it is "a history play with a tragic hero manque" (that is: might have been but is not). (4) The eminent Shakespearean Soji Iwasaki (b.1929) has been, among others, also a professor at Nagoya University. It is surprising that his mentor and supervisor at Cambridge (1964-66), the late eminent Shakespearean, Muriel C. Bradbrook, was, by family connections, related to Professor 0. Vocadlo, through 1939 at FFUK! Also surprisingly but significantly, the two of us have found common ground in each of us having devoted some related unconventional insights into Shakespeare's masterful comedy As You Like It (c . 1599) : he, in his contribution : "Transvestism and Social Reformation in A YLI;" and, as to me, in " W. Shakespeare's A YLI and Slovakia" (Almanac of the National Slovak Society, Pittsburgh 1999). The latter article compares the situation in the former Czecho-Slovakia, both after WW II in May 1945 and to the demise of Communism on November 17, 1989, to the situation following the usurper Duke Frederick's abdication in A YLI. (5) Jan Simko was, from 1945 to 1967 at FFUK, then in the U.S .A. In his contribution: "A Possible Parallel to 'Shall I Die?' A Poem Attributed to Shakespeare?" he compares this poem to English poetry of the 1590s, finding it highly unlikely for it to be by Shakespeare. SLOVAKIA 127 These contributions by mainly foreign, outstanding Anglicists , have added both luster and prestige to thi s commemorative volume published by Slovak Anglicists. Contributions by Domestic, that is, Slovak Anglicists LANGUAGE STUDIES Seventeen articles deal with the following areas: syntax; wordformation; semantics; style and stylistics; language and culture; language teaching (this is to be grouped with methodology below) ; translation (also to be grouped with translation below). Missing are articles on historical linguistics, varieties of English, etc, Seven (c.42%) of these articles quote A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (London: Longman, 1985), a seminal , monumental work created by Lord Quirk (and collaborators) of the University College, London. Although, for health reasons, he was unable to send in a contribution, his keen interest in the progress of Slovak studies of English and his April 1966 lecture at FFUK deserve special recognition. LITERARY STUDIES Out of eight contributions, English literature is di sc ussed in three; one each disc usses Canadian literature, women's iss ues, theory (realism: modified, and magic; tragedy). No article is devoted to Shakespeare or to American literature. TEACHING METHODOLOGY Nine articles di scuss various topics: the use of storytelling and drama; novels; on-line tutoring; innovative approaches; learning strategies; foreign-language teaching training. Eva Tandlichova (author of the introductory article) advocates, in her contribution: "More Autonomy ... The Need for Real LearnerCentred Teaching and Leaming." BRITISH STUDIES (2 contributions) 128 SLOVAKIA TRANSLATIONS (4 contributions) The emphasis is on quality philological preparation and a good memory. Jan Vilikovsky (former Czecho-Slovak and after 1993 Slovak Republic's first Ambassador to London) di sc usses, in his fundamental contribution: "Orwell, Politics and Translation - Notes of a Translator." He emphasizes the need to evaluate Orwell's texts with a view to the political situation in which they were written. CONCLUSION Even if considering the empty spaces in its overall coverage of the wide field of Anglistics, PHILOLOGICA LX of 2004 cannot but be evaluated as an obvious quantitative and qualitative advance of Slovak studies of English.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Review Essays, Slovakia, Vol. 39 (No. 72-73) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Subcarpathian Rus' and the New Slovak Historiography: Peter Mosný, Podkarpatská Rus', and Peter Švorc, Krajinská hranica medzi Slovenskom a Podkarpatskou Rusou, 1919-1939 (Paul Robert Magocsi), p. 119</li> <li>Zborník Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Komenského, Philologica LX (Ján Šimko), p. 123</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Magocsi, Paul Robert, 1945- Šimko, Ján, 1920-2011 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6cb2f9b2986ac84da51e30d62bea6a32.pdf fc5cf8e5db9e8902cfcca6529f847537 PDF Text Text 54 SLOVAKIA THE FAILURE OF COMMUNIST SCHOOLS By Eberhart Mahnert Red Justice ("Rude Pravo"), official Communist Party mouthpiece for Czecho-Slovakia, recently reported that thirty percent of the students enrolled in Czech and Slovak colleges and universities had to drop out. Only last Septem!ber, however, the same paper had lauded the socialist school system as the most efficacious an1d progressive, giving ,the indiviidual citizen the widest possible benefits by systematic development of his abilities. One month later the same news sheet had to admit the downright failure of the educational set-up it had so lavishly praised. Who is at fault? The teachers, of course, especially those not yet imbued with the "new spirit." A series of political purges is soon to be launched, despite the conspicuous shortage of teachers in Czecho-Slovakia, a situation likewise due to the "cleansing" that followed the Communist power grab. At that time an educational framework which had proved workable for a century and a half was jettisoned in favor of a Soviet-styled imitation. Until 1948 the Czecho-Slova:k school system was based on principles developed during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa of Austria and her son Joseph II and found acceptance in the territories of the Danubian Monarchy. The first Czecho-Slovak Republic was careful not to alter this well esta:blished structure, which was the very foundation of the high educational level of the Czech nation. The case was different with the Slovaiks whom the Czechs did not allow to maintain their own schools of higher learning. With the communist putsch the " reactionary" school system was swept aside ; so-called reform measures were inJ:roduced. The entire structure was radically transformed to •duplicate its Soviet original, regardless of whether or not it suited the educational needs of the Czech and Slovak peoples. The new measures a:bolished the former system of five years of primary school, eight years of high school and four to five years of college. They introduced a new system with an eight-gra:de primary school plus an additional three years of secondary school .that were ap- �SLOVAKIA 55 proved as an adequate basis for college entrance. Courses in certain subjects were reduced to half their former number, making it possible for a pupil to get a degree in engineering at the age of 19 or 20, where he was previously not ready for graduation until 22 or 23. Subjects that formerly had been given priority were placed un!der the new set-up by intensive courses in political propaganda that stressed Party ideology. During the years 1952 to 1953 a number of schools of technology were founded - today there are seventeen such colleges - many of them with but little more than the -crudest types of la:boratories, technical libraries and the like. Seldom does one find a textbook available; for the most part the students work from so-called scripts which they themselves have compiled. In selecting aspirants for -college preparatory schools and universities, the authorities show preference for children from proletarian homes, a tactic ,that envisages the complete annihilation of the Czech middle class with its high standar!ds of education. Some years ago it became evident that students educated under these new conditions, whose time was also taken up by paramilitary training, Communist Youth Association commitments and Party organization duties, Jagged behind in their studies. Furthermore, several weeks of the year are taken up in so-called "polytechnical training" at unpaid jobs in industry. Small wonder, then, thrut students who lack ability due to their "proletarian" origins, fail to stand the pace. They make up the bulk of the thirty percent forced to throw in the sponge. In 1959 the Czech Communist regime, following the lead of the Soviet school reform of 1959, also introduced new educational measures, the first stage of which will take effect in 1961 at the beginning of the scholastic year. To raise the educational standards of the general public, primary school will be extended from eight to nine years. "Polytechnical training," thus far encouraged only by the Czech Communist Party, will become obligatory, with intensification of paramilitary training. This shake-up of the school system to conform to Communist aims will certainly not· raise the over-all educational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with �56 SLOVAKIA such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than average educrutional pot.e n-U-al to a generation of robots . • • • A POLICY OF GENOCIDE Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans there remained approximately 170,000 to 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho~Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in ,the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the S,:ate of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not unti'l last year did they become the subject of considera,ble discussion within Czecho~lovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection with the ini:roduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that ,the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten Germans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this s tatement was by no means given unanimous approval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czec'ho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Koh'ler, took the opportunity to discuss the Sudeten German issue in detail in the official organ of the CPC tivot Strany (Par:y Life, No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the � 54 SLOVAKIA THE FAILURE OF COMMUNIST SCHOOLS By Eberhart Mahnert Red Justice ("Rude Pravo"), official Communist Party mouthpiece for Czecho-Slovakia, recently reported that thirty percent of the students enrolled in Czech and Slovak colleges and universities had to drop out. Only last Septem!ber, however, the same paper had lauded the socialist school system as the most efficacious an1d progressive, giving ,the indiviidual citizen the widest possible benefits by systematic development of his abilities. One month later the same news sheet had to admit the downright failure of the educational set-up it had so lavishly praised. Who is at fault? The teachers, of course, especially those not yet imbued with the "new spirit." A series of political purges is soon to be launched, despite the conspicuous shortage of teachers in Czecho-Slovakia, a situation likewise due to the "cleansing" that followed the Communist power grab. At that time an educational framework which had proved workable for a century and a half was jettisoned in favor of a Soviet-styled imitation. Until 1948 the Czecho-Slova:k school system was based on principles developed during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa of Austria and her son Joseph II and found acceptance in the territories of the Danubian Monarchy. The first Czecho-Slovak Republic was careful not to alter this well esta:blished structure, which was the very foundation of the high educational level of the Czech nation. The case was different with the Slovaiks whom the Czechs did not allow to maintain their own schools of higher learning. With the communist putsch the " reactionary" school system was swept aside ; so-called reform measures were inJ:roduced. The entire structure was radically transformed to •duplicate its Soviet original, regardless of whether or not it suited the educational needs of the Czech and Slovak peoples. The new measures a:bolished the former system of five years of primary school, eight years of high school and four to five years of college. They introduced a new system with an eight-gra:de primary school plus an additional three years of secondary school .that were ap- �SLOVAKIA 55 proved as an adequate basis for college entrance. Courses in certain subjects were reduced to half their former number, making it possible for a pupil to get a degree in engineering at the age of 19 or 20, where he was previously not ready for graduation until 22 or 23. Subjects that formerly had been given priority were placed un!der the new set-up by intensive courses in political propaganda that stressed Party ideology. During the years 1952 to 1953 a number of schools of technology were founded - today there are seventeen such colleges - many of them with but little more than the -crudest types of la:boratories, technical libraries and the like. Seldom does one find a textbook available; for the most part the students work from so-called scripts which they themselves have compiled. In selecting aspirants for -college preparatory schools and universities, the authorities show preference for children from proletarian homes, a tactic ,that envisages the complete annihilation of the Czech middle class with its high standar!ds of education. Some years ago it became evident that students educated under these new conditions, whose time was also taken up by paramilitary training, Communist Youth Association commitments and Party organization duties, Jagged behind in their studies. Furthermore, several weeks of the year are taken up in so-called "polytechnical training" at unpaid jobs in industry. Small wonder, then, thrut students who lack ability due to their "proletarian" origins, fail to stand the pace. They make up the bulk of the thirty percent forced to throw in the sponge. In 1959 the Czech Communist regime, following the lead of the Soviet school reform of 1959, also introduced new educational measures, the first stage of which will take effect in 1961 at the beginning of the scholastic year. To raise the educational standards of the general public, primary school will be extended from eight to nine years. "Polytechnical training," thus far encouraged only by the Czech Communist Party, will become obligatory, with intensification of paramilitary training. This shake-up of the school system to conform to Communist aims will certainly not· raise the over-all educational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with �56 SLOVAKIA such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than average educrutional pot.e n-U-al to a generation of robots . • • • A POLICY OF GENOCIDE Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans there remained approximately 170,000 to 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho~Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in ,the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the S,:ate of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not unti'l last year did they become the subject of considera,ble discussion within Czecho~lovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection with the ini:roduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that ,the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten Germans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this s tatement was by no means given unanimous approval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czec'ho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Koh'ler, took the opportunity to discuss the Sudeten German issue in detail in the official organ of the CPC tivot Strany (Par:y Life, No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1961, Vol. 11 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 33), March-June 1961.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 34), September-December June 1961.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 54 SLOVAKIA THE FAILURE OF COMMUNIST SCHOOLS By Eberhart Mahnert Red Justice ("Rude Pravo"), official Communist Party mouthpiece for Czecho-Slovakia, recently reported that thirty percent of the students enrolled in Czech and Slovak colleges and universities had to drop out. Only last Septem!ber, however, the same paper had lauded the socialist school system as the most efficacious an1d progressive, giving ,the indiviidual citizen the widest possible benefits by systematic development of his abilities. One month later the same news sheet had to admit the downright failure of the educational set-up it had so lavishly praised. Who is at fault? The teachers, of course, especially those not yet imbued with the "new spirit." A series of political purges is soon to be launched, despite the conspicuous shortage of teachers in Czecho-Slovakia, a situation likewise due to the "cleansing" that followed the Communist power grab. At that time an educational framework which had proved workable for a century and a half was jettisoned in favor of a Soviet-styled imitation. Until 1948 the Czecho-Slova:k school system was based on principles developed during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa of Austria and her son Joseph II and found acceptance in the territories of the Danubian Monarchy. The first Czecho-Slovak Republic was careful not to alter this well esta:blished structure, which was the very foundation of the high educational level of the Czech nation. The case was different with the Slovaiks whom the Czechs did not allow to maintain their own schools of higher learning. With the communist putsch the " reactionary" school system was swept aside ; so-called reform measures were inJ:roduced. The entire structure was radically transformed to •duplicate its Soviet original, regardless of whether or not it suited the educational needs of the Czech and Slovak peoples. The new measures a:bolished the former system of five years of primary school, eight years of high school and four to five years of college. They introduced a new system with an eight-gra:de primary school plus an additional three years of secondary school .that were ap- SLOVAKIA 55 proved as an adequate basis for college entrance. Courses in certain subjects were reduced to half their former number, making it possible for a pupil to get a degree in engineering at the age of 19 or 20, where he was previously not ready for graduation until 22 or 23. Subjects that formerly had been given priority were placed un!der the new set-up by intensive courses in political propaganda that stressed Party ideology. During the years 1952 to 1953 a number of schools of technology were founded - today there are seventeen such colleges - many of them with but little more than the -crudest types of la:boratories, technical libraries and the like. Seldom does one find a textbook available; for the most part the students work from so-called scripts which they themselves have compiled. In selecting aspirants for -college preparatory schools and universities, the authorities show preference for children from proletarian homes, a tactic ,that envisages the complete annihilation of the Czech middle class with its high standar!ds of education. Some years ago it became evident that students educated under these new conditions, whose time was also taken up by paramilitary training, Communist Youth Association commitments and Party organization duties, Jagged behind in their studies. Furthermore, several weeks of the year are taken up in so-called "polytechnical training" at unpaid jobs in industry. Small wonder, then, thrut students who lack ability due to their "proletarian" origins, fail to stand the pace. They make up the bulk of the thirty percent forced to throw in the sponge. In 1959 the Czech Communist regime, following the lead of the Soviet school reform of 1959, also introduced new educational measures, the first stage of which will take effect in 1961 at the beginning of the scholastic year. To raise the educational standards of the general public, primary school will be extended from eight to nine years. "Polytechnical training," thus far encouraged only by the Czech Communist Party, will become obligatory, with intensification of paramilitary training. This shake-up of the school system to conform to Communist aims will certainly not· raise the over-all educational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with 56 SLOVAKIA such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than average educrutional pot.e n-U-al to a generation of robots . • • • A POLICY OF GENOCIDE Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans there remained approximately 170,000 to 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho~Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in ,the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the S,:ate of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not unti'l last year did they become the subject of considera,ble discussion within Czecho~lovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection with the ini:roduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that ,the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten Germans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this s tatement was by no means given unanimous approval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czec'ho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Koh'ler, took the opportunity to discuss the Sudeten German issue in detail in the official organ of the CPC tivot Strany (Par:y Life, No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Failure of Communist Schools Description An account of the resource Eberhart Mahnert Slovakia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (33), March-June 1961 pp. 54-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mahnert, Eberhard Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1961 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/caa18326ad68641c46264df5abeb4dda.pdf ab8f40392e290d1e1bbdf4e113b22dcc PDF Text Text 86 SLOVAKIA C'LECH REDS HAVE SCHOOL TROUBLE By Eberhard Mahnert "Red Justice," official Communist Party mouthpiece for Czecho-Slovakia, recently reported that thirty per cent of the students enrolled in Czech and Slovak colleges and universities had to drop out. Only last September, however, the same paper had lauded the socialist school system as the most efficacious and progressive, giving the individual citizen the widest possible benefits by systematic development of his abilities. One month later the same news sheet had to admit the downright failure of the educational setup it had so lavishly praised. Who is at fault? The teachers, of course, especially those not yet imbued with the "new spirit." A series of political purges is soon to be launched, despite the conspicuous shortage of teachers in Czecho-Slovakia, a situation likewise due to the "cleansing" that followed the Communist power grab. At that time an educational framework which had proved workable for a century and a half was jettisoned in favor of a Soviet-styled imitation. Until 1948, the Czecho-Slovak school system was based on principles developed during the reign of Empress Maria Theresia of Austria and her son Joseph II and found acceptance in the territories of the Danubian Monarchy. The First Czecho~lovak Republic was careful not to alter this well established structure, which was the very foundation of the high educational level of the Czech nation. The case was different with the Slovaks whom the Czechs did not allow to maintain their own schools of higher learning. With the L;ommunist putsch the "reactionary" school -;;ystem was swept aside; so-called reform measures were introduced. The entire structure was radically transformed to duplicate its Soviet original, regardless of whether or not it suited the educational needs of the Czech and Slovak peoples. The new measures abolished the former system of five years of primary school, eight years of high school and four to five years of college. They introduced a new system \vith an eight-grade primary school plus an additional three years of secondary school that were ap- �SLOVAKIA 87 proved as an adequate basis for college entrance. Courses in• certain subjects were reduced to half their former number, making it possible for a pupil to get a degree in engineering at the age of 19 or 20, where he was previously not ready for ~aduation until 22 or 23. Subjects that formerly had been given priority were replaced under the new setup by intensive courses in political propaganda that stressed Party ideology. During the years 1952 to 1953 a number of schools of technology were founded - today there are seventeen such colleges - many of them with but little more than the crudest types of laboratories, technical libraries and the like. SeJdom does one find a text!book available; for the most part the students work f.rom so-called scripts which they themselves have compiled. In selecting aspirants for college preparatory schools and universities, the authorities show preference for children from proletarian homes, a tactic that envisages the complete annihilation of the Czech middle class with its high standards of education. Some years ago it became evident that students educated under these new conditions, whose time was also taken up by pairamilitary training, Communist Youth Association commitments and Party organization duties, lagged behind in their studies. Furthermore, several weeks of the year are taken up in so-called "polytechnical training" at unpaid jobs in industry. Small wonder, then, that students who lack ability due to their "proletarian" origins, fail to stand the pace. They make up the bulk of the thirty per cent forced to throw in the sponge. In 1959, the Czech Communist regime, following the lead of the Soviet school reform of 1959, also introduced new educational measures, the first stage of which took effect in 1961 at the beginning of the scholastic year. To raise the educational standards of the general public, primary school will be extended from eight to nine years. "Polytechnical training," thus far encouraged only by the Czech Communist Party, will become obligatory, with intensification of paramilitary training. This shake-up of the school system to conform to Communist aims will certainly not raise the over-all edu- �88 SLOVAKIA cational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without . knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than ·. average educational potential to a generation of robots. A POLICY OF GENOCIDE By Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten G€rmans there remained approximately 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho-Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the State of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not until two years ago did they become the subject of considerable discussion within Czecho-Slovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection . with the introduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it -deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten G€rmans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this statement was by no means given unanimous aproval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Kohler, took the . opportunity to discuss the Sudeten G€rman issue in detail in. the official 9rgan of the C:PC � 86 SLOVAKIA C'LECH REDS HAVE SCHOOL TROUBLE By Eberhard Mahnert "Red Justice," official Communist Party mouthpiece for Czecho-Slovakia, recently reported that thirty per cent of the students enrolled in Czech and Slovak colleges and universities had to drop out. Only last September, however, the same paper had lauded the socialist school system as the most efficacious and progressive, giving the individual citizen the widest possible benefits by systematic development of his abilities. One month later the same news sheet had to admit the downright failure of the educational setup it had so lavishly praised. Who is at fault? The teachers, of course, especially those not yet imbued with the "new spirit." A series of political purges is soon to be launched, despite the conspicuous shortage of teachers in Czecho-Slovakia, a situation likewise due to the "cleansing" that followed the Communist power grab. At that time an educational framework which had proved workable for a century and a half was jettisoned in favor of a Soviet-styled imitation. Until 1948, the Czecho-Slovak school system was based on principles developed during the reign of Empress Maria Theresia of Austria and her son Joseph II and found acceptance in the territories of the Danubian Monarchy. The First Czecho~lovak Republic was careful not to alter this well established structure, which was the very foundation of the high educational level of the Czech nation. The case was different with the Slovaks whom the Czechs did not allow to maintain their own schools of higher learning. With the L;ommunist putsch the "reactionary" school -;;ystem was swept aside; so-called reform measures were introduced. The entire structure was radically transformed to duplicate its Soviet original, regardless of whether or not it suited the educational needs of the Czech and Slovak peoples. The new measures abolished the former system of five years of primary school, eight years of high school and four to five years of college. They introduced a new system \vith an eight-grade primary school plus an additional three years of secondary school that were ap- �SLOVAKIA 87 proved as an adequate basis for college entrance. Courses in• certain subjects were reduced to half their former number, making it possible for a pupil to get a degree in engineering at the age of 19 or 20, where he was previously not ready for ~aduation until 22 or 23. Subjects that formerly had been given priority were replaced under the new setup by intensive courses in political propaganda that stressed Party ideology. During the years 1952 to 1953 a number of schools of technology were founded - today there are seventeen such colleges - many of them with but little more than the crudest types of laboratories, technical libraries and the like. SeJdom does one find a text!book available; for the most part the students work f.rom so-called scripts which they themselves have compiled. In selecting aspirants for college preparatory schools and universities, the authorities show preference for children from proletarian homes, a tactic that envisages the complete annihilation of the Czech middle class with its high standards of education. Some years ago it became evident that students educated under these new conditions, whose time was also taken up by pairamilitary training, Communist Youth Association commitments and Party organization duties, lagged behind in their studies. Furthermore, several weeks of the year are taken up in so-called "polytechnical training" at unpaid jobs in industry. Small wonder, then, that students who lack ability due to their "proletarian" origins, fail to stand the pace. They make up the bulk of the thirty per cent forced to throw in the sponge. In 1959, the Czech Communist regime, following the lead of the Soviet school reform of 1959, also introduced new educational measures, the first stage of which took effect in 1961 at the beginning of the scholastic year. To raise the educational standards of the general public, primary school will be extended from eight to nine years. "Polytechnical training," thus far encouraged only by the Czech Communist Party, will become obligatory, with intensification of paramilitary training. This shake-up of the school system to conform to Communist aims will certainly not raise the over-all edu- �88 SLOVAKIA cational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without . knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than ·. average educational potential to a generation of robots. A POLICY OF GENOCIDE By Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten G€rmans there remained approximately 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho-Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the State of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not until two years ago did they become the subject of considerable discussion within Czecho-Slovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection . with the introduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it -deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten G€rmans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this statement was by no means given unanimous aproval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Kohler, took the . opportunity to discuss the Sudeten G€rman issue in detail in. the official 9rgan of the C:PC � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 86 SLOVAKIA C'LECH REDS HAVE SCHOOL TROUBLE By Eberhard Mahnert "Red Justice," official Communist Party mouthpiece for Czecho-Slovakia, recently reported that thirty per cent of the students enrolled in Czech and Slovak colleges and universities had to drop out. Only last September, however, the same paper had lauded the socialist school system as the most efficacious and progressive, giving the individual citizen the widest possible benefits by systematic development of his abilities. One month later the same news sheet had to admit the downright failure of the educational setup it had so lavishly praised. Who is at fault? The teachers, of course, especially those not yet imbued with the "new spirit." A series of political purges is soon to be launched, despite the conspicuous shortage of teachers in Czecho-Slovakia, a situation likewise due to the "cleansing" that followed the Communist power grab. At that time an educational framework which had proved workable for a century and a half was jettisoned in favor of a Soviet-styled imitation. Until 1948, the Czecho-Slovak school system was based on principles developed during the reign of Empress Maria Theresia of Austria and her son Joseph II and found acceptance in the territories of the Danubian Monarchy. The First Czecho~lovak Republic was careful not to alter this well established structure, which was the very foundation of the high educational level of the Czech nation. The case was different with the Slovaks whom the Czechs did not allow to maintain their own schools of higher learning. With the L;ommunist putsch the "reactionary" school -;;ystem was swept aside; so-called reform measures were introduced. The entire structure was radically transformed to duplicate its Soviet original, regardless of whether or not it suited the educational needs of the Czech and Slovak peoples. The new measures abolished the former system of five years of primary school, eight years of high school and four to five years of college. They introduced a new system \vith an eight-grade primary school plus an additional three years of secondary school that were ap- SLOVAKIA 87 proved as an adequate basis for college entrance. Courses in• certain subjects were reduced to half their former number, making it possible for a pupil to get a degree in engineering at the age of 19 or 20, where he was previously not ready for ~aduation until 22 or 23. Subjects that formerly had been given priority were replaced under the new setup by intensive courses in political propaganda that stressed Party ideology. During the years 1952 to 1953 a number of schools of technology were founded - today there are seventeen such colleges - many of them with but little more than the crudest types of laboratories, technical libraries and the like. SeJdom does one find a text!book available; for the most part the students work f.rom so-called scripts which they themselves have compiled. In selecting aspirants for college preparatory schools and universities, the authorities show preference for children from proletarian homes, a tactic that envisages the complete annihilation of the Czech middle class with its high standards of education. Some years ago it became evident that students educated under these new conditions, whose time was also taken up by pairamilitary training, Communist Youth Association commitments and Party organization duties, lagged behind in their studies. Furthermore, several weeks of the year are taken up in so-called "polytechnical training" at unpaid jobs in industry. Small wonder, then, that students who lack ability due to their "proletarian" origins, fail to stand the pace. They make up the bulk of the thirty per cent forced to throw in the sponge. In 1959, the Czech Communist regime, following the lead of the Soviet school reform of 1959, also introduced new educational measures, the first stage of which took effect in 1961 at the beginning of the scholastic year. To raise the educational standards of the general public, primary school will be extended from eight to nine years. "Polytechnical training," thus far encouraged only by the Czech Communist Party, will become obligatory, with intensification of paramilitary training. This shake-up of the school system to conform to Communist aims will certainly not raise the over-all edu- 88 SLOVAKIA cational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without . knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than ·. average educational potential to a generation of robots. A POLICY OF GENOCIDE By Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten G€rmans there remained approximately 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho-Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the State of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not until two years ago did they become the subject of considerable discussion within Czecho-Slovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection . with the introduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it -deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten G€rmans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this statement was by no means given unanimous aproval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Kohler, took the . opportunity to discuss the Sudeten G€rman issue in detail in. the official 9rgan of the C:PC  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czech Reds Have School Trouble Description An account of the resource Eberhard Mahnert Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 86-88 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mahnert, Eberhard Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/029d603d9d512ac10874f3e99299fe7b.pdf d7f1309ae0047674f22aeaaea36de48b PDF Text Text 106 SLOVAKIA Slovakia on My Map MARGARET MATUS It' s been three years since they buried my grandfather. He died just after Christmas when I was seventeen. I can still picture the grief in his eyes the day they buried my grandmother, just three short weeks before his own death. I remember him sitting heavy and limp in his wheel chair next to her casket, staring at no one in particular, while pictures were taken of Grandma to send to her relatives in CzechoSlovakia. Somehow it seemed a disgusting thing to do - taking pictures of a dead person . But it caused me to think back to a picture that some distant cousin had sent from the old country. It was a woman, one hundred and one years old, so they said. She was stretched out in a narrow coffin with people lined up all around her. The picture fascinated me, not because the old woman was dead, but rather because those people, living so far away, were related to me . It caused me to wonder what it would be like to live in their country and speak in my grandparents' native tongue. My interest, however, didn't fully develop until my sophomore year of high school, when I was assigned to research my ethnic background. At the time I didn't even know where exactly CzechoSlovakia was on the map. None of the history courses I'd ever taken mentioned much about it. I could only find one book in the school library that had anything at all about Slovaks, other than a sentence or two. It was a paragraph of mostly derogatory remarks. It talked about' our bad temper and our weak will for booze - something to the effect that our idea of a good time was to see how many empty beer kegs we could leave rolling on the floor. I found it hard to believe that a history resource book could be so opinionated and it angered me. I flatly refused to tell the class about what I had found. Instead, I tried to rely on what little information I could dig up from my own family background. It wasn't easy. Even though both of my parents are Slovak, they were only able to answer a few of the many questions I raised about our family heritage. I couldn't speak to my father's parents about it. They had long since passed away. And, while my mother's parents were still alive, I never bothered much to question them about their history. I'm not sure exactly why . Maybe it was because they never encouraged my interest, or maybe I was just too impatient to struggle with their broken English. Besides, they always had a habit of slipping into Slovak, and I was never around them long enough to understand any of it . I remember once, when I was very young, I asked my mother to teach me Slovak. Unfortunately, she could only speak a few words of it �SLOVAKIA 107 herself, even though she was quite. capable of understanding it when it was spoken to her. She taught me a few things, like how to say my name and how to count to ten, but that was about the extent of it. Being close to the youngest in her family, my mother didn't have as much exposure to the Slovak tradition as her brothers and sister had. I guess you could say that by the time she was born, the family had become more Americanized. But she told me as much as she could about the life and conventiQns of my grandparents. They came to America shortly after World War I. My grandmother, Anna Goffa, was officially born in the United States but was taken back to Europe soon after her birth. She was still an infant when her mother died and her father returned to America, leaving her behind with relatives. Joseph Svac had known Anna as an infant, and it was said that once, while he was rocking her to sleep, he claimed he would one day marry her. As a child, Anna lived the life of an orphan, being pushed from one relative to another. She went to school for a short time only, never reaching the fourth grade. When the war broke out she was sent to work in fields where soldiers were buried, throwing lime on the ground to hasten the decay. She was eighteen when her father finally sent for her to join him in America. Joseph had embarked for the U.S. a few years earlier and he was working as a lumberjack in Colorado. When he heard of Anna's arrival in Pittsburgh, he joined her and they were married shortly afterwards at Holy Trinity Church in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, with a celebration that lasted three days. Eventually, they settled down in Clairton, Pennsylvania, where Joseph got a job as a mill worker. The Svac family came from a background that was rich in superstition. Many of their beliefs centered around the "evil eye." Anna claimed that her first-horn's death was caused by this curse. She said that on the day her newborn baby was baptized, a woman, presumably possessing the "evil eye," cast a spell on the baby by staring at her. At that very moment the baby began to cry and continued to do so for several hours. She died a day or so later. Anna's only son, Mike, was also supposedly cursed by the "evil eye" when he was five years old. He slipped into a convulsive-like state, and a neighborhood midwife had to perform some sort of ritulll to rid him of it. Altogether, Joseph and Anna Svac had eight children. Two of them died as infants. My mother was their seventh-born, which supposedly meant that her life would be blessed with good fortune. She was also a ''veiled'' child, signifying that she had the potential to develop certain psychic capabilities. ("Veiled" was a term used to describe a baby born with a film of skin over its face.) They christened her Margaret V. Svac. The "V" was meant to �108 SLOVAKIA stand for Wilma, but my grandmother's heavy accent caused some misunderstanding and Margaret' s middle name was recorded as Vilma instead. Many of her family ' s customs had faded out when my mother was young so that she could recall only a few with any clarity. She told me about the host-like bread that they had every Christmas Eve, and how it was imprinted with holy pictures and eaten with honey on it . She also mentioned the blessing of Easter baskets and managed to recall a few of my grandparents' superstitions. According to one of them, in order to have good luck all year, a dark haired man must be the first to enter the home on New Year's Eve. She said that my grandfather believed that it was bad luck to leave a room through a different doorway than that through which one entered. By the time my mother married, there was very little to pass on to her children in the way of tradition other than a few vague memories, most of which were fragmented and, more than likely, inaccurate. My father's family couldn't provide any more cultural information than that of my mother ' s. As a matter of fact, his family was even more Americanized than hers. He didn't even have any considerable exposure to the Slovak language . It wasn't spoken in his home because, I suspect, my grandparents philosophized that "when you ' re in America, you only need to speak English.'' My grandfather, Jan Matus, came to the United States shortly before the onset of World War I. Slovakia, then under Magyar control, was plagued by a serious economic depression - driving over 750,000 Slovaks to the U.S . in search of work and better living conditions . Jan, who was seventeen years old at the time, left his family of nineteen in hopes of finding a good paying job as a tool and die maker in America. My great-grandfather, Jan Sr. , had wanted to come to the U.S. for many years. But the thought of either uprooting or abandoning his large family kept him from leaving his home in Spisska Nova Ves, where he worked as supervisor to an ore mine. Jan Jr., though, had no intention of following his father's line of work, and so he embarked for America in 1910. Once he arrived here, my grandfather found out that life wouldn't be quite as easy as he had thought it would be. He ended up writing home for money to live on until he could establish himself. Eventually, he settled down in Pittsburgh after marrying Anna Kovalcik, who was American-born and, therefore, somewhat less ethnic-oriented than himself. Together, they raised seven children, each named according to the saint's day on which he or she was born an idea which Jan's eldest son, Sylvester, resented. Jan had four other sons, one of which was named John, after himself. John was to become my father. Early in 1943, Anna Kovalcik Matus died of cancer, leaving my grandfather to raise seven children on his own. My father was twelve �SLOVAKIA 109 years old at the time and very quickly learned to be independent. He lived at home until his marriage to my mother in 1955. I was nine years old when my grandfather passed away, and the only trace of him that I can remember, other than what can be seen in the family photograph album, is the foreign accent he had. Most of his relatives are still living in Eastern Europe. I have a great aunt who writes to thE¥I1 from time to time. However, her letters are written in Hungarian. She can no longer remember very much of her native language. I visited her a few times, when I was much younger, and I remember once finding a book of Slovak proverbs that had been lying next to her reading chair. I spent an entire day copying them over very carefully - first in Slovak, and then in English translation. I had two favorites out of all those sayings. One was, "If you have the horse, don't worry about the saddle,'' and the other, ''If there were no 'ifs' we'd all be in heaven." After that day, whenever I wrote to a friend, I'd make sure to add one of the Slovak proverbs, written in Slovak, to the bottom of the letter. I thought it looked impressive, almost as though I actually knew the language. None ofmy friends, that I can recall, were Slovak, and it made me feel rather unique that I was of a descent almost totally mysterious to them - the only problem being that it was just about as mysterious to me, also. I realize now that very few Slavic Americans felt the way that I had back then. Most of them tried to become as "American" as possible. Some even went as far as changing their surnames to cover up their heritage. I've only recently come to realize that this was due primarily to various forms of discrimination suffered by the Slavic Americans. Even though my parents' families let quite a few Slovak traditions slip away from them, they were never ashamed of their ancestry and never covered up the fact they were of Slavic origin. Of course, no one in my family ever tried to push for anything more than a modest middle class life. If they had, they might have felt the same oppression that so many other Slavic Americans faced. It reminds me of a teacher I once had, who asked me to name one famous American of Slovak descent. I couldn't think of any at all - at least none that would have ever openly admitted to being Slovak. The incident embarrassed me, but it had no effect whatsoever on the pride I had for my own heritage. Those Slovaks who emigrated to this country were a very humble and pious people, and I admire them very much. They were hard workers and, more than anything else, they were deeply religious. My elder relatives still adorn their homes with an abundance of sacred statues and pictures. Many of them spend a great deal of time in Church. And, of what little customs they do remember, almost all have strong religious connotations. Since the death of my grandfather, three years ago, my interest in my own heritage has grown considerably, and I'm beginning to learn �110 SLOVAKIA the language and the culture. And, I'm glad to see that ethnic awareness is developing, not only in my community, but in others as well. For Slavic Americans are rapidly losing a wealth of cultural knowledge that cannot be preserved unless desire is generated now. (Reprinted with permission from Growing Up Slavic in America, published by EMPAC, Box 48, Bayville, New York 10109.) (Margaret Matus, a junior at the University of Pittsburgh, is currently working on a self-designed major in Eastern European Studies. She is an active member in the Slavic-American Citizens Educational Society and is President of the University Slovak-Czech Club, in addition to being affiliated with various other University organizations.) � 106 SLOVAKIA Slovakia on My Map MARGARET MATUS It' s been three years since they buried my grandfather. He died just after Christmas when I was seventeen. I can still picture the grief in his eyes the day they buried my grandmother, just three short weeks before his own death. I remember him sitting heavy and limp in his wheel chair next to her casket, staring at no one in particular, while pictures were taken of Grandma to send to her relatives in CzechoSlovakia. Somehow it seemed a disgusting thing to do - taking pictures of a dead person . But it caused me to think back to a picture that some distant cousin had sent from the old country. It was a woman, one hundred and one years old, so they said. She was stretched out in a narrow coffin with people lined up all around her. The picture fascinated me, not because the old woman was dead, but rather because those people, living so far away, were related to me . It caused me to wonder what it would be like to live in their country and speak in my grandparents' native tongue. My interest, however, didn't fully develop until my sophomore year of high school, when I was assigned to research my ethnic background. At the time I didn't even know where exactly CzechoSlovakia was on the map. None of the history courses I'd ever taken mentioned much about it. I could only find one book in the school library that had anything at all about Slovaks, other than a sentence or two. It was a paragraph of mostly derogatory remarks. It talked about' our bad temper and our weak will for booze - something to the effect that our idea of a good time was to see how many empty beer kegs we could leave rolling on the floor. I found it hard to believe that a history resource book could be so opinionated and it angered me. I flatly refused to tell the class about what I had found. Instead, I tried to rely on what little information I could dig up from my own family background. It wasn't easy. Even though both of my parents are Slovak, they were only able to answer a few of the many questions I raised about our family heritage. I couldn't speak to my father's parents about it. They had long since passed away. And, while my mother's parents were still alive, I never bothered much to question them about their history. I'm not sure exactly why . Maybe it was because they never encouraged my interest, or maybe I was just too impatient to struggle with their broken English. Besides, they always had a habit of slipping into Slovak, and I was never around them long enough to understand any of it . I remember once, when I was very young, I asked my mother to teach me Slovak. Unfortunately, she could only speak a few words of it �SLOVAKIA 107 herself, even though she was quite. capable of understanding it when it was spoken to her. She taught me a few things, like how to say my name and how to count to ten, but that was about the extent of it. Being close to the youngest in her family, my mother didn't have as much exposure to the Slovak tradition as her brothers and sister had. I guess you could say that by the time she was born, the family had become more Americanized. But she told me as much as she could about the life and conventiQns of my grandparents. They came to America shortly after World War I. My grandmother, Anna Goffa, was officially born in the United States but was taken back to Europe soon after her birth. She was still an infant when her mother died and her father returned to America, leaving her behind with relatives. Joseph Svac had known Anna as an infant, and it was said that once, while he was rocking her to sleep, he claimed he would one day marry her. As a child, Anna lived the life of an orphan, being pushed from one relative to another. She went to school for a short time only, never reaching the fourth grade. When the war broke out she was sent to work in fields where soldiers were buried, throwing lime on the ground to hasten the decay. She was eighteen when her father finally sent for her to join him in America. Joseph had embarked for the U.S. a few years earlier and he was working as a lumberjack in Colorado. When he heard of Anna's arrival in Pittsburgh, he joined her and they were married shortly afterwards at Holy Trinity Church in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, with a celebration that lasted three days. Eventually, they settled down in Clairton, Pennsylvania, where Joseph got a job as a mill worker. The Svac family came from a background that was rich in superstition. Many of their beliefs centered around the "evil eye." Anna claimed that her first-horn's death was caused by this curse. She said that on the day her newborn baby was baptized, a woman, presumably possessing the "evil eye," cast a spell on the baby by staring at her. At that very moment the baby began to cry and continued to do so for several hours. She died a day or so later. Anna's only son, Mike, was also supposedly cursed by the "evil eye" when he was five years old. He slipped into a convulsive-like state, and a neighborhood midwife had to perform some sort of ritulll to rid him of it. Altogether, Joseph and Anna Svac had eight children. Two of them died as infants. My mother was their seventh-born, which supposedly meant that her life would be blessed with good fortune. She was also a ''veiled'' child, signifying that she had the potential to develop certain psychic capabilities. ("Veiled" was a term used to describe a baby born with a film of skin over its face.) They christened her Margaret V. Svac. The "V" was meant to �108 SLOVAKIA stand for Wilma, but my grandmother's heavy accent caused some misunderstanding and Margaret' s middle name was recorded as Vilma instead. Many of her family ' s customs had faded out when my mother was young so that she could recall only a few with any clarity. She told me about the host-like bread that they had every Christmas Eve, and how it was imprinted with holy pictures and eaten with honey on it . She also mentioned the blessing of Easter baskets and managed to recall a few of my grandparents' superstitions. According to one of them, in order to have good luck all year, a dark haired man must be the first to enter the home on New Year's Eve. She said that my grandfather believed that it was bad luck to leave a room through a different doorway than that through which one entered. By the time my mother married, there was very little to pass on to her children in the way of tradition other than a few vague memories, most of which were fragmented and, more than likely, inaccurate. My father's family couldn't provide any more cultural information than that of my mother ' s. As a matter of fact, his family was even more Americanized than hers. He didn't even have any considerable exposure to the Slovak language . It wasn't spoken in his home because, I suspect, my grandparents philosophized that "when you ' re in America, you only need to speak English.'' My grandfather, Jan Matus, came to the United States shortly before the onset of World War I. Slovakia, then under Magyar control, was plagued by a serious economic depression - driving over 750,000 Slovaks to the U.S . in search of work and better living conditions . Jan, who was seventeen years old at the time, left his family of nineteen in hopes of finding a good paying job as a tool and die maker in America. My great-grandfather, Jan Sr. , had wanted to come to the U.S. for many years. But the thought of either uprooting or abandoning his large family kept him from leaving his home in Spisska Nova Ves, where he worked as supervisor to an ore mine. Jan Jr., though, had no intention of following his father's line of work, and so he embarked for America in 1910. Once he arrived here, my grandfather found out that life wouldn't be quite as easy as he had thought it would be. He ended up writing home for money to live on until he could establish himself. Eventually, he settled down in Pittsburgh after marrying Anna Kovalcik, who was American-born and, therefore, somewhat less ethnic-oriented than himself. Together, they raised seven children, each named according to the saint's day on which he or she was born an idea which Jan's eldest son, Sylvester, resented. Jan had four other sons, one of which was named John, after himself. John was to become my father. Early in 1943, Anna Kovalcik Matus died of cancer, leaving my grandfather to raise seven children on his own. My father was twelve �SLOVAKIA 109 years old at the time and very quickly learned to be independent. He lived at home until his marriage to my mother in 1955. I was nine years old when my grandfather passed away, and the only trace of him that I can remember, other than what can be seen in the family photograph album, is the foreign accent he had. Most of his relatives are still living in Eastern Europe. I have a great aunt who writes to thE¥I1 from time to time. However, her letters are written in Hungarian. She can no longer remember very much of her native language. I visited her a few times, when I was much younger, and I remember once finding a book of Slovak proverbs that had been lying next to her reading chair. I spent an entire day copying them over very carefully - first in Slovak, and then in English translation. I had two favorites out of all those sayings. One was, "If you have the horse, don't worry about the saddle,'' and the other, ''If there were no 'ifs' we'd all be in heaven." After that day, whenever I wrote to a friend, I'd make sure to add one of the Slovak proverbs, written in Slovak, to the bottom of the letter. I thought it looked impressive, almost as though I actually knew the language. None ofmy friends, that I can recall, were Slovak, and it made me feel rather unique that I was of a descent almost totally mysterious to them - the only problem being that it was just about as mysterious to me, also. I realize now that very few Slavic Americans felt the way that I had back then. Most of them tried to become as "American" as possible. Some even went as far as changing their surnames to cover up their heritage. I've only recently come to realize that this was due primarily to various forms of discrimination suffered by the Slavic Americans. Even though my parents' families let quite a few Slovak traditions slip away from them, they were never ashamed of their ancestry and never covered up the fact they were of Slavic origin. Of course, no one in my family ever tried to push for anything more than a modest middle class life. If they had, they might have felt the same oppression that so many other Slavic Americans faced. It reminds me of a teacher I once had, who asked me to name one famous American of Slovak descent. I couldn't think of any at all - at least none that would have ever openly admitted to being Slovak. The incident embarrassed me, but it had no effect whatsoever on the pride I had for my own heritage. Those Slovaks who emigrated to this country were a very humble and pious people, and I admire them very much. They were hard workers and, more than anything else, they were deeply religious. My elder relatives still adorn their homes with an abundance of sacred statues and pictures. Many of them spend a great deal of time in Church. And, of what little customs they do remember, almost all have strong religious connotations. Since the death of my grandfather, three years ago, my interest in my own heritage has grown considerably, and I'm beginning to learn �110 SLOVAKIA the language and the culture. And, I'm glad to see that ethnic awareness is developing, not only in my community, but in others as well. For Slavic Americans are rapidly losing a wealth of cultural knowledge that cannot be preserved unless desire is generated now. (Reprinted with permission from Growing Up Slavic in America, published by EMPAC, Box 48, Bayville, New York 10109.) (Margaret Matus, a junior at the University of Pittsburgh, is currently working on a self-designed major in Eastern European Studies. She is an active member in the Slavic-American Citizens Educational Society and is President of the University Slovak-Czech Club, in addition to being affiliated with various other University organizations.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1976, Vol. 26 Description An account of the resource Vol. 26 (No. 49), 1976. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1976 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 106 SLOVAKIA Slovakia on My Map MARGARET MATUS It' s been three years since they buried my grandfather. He died just after Christmas when I was seventeen. I can still picture the grief in his eyes the day they buried my grandmother, just three short weeks before his own death. I remember him sitting heavy and limp in his wheel chair next to her casket, staring at no one in particular, while pictures were taken of Grandma to send to her relatives in CzechoSlovakia. Somehow it seemed a disgusting thing to do - taking pictures of a dead person . But it caused me to think back to a picture that some distant cousin had sent from the old country. It was a woman, one hundred and one years old, so they said. She was stretched out in a narrow coffin with people lined up all around her. The picture fascinated me, not because the old woman was dead, but rather because those people, living so far away, were related to me . It caused me to wonder what it would be like to live in their country and speak in my grandparents' native tongue. My interest, however, didn't fully develop until my sophomore year of high school, when I was assigned to research my ethnic background. At the time I didn't even know where exactly CzechoSlovakia was on the map. None of the history courses I'd ever taken mentioned much about it. I could only find one book in the school library that had anything at all about Slovaks, other than a sentence or two. It was a paragraph of mostly derogatory remarks. It talked about' our bad temper and our weak will for booze - something to the effect that our idea of a good time was to see how many empty beer kegs we could leave rolling on the floor. I found it hard to believe that a history resource book could be so opinionated and it angered me. I flatly refused to tell the class about what I had found. Instead, I tried to rely on what little information I could dig up from my own family background. It wasn't easy. Even though both of my parents are Slovak, they were only able to answer a few of the many questions I raised about our family heritage. I couldn't speak to my father's parents about it. They had long since passed away. And, while my mother's parents were still alive, I never bothered much to question them about their history. I'm not sure exactly why . Maybe it was because they never encouraged my interest, or maybe I was just too impatient to struggle with their broken English. Besides, they always had a habit of slipping into Slovak, and I was never around them long enough to understand any of it . I remember once, when I was very young, I asked my mother to teach me Slovak. Unfortunately, she could only speak a few words of it SLOVAKIA 107 herself, even though she was quite. capable of understanding it when it was spoken to her. She taught me a few things, like how to say my name and how to count to ten, but that was about the extent of it. Being close to the youngest in her family, my mother didn't have as much exposure to the Slovak tradition as her brothers and sister had. I guess you could say that by the time she was born, the family had become more Americanized. But she told me as much as she could about the life and conventiQns of my grandparents. They came to America shortly after World War I. My grandmother, Anna Goffa, was officially born in the United States but was taken back to Europe soon after her birth. She was still an infant when her mother died and her father returned to America, leaving her behind with relatives. Joseph Svac had known Anna as an infant, and it was said that once, while he was rocking her to sleep, he claimed he would one day marry her. As a child, Anna lived the life of an orphan, being pushed from one relative to another. She went to school for a short time only, never reaching the fourth grade. When the war broke out she was sent to work in fields where soldiers were buried, throwing lime on the ground to hasten the decay. She was eighteen when her father finally sent for her to join him in America. Joseph had embarked for the U.S. a few years earlier and he was working as a lumberjack in Colorado. When he heard of Anna's arrival in Pittsburgh, he joined her and they were married shortly afterwards at Holy Trinity Church in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, with a celebration that lasted three days. Eventually, they settled down in Clairton, Pennsylvania, where Joseph got a job as a mill worker. The Svac family came from a background that was rich in superstition. Many of their beliefs centered around the "evil eye." Anna claimed that her first-horn's death was caused by this curse. She said that on the day her newborn baby was baptized, a woman, presumably possessing the "evil eye," cast a spell on the baby by staring at her. At that very moment the baby began to cry and continued to do so for several hours. She died a day or so later. Anna's only son, Mike, was also supposedly cursed by the "evil eye" when he was five years old. He slipped into a convulsive-like state, and a neighborhood midwife had to perform some sort of ritulll to rid him of it. Altogether, Joseph and Anna Svac had eight children. Two of them died as infants. My mother was their seventh-born, which supposedly meant that her life would be blessed with good fortune. She was also a ''veiled'' child, signifying that she had the potential to develop certain psychic capabilities. ("Veiled" was a term used to describe a baby born with a film of skin over its face.) They christened her Margaret V. Svac. The "V" was meant to 108 SLOVAKIA stand for Wilma, but my grandmother's heavy accent caused some misunderstanding and Margaret' s middle name was recorded as Vilma instead. Many of her family ' s customs had faded out when my mother was young so that she could recall only a few with any clarity. She told me about the host-like bread that they had every Christmas Eve, and how it was imprinted with holy pictures and eaten with honey on it . She also mentioned the blessing of Easter baskets and managed to recall a few of my grandparents' superstitions. According to one of them, in order to have good luck all year, a dark haired man must be the first to enter the home on New Year's Eve. She said that my grandfather believed that it was bad luck to leave a room through a different doorway than that through which one entered. By the time my mother married, there was very little to pass on to her children in the way of tradition other than a few vague memories, most of which were fragmented and, more than likely, inaccurate. My father's family couldn't provide any more cultural information than that of my mother ' s. As a matter of fact, his family was even more Americanized than hers. He didn't even have any considerable exposure to the Slovak language . It wasn't spoken in his home because, I suspect, my grandparents philosophized that "when you ' re in America, you only need to speak English.'' My grandfather, Jan Matus, came to the United States shortly before the onset of World War I. Slovakia, then under Magyar control, was plagued by a serious economic depression - driving over 750,000 Slovaks to the U.S . in search of work and better living conditions . Jan, who was seventeen years old at the time, left his family of nineteen in hopes of finding a good paying job as a tool and die maker in America. My great-grandfather, Jan Sr. , had wanted to come to the U.S. for many years. But the thought of either uprooting or abandoning his large family kept him from leaving his home in Spisska Nova Ves, where he worked as supervisor to an ore mine. Jan Jr., though, had no intention of following his father's line of work, and so he embarked for America in 1910. Once he arrived here, my grandfather found out that life wouldn't be quite as easy as he had thought it would be. He ended up writing home for money to live on until he could establish himself. Eventually, he settled down in Pittsburgh after marrying Anna Kovalcik, who was American-born and, therefore, somewhat less ethnic-oriented than himself. Together, they raised seven children, each named according to the saint's day on which he or she was born an idea which Jan's eldest son, Sylvester, resented. Jan had four other sons, one of which was named John, after himself. John was to become my father. Early in 1943, Anna Kovalcik Matus died of cancer, leaving my grandfather to raise seven children on his own. My father was twelve SLOVAKIA 109 years old at the time and very quickly learned to be independent. He lived at home until his marriage to my mother in 1955. I was nine years old when my grandfather passed away, and the only trace of him that I can remember, other than what can be seen in the family photograph album, is the foreign accent he had. Most of his relatives are still living in Eastern Europe. I have a great aunt who writes to thE¥I1 from time to time. However, her letters are written in Hungarian. She can no longer remember very much of her native language. I visited her a few times, when I was much younger, and I remember once finding a book of Slovak proverbs that had been lying next to her reading chair. I spent an entire day copying them over very carefully - first in Slovak, and then in English translation. I had two favorites out of all those sayings. One was, "If you have the horse, don't worry about the saddle,'' and the other, ''If there were no 'ifs' we'd all be in heaven." After that day, whenever I wrote to a friend, I'd make sure to add one of the Slovak proverbs, written in Slovak, to the bottom of the letter. I thought it looked impressive, almost as though I actually knew the language. None ofmy friends, that I can recall, were Slovak, and it made me feel rather unique that I was of a descent almost totally mysterious to them - the only problem being that it was just about as mysterious to me, also. I realize now that very few Slavic Americans felt the way that I had back then. Most of them tried to become as "American" as possible. Some even went as far as changing their surnames to cover up their heritage. I've only recently come to realize that this was due primarily to various forms of discrimination suffered by the Slavic Americans. Even though my parents' families let quite a few Slovak traditions slip away from them, they were never ashamed of their ancestry and never covered up the fact they were of Slavic origin. Of course, no one in my family ever tried to push for anything more than a modest middle class life. If they had, they might have felt the same oppression that so many other Slavic Americans faced. It reminds me of a teacher I once had, who asked me to name one famous American of Slovak descent. I couldn't think of any at all - at least none that would have ever openly admitted to being Slovak. The incident embarrassed me, but it had no effect whatsoever on the pride I had for my own heritage. Those Slovaks who emigrated to this country were a very humble and pious people, and I admire them very much. They were hard workers and, more than anything else, they were deeply religious. My elder relatives still adorn their homes with an abundance of sacred statues and pictures. Many of them spend a great deal of time in Church. And, of what little customs they do remember, almost all have strong religious connotations. Since the death of my grandfather, three years ago, my interest in my own heritage has grown considerably, and I'm beginning to learn 110 SLOVAKIA the language and the culture. And, I'm glad to see that ethnic awareness is developing, not only in my community, but in others as well. For Slavic Americans are rapidly losing a wealth of cultural knowledge that cannot be preserved unless desire is generated now. (Reprinted with permission from Growing Up Slavic in America, published by EMPAC, Box 48, Bayville, New York 10109.) (Margaret Matus, a junior at the University of Pittsburgh, is currently working on a self-designed major in Eastern European Studies. She is an active member in the Slavic-American Citizens Educational Society and is President of the University Slovak-Czech Club, in addition to being affiliated with various other University organizations.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia on My Map Description An account of the resource Margaret Matus Slovakia, Vol. 26 (No. 49), 1976 pp. 106-110 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Matus, Margaret Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1976 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ddd0bdeda788ee4c11d6ce4a8d4ba7b5.pdf 29ea0dcde14b493a3a3f4d6a87885146 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 80 Antonia M a z d n o v d: Slovak Piano Composition (A BRIEF SURVEY ) Conditions in 19th century Slovakia were so repressive, so debilitating to the spirit, that only under menacing hardships could the Slovaks develop their music on a n ational scale. The leadership concentrated on the nation's struggle for liberation from the Magyars. All its efforts and energies were directed toward Slovak national and cultural independence. The incipient cultivation of Slovak national art cut across the injustice of the Slovak position , and music, too, actively entered the fray. Slovak music and its origins cannot be evaluated from the perspective of modern musical art. While urban artistic culture at that period was comparatively highly developed in Slovakia, it represented cosmopolitan, not Slovak art. Therefore, the movement for authentic Slovak revival kept aloof from it and concentrated its cultural and artistic activity within certain cities like Turciansky Sv. Martin, Banska Bystrica, Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, Dolny Kubin and several others, which likewise became important centers of patriotic and promotional movements. Music and song were completely at the service of national ideologies and struggles. Music no less than the other arts was expected to spark national consciousness and keep patriotism alive. Slovakia in that period possessed neither the means nor the conditions required for the cultivation of artistic music; consequently the character of its over-all musical life remained amateurish. Musical enthusiasts who happened to flourish were dilettantes devoid of professional training and only by way of exception did any of them attain artisticesthetic renown in competent circles. Folk creativity played a significant role in the growth and quality of Slovak national music. From the age of enlightenment it served as a powerful source of inspiration for artistic composition, chiefly under the influence of Romanticism, from which the entire Slovak national art evolved. A Slovak in the 19th century would have recognized �SLOVAKIA 81 in folk art (folksong) the most authentic expression of the national spirit, the personification of the nation's immortality and sole source of resistance in its struggle for self-identity. Eventually, toward the close of the 19th century, this trend resulted in conservatism and became a deterrent to fresh views in folk music and hampered any effort to raise the artistic standard of Slovak music. The earliest collections of folksongs were the basis from which piano compositions evolved. These consisted of simple arrangements of a primitive nature. In 1830 Martin Suchan arranged 12 songs from safarik's collection and in 1837 Ladislav Ftiredy composed piano arrangements for 25 pieces from Kollar's collection of patriotic songs. Toward the end of the 18th and on into the 19th century new musical creations appeared, combining Magyar elements with Slovak folksongs, resulting in the so-called neo-Hungarian song. The neo-Hungarian style, evident principally in the dance forms, also partly infiuenced emerging Slovak musical compositions in Slovak musical centers, as exemplified in the piano compositions of M. Godra, well-known songs like Matthew's Musing, Svihrovskd, and gypsy traces in M. Laciak's and M. Francisci's arrangements of folksongs. In the 1870's a counter influence arose against the gypsy influence in Slovak folksongs. The leading protagonist in the effort to offset foreign influence in music was the puristic oriented Milan Lichard. Early composers were prolific in their works for the piano. Paul Gerengay (1825-95) (Dance music: Recollection of Sitno) and Maximilian Hudec (1836-1911) ( Hurban March, Marina Quadrille) made a beginning. The most popular were the quadrilles, mazurkas, polkas, waltzes, etc. (Emigrant, by A. Krcmery; Quadrille of St. Martin, by Bella, Ladonka, by Laciak, a quartet, Tatra Flowers, by Boldis, and others). To this group belongs Michael Laciak ( 1826-1901) who, besides the piano variations for Our Times also attempted in his Instruction to standardize Slovak musical terminology. A. Horislav Skultety was a most productive composer. He composed about 6 stylistic dances for the piano. In this period l'..udovit Vansa (1835-73) received a thorough musical education and became a creative composer. For his own immediate :"'leeds and to his great personal satisfaction he produced Wreaths of Folksongs �82 SLOVAKIA for the piano. Similar aspirations were achieved by Stefan Fajnor ( 1844-1909) one of the most accomplished composers of a renaissance era. Originally he composed chamber music and was considerably influenced by the neo-Hungarian style, than finally turned to Slovak melodies in his Variations for piano and Fantasia of Slovak Folksongs. Vlastimir Melicko (1893-1946) the son of a musical family of the renowned Jan Melicko, already graced with a technical musical training, became a highly talented composer. He arranged dances for the piano and produced Slovak Rhapsody and Fantasia, based on Slovak folksongs. Associated with the activities of the Slovak Society in Budapest is the name of ~udovit Izak (Milos Lihovecky, 1862-1927) composer of a wide variety of works. For the piano he wrote the popular polka Anica and piano variations on the folksong Tecie voda, tecie. Another member of the Slovak Society was Milan Lichard (1853-1935). He obtained his specialized musical training at the Academy in Budapest. Noteworthy on his extensive list of compositions are his short piano pieces and two-piano rhapsodies, which in reality are outstanding collections of songs. Two other piano composers who lived and composed outside of Slovakia must be mentioned. Holding first place was Milos Francisci, a dentist (1854-1926). He was act~ve in the United States and besides choruses, he wrote for piano paraphrases of folksongs, entitled Trdvnice (two volumes of 100 songs each) and a Fantasia on Slovak songs for two pianos. Vladimir G. sasko (1875-1960) a piano virtuoso, also emigrated to the United States. He studied at the Academy of Music in Budapest and taught at the Chicago Musical College. He is the creator of many Slovak compositions: rhapsodies, Fantasia, based on Slovak folksongs and variations. Piano compositions and other unnamed works of these two composers were instrumental in making an impact on Slovak national consciousness in the United States. To this generation of Slovak creative artists, all of them composers in the Slovak national tradition, we further assign, Jan Levoslav Bella, Mikulas Mayzes, Viliam FigusBystry and Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky. The initial efforts of this generation of composers sparked a national revival of native Slovak art, which also embraced music in its �SLOVAKIA 83 patriotic-awakening, informative and world-wide roles. These composers, by contrast with the former generation, already possessed all the marks of a creative artistic individuality. Their compositions continued to show the influence of the former esthetic revival based on the role of the folksong, which extended into the 1920's and 1940's, when a new generation of composers with modern artistic styles was emerging. One of the first musicians with a European outlook was Jan Levoslav Bella 0843-1936), the dean of Slovak composers, one of the founders of Slovak national musical culture. Self-educated in playing the piano, he did not indulge in piano composition in the later years of his mature mastery. His four-movement Sonata in B Minor, which to this day appears on programs, represents a work of perennial merit in music literature. Another outstanding composition is his fragmentary Sonata in C Minor, from the elaborate first movement of which has been constructed a Beethoven allegro and an impressively beautiful adagio. Minor works include: Variations for the song Pri Presporku and Leti roj, as well as a Sonatina in E Minor, all of which exemplify the music standard of his contemporaries. An enthusiastic admirer and promoter of Slovak folksongs, Viliam Figus-Bystry ( 1875-1937) directed his activity almost exclusively to using folksongs in classical music. Together with Milan Lichard and Stefan Fajnor, he dominated the so-called renaissance period of Slovak music, in which the composers for the most part were self-trained. The basic design of Figus's creations is derived from Slovak folksong arrangements. His piano compositions include One Thousand Slovak Folksongs, Flowers of the Field, a collection written for children ( 106 songs in simple arrangement for the piano), Dances, and a march Pages from an Album, Multicolored Leaves (10 compositions) Musical Miniatures (12 compositions). Probably the most extensive of his piano compositions is the four-part Slovak Sonata in the dorian mode, based on themes of Slovak folksongs . In his earlier years Figus also composed practical piano music in chamber style (polkas, marches, etc.). The overture for his opera Detvan has been arranged for four hands. One of the pioneers of the national realistic trend in �84 SLOVAKIA Slovak music was Mikulas Moyzes (1872-1944). The bulk of his compositions gravitated toward orchestral music. Most of his piano compositions he eventually transposed to orchestral arrangements. His best known works are the three-movement Sonatina and a series of 12 piano compositions, To our Youth. His remaining piano works consist of short forms like mazurkas, polonaises, preludes, impromptus, arabesques, meditations, etc. The inspirational basis for his entire repertoire is the Slovak folksong, from which he selected a typical Slovak melodic theme in order to develop an independent creation. Moyzes originated the ballad song with its deep realistic picturesqueness. Following Bella, the most impressive member of the older generation of composers was Mikulas SchneiderTrnavsky ( 1881-1959) a pioneer in the trend toward realism in Slovak national music and a friend of Zoltan Kodaly. The strong point in his creativeness was artistic variation in Slovak folksongs and classical song form composition comparable to the motifs in the style of Schubert and Mendelssohn. Schneider-Trnavsky was the first to develop the recitative-rhapsodic type of Slovak melody. Because of the wealth of his compositions in this category, his piano works are not extensive. His Opus 5 is a Brief Waltz (1898) and his popular instructive Slovak Sonatina is well-known and often concertized. Later appeared his Variation Line of Compositions (1944). The musical philosophy of M. SchneiderTrnavsky in all his creative effort stems from the Slovak folksong. His style and tools of expression are Post-Romantic. To this creative quartet of Slovak musicians (from the standpoint of age and style) one must add the names of Frico Kafenda and Alexander Albrecht. As composers they were not specifically aligned with the effort to promote Slovak national music, but they nevertheless made a valuable contribution to the advancement of Slovak musical art. And although they belonged to the Romantic school of composers, they formed a logical link in the historical development of Slovak music and provided an effective transition from the dilettante culture of the previous century to the Slovak avantgarde and indeed paved the way for it. �SLOVAKIA 85 The character of Frico Kafenda's creations (1883-1965) was decisively influenced by his training in Leipzig, where conservative traditions merged with the Post-Romantic school. Among his teachers were Robert Teich-Mtiller (piano ), Stefan Krehl and Heinrich Zollner (composition), Arthur Nikisch (conducting). He also attended lectures by Herrmann Kretschmar and Hugh Riemann. Kafenda's compositions frequently exhibit a subjective intimate character. The style of his music is marked by strict harmony and proficient contrapuntal writing. The core of his works comprises chamber, song-like, and instrumental compositions. His piano works consist of A Piano Suite in the ancient modes, Three Piano Compositions, and Variations and Fugues. Alexander Albrecht (1885-1958) can be described as the type of composer-synthesist, who radiates a variety of influences. He was an intimate friend of Bartok. He studied at the Conservatory of Budapest and his teachers were Istvan Thoman (piano), Hans Kassler (composition), and F. Szandtner (conducting). Hindemith's influence led him to combine classicism with modern elements of expression. His musical thought was expressed chiefly in lyrics, in the tender grazioso and the play!ul scherzo. Among his distinguished piano compositions, the following are outstanding: Scherzo in F Major (duet) (1899), Sonata in F Major, Scherzo (1907), (duet), Aphorisms, New Year Greeting, Moods (duet), Wild Rose Suite, (duet), Sonatina in three movements as a duet, humoresque (Excursion i n a Thunderstorm), Twelve short compositions (Success to Music, Little Johnny, In the Distance, Shepherd Dance, Joyful Awakening, Wedding Feast of the Crickets, In a Gay Room, Beginner in Dancing, Perfect Dancer, Dusk, Night, Going to Work in the Morning). His final composition is an instructive work, entitled Ten Duets, based on song themes and recitations from Jan Krasko's collection. After 1918 the newly evolved Slovak music style encountered many difficult challenges : to create a firm material basis for a national musical life and to establish a strong organizational position in competition with a fully developed appreciation of foreign music, which had found a ready response in the musical life of Slovakia. The spirit of competition generated much activity, cen- �86 SLOVAKIA tered in new musically-cul tural institutions, organizations and music schools. In these years, as it were in the shadow of the previously mentioned composers, there indeed arose a group of musicians, who adhered to ancient traditions, but their productions lacked any distinguishab le unity. Renowned at this time was Dezider Lauko (1872-1942) whose piano compositions can be compared with Liszt's in their brilliance and salon presentation. For the piano he wrote Slovak Moods, Piano Etudes for Children, Humoresques, three Valse Scherzandos, Rhapsody in Slovak Meadows, duets for Slovak Dances, and others. :r.uctmila Krizkova-Leh otska (1863-1945), the first Slovak woman composer, in addition to various piano works, directed her talent to composing for children. Angeia Cziczkova (1888-1973) specialized in pedagogical elements of music instruction as well as in composition. Her works consist of more than 100 compositions (Unisono with 54 exercises, Study in Octaves, Rhythmic Exercises with Variations, Technique in Trills, A Study in Chromatics, Preparing to Play Tremolo . In addition she wrote 48 compositions, Youth, 16 Short Preludes for piano. From among her classical selections are Twelve Sonatas, Slavic Fantasy, Prelude in A Flat Major, and Nine Preludes for piano. An individualisti c pattern was folloved by Fran.a Dostalik (1896-1944). His music portrays modern expression and shows some attempt at experimentat ion. Besides shorter forms for the piano, he wrote Detvan Sonatina which he later arranged as a piano duet. To this group of composers belong many others who flourished in the years before and after World War I. Their thought and inspiration sprang from a cultural climate where struggle for an independent national musical art predominated ; or it was derived from the uncertain period of new social-cultura l conditions during the first Republic, when new ideas of national musical culture among the younger generation clashed with the older music. Some of these composers achieved only amateur status; for others again the unfavorable conditions of Slovak cultural life in that period precluded any advancement even with specialized musical training. One of the most productive composers in this group (he has about 260 works to his credit) is Jozef Rosinsky �SLOVAKIA 87 (1897-1973). He obtained his education in Turin and in Rome (law); in Nice he studied piano and organ. His rich productivity comprises all genres. A listing of his piano works must include the following noteworthy selections: Mazurka in A Minor, Children's March, Trencin Bells, Fantasia alla Zingara, Prelude on Slovak Motifs, Plastic Pictures, Scherzo (duet), Slovak Gleanings, Ten Short Compositions, First Sonata, Second Sonata, Sonata for piano or harmonium, Echoes of Enchanted Nitra, and Slovak Concert Fantasia for piano and orchestra. Ladislav Stancek ( 1898) is a composer of the same calibre. His vast productivity was directed almost exclusively to program music. In Brno he studied organ under Tregler, composition under V. Petrzelka and 0. Chlubna and conducting under F. Neumann. Among his most popular piano compositions are: Child's Suite, Variations on an original theme and a collection entitled From Life. Representative of the culturally-enlightened and popular composition, anchored in the great traditions of the nationally-revived chorus and group singing in Slovakia, is Jan Valast'an Dolinsky (1892-1965). In the area of piano composition he left short forms: Complaint, Remembrance of May, Minuets in G Major and E Flat Major, Waltz in A Minor, Page From an Album, and Valse Triste. The works of Jan Krasko-Zapotocky (1893-1968) fall into the same category. He, too, was noted as an enlightened leader in the field of music instruction. Among his works are sonatinas and patriotic songs issued under the title, Echoes of Freedom. Jan Mory (1897) belongs to quite another class of composers. He dealt principally with operettic, popular, and dance music. For the piano he prepared instructional works for children, several duets and a collection entitled Children Sing and Play. The composers of yet another school react sensitively to the contemporary, employing methods-modern, technical, and expressive. Their common characteristic is a higher artistic and idealistic standard, without, however, a uniform productivity. An outstanding figure is Stefan Ladislav Nemeth-samorinsky (1896), a typical representative of Bratislava's musical life. In thought and artistry he belongs to the progressive Magyar musical culture as �88 SLOVAKIA represented in Bratislava by Bela Bartok and Alexander Albrecht. He studied piano, organ, and composition at the Academy of Music in Budapest and later attended the Graduate School of Franz Schmidt in Vienna. He can claim a valuable collection of piano works. He arranged 20 Slovak folksongs for piano under