5 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/12b947135282539907e952e9791ea5eb.pdf a9d5b0ba4c3a697082adf96f9236a26a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 31 DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF SWVAK DESCENT MAY 24-25, 1954, WASHINGTON, D. C. WE - the participants of the National Conference of Americans of Slovak descent, sponsored by the Slovak League of America at Washington, D. C., May 24-25, 1954 - do solemnly and unanimously declare: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of our American Democracy - the principles upon which our United States of America was founded and which made it the greatest democratic country in the world. 2. Our primary interest is the welfare and security of the United States of America. 3. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at our command until the plague of Communism is completely wiped off the face of the earth . 4. We cannot sU1bscribe to the policy that doing business with the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests of the welfare and security of the United States and the free world. 5. The ''Council of Free Czechoslovakia" does not express the political will of the Slovak nation or the will of the Slovaks in exile. The Slovak members ("Czech" Slovaks) of the Council are individuals who either did not get a mandate from the Slovak nation, or betrayed it by collaborating with communists and the Sovi6}t Union. We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official and private American institutions desiring any information �32 SLOVAKIA on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the Slovak League of America, an Amelticfu illSltitution which since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation. Another organization worthy of consultation in the matter of the problems of the Slovak nation is the Slovak National Council Abroad whose leadership and membership ~epreserits the majority o.f the Slovak exiles. 6. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our Government, its agencies and Congressional Comrriitt~ to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all communists and fellow~travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy. All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism, should be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of our Government. 7. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity in all countries of the world, as far as is humanly possible. The UNO at the present time is not really an organization of United Nations, but an organization of Governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and the national interests of the nations they claim to represent. 8. We subscribe wholeheartedly to the principle that a.11 nations have the right to determine by their own free choice the state or form of political organization under which they wish to live. The principle of self-determination - the fundamental principle of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson must apply without reservations even to the Slovak nation from .which we are descended. 9. We endorse the principle that the Government of the United States shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power and urge that this principle be made operative even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is in fact dominated today �SLOVAKIA 33 by the . Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and the fundamental principle of American policy of self-determination. 10. The independent Slovak Republic, established by the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation on March 14, 1939, should not have been destroyed by the victorious allied Nations without consulting the will of the Slovak nation. We, therefore, respectfully request the President of the U. S. and the Congress to instruct our delegate to the United Nations Organization to request an investigation by the UNO of the destruction of the Slovak Republic. 11. We furthermo.re , respectfully petition the President of the U. S. and the Congress to voice a strong protest against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and political leaders by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague. 12. As Christians and adherents of the democratic way of life, we resolutely oppose the domination and exploitation of any nation by any other nation or political state. The Slovak nation did not want to be dominated by the Magyars prior to 1918 and, today, does not want to be ruled by the Czech nation. We firmly believe that the national existence and the welfare of the Slovruk nation can best be safeguarded by the Slovaks themselves in their own Slovak Republic. 13. We seek no special favors or grants for the nation we are descended from. We only plead for the recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because it cannot voice itself freely today. These rights are predicated on the elementary democratic and Christian principle that all peoples, wherever they may be found and however few their numbers, are morally entitled to speak in the council- of nations, there to defend the rights of their nation to survival and self-fulfillment. 14. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings ("Czech" Slovaks), now organized in various Czech and "Czechoslovak" organizations, do not represent the political will of the �34 SLOVAKIA Slovak nation and, therefore, have no authority to speak for the Slovaks anywhere. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," purports to be an organization of ''anti-communist, democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slova:kia, but is, in fact, an organization controlled by Czechs who were members of the communist-dominated "National Front" government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald, which collaborated closely with the Soviet Union and outlawed all anti-socialistic and anti-communistic parties in Czecho-Slovakia. The leading members of this Council should be recognized for what they really were in their homeland: promoters of socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the Czech socialists a nd communists. (Signatures:) P. A. Hrobak, Jacob J. Kocis, Julia Krajcovic, Milan V. Blazek, Frantisek Hrusovsky, t Theodore G. Kojis, O.S.B., Abbot, P. Jamriska, Msgr. F. J. Dubosh, Joseph G. Prusa, John J. Sirotnak, Julius A. Janci, Stephanie 0. Husek, Peter P. Hletko M.D., George P. Baluh, Stephen J. Tkach, M. J. Wargovich, Helen Kocan, Gabriela I. Vavrek, Frank J. Gurcak, Rev. Cyril M. Orendac, Karol Piacek, Frank Bobus, Marge Bleskan, Jozef A. Mikus, Mary Koenig, Victoria Lunter, Veronica Ginovsky, Maria Kolesar, Anna M. Sotak, John Lafko, Edward Alexovic, John P. Stankovic, M. F. Gajdos, Marge Bleskan, Anna Mae Hutira, Bridget Alexovic, George S. Luba O.S.B., Rev. Michael M. Tondra, Rev. Casimir Cvercko, Rev. John E. Senglar D.S.L., Susan Matuscak, Martin Kopunek, John A. Kanuck, Anna E. Kanuck, Rev. Augustine J. Zan, Rev. Max. Chladny-Hanos S.T.D., Frank Tartal, Mary Luchansky, Matej Varga, Steve S. Koenig, John J. Rozboril, Mary Janci, Joseph Bransky, Stefan Klucar, Bernadina Hanuscin, Helen Kudlac, Maria Walovich, Rev. Joseph Chochula, Rev. Alfons Vercek, Rev. Charles J. Florek, Paul C. Kazimer, Jan Beliansky, Stefan Hodos, M. J. Bosak, �SLOVAKIA 35 Jozef Pauco, Vojtech Balaz, Frank Deviatka, Method M. Balco, Juraj Getlik, Anton Moravcik, Otto Klement, Mike Soyka Sr., Joseph Stanek, Dr. Rudolph Medlen, Mary Student, Stephen Student, Gabriel Lantos, Andrew Welchek, Simon Siranec, Blase Dvorsky, Michal Rak, Veronica Janci, Anna M. Kocur, Irene F. Kocur, Anna V. Kocur, Mary Welchek, Irene Halac, Terezia Ondriska, Anna Vizza, Susanna K.lucar, Veronica Patala, Julia P. Benya. • • • ADDRESS OF PHILIP A. HROBAK, PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, DELIVERED AT THE INFORMAL DINNER OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF SLOVAK DESCENT, WASHINGTON HOTEL, MAY 24, 1954 As citizens of the United States of America we firmly hold to the belief that all nations without exception have the inherent, God-given right to freedom and independence, the right to establish their own political state and to freely elect a govern.men t of their own choice. On March 14, 1939, after over ten centuries of alien domination, the Slovak nation exercised its inherent right when its duly elected representatives in the Bratislava Assembly of autonomous Slovakia proclaimed the independence of the land the Slovaks had occupied for 1500 years and established the Republic of Slovakia. Of course, certain people in America present this historical fact in a false light and attempt to debase and vilify everything connected with it. But the utterly simple historical truth is that the Slovak Assembly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent republic. Independent Slovakia, the dream of Slova;k generations, did become a reality and was thoroughly enjoyed by the Slovak people, even though it was short-lived (1939-1945). And it is significant even today that the Slovak Republic was recognized by twenty-seven countries, includmg Great Britain, France, Japan, and even the Soviet Union. Natu- � SLOVAKIA 31 DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF SWVAK DESCENT MAY 24-25, 1954, WASHINGTON, D. C. WE - the participants of the National Conference of Americans of Slovak descent, sponsored by the Slovak League of America at Washington, D. C., May 24-25, 1954 - do solemnly and unanimously declare: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of our American Democracy - the principles upon which our United States of America was founded and which made it the greatest democratic country in the world. 2. Our primary interest is the welfare and security of the United States of America. 3. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at our command until the plague of Communism is completely wiped off the face of the earth . 4. We cannot sU1bscribe to the policy that doing business with the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests of the welfare and security of the United States and the free world. 5. The ''Council of Free Czechoslovakia" does not express the political will of the Slovak nation or the will of the Slovaks in exile. The Slovak members ("Czech" Slovaks) of the Council are individuals who either did not get a mandate from the Slovak nation, or betrayed it by collaborating with communists and the Sovi6}t Union. We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official and private American institutions desiring any information �32 SLOVAKIA on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the Slovak League of America, an Amelticfu illSltitution which since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation. Another organization worthy of consultation in the matter of the problems of the Slovak nation is the Slovak National Council Abroad whose leadership and membership ~epreserits the majority o.f the Slovak exiles. 6. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our Government, its agencies and Congressional Comrriitt~ to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all communists and fellow~travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy. All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism, should be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of our Government. 7. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity in all countries of the world, as far as is humanly possible. The UNO at the present time is not really an organization of United Nations, but an organization of Governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and the national interests of the nations they claim to represent. 8. We subscribe wholeheartedly to the principle that a.11 nations have the right to determine by their own free choice the state or form of political organization under which they wish to live. The principle of self-determination - the fundamental principle of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson must apply without reservations even to the Slovak nation from .which we are descended. 9. We endorse the principle that the Government of the United States shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power and urge that this principle be made operative even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is in fact dominated today �SLOVAKIA 33 by the . Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and the fundamental principle of American policy of self-determination. 10. The independent Slovak Republic, established by the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation on March 14, 1939, should not have been destroyed by the victorious allied Nations without consulting the will of the Slovak nation. We, therefore, respectfully request the President of the U. S. and the Congress to instruct our delegate to the United Nations Organization to request an investigation by the UNO of the destruction of the Slovak Republic. 11. We furthermo.re , respectfully petition the President of the U. S. and the Congress to voice a strong protest against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and political leaders by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague. 12. As Christians and adherents of the democratic way of life, we resolutely oppose the domination and exploitation of any nation by any other nation or political state. The Slovak nation did not want to be dominated by the Magyars prior to 1918 and, today, does not want to be ruled by the Czech nation. We firmly believe that the national existence and the welfare of the Slovruk nation can best be safeguarded by the Slovaks themselves in their own Slovak Republic. 13. We seek no special favors or grants for the nation we are descended from. We only plead for the recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because it cannot voice itself freely today. These rights are predicated on the elementary democratic and Christian principle that all peoples, wherever they may be found and however few their numbers, are morally entitled to speak in the council- of nations, there to defend the rights of their nation to survival and self-fulfillment. 14. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings ("Czech" Slovaks), now organized in various Czech and "Czechoslovak" organizations, do not represent the political will of the �34 SLOVAKIA Slovak nation and, therefore, have no authority to speak for the Slovaks anywhere. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," purports to be an organization of ''anti-communist, democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slova:kia, but is, in fact, an organization controlled by Czechs who were members of the communist-dominated "National Front" government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald, which collaborated closely with the Soviet Union and outlawed all anti-socialistic and anti-communistic parties in Czecho-Slovakia. The leading members of this Council should be recognized for what they really were in their homeland: promoters of socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the Czech socialists a nd communists. (Signatures:) P. A. Hrobak, Jacob J. Kocis, Julia Krajcovic, Milan V. Blazek, Frantisek Hrusovsky, t Theodore G. Kojis, O.S.B., Abbot, P. Jamriska, Msgr. F. J. Dubosh, Joseph G. Prusa, John J. Sirotnak, Julius A. Janci, Stephanie 0. Husek, Peter P. Hletko M.D., George P. Baluh, Stephen J. Tkach, M. J. Wargovich, Helen Kocan, Gabriela I. Vavrek, Frank J. Gurcak, Rev. Cyril M. Orendac, Karol Piacek, Frank Bobus, Marge Bleskan, Jozef A. Mikus, Mary Koenig, Victoria Lunter, Veronica Ginovsky, Maria Kolesar, Anna M. Sotak, John Lafko, Edward Alexovic, John P. Stankovic, M. F. Gajdos, Marge Bleskan, Anna Mae Hutira, Bridget Alexovic, George S. Luba O.S.B., Rev. Michael M. Tondra, Rev. Casimir Cvercko, Rev. John E. Senglar D.S.L., Susan Matuscak, Martin Kopunek, John A. Kanuck, Anna E. Kanuck, Rev. Augustine J. Zan, Rev. Max. Chladny-Hanos S.T.D., Frank Tartal, Mary Luchansky, Matej Varga, Steve S. Koenig, John J. Rozboril, Mary Janci, Joseph Bransky, Stefan Klucar, Bernadina Hanuscin, Helen Kudlac, Maria Walovich, Rev. Joseph Chochula, Rev. Alfons Vercek, Rev. Charles J. Florek, Paul C. Kazimer, Jan Beliansky, Stefan Hodos, M. J. Bosak, �SLOVAKIA 35 Jozef Pauco, Vojtech Balaz, Frank Deviatka, Method M. Balco, Juraj Getlik, Anton Moravcik, Otto Klement, Mike Soyka Sr., Joseph Stanek, Dr. Rudolph Medlen, Mary Student, Stephen Student, Gabriel Lantos, Andrew Welchek, Simon Siranec, Blase Dvorsky, Michal Rak, Veronica Janci, Anna M. Kocur, Irene F. Kocur, Anna V. Kocur, Mary Welchek, Irene Halac, Terezia Ondriska, Anna Vizza, Susanna K.lucar, Veronica Patala, Julia P. Benya. • • • ADDRESS OF PHILIP A. HROBAK, PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, DELIVERED AT THE INFORMAL DINNER OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF SLOVAK DESCENT, WASHINGTON HOTEL, MAY 24, 1954 As citizens of the United States of America we firmly hold to the belief that all nations without exception have the inherent, God-given right to freedom and independence, the right to establish their own political state and to freely elect a govern.men t of their own choice. On March 14, 1939, after over ten centuries of alien domination, the Slovak nation exercised its inherent right when its duly elected representatives in the Bratislava Assembly of autonomous Slovakia proclaimed the independence of the land the Slovaks had occupied for 1500 years and established the Republic of Slovakia. Of course, certain people in America present this historical fact in a false light and attempt to debase and vilify everything connected with it. But the utterly simple historical truth is that the Slovak Assembly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent republic. Independent Slovakia, the dream of Slova;k generations, did become a reality and was thoroughly enjoyed by the Slovak people, even though it was short-lived (1939-1945). And it is significant even today that the Slovak Republic was recognized by twenty-seven countries, includmg Great Britain, France, Japan, and even the Soviet Union. Natu- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 31 DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF SWVAK DESCENT MAY 24-25, 1954, WASHINGTON, D. C. WE - the participants of the National Conference of Americans of Slovak descent, sponsored by the Slovak League of America at Washington, D. C., May 24-25, 1954 - do solemnly and unanimously declare: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of our American Democracy - the principles upon which our United States of America was founded and which made it the greatest democratic country in the world. 2. Our primary interest is the welfare and security of the United States of America. 3. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at our command until the plague of Communism is completely wiped off the face of the earth . 4. We cannot sU1bscribe to the policy that doing business with the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests of the welfare and security of the United States and the free world. 5. The ''Council of Free Czechoslovakia" does not express the political will of the Slovak nation or the will of the Slovaks in exile. The Slovak members ("Czech" Slovaks) of the Council are individuals who either did not get a mandate from the Slovak nation, or betrayed it by collaborating with communists and the Sovi6}t Union. We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official and private American institutions desiring any information 32 SLOVAKIA on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the Slovak League of America, an Amelticfu illSltitution which since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation. Another organization worthy of consultation in the matter of the problems of the Slovak nation is the Slovak National Council Abroad whose leadership and membership ~epreserits the majority o.f the Slovak exiles. 6. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our Government, its agencies and Congressional Comrriitt~ to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all communists and fellow~travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy. All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism, should be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of our Government. 7. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity in all countries of the world, as far as is humanly possible. The UNO at the present time is not really an organization of United Nations, but an organization of Governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and the national interests of the nations they claim to represent. 8. We subscribe wholeheartedly to the principle that a.11 nations have the right to determine by their own free choice the state or form of political organization under which they wish to live. The principle of self-determination - the fundamental principle of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson must apply without reservations even to the Slovak nation from .which we are descended. 9. We endorse the principle that the Government of the United States shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power and urge that this principle be made operative even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is in fact dominated today SLOVAKIA 33 by the . Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and the fundamental principle of American policy of self-determination. 10. The independent Slovak Republic, established by the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation on March 14, 1939, should not have been destroyed by the victorious allied Nations without consulting the will of the Slovak nation. We, therefore, respectfully request the President of the U. S. and the Congress to instruct our delegate to the United Nations Organization to request an investigation by the UNO of the destruction of the Slovak Republic. 11. We furthermo.re , respectfully petition the President of the U. S. and the Congress to voice a strong protest against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and political leaders by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague. 12. As Christians and adherents of the democratic way of life, we resolutely oppose the domination and exploitation of any nation by any other nation or political state. The Slovak nation did not want to be dominated by the Magyars prior to 1918 and, today, does not want to be ruled by the Czech nation. We firmly believe that the national existence and the welfare of the Slovruk nation can best be safeguarded by the Slovaks themselves in their own Slovak Republic. 13. We seek no special favors or grants for the nation we are descended from. We only plead for the recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because it cannot voice itself freely today. These rights are predicated on the elementary democratic and Christian principle that all peoples, wherever they may be found and however few their numbers, are morally entitled to speak in the council- of nations, there to defend the rights of their nation to survival and self-fulfillment. 14. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings ("Czech" Slovaks), now organized in various Czech and "Czechoslovak" organizations, do not represent the political will of the 34 SLOVAKIA Slovak nation and, therefore, have no authority to speak for the Slovaks anywhere. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," purports to be an organization of ''anti-communist, democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slova:kia, but is, in fact, an organization controlled by Czechs who were members of the communist-dominated "National Front" government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald, which collaborated closely with the Soviet Union and outlawed all anti-socialistic and anti-communistic parties in Czecho-Slovakia. The leading members of this Council should be recognized for what they really were in their homeland: promoters of socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the Czech socialists a nd communists. (Signatures:) P. A. Hrobak, Jacob J. Kocis, Julia Krajcovic, Milan V. Blazek, Frantisek Hrusovsky, t Theodore G. Kojis, O.S.B., Abbot, P. Jamriska, Msgr. F. J. Dubosh, Joseph G. Prusa, John J. Sirotnak, Julius A. Janci, Stephanie 0. Husek, Peter P. Hletko M.D., George P. Baluh, Stephen J. Tkach, M. J. Wargovich, Helen Kocan, Gabriela I. Vavrek, Frank J. Gurcak, Rev. Cyril M. Orendac, Karol Piacek, Frank Bobus, Marge Bleskan, Jozef A. Mikus, Mary Koenig, Victoria Lunter, Veronica Ginovsky, Maria Kolesar, Anna M. Sotak, John Lafko, Edward Alexovic, John P. Stankovic, M. F. Gajdos, Marge Bleskan, Anna Mae Hutira, Bridget Alexovic, George S. Luba O.S.B., Rev. Michael M. Tondra, Rev. Casimir Cvercko, Rev. John E. Senglar D.S.L., Susan Matuscak, Martin Kopunek, John A. Kanuck, Anna E. Kanuck, Rev. Augustine J. Zan, Rev. Max. Chladny-Hanos S.T.D., Frank Tartal, Mary Luchansky, Matej Varga, Steve S. Koenig, John J. Rozboril, Mary Janci, Joseph Bransky, Stefan Klucar, Bernadina Hanuscin, Helen Kudlac, Maria Walovich, Rev. Joseph Chochula, Rev. Alfons Vercek, Rev. Charles J. Florek, Paul C. Kazimer, Jan Beliansky, Stefan Hodos, M. J. Bosak, SLOVAKIA 35 Jozef Pauco, Vojtech Balaz, Frank Deviatka, Method M. Balco, Juraj Getlik, Anton Moravcik, Otto Klement, Mike Soyka Sr., Joseph Stanek, Dr. Rudolph Medlen, Mary Student, Stephen Student, Gabriel Lantos, Andrew Welchek, Simon Siranec, Blase Dvorsky, Michal Rak, Veronica Janci, Anna M. Kocur, Irene F. Kocur, Anna V. Kocur, Mary Welchek, Irene Halac, Terezia Ondriska, Anna Vizza, Susanna K.lucar, Veronica Patala, Julia P. Benya. • • • ADDRESS OF PHILIP A. HROBAK, PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, DELIVERED AT THE INFORMAL DINNER OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF SLOVAK DESCENT, WASHINGTON HOTEL, MAY 24, 1954 As citizens of the United States of America we firmly hold to the belief that all nations without exception have the inherent, God-given right to freedom and independence, the right to establish their own political state and to freely elect a govern.men t of their own choice. On March 14, 1939, after over ten centuries of alien domination, the Slovak nation exercised its inherent right when its duly elected representatives in the Bratislava Assembly of autonomous Slovakia proclaimed the independence of the land the Slovaks had occupied for 1500 years and established the Republic of Slovakia. Of course, certain people in America present this historical fact in a false light and attempt to debase and vilify everything connected with it. But the utterly simple historical truth is that the Slovak Assembly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent republic. Independent Slovakia, the dream of Slova;k generations, did become a reality and was thoroughly enjoyed by the Slovak people, even though it was short-lived (1939-1945). And it is significant even today that the Slovak Republic was recognized by twenty-seven countries, includmg Great Britain, France, Japan, and even the Soviet Union. Natu-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Declaration of the National Conference of Americans of Slovak Descent - May 24-25,1954, Washington, D.C. Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954 pp. 31-35 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1954 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/092da258dd8160b010134cbdf02ee22f.pdf 8cf90adf07b58aab37e5d3e0e3a71bcc PDF Text Text 50 SLOVAKIA DEFENSE AWNE IS NOT ENOUGH By Ferdinand Durcansky It is a historical fact that the Soviet Imperium would have collapsed in the course of the second world war, without the military and economic support of America. At the end of the war the USA was still in a position - due to this active support - to emphasize America's political designs and put them into effect. Proof thereto lies in Stalin's having to withdraw his troops from Iran in 1946 at America's behest, although such a move by no means tallied with Communist strategy. U. S. political, economic and, a:bove all, military superiority was so impressive and was so highly regarded by Soviet leaders that even at the 1955 Geneva Conference they dared not show their real hand on the question of Germany's partition. To a certain extent this power relationship seems to have changed in favor of the Soviet Imperium. Russia, formerly one of the seven Great Powers, has meanwhile become one of the two World Powers, and now controls the eastern half of Europe, plus the most important areas of the Euro-Asiatic sphere. At the moment the great European Powers alone would hardly be in a position effectively to resist the Kremlin's political pressure. Even America, despite its costly system of defense, feels itself threatened. This e~lains why Khrushchev today feels he can simply refuse to discuss German reunification if it does not ta:ke place the way he thinks it should. The power complex of the Soviet Union has become so mighty that Khrushchev periodically threatens, hoping he will intimidate the allies of the United States and thereby weaken Western unity. This potential strength harbors the temptation to superimpose, even on the peoples of the still free world, the political will of the Kremlin. In any case we must reckon with the fact, that the men in the saddle in Moscow have made preparations for achieving world domination as called for by the Commu- �SLOVAKIA 51 nist ideology. The Russians have reached this position in less than twenty years, a status that is not only the expression of their own endeavors of military or economic strength, but for the most part the outcome of faulty Western policy. A continuation of such policy would stabilize the failures of the West and bring aJbout additional failures, a fact that should serve as a cogent warning to all Europe. Just how did this political and ideological Soviet Russian gain come about? Is it possible that Communist ideology and, above all, its practical application, is much more progressive than our economic and social order? Is it perhaps more in keeping with over-all human developments than ours, as the Kremlin rulers maintain? Is State capitalism more enriching and better for the people in the East than the freedom-loving order of the Western world? Facts refute the Communist theses. The basis of our social order is freedom with its ensuing initiative of the individual in all realms of human existence. The West is certainly not poor in ideas. We have both ideas and principles to offer Communism, which are effective not only in the West but even in the East. The suppressed peoples affirm these values. But our methods are wrong. Western policy refuses to look upon the ideological and political offensive of world Communism as something whole and indivisible, and preoccupies itself with only partial problems and partial aspects. Tension Is Mainly Political Too little attention is given to the fact that almost all the moral and ethical values that form the vital basis of the civilized nations of Europe are rejected by the Soviets. The leaders of the Soviet Union even regard, among other factors, the principles of international law as non-<binding for themselves. Every treaty concluded with the Kremlin is thus made suspect by a "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." An international treaty is only considered valid as long as it does not contra- �52 SLOVAKIA diet the interests of the class struggle. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that the agreements made with · the Kremlin are scarcely worth more than the paper they are printed on. Every treaty signed with the Soviets constitutes a disadvantage for the free world, which it excludes from certain actions and possibilities and does not obligate the Russians since they feel themselves dispensed from all erstwhile, generally valid, moral-legal maxims. Such principles, emanating from Western culture, contradict Marxist-Leninist teachings. The Soviets behave as if they had never assumed an obligation, a circumstance proven by t heir disregard for the treaties of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and London. Relations between the free world and the east cannot, therefore, be regarded as a normal nationally-binding relationship based on the principles of international law, because the main concern is a question of power. The behavior of the West toward the East Block has, nevertheless, been based at all times on the principles: and forms of classical foreign policy and diplomacy. In all differences of opinion and artifically trumped up crises, measures and methods are applied that scarcely differ from those employed during the periods of the Vienna Congress. The results of this conservative force behind Communist hunger for power are judged solely from the aspect of momentary security and military potential. To be sure, a number of Western political leaders have realized that the conflict is an ideological one, but they believe the controversy can be resolved by competing in the field of propaganda. Even these far-sighted statesmen, politicians, and publicists fail to see that the tension between East and West represents a political struggle. Cer tainly it has an iedological character with which it is inextricably bound. The Communists on the other hand leave no doubt that they are concerned with a whole. When they speak of a socialist society valid for the world of today they mean not only production patterns, State order and insti- �SLOVAKIA 53 tutions, but the intention of annihilating all values that we possess and that form the basis of our Christian-Western culture, and of replacing them by their ideas and patterns. We are actually witnesses of a great historical attempt to replace fre edom throughout the world with slavery. Millions of independent people are to be reduced to dependence and coercion. In this very century a decision will be made as to whether Russia is ruble to realize its plan - World Communism - and destroy the Christian"\Vestern culture, for, without crushing it, Bolshevism cannot get a foothold in these countries. It is thus a question, whether we value our culture highly enough ourselves and are resolved to fight for its preservation, or whether we want to yield to despotism step by step to make room for a false culture that levels off and nullifies the personality. Soviet Russia has forced this alternative upon us and it would be sheer suicide to evade the struggle. The ensuing political consequences would be of immeasurable importance and decisive for our future destiny. If it were only a question of distribution of power between Moscow and Washington, each of us - each nation, each people, each stratum of society - would have the right and the possibility to decide freely and, after consideration of individual interests, either to choose the friendship and alliance of the one or the other, or to remain neutral. Basic Values Are At Stake In our century, however, the matter is quite different. The traditional political struggle, which dealt with the acquisition of foreign territories, colonies and trade and customs was, with linguistically dependent national cultural propaganda, and, with competition toward the opening up of world markets, is a thing of the past. It means that if people today demand the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, of the Baltic or other oppressed peoples, this is not done in the interest of the United States of America, �54 SLOVAKIA and does not foresee therein the recognition of any claim to U. S. leadership and to strengthening U. S. policy, but that the people concerned become a simple co-combatant in a struggle for the preservation of our values, which are to remain the basis of human coexistence even in the future. When we fight against Communism and, hence, against the Soviet Union, we do not do so in the interest of so-called capitalists, but in the interest of our indivisible social order and in the struggle against the enslavement of our progeny. The fact has been cited in the September 1960 issue of Der Europaische Osten that World War III has already begun. For the time being it will be carried out on the not insignificant level of propaganda. To be sure the means employed, such as radio, television, press cinema, and literature, are less frightening than those of military, yet they are powerful and effective. Since the Soviets are resolved to impose their system on the entire world, it would be dangerous shortsightedness to believe that in the current tussle between the West and the East - in which all peoples are involved willy-nilly - the West can succeed by ,p urely defensive measures only. So far, however, the political leadership of the West has limited itself to defensive tactics. The outcome of this behavior which has been alarming for many millons, was the de facto recognition of the Iron Curtain, an abandonment of the moral and cultural mission and obligation to defend the freedom of all people and, if need be, to fight for it. By giving up the right of political control psychological prerequisites were estalblished for the ideological and political integration of East and Southeast Europe and the Soviets were given the chance to integrate more than one hundred millions of human beings into their sphere of power. Western Doors Always Open Much worse, however, is he fact that this Bolshevization of the Eastern half of Europe, effectuated in four to five years, has given the Kremlin the opportunity of �SLOVAKIA 55 unfolding a general political and ideological offensive against the free world without the West having a chance to look Jnto the darkness behind the wings of the Communist stage. At the same time the doors of the West remained open to agents and spies from all over the Communist world, thus enabling ~he Kremlin to cause unrest on a global scale under the motto of the class struggle and to allow a fabulous measure of propaganda to take effect that has brought whole peoples to ruin. The initiation of the so-called containment policy meant the indirect and de facto -r ecognition of the status quo resulting from Communist violence. Western leadership at the time believed that by sacrificing the European East and South it was possible to buy genuine peaceful cooperation with Russia and that it would put a stop to further spread of Communist power. Was it not sheer delusion to believe in a change in the European status quo? A change did take place, year after year, but always in favor of the Soviet Union. It is utopia to think that coexistence with the Communist world can go on permanently and that the Russians would be ready without any compelling reason to change the current status quo by the reunification of Germany or by free elections within the Satellite countries. This is dangerous wishful thinking which contradicts the facts as we see them happening in Asia and Africa. A Western policy that is prepared to recognize the status quo is not only a betrayal of hundreds of millions of people hungering for fredom, but a threat to the entire world. The final phase of colonialism that we are going through today, gave the Russians a golden opportunity for action. They demanded freedom and independence for nations that already enjoyed them without benefit of Soviet propaganda. Although Russia is subjugation incarnate, it claims the role of freedom fighter and liberator. This boastful sham of Soviet policy and the political naivete and inexperi,mce of the non-white peoples paved the way for it. �56 SLOVAKIA If an opportunistically-minded person observes the fanaticism with which the Soviet Russians work toward greater domination, it is no wonder if he begins to waver. If today the colored man - treated roughly in past centuries by many a European - falls prey to Communism, his attitude for the most part is the result of the West's own attitude of defense. The peoples of the East, then, often gain the impression that the political leaders of the West repeatedly fail, because the will and resolve to effectively combat the Communist world is simply lacking. Even on the West the opinion is winning ground that our culture and the nations and peoples who sustain this culture are doomed to extinction. Why, then, should a colored man choose the cultrue that limits itself to defense and, hence, can have no prospects for the future? Although this opinion stems from an optical illusion it can, nevertheless, have fateful consequences. Active Western St.and Is Imperative The Russians are everywhere engaged in a ruthless class struggle. Thus far the West has only been able to prevent Soviet world domination by non-military power, by recourse to costly armaments and military preparedness. As events in Asia and Africa prove, military preparedness and even superiority alone will not prevent Russia from spreading its influence and political control to other territories. The fact that the West has no voice and, hence, no control in the Soviet-dominated areas, while Soviet Russia, on the other hand, together with the West, decides all important affairs of the West, has unduly strengthened Communist self-confidence and the USSR's aggressive attitude. The Communists are more than ever convinced of the progr:essive nature of their ideology and of the correctness of their theses. It has merely heightened their fanaticism. This development is very disquieting because it intensifies instead of diminishing the danger of war. We should apply the principle of mutuality and draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that the Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 Russians disregard the principles of international law and automatically exclude themselves from the community of nations. The West dare not limit itself to being ready to fight for the preservation of freedom in the still free world as, for example, in Berlin or South Korea. Whenever Khrushchev says that he will never cease to encourage Communist victory throughout the entire world, the Western answer should ring out bold and clear, that we shall never cease to fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain and shall do everything we can to make freedom and Christian-Western culture apply on a world~wide basis. This should not be confused with a "crusade" against the Soviet Union or the enkindling of a third world war. On the contrary, conditions must be created that will prevent war. Psychological means must be applied to drive home to the Kremlin oppressors that their ideological fanaticism cannot intimidate the whole world and perpetuate a condition of slavery ad infinitum. 'l'he free world is still in a position to take political, economic, and diplomatic measures which can strengthen the actual political desires of millions of enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain and make it possible some day to see them realized It is not enough, however, to support the right of self-determination of peoples merely for tactical reasons. It is of no use as long as the men in the Kremlin notice that behind such speeches, declarations, and assertions there is no serious resolve to take political measures as well. Balance Can Be Restored The United States of America has created various anti~Communist institutions. They have been seriously weakened, however, by political compromise so that they could not live up to expectations. It is impossible to hope to carry out the struggle for freedom and at the same time divide the oppressed peoples into two categories. If one promises the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, �58 SLOVAKIA and Baltic Peoples freedom, independence, and the right of self-determination, one cannot withhold it from the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others . . The West sporadically fostered the hope that the Russians, in the course of time, would make certain political concessions · by easing terror and by liberalization. The fifteen years that lie immediately behind us prove that such expectations are illusory. Instead of allowing the dominated countries more freedom and self-determination, Russia has ruthlessly incorporated these peoples into its sphere of power. When one enters the large libraries of the West and leafs through the tables of contents, one finds numerous publications on American, German, English, French, Japanese, and even Soviet imperialism. But one seldom finds, and then but recently, references to a Russian imperialism although the Russians for centuries have ruled more non-Russians than Russians. Is this sheer coincidence? Moscow tries to exploit the dissatisfaction of five or ten per cent of the population of the West for purposes of propaganda. The West could use the dissatisfaction of at least 80 per cent of the people behind the Iron Curtain as a political weapon. This would be in the interest of freedom and Western culture. Yet it has not been done. Such a program should be adopted. If the Western Powers would decide to demand freedom for the peoples under Moscow's oppression and if appropriate political measures would be taken, they could again take the initiative in world politics and force the Kremlin to go on the defensive. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the existence and the continued development of our culture and social order. Only in this way can we restore ':he balance and create the conditions for a lasting peace. HROBAK'S E:NGLISH-SLOV AK DICTION ARY there is none better on the market today - can be yours for only $4.00. � 50 SLOVAKIA DEFENSE AWNE IS NOT ENOUGH By Ferdinand Durcansky It is a historical fact that the Soviet Imperium would have collapsed in the course of the second world war, without the military and economic support of America. At the end of the war the USA was still in a position - due to this active support - to emphasize America's political designs and put them into effect. Proof thereto lies in Stalin's having to withdraw his troops from Iran in 1946 at America's behest, although such a move by no means tallied with Communist strategy. U. S. political, economic and, a:bove all, military superiority was so impressive and was so highly regarded by Soviet leaders that even at the 1955 Geneva Conference they dared not show their real hand on the question of Germany's partition. To a certain extent this power relationship seems to have changed in favor of the Soviet Imperium. Russia, formerly one of the seven Great Powers, has meanwhile become one of the two World Powers, and now controls the eastern half of Europe, plus the most important areas of the Euro-Asiatic sphere. At the moment the great European Powers alone would hardly be in a position effectively to resist the Kremlin's political pressure. Even America, despite its costly system of defense, feels itself threatened. This e~lains why Khrushchev today feels he can simply refuse to discuss German reunification if it does not ta:ke place the way he thinks it should. The power complex of the Soviet Union has become so mighty that Khrushchev periodically threatens, hoping he will intimidate the allies of the United States and thereby weaken Western unity. This potential strength harbors the temptation to superimpose, even on the peoples of the still free world, the political will of the Kremlin. In any case we must reckon with the fact, that the men in the saddle in Moscow have made preparations for achieving world domination as called for by the Commu- �SLOVAKIA 51 nist ideology. The Russians have reached this position in less than twenty years, a status that is not only the expression of their own endeavors of military or economic strength, but for the most part the outcome of faulty Western policy. A continuation of such policy would stabilize the failures of the West and bring aJbout additional failures, a fact that should serve as a cogent warning to all Europe. Just how did this political and ideological Soviet Russian gain come about? Is it possible that Communist ideology and, above all, its practical application, is much more progressive than our economic and social order? Is it perhaps more in keeping with over-all human developments than ours, as the Kremlin rulers maintain? Is State capitalism more enriching and better for the people in the East than the freedom-loving order of the Western world? Facts refute the Communist theses. The basis of our social order is freedom with its ensuing initiative of the individual in all realms of human existence. The West is certainly not poor in ideas. We have both ideas and principles to offer Communism, which are effective not only in the West but even in the East. The suppressed peoples affirm these values. But our methods are wrong. Western policy refuses to look upon the ideological and political offensive of world Communism as something whole and indivisible, and preoccupies itself with only partial problems and partial aspects. Tension Is Mainly Political Too little attention is given to the fact that almost all the moral and ethical values that form the vital basis of the civilized nations of Europe are rejected by the Soviets. The leaders of the Soviet Union even regard, among other factors, the principles of international law as non-<binding for themselves. Every treaty concluded with the Kremlin is thus made suspect by a "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." An international treaty is only considered valid as long as it does not contra- �52 SLOVAKIA diet the interests of the class struggle. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that the agreements made with · the Kremlin are scarcely worth more than the paper they are printed on. Every treaty signed with the Soviets constitutes a disadvantage for the free world, which it excludes from certain actions and possibilities and does not obligate the Russians since they feel themselves dispensed from all erstwhile, generally valid, moral-legal maxims. Such principles, emanating from Western culture, contradict Marxist-Leninist teachings. The Soviets behave as if they had never assumed an obligation, a circumstance proven by t heir disregard for the treaties of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and London. Relations between the free world and the east cannot, therefore, be regarded as a normal nationally-binding relationship based on the principles of international law, because the main concern is a question of power. The behavior of the West toward the East Block has, nevertheless, been based at all times on the principles: and forms of classical foreign policy and diplomacy. In all differences of opinion and artifically trumped up crises, measures and methods are applied that scarcely differ from those employed during the periods of the Vienna Congress. The results of this conservative force behind Communist hunger for power are judged solely from the aspect of momentary security and military potential. To be sure, a number of Western political leaders have realized that the conflict is an ideological one, but they believe the controversy can be resolved by competing in the field of propaganda. Even these far-sighted statesmen, politicians, and publicists fail to see that the tension between East and West represents a political struggle. Cer tainly it has an iedological character with which it is inextricably bound. The Communists on the other hand leave no doubt that they are concerned with a whole. When they speak of a socialist society valid for the world of today they mean not only production patterns, State order and insti- �SLOVAKIA 53 tutions, but the intention of annihilating all values that we possess and that form the basis of our Christian-Western culture, and of replacing them by their ideas and patterns. We are actually witnesses of a great historical attempt to replace fre edom throughout the world with slavery. Millions of independent people are to be reduced to dependence and coercion. In this very century a decision will be made as to whether Russia is ruble to realize its plan - World Communism - and destroy the Christian"\Vestern culture, for, without crushing it, Bolshevism cannot get a foothold in these countries. It is thus a question, whether we value our culture highly enough ourselves and are resolved to fight for its preservation, or whether we want to yield to despotism step by step to make room for a false culture that levels off and nullifies the personality. Soviet Russia has forced this alternative upon us and it would be sheer suicide to evade the struggle. The ensuing political consequences would be of immeasurable importance and decisive for our future destiny. If it were only a question of distribution of power between Moscow and Washington, each of us - each nation, each people, each stratum of society - would have the right and the possibility to decide freely and, after consideration of individual interests, either to choose the friendship and alliance of the one or the other, or to remain neutral. Basic Values Are At Stake In our century, however, the matter is quite different. The traditional political struggle, which dealt with the acquisition of foreign territories, colonies and trade and customs was, with linguistically dependent national cultural propaganda, and, with competition toward the opening up of world markets, is a thing of the past. It means that if people today demand the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, of the Baltic or other oppressed peoples, this is not done in the interest of the United States of America, �54 SLOVAKIA and does not foresee therein the recognition of any claim to U. S. leadership and to strengthening U. S. policy, but that the people concerned become a simple co-combatant in a struggle for the preservation of our values, which are to remain the basis of human coexistence even in the future. When we fight against Communism and, hence, against the Soviet Union, we do not do so in the interest of so-called capitalists, but in the interest of our indivisible social order and in the struggle against the enslavement of our progeny. The fact has been cited in the September 1960 issue of Der Europaische Osten that World War III has already begun. For the time being it will be carried out on the not insignificant level of propaganda. To be sure the means employed, such as radio, television, press cinema, and literature, are less frightening than those of military, yet they are powerful and effective. Since the Soviets are resolved to impose their system on the entire world, it would be dangerous shortsightedness to believe that in the current tussle between the West and the East - in which all peoples are involved willy-nilly - the West can succeed by ,p urely defensive measures only. So far, however, the political leadership of the West has limited itself to defensive tactics. The outcome of this behavior which has been alarming for many millons, was the de facto recognition of the Iron Curtain, an abandonment of the moral and cultural mission and obligation to defend the freedom of all people and, if need be, to fight for it. By giving up the right of political control psychological prerequisites were estalblished for the ideological and political integration of East and Southeast Europe and the Soviets were given the chance to integrate more than one hundred millions of human beings into their sphere of power. Western Doors Always Open Much worse, however, is he fact that this Bolshevization of the Eastern half of Europe, effectuated in four to five years, has given the Kremlin the opportunity of �SLOVAKIA 55 unfolding a general political and ideological offensive against the free world without the West having a chance to look Jnto the darkness behind the wings of the Communist stage. At the same time the doors of the West remained open to agents and spies from all over the Communist world, thus enabling ~he Kremlin to cause unrest on a global scale under the motto of the class struggle and to allow a fabulous measure of propaganda to take effect that has brought whole peoples to ruin. The initiation of the so-called containment policy meant the indirect and de facto -r ecognition of the status quo resulting from Communist violence. Western leadership at the time believed that by sacrificing the European East and South it was possible to buy genuine peaceful cooperation with Russia and that it would put a stop to further spread of Communist power. Was it not sheer delusion to believe in a change in the European status quo? A change did take place, year after year, but always in favor of the Soviet Union. It is utopia to think that coexistence with the Communist world can go on permanently and that the Russians would be ready without any compelling reason to change the current status quo by the reunification of Germany or by free elections within the Satellite countries. This is dangerous wishful thinking which contradicts the facts as we see them happening in Asia and Africa. A Western policy that is prepared to recognize the status quo is not only a betrayal of hundreds of millions of people hungering for fredom, but a threat to the entire world. The final phase of colonialism that we are going through today, gave the Russians a golden opportunity for action. They demanded freedom and independence for nations that already enjoyed them without benefit of Soviet propaganda. Although Russia is subjugation incarnate, it claims the role of freedom fighter and liberator. This boastful sham of Soviet policy and the political naivete and inexperi,mce of the non-white peoples paved the way for it. �56 SLOVAKIA If an opportunistically-minded person observes the fanaticism with which the Soviet Russians work toward greater domination, it is no wonder if he begins to waver. If today the colored man - treated roughly in past centuries by many a European - falls prey to Communism, his attitude for the most part is the result of the West's own attitude of defense. The peoples of the East, then, often gain the impression that the political leaders of the West repeatedly fail, because the will and resolve to effectively combat the Communist world is simply lacking. Even on the West the opinion is winning ground that our culture and the nations and peoples who sustain this culture are doomed to extinction. Why, then, should a colored man choose the cultrue that limits itself to defense and, hence, can have no prospects for the future? Although this opinion stems from an optical illusion it can, nevertheless, have fateful consequences. Active Western St.and Is Imperative The Russians are everywhere engaged in a ruthless class struggle. Thus far the West has only been able to prevent Soviet world domination by non-military power, by recourse to costly armaments and military preparedness. As events in Asia and Africa prove, military preparedness and even superiority alone will not prevent Russia from spreading its influence and political control to other territories. The fact that the West has no voice and, hence, no control in the Soviet-dominated areas, while Soviet Russia, on the other hand, together with the West, decides all important affairs of the West, has unduly strengthened Communist self-confidence and the USSR's aggressive attitude. The Communists are more than ever convinced of the progr:essive nature of their ideology and of the correctness of their theses. It has merely heightened their fanaticism. This development is very disquieting because it intensifies instead of diminishing the danger of war. We should apply the principle of mutuality and draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that the Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 Russians disregard the principles of international law and automatically exclude themselves from the community of nations. The West dare not limit itself to being ready to fight for the preservation of freedom in the still free world as, for example, in Berlin or South Korea. Whenever Khrushchev says that he will never cease to encourage Communist victory throughout the entire world, the Western answer should ring out bold and clear, that we shall never cease to fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain and shall do everything we can to make freedom and Christian-Western culture apply on a world~wide basis. This should not be confused with a "crusade" against the Soviet Union or the enkindling of a third world war. On the contrary, conditions must be created that will prevent war. Psychological means must be applied to drive home to the Kremlin oppressors that their ideological fanaticism cannot intimidate the whole world and perpetuate a condition of slavery ad infinitum. 'l'he free world is still in a position to take political, economic, and diplomatic measures which can strengthen the actual political desires of millions of enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain and make it possible some day to see them realized It is not enough, however, to support the right of self-determination of peoples merely for tactical reasons. It is of no use as long as the men in the Kremlin notice that behind such speeches, declarations, and assertions there is no serious resolve to take political measures as well. Balance Can Be Restored The United States of America has created various anti~Communist institutions. They have been seriously weakened, however, by political compromise so that they could not live up to expectations. It is impossible to hope to carry out the struggle for freedom and at the same time divide the oppressed peoples into two categories. If one promises the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, �58 SLOVAKIA and Baltic Peoples freedom, independence, and the right of self-determination, one cannot withhold it from the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others . . The West sporadically fostered the hope that the Russians, in the course of time, would make certain political concessions · by easing terror and by liberalization. The fifteen years that lie immediately behind us prove that such expectations are illusory. Instead of allowing the dominated countries more freedom and self-determination, Russia has ruthlessly incorporated these peoples into its sphere of power. When one enters the large libraries of the West and leafs through the tables of contents, one finds numerous publications on American, German, English, French, Japanese, and even Soviet imperialism. But one seldom finds, and then but recently, references to a Russian imperialism although the Russians for centuries have ruled more non-Russians than Russians. Is this sheer coincidence? Moscow tries to exploit the dissatisfaction of five or ten per cent of the population of the West for purposes of propaganda. The West could use the dissatisfaction of at least 80 per cent of the people behind the Iron Curtain as a political weapon. This would be in the interest of freedom and Western culture. Yet it has not been done. Such a program should be adopted. If the Western Powers would decide to demand freedom for the peoples under Moscow's oppression and if appropriate political measures would be taken, they could again take the initiative in world politics and force the Kremlin to go on the defensive. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the existence and the continued development of our culture and social order. Only in this way can we restore ':he balance and create the conditions for a lasting peace. HROBAK'S E:NGLISH-SLOV AK DICTION ARY there is none better on the market today - can be yours for only $4.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1962, Vol. 12 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 35), March-June 1962. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOVAKIA DEFENSE AWNE IS NOT ENOUGH By Ferdinand Durcansky It is a historical fact that the Soviet Imperium would have collapsed in the course of the second world war, without the military and economic support of America. At the end of the war the USA was still in a position - due to this active support - to emphasize America's political designs and put them into effect. Proof thereto lies in Stalin's having to withdraw his troops from Iran in 1946 at America's behest, although such a move by no means tallied with Communist strategy. U. S. political, economic and, a:bove all, military superiority was so impressive and was so highly regarded by Soviet leaders that even at the 1955 Geneva Conference they dared not show their real hand on the question of Germany's partition. To a certain extent this power relationship seems to have changed in favor of the Soviet Imperium. Russia, formerly one of the seven Great Powers, has meanwhile become one of the two World Powers, and now controls the eastern half of Europe, plus the most important areas of the Euro-Asiatic sphere. At the moment the great European Powers alone would hardly be in a position effectively to resist the Kremlin's political pressure. Even America, despite its costly system of defense, feels itself threatened. This e~lains why Khrushchev today feels he can simply refuse to discuss German reunification if it does not ta:ke place the way he thinks it should. The power complex of the Soviet Union has become so mighty that Khrushchev periodically threatens, hoping he will intimidate the allies of the United States and thereby weaken Western unity. This potential strength harbors the temptation to superimpose, even on the peoples of the still free world, the political will of the Kremlin. In any case we must reckon with the fact, that the men in the saddle in Moscow have made preparations for achieving world domination as called for by the Commu- SLOVAKIA 51 nist ideology. The Russians have reached this position in less than twenty years, a status that is not only the expression of their own endeavors of military or economic strength, but for the most part the outcome of faulty Western policy. A continuation of such policy would stabilize the failures of the West and bring aJbout additional failures, a fact that should serve as a cogent warning to all Europe. Just how did this political and ideological Soviet Russian gain come about? Is it possible that Communist ideology and, above all, its practical application, is much more progressive than our economic and social order? Is it perhaps more in keeping with over-all human developments than ours, as the Kremlin rulers maintain? Is State capitalism more enriching and better for the people in the East than the freedom-loving order of the Western world? Facts refute the Communist theses. The basis of our social order is freedom with its ensuing initiative of the individual in all realms of human existence. The West is certainly not poor in ideas. We have both ideas and principles to offer Communism, which are effective not only in the West but even in the East. The suppressed peoples affirm these values. But our methods are wrong. Western policy refuses to look upon the ideological and political offensive of world Communism as something whole and indivisible, and preoccupies itself with only partial problems and partial aspects. Tension Is Mainly Political Too little attention is given to the fact that almost all the moral and ethical values that form the vital basis of the civilized nations of Europe are rejected by the Soviets. The leaders of the Soviet Union even regard, among other factors, the principles of international law as non-<binding for themselves. Every treaty concluded with the Kremlin is thus made suspect by a "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." An international treaty is only considered valid as long as it does not contra- 52 SLOVAKIA diet the interests of the class struggle. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that the agreements made with · the Kremlin are scarcely worth more than the paper they are printed on. Every treaty signed with the Soviets constitutes a disadvantage for the free world, which it excludes from certain actions and possibilities and does not obligate the Russians since they feel themselves dispensed from all erstwhile, generally valid, moral-legal maxims. Such principles, emanating from Western culture, contradict Marxist-Leninist teachings. The Soviets behave as if they had never assumed an obligation, a circumstance proven by t heir disregard for the treaties of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and London. Relations between the free world and the east cannot, therefore, be regarded as a normal nationally-binding relationship based on the principles of international law, because the main concern is a question of power. The behavior of the West toward the East Block has, nevertheless, been based at all times on the principles: and forms of classical foreign policy and diplomacy. In all differences of opinion and artifically trumped up crises, measures and methods are applied that scarcely differ from those employed during the periods of the Vienna Congress. The results of this conservative force behind Communist hunger for power are judged solely from the aspect of momentary security and military potential. To be sure, a number of Western political leaders have realized that the conflict is an ideological one, but they believe the controversy can be resolved by competing in the field of propaganda. Even these far-sighted statesmen, politicians, and publicists fail to see that the tension between East and West represents a political struggle. Cer tainly it has an iedological character with which it is inextricably bound. The Communists on the other hand leave no doubt that they are concerned with a whole. When they speak of a socialist society valid for the world of today they mean not only production patterns, State order and insti- SLOVAKIA 53 tutions, but the intention of annihilating all values that we possess and that form the basis of our Christian-Western culture, and of replacing them by their ideas and patterns. We are actually witnesses of a great historical attempt to replace fre edom throughout the world with slavery. Millions of independent people are to be reduced to dependence and coercion. In this very century a decision will be made as to whether Russia is ruble to realize its plan - World Communism - and destroy the Christian"\Vestern culture, for, without crushing it, Bolshevism cannot get a foothold in these countries. It is thus a question, whether we value our culture highly enough ourselves and are resolved to fight for its preservation, or whether we want to yield to despotism step by step to make room for a false culture that levels off and nullifies the personality. Soviet Russia has forced this alternative upon us and it would be sheer suicide to evade the struggle. The ensuing political consequences would be of immeasurable importance and decisive for our future destiny. If it were only a question of distribution of power between Moscow and Washington, each of us - each nation, each people, each stratum of society - would have the right and the possibility to decide freely and, after consideration of individual interests, either to choose the friendship and alliance of the one or the other, or to remain neutral. Basic Values Are At Stake In our century, however, the matter is quite different. The traditional political struggle, which dealt with the acquisition of foreign territories, colonies and trade and customs was, with linguistically dependent national cultural propaganda, and, with competition toward the opening up of world markets, is a thing of the past. It means that if people today demand the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, of the Baltic or other oppressed peoples, this is not done in the interest of the United States of America, 54 SLOVAKIA and does not foresee therein the recognition of any claim to U. S. leadership and to strengthening U. S. policy, but that the people concerned become a simple co-combatant in a struggle for the preservation of our values, which are to remain the basis of human coexistence even in the future. When we fight against Communism and, hence, against the Soviet Union, we do not do so in the interest of so-called capitalists, but in the interest of our indivisible social order and in the struggle against the enslavement of our progeny. The fact has been cited in the September 1960 issue of Der Europaische Osten that World War III has already begun. For the time being it will be carried out on the not insignificant level of propaganda. To be sure the means employed, such as radio, television, press cinema, and literature, are less frightening than those of military, yet they are powerful and effective. Since the Soviets are resolved to impose their system on the entire world, it would be dangerous shortsightedness to believe that in the current tussle between the West and the East - in which all peoples are involved willy-nilly - the West can succeed by ,p urely defensive measures only. So far, however, the political leadership of the West has limited itself to defensive tactics. The outcome of this behavior which has been alarming for many millons, was the de facto recognition of the Iron Curtain, an abandonment of the moral and cultural mission and obligation to defend the freedom of all people and, if need be, to fight for it. By giving up the right of political control psychological prerequisites were estalblished for the ideological and political integration of East and Southeast Europe and the Soviets were given the chance to integrate more than one hundred millions of human beings into their sphere of power. Western Doors Always Open Much worse, however, is he fact that this Bolshevization of the Eastern half of Europe, effectuated in four to five years, has given the Kremlin the opportunity of SLOVAKIA 55 unfolding a general political and ideological offensive against the free world without the West having a chance to look Jnto the darkness behind the wings of the Communist stage. At the same time the doors of the West remained open to agents and spies from all over the Communist world, thus enabling ~he Kremlin to cause unrest on a global scale under the motto of the class struggle and to allow a fabulous measure of propaganda to take effect that has brought whole peoples to ruin. The initiation of the so-called containment policy meant the indirect and de facto -r ecognition of the status quo resulting from Communist violence. Western leadership at the time believed that by sacrificing the European East and South it was possible to buy genuine peaceful cooperation with Russia and that it would put a stop to further spread of Communist power. Was it not sheer delusion to believe in a change in the European status quo? A change did take place, year after year, but always in favor of the Soviet Union. It is utopia to think that coexistence with the Communist world can go on permanently and that the Russians would be ready without any compelling reason to change the current status quo by the reunification of Germany or by free elections within the Satellite countries. This is dangerous wishful thinking which contradicts the facts as we see them happening in Asia and Africa. A Western policy that is prepared to recognize the status quo is not only a betrayal of hundreds of millions of people hungering for fredom, but a threat to the entire world. The final phase of colonialism that we are going through today, gave the Russians a golden opportunity for action. They demanded freedom and independence for nations that already enjoyed them without benefit of Soviet propaganda. Although Russia is subjugation incarnate, it claims the role of freedom fighter and liberator. This boastful sham of Soviet policy and the political naivete and inexperi,mce of the non-white peoples paved the way for it. 56 SLOVAKIA If an opportunistically-minded person observes the fanaticism with which the Soviet Russians work toward greater domination, it is no wonder if he begins to waver. If today the colored man - treated roughly in past centuries by many a European - falls prey to Communism, his attitude for the most part is the result of the West's own attitude of defense. The peoples of the East, then, often gain the impression that the political leaders of the West repeatedly fail, because the will and resolve to effectively combat the Communist world is simply lacking. Even on the West the opinion is winning ground that our culture and the nations and peoples who sustain this culture are doomed to extinction. Why, then, should a colored man choose the cultrue that limits itself to defense and, hence, can have no prospects for the future? Although this opinion stems from an optical illusion it can, nevertheless, have fateful consequences. Active Western St.and Is Imperative The Russians are everywhere engaged in a ruthless class struggle. Thus far the West has only been able to prevent Soviet world domination by non-military power, by recourse to costly armaments and military preparedness. As events in Asia and Africa prove, military preparedness and even superiority alone will not prevent Russia from spreading its influence and political control to other territories. The fact that the West has no voice and, hence, no control in the Soviet-dominated areas, while Soviet Russia, on the other hand, together with the West, decides all important affairs of the West, has unduly strengthened Communist self-confidence and the USSR's aggressive attitude. The Communists are more than ever convinced of the progr:essive nature of their ideology and of the correctness of their theses. It has merely heightened their fanaticism. This development is very disquieting because it intensifies instead of diminishing the danger of war. We should apply the principle of mutuality and draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that the Soviet SLOVAKIA 57 Russians disregard the principles of international law and automatically exclude themselves from the community of nations. The West dare not limit itself to being ready to fight for the preservation of freedom in the still free world as, for example, in Berlin or South Korea. Whenever Khrushchev says that he will never cease to encourage Communist victory throughout the entire world, the Western answer should ring out bold and clear, that we shall never cease to fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain and shall do everything we can to make freedom and Christian-Western culture apply on a world~wide basis. This should not be confused with a "crusade" against the Soviet Union or the enkindling of a third world war. On the contrary, conditions must be created that will prevent war. Psychological means must be applied to drive home to the Kremlin oppressors that their ideological fanaticism cannot intimidate the whole world and perpetuate a condition of slavery ad infinitum. 'l'he free world is still in a position to take political, economic, and diplomatic measures which can strengthen the actual political desires of millions of enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain and make it possible some day to see them realized It is not enough, however, to support the right of self-determination of peoples merely for tactical reasons. It is of no use as long as the men in the Kremlin notice that behind such speeches, declarations, and assertions there is no serious resolve to take political measures as well. Balance Can Be Restored The United States of America has created various anti~Communist institutions. They have been seriously weakened, however, by political compromise so that they could not live up to expectations. It is impossible to hope to carry out the struggle for freedom and at the same time divide the oppressed peoples into two categories. If one promises the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, 58 SLOVAKIA and Baltic Peoples freedom, independence, and the right of self-determination, one cannot withhold it from the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others . . The West sporadically fostered the hope that the Russians, in the course of time, would make certain political concessions · by easing terror and by liberalization. The fifteen years that lie immediately behind us prove that such expectations are illusory. Instead of allowing the dominated countries more freedom and self-determination, Russia has ruthlessly incorporated these peoples into its sphere of power. When one enters the large libraries of the West and leafs through the tables of contents, one finds numerous publications on American, German, English, French, Japanese, and even Soviet imperialism. But one seldom finds, and then but recently, references to a Russian imperialism although the Russians for centuries have ruled more non-Russians than Russians. Is this sheer coincidence? Moscow tries to exploit the dissatisfaction of five or ten per cent of the population of the West for purposes of propaganda. The West could use the dissatisfaction of at least 80 per cent of the people behind the Iron Curtain as a political weapon. This would be in the interest of freedom and Western culture. Yet it has not been done. Such a program should be adopted. If the Western Powers would decide to demand freedom for the peoples under Moscow's oppression and if appropriate political measures would be taken, they could again take the initiative in world politics and force the Kremlin to go on the defensive. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the existence and the continued development of our culture and social order. Only in this way can we restore ':he balance and create the conditions for a lasting peace. HROBAK'S E:NGLISH-SLOV AK DICTION ARY there is none better on the market today - can be yours for only $4.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Defense Alone is Not Enough Description An account of the resource Ferdinand Ďurčanský Slovakia, Vol. 12, No. 1 (35), March-June 1962 pp. 50-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ďurčanský, Ferdinand Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1962 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/13e1ead008f51afd33e683243b6dd496.pdf 211e067bcaf3ba63edfd5f2a9cca90c0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 111 Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States By J. M. K i r s c h b a u m, Ph.D. I. The emergence of the Slovak Republic in March 1939 has been for years presented by historians of Central Eastern Europe in accordance with the War propaganda rather than on the basis of historical facts. In the West, especially the propaganda of the "Czechoslovak governmentin-exile" crept into the history books and some misconceptions survived even the publication of secret documents and the opening of the War archives. It would, however, be unfair to blame Western historians alone for the inaccuracies and prejudices presentation of Slovakia's international status and diplomatic and consular relations. There was no serious attempt on the Slovak side to give historians of Central Eastern Europe sufficient information in foreign language, which could enable them to draw an objective picture of the Slovak Republic. Moreover, comprehensive work on international relations of Slovakia is missing even in Slovak historiography. The reason for not writing about the international relations of Slovakia with other countries by Communist historians is quite understandable: they were reluctant to admit that the Slovak Republic was also recognized by the Soviet Union and some 29 other countries, including the European Great Powers and neutral countries. According to the official "Czechoslovak" propaganda during the War, the Slovak Republic was recognized only by Germany and �112 SLOVAKIA her satellites and this distortion of historical facts suited the post-war Marxist historians. What is difficult to understand, however, is the neglect by Slovaks abroad, especially if we take into account that a number of former Slovak diplomats found refuge in the countries of the free world. During the War some articles surveying the first years of the Slovak Republic were published in Switzerland, but they discussed the international status of Slovakia only passingly. Such was the series of articles by Arnold Schwengeler in the daily Der Bund, and two French articles: one by the Swiss writer William Ritter in the Gazette de Lausanne and a contribution to the Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques by this writer under the pen-name Andre Cerisier.1 After the War, an English publication by F. nurcansky, The International Aspects of the Slovak Question, examined the subject from both the juridical and political points of view. The international relations of Slovakia with other countries were discussed, however, only briefly even in this study. Several other Slovak authors dealt with Slovakia's international relations in a general way by inserting a chapt.er or two in their books or in their articles on Slovakia. Such have been the contributions of this writer either in Slovak or foreign languages and especially a chapter on the diplomatic recognition of Slovakia in his book Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, and in his Slovak book Nds boj o samostatnost' Slovenska. 2 The Slovak diplomatic representative in Spain, Dr. J. A. Mikus, wrote on the subject in his book Slovakia A Political History and in the annuals published in the United States3 either in English or in Slovak, and F. Vnuk published a study based on the Vatican archives materials, 4 but all these writings are far from giving an adequat;e picture of the international relations of the Slovak Republic with European and non-European states which recognized Slovakia in 1939 as an independent state. As far as the memoirs are concerned, only Karol Sidor, the Slovak Envoy Extraordinary and Minist.er Plenipotentiary at the Vatican, published a full account of his years at the Holy See in his Slovak book sest' rokov pri Vatikdne (Six Years at the Vatican). This writer published reminis- �SLOVAKIA 113 cences on his years in Italy and as head of the legation of the Slovak Republic in Switzerland in various Slovak annuals, published in Canada and in the United States.5 More than a dozen former Slovak diplomats who live either in Western Europe or in other parts of the free world, are still expected to record the years of their diplomatic service to enable historians to present this chapter of modern Slovak history in an objective manner. In view of this, it will perhaps not be amiss to record some data and to answer the question of how the emergence of the Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939, was accepted by European and non-European public opinion and how the governments of European neutral countries received the proclamation of Slovakia's independence. In my book Slovakia- Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe a survey of the international recognition of the Slovak Republic has given general information on this subject with some documents to support the historical facts and to prove the utterly incorrect propaganda which for a period of the past 30 years bluntly disregarded the facts and asserted that the Slovak Republic was recognized only by Germany and her satellites. II. In the short period of liberalization in Czecho-Slovakia the Marxist historians who, for political reasons avoided writing about the international status of the Slovak Republic, admitted that: "In March 1939 appeared on the map of Europe a new state - Slovakia. With the exception of the United States all European Great Powers successively recognized the Slovak state de jure or at least de facto: Germany, Italy, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and many smaller European and non-European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Vatican, Switzerland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Spain, Sweden, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yougoslavia, Liberia, Ecuador, Costarica, Holland, Finland, Belgium, Croatia, the Chinese Government of Nanking, etc. The Slovak state became a member of various international conventions and agreements and in the first years of the War it was considered in many capital cities as a small, but as a not easily discarded part of the motley mosaic of European relations." 6 �114 SLOVAKIA Other Marxist historians recorded that the Soviet Union, who recognized the Slovak Republic on September 16, 1939, and established the largest embassy in the capitol city of Slovakia, counted until 1943 with the existence of the Slovak Republic also in the post-War European organization. According to the Communist party archives in March 1940 the illegal Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party received the following directives: "Our pre-War slogans must be changed. Under the slogan "Restoration of Czechoslovak ia" are hidden at the present time imperialist and anti-Soviet plans. The problem of nationalities is today not the same; it is reduced to the problem of Czechs and Slovaks. We state explicitly that our Party is now for the slogan of the full right of selfdeterminatio n of Czechs and Slovaks. The right of self-determination means the right to an independent state. For the Czechs, we fight for a restoration of their national and political freedom. For the Slovaks, we fight for the full sovereignty of the present Slovak state. The fight for the right of self-determin ation makes our way different from that of world imperialism and Benes. The Slovak state is the given basis for the full freedom of Slovaks. The future relations between the Czech and Slovak states is the question of self-determin ation of both nations and depends on the events of the war (and on its results, remark by Dimitrov)." 7 This was only consistent with the speech of the Soviet Minister Plenipotentia ry and Envoy Extraordinar y, G. Pushkin, who, upon presenting his credentials to the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Jozef Tiso, said: "Presenting to you the documents which accredit me as Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry, appointted by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can announce to you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken cognizance of the establishmen t of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. Because of the war in Europe the establishmen t of these relations oversteps the framework of mutual interests of both our states." 8 Since 1960, when my survey of the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic was published, some interesting �SLOVAKIA 115 documents pertaining to the attitude of the European Great Powers towards Slovakia were published also with regard to Great Britain. I found in 1960 documents and references which shed on the policy of Great Britain toward Slovakia quite a different light9 from that unscrupulously repeated in the War propaganda of the "Czechoslovak governmentin-exile," in the memoirs of Dr. E. Benes, and in the history books written by American and some European historians.10 On the basis of the British archives, F. Vnuk published a few years later a well documented insight into the British attitude which was far more favorable to Slovaks than it has been believed and recorded by Western histo:r.ians.11 However, the present survey aims at giving the basic data on the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic only by the European neutral countries and on the activities and political conceptions of Slovak diplomats accredited in those countries. Even that scope will be narrowed here because the Slovak representatives in Sweden and Spain are alive and work on their memoirs, and the relations between the Holy See and the Slovak Republic were sufficiently recorded in K. Sidor's book, mentioned above. III. NEUTRAL STATES WHICH RECOGNIZED THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC The first of all neutral states to recognize Slovakia diplomatically was Switzerland which gave full recognition to the Slovak Republic on April 19, 1939. Switzerland was followed by Spain on April 25, 1939, and by the Vatican on May 25, 1939. Sweden as the fourth neutral European state, recognized the Slovak Republic on July 26, 1939. Whereas between the Vatican, Switzerland and Spain, and Slovakia, diplomatic relations were de jure and de facto and existed from the very beginning, the relations with Sweden developed slowly and remained on the consular level. From the diplomatic point of view, the most important diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic was, of course, that by the Vatican. This recognition had not only a political but also a moral importance in Europe and in �116 SLOVAKIA the world before the Second World War. As mentioned, the Vatican gave diplomatic recognition to Slovakia on May 25, 1939, and the Slovak representativ e as Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry was accredited in July of the same year. The Holy See appointed first a Nuncio in Bratislava, Msgr. Xaverius Ritter, who had served previously in Prague, but due to some misunderstanding and misinterpreta tion of his credentials, Msgr. Giusepe Burzio, as Charge d'Affaires, represented the Holy See during the whole period of the War and fOT some time even after the War. In view of the fact that the War started just six months after the declaration of Slovakia's independence , the diploma.tic relations of Slovakia with the Vatican became even more important. The efforts of Czech exiles to induce the Vatican into breaking off relations were not successful1 2 and at the end of the War, the Slovak representative was the last one of all Slovak diplomats in neutral states to close his legation. The political, social and moral importance of the diplomatic relations with the Holy See is described in Sidor's book in which one can find not only some important documents, but also valuable information on political developments in Slovakia during the War. From Sidor's book and the above mentioned essay by Vnuk, historians can draw enough information to put into proper perspective the relations between Slovakia and the Holy See and prove incorrect the assertions spread in Western historiograph y. Spain was represented in Slovakia by an experienced career diplomat Juan Cano y Trueba, known generally in Bratislava as Count Bailen. He had the rank of Minister Plenipotentia ry and Envoy Extraordinar y. On the other hand, Slovakia was first represented in Spain by a Charge d'Affaires en pied and later by an Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry. The first Slovak diplomat to visit Madrid was Dr. Jozef M. Zvrskovec who represented Slovakia in Italy and who later became known for his note in which he spoke about a neutral status of Slovakia with regard to Great Britain.13 Zvrskovec, however, did not present his credentials in Spain. This was done in April 1940 by Dr. Joseph A. Mikus �SLOVAKIA 117 who was accredited as Charge d'Affaires en pied and presented his credentials to the Minister of External Affairs, General Cowit Jordana. Mikus remained in Spain from April 11, 1940 to March 24, 1944 and left his post on receiving the Honor of Commandador de la Order de Isabel la Catholica. He was replaced by Mister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, Dr. Jozef Cieker, who remained in Spain witil his witimely death in 1969. Cieker also was a career diplomat and one of the leading Catholic intellectuals. He was active in Pax Romana and Slavia Catholica before he entered the diplomatic service in Prague. He served in Belgrade as Charge d' Affaires and in Zagreb as Minister of the Slovak Republic. In Spain, Cieker was quite succe~ful not only among the members of the Government but also in his relations with the Catholic hierarchy. His good relations proved very useful after the War when he became director of an international College for refugee students ( Collegio Major Santiago Apostol). In exile, Cieker was witil his death one of the leading figures of the Slovak National Cowicil Abroad and known as author of books and articles in Slovak as well as in foreign languages. 14 The relations between Spain and Slovakia will, however, be treated by Mikus in his memoirs. The diplomatic relations of the Slovak Republic with Switzerland were, from the political as well as economic point of view, of great importance. The capital city of Switzerland, Bern, was the second most important European center of diplomatic activities during the whole period of the War, as the Allies, the states which belonged to the Axis camp and all the neutral cowitries were represented in Switzerland. Slovakia established a legation in Bern in the summer of 1939, and Switzerland opened a Consulate General in Bratislava, indicating that a legation would be established later. Even though the Swiss recognition was on the diplomatic level, this wieven representation caused the Slovak Government to send to Switzerland diplomatic representatives with the title Charge d'Affairs en pied, who were duly accredited as handl5 of diplomatic missions but only socially were addressed as Ministers or Envoys. The first Slovak representative in Switzerland was Dr. Bohdan Galvanek who, after a short stay, was sent to Rome, Italy, �118 SLOVAKIA and replaced by a well-known Slovak writer, Tido J. Gaspar. Even though Gaspar was very successful in Bern's diplomatic circles and made for Slovakia a good name, he was replaced in the fall of 1940 by a career diplomat, Dr. Raduz Radlinsky. Well prepared for his role, Radlinsky made many friends among diplomats from various countries and increased the prestige of the Slovak legation. However, in 1942, he left the dir,lomatic service and the Slovak government accredited in his stead the writer of this survey, who remained in Bern until the end of the War. The relations between Slovakia and Switzerland were, from the very beginning, friendly. For Slovakia Bern was of great political importance; for Switzerland economic relations prevailed. In addition to current diplomatic activities the Slovak legation in Bern had the mission to acquaint diplomats and journalists of all countries with the existence of the Slovak Republic as a new state in Central Europe, and with the aspirations pf the Slovak people not only during the War, but also after the world conflict ended. On the part of the Swiss government, the stress was understandably on economic relations which developed very favorably for both countries, leaving at the end of the war a large amount of surplus money from ecQnomic exchanges in Bern.15 Switzerland was represented in Slovakia by Dr. Max Graessli, a career diplomat with the title of Consul General. The good relations between Switzerland and the Slovak Republic were reflected not only in extensive economic and commercial relations but also in the fact that the Swiss government allowed to appoint two honorary consuls for Slovakia in Switzerland. One of them was a wealthy industrialist who had some economic interests in Slovakia also before the war, Rudolf Eckenstein, from Basel. In Zurich was appointed Arthur Gaerrick, a wealthy businessman who represented before the war several Czech firms in Switzerland. During the first years of the War there were indications that the relations between Switzerland and the Slovak Republic would be normalized in the sense that Switzerland would also establish a legation in Bratislava, and the head of the Slovak legation in Bern would assume the title of �SLOVAKIA 119 Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary. During one of my visits with the Minister for External Affairs, Pilez-Golas, I had the impression that this normalization was imminent and I reported the good news to Bratislava with great satisfaction as one of my achievements. However, the luck of the German armies on the Russian front changed and they started to retreat after a terrible defeat at Stalingrad. This made the Swiss government more cautious in their foreign policy with regard to the countries which nolens volens were on the side of the Axis. When the retreat assumed catastrophic dimensions, Minister Pilez-Golas was replaced by a person who had previously no connections with foreign policy and was considered as friendly and acceptable for the Allies. The victory of the Allies was expected after the German retreats as certain, even though rumors persisted that the Allies can make a separate peace with Germany and turn together against the Soviet march toward the West. Only after the failure to kill Hitler by the att.empt on July 22, 1944, these rumors died down and diplomats accredited in Switzerland, as well as some members of the Swiss government, began openly speaking about the unconditional surrender of Germany and her allies. This logically was the end of any hope that Switzerland would establish in Bratislava a legation instead of a consulate general. 16 In view of the complex world situation and hostile propaganda against Slovakia in the West one of the main goals of Slovak diplomatic representatives in Bern was to put into proper perspective the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom and independence regardless of the results of the military conflict. Therefore, many steps were made to counteract the hostile propaganda emanating from the exiled "Czechoslovak" circles in London and Washington and to inform the diplomats accredited in Switzerland about the true situation in Slovakia, and about the attitude of the Slovak people towards the West. Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed very little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians headed by Dr. E. Benes. �120 SLOVAKIA For acquainting foreign diplomats and Swiss journalists with Slovakia and with the political aspirations of the Slovak people, the Slovak Legation in Bern published from August 1943 to January 1945 a bulletin in French and German, Correspondence slovaque, and organized trips for Swiss journalists to Slovakia. One of them, the editor of the prestigious daily "Der Bund," Arnold H. Schwengler, published from his visit to Slovakia a series of articles which, compiled in a booklet "Die slowakische Reise," gave a favorable picture of the economic as well as cultural situation in the Slovak Republic. For publishing the Correspondence slovaque and for maintaining contacts with the press was mainly responsible, until the summer of 1944, Dr. Arved Grebert, who served as Press Attache at the Legation. Some newspapers used the information they received from the Correspondence slovaque of which 23 issues were published. The Correspondence slovaque aimed in the first place to give basic information on economic and cultural matters, but each issue also contained political articles defending the right of Slovaks to independence and refuting the adverse propaganda of the Czech exiles in the West. The political articles were usually free of any mention of Slovakia's relations with Germany and were concerned with the preservation of Slovakia's independence after the war, advocating a sort of federative solution of the problems of the Central European nations. This political concept was advocated also by the Slovak Legation at the Vatican. Sidor's articles on Central European Federation also appeared in some French and German press in Switzerland. In the fall of 1944, an article advocating federalism in Central Europe was published also in the Revue de droit international, mentioned above, by the former Minister of External Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Prof. F. :t>urcanskyP The Slovak Legation in Bern also had a mission to co-operate with Slovak diplomats in neutral countries in order to co-ordinate the efforts aiming at a just solution of the Slovak problem at the end of the War. Very close co-operation developed especially between Karol Sidor, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican, and the writer, for the concept of a Central European Federation conceived �SLOVAKIA 121 as a democratic and Christian block of states on the Soviet border. The idea met with some understanding in Swiss newspapers and in certain diplomatic circles in the West, but was not officially accepted by the Allies because of .agreement with the Soviet government in Teheran and Yalta. Swiss public opinion and the press were generally favorably disposed towards Slovakia during the first years of the War, and some newspapers did so also at the end of the War and after. Even though the "Czechoslovak government in exile" tried to use for their propaganda their old connections with Swiss newspapers and kept in Geneva a propagandist under the cover of an exiled journalist, only the Socialist and Communist press published here and there adverse articles on Slovakia. Generally the :picture was favorable to the Slovak Republic and to the striving of the Slovak people for independence. On the part of the Swiss government, the also was genuine understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people. At the end of the War, the world situation and external pressures forced, however, the Swiss government to follow the political concepts of the Allies and to recognize Czecho-Slovakia. The end of diplomatic relations between the Slovak Republic and Switzerland occurred at the time when the Slovak government was forced to leave the capital city of Slovakia. A sort of consular relations continued until the very end of the War, practically until .June 1st, 1945. Excerpts from "Notes to Memoires." FOOTNOTES 1 ) See Vol. 2, 1944, p. 123-142. In Slovak I published an editorial in the daily Slovak, January 1st, 1944, under the title "tJlohy a problemy slovenskej diplomacie" (Goals and Problems of Slovak Diplomacy). 2) See also my articles: "International Recognition of the Slovak Republic," Slovakia, Vol. I, No. 1, 1951, pp. 23-31; "Diplomatic Documents on Slovakia's Declaration of Independence," Slovakia, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1954, p. 3-12; "British Policy and Slovakia 1939-1945," S lovakia, Vol. X, No. 6, 1960, p. 50-61. These articles were published also in a German version in the periodical Slowakei. 3) See Slovakia, Vol. II, No. 2, 1952, pp. 38-41. 4) F . Vnuk, " Collapse of Czecho-Slovakia in Vatican Documents," Slovak Studies III, Cleveland-Rome, 1965, pp. 239-256. �122 SLOVAKIA 5) See my contributions to J. Pauco (ed.) Karol Sidor, politik, novinar a spisovatel', (Middletown, Pa. 1962); Kalendar Jednota 1971, p. 109, 117; Kalendar Kanadskej Slovenskej Ligy, 1968; Slowakei, Vol VII, No. 1-2, pp. 87-100. 6) L. Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci (Slovakia in the 20th Century), Bratislava, 1968, p. 177. 7) See S. Falt'an, Slovenska otazka v Ceskoslovensku, Bratislava, 1968, p. 112. 8) Quoted from Kirschbaum, Slovakia- Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, op. cit., pp. 1931-1932. 9) See Kirschbaum, "British Policy and Slovakia 1939-1945," Slovakia, Vol. X, No. 6, 1960, pp. 50-61. 10) Distorted information can be found in W. Shirer's book Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, by Gisevius and several specialists in East Central Europe. 11) F. Vnuk, "British Recognition of Independent Slovakia in 1939," Slovak Studies, Vol. IX, No. 6, Cleveland-Rome, 1969, pp. 49-73. 12) See A. Grebert, "Czech Intrigues Against the Slovak State," Slovakia, Vol. I, No. 2, 1951. 13) On March 29, 1940 Minister Zvrskovec sent a note to the Italian Foreign Ministry in which he stated that Slovakia was a neutral country and requested at the same time that the English Government be informed of this in order that England may recognize Slovakia's neutrality with all its consequences. See Documents on German Foreign PoHcy, Series 'D', Vol. X, reprinted in my book Slovakia, p. 281. 14) For details, see Liter6.rny Almanach for 1967, p. 125-126. 15) Unfortunately, the funds were transferred to Prague in the summer of 1945. Two officials of the Slovak National Bank, Pazman and Virsik, who sided with Dr . Benes, signed the transfer documents. 16) The failure of the attempt on Hitler's life and the outbreak of a communist inspired uprising in Central Slovakia in the Fall of 1944 created even a possibility for the interruption of the SwissSlovak relations. I received hints that the Swiss government would have welcome my defectien to Dr. Benes' camp and use it as a pretext for closing down our legation. On the other hand, Consul General Graessli tried to leave the responsibility for taking care of the affairs of the Consulate General to his subalter Consul Hans Keller. Both made after the War great careers in the Swiss di:i>lomatic services. Graessli was transferred to Washington and later became Ambassador to Sweden. Keller also moved fast and in the 1960's was Ambassador in Peking. 17) See Vol. XXII, No. 1. At the en.cl of August 1944, one of this writer's articles on the Federalist solution of Central European problems was published in the daily Slovak. Since it was a favorable analysis of Milan Hodza's book Federation in Central Europe, the German Embassy in Bratislava asked the newspaper to explain to the readers that the article was published by inadvertence and that the Slovak government and the newspaper did not agree with iti. contents. � SLOVAKIA 111 Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States By J. M. K i r s c h b a u m, Ph.D. I. The emergence of the Slovak Republic in March 1939 has been for years presented by historians of Central Eastern Europe in accordance with the War propaganda rather than on the basis of historical facts. In the West, especially the propaganda of the "Czechoslovak governmentin-exile" crept into the history books and some misconceptions survived even the publication of secret documents and the opening of the War archives. It would, however, be unfair to blame Western historians alone for the inaccuracies and prejudices presentation of Slovakia's international status and diplomatic and consular relations. There was no serious attempt on the Slovak side to give historians of Central Eastern Europe sufficient information in foreign language, which could enable them to draw an objective picture of the Slovak Republic. Moreover, comprehensive work on international relations of Slovakia is missing even in Slovak historiography. The reason for not writing about the international relations of Slovakia with other countries by Communist historians is quite understandable: they were reluctant to admit that the Slovak Republic was also recognized by the Soviet Union and some 29 other countries, including the European Great Powers and neutral countries. According to the official "Czechoslovak" propaganda during the War, the Slovak Republic was recognized only by Germany and �112 SLOVAKIA her satellites and this distortion of historical facts suited the post-war Marxist historians. What is difficult to understand, however, is the neglect by Slovaks abroad, especially if we take into account that a number of former Slovak diplomats found refuge in the countries of the free world. During the War some articles surveying the first years of the Slovak Republic were published in Switzerland, but they discussed the international status of Slovakia only passingly. Such was the series of articles by Arnold Schwengeler in the daily Der Bund, and two French articles: one by the Swiss writer William Ritter in the Gazette de Lausanne and a contribution to the Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques by this writer under the pen-name Andre Cerisier.1 After the War, an English publication by F. nurcansky, The International Aspects of the Slovak Question, examined the subject from both the juridical and political points of view. The international relations of Slovakia with other countries were discussed, however, only briefly even in this study. Several other Slovak authors dealt with Slovakia's international relations in a general way by inserting a chapt.er or two in their books or in their articles on Slovakia. Such have been the contributions of this writer either in Slovak or foreign languages and especially a chapter on the diplomatic recognition of Slovakia in his book Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, and in his Slovak book Nds boj o samostatnost' Slovenska. 2 The Slovak diplomatic representative in Spain, Dr. J. A. Mikus, wrote on the subject in his book Slovakia A Political History and in the annuals published in the United States3 either in English or in Slovak, and F. Vnuk published a study based on the Vatican archives materials, 4 but all these writings are far from giving an adequat;e picture of the international relations of the Slovak Republic with European and non-European states which recognized Slovakia in 1939 as an independent state. As far as the memoirs are concerned, only Karol Sidor, the Slovak Envoy Extraordinary and Minist.er Plenipotentiary at the Vatican, published a full account of his years at the Holy See in his Slovak book sest' rokov pri Vatikdne (Six Years at the Vatican). This writer published reminis- �SLOVAKIA 113 cences on his years in Italy and as head of the legation of the Slovak Republic in Switzerland in various Slovak annuals, published in Canada and in the United States.5 More than a dozen former Slovak diplomats who live either in Western Europe or in other parts of the free world, are still expected to record the years of their diplomatic service to enable historians to present this chapter of modern Slovak history in an objective manner. In view of this, it will perhaps not be amiss to record some data and to answer the question of how the emergence of the Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939, was accepted by European and non-European public opinion and how the governments of European neutral countries received the proclamation of Slovakia's independence. In my book Slovakia- Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe a survey of the international recognition of the Slovak Republic has given general information on this subject with some documents to support the historical facts and to prove the utterly incorrect propaganda which for a period of the past 30 years bluntly disregarded the facts and asserted that the Slovak Republic was recognized only by Germany and her satellites. II. In the short period of liberalization in Czecho-Slovakia the Marxist historians who, for political reasons avoided writing about the international status of the Slovak Republic, admitted that: "In March 1939 appeared on the map of Europe a new state - Slovakia. With the exception of the United States all European Great Powers successively recognized the Slovak state de jure or at least de facto: Germany, Italy, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and many smaller European and non-European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Vatican, Switzerland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Spain, Sweden, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yougoslavia, Liberia, Ecuador, Costarica, Holland, Finland, Belgium, Croatia, the Chinese Government of Nanking, etc. The Slovak state became a member of various international conventions and agreements and in the first years of the War it was considered in many capital cities as a small, but as a not easily discarded part of the motley mosaic of European relations." 6 �114 SLOVAKIA Other Marxist historians recorded that the Soviet Union, who recognized the Slovak Republic on September 16, 1939, and established the largest embassy in the capitol city of Slovakia, counted until 1943 with the existence of the Slovak Republic also in the post-War European organization. According to the Communist party archives in March 1940 the illegal Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party received the following directives: "Our pre-War slogans must be changed. Under the slogan "Restoration of Czechoslovak ia" are hidden at the present time imperialist and anti-Soviet plans. The problem of nationalities is today not the same; it is reduced to the problem of Czechs and Slovaks. We state explicitly that our Party is now for the slogan of the full right of selfdeterminatio n of Czechs and Slovaks. The right of self-determination means the right to an independent state. For the Czechs, we fight for a restoration of their national and political freedom. For the Slovaks, we fight for the full sovereignty of the present Slovak state. The fight for the right of self-determin ation makes our way different from that of world imperialism and Benes. The Slovak state is the given basis for the full freedom of Slovaks. The future relations between the Czech and Slovak states is the question of self-determin ation of both nations and depends on the events of the war (and on its results, remark by Dimitrov)." 7 This was only consistent with the speech of the Soviet Minister Plenipotentia ry and Envoy Extraordinar y, G. Pushkin, who, upon presenting his credentials to the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Jozef Tiso, said: "Presenting to you the documents which accredit me as Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry, appointted by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can announce to you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken cognizance of the establishmen t of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. Because of the war in Europe the establishmen t of these relations oversteps the framework of mutual interests of both our states." 8 Since 1960, when my survey of the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic was published, some interesting �SLOVAKIA 115 documents pertaining to the attitude of the European Great Powers towards Slovakia were published also with regard to Great Britain. I found in 1960 documents and references which shed on the policy of Great Britain toward Slovakia quite a different light9 from that unscrupulously repeated in the War propaganda of the "Czechoslovak governmentin-exile," in the memoirs of Dr. E. Benes, and in the history books written by American and some European historians.10 On the basis of the British archives, F. Vnuk published a few years later a well documented insight into the British attitude which was far more favorable to Slovaks than it has been believed and recorded by Western histo:r.ians.11 However, the present survey aims at giving the basic data on the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic only by the European neutral countries and on the activities and political conceptions of Slovak diplomats accredited in those countries. Even that scope will be narrowed here because the Slovak representatives in Sweden and Spain are alive and work on their memoirs, and the relations between the Holy See and the Slovak Republic were sufficiently recorded in K. Sidor's book, mentioned above. III. NEUTRAL STATES WHICH RECOGNIZED THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC The first of all neutral states to recognize Slovakia diplomatically was Switzerland which gave full recognition to the Slovak Republic on April 19, 1939. Switzerland was followed by Spain on April 25, 1939, and by the Vatican on May 25, 1939. Sweden as the fourth neutral European state, recognized the Slovak Republic on July 26, 1939. Whereas between the Vatican, Switzerland and Spain, and Slovakia, diplomatic relations were de jure and de facto and existed from the very beginning, the relations with Sweden developed slowly and remained on the consular level. From the diplomatic point of view, the most important diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic was, of course, that by the Vatican. This recognition had not only a political but also a moral importance in Europe and in �116 SLOVAKIA the world before the Second World War. As mentioned, the Vatican gave diplomatic recognition to Slovakia on May 25, 1939, and the Slovak representativ e as Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry was accredited in July of the same year. The Holy See appointed first a Nuncio in Bratislava, Msgr. Xaverius Ritter, who had served previously in Prague, but due to some misunderstanding and misinterpreta tion of his credentials, Msgr. Giusepe Burzio, as Charge d'Affaires, represented the Holy See during the whole period of the War and fOT some time even after the War. In view of the fact that the War started just six months after the declaration of Slovakia's independence , the diploma.tic relations of Slovakia with the Vatican became even more important. The efforts of Czech exiles to induce the Vatican into breaking off relations were not successful1 2 and at the end of the War, the Slovak representative was the last one of all Slovak diplomats in neutral states to close his legation. The political, social and moral importance of the diplomatic relations with the Holy See is described in Sidor's book in which one can find not only some important documents, but also valuable information on political developments in Slovakia during the War. From Sidor's book and the above mentioned essay by Vnuk, historians can draw enough information to put into proper perspective the relations between Slovakia and the Holy See and prove incorrect the assertions spread in Western historiograph y. Spain was represented in Slovakia by an experienced career diplomat Juan Cano y Trueba, known generally in Bratislava as Count Bailen. He had the rank of Minister Plenipotentia ry and Envoy Extraordinar y. On the other hand, Slovakia was first represented in Spain by a Charge d'Affaires en pied and later by an Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry. The first Slovak diplomat to visit Madrid was Dr. Jozef M. Zvrskovec who represented Slovakia in Italy and who later became known for his note in which he spoke about a neutral status of Slovakia with regard to Great Britain.13 Zvrskovec, however, did not present his credentials in Spain. This was done in April 1940 by Dr. Joseph A. Mikus �SLOVAKIA 117 who was accredited as Charge d'Affaires en pied and presented his credentials to the Minister of External Affairs, General Cowit Jordana. Mikus remained in Spain from April 11, 1940 to March 24, 1944 and left his post on receiving the Honor of Commandador de la Order de Isabel la Catholica. He was replaced by Mister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, Dr. Jozef Cieker, who remained in Spain witil his witimely death in 1969. Cieker also was a career diplomat and one of the leading Catholic intellectuals. He was active in Pax Romana and Slavia Catholica before he entered the diplomatic service in Prague. He served in Belgrade as Charge d' Affaires and in Zagreb as Minister of the Slovak Republic. In Spain, Cieker was quite succe~ful not only among the members of the Government but also in his relations with the Catholic hierarchy. His good relations proved very useful after the War when he became director of an international College for refugee students ( Collegio Major Santiago Apostol). In exile, Cieker was witil his death one of the leading figures of the Slovak National Cowicil Abroad and known as author of books and articles in Slovak as well as in foreign languages. 14 The relations between Spain and Slovakia will, however, be treated by Mikus in his memoirs. The diplomatic relations of the Slovak Republic with Switzerland were, from the political as well as economic point of view, of great importance. The capital city of Switzerland, Bern, was the second most important European center of diplomatic activities during the whole period of the War, as the Allies, the states which belonged to the Axis camp and all the neutral cowitries were represented in Switzerland. Slovakia established a legation in Bern in the summer of 1939, and Switzerland opened a Consulate General in Bratislava, indicating that a legation would be established later. Even though the Swiss recognition was on the diplomatic level, this wieven representation caused the Slovak Government to send to Switzerland diplomatic representatives with the title Charge d'Affairs en pied, who were duly accredited as handl5 of diplomatic missions but only socially were addressed as Ministers or Envoys. The first Slovak representative in Switzerland was Dr. Bohdan Galvanek who, after a short stay, was sent to Rome, Italy, �118 SLOVAKIA and replaced by a well-known Slovak writer, Tido J. Gaspar. Even though Gaspar was very successful in Bern's diplomatic circles and made for Slovakia a good name, he was replaced in the fall of 1940 by a career diplomat, Dr. Raduz Radlinsky. Well prepared for his role, Radlinsky made many friends among diplomats from various countries and increased the prestige of the Slovak legation. However, in 1942, he left the dir,lomatic service and the Slovak government accredited in his stead the writer of this survey, who remained in Bern until the end of the War. The relations between Slovakia and Switzerland were, from the very beginning, friendly. For Slovakia Bern was of great political importance; for Switzerland economic relations prevailed. In addition to current diplomatic activities the Slovak legation in Bern had the mission to acquaint diplomats and journalists of all countries with the existence of the Slovak Republic as a new state in Central Europe, and with the aspirations pf the Slovak people not only during the War, but also after the world conflict ended. On the part of the Swiss government, the stress was understandably on economic relations which developed very favorably for both countries, leaving at the end of the war a large amount of surplus money from ecQnomic exchanges in Bern.15 Switzerland was represented in Slovakia by Dr. Max Graessli, a career diplomat with the title of Consul General. The good relations between Switzerland and the Slovak Republic were reflected not only in extensive economic and commercial relations but also in the fact that the Swiss government allowed to appoint two honorary consuls for Slovakia in Switzerland. One of them was a wealthy industrialist who had some economic interests in Slovakia also before the war, Rudolf Eckenstein, from Basel. In Zurich was appointed Arthur Gaerrick, a wealthy businessman who represented before the war several Czech firms in Switzerland. During the first years of the War there were indications that the relations between Switzerland and the Slovak Republic would be normalized in the sense that Switzerland would also establish a legation in Bratislava, and the head of the Slovak legation in Bern would assume the title of �SLOVAKIA 119 Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary. During one of my visits with the Minister for External Affairs, Pilez-Golas, I had the impression that this normalization was imminent and I reported the good news to Bratislava with great satisfaction as one of my achievements. However, the luck of the German armies on the Russian front changed and they started to retreat after a terrible defeat at Stalingrad. This made the Swiss government more cautious in their foreign policy with regard to the countries which nolens volens were on the side of the Axis. When the retreat assumed catastrophic dimensions, Minister Pilez-Golas was replaced by a person who had previously no connections with foreign policy and was considered as friendly and acceptable for the Allies. The victory of the Allies was expected after the German retreats as certain, even though rumors persisted that the Allies can make a separate peace with Germany and turn together against the Soviet march toward the West. Only after the failure to kill Hitler by the att.empt on July 22, 1944, these rumors died down and diplomats accredited in Switzerland, as well as some members of the Swiss government, began openly speaking about the unconditional surrender of Germany and her allies. This logically was the end of any hope that Switzerland would establish in Bratislava a legation instead of a consulate general. 16 In view of the complex world situation and hostile propaganda against Slovakia in the West one of the main goals of Slovak diplomatic representatives in Bern was to put into proper perspective the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom and independence regardless of the results of the military conflict. Therefore, many steps were made to counteract the hostile propaganda emanating from the exiled "Czechoslovak" circles in London and Washington and to inform the diplomats accredited in Switzerland about the true situation in Slovakia, and about the attitude of the Slovak people towards the West. Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed very little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians headed by Dr. E. Benes. �120 SLOVAKIA For acquainting foreign diplomats and Swiss journalists with Slovakia and with the political aspirations of the Slovak people, the Slovak Legation in Bern published from August 1943 to January 1945 a bulletin in French and German, Correspondence slovaque, and organized trips for Swiss journalists to Slovakia. One of them, the editor of the prestigious daily "Der Bund," Arnold H. Schwengler, published from his visit to Slovakia a series of articles which, compiled in a booklet "Die slowakische Reise," gave a favorable picture of the economic as well as cultural situation in the Slovak Republic. For publishing the Correspondence slovaque and for maintaining contacts with the press was mainly responsible, until the summer of 1944, Dr. Arved Grebert, who served as Press Attache at the Legation. Some newspapers used the information they received from the Correspondence slovaque of which 23 issues were published. The Correspondence slovaque aimed in the first place to give basic information on economic and cultural matters, but each issue also contained political articles defending the right of Slovaks to independence and refuting the adverse propaganda of the Czech exiles in the West. The political articles were usually free of any mention of Slovakia's relations with Germany and were concerned with the preservation of Slovakia's independence after the war, advocating a sort of federative solution of the problems of the Central European nations. This political concept was advocated also by the Slovak Legation at the Vatican. Sidor's articles on Central European Federation also appeared in some French and German press in Switzerland. In the fall of 1944, an article advocating federalism in Central Europe was published also in the Revue de droit international, mentioned above, by the former Minister of External Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Prof. F. :t>urcanskyP The Slovak Legation in Bern also had a mission to co-operate with Slovak diplomats in neutral countries in order to co-ordinate the efforts aiming at a just solution of the Slovak problem at the end of the War. Very close co-operation developed especially between Karol Sidor, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican, and the writer, for the concept of a Central European Federation conceived �SLOVAKIA 121 as a democratic and Christian block of states on the Soviet border. The idea met with some understanding in Swiss newspapers and in certain diplomatic circles in the West, but was not officially accepted by the Allies because of .agreement with the Soviet government in Teheran and Yalta. Swiss public opinion and the press were generally favorably disposed towards Slovakia during the first years of the War, and some newspapers did so also at the end of the War and after. Even though the "Czechoslovak government in exile" tried to use for their propaganda their old connections with Swiss newspapers and kept in Geneva a propagandist under the cover of an exiled journalist, only the Socialist and Communist press published here and there adverse articles on Slovakia. Generally the :picture was favorable to the Slovak Republic and to the striving of the Slovak people for independence. On the part of the Swiss government, the also was genuine understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people. At the end of the War, the world situation and external pressures forced, however, the Swiss government to follow the political concepts of the Allies and to recognize Czecho-Slovakia. The end of diplomatic relations between the Slovak Republic and Switzerland occurred at the time when the Slovak government was forced to leave the capital city of Slovakia. A sort of consular relations continued until the very end of the War, practically until .June 1st, 1945. Excerpts from "Notes to Memoires." FOOTNOTES 1 ) See Vol. 2, 1944, p. 123-142. In Slovak I published an editorial in the daily Slovak, January 1st, 1944, under the title "tJlohy a problemy slovenskej diplomacie" (Goals and Problems of Slovak Diplomacy). 2) See also my articles: "International Recognition of the Slovak Republic," Slovakia, Vol. I, No. 1, 1951, pp. 23-31; "Diplomatic Documents on Slovakia's Declaration of Independence," Slovakia, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1954, p. 3-12; "British Policy and Slovakia 1939-1945," S lovakia, Vol. X, No. 6, 1960, p. 50-61. These articles were published also in a German version in the periodical Slowakei. 3) See Slovakia, Vol. II, No. 2, 1952, pp. 38-41. 4) F . Vnuk, " Collapse of Czecho-Slovakia in Vatican Documents," Slovak Studies III, Cleveland-Rome, 1965, pp. 239-256. �122 SLOVAKIA 5) See my contributions to J. Pauco (ed.) Karol Sidor, politik, novinar a spisovatel', (Middletown, Pa. 1962); Kalendar Jednota 1971, p. 109, 117; Kalendar Kanadskej Slovenskej Ligy, 1968; Slowakei, Vol VII, No. 1-2, pp. 87-100. 6) L. Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci (Slovakia in the 20th Century), Bratislava, 1968, p. 177. 7) See S. Falt'an, Slovenska otazka v Ceskoslovensku, Bratislava, 1968, p. 112. 8) Quoted from Kirschbaum, Slovakia- Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, op. cit., pp. 1931-1932. 9) See Kirschbaum, "British Policy and Slovakia 1939-1945," Slovakia, Vol. X, No. 6, 1960, pp. 50-61. 10) Distorted information can be found in W. Shirer's book Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, by Gisevius and several specialists in East Central Europe. 11) F. Vnuk, "British Recognition of Independent Slovakia in 1939," Slovak Studies, Vol. IX, No. 6, Cleveland-Rome, 1969, pp. 49-73. 12) See A. Grebert, "Czech Intrigues Against the Slovak State," Slovakia, Vol. I, No. 2, 1951. 13) On March 29, 1940 Minister Zvrskovec sent a note to the Italian Foreign Ministry in which he stated that Slovakia was a neutral country and requested at the same time that the English Government be informed of this in order that England may recognize Slovakia's neutrality with all its consequences. See Documents on German Foreign PoHcy, Series 'D', Vol. X, reprinted in my book Slovakia, p. 281. 14) For details, see Liter6.rny Almanach for 1967, p. 125-126. 15) Unfortunately, the funds were transferred to Prague in the summer of 1945. Two officials of the Slovak National Bank, Pazman and Virsik, who sided with Dr . Benes, signed the transfer documents. 16) The failure of the attempt on Hitler's life and the outbreak of a communist inspired uprising in Central Slovakia in the Fall of 1944 created even a possibility for the interruption of the SwissSlovak relations. I received hints that the Swiss government would have welcome my defectien to Dr. Benes' camp and use it as a pretext for closing down our legation. On the other hand, Consul General Graessli tried to leave the responsibility for taking care of the affairs of the Consulate General to his subalter Consul Hans Keller. Both made after the War great careers in the Swiss di:i>lomatic services. Graessli was transferred to Washington and later became Ambassador to Sweden. Keller also moved fast and in the 1960's was Ambassador in Peking. 17) See Vol. XXII, No. 1. At the en.cl of August 1944, one of this writer's articles on the Federalist solution of Central European problems was published in the daily Slovak. Since it was a favorable analysis of Milan Hodza's book Federation in Central Europe, the German Embassy in Bratislava asked the newspaper to explain to the readers that the article was published by inadvertence and that the Slovak government and the newspaper did not agree with iti. contents. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 111 Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States By J. M. K i r s c h b a u m, Ph.D. I. The emergence of the Slovak Republic in March 1939 has been for years presented by historians of Central Eastern Europe in accordance with the War propaganda rather than on the basis of historical facts. In the West, especially the propaganda of the "Czechoslovak governmentin-exile" crept into the history books and some misconceptions survived even the publication of secret documents and the opening of the War archives. It would, however, be unfair to blame Western historians alone for the inaccuracies and prejudices presentation of Slovakia's international status and diplomatic and consular relations. There was no serious attempt on the Slovak side to give historians of Central Eastern Europe sufficient information in foreign language, which could enable them to draw an objective picture of the Slovak Republic. Moreover, comprehensive work on international relations of Slovakia is missing even in Slovak historiography. The reason for not writing about the international relations of Slovakia with other countries by Communist historians is quite understandable: they were reluctant to admit that the Slovak Republic was also recognized by the Soviet Union and some 29 other countries, including the European Great Powers and neutral countries. According to the official "Czechoslovak" propaganda during the War, the Slovak Republic was recognized only by Germany and 112 SLOVAKIA her satellites and this distortion of historical facts suited the post-war Marxist historians. What is difficult to understand, however, is the neglect by Slovaks abroad, especially if we take into account that a number of former Slovak diplomats found refuge in the countries of the free world. During the War some articles surveying the first years of the Slovak Republic were published in Switzerland, but they discussed the international status of Slovakia only passingly. Such was the series of articles by Arnold Schwengeler in the daily Der Bund, and two French articles: one by the Swiss writer William Ritter in the Gazette de Lausanne and a contribution to the Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques by this writer under the pen-name Andre Cerisier.1 After the War, an English publication by F. nurcansky, The International Aspects of the Slovak Question, examined the subject from both the juridical and political points of view. The international relations of Slovakia with other countries were discussed, however, only briefly even in this study. Several other Slovak authors dealt with Slovakia's international relations in a general way by inserting a chapt.er or two in their books or in their articles on Slovakia. Such have been the contributions of this writer either in Slovak or foreign languages and especially a chapter on the diplomatic recognition of Slovakia in his book Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, and in his Slovak book Nds boj o samostatnost' Slovenska. 2 The Slovak diplomatic representative in Spain, Dr. J. A. Mikus, wrote on the subject in his book Slovakia A Political History and in the annuals published in the United States3 either in English or in Slovak, and F. Vnuk published a study based on the Vatican archives materials, 4 but all these writings are far from giving an adequat;e picture of the international relations of the Slovak Republic with European and non-European states which recognized Slovakia in 1939 as an independent state. As far as the memoirs are concerned, only Karol Sidor, the Slovak Envoy Extraordinary and Minist.er Plenipotentiary at the Vatican, published a full account of his years at the Holy See in his Slovak book sest' rokov pri Vatikdne (Six Years at the Vatican). This writer published reminis- SLOVAKIA 113 cences on his years in Italy and as head of the legation of the Slovak Republic in Switzerland in various Slovak annuals, published in Canada and in the United States.5 More than a dozen former Slovak diplomats who live either in Western Europe or in other parts of the free world, are still expected to record the years of their diplomatic service to enable historians to present this chapter of modern Slovak history in an objective manner. In view of this, it will perhaps not be amiss to record some data and to answer the question of how the emergence of the Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939, was accepted by European and non-European public opinion and how the governments of European neutral countries received the proclamation of Slovakia's independence. In my book Slovakia- Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe a survey of the international recognition of the Slovak Republic has given general information on this subject with some documents to support the historical facts and to prove the utterly incorrect propaganda which for a period of the past 30 years bluntly disregarded the facts and asserted that the Slovak Republic was recognized only by Germany and her satellites. II. In the short period of liberalization in Czecho-Slovakia the Marxist historians who, for political reasons avoided writing about the international status of the Slovak Republic, admitted that: "In March 1939 appeared on the map of Europe a new state - Slovakia. With the exception of the United States all European Great Powers successively recognized the Slovak state de jure or at least de facto: Germany, Italy, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and many smaller European and non-European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Vatican, Switzerland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Spain, Sweden, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yougoslavia, Liberia, Ecuador, Costarica, Holland, Finland, Belgium, Croatia, the Chinese Government of Nanking, etc. The Slovak state became a member of various international conventions and agreements and in the first years of the War it was considered in many capital cities as a small, but as a not easily discarded part of the motley mosaic of European relations." 6 114 SLOVAKIA Other Marxist historians recorded that the Soviet Union, who recognized the Slovak Republic on September 16, 1939, and established the largest embassy in the capitol city of Slovakia, counted until 1943 with the existence of the Slovak Republic also in the post-War European organization. According to the Communist party archives in March 1940 the illegal Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party received the following directives: "Our pre-War slogans must be changed. Under the slogan "Restoration of Czechoslovak ia" are hidden at the present time imperialist and anti-Soviet plans. The problem of nationalities is today not the same; it is reduced to the problem of Czechs and Slovaks. We state explicitly that our Party is now for the slogan of the full right of selfdeterminatio n of Czechs and Slovaks. The right of self-determination means the right to an independent state. For the Czechs, we fight for a restoration of their national and political freedom. For the Slovaks, we fight for the full sovereignty of the present Slovak state. The fight for the right of self-determin ation makes our way different from that of world imperialism and Benes. The Slovak state is the given basis for the full freedom of Slovaks. The future relations between the Czech and Slovak states is the question of self-determin ation of both nations and depends on the events of the war (and on its results, remark by Dimitrov)." 7 This was only consistent with the speech of the Soviet Minister Plenipotentia ry and Envoy Extraordinar y, G. Pushkin, who, upon presenting his credentials to the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Jozef Tiso, said: "Presenting to you the documents which accredit me as Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry, appointted by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can announce to you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken cognizance of the establishmen t of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. Because of the war in Europe the establishmen t of these relations oversteps the framework of mutual interests of both our states." 8 Since 1960, when my survey of the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic was published, some interesting SLOVAKIA 115 documents pertaining to the attitude of the European Great Powers towards Slovakia were published also with regard to Great Britain. I found in 1960 documents and references which shed on the policy of Great Britain toward Slovakia quite a different light9 from that unscrupulously repeated in the War propaganda of the "Czechoslovak governmentin-exile," in the memoirs of Dr. E. Benes, and in the history books written by American and some European historians.10 On the basis of the British archives, F. Vnuk published a few years later a well documented insight into the British attitude which was far more favorable to Slovaks than it has been believed and recorded by Western histo:r.ians.11 However, the present survey aims at giving the basic data on the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic only by the European neutral countries and on the activities and political conceptions of Slovak diplomats accredited in those countries. Even that scope will be narrowed here because the Slovak representatives in Sweden and Spain are alive and work on their memoirs, and the relations between the Holy See and the Slovak Republic were sufficiently recorded in K. Sidor's book, mentioned above. III. NEUTRAL STATES WHICH RECOGNIZED THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC The first of all neutral states to recognize Slovakia diplomatically was Switzerland which gave full recognition to the Slovak Republic on April 19, 1939. Switzerland was followed by Spain on April 25, 1939, and by the Vatican on May 25, 1939. Sweden as the fourth neutral European state, recognized the Slovak Republic on July 26, 1939. Whereas between the Vatican, Switzerland and Spain, and Slovakia, diplomatic relations were de jure and de facto and existed from the very beginning, the relations with Sweden developed slowly and remained on the consular level. From the diplomatic point of view, the most important diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic was, of course, that by the Vatican. This recognition had not only a political but also a moral importance in Europe and in 116 SLOVAKIA the world before the Second World War. As mentioned, the Vatican gave diplomatic recognition to Slovakia on May 25, 1939, and the Slovak representativ e as Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry was accredited in July of the same year. The Holy See appointed first a Nuncio in Bratislava, Msgr. Xaverius Ritter, who had served previously in Prague, but due to some misunderstanding and misinterpreta tion of his credentials, Msgr. Giusepe Burzio, as Charge d'Affaires, represented the Holy See during the whole period of the War and fOT some time even after the War. In view of the fact that the War started just six months after the declaration of Slovakia's independence , the diploma.tic relations of Slovakia with the Vatican became even more important. The efforts of Czech exiles to induce the Vatican into breaking off relations were not successful1 2 and at the end of the War, the Slovak representative was the last one of all Slovak diplomats in neutral states to close his legation. The political, social and moral importance of the diplomatic relations with the Holy See is described in Sidor's book in which one can find not only some important documents, but also valuable information on political developments in Slovakia during the War. From Sidor's book and the above mentioned essay by Vnuk, historians can draw enough information to put into proper perspective the relations between Slovakia and the Holy See and prove incorrect the assertions spread in Western historiograph y. Spain was represented in Slovakia by an experienced career diplomat Juan Cano y Trueba, known generally in Bratislava as Count Bailen. He had the rank of Minister Plenipotentia ry and Envoy Extraordinar y. On the other hand, Slovakia was first represented in Spain by a Charge d'Affaires en pied and later by an Envoy Extraordinar y and Minister Plenipotentia ry. The first Slovak diplomat to visit Madrid was Dr. Jozef M. Zvrskovec who represented Slovakia in Italy and who later became known for his note in which he spoke about a neutral status of Slovakia with regard to Great Britain.13 Zvrskovec, however, did not present his credentials in Spain. This was done in April 1940 by Dr. Joseph A. Mikus SLOVAKIA 117 who was accredited as Charge d'Affaires en pied and presented his credentials to the Minister of External Affairs, General Cowit Jordana. Mikus remained in Spain from April 11, 1940 to March 24, 1944 and left his post on receiving the Honor of Commandador de la Order de Isabel la Catholica. He was replaced by Mister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, Dr. Jozef Cieker, who remained in Spain witil his witimely death in 1969. Cieker also was a career diplomat and one of the leading Catholic intellectuals. He was active in Pax Romana and Slavia Catholica before he entered the diplomatic service in Prague. He served in Belgrade as Charge d' Affaires and in Zagreb as Minister of the Slovak Republic. In Spain, Cieker was quite succe~ful not only among the members of the Government but also in his relations with the Catholic hierarchy. His good relations proved very useful after the War when he became director of an international College for refugee students ( Collegio Major Santiago Apostol). In exile, Cieker was witil his death one of the leading figures of the Slovak National Cowicil Abroad and known as author of books and articles in Slovak as well as in foreign languages. 14 The relations between Spain and Slovakia will, however, be treated by Mikus in his memoirs. The diplomatic relations of the Slovak Republic with Switzerland were, from the political as well as economic point of view, of great importance. The capital city of Switzerland, Bern, was the second most important European center of diplomatic activities during the whole period of the War, as the Allies, the states which belonged to the Axis camp and all the neutral cowitries were represented in Switzerland. Slovakia established a legation in Bern in the summer of 1939, and Switzerland opened a Consulate General in Bratislava, indicating that a legation would be established later. Even though the Swiss recognition was on the diplomatic level, this wieven representation caused the Slovak Government to send to Switzerland diplomatic representatives with the title Charge d'Affairs en pied, who were duly accredited as handl5 of diplomatic missions but only socially were addressed as Ministers or Envoys. The first Slovak representative in Switzerland was Dr. Bohdan Galvanek who, after a short stay, was sent to Rome, Italy, 118 SLOVAKIA and replaced by a well-known Slovak writer, Tido J. Gaspar. Even though Gaspar was very successful in Bern's diplomatic circles and made for Slovakia a good name, he was replaced in the fall of 1940 by a career diplomat, Dr. Raduz Radlinsky. Well prepared for his role, Radlinsky made many friends among diplomats from various countries and increased the prestige of the Slovak legation. However, in 1942, he left the dir,lomatic service and the Slovak government accredited in his stead the writer of this survey, who remained in Bern until the end of the War. The relations between Slovakia and Switzerland were, from the very beginning, friendly. For Slovakia Bern was of great political importance; for Switzerland economic relations prevailed. In addition to current diplomatic activities the Slovak legation in Bern had the mission to acquaint diplomats and journalists of all countries with the existence of the Slovak Republic as a new state in Central Europe, and with the aspirations pf the Slovak people not only during the War, but also after the world conflict ended. On the part of the Swiss government, the stress was understandably on economic relations which developed very favorably for both countries, leaving at the end of the war a large amount of surplus money from ecQnomic exchanges in Bern.15 Switzerland was represented in Slovakia by Dr. Max Graessli, a career diplomat with the title of Consul General. The good relations between Switzerland and the Slovak Republic were reflected not only in extensive economic and commercial relations but also in the fact that the Swiss government allowed to appoint two honorary consuls for Slovakia in Switzerland. One of them was a wealthy industrialist who had some economic interests in Slovakia also before the war, Rudolf Eckenstein, from Basel. In Zurich was appointed Arthur Gaerrick, a wealthy businessman who represented before the war several Czech firms in Switzerland. During the first years of the War there were indications that the relations between Switzerland and the Slovak Republic would be normalized in the sense that Switzerland would also establish a legation in Bratislava, and the head of the Slovak legation in Bern would assume the title of SLOVAKIA 119 Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary. During one of my visits with the Minister for External Affairs, Pilez-Golas, I had the impression that this normalization was imminent and I reported the good news to Bratislava with great satisfaction as one of my achievements. However, the luck of the German armies on the Russian front changed and they started to retreat after a terrible defeat at Stalingrad. This made the Swiss government more cautious in their foreign policy with regard to the countries which nolens volens were on the side of the Axis. When the retreat assumed catastrophic dimensions, Minister Pilez-Golas was replaced by a person who had previously no connections with foreign policy and was considered as friendly and acceptable for the Allies. The victory of the Allies was expected after the German retreats as certain, even though rumors persisted that the Allies can make a separate peace with Germany and turn together against the Soviet march toward the West. Only after the failure to kill Hitler by the att.empt on July 22, 1944, these rumors died down and diplomats accredited in Switzerland, as well as some members of the Swiss government, began openly speaking about the unconditional surrender of Germany and her allies. This logically was the end of any hope that Switzerland would establish in Bratislava a legation instead of a consulate general. 16 In view of the complex world situation and hostile propaganda against Slovakia in the West one of the main goals of Slovak diplomatic representatives in Bern was to put into proper perspective the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom and independence regardless of the results of the military conflict. Therefore, many steps were made to counteract the hostile propaganda emanating from the exiled "Czechoslovak" circles in London and Washington and to inform the diplomats accredited in Switzerland about the true situation in Slovakia, and about the attitude of the Slovak people towards the West. Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed very little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians headed by Dr. E. Benes. 120 SLOVAKIA For acquainting foreign diplomats and Swiss journalists with Slovakia and with the political aspirations of the Slovak people, the Slovak Legation in Bern published from August 1943 to January 1945 a bulletin in French and German, Correspondence slovaque, and organized trips for Swiss journalists to Slovakia. One of them, the editor of the prestigious daily "Der Bund," Arnold H. Schwengler, published from his visit to Slovakia a series of articles which, compiled in a booklet "Die slowakische Reise," gave a favorable picture of the economic as well as cultural situation in the Slovak Republic. For publishing the Correspondence slovaque and for maintaining contacts with the press was mainly responsible, until the summer of 1944, Dr. Arved Grebert, who served as Press Attache at the Legation. Some newspapers used the information they received from the Correspondence slovaque of which 23 issues were published. The Correspondence slovaque aimed in the first place to give basic information on economic and cultural matters, but each issue also contained political articles defending the right of Slovaks to independence and refuting the adverse propaganda of the Czech exiles in the West. The political articles were usually free of any mention of Slovakia's relations with Germany and were concerned with the preservation of Slovakia's independence after the war, advocating a sort of federative solution of the problems of the Central European nations. This political concept was advocated also by the Slovak Legation at the Vatican. Sidor's articles on Central European Federation also appeared in some French and German press in Switzerland. In the fall of 1944, an article advocating federalism in Central Europe was published also in the Revue de droit international, mentioned above, by the former Minister of External Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Prof. F. :t>urcanskyP The Slovak Legation in Bern also had a mission to co-operate with Slovak diplomats in neutral countries in order to co-ordinate the efforts aiming at a just solution of the Slovak problem at the end of the War. Very close co-operation developed especially between Karol Sidor, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican, and the writer, for the concept of a Central European Federation conceived SLOVAKIA 121 as a democratic and Christian block of states on the Soviet border. The idea met with some understanding in Swiss newspapers and in certain diplomatic circles in the West, but was not officially accepted by the Allies because of .agreement with the Soviet government in Teheran and Yalta. Swiss public opinion and the press were generally favorably disposed towards Slovakia during the first years of the War, and some newspapers did so also at the end of the War and after. Even though the "Czechoslovak government in exile" tried to use for their propaganda their old connections with Swiss newspapers and kept in Geneva a propagandist under the cover of an exiled journalist, only the Socialist and Communist press published here and there adverse articles on Slovakia. Generally the :picture was favorable to the Slovak Republic and to the striving of the Slovak people for independence. On the part of the Swiss government, the also was genuine understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people. At the end of the War, the world situation and external pressures forced, however, the Swiss government to follow the political concepts of the Allies and to recognize Czecho-Slovakia. The end of diplomatic relations between the Slovak Republic and Switzerland occurred at the time when the Slovak government was forced to leave the capital city of Slovakia. A sort of consular relations continued until the very end of the War, practically until .June 1st, 1945. Excerpts from "Notes to Memoires." FOOTNOTES 1 ) See Vol. 2, 1944, p. 123-142. In Slovak I published an editorial in the daily Slovak, January 1st, 1944, under the title "tJlohy a problemy slovenskej diplomacie" (Goals and Problems of Slovak Diplomacy). 2) See also my articles: "International Recognition of the Slovak Republic," Slovakia, Vol. I, No. 1, 1951, pp. 23-31; "Diplomatic Documents on Slovakia's Declaration of Independence," Slovakia, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1954, p. 3-12; "British Policy and Slovakia 1939-1945," S lovakia, Vol. X, No. 6, 1960, p. 50-61. These articles were published also in a German version in the periodical Slowakei. 3) See Slovakia, Vol. II, No. 2, 1952, pp. 38-41. 4) F . Vnuk, " Collapse of Czecho-Slovakia in Vatican Documents," Slovak Studies III, Cleveland-Rome, 1965, pp. 239-256. 122 SLOVAKIA 5) See my contributions to J. Pauco (ed.) Karol Sidor, politik, novinar a spisovatel', (Middletown, Pa. 1962); Kalendar Jednota 1971, p. 109, 117; Kalendar Kanadskej Slovenskej Ligy, 1968; Slowakei, Vol VII, No. 1-2, pp. 87-100. 6) L. Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci (Slovakia in the 20th Century), Bratislava, 1968, p. 177. 7) See S. Falt'an, Slovenska otazka v Ceskoslovensku, Bratislava, 1968, p. 112. 8) Quoted from Kirschbaum, Slovakia- Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, op. cit., pp. 1931-1932. 9) See Kirschbaum, "British Policy and Slovakia 1939-1945," Slovakia, Vol. X, No. 6, 1960, pp. 50-61. 10) Distorted information can be found in W. Shirer's book Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, by Gisevius and several specialists in East Central Europe. 11) F. Vnuk, "British Recognition of Independent Slovakia in 1939," Slovak Studies, Vol. IX, No. 6, Cleveland-Rome, 1969, pp. 49-73. 12) See A. Grebert, "Czech Intrigues Against the Slovak State," Slovakia, Vol. I, No. 2, 1951. 