the title, For Youth. He wrote a very effective Slovak Rhapsody and Improvisation on a Slovak folksong . Other significant works include: Meditation on Paganini's Theme, a transcription of Beethoven's Romance in D Major for violin, Intermezzo for piano, Sonata with three movements, containing valuable content (Toccata and Fugue) Piano Concerto, and Transcription of Liszt's Prelude and Fugue on Bach's name for two pianos. A composer of an earlier generation with extensive production in music theory, writing, and pedagogy was Jan Fiser-Kveton (1896-1963). He studied composition and conducting at the Prague Conservatory under K. B. Jirak and J. B. Forster. In composition he reached out into diverse styles. In 1928 he produced Sonata in F Minor for piano and the best-loved compositions are his two-piano Suites for Youth. A distinctive role m Slovak musical life and composition was played by Michael Vilec (1902), who was associated in the early years of his creativity with Eastern Slovakia. His compositions reflect the influence of his teacher Zoltan Kodaly and are marked by impressionism. At first he had held himself aloof from the compositional efforts of his generation. His works are noted for their expressive folk elements, among which must be mentioned Bagatelles for piano, Ballade for two pianos, Sonata for piano, Rondo, Three Sonatinas, two series of duets From the Banks of the Danube, Conversation at the Piano, Two-Tone Inventions, Eight Studies on the Development of Interpretive Elements and Fantasia on the waltzes of Franz Schubert: Schubertiada for piano and orchestra. Together with Mikulas Mayzes, he wrote a significant two-volume School of Piano. The first third of the century saw the emergence of a young generation of Slovak composers with a new program and new ideals and goals: to create a style of music that would be contemporary, modern, deeply realistic and Slovak. These composers were determined to put an end to provincialism and dilettantism and at long last to incorpo- �SLOVAKIA 89 rate the culture of a highly talented Slovak nation into the great orchestra of European music. A Golden Age of musical composition was about to dawn throughout the world and Slovak piano creativity would play a responsible role in it. Another composer of contemporary music is Alexander Moyzes (1906). He obtained his musical training at the Prague Conservatory under the direction of such teachers as Otakar Sin and Rudolf Karel (composition), Otakar Ostrem (conducting), and B. A. Wiedermann (organ) . Moyzes is noted for his program music with its polished composition2.! technique, which combines classical and Post-Romantic principles with impulses of impressionism. In addition to his creative works, Moyzes actively promoted a new style of Slovak music by means of articles, critical essays, and reviews, in which he condemned in no uncertain terms both dilettantism and conservatism in Slovak musical life. In his capacity as music instructor he educated an entire generation of composers, who to this day occupy foremos t positions in Slovak musical circles. (Holoubek, Jurovsky, Kardos, Ocenas, Freso and several others) . Moyzes' creative works include basic instrumental and vocal genres. His principal compositions for the piano are: Sonata in E Minor (a transcription of Seven Compositions - 1942) which has been rated as one of the best Slovak piano compositions. Others are: Divertimento (1930), FoxEtude and Improptu (1935), Highwayman's Rhapsody (1957) . He also wrote Jazz Sonata (1932) for two pianos. Eugen Suchon (1908) shares with Moyzes the glory of initiating the Golden Age of Slovak musical art. He is at once its creator, its promoter, and its splendid flowering. He studied at the Academy of Music and Drama in Bratislava under the direction of Frico Kafenda and Jozef Vincourek. After graduation he continued his studies under Vitezoslav Novak at the Graduate School in Prague. Suchon's art is completely original. It matured under the impact of Slovak folk melodies combined with modern techniques. The blending of melody, harmony, rhyth::.n and form characterizes Suchoi'.t's music and gives it its national character. Omitting his earlier compositions, (1923-28), a list of his best known works includes the following: Short Suite with Passacaglia (1931), Ballade Suite (1936), which is a standard calling card among elite Slovak pianists; �90 SLOVAKIA Metamorphosis Suites (1953), which is a compendium of modern piano tunes with effective transition and harmonious techniques; Pictures from Slovakia, six series of piano compositions from 1956-1957; and a newer Rhapsodic Suite for piano and orchestra (1968). In 1969 he contributed Kaleidoscope (Evolution of Harmony) in which individual numbers are a succession of delicate musical miniatures. Jan Cikker (1911), pioneer of contemporary national opera, a celebrity known for his irrepressible vitality and vibrant energy, yet not without meditative depth, also belongs to the contemporary scene. He studied composition at the Prague Conservatory under Jaroslav Kricka, organ under B. A. Wiedermann, and conducting under Pavel Dedecek. At the Graduate School he was the student of Vitezoslav Novak and pursued conducting under Felix Weingartner. Cikker opened wide the concentrated art of folksong and dance and developed it into classical, highly spontaneous forms. He is a contemporary lyricist and dramatist. Although Cikker concentrated on operatic creations, he also wrote a considerable number of piano compositions: Sonata in E Minor (1927), while yet pursuing his studies, two compositions for piano In Solitude ( 1940), Piano Variations (1935), Lullaby (1942), Two Compositions for Youth (1948), Tatra's Brooks (three brilliant compositions for piano, 1954), and finally 15 piano water-colors, What the Children Narrated, also a Concertina for piano and orchestra. In addition there is his arrangement of Slovak Suites for orchestra and two pianos. The foremost personality in the field of Slovak music is Dezider Kardos (1914), a student of Alexander Moyzes and V. Novak, a.member of the central generation of composers (along with Ocenas, Jurovsky, Kresanek, Freso and Holoubek). Kardos concentrates his talent on the creation of monumental works, in which his technique is best applied. From among his numerous works the foremost are: Two Piano Compositions (1933), Piano Suite II (1937), Studies for Piano ( 1947), a series of piano compositions Bagatelles (1948), Cycle of 10 Piano Compositions for Youth (1956), many individual scores for children, and notably the interpretive, yet quite spontaneous three compositions To My Children (Banter, Humoresque, Toccatina). In 1969 �SLOVAKIA 91 he concluded Piano Concerto with orchestra. It was his first composition of the concert type. It is not a concert work in the traditional sense of the word. The piano is combined with the orchestral rhythm, but it continues to express the individual motifs and ideas. Another member of the central generation of composers is Ladislav Holoubek (1913). He studied composition under A. Moyzes, conducting under Jozef Vincourek, piano under Ernest Krizan. After completing his studies he pursued composition under V. Novak. Holoubek's artistry is best exemplified in his operatic creations. His works for piano are: Sonata in G Major (1931), Prelude, Passacaglia and Toccata (1934) , Four Fugues , II Sonata for Piano (1947), and a cycle for young advanced pianists, Children's Games and Joys . Prominent also as a representative member of the central generation of composers is Andrej Ocenas ( 1911). He studied in Bratislava under A. Moyzes (composition), conducting under Jozef Vincourek, and advanced composition under V. Novak in Prague. His production is characterized by design of splendor and monumentality. For the piano he wrote: First Letters (I Piano Suite), Fugue for piano, II Piano Suite, a piano fantasia Sleet, a series of piano compositions, New Spring, a piano suite Youth, a piano suite, Pictures from a Fable, Ballade, Piano Concerto with orchestra, several individual compositions and Flowers of the Field for young pianists. The creations of Ocenas are characterized by original reconstruction of genuine folklore; he therefore resembles the realists, Janacek and Moussorgsky. A lyrical composer with a feeling for poetic tonal-coloring detail was simon Jurovsky (1912-1963). A student of A. Moyzes (composition), Jozef Vincourek (conducting), he later studied in Vienna under Jozef Marx. In addition to a series of major forms, he left the following piano compositions: Piano Suite, 4 compositions for children, From a Child's Paradise, a suite from ballet, Chivalrous Ballade for piano, Peace Symphony, for concert piano and string orchestra. Tibor Freso ( 1918) belongs to a generation which injected a new creative spirit into Slovak music. He studied under the Italian composer, Ildebrand -Pizetti at the Academia �92 SLOVAKIA di Santa Cecilia in Rome. For piano he wrote a Miniature Suite, which is an effective recital composition with lesser technical demands; Russian Dance for piano, a piano suite In a Child's Room for very young pianists, and a succession of shorter works. Frantisek Babusek ( 1905-1954) a prominent broadcasting conductor, studied conducting under Pavel Dedecek and composition under V. Novak, Jozef Suk, and Jaroslav Kricka in Prague. To Babusek belongs well-deserved credit for producing original compositions and organizing periodic symphonic concerts. He wrote Prelude for piano and the majestic Concerto in D Minor, which in its claims is indeed somewhat exaggerated, but is a masterly composition in which Babusek amassed a whole assemblage of modern piano techniques, many-faceted rhythms and intricacies. The leading personality of Slovak musical science is Dr. Jozef Kresanek (1913). He was educated in composition under Rudolf Karl at the Prague Conservatory and at the Graduate School of V. Novak. Along with his scholarly pursuits, which netted him a long series of learned articles, and books, he composed many songs, choruses, chamber music as well as the following works for the piano: Piano Suite in four parts, I I Piano Suite, arrangements of Slovak folksongs for young pianists, Meadow Flowers, Elegy for piano, Highwayman's Ballade and others. His Scherzo for the piano is an outstanding work. The foremost exponent of Slovak musical theory and estheticism is Dr. Otto Ferenczy ( 1921) . As a composer he advanced on the knowledge of Bart6k and Stravinsky and was able to combine their thrust with the realism of the Slovak folksong. Characteristic of Ferenczy are his expressive elegance, his brilliance and intellectual humor. His works reflect inspiration from the eastern Slovak folksong and dance, and later from more imposing concert and symphonic works. From a wealth of creative works one must list his Intermezzo for piano, and Capriccio for piano and orchestra. He wrote an innovative piece entitled Partita for concert piano and orchestra. Jan Zimmer (1926) can be characterized as a highly productive artist and one of the most distinguished figures of a youthful generation of masters. He obtained his musical training at thP. Bratislava Conservatory, studying organ �SLOVAKIA 93 under Jozef Veber, piano under Frico Kafenda, and composition under Eugen Suchan. He also studied composition at the Franz Liszt Academy in Budapest, under Ferencz Farkas and is a graduate of the Salzburg Seminary in American studies (David Diamond). Zimmer himself is a piano virtuoso, appearing in concerts as the exclusive interpreter of his own compositions and constantly deals with problems involving the piano-solo and piano with orchestra. The blossoming of his style is based on the synthesis of neo-classical interpretive forms with the distinctive quality of sound. In all his works Zimmer explores new directions. Besides a lengthy list of other types of composition, he is credited also with numerous piano works as follows: Four Piano Compositions, Moods, I and II Sonatas for piano, Three Sonatas for 2 pianos, Tatry I-II (I and II suites for piano and orchestra), Three Sonatas for 2 pianos, Four Piano Concertos with orchestra, Concerto for piano without orchestra, A Piano Concerto, with solo part in the bass with orchestra, Three Preludes for piano, Rhapsody for piano and orchestra, Short Fantasia for piano and orchestra, Ten Children's Pieces, Concerto Grosso for 2 pianos, 2 string orchestras,· including percussion ·instruments. In contemporary musical life a place of distinction belongs to Rudolf Macudzinski (1907), master, pedagogue, and an outstanding Slovak piano virtuoso. A student of V. Kurz and Leos Janacek, he trained a significant number of young piano-artists. As an accomplished artist, he stands in the forefront of Slovak concert life and together with his wife Silvia Macudzinski often concertizes on two pianos, thus ably promoting this less known type of music. His talent and skill in composition takes many forms, but he excels chiefly in instrumental music. From his piano pieces we choose Two Romances, Sonatina, solo theme for piano, Meditation and Fugue for 2 pianos, Divertimento for two pianos, Bagatelles for 2 pianos, orchestral and concert arrangements, Valse-Improptu for piano and orchestra, Variazoni Olimpiche for piano and orchestra. Well known are his arrangements of folksongs for piano and his instructive and presentative works for youth, such as Study of Scales I and II, and Christmas Numbers I Can Play, and others. �94 SLOVAKIA Resembling Macudzinski in character and artistic creative thought, is the talented Slovak conductor, Dr. ~udovit Rajter (1906). He pursued his studies in Vienna under C. Kraus and A. Wunderer, as well as F. Schmidt and J. Marx. Later he continued his studies under Dohnanyi in Budapest. His creative works are not as numerous as those of Macudzinski, but artistically they are highly polished. His most important piano piece is Short Suite in the old style. Otherwise he composes for orchestra and chorus. Several composers align themselves with the tradition of artistic creativity based on the folklore of eastern Slovakia. One of these is Jozef Gresak (1907), who with his Piano Concerto introduced altogether unusual hues into piano tones and presented quite fascinating methodical problems about natural and unnatural fingerings and the central role of the thumb as the midpoint of a pianistic hand. An individual of remarkable stature in contemporary Slovak life is Julius Kowalski (1912). He studied composition and conducting at the Prague Conservatory under Rudolf Karl, Alojz Haba and Pavel Dedecek. He continued his studies at the Graduate School in Prague under Jozef Suk and Vaclav Talich, and later in Vienna under C. Kraus. His earlier compositions are influenced by the European avantgarde and Alojz Haba in his Four Pieces for piano, in Fantasia in the quarter-tone system; but his later works are influenced by the Post-Romantic tradition. As a pedagogue, he wrote much for children. His cycles From the World of Toys, five short recital pieces, are written for young pianists. The years after World War II witnessed the resurgence of a new segment of Slovak musical life, which achieved a natural fusion between folk art and the more exacting principles of classical music. Important for the development of the new genres was the appearance on the scene of artistic folk choirs, like the Slovak Artistic Collective, Lucnica, Military Artistic Choir, and others. Likewise important was the rise of opera scenarios and the use of radio, cinema, and television. With original composition all the Slovak artists participated in the development of these genres and simultaneously a young generation arose which �SLOVAKIA 95 also directed its activity to this new segment of Slovak musical life. A protagonist of modern Slovak musical achievement is Tibor Andrasovan (1917). He is a higly productive and successful Slovak composer in the field of operetta, film, scenario, and folk music. His Gypsy Dance for piano and orchestra stands as a worthy sample of his rich creativity, which gained for him both popularity and widespread accolades from an admiring public. A composer with similar tastes and merit is Bartolomej Urbanec (1918 ) . He studied composition and conducting under A. Mayzes, Eugen Suchan and Kornel Schimpel, and advanced conducting under Vaclav Talich. He is one of the pioneers of creative work for artistic folk choirs, such as the Slovak Artistic Collective, Lucnica, and others. His greatest works are Concertina for piano and orchestra and Three Romantic Pieces, which often appear on concert programs. By his creative compositions Teodor Hirner (1910) identifies himself with Eastern Slovakia. He wrote numerous compositions for various audiences. The familiar ones are Capriccio for piano and archestra, and his piano cycle Imagini. By character and musical ability Julius Letnan ( 19141973) falls into this group. His Sonata for piano causes amazement especially in its lyrical middle section where the presentation is colored with truly Slovak beauty and expression. The duet Dances and Songs for piano and orchestra is also included in this Sonata. Noteworthy is his work Ten Studies, in which he solves technical piano problems in modern style. With the great increase in educational and cultural programs on the radio, and the steadily mounting demands for high artistic standards in musical broadcasts, the number of musicians who turned their talents to the broadcasting arts has likewise increased. A veteran of this broadcasting activity was the pianist Janka Matuska (1897-1959 ) . He was a versatile composer, producing many works, especially for piano. His characteristic features are humor, laughter, optimism and emotional immediacy. The characteristic and typical examples of his notable talent are such short compositions as Imp in the Chimney, Musical Clock, Gi ant, �96 S LOVAKIA Rabbi t and Hunter, Hum oresque, Minuet, Valse Mignon, variations on folksong : Old M aids, Paraphrases on Slovak Folksongs , and a piano cycle, Slovak Land. A noteworthy representative of Slovak dance music and songs is Karol Elbert (1911). He wrote 3 jazz sonatas for piano. Ondrej Francisci (1915 ) dedicates his works principally to children and young people. He wrote 10 pieces for youth. In the 1950's a group of talented composers, pupils of Mayzes and Cikker, appeared on the scene. In their case there is no concern for program music or its style. The area of their creative interests is very broad and consists, above all, in contemporary musical art; not lacking, however , are positive efforts to come to terms with the impulses of serial and electronic music. A composer who divides his creative activity between theory and composition is the musical scholar, Dr. Ladislav Burlas (1922). In his compositions he inclines toward Bartok. The area of his brief forms is represented by Chaconne and Fugue for piano. Otherwise his chief interest and activity rest with folklore theory and composition. One of the most original composers in the effort for new artistic patterns is Ilja Zeljenka (1932 ) . His piano works excel in two Suites and a Sonata. Pavol Simai (1930) evinces fresh creative orientation in regard to Slovak folk themes. First he studied under Pavol Kados in Budapest, then in Bratislava under A. Moyzes and Jan Cikker; finally he came under Paul Dessau in Berlin. His compositions excel in unconventional lyricism, steeped in sentiment, as exemplified in his piano works: Pastoral for piano, a piano suite From Slovakia and a Sonata for piano. He also wrote numerous shorter forms, such as his Fugues, Invention, Song, Scherzo, Impressions. Mention must also be made of his Sonata Fragment, the Dead, and Pen and Ink Drawings. A composer noted for his scientific work in music theory is Dr. Ivan Hrusovsky (1927). In composition he was a student of A. Moyzes. His early works are characterized by principles of the new Romanticism and Impressionism, exemplifying the influence of his teacher. He manifests his individuality in his later compositions and his dominant characteristics are his inclination toward lyricism and his �SLOVAKIA 97 outstanding technique. Besides other works he wrote a Sonatina for piano, Piano Variations, Toccata for piano and a Piano Concerto with orchestra. His Sonata for piano is particularly valuable. In its three movements he incorporates all the concepts exemplifying piano techniques of the present day. Narcisa Donatova ( 1928 ) is an ambitious musician. The greater-lesser styles of vocal music are her domain, but she also writes piano pieces, such. as Suite for Youth , the suites How the Forests Reminisce, Talking Suite, the suite In n New School and others. Among her shorter works are Brioni Island, Marilyn Bridge, The Moon and the Ocean, and Red Lantern. The talented Jozef Malovec ( 1933) belongs to the youngest generation. Instrumental music is dominant in his limited production. He wrote two sonatinas for the piano. For the dissemination of cultural music to the rural areas much is being accomplished by these young musicians. One of them is Tibor Sladkovic (1928 ), known for his Ten Piano Variations. Peter Kolman ( 1937) may be classed among composers searching for fresh developmental methods. Hindemith and Schonberg exerted the greatest influence on his works. His two most serious pieces composed for piano are Three Miniatures and Three Compositions in memory of Schonberg. Dusan Martincek (1936) is a most versatile musician. He studied piano at the conservatory in Bratislava under the direction of Anna Kafenda, and composition privately under Jan Cikker and Jan Zimmer. He writes principally for piano; his models are eminent personalities in musical circles, such as A. N. Scriabin, S . V. Rachmaninoff, Bela Bartok, and D. D. Shostakovich. His works include: Rhapsody for piano and orchestra, Three Preludes , Six Etudes, Variations, Poem for piano (Sonata I), Three Preludes and Fugues , Two Dances with a Bulgarian Rhythm, D ialogues in the form of variations for piano and orchestra, T wo Romantic Preludes in memory of A. Scriabin, Concert Rhapsody Negrea, Seven Concert Etudes , containing interesting new problems in piano techniques; three waltzes, Quasi Valse, R eferences to Bagpipes, Introduction and Toccata for piano �98 SLOVAKIA and string orchestra, Three Sonatinas, five new Preludes and Fugues (1970). Ivan Parik (1936) has enjoyed close association with th~ vast panorama of European music. Originally he studied under Alexander Albrecht, composition under Andrej Ocemis, and conducting under K. Schimpel. Eventually he became a student of A. Moyzes. He is one of the most talented composers of the younger generation. In his search for contemporary and unconventional modes of expression, he attained admirable results in his works for piano: Rhapsody for piano, Night a sketch for two pianos, Suite for piano, Sketch for piano, Three Pieces for piano, Songs About Falling Leaves (4 compositions for piano) . Juraj Hatrik ( 1941) wrote Sonata in C Sharp M i nor for piano, Andante Semplice and Burlesque for piano, Toccata and Romantic Etude in F Sharp M i nor, Short Suite. For children he wrote the cycle The Last Vacation Day and for young clients a piano Concerto Facile. Miroslav Bazlik ( 1931) entered a music school upon the recommendation of Jan Cikker. His earliest productions, Sonata in B Minor for piano and bagatelles A Palette show a Post-Romantic and Impressionistic influence. In the following compositions he manifests an inclination toward neo-Classicism, as exemplified in Six Variations , Concert Etude, and Moment Musical. Marian Ivankovic (1931) has to his credit a number of works in various styles. He wrote Trifles for piano. Roman Berger, one of the youngest, wrote a Sonata for piano and a Suite (Prelude, Scherzo, Toccata). Jozef Sixta's first composition was Two Fugues . He also wrote Five Compositi ons and Fantasia for piano. To the afore-mentioned must be added Ivan Konecny, who wrote Two Bagatelles for piano, Variations , Two Fugues, and Three Compositions. Vladimir Bokes, son of the late Dr. Bokes, well-known musical author, made his debut in music composition with Partita for piano (Prelude, Aria, Capriccio). This brief survey gives some slight indication of the tireless effort and persistent struggle endured by the musically gifted Slovak nation, which ably shaped its musical culture despite turbulent times and developed it to match the music standards of greater nations. � SLOVAKIA 80 Antonia M a z d n o v d: Slovak Piano Composition (A BRIEF SURVEY ) Conditions in 19th century Slovakia were so repressive, so debilitating to the spirit, that only under menacing hardships could the Slovaks develop their music on a n ational scale. The leadership concentrated on the nation's struggle for liberation from the Magyars. All its efforts and energies were directed toward Slovak national and cultural independence. The incipient cultivation of Slovak national art cut across the injustice of the Slovak position , and music, too, actively entered the fray. Slovak music and its origins cannot be evaluated from the perspective of modern musical art. While urban artistic culture at that period was comparatively highly developed in Slovakia, it represented cosmopolitan, not Slovak art. Therefore, the movement for authentic Slovak revival kept aloof from it and concentrated its cultural and artistic activity within certain cities like Turciansky Sv. Martin, Banska Bystrica, Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, Dolny Kubin and several others, which likewise became important centers of patriotic and promotional movements. Music and song were completely at the service of national ideologies and struggles. Music no less than the other arts was expected to spark national consciousness and keep patriotism alive. Slovakia in that period possessed neither the means nor the conditions required for the cultivation of artistic music; consequently the character of its over-all musical life remained amateurish. Musical enthusiasts who happened to flourish were dilettantes devoid of professional training and only by way of exception did any of them attain artisticesthetic renown in competent circles. Folk creativity played a significant role in the growth and quality of Slovak national music. From the age of enlightenment it served as a powerful source of inspiration for artistic composition, chiefly under the influence of Romanticism, from which the entire Slovak national art evolved. A Slovak in the 19th century would have recognized �SLOVAKIA 81 in folk art (folksong) the most authentic expression of the national spirit, the personification of the nation's immortality and sole source of resistance in its struggle for self-identity. Eventually, toward the close of the 19th century, this trend resulted in conservatism and became a deterrent to fresh views in folk music and hampered any effort to raise the artistic standard of Slovak music. The earliest collections of folksongs were the basis from which piano compositions evolved. These consisted of simple arrangements of a primitive nature. In 1830 Martin Suchan arranged 12 songs from safarik's collection and in 1837 Ladislav Ftiredy composed piano arrangements for 25 pieces from Kollar's collection of patriotic songs. Toward the end of the 18th and on into the 19th century new musical creations appeared, combining Magyar elements with Slovak folksongs, resulting in the so-called neo-Hungarian song. The neo-Hungarian style, evident principally in the dance forms, also partly infiuenced emerging Slovak musical compositions in Slovak musical centers, as exemplified in the piano compositions of M. Godra, well-known songs like Matthew's Musing, Svihrovskd, and gypsy traces in M. Laciak's and M. Francisci's arrangements of folksongs. In the 1870's a counter influence arose against the gypsy influence in Slovak folksongs. The leading protagonist in the effort to offset foreign influence in music was the puristic oriented Milan Lichard. Early composers were prolific in their works for the piano. Paul Gerengay (1825-95) (Dance music: Recollection of Sitno) and Maximilian Hudec (1836-1911) ( Hurban March, Marina Quadrille) made a beginning. The most popular were the quadrilles, mazurkas, polkas, waltzes, etc. (Emigrant, by A. Krcmery; Quadrille of St. Martin, by Bella, Ladonka, by Laciak, a quartet, Tatra Flowers, by Boldis, and others). To this group belongs Michael Laciak ( 1826-1901) who, besides the piano variations for Our Times also attempted in his Instruction to standardize Slovak musical terminology. A. Horislav Skultety was a most productive composer. He composed about 6 stylistic dances for the piano. In this period l'..udovit Vansa (1835-73) received a thorough musical education and became a creative composer. For his own immediate :"'leeds and to his great personal satisfaction he produced Wreaths of Folksongs �82 SLOVAKIA for the piano. Similar aspirations were achieved by Stefan Fajnor ( 1844-1909) one of the most accomplished composers of a renaissance era. Originally he composed chamber music and was considerably influenced by the neo-Hungarian style, than finally turned to Slovak melodies in his Variations for piano and Fantasia of Slovak Folksongs. Vlastimir Melicko (1893-1946) the son of a musical family of the renowned Jan Melicko, already graced with a technical musical training, became a highly talented composer. He arranged dances for the piano and produced Slovak Rhapsody and Fantasia, based on Slovak folksongs. Associated with the activities of the Slovak Society in Budapest is the name of ~udovit Izak (Milos Lihovecky, 1862-1927) composer of a wide variety of works. For the piano he wrote the popular polka Anica and piano variations on the folksong Tecie voda, tecie. Another member of the Slovak Society was Milan Lichard (1853-1935). He obtained his specialized musical training at the Academy in Budapest. Noteworthy on his extensive list of compositions are his short piano pieces and two-piano rhapsodies, which in reality are outstanding collections of songs. Two other piano composers who lived and composed outside of Slovakia must be mentioned. Holding first place was Milos Francisci, a dentist (1854-1926). He was act~ve in the United States and besides choruses, he wrote for piano paraphrases of folksongs, entitled Trdvnice (two volumes of 100 songs each) and a Fantasia on Slovak songs for two pianos. Vladimir G. sasko (1875-1960) a piano virtuoso, also emigrated to the United States. He studied at the Academy of Music in Budapest and taught at the Chicago Musical College. He is the creator of many Slovak compositions: rhapsodies, Fantasia, based on Slovak folksongs and variations. Piano compositions and other unnamed works of these two composers were instrumental in making an impact on Slovak national consciousness in the United States. To this generation of Slovak creative artists, all of them composers in the Slovak national tradition, we further assign, Jan Levoslav Bella, Mikulas Mayzes, Viliam FigusBystry and Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky. The initial efforts of this generation of composers sparked a national revival of native Slovak art, which also embraced music in its �SLOVAKIA 83 patriotic-awakening, informative and world-wide roles. These composers, by contrast with the former generation, already possessed all the marks of a creative artistic individuality. Their compositions continued to show the influence of the former esthetic revival based on the role of the folksong, which extended into the 1920's and 1940's, when a new generation of composers with modern artistic styles was emerging. One of the first musicians with a European outlook was Jan Levoslav Bella 0843-1936), the dean of Slovak composers, one of the founders of Slovak national musical culture. Self-educated in playing the piano, he did not indulge in piano composition in the later years of his mature mastery. His four-movement Sonata in B Minor, which to this day appears on programs, represents a work of perennial merit in music literature. Another outstanding composition is his fragmentary Sonata in C Minor, from the elaborate first movement of which has been constructed a Beethoven allegro and an impressively beautiful adagio. Minor works include: Variations for the song Pri Presporku and Leti roj, as well as a Sonatina in E Minor, all of which exemplify the music standard of his contemporaries. An enthusiastic admirer and promoter of Slovak folksongs, Viliam Figus-Bystry ( 1875-1937) directed his activity almost exclusively to using folksongs in classical music. Together with Milan Lichard and Stefan Fajnor, he dominated the so-called renaissance period of Slovak music, in which the composers for the most part were self-trained. The basic design of Figus's creations is derived from Slovak folksong arrangements. His piano compositions include One Thousand Slovak Folksongs, Flowers of the Field, a collection written for children ( 106 songs in simple arrangement for the piano), Dances, and a march Pages from an Album, Multicolored Leaves (10 compositions) Musical Miniatures (12 compositions). Probably the most extensive of his piano compositions is the four-part Slovak Sonata in the dorian mode, based on themes of Slovak folksongs . In his earlier years Figus also composed practical piano music in chamber style (polkas, marches, etc.). The overture for his opera Detvan has been arranged for four hands. One of the pioneers of the national realistic trend in �84 SLOVAKIA Slovak music was Mikulas Moyzes (1872-1944). The bulk of his compositions gravitated toward orchestral music. Most of his piano compositions he eventually transposed to orchestral arrangements. His best known works are the three-movement Sonatina and a series of 12 piano compositions, To our Youth. His remaining piano works consist of short forms like mazurkas, polonaises, preludes, impromptus, arabesques, meditations, etc. The inspirational basis for his entire repertoire is the Slovak folksong, from which he selected a typical Slovak melodic theme in order to develop an independent creation. Moyzes originated the ballad song with its deep realistic picturesqueness. Following Bella, the most impressive member of the older generation of composers was Mikulas SchneiderTrnavsky ( 1881-1959) a pioneer in the trend toward realism in Slovak national music and a friend of Zoltan Kodaly. The strong point in his creativeness was artistic variation in Slovak folksongs and classical song form composition comparable to the motifs in the style of Schubert and Mendelssohn. Schneider-Trnavsky was the first to develop the recitative-rhapsodic type of Slovak melody. Because of the wealth of his compositions in this category, his piano works are not extensive. His Opus 5 is a Brief Waltz (1898) and his popular instructive Slovak Sonatina is well-known and often concertized. Later appeared his Variation Line of Compositions (1944). The musical philosophy of M. SchneiderTrnavsky in all his creative effort stems from the Slovak folksong. His style and tools of expression are Post-Romantic. To this creative quartet of Slovak musicians (from the standpoint of age and style) one must add the names of Frico Kafenda and Alexander Albrecht. As composers they were not specifically aligned with the effort to promote Slovak national music, but they nevertheless made a valuable contribution to the advancement of Slovak musical art. And although they belonged to the Romantic school of composers, they formed a logical link in the historical development of Slovak music and provided an effective transition from the dilettante culture of the previous century to the Slovak avantgarde and indeed paved the way for it. �SLOVAKIA 85 The character of Frico Kafenda's creations (1883-1965) was decisively influenced by his training in Leipzig, where conservative traditions merged with the Post-Romantic school. Among his teachers were Robert Teich-Mtiller (piano ), Stefan Krehl and Heinrich Zollner (composition), Arthur Nikisch (conducting). He also attended lectures by Herrmann Kretschmar and Hugh Riemann. Kafenda's compositions frequently exhibit a subjective intimate character. The style of his music is marked by strict harmony and proficient contrapuntal writing. The core of his works comprises chamber, song-like, and instrumental compositions. His piano works consist of A Piano Suite in the ancient modes, Three Piano Compositions, and Variations and Fugues. Alexander Albrecht (1885-1958) can be described as the type of composer-synthesist, who radiates a variety of influences. He was an intimate friend of Bartok. He studied at the Conservatory of Budapest and his teachers were Istvan Thoman (piano), Hans Kassler (composition), and F. Szandtner (conducting). Hindemith's influence led him to combine classicism with modern elements of expression. His musical thought was expressed chiefly in lyrics, in the tender grazioso and the play!ul scherzo. Among his distinguished piano compositions, the following are outstanding: Scherzo in F Major (duet) (1899), Sonata in F Major, Scherzo (1907), (duet), Aphorisms, New Year Greeting, Moods (duet), Wild Rose Suite, (duet), Sonatina in three movements as a duet, humoresque (Excursion i n a Thunderstorm), Twelve short compositions (Success to Music, Little Johnny, In the Distance, Shepherd Dance, Joyful Awakening, Wedding Feast of the Crickets, In a Gay Room, Beginner in Dancing, Perfect Dancer, Dusk, Night, Going to Work in the Morning). His final composition is an instructive work, entitled Ten Duets, based on song themes and recitations from Jan Krasko's collection. After 1918 the newly evolved Slovak music style encountered many difficult challenges : to create a firm material basis for a national musical life and to establish a strong organizational position in competition with a fully developed appreciation of foreign music, which had found a ready response in the musical life of Slovakia. The spirit of competition generated much activity, cen- �86 SLOVAKIA tered in new musically-cul tural institutions, organizations and music schools. In these years, as it were in the shadow of the previously mentioned composers, there indeed arose a group of musicians, who adhered to ancient traditions, but their productions lacked any distinguishab le unity. Renowned at this time was Dezider Lauko (1872-1942) whose piano compositions can be compared with Liszt's in their brilliance and salon presentation. For the piano he wrote Slovak Moods, Piano Etudes for Children, Humoresques, three Valse Scherzandos, Rhapsody in Slovak Meadows, duets for Slovak Dances, and others. :r.uctmila Krizkova-Leh otska (1863-1945), the first Slovak woman composer, in addition to various piano works, directed her talent to composing for children. Angeia Cziczkova (1888-1973) specialized in pedagogical elements of music instruction as well as in composition. Her works consist of more than 100 compositions (Unisono with 54 exercises, Study in Octaves, Rhythmic Exercises with Variations, Technique in Trills, A Study in Chromatics, Preparing to Play Tremolo . In addition she wrote 48 compositions, Youth, 16 Short Preludes for piano. From among her classical selections are Twelve Sonatas, Slavic Fantasy, Prelude in A Flat Major, and Nine Preludes for piano. An individualisti c pattern was folloved by Fran.a Dostalik (1896-1944). His music portrays modern expression and shows some attempt at experimentat ion. Besides shorter forms for the piano, he wrote Detvan Sonatina which he later arranged as a piano duet. To this group of composers belong many others who flourished in the years before and after World War I. Their thought and inspiration sprang from a cultural climate where struggle for an independent national musical art predominated ; or it was derived from the uncertain period of new social-cultura l conditions during the first Republic, when new ideas of national musical culture among the younger generation clashed with the older music. Some of these composers achieved only amateur status; for others again the unfavorable conditions of Slovak cultural life in that period precluded any advancement even with specialized musical training. One of the most productive composers in this group (he has about 260 works to his credit) is Jozef Rosinsky �SLOVAKIA 87 (1897-1973). He obtained his education in Turin and in Rome (law); in Nice he studied piano and organ. His rich productivity comprises all genres. A listing of his piano works must include the following noteworthy selections: Mazurka in A Minor, Children's March, Trencin Bells, Fantasia alla Zingara, Prelude on Slovak Motifs, Plastic Pictures, Scherzo (duet), Slovak Gleanings, Ten Short Compositions, First Sonata, Second Sonata, Sonata for piano or harmonium, Echoes of Enchanted Nitra, and Slovak Concert Fantasia for piano and orchestra. Ladislav Stancek ( 1898) is a composer of the same calibre. His vast productivity was directed almost exclusively to program music. In Brno he studied organ under Tregler, composition under V. Petrzelka and 0. Chlubna and conducting under F. Neumann. Among his most popular piano compositions are: Child's Suite, Variations on an original theme and a collection entitled From Life. Representative of the culturally-enlightened and popular composition, anchored in the great traditions of the nationally-revived chorus and group singing in Slovakia, is Jan Valast'an Dolinsky (1892-1965). In the area of piano composition he left short forms: Complaint, Remembrance of May, Minuets in G Major and E Flat Major, Waltz in A Minor, Page From an Album, and Valse Triste. The works of Jan Krasko-Zapotocky (1893-1968) fall into the same category. He, too, was noted as an enlightened leader in the field of music instruction. Among his works are sonatinas and patriotic songs issued under the title, Echoes of Freedom. Jan Mory (1897) belongs to quite another class of composers. He dealt principally with operettic, popular, and dance music. For the piano he prepared instructional works for children, several duets and a collection entitled Children Sing and Play. The composers of yet another school react sensitively to the contemporary, employing methods-modern, technical, and expressive. Their common characteristic is a higher artistic and idealistic standard, without, however, a uniform productivity. An outstanding figure is Stefan Ladislav Nemeth-samorinsky (1896), a typical representative of Bratislava's musical life. In thought and artistry he belongs to the progressive Magyar musical culture as �88 SLOVAKIA represented in Bratislava by Bela Bartok and Alexander Albrecht. He studied piano, organ, and composition at the Academy of Music in Budapest and later attended the Graduate School of Franz Schmidt in Vienna. He can claim a valuable collection of piano works. He arranged 20 Slovak folksongs for piano under the title, For Youth. He wrote a very effective Slovak Rhapsody and Improvisation on a Slovak folksong . Other significant works include: Meditation on Paganini's Theme, a transcription of Beethoven's Romance in D Major for violin, Intermezzo for piano, Sonata with three movements, containing valuable content (Toccata and Fugue) Piano Concerto, and Transcription of Liszt's Prelude and Fugue on Bach's name for two pianos. A composer of an earlier generation with extensive production in music theory, writing, and pedagogy was Jan Fiser-Kveton (1896-1963). He studied composition and conducting at the Prague Conservatory under K. B. Jirak and J. B. Forster. In composition he reached out into diverse styles. In 1928 he produced Sonata in F Minor for piano and the best-loved compositions are his two-piano Suites for Youth. A distinctive role m Slovak musical life and composition was played by Michael Vilec (1902), who was associated in the early years of his creativity with Eastern Slovakia. His compositions reflect the influence of his teacher Zoltan Kodaly and are marked by impressionism. At first he had held himself aloof from the compositional efforts of his generation. His works are noted for their expressive folk elements, among which must be mentioned Bagatelles for piano, Ballade for two pianos, Sonata for piano, Rondo, Three Sonatinas, two series of duets From the Banks of the Danube, Conversation at the Piano, Two-Tone Inventions, Eight Studies on the Development of Interpretive Elements and Fantasia on the waltzes of Franz Schubert: Schubertiada for piano and orchestra. Together with Mikulas Mayzes, he wrote a significant two-volume School of Piano. The first third of the century saw the emergence of a young generation of Slovak composers with a new program and new ideals and goals: to create a style of music that would be contemporary, modern, deeply realistic and Slovak. These composers were determined to put an end to provincialism and dilettantism and at long last to incorpo- �SLOVAKIA 89 rate the culture of a highly talented Slovak nation into the great orchestra of European music. A Golden Age of musical composition was about to dawn throughout the world and Slovak piano creativity would play a responsible role in it. Another composer of contemporary music is Alexander Moyzes (1906). He obtained his musical training at the Prague Conservatory under the direction of such teachers as Otakar Sin and Rudolf Karel (composition), Otakar Ostrem (conducting), and B. A. Wiedermann (organ) . Moyzes is noted for his program music with its polished composition2.! technique, which combines classical and Post-Romantic principles with impulses of impressionism. In addition to his creative works, Moyzes actively promoted a new style of Slovak music by means of articles, critical essays, and reviews, in which he condemned in no uncertain terms both dilettantism and conservatism in Slovak musical life. In his capacity as music instructor he educated an entire generation of composers, who to this day occupy foremos t positions in Slovak musical circles. (Holoubek, Jurovsky, Kardos, Ocenas, Freso and several others) . Moyzes' creative works include basic instrumental and vocal genres. His principal compositions for the piano are: Sonata in E Minor (a transcription of Seven Compositions - 1942) which has been rated as one of the best Slovak piano compositions. Others are: Divertimento (1930), FoxEtude and Improptu (1935), Highwayman's Rhapsody (1957) . He also wrote Jazz Sonata (1932) for two pianos. Eugen Suchon (1908) shares with Moyzes the glory of initiating the Golden Age of Slovak musical art. He is at once its creator, its promoter, and its splendid flowering. He studied at the Academy of Music and Drama in Bratislava under the direction of Frico Kafenda and Jozef Vincourek. After graduation he continued his studies under Vitezoslav Novak at the Graduate School in Prague. Suchon's art is completely original. It matured under the impact of Slovak folk melodies combined with modern techniques. The blending of melody, harmony, rhyth::.n and form characterizes Suchoi'.t's music and gives it its national character. Omitting his earlier compositions, (1923-28), a list of his best known works includes the following: Short Suite with Passacaglia (1931), Ballade Suite (1936), which is a standard calling card among elite Slovak pianists; �90 SLOVAKIA Metamorphosis Suites (1953), which is a compendium of modern piano tunes with effective transition and harmonious techniques; Pictures from Slovakia, six series of piano compositions from 1956-1957; and a newer Rhapsodic Suite for piano and orchestra (1968). In 1969 he contributed Kaleidoscope (Evolution of Harmony) in which individual numbers are a succession of delicate musical miniatures. Jan Cikker (1911), pioneer of contemporary national opera, a celebrity known for his irrepressible vitality and vibrant energy, yet not without meditative depth, also belongs to the contemporary scene. He studied composition at the Prague Conservatory under Jaroslav Kricka, organ under B. A. Wiedermann, and conducting under Pavel Dedecek. At the Graduate School he was the student of Vitezoslav Novak and pursued conducting under Felix Weingartner. Cikker opened wide the concentrated art of folksong and dance and developed it into classical, highly spontaneous forms. He is a contemporary lyricist and dramatist. Although Cikker concentrated on operatic creations, he also wrote a considerable number of piano compositions: Sonata in E Minor (1927), while yet pursuing his studies, two compositions for piano In Solitude ( 1940), Piano Variations (1935), Lullaby (1942), Two Compositions for Youth (1948), Tatra's Brooks (three brilliant compositions for piano, 1954), and finally 15 piano water-colors, What the Children Narrated, also a Concertina for piano and orchestra. In addition there is his arrangement of Slovak Suites for orchestra and two pianos. The foremost personality in the field of Slovak music is Dezider Kardos (1914), a student of Alexander Moyzes and V. Novak, a.member of the central generation of composers (along with Ocenas, Jurovsky, Kresanek, Freso and Holoubek). Kardos concentrates his talent on the creation of monumental works, in which his technique is best applied. From among his numerous works the foremost are: Two Piano Compositions (1933), Piano Suite II (1937), Studies for Piano ( 1947), a series of piano compositions Bagatelles (1948), Cycle of 10 Piano Compositions for Youth (1956), many individual scores for children, and notably the interpretive, yet quite spontaneous three compositions To My Children (Banter, Humoresque, Toccatina). In 1969 �SLOVAKIA 91 he concluded Piano Concerto with orchestra. It was his first composition of the concert type. It is not a concert work in the traditional sense of the word. The piano is combined with the orchestral rhythm, but it continues to express the individual motifs and ideas. Another member of the central generation of composers is Ladislav Holoubek (1913). He studied composition under A. Moyzes, conducting under Jozef Vincourek, piano under Ernest Krizan. After completing his studies he pursued composition under V. Novak. Holoubek's artistry is best exemplified in his operatic creations. His works for piano are: Sonata in G Major (1931), Prelude, Passacaglia and Toccata (1934) , Four Fugues , II Sonata for Piano (1947), and a cycle for young advanced pianists, Children's Games and Joys . Prominent also as a representative member of the central generation of composers is Andrej Ocenas ( 1911). He studied in Bratislava under A. Moyzes (composition), conducting under Jozef Vincourek, and advanced composition under V. Novak in Prague. His production is characterized by design of splendor and monumentality. For the piano he wrote: First Letters (I Piano Suite), Fugue for piano, II Piano Suite, a piano fantasia Sleet, a series of piano compositions, New Spring, a piano suite Youth, a piano suite, Pictures from a Fable, Ballade, Piano Concerto with orchestra, several individual compositions and Flowers of the Field for young pianists. The creations of Ocenas are characterized by original reconstruction of genuine folklore; he therefore resembles the realists, Janacek and Moussorgsky. A lyrical composer with a feeling for poetic tonal-coloring detail was simon Jurovsky (1912-1963). A student of A. Moyzes (composition), Jozef Vincourek (conducting), he later studied in Vienna under Jozef Marx. In addition to a series of major forms, he left the following piano compositions: Piano Suite, 4 compositions for children, From a Child's Paradise, a suite from ballet, Chivalrous Ballade for piano, Peace Symphony, for concert piano and string orchestra. Tibor Freso ( 1918) belongs to a generation which injected a new creative spirit into Slovak music. He studied under the Italian composer, Ildebrand -Pizetti at the Academia �92 SLOVAKIA di Santa Cecilia in Rome. For piano he wrote a Miniature Suite, which is an effective recital composition with lesser technical demands; Russian Dance for piano, a piano suite In a Child's Room for very young pianists, and a succession of shorter works. Frantisek Babusek ( 1905-1954) a prominent broadcasting conductor, studied conducting under Pavel Dedecek and composition under V. Novak, Jozef Suk, and Jaroslav Kricka in Prague. To Babusek belongs well-deserved credit for producing original compositions and organizing periodic symphonic concerts. He wrote Prelude for piano and the majestic Concerto in D Minor, which in its claims is indeed somewhat exaggerated, but is a masterly composition in which Babusek amassed a whole assemblage of modern piano techniques, many-faceted rhythms and intricacies. The leading personality of Slovak musical science is Dr. Jozef Kresanek (1913). He was educated in composition under Rudolf Karl at the Prague Conservatory and at the Graduate School of V. Novak. Along with his scholarly pursuits, which netted him a long series of learned articles, and books, he composed many songs, choruses, chamber music as well as the following works for the piano: Piano Suite in four parts, I I Piano Suite, arrangements of Slovak folksongs for young pianists, Meadow Flowers, Elegy for piano, Highwayman's Ballade and others. His Scherzo for the piano is an outstanding work. The foremost exponent of Slovak musical theory and estheticism is Dr. Otto Ferenczy ( 1921) . As a composer he advanced on the knowledge of Bart6k and Stravinsky and was able to combine their thrust with the realism of the Slovak folksong. Characteristic of Ferenczy are his expressive elegance, his brilliance and intellectual humor. His works reflect inspiration from the eastern Slovak folksong and dance, and later from more imposing concert and symphonic works. From a wealth of creative works one must list his Intermezzo for piano, and Capriccio for piano and orchestra. He wrote an innovative piece entitled Partita for concert piano and orchestra. Jan Zimmer (1926) can be characterized as a highly productive artist and one of the most distinguished figures of a youthful generation of masters. He obtained his musical training at thP. Bratislava Conservatory, studying organ �SLOVAKIA 93 under Jozef Veber, piano under Frico Kafenda, and composition under Eugen Suchan. He also studied composition at the Franz Liszt Academy in Budapest, under Ferencz Farkas and is a graduate of the Salzburg Seminary in American studies (David Diamond). Zimmer himself is a piano virtuoso, appearing in concerts as the exclusive interpreter of his own compositions and constantly deals with problems involving the piano-solo and piano with orchestra. The blossoming of his style is based on the synthesis of neo-classical interpretive forms with the distinctive quality of sound. In all his works Zimmer explores new directions. Besides a lengthy list of other types of composition, he is credited also with numerous piano works as follows: Four Piano Compositions, Moods, I and II Sonatas for piano, Three Sonatas for 2 pianos, Tatry I-II (I and II suites for piano and orchestra), Three Sonatas for 2 pianos, Four Piano Concertos with orchestra, Concerto for piano without orchestra, A Piano Concerto, with solo part in the bass with orchestra, Three Preludes for piano, Rhapsody for piano and orchestra, Short Fantasia for piano and orchestra, Ten Children's Pieces, Concerto Grosso for 2 pianos, 2 string orchestras,· including percussion ·instruments. In contemporary musical life a place of distinction belongs to Rudolf Macudzinski (1907), master, pedagogue, and an outstanding Slovak piano virtuoso. A student of V. Kurz and Leos Janacek, he trained a significant number of young piano-artists. As an accomplished artist, he stands in the forefront of Slovak concert life and together with his wife Silvia Macudzinski often concertizes on two pianos, thus ably promoting this less known type of music. His talent and skill in composition takes many forms, but he excels chiefly in instrumental music. From his piano pieces we choose Two Romances, Sonatina, solo theme for piano, Meditation and Fugue for 2 pianos, Divertimento for two pianos, Bagatelles for 2 pianos, orchestral and concert arrangements, Valse-Improptu for piano and orchestra, Variazoni Olimpiche for piano and orchestra. Well known are his arrangements of folksongs for piano and his instructive and presentative works for youth, such as Study of Scales I and II, and Christmas Numbers I Can Play, and others. �94 SLOVAKIA Resembling Macudzinski in character and artistic creative thought, is the talented Slovak conductor, Dr. ~udovit Rajter (1906). He pursued his studies in Vienna under C. Kraus and A. Wunderer, as well as F. Schmidt and J. Marx. Later he continued his studies under Dohnanyi in Budapest. His creative works are not as numerous as those of Macudzinski, but artistically they are highly polished. His most important piano piece is Short Suite in the old style. Otherwise he composes for orchestra and chorus. Several composers align themselves with the tradition of artistic creativity based on the folklore of eastern Slovakia. One of these is Jozef Gresak (1907), who with his Piano Concerto introduced altogether unusual hues into piano tones and presented quite fascinating methodical problems about natural and unnatural fingerings and the central role of the thumb as the midpoint of a pianistic hand. An individual of remarkable stature in contemporary Slovak life is Julius Kowalski (1912). He studied composition and conducting at the Prague Conservatory under Rudolf Karl, Alojz Haba and Pavel Dedecek. He continued his studies at the Graduate School in Prague under Jozef Suk and Vaclav Talich, and later in Vienna under C. Kraus. His earlier compositions are influenced by the European avantgarde and Alojz Haba in his Four Pieces for piano, in Fantasia in the quarter-tone system; but his later works are influenced by the Post-Romantic tradition. As a pedagogue, he wrote much for children. His cycles From the World of Toys, five short recital pieces, are written for young pianists. The years after World War II witnessed the resurgence of a new segment of Slovak musical life, which achieved a natural fusion between folk art and the more exacting principles of classical music. Important for the development of the new genres was the appearance on the scene of artistic folk choirs, like the Slovak Artistic Collective, Lucnica, Military Artistic Choir, and others. Likewise important was the rise of opera scenarios and the use of radio, cinema, and television. With original composition all the Slovak artists participated in the development of these genres and simultaneously a young generation arose which �SLOVAKIA 95 also directed its activity to this new segment of Slovak musical life. A protagonist of modern Slovak musical achievement is Tibor Andrasovan (1917). He is a higly productive and successful Slovak composer in the field of operetta, film, scenario, and folk music. His Gypsy Dance for piano and orchestra stands as a worthy sample of his rich creativity, which gained for him both popularity and widespread accolades from an admiring public. A composer with similar tastes and merit is Bartolomej Urbanec (1918 ) . He studied composition and conducting under A. Mayzes, Eugen Suchan and Kornel Schimpel, and advanced conducting under Vaclav Talich. He is one of the pioneers of creative work for artistic folk choirs, such as the Slovak Artistic Collective, Lucnica, and others. His greatest works are Concertina for piano and orchestra and Three Romantic Pieces, which often appear on concert programs. By his creative compositions Teodor Hirner (1910) identifies himself with Eastern Slovakia. He wrote numerous compositions for various audiences. The familiar ones are Capriccio for piano and archestra, and his piano cycle Imagini. By character and musical ability Julius Letnan ( 19141973) falls into this group. His Sonata for piano causes amazement especially in its lyrical middle section where the presentation is colored with truly Slovak beauty and expression. The duet Dances and Songs for piano and orchestra is also included in this Sonata. Noteworthy is his work Ten Studies, in which he solves technical piano problems in modern style. With the great increase in educational and cultural programs on the radio, and the steadily mounting demands for high artistic standards in musical broadcasts, the number of musicians who turned their talents to the broadcasting arts has likewise increased. A veteran of this broadcasting activity was the pianist Janka Matuska (1897-1959 ) . He was a versatile composer, producing many works, especially for piano. His characteristic features are humor, laughter, optimism and emotional immediacy. The characteristic and typical examples of his notable talent are such short compositions as Imp in the Chimney, Musical Clock, Gi ant, �96 S LOVAKIA Rabbi t and Hunter, Hum oresque, Minuet, Valse Mignon, variations on folksong : Old M aids, Paraphrases on Slovak Folksongs , and a piano cycle, Slovak Land. A noteworthy representative of Slovak dance music and songs is Karol Elbert (1911). He wrote 3 jazz sonatas for piano. Ondrej Francisci (1915 ) dedicates his works principally to children and young people. He wrote 10 pieces for youth. In the 1950's a group of talented composers, pupils of Mayzes and Cikker, appeared on the scene. In their case there is no concern for program music or its style. The area of their creative interests is very broad and consists, above all, in contemporary musical art; not lacking, however , are positive efforts to come to terms with the impulses of serial and electronic music. A composer who divides his creative activity between theory and composition is the musical scholar, Dr. Ladislav Burlas (1922). In his compositions he inclines toward Bartok. The area of his brief forms is represented by Chaconne and Fugue for piano. Otherwise his chief interest and activity rest with folklore theory and composition. One of the most original composers in the effort for new artistic patterns is Ilja Zeljenka (1932 ) . His piano works excel in two Suites and a Sonata. Pavol Simai (1930) evinces fresh creative orientation in regard to Slovak folk themes. First he studied under Pavol Kados in Budapest, then in Bratislava under A. Moyzes and Jan Cikker; finally he came under Paul Dessau in Berlin. His compositions excel in unconventional lyricism, steeped in sentiment, as exemplified in his piano works: Pastoral for piano, a piano suite From Slovakia and a Sonata for piano. He also wrote numerous shorter forms, such as his Fugues, Invention, Song, Scherzo, Impressions. Mention must also be made of his Sonata Fragment, the Dead, and Pen and Ink Drawings. A composer noted for his scientific work in music theory is Dr. Ivan Hrusovsky (1927). In composition he was a student of A. Moyzes. His early works are characterized by principles of the new Romanticism and Impressionism, exemplifying the influence of his teacher. He manifests his individuality in his later compositions and his dominant characteristics are his inclination toward lyricism and his �SLOVAKIA 97 outstanding technique. Besides other works he wrote a Sonatina for piano, Piano Variations, Toccata for piano and a Piano Concerto with orchestra. His Sonata for piano is particularly valuable. In its three movements he incorporates all the concepts exemplifying piano techniques of the present day. Narcisa Donatova ( 1928 ) is an ambitious musician. The greater-lesser styles of vocal music are her domain, but she also writes piano pieces, such. as Suite for Youth , the suites How the Forests Reminisce, Talking Suite, the suite In n New School and others. Among her shorter works are Brioni Island, Marilyn Bridge, The Moon and the Ocean, and Red Lantern. The talented Jozef Malovec ( 1933) belongs to the youngest generation. Instrumental music is dominant in his limited production. He wrote two sonatinas for the piano. For the dissemination of cultural music to the rural areas much is being accomplished by these young musicians. One of them is Tibor Sladkovic (1928 ), known for his Ten Piano Variations. Peter Kolman ( 1937) may be classed among composers searching for fresh developmental methods. Hindemith and Schonberg exerted the greatest influence on his works. His two most serious pieces composed for piano are Three Miniatures and Three Compositions in memory of Schonberg. Dusan Martincek (1936) is a most versatile musician. He studied piano at the conservatory in Bratislava under the direction of Anna Kafenda, and composition privately under Jan Cikker and Jan Zimmer. He writes principally for piano; his models are eminent personalities in musical circles, such as A. N. Scriabin, S . V. Rachmaninoff, Bela Bartok, and D. D. Shostakovich. His works include: Rhapsody for piano and orchestra, Three Preludes , Six Etudes, Variations, Poem for piano (Sonata I), Three Preludes and Fugues , Two Dances with a Bulgarian Rhythm, D ialogues in the form of variations for piano and orchestra, T wo Romantic Preludes in memory of A. Scriabin, Concert Rhapsody Negrea, Seven Concert Etudes , containing interesting new problems in piano techniques; three waltzes, Quasi Valse, R eferences to Bagpipes, Introduction and Toccata for piano �98 SLOVAKIA and string orchestra, Three Sonatinas, five new Preludes and Fugues (1970). Ivan Parik (1936) has enjoyed close association with th~ vast panorama of European music. Originally he studied under Alexander Albrecht, composition under Andrej Ocemis, and conducting under K. Schimpel. Eventually he became a student of A. Moyzes. He is one of the most talented composers of the younger generation. In his search for contemporary and unconventional modes of expression, he attained admirable results in his works for piano: Rhapsody for piano, Night a sketch for two pianos, Suite for piano, Sketch for piano, Three Pieces for piano, Songs About Falling Leaves (4 compositions for piano) . Juraj Hatrik ( 1941) wrote Sonata in C Sharp M i nor for piano, Andante Semplice and Burlesque for piano, Toccata and Romantic Etude in F Sharp M i nor, Short Suite. For children he wrote the cycle The Last Vacation Day and for young clients a piano Concerto Facile. Miroslav Bazlik ( 1931) entered a music school upon the recommendation of Jan Cikker. His earliest productions, Sonata in B Minor for piano and bagatelles A Palette show a Post-Romantic and Impressionistic influence. In the following compositions he manifests an inclination toward neo-Classicism, as exemplified in Six Variations , Concert Etude, and Moment Musical. Marian Ivankovic (1931) has to his credit a number of works in various styles. He wrote Trifles for piano. Roman Berger, one of the youngest, wrote a Sonata for piano and a Suite (Prelude, Scherzo, Toccata). Jozef Sixta's first composition was Two Fugues . He also wrote Five Compositi ons and Fantasia for piano. To the afore-mentioned must be added Ivan Konecny, who wrote Two Bagatelles for piano, Variations , Two Fugues, and Three Compositions. Vladimir Bokes, son of the late Dr. Bokes, well-known musical author, made his debut in music composition with Partita for piano (Prelude, Aria, Capriccio). This brief survey gives some slight indication of the tireless effort and persistent struggle endured by the musically gifted Slovak nation, which ably shaped its musical culture despite turbulent times and developed it to match the music standards of greater nations. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 80 Antonia M a z d n o v d: Slovak Piano Composition (A BRIEF SURVEY ) Conditions in 19th century Slovakia were so repressive, so debilitating to the spirit, that only under menacing hardships could the Slovaks develop their music on a n ational scale. The leadership concentrated on the nation's struggle for liberation from the Magyars. All its efforts and energies were directed toward Slovak national and cultural independence. The incipient cultivation of Slovak national art cut across the injustice of the Slovak position , and music, too, actively entered the fray. Slovak music and its origins cannot be evaluated from the perspective of modern musical art. While urban artistic culture at that period was comparatively highly developed in Slovakia, it represented cosmopolitan, not Slovak art. Therefore, the movement for authentic Slovak revival kept aloof from it and concentrated its cultural and artistic activity within certain cities like Turciansky Sv. Martin, Banska Bystrica, Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, Dolny Kubin and several others, which likewise became important centers of patriotic and promotional movements. Music and song were completely at the service of national ideologies and struggles. Music no less than the other arts was expected to spark national consciousness and keep patriotism alive. Slovakia in that period possessed neither the means nor the conditions required for the cultivation of artistic music; consequently the character of its over-all musical life remained amateurish. Musical enthusiasts who happened to flourish were dilettantes devoid of professional training and only by way of exception did any of them attain artisticesthetic renown in competent circles. Folk creativity played a significant role in the growth and quality of Slovak national music. From the age of enlightenment it served as a powerful source of inspiration for artistic composition, chiefly under the influence of Romanticism, from which the entire Slovak national art evolved. A Slovak in the 19th century would have recognized SLOVAKIA 81 in folk art (folksong) the most authentic expression of the national spirit, the personification of the nation's immortality and sole source of resistance in its struggle for self-identity. Eventually, toward the close of the 19th century, this trend resulted in conservatism and became a deterrent to fresh views in folk music and hampered any effort to raise the artistic standard of Slovak music. The earliest collections of folksongs were the basis from which piano compositions evolved. These consisted of simple arrangements of a primitive nature. In 1830 Martin Suchan arranged 12 songs from safarik's collection and in 1837 Ladislav Ftiredy composed piano arrangements for 25 pieces from Kollar's collection of patriotic songs. Toward the end of the 18th and on into the 19th century new musical creations appeared, combining Magyar elements with Slovak folksongs, resulting in the so-called neo-Hungarian song. The neo-Hungarian style, evident principally in the dance forms, also partly infiuenced emerging Slovak musical compositions in Slovak musical centers, as exemplified in the piano compositions of M. Godra, well-known songs like Matthew's Musing, Svihrovskd, and gypsy traces in M. Laciak's and M. Francisci's arrangements of folksongs. In the 1870's a counter influence arose against the gypsy influence in Slovak folksongs. The leading protagonist in the effort to offset foreign influence in music was the puristic oriented Milan Lichard. Early composers were prolific in their works for the piano. Paul Gerengay (1825-95) (Dance music: Recollection of Sitno) and Maximilian Hudec (1836-1911) ( Hurban March, Marina Quadrille) made a beginning. The most popular were the quadrilles, mazurkas, polkas, waltzes, etc. (Emigrant, by A. Krcmery; Quadrille of St. Martin, by Bella, Ladonka, by Laciak, a quartet, Tatra Flowers, by Boldis, and others). To this group belongs Michael Laciak ( 1826-1901) who, besides the piano variations for Our Times also attempted in his Instruction to standardize Slovak musical terminology. A. Horislav Skultety was a most productive composer. He composed about 6 stylistic dances for the piano. In this period l'..udovit Vansa (1835-73) received a thorough musical education and became a creative composer. For his own immediate :"'leeds and to his great personal satisfaction he produced Wreaths of Folksongs 82 SLOVAKIA for the piano. Similar aspirations were achieved by Stefan Fajnor ( 1844-1909) one of the most accomplished composers of a renaissance era. Originally he composed chamber music and was considerably influenced by the neo-Hungarian style, than finally turned to Slovak melodies in his Variations for piano and Fantasia of Slovak Folksongs. Vlastimir Melicko (1893-1946) the son of a musical family of the renowned Jan Melicko, already graced with a technical musical training, became a highly talented composer. He arranged dances for the piano and produced Slovak Rhapsody and Fantasia, based on Slovak folksongs. Associated with the activities of the Slovak Society in Budapest is the name of ~udovit Izak (Milos Lihovecky, 1862-1927) composer of a wide variety of works. For the piano he wrote the popular polka Anica and piano variations on the folksong Tecie voda, tecie. Another member of the Slovak Society was Milan Lichard (1853-1935). He obtained his specialized musical training at the Academy in Budapest. Noteworthy on his extensive list of compositions are his short piano pieces and two-piano rhapsodies, which in reality are outstanding collections of songs. Two other piano composers who lived and composed outside of Slovakia must be mentioned. Holding first place was Milos Francisci, a dentist (1854-1926). He was act~ve in the United States and besides choruses, he wrote for piano paraphrases of folksongs, entitled Trdvnice (two volumes of 100 songs each) and a Fantasia on Slovak songs for two pianos. Vladimir G. sasko (1875-1960) a piano virtuoso, also emigrated to the United States. He studied at the Academy of Music in Budapest and taught at the Chicago Musical College. He is the creator of many Slovak compositions: rhapsodies, Fantasia, based on Slovak folksongs and variations. Piano compositions and other unnamed works of these two composers were instrumental in making an impact on Slovak national consciousness in the United States. To this generation of Slovak creative artists, all of them composers in the Slovak national tradition, we further assign, Jan Levoslav Bella, Mikulas Mayzes, Viliam FigusBystry and Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky. The initial efforts of this generation of composers sparked a national revival of native Slovak art, which also embraced music in its SLOVAKIA 83 patriotic-awakening, informative and world-wide roles. These composers, by contrast with the former generation, already possessed all the marks of a creative artistic individuality. Their compositions continued to show the influence of the former esthetic revival based on the role of the folksong, which extended into the 1920's and 1940's, when a new generation of composers with modern artistic styles was emerging. One of the first musicians with a European outlook was Jan Levoslav Bella 0843-1936), the dean of Slovak composers, one of the founders of Slovak national musical culture. Self-educated in playing the piano, he did not indulge in piano composition in the later years of his mature mastery. His four-movement Sonata in B Minor, which to this day appears on programs, represents a work of perennial merit in music literature. Another outstanding composition is his fragmentary Sonata in C Minor, from the elaborate first movement of which has been constructed a Beethoven allegro and an impressively beautiful adagio. Minor works include: Variations for the song Pri Presporku and Leti roj, as well as a Sonatina in E Minor, all of which exemplify the music standard of his contemporaries. An enthusiastic admirer and promoter of Slovak folksongs, Viliam Figus-Bystry ( 1875-1937) directed his activity almost exclusively to using folksongs in classical music. Together with Milan Lichard and Stefan Fajnor, he dominated the so-called renaissance period of Slovak music, in which the composers for the most part were self-trained. The basic design of Figus's creations is derived from Slovak folksong arrangements. His piano compositions include One Thousand Slovak Folksongs, Flowers of the Field, a collection written for children ( 106 songs in simple arrangement for the piano), Dances, and a march Pages from an Album, Multicolored Leaves (10 compositions) Musical Miniatures (12 compositions). Probably the most extensive of his piano compositions is the four-part Slovak Sonata in the dorian mode, based on themes of Slovak folksongs . In his earlier years Figus also composed practical piano music in chamber style (polkas, marches, etc.). The overture for his opera Detvan has been arranged for four hands. One of the pioneers of the national realistic trend in 84 SLOVAKIA Slovak music was Mikulas Moyzes (1872-1944). The bulk of his compositions gravitated toward orchestral music. Most of his piano compositions he eventually transposed to orchestral arrangements. His best known works are the three-movement Sonatina and a series of 12 piano compositions, To our Youth. His remaining piano works consist of short forms like mazurkas, polonaises, preludes, impromptus, arabesques, meditations, etc. The inspirational basis for his entire repertoire is the Slovak folksong, from which he selected a typical Slovak melodic theme in order to develop an independent creation. Moyzes originated the ballad song with its deep realistic picturesqueness. Following Bella, the most impressive member of the older generation of composers was Mikulas SchneiderTrnavsky ( 1881-1959) a pioneer in the trend toward realism in Slovak national music and a friend of Zoltan Kodaly. The strong point in his creativeness was artistic variation in Slovak folksongs and classical song form composition comparable to the motifs in the style of Schubert and Mendelssohn. Schneider-Trnavsky was the first to develop the recitative-rhapsodic type of Slovak melody. Because of the wealth of his compositions in this category, his piano works are not extensive. His Opus 5 is a Brief Waltz (1898) and his popular instructive Slovak Sonatina is well-known and often concertized. Later appeared his Variation Line of Compositions (1944). The musical philosophy of M. SchneiderTrnavsky in all his creative effort stems from the Slovak folksong. His style and tools of expression are Post-Romantic. To this creative quartet of Slovak musicians (from the standpoint of age and style) one must add the names of Frico Kafenda and Alexander Albrecht. As composers they were not specifically aligned with the effort to promote Slovak national music, but they nevertheless made a valuable contribution to the advancement of Slovak musical art. And although they belonged to the Romantic school of composers, they formed a logical link in the historical development of Slovak music and provided an effective transition from the dilettante culture of the previous century to the Slovak avantgarde and indeed paved the way for it. SLOVAKIA 85 The character of Frico Kafenda's creations (1883-1965) was decisively influenced by his training in Leipzig, where conservative traditions merged with the Post-Romantic school. Among his teachers were Robert Teich-Mtiller (piano ), Stefan Krehl and Heinrich Zollner (composition), Arthur Nikisch (conducting). He also attended lectures by Herrmann Kretschmar and Hugh Riemann. Kafenda's compositions frequently exhibit a subjective intimate character. The style of his music is marked by strict harmony and proficient contrapuntal writing. The core of his works comprises chamber, song-like, and instrumental compositions. His piano works consist of A Piano Suite in the ancient modes, Three Piano Compositions, and Variations and Fugues. Alexander Albrecht (1885-1958) can be described as the type of composer-synthesist, who radiates a variety of influences. He was an intimate friend of Bartok. He studied at the Conservatory of Budapest and his teachers were Istvan Thoman (piano), Hans Kassler (composition), and F. Szandtner (conducting). Hindemith's influence led him to combine classicism with modern elements of expression. His musical thought was expressed chiefly in lyrics, in the tender grazioso and the play!ul scherzo. Among his distinguished piano compositions, the following are outstanding: Scherzo in F Major (duet) (1899), Sonata in F Major, Scherzo (1907), (duet), Aphorisms, New Year Greeting, Moods (duet), Wild Rose Suite, (duet), Sonatina in three movements as a duet, humoresque (Excursion i n a Thunderstorm), Twelve short compositions (Success to Music, Little Johnny, In the Distance, Shepherd Dance, Joyful Awakening, Wedding Feast of the Crickets, In a Gay Room, Beginner in Dancing, Perfect Dancer, Dusk, Night, Going to Work in the Morning). His final composition is an instructive work, entitled Ten Duets, based on song themes and recitations from Jan Krasko's collection. After 1918 the newly evolved Slovak music style encountered many difficult challenges : to create a firm material basis for a national musical life and to establish a strong organizational position in competition with a fully developed appreciation of foreign music, which had found a ready response in the musical life of Slovakia. The spirit of competition generated much activity, cen- 86 SLOVAKIA tered in new musically-cul tural institutions, organizations and music schools. In these years, as it were in the shadow of the previously mentioned composers, there indeed arose a group of musicians, who adhered to ancient traditions, but their productions lacked any distinguishab le unity. Renowned at this time was Dezider Lauko (1872-1942) whose piano compositions can be compared with Liszt's in their brilliance and salon presentation. For the piano he wrote Slovak Moods, Piano Etudes for Children, Humoresques, three Valse Scherzandos, Rhapsody in Slovak Meadows, duets for Slovak Dances, and others. :r.uctmila Krizkova-Leh otska (1863-1945), the first Slovak woman composer, in addition to various piano works, directed her talent to composing for children. Angeia Cziczkova (1888-1973) specialized in pedagogical elements of music instruction as well as in composition. Her works consist of more than 100 compositions (Unisono with 54 exercises, Study in Octaves, Rhythmic Exercises with Variations, Technique in Trills, A Study in Chromatics, Preparing to Play Tremolo . In addition she wrote 48 compositions, Youth, 16 Short Preludes for piano. From among her classical selections are Twelve Sonatas, Slavic Fantasy, Prelude in A Flat Major, and Nine Preludes for piano. An individualisti c pattern was folloved by Fran.a Dostalik (1896-1944). His music portrays modern expression and shows some attempt at experimentat ion. Besides shorter forms for the piano, he wrote Detvan Sonatina which he later arranged as a piano duet. To this group of composers belong many others who flourished in the years before and after World War I. Their thought and inspiration sprang from a cultural climate where struggle for an independent national musical art predominated ; or it was derived from the uncertain period of new social-cultura l conditions during the first Republic, when new ideas of national musical culture among the younger generation clashed with the older music. Some of these composers achieved only amateur status; for others again the unfavorable conditions of Slovak cultural life in that period precluded any advancement even with specialized musical training. One of the most productive composers in this group (he has about 260 works to his credit) is Jozef Rosinsky SLOVAKIA 87 (1897-1973). He obtained his education in Turin and in Rome (law); in Nice he studied piano and organ. His rich productivity comprises all genres. A listing of his piano works must include the following noteworthy selections: Mazurka in A Minor, Children's March, Trencin Bells, Fantasia alla Zingara, Prelude on Slovak Motifs, Plastic Pictures, Scherzo (duet), Slovak Gleanings, Ten Short Compositions, First Sonata, Second Sonata, Sonata for piano or harmonium, Echoes of Enchanted Nitra, and Slovak Concert Fantasia for piano and orchestra. Ladislav Stancek ( 1898) is a composer of the same calibre. His vast productivity was directed almost exclusively to program music. In Brno he studied organ under Tregler, composition under V. Petrzelka and 0. Chlubna and conducting under F. Neumann. Among his most popular piano compositions are: Child's Suite, Variations on an original theme and a collection entitled From Life. Representative of the culturally-enlightened and popular composition, anchored in the great traditions of the nationally-revived chorus and group singing in Slovakia, is Jan Valast'an Dolinsky (1892-1965). In the area of piano composition he left short forms: Complaint, Remembrance of May, Minuets in G Major and E Flat Major, Waltz in A Minor, Page From an Album, and Valse Triste. The works of Jan Krasko-Zapotocky (1893-1968) fall into the same category. He, too, was noted as an enlightened leader in the field of music instruction. Among his works are sonatinas and patriotic songs issued under the title, Echoes of Freedom. Jan Mory (1897) belongs to quite another class of composers. He dealt principally with operettic, popular, and dance music. For the piano he prepared instructional works for children, several duets and a collection entitled Children Sing and Play. The composers of yet another school react sensitively to the contemporary, employing methods-modern, technical, and expressive. Their common characteristic is a higher artistic and idealistic standard, without, however, a uniform productivity. An outstanding figure is Stefan Ladislav Nemeth-samorinsky (1896), a typical representative of Bratislava's musical life. In thought and artistry he belongs to the progressive Magyar musical culture as 88 SLOVAKIA represented in Bratislava by Bela Bartok and Alexander Albrecht. He studied piano, organ, and composition at the Academy of Music in Budapest and later attended the Graduate School of Franz Schmidt in Vienna. He can claim a valuable collection of piano works. He arranged 20 Slovak folksongs for piano under the title, For Youth. He wrote a very effective Slovak Rhapsody and Improvisation on a Slovak folksong . Other significant works include: Meditation on Paganini's Theme, a transcription of Beethoven's Romance in D Major for violin, Intermezzo for piano, Sonata with three movements, containing valuable content (Toccata and Fugue) Piano Concerto, and Transcription of Liszt's Prelude and Fugue on Bach's name for two pianos. A composer of an earlier generation with extensive production in music theory, writing, and pedagogy was Jan Fiser-Kveton (1896-1963). He studied composition and conducting at the Prague Conservatory under K. B. Jirak and J. B. Forster. In composition he reached out into diverse styles. In 1928 he produced Sonata in F Minor for piano and the best-loved compositions are his two-piano Suites for Youth. A distinctive role m Slovak musical life and composition was played by Michael Vilec (1902), who was associated in the early years of his creativity with Eastern Slovakia. His compositions reflect the influence of his teacher Zoltan Kodaly and are marked by impressionism. At first he had held himself aloof from the compositional efforts of his generation. His works are noted for their expressive folk elements, among which must be mentioned Bagatelles for piano, Ballade for two pianos, Sonata for piano, Rondo, Three Sonatinas, two series of duets From the Banks of the Danube, Conversation at the Piano, Two-Tone Inventions, Eight Studies on the Development of Interpretive Elements and Fantasia on the waltzes of Franz Schubert: Schubertiada for piano and orchestra. Together with Mikulas Mayzes, he wrote a significant two-volume School of Piano. The first third of the century saw the emergence of a young generation of Slovak composers with a new program and new ideals and goals: to create a style of music that would be contemporary, modern, deeply realistic and Slovak. These composers were determined to put an end to provincialism and dilettantism and at long last to incorpo- SLOVAKIA 89 rate the culture of a highly talented Slovak nation into the great orchestra of European music. A Golden Age of musical composition was about to dawn throughout the world and Slovak piano creativity would play a responsible role in it. Another composer of contemporary music is Alexander Moyzes (1906). He obtained his musical training at the Prague Conservatory under the direction of such teachers as Otakar Sin and Rudolf Karel (composition), Otakar Ostrem (conducting), and B. A. Wiedermann (organ) . Moyzes is noted for his program music with its polished composition2.! technique, which combines classical and Post-Romantic principles with impulses of impressionism. In addition to his creative works, Moyzes actively promoted a new style of Slovak music by means of articles, critical essays, and reviews, in which he condemned in no uncertain terms both dilettantism and conservatism in Slovak musical life. In his capacity as music instructor he educated an entire generation of composers, who to this day occupy foremos t positions in Slovak musical circles. (Holoubek, Jurovsky, Kardos, Ocenas, Freso and several others) . Moyzes' creative works include basic instrumental and vocal genres. His principal compositions for the piano are: Sonata in E Minor (a transcription of Seven Compositions - 1942) which has been rated as one of the best Slovak piano compositions. Others are: Divertimento (1930), FoxEtude and Improptu (1935), Highwayman's Rhapsody (1957) . He also wrote Jazz Sonata (1932) for two pianos. Eugen Suchon (1908) shares with Moyzes the glory of initiating the Golden Age of Slovak musical art. He is at once its creator, its promoter, and its splendid flowering. He studied at the Academy of Music and Drama in Bratislava under the direction of Frico Kafenda and Jozef Vincourek. After graduation he continued his studies under Vitezoslav Novak at the Graduate School in Prague. Suchon's art is completely original. It matured under the impact of Slovak folk melodies combined with modern techniques. The blending of melody, harmony, rhyth::.n and form characterizes Suchoi'.t's music and gives it its national character. Omitting his earlier compositions, (1923-28), a list of his best known works includes the following: Short Suite with Passacaglia (1931), Ballade Suite (1936), which is a standard calling card among elite Slovak pianists; 90 SLOVAKIA Metamorphosis Suites (1953), which is a compendium of modern piano tunes with effective transition and harmonious techniques; Pictures from Slovakia, six series of piano compositions from 1956-1957; and a newer Rhapsodic Suite for piano and orchestra (1968). In 1969 he contributed Kaleidoscope (Evolution of Harmony) in which individual numbers are a succession of delicate musical miniatures. Jan Cikker (1911), pioneer of contemporary national opera, a celebrity known for his irrepressible vitality and vibrant energy, yet not without meditative depth, also belongs to the contemporary scene. He studied composition at the Prague Conservatory under Jaroslav Kricka, organ under B. A. Wiedermann, and conducting under Pavel Dedecek. At the Graduate School he was the student of Vitezoslav Novak and pursued conducting under Felix Weingartner. Cikker opened wide the concentrated art of folksong and dance and developed it into classical, highly spontaneous forms. He is a contemporary lyricist and dramatist. Although Cikker concentrated on operatic creations, he also wrote a considerable number of piano compositions: Sonata in E Minor (1927), while yet pursuing his studies, two compositions for piano In Solitude ( 1940), Piano Variations (1935), Lullaby (1942), Two Compositions for Youth (1948), Tatra's Brooks (three brilliant compositions for piano, 1954), and finally 15 piano water-colors, What the Children Narrated, also a Concertina for piano and orchestra. In addition there is his arrangement of Slovak Suites for orchestra and two pianos. The foremost personality in the field of Slovak music is Dezider Kardos (1914), a student of Alexander Moyzes and V. Novak, a.member of the central generation of composers (along with Ocenas, Jurovsky, Kresanek, Freso and Holoubek). Kardos concentrates his talent on the creation of monumental works, in which his technique is best applied. From among his numerous works the foremost are: Two Piano Compositions (1933), Piano Suite II (1937), Studies for Piano ( 1947), a series of piano compositions Bagatelles (1948), Cycle of 10 Piano Compositions for Youth (1956), many individual scores for children, and notably the interpretive, yet quite spontaneous three compositions To My Children (Banter, Humoresque, Toccatina). In 1969 SLOVAKIA 91 he concluded Piano Concerto with orchestra. It was his first composition of the concert type. It is not a concert work in the traditional sense of the word. The piano is combined with the orchestral rhythm, but it continues to express the individual motifs and ideas. Another member of the central generation of composers is Ladislav Holoubek (1913). He studied composition under A. Moyzes, conducting under Jozef Vincourek, piano under Ernest Krizan. After completing his studies he pursued composition under V. Novak. Holoubek's artistry is best exemplified in his operatic creations. His works for piano are: Sonata in G Major (1931), Prelude, Passacaglia and Toccata (1934) , Four Fugues , II Sonata for Piano (1947), and a cycle for young advanced pianists, Children's Games and Joys . Prominent also as a representative member of the central generation of composers is Andrej Ocenas ( 1911). He studied in Bratislava under A. Moyzes (composition), conducting under Jozef Vincourek, and advanced composition under V. Novak in Prague. His production is characterized by design of splendor and monumentality. For the piano he wrote: First Letters (I Piano Suite), Fugue for piano, II Piano Suite, a piano fantasia Sleet, a series of piano compositions, New Spring, a piano suite Youth, a piano suite, Pictures from a Fable, Ballade, Piano Concerto with orchestra, several individual compositions and Flowers of the Field for young pianists. The creations of Ocenas are characterized by original reconstruction of genuine folklore; he therefore resembles the realists, Janacek and Moussorgsky. A lyrical composer with a feeling for poetic tonal-coloring detail was simon Jurovsky (1912-1963). A student of A. Moyzes (composition), Jozef Vincourek (conducting), he later studied in Vienna under Jozef Marx. In addition to a series of major forms, he left the following piano compositions: Piano Suite, 4 compositions for children, From a Child's Paradise, a suite from ballet, Chivalrous Ballade for piano, Peace Symphony, for concert piano and string orchestra. Tibor Freso ( 1918) belongs to a generation which injected a new creative spirit into Slovak music. He studied under the Italian composer, Ildebrand -Pizetti at the Academia 92 SLOVAKIA di Santa Cecilia in Rome. For piano he wrote a Miniature Suite, which is an effective recital composition with lesser technical demands; Russian Dance for piano, a piano suite In a Child's Room for very young pianists, and a succession of shorter works. Frantisek Babusek ( 1905-1954) a prominent broadcasting conductor, studied conducting under Pavel Dedecek and composition under V. Novak, Jozef Suk, and Jaroslav Kricka in Prague. To Babusek belongs well-deserved credit for producing original compositions and organizing periodic symphonic concerts. He wrote Prelude for piano and the majestic Concerto in D Minor, which in its claims is indeed somewhat exaggerated, but is a masterly composition in which Babusek amassed a whole assemblage of modern piano techniques, many-faceted rhythms and intricacies. The leading personality of Slovak musical science is Dr. Jozef Kresanek (1913). He was educated in composition under Rudolf Karl at the Prague Conservatory and at the Graduate School of V. Novak. Along with his scholarly pursuits, which netted him a long series of learned articles, and books, he composed many songs, choruses, chamber music as well as the following works for the piano: Piano Suite in four parts, I I Piano Suite, arrangements of Slovak folksongs for young pianists, Meadow Flowers, Elegy for piano, Highwayman's Ballade and others. His Scherzo for the piano is an outstanding work. The foremost exponent of Slovak musical theory and estheticism is Dr. Otto Ferenczy ( 1921) . As a composer he advanced on the knowledge of Bart6k and Stravinsky and was able to combine their thrust with the realism of the Slovak folksong. Characteristic of Ferenczy are his expressive elegance, his brilliance and intellectual humor. His works reflect inspiration from the eastern Slovak folksong and dance, and later from more imposing concert and symphonic works. From a wealth of creative works one must list his Intermezzo for piano, and Capriccio for piano and orchestra. He wrote an innovative piece entitled Partita for concert piano and orchestra. Jan Zimmer (1926) can be characterized as a highly productive artist and one of the most distinguished figures of a youthful generation of masters. He obtained his musical training at thP. Bratislava Conservatory, studying organ SLOVAKIA 93 under Jozef Veber, piano under Frico Kafenda, and composition under Eugen Suchan. He also studied composition at the Franz Liszt Academy in Budapest, under Ferencz Farkas and is a graduate of the Salzburg Seminary in American studies (David Diamond). Zimmer himself is a piano virtuoso, appearing in concerts as the exclusive interpreter of his own compositions and constantly deals with problems involving the piano-solo and piano with orchestra. The blossoming of his style is based on the synthesis of neo-classical interpretive forms with the distinctive quality of sound. In all his works Zimmer explores new directions. Besides a lengthy list of other types of composition, he is credited also with numerous piano works as follows: Four Piano Compositions, Moods, I and II Sonatas for piano, Three Sonatas for 2 pianos, Tatry I-II (I and II suites for piano and orchestra), Three Sonatas for 2 pianos, Four Piano Concertos with orchestra, Concerto for piano without orchestra, A Piano Concerto, with solo part in the bass with orchestra, Three Preludes for piano, Rhapsody for piano and orchestra, Short Fantasia for piano and orchestra, Ten Children's Pieces, Concerto Grosso for 2 pianos, 2 string orchestras,· including percussion ·instruments. In contemporary musical life a place of distinction belongs to Rudolf Macudzinski (1907), master, pedagogue, and an outstanding Slovak piano virtuoso. A student of V. Kurz and Leos Janacek, he trained a significant number of young piano-artists. As an accomplished artist, he stands in the forefront of Slovak concert life and together with his wife Silvia Macudzinski often concertizes on two pianos, thus ably promoting this less known type of music. His talent and skill in composition takes many forms, but he excels chiefly in instrumental music. From his piano pieces we choose Two Romances, Sonatina, solo theme for piano, Meditation and Fugue for 2 pianos, Divertimento for two pianos, Bagatelles for 2 pianos, orchestral and concert arrangements, Valse-Improptu for piano and orchestra, Variazoni Olimpiche for piano and orchestra. Well known are his arrangements of folksongs for piano and his instructive and presentative works for youth, such as Study of Scales I and II, and Christmas Numbers I Can Play, and others. 94 SLOVAKIA Resembling Macudzinski in character and artistic creative thought, is the talented Slovak conductor, Dr. ~udovit Rajter (1906). He pursued his studies in Vienna under C. Kraus and A. Wunderer, as well as F. Schmidt and J. Marx. Later he continued his studies under Dohnanyi in Budapest. His creative works are not as numerous as those of Macudzinski, but artistically they are highly polished. His most important piano piece is Short Suite in the old style. Otherwise he composes for orchestra and chorus. Several composers align themselves with the tradition of artistic creativity based on the folklore of eastern Slovakia. One of these is Jozef Gresak (1907), who with his Piano Concerto introduced altogether unusual hues into piano tones and presented quite fascinating methodical problems about natural and unnatural fingerings and the central role of the thumb as the midpoint of a pianistic hand. An individual of remarkable stature in contemporary Slovak life is Julius Kowalski (1912). He studied composition and conducting at the Prague Conservatory under Rudolf Karl, Alojz Haba and Pavel Dedecek. He continued his studies at the Graduate School in Prague under Jozef Suk and Vaclav Talich, and later in Vienna under C. Kraus. His earlier compositions are influenced by the European avantgarde and Alojz Haba in his Four Pieces for piano, in Fantasia in the quarter-tone system; but his later works are influenced by the Post-Romantic tradition. As a pedagogue, he wrote much for children. His cycles From the World of Toys, five short recital pieces, are written for young pianists. The years after World War II witnessed the resurgence of a new segment of Slovak musical life, which achieved a natural fusion between folk art and the more exacting principles of classical music. Important for the development of the new genres was the appearance on the scene of artistic folk choirs, like the Slovak Artistic Collective, Lucnica, Military Artistic Choir, and others. Likewise important was the rise of opera scenarios and the use of radio, cinema, and television. With original composition all the Slovak artists participated in the development of these genres and simultaneously a young generation arose which SLOVAKIA 95 also directed its activity to this new segment of Slovak musical life. A protagonist of modern Slovak musical achievement is Tibor Andrasovan (1917). He is a higly productive and successful Slovak composer in the field of operetta, film, scenario, and folk music. His Gypsy Dance for piano and orchestra stands as a worthy sample of his rich creativity, which gained for him both popularity and widespread accolades from an admiring public. A composer with similar tastes and merit is Bartolomej Urbanec (1918 ) . He studied composition and conducting under A. Mayzes, Eugen Suchan and Kornel Schimpel, and advanced conducting under Vaclav Talich. He is one of the pioneers of creative work for artistic folk choirs, such as the Slovak Artistic Collective, Lucnica, and others. His greatest works are Concertina for piano and orchestra and Three Romantic Pieces, which often appear on concert programs. By his creative compositions Teodor Hirner (1910) identifies himself with Eastern Slovakia. He wrote numerous compositions for various audiences. The familiar ones are Capriccio for piano and archestra, and his piano cycle Imagini. By character and musical ability Julius Letnan ( 19141973) falls into this group. His Sonata for piano causes amazement especially in its lyrical middle section where the presentation is colored with truly Slovak beauty and expression. The duet Dances and Songs for piano and orchestra is also included in this Sonata. Noteworthy is his work Ten Studies, in which he solves technical piano problems in modern style. With the great increase in educational and cultural programs on the radio, and the steadily mounting demands for high artistic standards in musical broadcasts, the number of musicians who turned their talents to the broadcasting arts has likewise increased. A veteran of this broadcasting activity was the pianist Janka Matuska (1897-1959 ) . He was a versatile composer, producing many works, especially for piano. His characteristic features are humor, laughter, optimism and emotional immediacy. The characteristic and typical examples of his notable talent are such short compositions as Imp in the Chimney, Musical Clock, Gi ant, 96 S LOVAKIA Rabbi t and Hunter, Hum oresque, Minuet, Valse Mignon, variations on folksong : Old M aids, Paraphrases on Slovak Folksongs , and a piano cycle, Slovak Land. A noteworthy representative of Slovak dance music and songs is Karol Elbert (1911). He wrote 3 jazz sonatas for piano. Ondrej Francisci (1915 ) dedicates his works principally to children and young people. He wrote 10 pieces for youth. In the 1950's a group of talented composers, pupils of Mayzes and Cikker, appeared on the scene. In their case there is no concern for program music or its style. The area of their creative interests is very broad and consists, above all, in contemporary musical art; not lacking, however , are positive efforts to come to terms with the impulses of serial and electronic music. A composer who divides his creative activity between theory and composition is the musical scholar, Dr. Ladislav Burlas (1922). In his compositions he inclines toward Bartok. The area of his brief forms is represented by Chaconne and Fugue for piano. Otherwise his chief interest and activity rest with folklore theory and composition. One of the most original composers in the effort for new artistic patterns is Ilja Zeljenka (1932 ) . His piano works excel in two Suites and a Sonata. Pavol Simai (1930) evinces fresh creative orientation in regard to Slovak folk themes. First he studied under Pavol Kados in Budapest, then in Bratislava under A. Moyzes and Jan Cikker; finally he came under Paul Dessau in Berlin. His compositions excel in unconventional lyricism, steeped in sentiment, as exemplified in his piano works: Pastoral for piano, a piano suite From Slovakia and a Sonata for piano. He also wrote numerous shorter forms, such as his Fugues, Invention, Song, Scherzo, Impressions. Mention must also be made of his Sonata Fragment, the Dead, and Pen and Ink Drawings. A composer noted for his scientific work in music theory is Dr. Ivan Hrusovsky (1927). In composition he was a student of A. Moyzes. His early works are characterized by principles of the new Romanticism and Impressionism, exemplifying the influence of his teacher. He manifests his individuality in his later compositions and his dominant characteristics are his inclination toward lyricism and his SLOVAKIA 97 outstanding technique. Besides other works he wrote a Sonatina for piano, Piano Variations, Toccata for piano and a Piano Concerto with orchestra. His Sonata for piano is particularly valuable. In its three movements he incorporates all the concepts exemplifying piano techniques of the present day. Narcisa Donatova ( 1928 ) is an ambitious musician. The greater-lesser styles of vocal music are her domain, but she also writes piano pieces, such. as Suite for Youth , the suites How the Forests Reminisce, Talking Suite, the suite In n New School and others. Among her shorter works are Brioni Island, Marilyn Bridge, The Moon and the Ocean, and Red Lantern. The talented Jozef Malovec ( 1933) belongs to the youngest generation. Instrumental music is dominant in his limited production. He wrote two sonatinas for the piano. For the dissemination of cultural music to the rural areas much is being accomplished by these young musicians. One of them is Tibor Sladkovic (1928 ), known for his Ten Piano Variations. Peter Kolman ( 1937) may be classed among composers searching for fresh developmental methods. Hindemith and Schonberg exerted the greatest influence on his works. His two most serious pieces composed for piano are Three Miniatures and Three Compositions in memory of Schonberg. Dusan Martincek (1936) is a most versatile musician. He studied piano at the conservatory in Bratislava under the direction of Anna Kafenda, and composition privately under Jan Cikker and Jan Zimmer. He writes principally for piano; his models are eminent personalities in musical circles, such as A. N. Scriabin, S . V. Rachmaninoff, Bela Bartok, and D. D. Shostakovich. His works include: Rhapsody for piano and orchestra, Three Preludes , Six Etudes, Variations, Poem for piano (Sonata I), Three Preludes and Fugues , Two Dances with a Bulgarian Rhythm, D ialogues in the form of variations for piano and orchestra, T wo Romantic Preludes in memory of A. Scriabin, Concert Rhapsody Negrea, Seven Concert Etudes , containing interesting new problems in piano techniques; three waltzes, Quasi Valse, R eferences to Bagpipes, Introduction and Toccata for piano 98 SLOVAKIA and string orchestra, Three Sonatinas, five new Preludes and Fugues (1970). Ivan Parik (1936) has enjoyed close association with th~ vast panorama of European music. Originally he studied under Alexander Albrecht, composition under Andrej Ocemis, and conducting under K. Schimpel. Eventually he became a student of A. Moyzes. He is one of the most talented composers of the younger generation. In his search for contemporary and unconventional modes of expression, he attained admirable results in his works for piano: Rhapsody for piano, Night a sketch for two pianos, Suite for piano, Sketch for piano, Three Pieces for piano, Songs About Falling Leaves (4 compositions for piano) . Juraj Hatrik ( 1941) wrote Sonata in C Sharp M i nor for piano, Andante Semplice and Burlesque for piano, Toccata and Romantic Etude in F Sharp M i nor, Short Suite. For children he wrote the cycle The Last Vacation Day and for young clients a piano Concerto Facile. Miroslav Bazlik ( 1931) entered a music school upon the recommendation of Jan Cikker. His earliest productions, Sonata in B Minor for piano and bagatelles A Palette show a Post-Romantic and Impressionistic influence. In the following compositions he manifests an inclination toward neo-Classicism, as exemplified in Six Variations , Concert Etude, and Moment Musical. Marian Ivankovic (1931) has to his credit a number of works in various styles. He wrote Trifles for piano. Roman Berger, one of the youngest, wrote a Sonata for piano and a Suite (Prelude, Scherzo, Toccata). Jozef Sixta's first composition was Two Fugues . He also wrote Five Compositi ons and Fantasia for piano. To the afore-mentioned must be added Ivan Konecny, who wrote Two Bagatelles for piano, Variations , Two Fugues, and Three Compositions. Vladimir Bokes, son of the late Dr. Bokes, well-known musical author, made his debut in music composition with Partita for piano (Prelude, Aria, Capriccio). This brief survey gives some slight indication of the tireless effort and persistent struggle endured by the musically gifted Slovak nation, which ably shaped its musical culture despite turbulent times and developed it to match the music standards of greater nations.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Piano Composition (A Brief Survey) Description An account of the resource Antonia Mazánová Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 80-98 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mazánová, Antonia Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/502fb4d5b5c80fb99d377f160300963a.pdf 286946a1c4f4e21d86360ffb11a028dc PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 153 Ethnics Work Hard Msgr. James T. Mc Hugh Back in the early 60s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan maintained that ethnicity would continue to play an important part in the social organization of New York City. They focused on the Black and Puerto Rican ascendancy and probably did not foresee the present emphasis on ethnic individualism as it now exists. With the 70s, national and ethnic origin matters-even if it goes back to great grand-parents. But the lines are fudged. It's hard to distinguish ethnic groups from middle Americans, blue-collar workers, lower socio-economic groups. And Spanish-surnamed Americans, though the largest immigrant group with a different language, actually comprise four or more distinct groups. However, following Robert Hill's analysis of the strengths of the black family, it's important to take a look at the family life of ethnics, middle Americans and Spanishspeaking groups. The criteria chosen by Hill are generally applicable, and the description can be drawn from the more popularly written description of the new ethnic Americans. First of all, ethnic families show a strong sense of kinship. Family unity, family relatedness and inter-family cooperation show up clearly. Mike Novak, in the Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics tells us that ethnics spend most of their free time with their families, and that many visit their parents at least once a week. Novak also maintains that ethnics tend to have relatives as best friends. Weddings-and wakes-are family reunions. Ethnics also tend to help each other. There's always a cousin or uncle who is a plumber, a couple of relatives to help paint the house, a brother-in-law who knows about cars. And the special jobs are taken care of on the weekends at minimal expense. �154 SLOVAKIA Strong work orientation seems almost to be the lifeblood of ethnics. Robert Coles captures this in his book on the middle-Americans. In his own style-accompanied by photographs by Jon Erikson-Coles has the people speak out. Joe and Doris-a typical couple-don't have too much time to waste. Joe works almost all the time-at his regular job and at second jobs that he always has. Doris is busy with the house and children. Increasingly, middle American wives are taking jobs outside the home, and many of them give willingly to help the school, the church or the community. Middle Americans and ethnics reject the welfare state-and are much more determined to work than accept money from the government. They believe "that it's not right that a man shouldn't be able to earn a living for his family." There may be more rigidity in regard to rules and tasks in ethnic and middle American families, but this doesn't seem to weaken the family structure. Children are expected to perform some tasks, and teen-agers have generally been given a good degree of responsibility. It seems that role expectations of the young have broken down with the move to the suburbs. There's a strong emphasis on achievement, but much of the expectation is tranferred to children. Ethnic and middle Americans find their jobs boring and uncertain, and they hope to educate their children so that they won't be trapped in a dead-end job. Police and firemen-who once enjoyed status-are made the scapegoats for society's problems, and take a disproportionate measure of criticism from the nouveau riche. But most of the police and other civil servants are people of integrity, and do receive some recognition and praise from neighbors and friends. Religious tradition runs hand in hand with ethnic traditions, though the young are less dedicated to any type of tradition. But the family engenders regular religious practice, and the Catholic school-which serves ethnics and middle Americans-tends to strengthen religious identification. Yet, the schools themselves are undergoing an identity crisis and the erosion is beginning to show through. �SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. � SLOVAKIA 153 Ethnics Work Hard Msgr. James T. Mc Hugh Back in the early 60s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan maintained that ethnicity would continue to play an important part in the social organization of New York City. They focused on the Black and Puerto Rican ascendancy and probably did not foresee the present emphasis on ethnic individualism as it now exists. With the 70s, national and ethnic origin matters-even if it goes back to great grand-parents. But the lines are fudged. It's hard to distinguish ethnic groups from middle Americans, blue-collar workers, lower socio-economic groups. And Spanish-surnamed Americans, though the largest immigrant group with a different language, actually comprise four or more distinct groups. However, following Robert Hill's analysis of the strengths of the black family, it's important to take a look at the family life of ethnics, middle Americans and Spanishspeaking groups. The criteria chosen by Hill are generally applicable, and the description can be drawn from the more popularly written description of the new ethnic Americans. First of all, ethnic families show a strong sense of kinship. Family unity, family relatedness and inter-family cooperation show up clearly. Mike Novak, in the Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics tells us that ethnics spend most of their free time with their families, and that many visit their parents at least once a week. Novak also maintains that ethnics tend to have relatives as best friends. Weddings-and wakes-are family reunions. Ethnics also tend to help each other. There's always a cousin or uncle who is a plumber, a couple of relatives to help paint the house, a brother-in-law who knows about cars. And the special jobs are taken care of on the weekends at minimal expense. �154 SLOVAKIA Strong work orientation seems almost to be the lifeblood of ethnics. Robert Coles captures this in his book on the middle-Americans. In his own style-accompanied by photographs by Jon Erikson-Coles has the people speak out. Joe and Doris-a typical couple-don't have too much time to waste. Joe works almost all the time-at his regular job and at second jobs that he always has. Doris is busy with the house and children. Increasingly, middle American wives are taking jobs outside the home, and many of them give willingly to help the school, the church or the community. Middle Americans and ethnics reject the welfare state-and are much more determined to work than accept money from the government. They believe "that it's not right that a man shouldn't be able to earn a living for his family." There may be more rigidity in regard to rules and tasks in ethnic and middle American families, but this doesn't seem to weaken the family structure. Children are expected to perform some tasks, and teen-agers have generally been given a good degree of responsibility. It seems that role expectations of the young have broken down with the move to the suburbs. There's a strong emphasis on achievement, but much of the expectation is tranferred to children. Ethnic and middle Americans find their jobs boring and uncertain, and they hope to educate their children so that they won't be trapped in a dead-end job. Police and firemen-who once enjoyed status-are made the scapegoats for society's problems, and take a disproportionate measure of criticism from the nouveau riche. But most of the police and other civil servants are people of integrity, and do receive some recognition and praise from neighbors and friends. Religious tradition runs hand in hand with ethnic traditions, though the young are less dedicated to any type of tradition. But the family engenders regular religious practice, and the Catholic school-which serves ethnics and middle Americans-tends to strengthen religious identification. Yet, the schools themselves are undergoing an identity crisis and the erosion is beginning to show through. �SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 153 Ethnics Work Hard Msgr. James T. Mc Hugh Back in the early 60s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan maintained that ethnicity would continue to play an important part in the social organization of New York City. They focused on the Black and Puerto Rican ascendancy and probably did not foresee the present emphasis on ethnic individualism as it now exists. With the 70s, national and ethnic origin matters-even if it goes back to great grand-parents. But the lines are fudged. It's hard to distinguish ethnic groups from middle Americans, blue-collar workers, lower socio-economic groups. And Spanish-surnamed Americans, though the largest immigrant group with a different language, actually comprise four or more distinct groups. However, following Robert Hill's analysis of the strengths of the black family, it's important to take a look at the family life of ethnics, middle Americans and Spanishspeaking groups. The criteria chosen by Hill are generally applicable, and the description can be drawn from the more popularly written description of the new ethnic Americans. First of all, ethnic families show a strong sense of kinship. Family unity, family relatedness and inter-family cooperation show up clearly. Mike Novak, in the Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics tells us that ethnics spend most of their free time with their families, and that many visit their parents at least once a week. Novak also maintains that ethnics tend to have relatives as best friends. Weddings-and wakes-are family reunions. Ethnics also tend to help each other. There's always a cousin or uncle who is a plumber, a couple of relatives to help paint the house, a brother-in-law who knows about cars. And the special jobs are taken care of on the weekends at minimal expense. 154 SLOVAKIA Strong work orientation seems almost to be the lifeblood of ethnics. Robert Coles captures this in his book on the middle-Americans. In his own style-accompanied by photographs by Jon Erikson-Coles has the people speak out. Joe and Doris-a typical couple-don't have too much time to waste. Joe works almost all the time-at his regular job and at second jobs that he always has. Doris is busy with the house and children. Increasingly, middle American wives are taking jobs outside the home, and many of them give willingly to help the school, the church or the community. Middle Americans and ethnics reject the welfare state-and are much more determined to work than accept money from the government. They believe "that it's not right that a man shouldn't be able to earn a living for his family." There may be more rigidity in regard to rules and tasks in ethnic and middle American families, but this doesn't seem to weaken the family structure. Children are expected to perform some tasks, and teen-agers have generally been given a good degree of responsibility. It seems that role expectations of the young have broken down with the move to the suburbs. There's a strong emphasis on achievement, but much of the expectation is tranferred to children. Ethnic and middle Americans find their jobs boring and uncertain, and they hope to educate their children so that they won't be trapped in a dead-end job. Police and firemen-who once enjoyed status-are made the scapegoats for society's problems, and take a disproportionate measure of criticism from the nouveau riche. But most of the police and other civil servants are people of integrity, and do receive some recognition and praise from neighbors and friends. Religious tradition runs hand in hand with ethnic traditions, though the young are less dedicated to any type of tradition. But the family engenders regular religious practice, and the Catholic school-which serves ethnics and middle Americans-tends to strengthen religious identification. Yet, the schools themselves are undergoing an identity crisis and the erosion is beginning to show through. SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Ethnics Work Hard Description An account of the resource Msgr. James T. McHugh Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 153-155 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource McHugh, James T. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c0c29f35f38e18e769727286a469d9d8.pdf 26789962c72a9d57cb89eaef06ff226a PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA CHURCHES IN A VISE Frances McPoyne It hias often been said that Czecho-Slovakia is Moscow's most obedient satellite. What is there a'b out this little nation that has earned for it such an uncomplimentary name 'i Is it by plan or mere accident that a Christian Westernoriented country should become such a loyal servant of :the Kremlin? To know and understand another people one must at least have an idea as to that people's language, history, music and its religious development. A little volume entitled Kirchen in der Zange (Churches in a Vise), published by the Munich University Press and Publishing House, Dr. C. Wolf and Son, one of a series on Central European Sources and Documents, d ~ exclusively with Czecho Slovakia and describes the plight of the churches in that country today. Czecho..Slovakia is territorially about as large as the State of New York. At its birth in 1919 it did not consist of one et!hnic people, the "Czechoslovaks," for there exists no such people. It contained Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and others. The census of 1930 gives the following breakdown: 7.2 million Czechs, 2.3 million Slovaks, 3.3 million Sudeten Germans (they were native to Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia and did ndt enter with Hitler in 1939), 550,000 Ukrainians, 700,000 Magyars, 190,000 Jews, 130,000 Poles and others. According to the same statistics the religious breakdown was 73.5 % Roman Caltholic, 7.6 % Evengelican Lutheran, 5.3 % Czech National Church (in Slovakia 0.4 % ), 2.4% Israelite, 5.4% ofiller and 5.8 % non-affil'iated. The Catholics in the present-day "People's Democratic" OSSR are estimated at 75 % of the population, the Evengeiicals at 8 % . For obvious reasons it is impossible to obtain a more exact tabulation. To rightly comprehend the situation, let it be said that feelings were generally drawn along nationality lines rather than on religious ones, even prior to the Communist putsch in Czecho-Slovakia. Such an attitude made it possible, for �SLOVAKIA 19 example, for the Slovak Catholic priest Andreas IIlinlm. . to win support not only among his co-religious fellowSlovaks but from the Sl ovak Protestants too. By the same token the Ca'tholic Slovaks never merged witJh tlhe Catholic Czechs to form a People's Party in the Prague Parliament. The 92 % Roman Catholic Sudeten population, to cite a second example, repeatedly voted for Lutheran Pastor Gottfrid Wehrenfennig as the president of their Volksverein. It is important, therefore, to bear these nationaHty differences and tensions in mind when tracing the trend of politiool events in Czecho-Slovakia. • Due to the bitter feeling between Czechs and Germans at the close of World War II and due perhaps to certain pro-Slav leanings of the Czedh people, it was possi1ble for Czedh collaboration with the Communists to make a bolo public hand-shake in the form of a pastoral letter which welcomed the Czec'h two-year plan as "a road to happiness and prosperity for the fatherland" and urged the faithful to support it. A special event that shows how smoothly tJhe near Church-Communist betrothal was working out, was the consecration on December 8, 1946, of Joseph Beran, Archbishop of Prague and primate of Bohemia. No less a rrominent Communist than Premier Klement Gottwald not only attended the church ceremonies but followed the various steps in the consecration with prayerbook in hand and congratulated the archbishop in the name of the entire government. So convinced at the time was the archbishop of the chances for good Church-Communist relations that he made no attempt to counteract the decrees of Dr. EdvaTd Benes calling for the brutal expulsion from the land of all native Sudeten German inhabitants. The driving out of the 92 % Roman Catholic Sudeten Germans was even acceded to by Primate Beran as "imperative." Not until tJhe draft of a new law seeking to nationalize the nation's schools did Archbishop Beran realize he had hitc'hed his wagon to the wrong star. His reaction was to try to effect a coalition of all the country's churches. When tihe government then confiscated all Church property and decided to give the clergy the sta1 �20 ::,LOVAKIA tus of any other governm ent employee, Beran issued a stateme nt - made on the heels of governm ent efforts to win the clergy for Commu nist Party member ship - in which he declared : "No Christia n and above all no priest dare align himself with an ideology that question s the existence of a soul or immorta lity." On May 10, 1948, a "uniform list" of candida tes for the revived Popular Front was drawn up, aimed to convince other countrie s that the Czech people had always been eager to embrace Commun ism. Gottwal d's cabinet did its utmost to win church support for that election campaign. 'Dhe head of the Orthodo x Church in the CSSR vehemenrtly stated that the casting of a white (inval'id) vote was tantamo unt to cowardl y flight from responsi bility for the future of the State. The Israelite Council called on its member s to vote for the Gottwa!ld Commu nist governm ent, believin g that it meant "a chance for quiet develop ment of the Jewish commun ity." The Central Council of the "Czechoslova k Church" declared : "It is the civil duty of every church member to vote so as to manifes t national unity." The election banner of the Evangel ical Bruderk irche was much more ,c onserva tive: "Let us strive for true unity in truth and justice." The Catholic Chul"ch refused to be misled by a tempora ry let-up in persecut ion of churchm en and refraine d from promisin g the regime its confidence. It simply declined to adopt any election slogan whatsoe ver. By Novemb er 1949, Archbis hop Beran had signed his last pastoral letter. On March 11, 1951, t'he Czeclh State police had taken him prisoner and silenced him perfuaps for all time. Parallel ing Beran's disappea rance came Sovietstyle "scare" tactics aimed at the clergy in general, with arrests and sentence s to prison. Not eager to create martyrs for either Luthera nism or Rome, the Communis'ts promised freedom to those it had interned provided they would march with the regime. In the meantim e properti es and building s of both Catholic and otJher denomin ations had been confisca ted, their building s turned into museum s or Commu nist headqua rters. In addition to the expropr iation of the clergy - a move thaJt not only meant materia l gains for the governm ent - an added blow had been �SLOVA KIA 21 struck design ed to make all men of the oloth mere tools of the State. Robbe d of their indepe ndence , they were to be reduce d to puppe ts by having to qualify for office on the same basis as all other public jobhol ders. Their salary, payme nt for lodgin g, and for the educat ion of their children in the case of the non-C atholic s, all were pll't on the level of State employ ees. The admin istrati on was to approve all appoin tments to office and be free to refuse a candid ate on "politi cal" ground . Such appoin ltment s are not valid accord ing to church law but it is relativ ely easy for the Red regime to fool a simple pavish ioner into bel'ieving that they are. In order to functio n as priest or preacih er, in church or other religio us society , the person in questi on must take an oath which reads : "I will suppo rt the govern ment with every means in my power ." Since the bishop s realize d that a segme nt of the priests would be accept ing govern ment pay they consen ted, approv ing the oath with the follow ing provis o: Insofa r as it would not conflic t with God's rights and Churc h rights. The bishop s themse lves decline d to accept State pay. How about religio us instruc tion in Czedh o-Slov akia? As such, it is not forbid den. It may on~y be given to those childre n, howev er, whose father s have submi tted a writte n reques t for it to the school princip al. Again the scare tactic is used, since fhe author ities know thaJt many a parent will refrain from submi tting such a petitio n lest pressu re be exert ed on him by P rty functio naries , threat ening loss of job or the like. A second type of scare tactic is tlhe fact that often the very person s selecte d to give tlhe religio us instruc tion are in reality loyal Comm unists. With the State reser~ ing the right to say who can or cannol t be priests and minist ers of the gospel , it will natura Hy choose for instruc tion in religio us doctrin e such clergy men who are willing to compr omise. Anoth er facet of the intimi dation tactic is the placin g in t'he path of those wlho remain loyal to tlheir religio us upbrin ging obstac les to their higher educat ion. The family attitud e itself is impor tant in mould ing the attitude of the child, and strong religio us familie s are natura lly consid ered a block to the spread ing of Comm unist ideas. �22 SLOVAKIA Once the Reds succeeded in liquidating the "unteachables," those who refused to follow the Party line, the remaining mmisters and priests had three paths to choose f.rom: (1) They could become ideological and practical collaborators with Communism, the road traveled by Jan Plojhar, a Catholic priest who, it is said, never wanted to be a priest in the first place, or Josef Hromadka, a Lutheran minister and Vice-President of the World Council of Reformed Churches (2). Like Archbishop Beran, having learned that compromise cannot work, this growp have become members of a resistance movement, (3) are those who have fallen in line with tfhe masses and when in Rome, do as the Romans do. Down through history persecutions have led to a deepening of religious life. In Czecho-Slovakia the government has had little success with its efforts to promote a substitute for religious activity in the form of youth initiation ceremonies, name-giving and the like. Perhaps an old Czech adage is again proving to be right: "When the spirit is drunk, God is forgotten. Only when trouble comes do we really learn to know Him." • • • NEW STRICTURES ON BENES Karl Kem Even outside Sudeten German circles Edward Benes' political genius is gradually being recognized for tfhe mere legend that it was. Czech hisltorians, too, are beginning to contribute to the truth. Josef Korbel's report "The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1945" is additional proof to that effect. The book has received much publicity. MaJlmo's leading Swedish newspa,per Arbetet has published a lengthy review of it. 'l'lhe Neue Zurcher Zeitung takes ponderous stock of some of the mistakes made by Benes, "that shrewd diplomat," at a time when judicious people clearly foresaw "where friendship with Moscow would lead him and his country." The review in Arbetet was written by the young Fm.n Jorn Donner. The author who spent some weeks in Prague � 18 SLOVAKIA CHURCHES IN A VISE Frances McPoyne It hias often been said that Czecho-Slovakia is Moscow's most obedient satellite. What is there a'b out this little nation that has earned for it such an uncomplimentary name 'i Is it by plan or mere accident that a Christian Westernoriented country should become such a loyal servant of :the Kremlin? To know and understand another people one must at least have an idea as to that people's language, history, music and its religious development. A little volume entitled Kirchen in der Zange (Churches in a Vise), published by the Munich University Press and Publishing House, Dr. C. Wolf and Son, one of a series on Central European Sources and Documents, d ~ exclusively with Czecho Slovakia and describes the plight of the churches in that country today. Czecho..Slovakia is territorially about as large as the State of New York. At its birth in 1919 it did not consist of one et!hnic people, the "Czechoslovaks," for there exists no such people. It contained Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and others. The census of 1930 gives the following breakdown: 7.2 million Czechs, 2.3 million Slovaks, 3.3 million Sudeten Germans (they were native to Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia and did ndt enter with Hitler in 1939), 550,000 Ukrainians, 700,000 Magyars, 190,000 Jews, 130,000 Poles and others. According to the same statistics the religious breakdown was 73.5 % Roman Caltholic, 7.6 % Evengelican Lutheran, 5.3 % Czech National Church (in Slovakia 0.4 % ), 2.4% Israelite, 5.4% ofiller and 5.8 % non-affil'iated. The Catholics in the present-day "People's Democratic" OSSR are estimated at 75 % of the population, the Evengeiicals at 8 % . For obvious reasons it is impossible to obtain a more exact tabulation. To rightly comprehend the situation, let it be said that feelings were generally drawn along nationality lines rather than on religious ones, even prior to the Communist putsch in Czecho-Slovakia. Such an attitude made it possible, for �SLOVAKIA 19 example, for the Slovak Catholic priest Andreas IIlinlm. . to win support not only among his co-religious fellowSlovaks but from the Sl ovak Protestants too. By the same token the Ca'tholic Slovaks never merged witJh tlhe Catholic Czechs to form a People's Party in the Prague Parliament. The 92 % Roman Catholic Sudeten population, to cite a second example, repeatedly voted for Lutheran Pastor Gottfrid Wehrenfennig as the president of their Volksverein. It is important, therefore, to bear these nationaHty differences and tensions in mind when tracing the trend of politiool events in Czecho-Slovakia. • Due to the bitter feeling between Czechs and Germans at the close of World War II and due perhaps to certain pro-Slav leanings of the Czedh people, it was possi1ble for Czedh collaboration with the Communists to make a bolo public hand-shake in the form of a pastoral letter which welcomed the Czec'h two-year plan as "a road to happiness and prosperity for the fatherland" and urged the faithful to support it. A special event that shows how smoothly tJhe near Church-Communist betrothal was working out, was the consecration on December 8, 1946, of Joseph Beran, Archbishop of Prague and primate of Bohemia. No less a rrominent Communist than Premier Klement Gottwald not only attended the church ceremonies but followed the various steps in the consecration with prayerbook in hand and congratulated the archbishop in the name of the entire government. So convinced at the time was the archbishop of the chances for good Church-Communist relations that he made no attempt to counteract the decrees of Dr. EdvaTd Benes calling for the brutal expulsion from the land of all native Sudeten German inhabitants. The driving out of the 92 % Roman Catholic Sudeten Germans was even acceded to by Primate Beran as "imperative." Not until tJhe draft of a new law seeking to nationalize the nation's schools did Archbishop Beran realize he had hitc'hed his wagon to the wrong star. His reaction was to try to effect a coalition of all the country's churches. When tihe government then confiscated all Church property and decided to give the clergy the sta1 �20 ::,LOVAKIA tus of any other governm ent employee, Beran issued a stateme nt - made on the heels of governm ent efforts to win the clergy for Commu nist Party member ship - in which he declared : "No Christia n and above all no priest dare align himself with an ideology that question s the existence of a soul or immorta lity." On May 10, 1948, a "uniform list" of candida tes for the revived Popular Front was drawn up, aimed to convince other countrie s that the Czech people had always been eager to embrace Commun ism. Gottwal d's cabinet did its utmost to win church support for that election campaign. 'Dhe head of the Orthodo x Church in the CSSR vehemenrtly stated that the casting of a white (inval'id) vote was tantamo unt to cowardl y flight from responsi bility for the future of the State. The Israelite Council called on its member s to vote for the Gottwa!ld Commu nist governm ent, believin g that it meant "a chance for quiet develop ment of the Jewish commun ity." The Central Council of the "Czechoslova k Church" declared : "It is the civil duty of every church member to vote so as to manifes t national unity." The election banner of the Evangel ical Bruderk irche was much more ,c onserva tive: "Let us strive for true unity in truth and justice." The Catholic Chul"ch refused to be misled by a tempora ry let-up in persecut ion of churchm en and refraine d from promisin g the regime its confidence. It simply declined to adopt any election slogan whatsoe ver. By Novemb er 1949, Archbis hop Beran had signed his last pastoral letter. On March 11, 1951, t'he Czeclh State police had taken him prisoner and silenced him perfuaps for all time. Parallel ing Beran's disappea rance came Sovietstyle "scare" tactics aimed at the clergy in general, with arrests and sentence s to prison. Not eager to create martyrs for either Luthera nism or Rome, the Communis'ts promised freedom to those it had interned provided they would march with the regime. In the meantim e properti es and building s of both Catholic and otJher denomin ations had been confisca ted, their building s turned into museum s or Commu nist headqua rters. In addition to the expropr iation of the clergy - a move thaJt not only meant materia l gains for the governm ent - an added blow had been �SLOVA KIA 21 struck design ed to make all men of the oloth mere tools of the State. Robbe d of their indepe ndence , they were to be reduce d to puppe ts by having to qualify for office on the same basis as all other public jobhol ders. Their salary, payme nt for lodgin g, and for the educat ion of their children in the case of the non-C atholic s, all were pll't on the level of State employ ees. The admin istrati on was to approve all appoin tments to office and be free to refuse a candid ate on "politi cal" ground . Such appoin ltment s are not valid accord ing to church law but it is relativ ely easy for the Red regime to fool a simple pavish ioner into bel'ieving that they are. In order to functio n as priest or preacih er, in church or other religio us society , the person in questi on must take an oath which reads : "I will suppo rt the govern ment with every means in my power ." Since the bishop s realize d that a segme nt of the priests would be accept ing govern ment pay they consen ted, approv ing the oath with the follow ing provis o: Insofa r as it would not conflic t with God's rights and Churc h rights. The bishop s themse lves decline d to accept State pay. How about religio us instruc tion in Czedh o-Slov akia? As such, it is not forbid den. It may on~y be given to those childre n, howev er, whose father s have submi tted a writte n reques t for it to the school princip al. Again the scare tactic is used, since fhe author ities know thaJt many a parent will refrain from submi tting such a petitio n lest pressu re be exert ed on him by P rty functio naries , threat ening loss of job or the like. A second type of scare tactic is tlhe fact that often the very person s selecte d to give tlhe religio us instruc tion are in reality loyal Comm unists. With the State reser~ ing the right to say who can or cannol t be priests and minist ers of the gospel , it will natura Hy choose for instruc tion in religio us doctrin e such clergy men who are willing to compr omise. Anoth er facet of the intimi dation tactic is the placin g in t'he path of those wlho remain loyal to tlheir religio us upbrin ging obstac les to their higher educat ion. The family attitud e itself is impor tant in mould ing the attitude of the child, and strong religio us familie s are natura lly consid ered a block to the spread ing of Comm unist ideas. �22 SLOVAKIA Once the Reds succeeded in liquidating the "unteachables," those who refused to follow the Party line, the remaining mmisters and priests had three paths to choose f.rom: (1) They could become ideological and practical collaborators with Communism, the road traveled by Jan Plojhar, a Catholic priest who, it is said, never wanted to be a priest in the first place, or Josef Hromadka, a Lutheran minister and Vice-President of the World Council of Reformed Churches (2). Like Archbishop Beran, having learned that compromise cannot work, this growp have become members of a resistance movement, (3) are those who have fallen in line with tfhe masses and when in Rome, do as the Romans do. Down through history persecutions have led to a deepening of religious life. In Czecho-Slovakia the government has had little success with its efforts to promote a substitute for religious activity in the form of youth initiation ceremonies, name-giving and the like. Perhaps an old Czech adage is again proving to be right: "When the spirit is drunk, God is forgotten. Only when trouble comes do we really learn to know Him." • • • NEW STRICTURES ON BENES Karl Kem Even outside Sudeten German circles Edward Benes' political genius is gradually being recognized for tfhe mere legend that it was. Czech hisltorians, too, are beginning to contribute to the truth. Josef Korbel's report "The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1945" is additional proof to that effect. The book has received much publicity. MaJlmo's leading Swedish newspa,per Arbetet has published a lengthy review of it. 'l'lhe Neue Zurcher Zeitung takes ponderous stock of some of the mistakes made by Benes, "that shrewd diplomat," at a time when judicious people clearly foresaw "where friendship with Moscow would lead him and his country." The review in Arbetet was written by the young Fm.n Jorn Donner. The author who spent some weeks in Prague � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA CHURCHES IN A VISE Frances McPoyne It hias often been said that Czecho-Slovakia is Moscow's most obedient satellite. What is there a'b out this little nation that has earned for it such an uncomplimentary name 'i Is it by plan or mere accident that a Christian Westernoriented country should become such a loyal servant of :the Kremlin? To know and understand another people one must at least have an idea as to that people's language, history, music and its religious development. A little volume entitled Kirchen in der Zange (Churches in a Vise), published by the Munich University Press and Publishing House, Dr. C. Wolf and Son, one of a series on Central European Sources and Documents, d ~ exclusively with Czecho Slovakia and describes the plight of the churches in that country today. Czecho..Slovakia is territorially about as large as the State of New York. At its birth in 1919 it did not consist of one et!hnic people, the "Czechoslovaks," for there exists no such people. It contained Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and others. The census of 1930 gives the following breakdown: 7.2 million Czechs, 2.3 million Slovaks, 3.3 million Sudeten Germans (they were native to Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia and did ndt enter with Hitler in 1939), 550,000 Ukrainians, 700,000 Magyars, 190,000 Jews, 130,000 Poles and others. According to the same statistics the religious breakdown was 73.5 % Roman Caltholic, 7.6 % Evengelican Lutheran, 5.3 % Czech National Church (in Slovakia 0.4 % ), 2.4% Israelite, 5.4% ofiller and 5.8 % non-affil'iated. The Catholics in the present-day "People's Democratic" OSSR are estimated at 75 % of the population, the Evengeiicals at 8 % . For obvious reasons it is impossible to obtain a more exact tabulation. To rightly comprehend the situation, let it be said that feelings were generally drawn along nationality lines rather than on religious ones, even prior to the Communist putsch in Czecho-Slovakia. Such an attitude made it possible, for SLOVAKIA 19 example, for the Slovak Catholic priest Andreas IIlinlm. . to win support not only among his co-religious fellowSlovaks but from the Sl ovak Protestants too. By the same token the Ca'tholic Slovaks never merged witJh tlhe Catholic Czechs to form a People's Party in the Prague Parliament. The 92 % Roman Catholic Sudeten population, to cite a second example, repeatedly voted for Lutheran Pastor Gottfrid Wehrenfennig as the president of their Volksverein. It is important, therefore, to bear these nationaHty differences and tensions in mind when tracing the trend of politiool events in Czecho-Slovakia. • Due to the bitter feeling between Czechs and Germans at the close of World War II and due perhaps to certain pro-Slav leanings of the Czedh people, it was possi1ble for Czedh collaboration with the Communists to make a bolo public hand-shake in the form of a pastoral letter which welcomed the Czec'h two-year plan as "a road to happiness and prosperity for the fatherland" and urged the faithful to support it. A special event that shows how smoothly tJhe near Church-Communist betrothal was working out, was the consecration on December 8, 1946, of Joseph Beran, Archbishop of Prague and primate of Bohemia. No less a rrominent Communist than Premier Klement Gottwald not only attended the church ceremonies but followed the various steps in the consecration with prayerbook in hand and congratulated the archbishop in the name of the entire government. So convinced at the time was the archbishop of the chances for good Church-Communist relations that he made no attempt to counteract the decrees of Dr. EdvaTd Benes calling for the brutal expulsion from the land of all native Sudeten German inhabitants. The driving out of the 92 % Roman Catholic Sudeten Germans was even acceded to by Primate Beran as "imperative." Not until tJhe draft of a new law seeking to nationalize the nation's schools did Archbishop Beran realize he had hitc'hed his wagon to the wrong star. His reaction was to try to effect a coalition of all the country's churches. When tihe government then confiscated all Church property and decided to give the clergy the sta1 20 ::,LOVAKIA tus of any other governm ent employee, Beran issued a stateme nt - made on the heels of governm ent efforts to win the clergy for Commu nist Party member ship - in which he declared : "No Christia n and above all no priest dare align himself with an ideology that question s the existence of a soul or immorta lity." On May 10, 1948, a "uniform list" of candida tes for the revived Popular Front was drawn up, aimed to convince other countrie s that the Czech people had always been eager to embrace Commun ism. Gottwal d's cabinet did its utmost to win church support for that election campaign. 'Dhe head of the Orthodo x Church in the CSSR vehemenrtly stated that the casting of a white (inval'id) vote was tantamo unt to cowardl y flight from responsi bility for the future of the State. The Israelite Council called on its member s to vote for the Gottwa!ld Commu nist governm ent, believin g that it meant "a chance for quiet develop ment of the Jewish commun ity." The Central Council of the "Czechoslova k Church" declared : "It is the civil duty of every church member to vote so as to manifes t national unity." The election banner of the Evangel ical Bruderk irche was much more ,c onserva tive: "Let us strive for true unity in truth and justice." The Catholic Chul"ch refused to be misled by a tempora ry let-up in persecut ion of churchm en and refraine d from promisin g the regime its confidence. It simply declined to adopt any election slogan whatsoe ver. By Novemb er 1949, Archbis hop Beran had signed his last pastoral letter. On March 11, 1951, t'he Czeclh State police had taken him prisoner and silenced him perfuaps for all time. Parallel ing Beran's disappea rance came Sovietstyle "scare" tactics aimed at the clergy in general, with arrests and sentence s to prison. Not eager to create martyrs for either Luthera nism or Rome, the Communis'ts promised freedom to those it had interned provided they would march with the regime. In the meantim e properti es and building s of both Catholic and otJher denomin ations had been confisca ted, their building s turned into museum s or Commu nist headqua rters. In addition to the expropr iation of the clergy - a move thaJt not only meant materia l gains for the governm ent - an added blow had been SLOVA KIA 21 struck design ed to make all men of the oloth mere tools of the State. Robbe d of their indepe ndence , they were to be reduce d to puppe ts by having to qualify for office on the same basis as all other public jobhol ders. Their salary, payme nt for lodgin g, and for the educat ion of their children in the case of the non-C atholic s, all were pll't on the level of State employ ees. The admin istrati on was to approve all appoin tments to office and be free to refuse a candid ate on "politi cal" ground . Such appoin ltment s are not valid accord ing to church law but it is relativ ely easy for the Red regime to fool a simple pavish ioner into bel'ieving that they are. In order to functio n as priest or preacih er, in church or other religio us society , the person in questi on must take an oath which reads : "I will suppo rt the govern ment with every means in my power ." Since the bishop s realize d that a segme nt of the priests would be accept ing govern ment pay they consen ted, approv ing the oath with the follow ing provis o: Insofa r as it would not conflic t with God's rights and Churc h rights. The bishop s themse lves decline d to accept State pay. How about religio us instruc tion in Czedh o-Slov akia? As such, it is not forbid den. It may on~y be given to those childre n, howev er, whose father s have submi tted a writte n reques t for it to the school princip al. Again the scare tactic is used, since fhe author ities know thaJt many a parent will refrain from submi tting such a petitio n lest pressu re be exert ed on him by P rty functio naries , threat ening loss of job or the like. A second type of scare tactic is tlhe fact that often the very person s selecte d to give tlhe religio us instruc tion are in reality loyal Comm unists. With the State reser~ ing the right to say who can or cannol t be priests and minist ers of the gospel , it will natura Hy choose for instruc tion in religio us doctrin e such clergy men who are willing to compr omise. Anoth er facet of the intimi dation tactic is the placin g in t'he path of those wlho remain loyal to tlheir religio us upbrin ging obstac les to their higher educat ion. The family attitud e itself is impor tant in mould ing the attitude of the child, and strong religio us familie s are natura lly consid ered a block to the spread ing of Comm unist ideas. 22 SLOVAKIA Once the Reds succeeded in liquidating the "unteachables," those who refused to follow the Party line, the remaining mmisters and priests had three paths to choose f.rom: (1) They could become ideological and practical collaborators with Communism, the road traveled by Jan Plojhar, a Catholic priest who, it is said, never wanted to be a priest in the first place, or Josef Hromadka, a Lutheran minister and Vice-President of the World Council of Reformed Churches (2). Like Archbishop Beran, having learned that compromise cannot work, this growp have become members of a resistance movement, (3) are those who have fallen in line with tfhe masses and when in Rome, do as the Romans do. Down through history persecutions have led to a deepening of religious life. In Czecho-Slovakia the government has had little success with its efforts to promote a substitute for religious activity in the form of youth initiation ceremonies, name-giving and the like. Perhaps an old Czech adage is again proving to be right: "When the spirit is drunk, God is forgotten. Only when trouble comes do we really learn to know Him." • • • NEW STRICTURES ON BENES Karl Kem Even outside Sudeten German circles Edward Benes' political genius is gradually being recognized for tfhe mere legend that it was. Czech hisltorians, too, are beginning to contribute to the truth. Josef Korbel's report "The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1945" is additional proof to that effect. The book has received much publicity. MaJlmo's leading Swedish newspa,per Arbetet has published a lengthy review of it. 'l'lhe Neue Zurcher Zeitung takes ponderous stock of some of the mistakes made by Benes, "that shrewd diplomat," at a time when judicious people clearly foresaw "where friendship with Moscow would lead him and his country." The review in Arbetet was written by the young Fm.n Jorn Donner. The author who spent some weeks in Prague  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Churches in a Vise Description An account of the resource Frances McPoyne Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 7 (32), September-December 1960 pp. 18-22 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource McPoyne, Frances Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1960 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/300872b1fc16055c2aec32c5cd361906.pdf 995df54c6ac5008b178fc60e105406cc PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA A VOICE FOR SWVAK.IA James McVann He stood about five feet ten, angular, and with the tenseness marked in so many priests who have fled from Communist countries. We met in Albany, N. Y ., at the home of Father B. Culver Alford, a diocesan official and a friend from Roman days. When I was introduced to the stranger, my curiosity rose at the announcement that this Father Augustin Zan came from Slovakia, where he had been assistant to Monsignor Tiso; later for six years he worked as the Papal Relief Mission's representative to Slovak D. P.'s throughout Germany and Austria. "Here was a man to interview. My first question had to do with the antecedents of Father Zan (prounonced Zan-yeh). He replied in an English by no means faultless but very good for one in this country only a year. "Forty-one years ago I was born at Prievidza, a Slovakian village in the foothills of the Carpathians. Prievidza means 'long view'; our village got the name because in old times there the government guards could see down the roads that went straight into the forests. "My seminary education was obtained at Nitra, ancient capital of Slovakia." Tiso The next question had to do with Monsignor Joseph Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic from 1939 to 1945, who was hanged in 1947 by the Red government of Prague. "How did Monsignor Tiso come to power?" "He succeeded Monsignor Andrew IIlinka as head of what was called the H'linka Party. When Slovakia, freed from the Czech government by the Nazi occupation of Bohemia, set up its own republic, Monsignor Tiso was elected president by the free votes of the country." "Wasn't Slovakia occupied by Hitler like the rest of Czechoslovakia?" �SLOVAKIA "No," he emphasized. "We stayed free. All during the war my country had neither German nor Russian occupation." "What sort of man was Tiso?" "He was a courageous - what do you call it? straight out, no speaking around." "Forthright?" "Forthright. He was a man prepared at all times to die. The Nazis tried to assassinate him at Bratislava in 1944. He had refused to let Slova,k soldiers be taken into the German army. When eleven American pilots were downed in Slovakia combatting Nazi fliers, he refused to give them up to Germany and spirited them to freedom via Jugoslavia. "Then the Reds pressed him to form a Soviet Slovak Republic. He refused, knowing they would take his life when the Allies won." "What was your own relation to Tiso?" I next asked. "Were you his political secretary or lieutenant?" "Oh, no. From 1938 to 1939 I was assistant - what you call curate - in the parish where he was pastor, at Banovce. All week Tiso was head of the government. On Sunday he came bacik to be priest of his people." "But why did he, a priest, accept the Presidency?" "He didn't want to. Sfovakia was under Nazi domination - four million against fifty million. What could they do? Tiso knew his position was almost impossible. But he accepted because he wanted to do all he could for his country. Once the West condemned him for things he had to do. They know better now. He was a great hero." Papal Almoner "Were you with him when he was executed?" "I had fled. A year before Monsignor Tiso died, the Catholic underground sent me a letter saying that the Reds had decided to hang me. The underground helped me to escape into the American zone of Austria." "Then what?" "Return to Slovakia was out of the question. I determined- to help my people - thousands of them - who were refugees in Western Germany and Austria. With the �SLOVAKIA aid of Archbishop Carlo Chiarlo, head of the Third Papal Relief Mission to G€rmany, I was appointed to look after Slovaks in eighty centers." "What was your work?" "Spiritual, charitable - not political. I tried to provide them with priests, sacraments and money raised by the Papal Relief. For that I made a hundred trips to Germany. Seventeen Slovak exile priests helped me. The Holy Father gave me the power to confer Confirmation. " "Why do you say your work was not political?" "As a priest and delegate of the Pope's charitable agency, I avoided politics. The nearest to political action I approached was when, on behalf of the Holy See, I questioned Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian refugees about church conditions in their country." Immigrant I asked him next how he came to the United States. "I knew I couJd get no help from the IRO - International Relief Organization - because some of their agents opposed my religious work. So I went direct to the American consulate at Salzburg, where I obtained entry not as a refugee official but strictly in terms of American immigration law. "Monsignor Emil Komora of New York, director of the Catholic Committee for Refugees, was helpful. And I am grateful to Bishop Gib.hons for admitting me to his diocese. They helped me to come to this nice country." I smiled a,t the little touch of newcomer's English, "nice country," Father Zan's one lapse in an otherwise good performance. The questions continued. "Why did you come to America?" "To work among the Slovaks here. There are two million in the United States and one million in Canada. And to obtain assistance for our unhappy people back home." "Tell me of your people's unhappiness " Intrepid Faith He leaned back in his chair, like a man recollecting-. "You will have to be patient with me a little if you would �SLOVAKIA 43 understand my nation's plight. We Slovaks are proud of our religious history - the oldest Christian nation in Central Europe, dating back from the fifth century. Then in 863 the great saints Cyril and Methodius came from Constantinople and renewed the Catholicism not only of the Slovaks but of all the various Slavic nations - Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croatians, Slovenes - as well as the Hungarians. "Though Slovakia lost its political independence in the eleventh century, it never let go its national consciousness. No, not even under the domination of the Prague government when the regimes of Masaryk and Benes, violating the autonomy assured Slovakia by Wilson at Versailles, forced on us a Czech control in government, police, and education. "So when Hitler took over Bohemia and Moravia, our people seized the chance and proclaimed their Independent Republic. Until 1945 the country was free of occupation. In the war it took sides with Nazi Germany by defending its borders against Russia; there could be no neutrality with godless Communism. "In the Red invasion many towns and villages were razed to the ground (the way the Nazis had razed Lidice ) . Women were raped, about thirty thousand Slovaks were deported to Siberia. Thousands more fled to the West. "Then when the Reds took control at Prague, the Slovaks voted 70 per cent against Communism. For that they have been persecuted by the so-called People's Courts. It is essentially a religious persecution, as the whole question of Central Europe is a religious question. "Now all churches and clergy are under Red supervision No priest may preach anything but state-issued bullet ins. Catholic education has been turned over to Marxism. The seminary at Bratislava has only Communist youth who go out passing for priests until the people detect them in their Marxist doctrine and walk out on their sermons. Every bishop is in prison or under house arrest. So severe is their confinement that they cannot go to confession except in the presence of a Red observer - · and they must confess in Slovak for him to understand. A thousand' priests are �SLOVAKIA in concentration camps, forced to ]31bor in mines and factories." I interupted him to ask, "Are any priests being sent to Siberia ?" "So far they are being kept in Slovakia. But Catholic laymen are sent to concentration camps. "Has this weakened the faith of the people?" "On the contrary." he replied with a touch of pride, "their faith is stronger. They fill the churches. Since the government seizes all Church collections, they support the clergy privately." Voice of Hope "Are you in a position now to help your nation?" "To some extent. To needy priests I send Mass stipends. and the money I collect for the people is transmitted to Father Vojtech Bucko, my successor as delegate to the Slovak exiles in Europe. We both shifted in our chairs for the last question. "Father Zan, what do you hope for your country?" "I hope Slovakia will be free again I hope it will have the same freedom as America, to worship God and decide its own affairs." - (INFORMATION, Dec. 1952). • • • • • WHO SAi D IT? - "However close the original bonds (between the Slovaks and the Czechs) may have been, the ten centuries during which the Slovaks formed a part of the kingdom of Hungary, while the ,Czechs were subjected to German and Austrian influences, naturally ' brought .. about a marked differentation between the two peoples. Even the physical stocks CaJ'iilOt be so closely related today as they were a thousand years ago, for the Czechs are today inextricably mingled with German elements, while the Slovak mountaineers have retained their racial purity to a larger degree . . . . 'l'he.re is, however, a noticeable difference both in physical appearance and in character between the dour, efficient, but somewhat ungainly Czech, and the airy, talkative, happy-go-lucky Slovak." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London) . • WHO SAID IT? "Slovakia has never been too happy in its union with Bohemia and Moravia in the synthetic Czechoslovak state. The Masaryk-Benes Government sentenced Dr. Vojtech Tuka to fifteen years imprisonment in 1928 for ,ieparatlsm. The Benes-Gottwald Government hanged Monsignor Tiso for the same offense in 1947, and Clementls Is to be tried for it In 1951." - (John MacCormac, The NEW YORK TIMES, 3-3-51). � SLOVAKIA A VOICE FOR SWVAK.IA James McVann He stood about five feet ten, angular, and with the tenseness marked in so many priests who have fled from Communist countries. We met in Albany, N. Y ., at the home of Father B. Culver Alford, a diocesan official and a friend from Roman days. When I was introduced to the stranger, my curiosity rose at the announcement that this Father Augustin Zan came from Slovakia, where he had been assistant to Monsignor Tiso; later for six years he worked as the Papal Relief Mission's representative to Slovak D. P.'s throughout Germany and Austria. "Here was a man to interview. My first question had to do with the antecedents of Father Zan (prounonced Zan-yeh). He replied in an English by no means faultless but very good for one in this country only a year. "Forty-one years ago I was born at Prievidza, a Slovakian village in the foothills of the Carpathians. Prievidza means 'long view'; our village got the name because in old times there the government guards could see down the roads that went straight into the forests. "My seminary education was obtained at Nitra, ancient capital of Slovakia." Tiso The next question had to do with Monsignor Joseph Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic from 1939 to 1945, who was hanged in 1947 by the Red government of Prague. "How did Monsignor Tiso come to power?" "He succeeded Monsignor Andrew IIlinka as head of what was called the H'linka Party. When Slovakia, freed from the Czech government by the Nazi occupation of Bohemia, set up its own republic, Monsignor Tiso was elected president by the free votes of the country." "Wasn't Slovakia occupied by Hitler like the rest of Czechoslovakia?" �SLOVAKIA "No," he emphasized. "We stayed free. All during the war my country had neither German nor Russian occupation." "What sort of man was Tiso?" "He was a courageous - what do you call it? straight out, no speaking around." "Forthright?" "Forthright. He was a man prepared at all times to die. The Nazis tried to assassinate him at Bratislava in 1944. He had refused to let Slova,k soldiers be taken into the German army. When eleven American pilots were downed in Slovakia combatting Nazi fliers, he refused to give them up to Germany and spirited them to freedom via Jugoslavia. "Then the Reds pressed him to form a Soviet Slovak Republic. He refused, knowing they would take his life when the Allies won." "What was your own relation to Tiso?" I next asked. "Were you his political secretary or lieutenant?" "Oh, no. From 1938 to 1939 I was assistant - what you call curate - in the parish where he was pastor, at Banovce. All week Tiso was head of the government. On Sunday he came bacik to be priest of his people." "But why did he, a priest, accept the Presidency?" "He didn't want to. Sfovakia was under Nazi domination - four million against fifty million. What could they do? Tiso knew his position was almost impossible. But he accepted because he wanted to do all he could for his country. Once the West condemned him for things he had to do. They know better now. He was a great hero." Papal Almoner "Were you with him when he was executed?" "I had fled. A year before Monsignor Tiso died, the Catholic underground sent me a letter saying that the Reds had decided to hang me. The underground helped me to escape into the American zone of Austria." "Then what?" "Return to Slovakia was out of the question. I determined- to help my people - thousands of them - who were refugees in Western Germany and Austria. With the �SLOVAKIA aid of Archbishop Carlo Chiarlo, head of the Third Papal Relief Mission to G€rmany, I was appointed to look after Slovaks in eighty centers." "What was your work?" "Spiritual, charitable - not political. I tried to provide them with priests, sacraments and money raised by the Papal Relief. For that I made a hundred trips to Germany. Seventeen Slovak exile priests helped me. The Holy Father gave me the power to confer Confirmation. " "Why do you say your work was not political?" "As a priest and delegate of the Pope's charitable agency, I avoided politics. The nearest to political action I approached was when, on behalf of the Holy See, I questioned Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian refugees about church conditions in their country." Immigrant I asked him next how he came to the United States. "I knew I couJd get no help from the IRO - International Relief Organization - because some of their agents opposed my religious work. So I went direct to the American consulate at Salzburg, where I obtained entry not as a refugee official but strictly in terms of American immigration law. "Monsignor Emil Komora of New York, director of the Catholic Committee for Refugees, was helpful. And I am grateful to Bishop Gib.hons for admitting me to his diocese. They helped me to come to this nice country." I smiled a,t the little touch of newcomer's English, "nice country," Father Zan's one lapse in an otherwise good performance. The questions continued. "Why did you come to America?" "To work among the Slovaks here. There are two million in the United States and one million in Canada. And to obtain assistance for our unhappy people back home." "Tell me of your people's unhappiness " Intrepid Faith He leaned back in his chair, like a man recollecting-. "You will have to be patient with me a little if you would �SLOVAKIA 43 understand my nation's plight. We Slovaks are proud of our religious history - the oldest Christian nation in Central Europe, dating back from the fifth century. Then in 863 the great saints Cyril and Methodius came from Constantinople and renewed the Catholicism not only of the Slovaks but of all the various Slavic nations - Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croatians, Slovenes - as well as the Hungarians. "Though Slovakia lost its political independence in the eleventh century, it never let go its national consciousness. No, not even under the domination of the Prague government when the regimes of Masaryk and Benes, violating the autonomy assured Slovakia by Wilson at Versailles, forced on us a Czech control in government, police, and education. "So when Hitler took over Bohemia and Moravia, our people seized the chance and proclaimed their Independent Republic. Until 1945 the country was free of occupation. In the war it took sides with Nazi Germany by defending its borders against Russia; there could be no neutrality with godless Communism. "In the Red invasion many towns and villages were razed to the ground (the way the Nazis had razed Lidice ) . Women were raped, about thirty thousand Slovaks were deported to Siberia. Thousands more fled to the West. "Then when the Reds took control at Prague, the Slovaks voted 70 per cent against Communism. For that they have been persecuted by the so-called People's Courts. It is essentially a religious persecution, as the whole question of Central Europe is a religious question. "Now all churches and clergy are under Red supervision No priest may preach anything but state-issued bullet ins. Catholic education has been turned over to Marxism. The seminary at Bratislava has only Communist youth who go out passing for priests until the people detect them in their Marxist doctrine and walk out on their sermons. Every bishop is in prison or under house arrest. So severe is their confinement that they cannot go to confession except in the presence of a Red observer - · and they must confess in Slovak for him to understand. A thousand' priests are �SLOVAKIA in concentration camps, forced to ]31bor in mines and factories." I interupted him to ask, "Are any priests being sent to Siberia ?" "So far they are being kept in Slovakia. But Catholic laymen are sent to concentration camps. "Has this weakened the faith of the people?" "On the contrary." he replied with a touch of pride, "their faith is stronger. They fill the churches. Since the government seizes all Church collections, they support the clergy privately." Voice of Hope "Are you in a position now to help your nation?" "To some extent. To needy priests I send Mass stipends. and the money I collect for the people is transmitted to Father Vojtech Bucko, my successor as delegate to the Slovak exiles in Europe. We both shifted in our chairs for the last question. "Father Zan, what do you hope for your country?" "I hope Slovakia will be free again I hope it will have the same freedom as America, to worship God and decide its own affairs." - (INFORMATION, Dec. 1952). • • • • • WHO SAi D IT? - "However close the original bonds (between the Slovaks and the Czechs) may have been, the ten centuries during which the Slovaks formed a part of the kingdom of Hungary, while the ,Czechs were subjected to German and Austrian influences, naturally ' brought .. about a marked differentation between the two peoples. Even the physical stocks CaJ'iilOt be so closely related today as they were a thousand years ago, for the Czechs are today inextricably mingled with German elements, while the Slovak mountaineers have retained their racial purity to a larger degree . . . . 'l'he.re is, however, a noticeable difference both in physical appearance and in character between the dour, efficient, but somewhat ungainly Czech, and the airy, talkative, happy-go-lucky Slovak." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London) . • WHO SAID IT? "Slovakia has never been too happy in its union with Bohemia and Moravia in the synthetic Czechoslovak state. The Masaryk-Benes Government sentenced Dr. Vojtech Tuka to fifteen years imprisonment in 1928 for ,ieparatlsm. The Benes-Gottwald Government hanged Monsignor Tiso for the same offense in 1947, and Clementls Is to be tried for it In 1951." - (John MacCormac, The NEW YORK TIMES, 3-3-51). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA A VOICE FOR SLOVAKIA James McVann He stood about five feet ten, angular, and with the tenseness marked in so many priests who have fled from Communist countries. We met in Albany, N. Y ., at the home of Father B. Culver Alford, a diocesan official and a friend from Roman days. When I was introduced to the stranger, my curiosity rose at the announcement that this Father Augustin Zan came from Slovakia, where he had been assistant to Monsignor Tiso; later for six years he worked as the Papal Relief Mission's representative to Slovak D. P.'s throughout Germany and Austria. "Here was a man to interview. My first question had to do with the antecedents of Father Zan (prounonced Zan-yeh). He replied in an English by no means faultless but very good for one in this country only a year. "Forty-one years ago I was born at Prievidza, a Slovakian village in the foothills of the Carpathians. Prievidza means 'long view'; our village got the name because in old times there the government guards could see down the roads that went straight into the forests. "My seminary education was obtained at Nitra, ancient capital of Slovakia." Tiso The next question had to do with Monsignor Joseph Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic from 1939 to 1945, who was hanged in 1947 by the Red government of Prague. "How did Monsignor Tiso come to power?" "He succeeded Monsignor Andrew IIlinka as head of what was called the H'linka Party. When Slovakia, freed from the Czech government by the Nazi occupation of Bohemia, set up its own republic, Monsignor Tiso was elected president by the free votes of the country." "Wasn't Slovakia occupied by Hitler like the rest of Czechoslovakia?" SLOVAKIA "No," he emphasized. "We stayed free. All during the war my country had neither German nor Russian occupation." "What sort of man was Tiso?" "He was a courageous - what do you call it? straight out, no speaking around." "Forthright?" "Forthright. He was a man prepared at all times to die. The Nazis tried to assassinate him at Bratislava in 1944. He had refused to let Slova,k soldiers be taken into the German army. When eleven American pilots were downed in Slovakia combatting Nazi fliers, he refused to give them up to Germany and spirited them to freedom via Jugoslavia. "Then the Reds pressed him to form a Soviet Slovak Republic. He refused, knowing they would take his life when the Allies won." "What was your own relation to Tiso?" I next asked. "Were you his political secretary or lieutenant?" "Oh, no. From 1938 to 1939 I was assistant - what you call curate - in the parish where he was pastor, at Banovce. All week Tiso was head of the government. On Sunday he came bacik to be priest of his people." "But why did he, a priest, accept the Presidency?" "He didn't want to. Sfovakia was under Nazi domination - four million against fifty million. What could they do? Tiso knew his position was almost impossible. But he accepted because he wanted to do all he could for his country. Once the West condemned him for things he had to do. They know better now. He was a great hero." Papal Almoner "Were you with him when he was executed?" "I had fled. A year before Monsignor Tiso died, the Catholic underground sent me a letter saying that the Reds had decided to hang me. The underground helped me to escape into the American zone of Austria." "Then what?" "Return to Slovakia was out of the question. I determined- to help my people - thousands of them - who were refugees in Western Germany and Austria. With the SLOVAKIA aid of Archbishop Carlo Chiarlo, head of the Third Papal Relief Mission to G€rmany, I was appointed to look after Slovaks in eighty centers." "What was your work?" "Spiritual, charitable - not political. I tried to provide them with priests, sacraments and money raised by the Papal Relief. For that I made a hundred trips to Germany. Seventeen Slovak exile priests helped me. The Holy Father gave me the power to confer Confirmation. " "Why do you say your work was not political?" "As a priest and delegate of the Pope's charitable agency, I avoided politics. The nearest to political action I approached was when, on behalf of the Holy See, I questioned Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian refugees about church conditions in their country." Immigrant I asked him next how he came to the United States. "I knew I couJd get no help from the IRO - International Relief Organization - because some of their agents opposed my religious work. So I went direct to the American consulate at Salzburg, where I obtained entry not as a refugee official but strictly in terms of American immigration law. "Monsignor Emil Komora of New York, director of the Catholic Committee for Refugees, was helpful. And I am grateful to Bishop Gib.hons for admitting me to his diocese. They helped me to come to this nice country." I smiled a,t the little touch of newcomer's English, "nice country," Father Zan's one lapse in an otherwise good performance. The questions continued. "Why did you come to America?" "To work among the Slovaks here. There are two million in the United States and one million in Canada. And to obtain assistance for our unhappy people back home." "Tell me of your people's unhappiness " Intrepid Faith He leaned back in his chair, like a man recollecting-. "You will have to be patient with me a little if you would SLOVAKIA 43 understand my nation's plight. We Slovaks are proud of our religious history - the oldest Christian nation in Central Europe, dating back from the fifth century. Then in 863 the great saints Cyril and Methodius came from Constantinople and renewed the Catholicism not only of the Slovaks but of all the various Slavic nations - Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croatians, Slovenes - as well as the Hungarians. "Though Slovakia lost its political independence in the eleventh century, it never let go its national consciousness. No, not even under the domination of the Prague government when the regimes of Masaryk and Benes, violating the autonomy assured Slovakia by Wilson at Versailles, forced on us a Czech control in government, police, and education. "So when Hitler took over Bohemia and Moravia, our people seized the chance and proclaimed their Independent Republic. Until 1945 the country was free of occupation. In the war it took sides with Nazi Germany by defending its borders against Russia; there could be no neutrality with godless Communism. "In the Red invasion many towns and villages were razed to the ground (the way the Nazis had razed Lidice ) . Women were raped, about thirty thousand Slovaks were deported to Siberia. Thousands more fled to the West. "Then when the Reds took control at Prague, the Slovaks voted 70 per cent against Communism. For that they have been persecuted by the so-called People's Courts. It is essentially a religious persecution, as the whole question of Central Europe is a religious question. "Now all churches and clergy are under Red supervision No priest may preach anything but state-issued bullet ins. Catholic education has been turned over to Marxism. The seminary at Bratislava has only Communist youth who go out passing for priests until the people detect them in their Marxist doctrine and walk out on their sermons. Every bishop is in prison or under house arrest. So severe is their confinement that they cannot go to confession except in the presence of a Red observer - · and they must confess in Slovak for him to understand. A thousand' priests are SLOVAKIA in concentration camps, forced to ]31bor in mines and factories." I interupted him to ask, "Are any priests being sent to Siberia ?" "So far they are being kept in Slovakia. But Catholic laymen are sent to concentration camps. "Has this weakened the faith of the people?" "On the contrary." he replied with a touch of pride, "their faith is stronger. They fill the churches. Since the government seizes all Church collections, they support the clergy privately." Voice of Hope "Are you in a position now to help your nation?" "To some extent. To needy priests I send Mass stipends. and the money I collect for the people is transmitted to Father Vojtech Bucko, my successor as delegate to the Slovak exiles in Europe. We both shifted in our chairs for the last question. "Father Zan, what do you hope for your country?" "I hope Slovakia will be free again I hope it will have the same freedom as America, to worship God and decide its own affairs." - (INFORMATION, Dec. 1952). • • • • • WHO SAi D IT? - "However close the original bonds (between the Slovaks and the Czechs) may have been, the ten centuries during which the Slovaks formed a part of the kingdom of Hungary, while the ,Czechs were subjected to German and Austrian influences, naturally ' brought .. about a marked differentation between the two peoples. Even the physical stocks CaJ'iilOt be so closely related today as they were a thousand years ago, for the Czechs are today inextricably mingled with German elements, while the Slovak mountaineers have retained their racial purity to a larger degree . . . . 'l'he.re is, however, a noticeable difference both in physical appearance and in character between the dour, efficient, but somewhat ungainly Czech, and the airy, talkative, happy-go-lucky Slovak." (C. A. Macartney: HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London) . • WHO SAID IT? "Slovakia has never been too happy in its union with Bohemia and Moravia in the synthetic Czechoslovak state. The Masaryk-Benes Government sentenced Dr. Vojtech Tuka to fifteen years imprisonment in 1928 for ,ieparatlsm. The Benes-Gottwald Government hanged Monsignor Tiso for the same offense in 1947, and Clementls Is to be tried for it In 1951." - (John MacCormac, The NEW YORK TIMES, 3-3-51).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Voice for Slovakia Description An account of the resource James McVann Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 40-44 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource McVann, James Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b418d6362b5374e999cecdce2273fecc.pdf 44016909e30ed47f43f76d674c578c5b PDF Text Text 66 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA, 1941-1945 1 Miroslav Michela The foreign policy of Slovakia in the years 1939 - 1945 has been quite a popular research topic of Slovak historians over the last ten to twenty years. 2 Significant achievements in this regard relate primarily to research on Slovak-German relations,3 but there are also several 1 1 would like to express my gratitude to prof. Mark Stolarik and his family for significant help in my research on Slovak emigres, and especially on the biography of Slovak journalist and politician Karol Murgas. My research in the Slovak collections in the Archives and Special Collections of the University of Ottawa Library would not have been possible without the support of the Helen and John lvanco Memorial Research Bursary. 2 Here I would like to list a few publications, which appeared in recent years, mostly as a result of long-term academic interest: Michal Schvarc, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945 a jej postavenie v ramci nemeckej sfery vplyvu," in Kfucove problemy modernych slovenskych dejin 1848-1992, ed. Valerian Bystricky et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 231-52; Edita lvanickova et. al. , Slovenslui republika 1939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2012); Pavo! Petruf, Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945: nacrt problematiky (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2011); James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3 For example: Sicherheitsdienst a Slovens/ca v rokach 1938-1944: od auton6mie po Povstanie. Slovensky stat vo vybranych spravach SD od jesene 1943 do septembra 1944, ed. Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Slovenske narodne muzeum-Muzeum karpatskych Nemcov, 2006) ; "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu;dokumenty. /., ed. Michal Schvarc, Martin Holak and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, SNM- Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2008); "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu : dokumenty. II. ed. Michal Schvarc and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, Historicky ustav SAV, SNM - Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2010) ; Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1941 v dokumentoch I.:od Mnichova k vojne proti ZSSR , ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky et. al. (Presov: Universum, 2009); Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1941-1945 v dokumentoch II. :od vojny proti ZSSR po zanik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945, ed. Eduard Niznansky et. al. (Presov: Universum-EU, 20 11); Von Munchen bis Salzburg 1938- 1940. Dokumente und Essay. Buch 1. Buch 2. Slovensko v jeseni 1944, ed. Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Luc, 2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politi- �SLOVAKIA 67 studies concerning the relationship between Slovakia and the Great Powers .4 In the context of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, plenty of studies are oriented on the Slovak-Polish and Slovak-Hungarian relationships at different levels of politics.5 In the last decade studies relating to Slovak-Croatian diplomatic relations have also appeared. 6 Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politischer Al/tag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn (Paderbom : Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003 ). 4 For example: Politicke vzt'ahy medzi Francuzskom a Ceskoslovenskom a Francuzskom a Slovenskom (1 939-1948): vyber dokumentov, ed. Pavo! Petruf (Martin: Matica slovenska, 2003); Dagmar Ciema-Lantayova, Pohfady na vychod: Postoje k Rusku v slovenskej politike 1934-1944 (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Slavomir Michalek, "Niekol'ko problemov slovensko-americkych vzt'ahov pocas druhej svetovej vojny," in Edita Ivanickova et. al. Slovenska republiko /939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach, 139-61 ; Petr Kubik, Slovensko-talianske vzt'ahy 1939-1945 (Bratislava: Ustav pamiiti naroda, 20 IO); Edita Ivanickova, "Zapadne vel'moci a slovensky stat 1939-1945," in Slovensky stat 1939-1945: predstavy a reality, eds. Martina Fiamova, Jan Hlavinka and Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2014), 8193 . 5 Here is a sample of some interesting works by young scholars: Aliaksandr Piahanau, "Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Mirror of the German-Soviet Conflictive Alliance (1939-1941 )," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 16 (2012): 144-63; Isvtan Janek, "The Issue of Hungarian- Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939- 1940," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 18 (2014): 128-41 ; Istvan Janek, "Mad'arsko-slovenske diplomaticke vzt'ahy v rokoch 1939-1941 , " in Slovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, IV. , eds. Michal Smigel' and Peter Micko (Banska Bystrica: Katedra hist6rie Fakulty humanitnych vied Univerzity Mateja Bela, 2005 ), 334-51 ; Mateusz Gniazdowski, "Kontakty PHsudczyk6w ze Slowakami w latach 19391945," Niepodleglosi: 55 (2005): I 07-50; Dusan Seges, "The Slovak Question and its International Context during World War Two," in 1945 - A Break with the Past, ed. Zdenko Cepic (Ljubljana: Institut za novejso zgodovino, 2008), 213-26; Dusan Seges, Dvojkrii v silociarach bieleho or/a. Slovenska otazka v politike pol'skej exi/ovej vlady za 2. svetovej vojny (Bratislava: Veda, 2009); Holy Case, "The Holocaust in Regional Perspective: Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia," in Varieties of Anti-Semitism, eds . Peter Kenez and Bruce Thompson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 76-92. 6 Jan Rychlik, "Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy v letech 1941-1945 ," Slovanske historicke studie 26 (2000): 265-83 ; Miroslav Michela, "Vznik slovenskeho vyslanectva v Chorvatsku a cinnost' Karola Murgasa, charge d 'affaires v Zahrebe v roku 1941 ," in Slovenska republika 1939 - 1945 ocami mladych historikov fl , ed. Martin Lacko (Bratislava: Merkury, 2003), 97-123 ; Miroslav Michela, "K otazke slovensko-chorvatskej kulturnej spoluprace v rokoch 1941-45," Slavica Slovaca 38 (2003): 112-22; Jan Tkac, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske a slovensko-chorvatske vzt'ahy �68 SLOVAKIA-2015 se works are mainly focused on the issues of diplomacy and the traditional history of politics. They describe the ideas and activities of major political players, thus complementing our knowledge about the process of negotiating and building the "New Europe." 7 The present study aims primarily to explain a few basic factors in the context of building official Slovak-Croatian cultural cooperation in the period from 1941 to 1945 . The foundation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH) on April 10th, 1941 resulted in the expansion of cultural interaction between it and the newly- independent Slovak Republic, as the representatives of both states shared similar experiences of national struggles and now ideological and political interests. The Slovak Republic officially recognized the NDH on v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Historicky zbornik 19 (2009): 154-68; Jan Tkac, "Chorvatsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941-1945," Historicky casopis 58 (2010): 659-83 ; Alena Bartlova, "Dr. Jozef Cieker, vyslanec Slovenskej republiky," in Dr. Jozef Cieker: seminar pri prileiitosti nedoi itym 90. narodenincim Jozefa Ciekera v Tvrdosine 20. juna 1997, ed. Juraj Chovan-Rehak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2000), 71-92; Jan Jankovic, Chorvcitska literatura v slovenskej kulture If. (19391948), (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Jan Jankovic, Stanis/av Meciar - chorvatofil (Bratislava: Ustav svetovej literatury SAV, 2001); Martin Jarinkovic, "Pohl'ad slovenskej dennej tlace na chorvatsku otazku v rokoch 1941-1944," in Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov VIII, ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2009), 261-88; Martin Jarinkovic, "Spolkovy zivot v prvej Slovenskej republike na priklade Slovenskochorvatskej spolocnosti v rokoch 1942-1944," in Zivot v Slovenskej republike. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov 9., ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda 2010), 305-24; Oldfich Pejs, "Nakup koni v Chorvatsku pro slovenskou armadu v roce 1944," Vojenskci hist6ria 8 (2004): 87-95; Oldfich Pejs, "Na okraj dodavky slovenskych zbrani do Chorvatska v roce 1942," Historie a vojenstvi 45 (1996): 56-73 . 7 See the following : Michal Schvarc, "Statna suverenita len ako fasada? Zasahy Nemecka do slovenskeho zakonodarstva v rokoch 1939-1940," in Slovensko v labyrinte modernych eur6pskych dejin : pocta historikov Milanovi Zemkovi, ed . Slavomir Michalek (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 20 14), 641-57; Pavo) Petruf, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskeho statu 1939-1945 : niekol'ko poznamok o jej vzniku, zamerani a kratkodobej existencii," in Riesenie iidovskej otcizky v spojeneckych krajincich nacistickeho Nemecka, ed. Viera Kovacova et. al. (Banska Bystrica: Muzeum Slovenskeho narodneho povstania, 20 12), 17-29; Pavo I Petruf, "Terna "novej Eur6py", "noveho eur6pskeho poriadku" a "zivotneho priestoru" na strankach novin Slovak ( I 939-1940)," in Kapitoly z hist6rie stredoeur6pskeho priestoru v 19. a 20. storoci: pocta k 70-rocnemu jubileu Dusana Kovcica, ed. Edita Ivanickova et. al. (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 201 I), 338-54. �SLOVAKIA 69 May 5th, 194 l along with other Axis members and satellites - Germany, Italy and Hungary. 8 The NDH's political role in the "New Europe" was outlined in the Treaty of Rome, signed on May 18, 194 l, which established long-term Italian patronage. After Croatia gained its sovereignty, this subordination was immediately subject to much domestic criticism. During the following Croatian-Slovak diplomatic discussions, both parties set out a preferred vision of German rather than Italian supervision, seeing in Nazi Germany a common protector and liberator and also admiring the state and the Flihrer. In May of 194 l the government of the Slovak Republic surprisingly appointed the radical Karol Murgas, as its charge d'affaires to Croatia. The request was officially delivered by German authorities, as there was no direct contact between the two parties at that time. 9 Murgas had no diplomatic experience and was known for his awkward and hot-tempered behavior in public, which might have caused some hesitation, but his paramilitary experience in the Hlinka Guard and his demonstrated sympathy for Croatian nationalists made their mark. Murgas himself saw the move as an attempt to remove him from Slovak domestic politics, as he had previously enjoyed the prominent post of head of the Department of Propaganda. 10 In May of 194 l Viliam Kovar, the distinguished Slovak journalist, visited Croatia. During his stay he met influential statesmen and leaders of the Ustasha movement and examined the potential for mu- 8 Croatia - Congratulations of president Jozef Tiso, file 1300/41 , box 61 , collection Kancelaria prezidenta republiky - Slovensky narodny archiv (SNA) - Bratislava. For more about Slovak-Yugoslav relations see: Jan Nemecek, "K slovensko-jugoslavskym vztahum 1939-45," in Evropa mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem. Sbornik praci k sedmdesatinam Jaroslava Valenty, eds. Miroslav Sestak and Emil Voracek (Praha: Historicky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, 2000), 385-98; Martin Jarinkovic, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske hospodarske a obchodne kontakty v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Pamdt' naroda 7 (20 11 ): 4-17. 9 S/ovak, May 11, I 941, 3. Zagreb's official approval of Murgas's mission came on May 15, but information ' s about it had already appeared in Grenzebote on the 4th of May 1941. For this question see also: File 79/41 , Box 1155 and File 77/41 , Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 10 See: Miroslav Michela, "Miesto a uloha Karola Murgasa v radikalnom prude slovenskej politiky v obdobi rokov 1939-1941 ," in S/ovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, ed. Martin Lacko (Trnava : Katedra hist6rie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Cyrila a Metoda, 2002), 77-105 . �70 SLOVAKIA-2015 tual cultural cooperation. 11 In a letter to his colleague Stanislav Meciar, the editor- in-chief of the journal Slovenske pohl'ady, Kovar suggested sending a series of congratulatory letters on Croatia's independence to demonstrate Slovak sympathy and support. 12 Meciar was known to be a Croatophile and ardent admirer of writer and politician Mile Budak, who later became Minister of Education and Religion of the newly-founded NDH. 13 In a letter dated May 23, Meciar asserted the brotherhood of both nations and expressed satisfaction with both countries' successful completion of the struggle for independence. In his words, "Croats were a sincere nation close to us" and "the future of Slovakia will be much safer when developed in tandem with the present beautiful reality of Croatia." 14 Such declarations of sympathy were common in contemporary formal communications and were not deemed awkward . The Slovak press continuously monitored the Croatian struggle for independence and dedicated significant space to discussions with Croat emancipation activists : the Ustasha and Hlinka Guard officials; and to both nations' notable historical figures, such as Ljudevit Gaj , Ban Jelacic and Ante Starcevic on the one hand, and Jan Kollar, Stefan Moyzes and Andrej Hlinka on the other. A lot of attention was also paid to contemporary figures such as Mile Budak, Milo Urban and Alexander Mach, the commander-in-chief of the Hlinka Guard. Andrej Vrbacky, the Slovak translator, deserves credit for this written presentation. On May 26, 1941, Karol Murgas paid an official visit to Ante Pavelic, Croatia's supreme leader - poglavnik. In his formal address, Murgas pointed to the similarities of both nation's histories and suggested close cooperation in future political and cultural activities. 15 After this the Slovak embassy was officially opened. Interestingly, although an embassy agreement was offered to Murgas, he came to Zagreb with the official status of an envoy, which the Croatian side considered insufficient and demanded diplomatic representation at 11 Croatia trip reports. Box 4, Papers of Viliam Kovar, Literarny archiv Slovenskej narodnej kniznici V Martine (LA SNK). 12 Letter of V. Kovar to S. Meciar, August 26, 1941 . File 164 E 20, LA SNK. 13 See for example: Stanislav Meciar, "Chorvatsky klasik Mile Budak," Slovenske pohl'ady 56 ( 1940): 429-44. 14 Letter of S. Meciar to M. Budak, May 21 , 1941. File 164 N 17, LA SNK. 15 File 8/41 , Box 1155, MZV, SNA; Karol Murgas, "Pred tridsiatimi rokmi v Zahrebe," Slovak a svet I (Chicago, 1971 ): 15. �SLOVAKIA 71 the top level. A month later, on June 25, Slovak president Jozef Tiso accepted the nomination of Dragutin Toth as Croatian charge d' affaires to Slovakia. 16 Murgas objected to this nomination, rating Toth as a liberal-orientated leftist. Toth's first audience with President Tiso took place on August l st, and his opening statement was dedicated again to both nations' independence. It is worth mentioning that he gave the speech in his native tongue, yet the president answered him in Slovak. This established a precedent for Tiso's interactions with envoys of Slavic states. 17 The newly-established Slovak embassy in Zagreb attracted broad interest and numerous appeals for bilateral cooperation. Both parties declared their intention to closely coordinate their political, economic, social and cultural activities. NOH officials wanted information on the organization of economic and social life in Slovakia. A common topic of bilateral talks was the means of settling the debts of former parent states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). After initial negotiations with Murgas, Anton Bonifacic, head of the Croatian Department of Culture of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out a "Proposal for Establishing Cultural Cooperation between the NOH and the Slovak Republic". Its aim was to build economic, social and cultural ties based on the mutual exchange of publications, translations of literature, the exchange of students, writers and task groups; and organizing art exhibitions, concerts etc. The proposal included a suggestion for the legal recognition and protec18 tion of Croats living in Slovakia and Slovaks in the NOH. The position of the latter was at that time far from satisfactory. Slovak minority rights gained during the former Yugoslavia were largely ignored by the Ustasha regime. 19 The first objective of the Slovak representatives in Croatia was to improve this situation. Within the Slo16 File 4961 /41 , Box 213, MZV, SNA. Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 270. 18 File 244/41 , Box 1157, MZV, SNA. 19 About the Slovak minority in Croatia, see: Vit Usak, Slovcici v Chorvcitsku - historicky ncicrt (C leveland-Rim : Historicky ustav, 1978); Sprievodca slovenskym zahranicim, ed. I.'.ubica Bartalska (Bratislava: Dom zahranicnych Slovakov, 2001), 8790; Report of J. Cieker, February 12, 1942. File 27/48 JozefCieker papers, Okresny l'udovy sud v Bratislave 1945-1947 (O1..'.S BA), Statny oblastny archiv Bratislava (SABa). Information about the exact number of Slovaks in Croatia at that time differed. The daily Slovak, on October 22, 1941 , page 3, estimated a maximum of 22,000 countrymen ; other sources gave higher numbers . 17 �72 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak community itself, there were further differences related to religious orientation. The Catholic population lacked education and schools, and its national identity was rapidly disappearing. On the other hand, Lutheran villages were keeping their traditions alive, with much of the work done by local pastors.20 However, the Lutheran community had stronger ties to the former Yugoslav regime and was treated with suspicion by Ustasha authorities. In numerous cases the Slovak embassy had to intervene to help individuals (conscripts of the Yugoslav army) who had been captured in the previous war with Germany. The chaos and scarcities following the transition of power also forced a lot of Slovaks to seek help at the embassy. Ever since the foundation of the NDH, leaders of the Slovak expatriate community were planning to set up a minority organization, the so-called Slovak National Group in Croatia, with a common official statute recognized by the Croatian regime. The eventual failure of this initiative was largely due to the fact that they were not coordinated with the Croatian side, which feared a potential precedent that wou ld allow other minorities to raise similar claims. The only minority to achieve the privilege of an officially recognized status was the German one, with a population up to 150,000 and enjoying the benefits of the parent country ' s political dominance. Following the negotiations of June 25, 1941 , Croatia and Slovakia announced a mutual settlement of their claims regarding real estate belonging to their predecessor states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).21 Murgas managed to obtain the property of the former Czech-Slovak society Beseda in Lipovljani for the Slovak side.22 The issue of schools for the Slovak minority was a frequently negotiated topic from early on. In spite of the initial mistrust by the Ustasha authorities, which culminated in the arrests of several Slovak teachers, Slovak primary education was preserved. 23 Mutual contacts also developed in the field of pedagogy and science. A visit by Croatian medics and an Ustasha Youth delegation to °File 36, Box 266, MZV, SNA . 2 21 File 217/41 , Box 1157 and File 217/41 , Box 1155 , MZV, SNA . The society officially dissolved on July 30, 1941. See Slovak Beseda in Bratislava. Box 207, f. Policajne riaditel'stvo v Bratislave (PR Ba), SNA; File 325/41 , Box 214 and File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. 23 File 33880/41 , Box 213 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. Gardista, September 21 , 1941 , 3; Gardista, October 22, 1941 , 3. 22 �SLOVAKIA 73 Slovakia was met by great domestic publicity. 24 A program of student exchange and scholarship financing was launched by numerous institutions: The Science Society for Foreign Slovaks (mainly focused on student exchange, support of Slovak foreign education and distribution of Slovak literature abroad), the Matica slovenska, The Society of St. Adalbert, the Slovak University, and the Hlinka Youth. The Croatian partner organizations included the Saint Jerome Society, the Matica Hrvatska, and later the new Croatian-Slovak Society. The pace at which interest in Croatia spread was almost overwhelming for the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which decided to halt the uncontrolled influx of NDH visitors . The Ministry then published a directive stating that it must approve all Croatian visits. 25 The founding of the already mentioned Croatian-Slovak Society (August 13, 1941) was a milestone in cultural interaction. The Slovak envoy requested the speedy assignment of a cultural attache to Croatia, recommending Jozef Ambrus, who had been studying in Zagreb. This request was turned down, as was his later proposal of founding an office of the Society in Bratislava. 26 A fact worth mentioning is that Murgas proposed Alexander Mach, the Minister of the Interior, to be the chairman of this branch. 27 The Slovak authorities, however, took a rather cautious approach and decided to wait until their Croatian counterparts founded a similar branch of the Society in Zagreb. 28 These facts indicate a kind of cautiousness on the Slovak part, caused primarily by foreign political factors. Contrary to their cordial relations and shared long-term plans, practical cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia was difficult from the beginning. Later on, such cooperation was also damaged by the Ustasha regime's inability to make good on its commitments. Meanwhile, the Croatian and Slovak Society was founded in Zagreb. Franjo Dujmovic, 29 the editor-in-chief of the daily Nova Hrvat24 See for example: Gardista, July 26, 1941, 3; Gardista , July 27, 1941, 3; Gardista, August 26, 1941, 3; File 32595/41, Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 25 Ibid, File 6978/41. 26 Reports of K. Murgas, August 19, 1941 and August 26, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA; File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. See also: Jarinkovic, Spolkovy i ivot v frvej Slovenskej republike ... , 305-24. 7 File 544/41, Box 1155 and File 137/41, Box 1160, MZV, SNA. 28 File 32.702/41, Box 118, MZV, SNA. 29 Initially led by the Croatian Minister of the Interior and well-known Ustasha activist Adrija Artukovic. �74 SLOVAKIA-2015 ska (New Croatia) , was appointed its President, with Mile Starcevic and Eugen Ftillop as Vice-Presidents, and Zlatko Milkovic as Secretary. The Society ' s Board included a number of significant individuals whose positions suggested strong links with Croatian state institutions .3° The Society's goal was to develop cultural relations and to promote the Slovak Republic in the NDH. Stanislav Meciar also hoped to expand cultural cooperation, with special focus on the new Croatian literature. When asked about which Slovak novelists he would recommend for translation, he included Jozef Ciger Hronsky, Milo Urban, Tido J. Gaspar, Julius Horvath, and Margita Figuli. He rejected Peter Jilemnicky, whom he labelled a Czech and a Communist. Among Slovak poets he suggested Valentin Beniak, Andrej Zamov, Emil Boleslav Lukac, Jan Smrek, Rudolf Dilong, I:udo Ondrejov, Ladislav Novomesky, Jan R. Ponican and Jan Kostra, with the comment that "the last three were Communists, but have written valuable Slovak poems; here you ought to make your own decision." 31 He also decided to publish a special issue of the Slovenske pohl'ady on the subject of Croatia. 32 As early as 1941 discussions began about the possibility of closer cooperation between Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, a project designed to raise the profile of all three states. The incentive to establish this bloc came from Romania, mainly as a reaction to Hungarian irredentism. At the same time, the three states intended to revisit their territorial losses to Hungary between 193 8 and 1941. Agreement to create the bloc was soon disclosed and the Hungarian Government protested against "reviving the spirit of the Little Entente," referring to the interwar East-Central European military alliance against Hungary. In spite of the initial hesitation of Slovak politicians, by early 1942 Vojtech Tuka, the Slovak Foreign Minister, showed great interest in such cooperation. He emphasized that the alliance could not be labelled with the "stigma of Pan-Slavism," referring to criticism raised by some representatives of the Slovak government. On the one hand, as soon as the Germans indicated that no such efforts would be tolerated within their sphere of influence, the 30 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 155 . Letter of S. Meciar to Zlatko Milkovic from August 26, I 941. File 164 P 17, LA SNK. 32 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 52-83. 31 �SLOVAKIA 75 Slovak Republic 's activities declined rapidly . On the other hand, the Slovaks discovered that the NDH was not a reliable partner. 33 In the fall of 1941 some changes were made to the charge d' affaires positions in both countries. Jozef Cieker replaced the undisciplined Karol Murgas. Cieker had previously worked in Yugoslavia and was knowledgeable about Croatian affairs. He presented his credentials in Zagreb on December 12, 1941. At the same time, there was also a change in the Croatian diplomatic posting in Bratislava. Josip Berkovic, the new envoy, presented his credentials on December 19. These changes had no impact on the mutual convergence, and the Croatian Embassy in Bratislava appointed a cultural attache, Geno Sencic who energetically participated in the development of Slovak and Croatian cultural relations. In January of 1942, Tido J. Gaspar, Head of the Propaganda Office, charged Jozef Ambrus with preparing the ground for establishing the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia. The general assembly of this cultural institution took place on March 13, 1942, in the Slovak University ' s amphitheater. Slovak Ministers Alexander Mach, Gejza Medricky and Ferdinand Catlos, as well as other major figures of political and cultural life attended, as did a numerous Croatian delegation. This meeting received broad media coverage. This general assembly prescribed uniforms as a part of the dress code. The Society set as its goal to unite all Croatophiles, spread the Croatian culture and develop mutual relationships. Political issues were to be avoided. Alexander Mach was acclaimed as the Society 's President. In his acceptance speech he pointed out the parallels between the Autonomists ' first paramilitary organization, the Rodobrana (Native Defense), the subsequent Hlinka Guards and the Croatian Ustasha movement. He added that cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia "is not based on the pharisaical chimera of the notorious Slavic solidarity," which had led to humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations. These contacts, he continued, "are supported by a good tradition, the present struggle for a common goal, which we all have before our eyes in the New Europe." Mach's 33 See Miroslav Tejchman, "Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace v letech druhe svetove valley a Mad'arsko," Slovansky pfehled 78 (1992) : 161-71 ; Cubomir Liptak, "Mad'arsko v slovenskej politike za druhej svetovej vojny," in Prispevky k dejinam fasizmu v Ceskos/ovensku a v Mad'arsku, ed. Gyorgy Ranki (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1969), 222-30. �76 SLOVAKIA-2015 speech marked the boundaries of the cultural society. He also delegated Stanislav Meciar, Anton Misik, Jozef Ambrus as its VicePresidents, Viliam Kovar, Eduard Urban as its Secretaries, and Belo Franc as the Treasurer. Many important people working in the area of culture and politics became board members .34 The next day, the first issue of the Slovak-and-Croatian literary review entitled Tatre i Velebit appeared.35 Josip Andric became the editor-in-chief. He had visited Slovakia since the 1920s, and maintained good contacts with the representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party. In the first issue's introductory address, Ferdinand Catlos, Slovak Minister of Defense, noted : "With the help of the Germans, both our nations have become autonomous and integrated as state actors among the nations of young Europe." He praised the shared destiny and goals, desires and hopes of both nations who required no written agreements to confirm their mutual relationships.36 It is evident that both societies had ideologically compatible people in the leadership, with close links to the official regime. It was typical of both states to infuse culture with politics, especially with propaganda. However, as Jan Jankovic pointed out, in spite of major ideological links, there was also much freedom, which he demonstrated by using literature translations that often avoided an ideological undertone. Once the Slovak Croatian Society was founded, the organization of commonly-held events grew in intensity, and the Society substantially participated in promoting cooperation with other cultural institutions. Contacts were developed in the area of sports as well, but did not exceed the norm. At that time, the establishment of the autonomy of Slovakia in October of 1938 was celebrated. The cultural program focused on Slovak popular sonfs and included lectures given by the country's major personalities.3 In Bratislava on April 9, 1942, the Society celebrated the first anniversary of the NDH' s inception by arranging a red-carpet procession in the highly representative build34 For example: Stefan Bella, Juraj Cecetka, Alojz Macek, Jozef Kutnik-Smalov, Valentin Beniak, Aladar Kocis, Karol Klinovsky, Karol Studenc, Alexander Moyzes and honorsry members included Jozef Skultety, Tido J. Gaspar, Rudolf Vavra, Ferdinand Catlos and Gejza Medricky. Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 204, PR-BA, SNA. 35 More precisely about the revue Tatre i Velebit, see: Jankovic, Chorwitska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 39-51. 36 Tatre i Velebit, March 14, 1942, 5. 31 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, 1942, 156. �SLOVAKIA 77 ing of the Reduta. On the next day, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by Bishop Michal Buzalka in Saint Martin's Cathedral, and on this occasion the Slovak dailies published special issues. 38 At that time a numerous group of Slovak journalists, cultural workers and politicians set off to Croatia to celebrate the first anniversary of the state. Besides Minister Mach and Secretary Kovar, the group included prominent Hlinka guard officers Otomar Kubala, Alexander Cunderlik, Frantisek Galan, and other persons who also discussed mutual cooperation in the area of culture. Within the context of the cooperation of Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, a meeting was held on May 13 in Bucharest, where the participants agreed to compile national bibliographies of major works, to organize regular visits, to promote each other and to organize so-called weeks of reciprocal culture. An Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the NDH was signed in Zagreb, which dealt with the foundation of a Chair of the Croatian Language, Literature and History and a Department of the Croatian Language and Literature at the Slovak University, with similar Slovak institutes in Zagreb. An important clause focused on maintaining and extending elementary schools for minorities. Both partners committed to support reciprocal visits and a minimum of two student scholarships. 39 The Agreement also included a clause on the recognition of academic titles, scientific education benefits for young people, and book exchanges. They also promised not to permit the publication of things "which could present the other state in a bad light." The Agreement established a Slovak and Croatian Cultural Committee to observe the provisions of the mutual agreements and to deepen relationships. The Agreement was for a period of five years and based on the principle of reciprocity .40 In spite of the fact that similar plans had existed since 1941, and that the final agreement was prepared in 1942, neither this Agreement, nor another cultural Agreement between the Slovak Republic and NDH came into force . This was due to their inability to make and perform agreements, and a certain inflexibility characteristic of both parties, which were the basic problems associated with the development of relations between Slovakia and Croatia. Some of these problems were caused by the fact that the NDH was not con38 /bid, 164-5 . Slovak-Croatian reciprocal scholarships. File 255/43, Box 2 14, MZV, SNA . 40 File 8/ 100/43 , Box 118, MZV, SNA. 39 �78 SLOVAKIA-2015 solidated politically and economically, that both countries were involved in the war, in a complicated foreign-policy situation, and also in the relationship of satellite states with their protector, Germany . The issue of the legal status of the Slovak minority in the NDH was perceived in a very sensitive way, and tackled unsuccessfully throughout the entire existence of the NDH. Frequent excesses of the Ustasha towards Slovak inhabitants in Croatia did not contribute to mutual trust. It is well-known that from the beginning some Slovaks rejected Croatian citizenship because they had supported the previous regime, they had to deal with poor living conditions and showed increased interest in repatriation to Slovakia. Viliam Kovar's visit to Lipovljany on June 14, 1941 created a stir. During his visit, Kovar showed concern about the situation of the local Slovaks and suggested repatriation in exchange for Croats living in Slovakia. This proposal resonated and some Slovaks in Croatia appealed to the embassy for help. 41 However, charge d'affaires Murgas viewed Kovar's initiative very critically. Croatians intended to repatriate the Slovak minority to the Slovak Republic, which Murgas found detrimental to the state.42 In any case, official Slovak circles showed no serious interest in repatriation to Slovakia. What did not make such a big stir was settling the issue of the validity of Jewish travel documents. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged their validity (until March 31, 1942), but at the same time the Ministry told Murgas not to intervene in these matters, to which he would agree. 43 The legation had the right to decide each Jewish case, but their objective was to ensure that these Jews would not return to Slovakia because they were "a useless and harmful element, " 44 which corresponded to the official policy of the Slovak Republic. 45 In the NDH 41 File 116/41 , Box 1160, MZV, SNA; Report written by representatives of the Slovak minority in the NDH regarding the visit of Viliam Kovar, June 16, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA. See also: Oldfich Pejs, "Slovenska diplomacie a valecni zajatci slovenske narodnosti (1939-1942)," Vojenska hist6ria 15 (2011), 122-41. 42 '1n today's situation we don't have the space and employment opportunities for returnees ... " Report ofK. Murgas, August 19, 1941 , Box 143 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. 43 File 903/41 and 1347/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 44 File 62/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 45 For a comparison of the Slovak and Croatian anti-Jewish policies, see: Eduard Niznansky and Jana Mnahoncakova, "Vymedzenie pojmu Zid na Slovensku a v �SLOVAKIA 79 the Jewish issue was "promptly resolved," and Serbs also became an "unwanted element." 46 The greatest boom of cultural relations between Slovakia and Croatia occurred in 1942. Numerous visits and social events were organized in order to strengthen this cooperation. For example, during the summer several Croatian delegations visited the Slovak Republic. From June 28 until July 4, a "Croatian Week" in Slovakia was organized to promote Croatian culture. Slovak Radio participated very actively by broadcasting Croatian music and a series of interviews by a number of major figures in culture and politics.47 At that time an ensemble of amateur actors form Croatia toured Slovakia with their theater program dedicated to Croatian dances.48 Reciprocal visits and presentations became the most typical component of Slovak-Croatian cultural policy, most frequently realized through national theatrical and music productions. As in Slovakia, various events were held in the NDH which concentrated on mutual convergence, such as the presentation of the Articles of Association of the Slovak National Unity (Slovenska narodna jednota) to the relevant Croatian authorities who promised their recognition. The Slovak Reading Club in Ilok organized Slovaks in the NDH. In spite of promises made, the Croatian administration did nothing. 49 The Slovak Day planned for August 30, 1942, in Stara Pazova, where Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, a famous descendant of the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, served as a Protestant minister, was postponed because of guerilla warfare.50 Jozef Cieker constantly pointed out the complicated situation in the country and the Ustasha's excesses. "The scope of action of ministers is limited to minis- Chorvatsku - pokus o porovnanie," in Z dejin holokaustu ajeho popierania, ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky (Bratislava: Stimul, 2007), 107-30. 46 See Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 47 Alexander Mach, Mladen Lorkovic, Stanislav Meciar, Jozef Ambrus, Valentin Beniak, Alexander Moyzes, Viliam Kovar, Mile Starcevic, Zlatko Milkovic, Franjo Dujmovic, Mile Budak, Viliam Peros, Josip Horvat, Geno Senecic and others. 48 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, I 942, p.165. 49 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, I 943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 50 Slovaks in Yugoslavia. File 6452/41-1 , Box 143, MZV, SNA. �80 SLOV AKIA-2015 terial buildings and a small region around Zagreb." 51 He perceived Slovak-Croatian relations as weak and suggested that it would be unwise to limit mutual relations to Ustasha Croatia and suggested that the two nations should relate to one another as wholes. The Ustasha were not pleased with the activities of the Slovak charge d'affaires in Zagreb, and therefore they suggested that he should be removed. Cieker often met with opposition groups, members of the higher clergy and criticized the situation in the country. These statements show that there were certain differences between Slovakia and Croatia. Conservative representatives in Croatia were the more moderate Catholics of a nationalist orientation, represented in the past by the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (the Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka). In that sense, they were competitors of the Ustasha. The Slovak Republic supported the regular Croatian army - the militia, with supplies of arms and equipment. However, much more evident were the contacts between the radical representatives of the Hlinka Guard and the Ustasha. They were ideologically close, and strongly involved in the development of mutual relations, for instance between the Hlinka Youth and the Ustasha Youth. Despite these differences, cultural contacts continued to evolve. Each autumn international commercial fairs were held in both Bratislava and Zagreb. Both states sent delegations of major figures of economic and political life to the fairs. In June of 1942, an agreement between Croatia and Slovakia was signed in Bratislava on the regulation of mutual contact under civil law. At the end of October, the Minister of Justice, Gejza Fritz, signed in Zagreb an interstate agreement on extradition and propertylaw assistance in criminal issues. Like the economic agreement entered into in October of 1941, these agreements came into force too late, and therefore had no significant impact on the actual relationship between the Slovak Republic and the NDH. 52 Also, an agreement was concluded on cooperation between the Slovak and Croatian academic youth.53 This cooperation seemed promising from the summer of 1941 and many young people from Croatia visited Slovakia. The Hlinka Youth, jointly with the Ustasha Youth and 51 Report of J. Cieker, August 28, 1942. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 52 Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 273-74. 53 Medunarodni ugovori 1943, p. 208-10. Box 214, MZV, SNA. �SLOVAKIA 81 Hitlerjugend, organized camps for their members . In this regard, there was a significant involvement by Alojz Macek and lvo Orsanic, the leaders of organizations in the Slovak Republic and the NDH, . As in the preceding year, the autumn of 1942 witnessed certain changes in Slovak- Croatian relations. Activist Viliam Kovar enlisted in the Slovak army and treasurer Belo Fronc replaced him. The NDH Government underwent a major reorganization which resolved the conflict between the Poglavnik and the Minister of Defense, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik. Kvaternik came to recover to Slovakia, when he probably sought some political support. However, the Government's reconstruction did not disturb the NDH's relations with the Slovak Republic. Promoting one another continued, which is evident in the Slovak Culture Week held in Zagreb from November 29, 1942, to December 5, 1942. 54 This event had some response. Besides abundant musical performances, several contributions were made on the present and the past of the relationships between Slovaks and Croatians. At that time, Andric's Slovak Language Grammar was published.55 By the end of that year, yet another change took place in diplomatic postings. Charge d'affaires Berkovic was dismissed and replaced with Blaz Lorkovic, who presented his credentials to President Tiso on December 22. In his speech, he remarked: "The Poglavnik appointed me as the charge d'affaires in Slovakia in his belief that our brother Slovaks wish to have an old and well-proven Ustasha as the charge d'affaires of the NDH."56 In 1943 further talks were held on cooperation between Romania, Slovakia and the NDH . It was evident that Ante Pavelic's Croatia was very weak as a partner, and, therefore, the Slovak representatives focused mainly on negotiations with the Romanians. In the end, however, these attempts also failed to improve cooperation and the idea of a tightly-bound Slovak and Croatian bloc against Hungary was unsuccessful. 57 In January of 1943, a full length propaganda film 54 At that time the following Slovaks visited Croatia: Stanislav Meciar, Andrej Mraz, Karol Ki:irper, Jan Pi:istenyi, Jozef Pauco, Jan Doransky as we ll as representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Matica slovenska, the Slovak-Croatian Society, the Society of St. Adalbert and the Bratislava Chamber Quintet. 55 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 157-159; File Slovaks in Yugoslavia, Box 143, MZV, SNA. 56 File 35.591 /42, Box 219, MZV, SNA. 57 Tejchman, Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace ... , 166-67 . �82 SLOV AKIA-2015 From the Tatras to the Sea of Azov was shown in the NDH, which highlighted the Slovak Army's activity on the Eastern Front in order to strengthen the idea of a joint struggle against Bolshevism . In the field of news reporting, a regular exchange of newsreels took place and a number of contributions on Croatian topics were broadcast over Slovak Radio. The fourth anniversary celebrations of independence in Zagreb were not as spectacular as in the preceding year. In addition to compulsory lectures and articles in the Croatian press, the Croatian and Slovak Society organized a tea party on March 13th. The next morning, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated and attended by representatives of the Croatian Government. 58 On March 25, 1943 the second general assembly of the Slovak and Croatian Society was held . Once again, this event became a manifestation of fondness for each other. Many prominent people of that period's political and cultural life participated, headed by ministers Mach, Medricky and charge d'affaires Blaz Lorkovic, who was elected an honorary member. A declaration of efforts to extend the statutes of the Society was made since there was an interest in establishing branches in other towns of Slovakia (it was planned to establish branches in Presov, Zilina and Banska Bystrica), and to extend activities in the field of culture.59 The general assembly also launched the celebration of Croatian independence, which was accompanied by a number of cultural events including a gala concert of the Slovak Radio on April 9th. Employees of Mach's Ministry of the Interior were invited to turn out in strength. A Croatian issue of the newspaper Gardista (Guardsman) was published to celebrate the third anniversary of the NDH's creation. During his visit to Slovakia in May, 1943, Ivan Veres, a Protestant minister, reported on the difficult situation of Slovaks in the NDH. Again, the unresolved issues emerged, especially those regarding culture. Based on this information Alexander Mach invited the Croatian charge d'affaires to an audience and gave him notice that the situation of Slovaks in the NDH could directly affect the future relations between Slovakia and Croatia. In this respect, Mach even intended to stop honoring Josip Andric, the writer, with a high 58 Tatre i Velebit, June 15, 1943, 61. The Slovak-Croatian Society - Minutes of the Second General Assembly. File 38/68, Box 204, PR Ba, SNA. 59 �SLOVAKIA 83 state award, and issued a command to suspend the establishment of the Slovak and Croatian Society's branches. Jozef Cieker also made a statement on the nature of the mutual relationships by pointing out that people in Bratislava had too many illusions, but the reality was much more complicated. 60 In spite of the fact that the negotiations on signing the Slovak and Croatian Cultural Convention continued, no consensus was reached. Croatia refused to recognize the special status of Slovaks in the NDH because of other minorities, who would then demand similar rights. However, the Croats were willing to guarantee Slovak education through separate legislation. They also demanded that the SNU should not be a political organization to represent Slovaks in the NDH and should not claim the property of former Czechoslovak: associations. However, at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was more interested in concluding the Slovak and Italian cultural convention, after which the Ministry would be willing to continue negotiations about the convention with Croatia.61 The fall of Mussolini in 1943 brought about an "unpleasant awakening" in the NDH. Nevertheless, Ante Pavelic, with Germany's support, managed to hold on to power and maintain the illusion of the existence of an independent Croatian state, and on September 10, 1943, he announced that previous Italian and Croatian agreements were no longer valid, as the Italians had failed to fulfil their obligations and agreed to an armistice with the enemy. 62 At that time, a number of Croatian politicians and their families, who refused to stay in the NDH for various reasons, were in Slovakia. This is very interesting, because the Slovak Republic granted asylum to persons whose blood-stained careers were inscribed in the NDH' s infamous history. For instance, this applied to Eugen "Dido" Kvaternik, the former commander of the Croatian secret police! Jozef Cieker tried unsuccessfully to reject entry visas to exponents of the Ustasha re• 63 g1me. 60 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 61 Report of J. Cieker from July 7, 1943. Box 143, MZV, SNA. 62 Jbid, File 313 2/43 . 63 Report of J. Cieker, September 9, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. �84 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the reality of that time, Slovak and Croatian cultural cooperation decreased and in 1943 the Tatre i Velebit cultural review folded . The Slovak Embassy in Zagreb pointed to the unbearable problems of the NDH, which were also reflected in its failure to fulfil economic contractual obligations. The embassy also dealt with propertyrelated sanctions and the loss of freedom which Slovaks in the NDH had to struggle with every day. Despite plans for further cooperation, the mutual relationships had reached their zenith. Their abovestandard scope in the period between 1939 and 1944 is shown by the fact that nineteen translated Croatian fiction titles were published in Slovakia, which is more than in the case of most Allied countries. In addition, popular and scientific, political and religious literature was published, although their numbers are difficult to reconstruct. 64 At the beginning of February, 1944, Jozef Cieker was replaced in Zagreb by charge d'affaires Viktor Becko. 65 However, he would not bring any changes to Slovak-Croat relations. From his reports we learn that actual power in Croatia was shared by guerilla and German and Ustasha troops, and about the oppression of the population. As regards Slovak-Croatian relations, Becko noted that higher state authorities had an interest and a positive approach, which, however, faded at lower positions. Therefore, he suggested, that Croatians should be promised economic concessions in return for cultural and social offsets for Slovaks in the NDH. 66 In his report he summarized the mutual contacts which he considered to be less developed than expected and pointed out that a certain platform could be found as a support. In spite of that, he labelled the cultural and political relations as very good. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, he criticized the absence of a trade representative "whom the Croatians have in the Protectorate as well." 67 As regards the issue of the Slovaks in the NDH, he underscored the fact that Slovaks were transported to concentration camps based on the principle of collective guilt. Some Croatians hated the Slovaks because they were not obliged to join the army or the Ustasha, and local personal and prop64 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 166-176. Slovak, February 2, 1944, p. 4; Slovak, February 9, 1944, p. 3. 66 Report of V. Becka, March 20, 1944. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1.'.S BA, SABa. 67 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, April 25, 1944. Box 213, MZV, SNA. 65 �SLOVAKIA 85 erty-related conflicts played an important role as well. He pointed to the nationalist attitudes of the Ustasha, who did not like "foreign elements" in their country. 68 However, the repatriation of Slovaks was technically impossible at that time.69 Contacts between Slovaks and Croats were not limited to the official political position, which I intended to describe in this paper. There was also significant cooperation among anti-fascist forces in the Slovak Republic, the NDH and elsewhere in Europe. Tomislav Poglajen-Kolakovic, a Catholic priest who worked in Slovakia from September of 1943 and joined the anti-fascist forces, was an outstanding person involved in this convergence. 70 In the last stages of the existence of both states, mutual contacts died out completely, and the dissolution of the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia on May 25th, 1945, 71 was just a formality, because most of the Society's representatives had fled abroad, where they continued to develop contacts with the Croats. Relationships between Slovakia and Croatia from 1941 to 1945 were affected by the political climate. Despite comparable efforts by Slovaks and Croats to attain national emancipation in the inter-war period and deep historical roots of mutual cooperation multiplied at that time by the concept of "historical inevitability," it was the ideological adherence of political representatives and their mentors (especially Germany) which played an important role in the mutual convergence. Cultural cooperation took a similar path, but it could not overcome the ideological framework. Due to both practical and political obstacles, such cooperation would not reach the desired form, and it peaked between 1942 and the first half of 1943 . However, as Viliam Kovar wrote about the activities of the Slovak and Croatian Society, which was supposed to reflect these relationships : 68 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, January 8, 1945 . Box 213, MZV, SNA . 69 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to V. Becka, January 26, 1945. Box I 160, MZV, SNA. 70 More precisely see: Jozef Jablonicky, Podoby nasilia (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000), 9-27. For the official Croatian reaction to the uprising in Slovakia, see: Jan Rychlik, "Obdobie pred Slovenskym narodnym povstanim v spravach chorvatskeho vyslanca v Bratislave," Historicky casopis 56 (2008): 349-84. ; Jan Rychlik, "Slovenske narodne povstanie v spravach chorvatskeho diplomata," Historicky casopis 54 (2006) : 315-52. 71 Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 20 14, PR Ba, SNA . �86 SLOV AKIA-2015 " ... (the Society) failed to do as much as one could possibly expect, but did not miss one chance to inform the Slovak public and make it familiar with the life of Croatia and its representatives." 72 It was clear before the end of World War II, which both countries entered on the side of Germany, that neither state would outlive it. However, this did not mean the end of mutual cultural contacts, which after the War took place in a brand new geopolitical and ideological environment. 72 Report of the Society' s secretary. File 38/68, Box 2014, PR Ba, SNA. � 66 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA, 1941-1945 1 Miroslav Michela The foreign policy of Slovakia in the years 1939 - 1945 has been quite a popular research topic of Slovak historians over the last ten to twenty years. 2 Significant achievements in this regard relate primarily to research on Slovak-German relations,3 but there are also several 1 1 would like to express my gratitude to prof. Mark Stolarik and his family for significant help in my research on Slovak emigres, and especially on the biography of Slovak journalist and politician Karol Murgas. My research in the Slovak collections in the Archives and Special Collections of the University of Ottawa Library would not have been possible without the support of the Helen and John lvanco Memorial Research Bursary. 2 Here I would like to list a few publications, which appeared in recent years, mostly as a result of long-term academic interest: Michal Schvarc, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945 a jej postavenie v ramci nemeckej sfery vplyvu," in Kfucove problemy modernych slovenskych dejin 1848-1992, ed. Valerian Bystricky et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 231-52; Edita lvanickova et. al. , Slovenslui republika 1939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2012); Pavo! Petruf, Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945: nacrt problematiky (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2011); James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3 For example: Sicherheitsdienst a Slovens/ca v rokach 1938-1944: od auton6mie po Povstanie. Slovensky stat vo vybranych spravach SD od jesene 1943 do septembra 1944, ed. Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Slovenske narodne muzeum-Muzeum karpatskych Nemcov, 2006) ; "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu;dokumenty. /., ed. Michal Schvarc, Martin Holak and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, SNM- Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2008); "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu : dokumenty. II. ed. Michal Schvarc and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, Historicky ustav SAV, SNM - Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2010) ; Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1941 v dokumentoch I.:od Mnichova k vojne proti ZSSR , ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky et. al. (Presov: Universum, 2009); Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1941-1945 v dokumentoch II. :od vojny proti ZSSR po zanik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945, ed. Eduard Niznansky et. al. (Presov: Universum-EU, 20 11); Von Munchen bis Salzburg 1938- 1940. Dokumente und Essay. Buch 1. Buch 2. Slovensko v jeseni 1944, ed. Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Luc, 2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politi- �SLOVAKIA 67 studies concerning the relationship between Slovakia and the Great Powers .4 In the context of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, plenty of studies are oriented on the Slovak-Polish and Slovak-Hungarian relationships at different levels of politics.5 In the last decade studies relating to Slovak-Croatian diplomatic relations have also appeared. 6 Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politischer Al/tag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn (Paderbom : Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003 ). 4 For example: Politicke vzt'ahy medzi Francuzskom a Ceskoslovenskom a Francuzskom a Slovenskom (1 939-1948): vyber dokumentov, ed. Pavo! Petruf (Martin: Matica slovenska, 2003); Dagmar Ciema-Lantayova, Pohfady na vychod: Postoje k Rusku v slovenskej politike 1934-1944 (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Slavomir Michalek, "Niekol'ko problemov slovensko-americkych vzt'ahov pocas druhej svetovej vojny," in Edita Ivanickova et. al. Slovenska republiko /939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach, 139-61 ; Petr Kubik, Slovensko-talianske vzt'ahy 1939-1945 (Bratislava: Ustav pamiiti naroda, 20 IO); Edita Ivanickova, "Zapadne vel'moci a slovensky stat 1939-1945," in Slovensky stat 1939-1945: predstavy a reality, eds. Martina Fiamova, Jan Hlavinka and Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2014), 8193 . 5 Here is a sample of some interesting works by young scholars: Aliaksandr Piahanau, "Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Mirror of the German-Soviet Conflictive Alliance (1939-1941 )," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 16 (2012): 144-63; Isvtan Janek, "The Issue of Hungarian- Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939- 1940," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 18 (2014): 128-41 ; Istvan Janek, "Mad'arsko-slovenske diplomaticke vzt'ahy v rokoch 1939-1941 , " in Slovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, IV. , eds. Michal Smigel' and Peter Micko (Banska Bystrica: Katedra hist6rie Fakulty humanitnych vied Univerzity Mateja Bela, 2005 ), 334-51 ; Mateusz Gniazdowski, "Kontakty PHsudczyk6w ze Slowakami w latach 19391945," Niepodleglosi: 55 (2005): I 07-50; Dusan Seges, "The Slovak Question and its International Context during World War Two," in 1945 - A Break with the Past, ed. Zdenko Cepic (Ljubljana: Institut za novejso zgodovino, 2008), 213-26; Dusan Seges, Dvojkrii v silociarach bieleho or/a. Slovenska otazka v politike pol'skej exi/ovej vlady za 2. svetovej vojny (Bratislava: Veda, 2009); Holy Case, "The Holocaust in Regional Perspective: Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia," in Varieties of Anti-Semitism, eds . Peter Kenez and Bruce Thompson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 76-92. 6 Jan Rychlik, "Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy v letech 1941-1945 ," Slovanske historicke studie 26 (2000): 265-83 ; Miroslav Michela, "Vznik slovenskeho vyslanectva v Chorvatsku a cinnost' Karola Murgasa, charge d 'affaires v Zahrebe v roku 1941 ," in Slovenska republika 1939 - 1945 ocami mladych historikov fl , ed. Martin Lacko (Bratislava: Merkury, 2003), 97-123 ; Miroslav Michela, "K otazke slovensko-chorvatskej kulturnej spoluprace v rokoch 1941-45," Slavica Slovaca 38 (2003): 112-22; Jan Tkac, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske a slovensko-chorvatske vzt'ahy �68 SLOVAKIA-2015 se works are mainly focused on the issues of diplomacy and the traditional history of politics. They describe the ideas and activities of major political players, thus complementing our knowledge about the process of negotiating and building the "New Europe." 7 The present study aims primarily to explain a few basic factors in the context of building official Slovak-Croatian cultural cooperation in the period from 1941 to 1945 . The foundation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH) on April 10th, 1941 resulted in the expansion of cultural interaction between it and the newly- independent Slovak Republic, as the representatives of both states shared similar experiences of national struggles and now ideological and political interests. The Slovak Republic officially recognized the NDH on v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Historicky zbornik 19 (2009): 154-68; Jan Tkac, "Chorvatsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941-1945," Historicky casopis 58 (2010): 659-83 ; Alena Bartlova, "Dr. Jozef Cieker, vyslanec Slovenskej republiky," in Dr. Jozef Cieker: seminar pri prileiitosti nedoi itym 90. narodenincim Jozefa Ciekera v Tvrdosine 20. juna 1997, ed. Juraj Chovan-Rehak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2000), 71-92; Jan Jankovic, Chorvcitska literatura v slovenskej kulture If. (19391948), (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Jan Jankovic, Stanis/av Meciar - chorvatofil (Bratislava: Ustav svetovej literatury SAV, 2001); Martin Jarinkovic, "Pohl'ad slovenskej dennej tlace na chorvatsku otazku v rokoch 1941-1944," in Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov VIII, ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2009), 261-88; Martin Jarinkovic, "Spolkovy zivot v prvej Slovenskej republike na priklade Slovenskochorvatskej spolocnosti v rokoch 1942-1944," in Zivot v Slovenskej republike. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov 9., ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda 2010), 305-24; Oldfich Pejs, "Nakup koni v Chorvatsku pro slovenskou armadu v roce 1944," Vojenskci hist6ria 8 (2004): 87-95; Oldfich Pejs, "Na okraj dodavky slovenskych zbrani do Chorvatska v roce 1942," Historie a vojenstvi 45 (1996): 56-73 . 7 See the following : Michal Schvarc, "Statna suverenita len ako fasada? Zasahy Nemecka do slovenskeho zakonodarstva v rokoch 1939-1940," in Slovensko v labyrinte modernych eur6pskych dejin : pocta historikov Milanovi Zemkovi, ed . Slavomir Michalek (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 20 14), 641-57; Pavo) Petruf, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskeho statu 1939-1945 : niekol'ko poznamok o jej vzniku, zamerani a kratkodobej existencii," in Riesenie iidovskej otcizky v spojeneckych krajincich nacistickeho Nemecka, ed. Viera Kovacova et. al. (Banska Bystrica: Muzeum Slovenskeho narodneho povstania, 20 12), 17-29; Pavo I Petruf, "Terna "novej Eur6py", "noveho eur6pskeho poriadku" a "zivotneho priestoru" na strankach novin Slovak ( I 939-1940)," in Kapitoly z hist6rie stredoeur6pskeho priestoru v 19. a 20. storoci: pocta k 70-rocnemu jubileu Dusana Kovcica, ed. Edita Ivanickova et. al. (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 201 I), 338-54. �SLOVAKIA 69 May 5th, 194 l along with other Axis members and satellites - Germany, Italy and Hungary. 8 The NDH's political role in the "New Europe" was outlined in the Treaty of Rome, signed on May 18, 194 l, which established long-term Italian patronage. After Croatia gained its sovereignty, this subordination was immediately subject to much domestic criticism. During the following Croatian-Slovak diplomatic discussions, both parties set out a preferred vision of German rather than Italian supervision, seeing in Nazi Germany a common protector and liberator and also admiring the state and the Flihrer. In May of 194 l the government of the Slovak Republic surprisingly appointed the radical Karol Murgas, as its charge d'affaires to Croatia. The request was officially delivered by German authorities, as there was no direct contact between the two parties at that time. 9 Murgas had no diplomatic experience and was known for his awkward and hot-tempered behavior in public, which might have caused some hesitation, but his paramilitary experience in the Hlinka Guard and his demonstrated sympathy for Croatian nationalists made their mark. Murgas himself saw the move as an attempt to remove him from Slovak domestic politics, as he had previously enjoyed the prominent post of head of the Department of Propaganda. 10 In May of 194 l Viliam Kovar, the distinguished Slovak journalist, visited Croatia. During his stay he met influential statesmen and leaders of the Ustasha movement and examined the potential for mu- 8 Croatia - Congratulations of president Jozef Tiso, file 1300/41 , box 61 , collection Kancelaria prezidenta republiky - Slovensky narodny archiv (SNA) - Bratislava. For more about Slovak-Yugoslav relations see: Jan Nemecek, "K slovensko-jugoslavskym vztahum 1939-45," in Evropa mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem. Sbornik praci k sedmdesatinam Jaroslava Valenty, eds. Miroslav Sestak and Emil Voracek (Praha: Historicky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, 2000), 385-98; Martin Jarinkovic, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske hospodarske a obchodne kontakty v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Pamdt' naroda 7 (20 11 ): 4-17. 9 S/ovak, May 11, I 941, 3. Zagreb's official approval of Murgas's mission came on May 15, but information ' s about it had already appeared in Grenzebote on the 4th of May 1941. For this question see also: File 79/41 , Box 1155 and File 77/41 , Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 10 See: Miroslav Michela, "Miesto a uloha Karola Murgasa v radikalnom prude slovenskej politiky v obdobi rokov 1939-1941 ," in S/ovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, ed. Martin Lacko (Trnava : Katedra hist6rie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Cyrila a Metoda, 2002), 77-105 . �70 SLOVAKIA-2015 tual cultural cooperation. 11 In a letter to his colleague Stanislav Meciar, the editor- in-chief of the journal Slovenske pohl'ady, Kovar suggested sending a series of congratulatory letters on Croatia's independence to demonstrate Slovak sympathy and support. 12 Meciar was known to be a Croatophile and ardent admirer of writer and politician Mile Budak, who later became Minister of Education and Religion of the newly-founded NDH. 13 In a letter dated May 23, Meciar asserted the brotherhood of both nations and expressed satisfaction with both countries' successful completion of the struggle for independence. In his words, "Croats were a sincere nation close to us" and "the future of Slovakia will be much safer when developed in tandem with the present beautiful reality of Croatia." 14 Such declarations of sympathy were common in contemporary formal communications and were not deemed awkward . The Slovak press continuously monitored the Croatian struggle for independence and dedicated significant space to discussions with Croat emancipation activists : the Ustasha and Hlinka Guard officials; and to both nations' notable historical figures, such as Ljudevit Gaj , Ban Jelacic and Ante Starcevic on the one hand, and Jan Kollar, Stefan Moyzes and Andrej Hlinka on the other. A lot of attention was also paid to contemporary figures such as Mile Budak, Milo Urban and Alexander Mach, the commander-in-chief of the Hlinka Guard. Andrej Vrbacky, the Slovak translator, deserves credit for this written presentation. On May 26, 1941, Karol Murgas paid an official visit to Ante Pavelic, Croatia's supreme leader - poglavnik. In his formal address, Murgas pointed to the similarities of both nation's histories and suggested close cooperation in future political and cultural activities. 15 After this the Slovak embassy was officially opened. Interestingly, although an embassy agreement was offered to Murgas, he came to Zagreb with the official status of an envoy, which the Croatian side considered insufficient and demanded diplomatic representation at 11 Croatia trip reports. Box 4, Papers of Viliam Kovar, Literarny archiv Slovenskej narodnej kniznici V Martine (LA SNK). 12 Letter of V. Kovar to S. Meciar, August 26, 1941 . File 164 E 20, LA SNK. 13 See for example: Stanislav Meciar, "Chorvatsky klasik Mile Budak," Slovenske pohl'ady 56 ( 1940): 429-44. 14 Letter of S. Meciar to M. Budak, May 21 , 1941. File 164 N 17, LA SNK. 15 File 8/41 , Box 1155, MZV, SNA; Karol Murgas, "Pred tridsiatimi rokmi v Zahrebe," Slovak a svet I (Chicago, 1971 ): 15. �SLOVAKIA 71 the top level. A month later, on June 25, Slovak president Jozef Tiso accepted the nomination of Dragutin Toth as Croatian charge d' affaires to Slovakia. 16 Murgas objected to this nomination, rating Toth as a liberal-orientated leftist. Toth's first audience with President Tiso took place on August l st, and his opening statement was dedicated again to both nations' independence. It is worth mentioning that he gave the speech in his native tongue, yet the president answered him in Slovak. This established a precedent for Tiso's interactions with envoys of Slavic states. 17 The newly-established Slovak embassy in Zagreb attracted broad interest and numerous appeals for bilateral cooperation. Both parties declared their intention to closely coordinate their political, economic, social and cultural activities. NOH officials wanted information on the organization of economic and social life in Slovakia. A common topic of bilateral talks was the means of settling the debts of former parent states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). After initial negotiations with Murgas, Anton Bonifacic, head of the Croatian Department of Culture of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out a "Proposal for Establishing Cultural Cooperation between the NOH and the Slovak Republic". Its aim was to build economic, social and cultural ties based on the mutual exchange of publications, translations of literature, the exchange of students, writers and task groups; and organizing art exhibitions, concerts etc. The proposal included a suggestion for the legal recognition and protec18 tion of Croats living in Slovakia and Slovaks in the NOH. The position of the latter was at that time far from satisfactory. Slovak minority rights gained during the former Yugoslavia were largely ignored by the Ustasha regime. 19 The first objective of the Slovak representatives in Croatia was to improve this situation. Within the Slo16 File 4961 /41 , Box 213, MZV, SNA. Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 270. 18 File 244/41 , Box 1157, MZV, SNA. 19 About the Slovak minority in Croatia, see: Vit Usak, Slovcici v Chorvcitsku - historicky ncicrt (C leveland-Rim : Historicky ustav, 1978); Sprievodca slovenskym zahranicim, ed. I.'.ubica Bartalska (Bratislava: Dom zahranicnych Slovakov, 2001), 8790; Report of J. Cieker, February 12, 1942. File 27/48 JozefCieker papers, Okresny l'udovy sud v Bratislave 1945-1947 (O1..'.S BA), Statny oblastny archiv Bratislava (SABa). Information about the exact number of Slovaks in Croatia at that time differed. The daily Slovak, on October 22, 1941 , page 3, estimated a maximum of 22,000 countrymen ; other sources gave higher numbers . 17 �72 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak community itself, there were further differences related to religious orientation. The Catholic population lacked education and schools, and its national identity was rapidly disappearing. On the other hand, Lutheran villages were keeping their traditions alive, with much of the work done by local pastors.20 However, the Lutheran community had stronger ties to the former Yugoslav regime and was treated with suspicion by Ustasha authorities. In numerous cases the Slovak embassy had to intervene to help individuals (conscripts of the Yugoslav army) who had been captured in the previous war with Germany. The chaos and scarcities following the transition of power also forced a lot of Slovaks to seek help at the embassy. Ever since the foundation of the NDH, leaders of the Slovak expatriate community were planning to set up a minority organization, the so-called Slovak National Group in Croatia, with a common official statute recognized by the Croatian regime. The eventual failure of this initiative was largely due to the fact that they were not coordinated with the Croatian side, which feared a potential precedent that wou ld allow other minorities to raise similar claims. The only minority to achieve the privilege of an officially recognized status was the German one, with a population up to 150,000 and enjoying the benefits of the parent country ' s political dominance. Following the negotiations of June 25, 1941 , Croatia and Slovakia announced a mutual settlement of their claims regarding real estate belonging to their predecessor states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).21 Murgas managed to obtain the property of the former Czech-Slovak society Beseda in Lipovljani for the Slovak side.22 The issue of schools for the Slovak minority was a frequently negotiated topic from early on. In spite of the initial mistrust by the Ustasha authorities, which culminated in the arrests of several Slovak teachers, Slovak primary education was preserved. 23 Mutual contacts also developed in the field of pedagogy and science. A visit by Croatian medics and an Ustasha Youth delegation to °File 36, Box 266, MZV, SNA . 2 21 File 217/41 , Box 1157 and File 217/41 , Box 1155 , MZV, SNA . The society officially dissolved on July 30, 1941. See Slovak Beseda in Bratislava. Box 207, f. Policajne riaditel'stvo v Bratislave (PR Ba), SNA; File 325/41 , Box 214 and File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. 23 File 33880/41 , Box 213 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. Gardista, September 21 , 1941 , 3; Gardista, October 22, 1941 , 3. 22 �SLOVAKIA 73 Slovakia was met by great domestic publicity. 24 A program of student exchange and scholarship financing was launched by numerous institutions: The Science Society for Foreign Slovaks (mainly focused on student exchange, support of Slovak foreign education and distribution of Slovak literature abroad), the Matica slovenska, The Society of St. Adalbert, the Slovak University, and the Hlinka Youth. The Croatian partner organizations included the Saint Jerome Society, the Matica Hrvatska, and later the new Croatian-Slovak Society. The pace at which interest in Croatia spread was almost overwhelming for the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which decided to halt the uncontrolled influx of NDH visitors . The Ministry then published a directive stating that it must approve all Croatian visits. 25 The founding of the already mentioned Croatian-Slovak Society (August 13, 1941) was a milestone in cultural interaction. The Slovak envoy requested the speedy assignment of a cultural attache to Croatia, recommending Jozef Ambrus, who had been studying in Zagreb. This request was turned down, as was his later proposal of founding an office of the Society in Bratislava. 26 A fact worth mentioning is that Murgas proposed Alexander Mach, the Minister of the Interior, to be the chairman of this branch. 27 The Slovak authorities, however, took a rather cautious approach and decided to wait until their Croatian counterparts founded a similar branch of the Society in Zagreb. 28 These facts indicate a kind of cautiousness on the Slovak part, caused primarily by foreign political factors. Contrary to their cordial relations and shared long-term plans, practical cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia was difficult from the beginning. Later on, such cooperation was also damaged by the Ustasha regime's inability to make good on its commitments. Meanwhile, the Croatian and Slovak Society was founded in Zagreb. Franjo Dujmovic, 29 the editor-in-chief of the daily Nova Hrvat24 See for example: Gardista, July 26, 1941, 3; Gardista , July 27, 1941, 3; Gardista, August 26, 1941, 3; File 32595/41, Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 25 Ibid, File 6978/41. 26 Reports of K. Murgas, August 19, 1941 and August 26, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA; File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. See also: Jarinkovic, Spolkovy i ivot v frvej Slovenskej republike ... , 305-24. 7 File 544/41, Box 1155 and File 137/41, Box 1160, MZV, SNA. 28 File 32.702/41, Box 118, MZV, SNA. 29 Initially led by the Croatian Minister of the Interior and well-known Ustasha activist Adrija Artukovic. �74 SLOVAKIA-2015 ska (New Croatia) , was appointed its President, with Mile Starcevic and Eugen Ftillop as Vice-Presidents, and Zlatko Milkovic as Secretary. The Society ' s Board included a number of significant individuals whose positions suggested strong links with Croatian state institutions .3° The Society's goal was to develop cultural relations and to promote the Slovak Republic in the NDH. Stanislav Meciar also hoped to expand cultural cooperation, with special focus on the new Croatian literature. When asked about which Slovak novelists he would recommend for translation, he included Jozef Ciger Hronsky, Milo Urban, Tido J. Gaspar, Julius Horvath, and Margita Figuli. He rejected Peter Jilemnicky, whom he labelled a Czech and a Communist. Among Slovak poets he suggested Valentin Beniak, Andrej Zamov, Emil Boleslav Lukac, Jan Smrek, Rudolf Dilong, I:udo Ondrejov, Ladislav Novomesky, Jan R. Ponican and Jan Kostra, with the comment that "the last three were Communists, but have written valuable Slovak poems; here you ought to make your own decision." 31 He also decided to publish a special issue of the Slovenske pohl'ady on the subject of Croatia. 32 As early as 1941 discussions began about the possibility of closer cooperation between Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, a project designed to raise the profile of all three states. The incentive to establish this bloc came from Romania, mainly as a reaction to Hungarian irredentism. At the same time, the three states intended to revisit their territorial losses to Hungary between 193 8 and 1941. Agreement to create the bloc was soon disclosed and the Hungarian Government protested against "reviving the spirit of the Little Entente," referring to the interwar East-Central European military alliance against Hungary. In spite of the initial hesitation of Slovak politicians, by early 1942 Vojtech Tuka, the Slovak Foreign Minister, showed great interest in such cooperation. He emphasized that the alliance could not be labelled with the "stigma of Pan-Slavism," referring to criticism raised by some representatives of the Slovak government. On the one hand, as soon as the Germans indicated that no such efforts would be tolerated within their sphere of influence, the 30 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 155 . Letter of S. Meciar to Zlatko Milkovic from August 26, I 941. File 164 P 17, LA SNK. 32 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 52-83. 31 �SLOVAKIA 75 Slovak Republic 's activities declined rapidly . On the other hand, the Slovaks discovered that the NDH was not a reliable partner. 33 In the fall of 1941 some changes were made to the charge d' affaires positions in both countries. Jozef Cieker replaced the undisciplined Karol Murgas. Cieker had previously worked in Yugoslavia and was knowledgeable about Croatian affairs. He presented his credentials in Zagreb on December 12, 1941. At the same time, there was also a change in the Croatian diplomatic posting in Bratislava. Josip Berkovic, the new envoy, presented his credentials on December 19. These changes had no impact on the mutual convergence, and the Croatian Embassy in Bratislava appointed a cultural attache, Geno Sencic who energetically participated in the development of Slovak and Croatian cultural relations. In January of 1942, Tido J. Gaspar, Head of the Propaganda Office, charged Jozef Ambrus with preparing the ground for establishing the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia. The general assembly of this cultural institution took place on March 13, 1942, in the Slovak University ' s amphitheater. Slovak Ministers Alexander Mach, Gejza Medricky and Ferdinand Catlos, as well as other major figures of political and cultural life attended, as did a numerous Croatian delegation. This meeting received broad media coverage. This general assembly prescribed uniforms as a part of the dress code. The Society set as its goal to unite all Croatophiles, spread the Croatian culture and develop mutual relationships. Political issues were to be avoided. Alexander Mach was acclaimed as the Society 's President. In his acceptance speech he pointed out the parallels between the Autonomists ' first paramilitary organization, the Rodobrana (Native Defense), the subsequent Hlinka Guards and the Croatian Ustasha movement. He added that cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia "is not based on the pharisaical chimera of the notorious Slavic solidarity," which had led to humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations. These contacts, he continued, "are supported by a good tradition, the present struggle for a common goal, which we all have before our eyes in the New Europe." Mach's 33 See Miroslav Tejchman, "Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace v letech druhe svetove valley a Mad'arsko," Slovansky pfehled 78 (1992) : 161-71 ; Cubomir Liptak, "Mad'arsko v slovenskej politike za druhej svetovej vojny," in Prispevky k dejinam fasizmu v Ceskos/ovensku a v Mad'arsku, ed. Gyorgy Ranki (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1969), 222-30. �76 SLOVAKIA-2015 speech marked the boundaries of the cultural society. He also delegated Stanislav Meciar, Anton Misik, Jozef Ambrus as its VicePresidents, Viliam Kovar, Eduard Urban as its Secretaries, and Belo Franc as the Treasurer. Many important people working in the area of culture and politics became board members .34 The next day, the first issue of the Slovak-and-Croatian literary review entitled Tatre i Velebit appeared.35 Josip Andric became the editor-in-chief. He had visited Slovakia since the 1920s, and maintained good contacts with the representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party. In the first issue's introductory address, Ferdinand Catlos, Slovak Minister of Defense, noted : "With the help of the Germans, both our nations have become autonomous and integrated as state actors among the nations of young Europe." He praised the shared destiny and goals, desires and hopes of both nations who required no written agreements to confirm their mutual relationships.36 It is evident that both societies had ideologically compatible people in the leadership, with close links to the official regime. It was typical of both states to infuse culture with politics, especially with propaganda. However, as Jan Jankovic pointed out, in spite of major ideological links, there was also much freedom, which he demonstrated by using literature translations that often avoided an ideological undertone. Once the Slovak Croatian Society was founded, the organization of commonly-held events grew in intensity, and the Society substantially participated in promoting cooperation with other cultural institutions. Contacts were developed in the area of sports as well, but did not exceed the norm. At that time, the establishment of the autonomy of Slovakia in October of 1938 was celebrated. The cultural program focused on Slovak popular sonfs and included lectures given by the country's major personalities.3 In Bratislava on April 9, 1942, the Society celebrated the first anniversary of the NDH' s inception by arranging a red-carpet procession in the highly representative build34 For example: Stefan Bella, Juraj Cecetka, Alojz Macek, Jozef Kutnik-Smalov, Valentin Beniak, Aladar Kocis, Karol Klinovsky, Karol Studenc, Alexander Moyzes and honorsry members included Jozef Skultety, Tido J. Gaspar, Rudolf Vavra, Ferdinand Catlos and Gejza Medricky. Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 204, PR-BA, SNA. 35 More precisely about the revue Tatre i Velebit, see: Jankovic, Chorwitska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 39-51. 36 Tatre i Velebit, March 14, 1942, 5. 31 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, 1942, 156. �SLOVAKIA 77 ing of the Reduta. On the next day, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by Bishop Michal Buzalka in Saint Martin's Cathedral, and on this occasion the Slovak dailies published special issues. 38 At that time a numerous group of Slovak journalists, cultural workers and politicians set off to Croatia to celebrate the first anniversary of the state. Besides Minister Mach and Secretary Kovar, the group included prominent Hlinka guard officers Otomar Kubala, Alexander Cunderlik, Frantisek Galan, and other persons who also discussed mutual cooperation in the area of culture. Within the context of the cooperation of Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, a meeting was held on May 13 in Bucharest, where the participants agreed to compile national bibliographies of major works, to organize regular visits, to promote each other and to organize so-called weeks of reciprocal culture. An Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the NDH was signed in Zagreb, which dealt with the foundation of a Chair of the Croatian Language, Literature and History and a Department of the Croatian Language and Literature at the Slovak University, with similar Slovak institutes in Zagreb. An important clause focused on maintaining and extending elementary schools for minorities. Both partners committed to support reciprocal visits and a minimum of two student scholarships. 39 The Agreement also included a clause on the recognition of academic titles, scientific education benefits for young people, and book exchanges. They also promised not to permit the publication of things "which could present the other state in a bad light." The Agreement established a Slovak and Croatian Cultural Committee to observe the provisions of the mutual agreements and to deepen relationships. The Agreement was for a period of five years and based on the principle of reciprocity .40 In spite of the fact that similar plans had existed since 1941, and that the final agreement was prepared in 1942, neither this Agreement, nor another cultural Agreement between the Slovak Republic and NDH came into force . This was due to their inability to make and perform agreements, and a certain inflexibility characteristic of both parties, which were the basic problems associated with the development of relations between Slovakia and Croatia. Some of these problems were caused by the fact that the NDH was not con38 /bid, 164-5 . Slovak-Croatian reciprocal scholarships. File 255/43, Box 2 14, MZV, SNA . 40 File 8/ 100/43 , Box 118, MZV, SNA. 39 �78 SLOVAKIA-2015 solidated politically and economically, that both countries were involved in the war, in a complicated foreign-policy situation, and also in the relationship of satellite states with their protector, Germany . The issue of the legal status of the Slovak minority in the NDH was perceived in a very sensitive way, and tackled unsuccessfully throughout the entire existence of the NDH. Frequent excesses of the Ustasha towards Slovak inhabitants in Croatia did not contribute to mutual trust. It is well-known that from the beginning some Slovaks rejected Croatian citizenship because they had supported the previous regime, they had to deal with poor living conditions and showed increased interest in repatriation to Slovakia. Viliam Kovar's visit to Lipovljany on June 14, 1941 created a stir. During his visit, Kovar showed concern about the situation of the local Slovaks and suggested repatriation in exchange for Croats living in Slovakia. This proposal resonated and some Slovaks in Croatia appealed to the embassy for help. 41 However, charge d'affaires Murgas viewed Kovar's initiative very critically. Croatians intended to repatriate the Slovak minority to the Slovak Republic, which Murgas found detrimental to the state.42 In any case, official Slovak circles showed no serious interest in repatriation to Slovakia. What did not make such a big stir was settling the issue of the validity of Jewish travel documents. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged their validity (until March 31, 1942), but at the same time the Ministry told Murgas not to intervene in these matters, to which he would agree. 43 The legation had the right to decide each Jewish case, but their objective was to ensure that these Jews would not return to Slovakia because they were "a useless and harmful element, " 44 which corresponded to the official policy of the Slovak Republic. 45 In the NDH 41 File 116/41 , Box 1160, MZV, SNA; Report written by representatives of the Slovak minority in the NDH regarding the visit of Viliam Kovar, June 16, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA. See also: Oldfich Pejs, "Slovenska diplomacie a valecni zajatci slovenske narodnosti (1939-1942)," Vojenska hist6ria 15 (2011), 122-41. 42 '1n today's situation we don't have the space and employment opportunities for returnees ... " Report ofK. Murgas, August 19, 1941 , Box 143 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. 43 File 903/41 and 1347/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 44 File 62/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 45 For a comparison of the Slovak and Croatian anti-Jewish policies, see: Eduard Niznansky and Jana Mnahoncakova, "Vymedzenie pojmu Zid na Slovensku a v �SLOVAKIA 79 the Jewish issue was "promptly resolved," and Serbs also became an "unwanted element." 46 The greatest boom of cultural relations between Slovakia and Croatia occurred in 1942. Numerous visits and social events were organized in order to strengthen this cooperation. For example, during the summer several Croatian delegations visited the Slovak Republic. From June 28 until July 4, a "Croatian Week" in Slovakia was organized to promote Croatian culture. Slovak Radio participated very actively by broadcasting Croatian music and a series of interviews by a number of major figures in culture and politics.47 At that time an ensemble of amateur actors form Croatia toured Slovakia with their theater program dedicated to Croatian dances.48 Reciprocal visits and presentations became the most typical component of Slovak-Croatian cultural policy, most frequently realized through national theatrical and music productions. As in Slovakia, various events were held in the NDH which concentrated on mutual convergence, such as the presentation of the Articles of Association of the Slovak National Unity (Slovenska narodna jednota) to the relevant Croatian authorities who promised their recognition. The Slovak Reading Club in Ilok organized Slovaks in the NDH. In spite of promises made, the Croatian administration did nothing. 49 The Slovak Day planned for August 30, 1942, in Stara Pazova, where Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, a famous descendant of the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, served as a Protestant minister, was postponed because of guerilla warfare.50 Jozef Cieker constantly pointed out the complicated situation in the country and the Ustasha's excesses. "The scope of action of ministers is limited to minis- Chorvatsku - pokus o porovnanie," in Z dejin holokaustu ajeho popierania, ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky (Bratislava: Stimul, 2007), 107-30. 46 See Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 47 Alexander Mach, Mladen Lorkovic, Stanislav Meciar, Jozef Ambrus, Valentin Beniak, Alexander Moyzes, Viliam Kovar, Mile Starcevic, Zlatko Milkovic, Franjo Dujmovic, Mile Budak, Viliam Peros, Josip Horvat, Geno Senecic and others. 48 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, I 942, p.165. 49 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, I 943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 50 Slovaks in Yugoslavia. File 6452/41-1 , Box 143, MZV, SNA. �80 SLOV AKIA-2015 terial buildings and a small region around Zagreb." 51 He perceived Slovak-Croatian relations as weak and suggested that it would be unwise to limit mutual relations to Ustasha Croatia and suggested that the two nations should relate to one another as wholes. The Ustasha were not pleased with the activities of the Slovak charge d'affaires in Zagreb, and therefore they suggested that he should be removed. Cieker often met with opposition groups, members of the higher clergy and criticized the situation in the country. These statements show that there were certain differences between Slovakia and Croatia. Conservative representatives in Croatia were the more moderate Catholics of a nationalist orientation, represented in the past by the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (the Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka). In that sense, they were competitors of the Ustasha. The Slovak Republic supported the regular Croatian army - the militia, with supplies of arms and equipment. However, much more evident were the contacts between the radical representatives of the Hlinka Guard and the Ustasha. They were ideologically close, and strongly involved in the development of mutual relations, for instance between the Hlinka Youth and the Ustasha Youth. Despite these differences, cultural contacts continued to evolve. Each autumn international commercial fairs were held in both Bratislava and Zagreb. Both states sent delegations of major figures of economic and political life to the fairs. In June of 1942, an agreement between Croatia and Slovakia was signed in Bratislava on the regulation of mutual contact under civil law. At the end of October, the Minister of Justice, Gejza Fritz, signed in Zagreb an interstate agreement on extradition and propertylaw assistance in criminal issues. Like the economic agreement entered into in October of 1941, these agreements came into force too late, and therefore had no significant impact on the actual relationship between the Slovak Republic and the NDH. 52 Also, an agreement was concluded on cooperation between the Slovak and Croatian academic youth.53 This cooperation seemed promising from the summer of 1941 and many young people from Croatia visited Slovakia. The Hlinka Youth, jointly with the Ustasha Youth and 51 Report of J. Cieker, August 28, 1942. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 52 Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 273-74. 53 Medunarodni ugovori 1943, p. 208-10. Box 214, MZV, SNA. �SLOVAKIA 81 Hitlerjugend, organized camps for their members . In this regard, there was a significant involvement by Alojz Macek and lvo Orsanic, the leaders of organizations in the Slovak Republic and the NDH, . As in the preceding year, the autumn of 1942 witnessed certain changes in Slovak- Croatian relations. Activist Viliam Kovar enlisted in the Slovak army and treasurer Belo Fronc replaced him. The NDH Government underwent a major reorganization which resolved the conflict between the Poglavnik and the Minister of Defense, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik. Kvaternik came to recover to Slovakia, when he probably sought some political support. However, the Government's reconstruction did not disturb the NDH's relations with the Slovak Republic. Promoting one another continued, which is evident in the Slovak Culture Week held in Zagreb from November 29, 1942, to December 5, 1942. 