13) On March 29, 1940 Minister Zvrskovec sent a note to the Italian Foreign Ministry in which he stated that Slovakia was a neutral country and requested at the same time that the English Government be informed of this in order that England may recognize Slovakia's neutrality with all its consequences. See Documents on German Foreign PoHcy, Series 'D', Vol. X, reprinted in my book Slovakia, p. 281. 14) For details, see Liter6.rny Almanach for 1967, p. 125-126. 15) Unfortunately, the funds were transferred to Prague in the summer of 1945. Two officials of the Slovak National Bank, Pazman and Virsik, who sided with Dr . Benes, signed the transfer documents. 16) The failure of the attempt on Hitler's life and the outbreak of a communist inspired uprising in Central Slovakia in the Fall of 1944 created even a possibility for the interruption of the SwissSlovak relations. I received hints that the Swiss government would have welcome my defectien to Dr. Benes' camp and use it as a pretext for closing down our legation. On the other hand, Consul General Graessli tried to leave the responsibility for taking care of the affairs of the Consulate General to his subalter Consul Hans Keller. Both made after the War great careers in the Swiss di:i>lomatic services. Graessli was transferred to Washington and later became Ambassador to Sweden. Keller also moved fast and in the 1960's was Ambassador in Peking. 17) See Vol. XXII, No. 1. At the en.cl of August 1944, one of this writer's articles on the Federalist solution of Central European problems was published in the daily Slovak. Since it was a favorable analysis of Milan Hodza's book Federation in Central Europe, the German Embassy in Bratislava asked the newspaper to explain to the readers that the article was published by inadvertence and that the Slovak government and the newspaper did not agree with iti. contents.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 111-122 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/70a4867303c04e6d7f7c38fdeeaa91fe.pdf f12c1aaa283e8bd5f8a3fc454ecf7894 PDF Text Text SLOYAKI A 3 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H. Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered Austria-<HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1). From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at home and abroa<l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a brilliant history-<:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries. In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and <pride. Czech politicians were quite aware of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ . �SLOVAKIA f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary, Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic. In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which later became invohed in a total war against the democratic powers of the western world, many American and British statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to . the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination over Slovakia after the war wias ended. 1 Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence? The Germans and Slovakia Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938, Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll: S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into �SLOVAKIA 5 incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward Poiand." The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence'' (Doc . No. 39). When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932, and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State." At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment, political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune" and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense" (Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46). 1 Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague, Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according �b S LOVAKIA to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-<rea:ohing autonomy is now demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939, Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion with Hll:Illgary." Did the Slovaks Want Independence? Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938. When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber 19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims ·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that "it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168). But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed 1 �SLOVAKIA 7 by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7, 1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic." According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day, howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk: representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed. President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186). Declaration of Slovak Independence The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events: 1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe through the medium of the V~enna radio. �8 SLOVAKIA In the documents it says that "the illegal measures taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po. litical factors. When the latter were taken out o<f Slovrukia , the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people to preserve peace and order and promised the release of political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing couild be done with him" (2). The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet. According to the extensive record about the conference of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy I (2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only by 't he SloYak Assembly. �SLOVAKIA 9 monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these conditions.'' Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia. "Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in 1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that ·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time, "he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving something that did not want to be preserved." Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only, and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged to Germany." The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision quickly" (Doc. No. 202). �10 SLOVAKIA How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr. Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question calmly." Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld, after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3). The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain, Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of t he Us.A. �SLOVAKIA 11 ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries. How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances? As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen, on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky, the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that "if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion calmly." But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl<Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia" and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha, "that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1 �12 SLOVAKIA tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him." Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc. No. 228). Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic, cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent. But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and failed to. escrupe, hung and shot. The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk who dares to work for the independence oif his nation. After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes "OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no means without bizarreness. � SLOYAKI A 3 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H. Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered Austria-<HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1). From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at home and abroa<l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a brilliant history-<:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries. In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and <pride. Czech politicians were quite aware of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ . �SLOVAKIA f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary, Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic. In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which later became invohed in a total war against the democratic powers of the western world, many American and British statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to . the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination over Slovakia after the war wias ended. 1 Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence? The Germans and Slovakia Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938, Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll: S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into �SLOVAKIA 5 incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward Poiand." The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence'' (Doc . No. 39). When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932, and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State." At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment, political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune" and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense" (Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46). 1 Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague, Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according �b S LOVAKIA to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-<rea:ohing autonomy is now demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939, Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion with Hll:Illgary." Did the Slovaks Want Independence? Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938. When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber 19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims ·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that "it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168). But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed 1 �SLOVAKIA 7 by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7, 1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic." According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day, howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk: representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed. President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186). Declaration of Slovak Independence The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events: 1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe through the medium of the V~enna radio. �8 SLOVAKIA In the documents it says that "the illegal measures taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po. litical factors. When the latter were taken out o<f Slovrukia , the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people to preserve peace and order and promised the release of political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing couild be done with him" (2). The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet. According to the extensive record about the conference of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy I (2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only by 't he SloYak Assembly. �SLOVAKIA 9 monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these conditions.'' Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia. "Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in 1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that ·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time, "he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving something that did not want to be preserved." Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only, and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged to Germany." The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision quickly" (Doc. No. 202). �10 SLOVAKIA How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr. Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question calmly." Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld, after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3). The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain, Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of t he Us.A. �SLOVAKIA 11 ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries. How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances? As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen, on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky, the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that "if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion calmly." But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl<Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia" and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha, "that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1 �12 SLOVAKIA tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him." Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc. No. 228). Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic, cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent. But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and failed to. escrupe, hung and shot. The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk who dares to work for the independence oif his nation. After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes "OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no means without bizarreness. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOYAKI A 3 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H. Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered Austria-<HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1). From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at home and abroa<l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a brilliant history-<:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries. In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and <pride. Czech politicians were quite aware of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ . SLOVAKIA f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary, Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic. In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which later became invohed in a total war against the democratic powers of the western world, many American and British statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to . the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination over Slovakia after the war wias ended. 1 Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence? The Germans and Slovakia Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938, Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll: S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into SLOVAKIA 5 incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward Poiand." The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence'' (Doc . No. 39). When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932, and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State." At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment, political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune" and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense" (Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46). 1 Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague, Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according b S LOVAKIA to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-<rea:ohing autonomy is now demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939, Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion with Hll:Illgary." Did the Slovaks Want Independence? Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938. When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber 19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims ·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that "it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168). But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed 1 SLOVAKIA 7 by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7, 1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic." According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day, howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk: representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed. President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186). Declaration of Slovak Independence The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events: 1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe through the medium of the V~enna radio. 8 SLOVAKIA In the documents it says that "the illegal measures taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po. litical factors. When the latter were taken out o<f Slovrukia , the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people to preserve peace and order and promised the release of political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing couild be done with him" (2). The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet. According to the extensive record about the conference of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy I (2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only by 't he SloYak Assembly. SLOVAKIA 9 monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these conditions.'' Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia. "Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in 1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that ·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time, "he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving something that did not want to be preserved." Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only, and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged to Germany." The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision quickly" (Doc. No. 202). 10 SLOVAKIA How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr. Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question calmly." Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld, after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3). The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain, Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of t he Us.A. SLOVAKIA 11 ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries. How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances? As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen, on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky, the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that "if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion calmly." But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl<Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia" and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha, "that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1 12 SLOVAKIA tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him." Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc. No. 228). Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic, cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent. But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and failed to. escrupe, hung and shot. The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk who dares to work for the independence oif his nation. After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes "OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no means without bizarreness.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Diplomatic Documents on Slovakia's Declaration of Independence Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954 pp. 3-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1954 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/635b6ed1c68bba1673b6a0d1ff764bbc.pdf cf43258673a41d9008eacf50c98385b5 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. 8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . 10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). 12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. 13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- 14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- 16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Košice in the Second Half of the 19th Century Description An account of the resource Frank Henschel Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 7-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Henschel, Frank Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cd097d77bb364356e1484c3c8e2503bd.pdf 967b63980e85bd86edd8d53a5c90cddd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still 52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · '  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Beneš Sold Out to the Kremlin Description An account of the resource R. Umiastowski Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 51-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Umiastowski, R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb3d02877fc492ac399c428eb97fa522.pdf e6f1497d28c7ae6d8ec2f6bb05784f1a PDF Text Text 5 SLOVAKIA Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history, were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent. Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous addresses delivered on various occasions. Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky, we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow." Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers who never die . Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision, his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their country that freedom, that independent and recognized state for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath . 1 • • • DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY - THE MAN Constantine Culen Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could have distinguished himself by a career at the University of Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook, nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But �6 SLOVAKIA on completing his university training, Hruswsky decided on a different course of life. There happened to be a vaicancy for the head.mastership at the Catholic Slovalk high school or gymna:zium at Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to apply for the post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason of the fact that the institution was burdened with financiaJ difficulties amd very often the first of the month found the administration really straitened ~bout meeting the payroll. Moreover, the school faced an expansion prog~am which complicated financial matters to an even greater degree. Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured se_ curity and prestige of a university chair in pr,e ference to this position which was less rewarding in material ivalues. He became the school's director and made of it the intellectual center which Bishop Stefan Moyses, its founder, had hoped it would once become. This particular gymnazium was the only institution which ,b ore upon its facade the inscription "SLOVIDNSKE GYMNAZl/lJ.M (,SI.JOV!AK GYiMiNAZIUM); all other similar schools were inscribed as "OZE}()HO-SLOiVA1K." It is not dear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. HTusovsky was singularly proud of such a distinctive designation of his school. And it was, in reality, the only genuine SLOV A1K gymna·zium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and in purpose. It was my privilege to go there often. And each visit proved to me a more refreshing experience. Perhaps there had never yet been as demanding a headmaster as was Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had been so universally loved and respected "Pan direk:to:r" -that was his title; it was a designation or an ruppellation by which we understood without question and immediately that the reference was to Dr. Hrusorvsky and to him alone. The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender was to hear from pan direktor no word rubout the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with hin1 when a student approached with an explanation and apology. �SLOVAKIA 7 "Did I say anything to you?" said pan direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no wiarmth. "Well, that's just it, pan direktor; thia t's the point. You said not a wo,r d," the student complained. Even here, in immigration, his former students often soug,h t out their pan direktor. The confidently referred to him for counsel and always ·p arted from him strengthened and imbued with resolution. Hrusorvsiky never recommended inconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict, he did encourage vigorous effort and endorsed even justified force that was deliberate and purposeful. Hrusorvsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic (193'8--1945). We happened to, serive together ,o n various committees. I learned that he looked even upon current problems with the dis1p osition of a serious historian, and it was especially in our committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our tasks. He was not given to frequent expression in Parliament but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although 'he was a,ble to, speak without prolonged ,p reparation, he always took pains to :p repare his par. liamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word was selected for a specific purpo,s e and a particula:r significance. These addresses are of such merit that one day they will be e!ID!bodied in handbooks of ;public speaking as classic creations. The thought-ieontent, as well as the delivery and all that was connected with these addresses, was thoroughly studied and weighed, tI believe that I derogate from no one's merits of fame when I judge thaJt Hrusovsky was one of. the best speakers of the Slovaik nation within the past century. Frequently HI'us01Vslky was also the speaker of the day in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense of appreciation of his talents. One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's s,pooial .p redilec-, tion was the Slov,a,k Institute of Arts and -Sciences (1M atica �8 SLOVAKIA slovenska). As chairman of various science departments and as secretary of the history depa:rtment of the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the organization of scientific pursuits and undertrukings in Slovakia. He was a real responsibility; he had accomplished much; but he still had a great deal of work .planned. Even the very last evening of his life he discussed several longstanding iprojects which he hoped to realize some future day that would grant a happy return to his native land. Recently a certain Slovak political leader who was en. gaiged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at this ,p oint it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return to his former calling, a!bsor'bed as, he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite the contrary. What I can most r,e adily imagine and what would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field at the gymnazilliill." It was most natural and logical that on the death of Ka,rol Sidor, Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of the Slovak National Council AJbroad. Never at home, and much less in exile, did he aspire to p'U'blic office. 'In response to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he finally yielded to, this extent that he agreed to undertake whatever responsibilities the membe'I'.s of the SNCA should decide to entrust to him. He conceived of this office as a service to the nation. Two days ,before his, death we were occupied in discussion until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of Slovakia, his eyes shone bdlliantly. He said that evening, and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of us may presume .pretensions to a privileged position at home. Our only duty, here in a new land which affords us liberty and the opportunity to live unshackled by the terror which dominates aJl life at home, is to devote ourseilves tq work for our naJtion . This is one of the most important convictions which each one of us must g~asp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in re- �SLOVAKIA 9 turn for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On the other hand, he continued, qualified aind deserving indi,v iduals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that any worthy indi1vidurul will receive less than his due. •I t behooves us all to re reasonable, non-extremist, and to do our utmost in beha[f of the Slovak cause under extraterritorial circumstances. This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusorvsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life. This article would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were trying times. We lived in constant danger of ,b eing overtaken and apprehended and committed. to our foes. Terrific pressure was .b eing put on iltalian officialdom, but Italian autho. rities, sympathetic to our case because of ~arol Sidor, with., stood and resisted this .pressure successfully. Rome captured: Hlrusovsky's heart. Day after day he frequented the Vatican library and devcoted himself particular1y to the study of the olosest relationships between .t he V aitican and Sl01Vrukia. !His finished wo11k on this sUJbject has already been published. When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned, we went out togethm-, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and ma,rket ;plaices, and visiting its shrines and churches. Hrnsovsky ha,d so intimate a knowledge of ancient Roman villages and country sites that when he began to re.late what happened in this or that locality, or how a ,plaice had distinguished itself, his listener lost ali cootact with time and became wholly unaware that planes roared in the Slky, that trolleys jangled in the streets, that cars meed by. Lost in the spell of Hrusovsky's words, one relirved the glory of ancient days. Before one's eyes the Roman Emp:i!re caime. to life again. Hrusovsky had a rare genius for creating this kind of atmosphere: It was this type of historica1 ,p resentation that also held the key to his eminent success as a classroom lecturer. Just as in Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did he regale his students in ,Slo'Va:kia with Slovak history. �SLOVAKIA Just as Jan Holly over a hundred years ago captivated and instructed the followers of Stur, so did Hrusovsky inspire and educate his high school students at the gymnazium. lt was in this manner, too, that he held audiences spellbound when he delivered occasional addresses at the various celebrations in Slovak villages and towns. ThaJt was his ,life; that was his life's work: to conjure an authentic image of the true greatness and the true glory of the distant past, t.o bridge the gay between the presBnt and the past, and then to forecast and build a more prosperous Slovak future. There is a very large number of Hrusovsky's addresses and articles in which he developed the subject of Slovak statehood. There have been many opponents to Slovaikia's aspirations to statehood, ,b ut not one of them has been able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusovsky's aJI1guments in its favor. In the ,p ast, the works of the most popular Slovak writers were putblished in editions running to several hundred copies. Never yet, however, did any Slovak booik win such ready ·a nd such widespread populairity as did Hlru_ sovsky's "Slovenske Dejiny" (Slovak History). It was the first complete survey of our Slovruk historicaJ record. Pre-. pared as it was ,b y Dr. Hrnsovsky, the first Slovak historian of learning and of note, it presented to the Slovak nation a continuous reel of a:bsoirbing scenes from its past. We were all ag,reeaJbly surprised when edition upon edition of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slova:kia, over one hundred thousand copies of this 'book were in the hands of the Slovak people. 'Dhis volume of Hrusovsky's history found its way even into homes where formerly hardly another book haid been brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac or annual. Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor, who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even unschooled ;parents in remote hamlets would haive no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote. That was its styllistic merit. In content, this history is �SLOVAKIA ll prepared. with so scholarl:y an approach - with restraint, with fairmindedness, with an oibjective outlook - that it ser.ves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated classes and for the less privileged. With this volume, which the new regime proscribed in 194'5, Hrusavsky turned in Slovak national life so deep and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can sue. ceed. in leveling it eiven in the course of years of effort. Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the most frequently sought book in the black ma.T!kets where, alas, an enonnous number of Slovaik writings are listed. In the early part of 1945 it was rll!ffiOTed that Communist par tisans caiptured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank God that this was a false rumor. The partisans were defeated; they retreated. and Hlrl.l'sovsky returned home. His first visit took him to Bresto vany to see 'his mother. It is understanda]ble that she embraced him warmly and held him close to her heart. Shortly after the e,raltation of their meeting, however., she ·b ravely reminded. him: "For a great cause, it is a worthy thing eiven to die, my son -- and Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrus ovsky often repeated these w<>irds, commenting: "Our peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient Rome's noble matrons." And now the noble heart of •F rancis Hrusovsky has stilled its ibeating. He departed., mourned by a company of outstanding quinquagenarians who had worked with him toward a common goal in ,puiblic life: Sidor, Cernak, Janci. All were oa.lled by the Angel of Death at an age when a public servant usually attains the peak and the full de. velopment of his strength and activity. National leaders though they were, their hearts, so devoted to theiT nation, could not withstand the strain orf the hour; they were overworked and exhausted. The burden of the yoke overtaxed their physical limitations, and their spark of life was crushed by it. � 5 SLOVAKIA Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history, were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent. Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous addresses delivered on various occasions. Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky, we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow." Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers who never die . Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision, his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their country that freedom, that independent and recognized state for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath . 1 • • • DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY - THE MAN Constantine Culen Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could have distinguished himself by a career at the University of Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook, nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But �6 SLOVAKIA on completing his university training, Hruswsky decided on a different course of life. There happened to be a vaicancy for the head.mastership at the Catholic Slovalk high school or gymna:zium at Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to apply for the post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason of the fact that the institution was burdened with financiaJ difficulties amd very often the first of the month found the administration really straitened ~bout meeting the payroll. Moreover, the school faced an expansion prog~am which complicated financial matters to an even greater degree. Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured se_ curity and prestige of a university chair in pr,e ference to this position which was less rewarding in material ivalues. He became the school's director and made of it the intellectual center which Bishop Stefan Moyses, its founder, had hoped it would once become. This particular gymnazium was the only institution which ,b ore upon its facade the inscription "SLOVIDNSKE GYMNAZl/lJ.M (,SI.JOV!AK GYiMiNAZIUM); all other similar schools were inscribed as "OZE}()HO-SLOiVA1K." It is not dear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. HTusovsky was singularly proud of such a distinctive designation of his school. And it was, in reality, the only genuine SLOV A1K gymna·zium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and in purpose. It was my privilege to go there often. And each visit proved to me a more refreshing experience. Perhaps there had never yet been as demanding a headmaster as was Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had been so universally loved and respected "Pan direk:to:r" -that was his title; it was a designation or an ruppellation by which we understood without question and immediately that the reference was to Dr. Hrusorvsky and to him alone. The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender was to hear from pan direktor no word rubout the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with hin1 when a student approached with an explanation and apology. �SLOVAKIA 7 "Did I say anything to you?" said pan direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no wiarmth. "Well, that's just it, pan direktor; thia t's the point. You said not a wo,r d," the student complained. Even here, in immigration, his former students often soug,h t out their pan direktor. The confidently referred to him for counsel and always ·p arted from him strengthened and imbued with resolution. Hrusorvsiky never recommended inconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict, he did encourage vigorous effort and endorsed even justified force that was deliberate and purposeful. Hrusorvsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic (193'8--1945). We happened to, serive together ,o n various committees. I learned that he looked even upon current problems with the dis1p osition of a serious historian, and it was especially in our committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our tasks. He was not given to frequent expression in Parliament but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although 'he was a,ble to, speak without prolonged ,p reparation, he always took pains to :p repare his par. liamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word was selected for a specific purpo,s e and a particula:r significance. These addresses are of such merit that one day they will be e!ID!bodied in handbooks of ;public speaking as classic creations. The thought-ieontent, as well as the delivery and all that was connected with these addresses, was thoroughly studied and weighed, tI believe that I derogate from no one's merits of fame when I judge thaJt Hrusovsky was one of. the best speakers of the Slovaik nation within the past century. Frequently HI'us01Vslky was also the speaker of the day in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense of appreciation of his talents. One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's s,pooial .p redilec-, tion was the Slov,a,k Institute of Arts and -Sciences (1M atica �8 SLOVAKIA slovenska). As chairman of various science departments and as secretary of the history depa:rtment of the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the organization of scientific pursuits and undertrukings in Slovakia. He was a real responsibility; he had accomplished much; but he still had a great deal of work .planned. Even the very last evening of his life he discussed several longstanding iprojects which he hoped to realize some future day that would grant a happy return to his native land. Recently a certain Slovak political leader who was en. gaiged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at this ,p oint it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return to his former calling, a!bsor'bed as, he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite the contrary. What I can most r,e adily imagine and what would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field at the gymnazilliill." It was most natural and logical that on the death of Ka,rol Sidor, Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of the Slovak National Council AJbroad. Never at home, and much less in exile, did he aspire to p'U'blic office. 'In response to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he finally yielded to, this extent that he agreed to undertake whatever responsibilities the membe'I'.s of the SNCA should decide to entrust to him. He conceived of this office as a service to the nation. Two days ,before his, death we were occupied in discussion until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of Slovakia, his eyes shone bdlliantly. He said that evening, and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of us may presume .pretensions to a privileged position at home. Our only duty, here in a new land which affords us liberty and the opportunity to live unshackled by the terror which dominates aJl life at home, is to devote ourseilves tq work for our naJtion . This is one of the most important convictions which each one of us must g~asp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in re- �SLOVAKIA 9 turn for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On the other hand, he continued, qualified aind deserving indi,v iduals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that any worthy indi1vidurul will receive less than his due. •I t behooves us all to re reasonable, non-extremist, and to do our utmost in beha[f of the Slovak cause under extraterritorial circumstances. This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusorvsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life. This article would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were trying times. We lived in constant danger of ,b eing overtaken and apprehended and committed. to our foes. Terrific pressure was .b eing put on iltalian officialdom, but Italian autho. rities, sympathetic to our case because of ~arol Sidor, with., stood and resisted this .pressure successfully. Rome captured: Hlrusovsky's heart. Day after day he frequented the Vatican library and devcoted himself particular1y to the study of the olosest relationships between .t he V aitican and Sl01Vrukia. !His finished wo11k on this sUJbject has already been published. When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned, we went out togethm-, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and ma,rket ;plaices, and visiting its shrines and churches. Hrnsovsky ha,d so intimate a knowledge of ancient Roman villages and country sites that when he began to re.late what happened in this or that locality, or how a ,plaice had distinguished itself, his listener lost ali cootact with time and became wholly unaware that planes roared in the Slky, that trolleys jangled in the streets, that cars meed by. Lost in the spell of Hrusovsky's words, one relirved the glory of ancient days. Before one's eyes the Roman Emp:i!re caime. to life again. Hrusovsky had a rare genius for creating this kind of atmosphere: It was this type of historica1 ,p resentation that also held the key to his eminent success as a classroom lecturer. Just as in Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did he regale his students in ,Slo'Va:kia with Slovak history. �SLOVAKIA Just as Jan Holly over a hundred years ago captivated and instructed the followers of Stur, so did Hrusovsky inspire and educate his high school students at the gymnazium. lt was in this manner, too, that he held audiences spellbound when he delivered occasional addresses at the various celebrations in Slovak villages and towns. ThaJt was his ,life; that was his life's work: to conjure an authentic image of the true greatness and the true glory of the distant past, t.o bridge the gay between the presBnt and the past, and then to forecast and build a more prosperous Slovak future. There is a very large number of Hrusovsky's addresses and articles in which he developed the subject of Slovak statehood. There have been many opponents to Slovaikia's aspirations to statehood, ,b ut not one of them has been able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusovsky's aJI1guments in its favor. In the ,p ast, the works of the most popular Slovak writers were putblished in editions running to several hundred copies. Never yet, however, did any Slovak booik win such ready ·a nd such widespread populairity as did Hlru_ sovsky's "Slovenske Dejiny" (Slovak History). It was the first complete survey of our Slovruk historicaJ record. Pre-. pared as it was ,b y Dr. Hrnsovsky, the first Slovak historian of learning and of note, it presented to the Slovak nation a continuous reel of a:bsoirbing scenes from its past. We were all ag,reeaJbly surprised when edition upon edition of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slova:kia, over one hundred thousand copies of this 'book were in the hands of the Slovak people. 'Dhis volume of Hrusovsky's history found its way even into homes where formerly hardly another book haid been brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac or annual. Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor, who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even unschooled ;parents in remote hamlets would haive no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote. That was its styllistic merit. In content, this history is �SLOVAKIA ll prepared. with so scholarl:y an approach - with restraint, with fairmindedness, with an oibjective outlook - that it ser.ves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated classes and for the less privileged. With this volume, which the new regime proscribed in 194'5, Hrusavsky turned in Slovak national life so deep and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can sue. ceed. in leveling it eiven in the course of years of effort. Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the most frequently sought book in the black ma.T!kets where, alas, an enonnous number of Slovaik writings are listed. In the early part of 1945 it was rll!ffiOTed that Communist par tisans caiptured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank God that this was a false rumor. The partisans were defeated; they retreated. and Hlrl.l'sovsky returned home. His first visit took him to Bresto vany to see 'his mother. It is understanda]ble that she embraced him warmly and held him close to her heart. Shortly after the e,raltation of their meeting, however., she ·b ravely reminded. him: "For a great cause, it is a worthy thing eiven to die, my son -- and Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrus ovsky often repeated these w<>irds, commenting: "Our peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient Rome's noble matrons." And now the noble heart of •F rancis Hrusovsky has stilled its ibeating. He departed., mourned by a company of outstanding quinquagenarians who had worked with him toward a common goal in ,puiblic life: Sidor, Cernak, Janci. All were oa.lled by the Angel of Death at an age when a public servant usually attains the peak and the full de. velopment of his strength and activity. National leaders though they were, their hearts, so devoted to theiT nation, could not withstand the strain orf the hour; they were overworked and exhausted. The burden of the yoke overtaxed their physical limitations, and their spark of life was crushed by it. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 5 SLOVAKIA Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history, were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent. Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous addresses delivered on various occasions. Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky, we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow." Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers who never die . Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision, his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their country that freedom, that independent and recognized state for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath . 1 • • • DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY - THE MAN Constantine Culen Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could have distinguished himself by a career at the University of Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook, nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But 6 SLOVAKIA on completing his university training, Hruswsky decided on a different course of life. There happened to be a vaicancy for the head.mastership at the Catholic Slovalk high school or gymna:zium at Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to apply for the post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason of the fact that the institution was burdened with financiaJ difficulties amd very often the first of the month found the administration really straitened ~bout meeting the payroll. Moreover, the school faced an expansion prog~am which complicated financial matters to an even greater degree. Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured se_ curity and prestige of a university chair in pr,e ference to this position which was less rewarding in material ivalues. He became the school's director and made of it the intellectual center which Bishop Stefan Moyses, its founder, had hoped it would once become. This particular gymnazium was the only institution which ,b ore upon its facade the inscription "SLOVIDNSKE GYMNAZl/lJ.M (,SI.JOV!AK GYiMiNAZIUM); all other similar schools were inscribed as "OZE}()HO-SLOiVA1K." It is not dear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. HTusovsky was singularly proud of such a distinctive designation of his school. And it was, in reality, the only genuine SLOV A1K gymna·zium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and in purpose. It was my privilege to go there often. And each visit proved to me a more refreshing experience. Perhaps there had never yet been as demanding a headmaster as was Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had been so universally loved and respected "Pan direk:to:r" -that was his title; it was a designation or an ruppellation by which we understood without question and immediately that the reference was to Dr. Hrusorvsky and to him alone. The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender was to hear from pan direktor no word rubout the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with hin1 when a student approached with an explanation and apology. SLOVAKIA 7 "Did I say anything to you?" said pan direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no wiarmth. "Well, that's just it, pan direktor; thia t's the point. You said not a wo,r d," the student complained. Even here, in immigration, his former students often soug,h t out their pan direktor. The confidently referred to him for counsel and always ·p arted from him strengthened and imbued with resolution. Hrusorvsiky never recommended inconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict, he did encourage vigorous effort and endorsed even justified force that was deliberate and purposeful. Hrusorvsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic (193'8--1945). We happened to, serive together ,o n various committees. I learned that he looked even upon current problems with the dis1p osition of a serious historian, and it was especially in our committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our tasks. He was not given to frequent expression in Parliament but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although 'he was a,ble to, speak without prolonged ,p reparation, he always took pains to :p repare his par. liamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word was selected for a specific purpo,s e and a particula:r significance. These addresses are of such merit that one day they will be e!ID!bodied in handbooks of ;public speaking as classic creations. The thought-ieontent, as well as the delivery and all that was connected with these addresses, was thoroughly studied and weighed, tI believe that I derogate from no one's merits of fame when I judge thaJt Hrusovsky was one of. the best speakers of the Slovaik nation within the past century. Frequently HI'us01Vslky was also the speaker of the day in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense of appreciation of his talents. One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's s,pooial .p redilec-, tion was the Slov,a,k Institute of Arts and -Sciences (1M atica 8 SLOVAKIA slovenska). As chairman of various science departments and as secretary of the history depa:rtment of the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the organization of scientific pursuits and undertrukings in Slovakia. He was a real responsibility; he had accomplished much; but he still had a great deal of work .planned. Even the very last evening of his life he discussed several longstanding iprojects which he hoped to realize some future day that would grant a happy return to his native land. Recently a certain Slovak political leader who was en. gaiged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at this ,p oint it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return to his former calling, a!bsor'bed as, he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite the contrary. What I can most r,e adily imagine and what would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field at the gymnazilliill." It was most natural and logical that on the death of Ka,rol Sidor, Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of the Slovak National Council AJbroad. Never at home, and much less in exile, did he aspire to p'U'blic office. 'In response to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he finally yielded to, this extent that he agreed to undertake whatever responsibilities the membe'I'.s of the SNCA should decide to entrust to him. He conceived of this office as a service to the nation. Two days ,before his, death we were occupied in discussion until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of Slovakia, his eyes shone bdlliantly. He said that evening, and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of us may presume .pretensions to a privileged position at home. Our only duty, here in a new land which affords us liberty and the opportunity to live unshackled by the terror which dominates aJl life at home, is to devote ourseilves tq work for our naJtion . This is one of the most important convictions which each one of us must g~asp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in re- SLOVAKIA 9 turn for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On the other hand, he continued, qualified aind deserving indi,v iduals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that any worthy indi1vidurul will receive less than his due. •I t behooves us all to re reasonable, non-extremist, and to do our utmost in beha[f of the Slovak cause under extraterritorial circumstances. This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusorvsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life. This article would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were trying times. We lived in constant danger of ,b eing overtaken and apprehended and committed. to our foes. Terrific pressure was .b eing put on iltalian officialdom, but Italian autho. rities, sympathetic to our case because of ~arol Sidor, with., stood and resisted this .pressure successfully. Rome captured: Hlrusovsky's heart. Day after day he frequented the Vatican library and devcoted himself particular1y to the study of the olosest relationships between .t he V aitican and Sl01Vrukia. !His finished wo11k on this sUJbject has already been published. When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned, we went out togethm-, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and ma,rket ;plaices, and visiting its shrines and churches. Hrnsovsky ha,d so intimate a knowledge of ancient Roman villages and country sites that when he began to re.late what happened in this or that locality, or how a ,plaice had distinguished itself, his listener lost ali cootact with time and became wholly unaware that planes roared in the Slky, that trolleys jangled in the streets, that cars meed by. Lost in the spell of Hrusovsky's words, one relirved the glory of ancient days. Before one's eyes the Roman Emp:i!re caime. to life again. Hrusovsky had a rare genius for creating this kind of atmosphere: It was this type of historica1 ,p resentation that also held the key to his eminent success as a classroom lecturer. Just as in Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did he regale his students in ,Slo'Va:kia with Slovak history. SLOVAKIA Just as Jan Holly over a hundred years ago captivated and instructed the followers of Stur, so did Hrusovsky inspire and educate his high school students at the gymnazium. lt was in this manner, too, that he held audiences spellbound when he delivered occasional addresses at the various celebrations in Slovak villages and towns. ThaJt was his ,life; that was his life's work: to conjure an authentic image of the true greatness and the true glory of the distant past, t.o bridge the gay between the presBnt and the past, and then to forecast and build a more prosperous Slovak future. There is a very large number of Hrusovsky's addresses and articles in which he developed the subject of Slovak statehood. There have been many opponents to Slovaikia's aspirations to statehood, ,b ut not one of them has been able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusovsky's aJI1guments in its favor. In the ,p ast, the works of the most popular Slovak writers were putblished in editions running to several hundred copies. Never yet, however, did any Slovak booik win such ready ·a nd such widespread populairity as did Hlru_ sovsky's "Slovenske Dejiny" (Slovak History). It was the first complete survey of our Slovruk historicaJ record. Pre-. pared as it was ,b y Dr. Hrnsovsky, the first Slovak historian of learning and of note, it presented to the Slovak nation a continuous reel of a:bsoirbing scenes from its past. We were all ag,reeaJbly surprised when edition upon edition of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slova:kia, over one hundred thousand copies of this 'book were in the hands of the Slovak people. 'Dhis volume of Hrusovsky's history found its way even into homes where formerly hardly another book haid been brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac or annual. Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor, who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even unschooled ;parents in remote hamlets would haive no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote. That was its styllistic merit. In content, this history is SLOVAKIA ll prepared. with so scholarl:y an approach - with restraint, with fairmindedness, with an oibjective outlook - that it ser.ves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated classes and for the less privileged. With this volume, which the new regime proscribed in 194'5, Hrusavsky turned in Slovak national life so deep and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can sue. ceed. in leveling it eiven in the course of years of effort. Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the most frequently sought book in the black ma.T!kets where, alas, an enonnous number of Slovaik writings are listed. In the early part of 1945 it was rll!ffiOTed that Communist par tisans caiptured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank God that this was a false rumor. The partisans were defeated; they retreated. and Hlrl.l'sovsky returned home. His first visit took him to Bresto vany to see 'his mother. It is understanda]ble that she embraced him warmly and held him close to her heart. Shortly after the e,raltation of their meeting, however., she ·b ravely reminded. him: "For a great cause, it is a worthy thing eiven to die, my son -- and Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrus ovsky often repeated these w<>irds, commenting: "Our peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient Rome's noble matrons." And now the noble heart of •F rancis Hrusovsky has stilled its ibeating. He departed., mourned by a company of outstanding quinquagenarians who had worked with him toward a common goal in ,puiblic life: Sidor, Cernak, Janci. All were oa.lled by the Angel of Death at an age when a public servant usually attains the peak and the full de. velopment of his strength and activity. National leaders though they were, their hearts, so devoted to theiT nation, could not withstand the strain orf the hour; they were overworked and exhausted. The burden of the yoke overtaxed their physical limitations, and their spark of life was crushed by it.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Francis Hrušovský - The Man Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956 pp. 5-11 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1956 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/acbca4aeaa05e6bb55a55bf2bfdc621d.pdf 7d140315605c3634d449e1a8dba15357 PDF Text Text 70 SLOVAKIA Dr. Francis I-Irusovsky - the Man (1903 -1956) Francis Hrusovsky was eminently a historian. He could have distinguished himself by a career at the University of Bratislav;i even under the tutelage of the Czech professor Chaloupecky. Chaloupecky realized that this young collegian's views were radically opposed to his own outlook but he entertained high esteem for the youth. It was a regard which Hrusovsky merited because of his consistent gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge . But on completing his university training, Hrusovsky decided on a different course in life. There happened to be a vacancy for the headmasteship at the Catholic Slovak high school or gymnazium at Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to make application for this post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason of the fact that the institution was yoked with financial difficulties and very often the first of the month found the administration really straitened about meeting the payroll. Moreover, the school faced an expansion program wn.ich complicated financial matters to an even greater degree. Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured security and prestige of a university chair in preference to this position which was less rewarding in material values. He became the school's principal and he made of it the intellectual center: which Bishop Stefan l.VIoyses, its founder , had hoped that it would become. This particular gymnazium was the only institution which bore upon its facade the inscription SLOVAK GYMNAZIUM (SLOVENSKE GYMNAZIUM ); all other similar schools were inscribed as being "CZECHO-SLOVAK". It is n et clear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. Hrusovsky was singularly proud of such a d istinctive designation on his school. And it was, in reality, the only true SLOVAK gymnazium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and purpose. It was my privilege to come here often. And each visit �71 SLOVAKIA proved to be a refreshing experience. Perhaps there had never yet bee.a as demanding a headmaster as was Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had been so universally loved and respected. "Pan direktor" - that was his title, and it was a designation or an appellation by which we understand without question and immediately that the reference was to Dr. Hrusovsky and to him alone . The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender was to hear from pdn direktor no word about the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with him when a student approached with an explanation and apology. "Did I say anything to you?" said pdn direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no warmth. "Well, that's just it, pan direktor; that's the point. You said not a word," the student complained. Even here in these circumstances of our emigration, his students often sought out their pan direktor. They confidently referred to him for counsel and always parted from him strengthened and imbued with resolution. Hrusovsky never recommended unconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict; he did encourage vigorous effort and he endorsed even justified force that was deliberate and purposeful. * * -l(· Hrusovsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic ( 19381946 ) . We happened to serve together on various committees. I learned that he looked even upon present-day problems with the disposition of a serious historian, and it was especially at our committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our task. HP was not given to frequent expression in Parliament but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although he was able to speak without prolonged preparation, he always took pains to prepare his parliamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word was selected for a specific purpose and a particular significance. These addresses are of. such merit that one day they will be embodied in handbooks of public speaking as classic creations. The thought-content as well as the delivery and all that was connected with these �SLOVAKIA 72 addresses was thoroughly studied and weighed, and it took on a classic aspect. I believe that I derogate from no one's merits of fame when I judg·e that Hrusovsky was one of the best speakers of the Slovak nation within the past century. Frequently Hrusovsky was also the speaker of the day in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense of appreciation of his gifts. * * * * * * One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's special predilection was the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences (Matica slovenska) . As chairman of various science departments and as secretary of the history department of the Slovak Inst.i tute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the organization of scientific pursuits and undertakings in Slovakia. His was no mean responsibility. He had accomplished very much, he had a great deal of work in progress and even in the very last evening of his life he had discussed several long-standing plans which he helped to realize in some future day that would grant a happy return to the homeland. A certain Slovak political leader who was engaged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at this point it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return to his former calling, absorbed as he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite the contrary. What I can most readily imagine and what would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field back in a gymnazium." It was most natural and logical that on the death of Karol Sidor. Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of the Slovak National Council Abroad. Never at home, and much less in exile, did he aspire to public office. In response to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he finally yielded to this extent that he agreed to undertake whatever responsibilities the members of the SNCA: should decide to entrust to him. He conoeived of this office as a service to the nation. Two days before his death we were occupied in discussion �SLOVAKIA 73 until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of Slovakia, his eyes shone brilliantly. He said that evening, and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of us may presume pretensions to a privileged position at home. Ours is only the duty here in a new land, which affords us liberty and the opportunity to live unshackled by that terror which dominates all life at home, to devote ourselves to work for our nation. This it one of the most important comictions which each one of us must grasp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in return for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On the other hand, he continued, qualified and deserving individuals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that any worthy individual will receive less than his due. It behooves us all to be reasonable, non-extremist, and to do our utmost in behalf of the Slovak cause in extra-territorial circumstances. This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusovsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life. * * * This column would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were trying times. We lived in constant danger of being overtaken and apprehended and committed to our foes. Terrific pressure was being put on Italian officialdom but Italian authorities, won to sympathy especially by contacts which Karol Sidor had established with them, withstood and resisted this pressure successfully. Rome captured Hrusovsky heart. Day after day he frequented the Vatican library and he devoted himself particularly to a study of the earliest relationships between the Vatican and Slovakia. His finished work on this subject was published. When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned, we went out together, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and market places, and visiting its shrines and churches. Hrusovsky had so intimate a know- �SLOVA KIA 74 ledge of ancien t Roman villages and countr y sites that when he began to relate what happen ed in this or that locality , or how a place had disting uished itself, his listene r lost all contac t with time and becam e wholly unawa re that planes roared in the sky, that trolley s jangled in the streets , that cars raced by. Lost in the spell of Hrusov sky's words, one re-lived the glory of ancien t days. Before one's eyes the Roman Empir e same to life again. Hrusov sky had a rare genius for creatin g this kind of atmosp here . It was this type of histori cal presen tation that also held the key to his eminen t succes s as a classro om lecture r. Just as in Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did he regale his studen ts in Slovak ia with Slovak history . Just as Jan Holly over a hundre d years ago captiva ted and instruc ted the followe rs of stur, so did Hrusov sky inspire and educat e his high school studen ts in the gymna zium. It was in this manne r, too, that he held audien ces spellbo und when he deliver ed occasio nal addres ses at the various celebra tions in Slovak villages and towns. That was his life; that was his life's work : to conjur e an authen tic image of the true greatne ss and the true glory of the distant past, to bridge the gap betwee n the presen t and the past and then to forecas t and build a more prospe rous Slovak future. * * * * * * There is a very large numbe r of Hrusov sky's addres ses and articles in which he develo ped the subjec t of Slovak stateho od. There have been many oppone nts to Slovak ia's aspirat ions to stateho od but not one of them has been able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusov sky's argum ents in its favor. In the past, the works of the most popula r Slovak writers were publish ed in edition s runnin g to several hundre d copies. Never yet, howev er, did any Slovak book win such ready and such wide-s pread popula rity as did Hrusov sky's SLOVAK HISTO RY. It was the first comple te survey of our Slovak histori cal record. Prepar ed as it was by Dr. Hrusov sky the first Slovak histori an of learnin g and of note, it presen ted to the Slovak nation a continu ous reel of absorb ing scenes from its past. We were all agree- �75 SLOVAKIA ably surprised when edition upon edition of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slovakia, over one hundred thousand copies of this book were in the hands of the Slovak people. This volume of Hrusovsky's HISTORY found its way even into homes where formerly hardly another book had been brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac or annual. Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even our unschooled parents in remote hamlets would have no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote. That was its stylistic merit. In content, this HISTORY is prepared with so scholarly an approach-with restraint, with fairmindedness, with an objective outlook -that it serves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated classes and for the less privileged. With this Yolume, which the new regime proscribed Hrusovsky turned in Slovak national life so deep 1945, in and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can succeed in leveling it even in the course of years of effort. Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the most frequently S()ught book in the black markets where, alas, an enormous number of Slovak writings are listed. * * * In the early of 1945 it was rumored that Communist partisans captured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank God, it was not so. The partisans were defeated; they retreated and Hrusovsky returned home. His first visit took him to Brestovany to see his mother. It is understandable that she embraced him warmly and held him close to her heart. Shortly after the exaltation of their meeting, however, she bravely reminded him, "For a great cause, it is a worthy thing even to die, my son. And Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrusovsky often repeated these words and commented, "Our peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient Rome's noble matrons." K. Culen � 70 SLOVAKIA Dr. Francis I-Irusovsky - the Man (1903 -1956) Francis Hrusovsky was eminently a historian. He could have distinguished himself by a career at the University of Bratislav;i even under the tutelage of the Czech professor Chaloupecky. Chaloupecky realized that this young collegian's views were radically opposed to his own outlook but he entertained high esteem for the youth. It was a regard which Hrusovsky merited because of his consistent gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge . But on completing his university training, Hrusovsky decided on a different course in life. There happened to be a vacancy for the headmasteship at the Catholic Slovak high school or gymnazium at Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to make application for this post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason of the fact that the institution was yoked with financial difficulties and very often the first of the month found the administration really straitened about meeting the payroll. Moreover, the school faced an expansion program wn.ich complicated financial matters to an even greater degree. Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured security and prestige of a university chair in preference to this position which was less rewarding in material values. He became the school's principal and he made of it the intellectual center: which Bishop Stefan l.VIoyses, its founder , had hoped that it would become. This particular gymnazium was the only institution which bore upon its facade the inscription SLOVAK GYMNAZIUM (SLOVENSKE GYMNAZIUM ); all other similar schools were inscribed as being "CZECHO-SLOVAK". It is n et clear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. Hrusovsky was singularly proud of such a d istinctive designation on his school. And it was, in reality, the only true SLOVAK gymnazium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and purpose. It was my privilege to come here often. And each visit �71 SLOVAKIA proved to be a refreshing experience. Perhaps there had never yet bee.a as demanding a headmaster as was Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had been so universally loved and respected. "Pan direktor" - that was his title, and it was a designation or an appellation by which we understand without question and immediately that the reference was to Dr. Hrusovsky and to him alone . The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender was to hear from pdn direktor no word about the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with him when a student approached with an explanation and apology. "Did I say anything to you?" said pdn direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no warmth. "Well, that's just it, pan direktor; that's the point. You said not a word," the student complained. Even here in these circumstances of our emigration, his students often sought out their pan direktor. They confidently referred to him for counsel and always parted from him strengthened and imbued with resolution. Hrusovsky never recommended unconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict; he did encourage vigorous effort and he endorsed even justified force that was deliberate and purposeful. * * -l(· Hrusovsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic ( 19381946 ) . We happened to serve together on various committees. I learned that he looked even upon present-day problems with the disposition of a serious historian, and it was especially at our committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our task. HP was not given to frequent expression in Parliament but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although he was able to speak without prolonged preparation, he always took pains to prepare his parliamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word was selected for a specific purpose and a particular significance. These addresses are of. such merit that one day they will be embodied in handbooks of public speaking as classic creations. The thought-content as well as the delivery and all that was connected with these �SLOVAKIA 72 addresses was thoroughly studied and weighed, and it took on a classic aspect. I believe that I derogate from no one's merits of fame when I judg·e that Hrusovsky was one of the best speakers of the Slovak nation within the past century. Frequently Hrusovsky was also the speaker of the day in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense of appreciation of his gifts. * * * * * * One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's special predilection was the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences (Matica slovenska) . As chairman of various science departments and as secretary of the history department of the Slovak Inst.i tute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the organization of scientific pursuits and undertakings in Slovakia. His was no mean responsibility. He had accomplished very much, he had a great deal of work in progress and even in the very last evening of his life he had discussed several long-standing plans which he helped to realize in some future day that would grant a happy return to the homeland. A certain Slovak political leader who was engaged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at this point it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return to his former calling, absorbed as he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite the contrary. What I can most readily imagine and what would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field back in a gymnazium." It was most natural and logical that on the death of Karol Sidor. Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of the Slovak National Council Abroad. Never at home, and much less in exile, did he aspire to public office. In response to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he finally yielded to this extent that he agreed to undertake whatever responsibilities the members of the SNCA: should decide to entrust to him. He conoeived of this office as a service to the nation. Two days before his death we were occupied in discussion �SLOVAKIA 73 until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of Slovakia, his eyes shone brilliantly. He said that evening, and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of us may presume pretensions to a privileged position at home. Ours is only the duty here in a new land, which affords us liberty and the opportunity to live unshackled by that terror which dominates all life at home, to devote ourselves to work for our nation. This it one of the most important comictions which each one of us must grasp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in return for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On the other hand, he continued, qualified and deserving individuals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that any worthy individual will receive less than his due. It behooves us all to be reasonable, non-extremist, and to do our utmost in behalf of the Slovak cause in extra-territorial circumstances. This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusovsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life. * * * This column would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were trying times. We lived in constant danger of being overtaken and apprehended and committed to our foes. Terrific pressure was being put on Italian officialdom but Italian authorities, won to sympathy especially by contacts which Karol Sidor had established with them, withstood and resisted this pressure successfully. Rome captured Hrusovsky heart. Day after day he frequented the Vatican library and he devoted himself particularly to a study of the earliest relationships between the Vatican and Slovakia. His finished work on this subject was published. When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned, we went out together, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and market places, and visiting its shrines and churches. Hrusovsky had so intimate a know- �SLOVA KIA 74 ledge of ancien t Roman villages and countr y sites that when he began to relate what happen ed in this or that locality , or how a place had disting uished itself, his listene r lost all contac t with time and becam e wholly unawa re that planes roared in the sky, that trolley s jangled in the streets , that cars raced by. Lost in the spell of Hrusov sky's words, one re-lived the glory of ancien t days. Before one's eyes the Roman Empir e same to life again. Hrusov sky had a rare genius for creatin g this kind of atmosp here . It was this type of histori cal presen tation that also held the key to his eminen t succes s as a classro om lecture r. Just as in Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did he regale his studen ts in Slovak ia with Slovak history . Just as Jan Holly over a hundre d years ago captiva ted and instruc ted the followe rs of stur, so did Hrusov sky inspire and educat e his high school studen ts in the gymna zium. It was in this manne r, too, that he held audien ces spellbo und when he deliver ed occasio nal addres ses at the various celebra tions in Slovak villages and towns. That was his life; that was his life's work : to conjur e an authen tic image of the true greatne ss and the true glory of the distant past, to bridge the gap betwee n the presen t and the past and then to forecas t and build a more prospe rous Slovak future. * * * * * * There is a very large numbe r of Hrusov sky's addres ses and articles in which he develo ped the subjec t of Slovak stateho od. There have been many oppone nts to Slovak ia's aspirat ions to stateho od but not one of them has been able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusov sky's argum ents in its favor. In the past, the works of the most popula r Slovak writers were publish ed in edition s runnin g to several hundre d copies. Never yet, howev er, did any Slovak book win such ready and such wide-s pread popula rity as did Hrusov sky's SLOVAK HISTO RY. It was the first comple te survey of our Slovak histori cal record. Prepar ed as it was by Dr. Hrusov sky the first Slovak histori an of learnin g and of note, it presen ted to the Slovak nation a continu ous reel of absorb ing scenes from its past. We were all agree- �75 SLOVAKIA ably surprised when edition upon edition of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slovakia, over one hundred thousand copies of this book were in the hands of the Slovak people. This volume of Hrusovsky's HISTORY found its way even into homes where formerly hardly another book had been brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac or annual. Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even our unschooled parents in remote hamlets would have no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote. That was its stylistic merit. In content, this HISTORY is prepared with so scholarly an approach-with restraint, with fairmindedness, with an objective outlook -that it serves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated classes and for the less privileged. With this Yolume, which the new regime proscribed Hrusovsky turned in Slovak national life so deep 1945, in and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can succeed in leveling it even in the course of years of effort. Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the most frequently S()ught book in the black markets where, alas, an enormous number of Slovak writings are listed. * * * In the early of 1945 it was rumored that Communist partisans captured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank God, it was not so. The partisans were defeated; they retreated and Hrusovsky returned home. His first visit took him to Brestovany to see his mother. It is understandable that she embraced him warmly and held him close to her heart. Shortly after the exaltation of their meeting, however, she bravely reminded him, "For a great cause, it is a worthy thing even to die, my son. And Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrusovsky often repeated these words and commented, "Our peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient Rome's noble matrons." K. Culen � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1970, Vol. 20 Description An account of the resource Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 70 SLOVAKIA Dr. Francis I-Irusovsky - the Man (1903 -1956) Francis Hrusovsky was eminently a historian. He could have distinguished himself by a career at the University of Bratislav;i even under the tutelage of the Czech professor Chaloupecky. Chaloupecky realized that this young collegian's views were radically opposed to his own outlook but he entertained high esteem for the youth. It was a regard which Hrusovsky merited because of his consistent gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge . But on completing his university training, Hrusovsky decided on a different course in life. There happened to be a vacancy for the headmasteship at the Catholic Slovak high school or gymnazium at Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to make application for this post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason of the fact that the institution was yoked with financial difficulties and very often the first of the month found the administration really straitened about meeting the payroll. Moreover, the school faced an expansion program wn.ich complicated financial matters to an even greater degree. Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured security and prestige of a university chair in preference to this position which was less rewarding in material values. He became the school's principal and he made of it the intellectual center: which Bishop Stefan l.VIoyses, its founder , had hoped that it would become. This particular gymnazium was the only institution which bore upon its facade the inscription SLOVAK GYMNAZIUM (SLOVENSKE GYMNAZIUM ); all other similar schools were inscribed as being "CZECHO-SLOVAK". It is n et clear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. Hrusovsky was singularly proud of such a d istinctive designation on his school. And it was, in reality, the only true SLOVAK gymnazium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and purpose. It was my privilege to come here often. And each visit 71 SLOVAKIA proved to be a refreshing experience. Perhaps there had never yet bee.a as demanding a headmaster as was Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had been so universally loved and respected. "Pan direktor" - that was his title, and it was a designation or an appellation by which we understand without question and immediately that the reference was to Dr. Hrusovsky and to him alone . The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender was to hear from pdn direktor no word about the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with him when a student approached with an explanation and apology. "Did I say anything to you?" said pdn direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no warmth. "Well, that's just it, pan direktor; that's the point. You said not a word," the student complained. Even here in these circumstances of our emigration, his students often sought out their pan direktor. They confidently referred to him for counsel and always parted from him strengthened and imbued with resolution. Hrusovsky never recommended unconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict; he did encourage vigorous effort and he endorsed even justified force that was deliberate and purposeful. * * -l(· Hrusovsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic ( 19381946 ) . We happened to serve together on various committees. I learned that he looked even upon present-day problems with the disposition of a serious historian, and it was especially at our committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our task. HP was not given to frequent expression in Parliament but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although he was able to speak without prolonged preparation, he always took pains to prepare his parliamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word was selected for a specific purpose and a particular significance. These addresses are of. such merit that one day they will be embodied in handbooks of public speaking as classic creations. The thought-content as well as the delivery and all that was connected with these SLOVAKIA 72 addresses was thoroughly studied and weighed, and it took on a classic aspect. I believe that I derogate from no one's merits of fame when I judg·e that Hrusovsky was one of the best speakers of the Slovak nation within the past century. Frequently Hrusovsky was also the speaker of the day in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense of appreciation of his gifts. * * * * * * One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's special predilection was the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences (Matica slovenska) . As chairman of various science departments and as secretary of the history department of the Slovak Inst.i tute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the organization of scientific pursuits and undertakings in Slovakia. His was no mean responsibility. He had accomplished very much, he had a great deal of work in progress and even in the very last evening of his life he had discussed several long-standing plans which he helped to realize in some future day that would grant a happy return to the homeland. A certain Slovak political leader who was engaged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at this point it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return to his former calling, absorbed as he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite the contrary. What I can most readily imagine and what would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field back in a gymnazium." It was most natural and logical that on the death of Karol Sidor. Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of the Slovak National Council Abroad. Never at home, and much less in exile, did he aspire to public office. In response to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he finally yielded to this extent that he agreed to undertake whatever responsibilities the members of the SNCA: should decide to entrust to him. He conoeived of this office as a service to the nation. Two days before his death we were occupied in discussion SLOVAKIA 73 until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of Slovakia, his eyes shone brilliantly. He said that evening, and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of us may presume pretensions to a privileged position at home. Ours is only the duty here in a new land, which affords us liberty and the opportunity to live unshackled by that terror which dominates all life at home, to devote ourselves to work for our nation. This it one of the most important comictions which each one of us must grasp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in return for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On the other hand, he continued, qualified and deserving individuals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that any worthy individual will receive less than his due. It behooves us all to be reasonable, non-extremist, and to do our utmost in behalf of the Slovak cause in extra-territorial circumstances. This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusovsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life. * * * This column would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were trying times. We lived in constant danger of being overtaken and apprehended and committed to our foes. Terrific pressure was being put on Italian officialdom but Italian authorities, won to sympathy especially by contacts which Karol Sidor had established with them, withstood and resisted this pressure successfully. Rome captured Hrusovsky heart. Day after day he frequented the Vatican library and he devoted himself particularly to a study of the earliest relationships between the Vatican and Slovakia. His finished work on this subject was published. When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned, we went out together, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and market places, and visiting its shrines and churches. Hrusovsky had so intimate a know- SLOVA KIA 74 ledge of ancien t Roman villages and countr y sites that when he began to relate what happen ed in this or that locality , or how a place had disting uished itself, his listene r lost all contac t with time and becam e wholly unawa re that planes roared in the sky, that trolley s jangled in the streets , that cars raced by. Lost in the spell of Hrusov sky's words, one re-lived the glory of ancien t days. Before one's eyes the Roman Empir e same to life again. Hrusov sky had a rare genius for creatin g this kind of atmosp here . It was this type of histori cal presen tation that also held the key to his eminen t succes s as a classro om lecture r. Just as in Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did he regale his studen ts in Slovak ia with Slovak history . Just as Jan Holly over a hundre d years ago captiva ted and instruc ted the followe rs of stur, so did Hrusov sky inspire and educat e his high school studen ts in the gymna zium. It was in this manne r, too, that he held audien ces spellbo und when he deliver ed occasio nal addres ses at the various celebra tions in Slovak villages and towns. That was his life; that was his life's work : to conjur e an authen tic image of the true greatne ss and the true glory of the distant past, to bridge the gap betwee n the presen t and the past and then to forecas t and build a more prospe rous Slovak future. * * * * * * There is a very large numbe r of Hrusov sky's addres ses and articles in which he develo ped the subjec t of Slovak stateho od. There have been many oppone nts to Slovak ia's aspirat ions to stateho od but not one of them has been able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusov sky's argum ents in its favor. In the past, the works of the most popula r Slovak writers were publish ed in edition s runnin g to several hundre d copies. Never yet, howev er, did any Slovak book win such ready and such wide-s pread popula rity as did Hrusov sky's SLOVAK HISTO RY. It was the first comple te survey of our Slovak histori cal record. Prepar ed as it was by Dr. Hrusov sky the first Slovak histori an of learnin g and of note, it presen ted to the Slovak nation a continu ous reel of absorb ing scenes from its past. We were all agree- 75 SLOVAKIA ably surprised when edition upon edition of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slovakia, over one hundred thousand copies of this book were in the hands of the Slovak people. This volume of Hrusovsky's HISTORY found its way even into homes where formerly hardly another book had been brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac or annual. Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even our unschooled parents in remote hamlets would have no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote. That was its stylistic merit. In content, this HISTORY is prepared with so scholarly an approach-with restraint, with fairmindedness, with an objective outlook -that it serves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated classes and for the less privileged. With this Yolume, which the new regime proscribed Hrusovsky turned in Slovak national life so deep 1945, in and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can succeed in leveling it even in the course of years of effort. Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the most frequently S()ught book in the black markets where, alas, an enormous number of Slovak writings are listed. * * * In the early of 1945 it was rumored that Communist partisans captured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank God, it was not so. The partisans were defeated; they retreated and Hrusovsky returned home. His first visit took him to Brestovany to see his mother. It is understandable that she embraced him warmly and held him close to her heart. Shortly after the exaltation of their meeting, however, she bravely reminded him, "For a great cause, it is a worthy thing even to die, my son. And Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrusovsky often repeated these words and commented, "Our peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient Rome's noble matrons." K. Culen  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Francis Hrušovský - the Man (1903-1956) Description An account of the resource K. Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970 pp. 70-75 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/864a2938c5418c427330e8baa3ace748.pdf 409a5a98741444fa357d39c956137f93 PDF Text Text 12 SLOVAKIA DR. HRUSOVSKY'S LAST COLUMN (,P repared and sent to press by Dr. Hrusovsky the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.) A number of our Slovak compatriot s recently under~ took a trip from America to 'Slova,kia. They had waited a long time for an opportunity to visit with their parents who had often written their sons and daughters in America that they yearned for the comfort of at least one more visit together. Naturally, once they undertook the long voyage, the visitors hoped also to meet their other relatives and friends and to extend their travels to other parts of S1ovakia. Travel agencies dispatched all that was necessary and our Slovak friends set out from America within a few weeks or a few months. They left with the fond hope that they would spend at least a short stay beneath their family roof, that beloved home they had to leave a long time ago, and they looked forward to being in· the circle of their dearest ones who expected them with open arms. lncidentally too, they were anxious to see for themselves in just what kind of circumstan ces their kin now live in Slovakia. ~he Czecho-Slovaik Communis t ,b oards which expedited these trips of our Slovak countryme n from the United States to Slovakia certainly did not do, it in order to affocd American Slovaks an opportunit y to visit with their closest relatives. They did it ·b ecause they covet American dollars which are very welcome even in Communist ic countries and they hoped to per.suade visitors from America that the Slovak peop1e feel satisfied and happy under the current Red regime. A Slovak lady fr,O!Ill Cleveland made one of these trips to Slorva!kia. On arriving in Prague, she wrote a letter to her husband in America, describing how the American Slovruk visitors were welcomed at the station with a .playing band and with flowers. The elated husband ma;de a full report to the editorial office of the .Communis tic paper �SLOVAKIA 13 "l'.,udove Noviny" of Chicago, which in turn relayed to its readers the message that the Communists extend to Slo. vak visitoo-s from America a signal welcome with music and bouquets. The entire affair merely hides a ruse of the crafty Communists, an artifice which might mislead superficially-minded persons w'ho return to their enslaved homeland. The implication is that the casual visitor to America is not pomipousily welcomed; he is not showered with flowers; he is not greeted with melody and song. But he comes into a free country; it is his privilege to move about at will anywhere firom New York to San Francisco, to con. verse with whomever he wishes. He is at full liberty to fo:mn his own convictions about the life of free citirens living in a democracy, and he bases his conclusions and opinions on personal contacts, on firsthand impressions, and on unrestricted study. The Communists are iprepared to delude visitors from the first moment of their arrival at a railroad, station or airport. They pay them a stirring march and send a coached committee of children to present flowers. They are meticulously solicitous about their guests; they take pains to point out whaitever featurns will redound to their advantage or credit and they proceed along a studied plan to create a favora1ble impression and to lead their visitors to conclude that the American press is circulating untrue reports about Communist-controlled countries . The Communists have made punctilious arrangements for the visits of our countrymen from America and their schedules orf entertainment are nothing but a studied scheme of propaganda. One who is not sufficiently shrewd and discerning, who has not the faculty to see things with his own eyes as they really are and to formulate his own judgments with a nicety of discretion becomes the gulhble victim of this Communistic propaganda program and accepts without question all this artificial ~litter. But there are and have been visitOTs to Slovrukia who have no need of anyone's reception with floral tokens and music, who have no disposition to learn what the Com- �14 SLOVAKIA munists themselves wish to tell them. Accustomed to life in a free and democratic land, they look for this liiberty and democracy in Slovakia. They draw comparisons between the life of a laborer in America and the lot of a worker in Slovakia. They hear what the Slo,va,k pea;sants ha:ve to tell them, the sad e~periences of men who have been despoiled of their property. They see for themselVFis how jaded Slovak women have become. They cannot fail to observe that the people are scantily clothed. They learn that it is extremely hard to ma;ke a living on the meager earnings that are realized, and at every step their convictions are confirmed that under Communistic domination there is no contentment, no prosperity, no paradise, none of those advantages and blessings which Communistic propa,ganda repeatedly and volubly advertises. If guests from America are given the occasion to speak with their relatives in ,priivate, removed from the hearing of witnesses or spies, they are informed not only of the abject servitude imposed upon Slovakia, not only of her resistance to Communism, but also of the vital hope which sustains the Slovaiks in the ho,p e that liberty and independence will yet be granted to the country. Who has eyes to _see will not be blinded by flowers. Who has ears to hear will not be deafened by CO!mIDunistic music. And he who has a rational mind for thinking will not become confused by Communist propaganda. Many SlO'V'aks who retU1I1I1 from Slovakia bring us reports which only cor.firm the fact that today S1ovakia enjoys neither freedom nor democracy, because under Red rule only terror and misery and iviolence prevail. The Slova!k people never accepted Communism; they will never become reconciled with it, and they only await the opportunity to throw off the despised yoke. And when they throw off this yoke, they will likewise throw off Czech doonination, and Slovakia will again be an independent republic. 1 • • 'Il.HE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in every pUiblic library, in every college ·a nd university, in the home of every American of Slovak descent. Get your copy NOW. Paper bound copy - $2.00; in cloth $3.00. � 12 SLOVAKIA DR. HRUSOVSKY'S LAST COLUMN (,P repared and sent to press by Dr. Hrusovsky the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.) A number of our Slovak compatriot s recently under~ took a trip from America to 'Slova,kia. They had waited a long time for an opportunity to visit with their parents who had often written their sons and daughters in America that they yearned for the comfort of at least one more visit together. Naturally, once they undertook the long voyage, the visitors hoped also to meet their other relatives and friends and to extend their travels to other parts of S1ovakia. Travel agencies dispatched all that was necessary and our Slovak friends set out from America within a few weeks or a few months. They left with the fond hope that they would spend at least a short stay beneath their family roof, that beloved home they had to leave a long time ago, and they looked forward to being in· the circle of their dearest ones who expected them with open arms. lncidentally too, they were anxious to see for themselves in just what kind of circumstan ces their kin now live in Slovakia. ~he Czecho-Slovaik Communis t ,b oards which expedited these trips of our Slovak countryme n from the United States to Slovakia certainly did not do, it in order to affocd American Slovaks an opportunit y to visit with their closest relatives. They did it ·b ecause they covet American dollars which are very welcome even in Communist ic countries and they hoped to per.suade visitors from America that the Slovak peop1e feel satisfied and happy under the current Red regime. A Slovak lady fr,O!Ill Cleveland made one of these trips to Slorva!kia. On arriving in Prague, she wrote a letter to her husband in America, describing how the American Slovruk visitors were welcomed at the station with a .playing band and with flowers. The elated husband ma;de a full report to the editorial office of the .Communis tic paper �SLOVAKIA 13 "l'.,udove Noviny" of Chicago, which in turn relayed to its readers the message that the Communists extend to Slo. vak visitoo-s from America a signal welcome with music and bouquets. The entire affair merely hides a ruse of the crafty Communists, an artifice which might mislead superficially-minded persons w'ho return to their enslaved homeland. The implication is that the casual visitor to America is not pomipousily welcomed; he is not showered with flowers; he is not greeted with melody and song. But he comes into a free country; it is his privilege to move about at will anywhere firom New York to San Francisco, to con. verse with whomever he wishes. He is at full liberty to fo:mn his own convictions about the life of free citirens living in a democracy, and he bases his conclusions and opinions on personal contacts, on firsthand impressions, and on unrestricted study. The Communists are iprepared to delude visitors from the first moment of their arrival at a railroad, station or airport. They pay them a stirring march and send a coached committee of children to present flowers. They are meticulously solicitous about their guests; they take pains to point out whaitever featurns will redound to their advantage or credit and they proceed along a studied plan to create a favora1ble impression and to lead their visitors to conclude that the American press is circulating untrue reports about Communist-controlled countries . The Communists have made punctilious arrangements for the visits of our countrymen from America and their schedules orf entertainment are nothing but a studied scheme of propaganda. One who is not sufficiently shrewd and discerning, who has not the faculty to see things with his own eyes as they really are and to formulate his own judgments with a nicety of discretion becomes the gulhble victim of this Communistic propaganda program and accepts without question all this artificial ~litter. But there are and have been visitOTs to Slovrukia who have no need of anyone's reception with floral tokens and music, who have no disposition to learn what the Com- �14 SLOVAKIA munists themselves wish to tell them. Accustomed to life in a free and democratic land, they look for this liiberty and democracy in Slovakia. They draw comparisons between the life of a laborer in America and the lot of a worker in Slovakia. They hear what the Slo,va,k pea;sants ha:ve to tell them, the sad e~periences of men who have been despoiled of their property. They see for themselVFis how jaded Slovak women have become. They cannot fail to observe that the people are scantily clothed. They learn that it is extremely hard to ma;ke a living on the meager earnings that are realized, and at every step their convictions are confirmed that under Communistic domination there is no contentment, no prosperity, no paradise, none of those advantages and blessings which Communistic propa,ganda repeatedly and volubly advertises. If guests from America are given the occasion to speak with their relatives in ,priivate, removed from the hearing of witnesses or spies, they are informed not only of the abject servitude imposed upon Slovakia, not only of her resistance to Communism, but also of the vital hope which sustains the Slovaiks in the ho,p e that liberty and independence will yet be granted to the country. Who has eyes to _see will not be blinded by flowers. Who has ears to hear will not be deafened by CO!mIDunistic music. And he who has a rational mind for thinking will not become confused by Communist propaganda. Many SlO'V'aks who retU1I1I1 from Slovakia bring us reports which only cor.firm the fact that today S1ovakia enjoys neither freedom nor democracy, because under Red rule only terror and misery and iviolence prevail. The Slova!k people never accepted Communism; they will never become reconciled with it, and they only await the opportunity to throw off the despised yoke. And when they throw off this yoke, they will likewise throw off Czech doonination, and Slovakia will again be an independent republic. 1 • • 'Il.HE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in every pUiblic library, in every college ·a nd university, in the home of every American of Slovak descent. Get your copy NOW. Paper bound copy - $2.00; in cloth $3.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 12 SLOVAKIA DR. HRUSOVSKY'S LAST COLUMN (,P repared and sent to press by Dr. Hrusovsky the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.) A number of our Slovak compatriot s recently under~ took a trip from America to 'Slova,kia. They had waited a long time for an opportunity to visit with their parents who had often written their sons and daughters in America that they yearned for the comfort of at least one more visit together. Naturally, once they undertook the long voyage, the visitors hoped also to meet their other relatives and friends and to extend their travels to other parts of S1ovakia. Travel agencies dispatched all that was necessary and our Slovak friends set out from America within a few weeks or a few months. They left with the fond hope that they would spend at least a short stay beneath their family roof, that beloved home they had to leave a long time ago, and they looked forward to being in· the circle of their dearest ones who expected them with open arms. lncidentally too, they were anxious to see for themselves in just what kind of circumstan ces their kin now live in Slovakia. ~he Czecho-Slovaik Communis t ,b oards which expedited these trips of our Slovak countryme n from the United States to Slovakia certainly did not do, it in order to affocd American Slovaks an opportunit y to visit with their closest relatives. They did it ·b ecause they covet American dollars which are very welcome even in Communist ic countries and they hoped to per.suade visitors from America that the Slovak peop1e feel satisfied and happy under the current Red regime. A Slovak lady fr,O!Ill Cleveland made one of these trips to Slorva!kia. On arriving in Prague, she wrote a letter to her husband in America, describing how the American Slovruk visitors were welcomed at the station with a .playing band and with flowers. The elated husband ma;de a full report to the editorial office of the .Communis tic paper SLOVAKIA 13 "l'.,udove Noviny" of Chicago, which in turn relayed to its readers the message that the Communists extend to Slo. vak visitoo-s from America a signal welcome with music and bouquets. The entire affair merely hides a ruse of the crafty Communists, an artifice which might mislead superficially-minded persons w'ho return to their enslaved homeland. The implication is that the casual visitor to America is not pomipousily welcomed; he is not showered with flowers; he is not greeted with melody and song. But he comes into a free country; it is his privilege to move about at will anywhere firom New York to San Francisco, to con. verse with whomever he wishes. He is at full liberty to fo:mn his own convictions about the life of free citirens living in a democracy, and he bases his conclusions and opinions on personal contacts, on firsthand impressions, and on unrestricted study. The Communists are iprepared to delude visitors from the first moment of their arrival at a railroad, station or airport. They pay them a stirring march and send a coached committee of children to present flowers. They are meticulously solicitous about their guests; they take pains to point out whaitever featurns will redound to their advantage or credit and they proceed along a studied plan to create a favora1ble impression and to lead their visitors to conclude that the American press is circulating untrue reports about Communist-controlled countries . The Communists have made punctilious arrangements for the visits of our countrymen from America and their schedules orf entertainment are nothing but a studied scheme of propaganda. One who is not sufficiently shrewd and discerning, who has not the faculty to see things with his own eyes as they really are and to formulate his own judgments with a nicety of discretion becomes the gulhble victim of this Communistic propaganda program and accepts without question all this artificial ~litter. But there are and have been visitOTs to Slovrukia who have no need of anyone's reception with floral tokens and music, who have no disposition to learn what the Com- 14 SLOVAKIA munists themselves wish to tell them. Accustomed to life in a free and democratic land, they look for this liiberty and democracy in Slovakia. They draw comparisons between the life of a laborer in America and the lot of a worker in Slovakia. They hear what the Slo,va,k pea;sants ha:ve to tell them, the sad e~periences of men who have been despoiled of their property. They see for themselVFis how jaded Slovak women have become. They cannot fail to observe that the people are scantily clothed. They learn that it is extremely hard to ma;ke a living on the meager earnings that are realized, and at every step their convictions are confirmed that under Communistic domination there is no contentment, no prosperity, no paradise, none of those advantages and blessings which Communistic propa,ganda repeatedly and volubly advertises. If guests from America are given the occasion to speak with their relatives in ,priivate, removed from the hearing of witnesses or spies, they are informed not only of the abject servitude imposed upon Slovakia, not only of her resistance to Communism, but also of the vital hope which sustains the Slovaiks in the ho,p e that liberty and independence will yet be granted to the country. Who has eyes to _see will not be blinded by flowers. Who has ears to hear will not be deafened by CO!mIDunistic music. And he who has a rational mind for thinking will not become confused by Communist propaganda. Many SlO'V'aks who retU1I1I1 from Slovakia bring us reports which only cor.firm the fact that today S1ovakia enjoys neither freedom nor democracy, because under Red rule only terror and misery and iviolence prevail. The Slova!k people never accepted Communism; they will never become reconciled with it, and they only await the opportunity to throw off the despised yoke. And when they throw off this yoke, they will likewise throw off Czech doonination, and Slovakia will again be an independent republic. 1 • • 'Il.HE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in every pUiblic library, in every college ·a nd university, in the home of every American of Slovak descent. Get your copy NOW. Paper bound copy - $2.00; in cloth $3.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Hrušovský's Last Column Description An account of the resource Dr. Francis Hrušovský Prepared and sent to press by Dr. Hrušovský the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13. Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956 pp. 12-14 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrušovský, František, 1903-1956 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1956 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/208254f95568e58a0bb64b8eba392d53.pdf 745c5ac46407f7c329eb3082fa1b68d6 PDF Text Text 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of �SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe �34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the �SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming �SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular �SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs �38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them �SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 �40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- �SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the �42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the �SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in �44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- �SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 �4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , �SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk �48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. �SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. �50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was �SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- �1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The �SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and �54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ �SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 �56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its �58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; �SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity �60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world. � 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of �SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe �34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the �SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming �SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular �SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs �38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them �SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 �40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- �SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the �42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the �SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in �44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- �SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 �4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , �SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk �48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. �SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. �50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was �SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- �1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The �SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and �54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ �SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 �56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its �58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; �SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity �60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe 34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs 38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the 42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in 44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk 48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. 50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- 1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and 54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its 58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity 60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Hubert Ripka's Version of the Communist "Putsch" in Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 32-60 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/059505bcecbc9634e3e95e4d84db947b.pdf 52881f07457f6b0188c03df90b9f30c9 PDF Text Text 82 SLOVAKIA Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY It is next to impossible to condense into a short biographical essay a life of such many-sided activity, so rich in events and experiences as that of Dr. J.M. Kirschbaum. It can be said of him and many of his contemporaries that their lives epitomise the Slovak history of the past half century in both its triumphant and tragic aspects. But nowhere is this symbolism so obvious and so clearly reflected as in the work and achievements of Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum. All his adult life has been spent in a dedicated service of the Slovak cause which, in turn, has in him its most ardent and articulate advocate. He was born on March 25th, 1913 in Dolne Vestenice, a well-known fruit-growing district of Central Slovakia. His father fought for the liberation of Slovakia in the Czecho-Slovak Legion during the First World War and returned from Siberia only in 1920. The years of fighting and deprivation sapped his health and he died in 1923 when the boy was ten years old. As a student of great promise and intellectual ability young Jozef Kirschbaum was sent to continue his schooling at the Lyceum (High School) in Nitra. I may add that at that time it was unusual for a village boy to pursue higher studies since the course was quite costly and demanding. Straight from the beginning J. Kirschbaum was an outstanding student whether at the Nitra Lyceum (1923-25) or later at the famous Jesuit college "Stanislavov" in Ruzomberok. In the days of Kirschbaum's stay at Ruzomberok the town had in the minds of most of the Slovak countryfolk the aura of a true capital city of Slovakia. Here resided as parish priest Fr. Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party and a fearless tribune of his people. Not even young students could escape the political atmosphere �SLOVAKIA 83 and the powerful influence of Hlinka's dynamic personality. For a young idealistic Slovak man Hlinka's political aims in their forceful simplicity must have been an irresistible attraction. There is no doubt that there and then was planted the seed of his future political commitments and involvements. After completion of his high school studies (at Kosice in 1933) Jozef Kirschbaum enrolled in the Law Faculty of the Bratislava University. Here he found himself right from the start in the thick of feverish political activities. The University halls and colleges were recruiting grounds and battle arenas where the new generation of political leaders were testing their skills and sharpening their tools. Kirschbaum and his contemporaries represented the first generation which grew up and was educated in the post-war Slovakia and was not exposed to the humiliating experiences of magyarization. They were the proud products of their teachers and professors (largely the Czechs) but in one respect they were to disappoint their tutors. They boldly asserted their Slovak nationality and refused to accept the hints and insinuations that they should consider themselves as a new breed of "Czechoslovaks". The youth of Slovakia (e.g. at their massive gathering at Trencianske Teplice in summer of 1932) even more vigorously than their fathers claimed for the Slovak nation those rights and privileges which every free nation should enjoy and which the Slovaks were once promised but since denied. In particular they demanded a fair deal for themselves and their countrymen: that the country's economy would pass into Slovak hands; that the Slovaks would get a proportional number of jobs in the Army, in the State and Public Service; that the Slovak language would be recognized and respected as the official language in Slovakia, etc. In the forefront of this struggle was the Slovak People's Party and one of its most energetic detachments was the academic youth where J. Kirschbaum was soon to play a leading role. His extensive involvement in politics-which inevitably had anti-Czech connotations-was frowned upon his Czech professors and the University authorities who would not allow him to graduate even though he had fulfilled all the �84 SLOVAKIA academic requirements with great distinction. Eventually he was awarded his Doctor of Law degree at a private ceremony in the summer of 1938. By this time Dr. J. Kirschbaum was already a wellknown public figure. His name frequently appeared in the Slovak press not only in connection with his activities but also as that of author of many articles, comments and penetrating observations. He was a regular contributor to several dailies and periodical of the time. The years 1938-39 passed into Slovak national history as the year of Slovakia's encounter with destiny. The evergrowing determination of the Slovak nation to be master in its own house manifested itself so patently that the further denial of political justice was no longer possible. The artificial edifice of "czechoslovakism " crumbled and the rigid centralist form of government was replaced by a federalist system. The post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia became a federated state and within its framework Slovakia obtained its overdue autonomy. The Slovak People's Party as the biggest political party in Slovakia and the most consistent advocate of autonomy assumed political responsibility for the future development of Slovakia. The first Slovak autonomous government formed in October 1938 consisted of two Hlinka followers (Dr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ferdinand !>urcansky), two Agrarians (Jan Lichner and Pavo! Teplansky) and one Nationalist (Matus cernak). These three parties represented-acco rding to the 1935 election results-almost two thirds of the Slovak electorate. The subsequent political activity of Dr. J. Kirschbaum must be viewed against this background. From the University lecture rooms he stepped straight into the turmoil of high-level politics. The situation facing the Slovak leaders was critical and very demanding. The People's Party had just lost its leader (Andrej Hlinka died in August 1938). Immediately after it had been granted autonomy Slovakia had to fight for its survival. Its greedy neighbors staked their territorial claims and Slovakia was forced to cede large portions of its territory to Hungary and 5maller ones to Poland and Germany. Truncated and harassed the country was even more determined to prove its vitality in spite of all threats and �SLOVAKIA 85 drawbacks. To achieve this, national unity was necessary. The political leaders thought that such a unity could be accomplished ( and convincingly demonstrated to outsiders) by the formation of a united political party for all Slovaks. This coalition-like party was formed in November 1938. It bore the dual name, Hlinka Slovak People's Party-The Party of Slovak National Unity and soon it was to be the real testing ground of the young Kirschbaum's abilities. But before this happened Dr. Kirschbaum had to prove his skill elsewhere. In the first months of Slovak autonomy he served as secretary of Minister f>urcansky (at the Ministry of Transport), and at the same time was the commandant of the Academic Hlinka Guards and the Editor-in-Chief of the radical fortnightly, "Nastup". In addition he was frequently seen and heard at many public meetings and demonstrations and his articles-which appeared regularly in "Nastup" and the daily press-were widely read. In the historic days of March 1939 when the Czechs by a military 'putsch' tried to quash Slovak autonomy and the future of Slovakia again hung in the balance, Dr. J. Kirschbaum-like his chief Dr. !>urcansky-considered the declaration of independence as the only viable solution. With fearless courage (the Czech military authorities issued an order for his arrest) he commuted between Dr. t>ucansky in Vienna and the Slovak political leaders in Bratislava (Karol Sidor and the deposed Prime Minister Dr. Jozef Tiso) in an attempt to arrange some coordinated political action. In these days of uncertainties he calmly organized-in defiance of Czech military orders--an impressive and welldisciplined march of University students through the streets of Bratislava. The authorities did not dare interfere and the demonstration turned out to be a significant moral booster for the suspense-packed hours preceding the declaration of independence. It is not surprising that in spite of his youth (he was barely 26) he figured on the list of the first Slovak government as proposed by Dr. t>urcansky, where he was allotted the Transport portfolio. But when-in the wake of the Slovak declaration of independence--the new government of Slovakia was an- �86 SLOVAKIA nounced, Kirschbaum's name was not included. But it was not because of his age. It is more probable that Dr. J. Tiso-the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Party of the Slovak National Unity - had for him a more challenging and exacting task. He appointed Dr. J . Kirschbaum the Secretary-General of the Party. The work imposed on his young shoulders by this appointment was enormous. The Slovak People's Party of the pre-1938 period was administered very haphazardly. Fr. Hlinka as the undisputed leader of a widespread popular movement did not see any great need and hence paid little attention to the organizational and bureaucratic details of the Party's day-to-day existence. This could do while the Party was in opposition and Hlinka's word was law. But after Hlinka's death the Party became the dominating influence in the government of the country and in addition was swelled by the influx of new members (including former members of those parties which united with it in November 1938) it was necessary for the Party to have its own statutes, modern organizational structure and an effective administrative machinery. By the Constitutional Law of July 1939 the Party was assigned a new and important role in the political, cultural and social life of independent Slovakia. The constructive implementation of this role was the job of the General Secretariat where Dr. J. Kirschbaum and an able team of dedicated and enthusiastic helpers were hard at work. At the Party Congress in Trencin (September 30thOctober 1st, 1939) Dr. J. Kirschbaum presented the new proposals for the organizational changes in the structure and administration of the Party. They were unanimously approved by the Congress and even his jealous critics had to admit that Dr. Kirschbaum and his team had done a thorough and creditable job. The Congress confirmed (also unanimously) Dr. Kirschbaum in the position of the Party's Secretary-General. As the Secretary-General of the Party Dr. J. Kirschbaum displayed not only zeal and agility but also a vision and sense of judgment so important in such a responsible job. Under his able administration the rejuvenated Party was launched on its new course under the new social and political conditions. �SLOVAKIA 87 Unfortunately Dr. Kirschbaum did not stay long in his Party post. In the first half of 1940 Slovak political life underwent dramatic changes due to the polarization of political thinking among the leaders of Slovakia. There were some who claimed that the present, as well as the future, of Slovakia must be linked with that of Germany in all respects. These close ties would postulate even the ideological remoulding of the Slovak life and outlook in the National Socialist pattern. This group, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka and the Commandant of the Hlinka Guards Alexander Mach, was resolutely opposed not only by President Dr. Tiso and the rest of the ministers but also by the overwhelming majority of ranli::. and file Party members and the people. The Party Secretariat stood solidly behind the President who insisted that Slovak politics must not slavishly imitate foreign examples but should be rooted in native traditions. Tuk.a and his followers called for German assistance which was soon forthcoming in the shape of the notorious "Salzburg consultations". In August 1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop forced President Tiso to dismiss from their positions of power the two men whom they considered as the chief trouble-makers and major obstructions to the spread of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia, namely Dr. F. nurcansky (Foreign and Interior Minister) and Dr. J. Kirschbaum (Secretary-General of the Party). After his dismissal from the Party job Dr. J. Kirschbaum was called up to do his military service in the Slovak Army (1940-41). A ban was imposed on his further participation in the domestic politics of Slovakia. And so after completion of his military duties he entered the Slovak diplomatic service. He started his diplomatic career as the Legation Counsellor at the Slovak Legation in Rome. After a short apprenticeship in Rome he assumed (in 1942) the position of Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Bern, where he stayed till the end of World War II. On the soil of neutral Switzerland he did his utmost to safeguard Slovak interests in the realm of international politics. Through personal contacts -both official and unofficial-and by all means available �88 SLOVAKIA to him he defended Slovakia's case for independence in the post-war territorial rearrangement of Central Europe. But the enemies of Slovak independence had at their side the victorious Western Powers and the Soviet Union and again it was the case of the "might-is-right" solution. With total disregard for the wishes of the small indigenous peoples it was decided to reimpose the discredited Versailles settlement on the nations of Central Europe. The Slovaks found themselves in an unwilling partnership with the Czechs in the reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia. As a result Dr. J. Kirschbaum like thousands of his countrymen stood face to face with the bitter reality of life in exile. The first years of his life as a political exile he spent in Switzerland where he worked for a short period ( 19461948) as an accredited representative of the Slovak League to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva. He was in continuous contact with the Slovak political leaders in exile and with Slovak organizations in America and elsewhere. It was obvious to them that the struggle for the restoration of Slovak independence must start there and then, no matter how hopeless the situation might look. To assure the maximum effectiveness of this struggle an organized and coordinated action was required. Thus in the summer of 1948 the foundations were laid for a Slovak political representation-The Slovak National Council A· broad-which took upon itself to carry on the struggle for the just and inalienable demands of the Slovak nation. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum was one of the principal architects of this organization. It included such well-known personalities as Sidor, Pridavok, Culen, Mondok, Cieker, Pauco, Mikus, etc., but-most regretably-not Dr. F. !>urcansky. Dr. J. Kirschbaum stood at the head of the Committee in charge of foreign affairs. For this task he was indeed suitably prepared and equipped. He had the background of diplomatic experience and a deep and intimate knowledge of Slovak politics. His knowledge of the Western world was based on close observations and supplemented by his studies at several Western universities: Paris (Political Science, 1938), Rome (Political Science, 1941-42), Geneva (International Relations, 1946-48) and Montreal (1951-54). �SLOVAKIA 89 In 1949 he emigrated with his family (he married Magdalena Danihel in 1941 and by this time they had three children) to Montreal in Canada. In spite of the difficulties which are the lot of every immigrant in a new country he quickly settled down and resumed his work where he had left off in Europe, including his university studies. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. and in 1954 a Ph.D. degree at the Universite de Montreal. But even at this time his involvement in university activities went far deeper than a simple studentship. In 1951 he started to give a course of lectures at the Universite de Montreal and later at the Universite d'Ottawa and the University of Toronto. His lectures dealt with the broad spectrum of the history of the Western Slavs ('Slavia Occidentalis') and also with specific Slovak topics. As time went by he became even more deeply concerned with Slovak emigre politics. After 1950 the centre of Slovak p olitical activities shifted from Europe across the Atlantic and Montreal became their focal point. Here resided K . Sidor, K. culen, F. Tiso, F. Mondok, K. Murin and J . Kirschbaum who in 1952 was elected the chairman of the Political Committee of the Slovak National Council Abroad. One worrying feature of the Slovak political life in exile was its bifurcation into two organizations struggling for the same aims but in bitter rivalry against each other. For a man like Dr. J. Kirschbaum it was a particularly heart-breaking experience since the rival organization was led by his former chief and friend, Dr. F. !>urcansky. I t took many years of patience and endurance to heal this split. Major credit for this achievement should go to Dr. J. Kirschbaum. It was largely through his effort that in 1960 the Slovak community both at home and abroad learned with satisfaction about the formation of a joint organization-The Slovak Liberation Council. Dr. !>urcansky became the President of the Council's E xecutive Committee and Dr. J . Kirschbaum became the President of its Assembly. On purpose I have not said anything about the journalistic and literary activities of Dr. J . Kirschbaum. They would form an extensive chapter all by themselves and one cannot do them justice within the framework of this �90 SLOVAKIA brief biographical sketch. I only wish to remind the reader that on top of all the accomplishments recorded in the preceding paragraphs he should superimpose an impressive literary and journalistic output. This activity began when Dr. J. Kirschbaum was 14 years old and it is still continuing. In the period of the past 45 years Dr. Kirschbaum wrote (by a modest estimate) something like 1200 articles on a wide variety of topics (political commentaries, editorials. literary criticism and history, Slavic studies, linguistics. political science) in five languages (Slovak, French, English, German, Spanish) as well as four scholarly books, two of them in English ('Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe', 1960, and 'Slovaks in Canada', 1967). In the last few years Dr. Kirschbaum has expended much of his time and energy in organizing and promoting the work of the Slovak World Congress. This relatively new body (founded in 1970) embraces all Slovak political, cultural, fraternal and other organizations and societies to speak on their behalf for the Slovak cause in the free world. Dr. J. Kirschbaum is one of the Vice Presidents of the Slovak World Congress and at the moment is putting the finishing editorial touches to a Symposium on Slovak history and culture. The book will contain the lectures and discussions which were delivered at the special conference successfully arranged by Dr. Kirschbaum to coincide with the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress in Toronto (June 1971). Karl Marx who knew vastly more about life in exile than he knew about world revolution once wrote that emigre life is "a school of scandal and of meanness". Dr. Kirschbaum would probably agree with him. More than once he became an innocent victim of vicious attacks, intrigues and malicious gossip from the enemies of Slovak independence (who wanted to eliminate him from Slovak politics for obvious reasons) as well as from jealous and frustrated compatriots (who had no obvious reasons at all). But all this "sound and fury"-unpleasant and distractful as it must have been-did not sway Dr. Kirschbaum from his firm determination to work selflessly and untiringly for the just Slovak cause. Which only confirms my personal conviction about life in exile, namely that �91 SLOVAKIA exile brings out the best in a noble and purposeful man and the worst in those who are weak and insecure. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum can look back on his past years, and in particular the years in exile, with contentment and satisfaction. We who watched his efforts and striving at a close distance and followed them with good wishes and admiration, we know he tried his utmost and did his best. His achievements when measured against a background of harrowing and unfavorable circumstances will irritate his detractors but will inspire many of his countrymen both at home and abroad, at present and in the future. AD MULTOS ANNOS! F. V n u k, Australia • • • SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA - - - supports freedom and independence of Slovakia; promotes a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation, its history, culture, traditions, and desires; makes America better known to Slovakia and Slovakia better known to America in the interest of world peace, freedom and security; has a scholarship program for college and university students; promotes cooperation among all American-Slovak organizations and publications for the promulgations of Slovak ethnic heritage. is a charter member of the Slovak World Congress. Life membership: $100.00 For further information, write to: Slovak League of America 313 Ridge Avenue Middletown, Pa. 17057 � 82 SLOVAKIA Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY It is next to impossible to condense into a short biographical essay a life of such many-sided activity, so rich in events and experiences as that of Dr. J.M. Kirschbaum. It can be said of him and many of his contemporaries that their lives epitomise the Slovak history of the past half century in both its triumphant and tragic aspects. But nowhere is this symbolism so obvious and so clearly reflected as in the work and achievements of Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum. All his adult life has been spent in a dedicated service of the Slovak cause which, in turn, has in him its most ardent and articulate advocate. He was born on March 25th, 1913 in Dolne Vestenice, a well-known fruit-growing district of Central Slovakia. His father fought for the liberation of Slovakia in the Czecho-Slovak Legion during the First World War and returned from Siberia only in 1920. The years of fighting and deprivation sapped his health and he died in 1923 when the boy was ten years old. As a student of great promise and intellectual ability young Jozef Kirschbaum was sent to continue his schooling at the Lyceum (High School) in Nitra. I may add that at that time it was unusual for a village boy to pursue higher studies since the course was quite costly and demanding. Straight from the beginning J. Kirschbaum was an outstanding student whether at the Nitra Lyceum (1923-25) or later at the famous Jesuit college "Stanislavov" in Ruzomberok. In the days of Kirschbaum's stay at Ruzomberok the town had in the minds of most of the Slovak countryfolk the aura of a true capital city of Slovakia. Here resided as parish priest Fr. Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party and a fearless tribune of his people. Not even young students could escape the political atmosphere �SLOVAKIA 83 and the powerful influence of Hlinka's dynamic personality. For a young idealistic Slovak man Hlinka's political aims in their forceful simplicity must have been an irresistible attraction. There is no doubt that there and then was planted the seed of his future political commitments and involvements. After completion of his high school studies (at Kosice in 1933) Jozef Kirschbaum enrolled in the Law Faculty of the Bratislava University. Here he found himself right from the start in the thick of feverish political activities. The University halls and colleges were recruiting grounds and battle arenas where the new generation of political leaders were testing their skills and sharpening their tools. Kirschbaum and his contemporaries represented the first generation which grew up and was educated in the post-war Slovakia and was not exposed to the humiliating experiences of magyarization. They were the proud products of their teachers and professors (largely the Czechs) but in one respect they were to disappoint their tutors. They boldly asserted their Slovak nationality and refused to accept the hints and insinuations that they should consider themselves as a new breed of "Czechoslovaks". The youth of Slovakia (e.g. at their massive gathering at Trencianske Teplice in summer of 1932) even more vigorously than their fathers claimed for the Slovak nation those rights and privileges which every free nation should enjoy and which the Slovaks were once promised but since denied. In particular they demanded a fair deal for themselves and their countrymen: that the country's economy would pass into Slovak hands; that the Slovaks would get a proportional number of jobs in the Army, in the State and Public Service; that the Slovak language would be recognized and respected as the official language in Slovakia, etc. In the forefront of this struggle was the Slovak People's Party and one of its most energetic detachments was the academic youth where J. Kirschbaum was soon to play a leading role. His extensive involvement in politics-which inevitably had anti-Czech connotations-was frowned upon his Czech professors and the University authorities who would not allow him to graduate even though he had fulfilled all the �84 SLOVAKIA academic requirements with great distinction. Eventually he was awarded his Doctor of Law degree at a private ceremony in the summer of 1938. By this time Dr. J. Kirschbaum was already a wellknown public figure. His name frequently appeared in the Slovak press not only in connection with his activities but also as that of author of many articles, comments and penetrating observations. He was a regular contributor to several dailies and periodical of the time. The years 1938-39 passed into Slovak national history as the year of Slovakia's encounter with destiny. The evergrowing determination of the Slovak nation to be master in its own house manifested itself so patently that the further denial of political justice was no longer possible. The artificial edifice of "czechoslovakism " crumbled and the rigid centralist form of government was replaced by a federalist system. The post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia became a federated state and within its framework Slovakia obtained its overdue autonomy. The Slovak People's Party as the biggest political party in Slovakia and the most consistent advocate of autonomy assumed political responsibility for the future development of Slovakia. The first Slovak autonomous government formed in October 1938 consisted of two Hlinka followers (Dr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ferdinand !>urcansky), two Agrarians (Jan Lichner and Pavo! Teplansky) and one Nationalist (Matus cernak). These three parties represented-acco rding to the 1935 election results-almost two thirds of the Slovak electorate. The subsequent political activity of Dr. J. Kirschbaum must be viewed against this background. From the University lecture rooms he stepped straight into the turmoil of high-level politics. The situation facing the Slovak leaders was critical and very demanding. The People's Party had just lost its leader (Andrej Hlinka died in August 1938). Immediately after it had been granted autonomy Slovakia had to fight for its survival. Its greedy neighbors staked their territorial claims and Slovakia was forced to cede large portions of its territory to Hungary and 5maller ones to Poland and Germany. Truncated and harassed the country was even more determined to prove its vitality in spite of all threats and �SLOVAKIA 85 drawbacks. To achieve this, national unity was necessary. The political leaders thought that such a unity could be accomplished ( and convincingly demonstrated to outsiders) by the formation of a united political party for all Slovaks. This coalition-like party was formed in November 1938. It bore the dual name, Hlinka Slovak People's Party-The Party of Slovak National Unity and soon it was to be the real testing ground of the young Kirschbaum's abilities. But before this happened Dr. Kirschbaum had to prove his skill elsewhere. In the first months of Slovak autonomy he served as secretary of Minister f>urcansky (at the Ministry of Transport), and at the same time was the commandant of the Academic Hlinka Guards and the Editor-in-Chief of the radical fortnightly, "Nastup". In addition he was frequently seen and heard at many public meetings and demonstrations and his articles-which appeared regularly in "Nastup" and the daily press-were widely read. In the historic days of March 1939 when the Czechs by a military 'putsch' tried to quash Slovak autonomy and the future of Slovakia again hung in the balance, Dr. J. Kirschbaum-like his chief Dr. !>urcansky-considered the declaration of independence as the only viable solution. With fearless courage (the Czech military authorities issued an order for his arrest) he commuted between Dr. t>ucansky in Vienna and the Slovak political leaders in Bratislava (Karol Sidor and the deposed Prime Minister Dr. Jozef Tiso) in an attempt to arrange some coordinated political action. In these days of uncertainties he calmly organized-in defiance of Czech military orders--an impressive and welldisciplined march of University students through the streets of Bratislava. The authorities did not dare interfere and the demonstration turned out to be a significant moral booster for the suspense-packed hours preceding the declaration of independence. It is not surprising that in spite of his youth (he was barely 26) he figured on the list of the first Slovak government as proposed by Dr. t>urcansky, where he was allotted the Transport portfolio. But when-in the wake of the Slovak declaration of independence--the new government of Slovakia was an- �86 SLOVAKIA nounced, Kirschbaum's name was not included. But it was not because of his age. It is more probable that Dr. J. Tiso-the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Party of the Slovak National Unity - had for him a more challenging and exacting task. He appointed Dr. J . Kirschbaum the Secretary-General of the Party. The work imposed on his young shoulders by this appointment was enormous. The Slovak People's Party of the pre-1938 period was administered very haphazardly. Fr. Hlinka as the undisputed leader of a widespread popular movement did not see any great need and hence paid little attention to the organizational and bureaucratic details of the Party's day-to-day existence. This could do while the Party was in opposition and Hlinka's word was law. But after Hlinka's death the Party became the dominating influence in the government of the country and in addition was swelled by the influx of new members (including former members of those parties which united with it in November 1938) it was necessary for the Party to have its own statutes, modern organizational structure and an effective administrative machinery. By the Constitutional Law of July 1939 the Party was assigned a new and important role in the political, cultural and social life of independent Slovakia. The constructive implementation of this role was the job of the General Secretariat where Dr. J. Kirschbaum and an able team of dedicated and enthusiastic helpers were hard at work. At the Party Congress in Trencin (September 30thOctober 1st, 1939) Dr. J. Kirschbaum presented the new proposals for the organizational changes in the structure and administration of the Party. They were unanimously approved by the Congress and even his jealous critics had to admit that Dr. Kirschbaum and his team had done a thorough and creditable job. The Congress confirmed (also unanimously) Dr. Kirschbaum in the position of the Party's Secretary-General. As the Secretary-General of the Party Dr. J. Kirschbaum displayed not only zeal and agility but also a vision and sense of judgment so important in such a responsible job. Under his able administration the rejuvenated Party was launched on its new course under the new social and political conditions. �SLOVAKIA 87 Unfortunately Dr. Kirschbaum did not stay long in his Party post. In the first half of 1940 Slovak political life underwent dramatic changes due to the polarization of political thinking among the leaders of Slovakia. There were some who claimed that the present, as well as the future, of Slovakia must be linked with that of Germany in all respects. These close ties would postulate even the ideological remoulding of the Slovak life and outlook in the National Socialist pattern. This group, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka and the Commandant of the Hlinka Guards Alexander Mach, was resolutely opposed not only by President Dr. Tiso and the rest of the ministers but also by the overwhelming majority of ranli::. and file Party members and the people. The Party Secretariat stood solidly behind the President who insisted that Slovak politics must not slavishly imitate foreign examples but should be rooted in native traditions. Tuk.a and his followers called for German assistance which was soon forthcoming in the shape of the notorious "Salzburg consultations". In August 1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop forced President Tiso to dismiss from their positions of power the two men whom they considered as the chief trouble-makers and major obstructions to the spread of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia, namely Dr. F. nurcansky (Foreign and Interior Minister) and Dr. J. Kirschbaum (Secretary-General of the Party). After his dismissal from the Party job Dr. J. Kirschbaum was called up to do his military service in the Slovak Army (1940-41). A ban was imposed on his further participation in the domestic politics of Slovakia. And so after completion of his military duties he entered the Slovak diplomatic service. He started his diplomatic career as the Legation Counsellor at the Slovak Legation in Rome. After a short apprenticeship in Rome he assumed (in 1942) the position of Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Bern, where he stayed till the end of World War II. On the soil of neutral Switzerland he did his utmost to safeguard Slovak interests in the realm of international politics. Through personal contacts -both official and unofficial-and by all means available �88 SLOVAKIA to him he defended Slovakia's case for independence in the post-war territorial rearrangement of Central Europe. But the enemies of Slovak independence had at their side the victorious Western Powers and the Soviet Union and again it was the case of the "might-is-right" solution. With total disregard for the wishes of the small indigenous peoples it was decided to reimpose the discredited Versailles settlement on the nations of Central Europe. The Slovaks found themselves in an unwilling partnership with the Czechs in the reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia. As a result Dr. J. Kirschbaum like thousands of his countrymen stood face to face with the bitter reality of life in exile. The first years of his life as a political exile he spent in Switzerland where he worked for a short period ( 19461948) as an accredited representative of the Slovak League to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva. He was in continuous contact with the Slovak political leaders in exile and with Slovak organizations in America and elsewhere. It was obvious to them that the struggle for the restoration of Slovak independence must start there and then, no matter how hopeless the situation might look. To assure the maximum effectiveness of this struggle an organized and coordinated action was required. Thus in the summer of 1948 the foundations were laid for a Slovak political representation-The Slovak National Council A· broad-which took upon itself to carry on the struggle for the just and inalienable demands of the Slovak nation. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum was one of the principal architects of this organization. It included such well-known personalities as Sidor, Pridavok, Culen, Mondok, Cieker, Pauco, Mikus, etc., but-most regretably-not Dr. F. !>urcansky. Dr. J. Kirschbaum stood at the head of the Committee in charge of foreign affairs. For this task he was indeed suitably prepared and equipped. He had the background of diplomatic experience and a deep and intimate knowledge of Slovak politics. His knowledge of the Western world was based on close observations and supplemented by his studies at several Western universities: Paris (Political Science, 1938), Rome (Political Science, 1941-42), Geneva (International Relations, 1946-48) and Montreal (1951-54). �SLOVAKIA 89 In 1949 he emigrated with his family (he married Magdalena Danihel in 1941 and by this time they had three children) to Montreal in Canada. In spite of the difficulties which are the lot of every immigrant in a new country he quickly settled down and resumed his work where he had left off in Europe, including his university studies. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. and in 1954 a Ph.D. degree at the Universite de Montreal. But even at this time his involvement in university activities went far deeper than a simple studentship. In 1951 he started to give a course of lectures at the Universite de Montreal and later at the Universite d'Ottawa and the University of Toronto. His lectures dealt with the broad spectrum of the history of the Western Slavs ('Slavia Occidentalis') and also with specific Slovak topics. As time went by he became even more deeply concerned with Slovak emigre politics. After 1950 the centre of Slovak p olitical activities shifted from Europe across the Atlantic and Montreal became their focal point. Here resided K . Sidor, K. culen, F. Tiso, F. Mondok, K. Murin and J . Kirschbaum who in 1952 was elected the chairman of the Political Committee of the Slovak National Council Abroad. One worrying feature of the Slovak political life in exile was its bifurcation into two organizations struggling for the same aims but in bitter rivalry against each other. For a man like Dr. J. Kirschbaum it was a particularly heart-breaking experience since the rival organization was led by his former chief and friend, Dr. F. !