54 This event had some response. Besides abundant musical performances, several contributions were made on the present and the past of the relationships between Slovaks and Croatians. At that time, Andric's Slovak Language Grammar was published.55 By the end of that year, yet another change took place in diplomatic postings. Charge d'affaires Berkovic was dismissed and replaced with Blaz Lorkovic, who presented his credentials to President Tiso on December 22. In his speech, he remarked: "The Poglavnik appointed me as the charge d'affaires in Slovakia in his belief that our brother Slovaks wish to have an old and well-proven Ustasha as the charge d'affaires of the NDH."56 In 1943 further talks were held on cooperation between Romania, Slovakia and the NDH . It was evident that Ante Pavelic's Croatia was very weak as a partner, and, therefore, the Slovak representatives focused mainly on negotiations with the Romanians. In the end, however, these attempts also failed to improve cooperation and the idea of a tightly-bound Slovak and Croatian bloc against Hungary was unsuccessful. 57 In January of 1943, a full length propaganda film 54 At that time the following Slovaks visited Croatia: Stanislav Meciar, Andrej Mraz, Karol Ki:irper, Jan Pi:istenyi, Jozef Pauco, Jan Doransky as we ll as representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Matica slovenska, the Slovak-Croatian Society, the Society of St. Adalbert and the Bratislava Chamber Quintet. 55 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 157-159; File Slovaks in Yugoslavia, Box 143, MZV, SNA. 56 File 35.591 /42, Box 219, MZV, SNA. 57 Tejchman, Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace ... , 166-67 . �82 SLOV AKIA-2015 From the Tatras to the Sea of Azov was shown in the NDH, which highlighted the Slovak Army's activity on the Eastern Front in order to strengthen the idea of a joint struggle against Bolshevism . In the field of news reporting, a regular exchange of newsreels took place and a number of contributions on Croatian topics were broadcast over Slovak Radio. The fourth anniversary celebrations of independence in Zagreb were not as spectacular as in the preceding year. In addition to compulsory lectures and articles in the Croatian press, the Croatian and Slovak Society organized a tea party on March 13th. The next morning, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated and attended by representatives of the Croatian Government. 58 On March 25, 1943 the second general assembly of the Slovak and Croatian Society was held . Once again, this event became a manifestation of fondness for each other. Many prominent people of that period's political and cultural life participated, headed by ministers Mach, Medricky and charge d'affaires Blaz Lorkovic, who was elected an honorary member. A declaration of efforts to extend the statutes of the Society was made since there was an interest in establishing branches in other towns of Slovakia (it was planned to establish branches in Presov, Zilina and Banska Bystrica), and to extend activities in the field of culture.59 The general assembly also launched the celebration of Croatian independence, which was accompanied by a number of cultural events including a gala concert of the Slovak Radio on April 9th. Employees of Mach's Ministry of the Interior were invited to turn out in strength. A Croatian issue of the newspaper Gardista (Guardsman) was published to celebrate the third anniversary of the NDH's creation. During his visit to Slovakia in May, 1943, Ivan Veres, a Protestant minister, reported on the difficult situation of Slovaks in the NDH. Again, the unresolved issues emerged, especially those regarding culture. Based on this information Alexander Mach invited the Croatian charge d'affaires to an audience and gave him notice that the situation of Slovaks in the NDH could directly affect the future relations between Slovakia and Croatia. In this respect, Mach even intended to stop honoring Josip Andric, the writer, with a high 58 Tatre i Velebit, June 15, 1943, 61. The Slovak-Croatian Society - Minutes of the Second General Assembly. File 38/68, Box 204, PR Ba, SNA. 59 �SLOVAKIA 83 state award, and issued a command to suspend the establishment of the Slovak and Croatian Society's branches. Jozef Cieker also made a statement on the nature of the mutual relationships by pointing out that people in Bratislava had too many illusions, but the reality was much more complicated. 60 In spite of the fact that the negotiations on signing the Slovak and Croatian Cultural Convention continued, no consensus was reached. Croatia refused to recognize the special status of Slovaks in the NDH because of other minorities, who would then demand similar rights. However, the Croats were willing to guarantee Slovak education through separate legislation. They also demanded that the SNU should not be a political organization to represent Slovaks in the NDH and should not claim the property of former Czechoslovak: associations. However, at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was more interested in concluding the Slovak and Italian cultural convention, after which the Ministry would be willing to continue negotiations about the convention with Croatia.61 The fall of Mussolini in 1943 brought about an "unpleasant awakening" in the NDH. Nevertheless, Ante Pavelic, with Germany's support, managed to hold on to power and maintain the illusion of the existence of an independent Croatian state, and on September 10, 1943, he announced that previous Italian and Croatian agreements were no longer valid, as the Italians had failed to fulfil their obligations and agreed to an armistice with the enemy. 62 At that time, a number of Croatian politicians and their families, who refused to stay in the NDH for various reasons, were in Slovakia. This is very interesting, because the Slovak Republic granted asylum to persons whose blood-stained careers were inscribed in the NDH' s infamous history. For instance, this applied to Eugen "Dido" Kvaternik, the former commander of the Croatian secret police! Jozef Cieker tried unsuccessfully to reject entry visas to exponents of the Ustasha re• 63 g1me. 60 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 61 Report of J. Cieker from July 7, 1943. Box 143, MZV, SNA. 62 Jbid, File 313 2/43 . 63 Report of J. Cieker, September 9, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. �84 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the reality of that time, Slovak and Croatian cultural cooperation decreased and in 1943 the Tatre i Velebit cultural review folded . The Slovak Embassy in Zagreb pointed to the unbearable problems of the NDH, which were also reflected in its failure to fulfil economic contractual obligations. The embassy also dealt with propertyrelated sanctions and the loss of freedom which Slovaks in the NDH had to struggle with every day. Despite plans for further cooperation, the mutual relationships had reached their zenith. Their abovestandard scope in the period between 1939 and 1944 is shown by the fact that nineteen translated Croatian fiction titles were published in Slovakia, which is more than in the case of most Allied countries. In addition, popular and scientific, political and religious literature was published, although their numbers are difficult to reconstruct. 64 At the beginning of February, 1944, Jozef Cieker was replaced in Zagreb by charge d'affaires Viktor Becko. 65 However, he would not bring any changes to Slovak-Croat relations. From his reports we learn that actual power in Croatia was shared by guerilla and German and Ustasha troops, and about the oppression of the population. As regards Slovak-Croatian relations, Becko noted that higher state authorities had an interest and a positive approach, which, however, faded at lower positions. Therefore, he suggested, that Croatians should be promised economic concessions in return for cultural and social offsets for Slovaks in the NDH. 66 In his report he summarized the mutual contacts which he considered to be less developed than expected and pointed out that a certain platform could be found as a support. In spite of that, he labelled the cultural and political relations as very good. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, he criticized the absence of a trade representative "whom the Croatians have in the Protectorate as well." 67 As regards the issue of the Slovaks in the NDH, he underscored the fact that Slovaks were transported to concentration camps based on the principle of collective guilt. Some Croatians hated the Slovaks because they were not obliged to join the army or the Ustasha, and local personal and prop64 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 166-176. Slovak, February 2, 1944, p. 4; Slovak, February 9, 1944, p. 3. 66 Report of V. Becka, March 20, 1944. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1.'.S BA, SABa. 67 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, April 25, 1944. Box 213, MZV, SNA. 65 �SLOVAKIA 85 erty-related conflicts played an important role as well. He pointed to the nationalist attitudes of the Ustasha, who did not like "foreign elements" in their country. 68 However, the repatriation of Slovaks was technically impossible at that time.69 Contacts between Slovaks and Croats were not limited to the official political position, which I intended to describe in this paper. There was also significant cooperation among anti-fascist forces in the Slovak Republic, the NDH and elsewhere in Europe. Tomislav Poglajen-Kolakovic, a Catholic priest who worked in Slovakia from September of 1943 and joined the anti-fascist forces, was an outstanding person involved in this convergence. 70 In the last stages of the existence of both states, mutual contacts died out completely, and the dissolution of the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia on May 25th, 1945, 71 was just a formality, because most of the Society's representatives had fled abroad, where they continued to develop contacts with the Croats. Relationships between Slovakia and Croatia from 1941 to 1945 were affected by the political climate. Despite comparable efforts by Slovaks and Croats to attain national emancipation in the inter-war period and deep historical roots of mutual cooperation multiplied at that time by the concept of "historical inevitability," it was the ideological adherence of political representatives and their mentors (especially Germany) which played an important role in the mutual convergence. Cultural cooperation took a similar path, but it could not overcome the ideological framework. Due to both practical and political obstacles, such cooperation would not reach the desired form, and it peaked between 1942 and the first half of 1943 . However, as Viliam Kovar wrote about the activities of the Slovak and Croatian Society, which was supposed to reflect these relationships : 68 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, January 8, 1945 . Box 213, MZV, SNA . 69 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to V. Becka, January 26, 1945. Box I 160, MZV, SNA. 70 More precisely see: Jozef Jablonicky, Podoby nasilia (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000), 9-27. For the official Croatian reaction to the uprising in Slovakia, see: Jan Rychlik, "Obdobie pred Slovenskym narodnym povstanim v spravach chorvatskeho vyslanca v Bratislave," Historicky casopis 56 (2008): 349-84. ; Jan Rychlik, "Slovenske narodne povstanie v spravach chorvatskeho diplomata," Historicky casopis 54 (2006) : 315-52. 71 Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 20 14, PR Ba, SNA . �86 SLOV AKIA-2015 " ... (the Society) failed to do as much as one could possibly expect, but did not miss one chance to inform the Slovak public and make it familiar with the life of Croatia and its representatives." 72 It was clear before the end of World War II, which both countries entered on the side of Germany, that neither state would outlive it. However, this did not mean the end of mutual cultural contacts, which after the War took place in a brand new geopolitical and ideological environment. 72 Report of the Society' s secretary. File 38/68, Box 2014, PR Ba, SNA. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 66 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA, 1941-1945 1 Miroslav Michela The foreign policy of Slovakia in the years 1939 - 1945 has been quite a popular research topic of Slovak historians over the last ten to twenty years. 2 Significant achievements in this regard relate primarily to research on Slovak-German relations,3 but there are also several 1 1 would like to express my gratitude to prof. Mark Stolarik and his family for significant help in my research on Slovak emigres, and especially on the biography of Slovak journalist and politician Karol Murgas. My research in the Slovak collections in the Archives and Special Collections of the University of Ottawa Library would not have been possible without the support of the Helen and John lvanco Memorial Research Bursary. 2 Here I would like to list a few publications, which appeared in recent years, mostly as a result of long-term academic interest: Michal Schvarc, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945 a jej postavenie v ramci nemeckej sfery vplyvu," in Kfucove problemy modernych slovenskych dejin 1848-1992, ed. Valerian Bystricky et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 231-52; Edita lvanickova et. al. , Slovenslui republika 1939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2012); Pavo! Petruf, Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945: nacrt problematiky (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2011); James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3 For example: Sicherheitsdienst a Slovens/ca v rokach 1938-1944: od auton6mie po Povstanie. Slovensky stat vo vybranych spravach SD od jesene 1943 do septembra 1944, ed. Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Slovenske narodne muzeum-Muzeum karpatskych Nemcov, 2006) ; "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu;dokumenty. /., ed. Michal Schvarc, Martin Holak and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, SNM- Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2008); "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu : dokumenty. II. ed. Michal Schvarc and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, Historicky ustav SAV, SNM - Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2010) ; Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1941 v dokumentoch I.:od Mnichova k vojne proti ZSSR , ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky et. al. (Presov: Universum, 2009); Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1941-1945 v dokumentoch II. :od vojny proti ZSSR po zanik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945, ed. Eduard Niznansky et. al. (Presov: Universum-EU, 20 11); Von Munchen bis Salzburg 1938- 1940. Dokumente und Essay. Buch 1. Buch 2. Slovensko v jeseni 1944, ed. Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Luc, 2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politi- SLOVAKIA 67 studies concerning the relationship between Slovakia and the Great Powers .4 In the context of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, plenty of studies are oriented on the Slovak-Polish and Slovak-Hungarian relationships at different levels of politics.5 In the last decade studies relating to Slovak-Croatian diplomatic relations have also appeared. 6 Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politischer Al/tag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn (Paderbom : Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003 ). 4 For example: Politicke vzt'ahy medzi Francuzskom a Ceskoslovenskom a Francuzskom a Slovenskom (1 939-1948): vyber dokumentov, ed. Pavo! Petruf (Martin: Matica slovenska, 2003); Dagmar Ciema-Lantayova, Pohfady na vychod: Postoje k Rusku v slovenskej politike 1934-1944 (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Slavomir Michalek, "Niekol'ko problemov slovensko-americkych vzt'ahov pocas druhej svetovej vojny," in Edita Ivanickova et. al. Slovenska republiko /939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach, 139-61 ; Petr Kubik, Slovensko-talianske vzt'ahy 1939-1945 (Bratislava: Ustav pamiiti naroda, 20 IO); Edita Ivanickova, "Zapadne vel'moci a slovensky stat 1939-1945," in Slovensky stat 1939-1945: predstavy a reality, eds. Martina Fiamova, Jan Hlavinka and Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2014), 8193 . 5 Here is a sample of some interesting works by young scholars: Aliaksandr Piahanau, "Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Mirror of the German-Soviet Conflictive Alliance (1939-1941 )," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 16 (2012): 144-63; Isvtan Janek, "The Issue of Hungarian- Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939- 1940," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 18 (2014): 128-41 ; Istvan Janek, "Mad'arsko-slovenske diplomaticke vzt'ahy v rokoch 1939-1941 , " in Slovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, IV. , eds. Michal Smigel' and Peter Micko (Banska Bystrica: Katedra hist6rie Fakulty humanitnych vied Univerzity Mateja Bela, 2005 ), 334-51 ; Mateusz Gniazdowski, "Kontakty PHsudczyk6w ze Slowakami w latach 19391945," Niepodleglosi: 55 (2005): I 07-50; Dusan Seges, "The Slovak Question and its International Context during World War Two," in 1945 - A Break with the Past, ed. Zdenko Cepic (Ljubljana: Institut za novejso zgodovino, 2008), 213-26; Dusan Seges, Dvojkrii v silociarach bieleho or/a. Slovenska otazka v politike pol'skej exi/ovej vlady za 2. svetovej vojny (Bratislava: Veda, 2009); Holy Case, "The Holocaust in Regional Perspective: Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia," in Varieties of Anti-Semitism, eds . Peter Kenez and Bruce Thompson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 76-92. 6 Jan Rychlik, "Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy v letech 1941-1945 ," Slovanske historicke studie 26 (2000): 265-83 ; Miroslav Michela, "Vznik slovenskeho vyslanectva v Chorvatsku a cinnost' Karola Murgasa, charge d 'affaires v Zahrebe v roku 1941 ," in Slovenska republika 1939 - 1945 ocami mladych historikov fl , ed. Martin Lacko (Bratislava: Merkury, 2003), 97-123 ; Miroslav Michela, "K otazke slovensko-chorvatskej kulturnej spoluprace v rokoch 1941-45," Slavica Slovaca 38 (2003): 112-22; Jan Tkac, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske a slovensko-chorvatske vzt'ahy 68 SLOVAKIA-2015 se works are mainly focused on the issues of diplomacy and the traditional history of politics. They describe the ideas and activities of major political players, thus complementing our knowledge about the process of negotiating and building the "New Europe." 7 The present study aims primarily to explain a few basic factors in the context of building official Slovak-Croatian cultural cooperation in the period from 1941 to 1945 . The foundation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH) on April 10th, 1941 resulted in the expansion of cultural interaction between it and the newly- independent Slovak Republic, as the representatives of both states shared similar experiences of national struggles and now ideological and political interests. The Slovak Republic officially recognized the NDH on v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Historicky zbornik 19 (2009): 154-68; Jan Tkac, "Chorvatsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941-1945," Historicky casopis 58 (2010): 659-83 ; Alena Bartlova, "Dr. Jozef Cieker, vyslanec Slovenskej republiky," in Dr. Jozef Cieker: seminar pri prileiitosti nedoi itym 90. narodenincim Jozefa Ciekera v Tvrdosine 20. juna 1997, ed. Juraj Chovan-Rehak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2000), 71-92; Jan Jankovic, Chorvcitska literatura v slovenskej kulture If. (19391948), (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Jan Jankovic, Stanis/av Meciar - chorvatofil (Bratislava: Ustav svetovej literatury SAV, 2001); Martin Jarinkovic, "Pohl'ad slovenskej dennej tlace na chorvatsku otazku v rokoch 1941-1944," in Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov VIII, ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2009), 261-88; Martin Jarinkovic, "Spolkovy zivot v prvej Slovenskej republike na priklade Slovenskochorvatskej spolocnosti v rokoch 1942-1944," in Zivot v Slovenskej republike. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov 9., ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda 2010), 305-24; Oldfich Pejs, "Nakup koni v Chorvatsku pro slovenskou armadu v roce 1944," Vojenskci hist6ria 8 (2004): 87-95; Oldfich Pejs, "Na okraj dodavky slovenskych zbrani do Chorvatska v roce 1942," Historie a vojenstvi 45 (1996): 56-73 . 7 See the following : Michal Schvarc, "Statna suverenita len ako fasada? Zasahy Nemecka do slovenskeho zakonodarstva v rokoch 1939-1940," in Slovensko v labyrinte modernych eur6pskych dejin : pocta historikov Milanovi Zemkovi, ed . Slavomir Michalek (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 20 14), 641-57; Pavo) Petruf, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskeho statu 1939-1945 : niekol'ko poznamok o jej vzniku, zamerani a kratkodobej existencii," in Riesenie iidovskej otcizky v spojeneckych krajincich nacistickeho Nemecka, ed. Viera Kovacova et. al. (Banska Bystrica: Muzeum Slovenskeho narodneho povstania, 20 12), 17-29; Pavo I Petruf, "Terna "novej Eur6py", "noveho eur6pskeho poriadku" a "zivotneho priestoru" na strankach novin Slovak ( I 939-1940)," in Kapitoly z hist6rie stredoeur6pskeho priestoru v 19. a 20. storoci: pocta k 70-rocnemu jubileu Dusana Kovcica, ed. Edita Ivanickova et. al. (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 201 I), 338-54. SLOVAKIA 69 May 5th, 194 l along with other Axis members and satellites - Germany, Italy and Hungary. 8 The NDH's political role in the "New Europe" was outlined in the Treaty of Rome, signed on May 18, 194 l, which established long-term Italian patronage. After Croatia gained its sovereignty, this subordination was immediately subject to much domestic criticism. During the following Croatian-Slovak diplomatic discussions, both parties set out a preferred vision of German rather than Italian supervision, seeing in Nazi Germany a common protector and liberator and also admiring the state and the Flihrer. In May of 194 l the government of the Slovak Republic surprisingly appointed the radical Karol Murgas, as its charge d'affaires to Croatia. The request was officially delivered by German authorities, as there was no direct contact between the two parties at that time. 9 Murgas had no diplomatic experience and was known for his awkward and hot-tempered behavior in public, which might have caused some hesitation, but his paramilitary experience in the Hlinka Guard and his demonstrated sympathy for Croatian nationalists made their mark. Murgas himself saw the move as an attempt to remove him from Slovak domestic politics, as he had previously enjoyed the prominent post of head of the Department of Propaganda. 10 In May of 194 l Viliam Kovar, the distinguished Slovak journalist, visited Croatia. During his stay he met influential statesmen and leaders of the Ustasha movement and examined the potential for mu- 8 Croatia - Congratulations of president Jozef Tiso, file 1300/41 , box 61 , collection Kancelaria prezidenta republiky - Slovensky narodny archiv (SNA) - Bratislava. For more about Slovak-Yugoslav relations see: Jan Nemecek, "K slovensko-jugoslavskym vztahum 1939-45," in Evropa mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem. Sbornik praci k sedmdesatinam Jaroslava Valenty, eds. Miroslav Sestak and Emil Voracek (Praha: Historicky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, 2000), 385-98; Martin Jarinkovic, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske hospodarske a obchodne kontakty v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Pamdt' naroda 7 (20 11 ): 4-17. 9 S/ovak, May 11, I 941, 3. Zagreb's official approval of Murgas's mission came on May 15, but information ' s about it had already appeared in Grenzebote on the 4th of May 1941. For this question see also: File 79/41 , Box 1155 and File 77/41 , Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 10 See: Miroslav Michela, "Miesto a uloha Karola Murgasa v radikalnom prude slovenskej politiky v obdobi rokov 1939-1941 ," in S/ovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, ed. Martin Lacko (Trnava : Katedra hist6rie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Cyrila a Metoda, 2002), 77-105 . 70 SLOVAKIA-2015 tual cultural cooperation. 11 In a letter to his colleague Stanislav Meciar, the editor- in-chief of the journal Slovenske pohl'ady, Kovar suggested sending a series of congratulatory letters on Croatia's independence to demonstrate Slovak sympathy and support. 12 Meciar was known to be a Croatophile and ardent admirer of writer and politician Mile Budak, who later became Minister of Education and Religion of the newly-founded NDH. 13 In a letter dated May 23, Meciar asserted the brotherhood of both nations and expressed satisfaction with both countries' successful completion of the struggle for independence. In his words, "Croats were a sincere nation close to us" and "the future of Slovakia will be much safer when developed in tandem with the present beautiful reality of Croatia." 14 Such declarations of sympathy were common in contemporary formal communications and were not deemed awkward . The Slovak press continuously monitored the Croatian struggle for independence and dedicated significant space to discussions with Croat emancipation activists : the Ustasha and Hlinka Guard officials; and to both nations' notable historical figures, such as Ljudevit Gaj , Ban Jelacic and Ante Starcevic on the one hand, and Jan Kollar, Stefan Moyzes and Andrej Hlinka on the other. A lot of attention was also paid to contemporary figures such as Mile Budak, Milo Urban and Alexander Mach, the commander-in-chief of the Hlinka Guard. Andrej Vrbacky, the Slovak translator, deserves credit for this written presentation. On May 26, 1941, Karol Murgas paid an official visit to Ante Pavelic, Croatia's supreme leader - poglavnik. In his formal address, Murgas pointed to the similarities of both nation's histories and suggested close cooperation in future political and cultural activities. 15 After this the Slovak embassy was officially opened. Interestingly, although an embassy agreement was offered to Murgas, he came to Zagreb with the official status of an envoy, which the Croatian side considered insufficient and demanded diplomatic representation at 11 Croatia trip reports. Box 4, Papers of Viliam Kovar, Literarny archiv Slovenskej narodnej kniznici V Martine (LA SNK). 12 Letter of V. Kovar to S. Meciar, August 26, 1941 . File 164 E 20, LA SNK. 13 See for example: Stanislav Meciar, "Chorvatsky klasik Mile Budak," Slovenske pohl'ady 56 ( 1940): 429-44. 14 Letter of S. Meciar to M. Budak, May 21 , 1941. File 164 N 17, LA SNK. 15 File 8/41 , Box 1155, MZV, SNA; Karol Murgas, "Pred tridsiatimi rokmi v Zahrebe," Slovak a svet I (Chicago, 1971 ): 15. SLOVAKIA 71 the top level. A month later, on June 25, Slovak president Jozef Tiso accepted the nomination of Dragutin Toth as Croatian charge d' affaires to Slovakia. 16 Murgas objected to this nomination, rating Toth as a liberal-orientated leftist. Toth's first audience with President Tiso took place on August l st, and his opening statement was dedicated again to both nations' independence. It is worth mentioning that he gave the speech in his native tongue, yet the president answered him in Slovak. This established a precedent for Tiso's interactions with envoys of Slavic states. 17 The newly-established Slovak embassy in Zagreb attracted broad interest and numerous appeals for bilateral cooperation. Both parties declared their intention to closely coordinate their political, economic, social and cultural activities. NOH officials wanted information on the organization of economic and social life in Slovakia. A common topic of bilateral talks was the means of settling the debts of former parent states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). After initial negotiations with Murgas, Anton Bonifacic, head of the Croatian Department of Culture of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out a "Proposal for Establishing Cultural Cooperation between the NOH and the Slovak Republic". Its aim was to build economic, social and cultural ties based on the mutual exchange of publications, translations of literature, the exchange of students, writers and task groups; and organizing art exhibitions, concerts etc. The proposal included a suggestion for the legal recognition and protec18 tion of Croats living in Slovakia and Slovaks in the NOH. The position of the latter was at that time far from satisfactory. Slovak minority rights gained during the former Yugoslavia were largely ignored by the Ustasha regime. 19 The first objective of the Slovak representatives in Croatia was to improve this situation. Within the Slo16 File 4961 /41 , Box 213, MZV, SNA. Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 270. 18 File 244/41 , Box 1157, MZV, SNA. 19 About the Slovak minority in Croatia, see: Vit Usak, Slovcici v Chorvcitsku - historicky ncicrt (C leveland-Rim : Historicky ustav, 1978); Sprievodca slovenskym zahranicim, ed. I.'.ubica Bartalska (Bratislava: Dom zahranicnych Slovakov, 2001), 8790; Report of J. Cieker, February 12, 1942. File 27/48 JozefCieker papers, Okresny l'udovy sud v Bratislave 1945-1947 (O1..'.S BA), Statny oblastny archiv Bratislava (SABa). Information about the exact number of Slovaks in Croatia at that time differed. The daily Slovak, on October 22, 1941 , page 3, estimated a maximum of 22,000 countrymen ; other sources gave higher numbers . 17 72 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak community itself, there were further differences related to religious orientation. The Catholic population lacked education and schools, and its national identity was rapidly disappearing. On the other hand, Lutheran villages were keeping their traditions alive, with much of the work done by local pastors.20 However, the Lutheran community had stronger ties to the former Yugoslav regime and was treated with suspicion by Ustasha authorities. In numerous cases the Slovak embassy had to intervene to help individuals (conscripts of the Yugoslav army) who had been captured in the previous war with Germany. The chaos and scarcities following the transition of power also forced a lot of Slovaks to seek help at the embassy. Ever since the foundation of the NDH, leaders of the Slovak expatriate community were planning to set up a minority organization, the so-called Slovak National Group in Croatia, with a common official statute recognized by the Croatian regime. The eventual failure of this initiative was largely due to the fact that they were not coordinated with the Croatian side, which feared a potential precedent that wou ld allow other minorities to raise similar claims. The only minority to achieve the privilege of an officially recognized status was the German one, with a population up to 150,000 and enjoying the benefits of the parent country ' s political dominance. Following the negotiations of June 25, 1941 , Croatia and Slovakia announced a mutual settlement of their claims regarding real estate belonging to their predecessor states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).21 Murgas managed to obtain the property of the former Czech-Slovak society Beseda in Lipovljani for the Slovak side.22 The issue of schools for the Slovak minority was a frequently negotiated topic from early on. In spite of the initial mistrust by the Ustasha authorities, which culminated in the arrests of several Slovak teachers, Slovak primary education was preserved. 23 Mutual contacts also developed in the field of pedagogy and science. A visit by Croatian medics and an Ustasha Youth delegation to °File 36, Box 266, MZV, SNA . 2 21 File 217/41 , Box 1157 and File 217/41 , Box 1155 , MZV, SNA . The society officially dissolved on July 30, 1941. See Slovak Beseda in Bratislava. Box 207, f. Policajne riaditel'stvo v Bratislave (PR Ba), SNA; File 325/41 , Box 214 and File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. 23 File 33880/41 , Box 213 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. Gardista, September 21 , 1941 , 3; Gardista, October 22, 1941 , 3. 22 SLOVAKIA 73 Slovakia was met by great domestic publicity. 24 A program of student exchange and scholarship financing was launched by numerous institutions: The Science Society for Foreign Slovaks (mainly focused on student exchange, support of Slovak foreign education and distribution of Slovak literature abroad), the Matica slovenska, The Society of St. Adalbert, the Slovak University, and the Hlinka Youth. The Croatian partner organizations included the Saint Jerome Society, the Matica Hrvatska, and later the new Croatian-Slovak Society. The pace at which interest in Croatia spread was almost overwhelming for the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which decided to halt the uncontrolled influx of NDH visitors . The Ministry then published a directive stating that it must approve all Croatian visits. 25 The founding of the already mentioned Croatian-Slovak Society (August 13, 1941) was a milestone in cultural interaction. The Slovak envoy requested the speedy assignment of a cultural attache to Croatia, recommending Jozef Ambrus, who had been studying in Zagreb. This request was turned down, as was his later proposal of founding an office of the Society in Bratislava. 26 A fact worth mentioning is that Murgas proposed Alexander Mach, the Minister of the Interior, to be the chairman of this branch. 27 The Slovak authorities, however, took a rather cautious approach and decided to wait until their Croatian counterparts founded a similar branch of the Society in Zagreb. 28 These facts indicate a kind of cautiousness on the Slovak part, caused primarily by foreign political factors. Contrary to their cordial relations and shared long-term plans, practical cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia was difficult from the beginning. Later on, such cooperation was also damaged by the Ustasha regime's inability to make good on its commitments. Meanwhile, the Croatian and Slovak Society was founded in Zagreb. Franjo Dujmovic, 29 the editor-in-chief of the daily Nova Hrvat24 See for example: Gardista, July 26, 1941, 3; Gardista , July 27, 1941, 3; Gardista, August 26, 1941, 3; File 32595/41, Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 25 Ibid, File 6978/41. 26 Reports of K. Murgas, August 19, 1941 and August 26, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA; File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. See also: Jarinkovic, Spolkovy i ivot v frvej Slovenskej republike ... , 305-24. 7 File 544/41, Box 1155 and File 137/41, Box 1160, MZV, SNA. 28 File 32.702/41, Box 118, MZV, SNA. 29 Initially led by the Croatian Minister of the Interior and well-known Ustasha activist Adrija Artukovic. 74 SLOVAKIA-2015 ska (New Croatia) , was appointed its President, with Mile Starcevic and Eugen Ftillop as Vice-Presidents, and Zlatko Milkovic as Secretary. The Society ' s Board included a number of significant individuals whose positions suggested strong links with Croatian state institutions .3° The Society's goal was to develop cultural relations and to promote the Slovak Republic in the NDH. Stanislav Meciar also hoped to expand cultural cooperation, with special focus on the new Croatian literature. When asked about which Slovak novelists he would recommend for translation, he included Jozef Ciger Hronsky, Milo Urban, Tido J. Gaspar, Julius Horvath, and Margita Figuli. He rejected Peter Jilemnicky, whom he labelled a Czech and a Communist. Among Slovak poets he suggested Valentin Beniak, Andrej Zamov, Emil Boleslav Lukac, Jan Smrek, Rudolf Dilong, I:udo Ondrejov, Ladislav Novomesky, Jan R. Ponican and Jan Kostra, with the comment that "the last three were Communists, but have written valuable Slovak poems; here you ought to make your own decision." 31 He also decided to publish a special issue of the Slovenske pohl'ady on the subject of Croatia. 32 As early as 1941 discussions began about the possibility of closer cooperation between Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, a project designed to raise the profile of all three states. The incentive to establish this bloc came from Romania, mainly as a reaction to Hungarian irredentism. At the same time, the three states intended to revisit their territorial losses to Hungary between 193 8 and 1941. Agreement to create the bloc was soon disclosed and the Hungarian Government protested against "reviving the spirit of the Little Entente," referring to the interwar East-Central European military alliance against Hungary. In spite of the initial hesitation of Slovak politicians, by early 1942 Vojtech Tuka, the Slovak Foreign Minister, showed great interest in such cooperation. He emphasized that the alliance could not be labelled with the "stigma of Pan-Slavism," referring to criticism raised by some representatives of the Slovak government. On the one hand, as soon as the Germans indicated that no such efforts would be tolerated within their sphere of influence, the 30 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 155 . Letter of S. Meciar to Zlatko Milkovic from August 26, I 941. File 164 P 17, LA SNK. 32 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 52-83. 31 SLOVAKIA 75 Slovak Republic 's activities declined rapidly . On the other hand, the Slovaks discovered that the NDH was not a reliable partner. 33 In the fall of 1941 some changes were made to the charge d' affaires positions in both countries. Jozef Cieker replaced the undisciplined Karol Murgas. Cieker had previously worked in Yugoslavia and was knowledgeable about Croatian affairs. He presented his credentials in Zagreb on December 12, 1941. At the same time, there was also a change in the Croatian diplomatic posting in Bratislava. Josip Berkovic, the new envoy, presented his credentials on December 19. These changes had no impact on the mutual convergence, and the Croatian Embassy in Bratislava appointed a cultural attache, Geno Sencic who energetically participated in the development of Slovak and Croatian cultural relations. In January of 1942, Tido J. Gaspar, Head of the Propaganda Office, charged Jozef Ambrus with preparing the ground for establishing the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia. The general assembly of this cultural institution took place on March 13, 1942, in the Slovak University ' s amphitheater. Slovak Ministers Alexander Mach, Gejza Medricky and Ferdinand Catlos, as well as other major figures of political and cultural life attended, as did a numerous Croatian delegation. This meeting received broad media coverage. This general assembly prescribed uniforms as a part of the dress code. The Society set as its goal to unite all Croatophiles, spread the Croatian culture and develop mutual relationships. Political issues were to be avoided. Alexander Mach was acclaimed as the Society 's President. In his acceptance speech he pointed out the parallels between the Autonomists ' first paramilitary organization, the Rodobrana (Native Defense), the subsequent Hlinka Guards and the Croatian Ustasha movement. He added that cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia "is not based on the pharisaical chimera of the notorious Slavic solidarity," which had led to humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations. These contacts, he continued, "are supported by a good tradition, the present struggle for a common goal, which we all have before our eyes in the New Europe." Mach's 33 See Miroslav Tejchman, "Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace v letech druhe svetove valley a Mad'arsko," Slovansky pfehled 78 (1992) : 161-71 ; Cubomir Liptak, "Mad'arsko v slovenskej politike za druhej svetovej vojny," in Prispevky k dejinam fasizmu v Ceskos/ovensku a v Mad'arsku, ed. Gyorgy Ranki (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1969), 222-30. 76 SLOVAKIA-2015 speech marked the boundaries of the cultural society. He also delegated Stanislav Meciar, Anton Misik, Jozef Ambrus as its VicePresidents, Viliam Kovar, Eduard Urban as its Secretaries, and Belo Franc as the Treasurer. Many important people working in the area of culture and politics became board members .34 The next day, the first issue of the Slovak-and-Croatian literary review entitled Tatre i Velebit appeared.35 Josip Andric became the editor-in-chief. He had visited Slovakia since the 1920s, and maintained good contacts with the representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party. In the first issue's introductory address, Ferdinand Catlos, Slovak Minister of Defense, noted : "With the help of the Germans, both our nations have become autonomous and integrated as state actors among the nations of young Europe." He praised the shared destiny and goals, desires and hopes of both nations who required no written agreements to confirm their mutual relationships.36 It is evident that both societies had ideologically compatible people in the leadership, with close links to the official regime. It was typical of both states to infuse culture with politics, especially with propaganda. However, as Jan Jankovic pointed out, in spite of major ideological links, there was also much freedom, which he demonstrated by using literature translations that often avoided an ideological undertone. Once the Slovak Croatian Society was founded, the organization of commonly-held events grew in intensity, and the Society substantially participated in promoting cooperation with other cultural institutions. Contacts were developed in the area of sports as well, but did not exceed the norm. At that time, the establishment of the autonomy of Slovakia in October of 1938 was celebrated. The cultural program focused on Slovak popular sonfs and included lectures given by the country's major personalities.3 In Bratislava on April 9, 1942, the Society celebrated the first anniversary of the NDH' s inception by arranging a red-carpet procession in the highly representative build34 For example: Stefan Bella, Juraj Cecetka, Alojz Macek, Jozef Kutnik-Smalov, Valentin Beniak, Aladar Kocis, Karol Klinovsky, Karol Studenc, Alexander Moyzes and honorsry members included Jozef Skultety, Tido J. Gaspar, Rudolf Vavra, Ferdinand Catlos and Gejza Medricky. Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 204, PR-BA, SNA. 35 More precisely about the revue Tatre i Velebit, see: Jankovic, Chorwitska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 39-51. 36 Tatre i Velebit, March 14, 1942, 5. 31 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, 1942, 156. SLOVAKIA 77 ing of the Reduta. On the next day, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by Bishop Michal Buzalka in Saint Martin's Cathedral, and on this occasion the Slovak dailies published special issues. 38 At that time a numerous group of Slovak journalists, cultural workers and politicians set off to Croatia to celebrate the first anniversary of the state. Besides Minister Mach and Secretary Kovar, the group included prominent Hlinka guard officers Otomar Kubala, Alexander Cunderlik, Frantisek Galan, and other persons who also discussed mutual cooperation in the area of culture. Within the context of the cooperation of Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, a meeting was held on May 13 in Bucharest, where the participants agreed to compile national bibliographies of major works, to organize regular visits, to promote each other and to organize so-called weeks of reciprocal culture. An Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the NDH was signed in Zagreb, which dealt with the foundation of a Chair of the Croatian Language, Literature and History and a Department of the Croatian Language and Literature at the Slovak University, with similar Slovak institutes in Zagreb. An important clause focused on maintaining and extending elementary schools for minorities. Both partners committed to support reciprocal visits and a minimum of two student scholarships. 39 The Agreement also included a clause on the recognition of academic titles, scientific education benefits for young people, and book exchanges. They also promised not to permit the publication of things "which could present the other state in a bad light." The Agreement established a Slovak and Croatian Cultural Committee to observe the provisions of the mutual agreements and to deepen relationships. The Agreement was for a period of five years and based on the principle of reciprocity .40 In spite of the fact that similar plans had existed since 1941, and that the final agreement was prepared in 1942, neither this Agreement, nor another cultural Agreement between the Slovak Republic and NDH came into force . This was due to their inability to make and perform agreements, and a certain inflexibility characteristic of both parties, which were the basic problems associated with the development of relations between Slovakia and Croatia. Some of these problems were caused by the fact that the NDH was not con38 /bid, 164-5 . Slovak-Croatian reciprocal scholarships. File 255/43, Box 2 14, MZV, SNA . 40 File 8/ 100/43 , Box 118, MZV, SNA. 39 78 SLOVAKIA-2015 solidated politically and economically, that both countries were involved in the war, in a complicated foreign-policy situation, and also in the relationship of satellite states with their protector, Germany . The issue of the legal status of the Slovak minority in the NDH was perceived in a very sensitive way, and tackled unsuccessfully throughout the entire existence of the NDH. Frequent excesses of the Ustasha towards Slovak inhabitants in Croatia did not contribute to mutual trust. It is well-known that from the beginning some Slovaks rejected Croatian citizenship because they had supported the previous regime, they had to deal with poor living conditions and showed increased interest in repatriation to Slovakia. Viliam Kovar's visit to Lipovljany on June 14, 1941 created a stir. During his visit, Kovar showed concern about the situation of the local Slovaks and suggested repatriation in exchange for Croats living in Slovakia. This proposal resonated and some Slovaks in Croatia appealed to the embassy for help. 41 However, charge d'affaires Murgas viewed Kovar's initiative very critically. Croatians intended to repatriate the Slovak minority to the Slovak Republic, which Murgas found detrimental to the state.42 In any case, official Slovak circles showed no serious interest in repatriation to Slovakia. What did not make such a big stir was settling the issue of the validity of Jewish travel documents. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged their validity (until March 31, 1942), but at the same time the Ministry told Murgas not to intervene in these matters, to which he would agree. 43 The legation had the right to decide each Jewish case, but their objective was to ensure that these Jews would not return to Slovakia because they were "a useless and harmful element, " 44 which corresponded to the official policy of the Slovak Republic. 45 In the NDH 41 File 116/41 , Box 1160, MZV, SNA; Report written by representatives of the Slovak minority in the NDH regarding the visit of Viliam Kovar, June 16, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA. See also: Oldfich Pejs, "Slovenska diplomacie a valecni zajatci slovenske narodnosti (1939-1942)," Vojenska hist6ria 15 (2011), 122-41. 42 '1n today's situation we don't have the space and employment opportunities for returnees ... " Report ofK. Murgas, August 19, 1941 , Box 143 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. 43 File 903/41 and 1347/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 44 File 62/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 45 For a comparison of the Slovak and Croatian anti-Jewish policies, see: Eduard Niznansky and Jana Mnahoncakova, "Vymedzenie pojmu Zid na Slovensku a v SLOVAKIA 79 the Jewish issue was "promptly resolved," and Serbs also became an "unwanted element." 46 The greatest boom of cultural relations between Slovakia and Croatia occurred in 1942. Numerous visits and social events were organized in order to strengthen this cooperation. For example, during the summer several Croatian delegations visited the Slovak Republic. From June 28 until July 4, a "Croatian Week" in Slovakia was organized to promote Croatian culture. Slovak Radio participated very actively by broadcasting Croatian music and a series of interviews by a number of major figures in culture and politics.47 At that time an ensemble of amateur actors form Croatia toured Slovakia with their theater program dedicated to Croatian dances.48 Reciprocal visits and presentations became the most typical component of Slovak-Croatian cultural policy, most frequently realized through national theatrical and music productions. As in Slovakia, various events were held in the NDH which concentrated on mutual convergence, such as the presentation of the Articles of Association of the Slovak National Unity (Slovenska narodna jednota) to the relevant Croatian authorities who promised their recognition. The Slovak Reading Club in Ilok organized Slovaks in the NDH. In spite of promises made, the Croatian administration did nothing. 49 The Slovak Day planned for August 30, 1942, in Stara Pazova, where Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, a famous descendant of the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, served as a Protestant minister, was postponed because of guerilla warfare.50 Jozef Cieker constantly pointed out the complicated situation in the country and the Ustasha's excesses. "The scope of action of ministers is limited to minis- Chorvatsku - pokus o porovnanie," in Z dejin holokaustu ajeho popierania, ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky (Bratislava: Stimul, 2007), 107-30. 46 See Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 47 Alexander Mach, Mladen Lorkovic, Stanislav Meciar, Jozef Ambrus, Valentin Beniak, Alexander Moyzes, Viliam Kovar, Mile Starcevic, Zlatko Milkovic, Franjo Dujmovic, Mile Budak, Viliam Peros, Josip Horvat, Geno Senecic and others. 48 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, I 942, p.165. 49 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, I 943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 50 Slovaks in Yugoslavia. File 6452/41-1 , Box 143, MZV, SNA. 80 SLOV AKIA-2015 terial buildings and a small region around Zagreb." 51 He perceived Slovak-Croatian relations as weak and suggested that it would be unwise to limit mutual relations to Ustasha Croatia and suggested that the two nations should relate to one another as wholes. The Ustasha were not pleased with the activities of the Slovak charge d'affaires in Zagreb, and therefore they suggested that he should be removed. Cieker often met with opposition groups, members of the higher clergy and criticized the situation in the country. These statements show that there were certain differences between Slovakia and Croatia. Conservative representatives in Croatia were the more moderate Catholics of a nationalist orientation, represented in the past by the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (the Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka). In that sense, they were competitors of the Ustasha. The Slovak Republic supported the regular Croatian army - the militia, with supplies of arms and equipment. However, much more evident were the contacts between the radical representatives of the Hlinka Guard and the Ustasha. They were ideologically close, and strongly involved in the development of mutual relations, for instance between the Hlinka Youth and the Ustasha Youth. Despite these differences, cultural contacts continued to evolve. Each autumn international commercial fairs were held in both Bratislava and Zagreb. Both states sent delegations of major figures of economic and political life to the fairs. In June of 1942, an agreement between Croatia and Slovakia was signed in Bratislava on the regulation of mutual contact under civil law. At the end of October, the Minister of Justice, Gejza Fritz, signed in Zagreb an interstate agreement on extradition and propertylaw assistance in criminal issues. Like the economic agreement entered into in October of 1941, these agreements came into force too late, and therefore had no significant impact on the actual relationship between the Slovak Republic and the NDH. 52 Also, an agreement was concluded on cooperation between the Slovak and Croatian academic youth.53 This cooperation seemed promising from the summer of 1941 and many young people from Croatia visited Slovakia. The Hlinka Youth, jointly with the Ustasha Youth and 51 Report of J. Cieker, August 28, 1942. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 52 Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 273-74. 53 Medunarodni ugovori 1943, p. 208-10. Box 214, MZV, SNA. SLOVAKIA 81 Hitlerjugend, organized camps for their members . In this regard, there was a significant involvement by Alojz Macek and lvo Orsanic, the leaders of organizations in the Slovak Republic and the NDH, . As in the preceding year, the autumn of 1942 witnessed certain changes in Slovak- Croatian relations. Activist Viliam Kovar enlisted in the Slovak army and treasurer Belo Fronc replaced him. The NDH Government underwent a major reorganization which resolved the conflict between the Poglavnik and the Minister of Defense, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik. Kvaternik came to recover to Slovakia, when he probably sought some political support. However, the Government's reconstruction did not disturb the NDH's relations with the Slovak Republic. Promoting one another continued, which is evident in the Slovak Culture Week held in Zagreb from November 29, 1942, to December 5, 1942. 54 This event had some response. Besides abundant musical performances, several contributions were made on the present and the past of the relationships between Slovaks and Croatians. At that time, Andric's Slovak Language Grammar was published.55 By the end of that year, yet another change took place in diplomatic postings. Charge d'affaires Berkovic was dismissed and replaced with Blaz Lorkovic, who presented his credentials to President Tiso on December 22. In his speech, he remarked: "The Poglavnik appointed me as the charge d'affaires in Slovakia in his belief that our brother Slovaks wish to have an old and well-proven Ustasha as the charge d'affaires of the NDH."56 In 1943 further talks were held on cooperation between Romania, Slovakia and the NDH . It was evident that Ante Pavelic's Croatia was very weak as a partner, and, therefore, the Slovak representatives focused mainly on negotiations with the Romanians. In the end, however, these attempts also failed to improve cooperation and the idea of a tightly-bound Slovak and Croatian bloc against Hungary was unsuccessful. 57 In January of 1943, a full length propaganda film 54 At that time the following Slovaks visited Croatia: Stanislav Meciar, Andrej Mraz, Karol Ki:irper, Jan Pi:istenyi, Jozef Pauco, Jan Doransky as we ll as representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Matica slovenska, the Slovak-Croatian Society, the Society of St. Adalbert and the Bratislava Chamber Quintet. 55 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 157-159; File Slovaks in Yugoslavia, Box 143, MZV, SNA. 56 File 35.591 /42, Box 219, MZV, SNA. 57 Tejchman, Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace ... , 166-67 . 82 SLOV AKIA-2015 From the Tatras to the Sea of Azov was shown in the NDH, which highlighted the Slovak Army's activity on the Eastern Front in order to strengthen the idea of a joint struggle against Bolshevism . In the field of news reporting, a regular exchange of newsreels took place and a number of contributions on Croatian topics were broadcast over Slovak Radio. The fourth anniversary celebrations of independence in Zagreb were not as spectacular as in the preceding year. In addition to compulsory lectures and articles in the Croatian press, the Croatian and Slovak Society organized a tea party on March 13th. The next morning, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated and attended by representatives of the Croatian Government. 58 On March 25, 1943 the second general assembly of the Slovak and Croatian Society was held . Once again, this event became a manifestation of fondness for each other. Many prominent people of that period's political and cultural life participated, headed by ministers Mach, Medricky and charge d'affaires Blaz Lorkovic, who was elected an honorary member. A declaration of efforts to extend the statutes of the Society was made since there was an interest in establishing branches in other towns of Slovakia (it was planned to establish branches in Presov, Zilina and Banska Bystrica), and to extend activities in the field of culture.59 The general assembly also launched the celebration of Croatian independence, which was accompanied by a number of cultural events including a gala concert of the Slovak Radio on April 9th. Employees of Mach's Ministry of the Interior were invited to turn out in strength. A Croatian issue of the newspaper Gardista (Guardsman) was published to celebrate the third anniversary of the NDH's creation. During his visit to Slovakia in May, 1943, Ivan Veres, a Protestant minister, reported on the difficult situation of Slovaks in the NDH. Again, the unresolved issues emerged, especially those regarding culture. Based on this information Alexander Mach invited the Croatian charge d'affaires to an audience and gave him notice that the situation of Slovaks in the NDH could directly affect the future relations between Slovakia and Croatia. In this respect, Mach even intended to stop honoring Josip Andric, the writer, with a high 58 Tatre i Velebit, June 15, 1943, 61. The Slovak-Croatian Society - Minutes of the Second General Assembly. File 38/68, Box 204, PR Ba, SNA. 59 SLOVAKIA 83 state award, and issued a command to suspend the establishment of the Slovak and Croatian Society's branches. Jozef Cieker also made a statement on the nature of the mutual relationships by pointing out that people in Bratislava had too many illusions, but the reality was much more complicated. 60 In spite of the fact that the negotiations on signing the Slovak and Croatian Cultural Convention continued, no consensus was reached. Croatia refused to recognize the special status of Slovaks in the NDH because of other minorities, who would then demand similar rights. However, the Croats were willing to guarantee Slovak education through separate legislation. They also demanded that the SNU should not be a political organization to represent Slovaks in the NDH and should not claim the property of former Czechoslovak: associations. However, at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was more interested in concluding the Slovak and Italian cultural convention, after which the Ministry would be willing to continue negotiations about the convention with Croatia.61 The fall of Mussolini in 1943 brought about an "unpleasant awakening" in the NDH. Nevertheless, Ante Pavelic, with Germany's support, managed to hold on to power and maintain the illusion of the existence of an independent Croatian state, and on September 10, 1943, he announced that previous Italian and Croatian agreements were no longer valid, as the Italians had failed to fulfil their obligations and agreed to an armistice with the enemy. 62 At that time, a number of Croatian politicians and their families, who refused to stay in the NDH for various reasons, were in Slovakia. This is very interesting, because the Slovak Republic granted asylum to persons whose blood-stained careers were inscribed in the NDH' s infamous history. For instance, this applied to Eugen "Dido" Kvaternik, the former commander of the Croatian secret police! Jozef Cieker tried unsuccessfully to reject entry visas to exponents of the Ustasha re• 63 g1me. 60 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 61 Report of J. Cieker from July 7, 1943. Box 143, MZV, SNA. 62 Jbid, File 313 2/43 . 63 Report of J. Cieker, September 9, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 84 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the reality of that time, Slovak and Croatian cultural cooperation decreased and in 1943 the Tatre i Velebit cultural review folded . The Slovak Embassy in Zagreb pointed to the unbearable problems of the NDH, which were also reflected in its failure to fulfil economic contractual obligations. The embassy also dealt with propertyrelated sanctions and the loss of freedom which Slovaks in the NDH had to struggle with every day. Despite plans for further cooperation, the mutual relationships had reached their zenith. Their abovestandard scope in the period between 1939 and 1944 is shown by the fact that nineteen translated Croatian fiction titles were published in Slovakia, which is more than in the case of most Allied countries. In addition, popular and scientific, political and religious literature was published, although their numbers are difficult to reconstruct. 64 At the beginning of February, 1944, Jozef Cieker was replaced in Zagreb by charge d'affaires Viktor Becko. 65 However, he would not bring any changes to Slovak-Croat relations. From his reports we learn that actual power in Croatia was shared by guerilla and German and Ustasha troops, and about the oppression of the population. As regards Slovak-Croatian relations, Becko noted that higher state authorities had an interest and a positive approach, which, however, faded at lower positions. Therefore, he suggested, that Croatians should be promised economic concessions in return for cultural and social offsets for Slovaks in the NDH. 66 In his report he summarized the mutual contacts which he considered to be less developed than expected and pointed out that a certain platform could be found as a support. In spite of that, he labelled the cultural and political relations as very good. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, he criticized the absence of a trade representative "whom the Croatians have in the Protectorate as well." 67 As regards the issue of the Slovaks in the NDH, he underscored the fact that Slovaks were transported to concentration camps based on the principle of collective guilt. Some Croatians hated the Slovaks because they were not obliged to join the army or the Ustasha, and local personal and prop64 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 166-176. Slovak, February 2, 1944, p. 4; Slovak, February 9, 1944, p. 3. 66 Report of V. Becka, March 20, 1944. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1.'.S BA, SABa. 67 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, April 25, 1944. Box 213, MZV, SNA. 65 SLOVAKIA 85 erty-related conflicts played an important role as well. He pointed to the nationalist attitudes of the Ustasha, who did not like "foreign elements" in their country. 68 However, the repatriation of Slovaks was technically impossible at that time.69 Contacts between Slovaks and Croats were not limited to the official political position, which I intended to describe in this paper. There was also significant cooperation among anti-fascist forces in the Slovak Republic, the NDH and elsewhere in Europe. Tomislav Poglajen-Kolakovic, a Catholic priest who worked in Slovakia from September of 1943 and joined the anti-fascist forces, was an outstanding person involved in this convergence. 70 In the last stages of the existence of both states, mutual contacts died out completely, and the dissolution of the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia on May 25th, 1945, 71 was just a formality, because most of the Society's representatives had fled abroad, where they continued to develop contacts with the Croats. Relationships between Slovakia and Croatia from 1941 to 1945 were affected by the political climate. Despite comparable efforts by Slovaks and Croats to attain national emancipation in the inter-war period and deep historical roots of mutual cooperation multiplied at that time by the concept of "historical inevitability," it was the ideological adherence of political representatives and their mentors (especially Germany) which played an important role in the mutual convergence. Cultural cooperation took a similar path, but it could not overcome the ideological framework. Due to both practical and political obstacles, such cooperation would not reach the desired form, and it peaked between 1942 and the first half of 1943 . However, as Viliam Kovar wrote about the activities of the Slovak and Croatian Society, which was supposed to reflect these relationships : 68 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, January 8, 1945 . Box 213, MZV, SNA . 69 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to V. Becka, January 26, 1945. Box I 160, MZV, SNA. 70 More precisely see: Jozef Jablonicky, Podoby nasilia (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000), 9-27. For the official Croatian reaction to the uprising in Slovakia, see: Jan Rychlik, "Obdobie pred Slovenskym narodnym povstanim v spravach chorvatskeho vyslanca v Bratislave," Historicky casopis 56 (2008): 349-84. ; Jan Rychlik, "Slovenske narodne povstanie v spravach chorvatskeho diplomata," Historicky casopis 54 (2006) : 315-52. 71 Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 20 14, PR Ba, SNA . 86 SLOV AKIA-2015 " ... (the Society) failed to do as much as one could possibly expect, but did not miss one chance to inform the Slovak public and make it familiar with the life of Croatia and its representatives." 72 It was clear before the end of World War II, which both countries entered on the side of Germany, that neither state would outlive it. However, this did not mean the end of mutual cultural contacts, which after the War took place in a brand new geopolitical and ideological environment. 72 Report of the Society' s secretary. File 38/68, Box 2014, PR Ba, SNA.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Development of Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 Description An account of the resource Miroslav Michela Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 66-86 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Michela, Miroslav, 1978- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/29af679117eb1a8f94f9279572e14640.pdf f2fa8623d117cb324497ad5972796b06 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe �18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. �SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion �20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· �SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl �22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians. � SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe �18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. �SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion �20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· �SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl �22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe 18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion 20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl 22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Federation of the Danube Description An account of the resource Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 17-22 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, 1905-1992 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/44918f3a03f71078ef3b2e89438c90c4.pdf 418822d7fc944d38d9f1423da81e3e62 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 51 MASARYK'S ROLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE F. O. Miksche Before World War I, the interests of the Czech people were represented in the Vienna parliament by powerful political parties with a total of 107 mandates. The Agrarians had 29 seats! the Socialists 23; the so-called Youl'!g Czechs 20; the Catholics 17; the Radicals 10; the Conservatives 7; .the so-cal'led Progressives 1, which was held by T. G. Masaryk, spokesman for the entire Czecih nation in England and other Allied countries during the First World War. His battle-cry "Destroy Austria" was by no means echoed by the other legally eleoted representatives, for in 1917 the Czech parties in the Vienna Assembly all proclaimed their loyalty to the Habsburg Dynasty. What Masaryk had to say about this subject is recorded in his memoirs: "Again and again we were told (in the Allied countries) that the Czech leaders at home were not in opposition to Austria, and the disavowals were soon forgotten. The Russian revolution and the entry of the United States into the war filled mens' minds. The refrain of my propaganda was 'Break up Austria'." Thus Masaryk's lonely voice, strengthened by Allied propaganda, became louder than the united voices of his 106 former colleagues in the Vienna Assem1bly. The Czech politicians demanded the restoration of the Czech State, in federal association witlh the other countries of the Habsburg Crown. Their motives in doing so can certainly not be ascribed to any special love for the Dynasty, but to the necessity for ensuring the national existence and development of the Czech people. It was thought !:'hat if the Habsburg Monarchy were to fall, Bohemia would inevitably become a victim of German or Russian imperialism and lose its Home Rule. Palacky, famous Czech historian, who is always looked upon as the Father of the Czech nation, declared in 1848 that if Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented. All the radical slogans used for agitation could no't hide the fact that the existence of all the small people of the Danubian Empire depended on it, and until the end of the First �52 SLOVAKIA World War Palacky's declaration remained a guide for Czech politicians. Some years earlier even Masaryk expressed the same view, as the following quotation from the program of his party, dated April 14, 1900, shows: "We be1ieve thai the former swer,eiign independence od: our Bohemian Lands is ilffipossiible today. Our smaH numlbers, our geograrphi;cal siltua:tion, and the fac,t th<1t the Czech counrtries are a,lso inhabited by Germans, have compelled us to umte with the other oolt.i:ons and la·nds. " And what did youn,g Benes say iin, his French thesis for a d·octooa.t e, written at Dijon in 1·908? The following is· a quOlbation fr:oon ·has text: "People have od3ten spoken cxf a dismemberunent of Austria. I do not 'believe in it at all. The Mstorical and po1ivi'cal bonds ·bevween the dfflerewt nations of the Emnir.e are too powel'lful to make sueh dhm1emlbermenrt possiib le. . . . ·one cannot seriously think ~ the estaiblishment olf a Czech State iif one-tlhird cxf the inha;b itants of the country (the Sudeten Genma-ns) are d'ertermined to resist and wrn illever accept it lega,Hy. " Break With Tradition Masaryk was the first Czech politician to break with the Palacky tradition, and is consequently often regarded as the betrayer of his testament. Did he perhB!ps imagine that afiter the end of the First World War the danger of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism would disappear forever? If so, his mistake was catastrophic, for not he but Palacky was in the right. It is dificult to im:agine on what grounds Masaryk switched over after 1914 to an attitude so different from his own past ideas. His views in 1915 were clearly e~ressed in his first note addressed to the British Foreign Office on April 15th of that year: "Now Bohemia wishes and hopes that her Russian brethren will soon succeed in occupying the Bohemian and Slovak districts. . . . They must, however, on no account enter Bohemia except to stay." Prophetic words, expressing a wish which has since been fulfilled. Whatever his reasons, the fact remains thait Masaryk's activities in the Allied countries during the First World War have become a model for many of the exiled politicians of today. With considerable skill and the help of only a few friends he succeeded in enlisting the support of a large part of the Western press for his plans. Several hundreds of thousands of Czechs who had been settled for years in America and other Allied countries �SLOVAKIA 53 took the place of the Czech people at home, on whom he had no influence, and organized demonstrations and passed resolutions by acclamation which were presented to the Allied governments as proof of the will of the people. In Russia, and later also in France and Italy, Czech military formations were organized. Associations were formed and congresses were held to further the program for the "liberation of the oppressed nations," and prominent Allied personalities, invited to play leading parts in them, were so flattered that they did not realize their names were being misused for propaganda purposes by a group of ambitious adve111turers. Closer and closer the nets of intrigue were drawn round the Western statesmen, who were also influenced by the idea that the breeding of national revolutions in the Danubian Empire would shorten the war, and when it ended, in 1918, were unruble to rid themselves of the promises they had so lighft..heartedly given :to exiled politicians, although many of them had foreseen the results of the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy. No doubt Masaryk's name is graven deeply in the history of all Danubian peoples, for his conspiracies shattered the nucleus of the Danubian Empire - the Union of Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria. It will always remain one of the great questions of history whether the Empire would have fallen asunder spontaneously, or under the influence of foreign propaganda, and there are enough arguments for and against both theories to support neverending discussion. The territorial claims of Italy, Serbia, and Rumania would certainly have deprived it of important provinces, but would not have destroyed its nucleus. The fact is that the Allies officially recognized the CzechoSlovak government while the war was still in progress; and Masaryk took advantage of this circumstance to present his own people with a fait accompli. Instead of having to negotiate with the elected representatives of the peoples the exifod politicians were themselves declared to be legal representatives. The Treaty ·b y means of which the Peace Conference establ1i'shed the new State was entitled: "Traite entre les Puissances Alliees et la Tcheco-Slovaquie," and was signed �54 SLOVAKIA at Saint Germain on September 9, 1919. As soon as Dr. Benes got hold of this document the proper name of the new State as it appeared in the original text - CzechoSlovakia - vanished, and the name Czechoslovakia appeared for the first time. This may appear to be only a small change in nomenclature, but behind it is h1dden one of the gr.e atest bluffs in history. The peoples of the world believe in a nation which has never existed, but was conjured up by trickery and treaohery and maintained by propaganda, for there are no Czechoslovaks, only Czechs and Slovaks. The change in t'he name of the new Republic was inserted into the Constitution by the first Czecho . .Slovak Parliament, whdch was approved on February 20, 1920, but at that time S,loV'akia was occupied by the Czech army, and the leader of the Slovaks, Father Hlinka, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in Moravia. No Lawful Representatives The "lawful representatives" who voted for the Constitution were anything but lawful, for the members of the first Parliament were not elected but appointed by the political cHque headed by Masaryk, which came to power with the help of the Allies. Over 4.5 million Germans, Hungarians, and people of other nationalities, were without a single representative in this "National Assembly," all claims on their behalf having been ignored by the Czechs. All the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, concerning social reform, the expropriation of land, etc., and the langua:ge to be used officially, were determined by this arbitrarily formed body without a single GermanBohemian or Hungarian voice being heard. To remove all possibility of amendments to the Constitution being approved against the will of the Czechs, it was decreed that a .t wo-thirds majority would be required. After the Constitution had been ratified, the nominated Assembly was dissolved and four weeks later elections were held for a new Parliament. Father Hlinka, elected whlle still in prison, was thereupon released. At the first sitting the Slovak members demanded the implementation of the �SLOVAKIA 55 Pittsburgh Treaty, but were told that it was contrary to the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and the Treaty was invalid because it was signed by people who were already American citizens. Thus was Czecho-Slovakia created, the "island of democracy in Danubian Europe," and Masaryk, who only a few years before had sharply criticized the smallest injustice in the Vienna Parliament, did not utter a word of protest. From the inception o:f the new Republic a religious antagonism developed between Czechs and Slovaks whicih was of muoh more importance than the national one. The Slovak character has been decisively influenced by Catholicism, while the religious beliefs of the Czechs owe too much to Jan Hus to allow them to become willing subjects to Rome. The founders of Czecho-Slovak,i a, Masaryk and Benes, were free-thinkers, and the numerous quanels in which they soon became involved with the nciglrboring Catholic countries, mainly Hungary, soon brought them up against the Vatican, while no more promising foundation could be found for the national tradition they wished to establish than a return to Hussitism. So a new "National Czechoslovak Church" was founded. Between the two wars, Dr. Benes was one of the leading lights of European diplomacy. He hated Austria and Hungary, feared any sort of federation of the Danubian States, and obst inately upheld the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity. He conspired with anyone and everyone - Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Russians, and Frenchmen but he never tried to reach an understanding with his immediate neighbors, the Austrians and Hungarians, the most natural thing for him to have done. Czecho-Slovakia's internal situation also became more difficult. The collapse of Masaryk's State in 1939 was inevitable, because the German, Slovak, and Hungarian minorities could not be expected to defend a regime which they regarded as an oppressor. The widespread belief that Czecho-S1ovakia could have survived but for the Munich capitulation i's unfounded, and is only one of the many propaganda legends which have become accepted as fact. It remains to be seen whether the West will continue �56 SLOVAKIA to support the ambitions of a few exiled po1iticians who may or may not represent the wishes and interests of their peoples. It is not surprising that many Czech politicians find it easier to make political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to follow an entirely new line, but would it not be advisable to eliminate this myth from Western pmpaganda and make no more use of names which bear a heavy responsibility for disrupting the unity of the Danubian region? It is difficult to see how the creation of a new Europe can be assisted by the memory of people whose narrow nationalism had such a baneful influence on the course of history. Politicians of Masaryk's type are very often public dangera, for they rouse peoples to revolt and then fail through weakness to guide the forces they have had conjured up in a suitable direction. A new spirit is needed; the entire Central European problem must be settled on a basis of what is right and not who is right. Political actions should be judged by their results and not by the nationality of those responsible for them, and usually it is at least a generaition before the true nature of these results becomes apparent. Viewed from this distance in time, it is obvious that Masaryk's "liberation" led to the balkanization of Central Europe and that the treaties of 1919 created a situation incomparably worse than the one they were supposed to remedy . • • • HUMAN IUGHTS AND EXILES Hans Schlitz Emigrants are to be pitied. Anyone forced to leave his home because of danger to life and limb deserves our sincerest sympathy. I can even feel for those emigrants who were at one time my bitter political opponents. The right to asylum is one of the human rights; so is the right to one's homeland. Exiles should, in their own interest, beware of treating human rights to·o lightly. By consigning them to the flames, we burn with them the right to asylum. He who breaks a principle should not complain if the stigma of C~in marks his brow. � SLOVAKIA 51 MASARYK'S ROLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE F. O. Miksche Before World War I, the interests of the Czech people were represented in the Vienna parliament by powerful political parties with a total of 107 mandates. The Agrarians had 29 seats! the Socialists 23; the so-called Youl'!g Czechs 20; the Catholics 17; the Radicals 10; the Conservatives 7; .the so-cal'led Progressives 1, which was held by T. G. Masaryk, spokesman for the entire Czecih nation in England and other Allied countries during the First World War. His battle-cry "Destroy Austria" was by no means echoed by the other legally eleoted representatives, for in 1917 the Czech parties in the Vienna Assembly all proclaimed their loyalty to the Habsburg Dynasty. What Masaryk had to say about this subject is recorded in his memoirs: "Again and again we were told (in the Allied countries) that the Czech leaders at home were not in opposition to Austria, and the disavowals were soon forgotten. The Russian revolution and the entry of the United States into the war filled mens' minds. The refrain of my propaganda was 'Break up Austria'." Thus Masaryk's lonely voice, strengthened by Allied propaganda, became louder than the united voices of his 106 former colleagues in the Vienna Assem1bly. The Czech politicians demanded the restoration of the Czech State, in federal association witlh the other countries of the Habsburg Crown. Their motives in doing so can certainly not be ascribed to any special love for the Dynasty, but to the necessity for ensuring the national existence and development of the Czech people. It was thought !:'hat if the Habsburg Monarchy were to fall, Bohemia would inevitably become a victim of German or Russian imperialism and lose its Home Rule. Palacky, famous Czech historian, who is always looked upon as the Father of the Czech nation, declared in 1848 that if Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented. All the radical slogans used for agitation could no't hide the fact that the existence of all the small people of the Danubian Empire depended on it, and until the end of the First �52 SLOVAKIA World War Palacky's declaration remained a guide for Czech politicians. Some years earlier even Masaryk expressed the same view, as the following quotation from the program of his party, dated April 14, 1900, shows: "We be1ieve thai the former swer,eiign independence od: our Bohemian Lands is ilffipossiible today. Our smaH numlbers, our geograrphi;cal siltua:tion, and the fac,t th<1t the Czech counrtries are a,lso inhabited by Germans, have compelled us to umte with the other oolt.i:ons and la·nds. " And what did youn,g Benes say iin, his French thesis for a d·octooa.t e, written at Dijon in 1·908? The following is· a quOlbation fr:oon ·has text: "People have od3ten spoken cxf a dismemberunent of Austria. I do not 'believe in it at all. The Mstorical and po1ivi'cal bonds ·bevween the dfflerewt nations of the Emnir.e are too powel'lful to make sueh dhm1emlbermenrt possiib le. . . . ·one cannot seriously think ~ the estaiblishment olf a Czech State iif one-tlhird cxf the inha;b itants of the country (the Sudeten Genma-ns) are d'ertermined to resist and wrn illever accept it lega,Hy. " Break With Tradition Masaryk was the first Czech politician to break with the Palacky tradition, and is consequently often regarded as the betrayer of his testament. Did he perhB!ps imagine that afiter the end of the First World War the danger of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism would disappear forever? If so, his mistake was catastrophic, for not he but Palacky was in the right. It is dificult to im:agine on what grounds Masaryk switched over after 1914 to an attitude so different from his own past ideas. His views in 1915 were clearly e~ressed in his first note addressed to the British Foreign Office on April 15th of that year: "Now Bohemia wishes and hopes that her Russian brethren will soon succeed in occupying the Bohemian and Slovak districts. . . . They must, however, on no account enter Bohemia except to stay." Prophetic words, expressing a wish which has since been fulfilled. Whatever his reasons, the fact remains thait Masaryk's activities in the Allied countries during the First World War have become a model for many of the exiled politicians of today. With considerable skill and the help of only a few friends he succeeded in enlisting the support of a large part of the Western press for his plans. Several hundreds of thousands of Czechs who had been settled for years in America and other Allied countries �SLOVAKIA 53 took the place of the Czech people at home, on whom he had no influence, and organized demonstrations and passed resolutions by acclamation which were presented to the Allied governments as proof of the will of the people. In Russia, and later also in France and Italy, Czech military formations were organized. Associations were formed and congresses were held to further the program for the "liberation of the oppressed nations," and prominent Allied personalities, invited to play leading parts in them, were so flattered that they did not realize their names were being misused for propaganda purposes by a group of ambitious adve111turers. Closer and closer the nets of intrigue were drawn round the Western statesmen, who were also influenced by the idea that the breeding of national revolutions in the Danubian Empire would shorten the war, and when it ended, in 1918, were unruble to rid themselves of the promises they had so lighft..heartedly given :to exiled politicians, although many of them had foreseen the results of the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy. No doubt Masaryk's name is graven deeply in the history of all Danubian peoples, for his conspiracies shattered the nucleus of the Danubian Empire - the Union of Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria. It will always remain one of the great questions of history whether the Empire would have fallen asunder spontaneously, or under the influence of foreign propaganda, and there are enough arguments for and against both theories to support neverending discussion. The territorial claims of Italy, Serbia, and Rumania would certainly have deprived it of important provinces, but would not have destroyed its nucleus. The fact is that the Allies officially recognized the CzechoSlovak government while the war was still in progress; and Masaryk took advantage of this circumstance to present his own people with a fait accompli. Instead of having to negotiate with the elected representatives of the peoples the exifod politicians were themselves declared to be legal representatives. The Treaty ·b y means of which the Peace Conference establ1i'shed the new State was entitled: "Traite entre les Puissances Alliees et la Tcheco-Slovaquie," and was signed �54 SLOVAKIA at Saint Germain on September 9, 1919. As soon as Dr. Benes got hold of this document the proper name of the new State as it appeared in the original text - CzechoSlovakia - vanished, and the name Czechoslovakia appeared for the first time. This may appear to be only a small change in nomenclature, but behind it is h1dden one of the gr.e atest bluffs in history. The peoples of the world believe in a nation which has never existed, but was conjured up by trickery and treaohery and maintained by propaganda, for there are no Czechoslovaks, only Czechs and Slovaks. The change in t'he name of the new Republic was inserted into the Constitution by the first Czecho . .Slovak Parliament, whdch was approved on February 20, 1920, but at that time S,loV'akia was occupied by the Czech army, and the leader of the Slovaks, Father Hlinka, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in Moravia. No Lawful Representatives The "lawful representatives" who voted for the Constitution were anything but lawful, for the members of the first Parliament were not elected but appointed by the political cHque headed by Masaryk, which came to power with the help of the Allies. Over 4.5 million Germans, Hungarians, and people of other nationalities, were without a single representative in this "National Assembly," all claims on their behalf having been ignored by the Czechs. All the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, concerning social reform, the expropriation of land, etc., and the langua:ge to be used officially, were determined by this arbitrarily formed body without a single GermanBohemian or Hungarian voice being heard. To remove all possibility of amendments to the Constitution being approved against the will of the Czechs, it was decreed that a .t wo-thirds majority would be required. After the Constitution had been ratified, the nominated Assembly was dissolved and four weeks later elections were held for a new Parliament. Father Hlinka, elected whlle still in prison, was thereupon released. At the first sitting the Slovak members demanded the implementation of the �SLOVAKIA 55 Pittsburgh Treaty, but were told that it was contrary to the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and the Treaty was invalid because it was signed by people who were already American citizens. Thus was Czecho-Slovakia created, the "island of democracy in Danubian Europe," and Masaryk, who only a few years before had sharply criticized the smallest injustice in the Vienna Parliament, did not utter a word of protest. From the inception o:f the new Republic a religious antagonism developed between Czechs and Slovaks whicih was of muoh more importance than the national one. The Slovak character has been decisively influenced by Catholicism, while the religious beliefs of the Czechs owe too much to Jan Hus to allow them to become willing subjects to Rome. The founders of Czecho-Slovak,i a, Masaryk and Benes, were free-thinkers, and the numerous quanels in which they soon became involved with the nciglrboring Catholic countries, mainly Hungary, soon brought them up against the Vatican, while no more promising foundation could be found for the national tradition they wished to establish than a return to Hussitism. So a new "National Czechoslovak Church" was founded. Between the two wars, Dr. Benes was one of the leading lights of European diplomacy. He hated Austria and Hungary, feared any sort of federation of the Danubian States, and obst inately upheld the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity. He conspired with anyone and everyone - Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Russians, and Frenchmen but he never tried to reach an understanding with his immediate neighbors, the Austrians and Hungarians, the most natural thing for him to have done. Czecho-Slovakia's internal situation also became more difficult. The collapse of Masaryk's State in 1939 was inevitable, because the German, Slovak, and Hungarian minorities could not be expected to defend a regime which they regarded as an oppressor. The widespread belief that Czecho-S1ovakia could have survived but for the Munich capitulation i's unfounded, and is only one of the many propaganda legends which have become accepted as fact. It remains to be seen whether the West will continue �56 SLOVAKIA to support the ambitions of a few exiled po1iticians who may or may not represent the wishes and interests of their peoples. It is not surprising that many Czech politicians find it easier to make political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to follow an entirely new line, but would it not be advisable to eliminate this myth from Western pmpaganda and make no more use of names which bear a heavy responsibility for disrupting the unity of the Danubian region? It is difficult to see how the creation of a new Europe can be assisted by the memory of people whose narrow nationalism had such a baneful influence on the course of history. Politicians of Masaryk's type are very often public dangera, for they rouse peoples to revolt and then fail through weakness to guide the forces they have had conjured up in a suitable direction. A new spirit is needed; the entire Central European problem must be settled on a basis of what is right and not who is right. Political actions should be judged by their results and not by the nationality of those responsible for them, and usually it is at least a generaition before the true nature of these results becomes apparent. Viewed from this distance in time, it is obvious that Masaryk's "liberation" led to the balkanization of Central Europe and that the treaties of 1919 created a situation incomparably worse than the one they were supposed to remedy . • • • HUMAN IUGHTS AND EXILES Hans Schlitz Emigrants are to be pitied. Anyone forced to leave his home because of danger to life and limb deserves our sincerest sympathy. I can even feel for those emigrants who were at one time my bitter political opponents. The right to asylum is one of the human rights; so is the right to one's homeland. Exiles should, in their own interest, beware of treating human rights to·o lightly. By consigning them to the flames, we burn with them the right to asylum. He who breaks a principle should not complain if the stigma of C~in marks his brow. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 51 MASARYK'S ROLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE F. O. Miksche Before World War I, the interests of the Czech people were represented in the Vienna parliament by powerful political parties with a total of 107 mandates. The Agrarians had 29 seats! the Socialists 23; the so-called Youl'!g Czechs 20; the Catholics 17; the Radicals 10; the Conservatives 7; .the so-cal'led Progressives 1, which was held by T. G. Masaryk, spokesman for the entire Czecih nation in England and other Allied countries during the First World War. His battle-cry "Destroy Austria" was by no means echoed by the other legally eleoted representatives, for in 1917 the Czech parties in the Vienna Assembly all proclaimed their loyalty to the Habsburg Dynasty. What Masaryk had to say about this subject is recorded in his memoirs: "Again and again we were told (in the Allied countries) that the Czech leaders at home were not in opposition to Austria, and the disavowals were soon forgotten. The Russian revolution and the entry of the United States into the war filled mens' minds. The refrain of my propaganda was 'Break up Austria'." Thus Masaryk's lonely voice, strengthened by Allied propaganda, became louder than the united voices of his 106 former colleagues in the Vienna Assem1bly. The Czech politicians demanded the restoration of the Czech State, in federal association witlh the other countries of the Habsburg Crown. Their motives in doing so can certainly not be ascribed to any special love for the Dynasty, but to the necessity for ensuring the national existence and development of the Czech people. It was thought !:'hat if the Habsburg Monarchy were to fall, Bohemia would inevitably become a victim of German or Russian imperialism and lose its Home Rule. Palacky, famous Czech historian, who is always looked upon as the Father of the Czech nation, declared in 1848 that if Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented. All the radical slogans used for agitation could no't hide the fact that the existence of all the small people of the Danubian Empire depended on it, and until the end of the First 52 SLOVAKIA World War Palacky's declaration remained a guide for Czech politicians. Some years earlier even Masaryk expressed the same view, as the following quotation from the program of his party, dated April 14, 1900, shows: "We be1ieve thai the former swer,eiign independence od: our Bohemian Lands is ilffipossiible today. Our smaH numlbers, our geograrphi;cal siltua:tion, and the fac,t th<1t the Czech counrtries are a,lso inhabited by Germans, have compelled us to umte with the other oolt.i:ons and la·nds. " And what did youn,g Benes say iin, his French thesis for a d·octooa.t e, written at Dijon in 1·908? The following is· a quOlbation fr:oon ·has text: "People have od3ten spoken cxf a dismemberunent of Austria. I do not 'believe in it at all. The Mstorical and po1ivi'cal bonds ·bevween the dfflerewt nations of the Emnir.e are too powel'lful to make sueh dhm1emlbermenrt possiib le. . . . ·one cannot seriously think ~ the estaiblishment olf a Czech State iif one-tlhird cxf the inha;b itants of the country (the Sudeten Genma-ns) are d'ertermined to resist and wrn illever accept it lega,Hy. " Break With Tradition Masaryk was the first Czech politician to break with the Palacky tradition, and is consequently often regarded as the betrayer of his testament. Did he perhB!ps imagine that afiter the end of the First World War the danger of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism would disappear forever? If so, his mistake was catastrophic, for not he but Palacky was in the right. It is dificult to im:agine on what grounds Masaryk switched over after 1914 to an attitude so different from his own past ideas. His views in 1915 were clearly e~ressed in his first note addressed to the British Foreign Office on April 15th of that year: "Now Bohemia wishes and hopes that her Russian brethren will soon succeed in occupying the Bohemian and Slovak districts. . . . They must, however, on no account enter Bohemia except to stay." Prophetic words, expressing a wish which has since been fulfilled. Whatever his reasons, the fact remains thait Masaryk's activities in the Allied countries during the First World War have become a model for many of the exiled politicians of today. With considerable skill and the help of only a few friends he succeeded in enlisting the support of a large part of the Western press for his plans. Several hundreds of thousands of Czechs who had been settled for years in America and other Allied countries SLOVAKIA 53 took the place of the Czech people at home, on whom he had no influence, and organized demonstrations and passed resolutions by acclamation which were presented to the Allied governments as proof of the will of the people. In Russia, and later also in France and Italy, Czech military formations were organized. Associations were formed and congresses were held to further the program for the "liberation of the oppressed nations," and prominent Allied personalities, invited to play leading parts in them, were so flattered that they did not realize their names were being misused for propaganda purposes by a group of ambitious adve111turers. Closer and closer the nets of intrigue were drawn round the Western statesmen, who were also influenced by the idea that the breeding of national revolutions in the Danubian Empire would shorten the war, and when it ended, in 1918, were unruble to rid themselves of the promises they had so lighft..heartedly given :to exiled politicians, although many of them had foreseen the results of the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy. No doubt Masaryk's name is graven deeply in the history of all Danubian peoples, for his conspiracies shattered the nucleus of the Danubian Empire - the Union of Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria. It will always remain one of the great questions of history whether the Empire would have fallen asunder spontaneously, or under the influence of foreign propaganda, and there are enough arguments for and against both theories to support neverending discussion. The territorial claims of Italy, Serbia, and Rumania would certainly have deprived it of important provinces, but would not have destroyed its nucleus. The fact is that the Allies officially recognized the CzechoSlovak government while the war was still in progress; and Masaryk took advantage of this circumstance to present his own people with a fait accompli. Instead of having to negotiate with the elected representatives of the peoples the exifod politicians were themselves declared to be legal representatives. The Treaty ·b y means of which the Peace Conference establ1i'shed the new State was entitled: "Traite entre les Puissances Alliees et la Tcheco-Slovaquie," and was signed 54 SLOVAKIA at Saint Germain on September 9, 1919. As soon as Dr. Benes got hold of this document the proper name of the new State as it appeared in the original text - CzechoSlovakia - vanished, and the name Czechoslovakia appeared for the first time. This may appear to be only a small change in nomenclature, but behind it is h1dden one of the gr.e atest bluffs in history. The peoples of the world believe in a nation which has never existed, but was conjured up by trickery and treaohery and maintained by propaganda, for there are no Czechoslovaks, only Czechs and Slovaks. The change in t'he name of the new Republic was inserted into the Constitution by the first Czecho . .Slovak Parliament, whdch was approved on February 20, 1920, but at that time S,loV'akia was occupied by the Czech army, and the leader of the Slovaks, Father Hlinka, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in Moravia. No Lawful Representatives The "lawful representatives" who voted for the Constitution were anything but lawful, for the members of the first Parliament were not elected but appointed by the political cHque headed by Masaryk, which came to power with the help of the Allies. Over 4.5 million Germans, Hungarians, and people of other nationalities, were without a single representative in this "National Assembly," all claims on their behalf having been ignored by the Czechs. All the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, concerning social reform, the expropriation of land, etc., and the langua:ge to be used officially, were determined by this arbitrarily formed body without a single GermanBohemian or Hungarian voice being heard. To remove all possibility of amendments to the Constitution being approved against the will of the Czechs, it was decreed that a .t wo-thirds majority would be required. After the Constitution had been ratified, the nominated Assembly was dissolved and four weeks later elections were held for a new Parliament. Father Hlinka, elected whlle still in prison, was thereupon released. At the first sitting the Slovak members demanded the implementation of the SLOVAKIA 55 Pittsburgh Treaty, but were told that it was contrary to the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and the Treaty was invalid because it was signed by people who were already American citizens. Thus was Czecho-Slovakia created, the "island of democracy in Danubian Europe," and Masaryk, who only a few years before had sharply criticized the smallest injustice in the Vienna Parliament, did not utter a word of protest. From the inception o:f the new Republic a religious antagonism developed between Czechs and Slovaks whicih was of muoh more importance than the national one. The Slovak character has been decisively influenced by Catholicism, while the religious beliefs of the Czechs owe too much to Jan Hus to allow them to become willing subjects to Rome. The founders of Czecho-Slovak,i a, Masaryk and Benes, were free-thinkers, and the numerous quanels in which they soon became involved with the nciglrboring Catholic countries, mainly Hungary, soon brought them up against the Vatican, while no more promising foundation could be found for the national tradition they wished to establish than a return to Hussitism. So a new "National Czechoslovak Church" was founded. Between the two wars, Dr. Benes was one of the leading lights of European diplomacy. He hated Austria and Hungary, feared any sort of federation of the Danubian States, and obst inately upheld the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity. He conspired with anyone and everyone - Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Russians, and Frenchmen but he never tried to reach an understanding with his immediate neighbors, the Austrians and Hungarians, the most natural thing for him to have done. Czecho-Slovakia's internal situation also became more difficult. The collapse of Masaryk's State in 1939 was inevitable, because the German, Slovak, and Hungarian minorities could not be expected to defend a regime which they regarded as an oppressor. The widespread belief that Czecho-S1ovakia could have survived but for the Munich capitulation i's unfounded, and is only one of the many propaganda legends which have become accepted as fact. It remains to be seen whether the West will continue 56 SLOVAKIA to support the ambitions of a few exiled po1iticians who may or may not represent the wishes and interests of their peoples. It is not surprising that many Czech politicians find it easier to make political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to follow an entirely new line, but would it not be advisable to eliminate this myth from Western pmpaganda and make no more use of names which bear a heavy responsibility for disrupting the unity of the Danubian region? It is difficult to see how the creation of a new Europe can be assisted by the memory of people whose narrow nationalism had such a baneful influence on the course of history. Politicians of Masaryk's type are very often public dangera, for they rouse peoples to revolt and then fail through weakness to guide the forces they have had conjured up in a suitable direction. A new spirit is needed; the entire Central European problem must be settled on a basis of what is right and not who is right. Political actions should be judged by their results and not by the nationality of those responsible for them, and usually it is at least a generaition before the true nature of these results becomes apparent. Viewed from this distance in time, it is obvious that Masaryk's "liberation" led to the balkanization of Central Europe and that the treaties of 1919 created a situation incomparably worse than the one they were supposed to remedy . • • • HUMAN IUGHTS AND EXILES Hans Schlitz Emigrants are to be pitied. Anyone forced to leave his home because of danger to life and limb deserves our sincerest sympathy. I can even feel for those emigrants who were at one time my bitter political opponents. The right to asylum is one of the human rights; so is the right to one's homeland. Exiles should, in their own interest, beware of treating human rights to·o lightly. By consigning them to the flames, we burn with them the right to asylum. He who breaks a principle should not complain if the stigma of C~in marks his brow.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Masaryk’s Role in Central Europe Description An account of the resource F. O. Miksche Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 7 (32), September-December 1960 pp. 51-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, 1905-1992 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1960 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4b70563c26e3df62ff5e179b48253864.pdf f720ff9f14720f917cb2336afd39bb5e PDF Text Text 104 SLOVAKIA UUDOVfT STUR AND THE PANSLAVIC MOVEMENT By Suzanna Mikula, B.A. Slovaks have long recognized the achievements of Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) in promoting Slovak unity, culture, and independence. He is a great national figure, revered as the "Father of Modern Slovak Nationa1ism". Stur was a man of many talents, literary, pedagogical, and political. He was an ardent patriot among people who had been without a nation for a thousand years, a Protestant in an area predominantly Catholic. Stur was also the author of a number of books, poems, and pamphlets, all in a strong patriotic vein. His most famous work even though not the best is Slavdom and the World of the Future, wrUten in the early 1850's in the German language, but not published until 1867 in Russia. Stur's contributions to the Slovak nation are quite known. But what of his place in the history of Slavs at his time? The third, fourth, and fifth decades of the 19th century saw a · tremendous national revival of the Slavic world. This revival led to a Panslavic movement, received enthusiastically by the Slavic world and fearfully by western Europe. Stur had an active role in the Panslavic Movement, and with his work at the Prague Congress of 1848 as well as with his book, Slavdom and the World of the Future, introduced the concept of poHtical panslavism. Slovakia can be called the mother of the Panslavic Movement, for a Slovak writer named John Herkel first used the word "panslavic" in a Latin treatise published in 1826. Furthermore the main leaders and writers of the Panslavic Movement of the 19th century were Slovaks; the poet Jan Kollar and scholar P. J. Safarik may even be regarded as the fathers of Panslavism. 1 The success of panslavism among the Slovaks was due to the fact that the Slovaks occupy the central position (geographically) in the Slavic world. Also since the Slovak language is the purest of the Slavic tongues, they believed they were the original Slav nation. In fact, the Slovaks seem to have some resemblance to nearly all of the Slavic nations, further strengthening the "mother-of-the-Slavs" concept which the Slovaks cherish. Thus it seems that from the heart �SLOVAKIA 105 of Slavdom, the Slovaks were chosen to lead the separated brothers. 2 Furthermore, the Slovaks had been dominated by other nations for nearly a thousand years; now the activities of the panslavists gave leadership and direction to the long suppressed desires of the Slovaks for their own nation.3 These factors help explain why Slovakia became "the classic country of the Slavic idea." 4 However, the Panslavic Movement was not limited to Slovakia, but spread throughout the Slavic world, taking deeper root in some areas than in others. There had been an early attempt at achieving some type of Slavic unity in the 17th century. Juraj Krizanic (1618-1683), a Croatian, was a forerunner of Panslavism in that he sought the adoption of a single Slavic language for all Slavic nations. He also advocated agreement to political unity under Russia, but little attention was paid to him.5 The idea of Slavic unity had no success in the 17th century, but by the 19th century, events in Europe offered more hope for its acceptance. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars caused a political awakening of intellectuals in central and Eastern Europe. 6 Jin Austria, the enlightened reigns of Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Leopold II improved the economic and social conditions of the Slav subjects, who now for the first time found opportunity for education and intellectual activity. And finally, the great success and power of Russia offered a shining example to the downtrodden Slavic nations of what a brother nation could achieve. A far greater influence on the intellectual thought leading to Panslavism was linguistic and political Pangermanism, especially as interpreted by Johann Herder. According to Herder, the national language was regarded as a determining factor for men's loyalty. 7 But even more than this, Herder believed, and proclaimed in his writings, that the Slavic race was the future leader of Europe. The decadent8 Romanic and Germanic tribes would of nesessity yield to the peace-loving, moral, and primitively democratic Slavs. He urged them not to abandon their language, but to cultivate it carefully and consistently, for it was a precious g,ift from their fathers. Thus Panslavism rested on the two principles of a common language and a kind nebulous unity created by the existence of a widespread, primitive, but untainted Slavic civilization. �106 SLOVAJOA Panslavism was a sign of the national awakening of central and eastern Europe, and as such its primary emphasis was on language, literature, and culture. Having been subjugated for so many centuries, the Slavic people needed support in formulating a national consciousness, a national vernacular literature, and they sought this support in each other. Panslavism arose at first more as a defensive movement among the western Slavs than as a political movement with the aim of replacing western dominance in Europe. However for many years, even to this day, the word panslavism has a political connotation for the Romance and Germanic nations, implying a belligerent attempt to replace their civilization with the Slavic civilization.!) This connotation was attached to the Panslavic movement from the very beginning, largely because of a slight resemblanc e to a pangerman movement, but also because of the subjugated position of the various Slavic nations. This gave rise to the fear that they would attempt to recover their former independen ce, and thus disturb the surface-peace of Europe. Individual Slavic nations could hardly create a problem for the rest of Europe, except Russia. But once unified, the Slavic race far outnumbered the other two, and could quite possibly overpower them. This fear never materialized. Panslavism , throughout the 19th century, remained the primary concern of poets, newspaper writers, literary scholars, philologists , and historians.10 Unlike western European nations, where national awakening came as a result of the activities of politicians and statesmen, Slavic nationalism was removed from the political plan and situated in the literary field . The panslavic poets and writers expressed, in a period when such feelings were dominant, an optomistic belief in man's inevitable progress, in a great spiritual rejuvenatio n, which would result in the establishme nt of liberty, peace, and happiness.11 The Slavs were far removed from the conflicts of the older nations ; perhaps they were the heralds of this new era? Certainly the Slavic writers offered promises that this was so. The Panslavic movement was also used as a protest against the dominant position of the German and Magyar tongues within the Slavic world. The Slavs used the appeal of ethnograph ic nationality, so much a part of the thinking of this age that it was regarded as a national right, against their two major oppressors. �SLOVAKIA 107 There were three stages in the Panslavic movement: literary, scientific, and political, with literary panslavism being the primary and most successful. The Slovak poet Jan Kollar was the spokesman for literary panslavism. His chief goal was the literary and cultural union of Slavic nations. According to Kollar, there is only one Slavic nation, and only one Slavric language. He did not feel that a single political state was necessary, nor even a single spoken language. The various dialects were to be respected, but in literature, only the one common Slavic language should prevail. 12 Kollar was against political union of Slavric nations because he felt agitation for such union would result in disorder and catastrophe for the Slavs. 13 What Kollar hoped to attain was a state of literary reciprocity, whereby the writings of one nation would be the property and treasure of every other Slav nation. Kollar tried to awaken within the Slavs their sense of unity, their glorsious destiny and bright future. He stressed the need of self-recognition and inter-communication, but without any conflicts with existing political structures. Yet in spite of his dislike of political agitation, it was his impassioned and imaginative writing which led the Slavic people to action. Scientific panslavism was chiefly the result of the efforts of Pavel Jozef Safarik, who was the first to pursue a scholarly and systematic study of the background and origins of the Slavic nations and language. He provided the foundation upon which the panslavists might build Slavic unity and destiny, and his work gave authenticity to the poems of Kollar and the writings of Stur. His book Slavic Antiquities became famous throughout Europe, stimu}ating an interest in the early history and culture of the Slav peoples. Safarik may be regarded as the founder of a whole school of scientific writers, and his book had a very direct influence on subsequent developments in the Slav world. 14 His studies of the Slavic languages substantiated the early belief that all the Slavic languages were quite closely related; Safarik provided a rational foundation for the emotional appeal of Kollar. The literary and scientif,ic panslavism of Kollar and Safarik succeeded in creating a strong national spirit among the Slavs, the Czechs and Slovaks in particular. It is only natural that this cry for national unity and for self-recognition should be heard and taken to its logical conclusion, namely �108 SLOVAKIA political panslavism. And this had been done by Uudovit Stur, who saw in which direction panslavism must now go. Literary and cultural unity was not enough. To achieve their glorious destiny, the destiny to which both Kollar and Safari.k alluded, the Slavic peoples had to attain a measure of political unity. There were two paths that political panslavism could follow: Austroslavism, which meant maintaining a form of Austrian political influence, and which Stur advocated at the Prague Congress of 1848, the first great manifestation of Panslavism, and Pan-Russianism, which Stur adopted after the failure of the Prague Congress. The Prague Congress of 1848 was the natural result of the Panslavic movement. It was apparent that a true spirit of panslavism would necessitate a dialog between the Slavs, a dialog not only literary but political as well. Several events which occured in the years 1846-1848 made such a meeting desireable. The Polish uprisings in Galicia and Cracow in 1846, the national agitation in Italy when Cardinal Terretto became Pope, the United Landtag in Prussia, the elections to the Hungarian Diet in 1847, to which Stur was elected, and most immediately, the February, 1848, Revolution in Paris, and the Congress of Germ,an deputies (members of Parliament) in Frankfurt discussing the unification of an Germans, all these events served to stir the Slavic people to action. The spirit of revolution and nationalism was in the arir, dominating the writings and conversations of the year. 15 The Czechs and Slovaks, especially felt that immediate action of some sort was necessary. In Austria, there was the threat of German expansion under the leadership of Prussia. Hungary, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth was pursuing a policy of complete magyarization. The Slovak language was to be suppressed, with Magyar the official language of education and government. It seemed almost paradoxical that the Magyars sought to suppress the national spirit of the Slovaks in order to achieve the same for themselves. Stur saw this paradox, and said in this respect: "Each nation is only one pa1t of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended the best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move itself and educate itself as it sees fit. 16 The time seemed opportune for action on the part of �SLOVAKIA 109 the Slavs as well. Stur offered the idea of proclaiming a Slavic Congress, 17 and on May 31, 1848, it was called by Stur and the Czech writers. Prague was chosen for the Congress, and a total of 362 delegates from the various Slavic nations arrived. The delegates were largely from among the Slavs under the Hapsburg rule, but the Poles and Russians also were represented. The avowed objective of the meeting was the establishment of periodic relations between the Slav peoples and the drawing up of a program of action for such peoples subject to Austrian and/ or Hungarian domination. 18 At the Congress Stur offered a program for federalizing Central Europe. In spite of his antagonism to the idea that a non-Slav nation should have any say in the affairs of a Slav nation, he realized that total independence was impossible. The Czechs, being far more realistic than the Slovaks, had realized this, and were consistent supporters of Austroslavism. Thus at the conference the problem narrowed down to a definition of terms: the objective of the Congress was either to save Austria, for with her lay the best chances of maintaining Slavic identity, or the primary concern were the needs of the Slavic people living under Austria. 19 Stur passionately declared at the Congress: Our aim should be to save ourselves, not to save Austria. First we must work for ourselves, then for others. Thus far Austria has been existing but we have been perishing. What wo.u ld the world say to us if we stood for nothing but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slavonic communities under the government of Austria . . . this will give our work a Slavonic accent.20 Stur felt the program of the congress should be: (1) the creation of independent Slavic united states within Austria, and (2) prompt agreement to this, so that the Austrian armies might destroy Magyar encroachments into Slovakia. 21 Stur could not place enough stress on the need for Slavic independence: "So that we might take over the spot in history which belongs to us according to our strength and abilities, we must once and for all time free ourselves from this unbearable foreign thraldom and gain state independence for ourselves." 22 Stur fully understood the necessity of remaining within the Austrian framework. But his Austroslavism was very �110 SLOVAKIA tepid, and he carefully pointed out that it (Austroslavism) existed only because of sheer necessity. Stur made no attempt to hide his distrust of Austria and his distaste with certain features of the regime. It was otherwise with the Czechs. They had not suffered the same suppressions under the Austrians as the Slovaks had under the Magyars. Hence they were ready to accept the vague promises of the Austrian Emperor that Slavic rights would be recognized and respected. In return, the delegates of the Congress decided to give Austria full support in helping to subdue the Magyars. Futhermore, they adopted a "Manifesto to the European Nations" which called for the following objectives: 1. 2. 3. 4. The freeing of the Slavic people under Turkish rule. That the Magyars acknowledge the rights of the Slovak nation, including the right to its own language. That Croatian autonomy be maintained. That the Slovenians be permitted to possess their land. 23 It would seem then, that the Prague Congress reduced the Panslavic movement to an attempt to reorganize Austria so as to satisfy the nationalism of the Slavs.24 So it must have seemed to Stur, for he felt that the Congress had been a failure. Then too the attempted insurrection in 1848 against the Magyars also failed. Stur was greatly despondent. He had had great faith in the panslavic movement and felt Slavic independence was not an impossible goal. Yet the two expressions of this political panslavism certainly did not succeed. In his despair and disillusionment, Stur concluded that a small nation could not seek its freedom alone, or in the frame of Austroslavism. There was only one alternative left: Russia, for Russia alone of the Slavic nations was powerful enough to lead others to independence. This was the basic idea expressed throughout his book SLavdom and the World of the Future, an exceptional tribute to the cultural, moral, and political forces of the Russian Empire. It also presented a detailed and complete program for the union of Slavs with Russia. Stu.r's book had little impact on his own people. The book was published for the Congress of 1867, when a group of Russians discovered it and translated it. It was the major �SLOVAKIA 111 work studied and examined at the Congress, and was regarded as a complete and perfect program of panrussianism. Stur set out to accomplish four basic tasks in his book. First of all he wished to determine whether the Slavs had a role of their own to fulfill in world history. 25 A close review of the Slavic past ought to yield the answer. Stur of course, was certain of the answer even before he began his examination, for this belief had been the basic reason for the entire panslavic movement. The Slavs were to be the leaders of a "new" Europe. They were at this point in no position to do anything, but history was a progression of spent nations being replaced by young ones, and Slavic emancipation and self-realization would eventually occur. The second task of the book is to describe the Slavic mission in universal history against the background of the cultural difference between Western and Eastern Europe.26 In the west, Stur could see only moral, political, and social dissolution, the ruination of the peasants (true guardians of democracy), and finally the schism between religion and daily life. It was no use looking to the West for salvation, when they were already on the downward path. Nor was there any use in imitating the society and institutions of the West since they were contributing to the very decline of the West. The Western civilization had deteriorated; the Slavs could only look to themselves for help. In the third part Stur presents a highly romantic picture of the Slavic people. The Slavs are people of extraordinary virtue; their only vices were those which had crept in from the influence of the west. The Slavs were naturally good of heart, patient, humble, kind, and democratic. These virtues were the characteristic of all Slavs, but especially the Russians. The Russians were the embodiment of all the best and noble features of the entire Slav nation. Stur had never been in Russia, nor had any prolonged contact with Russians. He based his notion merely on the fact that this had to be logically so, for of the Russians were to be the leaders of the Slavs, they had to be the best among the Slavs. The last section of Slavdom and the World of the Future deals with the problems of Slavic political unification. Unity was an absolute necessity if the Slavs were to achieve their historic mission. But what type of unity? �112 SLOVAKIA There were three possibilities. The first one that he considered was a Slavic Federation without Russia. This he rejected because such a federation could never succeed due to internal dissention among the various Slavic peoples. So union of so many Slavic nations of about equal strength would destroy the possibility of the emergence of a leader. Yet a leader was absolutely necessary if the Slavs were to jointly work for their destiny. A second possibility was the transformation of Austria into a Slavic Empire. Any type of unity with Austria was an illusion that could never gain substance. Attempts at cooperation with Austria had failed once before, and Stur believed Austria was doomed to destruction ; Austroslavism should not even be considered. The only remaining alternative was union with Russia. Russia was powerful enough to unite all the Slavic nations ; she was the leader the Slavs needed . Stur was proud of Russia's vastness and power, but it was a Slavic pride. Should the Slavic peoples unite under Russia, their equal could not be found in all of Europe. This is an amazing document to come from the hands of I..:udovit Stur. And yet, given the circumstances he faced in the 1850's, it is not so hard to understand. Stur's primary goal, for which he had worked all his life, was a Slavic nationalism, a Slavic unity. Austroslavism had failed; there was only one place left to turn: to Russia. Stur did not reject independence for the individual Slavic nations; he was not willing to replace Austrian domination with Russian. He hoped for the creation of a federation of independent Slavic states under Russian leadership, substantially the same as he urged in 1848 under Austrian leadership. Stur's book was greatly praised by the Russian Slavophils, for it was so closely atuned to their ideas. However, the book was an expression of Stur's ideas which he arrived at independently of any noticeable influence from the Russians.27 Stur died in 1856, and hence, having never set foot in Russia, had little contact with the Slavophils. He did carry on a correspondence with several Russians, but not enough to permit the statement that his book was an expression of their views. Stur was interested in panslavism, in unity for �SLOVAKIA 113 all Slavic nations; his interest in Russia came only as a result of this. The Panslavic Movement did not, during Stu.r's time, achieve any notable results. In fact, by the time of his death, the whole movement was pretty much a failure. Panslavism failed because the very nationalism that it promoted led to its defeat. By urging Slavic national consciousness, panslavism created dissent among the various Slav nations. The more the people became aware of their individuality, their historical traditions, and their own language, the less they wanted to sacrifice them for a non-existent Slav federation. Secondly, the centuries-old and traditional antagonism between various Slavic nations, such as Poles and Russians, Czechs and Slovaks, Croatians and Serbians, prevented any success for a plan that would unite them. These two factors prevented Panslavism from exercising any dominant or stable influence on European political thought at that time. Yet Panslavism has an inherent value in that it revealed for the first time to the rest of Europe the Slavic mind. This is especially important in the light of the present role which the Slavs play in Europe. The Prague Congress too, could be regarded as a failure, for there was little change in the situation of the Slavic people after it. But the Prague Congress was the first expression of Slavic unity, of Slavic identity, separate from the Hapsburg rule. As such, it gave the Slavs confidence and a guide for future actions. Slavdom and the World of the Future is relatively unknown, even in the Slavic world. Yet it had a strong influence on Russian thinking in the 1870's and was in fact a forerunner of their program and goals. :Cudovit Stur was the author of political panslavism. He initiated the Prague Congress of 1848, and through his book, spread his influence beyond the confines of the Austrian Empire. He revealed to the West the Slavic mind and the Slavic desires ; he deserves a place in the 19th century intellectual and national thought and doctrine. FOOTNOTES 1. Hans Kohn, Panslavism, Notre Dame University Press, p. 18. 2. Ernest Denis, Les Slovaques, Paris, p. 14. 3. As Jan Kollar, great Slovak poet, stated: "The Tatra Slavs had �SLOVAKIA 114 so far almost no literature of their own, therefore they first opened their arms to embrace all Slavs . . . the Tatra mountains are the nest and cradle of all Slavs. Therefore the idea of solidarity ... took root there faster and deeper than anywhere else." (Kohn, p. 17) 4. Ibid., p. 44. 5. Jozef Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovenska, Slovak Institute, p. 233. 6. Kohn, p. 1. 7. Ibid., 8. It is hard to say why the west was considered to be decadent. Possibly because, after the nationalistic hopes aroused by Napoleon, Europe was successfully forced to return to the status quo ante Napoleon, to the despair of liberals and nationalists. Even with the political panslavism of Stur, the aim was Slavic independence, not Slavic control of Europe in the immediate future. 10. Kirschbaum, Nas boj, p. 231, and Jan Kollar - Slovak Poet of Panslavism, Slavistica, No. 56, Slovak Institute, Cleveland, 0., 1965. 11. Kohn, p. 18. 12. Kirschbaum, p. 235. 13. Ibid. 14. H. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, p. 175, and Kirschbaum, Pavol J. Safarik and His Contribution to Slavic Studies, Slavistica No. 43, Cleveland, 0., 1962. 15. Kohn, p. 62. 16. Marian 2iar, " Stur: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism", Slovakia, Vol. VI, March 1956, Middletown, Pa., p. 9. 17. Zdenek Tobolka, Slovanskii Sjezd v Praze roku 1848, Prague, p. 51. 18. A. Mouset, Le Monde Slave, Paris, p. 14. 9. 19. Karol Galan, " Sturove reci na slovanskom sjazde roku 1848", Slovenske pohl'ady, cislo 8-9, aug.-sept. 1936, p. 422. The difference in the two positions lay mostly in their emphasis; the one put Austria first, the other put the Slavs first. Stur of course, was in favor of the second phraseology. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., p. 423. 22. Jozef Kirschbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, Robert Speller Co., p. 73. 23. Kirschbaum, N<is boj, pp. 247-48. 24. Waclaw Lednicki, "Panslavism". European Ideologies, ed. Felix Gross, New York, p. 869. 25. M. Petrovich, "I:udovit Stur and Russian Panslavism", Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 12, April 1952, p. 6. 26. Ibid., p. 9. �SLOVAKIA 27. 115 Jozef Kirschbaum, "Uudovit Stur and His Place in the Slavic World", Slavistica, No. 32, 1958, Slovak Institute p. 12. BIBLIOGRAPHY Denis, Ernest, La Question d'Autriche Delagrave: Paris) , 1917. Les Slovaques. (Librairie Galan, Karol, "Sturove reci na slovanskom sjazde roku 1848". Slovenske pohi'ady, cislo 8-9, aug.-sept. 1936, Bratislava. Kirschbaum, Jozef, Nas boj o samostatnosf Slovenska. (Slovak Institute: Cleveland, Ohio), 1958. Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. (Robert Speller and Sons Co.: New York), 1960. "Uudovit Stur and His Place in the Slavic World". siavistica No .32, (Slovak Institute: Cleve1and), 1958. Kohn, Hans, Pansfovism. (University of Notre Dame Press: South Bend, Ind.), 1953. Lednicki, Waclaw, "Panslavism" European Ideologies. ed. Feliks Gross (Philosophical Library: New York), 1948. Miku~. Joseph, Slovakia, a Political History . (Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, Wis.), 1963. Mousset, Albert, Le Monde siave. Paris, 1946. Oddo, Gilbert, Slovakia and Its People . (Robert Speller and Sons Co.: New York), 1960. Pauco, Jozef, r.udovychova u sturovcov. Matiea slovenska, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1943. Petrovich, Michael, "Uudovit Stur and Russian Panslavism" Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 12, April, 1952. Seton-Watson, R. H., A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London: 1943. Stur, L'udovit, Listy I?.udovita Stura, ed. Dr. Jozef Ambru~ (Slovenska Akademia Vied: Bratislava), 1956. Tobolka, Zdenek, Slovansky sjezd v Praze roku 1848. (F. Simacek Co.: Prague), 1901. Vlcek, Jaroslav, Dejiny literatury slovenskej (Matica slovenska: Turciansky Sv. Martin), 1923. 2iar, Marian, "Stur: Father of Modem Slovak Nationalism". Slovakia, Vol. VI, March 1956, (Jednota Press: Middletown, Pa.) � 104 SLOVAKIA UUDOVfT STUR AND THE PANSLAVIC MOVEMENT By Suzanna Mikula, B.A. Slovaks have long recognized the achievements of Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) in promoting Slovak unity, culture, and independence. He is a great national figure, revered as the "Father of Modern Slovak Nationa1ism". Stur was a man of many talents, literary, pedagogical, and political. He was an ardent patriot among people who had been without a nation for a thousand years, a Protestant in an area predominantly Catholic. Stur was also the author of a number of books, poems, and pamphlets, all in a strong patriotic vein. His most famous work even though not the best is Slavdom and the World of the Future, wrUten in the early 1850's in the German language, but not published until 1867 in Russia. Stur's contributions to the Slovak nation are quite known. But what of his place in the history of Slavs at his time? The third, fourth, and fifth decades of the 19th century saw a · tremendous national revival of the Slavic world. This revival led to a Panslavic movement, received enthusiastically by the Slavic world and fearfully by western Europe. Stur had an active role in the Panslavic Movement, and with his work at the Prague Congress of 1848 as well as with his book, Slavdom and the World of the Future, introduced the concept of poHtical panslavism. Slovakia can be called the mother of the Panslavic Movement, for a Slovak writer named John Herkel first used the word "panslavic" in a Latin treatise published in 1826. Furthermore the main leaders and writers of the Panslavic Movement of the 19th century were Slovaks; the poet Jan Kollar and scholar P. J. Safarik may even be regarded as the fathers of Panslavism. 1 The success of panslavism among the Slovaks was due to the fact that the Slovaks occupy the central position (geographically) in the Slavic world. Also since the Slovak language is the purest of the Slavic tongues, they believed they were the original Slav nation. In fact, the Slovaks seem to have some resemblance to nearly all of the Slavic nations, further strengthening the "mother-of-the-Slavs" concept which the Slovaks cherish. Thus it seems that from the heart �SLOVAKIA 105 of Slavdom, the Slovaks were chosen to lead the separated brothers. 2 Furthermore, the Slovaks had been dominated by other nations for nearly a thousand years; now the activities of the panslavists gave leadership and direction to the long suppressed desires of the Slovaks for their own nation.3 These factors help explain why Slovakia became "the classic country of the Slavic idea." 4 However, the Panslavic Movement was not limited to Slovakia, but spread throughout the Slavic world, taking deeper root in some areas than in others. There had been an early attempt at achieving some type of Slavic unity in the 17th century. Juraj Krizanic (1618-1683), a Croatian, was a forerunner of Panslavism in that he sought the adoption of a single Slavic language for all Slavic nations. He also advocated agreement to political unity under Russia, but little attention was paid to him.5 The idea of Slavic unity had no success in the 17th century, but by the 19th century, events in Europe offered more hope for its acceptance. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars caused a political awakening of intellectuals in central and Eastern Europe. 6 Jin Austria, the enlightened reigns of Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Leopold II improved the economic and social conditions of the Slav subjects, who now for the first time found opportunity for education and intellectual activity. And finally, the great success and power of Russia offered a shining example to the downtrodden Slavic nations of what a brother nation could achieve. A far greater influence on the intellectual thought leading to Panslavism was linguistic and political Pangermanism, especially as interpreted by Johann Herder. According to Herder, the national language was regarded as a determining factor for men's loyalty. 7 But even more than this, Herder believed, and proclaimed in his writings, that the Slavic race was the future leader of Europe. The decadent8 Romanic and Germanic tribes would of nesessity yield to the peace-loving, moral, and primitively democratic Slavs. He urged them not to abandon their language, but to cultivate it carefully and consistently, for it was a precious g,ift from their fathers. Thus Panslavism rested on the two principles of a common language and a kind nebulous unity created by the existence of a widespread, primitive, but untainted Slavic civilization. �106 SLOVAJOA Panslavism was a sign of the national awakening of central and eastern Europe, and as such its primary emphasis was on language, literature, and culture. Having been subjugated for so many centuries, the Slavic people needed support in formulating a national consciousness, a national vernacular literature, and they sought this support in each other. Panslavism arose at first more as a defensive movement among the western Slavs than as a political movement with the aim of replacing western dominance in Europe. However for many years, even to this day, the word panslavism has a political connotation for the Romance and Germanic nations, implying a belligerent attempt to replace their civilization with the Slavic civilization.!) This connotation was attached to the Panslavic movement from the very beginning, largely because of a slight resemblanc e to a pangerman movement, but also because of the subjugated position of the various Slavic nations. This gave rise to the fear that they would attempt to recover their former independen ce, and thus disturb the surface-peace of Europe. Individual Slavic nations could hardly create a problem for the rest of Europe, except Russia. But once unified, the Slavic race far outnumbered the other two, and could quite possibly overpower them. This fear never materialized. Panslavism , throughout the 19th century, remained the primary concern of poets, newspaper writers, literary scholars, philologists , and historians.10 Unlike western European nations, where national awakening came as a result of the activities of politicians and statesmen, Slavic nationalism was removed from the political plan and situated in the literary field . The panslavic poets and writers expressed, in a period when such feelings were dominant, an optomistic belief in man's inevitable progress, in a great spiritual rejuvenatio n, which would result in the establishme nt of liberty, peace, and happiness.11 The Slavs were far removed from the conflicts of the older nations ; perhaps they were the heralds of this new era? Certainly the Slavic writers offered promises that this was so. The Panslavic movement was also used as a protest against the dominant position of the German and Magyar tongues within the Slavic world. The Slavs used the appeal of ethnograph ic nationality, so much a part of the thinking of this age that it was regarded as a national right, against their two major oppressors. �SLOVAKIA 107 There were three stages in the Panslavic movement: literary, scientific, and political, with literary panslavism being the primary and most successful. The Slovak poet Jan Kollar was the spokesman for literary panslavism. His chief goal was the literary and cultural union of Slavic nations. According to Kollar, there is only one Slavic nation, and only one Slavric language. He did not feel that a single political state was necessary, nor even a single spoken language. The various dialects were to be respected, but in literature, only the one common Slavic language should prevail. 12 Kollar was against political union of Slavric nations because he felt agitation for such union would result in disorder and catastrophe for the Slavs. 13 What Kollar hoped to attain was a state of literary reciprocity, whereby the writings of one nation would be the property and treasure of every other Slav nation. Kollar tried to awaken within the Slavs their sense of unity, their glorsious destiny and bright future. He stressed the need of self-recognition and inter-communication, but without any conflicts with existing political structures. Yet in spite of his dislike of political agitation, it was his impassioned and imaginative writing which led the Slavic people to action. Scientific panslavism was chiefly the result of the efforts of Pavel Jozef Safarik, who was the first to pursue a scholarly and systematic study of the background and origins of the Slavic nations and language. He provided the foundation upon which the panslavists might build Slavic unity and destiny, and his work gave authenticity to the poems of Kollar and the writings of Stur. His book Slavic Antiquities became famous throughout Europe, stimu}ating an interest in the early history and culture of the Slav peoples. Safarik may be regarded as the founder of a whole school of scientific writers, and his book had a very direct influence on subsequent developments in the Slav world. 14 His studies of the Slavic languages substantiated the early belief that all the Slavic languages were quite closely related; Safarik provided a rational foundation for the emotional appeal of Kollar. The literary and scientif,ic panslavism of Kollar and Safarik succeeded in creating a strong national spirit among the Slavs, the Czechs and Slovaks in particular. It is only natural that this cry for national unity and for self-recognition should be heard and taken to its logical conclusion, namely �108 SLOVAKIA political panslavism. And this had been done by Uudovit Stur, who saw in which direction panslavism must now go. Literary and cultural unity was not enough. To achieve their glorious destiny, the destiny to which both Kollar and Safari.k alluded, the Slavic peoples had to attain a measure of political unity. There were two paths that political panslavism could follow: Austroslavism, which meant maintaining a form of Austrian political influence, and which Stur advocated at the Prague Congress of 1848, the first great manifestation of Panslavism, and Pan-Russianism, which Stur adopted after the failure of the Prague Congress. The Prague Congress of 1848 was the natural result of the Panslavic movement. It was apparent that a true spirit of panslavism would necessitate a dialog between the Slavs, a dialog not only literary but political as well. Several events which occured in the years 1846-1848 made such a meeting desireable. The Polish uprisings in Galicia and Cracow in 1846, the national agitation in Italy when Cardinal Terretto became Pope, the United Landtag in Prussia, the elections to the Hungarian Diet in 1847, to which Stur was elected, and most immediately, the February, 1848, Revolution in Paris, and the Congress of Germ,an deputies (members of Parliament) in Frankfurt discussing the unification of an Germans, all these events served to stir the Slavic people to action. The spirit of revolution and nationalism was in the arir, dominating the writings and conversations of the year. 15 The Czechs and Slovaks, especially felt that immediate action of some sort was necessary. In Austria, there was the threat of German expansion under the leadership of Prussia. Hungary, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth was pursuing a policy of complete magyarization. The Slovak language was to be suppressed, with Magyar the official language of education and government. It seemed almost paradoxical that the Magyars sought to suppress the national spirit of the Slovaks in order to achieve the same for themselves. Stur saw this paradox, and said in this respect: "Each nation is only one pa1t of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended the best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move itself and educate itself as it sees fit. 16 The time seemed opportune for action on the part of �SLOVAKIA 109 the Slavs as well. Stur offered the idea of proclaiming a Slavic Congress, 17 and on May 31, 1848, it was called by Stur and the Czech writers. Prague was chosen for the Congress, and a total of 362 delegates from the various Slavic nations arrived. The delegates were largely from among the Slavs under the Hapsburg rule, but the Poles and Russians also were represented. The avowed objective of the meeting was the establishment of periodic relations between the Slav peoples and the drawing up of a program of action for such peoples subject to Austrian and/ or Hungarian domination. 18 At the Congress Stur offered a program for federalizing Central Europe. In spite of his antagonism to the idea that a non-Slav nation should have any say in the affairs of a Slav nation, he realized that total independence was impossible. The Czechs, being far more realistic than the Slovaks, had realized this, and were consistent supporters of Austroslavism. Thus at the conference the problem narrowed down to a definition of terms: the objective of the Congress was either to save Austria, for with her lay the best chances of maintaining Slavic identity, or the primary concern were the needs of the Slavic people living under Austria. 19 Stur passionately declared at the Congress: Our aim should be to save ourselves, not to save Austria. First we must work for ourselves, then for others. Thus far Austria has been existing but we have been perishing. What wo.u ld the world say to us if we stood for nothing but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slavonic communities under the government of Austria . . . this will give our work a Slavonic accent.20 Stur felt the program of the congress should be: (1) the creation of independent Slavic united states within Austria, and (2) prompt agreement to this, so that the Austrian armies might destroy Magyar encroachments into Slovakia. 21 Stur could not place enough stress on the need for Slavic independence: "So that we might take over the spot in history which belongs to us according to our strength and abilities, we must once and for all time free ourselves from this unbearable foreign thraldom and gain state independence for ourselves." 22 Stur fully understood the necessity of remaining within the Austrian framework. But his Austroslavism was very �110 SLOVAKIA tepid, and he carefully pointed out that it (Austroslavism) existed only because of sheer necessity. Stur made no attempt to hide his distrust of Austria and his distaste with certain features of the regime. It was otherwise with the Czechs. They had not suffered the same suppressions under the Austrians as the Slovaks had under the Magyars. Hence they were ready to accept the vague promises of the Austrian Emperor that Slavic rights would be recognized and respected. In return, the delegates of the Congress decided to give Austria full support in helping to subdue the Magyars. Futhermore, they adopted a "Manifesto to the European Nations" which called for the following objectives: 1. 2. 3. 4. The freeing of the Slavic people under Turkish rule. That the Magyars acknowledge the rights of the Slovak nation, including the right to its own language. That Croatian autonomy be maintained. That the Slovenians be permitted to possess their land. 23 It would seem then, that the Prague Congress reduced the Panslavic movement to an attempt to reorganize Austria so as to satisfy the nationalism of the Slavs.24 So it must have seemed to Stur, for he felt that the Congress had been a failure. Then too the attempted insurrection in 1848 against the Magyars also failed. Stur was greatly despondent. He had had great faith in the panslavic movement and felt Slavic independence was not an impossible goal. Yet the two expressions of this political panslavism certainly did not succeed. In his despair and disillusionment, Stur concluded that a small nation could not seek its freedom alone, or in the frame of Austroslavism. There was only one alternative left: Russia, for Russia alone of the Slavic nations was powerful enough to lead others to independence. This was the basic idea expressed throughout his book SLavdom and the World of the Future, an exceptional tribute to the cultural, moral, and political forces of the Russian Empire. It also presented a detailed and complete program for the union of Slavs with Russia. Stu.r's book had little impact on his own people. The book was published for the Congress of 1867, when a group of Russians discovered it and translated it. It was the major �SLOVAKIA 111 work studied and examined at the Congress, and was regarded as a complete and perfect program of panrussianism. Stur set out to accomplish four basic tasks in his book. First of all he wished to determine whether the Slavs had a role of their own to fulfill in world history. 25 A close review of the Slavic past ought to yield the answer. Stur of course, was certain of the answer even before he began his examination, for this belief had been the basic reason for the entire panslavic movement. The Slavs were to be the leaders of a "new" Europe. They were at this point in no position to do anything, but history was a progression of spent nations being replaced by young ones, and Slavic emancipation and self-realization would eventually occur. The second task of the book is to describe the Slavic mission in universal history against the background of the cultural difference between Western and Eastern Europe.26 In the west, Stur could see only moral, political, and social dissolution, the ruination of the peasants (true guardians of democracy), and finally the schism between religion and daily life. It was no use looking to the West for salvation, when they were already on the downward path. Nor was there any use in imitating the society and institutions of the West since they were contributing to the very decline of the West. The Western civilization had deteriorated; the Slavs could only look to themselves for help. In the third part Stur presents a highly romantic picture of the Slavic people. The Slavs are people of extraordinary virtue; their only vices were those which had crept in from the influence of the west. The Slavs were naturally good of heart, patient, humble, kind, and democratic. These virtues were the characteristic of all Slavs, but especially the Russians. The Russians were the embodiment of all the best and noble features of the entire Slav nation. Stur had never been in Russia, nor had any prolonged contact with Russians. He based his notion merely on the fact that this had to be logically so, for of the Russians were to be the leaders of the Slavs, they had to be the best among the Slavs. The last section of Slavdom and the World of the Future deals with the problems of Slavic political unification. Unity was an absolute necessity if the Slavs were to achieve their historic mission. But what type of unity? �112 SLOVAKIA There were three possibilities. The first one that he considered was a Slavic Federation without Russia. This he rejected because such a federation could never succeed due to internal dissention among the various Slavic peoples. So union of so many Slavic nations of about equal strength would destroy the possibility of the emergence of a leader. Yet a leader was absolutely necessary if the Slavs were to jointly work for their destiny. A second possibility was the transformation of Austria into a Slavic Empire. Any type of unity with Austria was an illusion that could never gain substance. Attempts at cooperation with Austria had failed once before, and Stur believed Austria was doomed to destruction ; Austroslavism should not even be considered. The only remaining alternative was union with Russia. Russia was powerful enough to unite all the Slavic nations ; she was the leader the Slavs needed . Stur was proud of Russia's vastness and power, but it was a Slavic pride. Should the Slavic peoples unite under Russia, their equal could not be found in all of Europe. This is an amazing document to come from the hands of I..:udovit Stur. And yet, given the circumstances he faced in the 1850's, it is not so hard to understand. Stur's primary goal, for which he had worked all his life, was a Slavic nationalism, a Slavic unity. Austroslavism had failed; there was only one place left to turn: to Russia. Stur did not reject independence for the individual Slavic nations; he was not willing to replace Austrian domination with Russian. He hoped for the creation of a federation of independent Slavic states under Russian leadership, substantially the same as he urged in 1848 under Austrian leadership. Stur's book was greatly praised by the Russian Slavophils, for it was so closely atuned to their ideas. However, the book was an expression of Stur's ideas which he arrived at independently of any noticeable influence from the Russians.27 Stur died in 1856, and hence, having never set foot in Russia, had little contact with the Slavophils. He did carry on a correspondence with several Russians, but not enough to permit the statement that his book was an expression of their views. Stur was interested in panslavism, in unity for �SLOVAKIA 113 all Slavic nations; his interest in Russia came only as a result of this. The Panslavic Movement did not, during Stu.r's time, achieve any notable results. In fact, by the time of his death, the whole movement was pretty much a failure. Panslavism failed because the very nationalism that it promoted led to its defeat. By urging Slavic national consciousness, panslavism created dissent among the various Slav nations. The more the people became aware of their individuality, their historical traditions, and their own language, the less they wanted to sacrifice them for a non-existent Slav federation. Secondly, the centuries-old and traditional antagonism between various Slavic nations, such as Poles and Russians, Czechs and Slovaks, Croatians and Serbians, prevented any success for a plan that would unite them. These two factors prevented Panslavism from exercising any dominant or stable influence on European political thought at that time. Yet Panslavism has an inherent value in that it revealed for the first time to the rest of Europe the Slavic mind. This is especially important in the light of the present role which the Slavs play in Europe. The Prague Congress too, could be regarded as a failure, for there was little change in the situation of the Slavic people after it. But the Prague Congress was the first expression of Slavic unity, of Slavic identity, separate from the Hapsburg rule. As such, it gave the Slavs confidence and a guide for future actions. Slavdom and the World of the Future is relatively unknown, even in the Slavic world. Yet it had a strong influence on Russian thinking in the 1870's and was in fact a forerunner of their program and goals. :Cudovit Stur was the author of political panslavism. He initiated the Prague Congress of 1848, and through his book, spread his influence beyond the confines of the Austrian Empire. He revealed to the West the Slavic mind and the Slavic desires ; he deserves a place in the 19th century intellectual and national thought and doctrine. FOOTNOTES 1. Hans Kohn, Panslavism, Notre Dame University Press, p. 18. 2. Ernest Denis, Les Slovaques, Paris, p. 14. 3. As Jan Kollar, great Slovak poet, stated: "The Tatra Slavs had �SLOVAKIA 114 so far almost no literature of their own, therefore they first opened their arms to embrace all Slavs . . . the Tatra mountains are the nest and cradle of all Slavs. Therefore the idea of solidarity ... took root there faster and deeper than anywhere else." (Kohn, p. 17) 4. Ibid., p. 44. 5. Jozef Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovenska, Slovak Institute, p. 233. 6. Kohn, p. 1. 7. Ibid., 8. It is hard to say why the west was considered to be decadent. Possibly because, after the nationalistic hopes aroused by Napoleon, Europe was successfully forced to return to the status quo ante Napoleon, to the despair of liberals and nationalists. Even with the political panslavism of Stur, the aim was Slavic independence, not Slavic control of Europe in the immediate future. 10. Kirschbaum, Nas boj, p. 231, and Jan Kollar - Slovak Poet of Panslavism, Slavistica, No. 56, Slovak Institute, Cleveland, 0., 1965. 11. Kohn, p. 18. 12. Kirschbaum, p. 235. 13. Ibid. 14. H. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, p. 175, and Kirschbaum, Pavol J. Safarik and His Contribution to Slavic Studies, Slavistica No. 43, Cleveland, 0., 1962. 15. Kohn, p. 62. 16. Marian 2iar, " Stur: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism", Slovakia, Vol. VI, March 1956, Middletown, Pa., p. 9. 17. Zdenek Tobolka, Slovanskii Sjezd v Praze roku 1848, Prague, p. 51. 18. A. Mouset, Le Monde Slave, Paris, p. 14. 9. 19. Karol Galan, " Sturove reci na slovanskom sjazde roku 1848", Slovenske pohl'ady, cislo 8-9, aug.-sept. 1936, p. 422. The difference in the two positions lay mostly in their emphasis; the one put Austria first, the other put the Slavs first. Stur of course, was in favor of the second phraseology. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., p. 423. 22. Jozef Kirschbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, Robert Speller Co., p. 73. 23. Kirschbaum, N<is boj, pp. 247-48. 24. Waclaw Lednicki, "Panslavism". European Ideologies, ed. Felix Gross, New York, p. 869. 25. M. Petrovich, "I:udovit Stur and Russian Panslavism", Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 12, April 1952, p. 6. 26. Ibid., p. 9. �SLOVAKIA 27. 115 Jozef Kirschbaum, "Uudovit Stur and His Place in the Slavic World", Slavistica, No. 32, 1958, Slovak Institute p. 12. BIBLIOGRAPHY Denis, Ernest, La Question d'Autriche Delagrave: Paris) , 1917. Les Slovaques. (Librairie Galan, Karol, "Sturove reci na slovanskom sjazde roku 1848". Slovenske pohi'ady, cislo 8-9, aug.-sept. 1936, Bratislava. Kirschbaum, Jozef, Nas boj o samostatnosf Slovenska. (Slovak Institute: Cleveland, Ohio), 1958. Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. (Robert Speller and Sons Co.: New York), 1960. "Uudovit Stur and His Place in the Slavic World". siavistica No .32, (Slovak Institute: Cleve1and), 1958. Kohn, Hans, Pansfovism. (University of Notre Dame Press: South Bend, Ind.), 1953. Lednicki, Waclaw, "Panslavism" European Ideologies. ed. Feliks Gross (Philosophical Library: New York), 1948. Miku~. Joseph, Slovakia, a Political History . (Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, Wis.), 1963. Mousset, Albert, Le Monde siave. Paris, 1946. Oddo, Gilbert, Slovakia and Its People . (Robert Speller and Sons Co.: New York), 1960. Pauco, Jozef, r.udovychova u sturovcov. Matiea slovenska, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1943. Petrovich, Michael, "Uudovit Stur and Russian Panslavism" Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 12, April, 1952. Seton-Watson, R. H., A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London: 1943. Stur, L'udovit, Listy I?.udovita Stura, ed. Dr. Jozef Ambru~ (Slovenska Akademia Vied: Bratislava), 1956. Tobolka, Zdenek, Slovansky sjezd v Praze roku 1848. (F. Simacek Co.: Prague), 1901. Vlcek, Jaroslav, Dejiny literatury slovenskej (Matica slovenska: Turciansky Sv. Martin), 1923. 2iar, Marian, "Stur: Father of Modem Slovak Nationalism". Slovakia, Vol. VI, March 1956, (Jednota Press: Middletown, Pa.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1966, Vol. 16 Description An account of the resource Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 104 SLOVAKIA UUDOVfT STUR AND THE PANSLAVIC MOVEMENT By Suzanna Mikula, B.A. Slovaks have long recognized the achievements of Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) in promoting Slovak unity, culture, and independence. He is a great national figure, revered as the "Father of Modern Slovak Nationa1ism". Stur was a man of many talents, literary, pedagogical, and political. He was an ardent patriot among people who had been without a nation for a thousand years, a Protestant in an area predominantly Catholic. Stur was also the author of a number of books, poems, and pamphlets, all in a strong patriotic vein. His most famous work even though not the best is Slavdom and the World of the Future, wrUten in the early 1850's in the German language, but not published until 1867 in Russia. Stur's contributions to the Slovak nation are quite known. But what of his place in the history of Slavs at his time? The third, fourth, and fifth decades of the 19th century saw a · tremendous national revival of the Slavic world. This revival led to a Panslavic movement, received enthusiastically by the Slavic world and fearfully by western Europe. Stur had an active role in the Panslavic Movement, and with his work at the Prague Congress of 1848 as well as with his book, Slavdom and the World of the Future, introduced the concept of poHtical panslavism. Slovakia can be called the mother of the Panslavic Movement, for a Slovak writer named John Herkel first used the word "panslavic" in a Latin treatise published in 1826. Furthermore the main leaders and writers of the Panslavic Movement of the 19th century were Slovaks; the poet Jan Kollar and scholar P. J. Safarik may even be regarded as the fathers of Panslavism. 1 The success of panslavism among the Slovaks was due to the fact that the Slovaks occupy the central position (geographically) in the Slavic world. Also since the Slovak language is the purest of the Slavic tongues, they believed they were the original Slav nation. In fact, the Slovaks seem to have some resemblance to nearly all of the Slavic nations, further strengthening the "mother-of-the-Slavs" concept which the Slovaks cherish. Thus it seems that from the heart SLOVAKIA 105 of Slavdom, the Slovaks were chosen to lead the separated brothers. 2 Furthermore, the Slovaks had been dominated by other nations for nearly a thousand years; now the activities of the panslavists gave leadership and direction to the long suppressed desires of the Slovaks for their own nation.3 These factors help explain why Slovakia became "the classic country of the Slavic idea." 4 However, the Panslavic Movement was not limited to Slovakia, but spread throughout the Slavic world, taking deeper root in some areas than in others. There had been an early attempt at achieving some type of Slavic unity in the 17th century. Juraj Krizanic (1618-1683), a Croatian, was a forerunner of Panslavism in that he sought the adoption of a single Slavic language for all Slavic nations. He also advocated agreement to political unity under Russia, but little attention was paid to him.5 The idea of Slavic unity had no success in the 17th century, but by the 19th century, events in Europe offered more hope for its acceptance. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars caused a political awakening of intellectuals in central and Eastern Europe. 6 Jin Austria, the enlightened reigns of Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Leopold II improved the economic and social conditions of the Slav subjects, who now for the first time found opportunity for education and intellectual activity. And finally, the great success and power of Russia offered a shining example to the downtrodden Slavic nations of what a brother nation could achieve. A far greater influence on the intellectual thought leading to Panslavism was linguistic and political Pangermanism, especially as interpreted by Johann Herder. According to Herder, the national language was regarded as a determining factor for men's loyalty. 7 But even more than this, Herder believed, and proclaimed in his writings, that the Slavic race was the future leader of Europe. The decadent8 Romanic and Germanic tribes would of nesessity yield to the peace-loving, moral, and primitively democratic Slavs. He urged them not to abandon their language, but to cultivate it carefully and consistently, for it was a precious g,ift from their fathers. Thus Panslavism rested on the two principles of a common language and a kind nebulous unity created by the existence of a widespread, primitive, but untainted Slavic civilization. 106 SLOVAJOA Panslavism was a sign of the national awakening of central and eastern Europe, and as such its primary emphasis was on language, literature, and culture. Having been subjugated for so many centuries, the Slavic people needed support in formulating a national consciousness, a national vernacular literature, and they sought this support in each other. Panslavism arose at first more as a defensive movement among the western Slavs than as a political movement with the aim of replacing western dominance in Europe. However for many years, even to this day, the word panslavism has a political connotation for the Romance and Germanic nations, implying a belligerent attempt to replace their civilization with the Slavic civilization.!) This connotation was attached to the Panslavic movement from the very beginning, largely because of a slight resemblanc e to a pangerman movement, but also because of the subjugated position of the various Slavic nations. This gave rise to the fear that they would attempt to recover their former independen ce, and thus disturb the surface-peace of Europe. Individual Slavic nations could hardly create a problem for the rest of Europe, except Russia. But once unified, the Slavic race far outnumbered the other two, and could quite possibly overpower them. This fear never materialized. Panslavism , throughout the 19th century, remained the primary concern of poets, newspaper writers, literary scholars, philologists , and historians.10 Unlike western European nations, where national awakening came as a result of the activities of politicians and statesmen, Slavic nationalism was removed from the political plan and situated in the literary field . The panslavic poets and writers expressed, in a period when such feelings were dominant, an optomistic belief in man's inevitable progress, in a great spiritual rejuvenatio n, which would result in the establishme nt of liberty, peace, and happiness.11 The Slavs were far removed from the conflicts of the older nations ; perhaps they were the heralds of this new era? Certainly the Slavic writers offered promises that this was so. The Panslavic movement was also used as a protest against the dominant position of the German and Magyar tongues within the Slavic world. The Slavs used the appeal of ethnograph ic nationality, so much a part of the thinking of this age that it was regarded as a national right, against their two major oppressors. SLOVAKIA 107 There were three stages in the Panslavic movement: literary, scientific, and political, with literary panslavism being the primary and most successful. The Slovak poet Jan Kollar was the spokesman for literary panslavism. His chief goal was the literary and cultural union of Slavic nations. According to Kollar, there is only one Slavic nation, and only one Slavric language. He did not feel that a single political state was necessary, nor even a single spoken language. The various dialects were to be respected, but in literature, only the one common Slavic language should prevail. 12 Kollar was against political union of Slavric nations because he felt agitation for such union would result in disorder and catastrophe for the Slavs. 13 What Kollar hoped to attain was a state of literary reciprocity, whereby the writings of one nation would be the property and treasure of every other Slav nation. Kollar tried to awaken within the Slavs their sense of unity, their glorsious destiny and bright future. He stressed the need of self-recognition and inter-communication, but without any conflicts with existing political structures. Yet in spite of his dislike of political agitation, it was his impassioned and imaginative writing which led the Slavic people to action. Scientific panslavism was chiefly the result of the efforts of Pavel Jozef Safarik, who was the first to pursue a scholarly and systematic study of the background and origins of the Slavic nations and language. He provided the foundation upon which the panslavists might build Slavic unity and destiny, and his work gave authenticity to the poems of Kollar and the writings of Stur. His book Slavic Antiquities became famous throughout Europe, stimu}ating an interest in the early history and culture of the Slav peoples. Safarik may be regarded as the founder of a whole school of scientific writers, and his book had a very direct influence on subsequent developments in the Slav world. 14 His studies of the Slavic languages substantiated the early belief that all the Slavic languages were quite closely related; Safarik provided a rational foundation for the emotional appeal of Kollar. The literary and scientif,ic panslavism of Kollar and Safarik succeeded in creating a strong national spirit among the Slavs, the Czechs and Slovaks in particular. It is only natural that this cry for national unity and for self-recognition should be heard and taken to its logical conclusion, namely 108 SLOVAKIA political panslavism. And this had been done by Uudovit Stur, who saw in which direction panslavism must now go. Literary and cultural unity was not enough. To achieve their glorious destiny, the destiny to which both Kollar and Safari.k alluded, the Slavic peoples had to attain a measure of political unity. There were two paths that political panslavism could follow: Austroslavism, which meant maintaining a form of Austrian political influence, and which Stur advocated at the Prague Congress of 1848, the first great manifestation of Panslavism, and Pan-Russianism, which Stur adopted after the failure of the Prague Congress. The Prague Congress of 1848 was the natural result of the Panslavic movement. It was apparent that a true spirit of panslavism would necessitate a dialog between the Slavs, a dialog not only literary but political as well. Several events which occured in the years 1846-1848 made such a meeting desireable. The Polish uprisings in Galicia and Cracow in 1846, the national agitation in Italy when Cardinal Terretto became Pope, the United Landtag in Prussia, the elections to the Hungarian Diet in 1847, to which Stur was elected, and most immediately, the February, 1848, Revolution in Paris, and the Congress of Germ,an deputies (members of Parliament) in Frankfurt discussing the unification of an Germans, all these events served to stir the Slavic people to action. The spirit of revolution and nationalism was in the arir, dominating the writings and conversations of the year. 15 The Czechs and Slovaks, especially felt that immediate action of some sort was necessary. In Austria, there was the threat of German expansion under the leadership of Prussia. Hungary, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth was pursuing a policy of complete magyarization. The Slovak language was to be suppressed, with Magyar the official language of education and government. It seemed almost paradoxical that the Magyars sought to suppress the national spirit of the Slovaks in order to achieve the same for themselves. Stur saw this paradox, and said in this respect: "Each nation is only one pa1t of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended the best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move itself and educate itself as it sees fit. 16 The time seemed opportune for action on the part of SLOVAKIA 109 the Slavs as well. Stur offered the idea of proclaiming a Slavic Congress, 17 and on May 31, 1848, it was called by Stur and the Czech writers. Prague was chosen for the Congress, and a total of 362 delegates from the various Slavic nations arrived. The delegates were largely from among the Slavs under the Hapsburg rule, but the Poles and Russians also were represented. The avowed objective of the meeting was the establishment of periodic relations between the Slav peoples and the drawing up of a program of action for such peoples subject to Austrian and/ or Hungarian domination. 18 At the Congress Stur offered a program for federalizing Central Europe. In spite of his antagonism to the idea that a non-Slav nation should have any say in the affairs of a Slav nation, he realized that total independence was impossible. The Czechs, being far more realistic than the Slovaks, had realized this, and were consistent supporters of Austroslavism. Thus at the conference the problem narrowed down to a definition of terms: the objective of the Congress was either to save Austria, for with her lay the best chances of maintaining Slavic identity, or the primary concern were the needs of the Slavic people living under Austria. 19 Stur passionately declared at the Congress: Our aim should be to save ourselves, not to save Austria. First we must work for ourselves, then for others. Thus far Austria has been existing but we have been perishing. What wo.u ld the world say to us if we stood for nothing but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slavonic communities under the government of Austria . . . this will give our work a Slavonic accent.20 Stur felt the program of the congress should be: (1) the creation of independent Slavic united states within Austria, and (2) prompt agreement to this, so that the Austrian armies might destroy Magyar encroachments into Slovakia. 21 Stur could not place enough stress on the need for Slavic independence: "So that we might take over the spot in history which belongs to us according to our strength and abilities, we must once and for all time free ourselves from this unbearable foreign thraldom and gain state independence for ourselves." 22 Stur fully understood the necessity of remaining within the Austrian framework. But his Austroslavism was very 110 SLOVAKIA tepid, and he carefully pointed out that it (Austroslavism) existed only because of sheer necessity. Stur made no attempt to hide his distrust of Austria and his distaste with certain features of the regime. It was otherwise with the Czechs. They had not suffered the same suppressions under the Austrians as the Slovaks had under the Magyars. Hence they were ready to accept the vague promises of the Austrian Emperor that Slavic rights would be recognized and respected. In return, the delegates of the Congress decided to give Austria full support in helping to subdue the Magyars. Futhermore, they adopted a "Manifesto to the European Nations" which called for the following objectives: 1. 2. 3. 4. The freeing of the Slavic people under Turkish rule. That the Magyars acknowledge the rights of the Slovak nation, including the right to its own language. That Croatian autonomy be maintained. That the Slovenians be permitted to possess their land. 23 It would seem then, that the Prague Congress reduced the Panslavic movement to an attempt to reorganize Austria so as to satisfy the nationalism of the Slavs.24 So it must have seemed to Stur, for he felt that the Congress had been a failure. Then too the attempted insurrection in 1848 against the Magyars also failed. Stur was greatly despondent. He had had great faith in the panslavic movement and felt Slavic independence was not an impossible goal. Yet the two expressions of this political panslavism certainly did not succeed. In his despair and disillusionment, Stur concluded that a small nation could not seek its freedom alone, or in the frame of Austroslavism. There was only one alternative left: Russia, for Russia alone of the Slavic nations was powerful enough to lead others to independence. This was the basic idea expressed throughout his book SLavdom and the World of the Future, an exceptional tribute to the cultural, moral, and political forces of the Russian Empire. It also presented a detailed and complete program for the union of Slavs with Russia. Stu.r's book had little impact on his own people. The book was published for the Congress of 1867, when a group of Russians discovered it and translated it. It was the major SLOVAKIA 111 work studied and examined at the Congress, and was regarded as a complete and perfect program of panrussianism. Stur set out to accomplish four basic tasks in his book. First of all he wished to determine whether the Slavs had a role of their own to fulfill in world history. 25 A close review of the Slavic past ought to yield the answer. Stur of course, was certain of the answer even before he began his examination, for this belief had been the basic reason for the entire panslavic movement. The Slavs were to be the leaders of a "new" Europe. They were at this point in no position to do anything, but history was a progression of spent nations being replaced by young ones, and Slavic emancipation and self-realization would eventually occur. The second task of the book is to describe the Slavic mission in universal history against the background of the cultural difference between Western and Eastern Europe.26 In the west, Stur could see only moral, political, and social dissolution, the ruination of the peasants (true guardians of democracy), and finally the schism between religion and daily life. It was no use looking to the West for salvation, when they were already on the downward path. Nor was there any use in imitating the society and institutions of the West since they were contributing to the very decline of the West. The Western civilization had deteriorated; the Slavs could only look to themselves for help. In the third part Stur presents a highly romantic picture of the Slavic people. The Slavs are people of extraordinary virtue; their only vices were those which had crept in from the influence of the west. The Slavs were naturally good of heart, patient, humble, kind, and democratic. These virtues were the characteristic of all Slavs, but especially the Russians. The Russians were the embodiment of all the best and noble features of the entire Slav nation. Stur had never been in Russia, nor had any prolonged contact with Russians. He based his notion merely on the fact that this had to be logically so, for of the Russians were to be the leaders of the Slavs, they had to be the best among the Slavs. The last section of Slavdom and the World of the Future deals with the problems of Slavic political unification. Unity was an absolute necessity if the Slavs were to achieve their historic mission. But what type of unity? 112 SLOVAKIA There were three possibilities. The first one that he considered was a Slavic Federation without Russia. This he rejected because such a federation could never succeed due to internal dissention among the various Slavic peoples. So union of so many Slavic nations of about equal strength would destroy the possibility of the emergence of a leader. Yet a leader was absolutely necessary if the Slavs were to jointly work for their destiny. A second possibility was the transformation of Austria into a Slavic Empire. Any type of unity with Austria was an illusion that could never gain substance. Attempts at cooperation with Austria had failed once before, and Stur believed Austria was doomed to destruction ; Austroslavism should not even be considered. The only remaining alternative was union with Russia. Russia was powerful enough to unite all the Slavic nations ; she was the leader the Slavs needed . Stur was proud of Russia's vastness and power, but it was a Slavic pride. Should the Slavic peoples unite under Russia, their equal could not be found in all of Europe. This is an amazing document to come from the hands of I..:udovit Stur. And yet, given the circumstances he faced in the 1850's, it is not so hard to understand. Stur's primary goal, for which he had worked all his life, was a Slavic nationalism, a Slavic unity. Austroslavism had failed; there was only one place left to turn: to Russia. Stur did not reject independence for the individual Slavic nations; he was not willing to replace Austrian domination with Russian. He hoped for the creation of a federation of independent Slavic states under Russian leadership, substantially the same as he urged in 1848 under Austrian leadership. Stur's book was greatly praised by the Russian Slavophils, for it was so closely atuned to their ideas. However, the book was an expression of Stur's ideas which he arrived at independently of any noticeable influence from the Russians.27 Stur died in 1856, and hence, having never set foot in Russia, had little contact with the Slavophils. He did carry on a correspondence with several Russians, but not enough to permit the statement that his book was an expression of their views. Stur was interested in panslavism, in unity for SLOVAKIA 113 all Slavic nations; his interest in Russia came only as a result of this. The Panslavic Movement did not, during Stu.r's time, achieve any notable results. In fact, by the time of his death, the whole movement was pretty much a failure. Panslavism failed because the very nationalism that it promoted led to its defeat. By urging Slavic national consciousness, panslavism created dissent among the various Slav nations. The more the people became aware of their individuality, their historical traditions, and their own language, the less they wanted to sacrifice them for a non-existent Slav federation. Secondly, the centuries-old and traditional antagonism between various Slavic nations, such as Poles and Russians, Czechs and Slovaks, Croatians and Serbians, prevented any success for a plan that would unite them. These two factors prevented Panslavism from exercising any dominant or stable influence on European political thought at that time. Yet Panslavism has an inherent value in that it revealed for the first time to the rest of Europe the Slavic mind. This is especially important in the light of the present role which the Slavs play in Europe. The Prague Congress too, could be regarded as a failure, for there was little change in the situation of the Slavic people after it. But the Prague Congress was the first expression of Slavic unity, of Slavic identity, separate from the Hapsburg rule. As such, it gave the Slavs confidence and a guide for future actions. Slavdom and the World of the Future is relatively unknown, even in the Slavic world. Yet it had a strong influence on Russian thinking in the 1870's and was in fact a forerunner of their program and goals. :Cudovit Stur was the author of political panslavism. He initiated the Prague Congress of 1848, and through his book, spread his influence beyond the confines of the Austrian Empire. He revealed to the West the Slavic mind and the Slavic desires ; he deserves a place in the 19th century intellectual and national thought and doctrine. FOOTNOTES 1. Hans Kohn, Panslavism, Notre Dame University Press, p. 18. 2. Ernest Denis, Les Slovaques, Paris, p. 14. 3. As Jan Kollar, great Slovak poet, stated: "The Tatra Slavs had SLOVAKIA 114 so far almost no literature of their own, therefore they first opened their arms to embrace all Slavs . . . the Tatra mountains are the nest and cradle of all Slavs. Therefore the idea of solidarity ... took root there faster and deeper than anywhere else." (Kohn, p. 17) 4. Ibid., p. 44. 5. Jozef Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovenska, Slovak Institute, p. 233. 6. Kohn, p. 1. 7. Ibid., 8. It is hard to say why the west was considered to be decadent. Possibly because, after the nationalistic hopes aroused by Napoleon, Europe was successfully forced to return to the status quo ante Napoleon, to the despair of liberals and nationalists. Even with the political panslavism of Stur, the aim was Slavic independence, not Slavic control of Europe in the immediate future. 10. Kirschbaum, Nas boj, p. 231, and Jan Kollar - Slovak Poet of Panslavism, Slavistica, No. 56, Slovak Institute, Cleveland, 0., 1965. 11. Kohn, p. 18. 12. Kirschbaum, p. 235. 13. Ibid. 14. H. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, p. 175, and Kirschbaum, Pavol J. Safarik and His Contribution to Slavic Studies, Slavistica No. 43, Cleveland, 0., 1962. 15. Kohn, p. 62. 16. Marian 2iar, " Stur: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism", Slovakia, Vol. VI, March 1956, Middletown, Pa., p. 9. 17. Zdenek Tobolka, Slovanskii Sjezd v Praze roku 1848, Prague, p. 51. 18. A. Mouset, Le Monde Slave, Paris, p. 14. 9. 19. Karol Galan, " Sturove reci na slovanskom sjazde roku 1848", Slovenske pohl'ady, cislo 8-9, aug.-sept. 1936, p. 422. The difference in the two positions lay mostly in their emphasis; the one put Austria first, the other put the Slavs first. Stur of course, was in favor of the second phraseology. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., p. 423. 22. Jozef Kirschbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, Robert Speller Co., p. 73. 23. Kirschbaum, N<is boj, pp. 247-48. 24. Waclaw Lednicki, "Panslavism". European Ideologies, ed. Felix Gross, New York, p. 869. 25. M. Petrovich, "I:udovit Stur and Russian Panslavism", Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 12, April 1952, p. 6. 26. Ibid., p. 9. SLOVAKIA 27. 115 Jozef Kirschbaum, "Uudovit Stur and His Place in the Slavic World", Slavistica, No. 32, 1958, Slovak Institute p. 12. BIBLIOGRAPHY Denis, Ernest, La Question d'Autriche Delagrave: Paris) , 1917. Les Slovaques. (Librairie Galan, Karol, "Sturove reci na slovanskom sjazde roku 1848". Slovenske pohi'ady, cislo 8-9, aug.-sept. 1936, Bratislava. Kirschbaum, Jozef, Nas boj o samostatnosf Slovenska. (Slovak Institute: Cleveland, Ohio), 1958. Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. (Robert Speller and Sons Co.: New York), 1960. "Uudovit Stur and His Place in the Slavic World". siavistica No .32, (Slovak Institute: Cleve1and), 1958. Kohn, Hans, Pansfovism. (University of Notre Dame Press: South Bend, Ind.), 1953. Lednicki, Waclaw, "Panslavism" European Ideologies. ed. Feliks Gross (Philosophical Library: New York), 1948. Miku~. Joseph, Slovakia, a Political History . (Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, Wis.), 1963. Mousset, Albert, Le Monde siave. Paris, 1946. Oddo, Gilbert, Slovakia and Its People . (Robert Speller and Sons Co.: New York), 1960. Pauco, Jozef, r.udovychova u sturovcov. Matiea slovenska, Turc. Sv. Martin, 1943. Petrovich, Michael, "Uudovit Stur and Russian Panslavism" Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 12, April, 1952. Seton-Watson, R. H., A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London: 1943. Stur, L'udovit, Listy I?.udovita Stura, ed. Dr. Jozef Ambru~ (Slovenska Akademia Vied: Bratislava), 1956. Tobolka, Zdenek, Slovansky sjezd v Praze roku 1848. (F. Simacek Co.: Prague), 1901. Vlcek, Jaroslav, Dejiny literatury slovenskej (Matica slovenska: Turciansky Sv. Martin), 1923. 2iar, Marian, "Stur: Father of Modem Slovak Nationalism". Slovakia, Vol. VI, March 1956, (Jednota Press: Middletown, Pa.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Ľudovít Štúr and the Panslavic Movement Description An account of the resource Suzanna Mikula, B.A. Slovakia, Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966 pp. 104-115 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikula, Suzanna Maria, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/56d04b1b183ad87ba1111fba4989ab07.pdf fc1dae71100e15a9b672c29140f57429 PDF Text Text 78 SLOVAKIA Relations Between Slovaks and Czechs in the First CSR SUSAN MIKULA At this particular point in the history of the Czechs and Slovaks, the question of the nature of the relationship between these two nations has assumed a renewed significance and interest. The disintegration of the common state which had existed for 74 years is often presented in the popular press as the result of Slovak backwardness, provincialism, undemocratic tendencies, vestiges of communist influence; in short as anything but the consequence of a long historical process. There has in fact been a persistent tendency throughout much of the 20th century, whether by popular writers or even some professional scholars, to view Slovak demands for structural changes in their relationship with the Czechs along much the same lines, that is as reflective of fascist or communist extremists, of political, economic or cultural immaturity, or of a destructive opportunism. The prime reason for such tendencies may be that the prism through which the "Slovak problem" has often been viewed is the Czech or Czechoslovak. In other words, there are certain a priori assumptions being made about the nature of the problem which affect the analysis of the problem. One such tendency is to see it as just that, a Slovak problem, that is, as a problem between two competing Slovak factions, rather than as a problem between Czechs and Slovaks. The consequence of that has been the tendency to dismiss the problem and then be repeatedly surprised and dismayed when the central nature of the issues resurfaced and influenced the �SLOVAKIA 79 entire state and people. Another tendency is to identify the Slovak nationalist aspirations in the First Czechoslovak Republic (CSR) with the extreme nationalist movements of the inter-war era, that is with fascism. The problem thus becomes reduced to the analysis of Andrej Hlinka and the Slovak People's Party, which is designated as a clerical-fascist movement. The problem is then still a Slovak problem - the authoritarian tendencies of a huge segment of the Slovak population - and also an external one - the broad movement of European fascism. The difficulty comes with trying to account for the persistence of the Slovak national aspirations, long after the dismantling and systematic discrediting of the Slovak Republic. Here the notion of backwardness (economic and political) and immaturity (political and cultural) assumes a satisfactory explanatory character. What has been common in the great majority of these analyses, written mostly from the Czechoslovak perspective, is this notion that it is the Slovak's problem . On the other hand, the few works written from the Slovak perspective , at least until very recently , have tended to veer in the opposite direction, to view it as strictly a Czech problem, that is as the result of a systematic and deliberate policy of Czechoslovakization (analogous to Magyarization). This tendency has likewise but limited value. The Czech/Slovak problem has, rather, been a structural, historical problem, especially in the First Republic. With the creation of that state an attempt was made to apply an undifferentiated model of the nation-state to a society in which a number of nations were undergoing the process of national self-actualization accelerated beyond previous historical experience. The attempt to establish a unitary nation-state comprised of a hastily constructed nation (Czechoslovak) was thus flying in the face of the very process which had led to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire and which had precisely allowed for the possibility of self-determination for the various nations of the empire. From this perspective, the problem ceases to be a Czech or Slovak problem and becomes a problem of �80 SLOVAKIA the very idea of the Czechoslovak state as it emerged by 1920.19 The unitary, power-based political structure (mocensko-politicky system)20 of the First Republic could not satisfy the needs of the Slovaks without significant revision. However the very real successes and achievements of that state, especially for the Czechs, meant that the need for revision met with incomprehension and therefore indifference and then resistance. An examination of some critical economic and political issues affecting the Slovaks illustrates the fundamental nature of the problem for the Czechoslovak republic. To do so, certain inescapable realities must be recognized. The first is that the economic conditions of the Czech and Slovak lands were vastly different at the very onset of the Republic. A further inescapable reality is that that differences persisted throughout the First Republic and in fact deepened. A third inescapable reality is that l 9 A recent example in Western scholarship which looks at how the structure of the state related to the national struggle of the Slovaks is Carol Skalnik Leff's book , National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, Princeton University Press, I 988 . The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Science (Historicky ustav SA V) has just published the papers from the symposium held November, 1991 entitled Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, Bratislava, Historicky ustav , 1992. Here both Czech and Slovak scholars examined the political and structural aspects of the Slovak position in the First Republic; most of them have taken a hard look at the system itself. In that vein, some of the recent writings by Czech scholars, such as Vojtech Mencl a kollectiv, Krizovatky 20. stoleti, Prague, Na~e Vojsko, 1990; Petr Pithart Dejiny a politika , Prague, Prostor , 1990; and Zdenek Pinc "The Idea of the Czechoslovak State: History, Theory and Political Reality" in Czechoslovak and Central European Journal, Vol. 10, no . I, 1991, pp. 36-45 have also taken a more critical approach to the analysis of the political system of the First Republic . There are a variety of viewpoints here and not all agree with the notion that the very structure of the First Republic, namely that of a unitary nation-state, almost certainly precluded a satisfactory resolution of conflicting national aspirations, but all recognize that at issue was much more than competing Slovak factions or Slovak immaturity. On a related subject, the theoretical and methodological approach used by Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984, is very useful. 20 Josef Harna uses that term to characterize the operational structure of the First Republic . See Politickf system a statni politika v prvnfch Jetech existence Ceskoslo venske republiky (1918-1923), Praha, Historicky ustav, 1990. �SLOVAKIA 81 these circumstances were at the root of Slovak grievances and frustrations, which came to be shared by nearly all Slovaks, irrespective of their political beliefs. The initial differences between the two arose from their historical conditions, and are well known. While due to some degree to natural environmental factors (resources, terrain, geophysical placement) they are also the result of differing economic and political policies and interests on the part of the Austrians and the Magyars. While the Czechs had become the industrial nucleus of the Habsburg Empire and were well advanced in industrialization and urbanization by the latter decades of the 19th century, Slovak industrialization was at that time at its beginning stages. The Slovaks did have an analogous position within the Hungarian kingdom, designated to become industrially active for that sector of the Empire, but this was in its infancy stage when compared to the Czechs. Thus the creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918 joined together two very different economic regions. The effects of that union were also very different. While the Czech Lands continued to develop, after some initial adjustments, at least until the Great Depression, Slovakia stagnated throughout the entire period in almost every category of economic activity. 21 In attempting to explain this fact, one has to recognize that there was little if any economic planning prior to the establishment of the First Republic. In the immediate postwar period, Slovaks recognized the need for economic development and submitted plans and requests to Prague. However, their weak political representation in the crucial first years, the liquidation of the Slovak National Council, which left a leadership vacuum in Slovakia, and the small number of economic leaders in Slovakia all meant that these early efforts were without success. Equally powerless in the realm of economics were the Ministry of Unification of Laws and the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. The structure of the system did not allow for conside21 For an analysis of the Slovak economic situation in the First Republic , see the works of Miroslav Fabricius, Hospodarsky vjvoj Slovenska do konca predmnfchovskej republiky, 1987, no. 75 and Vjvoj nazorov na postavenie ekonomiky Sloven ska v prednmfchovskej republike, Bratislava, Eckonomicky ustav SAV , I 990, no. 79. �82 SLOVAKIA ration of Slovakia's economic development; it was rather submerged into the whole. In fact, the strongest protests over the restructuring of the historic counties came from those county boards most concerned with economic issues. Economic policy in the new republic was highly centralized, as was the political system. Prague was the political and economic center where all the offices and organs were located. Slovakia was not viewed as one of the two integrating units, but rather as a region to be appended to the Historic Lands.22 If there was any recognition of Slovakia's role in the economy as a distinct sector, it was to serve as the agricultural sector, to insure the agrarian self-sufficiency of the state. This theory of an "agrarian Slovakia" was the cornerstone of economic policy in the 1920's, in particular within the Agrarian Party, where political considerations played a part. Slovak Agrarian politicians also supported this notion, although by the end of the 1920's even Milan Hodfa recognized the need to bring industry to Slovakia.23 It was difficult to overcome this notion that the agrarian character of Slovakia was both natural and desirable, even while it was recognized that industrialization was essential to economic development in other areas of East Europe and also that there were actually less than optimal conditions for agriculture in Slovakia. This was especially unfortunate because there was plenty of available evidence which pointed to the social and economic inequality of the two halves of the state and their undesirable social and political consequences. The chief reason for failing to address this problem was the commitment to a laissez-faire policy of economic development. It was argued that to target Slovakia for special investment and\or development would create a dualistic policy while there existed a unitary society. In fact, 22 Vlastislav Lacina, "Uloha hospodai'ske politiky pri vytvlii'enf nove ceskoslovenske ekonomiky 1918-1923" in Politicky system a statni politika v prvnich Jetech existence Ceskoslovenske republiky, p. 86. 23 A summary of this debate about agrarian versus industrial Slovakia is to be found in Fabricius, Vyvoj nazorov na posta venie ekonomiky Slovenska v predmnfchovskej republike . �SLOVAKIA 83 economic dualism already existed and persisted and the failure to deal with it had enormous consequences for both people. Nor did Czechoslovakia actually pursue a laissez-faire economic policy, especially in the first years of the Republic. Rather what occurred was a failure to recognize the special Slovak economic needs, within the context of Slovakia rather than the context of the whole state. As a result the Slovak economy stagnated, with social, economic and political consequences. Evidence of this economic dualism can be found in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. In agriculture, between 19191927, for instance, 87,263 hectares of land in the Czech region underwent improvement while in Slovakia it amounted to 9,323 hectares or 9.6% of the total land improved . The division of investment costs for rural modernization were 95 .1 % to the Czech lands and 4.3% to Slovakia.2 4 Another indicator of the disparity was the rate of rural electrification; in 1933 , for example 125 villages were joined to the electrical network in the Czech lands, 112 in Moravia and Silesia and only 9 in Slovakia. Altogether only 1.9% of agricultural enterprises were electrified in Slovakia compared to 31.7% in Czech lands and 25.2% in Moravia.25 As a consequence, throughout the 1920 1s, Slovak agriculture remained essentially stagnant and less productive and in the 19301s the world agricultural crisis had a greater adverse effect on the Slovaks. In the industrial sector there was a whole battery of problems, so much so that it was referred to as the 11 complex of Slovak industrial woes (komplex bolesti slovenskeho priemyslu)" _26 The restructuring of Slovak industry during the period 19191921 led to an emphasis on the production of consumable (primary) goods, so that the percentage of activity devoted to producing export oriented goods declined. In spite of the fact that Slovakia needed greater modernization and improvement in its economic situation, the 24 Fabricius, Hospodarsky vyvoj S/ovenska do konca predmnichovskej republiky, p. 47 . 25 Jbid. , p. 64. 26 Ibid., p. 52. �84 SLOVAKIA pace of improvement here too was slower than in the Czech Lands. In fact, when in 1921-23 industrial output fell by 30%, some even began to talk about a policy of de-industrialization (odburavanie priemyslu). This was not quite the case but it did ring true for heavy industry; between 1918 and 1932, 260 enterprises were dismantled; by 1937 this had reached another 680 _2 7 Another severe problem was the lack of capital investment; the Czech bourgeoisie invested in existing Slovak firms, not in new ones and those listed in statistics as new were in fact results of transfer of capital and ownership. This process (nostrifikacia) was the road by which Czech capital was able to entrench itself in key positions , especially in banking, industry and marketing. 28 By 1930, after a 10 year period of the integration process, Slovakia was more clearly agrarian in character than before. The Slovak industrial labor share was at 19 .4% while Czech industrial labor rate reached 42.1 % . In the mid-1930's there was a brief spurt of "re-industrialization" in Slovakia, largely in defenserelated industries (perhaps to move them eastward, away from the German border), but even with this , at the end of the First Republic there was still a relative 6% decrease of industrial employment in Slovakia. The percentage of Slovaks in the total industrial employment in Czechoslovakia did not rise above 8% during the entire period. 29 Over the twenty year existence of the First Republic, Slovak economic development consistently lagged behind that of the Czechs, producing a highly developed sense of economic grievance among Slovaks of all political persuasions, including the centrists. On the issue of the economy there existed near unanimity of opinion among the Slovaks. The inability of the Slovaks, however, to effect significant changes in the economic policies and expenditures of the 27 Mencl , p. 143. 28 see Fabricius, Hospodarsky vyvoj S/ovenska do konca predmnfchovskej repub liky, pp . 40-56 and Lacina, pp . 87 and passim for a discusstion of Czech fin ancial investment policies in Slovakia. 29 Radoslav Selucky, "The Economic Equalization of Slovakia with the Czech Lands ", East European Economics, 4/1965, pp . 42-59. �SLOVAKIA 85 central government served to make manifest the structural impediments to full Slovak self-fulfillment within the framework of the unitary Czechoslovak republic. The result was frustration and alienation, both in the economic and the political sphere. In the political sphere, one could almost say that the very decision to create an unitary state of the "Czechoslovak" nation created an untenable situation. Even the most cursory examination of the process by which the unitary state was formed and the structure through which it functioned reveals that the system itself contributed to the erosion of the viability of the unitary Czechoslovak state. The prevailing opinions have generally been that this decision was necessary and beneficial: necessary because of the international situation, the Wilsonian commitment to national self-determination and above all by the fact that the Germans constituted the second largest national group in the new state. And it was beneficial because by that process the Slovaks became a state people rather than a national minority. The assumption therefore is that an unitary state structure was in response to these factors, and not a political decision by the Czech leadership, less a political opportunity but rather an historical necessity. What is generally glossed over is that until almost the very end of the peace process, the dualistic principle was a very real option, that is Czecho-Slovakia, as indicated by the use of the hyphen until 1920 _30 What decided the issue was not Wilsonian expectations but the military turmoil in Slovakia, necessitating occupation and creating fears for the safety of the whole republic . The structure of the state was influenced as much by some short-term problems which could have been resolved in several ways as by broad historical forces . Nor was the decision made because Slovaks were unprepared or disinterested in the structure of the new state. From the time that the Slovak League of America was empowered to negotiate for the Slovaks (Martin Memorandum, 1906) to the Pittsburgh Agreement to the various plans and statements made by Slovak leaders 30 see Joseph Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslo vakia , Boulder, East European Monographs , 1986. �86 SLOVAKIA throughout 1918, it was clear the Slovaks were formulating concepts about their relationship with the Czechs. Examination of the meetings, speeches, correspondence of Slovak leaders, especially in 1918 reveals wide-ranging discussions about the anticipated relationship; autonomy was perhaps the most consistent expectation. For example, Matus Dula wrote on November 23, 1918: "when I discussed our autonomy with responsible [rozhodnymi] Czech leaders, they attested that Slovaks would get full autonomy autonomous rights would fall under the competency of the regional diet." 31 It is clear that in 1918 Slovaks were willing to join their sovereignty with that of the Czechs as partners in a new state, because that afforded them the best opportunity for political emancipation; what they were not expecting to do was to blend and blur their hardfought national identity. The decision to postulate a "Czechoslovak nation" was not made by Slovak political representatives, and these did exist, as did political parties, nor by any electoral process, but rather by a very small group of appointed politicians not very representative of the political, economic, social and cultural spectrum of Slovakia.32 There is no question that conditions were such that it did not appear that reasoned debates and consensus building were luxuries which could be afforded. What needs to be understood however is that decisions were made due to very specific historical events which led to the choice of certain options, which were not necessarily the optimal or sole options and which therefore could 31 Milan Krajcovic, "Slovensko v zahranicnopolitickych suvislostiach 1918-1922", in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, p. 148 . See also the article by Vladimir Zuberec, "Vyznamny dokument o postaveni Slovenska za burfoaznej CSR v zbierkach Slovenskeho Narodneho Muzea" in Zbornik Slovenskeho Narodneho Muzea, LXXXIII , 1989, pp. 201-207 . 32 r:ubomir Liptak points out that there were 10,000 people with, if not political experience, certainly with experience in a variety of organizations and public life. And while the number of Slovak schools had dramatically declined , the number of Slovak students had gone up; these could all be acclimated quickly to the new Slovak reality . See "Pripravenosi Slovenska na demokraciu" in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, pp. 7-12. �SLOVAKIA 87 have been readdressed as the situation changed. An underlying element in the creation of the new state was the notion that the year 1918 was the year zero - a new beginning with a clean slate. The failure to recognize and internalize the fundamentally different historical experiences and character of the two people, to recognize that in fact two separate nations existed, not branches of one nation, and that these two had differing notions about both the nature of their new relationship and its state structure influenced the subsequent development of the state as well as the two peoples. As Josef Hama points out "On the Czech side there was not the willingness to understand the differences; on the Slovak side there was impatience and anxiety arising from the feeling of powerlessness to achieve their objectives. Czechoslovakia was formed from the prevailing weight of the Czechs as a unitary state with significant characteristics of centralism." _33 The construct of the unitary state, and the method of ratification of the constitution, meant that there was no national debate and therefore no national consensus on the very definition of the nation state . In the formative period, the hyphenated form, suggesting a state of the Czechs and Slovaks, often was used interchangeably with the Czechoslovak. The definitive proclamation in the Constitution that the "Czechoslovak nation" was the creator of the state and "Czechoslovak" the language of the state created the situation in which those large numbers of Slovaks who resisted the label Czechoslovak were forced into opposition not just against the policies of the state, a normal aspect of parliamentary systems, but against the very nature of the state itself, a position the Slovaks initially had no desire to take and in fact until the very end of the republic sought to avoid. As a consequence the fiction of the single Czechoslovak nation was assumed to be the selfevident principle on which relations between Czechs and Slovaks were based. From the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of Czech politicians, therefore, neither Slovak autonomy nor the federalization of the state on the basis of the national principle was deemed to be at all 33 Harna, p. 14. �88 SLOVAKIA necessary. This attitude prevailed even as the very construct "two branches of the Czechoslovak nation" would seem to demand the necessity of constitutional elaboration and resolution of the individuality contained within the notion of two branches _34 Once the decision was made to create a unitary state, the opportunities for initiating and implementing Slovak policies and political objectives were circumscribed at best, both by the structure of the state system, the political party structure and to an extent the Slovak political forms. The peculiar structure of the party system meant that opposition parties had no realistic chance of modifying the system. The frustration that results from the perceived inability to influence the system in any way often leads to radicalism and this was certainly the case in Czechoslovakia. The power politics party system in the interwar republic proved to be remarkably stable, even though it was a multi-party system in which significant groups were polarized. Stability was achieved at a price, namely the diminution of the role of Parliament and the enhancement of the power of the President and of the government forming coalition parties. A further price was the perception that these centrist parties (generally known as the Petka) had to achieve a consensus and cohesiveness in the face of the fundamental divergence of views from the outsider parties. Hence opposition becomes not something to be tolerated and contested, but something threatening and destabilizing. In effect, the coalition parties could not afford the luxury of opposition; aware of the differences in the state, they felt compelled to focus on retaining and centralizing power. The political cabinet of party leaders essentially overshadowed the ministerial cabinet and tended to make of Parliament a virtual rubber stamp, at least for deputies from the governing parties. What that meant in practice was that the system was impervious to any fundamental change through the normal parliamentary 34M. Matula, "Nektere problemy souvisejfci s institucionalnfm aspektem narodnfc h vztahu CSR v letech 1918-1938" in Slovensko v politickom syst6me Ceskoslovenska, p. 91 . �SLOVAKIA 89 process. What ensued then was the belief that the structure itself had to be modified if any real political power was to develop among the Slovaks. As one historian writes: The issue was not really whether or not the Slovaks achieved immediate autonomy but the Jack of understanding and the unwillingness of the Czech parties even to recognize the problem. Thus the spokesmen for the Slovak position were pushed into opposition and progressively forced into a negative stance relative to the existing regime.3 5 Illustrative of the unwillingness even to address the question of constitutional organization was the fate of administrative reconstruction. The County Law of 1920 was designed to integrate Slovakia into the new state by creating a new county structure to replace the old. What especially generated protests by Slovak administrators was that financial control at the county level was taken over by the central Ministries oflnterior and Finance. During 1921-22, several proposals were made in Parliament to address these Slovak concerns. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP) called for selfadministration in Slovak affairs, a provincial Diet and a provincial government named by the President. There were also other variants, some more radical, of Slovak autonomy. Hodza, who at this time was still looking for a means of unifying Slovak political power, suggested a County Union with competencies in health, welfare, economic and cultural spheres precisely to shift administrative power in Slovakia out of Prague's bureaucratic hands and into Slovak political hands. The debate on these issues in the ministerial circles in Prague revealed a reluctance to delegate any real powers, even to a body like the County Union. The only concessions to be made were delegating powers addressing the needs of the feeble-minded, blind, deaf, epileptic, supervising forced labor and the poorhouses .36 35 Hama, p. 19. 36 For an analysis of the debate over the administration of Slovakia, see Natalia Krajcovicovli , "Politicke strany na Slovensku a usilie o samosprlivu v dvadsiatich rokoch" in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, pp . 47-55 . See also Ladislav Lipscher, K vyvinu politickej spravy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1938, Bratislava, SA V, 1966. �90 SLOVAKIA The political concerns behind such positions were evident, as expressed in the magazine Tribuna: "It is certain that a County Union in Slovakia would be a constant threat to the unity of the state. Who can guarantee that it would not give birth to some kind of autonomous Diet for Slovakia?"3 7 The result was that the administrative structure for Slovakia was extraordinarily limited, always under the strict supervision of Prague. Slovaks lost even a modicum of local autonomy, under a system which was not implemented in the rest of the country precisely because the example of centralized power as manifested in Slovakia aroused local opposition in Bohemia and Moravia. The anomaly could not be sustained and in 1927 the Provincial Law replaced the county system with the four historic provinces. While this acknowledged the territorial existence of Slovakia as an entity, little was done to give that entity any real administrative powers. The failure of these administrative efforts indicated that no serious attempt would be made to bring about a measure of decentralization of government. Problems of special significance to the Slovaks, such as the economic imbalance, the lower standard of living, the dearth of jobs for the growing numbers of university trained younger leaders, the preservation of religious and cultural values were thus not addressed regionally, but left to the central government in Prague, where Slovak power was minimal at best. It could be argued, and often has been, that the lack of Slovak power was more the result of the divisions among the Slovaks themselves than of the unitary and centralized nature of the system. The inability of the Slovaks to form a cohesive bloc was a factor, but not a decisive factor, for as long as even one Slovak was found who would enter the government in the name of the Slovaks (and in fact three, namely Vavro Srobar, Ivan Derer, Hod:fa, were all that were basically necessary during the First Republic) and while coalition parties could attract a Slovak following, (and two did), the power of the coalition bloc would outweigh any Slovak bloc. The ambiguity about the nature of the Czech-Slovak problem would however have 37Krajfovicovii, p. 51. �SLOVAKIA 91 been clarified had the Slovaks achieved a Slovak party. Hod:fa and others recognized this and an attempt was made to form a National Bloc or even a Political Committee (which Hod:fa tried) which would have functioned in a manner analogous to the Petka. This failed because of the inability to achieve a uniform stand on the question of the Slovak position in the state and also to a diversity of views on some specific issues, a problem partially attributable to confessional differences. There did exist a basic consensus on general principles; only a few Slovaks were convinced Czechoslovaks. Unfortunately it was precisely these few who were able to join the government in Prague and were thus considered to represent the Slovaks. There was in fact a fundamental unity among the Slovak populace: a rejection of ethnic and linguistic Czechoslovakism, a commitment to the Czechoslovak state, albeit a reformed one, and a recognition of the pluralistic nature of the state and society. If there was division among the Slovaks, it came on the question of how, not whether, to reform the state: regionalism or autonomy. The Slovak Agrarians, under Hod:fa's leadership, were centrist in that they worked within the system to bring about a modification of some of the system, but especially in the 1930's were also advocates of regionalism. Hodfa came to advocate an intermediary notion, looking at it from a pragmatic perspective, which "means neither centralism nor autonomy, but state-political unity and regionalism with administrative self-government" .38 Hodfa was trying to find a bridge between two ever diverging assessments (one Czech and the other Slovak) of the satisfaction level with the existing political system. The escalating criticism by Slovaks of their position in the First Republic is evident from the following editorial in Zem, the journal of the younger generation of Agrarians: The aversion of Czechs and Slovaks arises from economic and social problems . Czechs accept our arguments with a judicious attentiveness , while they continue to make their own national , cultural and linguistic politics .. . Currently a majority of the Slovaks want to acknowledge their own nation .... and the unfortunate tendencies (potmehudske narazky) seen 38Milan Hodfa, C/anky, reci, §tudie, Prague , Novina , 1934, Vol. 7, pp . xxxii-iii . �92 SLOVAKIA in various Czech newspapers, to suggest that Slovak efforts to achieve their rights somehow indicates political unreliabi lity, wi ll not deter the Slovaks. 39 If even Hodza's and the Agrarians' moderate call for regionalism was ignored , the possibility for substantive constitutional reform was all the more remote. The position of the HSPP, which consistently included Slovak autonomy as its basic program, is certainly a case in point. Representing a large portion of the Slovak people,40 they were systematically frustrated in their attempts to implement their programs. Ignored most of the time, only in times of crisis did the governing powers seek to integrate the HSPP into the process , such as the coalition crisis of the late 192O's or the presidential elections of 1935 ; once the crisis was resolved, any further negotiations were deemed unnecessary. A good illustration of this can be seen from the December 1935 talks between President Edvard Benes and Andrej Hlinka, leader of the HSPP. Hlinka asked for decentralization and legislative power for regional Slovak organs and for the post of Minister for Slovakia for the HSPP. Benes promised to give the Slovaks all that was possible without undermining the unity of the state. In February 1936 Benes noted that the entry of HSPP into the government was delayed due to unacceptable nature of the demands: the same demands which were made in negotiations in December. The governing coalition rejected the demands and the matter was closed.41 No matter what route the Slovaks followed in their efforts to modify the structure and political system, they had little success. Political parties in Slovakia were unable to compete nationally, for 39zem, IV , 4 , 20 . February , 1938, p. 39 . 40 one could argue that at times it did indeed represent a majority of the Slovaks, if one assumes that Czechs voting in Slovakia supported centrist parties and Magyars their own parties . 41 E.F. Firsov, "K problemu modifik,kif parlamentneho systemu CSR a narodnopolitickeho konsenzu Cechov a Slovakov na prelome 20. a 30 . rokov" in Slo vensk o v politickom systeme Ceskos/ovenska, p. 104. �SLOVAKIA 93 the state was in the hands of the centrist parties and thus no shadow coalition or cabinet could form. Slovaks were united in their efforts to gain control of the bureaucratic apparatus in Slovakia, as a means of indirect access to the power center. This too was frustrated by the bureaucratic structure of centralism. It took the crisis of 1938 to bring about some readjustment in the state relations between Czechs and Slovaks, a settlement subsequently repudiated as being forcibly imposed. 42 By that time however a more aggressive and assertive stance had been taken by the HSPP; 20 years of waiting for the system to change from above had led to the radicalization of the efforts to change it. It is often argued that in time of crisis the Slovaks abandoned the Czechs, generating the notion of ungrateful Slovaks. One could likewise argue that only in times of crisis did the Czechs remember the Slovaks .. . one can go to the well only so many times. There is no question that fascist elements had entered into the Slovak political arena, fueled in part by economic grievances and political frustration . The fact that fascism was a force sweeping across the disaffected sectors of Europe does not absolve the Slovaks of responsibility for those fascist features; nor does however the argument that Czechoslovakia, while it had its faults, was still the only functioning democracy in Eastern Europe and better than the surrounding systems excuse those faults and deny their consequences. For both, historical relativism is a tempting but ultimately unsatisfying position. 43 42 An interesting side point here is Hodza's argument that the political cabinet's acceptance of Slovak self-administration, as negotiated in the summer of 1938 was in fact valid , against Bene§' subsequent argument , after W .W .II broke out , that Parliament had not approved it and it was therefore invalid. Hodza was correct in his perception that the political cabinet was the crucial decision making body . That was why Slovak political efforts were in fact so often frustrated, because Parliament tended only to reflect the decisions of the political cabinet. 43 As a prominent Czech historian has observed: "The ideal of democracy became a self-indulgent compliment, nurturing the need of the Czechs for universal recognition and admiration. Czech nationalism greeted the foundation of the republic not only as an occasion to score points in the nationalistic struggle with imperialistic �94 SLOVAKIA The analogy of a marriage is perhaps an appropriate metaphor for the course of Czech and Slovaks relations . In May of 1918, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire was moving inexorably toward its demise, Hlinka declared: "It is absolutely necessary for us to decide if we will continue with the Magyars, or go with the Czechs. Let us not evade the question, let us say openly that we are for the CzechoSlovak orientation. The thousand year marriage with the Magyars has not worked. A divorce is necessary." 44 The marriage of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 was a classic war-time marriage: undertaken in haste, without adequate courtship, with both partners moving immediately from divorce (Austrian and Hungarian partners respectively) into this new relationship. There was no time to discuss the terms and conditions of the marriage, the expectations about what each sought and would bring to the marriage. What little was prepared was done largely by marriage brokers (Toma~ G. Masaryk on one side and the American Slovaks on the other, resulting in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918) . The first months of the marriage were very difficult, as the residual effects of the Great War needed to be addressed . It became apparent fairly soon, however, that the two partners in the marriage had very different expectations and notions. The Czech partner clearly saw himself as the preponderant factor, functioning as provider and decision maker in a traditional marriage . This was a natural expectation, given the Czech numerical and material dominance. Thus the Czechs had a clear notion of the nature of the relationship: a unitary state of the Czechoslovak nation. The Slovak partner was much less clear about her role in the marriage. Given her relative lack of wealth and experience, there was a tendency on the part of some to accept a dependent relationship and a subservient role in the marriage. Thus generally more than a third of the Slovaks Germany, but also as a justification of its own colonial ambitions toward Slovakia." Zden~k Pinc, "The Idea of the Czechoslovak State: History, Theory and Political Reality", Czechoslovak and Central European Journal, 10, no. I , 1991, p. 38 . 44 Karol Medvecky, Slovenskf prevrat, Tmava, Spolok Sv. Vojtecha, 1930-31 , Vol. Ill , p. 347 . �SLOVAKIA 95 accepted the Czechoslovak unitary state, though only a tiny minority believed in the notion of the Czechoslovak people and virtually no one subscribed to a Czechoslovak language. There also existed a different notion of the marriage, namely the desire for an equal partnership between two equals. This was manifested in the desire for some form of Slovak autonomy as exemplified by the hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia, a position which generally a majority of the Slovaks supported. As the marriage progressed during the 1920's and 1930's, both internal and external factors escalated Slovak discontent. The Slovaks came to resent their status in the Czechoslovak Republic because they felt increasingly frustrated , both economically and politically and because they perceived a paternalistic indifference to Slovak grievances. Increasingly, this frustration led to a sense of alienation from the marriage and a greater responsiveness to ideological concepts which addressed both the reality and the theory of the inadequacy of an unequal marriage; in this marriage it was the call of nationalism which led the "weaker" partner to re-evaluate her place within the Czech-defined relationship. As storm clouds gathered over Europe, as tension and fear escalated, the Slovaks sought to re-define the marriage precisely at the moment that the Czechs, feeling far more threatened by the forces gathering over Europe, resisted any tampering with what to them was a satisfactory marriage. They in fact did not even comprehend the alienation and sense of frustration prevalent among the Slovaks . Thus the events of Munich and after led to deep bitterness, for the Czechs believed the Slovaks had stabbed them in the back, and the Slovaks felt that, having been denied the opportunity to improve their relationship with the Czechs, they had no obligations to travel the bitter path with a partner who had never listened to them and had never been prepared to engage in a genuine dialogue with a view toward developing a marriage of true partners. During the period of the war, the Czechs and some Slovaks denied that the marriage had broken up; some Czechs even denied that any adjustments were necessary for the marriage to resume. Virtually no Slovak could subscribe to that position; for the Slovaks, at the very minimum, a co-equal marriage was imperative. �96 SLOVAKIA The fall of communism enabled old and new grievances to surface, on both sides, and to be finally openly confronted. The result was a divorce. The seeds of that divorce, not necessarily inevitable , had been planted by failures common to so many marriages: lack of communications and the inability to listen as Czechs and Slovaks talked from different historical perspectives, in different languages and with different objectives , resulting in misunderstandings, undervaluing of roles , responsibilities and contributions, and above all , the lack of commitment to a marriage of diversity and genuine equality. � 78 SLOVAKIA Relations Between Slovaks and Czechs in the First CSR SUSAN MIKULA At this particular point in the history of the Czechs and Slovaks, the question of the nature of the relationship between these two nations has assumed a renewed significance and interest. The disintegration of the common state which had existed for 74 years is often presented in the popular press as the result of Slovak backwardness, provincialism, undemocratic tendencies, vestiges of communist influence; in short as anything but the consequence of a long historical process. There has in fact been a persistent tendency throughout much of the 20th century, whether by popular writers or even some professional scholars, to view Slovak demands for structural changes in their relationship with the Czechs along much the same lines, that is as reflective of fascist or communist extremists, of political, economic or cultural immaturity, or of a destructive opportunism. The prime reason for such tendencies may be that the prism through which the "Slovak problem" has often been viewed is the Czech or Czechoslovak. In other words, there are certain a priori assumptions being made about the nature of the problem which affect the analysis of the problem. One such tendency is to see it as just that, a Slovak problem, that is, as a problem between two competing Slovak factions, rather than as a problem between Czechs and Slovaks. The consequence of that has been the tendency to dismiss the problem and then be repeatedly surprised and dismayed when the central nature of the issues resurfaced and influenced the �SLOVAKIA 79 entire state and people. Another tendency is to identify the Slovak nationalist aspirations in the First Czechoslovak Republic (CSR) with the extreme nationalist movements of the inter-war era, that is with fascism. The problem thus becomes reduced to the analysis of Andrej Hlinka and the Slovak People's Party, which is designated as a clerical-fascist movement. The problem is then still a Slovak problem - the authoritarian tendencies of a huge segment of the Slovak population - and also an external one - the broad movement of European fascism. The difficulty comes with trying to account for the persistence of the Slovak national aspirations, long after the dismantling and systematic discrediting of the Slovak Republic. Here the notion of backwardness (economic and political) and immaturity (political and cultural) assumes a satisfactory explanatory character. What has been common in the great majority of these analyses, written mostly from the Czechoslovak perspective, is this notion that it is the Slovak's problem . On the other hand, the few works written from the Slovak perspective , at least until very recently , have tended to veer in the opposite direction, to view it as strictly a Czech problem, that is as the result of a systematic and deliberate policy of Czechoslovakization (analogous to Magyarization). This tendency has likewise but limited value. The Czech/Slovak problem has, rather, been a structural, historical problem, especially in the First Republic. With the creation of that state an attempt was made to apply an undifferentiated model of the nation-state to a society in which a number of nations were undergoing the process of national self-actualization accelerated beyond previous historical experience. The attempt to establish a unitary nation-state comprised of a hastily constructed nation (Czechoslovak) was thus flying in the face of the very process which had led to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire and which had precisely allowed for the possibility of self-determination for the various nations of the empire. From this perspective, the problem ceases to be a Czech or Slovak problem and becomes a problem of �80 SLOVAKIA the very idea of the Czechoslovak state as it emerged by 1920.19 The unitary, power-based political structure (mocensko-politicky system)20 of the First Republic could not satisfy the needs of the Slovaks without significant revision. However the very real successes and achievements of that state, especially for the Czechs, meant that the need for revision met with incomprehension and therefore indifference and then resistance. An examination of some critical economic and political issues affecting the Slovaks illustrates the fundamental nature of the problem for the Czechoslovak republic. To do so, certain inescapable realities must be recognized. The first is that the economic conditions of the Czech and Slovak lands were vastly different at the very onset of the Republic. A further inescapable reality is that that differences persisted throughout the First Republic and in fact deepened. A third inescapable reality is that l 9 A recent example in Western scholarship which looks at how the structure of the state related to the national struggle of the Slovaks is Carol Skalnik Leff's book , National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, Princeton University Press, I 988 . The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Science (Historicky ustav SA V) has just published the papers from the symposium held November, 1991 entitled Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, Bratislava, Historicky ustav , 1992. Here both Czech and Slovak scholars examined the political and structural aspects of the Slovak position in the First Republic; most of them have taken a hard look at the system itself. In that vein, some of the recent writings by Czech scholars, such as Vojtech Mencl a kollectiv, Krizovatky 20. stoleti, Prague, Na~e Vojsko, 1990; Petr Pithart Dejiny a politika , Prague, Prostor , 1990; and Zdenek Pinc "The Idea of the Czechoslovak State: History, Theory and Political Reality" in Czechoslovak and Central European Journal, Vol. 10, no . I, 1991, pp. 36-45 have also taken a more critical approach to the analysis of the political system of the First Republic . There are a variety of viewpoints here and not all agree with the notion that the very structure of the First Republic, namely that of a unitary nation-state, almost certainly precluded a satisfactory resolution of conflicting national aspirations, but all recognize that at issue was much more than competing Slovak factions or Slovak immaturity. On a related subject, the theoretical and methodological approach used by Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984, is very useful. 20 Josef Harna uses that term to characterize the operational structure of the First Republic . See Politickf system a statni politika v prvnfch Jetech existence Ceskoslo venske republiky (1918-1923), Praha, Historicky ustav, 1990. �SLOVAKIA 81 these circumstances were at the root of Slovak grievances and frustrations, which came to be shared by nearly all Slovaks, irrespective of their political beliefs. The initial differences between the two arose from their historical conditions, and are well known. While due to some degree to natural environmental factors (resources, terrain, geophysical placement) they are also the result of differing economic and political policies and interests on the part of the Austrians and the Magyars. While the Czechs had become the industrial nucleus of the Habsburg Empire and were well advanced in industrialization and urbanization by the latter decades of the 19th century, Slovak industrialization was at that time at its beginning stages. The Slovaks did have an analogous position within the Hungarian kingdom, designated to become industrially active for that sector of the Empire, but this was in its infancy stage when compared to the Czechs. Thus the creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918 joined together two very different economic regions. The effects of that union were also very different. While the Czech Lands continued to develop, after some initial adjustments, at least until the Great Depression, Slovakia stagnated throughout the entire period in almost every category of economic activity. 21 In attempting to explain this fact, one has to recognize that there was little if any economic planning prior to the establishment of the First Republic. In the immediate postwar period, Slovaks recognized the need for economic development and submitted plans and requests to Prague. However, their weak political representation in the crucial first years, the liquidation of the Slovak National Council, which left a leadership vacuum in Slovakia, and the small number of economic leaders in Slovakia all meant that these early efforts were without success. Equally powerless in the realm of economics were the Ministry of Unification of Laws and the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. The structure of the system did not allow for conside21 For an analysis of the Slovak economic situation in the First Republic , see the works of Miroslav Fabricius, Hospodarsky vjvoj Slovenska do konca predmnfchovskej republiky, 1987, no. 75 and Vjvoj nazorov na postavenie ekonomiky Sloven ska v prednmfchovskej republike, Bratislava, Eckonomicky ustav SAV , I 990, no. 79. �82 SLOVAKIA ration of Slovakia's economic development; it was rather submerged into the whole. In fact, the strongest protests over the restructuring of the historic counties came from those county boards most concerned with economic issues. Economic policy in the new republic was highly centralized, as was the political system. Prague was the political and economic center where all the offices and organs were located. Slovakia was not viewed as one of the two integrating units, but rather as a region to be appended to the Historic Lands.22 If there was any recognition of Slovakia's role in the economy as a distinct sector, it was to serve as the agricultural sector, to insure the agrarian self-sufficiency of the state. This theory of an "agrarian Slovakia" was the cornerstone of economic policy in the 1920's, in particular within the Agrarian Party, where political considerations played a part. Slovak Agrarian politicians also supported this notion, although by the end of the 1920's even Milan Hodfa recognized the need to bring industry to Slovakia.23 It was difficult to overcome this notion that the agrarian character of Slovakia was both natural and desirable, even while it was recognized that industrialization was essential to economic development in other areas of East Europe and also that there were actually less than optimal conditions for agriculture in Slovakia. This was especially unfortunate because there was plenty of available evidence which pointed to the social and economic inequality of the two halves of the state and their undesirable social and political consequences. The chief reason for failing to address this problem was the commitment to a laissez-faire policy of economic development. It was argued that to target Slovakia for special investment and\or development would create a dualistic policy while there existed a unitary society. In fact, 22 Vlastislav Lacina, "Uloha hospodai'ske politiky pri vytvlii'enf nove ceskoslovenske ekonomiky 1918-1923" in Politicky system a statni politika v prvnich Jetech existence Ceskoslovenske republiky, p. 86. 23 A summary of this debate about agrarian versus industrial Slovakia is to be found in Fabricius, Vyvoj nazorov na posta venie ekonomiky Slovenska v predmnfchovskej republike . �SLOVAKIA 83 economic dualism already existed and persisted and the failure to deal with it had enormous consequences for both people. Nor did Czechoslovakia actually pursue a laissez-faire economic policy, especially in the first years of the Republic. Rather what occurred was a failure to recognize the special Slovak economic needs, within the context of Slovakia rather than the context of the whole state. As a result the Slovak economy stagnated, with social, economic and political consequences. Evidence of this economic dualism can be found in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. In agriculture, between 19191927, for instance, 87,263 hectares of land in the Czech region underwent improvement while in Slovakia it amounted to 9,323 hectares or 9.6% of the total land improved . The division of investment costs for rural modernization were 95 .1 % to the Czech lands and 4.3% to Slovakia.2 4 Another indicator of the disparity was the rate of rural electrification; in 1933 , for example 125 villages were joined to the electrical network in the Czech lands, 112 in Moravia and Silesia and only 9 in Slovakia. Altogether only 1.9% of agricultural enterprises were electrified in Slovakia compared to 31.7% in Czech lands and 25.2% in Moravia.25 As a consequence, throughout the 1920 1s, Slovak agriculture remained essentially stagnant and less productive and in the 19301s the world agricultural crisis had a greater adverse effect on the Slovaks. In the industrial sector there was a whole battery of problems, so much so that it was referred to as the 11 complex of Slovak industrial woes (komplex bolesti slovenskeho priemyslu)" _26 The restructuring of Slovak industry during the period 19191921 led to an emphasis on the production of consumable (primary) goods, so that the percentage of activity devoted to producing export oriented goods declined. In spite of the fact that Slovakia needed greater modernization and improvement in its economic situation, the 24 Fabricius, Hospodarsky vyvoj S/ovenska do konca predmnichovskej republiky, p. 47 . 25 Jbid. , p. 64. 26 Ibid., p. 52. �84 SLOVAKIA pace of improvement here too was slower than in the Czech Lands. In fact, when in 1921-23 industrial output fell by 30%, some even began to talk about a policy of de-industrialization (odburavanie priemyslu). This was not quite the case but it did ring true for heavy industry; between 1918 and 1932, 260 enterprises were dismantled; by 1937 this had reached another 680 _2 7 Another severe problem was the lack of capital investment; the Czech bourgeoisie invested in existing Slovak firms, not in new ones and those listed in statistics as new were in fact results of transfer of capital and ownership. This process (nostrifikacia) was the road by which Czech capital was able to entrench itself in key positions , especially in banking, industry and marketing. 28 By 1930, after a 10 year period of the integration process, Slovakia was more clearly agrarian in character than before. The Slovak industrial labor share was at 19 .4% while Czech industrial labor rate reached 42.1 % . In the mid-1930's there was a brief spurt of "re-industrialization" in Slovakia, largely in defenserelated industries (perhaps to move them eastward, away from the German border), but even with this , at the end of the First Republic there was still a relative 6% decrease of industrial employment in Slovakia. The percentage of Slovaks in the total industrial employment in Czechoslovakia did not rise above 8% during the entire period. 29 Over the twenty year existence of the First Republic, Slovak economic development consistently lagged behind that of the Czechs, producing a highly developed sense of economic grievance among Slovaks of all political persuasions, including the centrists. On the issue of the economy there existed near unanimity of opinion among the Slovaks. The inability of the Slovaks, however, to effect significant changes in the economic policies and expenditures of the 27 Mencl , p. 143. 28 see Fabricius, Hospodarsky vyvoj S/ovenska do konca predmnfchovskej repub liky, pp . 40-56 and Lacina, pp . 87 and passim for a discusstion of Czech fin ancial investment policies in Slovakia. 29 Radoslav Selucky, "The Economic Equalization of Slovakia with the Czech Lands ", East European Economics, 4/1965, pp . 42-59. �SLOVAKIA 85 central government served to make manifest the structural impediments to full Slovak self-fulfillment within the framework of the unitary Czechoslovak republic. The result was frustration and alienation, both in the economic and the political sphere. In the political sphere, one could almost say that the very decision to create an unitary state of the "Czechoslovak" nation created an untenable situation. Even the most cursory examination of the process by which the unitary state was formed and the structure through which it functioned reveals that the system itself contributed to the erosion of the viability of the unitary Czechoslovak state. The prevailing opinions have generally been that this decision was necessary and beneficial: necessary because of the international situation, the Wilsonian commitment to national self-determination and above all by the fact that the Germans constituted the second largest national group in the new state. And it was beneficial because by that process the Slovaks became a state people rather than a national minority. The assumption therefore is that an unitary state structure was in response to these factors, and not a political decision by the Czech leadership, less a political opportunity but rather an historical necessity. What is generally glossed over is that until almost the very end of the peace process, the dualistic principle was a very real option, that is Czecho-Slovakia, as indicated by the use of the hyphen until 1920 _30 What decided the issue was not Wilsonian expectations but the military turmoil in Slovakia, necessitating occupation and creating fears for the safety of the whole republic . The structure of the state was influenced as much by some short-term problems which could have been resolved in several ways as by broad historical forces . Nor was the decision made because Slovaks were unprepared or disinterested in the structure of the new state. From the time that the Slovak League of America was empowered to negotiate for the Slovaks (Martin Memorandum, 1906) to the Pittsburgh Agreement to the various plans and statements made by Slovak leaders 30 see Joseph Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslo vakia , Boulder, East European Monographs , 1986. �86 SLOVAKIA throughout 1918, it was clear the Slovaks were formulating concepts about their relationship with the Czechs. Examination of the meetings, speeches, correspondence of Slovak leaders, especially in 1918 reveals wide-ranging discussions about the anticipated relationship; autonomy was perhaps the most consistent expectation. For example, Matus Dula wrote on November 23, 1918: "when I discussed our autonomy with responsible [rozhodnymi] Czech leaders, they attested that Slovaks would get full autonomy autonomous rights would fall under the competency of the regional diet." 31 It is clear that in 1918 Slovaks were willing to join their sovereignty with that of the Czechs as partners in a new state, because that afforded them the best opportunity for political emancipation; what they were not expecting to do was to blend and blur their hardfought national identity. The decision to postulate a "Czechoslovak nation" was not made by Slovak political representatives, and these did exist, as did political parties, nor by any electoral process, but rather by a very small group of appointed politicians not very representative of the political, economic, social and cultural spectrum of Slovakia.32 There is no question that conditions were such that it did not appear that reasoned debates and consensus building were luxuries which could be afforded. What needs to be understood however is that decisions were made due to very specific historical events which led to the choice of certain options, which were not necessarily the optimal or sole options and which therefore could 31 Milan Krajcovic, "Slovensko v zahranicnopolitickych suvislostiach 1918-1922", in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, p. 148 . See also the article by Vladimir Zuberec, "Vyznamny dokument o postaveni Slovenska za burfoaznej CSR v zbierkach Slovenskeho Narodneho Muzea" in Zbornik Slovenskeho Narodneho Muzea, LXXXIII , 1989, pp. 201-207 . 32 r:ubomir Liptak points out that there were 10,000 people with, if not political experience, certainly with experience in a variety of organizations and public life. And while the number of Slovak schools had dramatically declined , the number of Slovak students had gone up; these could all be acclimated quickly to the new Slovak reality . See "Pripravenosi Slovenska na demokraciu" in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, pp. 7-12. �SLOVAKIA 87 have been readdressed as the situation changed. An underlying element in the creation of the new state was the notion that the year 1918 was the year zero - a new beginning with a clean slate. The failure to recognize and internalize the fundamentally different historical experiences and character of the two people, to recognize that in fact two separate nations existed, not branches of one nation, and that these two had differing notions about both the nature of their new relationship and its state structure influenced the subsequent development of the state as well as the two peoples. As Josef Hama points out "On the Czech side there was not the willingness to understand the differences; on the Slovak side there was impatience and anxiety arising from the feeling of powerlessness to achieve their objectives. Czechoslovakia was formed from the prevailing weight of the Czechs as a unitary state with significant characteristics of centralism." _33 The construct of the unitary state, and the method of ratification of the constitution, meant that there was no national debate and therefore no national consensus on the very definition of the nation state . In the formative period, the hyphenated form, suggesting a state of the Czechs and Slovaks, often was used interchangeably with the Czechoslovak. The definitive proclamation in the Constitution that the "Czechoslovak nation" was the creator of the state and "Czechoslovak" the language of the state created the situation in which those large numbers of Slovaks who resisted the label Czechoslovak were forced into opposition not just against the policies of the state, a normal aspect of parliamentary systems, but against the very nature of the state itself, a position the Slovaks initially had no desire to take and in fact until the very end of the republic sought to avoid. As a consequence the fiction of the single Czechoslovak nation was assumed to be the selfevident principle on which relations between Czechs and Slovaks were based. From the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of Czech politicians, therefore, neither Slovak autonomy nor the federalization of the state on the basis of the national principle was deemed to be at all 33 Harna, p. 14. �88 SLOVAKIA necessary. This attitude prevailed even as the very construct "two branches of the Czechoslovak nation" would seem to demand the necessity of constitutional elaboration and resolution of the individuality contained within the notion of two branches _34 Once the decision was made to create a unitary state, the opportunities for initiating and implementing Slovak policies and political objectives were circumscribed at best, both by the structure of the state system, the political party structure and to an extent the Slovak political forms. The peculiar structure of the party system meant that opposition parties had no realistic chance of modifying the system. The frustration that results from the perceived inability to influence the system in any way often leads to radicalism and this was certainly the case in Czechoslovakia. The power politics party system in the interwar republic proved to be remarkably stable, even though it was a multi-party system in which significant groups were polarized. Stability was achieved at a price, namely the diminution of the role of Parliament and the enhancement of the power of the President and of the government forming coalition parties. A further price was the perception that these centrist parties (generally known as the Petka) had to achieve a consensus and cohesiveness in the face of the fundamental divergence of views from the outsider parties. Hence opposition becomes not something to be tolerated and contested, but something threatening and destabilizing. In effect, the coalition parties could not afford the luxury of opposition; aware of the differences in the state, they felt compelled to focus on retaining and centralizing power. The political cabinet of party leaders essentially overshadowed the ministerial cabinet and tended to make of Parliament a virtual rubber stamp, at least for deputies from the governing parties. What that meant in practice was that the system was impervious to any fundamental change through the normal parliamentary 34M. Matula, "Nektere problemy souvisejfci s institucionalnfm aspektem narodnfc h vztahu CSR v letech 1918-1938" in Slovensko v politickom syst6me Ceskoslovenska, p. 91 . �SLOVAKIA 89 process. What ensued then was the belief that the structure itself had to be modified if any real political power was to develop among the Slovaks. As one historian writes: The issue was not really whether or not the Slovaks achieved immediate autonomy but the Jack of understanding and the unwillingness of the Czech parties even to recognize the problem. Thus the spokesmen for the Slovak position were pushed into opposition and progressively forced into a negative stance relative to the existing regime.3 5 Illustrative of the unwillingness even to address the question of constitutional organization was the fate of administrative reconstruction. The County Law of 1920 was designed to integrate Slovakia into the new state by creating a new county structure to replace the old. What especially generated protests by Slovak administrators was that financial control at the county level was taken over by the central Ministries oflnterior and Finance. During 1921-22, several proposals were made in Parliament to address these Slovak concerns. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP) called for selfadministration in Slovak affairs, a provincial Diet and a provincial government named by the President. There were also other variants, some more radical, of Slovak autonomy. Hodza, who at this time was still looking for a means of unifying Slovak political power, suggested a County Union with competencies in health, welfare, economic and cultural spheres precisely to shift administrative power in Slovakia out of Prague's bureaucratic hands and into Slovak political hands. The debate on these issues in the ministerial circles in Prague revealed a reluctance to delegate any real powers, even to a body like the County Union. The only concessions to be made were delegating powers addressing the needs of the feeble-minded, blind, deaf, epileptic, supervising forced labor and the poorhouses .36 35 Hama, p. 19. 36 For an analysis of the debate over the administration of Slovakia, see Natalia Krajcovicovli , "Politicke strany na Slovensku a usilie o samosprlivu v dvadsiatich rokoch" in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, pp . 47-55 . See also Ladislav Lipscher, K vyvinu politickej spravy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1938, Bratislava, SA V, 1966. �90 SLOVAKIA The political concerns behind such positions were evident, as expressed in the magazine Tribuna: "It is certain that a County Union in Slovakia would be a constant threat to the unity of the state. Who can guarantee that it would not give birth to some kind of autonomous Diet for Slovakia?"3 7 The result was that the administrative structure for Slovakia was extraordinarily limited, always under the strict supervision of Prague. Slovaks lost even a modicum of local autonomy, under a system which was not implemented in the rest of the country precisely because the example of centralized power as manifested in Slovakia aroused local opposition in Bohemia and Moravia. The anomaly could not be sustained and in 1927 the Provincial Law replaced the county system with the four historic provinces. While this acknowledged the territorial existence of Slovakia as an entity, little was done to give that entity any real administrative powers. The failure of these administrative efforts indicated that no serious attempt would be made to bring about a measure of decentralization of government. Problems of special significance to the Slovaks, such as the economic imbalance, the lower standard of living, the dearth of jobs for the growing numbers of university trained younger leaders, the preservation of religious and cultural values were thus not addressed regionally, but left to the central government in Prague, where Slovak power was minimal at best. It could be argued, and often has been, that the lack of Slovak power was more the result of the divisions among the Slovaks themselves than of the unitary and centralized nature of the system. The inability of the Slovaks to form a cohesive bloc was a factor, but not a decisive factor, for as long as even one Slovak was found who would enter the government in the name of the Slovaks (and in fact three, namely Vavro Srobar, Ivan Derer, Hod:fa, were all that were basically necessary during the First Republic) and while coalition parties could attract a Slovak following, (and two did), the power of the coalition bloc would outweigh any Slovak bloc. The ambiguity about the nature of the Czech-Slovak problem would however have 37Krajfovicovii, p. 51. �SLOVAKIA 91 been clarified had the Slovaks achieved a Slovak party. Hod:fa and others recognized this and an attempt was made to form a National Bloc or even a Political Committee (which Hod:fa tried) which would have functioned in a manner analogous to the Petka. This failed because of the inability to achieve a uniform stand on the question of the Slovak position in the state and also to a diversity of views on some specific issues, a problem partially attributable to confessional differences. There did exist a basic consensus on general principles; only a few Slovaks were convinced Czechoslovaks. Unfortunately it was precisely these few who were able to join the government in Prague and were thus considered to represent the Slovaks. There was in fact a fundamental unity among the Slovak populace: a rejection of ethnic and linguistic Czechoslovakism, a commitment to the Czechoslovak state, albeit a reformed one, and a recognition of the pluralistic nature of the state and society. If there was division among the Slovaks, it came on the question of how, not whether, to reform the state: regionalism or autonomy. The Slovak Agrarians, under Hod:fa's leadership, were centrist in that they worked within the system to bring about a modification of some of the system, but especially in the 1930's were also advocates of regionalism. Hodfa came to advocate an intermediary notion, looking at it from a pragmatic perspective, which "means neither centralism nor autonomy, but state-political unity and regionalism with administrative self-government" .38 Hodfa was trying to find a bridge between two ever diverging assessments (one Czech and the other Slovak) of the satisfaction level with the existing political system. The escalating criticism by Slovaks of their position in the First Republic is evident from the following editorial in Zem, the journal of the younger generation of Agrarians: The aversion of Czechs and Slovaks arises from economic and social problems . Czechs accept our arguments with a judicious attentiveness , while they continue to make their own national , cultural and linguistic politics .. . Currently a majority of the Slovaks want to acknowledge their own nation .... and the unfortunate tendencies (potmehudske narazky) seen 38Milan Hodfa, C/anky, reci, §tudie, Prague , Novina , 1934, Vol. 7, pp . xxxii-iii . �92 SLOVAKIA in various Czech newspapers, to suggest that Slovak efforts to achieve their rights somehow indicates political unreliabi lity, wi ll not deter the Slovaks. 39 If even Hodza's and the Agrarians' moderate call for regionalism was ignored , the possibility for substantive constitutional reform was all the more remote. The position of the HSPP, which consistently included Slovak autonomy as its basic program, is certainly a case in point. Representing a large portion of the Slovak people,40 they were systematically frustrated in their attempts to implement their programs. Ignored most of the time, only in times of crisis did the governing powers seek to integrate the HSPP into the process , such as the coalition crisis of the late 192O's or the presidential elections of 1935 ; once the crisis was resolved, any further negotiations were deemed unnecessary. A good illustration of this can be seen from the December 1935 talks between President Edvard Benes and Andrej Hlinka, leader of the HSPP. Hlinka asked for decentralization and legislative power for regional Slovak organs and for the post of Minister for Slovakia for the HSPP. Benes promised to give the Slovaks all that was possible without undermining the unity of the state. In February 1936 Benes noted that the entry of HSPP into the government was delayed due to unacceptable nature of the demands: the same demands which were made in negotiations in December. The governing coalition rejected the demands and the matter was closed.41 No matter what route the Slovaks followed in their efforts to modify the structure and political system, they had little success. Political parties in Slovakia were unable to compete nationally, for 39zem, IV , 4 , 20 . February , 1938, p. 39 . 40 one could argue that at times it did indeed represent a majority of the Slovaks, if one assumes that Czechs voting in Slovakia supported centrist parties and Magyars their own parties . 41 E.F. Firsov, "K problemu modifik,kif parlamentneho systemu CSR a narodnopolitickeho konsenzu Cechov a Slovakov na prelome 20. a 30 . rokov" in Slo vensk o v politickom systeme Ceskos/ovenska, p. 104. �SLOVAKIA 93 the state was in the hands of the centrist parties and thus no shadow coalition or cabinet could form. Slovaks were united in their efforts to gain control of the bureaucratic apparatus in Slovakia, as a means of indirect access to the power center. This too was frustrated by the bureaucratic structure of centralism. It took the crisis of 1938 to bring about some readjustment in the state relations between Czechs and Slovaks, a settlement subsequently repudiated as being forcibly imposed. 42 By that time however a more aggressive and assertive stance had been taken by the HSPP; 20 years of waiting for the system to change from above had led to the radicalization of the efforts to change it. It is often argued that in time of crisis the Slovaks abandoned the Czechs, generating the notion of ungrateful Slovaks. One could likewise argue that only in times of crisis did the Czechs remember the Slovaks .. . one can go to the well only so many times. There is no question that fascist elements had entered into the Slovak political arena, fueled in part by economic grievances and political frustration . The fact that fascism was a force sweeping across the disaffected sectors of Europe does not absolve the Slovaks of responsibility for those fascist features; nor does however the argument that Czechoslovakia, while it had its faults, was still the only functioning democracy in Eastern Europe and better than the surrounding systems excuse those faults and deny their consequences. For both, historical relativism is a tempting but ultimately unsatisfying position. 43 42 An interesting side point here is Hodza's argument that the political cabinet's acceptance of Slovak self-administration, as negotiated in the summer of 1938 was in fact valid , against Bene§' subsequent argument , after W .W .II broke out , that Parliament had not approved it and it was therefore invalid. Hodza was correct in his perception that the political cabinet was the crucial decision making body . That was why Slovak political efforts were in fact so often frustrated, because Parliament tended only to reflect the decisions of the political cabinet. 43 As a prominent Czech historian has observed: "The ideal of democracy became a self-indulgent compliment, nurturing the need of the Czechs for universal recognition and admiration. Czech nationalism greeted the foundation of the republic not only as an occasion to score points in the nationalistic struggle with imperialistic �94 SLOVAKIA The analogy of a marriage is perhaps an appropriate metaphor for the course of Czech and Slovaks relations . In May of 1918, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire was moving inexorably toward its demise, Hlinka declared: "It is absolutely necessary for us to decide if we will continue with the Magyars, or go with the Czechs. Let us not evade the question, let us say openly that we are for the CzechoSlovak orientation. The thousand year marriage with the Magyars has not worked. A divorce is necessary." 44 The marriage of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 was a classic war-time marriage: undertaken in haste, without adequate courtship, with both partners moving immediately from divorce (Austrian and Hungarian partners respectively) into this new relationship. There was no time to discuss the terms and conditions of the marriage, the expectations about what each sought and would bring to the marriage. What little was prepared was done largely by marriage brokers (Toma~ G. Masaryk on one side and the American Slovaks on the other, resulting in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918) . The first months of the marriage were very difficult, as the residual effects of the Great War needed to be addressed . It became apparent fairly soon, however, that the two partners in the marriage had very different expectations and notions. The Czech partner clearly saw himself as the preponderant factor, functioning as provider and decision maker in a traditional marriage . This was a natural expectation, given the Czech numerical and material dominance. Thus the Czechs had a clear notion of the nature of the relationship: a unitary state of the Czechoslovak nation. The Slovak partner was much less clear about her role in the marriage. Given her relative lack of wealth and experience, there was a tendency on the part of some to accept a dependent relationship and a subservient role in the marriage. Thus generally more than a third of the Slovaks Germany, but also as a justification of its own colonial ambitions toward Slovakia." Zden~k Pinc, "The Idea of the Czechoslovak State: History, Theory and Political Reality", Czechoslovak and Central European Journal, 10, no. I , 1991, p. 38 . 44 Karol Medvecky, Slovenskf prevrat, Tmava, Spolok Sv. Vojtecha, 1930-31 , Vol. Ill , p. 347 . �SLOVAKIA 95 accepted the Czechoslovak unitary state, though only a tiny minority believed in the notion of the Czechoslovak people and virtually no one subscribed to a Czechoslovak language. There also existed a different notion of the marriage, namely the desire for an equal partnership between two equals. This was manifested in the desire for some form of Slovak autonomy as exemplified by the hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia, a position which generally a majority of the Slovaks supported. As the marriage progressed during the 1920's and 1930's, both internal and external factors escalated Slovak discontent. The Slovaks came to resent their status in the Czechoslovak Republic because they felt increasingly frustrated , both economically and politically and because they perceived a paternalistic indifference to Slovak grievances. Increasingly, this frustration led to a sense of alienation from the marriage and a greater responsiveness to ideological concepts which addressed both the reality and the theory of the inadequacy of an unequal marriage; in this marriage it was the call of nationalism which led the "weaker" partner to re-evaluate her place within the Czech-defined relationship. As storm clouds gathered over Europe, as tension and fear escalated, the Slovaks sought to re-define the marriage precisely at the moment that the Czechs, feeling far more threatened by the forces gathering over Europe, resisted any tampering with what to them was a satisfactory marriage. They in fact did not even comprehend the alienation and sense of frustration prevalent among the Slovaks . Thus the events of Munich and after led to deep bitterness, for the Czechs believed the Slovaks had stabbed them in the back, and the Slovaks felt that, having been denied the opportunity to improve their relationship with the Czechs, they had no obligations to travel the bitter path with a partner who had never listened to them and had never been prepared to engage in a genuine dialogue with a view toward developing a marriage of true partners. During the period of the war, the Czechs and some Slovaks denied that the marriage had broken up; some Czechs even denied that any adjustments were necessary for the marriage to resume. Virtually no Slovak could subscribe to that position; for the Slovaks, at the very minimum, a co-equal marriage was imperative. �96 SLOVAKIA The fall of communism enabled old and new grievances to surface, on both sides, and to be finally openly confronted. The result was a divorce. The seeds of that divorce, not necessarily inevitable , had been planted by failures common to so many marriages: lack of communications and the inability to listen as Czechs and Slovaks talked from different historical perspectives, in different languages and with different objectives , resulting in misunderstandings, undervaluing of roles , responsibilities and contributions, and above all , the lack of commitment to a marriage of diversity and genuine equality. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1991-92, Vol. 35 Description An account of the resource Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The Slovak League of America Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available 1991-92 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 78 SLOVAKIA Relations Between Slovaks and Czechs in the First CSR SUSAN MIKULA At this particular point in the history of the Czechs and Slovaks, the question of the nature of the relationship between these two nations has assumed a renewed significance and interest. The disintegration of the common state which had existed for 74 years is often presented in the popular press as the result of Slovak backwardness, provincialism, undemocratic tendencies, vestiges of communist influence; in short as anything but the consequence of a long historical process. There has in fact been a persistent tendency throughout much of the 20th century, whether by popular writers or even some professional scholars, to view Slovak demands for structural changes in their relationship with the Czechs along much the same lines, that is as reflective of fascist or communist extremists, of political, economic or cultural immaturity, or of a destructive opportunism. The prime reason for such tendencies may be that the prism through which the "Slovak problem" has often been viewed is the Czech or Czechoslovak. In other words, there are certain a priori assumptions being made about the nature of the problem which affect the analysis of the problem. One such tendency is to see it as just that, a Slovak problem, that is, as a problem between two competing Slovak factions, rather than as a problem between Czechs and Slovaks. The consequence of that has been the tendency to dismiss the problem and then be repeatedly surprised and dismayed when the central nature of the issues resurfaced and influenced the SLOVAKIA 79 entire state and people. Another tendency is to identify the Slovak nationalist aspirations in the First Czechoslovak Republic (CSR) with the extreme nationalist movements of the inter-war era, that is with fascism. The problem thus becomes reduced to the analysis of Andrej Hlinka and the Slovak People's Party, which is designated as a clerical-fascist movement. The problem is then still a Slovak problem - the authoritarian tendencies of a huge segment of the Slovak population - and also an external one - the broad movement of European fascism. The difficulty comes with trying to account for the persistence of the Slovak national aspirations, long after the dismantling and systematic discrediting of the Slovak Republic. Here the notion of backwardness (economic and political) and immaturity (political and cultural) assumes a satisfactory explanatory character. What has been common in the great majority of these analyses, written mostly from the Czechoslovak perspective, is this notion that it is the Slovak's problem . On the other hand, the few works written from the Slovak perspective , at least until very recently , have tended to veer in the opposite direction, to view it as strictly a Czech problem, that is as the result of a systematic and deliberate policy of Czechoslovakization (analogous to Magyarization). This tendency has likewise but limited value. The Czech/Slovak problem has, rather, been a structural, historical problem, especially in the First Republic. With the creation of that state an attempt was made to apply an undifferentiated model of the nation-state to a society in which a number of nations were undergoing the process of national self-actualization accelerated beyond previous historical experience. The attempt to establish a unitary nation-state comprised of a hastily constructed nation (Czechoslovak) was thus flying in the face of the very process which had led to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire and which had precisely allowed for the possibility of self-determination for the various nations of the empire. From this perspective, the problem ceases to be a Czech or Slovak problem and becomes a problem of 80 SLOVAKIA the very idea of the Czechoslovak state as it emerged by 1920.19 The unitary, power-based political structure (mocensko-politicky system)20 of the First Republic could not satisfy the needs of the Slovaks without significant revision. However the very real successes and achievements of that state, especially for the Czechs, meant that the need for revision met with incomprehension and therefore indifference and then resistance. An examination of some critical economic and political issues affecting the Slovaks illustrates the fundamental nature of the problem for the Czechoslovak republic. To do so, certain inescapable realities must be recognized. The first is that the economic conditions of the Czech and Slovak lands were vastly different at the very onset of the Republic. A further inescapable reality is that that differences persisted throughout the First Republic and in fact deepened. A third inescapable reality is that l 9 A recent example in Western scholarship which looks at how the structure of the state related to the national struggle of the Slovaks is Carol Skalnik Leff's book , National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, Princeton University Press, I 988 . The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Science (Historicky ustav SA V) has just published the papers from the symposium held November, 1991 entitled Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, Bratislava, Historicky ustav , 1992. Here both Czech and Slovak scholars examined the political and structural aspects of the Slovak position in the First Republic; most of them have taken a hard look at the system itself. In that vein, some of the recent writings by Czech scholars, such as Vojtech Mencl a kollectiv, Krizovatky 20. stoleti, Prague, Na~e Vojsko, 1990; Petr Pithart Dejiny a politika , Prague, Prostor , 1990; and Zdenek Pinc "The Idea of the Czechoslovak State: History, Theory and Political Reality" in Czechoslovak and Central European Journal, Vol. 10, no . I, 1991, pp. 36-45 have also taken a more critical approach to the analysis of the political system of the First Republic . There are a variety of viewpoints here and not all agree with the notion that the very structure of the First Republic, namely that of a unitary nation-state, almost certainly precluded a satisfactory resolution of conflicting national aspirations, but all recognize that at issue was much more than competing Slovak factions or Slovak immaturity. On a related subject, the theoretical and methodological approach used by Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984, is very useful. 20 Josef Harna uses that term to characterize the operational structure of the First Republic . See Politickf system a statni politika v prvnfch Jetech existence Ceskoslo venske republiky (1918-1923), Praha, Historicky ustav, 1990. SLOVAKIA 81 these circumstances were at the root of Slovak grievances and frustrations, which came to be shared by nearly all Slovaks, irrespective of their political beliefs. The initial differences between the two arose from their historical conditions, and are well known. While due to some degree to natural environmental factors (resources, terrain, geophysical placement) they are also the result of differing economic and political policies and interests on the part of the Austrians and the Magyars. While the Czechs had become the industrial nucleus of the Habsburg Empire and were well advanced in industrialization and urbanization by the latter decades of the 19th century, Slovak industrialization was at that time at its beginning stages. The Slovaks did have an analogous position within the Hungarian kingdom, designated to become industrially active for that sector of the Empire, but this was in its infancy stage when compared to the Czechs. Thus the creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918 joined together two very different economic regions. The effects of that union were also very different. While the Czech Lands continued to develop, after some initial adjustments, at least until the Great Depression, Slovakia stagnated throughout the entire period in almost every category of economic activity. 