>urcansky. I t took many years of patience and endurance to heal this split. Major credit for this achievement should go to Dr. J. Kirschbaum. It was largely through his effort that in 1960 the Slovak community both at home and abroad learned with satisfaction about the formation of a joint organization-The Slovak Liberation Council. Dr. !>urcansky became the President of the Council's E xecutive Committee and Dr. J . Kirschbaum became the President of its Assembly. On purpose I have not said anything about the journalistic and literary activities of Dr. J . Kirschbaum. They would form an extensive chapter all by themselves and one cannot do them justice within the framework of this �90 SLOVAKIA brief biographical sketch. I only wish to remind the reader that on top of all the accomplishments recorded in the preceding paragraphs he should superimpose an impressive literary and journalistic output. This activity began when Dr. J. Kirschbaum was 14 years old and it is still continuing. In the period of the past 45 years Dr. Kirschbaum wrote (by a modest estimate) something like 1200 articles on a wide variety of topics (political commentaries, editorials. literary criticism and history, Slavic studies, linguistics. political science) in five languages (Slovak, French, English, German, Spanish) as well as four scholarly books, two of them in English ('Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe', 1960, and 'Slovaks in Canada', 1967). In the last few years Dr. Kirschbaum has expended much of his time and energy in organizing and promoting the work of the Slovak World Congress. This relatively new body (founded in 1970) embraces all Slovak political, cultural, fraternal and other organizations and societies to speak on their behalf for the Slovak cause in the free world. Dr. J. Kirschbaum is one of the Vice Presidents of the Slovak World Congress and at the moment is putting the finishing editorial touches to a Symposium on Slovak history and culture. The book will contain the lectures and discussions which were delivered at the special conference successfully arranged by Dr. Kirschbaum to coincide with the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress in Toronto (June 1971). Karl Marx who knew vastly more about life in exile than he knew about world revolution once wrote that emigre life is "a school of scandal and of meanness". Dr. Kirschbaum would probably agree with him. More than once he became an innocent victim of vicious attacks, intrigues and malicious gossip from the enemies of Slovak independence (who wanted to eliminate him from Slovak politics for obvious reasons) as well as from jealous and frustrated compatriots (who had no obvious reasons at all). But all this "sound and fury"-unpleasant and distractful as it must have been-did not sway Dr. Kirschbaum from his firm determination to work selflessly and untiringly for the just Slovak cause. Which only confirms my personal conviction about life in exile, namely that �91 SLOVAKIA exile brings out the best in a noble and purposeful man and the worst in those who are weak and insecure. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum can look back on his past years, and in particular the years in exile, with contentment and satisfaction. We who watched his efforts and striving at a close distance and followed them with good wishes and admiration, we know he tried his utmost and did his best. His achievements when measured against a background of harrowing and unfavorable circumstances will irritate his detractors but will inspire many of his countrymen both at home and abroad, at present and in the future. AD MULTOS ANNOS! F. V n u k, Australia • • • SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA - - - supports freedom and independence of Slovakia; promotes a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation, its history, culture, traditions, and desires; makes America better known to Slovakia and Slovakia better known to America in the interest of world peace, freedom and security; has a scholarship program for college and university students; promotes cooperation among all American-Slovak organizations and publications for the promulgations of Slovak ethnic heritage. is a charter member of the Slovak World Congress. Life membership: $100.00 For further information, write to: Slovak League of America 313 Ridge Avenue Middletown, Pa. 17057 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 82 SLOVAKIA Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY It is next to impossible to condense into a short biographical essay a life of such many-sided activity, so rich in events and experiences as that of Dr. J.M. Kirschbaum. It can be said of him and many of his contemporaries that their lives epitomise the Slovak history of the past half century in both its triumphant and tragic aspects. But nowhere is this symbolism so obvious and so clearly reflected as in the work and achievements of Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum. All his adult life has been spent in a dedicated service of the Slovak cause which, in turn, has in him its most ardent and articulate advocate. He was born on March 25th, 1913 in Dolne Vestenice, a well-known fruit-growing district of Central Slovakia. His father fought for the liberation of Slovakia in the Czecho-Slovak Legion during the First World War and returned from Siberia only in 1920. The years of fighting and deprivation sapped his health and he died in 1923 when the boy was ten years old. As a student of great promise and intellectual ability young Jozef Kirschbaum was sent to continue his schooling at the Lyceum (High School) in Nitra. I may add that at that time it was unusual for a village boy to pursue higher studies since the course was quite costly and demanding. Straight from the beginning J. Kirschbaum was an outstanding student whether at the Nitra Lyceum (1923-25) or later at the famous Jesuit college "Stanislavov" in Ruzomberok. In the days of Kirschbaum's stay at Ruzomberok the town had in the minds of most of the Slovak countryfolk the aura of a true capital city of Slovakia. Here resided as parish priest Fr. Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party and a fearless tribune of his people. Not even young students could escape the political atmosphere SLOVAKIA 83 and the powerful influence of Hlinka's dynamic personality. For a young idealistic Slovak man Hlinka's political aims in their forceful simplicity must have been an irresistible attraction. There is no doubt that there and then was planted the seed of his future political commitments and involvements. After completion of his high school studies (at Kosice in 1933) Jozef Kirschbaum enrolled in the Law Faculty of the Bratislava University. Here he found himself right from the start in the thick of feverish political activities. The University halls and colleges were recruiting grounds and battle arenas where the new generation of political leaders were testing their skills and sharpening their tools. Kirschbaum and his contemporaries represented the first generation which grew up and was educated in the post-war Slovakia and was not exposed to the humiliating experiences of magyarization. They were the proud products of their teachers and professors (largely the Czechs) but in one respect they were to disappoint their tutors. They boldly asserted their Slovak nationality and refused to accept the hints and insinuations that they should consider themselves as a new breed of "Czechoslovaks". The youth of Slovakia (e.g. at their massive gathering at Trencianske Teplice in summer of 1932) even more vigorously than their fathers claimed for the Slovak nation those rights and privileges which every free nation should enjoy and which the Slovaks were once promised but since denied. In particular they demanded a fair deal for themselves and their countrymen: that the country's economy would pass into Slovak hands; that the Slovaks would get a proportional number of jobs in the Army, in the State and Public Service; that the Slovak language would be recognized and respected as the official language in Slovakia, etc. In the forefront of this struggle was the Slovak People's Party and one of its most energetic detachments was the academic youth where J. Kirschbaum was soon to play a leading role. His extensive involvement in politics-which inevitably had anti-Czech connotations-was frowned upon his Czech professors and the University authorities who would not allow him to graduate even though he had fulfilled all the 84 SLOVAKIA academic requirements with great distinction. Eventually he was awarded his Doctor of Law degree at a private ceremony in the summer of 1938. By this time Dr. J. Kirschbaum was already a wellknown public figure. His name frequently appeared in the Slovak press not only in connection with his activities but also as that of author of many articles, comments and penetrating observations. He was a regular contributor to several dailies and periodical of the time. The years 1938-39 passed into Slovak national history as the year of Slovakia's encounter with destiny. The evergrowing determination of the Slovak nation to be master in its own house manifested itself so patently that the further denial of political justice was no longer possible. The artificial edifice of "czechoslovakism " crumbled and the rigid centralist form of government was replaced by a federalist system. The post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia became a federated state and within its framework Slovakia obtained its overdue autonomy. The Slovak People's Party as the biggest political party in Slovakia and the most consistent advocate of autonomy assumed political responsibility for the future development of Slovakia. The first Slovak autonomous government formed in October 1938 consisted of two Hlinka followers (Dr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ferdinand !>urcansky), two Agrarians (Jan Lichner and Pavo! Teplansky) and one Nationalist (Matus cernak). These three parties represented-acco rding to the 1935 election results-almost two thirds of the Slovak electorate. The subsequent political activity of Dr. J. Kirschbaum must be viewed against this background. From the University lecture rooms he stepped straight into the turmoil of high-level politics. The situation facing the Slovak leaders was critical and very demanding. The People's Party had just lost its leader (Andrej Hlinka died in August 1938). Immediately after it had been granted autonomy Slovakia had to fight for its survival. Its greedy neighbors staked their territorial claims and Slovakia was forced to cede large portions of its territory to Hungary and 5maller ones to Poland and Germany. Truncated and harassed the country was even more determined to prove its vitality in spite of all threats and SLOVAKIA 85 drawbacks. To achieve this, national unity was necessary. The political leaders thought that such a unity could be accomplished ( and convincingly demonstrated to outsiders) by the formation of a united political party for all Slovaks. This coalition-like party was formed in November 1938. It bore the dual name, Hlinka Slovak People's Party-The Party of Slovak National Unity and soon it was to be the real testing ground of the young Kirschbaum's abilities. But before this happened Dr. Kirschbaum had to prove his skill elsewhere. In the first months of Slovak autonomy he served as secretary of Minister f>urcansky (at the Ministry of Transport), and at the same time was the commandant of the Academic Hlinka Guards and the Editor-in-Chief of the radical fortnightly, "Nastup". In addition he was frequently seen and heard at many public meetings and demonstrations and his articles-which appeared regularly in "Nastup" and the daily press-were widely read. In the historic days of March 1939 when the Czechs by a military 'putsch' tried to quash Slovak autonomy and the future of Slovakia again hung in the balance, Dr. J. Kirschbaum-like his chief Dr. !>urcansky-considered the declaration of independence as the only viable solution. With fearless courage (the Czech military authorities issued an order for his arrest) he commuted between Dr. t>ucansky in Vienna and the Slovak political leaders in Bratislava (Karol Sidor and the deposed Prime Minister Dr. Jozef Tiso) in an attempt to arrange some coordinated political action. In these days of uncertainties he calmly organized-in defiance of Czech military orders--an impressive and welldisciplined march of University students through the streets of Bratislava. The authorities did not dare interfere and the demonstration turned out to be a significant moral booster for the suspense-packed hours preceding the declaration of independence. It is not surprising that in spite of his youth (he was barely 26) he figured on the list of the first Slovak government as proposed by Dr. t>urcansky, where he was allotted the Transport portfolio. But when-in the wake of the Slovak declaration of independence--the new government of Slovakia was an- 86 SLOVAKIA nounced, Kirschbaum's name was not included. But it was not because of his age. It is more probable that Dr. J. Tiso-the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Party of the Slovak National Unity - had for him a more challenging and exacting task. He appointed Dr. J . Kirschbaum the Secretary-General of the Party. The work imposed on his young shoulders by this appointment was enormous. The Slovak People's Party of the pre-1938 period was administered very haphazardly. Fr. Hlinka as the undisputed leader of a widespread popular movement did not see any great need and hence paid little attention to the organizational and bureaucratic details of the Party's day-to-day existence. This could do while the Party was in opposition and Hlinka's word was law. But after Hlinka's death the Party became the dominating influence in the government of the country and in addition was swelled by the influx of new members (including former members of those parties which united with it in November 1938) it was necessary for the Party to have its own statutes, modern organizational structure and an effective administrative machinery. By the Constitutional Law of July 1939 the Party was assigned a new and important role in the political, cultural and social life of independent Slovakia. The constructive implementation of this role was the job of the General Secretariat where Dr. J. Kirschbaum and an able team of dedicated and enthusiastic helpers were hard at work. At the Party Congress in Trencin (September 30thOctober 1st, 1939) Dr. J. Kirschbaum presented the new proposals for the organizational changes in the structure and administration of the Party. They were unanimously approved by the Congress and even his jealous critics had to admit that Dr. Kirschbaum and his team had done a thorough and creditable job. The Congress confirmed (also unanimously) Dr. Kirschbaum in the position of the Party's Secretary-General. As the Secretary-General of the Party Dr. J. Kirschbaum displayed not only zeal and agility but also a vision and sense of judgment so important in such a responsible job. Under his able administration the rejuvenated Party was launched on its new course under the new social and political conditions. SLOVAKIA 87 Unfortunately Dr. Kirschbaum did not stay long in his Party post. In the first half of 1940 Slovak political life underwent dramatic changes due to the polarization of political thinking among the leaders of Slovakia. There were some who claimed that the present, as well as the future, of Slovakia must be linked with that of Germany in all respects. These close ties would postulate even the ideological remoulding of the Slovak life and outlook in the National Socialist pattern. This group, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka and the Commandant of the Hlinka Guards Alexander Mach, was resolutely opposed not only by President Dr. Tiso and the rest of the ministers but also by the overwhelming majority of ranli::. and file Party members and the people. The Party Secretariat stood solidly behind the President who insisted that Slovak politics must not slavishly imitate foreign examples but should be rooted in native traditions. Tuk.a and his followers called for German assistance which was soon forthcoming in the shape of the notorious "Salzburg consultations". In August 1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop forced President Tiso to dismiss from their positions of power the two men whom they considered as the chief trouble-makers and major obstructions to the spread of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia, namely Dr. F. nurcansky (Foreign and Interior Minister) and Dr. J. Kirschbaum (Secretary-General of the Party). After his dismissal from the Party job Dr. J. Kirschbaum was called up to do his military service in the Slovak Army (1940-41). A ban was imposed on his further participation in the domestic politics of Slovakia. And so after completion of his military duties he entered the Slovak diplomatic service. He started his diplomatic career as the Legation Counsellor at the Slovak Legation in Rome. After a short apprenticeship in Rome he assumed (in 1942) the position of Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Bern, where he stayed till the end of World War II. On the soil of neutral Switzerland he did his utmost to safeguard Slovak interests in the realm of international politics. Through personal contacts -both official and unofficial-and by all means available 88 SLOVAKIA to him he defended Slovakia's case for independence in the post-war territorial rearrangement of Central Europe. But the enemies of Slovak independence had at their side the victorious Western Powers and the Soviet Union and again it was the case of the "might-is-right" solution. With total disregard for the wishes of the small indigenous peoples it was decided to reimpose the discredited Versailles settlement on the nations of Central Europe. The Slovaks found themselves in an unwilling partnership with the Czechs in the reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia. As a result Dr. J. Kirschbaum like thousands of his countrymen stood face to face with the bitter reality of life in exile. The first years of his life as a political exile he spent in Switzerland where he worked for a short period ( 19461948) as an accredited representative of the Slovak League to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva. He was in continuous contact with the Slovak political leaders in exile and with Slovak organizations in America and elsewhere. It was obvious to them that the struggle for the restoration of Slovak independence must start there and then, no matter how hopeless the situation might look. To assure the maximum effectiveness of this struggle an organized and coordinated action was required. Thus in the summer of 1948 the foundations were laid for a Slovak political representation-The Slovak National Council A· broad-which took upon itself to carry on the struggle for the just and inalienable demands of the Slovak nation. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum was one of the principal architects of this organization. It included such well-known personalities as Sidor, Pridavok, Culen, Mondok, Cieker, Pauco, Mikus, etc., but-most regretably-not Dr. F. !>urcansky. Dr. J. Kirschbaum stood at the head of the Committee in charge of foreign affairs. For this task he was indeed suitably prepared and equipped. He had the background of diplomatic experience and a deep and intimate knowledge of Slovak politics. His knowledge of the Western world was based on close observations and supplemented by his studies at several Western universities: Paris (Political Science, 1938), Rome (Political Science, 1941-42), Geneva (International Relations, 1946-48) and Montreal (1951-54). SLOVAKIA 89 In 1949 he emigrated with his family (he married Magdalena Danihel in 1941 and by this time they had three children) to Montreal in Canada. In spite of the difficulties which are the lot of every immigrant in a new country he quickly settled down and resumed his work where he had left off in Europe, including his university studies. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. and in 1954 a Ph.D. degree at the Universite de Montreal. But even at this time his involvement in university activities went far deeper than a simple studentship. In 1951 he started to give a course of lectures at the Universite de Montreal and later at the Universite d'Ottawa and the University of Toronto. His lectures dealt with the broad spectrum of the history of the Western Slavs ('Slavia Occidentalis') and also with specific Slovak topics. As time went by he became even more deeply concerned with Slovak emigre politics. After 1950 the centre of Slovak p olitical activities shifted from Europe across the Atlantic and Montreal became their focal point. Here resided K . Sidor, K. culen, F. Tiso, F. Mondok, K. Murin and J . Kirschbaum who in 1952 was elected the chairman of the Political Committee of the Slovak National Council Abroad. One worrying feature of the Slovak political life in exile was its bifurcation into two organizations struggling for the same aims but in bitter rivalry against each other. For a man like Dr. J. Kirschbaum it was a particularly heart-breaking experience since the rival organization was led by his former chief and friend, Dr. F. !>urcansky. I t took many years of patience and endurance to heal this split. Major credit for this achievement should go to Dr. J. Kirschbaum. It was largely through his effort that in 1960 the Slovak community both at home and abroad learned with satisfaction about the formation of a joint organization-The Slovak Liberation Council. Dr. !>urcansky became the President of the Council's E xecutive Committee and Dr. J . Kirschbaum became the President of its Assembly. On purpose I have not said anything about the journalistic and literary activities of Dr. J . Kirschbaum. They would form an extensive chapter all by themselves and one cannot do them justice within the framework of this 90 SLOVAKIA brief biographical sketch. I only wish to remind the reader that on top of all the accomplishments recorded in the preceding paragraphs he should superimpose an impressive literary and journalistic output. This activity began when Dr. J. Kirschbaum was 14 years old and it is still continuing. In the period of the past 45 years Dr. Kirschbaum wrote (by a modest estimate) something like 1200 articles on a wide variety of topics (political commentaries, editorials. literary criticism and history, Slavic studies, linguistics. political science) in five languages (Slovak, French, English, German, Spanish) as well as four scholarly books, two of them in English ('Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe', 1960, and 'Slovaks in Canada', 1967). In the last few years Dr. Kirschbaum has expended much of his time and energy in organizing and promoting the work of the Slovak World Congress. This relatively new body (founded in 1970) embraces all Slovak political, cultural, fraternal and other organizations and societies to speak on their behalf for the Slovak cause in the free world. Dr. J. Kirschbaum is one of the Vice Presidents of the Slovak World Congress and at the moment is putting the finishing editorial touches to a Symposium on Slovak history and culture. The book will contain the lectures and discussions which were delivered at the special conference successfully arranged by Dr. Kirschbaum to coincide with the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress in Toronto (June 1971). Karl Marx who knew vastly more about life in exile than he knew about world revolution once wrote that emigre life is "a school of scandal and of meanness". Dr. Kirschbaum would probably agree with him. More than once he became an innocent victim of vicious attacks, intrigues and malicious gossip from the enemies of Slovak independence (who wanted to eliminate him from Slovak politics for obvious reasons) as well as from jealous and frustrated compatriots (who had no obvious reasons at all). But all this "sound and fury"-unpleasant and distractful as it must have been-did not sway Dr. Kirschbaum from his firm determination to work selflessly and untiringly for the just Slovak cause. Which only confirms my personal conviction about life in exile, namely that 91 SLOVAKIA exile brings out the best in a noble and purposeful man and the worst in those who are weak and insecure. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum can look back on his past years, and in particular the years in exile, with contentment and satisfaction. We who watched his efforts and striving at a close distance and followed them with good wishes and admiration, we know he tried his utmost and did his best. His achievements when measured against a background of harrowing and unfavorable circumstances will irritate his detractors but will inspire many of his countrymen both at home and abroad, at present and in the future. AD MULTOS ANNOS! F. V n u k, Australia • • • SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA - - - supports freedom and independence of Slovakia; promotes a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation, its history, culture, traditions, and desires; makes America better known to Slovakia and Slovakia better known to America in the interest of world peace, freedom and security; has a scholarship program for college and university students; promotes cooperation among all American-Slovak organizations and publications for the promulgations of Slovak ethnic heritage. is a charter member of the Slovak World Congress. Life membership: $100.00 For further information, write to: Slovak League of America 313 Ridge Avenue Middletown, Pa. 17057  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum: A biographical sketch on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday Description An account of the resource F. Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 82-91 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cd17d0344bde42a0a0e78c075006252.pdf 1bc6bb2984939dcd15a5a6d7a8eae570 PDF Text Text 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) . � 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Lettrich in Retrospect Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 p. 64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6036a6cfc57a8c6328882ea4fd8d79a3.pdf a232be884f6cf20bd4c5ec3d07a2e82a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar �46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar �46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 45-46 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7b2aec6cfb355c412f5c2249098659fc.pdf 5b181452e9a4fd694829f643e849b9c1 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Pub I ished VOL. V II quart erly by the Slovak League SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER, 195 7 of America NO. 3-4(24-25) DR. JOSEPH TISO AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN SLOVAKIA MILAN S. DURI CA The fact that, during the period when Dr. Joseph Tiso was at the head of the Slova)k Republic as its president, there ,w ere "liqttidated" in an inhumane manner, in Nazi concentration camps, per.haps also severa1 tens of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, has tempted many authors either to hold Dr. Tiso directly responsible for these crimes, or at -least to consider this point as t,h e real weaJkness of Tiso's policy and his defense< 1 >. We are convinced that the so1ution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia is a very complicated proiblem and, therefore, it is necessary to gather in an objective study all existing documents so that the _true state of affairs might become known (2) . While awaiting the results of such a study, we are attempting here to focalize some of the actualities which already h ave been documented - facts which can put some light on definite, shadowy sides of this problem and also note in what direction it is necessary to move in making a further study so that we might arrive at an objective statement of the facts that had taken iplace and thus also at a correct moral evaluation of them. J EW RY IN S LOVAK IA Already in the past century, native and foreign observers were stunned by the great influx of Jews to Hungary and especially to the part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks from time immemorial. While Caplovic noted 6,850 J ews in the Trencin area h efore 1829, according to. the census of 1869 there already were 13,365 of them among 237,702 SlavaJks. Sveto,z ar Hurban, writing in 1881, said: A hundred years ago, there were 75,098 Jews in Hun- �2 SLOVAKJA gary; 55 years later there were already 241,632 of them (the increase burdened Slovakia mostly); in 1'870 they numbered 552,133 and now there are more than 600,000 of them in Hungary!" (Slovenske Pohl'ady, 1881, p. 291). The Czech writer Rudolph Pokorny, who reproduces these figures from direct eX:perience, describes the methods of Jewish immigrants in SlovaJkia as parasitical and exploitative (3). It would be very interesting to study in detaril the relations between the influx of Jews to Slovakia by the strengthening of their economic position and the economic decline orf the Slovak in1halbitants which resulted in an increasing exodus of Slovaks into foreign lands especially to the United States. According to our impressions from Hterature already reviewed, such a study would most li!kely lead to the conclusion that the exodus of the Sl()IVaks was in part caused by the great influx of Jews into rSl()IVaJkia. The strengthened economic positions of t:he Jews in Slovakia gave them the opportunity to exert stronger politicai influence and to propagate their ideology. A Polish observer A:gaton GiHer, ,w riting in 1876, described how the Jews in Slovalkia systematically worked against the Catholic Church and against Christianity in general( 4) under the aegis of the liberalism that was preached lby t:he Hungarian government ,o f the same Colman Tisza who, at the same time (1875) , denied the fact that the Slovak nation existed.(5). Jif we bear in mind the eX:tent and the constant increase of these mentioned effects of the Jewish minority in Slovak,ia, we shall more readily understand the spontaneous psychological reaction of the intelligentsia and the broad masses of the SloviaJk people. This reaction expressed itself, first of aill, in response to the tolerant nature of the SlovaJks and the fact that they laciked means of -power, in a blood-perspir~ng effort to save their own economic situation, ( with dollars made in American mines, the Slovak peasant tried to secure his livelihood in his native 'land) , then in t:he effort to emancipate themselves from dependence on the Jews in commerce to provide the daily necessities of life (by establishnig self-help cooperatives), amd also by an intensive building of institutions to preserve �SLOVAKIA 3 and •f .urther their original national culture both in a general and also in a specifically Christian sense (it suffices to mention the -Matica .Slovenska •a nd the Society of St. Adalbert). The situation did not change substantially even after the c,r eation oif the Czecho-Slova:k Republic in 1918(6). In 1923, a !French observer wa'S amazed \by the dis:proportion., ate preponderance of Jewish students in the universities and trade schools(7) and he foresaw that the Jews would thus soon capture the best positions in the new State(8). This prediction was if'll'lfilled, especiaUy a'S far as Slovakia was concerned. After the Vienna Arbitration, when the Jews constituted only 3.3'5 % of the population in S1ov,alkia(9), they owned almost one-half of the entire nation.a{ wealth(l0) and occupied most of the econ.omicaHy and civically important pwbl:i!c functionsO1). That this fact influenced the daily press and cultural production in general is evidence which needs no special proof(J2). It was only natural that the Slovak with all his legendary peace-loving characteristics, lbore the situation with difficulty; and the :Slovalk demands for autonomy, whicih characterized Slovak activities in the twenties and thirties of thi:s century, were accompanied by demands for a solution of the Jewish !problem. The current of anti-Semitism, which had overtalken many countries on the initiative of German Nazism, even such countries in whi·c h objectively suppositions fo'!" anti-Jew,i sh feeling were really insignificant if not directly fictitious, definitely did 1ha;ve some inf1uence even in 'Slova;kia(13). But who could stop Hitler at that time? It is not the fau~t •o f the Slovalks that many arguments of anti-Jewish :propaganda, originating outside of Slovalkia but ascribed to ,Slovakia, found at iJeast partial su!bstantiation in fact. THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Tiso took over the government of Sl01Vakia under the most difficult circumstances. His first worry was to preserve order and to prevent arbitray acts of usurpers even in the so,l ution of the Jewish .problem<14). Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, whose public opinion 1 �SLOVAKIA already for a longer time impatiently demanded radical regulations with regard to the privileged Czec,h and Jewish minority in Slovarkia(15), Dr. Tiso sought a legal solution of the matter already in federated Czecho-Slovakia(l6), as well as after March 14, 1919, in the Slova;k Republic. For an objectively moral evaluation of Tiso's conduct in the solution of the Jewish problem in .Slovakia, is is necessary to clearly distinguish ,various time periods, during which the legal and practical possibilities of Dr. Tiso to decide this question personally changed substantially. 1. From October 6, 1938, to October 26, 1939: Dr. Joseph Tiso, as Prime Mini:ster of the Slo,vaJk Go,vernment, had broad ;possiibilities oif legislative and executive intrative and, therefore, also dir,e ct, personal responsibility in this regard(17 ). 2. From October 26, 1939, to July 28, 1940: As President of the Slova:k Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso could intervene in the legislative acti,viby of the Assembly and influence the executive power reserived to the government, which was responsible to the Assembly and not to the President, only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the S'lovaJk Republic(18) . During this ,p eriod, we cannot regard Dr. Tiso directly res,ponsible for the various initiatives in the solution of the Jewis'h problem, but only for the acts of his office as prescrilbed by the Constitution: whether and how he used the rights of intervention., ·a s defined 'by the Constitution, in regard to legislative and exec,utirve acts which required his appm,val. For the latter, as head of the State, Dr. Tiso carries the responsibility, dividing it with the respective Constitutional organs. 3. From July 28, 1940, to August 30, 1944: at the Salziburg meeting with Germany's intervention in the internal affairs of 'Slova'kia(19) - Dr. Tiso lost a definite part of the effective possibilities to exercise his Constitutional rights in regard to persons who were forced by Hitler into the Slovaik Government, especially with regard to expressed demands of the Germans upon the Slova;k Government(20). Such was the problem of e~pelling or liquidating the Jew:? <21) . In this period we can hold Tiso as responsible, as in the previous period, only in proportion 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 to the effective possibilities of free action which remained open to him after !Hitler's intervention at Salzburg. 4. From August 30, 1944, to April 5, 1945: Slovakia was to a great extent a battleground, where actual governmental power was exercised by various fighting units, most of the time completely independent of civil governmental organs, nay even expressly in opposition to them. (22). Here the responsibility of Dr. Tiso is limited to those acts, which - aliWays within the extent of this Constitutional rights and duties - took ·p lace on the territory and at ra time when the Government of the SlovaJk Republic still go;verned there and had effective 1possibility to exercise its power. TISO'S SOLUTION Despite the critical political - internal and international - situation and the revolutionary events of October, 1938, and of March, 1939, with his resolute influence, Dr. Joseph Tiso checked all violent intervention of incited masses of ,people in the solution of the Jewish problem (23) and consistently in;volked a legal courne to- solve this problem. Such a course, while it secured for the Slovaks time for the necessary study of the various aspects of the complicated situation and for a democratic negotation .o f various motions, with regard to the Jews themselves, it eliminated the typically Nazi factor of surprise(2-!), giving them time and opportunity to prepare themselves psychologically and to make necessary provisions, including financial(25) in the face of the new situation. After such a preliminary preparation, the first Slo;vruk governmental regulation was issued April 30, 1939, with the force of law, the object of which was to solve the Jewish pro1blem (26). This regulation defined the concept of a confessional and civic viewpoint, without considering racial motives at all. Its aim was to reduce the disproportionate preponderance of Jews in the economic life of Slovakia. The Jews could continue to manage their enterprises if they allowed a 51 % per cent ,participation of Slovaks the 51 % not being confiscated, but lbought in a regular manner by Slovak participants (shareholders). The participation of Jews in the legal, medical, and other important �6 SLOVAKIA and profitable professions was to be regulated gradually in proportion to the total number of the Jewish minority. Besides this, the Slovak Government of Dr. Joseph Tiso supported. the voluntary emigration of Jews to Palestine in all possible ways< 27) . If we consider all the facts of the matter objecttvely, we must admit that in these regulations there really was nothing w'hich, under the given circumstances, would exceed the normal competency of a legislator that did not emanate from the natural law itself, or that would be opposed to the principles of justice and humanity(28). The first 'S lovak resolution of the J ewish question - and tihe only one which, in the full sense, we can call Tiso's solution - contained and realized the attributes proposed by Tiso when he ,proclaimed. that "t'he Jewish question in Slovakia shall be solved justly, socially, and humanly"( 29) . THE SLOVAK "JEWISH LAW" These :provisions clearly, but not altogether effectively because they left wide possibilities to evade the law(30), proved to be insufficient in attaining their aim. 'Dherefore, but probably also under German pressure(31), the Slovak Parliament prepared. a new so-catled "Jewish Law," which was approved on iFeb11uary 29, 1940(32). Fundamentally, this law differed little from the previous provision; it defined more accurately many details and fixed the principle of participation o.f the Jews in economic, civic, and cultural life in proportion to their number of the tdtal population, that is, 4 percent(33) . The confessional and civic principle remained in force, therefore not that of racial discrimination; so did the principle of selling 51 % of the shares of Jewish ente11prises to companion SloJVaks freely chosen lby them. This .principle of "Aryani:zation" Dr. Tiso defended consistently, even by using his constitutional authority as President(34) . GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE "JEWISH CODE" It aippears t'hat even these new legal dispositions were not sufficient in practice to attain the goal. Several loopholes were left open for escape from the consequences of �SLOVAKIA 7 the [aw - and those affected naturally did not hesitate to use them in every way(35) - so t:Jhat the more radical circles in Slovakia expressed their dissatisfaction with such a solution. However, it was chiefly in Germany that the Slovak solution of the Jewish question was bitterly criticized as being basiically in conflict with the German Jewish !aws(36). It was this consistent originality and independence of Dr. Tiso and his government in regard to the so1ution of the Jewish question that was one of the reasons for intervention o,f Adol'ph Hitler in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic at SalzJburg on July 28, 1940(37). There Dr. Tiso was forced to drop Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, who collorborated with him in the independent solution of the Jewish question. Dr. Vojtech T,uik,a, who was ,g reatly influenced by the Germans, was forced on tJhe Slova,k Government as Minister of Fo·r eign Affairs against the will of President Tiso(38), as was journalist Alexander Mach, who became the executor of German dictates especially in the Jewish question as Minister of the Interior(39) . For Dr. Joseph Tiso, Salzburg meant personally such a blow that he was determined to, tender his resignation( 40). It was only at the insistence of moderate SloivaJk ciroles, nay, even the Jews themselves, that he remained at his post to use his authority to check the radical group which was under the influence of the Germans(41). Tiso's position after SalaJbur,g, therefore, became substantially a defensi'Ve one: not only did he lose in notable measure the possibility of concrete intiative in regard to the Jewish question, but also his constitutional authority of intervention was ,partially reduced by t:Jhe facts of this new political situation. Thus it happened that on September 10, Prime Minister Tuika could force the parliament to pass an enabling law for the solution of the Jewish question by the government. This "emandpated" ,goivernment of Dr. T,uka issued in the form of a goivernment regulation - without the signature of the President of the Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - the so-called "Jewish Code"< 42 >, Wihich copied the Ger~ man Nuremberg Laiw. Apparently the Germans were de- �8 SLOVAKIA termined to impose Hitler's order in SlovaJkia - the same imperial imposition of Hitler's Germaniy to which all the governments of states in the German sphere of influence had succumbed. In comparison with the Jewish laws of Germany and the other States (iltaly, France, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Holland, Denmark, Norway - and even annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the General Governorship of Poland), the "Jewish Code" of S1ovakia contained two lucid points which were hers exclusive ly: the first reserved to the Preside nt of the Repulblic the right of direct administrational "exception" of anyone from the power of this law <43), while the second confirmed the validity of all exce ptions alre ady granted according to the aforementioned Slovak law(44 ). These two paragraphs, leaving tJhe head of the State an open possibility to protect in the face of an avalanche of force which evidently it was impossible to oppose, were the motive why Dr. Joseiph Tiso finally decided not to resign his office after the .promulgation of the "Jewish Code"< 45 ). PRESIDENT TISO'S STAND The question was a real "ca:sus conscientiae," which today ,w e can reconstruct in its main outlines. Dr. Tiso was opposed to any violent solution of the Jewish question; he was ready to .p rotest against it by resigning his office. The following realities, however , came into ,c onsideration: if Tiso did resign, it was c ertain that Tu.ka would be put into his office - and it was generally !known that Tu!ka was strongly under German influences. I,f this would have happened, not only all the Jews of SlovaJkia would ha'Ve been completely subject to German inte:vventions, but even government power of all Slovakia would practically have passed ()IVer completely into German hands and this w·o uld have had catastrophic consequences for the entire nation. Let it suffice here to mention the forced participation in the war and the system of National 1Socialism promoted b.y Dr. Tutka. Under such circumstances, the resignation o;f Dr. Tiso would have meant deserting from a position of responsi- �SLOVAKIA 9 bility, disappointing the h0ipes of all the people who sa,w in him the salvation of the nation in a critical world situation and a ,g uarantee aigainst the 'Very actual ideological danger of Nazi,sm(46). By retaining t:Jhe funcUon o.f the President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso had a hoipe not only of continuing the defensive policy of Slova!kia a,gainst Nazism, but a:lso to sarve, if not all, at least as many as possible Jews of Slovakia who were persecuted by Nazism. Were these ihoipes however, sUJbstantiated? The answer to this question is very impo,r tant for the moral qualification of the stand of Dr. Joseph Tiso and thereby of his entire relationship to the proiblem orf the Jews in SlovaJkia. It is not difficult to answer the first part of the question: It has been proved that by remaining President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso not only sruved the SlovaJk nation from threatened occupation and division, from the flood of Nazi ideolo,gy, from most of the economic and social consequences of the world rwar, but, despite the exceptional circumstances, he also organized Slovakia legally, culturally and economically as an independent State and thereby demonstrated t:Jhat Sloiva,kia had all the ;prerequisites orf developmernt as an independent State. Under his guidance Slovalk ia attained "brilliant results and the elan of autonomous life was reaHy wonderful"< 47). So that we could answer the second part of the question, we must objecti'Ve1y examine the cause of Jewish provisions and their exeoution in Slovakia in the third and fourth periods (1941-1945). After the promulgation of the "Jewish Code," the Jews were supposed to be transferred from Slovakia to the territory between the Visla and t:Jhe Bug in former Poland, where there was to be found some kind of state creation reserved for them. Here it is necessary to, note that the project of a separate territory for European Jews presented a solution which was seriously studied not only in Ckrmany( 48), but ,a iso iby other powers, such as, for example, the United States (4 9). To:l. order to ascertain the situation the SlovaJk Gov•e rnment sent to Poland a representatiive of the Ministry of the Interior, Isidore Koso, to whom they 1, 1 �10 SLOVAKIA actually did show the Jewish city of Sosnowitz, Oppel, with its own administration, police, etc. Well, even .after this the SlovaJk Government did not begin to transfer Jews, but arranged labor camps for them in Slovakia, where they were to be gradually concentrated. This course, which Reitlinger explains as motivated by economy(50), is apparently 1b etter ex.plained as a reaction of the Slovak Government to the Memorandum of the Slovak Catholic Bishops of October 7, 1941(51), and to the reminders of the Holy See of Novemfber 12, 1941 (52). In both these doouments ecclesiastical representatives protested against the racist principle which inspired governmentrul regulation No. 198--1941 of the Slova!k Code, especiaUy however rugainst those ,p oints which were out of line with the teachings of the Church (outlawing mixed marriages, ex:pulsion from schools) and called upon the SlovaJk G()IVernment to recall or at least change the mentioned regulations in this seinse. The Holy See, wihich was for apparent reasons generally regarded as "the best informed political center of the world"(53 ), at the same time manifested its understanding for the situation of the ,Slov,a;k Government when it concluded its note with these words,: "The Holy See hopes that the Slovak Government, as long as the government regulations are not repealed or amended, will try to ex;plain and to validate the issued regulations in suoh a measUTe and in such a manner so that they mig1ht become as far as is possible least harmful to the needs (demands) of Catholic conscience"(54). These words appear to be the norm and therefore the explanation of the course not only of Dr. Tiso, but also that of the :SloIVaJk gOIVemment followed in practice until the end of their activities. Thus it was that despite the Nuremberg t01J1e of the "Jewish Code," the f,unda:mental :points of that code were not practically applied until March 10, 1942. Thus far it has not been conclusively ascertained, whether under German pressure or not(5,5), Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach issued the decree on March 7, 1942, which confined all the Jews of Slovakia to their homes until their transfer to the East(5&) . This provision, which was soon followed by the first transports of Jews from Slo- �SLOVAKIA 11 vakia to Galicia (March 10, 1942), inspired a strong opposition of public opinion, new protests of ecclesiastical circles (.57), nay, even dissent of the rest of the members of the government.(5<8). But it has been safely ascertained that Germany did pressure the Slovak Government to adopt the solution of the Jewish question in the form of transferring the Jews which had been accepted by the other States (Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Hungary). To this end Heydrich himself came to Bratislava on April 10, 1942, to tell Tuka that the Jews of Slovakia would be transferred to the Lublin area where they would be settled permanently. Separate settlements were to be arranged for baptized Jews (59). After repeated insistence and assurances from the German side that Jewish families would be respected and that they would be dealt with decently(·60), the Slovak Government began to send to the East the members of the families of those young, able-to-work Jews who had been transported the previous month. In this second intervention of the Slovak Government, it is possible to see an effort to correct in some way the mistake of the first transfer by which many Jewish families were broken up. It became tragic that the promises of Heydrich and Eichmann were the treacherous trap which was not without effect(&l). At that time the Slovak Government could not know about the real intentions of the Nazis: Wisliceny himself found this out, as we shall see, only several months later. Nevertheless Dr. Tuka insisted that he might send an inspection mission to ascertain on the spot just how the transferred Jews were being dealt with. The Slovak Government presented this demand also formally in the form of a note addressed to the German Government(,62) - but received only an evasive reply. It was this, most likely, that roused suspicions on the Slovak side. Therefore already on May 15, 1942, the Slovak parliament approved a constitutional law by which it practically repealed the power given the government in September, 1941, and legally set the course for the problem of emigration. The substance of this law was, however, the practical cessation of deportations; the law, that is, sanctioned all the previously granted presidential and minis- �12 SLOVAKIA terial "exceptions" and established a new general exception for Jews baptized before March 14, 1939(63) . Furthermore, it established that Jews, affected by the law, would be concentrated in labor camps in Slovakia. In July, 1942, when the representative of the Holy See in Bratislava notified President Tiso that the Jews in the Lublin area were being murdered, Dr. Tiso with absolute determination insisted on the realization of a Slovak inspection mission - or else there would be no further transfer of Jews from Slovakia. In August, Wisliceny went to Berlin with the matter. There Eichmann told him that Tiso was asking an impossible thing because those Jews were no longer alive. Thereupon he showed him a secret order, issued by the will of Hitler and signed by Himmler, according to which the entire Jewish race was to be gradually destroyed(64). Wisliceny returned to Bratislava again with an evasive reply. After this deportations from Slovakia were completely stopped. From what has been said it is quite clear that the Slovak Government allowed the transfer of a part of the Jews from Slovakia under the imperialistic pressure of Germany - in the face of guarantees to respect basic human rights and humanitarian treatment. As soon as there arose a reason to doubt that the Nazis were fulfilling the guarantees given, the parliament of the Slovak Republic with the strength of a constitutional law stood up to protect the Jewish citizens of Slovakia. The fact that it is necessary to explain the law of May 15, 1942, in this maner, is also supported by the following realities : 1. The motive for voting this law was the merciless exportation of the Jews on the basis of the decree of Minister Mach of March 7, 1942 (65). 2. By this law, constitutionally, were sanctioned all the exceptions granted by the President of the Republic and the resort Ministers ; also a new general exception was established by which a confessional criterion was given priority - which the Germans sharply criticized already in 1940 as opposed to the racist principles of Nuremberg. 3. The real aim of concentrating the Jews, who did not have the mentioned exceptions, in Slovak labor camps was �SLOVAKIA 13 to save them from possible transfer elsewhere on the initiative of radical circles around Minister Mach behind which stood the power of Germany. This was evident from the way these camps were set up - the living conditions of which were but little different from complete freedom(66). 4. Despite repeated insistence from the side of the Germans, nay, even despite the intervention of Hitler himself with President Tiso(67), Slovakia did not retreat from her position and protected the Jews with all means of political tactics(68) and her own State power. 5. After September 1, 1944, when Slovakia became a battlefield and governmental power was factually exercised by the fighting armies, despite German occupation of practically the whole of Slovakia, the new Minister of National Defense and State Security of the Slovak Republic, Stephen Hrussik, ordered the abolishment of all concentration camps and of all anti-Jewish administrational regulations(69). 6. When German army commanders defied the above order and by force transported to Germany all Jews that fell into their hands during military operations, the new Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Stephen Tiso, energetically protested to the German Government(70). 7. Later, when the commander of the occupation army and "the only representative of the Reich in Slovakia"(71), SS-General Berger forced the Slovak Government regulation in regard to concentrating the Jews (Nov. 16, 1944), the provision had practically no effect because the Slovak Government and Slovak officials silently agreed that the Jews be free to hide themselves(72). From the given facts it is quite clear that despite some drastic interventions of the Nazis and their several Slovak collaborators in the spring of 1942, for which they gained partial accord of the Slovak Government by cunning, the great part of the Jewish minority could remain in Slovakia and there be effectively protected to such an extent that the Slovak Republic in certain periods was regarded as a relative asylum even for the Jews from other countries, especially those from Poland and Hungary(73). The stand of the Slovak Republic in regard to the "definite solution" (Endlosung) of the Jewish question, pres- �14 SLOVAKIA sured by the Nazis, immediately from the first moments of suspicion about the real aim of these " regulations," was unanimously and consistently so rejective that it really presents "the story of the first outright failure of the 'Final Solution' and a failure at a time when there was no glimmer of hope for Jewry in Axis-controlled Europe" (74). The fact that the small Slovak State, even though it could not prevent all violence, knew how to stand up against it - and with such a determination that an objective historian can today talk about "a challenge to war" and about "a revolt" of the Slovak Government(75) - proves t hat t he Slovak Government even in this r egard not only did not accept without reservations the principles of Hitler's National Socialism, but even knew how to defend itself against them, nay, even to repudiate them forcefully, as long as it was not completely overpowered by the brutal preponderance of military occupation and frontal operations. This important fact has thus far not been properly evaluated in world literature which concerns itself with this historical period. If we pause now in our search for the reasons of the described facts, we shall come to the conclusion that one of the most decisive factors in the course of events in Slovakia was the personality of President Dr. Joseph Tiso. To this conclusion we are led by the following facts: 1. While Dr. Joseph Tiso held the initiative of solving the Jewish question in Slovakia( we saw that he solved it in a sense of strict justice, in a legal way, and in a most human manner. 2. As President of the Republic he used his constitutional right in order that the laws proposed by the parliament remained within the confines of the same principles which were in opposition to the Nazi anti-Jewish laws( 7,6). 3. When he could not prevent the issuance of the "Jewish Codex," he reserved the right for himself to limit its effectiveness as much as possible by personal "exceptions." That this was the intent of the mentioned paragraph 225 is confirmed by the fact ascertained by the court that Dr. Joseph Tiso used his authority as a matter of principle for every case placed before him, by which in a short time he �SLOVAKIA 15 liberated a great part of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia from the "Jewish Codex"(77). 4. It was generally known that the initiative of proGerman politics was held by the ministers forced on Tiso (Dr. Tuka and A. Mach) - and that there were basic conflicts between them and President Tiso. If, therefore, the Slovak parliament could pass the constitutional law of May 15, 1942 - which was in fact aimed against German Nazis and the executors of their influence in Slovakia this is understandable only if we allow that it did so not only within the support of the authority of the President of the Republic and the chairman of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, but, as it has been safely ascertained: directly on his initiative (78) . 5. Finally, only such a consistently anti-Nazi stand of President Tiso in regard to the Jewish question can explain the fact that, even despite the regulations of the government and the Minister of the Interior, some of the regional representatives of state power could during that entire time take positions of open protection of the Jewish inhabitants, nay, even actually intervene in the initiative of government trustees in the Jewish question on territory administered by them( 79) . CONCLUSION As we emphasized at the outset, in this study we were interested in focalizing some of the facts that are important and pertinent for a correct evaluation of the relationship of Dr. Joseph Tiso to the Jewish problem in Slovakia. Intentionally we have not touched upon some undoubtedly interesting and relatively important aspects of this complicated problem which require a separate study (e.g., the question of statistical data, the question of the legal and moral side of the individual regulations and respective responsibilities, etc.) . This study, we believe, does prove that we cannot honestly regard Dr. Joseph Tiso as a persecutor of the Jews or as a collaborator of the Nazis in their inhuman work of genocide of the Jewish nation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that the President of the Slovak Republic did prove himself an eminent opponent of every injustice against the Jews, whether perpetrated by �16 SLOVAKIA the German Nazis or by others in their service. Dr. Tiso did everything in his power to save them - and we say, without fear of contradiction, that he did for the Jews what no other statesman dared to do in the Europe controlled by Hitler at that time. If, despite this, a part of the Jews of Slovakia was taken out of Slovakia by violent intervention of brute force, it is certain that this happened without any direct participation of Dr. Joseph Tiso - nay, against his will - and, hence, we cannot hold him responsible for it. Dr. Tiso found himself face to face with a current "which it was possible to impede and probably even to influence, but not stop," as he himself had said during his trial in Bratislava <SO) . There is no evidence to prove that Dr. Tiso aided or abetted, motivated or approved in any way, the brutal treatment of Jews in Slovakia or anywhere else. To lie in the face of death is not easy. So much the less can we allow that Dr. Joseph Tiso could do so - the same Dr. Tiso who could proclaim before the entire nation that never in his life did he utter an untruth intentionally. And he did not fear that someone might be able to prove the opposite. Would that the world were managed by politicians and statesmen who would follow the noble example of the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso! REFERENCES: 1. The first opm10n is practically current in encyclopedic and scientific literature; some Slovak authors are inclined to the second; e.g., Th. J. Zubek ("Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality" - The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Nov. 1955, p. 125). 2. Dr. Joseph Pauco: Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Passaic, N. J ., 1952; pp. 323-323. 3. R. Pokorny: Z potulek po Slovensku, Prague, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 56-. 4. It was not by accident that the German translation of Rabbi Benjamin Halvey's Hebrew pasquinade "Das leben Jesu. Zurn ersten Male historisch bearbeitet nach neuentdeckten jiidisch orientalischen Quellen" was published in Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1875. According to the translator, who personally offered it to Giller in Trencianske Teplice, it surpassed by far the dilettante attempts of Strauss, Voltaire and other blasphemous pseudo-historians. See A. Giller - Z podrozy po kraju slowackim" - Lw6w, -876; pp. 197-. 5. Th. G. Locher: Die nationale Differenzeirung und lntegrie• rung der Slowaken und Tschechen in ihren geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 - Haarlem, 1931; p. 196. 6. J. A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe - Paris, 1955; p. 133. 7. While Hungary, for example, had a "numerus clausus" estab- �SLOVAKIA 17 lished by law, in Czecho-Slova kia, where the number of J ews was estimated at 3--4 percent of the population, the secondary schools became practically the exclusive domain of the Jews. In Prague itself over half the students were Jewish; the State Gymnazium for girls bad 163 Jewish pupils out of a total of 248; in several gymnaziums for boys the relationship of Jews to non-Jews was: 116 out of 254; 123 out of 250; 185 out of 240. At the university for every three nonJewish professors there was one Jewish professor. See: J. Boubee Tcheco-Slova quie - in "ETUDES," Paris, Vol. 60, No. 174, 1923; pp. 225-. 8. Ibidem. 9. G. Reitlinger: The Final Solution - London, 1953; p. 386. 10. The value of Jewish properties was evaluated at 3,150 million Slovak Crowns; besides this, the Jews controlled over 12,000 industrial enterprises with a capital of 1,250 million Slovak Crowns, especially the textile industry where they controlled 90 percent oi the production. The situation was much the same in the wood and alcohol industries. See the article "La Slovacchia e gli Ebrei" in the periodical RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milan, Vol. 8, No. 34, 1942; p , 902. 11. Ibidem: 72 percent of the lawyers and 64 percent of the medics were Jews, while 58 percent of all restaurant and liquor concessions was in their hands. 12. See the statement, e.g., of P . R. Mikus in the SLOVAK, Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 34, February 10, 1939; p. 1. 13. Here we do not have in mind only States, such as Italy, for example, which did adopt various anti-Jewish regulations. Count Ciano noted that on January 13, 1939, in a conversation with Mussolini, Chamberlain expressed grave fears that "further immigration of Jews into England would incite anti-Semitism which is already being planned in many sectors of the country." Besides the Jewish minority in England was negligible: according to Chamberlain , 60,000 (Mussolini stated that it was over 200,000) - G. Ciano, "Diario, 1939-1940," Milan, 1946; p. 22. - In regard to the anti-Jewish mood in other States, see "Les archives secre de la Wilhelmstras se" - Vol V, Book II, Paris, 1954, Documents Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-. 14. Dr. Tiso stressed this in general in his first speech after taking over government in Slovakia, Oct. 8, 1938 (K. Culen: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava," Middletown, Pa., 1948; p. 215). Later, on March 15, 1939, in a broadcast he warned all who would be guilty of such acts and threatened that the government would prosecute all culprits ("SLOVAK" - Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 63, 1939; p . 4). 15. "SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1939. 16. "SLOVAK" - Vol XXI, No. 28, Feb. 3, 1939; p. 3. Compare also the government declaration of Feb. 22, 1939 ("SLOVAK," Vol. XXI, Nos. 44-45, Feb. 22-23, 1939). 17. Speech of Dr. Tiso at the Eighth Convention of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at Trencin, Oct. 1, 1939 ("SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 227, Oct. 3, 1939; pp. 3-4). 18. An analysis of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic by H. Schimani: "Die Verfassun~ der Slowakischen Republik" - Vienna, 1947. 19. Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov - Vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1954; p. 196. 20. Dr. J. Pauco: op. cit., p. 55. �18 SLOVAKIA Dr. F. Durcansky: op. cit., p. 237. J. A. Mikus: op. cit., pp. 185-; F. Durcansky: op. cit.; pp. 475: In an official pronouncement, Feb. 21, 1939, Tiso declared: "It is proof of the maturity of our nation that despite all incitements the Slovak nation waited for the legal solution of the Jewish question" (stenographic report of the second meeting of the Slovak Assembly, Bratislava, Feb. 21-23, 1939, p. 9). 24. That this was the expressed intention of Dr. Tiso is attested to by his statement to the correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, J. Frankel, Feb. 8, 1939: "The coming Jewish law will certainly serve the purpose that the Jews might not be caught by surprises and would know just how far they will be able to go in economic life" (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). 25. Memorandum of the British Consul in Bratislava, Mr. P. Pares, Feb. 3, 1939, in the "DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939" - Third Series, Vol. IV, No. 97, 1951, London; p. 96. 26. No. 63-39 SLOVAK CODE; No. 102-39 Ur. nov. (Official News). 27. It approved the transfer and emigration plan of Dr. S. E. Soskin (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). Innsbruck28. Compare, e.g., J. Messner: Das Naturrecht Vienna, 1950, pp. 365-366 - and: P. Pavan: l.'.uomo nella communita internazionale - Rome, s.d., p. 47. 29. SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3. 30. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, op. cit., p. 902. 31. We did not find documents which would definitely confirm such pressure in this period, but the testimony of F. Durcansky inclines us to believe that pressures were exercised. He said: "secret influences of the Germans did not validate themselves anywhere to such an extent as they did in the attempt to attain the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia according to the desires of the National Socialistic circles. . . . " (Speaking of the period prior to July 28, 1940) - F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. 32. No. 46-40, SLOVAK CODE. 33. Commenting on this law on March 10, 1940, Tiso stressed that we are here concerned "with our own reasonable course. This is not an imitation of foreign patterns." - (SLOVAK, March 13, 21. 22. 23. 1940, p. 3). 34. Thus, e.g., in April, 1940, he returned to the Parliament for renewed debate on the draft of the law about Jewish enterprises with his own remarks and reminders; the parliament then approved the law with Tiso's recommendations on April 25, 1940 (SLOVAK, April 26, 1940), p. 2). 35. The amount which the Jews transferred abroad at that time was estimated at 2,000 million Slovak Crowns. Even in the "Aryan- only ized" enterprises "the Jews frequently remained bosses names changed on paper" (GARDISTA, June 14, 1941, p. 3). 36. Compare the study of the German legal expert for Slovak affairs, K. 0. Rabl, "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsleben in der neuen Slowakei" (in the periodical: ZEITSCHRIFT fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht - Berlin, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1940), which concludes categorically: "The Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically, therefore, according to previous provisions, not solved at all. Mainly the economic and imperial position of Jewry remains the same as it was before" (p. 867). �SLOVAKIA 37. 38. 39. 40, 41. l!} F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. K. Culen, op. cit., pp. 263-; p. 480; J . A. Mikus, op. cit. p. 163. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 386. J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 35; K. Culen, op. cit., p. 380. Minister Gejza Medricky's testimony during the Tiso trial ; this is reproduced by K. Culen, op. cit., p. 480. 42. SLOVAK CODE, part 52, No. 198, September 10, 1941. 43. "Jewish Codex" - part X, par. 255. 44. Ibidem, par. 256. 45. J . Pauco, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 323. 46. Compare the testimony of Archbishop Kmet'ko before the National Court in Bratislava, January 6, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit. pp. 369-370. 47. A. Giannini: Monsignor Tiso (in "Rivista di studi politici internazionali" - Firenze, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1952, p. 451); a wealth of documentaton is produced also by F . Durcansky, op. cit., pp. 166-169, 190-248. 48. Dr. Ley, German Minister, informed Count Ciano about the project in Rome, Dec. 6, 1939. In 1940, Ribbentrop told Ciano about Hitler's plan to create a Jewish free state on the island of Madagascar, where all the Jews of Europe were supposed to be concentrated. (l!Europa verso la catastrofe - Verona, 1948; G. Ciano, Diario 19391943, Milan, 1946, Vol. I, p. 280). 49. On December 7, 1938, President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal letter in which he proposed that a part of the south and southwest territory of Abyssinia be reserved for the Jews. Mussolini declared that personally he sympathized with the idea of creating a Jewish state, but decidely not in Abyssinia, nor anywhere in Africa. He proposed Russia, Brazil or the United States of America (Les Archives Secretes de la Wilhelmstrasse, Vol. IV, Les suites de Munich, Paris, 1953, doc. No. 341, pp. 498-500; compare also Vol. V, Book II, Paris, 1954, doc. Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-158). 50. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. -387. 51. Partially reproduced in K. Sidor's "~est' rokov pri Vatik'• ne" - Scranton, Pa., 1947, pp. 135-138. 52. In the note of the State Secretariate to His Holiness, No. 8355-41 , published in Sidor's op. cit., pp. 138-140. 53. W. Theimer: Lexicon der Politik, Bern, 1947, under "Vatikan" - p. 482. 54. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Sidor used the Slovak word "potrebam" (needs) in translating the Italian "esigenze," but the latter would probably be better expressed by "poziadavkam" (demands). 55. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 387. 56. At a press conference, March 27, 1942, Minister A. Mach declared that "the ultimate aim is to transfer all Jews to a territory, which would be ordered for the settlement within the framework of a new European order" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942, p. 3). 57. The Vatican protested with the note of the State Secretariate of His Holiness, No. 2027-42 ,dated March 14, 1942. At the end of March, the Slovak Minister at the Vatican, Karol Sidor, personally was in Bratislava with a demand to stop deportations (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 141-142). 58. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 388; from this reaction, as well as from the declaration of Minister A. Mach at the press conference �20 SLOVAKIA mentioned above (56), it is apparent that the personal intervention of the minister forced by Ribbentrop on Tiso was concerned and/ or his group of Slovak extremists. Mach publicly repudiated "speeches (which implied) that we had been somehow asked from the outside or forced to this solution. We ourselves have undertaken everything possible to have the opportunity to get rid of the Jews" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942). According to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, No. 8.325/ 1/ 42, of May 8, 1942, addressed to the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican (concerning the reply to the mentioned interventions of the Vatican of Nov. 12, 1941, and March 14, 1942), at that time " there were negotiations between the factors of the Slovak Republic and the Greman Reich in regard to the problem of the European Jews," in the sense of which "the Jews of Slovakia would be placed in several areas in the vicinity of Lublin ... where they would remain permanently" (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 142-143). This connection of matters appears to be more probable. 59. F . Steiner: Tragedy of Slovak Jewry - Bratislava, 1949, p. 6; reprod. from G. Reitlinger, op. cit. 60. At the beginning of May, Eichmann negotiated in this sense with Dr. Tuka and A. Mach. 61. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 388. 62. Wisliceny admitted this before the Nuremberg Court The Trial of the Major War Criminals - Vol. ill, pp. 276-278; reprod . .bY G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390). 63. "In practice the way was open in this intensely Catholic country for any professed convert to demand protection" (B. Shub: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews, New York, 1943, p . 54;reprod. by G. Reitlingeh ,op. cit. , p. 390). 64. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390. 65. Compare the testimony of Minister G. Medricky before the National Court in Bratislava, Feb. 21, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit., p . 482. 66. The official report of the International Red Cross describes them thusly: " ... les camps qui presentaient des conditions de nouriture et de logement passables, les internes etaient admis a travailler moyennant salaire dans des conditio se rapprochant de :Ueconomie libre" (Rapport du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge sur son action pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Geneve, 1948, p. 674). 67. After various messengers and plenipotentiaries had pressured Tiso and the Slovak Government, Tiso was called to Salzburg in May, 1943, where Hitler angrily marked the Slovak resolution of the Jewish question 'insufficient." 68. In the light of realities, such would appear to be the various public manifestations (as, e.g., the anti-Jewish speech of Min. A. Mach in Ruzomberok, Feb. 7, 1943) and the conditioned promises of President Tiso (in December, 1943, to Himmler's special agent E. Weesenmayer) which, however, were never fulfilled . Compare Sidor's account, op. cit., pp. 146-147, and G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390. 69. According to unpublished testimonies in manuscript which are in the hands of the author. 70. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 148. 71. It was thus that he presented himself to President Tiso on his arrival to Bratislava "as the accredited agent of Hitler" at the end of August, 1944. See: J . Pauco, op. cit., p. 293. 72. The regulation was formulated as a summons to come to a �SLOVAKIA 21 definite place on Nov. 24. A delegate of the International Red Cr oss ascertained on the spot that the summons was answered only by about 50 Jews: "Comme les Autorites slovaques l'avaient d'ailleurs prevu" he relates literally - "les Israelites se cachaient" (Rapport du Comite .. . . op. cit., p. 674). The hidden Jews could be aided not only by the population, but also by the International Red Cross with the help of the Slovak Red Cross and the Catholic Church (p. 675). 73. Intern. Red Cross Report, op. cit., p. 674; F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 239. 74. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 385. 75. "Yet as early as July, 1942, this Government rebelled" writes G. Reitlinger (op. cit., p. 385). We note, apparent as it is from the foregoing, that it is necessary to see this "rebellion" already in the constitutional law of May 15, 1942. The same autor says in another place: "We have seen in the case of Slovakia, how a Government which defied German pressure and abandoned the Final Solution, was forced to return to it, when, on the eve of capitulation to the enemy, the country was occupied by German troops" (p. 412). 76. It is worthy of note here that Tiso's insistence on a per centual participation of the Jews in the economy of Slovakia in relation to their number of the entire population could in no way be regarded as a repressive regulation, inasmuch as the principle concerned here was the same as that which Tiso ordered to be applied even in regards to the other minorities, not even excluding the Germans themselves. It has been ascertained, e.g. , that in official State positions the Germans could not occupy more than 5 percent of them (K. Culen , op. cit., p. 432); the same applied in regards to the "aryanization" of Jewish enterprises - their participation was limited percentually (J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 238). 77. The actual number of "Presidential exceptions" granted by Tiso has thus far not been accurately ascertained. Some authors estimate the number "above 9,000" (J. Pauco, who bases his account on the statements of lawyers during the Tiso trial; op. cit., p. 323); Dr. J. A. Mikus gives the figure 9,964 without, however, quoting any document or source (op . cit., p. 135); Minister Stephen Hassik estimated "about 15,000" (manuscript in author's possession). The report of J. Luther to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, indicates a greater number; according to that report, at that time 35,000 Jews in Slovakia were already safeguarded "by special legitimation" (G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390); a greater number is also indicated by the fact that the presiding judge of the National Court in Bratislava, Dr. Igor Daxner, in the trial against Dr. Tiso and his associates, did not allow an accurate ascertainment of the number of "exceptions"; he did this as a rule whenever it came to ascertaining matters that were favorable for Dr. Tiso (compare K. Culen, op. cit.). 78. Already on March 23, 1942, Dr. Tiso had Monsignor John Postenyi present the question to the State Council to sound out the ground and to gain a basis for his further intervention, which he later realized by means of the parliament (Dr. Zabkaj, in the National Court in Bratislava, March 15, 1947, according to mimeographed reports of the Slovak Press Bureau, Bratislava). 79. Typical is the example of Nitra Province, which in 1940-1944 was administered by Stephen Hassik, where the Jews were consistently protected and where, in 1943, the administrator, even though �22 SLOVAKIA not present, was able to obstruct the transfer of a certain number of Jews into Germany even after the action had begun (Manuscript in author's hands). 80. J. Pauco Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe), op. cit., p. 322. SOURCES: CIANO, Galeazzo: Diario - Volume primo, 1939-1940; Milano, Rizzoli, 1946; L'Europa verso la catastrofe; 184 colloqui con Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Sumner Welles, Rustu Aras, Stoiadinovic, Goring, Zog, Francois-Poncet ecc. verbalizzati da Galeazzo Ciano, con 40 documenti diplomatici inediti; (Verona), A. Mondadori, 1948. CULEN, Konstantin: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu); Middletown, Pa. , Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947-1948; 2Vols. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN :POLICY 1919--1939, Third Series; London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. DURCANSKY, Ferdinand: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, Vol. 1, Biela kniha; Buenos Aires, Slovensky Oslobodzovaci Vybor, 1954. GILLER, Agaton, Z podr6zy po kraju slowackim; Lw6w, Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1876. ·HAssiK, Stefan: Prispevok O rieseni iidovskej otazky V Sloven• skei republike (unpublished manuscript). INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAffiS: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews; New York, 1943. LES ARCHIVES SECRETES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE: Documents traduits de l' allemand par Michael TOURNIER; Paris, Librairie Plon, 1950. Les Juives en Europe 1939-1945; Paris, CDJC, 1947. MIKUS, Joseph A., La Slovaquie dans le drame de I' Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 a 1950); Paris, Les Iles d' Or, 1955. POKORNY, Rudolf: Z potulek po Slovensku; Praha, 1884-1885, 2 Vols .. RAPPORT DU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIXROUGE sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 - 30 juin 1947); Geneve, 1948. REITLINGER, Gerald: The Final Solution. The Attempt to Ex• ter~inate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945; London, Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953. SIDOR, Karol: ~est' rokov pri Vatikane; Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. STEINER, Frederick: The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry; Bratislava, 1949; (Documentation Centre CUJCR). TISO, Jozef : Obhajobna rec pred Narodnym sudom v Bratislave dna 17. a 18. marca 1947; edited by Dr. Jozef PAUCO : Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe; Passaic, N. J ., Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952. PERIODICALS: ETUDES, Paris. GARDISTA, Bratislava-Zilina. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milano. RIVISTA DI STUD! POLITIC! INTERNAZIONALI, Firenze. SLOVAK, Bratislava. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Berlin. � SLOVAKIA Pub I ished VOL. V II quart erly by the Slovak League SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER, 195 7 of America NO. 3-4(24-25) DR. JOSEPH TISO AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN SLOVAKIA MILAN S. DURI CA The fact that, during the period when Dr. Joseph Tiso was at the head of the Slova)k Republic as its president, there ,w ere "liqttidated" in an inhumane manner, in Nazi concentration camps, per.haps also severa1 tens of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, has tempted many authors either to hold Dr. Tiso directly responsible for these crimes, or at -least to consider this point as t,h e real weaJkness of Tiso's policy and his defense< 1 >. We are convinced that the so1ution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia is a very complicated proiblem and, therefore, it is necessary to gather in an objective study all existing documents so that the _true state of affairs might become known (2) . While awaiting the results of such a study, we are attempting here to focalize some of the actualities which already h ave been documented - facts which can put some light on definite, shadowy sides of this problem and also note in what direction it is necessary to move in making a further study so that we might arrive at an objective statement of the facts that had taken iplace and thus also at a correct moral evaluation of them. J EW RY IN S LOVAK IA Already in the past century, native and foreign observers were stunned by the great influx of Jews to Hungary and especially to the part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks from time immemorial. While Caplovic noted 6,850 J ews in the Trencin area h efore 1829, according to. the census of 1869 there already were 13,365 of them among 237,702 SlavaJks. Sveto,z ar Hurban, writing in 1881, said: A hundred years ago, there were 75,098 Jews in Hun- �2 SLOVAKJA gary; 55 years later there were already 241,632 of them (the increase burdened Slovakia mostly); in 1'870 they numbered 552,133 and now there are more than 600,000 of them in Hungary!" (Slovenske Pohl'ady, 1881, p. 291). The Czech writer Rudolph Pokorny, who reproduces these figures from direct eX:perience, describes the methods of Jewish immigrants in SlovaJkia as parasitical and exploitative (3). It would be very interesting to study in detaril the relations between the influx of Jews to Slovakia by the strengthening of their economic position and the economic decline orf the Slovak in1halbitants which resulted in an increasing exodus of Slovaks into foreign lands especially to the United States. According to our impressions from Hterature already reviewed, such a study would most li!kely lead to the conclusion that the exodus of the Sl()IVaks was in part caused by the great influx of Jews into rSl()IVaJkia. The strengthened economic positions of t:he Jews in Slovakia gave them the opportunity to exert stronger politicai influence and to propagate their ideology. A Polish observer A:gaton GiHer, ,w riting in 1876, described how the Jews in Slovalkia systematically worked against the Catholic Church and against Christianity in general( 4) under the aegis of the liberalism that was preached lby t:he Hungarian government ,o f the same Colman Tisza who, at the same time (1875) , denied the fact that the Slovak nation existed.(5). Jif we bear in mind the eX:tent and the constant increase of these mentioned effects of the Jewish minority in Slovak,ia, we shall more readily understand the spontaneous psychological reaction of the intelligentsia and the broad masses of the SloviaJk people. This reaction expressed itself, first of aill, in response to the tolerant nature of the SlovaJks and the fact that they laciked means of -power, in a blood-perspir~ng effort to save their own economic situation, ( with dollars made in American mines, the Slovak peasant tried to secure his livelihood in his native 'land) , then in t:he effort to emancipate themselves from dependence on the Jews in commerce to provide the daily necessities of life (by establishnig self-help cooperatives), amd also by an intensive building of institutions to preserve �SLOVAKIA 3 and •f .urther their original national culture both in a general and also in a specifically Christian sense (it suffices to mention the -Matica .Slovenska •a nd the Society of St. Adalbert). The situation did not change substantially even after the c,r eation oif the Czecho-Slova:k Republic in 1918(6). In 1923, a !French observer wa'S amazed \by the dis:proportion., ate preponderance of Jewish students in the universities and trade schools(7) and he foresaw that the Jews would thus soon capture the best positions in the new State(8). This prediction was if'll'lfilled, especiaUy a'S far as Slovakia was concerned. After the Vienna Arbitration, when the Jews constituted only 3.3'5 % of the population in S1ov,alkia(9), they owned almost one-half of the entire nation.a{ wealth(l0) and occupied most of the econ.omicaHy and civically important pwbl:i!c functionsO1). That this fact influenced the daily press and cultural production in general is evidence which needs no special proof(J2). It was only natural that the Slovak with all his legendary peace-loving characteristics, lbore the situation with difficulty; and the :Slovalk demands for autonomy, whicih characterized Slovak activities in the twenties and thirties of thi:s century, were accompanied by demands for a solution of the Jewish !problem. The current of anti-Semitism, which had overtalken many countries on the initiative of German Nazism, even such countries in whi·c h objectively suppositions fo'!" anti-Jew,i sh feeling were really insignificant if not directly fictitious, definitely did 1ha;ve some inf1uence even in 'Slova;kia(13). But who could stop Hitler at that time? It is not the fau~t •o f the Slovalks that many arguments of anti-Jewish :propaganda, originating outside of Slovalkia but ascribed to ,Slovakia, found at iJeast partial su!bstantiation in fact. THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Tiso took over the government of Sl01Vakia under the most difficult circumstances. His first worry was to preserve order and to prevent arbitray acts of usurpers even in the so,l ution of the Jewish .problem<14). Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, whose public opinion 1 �SLOVAKIA already for a longer time impatiently demanded radical regulations with regard to the privileged Czec,h and Jewish minority in Slovarkia(15), Dr. Tiso sought a legal solution of the matter already in federated Czecho-Slovakia(l6), as well as after March 14, 1919, in the Slova;k Republic. For an objectively moral evaluation of Tiso's conduct in the solution of the Jewish problem in .Slovakia, is is necessary to clearly distinguish ,various time periods, during which the legal and practical possibilities of Dr. Tiso to decide this question personally changed substantially. 1. From October 6, 1938, to October 26, 1939: Dr. Joseph Tiso, as Prime Mini:ster of the Slo,vaJk Go,vernment, had broad ;possiibilities oif legislative and executive intrative and, therefore, also dir,e ct, personal responsibility in this regard(17 ). 2. From October 26, 1939, to July 28, 1940: As President of the Slova:k Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso could intervene in the legislative acti,viby of the Assembly and influence the executive power reserived to the government, which was responsible to the Assembly and not to the President, only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the S'lovaJk Republic(18) . During this ,p eriod, we cannot regard Dr. Tiso directly res,ponsible for the various initiatives in the solution of the Jewis'h problem, but only for the acts of his office as prescrilbed by the Constitution: whether and how he used the rights of intervention., ·a s defined 'by the Constitution, in regard to legislative and exec,utirve acts which required his appm,val. For the latter, as head of the State, Dr. Tiso carries the responsibility, dividing it with the respective Constitutional organs. 3. From July 28, 1940, to August 30, 1944: at the Salziburg meeting with Germany's intervention in the internal affairs of 'Slova'kia(19) - Dr. Tiso lost a definite part of the effective possibilities to exercise his Constitutional rights in regard to persons who were forced by Hitler into the Slovaik Government, especially with regard to expressed demands of the Germans upon the Slova;k Government(20). Such was the problem of e~pelling or liquidating the Jew:? <21) . In this period we can hold Tiso as responsible, as in the previous period, only in proportion 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 to the effective possibilities of free action which remained open to him after !Hitler's intervention at Salzburg. 4. From August 30, 1944, to April 5, 1945: Slovakia was to a great extent a battleground, where actual governmental power was exercised by various fighting units, most of the time completely independent of civil governmental organs, nay even expressly in opposition to them. (22). Here the responsibility of Dr. Tiso is limited to those acts, which - aliWays within the extent of this Constitutional rights and duties - took ·p lace on the territory and at ra time when the Government of the SlovaJk Republic still go;verned there and had effective 1possibility to exercise its power. TISO'S SOLUTION Despite the critical political - internal and international - situation and the revolutionary events of October, 1938, and of March, 1939, with his resolute influence, Dr. Joseph Tiso checked all violent intervention of incited masses of ,people in the solution of the Jewish problem (23) and consistently in;volked a legal courne to- solve this problem. Such a course, while it secured for the Slovaks time for the necessary study of the various aspects of the complicated situation and for a democratic negotation .o f various motions, with regard to the Jews themselves, it eliminated the typically Nazi factor of surprise(2-!), giving them time and opportunity to prepare themselves psychologically and to make necessary provisions, including financial(25) in the face of the new situation. After such a preliminary preparation, the first Slo;vruk governmental regulation was issued April 30, 1939, with the force of law, the object of which was to solve the Jewish pro1blem (26). This regulation defined the concept of a confessional and civic viewpoint, without considering racial motives at all. Its aim was to reduce the disproportionate preponderance of Jews in the economic life of Slovakia. The Jews could continue to manage their enterprises if they allowed a 51 % per cent ,participation of Slovaks the 51 % not being confiscated, but lbought in a regular manner by Slovak participants (shareholders). The participation of Jews in the legal, medical, and other important �6 SLOVAKIA and profitable professions was to be regulated gradually in proportion to the total number of the Jewish minority. Besides this, the Slovak Government of Dr. Joseph Tiso supported. the voluntary emigration of Jews to Palestine in all possible ways< 27) . If we consider all the facts of the matter objecttvely, we must admit that in these regulations there really was nothing w'hich, under the given circumstances, would exceed the normal competency of a legislator that did not emanate from the natural law itself, or that would be opposed to the principles of justice and humanity(28). The first 'S lovak resolution of the J ewish question - and tihe only one which, in the full sense, we can call Tiso's solution - contained and realized the attributes proposed by Tiso when he ,proclaimed. that "t'he Jewish question in Slovakia shall be solved justly, socially, and humanly"( 29) . THE SLOVAK "JEWISH LAW" These :provisions clearly, but not altogether effectively because they left wide possibilities to evade the law(30), proved to be insufficient in attaining their aim. 'Dherefore, but probably also under German pressure(31), the Slovak Parliament prepared. a new so-catled "Jewish Law," which was approved on iFeb11uary 29, 1940(32). Fundamentally, this law differed little from the previous provision; it defined more accurately many details and fixed the principle of participation o.f the Jews in economic, civic, and cultural life in proportion to their number of the tdtal population, that is, 4 percent(33) . The confessional and civic principle remained in force, therefore not that of racial discrimination; so did the principle of selling 51 % of the shares of Jewish ente11prises to companion SloJVaks freely chosen lby them. This .principle of "Aryani:zation" Dr. Tiso defended consistently, even by using his constitutional authority as President(34) . GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE "JEWISH CODE" It aippears t'hat even these new legal dispositions were not sufficient in practice to attain the goal. Several loopholes were left open for escape from the consequences of �SLOVAKIA 7 the [aw - and those affected naturally did not hesitate to use them in every way(35) - so t:Jhat the more radical circles in Slovakia expressed their dissatisfaction with such a solution. However, it was chiefly in Germany that the Slovak solution of the Jewish question was bitterly criticized as being basiically in conflict with the German Jewish !aws(36). It was this consistent originality and independence of Dr. Tiso and his government in regard to the so1ution of the Jewish question that was one of the reasons for intervention o,f Adol'ph Hitler in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic at SalzJburg on July 28, 1940(37). There Dr. Tiso was forced to drop Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, who collorborated with him in the independent solution of the Jewish question. Dr. Vojtech T,uik,a, who was ,g reatly influenced by the Germans, was forced on tJhe Slova,k Government as Minister of Fo·r eign Affairs against the will of President Tiso(38), as was journalist Alexander Mach, who became the executor of German dictates especially in the Jewish question as Minister of the Interior(39) . For Dr. Joseph Tiso, Salzburg meant personally such a blow that he was determined to, tender his resignation( 40). It was only at the insistence of moderate SloivaJk ciroles, nay, even the Jews themselves, that he remained at his post to use his authority to check the radical group which was under the influence of the Germans(41). Tiso's position after SalaJbur,g, therefore, became substantially a defensi'Ve one: not only did he lose in notable measure the possibility of concrete intiative in regard to the Jewish question, but also his constitutional authority of intervention was ,partially reduced by t:Jhe facts of this new political situation. Thus it happened that on September 10, Prime Minister Tuika could force the parliament to pass an enabling law for the solution of the Jewish question by the government. This "emandpated" ,goivernment of Dr. T,uka issued in the form of a goivernment regulation - without the signature of the President of the Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - the so-called "Jewish Code"< 42 >, Wihich copied the Ger~ man Nuremberg Laiw. Apparently the Germans were de- �8 SLOVAKIA termined to impose Hitler's order in SlovaJkia - the same imperial imposition of Hitler's Germaniy to which all the governments of states in the German sphere of influence had succumbed. In comparison with the Jewish laws of Germany and the other States (iltaly, France, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Holland, Denmark, Norway - and even annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the General Governorship of Poland), the "Jewish Code" of S1ovakia contained two lucid points which were hers exclusive ly: the first reserved to the Preside nt of the Repulblic the right of direct administrational "exception" of anyone from the power of this law <43), while the second confirmed the validity of all exce ptions alre ady granted according to the aforementioned Slovak law(44 ). These two paragraphs, leaving tJhe head of the State an open possibility to protect in the face of an avalanche of force which evidently it was impossible to oppose, were the motive why Dr. Joseiph Tiso finally decided not to resign his office after the .promulgation of the "Jewish Code"< 45 ). PRESIDENT TISO'S STAND The question was a real "ca:sus conscientiae," which today ,w e can reconstruct in its main outlines. Dr. Tiso was opposed to any violent solution of the Jewish question; he was ready to .p rotest against it by resigning his office. The following realities, however , came into ,c onsideration: if Tiso did resign, it was c ertain that Tu.ka would be put into his office - and it was generally !known that Tu!ka was strongly under German influences. I,f this would have happened, not only all the Jews of SlovaJkia would ha'Ve been completely subject to German inte:vventions, but even government power of all Slovakia would practically have passed ()IVer completely into German hands and this w·o uld have had catastrophic consequences for the entire nation. Let it suffice here to mention the forced participation in the war and the system of National 1Socialism promoted b.y Dr. Tutka. Under such circumstances, the resignation o;f Dr. Tiso would have meant deserting from a position of responsi- �SLOVAKIA 9 bility, disappointing the h0ipes of all the people who sa,w in him the salvation of the nation in a critical world situation and a ,g uarantee aigainst the 'Very actual ideological danger of Nazi,sm(46). By retaining t:Jhe funcUon o.f the President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso had a hoipe not only of continuing the defensive policy of Slova!kia a,gainst Nazism, but a:lso to sarve, if not all, at least as many as possible Jews of Slovakia who were persecuted by Nazism. Were these ihoipes however, sUJbstantiated? The answer to this question is very impo,r tant for the moral qualification of the stand of Dr. Joseph Tiso and thereby of his entire relationship to the proiblem orf the Jews in SlovaJkia. It is not difficult to answer the first part of the question: It has been proved that by remaining President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso not only sruved the SlovaJk nation from threatened occupation and division, from the flood of Nazi ideolo,gy, from most of the economic and social consequences of the world rwar, but, despite the exceptional circumstances, he also organized Slovakia legally, culturally and economically as an independent State and thereby demonstrated t:Jhat Sloiva,kia had all the ;prerequisites orf developmernt as an independent State. Under his guidance Slovalk ia attained "brilliant results and the elan of autonomous life was reaHy wonderful"< 47). So that we could answer the second part of the question, we must objecti'Ve1y examine the cause of Jewish provisions and their exeoution in Slovakia in the third and fourth periods (1941-1945). After the promulgation of the "Jewish Code," the Jews were supposed to be transferred from Slovakia to the territory between the Visla and t:Jhe Bug in former Poland, where there was to be found some kind of state creation reserved for them. Here it is necessary to, note that the project of a separate territory for European Jews presented a solution which was seriously studied not only in Ckrmany( 48), but ,a iso iby other powers, such as, for example, the United States (4 9). To:l. order to ascertain the situation the SlovaJk Gov•e rnment sent to Poland a representatiive of the Ministry of the Interior, Isidore Koso, to whom they 1, 1 �10 SLOVAKIA actually did show the Jewish city of Sosnowitz, Oppel, with its own administration, police, etc. Well, even .after this the SlovaJk Government did not begin to transfer Jews, but arranged labor camps for them in Slovakia, where they were to be gradually concentrated. This course, which Reitlinger explains as motivated by economy(50), is apparently 1b etter ex.plained as a reaction of the Slovak Government to the Memorandum of the Slovak Catholic Bishops of October 7, 1941(51), and to the reminders of the Holy See of Novemfber 12, 1941 (52). In both these doouments ecclesiastical representatives protested against the racist principle which inspired governmentrul regulation No. 198--1941 of the Slova!k Code, especiaUy however rugainst those ,p oints which were out of line with the teachings of the Church (outlawing mixed marriages, ex:pulsion from schools) and called upon the SlovaJk G()IVernment to recall or at least change the mentioned regulations in this seinse. The Holy See, wihich was for apparent reasons generally regarded as "the best informed political center of the world"(53 ), at the same time manifested its understanding for the situation of the ,Slov,a;k Government when it concluded its note with these words,: "The Holy See hopes that the Slovak Government, as long as the government regulations are not repealed or amended, will try to ex;plain and to validate the issued regulations in suoh a measUTe and in such a manner so that they mig1ht become as far as is possible least harmful to the needs (demands) of Catholic conscience"(54). These words appear to be the norm and therefore the explanation of the course not only of Dr. Tiso, but also that of the :SloIVaJk gOIVemment followed in practice until the end of their activities. Thus it was that despite the Nuremberg t01J1e of the "Jewish Code," the f,unda:mental :points of that code were not practically applied until March 10, 1942. Thus far it has not been conclusively ascertained, whether under German pressure or not(5,5), Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach issued the decree on March 7, 1942, which confined all the Jews of Slovakia to their homes until their transfer to the East(5&) . This provision, which was soon followed by the first transports of Jews from Slo- �SLOVAKIA 11 vakia to Galicia (March 10, 1942), inspired a strong opposition of public opinion, new protests of ecclesiastical circles (.57), nay, even dissent of the rest of the members of the government.(5<8). But it has been safely ascertained that Germany did pressure the Slovak Government to adopt the solution of the Jewish question in the form of transferring the Jews which had been accepted by the other States (Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Hungary). To this end Heydrich himself came to Bratislava on April 10, 1942, to tell Tuka that the Jews of Slovakia would be transferred to the Lublin area where they would be settled permanently. Separate settlements were to be arranged for baptized Jews (59). After repeated insistence and assurances from the German side that Jewish families would be respected and that they would be dealt with decently(·60), the Slovak Government began to send to the East the members of the families of those young, able-to-work Jews who had been transported the previous month. In this second intervention of the Slovak Government, it is possible to see an effort to correct in some way the mistake of the first transfer by which many Jewish families were broken up. It became tragic that the promises of Heydrich and Eichmann were the treacherous trap which was not without effect(&l). At that time the Slovak Government could not know about the real intentions of the Nazis: Wisliceny himself found this out, as we shall see, only several months later. Nevertheless Dr. Tuka insisted that he might send an inspection mission to ascertain on the spot just how the transferred Jews were being dealt with. The Slovak Government presented this demand also formally in the form of a note addressed to the German Government(,62) - but received only an evasive reply. It was this, most likely, that roused suspicions on the Slovak side. Therefore already on May 15, 1942, the Slovak parliament approved a constitutional law by which it practically repealed the power given the government in September, 1941, and legally set the course for the problem of emigration. The substance of this law was, however, the practical cessation of deportations; the law, that is, sanctioned all the previously granted presidential and minis- �12 SLOVAKIA terial "exceptions" and established a new general exception for Jews baptized before March 14, 1939(63) . Furthermore, it established that Jews, affected by the law, would be concentrated in labor camps in Slovakia. In July, 1942, when the representative of the Holy See in Bratislava notified President Tiso that the Jews in the Lublin area were being murdered, Dr. Tiso with absolute determination insisted on the realization of a Slovak inspection mission - or else there would be no further transfer of Jews from Slovakia. In August, Wisliceny went to Berlin with the matter. There Eichmann told him that Tiso was asking an impossible thing because those Jews were no longer alive. Thereupon he showed him a secret order, issued by the will of Hitler and signed by Himmler, according to which the entire Jewish race was to be gradually destroyed(64). Wisliceny returned to Bratislava again with an evasive reply. After this deportations from Slovakia were completely stopped. From what has been said it is quite clear that the Slovak Government allowed the transfer of a part of the Jews from Slovakia under the imperialistic pressure of Germany - in the face of guarantees to respect basic human rights and humanitarian treatment. As soon as there arose a reason to doubt that the Nazis were fulfilling the guarantees given, the parliament of the Slovak Republic with the strength of a constitutional law stood up to protect the Jewish citizens of Slovakia. The fact that it is necessary to explain the law of May 15, 1942, in this maner, is also supported by the following realities : 1. The motive for voting this law was the merciless exportation of the Jews on the basis of the decree of Minister Mach of March 7, 1942 (65). 2. By this law, constitutionally, were sanctioned all the exceptions granted by the President of the Republic and the resort Ministers ; also a new general exception was established by which a confessional criterion was given priority - which the Germans sharply criticized already in 1940 as opposed to the racist principles of Nuremberg. 3. The real aim of concentrating the Jews, who did not have the mentioned exceptions, in Slovak labor camps was �SLOVAKIA 13 to save them from possible transfer elsewhere on the initiative of radical circles around Minister Mach behind which stood the power of Germany. This was evident from the way these camps were set up - the living conditions of which were but little different from complete freedom(66). 4. Despite repeated insistence from the side of the Germans, nay, even despite the intervention of Hitler himself with President Tiso(67), Slovakia did not retreat from her position and protected the Jews with all means of political tactics(68) and her own State power. 5. After September 1, 1944, when Slovakia became a battlefield and governmental power was factually exercised by the fighting armies, despite German occupation of practically the whole of Slovakia, the new Minister of National Defense and State Security of the Slovak Republic, Stephen Hrussik, ordered the abolishment of all concentration camps and of all anti-Jewish administrational regulations(69). 6. When German army commanders defied the above order and by force transported to Germany all Jews that fell into their hands during military operations, the new Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Stephen Tiso, energetically protested to the German Government(70). 7. Later, when the commander of the occupation army and "the only representative of the Reich in Slovakia"(71), SS-General Berger forced the Slovak Government regulation in regard to concentrating the Jews (Nov. 16, 1944), the provision had practically no effect because the Slovak Government and Slovak officials silently agreed that the Jews be free to hide themselves(72). From the given facts it is quite clear that despite some drastic interventions of the Nazis and their several Slovak collaborators in the spring of 1942, for which they gained partial accord of the Slovak Government by cunning, the great part of the Jewish minority could remain in Slovakia and there be effectively protected to such an extent that the Slovak Republic in certain periods was regarded as a relative asylum even for the Jews from other countries, especially those from Poland and Hungary(73). The stand of the Slovak Republic in regard to the "definite solution" (Endlosung) of the Jewish question, pres- �14 SLOVAKIA sured by the Nazis, immediately from the first moments of suspicion about the real aim of these " regulations," was unanimously and consistently so rejective that it really presents "the story of the first outright failure of the 'Final Solution' and a failure at a time when there was no glimmer of hope for Jewry in Axis-controlled Europe" (74). The fact that the small Slovak State, even though it could not prevent all violence, knew how to stand up against it - and with such a determination that an objective historian can today talk about "a challenge to war" and about "a revolt" of the Slovak Government(75) - proves t hat t he Slovak Government even in this r egard not only did not accept without reservations the principles of Hitler's National Socialism, but even knew how to defend itself against them, nay, even to repudiate them forcefully, as long as it was not completely overpowered by the brutal preponderance of military occupation and frontal operations. This important fact has thus far not been properly evaluated in world literature which concerns itself with this historical period. If we pause now in our search for the reasons of the described facts, we shall come to the conclusion that one of the most decisive factors in the course of events in Slovakia was the personality of President Dr. Joseph Tiso. To this conclusion we are led by the following facts: 1. While Dr. Joseph Tiso held the initiative of solving the Jewish question in Slovakia( we saw that he solved it in a sense of strict justice, in a legal way, and in a most human manner. 2. As President of the Republic he used his constitutional right in order that the laws proposed by the parliament remained within the confines of the same principles which were in opposition to the Nazi anti-Jewish laws( 7,6). 3. When he could not prevent the issuance of the "Jewish Codex," he reserved the right for himself to limit its effectiveness as much as possible by personal "exceptions." That this was the intent of the mentioned paragraph 225 is confirmed by the fact ascertained by the court that Dr. Joseph Tiso used his authority as a matter of principle for every case placed before him, by which in a short time he �SLOVAKIA 15 liberated a great part of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia from the "Jewish Codex"(77). 4. It was generally known that the initiative of proGerman politics was held by the ministers forced on Tiso (Dr. Tuka and A. Mach) - and that there were basic conflicts between them and President Tiso. If, therefore, the Slovak parliament could pass the constitutional law of May 15, 1942 - which was in fact aimed against German Nazis and the executors of their influence in Slovakia this is understandable only if we allow that it did so not only within the support of the authority of the President of the Republic and the chairman of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, but, as it has been safely ascertained: directly on his initiative (78) . 5. Finally, only such a consistently anti-Nazi stand of President Tiso in regard to the Jewish question can explain the fact that, even despite the regulations of the government and the Minister of the Interior, some of the regional representatives of state power could during that entire time take positions of open protection of the Jewish inhabitants, nay, even actually intervene in the initiative of government trustees in the Jewish question on territory administered by them( 79) . CONCLUSION As we emphasized at the outset, in this study we were interested in focalizing some of the facts that are important and pertinent for a correct evaluation of the relationship of Dr. Joseph Tiso to the Jewish problem in Slovakia. Intentionally we have not touched upon some undoubtedly interesting and relatively important aspects of this complicated problem which require a separate study (e.g., the question of statistical data, the question of the legal and moral side of the individual regulations and respective responsibilities, etc.) . This study, we believe, does prove that we cannot honestly regard Dr. Joseph Tiso as a persecutor of the Jews or as a collaborator of the Nazis in their inhuman work of genocide of the Jewish nation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that the President of the Slovak Republic did prove himself an eminent opponent of every injustice against the Jews, whether perpetrated by �16 SLOVAKIA the German Nazis or by others in their service. Dr. Tiso did everything in his power to save them - and we say, without fear of contradiction, that he did for the Jews what no other statesman dared to do in the Europe controlled by Hitler at that time. If, despite this, a part of the Jews of Slovakia was taken out of Slovakia by violent intervention of brute force, it is certain that this happened without any direct participation of Dr. Joseph Tiso - nay, against his will - and, hence, we cannot hold him responsible for it. Dr. Tiso found himself face to face with a current "which it was possible to impede and probably even to influence, but not stop," as he himself had said during his trial in Bratislava <SO) . There is no evidence to prove that Dr. Tiso aided or abetted, motivated or approved in any way, the brutal treatment of Jews in Slovakia or anywhere else. To lie in the face of death is not easy. So much the less can we allow that Dr. Joseph Tiso could do so - the same Dr. Tiso who could proclaim before the entire nation that never in his life did he utter an untruth intentionally. And he did not fear that someone might be able to prove the opposite. Would that the world were managed by politicians and statesmen who would follow the noble example of the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso! REFERENCES: 1. The first opm10n is practically current in encyclopedic and scientific literature; some Slovak authors are inclined to the second; e.g., Th. J. Zubek ("Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality" - The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Nov. 1955, p. 125). 2. Dr. Joseph Pauco: Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Passaic, N. J ., 1952; pp. 323-323. 3. R. Pokorny: Z potulek po Slovensku, Prague, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 56-. 4. It was not by accident that the German translation of Rabbi Benjamin Halvey's Hebrew pasquinade "Das leben Jesu. Zurn ersten Male historisch bearbeitet nach neuentdeckten jiidisch orientalischen Quellen" was published in Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1875. According to the translator, who personally offered it to Giller in Trencianske Teplice, it surpassed by far the dilettante attempts of Strauss, Voltaire and other blasphemous pseudo-historians. See A. Giller - Z podrozy po kraju slowackim" - Lw6w, -876; pp. 197-. 5. Th. G. Locher: Die nationale Differenzeirung und lntegrie• rung der Slowaken und Tschechen in ihren geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 - Haarlem, 1931; p. 196. 6. J. A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe - Paris, 1955; p. 133. 7. While Hungary, for example, had a "numerus clausus" estab- �SLOVAKIA 17 lished by law, in Czecho-Slova kia, where the number of J ews was estimated at 3--4 percent of the population, the secondary schools became practically the exclusive domain of the Jews. In Prague itself over half the students were Jewish; the State Gymnazium for girls bad 163 Jewish pupils out of a total of 248; in several gymnaziums for boys the relationship of Jews to non-Jews was: 116 out of 254; 123 out of 250; 185 out of 240. At the university for every three nonJewish professors there was one Jewish professor. See: J. Boubee Tcheco-Slova quie - in "ETUDES," Paris, Vol. 60, No. 174, 1923; pp. 225-. 8. Ibidem. 9. G. Reitlinger: The Final Solution - London, 1953; p. 386. 10. The value of Jewish properties was evaluated at 3,150 million Slovak Crowns; besides this, the Jews controlled over 12,000 industrial enterprises with a capital of 1,250 million Slovak Crowns, especially the textile industry where they controlled 90 percent oi the production. The situation was much the same in the wood and alcohol industries. See the article "La Slovacchia e gli Ebrei" in the periodical RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milan, Vol. 8, No. 34, 1942; p , 902. 11. Ibidem: 72 percent of the lawyers and 64 percent of the medics were Jews, while 58 percent of all restaurant and liquor concessions was in their hands. 12. See the statement, e.g., of P . R. Mikus in the SLOVAK, Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 34, February 10, 1939; p. 1. 13. Here we do not have in mind only States, such as Italy, for example, which did adopt various anti-Jewish regulations. Count Ciano noted that on January 13, 1939, in a conversation with Mussolini, Chamberlain expressed grave fears that "further immigration of Jews into England would incite anti-Semitism which is already being planned in many sectors of the country." Besides the Jewish minority in England was negligible: according to Chamberlain , 60,000 (Mussolini stated that it was over 200,000) - G. Ciano, "Diario, 1939-1940," Milan, 1946; p. 22. - In regard to the anti-Jewish mood in other States, see "Les archives secre de la Wilhelmstras se" - Vol V, Book II, Paris, 1954, Documents Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-. 14. Dr. Tiso stressed this in general in his first speech after taking over government in Slovakia, Oct. 8, 1938 (K. Culen: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava," Middletown, Pa., 1948; p. 215). Later, on March 15, 1939, in a broadcast he warned all who would be guilty of such acts and threatened that the government would prosecute all culprits ("SLOVAK" - Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 63, 1939; p . 4). 15. "SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1939. 16. "SLOVAK" - Vol XXI, No. 28, Feb. 3, 1939; p. 3. Compare also the government declaration of Feb. 22, 1939 ("SLOVAK," Vol. XXI, Nos. 44-45, Feb. 22-23, 1939). 17. Speech of Dr. Tiso at the Eighth Convention of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at Trencin, Oct. 1, 1939 ("SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 227, Oct. 3, 1939; pp. 3-4). 18. An analysis of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic by H. Schimani: "Die Verfassun~ der Slowakischen Republik" - Vienna, 1947. 19. Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov - Vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1954; p. 196. 20. Dr. J. Pauco: op. cit., p. 55. �18 SLOVAKIA Dr. F. Durcansky: op. cit., p. 237. J. A. Mikus: op. cit., pp. 185-; F. Durcansky: op. cit.; pp. 475: In an official pronouncement, Feb. 21, 1939, Tiso declared: "It is proof of the maturity of our nation that despite all incitements the Slovak nation waited for the legal solution of the Jewish question" (stenographic report of the second meeting of the Slovak Assembly, Bratislava, Feb. 21-23, 1939, p. 9). 24. That this was the expressed intention of Dr. Tiso is attested to by his statement to the correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, J. Frankel, Feb. 8, 1939: "The coming Jewish law will certainly serve the purpose that the Jews might not be caught by surprises and would know just how far they will be able to go in economic life" (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). 25. Memorandum of the British Consul in Bratislava, Mr. P. Pares, Feb. 3, 1939, in the "DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939" - Third Series, Vol. IV, No. 97, 1951, London; p. 96. 26. No. 63-39 SLOVAK CODE; No. 102-39 Ur. nov. (Official News). 27. It approved the transfer and emigration plan of Dr. S. E. Soskin (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). Innsbruck28. Compare, e.g., J. Messner: Das Naturrecht Vienna, 1950, pp. 365-366 - and: P. Pavan: l.'.uomo nella communita internazionale - Rome, s.d., p. 47. 29. SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3. 30. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, op. cit., p. 902. 31. We did not find documents which would definitely confirm such pressure in this period, but the testimony of F. Durcansky inclines us to believe that pressures were exercised. He said: "secret influences of the Germans did not validate themselves anywhere to such an extent as they did in the attempt to attain the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia according to the desires of the National Socialistic circles. . . . " (Speaking of the period prior to July 28, 1940) - F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. 32. No. 46-40, SLOVAK CODE. 33. Commenting on this law on March 10, 1940, Tiso stressed that we are here concerned "with our own reasonable course. This is not an imitation of foreign patterns." - (SLOVAK, March 13, 21. 22. 23. 1940, p. 3). 34. Thus, e.g., in April, 1940, he returned to the Parliament for renewed debate on the draft of the law about Jewish enterprises with his own remarks and reminders; the parliament then approved the law with Tiso's recommendations on April 25, 1940 (SLOVAK, April 26, 1940), p. 2). 35. The amount which the Jews transferred abroad at that time was estimated at 2,000 million Slovak Crowns. Even in the "Aryan- only ized" enterprises "the Jews frequently remained bosses names changed on paper" (GARDISTA, June 14, 1941, p. 3). 36. Compare the study of the German legal expert for Slovak affairs, K. 0. Rabl, "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsleben in der neuen Slowakei" (in the periodical: ZEITSCHRIFT fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht - Berlin, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1940), which concludes categorically: "The Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically, therefore, according to previous provisions, not solved at all. Mainly the economic and imperial position of Jewry remains the same as it was before" (p. 867). �SLOVAKIA 37. 38. 39. 40, 41. l!} F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. K. Culen, op. cit., pp. 263-; p. 480; J . A. Mikus, op. cit. p. 163. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 386. J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 35; K. Culen, op. cit., p. 380. Minister Gejza Medricky's testimony during the Tiso trial ; this is reproduced by K. Culen, op. cit., p. 480. 42. SLOVAK CODE, part 52, No. 198, September 10, 1941. 43. "Jewish Codex" - part X, par. 255. 44. Ibidem, par. 256. 45. J . Pauco, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 323. 46. Compare the testimony of Archbishop Kmet'ko before the National Court in Bratislava, January 6, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit. pp. 369-370. 47. A. Giannini: Monsignor Tiso (in "Rivista di studi politici internazionali" - Firenze, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1952, p. 451); a wealth of documentaton is produced also by F . Durcansky, op. cit., pp. 166-169, 190-248. 48. Dr. Ley, German Minister, informed Count Ciano about the project in Rome, Dec. 6, 1939. In 1940, Ribbentrop told Ciano about Hitler's plan to create a Jewish free state on the island of Madagascar, where all the Jews of Europe were supposed to be concentrated. (l!Europa verso la catastrofe - Verona, 1948; G. Ciano, Diario 19391943, Milan, 1946, Vol. I, p. 280). 49. On December 7, 1938, President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal letter in which he proposed that a part of the south and southwest territory of Abyssinia be reserved for the Jews. Mussolini declared that personally he sympathized with the idea of creating a Jewish state, but decidely not in Abyssinia, nor anywhere in Africa. He proposed Russia, Brazil or the United States of America (Les Archives Secretes de la Wilhelmstrasse, Vol. IV, Les suites de Munich, Paris, 1953, doc. No. 341, pp. 498-500; compare also Vol. V, Book II, Paris, 1954, doc. Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-158). 50. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. -387. 51. Partially reproduced in K. Sidor's "~est' rokov pri Vatik'• ne" - Scranton, Pa., 1947, pp. 135-138. 52. In the note of the State Secretariate to His Holiness, No. 8355-41 , published in Sidor's op. cit., pp. 138-140. 53. W. Theimer: Lexicon der Politik, Bern, 1947, under "Vatikan" - p. 482. 54. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Sidor used the Slovak word "potrebam" (needs) in translating the Italian "esigenze," but the latter would probably be better expressed by "poziadavkam" (demands). 55. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 387. 56. At a press conference, March 27, 1942, Minister A. Mach declared that "the ultimate aim is to transfer all Jews to a territory, which would be ordered for the settlement within the framework of a new European order" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942, p. 3). 57. The Vatican protested with the note of the State Secretariate of His Holiness, No. 2027-42 ,dated March 14, 1942. At the end of March, the Slovak Minister at the Vatican, Karol Sidor, personally was in Bratislava with a demand to stop deportations (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 141-142). 58. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 388; from this reaction, as well as from the declaration of Minister A. Mach at the press conference �20 SLOVAKIA mentioned above (56), it is apparent that the personal intervention of the minister forced by Ribbentrop on Tiso was concerned and/ or his group of Slovak extremists. Mach publicly repudiated "speeches (which implied) that we had been somehow asked from the outside or forced to this solution. We ourselves have undertaken everything possible to have the opportunity to get rid of the Jews" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942). According to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, No. 8.325/ 1/ 42, of May 8, 1942, addressed to the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican (concerning the reply to the mentioned interventions of the Vatican of Nov. 12, 1941, and March 14, 1942), at that time " there were negotiations between the factors of the Slovak Republic and the Greman Reich in regard to the problem of the European Jews," in the sense of which "the Jews of Slovakia would be placed in several areas in the vicinity of Lublin ... where they would remain permanently" (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 142-143). This connection of matters appears to be more probable. 59. F . Steiner: Tragedy of Slovak Jewry - Bratislava, 1949, p. 6; reprod. from G. Reitlinger, op. cit. 60. At the beginning of May, Eichmann negotiated in this sense with Dr. Tuka and A. Mach. 61. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 388. 62. Wisliceny admitted this before the Nuremberg Court The Trial of the Major War Criminals - Vol. ill, pp. 276-278; reprod . .bY G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390). 63. "In practice the way was open in this intensely Catholic country for any professed convert to demand protection" (B. Shub: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews, New York, 1943, p . 54;reprod. by G. Reitlingeh ,op. cit. , p. 390). 64. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390. 65. Compare the testimony of Minister G. Medricky before the National Court in Bratislava, Feb. 21, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit., p . 482. 66. The official report of the International Red Cross describes them thusly: " ... les camps qui presentaient des conditions de nouriture et de logement passables, les internes etaient admis a travailler moyennant salaire dans des conditio se rapprochant de :Ueconomie libre" (Rapport du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge sur son action pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Geneve, 1948, p. 674). 67. After various messengers and plenipotentiaries had pressured Tiso and the Slovak Government, Tiso was called to Salzburg in May, 1943, where Hitler angrily marked the Slovak resolution of the Jewish question 'insufficient." 68. In the light of realities, such would appear to be the various public manifestations (as, e.g., the anti-Jewish speech of Min. A. Mach in Ruzomberok, Feb. 7, 1943) and the conditioned promises of President Tiso (in December, 1943, to Himmler's special agent E. Weesenmayer) which, however, were never fulfilled . Compare Sidor's account, op. cit., pp. 146-147, and G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390. 69. According to unpublished testimonies in manuscript which are in the hands of the author. 70. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 148. 71. It was thus that he presented himself to President Tiso on his arrival to Bratislava "as the accredited agent of Hitler" at the end of August, 1944. See: J . Pauco, op. cit., p. 293. 72. The regulation was formulated as a summons to come to a �SLOVAKIA 21 definite place on Nov. 24. A delegate of the International Red Cr oss ascertained on the spot that the summons was answered only by about 50 Jews: "Comme les Autorites slovaques l'avaient d'ailleurs prevu" he relates literally - "les Israelites se cachaient" (Rapport du Comite .. . . op. cit., p. 674). The hidden Jews could be aided not only by the population, but also by the International Red Cross with the help of the Slovak Red Cross and the Catholic Church (p. 675). 73. Intern. Red Cross Report, op. cit., p. 674; F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 239. 74. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 385. 75. "Yet as early as July, 1942, this Government rebelled" writes G. Reitlinger (op. cit., p. 385). We note, apparent as it is from the foregoing, that it is necessary to see this "rebellion" already in the constitutional law of May 15, 1942. The same autor says in another place: "We have seen in the case of Slovakia, how a Government which defied German pressure and abandoned the Final Solution, was forced to return to it, when, on the eve of capitulation to the enemy, the country was occupied by German troops" (p. 412). 76. It is worthy of note here that Tiso's insistence on a per centual participation of the Jews in the economy of Slovakia in relation to their number of the entire population could in no way be regarded as a repressive regulation, inasmuch as the principle concerned here was the same as that which Tiso ordered to be applied even in regards to the other minorities, not even excluding the Germans themselves. It has been ascertained, e.g. , that in official State positions the Germans could not occupy more than 5 percent of them (K. Culen , op. cit., p. 432); the same applied in regards to the "aryanization" of Jewish enterprises - their participation was limited percentually (J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 238). 77. The actual number of "Presidential exceptions" granted by Tiso has thus far not been accurately ascertained. Some authors estimate the number "above 9,000" (J. Pauco, who bases his account on the statements of lawyers during the Tiso trial; op. cit., p. 323); Dr. J. A. Mikus gives the figure 9,964 without, however, quoting any document or source (op . cit., p. 135); Minister Stephen Hassik estimated "about 15,000" (manuscript in author's possession). The report of J. Luther to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, indicates a greater number; according to that report, at that time 35,000 Jews in Slovakia were already safeguarded "by special legitimation" (G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390); a greater number is also indicated by the fact that the presiding judge of the National Court in Bratislava, Dr. Igor Daxner, in the trial against Dr. Tiso and his associates, did not allow an accurate ascertainment of the number of "exceptions"; he did this as a rule whenever it came to ascertaining matters that were favorable for Dr. Tiso (compare K. Culen, op. cit.). 78. Already on March 23, 1942, Dr. Tiso had Monsignor John Postenyi present the question to the State Council to sound out the ground and to gain a basis for his further intervention, which he later realized by means of the parliament (Dr. Zabkaj, in the National Court in Bratislava, March 15, 1947, according to mimeographed reports of the Slovak Press Bureau, Bratislava). 79. Typical is the example of Nitra Province, which in 1940-1944 was administered by Stephen Hassik, where the Jews were consistently protected and where, in 1943, the administrator, even though �22 SLOVAKIA not present, was able to obstruct the transfer of a certain number of Jews into Germany even after the action had begun (Manuscript in author's hands). 80. J. Pauco Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe), op. cit., p. 322. SOURCES: CIANO, Galeazzo: Diario - Volume primo, 1939-1940; Milano, Rizzoli, 1946; L'Europa verso la catastrofe; 184 colloqui con Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Sumner Welles, Rustu Aras, Stoiadinovic, Goring, Zog, Francois-Poncet ecc. verbalizzati da Galeazzo Ciano, con 40 documenti diplomatici inediti; (Verona), A. Mondadori, 1948. CULEN, Konstantin: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu); Middletown, Pa. , Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947-1948; 2Vols. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN :POLICY 1919--1939, Third Series; London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. DURCANSKY, Ferdinand: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, Vol. 1, Biela kniha; Buenos Aires, Slovensky Oslobodzovaci Vybor, 1954. GILLER, Agaton, Z podr6zy po kraju slowackim; Lw6w, Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1876. ·HAssiK, Stefan: Prispevok O rieseni iidovskej otazky V Sloven• skei republike (unpublished manuscript). INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAffiS: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews; New York, 1943. LES ARCHIVES SECRETES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE: Documents traduits de l' allemand par Michael TOURNIER; Paris, Librairie Plon, 1950. Les Juives en Europe 1939-1945; Paris, CDJC, 1947. MIKUS, Joseph A., La Slovaquie dans le drame de I' Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 a 1950); Paris, Les Iles d' Or, 1955. POKORNY, Rudolf: Z potulek po Slovensku; Praha, 1884-1885, 2 Vols .. RAPPORT DU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIXROUGE sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 - 30 juin 1947); Geneve, 1948. REITLINGER, Gerald: The Final Solution. The Attempt to Ex• ter~inate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945; London, Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953. SIDOR, Karol: ~est' rokov pri Vatikane; Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. STEINER, Frederick: The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry; Bratislava, 1949; (Documentation Centre CUJCR). TISO, Jozef : Obhajobna rec pred Narodnym sudom v Bratislave dna 17. a 18. marca 1947; edited by Dr. Jozef PAUCO : Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe; Passaic, N. J ., Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952. PERIODICALS: ETUDES, Paris. GARDISTA, Bratislava-Zilina. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milano. RIVISTA DI STUD! POLITIC! INTERNAZIONALI, Firenze. SLOVAK, Bratislava. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Berlin. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1957, Vol. 7 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 22), March 1957.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 23), June 1957.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 24-25), September-December 1957.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Pub I ished VOL. V II quart erly by the Slovak League SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER, 195 7 of America NO. 3-4(24-25) DR. JOSEPH TISO AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN SLOVAKIA MILAN S. DURI CA The fact that, during the period when Dr. Joseph Tiso was at the head of the Slova)k Republic as its president, there ,w ere "liqttidated" in an inhumane manner, in Nazi concentration camps, per.haps also severa1 tens of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, has tempted many authors either to hold Dr. Tiso directly responsible for these crimes, or at -least to consider this point as t,h e real weaJkness of Tiso's policy and his defense< 1 >. We are convinced that the so1ution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia is a very complicated proiblem and, therefore, it is necessary to gather in an objective study all existing documents so that the _true state of affairs might become known (2) . While awaiting the results of such a study, we are attempting here to focalize some of the actualities which already h ave been documented - facts which can put some light on definite, shadowy sides of this problem and also note in what direction it is necessary to move in making a further study so that we might arrive at an objective statement of the facts that had taken iplace and thus also at a correct moral evaluation of them. J EW RY IN S LOVAK IA Already in the past century, native and foreign observers were stunned by the great influx of Jews to Hungary and especially to the part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks from time immemorial. While Caplovic noted 6,850 J ews in the Trencin area h efore 1829, according to. the census of 1869 there already were 13,365 of them among 237,702 SlavaJks. Sveto,z ar Hurban, writing in 1881, said: A hundred years ago, there were 75,098 Jews in Hun- 2 SLOVAKJA gary; 55 years later there were already 241,632 of them (the increase burdened Slovakia mostly); in 1'870 they numbered 552,133 and now there are more than 600,000 of them in Hungary!" (Slovenske Pohl'ady, 1881, p. 291). The Czech writer Rudolph Pokorny, who reproduces these figures from direct eX:perience, describes the methods of Jewish immigrants in SlovaJkia as parasitical and exploitative (3). It would be very interesting to study in detaril the relations between the influx of Jews to Slovakia by the strengthening of their economic position and the economic decline orf the Slovak in1halbitants which resulted in an increasing exodus of Slovaks into foreign lands especially to the United States. According to our impressions from Hterature already reviewed, such a study would most li!kely lead to the conclusion that the exodus of the Sl()IVaks was in part caused by the great influx of Jews into rSl()IVaJkia. The strengthened economic positions of t:he Jews in Slovakia gave them the opportunity to exert stronger politicai influence and to propagate their ideology. A Polish observer A:gaton GiHer, ,w riting in 1876, described how the Jews in Slovalkia systematically worked against the Catholic Church and against Christianity in general( 4) under the aegis of the liberalism that was preached lby t:he Hungarian government ,o f the same Colman Tisza who, at the same time (1875) , denied the fact that the Slovak nation existed.(5). Jif we bear in mind the eX:tent and the constant increase of these mentioned effects of the Jewish minority in Slovak,ia, we shall more readily understand the spontaneous psychological reaction of the intelligentsia and the broad masses of the SloviaJk people. This reaction expressed itself, first of aill, in response to the tolerant nature of the SlovaJks and the fact that they laciked means of -power, in a blood-perspir~ng effort to save their own economic situation, ( with dollars made in American mines, the Slovak peasant tried to secure his livelihood in his native 'land) , then in t:he effort to emancipate themselves from dependence on the Jews in commerce to provide the daily necessities of life (by establishnig self-help cooperatives), amd also by an intensive building of institutions to preserve SLOVAKIA 3 and •f .urther their original national culture both in a general and also in a specifically Christian sense (it suffices to mention the -Matica .Slovenska •a nd the Society of St. Adalbert). The situation did not change substantially even after the c,r eation oif the Czecho-Slova:k Republic in 1918(6). In 1923, a !French observer wa'S amazed \by the dis:proportion., ate preponderance of Jewish students in the universities and trade schools(7) and he foresaw that the Jews would thus soon capture the best positions in the new State(8). This prediction was if'll'lfilled, especiaUy a'S far as Slovakia was concerned. After the Vienna Arbitration, when the Jews constituted only 3.3'5 % of the population in S1ov,alkia(9), they owned almost one-half of the entire nation.a{ wealth(l0) and occupied most of the econ.omicaHy and civically important pwbl:i!c functionsO1). That this fact influenced the daily press and cultural production in general is evidence which needs no special proof(J2). It was only natural that the Slovak with all his legendary peace-loving characteristics, lbore the situation with difficulty; and the :Slovalk demands for autonomy, whicih characterized Slovak activities in the twenties and thirties of thi:s century, were accompanied by demands for a solution of the Jewish !problem. The current of anti-Semitism, which had overtalken many countries on the initiative of German Nazism, even such countries in whi·c h objectively suppositions fo'!" anti-Jew,i sh feeling were really insignificant if not directly fictitious, definitely did 1ha;ve some inf1uence even in 'Slova;kia(13). But who could stop Hitler at that time? It is not the fau~t •o f the Slovalks that many arguments of anti-Jewish :propaganda, originating outside of Slovalkia but ascribed to ,Slovakia, found at iJeast partial su!bstantiation in fact. THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Tiso took over the government of Sl01Vakia under the most difficult circumstances. His first worry was to preserve order and to prevent arbitray acts of usurpers even in the so,l ution of the Jewish .problem<14). Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, whose public opinion 1 SLOVAKIA already for a longer time impatiently demanded radical regulations with regard to the privileged Czec,h and Jewish minority in Slovarkia(15), Dr. Tiso sought a legal solution of the matter already in federated Czecho-Slovakia(l6), as well as after March 14, 1919, in the Slova;k Republic. For an objectively moral evaluation of Tiso's conduct in the solution of the Jewish problem in .Slovakia, is is necessary to clearly distinguish ,various time periods, during which the legal and practical possibilities of Dr. Tiso to decide this question personally changed substantially. 1. From October 6, 1938, to October 26, 1939: Dr. Joseph Tiso, as Prime Mini:ster of the Slo,vaJk Go,vernment, had broad ;possiibilities oif legislative and executive intrative and, therefore, also dir,e ct, personal responsibility in this regard(17 ). 2. From October 26, 1939, to July 28, 1940: As President of the Slova:k Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso could intervene in the legislative acti,viby of the Assembly and influence the executive power reserived to the government, which was responsible to the Assembly and not to the President, only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the S'lovaJk Republic(18) . During this ,p eriod, we cannot regard Dr. Tiso directly res,ponsible for the various initiatives in the solution of the Jewis'h problem, but only for the acts of his office as prescrilbed by the Constitution: whether and how he used the rights of intervention., ·a s defined 'by the Constitution, in regard to legislative and exec,utirve acts which required his appm,val. For the latter, as head of the State, Dr. Tiso carries the responsibility, dividing it with the respective Constitutional organs. 3. From July 28, 1940, to August 30, 1944: at the Salziburg meeting with Germany's intervention in the internal affairs of 'Slova'kia(19) - Dr. Tiso lost a definite part of the effective possibilities to exercise his Constitutional rights in regard to persons who were forced by Hitler into the Slovaik Government, especially with regard to expressed demands of the Germans upon the Slova;k Government(20). Such was the problem of e~pelling or liquidating the Jew:? <21) . In this period we can hold Tiso as responsible, as in the previous period, only in proportion 1 1 SLOVAKIA 5 to the effective possibilities of free action which remained open to him after !Hitler's intervention at Salzburg. 4. From August 30, 1944, to April 5, 1945: Slovakia was to a great extent a battleground, where actual governmental power was exercised by various fighting units, most of the time completely independent of civil governmental organs, nay even expressly in opposition to them. (22). Here the responsibility of Dr. Tiso is limited to those acts, which - aliWays within the extent of this Constitutional rights and duties - took ·p lace on the territory and at ra time when the Government of the SlovaJk Republic still go;verned there and had effective 1possibility to exercise its power. TISO'S SOLUTION Despite the critical political - internal and international - situation and the revolutionary events of October, 1938, and of March, 1939, with his resolute influence, Dr. Joseph Tiso checked all violent intervention of incited masses of ,people in the solution of the Jewish problem (23) and consistently in;volked a legal courne to- solve this problem. Such a course, while it secured for the Slovaks time for the necessary study of the various aspects of the complicated situation and for a democratic negotation .o f various motions, with regard to the Jews themselves, it eliminated the typically Nazi factor of surprise(2-!), giving them time and opportunity to prepare themselves psychologically and to make necessary provisions, including financial(25) in the face of the new situation. After such a preliminary preparation, the first Slo;vruk governmental regulation was issued April 30, 1939, with the force of law, the object of which was to solve the Jewish pro1blem (26). This regulation defined the concept of a confessional and civic viewpoint, without considering racial motives at all. Its aim was to reduce the disproportionate preponderance of Jews in the economic life of Slovakia. The Jews could continue to manage their enterprises if they allowed a 51 % per cent ,participation of Slovaks the 51 % not being confiscated, but lbought in a regular manner by Slovak participants (shareholders). The participation of Jews in the legal, medical, and other important 6 SLOVAKIA and profitable professions was to be regulated gradually in proportion to the total number of the Jewish minority. Besides this, the Slovak Government of Dr. Joseph Tiso supported. the voluntary emigration of Jews to Palestine in all possible ways< 27) . If we consider all the facts of the matter objecttvely, we must admit that in these regulations there really was nothing w'hich, under the given circumstances, would exceed the normal competency of a legislator that did not emanate from the natural law itself, or that would be opposed to the principles of justice and humanity(28). The first 'S lovak resolution of the J ewish question - and tihe only one which, in the full sense, we can call Tiso's solution - contained and realized the attributes proposed by Tiso when he ,proclaimed. that "t'he Jewish question in Slovakia shall be solved justly, socially, and humanly"( 29) . THE SLOVAK "JEWISH LAW" These :provisions clearly, but not altogether effectively because they left wide possibilities to evade the law(30), proved to be insufficient in attaining their aim. 'Dherefore, but probably also under German pressure(31), the Slovak Parliament prepared. a new so-catled "Jewish Law," which was approved on iFeb11uary 29, 1940(32). Fundamentally, this law differed little from the previous provision; it defined more accurately many details and fixed the principle of participation o.f the Jews in economic, civic, and cultural life in proportion to their number of the tdtal population, that is, 4 percent(33) . The confessional and civic principle remained in force, therefore not that of racial discrimination; so did the principle of selling 51 % of the shares of Jewish ente11prises to companion SloJVaks freely chosen lby them. This .principle of "Aryani:zation" Dr. Tiso defended consistently, even by using his constitutional authority as President(34) . GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE "JEWISH CODE" It aippears t'hat even these new legal dispositions were not sufficient in practice to attain the goal. Several loopholes were left open for escape from the consequences of SLOVAKIA 7 the [aw - and those affected naturally did not hesitate to use them in every way(35) - so t:Jhat the more radical circles in Slovakia expressed their dissatisfaction with such a solution. However, it was chiefly in Germany that the Slovak solution of the Jewish question was bitterly criticized as being basiically in conflict with the German Jewish !aws(36). It was this consistent originality and independence of Dr. Tiso and his government in regard to the so1ution of the Jewish question that was one of the reasons for intervention o,f Adol'ph Hitler in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic at SalzJburg on July 28, 1940(37). There Dr. Tiso was forced to drop Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, who collorborated with him in the independent solution of the Jewish question. Dr. Vojtech T,uik,a, who was ,g reatly influenced by the Germans, was forced on tJhe Slova,k Government as Minister of Fo·r eign Affairs against the will of President Tiso(38), as was journalist Alexander Mach, who became the executor of German dictates especially in the Jewish question as Minister of the Interior(39) . For Dr. Joseph Tiso, Salzburg meant personally such a blow that he was determined to, tender his resignation( 40). It was only at the insistence of moderate SloivaJk ciroles, nay, even the Jews themselves, that he remained at his post to use his authority to check the radical group which was under the influence of the Germans(41). Tiso's position after SalaJbur,g, therefore, became substantially a defensi'Ve one: not only did he lose in notable measure the possibility of concrete intiative in regard to the Jewish question, but also his constitutional authority of intervention was ,partially reduced by t:Jhe facts of this new political situation. Thus it happened that on September 10, Prime Minister Tuika could force the parliament to pass an enabling law for the solution of the Jewish question by the government. This "emandpated" ,goivernment of Dr. T,uka issued in the form of a goivernment regulation - without the signature of the President of the Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - the so-called "Jewish Code"< 42 >, Wihich copied the Ger~ man Nuremberg Laiw. Apparently the Germans were de- 8 SLOVAKIA termined to impose Hitler's order in SlovaJkia - the same imperial imposition of Hitler's Germaniy to which all the governments of states in the German sphere of influence had succumbed. In comparison with the Jewish laws of Germany and the other States (iltaly, France, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Holland, Denmark, Norway - and even annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the General Governorship of Poland), the "Jewish Code" of S1ovakia contained two lucid points which were hers exclusive ly: the first reserved to the Preside nt of the Repulblic the right of direct administrational "exception" of anyone from the power of this law <43), while the second confirmed the validity of all exce ptions alre ady granted according to the aforementioned Slovak law(44 ). These two paragraphs, leaving tJhe head of the State an open possibility to protect in the face of an avalanche of force which evidently it was impossible to oppose, were the motive why Dr. Joseiph Tiso finally decided not to resign his office after the .promulgation of the "Jewish Code"< 45 ). PRESIDENT TISO'S STAND The question was a real "ca:sus conscientiae," which today ,w e can reconstruct in its main outlines. Dr. Tiso was opposed to any violent solution of the Jewish question; he was ready to .p rotest against it by resigning his office. The following realities, however , came into ,c onsideration: if Tiso did resign, it was c ertain that Tu.ka would be put into his office - and it was generally !known that Tu!ka was strongly under German influences. I,f this would have happened, not only all the Jews of SlovaJkia would ha'Ve been completely subject to German inte:vventions, but even government power of all Slovakia would practically have passed ()IVer completely into German hands and this w·o uld have had catastrophic consequences for the entire nation. Let it suffice here to mention the forced participation in the war and the system of National 1Socialism promoted b.y Dr. Tutka. Under such circumstances, the resignation o;f Dr. Tiso would have meant deserting from a position of responsi- SLOVAKIA 9 bility, disappointing the h0ipes of all the people who sa,w in him the salvation of the nation in a critical world situation and a ,g uarantee aigainst the 'Very actual ideological danger of Nazi,sm(46). By retaining t:Jhe funcUon o.f the President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso had a hoipe not only of continuing the defensive policy of Slova!kia a,gainst Nazism, but a:lso to sarve, if not all, at least as many as possible Jews of Slovakia who were persecuted by Nazism. Were these ihoipes however, sUJbstantiated? The answer to this question is very impo,r tant for the moral qualification of the stand of Dr. Joseph Tiso and thereby of his entire relationship to the proiblem orf the Jews in SlovaJkia. It is not difficult to answer the first part of the question: It has been proved that by remaining President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso not only sruved the SlovaJk nation from threatened occupation and division, from the flood of Nazi ideolo,gy, from most of the economic and social consequences of the world rwar, but, despite the exceptional circumstances, he also organized Slovakia legally, culturally and economically as an independent State and thereby demonstrated t:Jhat Sloiva,kia had all the ;prerequisites orf developmernt as an independent State. Under his guidance Slovalk ia attained "brilliant results and the elan of autonomous life was reaHy wonderful"< 47). So that we could answer the second part of the question, we must objecti'Ve1y examine the cause of Jewish provisions and their exeoution in Slovakia in the third and fourth periods (1941-1945). After the promulgation of the "Jewish Code," the Jews were supposed to be transferred from Slovakia to the territory between the Visla and t:Jhe Bug in former Poland, where there was to be found some kind of state creation reserved for them. Here it is necessary to, note that the project of a separate territory for European Jews presented a solution which was seriously studied not only in Ckrmany( 48), but ,a iso iby other powers, such as, for example, the United States (4 9). To:l. order to ascertain the situation the SlovaJk Gov•e rnment sent to Poland a representatiive of the Ministry of the Interior, Isidore Koso, to whom they 1, 1 10 SLOVAKIA actually did show the Jewish city of Sosnowitz, Oppel, with its own administration, police, etc. Well, even .after this the SlovaJk Government did not begin to transfer Jews, but arranged labor camps for them in Slovakia, where they were to be gradually concentrated. This course, which Reitlinger explains as motivated by economy(50), is apparently 1b etter ex.plained as a reaction of the Slovak Government to the Memorandum of the Slovak Catholic Bishops of October 7, 1941(51), and to the reminders of the Holy See of Novemfber 12, 1941 (52). In both these doouments ecclesiastical representatives protested against the racist principle which inspired governmentrul regulation No. 198--1941 of the Slova!k Code, especiaUy however rugainst those ,p oints which were out of line with the teachings of the Church (outlawing mixed marriages, ex:pulsion from schools) and called upon the SlovaJk G()IVernment to recall or at least change the mentioned regulations in this seinse. The Holy See, wihich was for apparent reasons generally regarded as "the best informed political center of the world"(53 ), at the same time manifested its understanding for the situation of the ,Slov,a;k Government when it concluded its note with these words,: "The Holy See hopes that the Slovak Government, as long as the government regulations are not repealed or amended, will try to ex;plain and to validate the issued regulations in suoh a measUTe and in such a manner so that they mig1ht become as far as is possible least harmful to the needs (demands) of Catholic conscience"(54). These words appear to be the norm and therefore the explanation of the course not only of Dr. Tiso, but also that of the :SloIVaJk gOIVemment followed in practice until the end of their activities. Thus it was that despite the Nuremberg t01J1e of the "Jewish Code," the f,unda:mental :points of that code were not practically applied until March 10, 1942. Thus far it has not been conclusively ascertained, whether under German pressure or not(5,5), Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach issued the decree on March 7, 1942, which confined all the Jews of Slovakia to their homes until their transfer to the East(5&) . This provision, which was soon followed by the first transports of Jews from Slo- SLOVAKIA 11 vakia to Galicia (March 10, 1942), inspired a strong opposition of public opinion, new protests of ecclesiastical circles (.57), nay, even dissent of the rest of the members of the government.