21 In attempting to explain this fact, one has to recognize that there was little if any economic planning prior to the establishment of the First Republic. In the immediate postwar period, Slovaks recognized the need for economic development and submitted plans and requests to Prague. However, their weak political representation in the crucial first years, the liquidation of the Slovak National Council, which left a leadership vacuum in Slovakia, and the small number of economic leaders in Slovakia all meant that these early efforts were without success. Equally powerless in the realm of economics were the Ministry of Unification of Laws and the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. The structure of the system did not allow for conside21 For an analysis of the Slovak economic situation in the First Republic , see the works of Miroslav Fabricius, Hospodarsky vjvoj Slovenska do konca predmnfchovskej republiky, 1987, no. 75 and Vjvoj nazorov na postavenie ekonomiky Sloven ska v prednmfchovskej republike, Bratislava, Eckonomicky ustav SAV , I 990, no. 79. 82 SLOVAKIA ration of Slovakia's economic development; it was rather submerged into the whole. In fact, the strongest protests over the restructuring of the historic counties came from those county boards most concerned with economic issues. Economic policy in the new republic was highly centralized, as was the political system. Prague was the political and economic center where all the offices and organs were located. Slovakia was not viewed as one of the two integrating units, but rather as a region to be appended to the Historic Lands.22 If there was any recognition of Slovakia's role in the economy as a distinct sector, it was to serve as the agricultural sector, to insure the agrarian self-sufficiency of the state. This theory of an "agrarian Slovakia" was the cornerstone of economic policy in the 1920's, in particular within the Agrarian Party, where political considerations played a part. Slovak Agrarian politicians also supported this notion, although by the end of the 1920's even Milan Hodfa recognized the need to bring industry to Slovakia.23 It was difficult to overcome this notion that the agrarian character of Slovakia was both natural and desirable, even while it was recognized that industrialization was essential to economic development in other areas of East Europe and also that there were actually less than optimal conditions for agriculture in Slovakia. This was especially unfortunate because there was plenty of available evidence which pointed to the social and economic inequality of the two halves of the state and their undesirable social and political consequences. The chief reason for failing to address this problem was the commitment to a laissez-faire policy of economic development. It was argued that to target Slovakia for special investment and\or development would create a dualistic policy while there existed a unitary society. In fact, 22 Vlastislav Lacina, "Uloha hospodai'ske politiky pri vytvlii'enf nove ceskoslovenske ekonomiky 1918-1923" in Politicky system a statni politika v prvnich Jetech existence Ceskoslovenske republiky, p. 86. 23 A summary of this debate about agrarian versus industrial Slovakia is to be found in Fabricius, Vyvoj nazorov na posta venie ekonomiky Slovenska v predmnfchovskej republike . SLOVAKIA 83 economic dualism already existed and persisted and the failure to deal with it had enormous consequences for both people. Nor did Czechoslovakia actually pursue a laissez-faire economic policy, especially in the first years of the Republic. Rather what occurred was a failure to recognize the special Slovak economic needs, within the context of Slovakia rather than the context of the whole state. As a result the Slovak economy stagnated, with social, economic and political consequences. Evidence of this economic dualism can be found in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. In agriculture, between 19191927, for instance, 87,263 hectares of land in the Czech region underwent improvement while in Slovakia it amounted to 9,323 hectares or 9.6% of the total land improved . The division of investment costs for rural modernization were 95 .1 % to the Czech lands and 4.3% to Slovakia.2 4 Another indicator of the disparity was the rate of rural electrification; in 1933 , for example 125 villages were joined to the electrical network in the Czech lands, 112 in Moravia and Silesia and only 9 in Slovakia. Altogether only 1.9% of agricultural enterprises were electrified in Slovakia compared to 31.7% in Czech lands and 25.2% in Moravia.25 As a consequence, throughout the 1920 1s, Slovak agriculture remained essentially stagnant and less productive and in the 19301s the world agricultural crisis had a greater adverse effect on the Slovaks. In the industrial sector there was a whole battery of problems, so much so that it was referred to as the 11 complex of Slovak industrial woes (komplex bolesti slovenskeho priemyslu)" _26 The restructuring of Slovak industry during the period 19191921 led to an emphasis on the production of consumable (primary) goods, so that the percentage of activity devoted to producing export oriented goods declined. In spite of the fact that Slovakia needed greater modernization and improvement in its economic situation, the 24 Fabricius, Hospodarsky vyvoj S/ovenska do konca predmnichovskej republiky, p. 47 . 25 Jbid. , p. 64. 26 Ibid., p. 52. 84 SLOVAKIA pace of improvement here too was slower than in the Czech Lands. In fact, when in 1921-23 industrial output fell by 30%, some even began to talk about a policy of de-industrialization (odburavanie priemyslu). This was not quite the case but it did ring true for heavy industry; between 1918 and 1932, 260 enterprises were dismantled; by 1937 this had reached another 680 _2 7 Another severe problem was the lack of capital investment; the Czech bourgeoisie invested in existing Slovak firms, not in new ones and those listed in statistics as new were in fact results of transfer of capital and ownership. This process (nostrifikacia) was the road by which Czech capital was able to entrench itself in key positions , especially in banking, industry and marketing. 28 By 1930, after a 10 year period of the integration process, Slovakia was more clearly agrarian in character than before. The Slovak industrial labor share was at 19 .4% while Czech industrial labor rate reached 42.1 % . In the mid-1930's there was a brief spurt of "re-industrialization" in Slovakia, largely in defenserelated industries (perhaps to move them eastward, away from the German border), but even with this , at the end of the First Republic there was still a relative 6% decrease of industrial employment in Slovakia. The percentage of Slovaks in the total industrial employment in Czechoslovakia did not rise above 8% during the entire period. 29 Over the twenty year existence of the First Republic, Slovak economic development consistently lagged behind that of the Czechs, producing a highly developed sense of economic grievance among Slovaks of all political persuasions, including the centrists. On the issue of the economy there existed near unanimity of opinion among the Slovaks. The inability of the Slovaks, however, to effect significant changes in the economic policies and expenditures of the 27 Mencl , p. 143. 28 see Fabricius, Hospodarsky vyvoj S/ovenska do konca predmnfchovskej repub liky, pp . 40-56 and Lacina, pp . 87 and passim for a discusstion of Czech fin ancial investment policies in Slovakia. 29 Radoslav Selucky, "The Economic Equalization of Slovakia with the Czech Lands ", East European Economics, 4/1965, pp . 42-59. SLOVAKIA 85 central government served to make manifest the structural impediments to full Slovak self-fulfillment within the framework of the unitary Czechoslovak republic. The result was frustration and alienation, both in the economic and the political sphere. In the political sphere, one could almost say that the very decision to create an unitary state of the "Czechoslovak" nation created an untenable situation. Even the most cursory examination of the process by which the unitary state was formed and the structure through which it functioned reveals that the system itself contributed to the erosion of the viability of the unitary Czechoslovak state. The prevailing opinions have generally been that this decision was necessary and beneficial: necessary because of the international situation, the Wilsonian commitment to national self-determination and above all by the fact that the Germans constituted the second largest national group in the new state. And it was beneficial because by that process the Slovaks became a state people rather than a national minority. The assumption therefore is that an unitary state structure was in response to these factors, and not a political decision by the Czech leadership, less a political opportunity but rather an historical necessity. What is generally glossed over is that until almost the very end of the peace process, the dualistic principle was a very real option, that is Czecho-Slovakia, as indicated by the use of the hyphen until 1920 _30 What decided the issue was not Wilsonian expectations but the military turmoil in Slovakia, necessitating occupation and creating fears for the safety of the whole republic . The structure of the state was influenced as much by some short-term problems which could have been resolved in several ways as by broad historical forces . Nor was the decision made because Slovaks were unprepared or disinterested in the structure of the new state. From the time that the Slovak League of America was empowered to negotiate for the Slovaks (Martin Memorandum, 1906) to the Pittsburgh Agreement to the various plans and statements made by Slovak leaders 30 see Joseph Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslo vakia , Boulder, East European Monographs , 1986. 86 SLOVAKIA throughout 1918, it was clear the Slovaks were formulating concepts about their relationship with the Czechs. Examination of the meetings, speeches, correspondence of Slovak leaders, especially in 1918 reveals wide-ranging discussions about the anticipated relationship; autonomy was perhaps the most consistent expectation. For example, Matus Dula wrote on November 23, 1918: "when I discussed our autonomy with responsible [rozhodnymi] Czech leaders, they attested that Slovaks would get full autonomy autonomous rights would fall under the competency of the regional diet." 31 It is clear that in 1918 Slovaks were willing to join their sovereignty with that of the Czechs as partners in a new state, because that afforded them the best opportunity for political emancipation; what they were not expecting to do was to blend and blur their hardfought national identity. The decision to postulate a "Czechoslovak nation" was not made by Slovak political representatives, and these did exist, as did political parties, nor by any electoral process, but rather by a very small group of appointed politicians not very representative of the political, economic, social and cultural spectrum of Slovakia.32 There is no question that conditions were such that it did not appear that reasoned debates and consensus building were luxuries which could be afforded. What needs to be understood however is that decisions were made due to very specific historical events which led to the choice of certain options, which were not necessarily the optimal or sole options and which therefore could 31 Milan Krajcovic, "Slovensko v zahranicnopolitickych suvislostiach 1918-1922", in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, p. 148 . See also the article by Vladimir Zuberec, "Vyznamny dokument o postaveni Slovenska za burfoaznej CSR v zbierkach Slovenskeho Narodneho Muzea" in Zbornik Slovenskeho Narodneho Muzea, LXXXIII , 1989, pp. 201-207 . 32 r:ubomir Liptak points out that there were 10,000 people with, if not political experience, certainly with experience in a variety of organizations and public life. And while the number of Slovak schools had dramatically declined , the number of Slovak students had gone up; these could all be acclimated quickly to the new Slovak reality . See "Pripravenosi Slovenska na demokraciu" in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, pp. 7-12. SLOVAKIA 87 have been readdressed as the situation changed. An underlying element in the creation of the new state was the notion that the year 1918 was the year zero - a new beginning with a clean slate. The failure to recognize and internalize the fundamentally different historical experiences and character of the two people, to recognize that in fact two separate nations existed, not branches of one nation, and that these two had differing notions about both the nature of their new relationship and its state structure influenced the subsequent development of the state as well as the two peoples. As Josef Hama points out "On the Czech side there was not the willingness to understand the differences; on the Slovak side there was impatience and anxiety arising from the feeling of powerlessness to achieve their objectives. Czechoslovakia was formed from the prevailing weight of the Czechs as a unitary state with significant characteristics of centralism." _33 The construct of the unitary state, and the method of ratification of the constitution, meant that there was no national debate and therefore no national consensus on the very definition of the nation state . In the formative period, the hyphenated form, suggesting a state of the Czechs and Slovaks, often was used interchangeably with the Czechoslovak. The definitive proclamation in the Constitution that the "Czechoslovak nation" was the creator of the state and "Czechoslovak" the language of the state created the situation in which those large numbers of Slovaks who resisted the label Czechoslovak were forced into opposition not just against the policies of the state, a normal aspect of parliamentary systems, but against the very nature of the state itself, a position the Slovaks initially had no desire to take and in fact until the very end of the republic sought to avoid. As a consequence the fiction of the single Czechoslovak nation was assumed to be the selfevident principle on which relations between Czechs and Slovaks were based. From the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of Czech politicians, therefore, neither Slovak autonomy nor the federalization of the state on the basis of the national principle was deemed to be at all 33 Harna, p. 14. 88 SLOVAKIA necessary. This attitude prevailed even as the very construct "two branches of the Czechoslovak nation" would seem to demand the necessity of constitutional elaboration and resolution of the individuality contained within the notion of two branches _34 Once the decision was made to create a unitary state, the opportunities for initiating and implementing Slovak policies and political objectives were circumscribed at best, both by the structure of the state system, the political party structure and to an extent the Slovak political forms. The peculiar structure of the party system meant that opposition parties had no realistic chance of modifying the system. The frustration that results from the perceived inability to influence the system in any way often leads to radicalism and this was certainly the case in Czechoslovakia. The power politics party system in the interwar republic proved to be remarkably stable, even though it was a multi-party system in which significant groups were polarized. Stability was achieved at a price, namely the diminution of the role of Parliament and the enhancement of the power of the President and of the government forming coalition parties. A further price was the perception that these centrist parties (generally known as the Petka) had to achieve a consensus and cohesiveness in the face of the fundamental divergence of views from the outsider parties. Hence opposition becomes not something to be tolerated and contested, but something threatening and destabilizing. In effect, the coalition parties could not afford the luxury of opposition; aware of the differences in the state, they felt compelled to focus on retaining and centralizing power. The political cabinet of party leaders essentially overshadowed the ministerial cabinet and tended to make of Parliament a virtual rubber stamp, at least for deputies from the governing parties. What that meant in practice was that the system was impervious to any fundamental change through the normal parliamentary 34M. Matula, "Nektere problemy souvisejfci s institucionalnfm aspektem narodnfc h vztahu CSR v letech 1918-1938" in Slovensko v politickom syst6me Ceskoslovenska, p. 91 . SLOVAKIA 89 process. What ensued then was the belief that the structure itself had to be modified if any real political power was to develop among the Slovaks. As one historian writes: The issue was not really whether or not the Slovaks achieved immediate autonomy but the Jack of understanding and the unwillingness of the Czech parties even to recognize the problem. Thus the spokesmen for the Slovak position were pushed into opposition and progressively forced into a negative stance relative to the existing regime.3 5 Illustrative of the unwillingness even to address the question of constitutional organization was the fate of administrative reconstruction. The County Law of 1920 was designed to integrate Slovakia into the new state by creating a new county structure to replace the old. What especially generated protests by Slovak administrators was that financial control at the county level was taken over by the central Ministries oflnterior and Finance. During 1921-22, several proposals were made in Parliament to address these Slovak concerns. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP) called for selfadministration in Slovak affairs, a provincial Diet and a provincial government named by the President. There were also other variants, some more radical, of Slovak autonomy. Hodza, who at this time was still looking for a means of unifying Slovak political power, suggested a County Union with competencies in health, welfare, economic and cultural spheres precisely to shift administrative power in Slovakia out of Prague's bureaucratic hands and into Slovak political hands. The debate on these issues in the ministerial circles in Prague revealed a reluctance to delegate any real powers, even to a body like the County Union. The only concessions to be made were delegating powers addressing the needs of the feeble-minded, blind, deaf, epileptic, supervising forced labor and the poorhouses .36 35 Hama, p. 19. 36 For an analysis of the debate over the administration of Slovakia, see Natalia Krajcovicovli , "Politicke strany na Slovensku a usilie o samosprlivu v dvadsiatich rokoch" in Slovensko v politickom systeme Ceskoslovenska, pp . 47-55 . See also Ladislav Lipscher, K vyvinu politickej spravy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1938, Bratislava, SA V, 1966. 90 SLOVAKIA The political concerns behind such positions were evident, as expressed in the magazine Tribuna: "It is certain that a County Union in Slovakia would be a constant threat to the unity of the state. Who can guarantee that it would not give birth to some kind of autonomous Diet for Slovakia?"3 7 The result was that the administrative structure for Slovakia was extraordinarily limited, always under the strict supervision of Prague. Slovaks lost even a modicum of local autonomy, under a system which was not implemented in the rest of the country precisely because the example of centralized power as manifested in Slovakia aroused local opposition in Bohemia and Moravia. The anomaly could not be sustained and in 1927 the Provincial Law replaced the county system with the four historic provinces. While this acknowledged the territorial existence of Slovakia as an entity, little was done to give that entity any real administrative powers. The failure of these administrative efforts indicated that no serious attempt would be made to bring about a measure of decentralization of government. Problems of special significance to the Slovaks, such as the economic imbalance, the lower standard of living, the dearth of jobs for the growing numbers of university trained younger leaders, the preservation of religious and cultural values were thus not addressed regionally, but left to the central government in Prague, where Slovak power was minimal at best. It could be argued, and often has been, that the lack of Slovak power was more the result of the divisions among the Slovaks themselves than of the unitary and centralized nature of the system. The inability of the Slovaks to form a cohesive bloc was a factor, but not a decisive factor, for as long as even one Slovak was found who would enter the government in the name of the Slovaks (and in fact three, namely Vavro Srobar, Ivan Derer, Hod:fa, were all that were basically necessary during the First Republic) and while coalition parties could attract a Slovak following, (and two did), the power of the coalition bloc would outweigh any Slovak bloc. The ambiguity about the nature of the Czech-Slovak problem would however have 37Krajfovicovii, p. 51. SLOVAKIA 91 been clarified had the Slovaks achieved a Slovak party. Hod:fa and others recognized this and an attempt was made to form a National Bloc or even a Political Committee (which Hod:fa tried) which would have functioned in a manner analogous to the Petka. This failed because of the inability to achieve a uniform stand on the question of the Slovak position in the state and also to a diversity of views on some specific issues, a problem partially attributable to confessional differences. There did exist a basic consensus on general principles; only a few Slovaks were convinced Czechoslovaks. Unfortunately it was precisely these few who were able to join the government in Prague and were thus considered to represent the Slovaks. There was in fact a fundamental unity among the Slovak populace: a rejection of ethnic and linguistic Czechoslovakism, a commitment to the Czechoslovak state, albeit a reformed one, and a recognition of the pluralistic nature of the state and society. If there was division among the Slovaks, it came on the question of how, not whether, to reform the state: regionalism or autonomy. The Slovak Agrarians, under Hod:fa's leadership, were centrist in that they worked within the system to bring about a modification of some of the system, but especially in the 1930's were also advocates of regionalism. Hodfa came to advocate an intermediary notion, looking at it from a pragmatic perspective, which "means neither centralism nor autonomy, but state-political unity and regionalism with administrative self-government" .38 Hodfa was trying to find a bridge between two ever diverging assessments (one Czech and the other Slovak) of the satisfaction level with the existing political system. The escalating criticism by Slovaks of their position in the First Republic is evident from the following editorial in Zem, the journal of the younger generation of Agrarians: The aversion of Czechs and Slovaks arises from economic and social problems . Czechs accept our arguments with a judicious attentiveness , while they continue to make their own national , cultural and linguistic politics .. . Currently a majority of the Slovaks want to acknowledge their own nation .... and the unfortunate tendencies (potmehudske narazky) seen 38Milan Hodfa, C/anky, reci, §tudie, Prague , Novina , 1934, Vol. 7, pp . xxxii-iii . 92 SLOVAKIA in various Czech newspapers, to suggest that Slovak efforts to achieve their rights somehow indicates political unreliabi lity, wi ll not deter the Slovaks. 39 If even Hodza's and the Agrarians' moderate call for regionalism was ignored , the possibility for substantive constitutional reform was all the more remote. The position of the HSPP, which consistently included Slovak autonomy as its basic program, is certainly a case in point. Representing a large portion of the Slovak people,40 they were systematically frustrated in their attempts to implement their programs. Ignored most of the time, only in times of crisis did the governing powers seek to integrate the HSPP into the process , such as the coalition crisis of the late 192O's or the presidential elections of 1935 ; once the crisis was resolved, any further negotiations were deemed unnecessary. A good illustration of this can be seen from the December 1935 talks between President Edvard Benes and Andrej Hlinka, leader of the HSPP. Hlinka asked for decentralization and legislative power for regional Slovak organs and for the post of Minister for Slovakia for the HSPP. Benes promised to give the Slovaks all that was possible without undermining the unity of the state. In February 1936 Benes noted that the entry of HSPP into the government was delayed due to unacceptable nature of the demands: the same demands which were made in negotiations in December. The governing coalition rejected the demands and the matter was closed.41 No matter what route the Slovaks followed in their efforts to modify the structure and political system, they had little success. Political parties in Slovakia were unable to compete nationally, for 39zem, IV , 4 , 20 . February , 1938, p. 39 . 40 one could argue that at times it did indeed represent a majority of the Slovaks, if one assumes that Czechs voting in Slovakia supported centrist parties and Magyars their own parties . 41 E.F. Firsov, "K problemu modifik,kif parlamentneho systemu CSR a narodnopolitickeho konsenzu Cechov a Slovakov na prelome 20. a 30 . rokov" in Slo vensk o v politickom systeme Ceskos/ovenska, p. 104. SLOVAKIA 93 the state was in the hands of the centrist parties and thus no shadow coalition or cabinet could form. Slovaks were united in their efforts to gain control of the bureaucratic apparatus in Slovakia, as a means of indirect access to the power center. This too was frustrated by the bureaucratic structure of centralism. It took the crisis of 1938 to bring about some readjustment in the state relations between Czechs and Slovaks, a settlement subsequently repudiated as being forcibly imposed. 42 By that time however a more aggressive and assertive stance had been taken by the HSPP; 20 years of waiting for the system to change from above had led to the radicalization of the efforts to change it. It is often argued that in time of crisis the Slovaks abandoned the Czechs, generating the notion of ungrateful Slovaks. One could likewise argue that only in times of crisis did the Czechs remember the Slovaks .. . one can go to the well only so many times. There is no question that fascist elements had entered into the Slovak political arena, fueled in part by economic grievances and political frustration . The fact that fascism was a force sweeping across the disaffected sectors of Europe does not absolve the Slovaks of responsibility for those fascist features; nor does however the argument that Czechoslovakia, while it had its faults, was still the only functioning democracy in Eastern Europe and better than the surrounding systems excuse those faults and deny their consequences. For both, historical relativism is a tempting but ultimately unsatisfying position. 43 42 An interesting side point here is Hodza's argument that the political cabinet's acceptance of Slovak self-administration, as negotiated in the summer of 1938 was in fact valid , against Bene§' subsequent argument , after W .W .II broke out , that Parliament had not approved it and it was therefore invalid. Hodza was correct in his perception that the political cabinet was the crucial decision making body . That was why Slovak political efforts were in fact so often frustrated, because Parliament tended only to reflect the decisions of the political cabinet. 43 As a prominent Czech historian has observed: "The ideal of democracy became a self-indulgent compliment, nurturing the need of the Czechs for universal recognition and admiration. Czech nationalism greeted the foundation of the republic not only as an occasion to score points in the nationalistic struggle with imperialistic 94 SLOVAKIA The analogy of a marriage is perhaps an appropriate metaphor for the course of Czech and Slovaks relations . In May of 1918, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire was moving inexorably toward its demise, Hlinka declared: "It is absolutely necessary for us to decide if we will continue with the Magyars, or go with the Czechs. Let us not evade the question, let us say openly that we are for the CzechoSlovak orientation. The thousand year marriage with the Magyars has not worked. A divorce is necessary." 44 The marriage of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1918 was a classic war-time marriage: undertaken in haste, without adequate courtship, with both partners moving immediately from divorce (Austrian and Hungarian partners respectively) into this new relationship. There was no time to discuss the terms and conditions of the marriage, the expectations about what each sought and would bring to the marriage. What little was prepared was done largely by marriage brokers (Toma~ G. Masaryk on one side and the American Slovaks on the other, resulting in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918) . The first months of the marriage were very difficult, as the residual effects of the Great War needed to be addressed . It became apparent fairly soon, however, that the two partners in the marriage had very different expectations and notions. The Czech partner clearly saw himself as the preponderant factor, functioning as provider and decision maker in a traditional marriage . This was a natural expectation, given the Czech numerical and material dominance. Thus the Czechs had a clear notion of the nature of the relationship: a unitary state of the Czechoslovak nation. The Slovak partner was much less clear about her role in the marriage. Given her relative lack of wealth and experience, there was a tendency on the part of some to accept a dependent relationship and a subservient role in the marriage. Thus generally more than a third of the Slovaks Germany, but also as a justification of its own colonial ambitions toward Slovakia." Zden~k Pinc, "The Idea of the Czechoslovak State: History, Theory and Political Reality", Czechoslovak and Central European Journal, 10, no. I , 1991, p. 38 . 44 Karol Medvecky, Slovenskf prevrat, Tmava, Spolok Sv. Vojtecha, 1930-31 , Vol. Ill , p. 347 . SLOVAKIA 95 accepted the Czechoslovak unitary state, though only a tiny minority believed in the notion of the Czechoslovak people and virtually no one subscribed to a Czechoslovak language. There also existed a different notion of the marriage, namely the desire for an equal partnership between two equals. This was manifested in the desire for some form of Slovak autonomy as exemplified by the hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia, a position which generally a majority of the Slovaks supported. As the marriage progressed during the 1920's and 1930's, both internal and external factors escalated Slovak discontent. The Slovaks came to resent their status in the Czechoslovak Republic because they felt increasingly frustrated , both economically and politically and because they perceived a paternalistic indifference to Slovak grievances. Increasingly, this frustration led to a sense of alienation from the marriage and a greater responsiveness to ideological concepts which addressed both the reality and the theory of the inadequacy of an unequal marriage; in this marriage it was the call of nationalism which led the "weaker" partner to re-evaluate her place within the Czech-defined relationship. As storm clouds gathered over Europe, as tension and fear escalated, the Slovaks sought to re-define the marriage precisely at the moment that the Czechs, feeling far more threatened by the forces gathering over Europe, resisted any tampering with what to them was a satisfactory marriage. They in fact did not even comprehend the alienation and sense of frustration prevalent among the Slovaks . Thus the events of Munich and after led to deep bitterness, for the Czechs believed the Slovaks had stabbed them in the back, and the Slovaks felt that, having been denied the opportunity to improve their relationship with the Czechs, they had no obligations to travel the bitter path with a partner who had never listened to them and had never been prepared to engage in a genuine dialogue with a view toward developing a marriage of true partners. During the period of the war, the Czechs and some Slovaks denied that the marriage had broken up; some Czechs even denied that any adjustments were necessary for the marriage to resume. Virtually no Slovak could subscribe to that position; for the Slovaks, at the very minimum, a co-equal marriage was imperative. 96 SLOVAKIA The fall of communism enabled old and new grievances to surface, on both sides, and to be finally openly confronted. The result was a divorce. The seeds of that divorce, not necessarily inevitable , had been planted by failures common to so many marriages: lack of communications and the inability to listen as Czechs and Slovaks talked from different historical perspectives, in different languages and with different objectives , resulting in misunderstandings, undervaluing of roles , responsibilities and contributions, and above all , the lack of commitment to a marriage of diversity and genuine equality.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Relations Between Slovaks and Czechs in the First CSR Description An account of the resource Susan Mikula Slovakia, Vol. 35 (No. 64-65), 1991-92 pp. 78-96 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikula, Suzanna Maria, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991-92 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c9f3421fefc835397e1825fe1d41f08b.pdf e4b7ca934a2cb12d830a6397fb72344d PDF Text Text 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. �SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. �52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. �SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. �54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. �SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 �56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° �SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. �58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. �SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . �60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: �SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. �62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 �SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 �64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. �SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995) � 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. �SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. �52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. �SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. �54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. �SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 �56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° �SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. �58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. �SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . �60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: �SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. �62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 �SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 �64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. �SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. 52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. 54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. 58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . 60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Birth of Lexicographic Works in North America with Special Emphasis on J. J. Konuš Description An account of the resource Dalibor Mikuláš Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 50-65 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuláš, Dalibor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4cf23d1de317242aa7b3b53d9845a1ba.pdf 5ae41e4c22c3723c5c58f0fff39e3903 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak �iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA). � 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak �iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA mE PURGE IN PRAGUE JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky, and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms." Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow." But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr. Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State. The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow, his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow. And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr. Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only 'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and Actlng Chief of the delegatlon. After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak iLOVAKIA 29 delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive. In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection. Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later, in February 1951, he was lncarcerated. As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague. The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers. • • • WHO SAI D IT ? "The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Purge in Prague Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 28-29 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f841e2bddb560de426f2a8cd936a6f02.pdf e149e9d1fae319afac2fbbe288f8448e PDF Text Text 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. �BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e �tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a �SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? - � 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. �BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e �tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a �SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? -  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Diplomatic Service of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 38-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4355d5fa608dcbd2e5899b446d1a939b.pdf 80ffe57af0f2baf80c1a8cf5b8032a04 PDF Text Text 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" �SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 �2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by �SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." �30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- �SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor. � 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" �SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 �2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by �SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." �30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- �SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." 30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak and European Separatism: An Interview with the Late Royal Taylor Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikus Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 26-31 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f7c9d1a75e0451ddb6cf16ce129e65fa.pdf 50aa08ee2cb27a68097dac0f0dcc5754 PDF Text Text 57 SLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA JOSEPH A. MIKUS Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in 1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy. As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader, Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God and the nation." - What did it mean? From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence. 1 From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be- �58 SLOVAKIA tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government. In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So, "OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State. For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism. From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet Union. After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small 1 �SLOVAKIA 59 nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless, recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government, represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach, the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso ..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end. Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition goes back to the eighth century. But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical pressure from t he outside. In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party, which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we . the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus- see �60 SLOVAKIA sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore, decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow. In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked - not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny, Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition, shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that of the "M_a rxist majority." Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book "Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a change in the internal structure of the government. 'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact. This resistance is both religious and national. Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr. V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than �61 SLOVAKIA sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State police. From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national 'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is only one possible solution to the situation: the application of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world. Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United .Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr. Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr. J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen, John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength, to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it 1 WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "The importance of our trea ty with the U. S. S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944) . � 57 SLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA JOSEPH A. MIKUS Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in 1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy. As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader, Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God and the nation." - What did it mean? From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence. 1 From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be- �58 SLOVAKIA tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government. In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So, "OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State. For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism. From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet Union. After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small 1 �SLOVAKIA 59 nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless, recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government, represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach, the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso ..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end. Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition goes back to the eighth century. But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical pressure from t he outside. In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party, which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we . the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus- see �60 SLOVAKIA sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore, decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow. In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked - not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny, Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition, shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that of the "M_a rxist majority." Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book "Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a change in the internal structure of the government. 'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact. This resistance is both religious and national. Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr. V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than �61 SLOVAKIA sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State police. From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national 'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is only one possible solution to the situation: the application of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world. Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United .Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr. Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr. J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen, John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength, to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it 1 WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "The importance of our trea ty with the U. S. S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 57 SLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA JOSEPH A. MIKUS Firom 1918 untirl 1948, Ohristian democracy was a dominant poliltical fo11ce ,i n S}ovrukia. Orig1nated ,u nder Hungarian rll!le at the >beginning olf the twentieth cenrtn.ury, Sloviak Chilistiian demo·c r-rucy realflf,iirmed i.itself and a,r ose ,v i1ctorious from ,t he i:dedl'og~all. cha:O's whicli existed in Czecho-iSlovakia and in Centrail EuTope af1ter 1918. W:hi'le Trj,anon Hunga,r y was the vidiim of the Oommilliru.Sm of Belia Kuihn in 1919, SociaJl Demo:crat:s fomne:d the .strongest :po1itica1 pairty in Czecho.,Sloivaikia. It remains t'he histodcal merit of the great Slovaik Caitholi:c and nationa[ leader, Msg1r. Andrew Hlinlka, for having saved Slo,vaJkia from spi.ri.itual anarchy. As founder of ,t he Slovak Peo:ple'·s Party amd. i.ts. leader, Hli:nlka designed for .SlovaJkia the right way of Christian demoCTa'Cy. 'Tihe ,program of his party w:as Ito work "foir God and the nation." - What did it mean? From the .r eligious standpoint, the People's Party always defended the Oa;tholic tramtion of the country against a narrow and panti-cmlarist Ozecih Husritiscrn which attempted to conquer the Slovak people. In the hard spirituaJl struggle Slovakia remained loyally on the side of the Roman Catholic Chu:rc:h amd in opposirt:ion to .t'he effo,r t of the governmental circles of P:mgiue which used ail[ the iresauirces. of the State to bring ,a bowt the "emancipati on" of Ozecho~Slovakia from the infllueI11Ce ~ Rome. T. G . Ma:saryk authored the •s 'logans "Asway from Rome" and •~Rome must ibe brought to tria•l and ,e;onrvioted !" The Slovruks were decidedly opposed ,to the estiaJb!lishment of the soJcal,led national "Czechoglovruk cihurClh" in Sil01v;akia, whtch .they re:cognirzed onl,y as a tool orf foreign spi.rii.itil.la1 influence. 1 From the naJtionall point orf view, the People's Party defended the natUTal rights of the Sloivak nation which were systema:tiica:Uy being abbTe-viated by the Prague Administration. The Czecho-S1-o;vak State in 1918, was sUipposed to be a federal union, such as the United States, be- 58 SLOVAKIA tween two equial par.tneTs, Ozechia (Bohemia, Moravia and SHesia) and Slova~ia, with a common cm,rency, forei1gn policy and m~litaey defel1$e. In fa.dt, howeveT, the Ce;echs ar'bitraril;y ohanged this nationally drualistic State into a strong centralized, umoorian "Czoohoslovaik" State by the Cons,titution of Fe/brua:ry 29, 1920, which was imipdsed on the Slo:vak nation lby the so-Oal[ed "RevoluJtiorrary Pa,rliament" tihat had .been handpicked by the Prague Government. In this way, .u nder Czech :r,ule, the SlOIV'aks were deprived of thek nationa!l rights and ;b ecame an initernal minority. In 1923, the Czech major1ty in Parfa1ment su,ppressed the ind'iJviidu,a,l consti'burtionaJ libertiies of minorities (the right olf free press•, tree spooclh, free asseniibl,y, etc) by adopting the Internal Seicurirty Aot. (No. 50-1923) which indica.ted alil efforts to;wa~d federa!lisrn as subversive. So, "OrechoslloviaJkia" never was, in fad, a country of f:ree politiica,l ins't!ituitfons, nor a t:riue democratic State. For these reasons, the SloJVlalk People's Party claimed in accordanice with dispositions of .t he Cleveland (191'5 ) and the Pilttshw-gh (1918) agreements signed by the Slovaik League of Ameriica and various Czech organmaitions - a dualist federation, which would bring to an end the privileged situaition of the Czechs and carry on the pr.inci,ple of equaility of bolth :peOiples in the oommon Staite If the Slovak peop'le were dlisiposed, in spkit and in ,t he interests of Christian integration, to abandon ceI1ta·i n national prerogatives in favor of a Czecho-iSlovaJk federal government, it was not at a1Jl disposed to relinquish the Slov<aJk nationa!l idea in favor of a Czech, that is a foreign nationalism. From the point of view of foreign policy, the Slovaik Peoiple's Pairty strongly .cr.ftici'Zed the miilita,:r,y alliance which MT. Benes signed in 1935 in Moscow with the Soviet Union. After the M'Uilich Agreement, when Hiit:Jler was giiven a fa:·ee hand in Central EJwro.pe by the Western Powers, Slova;k Christian democra:cy, the biggest 1po[irtica1 force in Slovakia, was charged with the task to cond~, at su.ch a d:iJfficuilt stage, th~ policy of thalt country. Foir such a small 1 SLOVAKIA 59 nation it was very hrurd, ind:eeld, both spiritually and politically, to oppose eff~ctiivcly a totalitarian sys'tem such as Nazism. An iimipaI"tia:l historiography wiM, nevertheless, recognize the resist'a.rrce which Msgr. Joseph Tiso, the President of the Slov•aJk Repulblic, devcloped diuring World War II against the attempt of Nazism to estaJb'lish i.tself in his rarucaUy pro-German elements in the Sloivak Government, represenited m:aJinly by Vojtech Tu!k•a, the Brime Minister and the Minister of Fore,i,gn Affaiirs, and Afexander Mach, the Minister of Interior. The 'l:'uka-iMaich cornlbine iplayed uip to the Namis to win t!heir favor and thus to e:Hmina'te Tiso and his regime and ,puit 'l:'uka and his followers in their place. But they l,ruaked popular suipport. Being .previailed upon by the SlOIVak hiera~hiy and the people, Msgr. Joseph Tiso ..::.ecided to stay at his .p ost, and stay he did to the very end. Tiso's merit consists in hiruving saved Slovakia and his people from territorial d'ismeimlbeI1Inent, which was planned by Hungary and Gemniany, as proved at the Nuremberg trials, and in h'a!V,i ng preserved from Na'2li influence the spiritual individua!lilty of Slov,aJkia whose Christian tradition goes back to the eighth century. But Christian democra'Cy in Sfovakia faced its hardest task after 1'94,5. Slovalkia was at that time occupied by the Soviet Aruny and talken OIVer by Mir. Benes's Government forrr:ed in the shadow of the Kremlin. Since that time Slovakia has been exposed to a terrific ideological and po'lttical pressure from t he outside. In the elections in 1946. ChPi:sitian democra·c y in Slovakia manifested its strength. The Cathoilics, instructed by their hieiraTchy, gave an heroic example of great political disciopJ.i.ne. They •v oted for ,t he Slovalk Democratic Party, which gained 62 p€!r cent of the total ~lectorai vote; meanwhile in Czechia 56 per cent voted for pro-Communist parties ( 42 per cent for the Communists and 14 -p er cent for the Social Democrats). Those elections were the :b est expression of the Western orientation of the Slovaik people and of the fatal pro~Soviet position of the Czechs. In this distinction we . the internal ,p aradox of Czecho-Slova,kia. Though territorially farther West, the Czechs looked to Soviet Rus- see 60 SLOVAKIA sia as their best ally and protector, while the S[o,vaiks, the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, looked to the Western Powers. The Benes~Gottwa!ld regime regarded this altitude of the Sl~aks as "trea:cherouis" and, theTefore, decided to do s01rnething aJbout it to save face in Moscow. In the autumn of 1947, under the pretext oif con1eealing a girouip of "sepaJI1aJtists and consptrators agaiins.t the secwrity of ,t,he State," the Sl:ovak Demo'CraNc Party was attacked - not ontlry ,b y the Cotnmiun.ists, Qt.I't the Ozec,h democratic par,ties, too - !n ruch a way that it could never recover from the blo,w ''.Dwo thoU1Sand of its memlbers were imprisonoo, among them thrne olf its: deputies (iBugar, Kempny, Stasko) and. bne of its representatiJVes in the_ GoJVernment of the "Nationrul Fronrt," Vi'Ce~Premier John Uirsiny. With this "coup de fooce'' by which fta:gue imposed on democratic Slovakia a Oo:mrmunist ma:jorrty in the autonomous. Government in Bmtislava, the biggest political fac'tor in that country was crushed. HaJVing removed in this manner their strongest opponent in the Prague P.arJiament, the Communists coulld afterwards easiil y consoHda.te their ,p osition, shi,fting sirrnply from the system of "Na'tiona'1 Front" to that of the "M_a rxist majority." Contrary to what Mr. Hubert Ripka states in his book "Le coup d'Etat de Prague en 1948," there was, therefore, no revolution in Prague in February 1948. There was only a change in the internal structure of the government. 'Jihe present situation oi Christian demoomc,y in Slo·v akia is that of a resisting force to the Communist impact. This resistance is both religious and national. Catholiroism in Slovakia is a proven eounter-force to Communis:n. By the imprisonment of three Bishops, Msgr. V:oJtassruk, Msgr. Buza:lka and Msgr. Gojclic, and by keeping in house-arrest others of the Hierarchy, .the Chrur.ch finds it icrr:ipossilble to full.fill its obligations. But though there aire several hundred priests in jaH, though aH the Catholic lay elite has been "eliminated," though Christian demooracy as a poliiticail force has been crushed, . the Sl01V'8Jk peopie neventheless have retained a deep re!i,gious ooillViiction a:nd have defended chU'I'Ches an:d 'Priests with no more than 61 SLOVAKIA sticks and bare hands against the intervention of the State police. From the naHonal point of view, present-day OzechoSlavaJkia offers Vhe Slovaks nothing common to a national 'Staite. 'Bheir mherenit and ,a utonomous rights hruve been repudiated by Prag;ue once again. Ozecho~S!lwalkia today is simply one of the nll!mer()!U:s Socia[ist Reipuibl,ic.s of the Soviet orbit. Slovrukia has been depri·v ed of naitionail liberty in the name of the SocialiSIID preached by Moscow and executed by Prague. The Slovaks are firmly convinced that there is only one possible solution to the situation: the application of the right of national self-determination within the framework of a Federated Europe. This 'belief is shaired by the Slovak Lea,g ue of America and by aJl:l organie;ations of Slo-, J.!k political ref,u,gees in the free world. Slovak Ohnist:ian deimocraoy counts and relies on a nu1C'l eus oif prominent exi1ed peI'.sonallitities in the United .Jtrutes and Canada : some former Deiputies orf the Praigue Parlrarrnernt (Dr. :EJmanruel Boehm, St€iphen B1 aslko, John Daxner, Dr. Michael Zi:brin, Rev. Ferdinad Mondok, Dr. Francis Orlicky, Siteiphen BeniaJk), se;veral professors (Dr. J,o seph Cin:cik, Rev. Bonarventwre Ewe, Dr. Francis. Hrrusovsky, Reiv. Joseph PaJpin), nU1merous writers and jaurnaJlists George Gajdos-Bre~a, Rev. Nicha1as Sprinc, Constantine Ct.den, Dr. Joseipih Pa.iuco, Louis Kandra, Charles Sitrmen, John Okal'). and s.evera!l former Sllova!k diploona;ts (Charles Sidor, Dr. John Kassovk, Dr. Joseiph Kirs'Cihibaum, Dr. Joseph OmiliaJk) . All these men consider the United Statt•s as a fixed poh11t i;n the unive~se of Archi!Inides, frOim which it wilfil be possi,ble one day, by spiritual and physi.cal strength, to rock Communism from its foundations. They are most willing to conbrilbute their aJbilities and talents to effect the h'beration of Centra!l ffiurope and the formation of a European Federati'On with a free Slovrukia in it 1 WHO SAi D IT? - • • • "The importance of our trea ty with the U. S. S. R. is self-evident. Soviet Russia is rapidly freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny. Close ties have always existed between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and they have now been strengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, which is bound to play the leading role in Europe after the war." - (Jan Mas aryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christian Democracy in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 57-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0e4f9c285a353ca219a393203f06f902.pdf 1ef8e803ea2aa6cba32fe038b354f134 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 13 PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945 Joseph A. Mikus (A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.) "Between law and discipline the Judge must, without any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_ Prelitninary Observations The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives .o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a power imposed on the majority of the population, which is little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests, hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ>erlfectly all the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends. Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of its legitimity. t If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power, its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties. Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies, such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no place in a totalitarian State. In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality �14 ~LOVAKIA of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit. I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948. The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29, 1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~ tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could exist only by its system of international alliances and a police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity of all individual rights. It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID. Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State. During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing �SLOVAKIA 15 State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945, assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer.. Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947, pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the State. According to this principle, the Communists had a veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!" - that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943. This principle had been put into practice from the beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May 1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could have coooteracted their political aims. At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome, the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension. of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow Red MetrQPOlitan. As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard �16 SLO VAKIA b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions (~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950, whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the regional Government of SlovaJkia. The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are not for sale . . • • • WHO SAID IT? "We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we never participated in any political combination directed · against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY 0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) . � SLOVAKIA 13 PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945 Joseph A. Mikus (A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.) "Between law and discipline the Judge must, without any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_ Prelitninary Observations The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives .o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a power imposed on the majority of the population, which is little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests, hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ>erlfectly all the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends. Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of its legitimity. t If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power, its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties. Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies, such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no place in a totalitarian State. In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality �14 ~LOVAKIA of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit. I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948. The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29, 1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~ tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could exist only by its system of international alliances and a police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity of all individual rights. It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID. Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State. During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing �SLOVAKIA 15 State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945, assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer.. Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947, pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the State. According to this principle, the Communists had a veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!" - that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943. This principle had been put into practice from the beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May 1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could have coooteracted their political aims. At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome, the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension. of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow Red MetrQPOlitan. As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard �16 SLO VAKIA b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions (~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950, whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the regional Government of SlovaJkia. The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are not for sale . . • • • WHO SAID IT? "We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we never participated in any political combination directed · against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY 0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 13 PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945 Joseph A. Mikus (A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.) "Between law and discipline the Judge must, without any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_ Prelitninary Observations The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives .o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a power imposed on the majority of the population, which is little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests, hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ>erlfectly all the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends. Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of its legitimity. t If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power, its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties. Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies, such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no place in a totalitarian State. In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality 14 ~LOVAKIA of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit. I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948. The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29, 1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~ tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could exist only by its system of international alliances and a police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity of all individual rights. It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID. Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State. During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing SLOVAKIA 15 State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945, assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer.. Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947, pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the State. According to this principle, the Communists had a veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!" - that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943. This principle had been put into practice from the beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May 1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could have coooteracted their political aims. At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome, the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension. of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow Red MetrQPOlitan. As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard 16 SLO VAKIA b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions (~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950, whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the regional Government of SlovaJkia. The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are not for sale . . • • • WHO SAID IT? "We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we never participated in any political combination directed · against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY 0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Law in Czecho-Slovakia After 1945 Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikus Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954 pp. 13-16 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1954 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d558bf486130113f31bb768332df1b00.pdf 9eda05cb64a925f0729ab0352dd02569 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA Joseph A. Mikus An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv<akia, put the following questions to me recently: 1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the Slovaks? 2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa. nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak State? 3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920? 4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at.., tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia? '5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik Peop~e's Party? 6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and Protestantism in Slovakia? 7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program? 1 Since these questions are asked morn frequently by persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this regard. Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord. ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim, the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo. gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his life than in the choice between two ponds that he would prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con- �46 SLOVAKIA eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect. The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8, arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia. Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was by far a much more important document in the moderp. history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- , ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts .. burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot be considered separately from morals and politics. It is indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted .. ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document, but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes would have remained somewhere in France as obscure journalists or poor college-iteachers. In any deal none of the two contracting parties has the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of America were American citizens and, consequently, did not have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not honest. When he signe<l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa.. ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers. He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should, then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa- �SLOVAKIA 47 tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors? What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of Czecho-Slovakia? It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe. His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs. In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview, ,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) , reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement: "Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic character. There is no question about that and on this point - as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1) That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation, contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." 1 fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920 The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says : "Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the �48 SLOVAKIA problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920. This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they? Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the "·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks, the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle. At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down , from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia. Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia. Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a "due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism . �SLOVAKIA 49 After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera. tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:; terrorized the population during the electoral campaign as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo men were killed iby the police during a political gathering. Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech "liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party." Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats 23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 . In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr. Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament: "We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im. prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2) It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni. fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE �50 SLOVAKIA fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia, and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion of 750,000, had only 9. The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and killed two peasants. (3) All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights. That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom. Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic, awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks. In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23 deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state. While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither �SLOVAKIA 51 was it possible to recognize any right of decision about Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who, preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc. Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of 1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the 22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and 19'29. Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always sought to vilify this party by different accusations and denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones" into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted. When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the "Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in 1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy, regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State. What connections are there 'between Catholicism and autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some 82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con- �52 SLOVAKIA structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina, i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It happened that after the White Mountain debacle many Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language, they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832), a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech religious emigration in Slovrukia: "When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to return easily from there back tio their native country in order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT, to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they . found security under tlie protection of big landowners in the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura, etc" C4l This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich, Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus. It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky, �SLOVAKIA 53 Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality. One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks, however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world that the human rights of racial and religious minorities should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony. Conclusion The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism. �54 SLOVAKIA This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of ~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist Party in order to break the resistance of the population aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of State Seourity. For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe. (1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955. (2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament, Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144. (3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165. (4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 . • • • WHO SAID IT? "I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948 there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front, led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr. Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech "BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952). � SLOVAKIA MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA Joseph A. Mikus An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv<akia, put the following questions to me recently: 1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the Slovaks? 2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa. nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak State? 3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920? 4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at.., tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia? '5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik Peop~e's Party? 6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and Protestantism in Slovakia? 7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program? 1 Since these questions are asked morn frequently by persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this regard. Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord. ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim, the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo. gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his life than in the choice between two ponds that he would prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con- �46 SLOVAKIA eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect. The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8, arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia. Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was by far a much more important document in the moderp. history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- , ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts .. burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot be considered separately from morals and politics. It is indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted .. ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document, but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes would have remained somewhere in France as obscure journalists or poor college-iteachers. In any deal none of the two contracting parties has the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of America were American citizens and, consequently, did not have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not honest. When he signe<l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa.. ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers. He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should, then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa- �SLOVAKIA 47 tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors? What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of Czecho-Slovakia? It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe. His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs. In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview, ,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) , reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement: "Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic character. There is no question about that and on this point - as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1) That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation, contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." 1 fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920 The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says : "Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the �48 SLOVAKIA problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920. This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they? Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the "·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks, the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle. At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down , from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia. Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia. Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a "due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism . �SLOVAKIA 49 After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera. tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:; terrorized the population during the electoral campaign as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo men were killed iby the police during a political gathering. Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech "liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party." Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats 23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 . In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr. Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament: "We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im. prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2) It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni. fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE �50 SLOVAKIA fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia, and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion of 750,000, had only 9. The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and killed two peasants. (3) All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights. That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom. Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic, awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks. In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23 deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state. While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither �SLOVAKIA 51 was it possible to recognize any right of decision about Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who, preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc. Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of 1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the 22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and 19'29. Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always sought to vilify this party by different accusations and denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones" into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted. When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the "Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in 1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy, regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State. What connections are there 'between Catholicism and autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some 82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con- �52 SLOVAKIA structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina, i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It happened that after the White Mountain debacle many Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language, they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832), a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech religious emigration in Slovrukia: "When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to return easily from there back tio their native country in order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT, to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they . found security under tlie protection of big landowners in the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura, etc" C4l This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich, Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus. It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky, �SLOVAKIA 53 Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality. One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks, however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world that the human rights of racial and religious minorities should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony. Conclusion The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism. �54 SLOVAKIA This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of ~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist Party in order to break the resistance of the population aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of State Seourity. For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe. (1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955. (2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament, Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144. (3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165. (4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 . • • • WHO SAID IT? "I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948 there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front, led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr. Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech "BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA Joseph A. Mikus An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv<akia, put the following questions to me recently: 1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the Slovaks? 2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa. nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak State? 3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920? 4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at.., tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia? '5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik Peop~e's Party? 6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and Protestantism in Slovakia? 7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program? 1 Since these questions are asked morn frequently by persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this regard. Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord. ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim, the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo. gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his life than in the choice between two ponds that he would prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con- 46 SLOVAKIA eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect. The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8, arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia. Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was by far a much more important document in the moderp. history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- , ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts .. burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot be considered separately from morals and politics. It is indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted .. ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document, but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes would have remained somewhere in France as obscure journalists or poor college-iteachers. In any deal none of the two contracting parties has the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of America were American citizens and, consequently, did not have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not honest. When he signe<l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa.. ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers. He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should, then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa- SLOVAKIA 47 tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors? What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of Czecho-Slovakia? It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe. His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs. In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview, ,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) , reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement: "Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic character. There is no question about that and on this point - as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1) That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation, contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." 1 fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920 The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says : "Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the 48 SLOVAKIA problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920. This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they? Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the "·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks, the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle. At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down , from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia. Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia. Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a "due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism . SLOVAKIA 49 After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera. tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:; terrorized the population during the electoral campaign as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo men were killed iby the police during a political gathering. Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech "liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party." Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats 23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 . In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr. Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament: "We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im. prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2) It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni. fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE 50 SLOVAKIA fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia, and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion of 750,000, had only 9. The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and killed two peasants. (3) All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights. That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom. Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic, awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks. In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23 deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state. While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither SLOVAKIA 51 was it possible to recognize any right of decision about Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who, preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc. Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of 1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the 22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and 19'29. Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always sought to vilify this party by different accusations and denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones" into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted. When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the "Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in 1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy, regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State. What connections are there 'between Catholicism and autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some 82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con- 52 SLOVAKIA structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina, i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It happened that after the White Mountain debacle many Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language, they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832), a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech religious emigration in Slovrukia: "When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to return easily from there back tio their native country in order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT, to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they . found security under tlie protection of big landowners in the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura, etc" C4l This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich, Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus. It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky, SLOVAKIA 53 Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality. One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks, however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world that the human rights of racial and religious minorities should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony. Conclusion The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism. 54 SLOVAKIA This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of ~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist Party in order to break the resistance of the population aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of State Seourity. For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe. (1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955. (2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament, Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144. (3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165. (4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 . • • • WHO SAID IT? "I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948 there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front, led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr. Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech "BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Masaryk's Democracy and Slovakia Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956 pp. 45-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1956 LCNAF+dates