(5<8). But it has been safely ascertained that Germany did pressure the Slovak Government to adopt the solution of the Jewish question in the form of transferring the Jews which had been accepted by the other States (Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Hungary). To this end Heydrich himself came to Bratislava on April 10, 1942, to tell Tuka that the Jews of Slovakia would be transferred to the Lublin area where they would be settled permanently. Separate settlements were to be arranged for baptized Jews (59). After repeated insistence and assurances from the German side that Jewish families would be respected and that they would be dealt with decently(·60), the Slovak Government began to send to the East the members of the families of those young, able-to-work Jews who had been transported the previous month. In this second intervention of the Slovak Government, it is possible to see an effort to correct in some way the mistake of the first transfer by which many Jewish families were broken up. It became tragic that the promises of Heydrich and Eichmann were the treacherous trap which was not without effect(&l). At that time the Slovak Government could not know about the real intentions of the Nazis: Wisliceny himself found this out, as we shall see, only several months later. Nevertheless Dr. Tuka insisted that he might send an inspection mission to ascertain on the spot just how the transferred Jews were being dealt with. The Slovak Government presented this demand also formally in the form of a note addressed to the German Government(,62) - but received only an evasive reply. It was this, most likely, that roused suspicions on the Slovak side. Therefore already on May 15, 1942, the Slovak parliament approved a constitutional law by which it practically repealed the power given the government in September, 1941, and legally set the course for the problem of emigration. The substance of this law was, however, the practical cessation of deportations; the law, that is, sanctioned all the previously granted presidential and minis- 12 SLOVAKIA terial "exceptions" and established a new general exception for Jews baptized before March 14, 1939(63) . Furthermore, it established that Jews, affected by the law, would be concentrated in labor camps in Slovakia. In July, 1942, when the representative of the Holy See in Bratislava notified President Tiso that the Jews in the Lublin area were being murdered, Dr. Tiso with absolute determination insisted on the realization of a Slovak inspection mission - or else there would be no further transfer of Jews from Slovakia. In August, Wisliceny went to Berlin with the matter. There Eichmann told him that Tiso was asking an impossible thing because those Jews were no longer alive. Thereupon he showed him a secret order, issued by the will of Hitler and signed by Himmler, according to which the entire Jewish race was to be gradually destroyed(64). Wisliceny returned to Bratislava again with an evasive reply. After this deportations from Slovakia were completely stopped. From what has been said it is quite clear that the Slovak Government allowed the transfer of a part of the Jews from Slovakia under the imperialistic pressure of Germany - in the face of guarantees to respect basic human rights and humanitarian treatment. As soon as there arose a reason to doubt that the Nazis were fulfilling the guarantees given, the parliament of the Slovak Republic with the strength of a constitutional law stood up to protect the Jewish citizens of Slovakia. The fact that it is necessary to explain the law of May 15, 1942, in this maner, is also supported by the following realities : 1. The motive for voting this law was the merciless exportation of the Jews on the basis of the decree of Minister Mach of March 7, 1942 (65). 2. By this law, constitutionally, were sanctioned all the exceptions granted by the President of the Republic and the resort Ministers ; also a new general exception was established by which a confessional criterion was given priority - which the Germans sharply criticized already in 1940 as opposed to the racist principles of Nuremberg. 3. The real aim of concentrating the Jews, who did not have the mentioned exceptions, in Slovak labor camps was SLOVAKIA 13 to save them from possible transfer elsewhere on the initiative of radical circles around Minister Mach behind which stood the power of Germany. This was evident from the way these camps were set up - the living conditions of which were but little different from complete freedom(66). 4. Despite repeated insistence from the side of the Germans, nay, even despite the intervention of Hitler himself with President Tiso(67), Slovakia did not retreat from her position and protected the Jews with all means of political tactics(68) and her own State power. 5. After September 1, 1944, when Slovakia became a battlefield and governmental power was factually exercised by the fighting armies, despite German occupation of practically the whole of Slovakia, the new Minister of National Defense and State Security of the Slovak Republic, Stephen Hrussik, ordered the abolishment of all concentration camps and of all anti-Jewish administrational regulations(69). 6. When German army commanders defied the above order and by force transported to Germany all Jews that fell into their hands during military operations, the new Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Stephen Tiso, energetically protested to the German Government(70). 7. Later, when the commander of the occupation army and "the only representative of the Reich in Slovakia"(71), SS-General Berger forced the Slovak Government regulation in regard to concentrating the Jews (Nov. 16, 1944), the provision had practically no effect because the Slovak Government and Slovak officials silently agreed that the Jews be free to hide themselves(72). From the given facts it is quite clear that despite some drastic interventions of the Nazis and their several Slovak collaborators in the spring of 1942, for which they gained partial accord of the Slovak Government by cunning, the great part of the Jewish minority could remain in Slovakia and there be effectively protected to such an extent that the Slovak Republic in certain periods was regarded as a relative asylum even for the Jews from other countries, especially those from Poland and Hungary(73). The stand of the Slovak Republic in regard to the "definite solution" (Endlosung) of the Jewish question, pres- 14 SLOVAKIA sured by the Nazis, immediately from the first moments of suspicion about the real aim of these " regulations," was unanimously and consistently so rejective that it really presents "the story of the first outright failure of the 'Final Solution' and a failure at a time when there was no glimmer of hope for Jewry in Axis-controlled Europe" (74). The fact that the small Slovak State, even though it could not prevent all violence, knew how to stand up against it - and with such a determination that an objective historian can today talk about "a challenge to war" and about "a revolt" of the Slovak Government(75) - proves t hat t he Slovak Government even in this r egard not only did not accept without reservations the principles of Hitler's National Socialism, but even knew how to defend itself against them, nay, even to repudiate them forcefully, as long as it was not completely overpowered by the brutal preponderance of military occupation and frontal operations. This important fact has thus far not been properly evaluated in world literature which concerns itself with this historical period. If we pause now in our search for the reasons of the described facts, we shall come to the conclusion that one of the most decisive factors in the course of events in Slovakia was the personality of President Dr. Joseph Tiso. To this conclusion we are led by the following facts: 1. While Dr. Joseph Tiso held the initiative of solving the Jewish question in Slovakia( we saw that he solved it in a sense of strict justice, in a legal way, and in a most human manner. 2. As President of the Republic he used his constitutional right in order that the laws proposed by the parliament remained within the confines of the same principles which were in opposition to the Nazi anti-Jewish laws( 7,6). 3. When he could not prevent the issuance of the "Jewish Codex," he reserved the right for himself to limit its effectiveness as much as possible by personal "exceptions." That this was the intent of the mentioned paragraph 225 is confirmed by the fact ascertained by the court that Dr. Joseph Tiso used his authority as a matter of principle for every case placed before him, by which in a short time he SLOVAKIA 15 liberated a great part of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia from the "Jewish Codex"(77). 4. It was generally known that the initiative of proGerman politics was held by the ministers forced on Tiso (Dr. Tuka and A. Mach) - and that there were basic conflicts between them and President Tiso. If, therefore, the Slovak parliament could pass the constitutional law of May 15, 1942 - which was in fact aimed against German Nazis and the executors of their influence in Slovakia this is understandable only if we allow that it did so not only within the support of the authority of the President of the Republic and the chairman of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, but, as it has been safely ascertained: directly on his initiative (78) . 5. Finally, only such a consistently anti-Nazi stand of President Tiso in regard to the Jewish question can explain the fact that, even despite the regulations of the government and the Minister of the Interior, some of the regional representatives of state power could during that entire time take positions of open protection of the Jewish inhabitants, nay, even actually intervene in the initiative of government trustees in the Jewish question on territory administered by them( 79) . CONCLUSION As we emphasized at the outset, in this study we were interested in focalizing some of the facts that are important and pertinent for a correct evaluation of the relationship of Dr. Joseph Tiso to the Jewish problem in Slovakia. Intentionally we have not touched upon some undoubtedly interesting and relatively important aspects of this complicated problem which require a separate study (e.g., the question of statistical data, the question of the legal and moral side of the individual regulations and respective responsibilities, etc.) . This study, we believe, does prove that we cannot honestly regard Dr. Joseph Tiso as a persecutor of the Jews or as a collaborator of the Nazis in their inhuman work of genocide of the Jewish nation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that the President of the Slovak Republic did prove himself an eminent opponent of every injustice against the Jews, whether perpetrated by 16 SLOVAKIA the German Nazis or by others in their service. Dr. Tiso did everything in his power to save them - and we say, without fear of contradiction, that he did for the Jews what no other statesman dared to do in the Europe controlled by Hitler at that time. If, despite this, a part of the Jews of Slovakia was taken out of Slovakia by violent intervention of brute force, it is certain that this happened without any direct participation of Dr. Joseph Tiso - nay, against his will - and, hence, we cannot hold him responsible for it. Dr. Tiso found himself face to face with a current "which it was possible to impede and probably even to influence, but not stop," as he himself had said during his trial in Bratislava <SO) . There is no evidence to prove that Dr. Tiso aided or abetted, motivated or approved in any way, the brutal treatment of Jews in Slovakia or anywhere else. To lie in the face of death is not easy. So much the less can we allow that Dr. Joseph Tiso could do so - the same Dr. Tiso who could proclaim before the entire nation that never in his life did he utter an untruth intentionally. And he did not fear that someone might be able to prove the opposite. Would that the world were managed by politicians and statesmen who would follow the noble example of the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso! REFERENCES: 1. The first opm10n is practically current in encyclopedic and scientific literature; some Slovak authors are inclined to the second; e.g., Th. J. Zubek ("Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality" - The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Nov. 1955, p. 125). 2. Dr. Joseph Pauco: Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Passaic, N. J ., 1952; pp. 323-323. 3. R. Pokorny: Z potulek po Slovensku, Prague, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 56-. 4. It was not by accident that the German translation of Rabbi Benjamin Halvey's Hebrew pasquinade "Das leben Jesu. Zurn ersten Male historisch bearbeitet nach neuentdeckten jiidisch orientalischen Quellen" was published in Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1875. According to the translator, who personally offered it to Giller in Trencianske Teplice, it surpassed by far the dilettante attempts of Strauss, Voltaire and other blasphemous pseudo-historians. See A. Giller - Z podrozy po kraju slowackim" - Lw6w, -876; pp. 197-. 5. Th. G. Locher: Die nationale Differenzeirung und lntegrie• rung der Slowaken und Tschechen in ihren geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 - Haarlem, 1931; p. 196. 6. J. A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe - Paris, 1955; p. 133. 7. While Hungary, for example, had a "numerus clausus" estab- SLOVAKIA 17 lished by law, in Czecho-Slova kia, where the number of J ews was estimated at 3--4 percent of the population, the secondary schools became practically the exclusive domain of the Jews. In Prague itself over half the students were Jewish; the State Gymnazium for girls bad 163 Jewish pupils out of a total of 248; in several gymnaziums for boys the relationship of Jews to non-Jews was: 116 out of 254; 123 out of 250; 185 out of 240. At the university for every three nonJewish professors there was one Jewish professor. See: J. Boubee Tcheco-Slova quie - in "ETUDES," Paris, Vol. 60, No. 174, 1923; pp. 225-. 8. Ibidem. 9. G. Reitlinger: The Final Solution - London, 1953; p. 386. 10. The value of Jewish properties was evaluated at 3,150 million Slovak Crowns; besides this, the Jews controlled over 12,000 industrial enterprises with a capital of 1,250 million Slovak Crowns, especially the textile industry where they controlled 90 percent oi the production. The situation was much the same in the wood and alcohol industries. See the article "La Slovacchia e gli Ebrei" in the periodical RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milan, Vol. 8, No. 34, 1942; p , 902. 11. Ibidem: 72 percent of the lawyers and 64 percent of the medics were Jews, while 58 percent of all restaurant and liquor concessions was in their hands. 12. See the statement, e.g., of P . R. Mikus in the SLOVAK, Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 34, February 10, 1939; p. 1. 13. Here we do not have in mind only States, such as Italy, for example, which did adopt various anti-Jewish regulations. Count Ciano noted that on January 13, 1939, in a conversation with Mussolini, Chamberlain expressed grave fears that "further immigration of Jews into England would incite anti-Semitism which is already being planned in many sectors of the country." Besides the Jewish minority in England was negligible: according to Chamberlain , 60,000 (Mussolini stated that it was over 200,000) - G. Ciano, "Diario, 1939-1940," Milan, 1946; p. 22. - In regard to the anti-Jewish mood in other States, see "Les archives secre de la Wilhelmstras se" - Vol V, Book II, Paris, 1954, Documents Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-. 14. Dr. Tiso stressed this in general in his first speech after taking over government in Slovakia, Oct. 8, 1938 (K. Culen: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava," Middletown, Pa., 1948; p. 215). Later, on March 15, 1939, in a broadcast he warned all who would be guilty of such acts and threatened that the government would prosecute all culprits ("SLOVAK" - Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 63, 1939; p . 4). 15. "SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1939. 16. "SLOVAK" - Vol XXI, No. 28, Feb. 3, 1939; p. 3. Compare also the government declaration of Feb. 22, 1939 ("SLOVAK," Vol. XXI, Nos. 44-45, Feb. 22-23, 1939). 17. Speech of Dr. Tiso at the Eighth Convention of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at Trencin, Oct. 1, 1939 ("SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 227, Oct. 3, 1939; pp. 3-4). 18. An analysis of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic by H. Schimani: "Die Verfassun~ der Slowakischen Republik" - Vienna, 1947. 19. Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov - Vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1954; p. 196. 20. Dr. J. Pauco: op. cit., p. 55. 18 SLOVAKIA Dr. F. Durcansky: op. cit., p. 237. J. A. Mikus: op. cit., pp. 185-; F. Durcansky: op. cit.; pp. 475: In an official pronouncement, Feb. 21, 1939, Tiso declared: "It is proof of the maturity of our nation that despite all incitements the Slovak nation waited for the legal solution of the Jewish question" (stenographic report of the second meeting of the Slovak Assembly, Bratislava, Feb. 21-23, 1939, p. 9). 24. That this was the expressed intention of Dr. Tiso is attested to by his statement to the correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, J. Frankel, Feb. 8, 1939: "The coming Jewish law will certainly serve the purpose that the Jews might not be caught by surprises and would know just how far they will be able to go in economic life" (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). 25. Memorandum of the British Consul in Bratislava, Mr. P. Pares, Feb. 3, 1939, in the "DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939" - Third Series, Vol. IV, No. 97, 1951, London; p. 96. 26. No. 63-39 SLOVAK CODE; No. 102-39 Ur. nov. (Official News). 27. It approved the transfer and emigration plan of Dr. S. E. Soskin (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). Innsbruck28. Compare, e.g., J. Messner: Das Naturrecht Vienna, 1950, pp. 365-366 - and: P. Pavan: l.'.uomo nella communita internazionale - Rome, s.d., p. 47. 29. SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3. 30. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, op. cit., p. 902. 31. We did not find documents which would definitely confirm such pressure in this period, but the testimony of F. Durcansky inclines us to believe that pressures were exercised. He said: "secret influences of the Germans did not validate themselves anywhere to such an extent as they did in the attempt to attain the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia according to the desires of the National Socialistic circles. . . . " (Speaking of the period prior to July 28, 1940) - F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. 32. No. 46-40, SLOVAK CODE. 33. Commenting on this law on March 10, 1940, Tiso stressed that we are here concerned "with our own reasonable course. This is not an imitation of foreign patterns." - (SLOVAK, March 13, 21. 22. 23. 1940, p. 3). 34. Thus, e.g., in April, 1940, he returned to the Parliament for renewed debate on the draft of the law about Jewish enterprises with his own remarks and reminders; the parliament then approved the law with Tiso's recommendations on April 25, 1940 (SLOVAK, April 26, 1940), p. 2). 35. The amount which the Jews transferred abroad at that time was estimated at 2,000 million Slovak Crowns. Even in the "Aryan- only ized" enterprises "the Jews frequently remained bosses names changed on paper" (GARDISTA, June 14, 1941, p. 3). 36. Compare the study of the German legal expert for Slovak affairs, K. 0. Rabl, "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsleben in der neuen Slowakei" (in the periodical: ZEITSCHRIFT fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht - Berlin, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1940), which concludes categorically: "The Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically, therefore, according to previous provisions, not solved at all. Mainly the economic and imperial position of Jewry remains the same as it was before" (p. 867). SLOVAKIA 37. 38. 39. 40, 41. l!} F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. K. Culen, op. cit., pp. 263-; p. 480; J . A. Mikus, op. cit. p. 163. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 386. J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 35; K. Culen, op. cit., p. 380. Minister Gejza Medricky's testimony during the Tiso trial ; this is reproduced by K. Culen, op. cit., p. 480. 42. SLOVAK CODE, part 52, No. 198, September 10, 1941. 43. "Jewish Codex" - part X, par. 255. 44. Ibidem, par. 256. 45. J . Pauco, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 323. 46. Compare the testimony of Archbishop Kmet'ko before the National Court in Bratislava, January 6, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit. pp. 369-370. 47. A. Giannini: Monsignor Tiso (in "Rivista di studi politici internazionali" - Firenze, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1952, p. 451); a wealth of documentaton is produced also by F . Durcansky, op. cit., pp. 166-169, 190-248. 48. Dr. Ley, German Minister, informed Count Ciano about the project in Rome, Dec. 6, 1939. In 1940, Ribbentrop told Ciano about Hitler's plan to create a Jewish free state on the island of Madagascar, where all the Jews of Europe were supposed to be concentrated. (l!Europa verso la catastrofe - Verona, 1948; G. Ciano, Diario 19391943, Milan, 1946, Vol. I, p. 280). 49. On December 7, 1938, President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal letter in which he proposed that a part of the south and southwest territory of Abyssinia be reserved for the Jews. Mussolini declared that personally he sympathized with the idea of creating a Jewish state, but decidely not in Abyssinia, nor anywhere in Africa. He proposed Russia, Brazil or the United States of America (Les Archives Secretes de la Wilhelmstrasse, Vol. IV, Les suites de Munich, Paris, 1953, doc. No. 341, pp. 498-500; compare also Vol. V, Book II, Paris, 1954, doc. Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-158). 50. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. -387. 51. Partially reproduced in K. Sidor's "~est' rokov pri Vatik'• ne" - Scranton, Pa., 1947, pp. 135-138. 52. In the note of the State Secretariate to His Holiness, No. 8355-41 , published in Sidor's op. cit., pp. 138-140. 53. W. Theimer: Lexicon der Politik, Bern, 1947, under "Vatikan" - p. 482. 54. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Sidor used the Slovak word "potrebam" (needs) in translating the Italian "esigenze," but the latter would probably be better expressed by "poziadavkam" (demands). 55. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 387. 56. At a press conference, March 27, 1942, Minister A. Mach declared that "the ultimate aim is to transfer all Jews to a territory, which would be ordered for the settlement within the framework of a new European order" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942, p. 3). 57. The Vatican protested with the note of the State Secretariate of His Holiness, No. 2027-42 ,dated March 14, 1942. At the end of March, the Slovak Minister at the Vatican, Karol Sidor, personally was in Bratislava with a demand to stop deportations (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 141-142). 58. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 388; from this reaction, as well as from the declaration of Minister A. Mach at the press conference 20 SLOVAKIA mentioned above (56), it is apparent that the personal intervention of the minister forced by Ribbentrop on Tiso was concerned and/ or his group of Slovak extremists. Mach publicly repudiated "speeches (which implied) that we had been somehow asked from the outside or forced to this solution. We ourselves have undertaken everything possible to have the opportunity to get rid of the Jews" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942). According to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, No. 8.325/ 1/ 42, of May 8, 1942, addressed to the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican (concerning the reply to the mentioned interventions of the Vatican of Nov. 12, 1941, and March 14, 1942), at that time " there were negotiations between the factors of the Slovak Republic and the Greman Reich in regard to the problem of the European Jews," in the sense of which "the Jews of Slovakia would be placed in several areas in the vicinity of Lublin ... where they would remain permanently" (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 142-143). This connection of matters appears to be more probable. 59. F . Steiner: Tragedy of Slovak Jewry - Bratislava, 1949, p. 6; reprod. from G. Reitlinger, op. cit. 60. At the beginning of May, Eichmann negotiated in this sense with Dr. Tuka and A. Mach. 61. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 388. 62. Wisliceny admitted this before the Nuremberg Court The Trial of the Major War Criminals - Vol. ill, pp. 276-278; reprod . .bY G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390). 63. "In practice the way was open in this intensely Catholic country for any professed convert to demand protection" (B. Shub: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews, New York, 1943, p . 54;reprod. by G. Reitlingeh ,op. cit. , p. 390). 64. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390. 65. Compare the testimony of Minister G. Medricky before the National Court in Bratislava, Feb. 21, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit., p . 482. 66. The official report of the International Red Cross describes them thusly: " ... les camps qui presentaient des conditions de nouriture et de logement passables, les internes etaient admis a travailler moyennant salaire dans des conditio se rapprochant de :Ueconomie libre" (Rapport du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge sur son action pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Geneve, 1948, p. 674). 67. After various messengers and plenipotentiaries had pressured Tiso and the Slovak Government, Tiso was called to Salzburg in May, 1943, where Hitler angrily marked the Slovak resolution of the Jewish question 'insufficient." 68. In the light of realities, such would appear to be the various public manifestations (as, e.g., the anti-Jewish speech of Min. A. Mach in Ruzomberok, Feb. 7, 1943) and the conditioned promises of President Tiso (in December, 1943, to Himmler's special agent E. Weesenmayer) which, however, were never fulfilled . Compare Sidor's account, op. cit., pp. 146-147, and G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390. 69. According to unpublished testimonies in manuscript which are in the hands of the author. 70. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 148. 71. It was thus that he presented himself to President Tiso on his arrival to Bratislava "as the accredited agent of Hitler" at the end of August, 1944. See: J . Pauco, op. cit., p. 293. 72. The regulation was formulated as a summons to come to a SLOVAKIA 21 definite place on Nov. 24. A delegate of the International Red Cr oss ascertained on the spot that the summons was answered only by about 50 Jews: "Comme les Autorites slovaques l'avaient d'ailleurs prevu" he relates literally - "les Israelites se cachaient" (Rapport du Comite .. . . op. cit., p. 674). The hidden Jews could be aided not only by the population, but also by the International Red Cross with the help of the Slovak Red Cross and the Catholic Church (p. 675). 73. Intern. Red Cross Report, op. cit., p. 674; F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 239. 74. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 385. 75. "Yet as early as July, 1942, this Government rebelled" writes G. Reitlinger (op. cit., p. 385). We note, apparent as it is from the foregoing, that it is necessary to see this "rebellion" already in the constitutional law of May 15, 1942. The same autor says in another place: "We have seen in the case of Slovakia, how a Government which defied German pressure and abandoned the Final Solution, was forced to return to it, when, on the eve of capitulation to the enemy, the country was occupied by German troops" (p. 412). 76. It is worthy of note here that Tiso's insistence on a per centual participation of the Jews in the economy of Slovakia in relation to their number of the entire population could in no way be regarded as a repressive regulation, inasmuch as the principle concerned here was the same as that which Tiso ordered to be applied even in regards to the other minorities, not even excluding the Germans themselves. It has been ascertained, e.g. , that in official State positions the Germans could not occupy more than 5 percent of them (K. Culen , op. cit., p. 432); the same applied in regards to the "aryanization" of Jewish enterprises - their participation was limited percentually (J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 238). 77. The actual number of "Presidential exceptions" granted by Tiso has thus far not been accurately ascertained. Some authors estimate the number "above 9,000" (J. Pauco, who bases his account on the statements of lawyers during the Tiso trial; op. cit., p. 323); Dr. J. A. Mikus gives the figure 9,964 without, however, quoting any document or source (op . cit., p. 135); Minister Stephen Hassik estimated "about 15,000" (manuscript in author's possession). The report of J. Luther to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, indicates a greater number; according to that report, at that time 35,000 Jews in Slovakia were already safeguarded "by special legitimation" (G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390); a greater number is also indicated by the fact that the presiding judge of the National Court in Bratislava, Dr. Igor Daxner, in the trial against Dr. Tiso and his associates, did not allow an accurate ascertainment of the number of "exceptions"; he did this as a rule whenever it came to ascertaining matters that were favorable for Dr. Tiso (compare K. Culen, op. cit.). 78. Already on March 23, 1942, Dr. Tiso had Monsignor John Postenyi present the question to the State Council to sound out the ground and to gain a basis for his further intervention, which he later realized by means of the parliament (Dr. Zabkaj, in the National Court in Bratislava, March 15, 1947, according to mimeographed reports of the Slovak Press Bureau, Bratislava). 79. Typical is the example of Nitra Province, which in 1940-1944 was administered by Stephen Hassik, where the Jews were consistently protected and where, in 1943, the administrator, even though 22 SLOVAKIA not present, was able to obstruct the transfer of a certain number of Jews into Germany even after the action had begun (Manuscript in author's hands). 80. J. Pauco Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe), op. cit., p. 322. SOURCES: CIANO, Galeazzo: Diario - Volume primo, 1939-1940; Milano, Rizzoli, 1946; L'Europa verso la catastrofe; 184 colloqui con Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Sumner Welles, Rustu Aras, Stoiadinovic, Goring, Zog, Francois-Poncet ecc. verbalizzati da Galeazzo Ciano, con 40 documenti diplomatici inediti; (Verona), A. Mondadori, 1948. CULEN, Konstantin: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu); Middletown, Pa. , Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947-1948; 2Vols. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN :POLICY 1919--1939, Third Series; London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. DURCANSKY, Ferdinand: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, Vol. 1, Biela kniha; Buenos Aires, Slovensky Oslobodzovaci Vybor, 1954. GILLER, Agaton, Z podr6zy po kraju slowackim; Lw6w, Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1876. ·HAssiK, Stefan: Prispevok O rieseni iidovskej otazky V Sloven• skei republike (unpublished manuscript). INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAffiS: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews; New York, 1943. LES ARCHIVES SECRETES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE: Documents traduits de l' allemand par Michael TOURNIER; Paris, Librairie Plon, 1950. Les Juives en Europe 1939-1945; Paris, CDJC, 1947. MIKUS, Joseph A., La Slovaquie dans le drame de I' Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 a 1950); Paris, Les Iles d' Or, 1955. POKORNY, Rudolf: Z potulek po Slovensku; Praha, 1884-1885, 2 Vols .. RAPPORT DU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIXROUGE sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 - 30 juin 1947); Geneve, 1948. REITLINGER, Gerald: The Final Solution. The Attempt to Ex• ter~inate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945; London, Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953. SIDOR, Karol: ~est' rokov pri Vatikane; Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. STEINER, Frederick: The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry; Bratislava, 1949; (Documentation Centre CUJCR). TISO, Jozef : Obhajobna rec pred Narodnym sudom v Bratislave dna 17. a 18. marca 1947; edited by Dr. Jozef PAUCO : Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe; Passaic, N. J ., Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952. PERIODICALS: ETUDES, Paris. GARDISTA, Bratislava-Zilina. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milano. RIVISTA DI STUD! POLITIC! INTERNAZIONALI, Firenze. SLOVAK, Bratislava. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Berlin.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Milan S. Ďurica Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (24-25), September-December 1957 pp. 1-22 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ďurica, Milan S., 1925- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1957 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e7d58f0101dc3bc3c7cbd8a77d42cbea.pdf 7e88960ec02df715f56f9bffea6cd373 PDF Text Text SL OVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents By Dr. Arved Gr e b e rt Geneva, Switzerland L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican daily, published (April 27, 1974) an article by Robert A. Graham, S. J., an American Jesuit, on the policy of the Holy See in regard to anti-Jewish legislation during the second World War in Hitler-dominated Europe. (La Santa Sede e le vittime della guerra.) The author based his conclusions exclusively on material in a volume of diplomatic doc~ments published by the Vatican: Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la seconde guerre mondiale. The aforementioned article touches upon the stand taken by the Slovak government in regulations concerning the Jews which were implemented without exception in all the states that were in the GermanItalian orbit. As a matter of record, neither in Italy, the centuries-old bastion of Catholicism, nor in France, which was headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, a practical Catholic, was the Holy See able to halt discrimination that was officially prescribed by law. The author of the review merely noted the facts relating to the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia without taking into account existing circumstances, very often completely unknown to foreign readers. These were influenced by the geopolitical situation of Slovakia caught in the German-Magyar vise or web. Moreover, Hungary enjoyed a privileged position. At this period of history its policy-makers knew how to take advantage of its political anti-semitic regulations under the domination of the Third Reich. One must take into consideration, too, the overwhelming power pressure imposed upon Slovakia by Germany. No less important in this delicate situation was the fact that Bratislava, the Slovak capital and seat of the government, was located on the very borders of Germany. This was �6 SLOVAKIA a precarious position that could have toppled the Slovak government from power at any moment by a military invasion. Without weighing all these basic realities one cannot begin to understand the policy of President Tiso and the Slovak government in this problem of seeking a solution for the Jewish question during the second World War in Slovakia. It is not our intention on this occasion to discuss the circumstances that brought on anti-Jewish regulations by the government in Slovakia at this particular time. An analysis of this phase of the Slovak past will be the role of a free Slovak historical study which will have free access to and complete use of all existing documents on the basis of a comparative study of all the contemporary events in Europe and local circumstances. Things looked entirely different in Bratislava and at the Vatican, for example. And, likewise, the problems of President Tiso were judged quite differently at the Vatican and German headquarters ( and by Nazi reporters) in Berlin or Bratislava. It will not be out of place, therefore, to illustrate our point of view on this historical problem by citing official statements of a Nazi report of February, 1943, in Bratislava itself. This report on the situation in Slovakia together with a proposal for the future destiny of the Slovak nation in the sphere of Nazi Germany after the expected victorious end of the war was presented to the chief of the SS. bureau. It was top secret, dated February 16, 1943, and sent to the SS. Hauptamt headquarters, whose chief was G. Berger. The latter, in a letter to Heinrich Himler (February 19, 1943 ), the chief of SS. and the police in the Third Reich, informed him of the situation in Slovakia with a supplementary note that a detailed report was being sent to the third department of the main office of national security . The text of this communique appeared in a Slovak translation of the documents which Vilem Precan edited in Bratislava in 1965. (Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty. Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, pp . 45-54 ). We will quote only those paragraphs that refer to Dr. Jozef Tiso and his closest political associates . They quite clearly reflect the attitude of the German Nazis toward the Slovak Republic. In the introduction we read: President Dr. Tiso has ranged wid ely in his politics. According to �SLOVAKIA 7 law he is the leader of the nation and the party, and is the top man in the state. This powerful position was secured with the coop eTation of old associates, the strong support of the clergy and leaders of Catholic Action, and also with the aid of Sidor's followers, and apparently, too, by the backing of recruits from neutral or indifferent sources, such as those of Dr. Karvas. Tiso, a realist, declared himself in favor of the Reich. But internally he leans on elements that are fundamentally hosti1e to Germany and opposed to the ideas of the Third Reich. He is endeavoring to build up Slovakia on the principles of the Catholic Action group, and hence his ultimate objective is a Catholic state. In the beginning his intentions were hidden by a mask. Opportunistic references to national socialism seemed that he was favorably disposed to it, but lately he has thrown off the mask and a frontal attack on national socialism is underway. And a Nazi informer writes further: After Sidor's resignation Tiso and his associates have a free hand. Catholic Action and the clergy are in confrontation with the national guard (Hlinka Guards). Their allies are those who felt they had suffered losses as the result of the establishment of the Slovak state those who had lost rights or privileges, those who had always cooperated with the Jews and were dependent on them, and finally by all the Jews who remained in the country. The national guard obviously could not offer sufficient resistance to this •a lignment without outside help. The result was Salzburg, an agreement that Tiso regarded as foroed upon him and which he never respected. Attached to this offjcial report were addenda in the form of written observations about individual aspects of the Slovak problem in 1943. Supplement 6 was labeled: "State President Dr. Jozef Tiso, Bratislava, February 11, 1943." President Tiso's political profile is drawn and the views of his associates recorded. For example, Ravasz and Dr. Polyak ("another cleric-oriented ally of Dr. Tiso, a full fledged minister."). According to Semi-Goth, Polyak was a Jew and a friend of the Jews. cavojsky, Suroviak and Drobny are listed as Tiso's allies. Liberals Stano, Sokol and Sivak are in Tiso's camp as are Stefan Danihel and Dr. Turcek, industrialists, the report sp,id. "All these," the report continued, "on the basis of their life style and urban environment are opposed to the Reich. It is apparent that the clergy and all the forces of Catholic Action are behind Tiso. From 1941 Tiso won over the party affiliation of the erstwhile followers of Sidor." The Nazi informer continues: Three years ago in response to a radio talk by a Catholic priest, �8 SLOVAKIA R , who advocated social security, Tiso told bim that he was thinking of following the example of Salazar of Portugal in Slovakia. (Salazar was looked upon as a civilian Jesuit who leaned towards the idea of a Catholic state.) The book of a theologian (Dr. Polakovic), Tisov a ruiuka, reflects the views and plans of Tiso in bold outlines. They follow the Catholic idea of a state quite clearly as an objective of Catholic Action. The author upholds the absolute primacy of the Church over the state. Proof of Tiso's state-political views are clearly evidenced by hi.s philosophy of education, the establishment of organizations in support of Catholic Action, etc. A former Jesuit, Misik, is his close advisor. Tiso also actively supported the organization of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the initiator was Dr. Novak, a university professor and well known Pan Slav. Tiso's reaction to the Salzburg Agreement is manifested in his statement that he accepted it "with clenched teeth" because it was forced upon him. He said to Mach who handed in his resignation in December, 1942: "You know where I stand. They forced you upon me. Therefore, it will be better if you present your resignation where you received your appointment." This attitude towards the Salzburg Agreement is the inevitable result of Tiso's rejection of national socialism and German influence in general. There are many proofs of this. For example, in the fall of 1942 Tiso told Commander Kubicek of the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen du ring his visit at the president's residence (palace): "We do not need any form of national socialism. We have our own views." In May, 1942, the president received Dr. Elemer Fink from Zvolen, together with Dr. Kovac, Mayor of Bratislava, at which meeting Dr. E. Fink presented a petition in behalf of his brother, Dr. Zoltan Fink. Tiso promised him a position and economic privileges on condition that the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen ceases to demand the implementation of a program of national socialism. And Tiso stated that neither the Church nor the state would tolerate any form of national socialism, and added emphatically that it was in his power to prevent its establishment. At a party conference in the Pohronie region in December, 1942, Tiso declared: "We must strive by our work to achieve what we want. Our nation must manifest its maturity in every phase of life in order to prove that it is capable of self-government. In the future we will not need supervision (this he emphasized) . We must prove to the whole world we do not need enyone to subsidize us." Towards national socialism Tiso expressed his views. openly at a conference of leaders of the Hlinka Guard in Bojnice (July 1-31, 1942). Despite the fact that he was speaking to a number of avowed Slovak national socialists Tiso did not use the term, "national socialism," at all. As a matter of fact, he declared that the Hlinka Guard must not become involved in an ideological struggle. Reaction to his address in which he stated that the Slovaks were not working in the interests of the Germans or any alien nation but only in the interest of the �SLOVAKIA 9 Slovak nation was very much in evidence among the assembly of the Hlinka Guard. For the president, next to his alliance with the clergy, his strength lies in the solid support of the Academic youth (college and university students). On June 2, 1942, Tiso received a tremendous ovation for his speech in the university amphitheatre in Bratislava. The residents of the Lafranconi and Svoradov fraternity houses gave a public demonstration in which they voiced their anti-German but pro Pan Slav and Roman Catholic sympathy during the course of President Tiso's address. This compromised Tiso's policy and was a direct answer to Ambassador Ludin's earlier speech in Kezmarok. In this respect it is necessary to quote from Tiso's speech: "We have our own policies in regard to foreign states, particularly towards the great German Reich with which we are allied by a special agreement. But who could imagine that Germany should wish to direct Slovak politics? We have to direct our own political life under this agi,eement. No thinking German would expect a Slovak to conduct German politics in Slovakia. Frankly, every reasoning German would resent such an attitude. Let us, therefore, conduct our own politics in Slovakia." Furthe.r proof that Tiso does not absolutely follow the pro-German political line we deduce from the words of one of his loyal followers, namely, Father Izakovic. The latter in his speech in August, 1942, in Trnava to some 300 officers, said that it is imperative to adjust to the circumstances of the times, and that if a certain policy is being followed today is does not necessarily mean that it cannot be changed by new circumstances tomorrow. The speaker insisted he was repeating the views of Tiso with whom he had just had an interview. This, then, is the political profile of President Tiso as drawn by a German Nazi informer in his February 11, 1943, report from Bratislava. In reply to Father Graham, the American Jesuit, whose article appeared in the Osservatore Romano, it is enlightening to quote again from the official statement (Par. 7) under the title, "Influence of the Clergy, particularly the Jesuits and Catholic Action in Slovakia." It is dated February 11, 1943. We quote: The privileged position of the clergy in the Slovak nation may be explained on the basis of historical development. While the Slovaks were incorporated in Hungary they did not belong to the upper class. Magyarization was allied with the social oppression of the Slovak nation. Proof of this is in the large number of Magyar clergy and secular leaders of Slovak origin. The lower clergy remained united with the Slovak people. Thus, since the clergy in general was held in high esteem in the kingdom of Hungary and because there was no upper class in Slovakia, the Slovak clergy assumed the role of leadership in their own country rather automatically. Even the establishment of the Slovak Peoples Party at the beginning �10 SLOVAKIA of the 20th century was inspired and greatly influenced by the clergy. Prominent Slovak clergymen like Hlinka became involved with ecclesiastical authorities in a controversy on national issues. During the existence of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic after World War I the Slovak Peoples Party was in constant conflict with the centralistic regime ruling Slovakia from Prague. For Hlinka and Sidor and their adherents the Slovak nation's interests were dominant factors in their political program, the chief objective of which was the fulfillment of the promise of autonomy or self-government for the Slovaks in their own native land. One other vital factor in the relations of the Slovak Peoples Party and the central government of Masaryk and Benes in Prague was the attempt of the politicians in the Czech capital of Prague (most of whom were free-thinkers and opposed to the Church) to separate church and state and secularfae all schools in the country. In contrast to the privileged position of the clergy in Hungary and its endangered future this was a threat to their very existence in the new republic of CzechoSlovakia. This reality was very much in evidence by the fact that the Slovak Peoples Party was predominantly represented by the clergy in Prague. Thus, while Hlinka basically maintained an uncompromising stand towards the Czechs, Tiso and the clerical wing pursued a policy of tactical maneuvering and realistic consideration. Attempts of the Catholic Church after the first World War to adapt itself to the new revolutionary conditions of the times by a dynamic program of Catholic Action found fertile soil for its ideals among the religious Slovak populace. This enabled both th e clergy and the Church in Slovakia to maintain dominant influence. Sivak, Minister of education in the Slovak Republic, was, and is an outspoken party affiliate of Tiso and strongly pro-clerical. Under him the schools we11e re-organized on the basis of the Catholic and Lutheran Evangelical faiths. The local committees for national education are chiefly headed by the pastors of the region. In the denominational schools the chairman of the school-board ex officio is the pastor, who is also ex officio a member of the non-denominational school-board in his district. According to a secret directive the clergy is obligated by all mram possible to secure and maintain control over social life, and wield its influence in all business enterprises, organizations, labor and industry . Even today the largest land-owners in the state are the clergy, and they lead a very feudal life in their episcopal sees and in country parishes. Moreover, many pastors are representatives in parliament and are on various committees. The influence of the Jesuits is obviously wide. It was apparent during Magyar rule and later when Ledochowski, the Jesuit General, offered aid to Hlinka and his party. As it flows from the very substance of the Jesuit style of work, only seldom is one able to detect any signs of their activity. They exert their influence primarily through the clergy. The Jesuits have the training of clerical candidates in their hand s. At �SLOVAKIA 11 monthly meetings of diocesan priests, the Jesuits conducted the conferences mostly by ser,mons. They are also in charge of spiritual exercises for rthe clergy. The restoration of the Jesuit monastery in Ruzomberok is a further sign of the intensification of Jesuit activity. The Jesuits have a direct influence on Slovak politics. For example, in 1941 they had a religious conference for Slovak political leaders in Ruzomberok under the supervision of Father Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. According to reports, some of those present were given quite a going-over, but since these exercises required silence this prevented any open discussions or a request for any questions to be answered publicly. Anyone who had a question or problem could discuss it only privately with a Jesuit priest assigned for individual consultation. Besides, other means for their influence are readily available. For instance, two sisters of Ledochowski, the Jesuit provincial, live in Bratislava. For a time after the dedaration of the independence of the Slovak Republic Tiso resided in a Jesuit monastery where Father Mikus, former Jesuit provincial, was one of his closest advisers. There are Slovak Jesuits in the Vatican, too. Among them there is Father Javorka, director of the Russicum College, and Dr. Kralicek, Hlinka's grand-nephew who is a librarian at the Vatican. Sidor himself revealed in a radio speech on December 16, 1942, that Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, is a frequent guest at the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican. It is entirely unnecessary to point out that the Jesuit position is absolutely anti-German. As ·a n example, we will cite the case of a pastor who was suspended for his national-socialistic writings. During his talk with Mikus (the Jesuit provincial, who visited him) he was admonished and asked not to do anything that would sever his relations with his bishop. Mikus added that the situation would undoubtedly change in a year ar two. To the query he intimated that Germany would not win the war Mikus replied he not only surmised it but he was wholly convinced of it, -and even said that there were many others of the same opinion, evidence that he was voicing an opinion held in high places. Although the youngest group of the Jesuits is not numerically large, there are many among them with a high I.Q. Catholic Action has as its primary role a lay apostolate designated to support the activity of the clergy. Its influence and importance have grown perceptibly in the past few years. Its branches are found everywhere. Dr. Buzalka, director of the seminary in Braitislava, is also the director of Catholic Action. His anti-German sentiments are public knowledge. The press of the Catholic Action movement has great opportunities and is definitely anti-German. In addition to its own internal information service, Catholic Action has its own Catholic Press Bureau whose releases are used by the Catholic periodicals and party publications. Svoradov, the Catholic student center at the Slovak University in Bratislava, is a bulwark of Catholic Action, clericalism and a hotbed of anti-German views. Its director is Dr. Filkorn, a good friend of Tiso. Dr. Kirschbaum, a close follower of Sidor, was active for a long time as a Pan Slav and �12 SLOVAKIA German foe. He was with Sidor in Rome for a long time but was recently transierred to the Slovak Embassy in Switzerland. In his report on Sidor, the informant in Bratislava observes that he and his friends in Slovakia resist German influence. "Their attitude is known and manifests itself at ~very opportunity," he writes. As evidence of this the informer observes: Thus, for example, Culen fails to say one word about German 3id given in the founding of the Slovak state in his introduction to an article in the pictorial book of the Slovak Peoples Party which was published on the second anniversary of Slovak Independence Day (March 14, 1941). Not only does he fail to mention German assistance but he repeatedly claims that the creation of the Slovak state was accomplished by the Slovak nation alone! Then, too, as another glaring example, Carnogursky does not refer to German-Slovak cooperation during his lectures to party members, and at the funeral of Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, he openly expressed hi s pro-Polish sympathies. Sidor in his post at the Slovak Embassy in th e Vatican had every opportunity to renew old acquaintances. Through enemy representatives at th e Vatican there were many such occasions. Although he faithfully reported that he received several letters from Benes, Minister Mach, for one, is firmly convinced that Sidor replied either in writing or through oth er channels on his own. When we take into consideration the increasingly strong desire of the Catholic Church to have the Pope play a role as mediator, and possibly, a decisive role in terminating the present world conflict, and since the Slovak Catholic press in Slovakia constantly emphasizes this point of view, then it is perhaps not a mistake to assume that Sidor seeks to direct Slovak internal politics into other channels through Catholic Action. The mission of Kirschbaum, a fanatical follower of Sidor who has been transferred to the Embassy in Switzerland, means the strengthening of Sidor's position in his foreign political policy outside Slovakia. "The Jews in Slovakia" (under that caption or heading the informer continues): The Jews, 20,000 of them, still occupy positions in government and in various administrative posts and supervising positions, apparently permanent assignments. Jews, whom the Guard seized when they were trying to escape from the country, and who were put into concentration camps, reappeared in their homes soon after being released. These were given the protection of a presidential immunity card as wards of the state. They are more or less impertinent, depending on fluctuating changes in the war. To supplement his report, the Nazi informant adds that culen, a member of the Slovak parliament and trusted �SLOVAKIA 13 friend of President Jozef Tiso, has a half-Jewish wife, that Minister i'.>urcansky intervened for 200 Jews who were released at his command from transport ready to leave the country, that the Mayor of Nitra was the godfather of many Jewish children, that when Minister Mach wanted to remove the above Mayor from office, President Tiso intervened in his behalf, that Msgr. Filkorn spoke openly in parliament in protest against the unchristian methods of disposing of Jewish properties, and finally, that Minister Polyak was a half-Jew. Such was the context of the information supplied his government in Berlin by a Nazi agent living in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Nazis did not think that the communists or the "Czechoslovaks" in Slovakia were their dangerous foes, but, strangely enough, the people who were loyal to President Tiso, followers of Sidor, the Catholic clergy, the Jesuits and the majority of the Slovak Peoples Party were feared. From the German viewpoint only Premier Dr. Tuka, Minister Alexander Mach and the Hlinka Guards were their only trusted allies in the Slovak Republic. To comprehend fully and judge conditions in Slovakia during war time it is necessary to study these official German documents. That is what Robert A. Graham, S. J . should have done but failed to do. Many German documents are now available as official records of what transpired from the German point of view. Their policy, their views, reactions and their analysis of President Tiso are all there for anyone who wants to know the truth. Unquestionably, they confirm the negative stand of President Tiso to German national socialism and an appraisal of his realistic approach to the Third Reich in the interest of his own Slovak nation. In conclusion we will cite a part of the official report of SS. Haupsturmftihrer Dr. H. Barsch, chief of the department of III B of the central division security in Vienna. His report of October, 1943, almost a year before the so-called 'Slovak Revolt' was sent to Dr. E . Kaltenbrunner, Nazi chief of security police and safety. (This report appeared in the publication Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, Nemci a Slovensko, 1944, Dokumenty, Nakladatel'stvo Epocha, Bra- �14 SLOVAKIA tislava, 1970. Zostavil Vilem Precan, pp. 40-43.) Aside from other comments this is what the report has to say about Dr. Jozef Tiso's stand towards the Third Reich: Although there do not as yet exist any direct proofs of Tiso's duplicity in his suspected role of double-dealing, nevertheless, his personal politics in recent years have resulted in strengthening forces that are least sympathetic to the Reich. Since he was aware of the political past of these elements, and hence could have easily foreseen their future activity and behaviour towards the Reich, it seems that already then he was thinking of an orientation away from the pro-German position. Besides this, as it happened frequently, whenever German requests were not fulfilled and when there were other deviations from the German line, he could always defend himself by claiming these groups were to blame and thus was able to allay suspicions of personal disloyalty to the German Reich. A further argument in a careful evaluation of Tiso's stand is his position as a priest. In spite of many instances of self-will, Tiso maintains close contacts with higher authorities in the Church. Moreover, his most intimate co-workers are clerics: Msgr. Filkorn, Pastor Izakovic and Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. From this friendship one can conclude more than an indecisive stand on the Jewish question. From the German standpoint this may well be the decisive point that can prove the President's loyalty or disloyalty, the touchstone of his fidelity. Finally, his official appearance, especially in recent times, has not added anything significantly to warrant our trust of Tiso on the German side. Whenever Tiso claims that his speeches (e.g. in Nitra) are addressed to various groups, perhaps one cannot argue against this, for his dialectic is truly excellent. But one cannot overlook the fact that the President knows full well the caliber of his people, and consequently he must be aware of the fact that all political double-talk, even if having reference to other states with an interest in Slovakia, is understood by the populace as being aimed at the Reich, and finally, a keen observer can grasp what is going on in the highest positions of the state and confirm what he has long suspected, and that is the consequence of influence from the enemy side. It is, generally speaking, problematical to depend upon Tiso entirely. Consideration of the party as a factor in the internal political security of the country is a mistaken notion. The leading positions in the party are held by persons with anti-German sentiments. If, for the sake of argument, one considers these people generally without power, and therefore harmless to our cause, it must be noted that then they are not capable of insuring the defense of an internal front to the degree and measure demanded for the interests of the Reich. And even �SLOVAKIA 15 if we assume indifference, the interests of the Reich are not assured since German direction and control are possible under present conditions only with great difficulty. The Nazis were also well informed about the political views of Tiso's political aides. For example, in a detailed and extensive report of November 28, 1944, from Bratislava, addressed to the main office of security in the Reich, III B and III C, which was delivered to both SS-Standardftihrer Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Spengler in Berlin, among other items, there is reference to the relationship of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Hlinka Guards. The German reporter writes that "the Hlinka Guard considers itself national socialist and absolutely pro-German while the party advocates a form of Christian nationalism as a Slovak ideology, and that it looks upon Slovak-German cooperation and friendship as a temporary and not a permanent association, and this opportunism ( certainly not based on a bond of affection) the party spokesmen spread through the Slovak press." After the uprising (the so-called Slovak revolt of August-October, 1944) the Nazi informer writes: "The Party ideologically prepared propaganda favoring a Christian social world view, and Opustil, the general secretary, adopted this as part of his program for immediate implementation. Dr. Jozef Pauco, chief editor of the Slovak daily addressed the members of the 'Domobrana' (National Defense) on the problems of Slovak spiritual orientation and simultaneously declared clearly that for the Slovaks only the Christian national point of view is acceptable. Even more clearly did the member of parliament Cavojsky state this in his radio broadcast of November 8, 1944. He said, to quote : 'As an independent and Christian nation we want to live in freedom in our own free land. A good and selfconscious Slovak never desired a change of masters, he wanted to be master of his own destiny in his own country. In the same way we do not want an exchange of foreign ideologies because these are not for our national interest. As Christians we want to establish our own social, economic and cultural life on the basis of a Christian world view.' Dr. Korper's address had a Sophist tone, the reporter notes, when he said: 'Our agreement with Germany was precious and fundamental because it guaranteed the strong- �16 SLOVAKIA est and freest right for national life which, up to 1939, no other power on earth was willing to recognize as our right to national existence. If there had been another possibility the Slovaks most probably would have chosen to act otherwise.' Dr. Ferdinand t:>urcansky, former foreign minister, spoke in the same vein when he declared: 'I am not a Bolshevik but it is possible I may become one if I can thereby be of service to my nation.' cavojsky, member of the Slovak parliament, in his above mentioned radio address said: 'A bit of egoism in the life of nations is not harmful; in these times we must not forget that alien interests are not always identical with our own national interests.' In other words, he wanted to tell the Slovak people not to subscribe to any wartime party but to work for themselves and to wait for the outcome of events in the future. For the time being the young opposition, encouraged by Opustil, that is, the Mikula-Polakovic wing, the Nazi official informer notes: "Party discipline was imposed upon Mikula for his activity. In the event of this opposition, however, there is no hope of friendly aid to the Germans, but only in the interests of the young Slovak chauvinists who stand uncompromisingly for Slovak independence, and therefore are opposed to any kind of German interference in Slovak internal affairs. This opposition party, first of all, has adherents among university students and may be considered the successor of the former adherents of Ndstup from which emerged activistic elements led by Dr. t:>urcansky, former minister of foreign affairs in the Slovak Republic. By his resolute stand and frequent addresses to the university students, and his association with this opposition movement, Dr. f>urcansky considers this to be a bridge to new political action." German Nazis saw Slovak politicians surrounding President Tiso at the end of November, 1944, in this light. ( See the above mentioned publication, pp. 435-446). These documents, and others in the same way, including the well known Documents on German Foreign Policy published by the British, French and American governments, uniformly place the ·political activity of Dr. Joseph Tiso �SLOVAKIA 17 and his associates during the second World War in an objective light. This means in a practical sense the political rehabilitation of Slovak political policy during this era on the basis of ideological principles. Dr. Tiso was of the opinion that in Slovakia the ideological defense against Nazism and Bolshevist Stalinism can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of a Christian world view derived mainly from Catholicism. All this can be disputed, but Tiso's good intentions cannot be denied. Fundamentally, there is no proof to the contrary. Dr. Joseph Tiso was an extraordinary person. During the second World War his political life was surrounded by obstacles, threats and dangers such as very few statesmen had to face in this epoch. The unique Slovak situation increased and complicated his public life. His tragic death as a punishment for the declaration and successful realization of the independence of the Slovak state, and also as revenge for his opposition to the bolshevik invasion and its subsequent criminal Stalinist establishment of the communist regime in his country, all this forces one to evaluate perhaps even his political mistakes obviously from many different angles. Nevertheless, his political career was subject to criticism during wartime as it is today, and it was not infrequently marked by bitter partisan politics, prejudice, injustice and merciless condemnation. He was subject to hateful attacks by the communists, angry criticism by the Nazis, hatred on the part of those in the service of Czech imperialism, as well as by unjust accusations by contemporary historians and in many details unjustly condemned by the uninformed or highly prejudiced historical writers and journalists of our time. And now the Vatican newspaper! In spite of all this the memory of Dr. Joseph Tiso remains revered by the great majority of Slovaks living in their homeland and throughout the world. Few Slovak political leaders, living or dead, enjoy his stature as a statesman, his popularity and enduring fame among his own people. Dr. Joseph Tiso was undoubtedly a foremost political leader on the entire European scene. Lightning strikes only the tallest trees! � SL OVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents By Dr. Arved Gr e b e rt Geneva, Switzerland L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican daily, published (April 27, 1974) an article by Robert A. Graham, S. J., an American Jesuit, on the policy of the Holy See in regard to anti-Jewish legislation during the second World War in Hitler-dominated Europe. (La Santa Sede e le vittime della guerra.) The author based his conclusions exclusively on material in a volume of diplomatic doc~ments published by the Vatican: Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la seconde guerre mondiale. The aforementioned article touches upon the stand taken by the Slovak government in regulations concerning the Jews which were implemented without exception in all the states that were in the GermanItalian orbit. As a matter of record, neither in Italy, the centuries-old bastion of Catholicism, nor in France, which was headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, a practical Catholic, was the Holy See able to halt discrimination that was officially prescribed by law. The author of the review merely noted the facts relating to the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia without taking into account existing circumstances, very often completely unknown to foreign readers. These were influenced by the geopolitical situation of Slovakia caught in the German-Magyar vise or web. Moreover, Hungary enjoyed a privileged position. At this period of history its policy-makers knew how to take advantage of its political anti-semitic regulations under the domination of the Third Reich. One must take into consideration, too, the overwhelming power pressure imposed upon Slovakia by Germany. No less important in this delicate situation was the fact that Bratislava, the Slovak capital and seat of the government, was located on the very borders of Germany. This was �6 SLOVAKIA a precarious position that could have toppled the Slovak government from power at any moment by a military invasion. Without weighing all these basic realities one cannot begin to understand the policy of President Tiso and the Slovak government in this problem of seeking a solution for the Jewish question during the second World War in Slovakia. It is not our intention on this occasion to discuss the circumstances that brought on anti-Jewish regulations by the government in Slovakia at this particular time. An analysis of this phase of the Slovak past will be the role of a free Slovak historical study which will have free access to and complete use of all existing documents on the basis of a comparative study of all the contemporary events in Europe and local circumstances. Things looked entirely different in Bratislava and at the Vatican, for example. And, likewise, the problems of President Tiso were judged quite differently at the Vatican and German headquarters ( and by Nazi reporters) in Berlin or Bratislava. It will not be out of place, therefore, to illustrate our point of view on this historical problem by citing official statements of a Nazi report of February, 1943, in Bratislava itself. This report on the situation in Slovakia together with a proposal for the future destiny of the Slovak nation in the sphere of Nazi Germany after the expected victorious end of the war was presented to the chief of the SS. bureau. It was top secret, dated February 16, 1943, and sent to the SS. Hauptamt headquarters, whose chief was G. Berger. The latter, in a letter to Heinrich Himler (February 19, 1943 ), the chief of SS. and the police in the Third Reich, informed him of the situation in Slovakia with a supplementary note that a detailed report was being sent to the third department of the main office of national security . The text of this communique appeared in a Slovak translation of the documents which Vilem Precan edited in Bratislava in 1965. (Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty. Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, pp . 45-54 ). We will quote only those paragraphs that refer to Dr. Jozef Tiso and his closest political associates . They quite clearly reflect the attitude of the German Nazis toward the Slovak Republic. In the introduction we read: President Dr. Tiso has ranged wid ely in his politics. According to �SLOVAKIA 7 law he is the leader of the nation and the party, and is the top man in the state. This powerful position was secured with the coop eTation of old associates, the strong support of the clergy and leaders of Catholic Action, and also with the aid of Sidor's followers, and apparently, too, by the backing of recruits from neutral or indifferent sources, such as those of Dr. Karvas. Tiso, a realist, declared himself in favor of the Reich. But internally he leans on elements that are fundamentally hosti1e to Germany and opposed to the ideas of the Third Reich. He is endeavoring to build up Slovakia on the principles of the Catholic Action group, and hence his ultimate objective is a Catholic state. In the beginning his intentions were hidden by a mask. Opportunistic references to national socialism seemed that he was favorably disposed to it, but lately he has thrown off the mask and a frontal attack on national socialism is underway. And a Nazi informer writes further: After Sidor's resignation Tiso and his associates have a free hand. Catholic Action and the clergy are in confrontation with the national guard (Hlinka Guards). Their allies are those who felt they had suffered losses as the result of the establishment of the Slovak state those who had lost rights or privileges, those who had always cooperated with the Jews and were dependent on them, and finally by all the Jews who remained in the country. The national guard obviously could not offer sufficient resistance to this •a lignment without outside help. The result was Salzburg, an agreement that Tiso regarded as foroed upon him and which he never respected. Attached to this offjcial report were addenda in the form of written observations about individual aspects of the Slovak problem in 1943. Supplement 6 was labeled: "State President Dr. Jozef Tiso, Bratislava, February 11, 1943." President Tiso's political profile is drawn and the views of his associates recorded. For example, Ravasz and Dr. Polyak ("another cleric-oriented ally of Dr. Tiso, a full fledged minister."). According to Semi-Goth, Polyak was a Jew and a friend of the Jews. cavojsky, Suroviak and Drobny are listed as Tiso's allies. Liberals Stano, Sokol and Sivak are in Tiso's camp as are Stefan Danihel and Dr. Turcek, industrialists, the report sp,id. "All these," the report continued, "on the basis of their life style and urban environment are opposed to the Reich. It is apparent that the clergy and all the forces of Catholic Action are behind Tiso. From 1941 Tiso won over the party affiliation of the erstwhile followers of Sidor." The Nazi informer continues: Three years ago in response to a radio talk by a Catholic priest, �8 SLOVAKIA R , who advocated social security, Tiso told bim that he was thinking of following the example of Salazar of Portugal in Slovakia. (Salazar was looked upon as a civilian Jesuit who leaned towards the idea of a Catholic state.) The book of a theologian (Dr. Polakovic), Tisov a ruiuka, reflects the views and plans of Tiso in bold outlines. They follow the Catholic idea of a state quite clearly as an objective of Catholic Action. The author upholds the absolute primacy of the Church over the state. Proof of Tiso's state-political views are clearly evidenced by hi.s philosophy of education, the establishment of organizations in support of Catholic Action, etc. A former Jesuit, Misik, is his close advisor. Tiso also actively supported the organization of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the initiator was Dr. Novak, a university professor and well known Pan Slav. Tiso's reaction to the Salzburg Agreement is manifested in his statement that he accepted it "with clenched teeth" because it was forced upon him. He said to Mach who handed in his resignation in December, 1942: "You know where I stand. They forced you upon me. Therefore, it will be better if you present your resignation where you received your appointment." This attitude towards the Salzburg Agreement is the inevitable result of Tiso's rejection of national socialism and German influence in general. There are many proofs of this. For example, in the fall of 1942 Tiso told Commander Kubicek of the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen du ring his visit at the president's residence (palace): "We do not need any form of national socialism. We have our own views." In May, 1942, the president received Dr. Elemer Fink from Zvolen, together with Dr. Kovac, Mayor of Bratislava, at which meeting Dr. E. Fink presented a petition in behalf of his brother, Dr. Zoltan Fink. Tiso promised him a position and economic privileges on condition that the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen ceases to demand the implementation of a program of national socialism. And Tiso stated that neither the Church nor the state would tolerate any form of national socialism, and added emphatically that it was in his power to prevent its establishment. At a party conference in the Pohronie region in December, 1942, Tiso declared: "We must strive by our work to achieve what we want. Our nation must manifest its maturity in every phase of life in order to prove that it is capable of self-government. In the future we will not need supervision (this he emphasized) . We must prove to the whole world we do not need enyone to subsidize us." Towards national socialism Tiso expressed his views. openly at a conference of leaders of the Hlinka Guard in Bojnice (July 1-31, 1942). Despite the fact that he was speaking to a number of avowed Slovak national socialists Tiso did not use the term, "national socialism," at all. As a matter of fact, he declared that the Hlinka Guard must not become involved in an ideological struggle. Reaction to his address in which he stated that the Slovaks were not working in the interests of the Germans or any alien nation but only in the interest of the �SLOVAKIA 9 Slovak nation was very much in evidence among the assembly of the Hlinka Guard. For the president, next to his alliance with the clergy, his strength lies in the solid support of the Academic youth (college and university students). On June 2, 1942, Tiso received a tremendous ovation for his speech in the university amphitheatre in Bratislava. The residents of the Lafranconi and Svoradov fraternity houses gave a public demonstration in which they voiced their anti-German but pro Pan Slav and Roman Catholic sympathy during the course of President Tiso's address. This compromised Tiso's policy and was a direct answer to Ambassador Ludin's earlier speech in Kezmarok. In this respect it is necessary to quote from Tiso's speech: "We have our own policies in regard to foreign states, particularly towards the great German Reich with which we are allied by a special agreement. But who could imagine that Germany should wish to direct Slovak politics? We have to direct our own political life under this agi,eement. No thinking German would expect a Slovak to conduct German politics in Slovakia. Frankly, every reasoning German would resent such an attitude. Let us, therefore, conduct our own politics in Slovakia." Furthe.r proof that Tiso does not absolutely follow the pro-German political line we deduce from the words of one of his loyal followers, namely, Father Izakovic. The latter in his speech in August, 1942, in Trnava to some 300 officers, said that it is imperative to adjust to the circumstances of the times, and that if a certain policy is being followed today is does not necessarily mean that it cannot be changed by new circumstances tomorrow. The speaker insisted he was repeating the views of Tiso with whom he had just had an interview. This, then, is the political profile of President Tiso as drawn by a German Nazi informer in his February 11, 1943, report from Bratislava. In reply to Father Graham, the American Jesuit, whose article appeared in the Osservatore Romano, it is enlightening to quote again from the official statement (Par. 7) under the title, "Influence of the Clergy, particularly the Jesuits and Catholic Action in Slovakia." It is dated February 11, 1943. We quote: The privileged position of the clergy in the Slovak nation may be explained on the basis of historical development. While the Slovaks were incorporated in Hungary they did not belong to the upper class. Magyarization was allied with the social oppression of the Slovak nation. Proof of this is in the large number of Magyar clergy and secular leaders of Slovak origin. The lower clergy remained united with the Slovak people. Thus, since the clergy in general was held in high esteem in the kingdom of Hungary and because there was no upper class in Slovakia, the Slovak clergy assumed the role of leadership in their own country rather automatically. Even the establishment of the Slovak Peoples Party at the beginning �10 SLOVAKIA of the 20th century was inspired and greatly influenced by the clergy. Prominent Slovak clergymen like Hlinka became involved with ecclesiastical authorities in a controversy on national issues. During the existence of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic after World War I the Slovak Peoples Party was in constant conflict with the centralistic regime ruling Slovakia from Prague. For Hlinka and Sidor and their adherents the Slovak nation's interests were dominant factors in their political program, the chief objective of which was the fulfillment of the promise of autonomy or self-government for the Slovaks in their own native land. One other vital factor in the relations of the Slovak Peoples Party and the central government of Masaryk and Benes in Prague was the attempt of the politicians in the Czech capital of Prague (most of whom were free-thinkers and opposed to the Church) to separate church and state and secularfae all schools in the country. In contrast to the privileged position of the clergy in Hungary and its endangered future this was a threat to their very existence in the new republic of CzechoSlovakia. This reality was very much in evidence by the fact that the Slovak Peoples Party was predominantly represented by the clergy in Prague. Thus, while Hlinka basically maintained an uncompromising stand towards the Czechs, Tiso and the clerical wing pursued a policy of tactical maneuvering and realistic consideration. Attempts of the Catholic Church after the first World War to adapt itself to the new revolutionary conditions of the times by a dynamic program of Catholic Action found fertile soil for its ideals among the religious Slovak populace. This enabled both th e clergy and the Church in Slovakia to maintain dominant influence. Sivak, Minister of education in the Slovak Republic, was, and is an outspoken party affiliate of Tiso and strongly pro-clerical. Under him the schools we11e re-organized on the basis of the Catholic and Lutheran Evangelical faiths. The local committees for national education are chiefly headed by the pastors of the region. In the denominational schools the chairman of the school-board ex officio is the pastor, who is also ex officio a member of the non-denominational school-board in his district. According to a secret directive the clergy is obligated by all mram possible to secure and maintain control over social life, and wield its influence in all business enterprises, organizations, labor and industry . Even today the largest land-owners in the state are the clergy, and they lead a very feudal life in their episcopal sees and in country parishes. Moreover, many pastors are representatives in parliament and are on various committees. The influence of the Jesuits is obviously wide. It was apparent during Magyar rule and later when Ledochowski, the Jesuit General, offered aid to Hlinka and his party. As it flows from the very substance of the Jesuit style of work, only seldom is one able to detect any signs of their activity. They exert their influence primarily through the clergy. The Jesuits have the training of clerical candidates in their hand s. At �SLOVAKIA 11 monthly meetings of diocesan priests, the Jesuits conducted the conferences mostly by ser,mons. They are also in charge of spiritual exercises for rthe clergy. The restoration of the Jesuit monastery in Ruzomberok is a further sign of the intensification of Jesuit activity. The Jesuits have a direct influence on Slovak politics. For example, in 1941 they had a religious conference for Slovak political leaders in Ruzomberok under the supervision of Father Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. According to reports, some of those present were given quite a going-over, but since these exercises required silence this prevented any open discussions or a request for any questions to be answered publicly. Anyone who had a question or problem could discuss it only privately with a Jesuit priest assigned for individual consultation. Besides, other means for their influence are readily available. For instance, two sisters of Ledochowski, the Jesuit provincial, live in Bratislava. For a time after the dedaration of the independence of the Slovak Republic Tiso resided in a Jesuit monastery where Father Mikus, former Jesuit provincial, was one of his closest advisers. There are Slovak Jesuits in the Vatican, too. Among them there is Father Javorka, director of the Russicum College, and Dr. Kralicek, Hlinka's grand-nephew who is a librarian at the Vatican. Sidor himself revealed in a radio speech on December 16, 1942, that Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, is a frequent guest at the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican. It is entirely unnecessary to point out that the Jesuit position is absolutely anti-German. As ·a n example, we will cite the case of a pastor who was suspended for his national-socialistic writings. During his talk with Mikus (the Jesuit provincial, who visited him) he was admonished and asked not to do anything that would sever his relations with his bishop. Mikus added that the situation would undoubtedly change in a year ar two. To the query he intimated that Germany would not win the war Mikus replied he not only surmised it but he was wholly convinced of it, -and even said that there were many others of the same opinion, evidence that he was voicing an opinion held in high places. Although the youngest group of the Jesuits is not numerically large, there are many among them with a high I.Q. Catholic Action has as its primary role a lay apostolate designated to support the activity of the clergy. Its influence and importance have grown perceptibly in the past few years. Its branches are found everywhere. Dr. Buzalka, director of the seminary in Braitislava, is also the director of Catholic Action. His anti-German sentiments are public knowledge. The press of the Catholic Action movement has great opportunities and is definitely anti-German. In addition to its own internal information service, Catholic Action has its own Catholic Press Bureau whose releases are used by the Catholic periodicals and party publications. Svoradov, the Catholic student center at the Slovak University in Bratislava, is a bulwark of Catholic Action, clericalism and a hotbed of anti-German views. Its director is Dr. Filkorn, a good friend of Tiso. Dr. Kirschbaum, a close follower of Sidor, was active for a long time as a Pan Slav and �12 SLOVAKIA German foe. He was with Sidor in Rome for a long time but was recently transierred to the Slovak Embassy in Switzerland. In his report on Sidor, the informant in Bratislava observes that he and his friends in Slovakia resist German influence. "Their attitude is known and manifests itself at ~very opportunity," he writes. As evidence of this the informer observes: Thus, for example, Culen fails to say one word about German 3id given in the founding of the Slovak state in his introduction to an article in the pictorial book of the Slovak Peoples Party which was published on the second anniversary of Slovak Independence Day (March 14, 1941). Not only does he fail to mention German assistance but he repeatedly claims that the creation of the Slovak state was accomplished by the Slovak nation alone! Then, too, as another glaring example, Carnogursky does not refer to German-Slovak cooperation during his lectures to party members, and at the funeral of Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, he openly expressed hi s pro-Polish sympathies. Sidor in his post at the Slovak Embassy in th e Vatican had every opportunity to renew old acquaintances. Through enemy representatives at th e Vatican there were many such occasions. Although he faithfully reported that he received several letters from Benes, Minister Mach, for one, is firmly convinced that Sidor replied either in writing or through oth er channels on his own. When we take into consideration the increasingly strong desire of the Catholic Church to have the Pope play a role as mediator, and possibly, a decisive role in terminating the present world conflict, and since the Slovak Catholic press in Slovakia constantly emphasizes this point of view, then it is perhaps not a mistake to assume that Sidor seeks to direct Slovak internal politics into other channels through Catholic Action. The mission of Kirschbaum, a fanatical follower of Sidor who has been transferred to the Embassy in Switzerland, means the strengthening of Sidor's position in his foreign political policy outside Slovakia. "The Jews in Slovakia" (under that caption or heading the informer continues): The Jews, 20,000 of them, still occupy positions in government and in various administrative posts and supervising positions, apparently permanent assignments. Jews, whom the Guard seized when they were trying to escape from the country, and who were put into concentration camps, reappeared in their homes soon after being released. These were given the protection of a presidential immunity card as wards of the state. They are more or less impertinent, depending on fluctuating changes in the war. To supplement his report, the Nazi informant adds that culen, a member of the Slovak parliament and trusted �SLOVAKIA 13 friend of President Jozef Tiso, has a half-Jewish wife, that Minister i'.>urcansky intervened for 200 Jews who were released at his command from transport ready to leave the country, that the Mayor of Nitra was the godfather of many Jewish children, that when Minister Mach wanted to remove the above Mayor from office, President Tiso intervened in his behalf, that Msgr. Filkorn spoke openly in parliament in protest against the unchristian methods of disposing of Jewish properties, and finally, that Minister Polyak was a half-Jew. Such was the context of the information supplied his government in Berlin by a Nazi agent living in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Nazis did not think that the communists or the "Czechoslovaks" in Slovakia were their dangerous foes, but, strangely enough, the people who were loyal to President Tiso, followers of Sidor, the Catholic clergy, the Jesuits and the majority of the Slovak Peoples Party were feared. From the German viewpoint only Premier Dr. Tuka, Minister Alexander Mach and the Hlinka Guards were their only trusted allies in the Slovak Republic. To comprehend fully and judge conditions in Slovakia during war time it is necessary to study these official German documents. That is what Robert A. Graham, S. J . should have done but failed to do. Many German documents are now available as official records of what transpired from the German point of view. Their policy, their views, reactions and their analysis of President Tiso are all there for anyone who wants to know the truth. Unquestionably, they confirm the negative stand of President Tiso to German national socialism and an appraisal of his realistic approach to the Third Reich in the interest of his own Slovak nation. In conclusion we will cite a part of the official report of SS. Haupsturmftihrer Dr. H. Barsch, chief of the department of III B of the central division security in Vienna. His report of October, 1943, almost a year before the so-called 'Slovak Revolt' was sent to Dr. E . Kaltenbrunner, Nazi chief of security police and safety. (This report appeared in the publication Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, Nemci a Slovensko, 1944, Dokumenty, Nakladatel'stvo Epocha, Bra- �14 SLOVAKIA tislava, 1970. Zostavil Vilem Precan, pp. 40-43.) Aside from other comments this is what the report has to say about Dr. Jozef Tiso's stand towards the Third Reich: Although there do not as yet exist any direct proofs of Tiso's duplicity in his suspected role of double-dealing, nevertheless, his personal politics in recent years have resulted in strengthening forces that are least sympathetic to the Reich. Since he was aware of the political past of these elements, and hence could have easily foreseen their future activity and behaviour towards the Reich, it seems that already then he was thinking of an orientation away from the pro-German position. Besides this, as it happened frequently, whenever German requests were not fulfilled and when there were other deviations from the German line, he could always defend himself by claiming these groups were to blame and thus was able to allay suspicions of personal disloyalty to the German Reich. A further argument in a careful evaluation of Tiso's stand is his position as a priest. In spite of many instances of self-will, Tiso maintains close contacts with higher authorities in the Church. Moreover, his most intimate co-workers are clerics: Msgr. Filkorn, Pastor Izakovic and Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. From this friendship one can conclude more than an indecisive stand on the Jewish question. From the German standpoint this may well be the decisive point that can prove the President's loyalty or disloyalty, the touchstone of his fidelity. Finally, his official appearance, especially in recent times, has not added anything significantly to warrant our trust of Tiso on the German side. Whenever Tiso claims that his speeches (e.g. in Nitra) are addressed to various groups, perhaps one cannot argue against this, for his dialectic is truly excellent. But one cannot overlook the fact that the President knows full well the caliber of his people, and consequently he must be aware of the fact that all political double-talk, even if having reference to other states with an interest in Slovakia, is understood by the populace as being aimed at the Reich, and finally, a keen observer can grasp what is going on in the highest positions of the state and confirm what he has long suspected, and that is the consequence of influence from the enemy side. It is, generally speaking, problematical to depend upon Tiso entirely. Consideration of the party as a factor in the internal political security of the country is a mistaken notion. The leading positions in the party are held by persons with anti-German sentiments. If, for the sake of argument, one considers these people generally without power, and therefore harmless to our cause, it must be noted that then they are not capable of insuring the defense of an internal front to the degree and measure demanded for the interests of the Reich. And even �SLOVAKIA 15 if we assume indifference, the interests of the Reich are not assured since German direction and control are possible under present conditions only with great difficulty. The Nazis were also well informed about the political views of Tiso's political aides. For example, in a detailed and extensive report of November 28, 1944, from Bratislava, addressed to the main office of security in the Reich, III B and III C, which was delivered to both SS-Standardftihrer Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Spengler in Berlin, among other items, there is reference to the relationship of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Hlinka Guards. The German reporter writes that "the Hlinka Guard considers itself national socialist and absolutely pro-German while the party advocates a form of Christian nationalism as a Slovak ideology, and that it looks upon Slovak-German cooperation and friendship as a temporary and not a permanent association, and this opportunism ( certainly not based on a bond of affection) the party spokesmen spread through the Slovak press." After the uprising (the so-called Slovak revolt of August-October, 1944) the Nazi informer writes: "The Party ideologically prepared propaganda favoring a Christian social world view, and Opustil, the general secretary, adopted this as part of his program for immediate implementation. Dr. Jozef Pauco, chief editor of the Slovak daily addressed the members of the 'Domobrana' (National Defense) on the problems of Slovak spiritual orientation and simultaneously declared clearly that for the Slovaks only the Christian national point of view is acceptable. Even more clearly did the member of parliament Cavojsky state this in his radio broadcast of November 8, 1944. He said, to quote : 'As an independent and Christian nation we want to live in freedom in our own free land. A good and selfconscious Slovak never desired a change of masters, he wanted to be master of his own destiny in his own country. In the same way we do not want an exchange of foreign ideologies because these are not for our national interest. As Christians we want to establish our own social, economic and cultural life on the basis of a Christian world view.' Dr. Korper's address had a Sophist tone, the reporter notes, when he said: 'Our agreement with Germany was precious and fundamental because it guaranteed the strong- �16 SLOVAKIA est and freest right for national life which, up to 1939, no other power on earth was willing to recognize as our right to national existence. If there had been another possibility the Slovaks most probably would have chosen to act otherwise.' Dr. Ferdinand t:>urcansky, former foreign minister, spoke in the same vein when he declared: 'I am not a Bolshevik but it is possible I may become one if I can thereby be of service to my nation.' cavojsky, member of the Slovak parliament, in his above mentioned radio address said: 'A bit of egoism in the life of nations is not harmful; in these times we must not forget that alien interests are not always identical with our own national interests.' In other words, he wanted to tell the Slovak people not to subscribe to any wartime party but to work for themselves and to wait for the outcome of events in the future. For the time being the young opposition, encouraged by Opustil, that is, the Mikula-Polakovic wing, the Nazi official informer notes: "Party discipline was imposed upon Mikula for his activity. In the event of this opposition, however, there is no hope of friendly aid to the Germans, but only in the interests of the young Slovak chauvinists who stand uncompromisingly for Slovak independence, and therefore are opposed to any kind of German interference in Slovak internal affairs. This opposition party, first of all, has adherents among university students and may be considered the successor of the former adherents of Ndstup from which emerged activistic elements led by Dr. t:>urcansky, former minister of foreign affairs in the Slovak Republic. By his resolute stand and frequent addresses to the university students, and his association with this opposition movement, Dr. f>urcansky considers this to be a bridge to new political action." German Nazis saw Slovak politicians surrounding President Tiso at the end of November, 1944, in this light. ( See the above mentioned publication, pp. 435-446). These documents, and others in the same way, including the well known Documents on German Foreign Policy published by the British, French and American governments, uniformly place the ·political activity of Dr. Joseph Tiso �SLOVAKIA 17 and his associates during the second World War in an objective light. This means in a practical sense the political rehabilitation of Slovak political policy during this era on the basis of ideological principles. Dr. Tiso was of the opinion that in Slovakia the ideological defense against Nazism and Bolshevist Stalinism can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of a Christian world view derived mainly from Catholicism. All this can be disputed, but Tiso's good intentions cannot be denied. Fundamentally, there is no proof to the contrary. Dr. Joseph Tiso was an extraordinary person. During the second World War his political life was surrounded by obstacles, threats and dangers such as very few statesmen had to face in this epoch. The unique Slovak situation increased and complicated his public life. His tragic death as a punishment for the declaration and successful realization of the independence of the Slovak state, and also as revenge for his opposition to the bolshevik invasion and its subsequent criminal Stalinist establishment of the communist regime in his country, all this forces one to evaluate perhaps even his political mistakes obviously from many different angles. Nevertheless, his political career was subject to criticism during wartime as it is today, and it was not infrequently marked by bitter partisan politics, prejudice, injustice and merciless condemnation. He was subject to hateful attacks by the communists, angry criticism by the Nazis, hatred on the part of those in the service of Czech imperialism, as well as by unjust accusations by contemporary historians and in many details unjustly condemned by the uninformed or highly prejudiced historical writers and journalists of our time. And now the Vatican newspaper! In spite of all this the memory of Dr. Joseph Tiso remains revered by the great majority of Slovaks living in their homeland and throughout the world. Few Slovak political leaders, living or dead, enjoy his stature as a statesman, his popularity and enduring fame among his own people. Dr. Joseph Tiso was undoubtedly a foremost political leader on the entire European scene. Lightning strikes only the tallest trees! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SL OVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents By Dr. Arved Gr e b e rt Geneva, Switzerland L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican daily, published (April 27, 1974) an article by Robert A. Graham, S. J., an American Jesuit, on the policy of the Holy See in regard to anti-Jewish legislation during the second World War in Hitler-dominated Europe. (La Santa Sede e le vittime della guerra.) The author based his conclusions exclusively on material in a volume of diplomatic doc~ments published by the Vatican: Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la seconde guerre mondiale. The aforementioned article touches upon the stand taken by the Slovak government in regulations concerning the Jews which were implemented without exception in all the states that were in the GermanItalian orbit. As a matter of record, neither in Italy, the centuries-old bastion of Catholicism, nor in France, which was headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, a practical Catholic, was the Holy See able to halt discrimination that was officially prescribed by law. The author of the review merely noted the facts relating to the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia without taking into account existing circumstances, very often completely unknown to foreign readers. These were influenced by the geopolitical situation of Slovakia caught in the German-Magyar vise or web. Moreover, Hungary enjoyed a privileged position. At this period of history its policy-makers knew how to take advantage of its political anti-semitic regulations under the domination of the Third Reich. One must take into consideration, too, the overwhelming power pressure imposed upon Slovakia by Germany. No less important in this delicate situation was the fact that Bratislava, the Slovak capital and seat of the government, was located on the very borders of Germany. This was 6 SLOVAKIA a precarious position that could have toppled the Slovak government from power at any moment by a military invasion. Without weighing all these basic realities one cannot begin to understand the policy of President Tiso and the Slovak government in this problem of seeking a solution for the Jewish question during the second World War in Slovakia. It is not our intention on this occasion to discuss the circumstances that brought on anti-Jewish regulations by the government in Slovakia at this particular time. An analysis of this phase of the Slovak past will be the role of a free Slovak historical study which will have free access to and complete use of all existing documents on the basis of a comparative study of all the contemporary events in Europe and local circumstances. Things looked entirely different in Bratislava and at the Vatican, for example. And, likewise, the problems of President Tiso were judged quite differently at the Vatican and German headquarters ( and by Nazi reporters) in Berlin or Bratislava. It will not be out of place, therefore, to illustrate our point of view on this historical problem by citing official statements of a Nazi report of February, 1943, in Bratislava itself. This report on the situation in Slovakia together with a proposal for the future destiny of the Slovak nation in the sphere of Nazi Germany after the expected victorious end of the war was presented to the chief of the SS. bureau. It was top secret, dated February 16, 1943, and sent to the SS. Hauptamt headquarters, whose chief was G. Berger. The latter, in a letter to Heinrich Himler (February 19, 1943 ), the chief of SS. and the police in the Third Reich, informed him of the situation in Slovakia with a supplementary note that a detailed report was being sent to the third department of the main office of national security . The text of this communique appeared in a Slovak translation of the documents which Vilem Precan edited in Bratislava in 1965. (Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty. Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, pp . 45-54 ). We will quote only those paragraphs that refer to Dr. Jozef Tiso and his closest political associates . They quite clearly reflect the attitude of the German Nazis toward the Slovak Republic. In the introduction we read: President Dr. Tiso has ranged wid ely in his politics. According to SLOVAKIA 7 law he is the leader of the nation and the party, and is the top man in the state. This powerful position was secured with the coop eTation of old associates, the strong support of the clergy and leaders of Catholic Action, and also with the aid of Sidor's followers, and apparently, too, by the backing of recruits from neutral or indifferent sources, such as those of Dr. Karvas. Tiso, a realist, declared himself in favor of the Reich. But internally he leans on elements that are fundamentally hosti1e to Germany and opposed to the ideas of the Third Reich. He is endeavoring to build up Slovakia on the principles of the Catholic Action group, and hence his ultimate objective is a Catholic state. In the beginning his intentions were hidden by a mask. Opportunistic references to national socialism seemed that he was favorably disposed to it, but lately he has thrown off the mask and a frontal attack on national socialism is underway. And a Nazi informer writes further: After Sidor's resignation Tiso and his associates have a free hand. Catholic Action and the clergy are in confrontation with the national guard (Hlinka Guards). Their allies are those who felt they had suffered losses as the result of the establishment of the Slovak state those who had lost rights or privileges, those who had always cooperated with the Jews and were dependent on them, and finally by all the Jews who remained in the country. The national guard obviously could not offer sufficient resistance to this •a lignment without outside help. The result was Salzburg, an agreement that Tiso regarded as foroed upon him and which he never respected. Attached to this offjcial report were addenda in the form of written observations about individual aspects of the Slovak problem in 1943. Supplement 6 was labeled: "State President Dr. Jozef Tiso, Bratislava, February 11, 1943." President Tiso's political profile is drawn and the views of his associates recorded. For example, Ravasz and Dr. Polyak ("another cleric-oriented ally of Dr. Tiso, a full fledged minister."). According to Semi-Goth, Polyak was a Jew and a friend of the Jews. cavojsky, Suroviak and Drobny are listed as Tiso's allies. Liberals Stano, Sokol and Sivak are in Tiso's camp as are Stefan Danihel and Dr. Turcek, industrialists, the report sp,id. "All these," the report continued, "on the basis of their life style and urban environment are opposed to the Reich. It is apparent that the clergy and all the forces of Catholic Action are behind Tiso. From 1941 Tiso won over the party affiliation of the erstwhile followers of Sidor." The Nazi informer continues: Three years ago in response to a radio talk by a Catholic priest, 8 SLOVAKIA R , who advocated social security, Tiso told bim that he was thinking of following the example of Salazar of Portugal in Slovakia. (Salazar was looked upon as a civilian Jesuit who leaned towards the idea of a Catholic state.) The book of a theologian (Dr. Polakovic), Tisov a ruiuka, reflects the views and plans of Tiso in bold outlines. They follow the Catholic idea of a state quite clearly as an objective of Catholic Action. The author upholds the absolute primacy of the Church over the state. Proof of Tiso's state-political views are clearly evidenced by hi.s philosophy of education, the establishment of organizations in support of Catholic Action, etc. A former Jesuit, Misik, is his close advisor. Tiso also actively supported the organization of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the initiator was Dr. Novak, a university professor and well known Pan Slav. Tiso's reaction to the Salzburg Agreement is manifested in his statement that he accepted it "with clenched teeth" because it was forced upon him. He said to Mach who handed in his resignation in December, 1942: "You know where I stand. They forced you upon me. Therefore, it will be better if you present your resignation where you received your appointment." This attitude towards the Salzburg Agreement is the inevitable result of Tiso's rejection of national socialism and German influence in general. There are many proofs of this. For example, in the fall of 1942 Tiso told Commander Kubicek of the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen du ring his visit at the president's residence (palace): "We do not need any form of national socialism. We have our own views." In May, 1942, the president received Dr. Elemer Fink from Zvolen, together with Dr. Kovac, Mayor of Bratislava, at which meeting Dr. E. Fink presented a petition in behalf of his brother, Dr. Zoltan Fink. Tiso promised him a position and economic privileges on condition that the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen ceases to demand the implementation of a program of national socialism. And Tiso stated that neither the Church nor the state would tolerate any form of national socialism, and added emphatically that it was in his power to prevent its establishment. At a party conference in the Pohronie region in December, 1942, Tiso declared: "We must strive by our work to achieve what we want. Our nation must manifest its maturity in every phase of life in order to prove that it is capable of self-government. In the future we will not need supervision (this he emphasized) . We must prove to the whole world we do not need enyone to subsidize us." Towards national socialism Tiso expressed his views. openly at a conference of leaders of the Hlinka Guard in Bojnice (July 1-31, 1942). Despite the fact that he was speaking to a number of avowed Slovak national socialists Tiso did not use the term, "national socialism," at all. As a matter of fact, he declared that the Hlinka Guard must not become involved in an ideological struggle. Reaction to his address in which he stated that the Slovaks were not working in the interests of the Germans or any alien nation but only in the interest of the SLOVAKIA 9 Slovak nation was very much in evidence among the assembly of the Hlinka Guard. For the president, next to his alliance with the clergy, his strength lies in the solid support of the Academic youth (college and university students). On June 2, 1942, Tiso received a tremendous ovation for his speech in the university amphitheatre in Bratislava. The residents of the Lafranconi and Svoradov fraternity houses gave a public demonstration in which they voiced their anti-German but pro Pan Slav and Roman Catholic sympathy during the course of President Tiso's address. This compromised Tiso's policy and was a direct answer to Ambassador Ludin's earlier speech in Kezmarok. In this respect it is necessary to quote from Tiso's speech: "We have our own policies in regard to foreign states, particularly towards the great German Reich with which we are allied by a special agreement. But who could imagine that Germany should wish to direct Slovak politics? We have to direct our own political life under this agi,eement. No thinking German would expect a Slovak to conduct German politics in Slovakia. Frankly, every reasoning German would resent such an attitude. Let us, therefore, conduct our own politics in Slovakia." Furthe.r proof that Tiso does not absolutely follow the pro-German political line we deduce from the words of one of his loyal followers, namely, Father Izakovic. The latter in his speech in August, 1942, in Trnava to some 300 officers, said that it is imperative to adjust to the circumstances of the times, and that if a certain policy is being followed today is does not necessarily mean that it cannot be changed by new circumstances tomorrow. The speaker insisted he was repeating the views of Tiso with whom he had just had an interview. This, then, is the political profile of President Tiso as drawn by a German Nazi informer in his February 11, 1943, report from Bratislava. In reply to Father Graham, the American Jesuit, whose article appeared in the Osservatore Romano, it is enlightening to quote again from the official statement (Par. 7) under the title, "Influence of the Clergy, particularly the Jesuits and Catholic Action in Slovakia." It is dated February 11, 1943. We quote: The privileged position of the clergy in the Slovak nation may be explained on the basis of historical development. While the Slovaks were incorporated in Hungary they did not belong to the upper class. Magyarization was allied with the social oppression of the Slovak nation. Proof of this is in the large number of Magyar clergy and secular leaders of Slovak origin. The lower clergy remained united with the Slovak people. Thus, since the clergy in general was held in high esteem in the kingdom of Hungary and because there was no upper class in Slovakia, the Slovak clergy assumed the role of leadership in their own country rather automatically. Even the establishment of the Slovak Peoples Party at the beginning 10 SLOVAKIA of the 20th century was inspired and greatly influenced by the clergy. Prominent Slovak clergymen like Hlinka became involved with ecclesiastical authorities in a controversy on national issues. During the existence of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic after World War I the Slovak Peoples Party was in constant conflict with the centralistic regime ruling Slovakia from Prague. For Hlinka and Sidor and their adherents the Slovak nation's interests were dominant factors in their political program, the chief objective of which was the fulfillment of the promise of autonomy or self-government for the Slovaks in their own native land. One other vital factor in the relations of the Slovak Peoples Party and the central government of Masaryk and Benes in Prague was the attempt of the politicians in the Czech capital of Prague (most of whom were free-thinkers and opposed to the Church) to separate church and state and secularfae all schools in the country. In contrast to the privileged position of the clergy in Hungary and its endangered future this was a threat to their very existence in the new republic of CzechoSlovakia. This reality was very much in evidence by the fact that the Slovak Peoples Party was predominantly represented by the clergy in Prague. Thus, while Hlinka basically maintained an uncompromising stand towards the Czechs, Tiso and the clerical wing pursued a policy of tactical maneuvering and realistic consideration. Attempts of the Catholic Church after the first World War to adapt itself to the new revolutionary conditions of the times by a dynamic program of Catholic Action found fertile soil for its ideals among the religious Slovak populace. This enabled both th e clergy and the Church in Slovakia to maintain dominant influence. Sivak, Minister of education in the Slovak Republic, was, and is an outspoken party affiliate of Tiso and strongly pro-clerical. Under him the schools we11e re-organized on the basis of the Catholic and Lutheran Evangelical faiths. The local committees for national education are chiefly headed by the pastors of the region. In the denominational schools the chairman of the school-board ex officio is the pastor, who is also ex officio a member of the non-denominational school-board in his district. According to a secret directive the clergy is obligated by all mram possible to secure and maintain control over social life, and wield its influence in all business enterprises, organizations, labor and industry . Even today the largest land-owners in the state are the clergy, and they lead a very feudal life in their episcopal sees and in country parishes. Moreover, many pastors are representatives in parliament and are on various committees. The influence of the Jesuits is obviously wide. It was apparent during Magyar rule and later when Ledochowski, the Jesuit General, offered aid to Hlinka and his party. As it flows from the very substance of the Jesuit style of work, only seldom is one able to detect any signs of their activity. They exert their influence primarily through the clergy. The Jesuits have the training of clerical candidates in their hand s. At SLOVAKIA 11 monthly meetings of diocesan priests, the Jesuits conducted the conferences mostly by ser,mons. They are also in charge of spiritual exercises for rthe clergy. The restoration of the Jesuit monastery in Ruzomberok is a further sign of the intensification of Jesuit activity. The Jesuits have a direct influence on Slovak politics. For example, in 1941 they had a religious conference for Slovak political leaders in Ruzomberok under the supervision of Father Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. According to reports, some of those present were given quite a going-over, but since these exercises required silence this prevented any open discussions or a request for any questions to be answered publicly. Anyone who had a question or problem could discuss it only privately with a Jesuit priest assigned for individual consultation. Besides, other means for their influence are readily available. For instance, two sisters of Ledochowski, the Jesuit provincial, live in Bratislava. For a time after the dedaration of the independence of the Slovak Republic Tiso resided in a Jesuit monastery where Father Mikus, former Jesuit provincial, was one of his closest advisers. There are Slovak Jesuits in the Vatican, too. Among them there is Father Javorka, director of the Russicum College, and Dr. Kralicek, Hlinka's grand-nephew who is a librarian at the Vatican. Sidor himself revealed in a radio speech on December 16, 1942, that Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, is a frequent guest at the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican. It is entirely unnecessary to point out that the Jesuit position is absolutely anti-German. As ·a n example, we will cite the case of a pastor who was suspended for his national-socialistic writings. During his talk with Mikus (the Jesuit provincial, who visited him) he was admonished and asked not to do anything that would sever his relations with his bishop. Mikus added that the situation would undoubtedly change in a year ar two. To the query he intimated that Germany would not win the war Mikus replied he not only surmised it but he was wholly convinced of it, -and even said that there were many others of the same opinion, evidence that he was voicing an opinion held in high places. Although the youngest group of the Jesuits is not numerically large, there are many among them with a high I.Q. Catholic Action has as its primary role a lay apostolate designated to support the activity of the clergy. Its influence and importance have grown perceptibly in the past few years. Its branches are found everywhere. Dr. Buzalka, director of the seminary in Braitislava, is also the director of Catholic Action. His anti-German sentiments are public knowledge. The press of the Catholic Action movement has great opportunities and is definitely anti-German. In addition to its own internal information service, Catholic Action has its own Catholic Press Bureau whose releases are used by the Catholic periodicals and party publications. Svoradov, the Catholic student center at the Slovak University in Bratislava, is a bulwark of Catholic Action, clericalism and a hotbed of anti-German views. Its director is Dr. Filkorn, a good friend of Tiso. Dr. Kirschbaum, a close follower of Sidor, was active for a long time as a Pan Slav and 12 SLOVAKIA German foe. He was with Sidor in Rome for a long time but was recently transierred to the Slovak Embassy in Switzerland. In his report on Sidor, the informant in Bratislava observes that he and his friends in Slovakia resist German influence. "Their attitude is known and manifests itself at ~very opportunity," he writes. As evidence of this the informer observes: Thus, for example, Culen fails to say one word about German 3id given in the founding of the Slovak state in his introduction to an article in the pictorial book of the Slovak Peoples Party which was published on the second anniversary of Slovak Independence Day (March 14, 1941). Not only does he fail to mention German assistance but he repeatedly claims that the creation of the Slovak state was accomplished by the Slovak nation alone! Then, too, as another glaring example, Carnogursky does not refer to German-Slovak cooperation during his lectures to party members, and at the funeral of Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, he openly expressed hi s pro-Polish sympathies. Sidor in his post at the Slovak Embassy in th e Vatican had every opportunity to renew old acquaintances. Through enemy representatives at th e Vatican there were many such occasions. Although he faithfully reported that he received several letters from Benes, Minister Mach, for one, is firmly convinced that Sidor replied either in writing or through oth er channels on his own. When we take into consideration the increasingly strong desire of the Catholic Church to have the Pope play a role as mediator, and possibly, a decisive role in terminating the present world conflict, and since the Slovak Catholic press in Slovakia constantly emphasizes this point of view, then it is perhaps not a mistake to assume that Sidor seeks to direct Slovak internal politics into other channels through Catholic Action. The mission of Kirschbaum, a fanatical follower of Sidor who has been transferred to the Embassy in Switzerland, means the strengthening of Sidor's position in his foreign political policy outside Slovakia. "The Jews in Slovakia" (under that caption or heading the informer continues): The Jews, 20,000 of them, still occupy positions in government and in various administrative posts and supervising positions, apparently permanent assignments. Jews, whom the Guard seized when they were trying to escape from the country, and who were put into concentration camps, reappeared in their homes soon after being released. These were given the protection of a presidential immunity card as wards of the state. They are more or less impertinent, depending on fluctuating changes in the war. To supplement his report, the Nazi informant adds that culen, a member of the Slovak parliament and trusted SLOVAKIA 13 friend of President Jozef Tiso, has a half-Jewish wife, that Minister i'.>urcansky intervened for 200 Jews who were released at his command from transport ready to leave the country, that the Mayor of Nitra was the godfather of many Jewish children, that when Minister Mach wanted to remove the above Mayor from office, President Tiso intervened in his behalf, that Msgr. Filkorn spoke openly in parliament in protest against the unchristian methods of disposing of Jewish properties, and finally, that Minister Polyak was a half-Jew. Such was the context of the information supplied his government in Berlin by a Nazi agent living in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Nazis did not think that the communists or the "Czechoslovaks" in Slovakia were their dangerous foes, but, strangely enough, the people who were loyal to President Tiso, followers of Sidor, the Catholic clergy, the Jesuits and the majority of the Slovak Peoples Party were feared. From the German viewpoint only Premier Dr. Tuka, Minister Alexander Mach and the Hlinka Guards were their only trusted allies in the Slovak Republic. To comprehend fully and judge conditions in Slovakia during war time it is necessary to study these official German documents. That is what Robert A. Graham, S. J . should have done but failed to do. Many German documents are now available as official records of what transpired from the German point of view. Their policy, their views, reactions and their analysis of President Tiso are all there for anyone who wants to know the truth. Unquestionably, they confirm the negative stand of President Tiso to German national socialism and an appraisal of his realistic approach to the Third Reich in the interest of his own Slovak nation. In conclusion we will cite a part of the official report of SS. Haupsturmftihrer Dr. H. Barsch, chief of the department of III B of the central division security in Vienna. His report of October, 1943, almost a year before the so-called 'Slovak Revolt' was sent to Dr. E . Kaltenbrunner, Nazi chief of security police and safety. (This report appeared in the publication Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, Nemci a Slovensko, 1944, Dokumenty, Nakladatel'stvo Epocha, Bra- 14 SLOVAKIA tislava, 1970. Zostavil Vilem Precan, pp. 40-43.) Aside from other comments this is what the report has to say about Dr. Jozef Tiso's stand towards the Third Reich: Although there do not as yet exist any direct proofs of Tiso's duplicity in his suspected role of double-dealing, nevertheless, his personal politics in recent years have resulted in strengthening forces that are least sympathetic to the Reich. Since he was aware of the political past of these elements, and hence could have easily foreseen their future activity and behaviour towards the Reich, it seems that already then he was thinking of an orientation away from the pro-German position. Besides this, as it happened frequently, whenever German requests were not fulfilled and when there were other deviations from the German line, he could always defend himself by claiming these groups were to blame and thus was able to allay suspicions of personal disloyalty to the German Reich. A further argument in a careful evaluation of Tiso's stand is his position as a priest. In spite of many instances of self-will, Tiso maintains close contacts with higher authorities in the Church. Moreover, his most intimate co-workers are clerics: Msgr. Filkorn, Pastor Izakovic and Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. From this friendship one can conclude more than an indecisive stand on the Jewish question. From the German standpoint this may well be the decisive point that can prove the President's loyalty or disloyalty, the touchstone of his fidelity. Finally, his official appearance, especially in recent times, has not added anything significantly to warrant our trust of Tiso on the German side. Whenever Tiso claims that his speeches (e.g. in Nitra) are addressed to various groups, perhaps one cannot argue against this, for his dialectic is truly excellent. But one cannot overlook the fact that the President knows full well the caliber of his people, and consequently he must be aware of the fact that all political double-talk, even if having reference to other states with an interest in Slovakia, is understood by the populace as being aimed at the Reich, and finally, a keen observer can grasp what is going on in the highest positions of the state and confirm what he has long suspected, and that is the consequence of influence from the enemy side. It is, generally speaking, problematical to depend upon Tiso entirely. Consideration of the party as a factor in the internal political security of the country is a mistaken notion. The leading positions in the party are held by persons with anti-German sentiments. If, for the sake of argument, one considers these people generally without power, and therefore harmless to our cause, it must be noted that then they are not capable of insuring the defense of an internal front to the degree and measure demanded for the interests of the Reich. And even SLOVAKIA 15 if we assume indifference, the interests of the Reich are not assured since German direction and control are possible under present conditions only with great difficulty. The Nazis were also well informed about the political views of Tiso's political aides. For example, in a detailed and extensive report of November 28, 1944, from Bratislava, addressed to the main office of security in the Reich, III B and III C, which was delivered to both SS-Standardftihrer Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Spengler in Berlin, among other items, there is reference to the relationship of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Hlinka Guards. The German reporter writes that "the Hlinka Guard considers itself national socialist and absolutely pro-German while the party advocates a form of Christian nationalism as a Slovak ideology, and that it looks upon Slovak-German cooperation and friendship as a temporary and not a permanent association, and this opportunism ( certainly not based on a bond of affection) the party spokesmen spread through the Slovak press." After the uprising (the so-called Slovak revolt of August-October, 1944) the Nazi informer writes: "The Party ideologically prepared propaganda favoring a Christian social world view, and Opustil, the general secretary, adopted this as part of his program for immediate implementation. Dr. Jozef Pauco, chief editor of the Slovak daily addressed the members of the 'Domobrana' (National Defense) on the problems of Slovak spiritual orientation and simultaneously declared clearly that for the Slovaks only the Christian national point of view is acceptable. Even more clearly did the member of parliament Cavojsky state this in his radio broadcast of November 8, 1944. He said, to quote : 'As an independent and Christian nation we want to live in freedom in our own free land. A good and selfconscious Slovak never desired a change of masters, he wanted to be master of his own destiny in his own country. In the same way we do not want an exchange of foreign ideologies because these are not for our national interest. As Christians we want to establish our own social, economic and cultural life on the basis of a Christian world view.' Dr. Korper's address had a Sophist tone, the reporter notes, when he said: 'Our agreement with Germany was precious and fundamental because it guaranteed the strong- 16 SLOVAKIA est and freest right for national life which, up to 1939, no other power on earth was willing to recognize as our right to national existence. If there had been another possibility the Slovaks most probably would have chosen to act otherwise.' Dr. Ferdinand t:>urcansky, former foreign minister, spoke in the same vein when he declared: 'I am not a Bolshevik but it is possible I may become one if I can thereby be of service to my nation.' cavojsky, member of the Slovak parliament, in his above mentioned radio address said: 'A bit of egoism in the life of nations is not harmful; in these times we must not forget that alien interests are not always identical with our own national interests.' In other words, he wanted to tell the Slovak people not to subscribe to any wartime party but to work for themselves and to wait for the outcome of events in the future. For the time being the young opposition, encouraged by Opustil, that is, the Mikula-Polakovic wing, the Nazi official informer notes: "Party discipline was imposed upon Mikula for his activity. In the event of this opposition, however, there is no hope of friendly aid to the Germans, but only in the interests of the young Slovak chauvinists who stand uncompromisingly for Slovak independence, and therefore are opposed to any kind of German interference in Slovak internal affairs. This opposition party, first of all, has adherents among university students and may be considered the successor of the former adherents of Ndstup from which emerged activistic elements led by Dr. t:>urcansky, former minister of foreign affairs in the Slovak Republic. By his resolute stand and frequent addresses to the university students, and his association with this opposition movement, Dr. f>urcansky considers this to be a bridge to new political action." German Nazis saw Slovak politicians surrounding President Tiso at the end of November, 1944, in this light. ( See the above mentioned publication, pp. 435-446). These documents, and others in the same way, including the well known Documents on German Foreign Policy published by the British, French and American governments, uniformly place the ·political activity of Dr. Joseph Tiso SLOVAKIA 17 and his associates during the second World War in an objective light. This means in a practical sense the political rehabilitation of Slovak political policy during this era on the basis of ideological principles. Dr. Tiso was of the opinion that in Slovakia the ideological defense against Nazism and Bolshevist Stalinism can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of a Christian world view derived mainly from Catholicism. All this can be disputed, but Tiso's good intentions cannot be denied. Fundamentally, there is no proof to the contrary. Dr. Joseph Tiso was an extraordinary person. During the second World War his political life was surrounded by obstacles, threats and dangers such as very few statesmen had to face in this epoch. The unique Slovak situation increased and complicated his public life. His tragic death as a punishment for the declaration and successful realization of the independence of the Slovak state, and also as revenge for his opposition to the bolshevik invasion and its subsequent criminal Stalinist establishment of the communist regime in his country, all this forces one to evaluate perhaps even his political mistakes obviously from many different angles. Nevertheless, his political career was subject to criticism during wartime as it is today, and it was not infrequently marked by bitter partisan politics, prejudice, injustice and merciless condemnation. He was subject to hateful attacks by the communists, angry criticism by the Nazis, hatred on the part of those in the service of Czech imperialism, as well as by unjust accusations by contemporary historians and in many details unjustly condemned by the uninformed or highly prejudiced historical writers and journalists of our time. And now the Vatican newspaper! In spite of all this the memory of Dr. Joseph Tiso remains revered by the great majority of Slovaks living in their homeland and throughout the world. Few Slovak political leaders, living or dead, enjoy his stature as a statesman, his popularity and enduring fame among his own people. Dr. Joseph Tiso was undoubtedly a foremost political leader on the entire European scene. Lightning strikes only the tallest trees!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents Description An account of the resource Dr. Arvéd Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 5-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/82be9684b63163d7ebd33f880bcd018b.pdf 7c970814af7f74bde39e8c666f1cb284 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 37 DR. JOSEPH TISO: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT Dr. Joseph Pauco The President of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), who was executed by a pro-Communist regime on April 18, 1947, ranks among the outstanding figures of the centralEuropean Christian Democratic movement. He was Dr. Joseph Tiso, ideologist of the Slovak Populist Party, which fought for the independence of Slovakia and since 1925 represented the majority of Slovak voting power. The philosophy motivating the Slovak Populist Party was For God and Nation, and it was in the spirit of this principle that Dr. Tiso embodied all his Christian Democratic politics. "Let no one pause to wonder," he wrote, "that we work with God for the nation. God does not need the nation. God will be God even without a nation whether we admit the fact or not, but without God there can be no nation .... There is no sinful failing against God in allying the concepts 'For God, For Nation.' It means the binding of human values to values that are eternal, that are divine."(!) Dr. Tiso affirmed that this clarion call "For God, for Nation" should intensify Christian idealism. His own words are: "Putting it in a practical way, this simply means that one (who cultivates Christian idealism) will not frustrate the influence of Christianity upon the life of a nation in its schools, its literature, its parliament; he will, on the contrary, use every opportunity to help Christianity enter more and more significantly into classrooms and lecture halls, into family life and into public life, for it is Christianity alone that can preserve the roots of idealism without which no nation can survive.''(2) Idealism and Christian morality are the sine qua non of the life of nations and society. "I rely on a weak analogy," declared Dr. Tiso, "when I say that if nature cannot survive without the beneficence of heat and sun, neither can human life endure without faith, without moral philosophy. The histories of nations and our personal experiences furnish evidence to substantiate the fact that whatever the light of faith and Christian morals was extinguished, there followed not only a decline in culture, truth and art, but also �38 SLOVAKIA a decay that affected the nation's economic system as well. A social order grounded in gross materialism, devoid of Christian idealism, cannot long endure, and a nation bred in materialism, grasping for matter alone, becomes like a withered shrub that stands in the midst of luxuriant verdure, a thing alien and repulsive to other nations."(3) Christianity imposes the obligation of love for one's nation. "Love for the nation is a religious precept, and anyone who does not foster a love for his nation violates the fourth commandment. He is branded not only as an earthly traitor, but also as a transgressor who profanes the law of God."(4) Chauvinism, on the other hand, he denounced as can be seen from these extracts: "A regulated love of self is the foundation of Christian charity. From this basic tenet there also evolves the proper concept of Christian nationalism. First comes love of one's own nation, then an extension of charity to others. Non-Christian nationalism is of an entirely different stock, loving self and hybridizing into chauvinism. " (5) "Nationalism, a kind of centering on self diffused on a national scale, is not only the indispensable drive in service for the nation, it is also the natural measure of obligation on the part of one nation toward other nations, just as love of self becomes the stimulating force or the incentive for self-improvement and the gauge of human relations. But in order to prevent self-love as well as nationalism from degenerating into formidable media of destruction, there must be an obligation which is expressed in the universally known precept: Love thy neighbor as thyself."(6) According to the teaching of the Church, "nationalism loves its own but it must not hate what is other than its own; it builds its own but it may not destroy another's; it strengthens its own but it does not divide the whole."(7) One who is a believing Christian and a patriot works for the freedom of his nation because "the independence of a nation is a natural good which substantially affects not only the individual and his material and spiritual interests, but it concerns the entire national commonwealth. Since national freedom is then such a natural good that affects the �SLOVAKIA individual, the family and the entire national community, there can be nothing inappropriate in the gratitude which is shown to God in return for it.... "For a nation to exist and yet not be independent means sentencing it to its extinction. If a nation is to exist, and there is proof of this in the fact that it now does exist, then that nation, by the will of God, must be free .... "A nation must be granted its freedom, for without liberty it would in vain have the God-given gift of language; it would be unable to use it. In vain would it have a Godgiven territory; it would be unable to cultivate its land and make a living on it. Consequently if a nation is to live according to its intellectual endowments and character, it must be free in order to fulfill its destiny. The Divine Will, therefore, is for a nation to be independent and free."(8) The liberty of a nation is protected by the State. As Tiso sees it, "The State is an organized body established for the welfare of the citizens. It is founded on the natural law, therefore on the will of the Creator, Who so created man that he can live and develop his mental and moral faculties only in association with other men. The State is a means to an end and not the end of man. It is for the State to serve the welfare of man, not for man to serve the State. This is the original design of the Creator from which, however, the developmental periphery of human society has steadily departed more and more. "The State is founded on the individuality of its citizens whose interests it promotes rather than absorbs. The State does not assume the obligations of individuals but it discharges those functions that are essential for the life of all, tasks for which the capacities of the individual alone are not commensurate. Always and everywhere it must be the individual first and as far as his abilities can reach and only beyond that point may the State enter as a collective unit of strength. It is for the State to serve society, not society the State. The organization of the State is determined by the moral disposition, the physical capacity and the material potential of the nation. What holds in regard to the relationship of the individual to the State, likewise holds in regard to the family and the nation as a biological unit and �40 SLOVAKIA of the Church as a supernatur al institution. The State does not assume and absorb their rights and their functioning ; contrarywis e, it reinforces and as a collective organism it merely supplement s whatever the family or the nation alone cannot provide or whatever would hinder the Church from attaining her mission. The State therefore should be the organ of the nation and not a medium of the arrogance, aggressiven ess and violence of its representat ives in authority. By its collective instrument ality it should promote individual enterprise and not thwart the developmen t of the vigor of the nation by imposing excessive financial burdens. It is an institution of temporal welfare which does not interfere with supernatur al aspirations but respects them because of their delicate bearing on the temporal wellbeing of society."(9) The State should respect the natural law and should not interfere in Church matters: "God is a power greater than man; the Church is more than the State. The State may not meddle in ecclesiastic al affairs."(10 ) The State must submit to Christian ideals. "We subordinate the powers of the State to the laws of morality and justice. In keeping with this principle, the State must respect the rights of individuals, of families, of society and of local self-govern ing entities. It regards as sacred the right of parents to educate their children and the privilege of free religious profession. It guarantees the right of private ownership and insures the peaceful co-existenc e of empolyer and employee."(11) It was only natural for Dr. Tiso as the ideologist of the Slovak Populist Party to conceive of the democratic structure of the State. "Just as it is an axiom for political activity to be concerned above all about the public good and about the common welfare," writes Dr. Tiso, "so it is likewise true that political activity of such a nature is carried on more successfull y on a democratic basis than on any other kind of foundation. The very root of the word, demos - people, signifies the universalit y of all the members of a nation, incidentally of a State, who are to be not merely passive but truly active in this common functioning . A democratic system brings up people for universality , for it �SLOVAKIA 41 draws the widest possible public to share in the governing of the State, and thereby more and more come to be identified with the State. Consequently there is not only an awakening of responsibility in wide circles, but there is also established a definite degree of confidence in the directives that are promulgated, for in them the citizens see an expression of their will and of their effort to attain a better future. It is true that democracy presupposes a people educated for public service lest it degenerate into a mass easily swayed in the hands of oligarchs or political parties. Hence democracy can thrive only under Utopian or eminently ideal conditions. A foundation based on materialism will educe class struggle incited by selfishness and before long it will evolve into a dictatorship. In a democracy, however, this counterbalanc e of an ideally educated people insures a rich burgeoning of life and secures the firm consolidation of the State. "(12) In defining the duties of a democratic government, Dr. Tiso stated: "A democracy is a regime according to the will of the people. It is a regime which makes it possible for the will of the people to be manifest in all that affects public life. Democracy in this sense implies that the citizens do not merely express their will or their preferences in regard to organization and government at election time or in various types of balloting, but in the interests of the people and in the spirit of true democracy as such, the educated stratum, the intellectuals, fully explain to the people the program proposed and the objectives of the political party and thus instruct the citizens."(13) "Democracy means putting into effective use every creative force in the State as well as appraising its every component unit according to its moral worth even in the event that the ruling power does not demand this."(14) Dr. Tiso dedicated himself to service in a Christian democracy: "We uphold the principle of democracy because democracy is consonant with Christian teaching and we will not permit it to become corrupted with Marixist and socialistic appendages."(15) "We Slovaks are from our very souls adherents to this Christian democracy and we condemn every form of dictatorship regardless of the label under �42 SLOVAKIA . which it may try to hide its true nature or identity. We pledge ourselves to stand for democracy but for democracy of the proper stamp." Not a mystified or mystifying democracy. "In the maelstrom of views and opinions on democracy, it seems that there is developing a conscious tendency. Out of an indefinite conception of democracy there is being shaped a mystique of democracy which would affect people and command their reluctant respect; none may dare to voice any question or to protest once the statement is made that democracy requires this or that; none may presume to question an arrangement, for if it is a democratic arrangement, it is the best possible arrangement. And thus there is fabricated the mystique of democracy."(16) In a Christian democracy whatever holds in general extends also into individual departments, branches of public service and activity. Nor is it otherwise in the Christian democracy of Tiso. It may be helpful to examine in this connection a matter as weighty as the social problem. For the Slovak nation which had been so long the victim of foreign exploitation, this question bearing on the disposition of social affairs has been, and even after the overthrow of Communism it will still remain, a vital issue. Prime importance attaches especially to the relation between worker and employer; to the valuation attached not merely to property worth but also to labor; to the extent to which the government will identify itself with private initiative, and similar matters. The Church has long since made a clear pronouncement on this subject. Both the Rerum Novarum and the Quadragesimo Anno are well known encyclicals containing for modern Christian democracy the entire teaching of the Church on socio-economic affairs. Slovak Populists have likewise built on these social encyclicals of the Popes. Hence it was but natural that Dr. Tiso made application from these documents of the Church in the light of Christian philosophy rather than from any other sources when he set about his task of settling the long neglected problem of economics and social justice in Slovakia. He opposed class struggle and class hatred. "Instead of class warfare, we must. cultivate mutual and national �SLOVAKIA 43 Christian charity; by humility, simplicity and industry we must supplant rapaciousness, materialism and voluptousness. "(17) "To every man his due and injustice to none! That is our watchword - no hollow-sounding catchword but an honored principle. If we do not wish to violate tradition, we must tolerate no privileged classes, no privileges of any kind whatever, no indulgence of prerogatives, whatever their origin may have been."(18) Dr. Tiso interprets Christian social politics as "founded on realistic assumption: it takes into account the nature of man composed of body and soul and conscious of this dual basis it classifies among the most potent agencies of the social order not mere material forces but rather spiritual and moral incentives, giving these precedence, in fact. Hence, it is not concerned solely about a crust of bread; it cares also for every man's spirit, for sheer materialism can never satisfy man completely."(19) Christian socialism has always defended man's right to own private property. Dr. Tiso realized that sometimes capitalism can go to extremes, since capitalists are in the money and on occasion "they use wealth only for self aggrandizement and not for the general good."(20) On the other hand, although Dr. Tiso appreciated the deficiencies of capitalism, he consistently defended the principle of private ownership because he knew that the abrogation of ownership "would endanger both economic and cultural progress to a greater extent than does the capitalistic system, hedged about as it is by social policies.' (21) "In regard to the great question of individual ownership, considering it, for example, from the one extreme of liberalism to the opposite extreme of socialist communism," Dr. Tiso emphasized, "we juxtapose our principle which asserts the sacredness of private ownership and the uninviolable right of the individual."(22) On the other hand, however, "let him who has capital make just returns; let him distribute it with labor, and satisfy labor with decent civic gain." (23) A Christian view of capital and the income derived from it differs from that of other systems. "Former systems of liberalism and capitalism," Tiso wrote, "were al- �44 SLOVAKIA ways ready to calculate the profit trhat would accrue from an enterprise or a plant. Superficially it appears that income is the natural end of enterprise, but Catholic morality has long since taught that all the estates and properties of this world exist for man, for life. This truth is supported by the natural law also. Life is of higher value than gain. The theory that gain is of utmost value and importance must be invalidated. What is the world and everything in it for? For life, not for gain. Gain is subordinated to life and it may become an end only to the extent that it promotes life." (24) And where is capital to be sought? "Out of the strong spiritual resources of our national character," declared Dr. Tiso, "not by any exploitation of those who are socially weaker than we ourselves. It is not an international capital, not impersonalized, not embodied in the worship of gold, but the capital of individuals happily at work in the interests of their nation and their State; a capital which is evidenced in morally strong individuals, in numerous families socially secure, in a contented society united in social justice, in the harmonious commerce of all the citizens who work under the aegis of an organized State."(25) Capital and income are not produced except as the fruit of the laborer's toil. "We look upon work in an enlightened manner," Dr. Tiso asserted. "In it we see not only the creative force of economic values but the animate expression of human personality which has moral and social obligations; which a workingman therefore performs as his required contribution for the communal good and for which a wage is paid not only as the countervalue of energy expended or economic income achieved, but rather as a medium which in turn enables the laborer to satisfy all his obligations."(26) "In the light of Christian teaching, work is not a burden; it is not a means for effecting gain; it is rather the life expression of a man who is the inevitable agent under all circumstances. Christianity proceeds from man and says 'God endowed you with physical, spiritual, and intellectual powers and faculties so that you might use them to advantage.' This is a noble and holy thought. Work is a requisite �SLOVAKIA 45 for man even when he is already provided with sufficient resources for his livelihood."(27) He who works is entitled to a just wage. Humanity, in Dr. Tiso's words, "drew out of our venerable Christian socio-national spirit many a fresh impetus for fulfilling the words of Scripture 'The laborer is worthy of his hire'; to abide by the dictum of the same Scripture, 'He who does not work, let him not eat'; to demolish the idol of the golden calf in imitation of the example of Scripture; to measure with the same measure of justice to all, as the Scripture commands for we are all the children of one Father Who is in heaven."(28) Everyone has a claim to work. And "we shall distribute pay only for work." Dr. Tiso stresses this point, adding however, "We shall tolerate no unreasonable fomenting against capital. A workingman must not regard the capitalist as his enemy; on the other hand, a capitalist must realize that the capital, over which he is in reality only an administrator, essentially belongs to the nation in order to provide work and sustenance for all."(29) In short, the Christian-democratic system really "unites all - employers arnd workers - on the groundwork of a common interest: the material and moral well-being of the Slovak nation." (30) In all undertakings there must be effected an attitude in which "each one, regardless of what type of work he does, will come to regard the work as his own and will perform it with that devotion which he would lavish on his own."(31) It is the Christian democracy more than any other political system that cares for "the fundamental cell of the State and of society in general: the family," for the family "is the source from which all life is derived; it is the first school which educates one to think; it is the first temple which teaches one to pray; it is the first workshop which trains one to work; and it is also the first social bond which instructs one to live in the company of others in the spirit of love and equity. For this reason we must resist anything that may tend to ruin or impair the family and we must support everything that shall contribute to its unity and solidarity.... �46 SLOVAKIA "Therefore one prime concern shall be to foster the establishment of the family and to insure the material prerequisites for its existence. For the benefit of every type of employee, then, but especially for the laborer, measures must be taken to legislate a so-called family wage or familial pay to enable a young man to contract marriage and by a suitable scale of subsidies for wife and children (a scale graduated acording to their number) be assured a decent livelihood and proper education. Obviously this measure is also intended to provide a solution to the problem of married women now under employment. The ideal is to return married women to the family circle, for they are called to manage and maintain the government of the household and their proper place is the home."(32) Mankind as a Christian-democratic entity requires for its social security not only a family wage but also a settlement of housing policies. On this score Dr. Tiso observed, "Family life must be encouraged also by providing healthful and reasonably priced living quarters ... . A reasonable and hygienic housing unit is just as essential to family life as a decent income earned by the breadwinner."(33) "A family will be placed on the foundations where it properly belongs only when it has respectable quarters. When I say 'respectable quarters,' I mean that the home must qualify for the occupation of a family. . . . A guiding principle must be: to have a home in keeping with one's social standing."(34) "We must devote considerable attention to educate our people in regard to housing culture. The general cultural level of a nation is often judged by its housing culture and this also enters into the reasons why we are concerned about the living conditions of our Slovak residents in small towns and in the suburbs. Without improving housing conditions, one can hardly raise the level of the population or improve the position of the family."(35) In a Christian State, the family must be an exemplary unit in every respect. That is the reason why so much attention is devoted to preparation for family living. This was Dr. Tiso's attitude on the subject: "We shall provide for the family by supporting the �SLOVAKIA 47 education of youth designedly for family living, by providing moral safeguards for children and by arranging sociomedical conferences for those contemplating marriage as well as for those who are married, especially mothers."(36) Also: "We regard solicitude for the Slovak child as the most .s ublime aspect of social care."(37) The Christian-democratic State watchfully takes note -0f all social problems. It resolves difficulties and extends help to every level of its inhabitants that may require the support of State authority. In this manner it seems even to encroach upon private ownership. But this is really no encroachment in the usually accepted sense of the word; it is rather a kind of mediation and vigilance. Dr. Tiso advocates, fo rexample, that the government "should provide for the unemployed by creating jobs for them" or even by "introducing a working obligation." "The government considers it a duty to feel responsible for the employed as well as for the unemployed. Protection for the workers will be perfected by more thorough supervision in regard to the wage claims of employees as well as in the matter of safety and security measures to safeguard the health and the lives of the workers, but, above all, in provisions to protect the existence of the employees .... "(38) If projects are not managed in accordance with the natural law, the government calls for mediation or collective bargaining. "True, it is not easy to translate the natural law into action. Herein devolves a difficult assignment for the State. The State must put the natural law into concrete expression, an application appropriate to prevailing circumstances. Allow me to illustrate this point by an example: A family wage is obligatory under the natural law. Realizing this and anxious to secure the greatest possible success in his business, a manufacturer plans to hire single men only. This amounts to cudgelling life. The State must find a remedy for such a situation, some means by which to help large families and likewise to secure the prosperity of enterprising business. In some states all the workers are allotted the same pay but a definite portion of their earnings is withheld. Out of this reserve, compensation is then distributed to workers with large families. In other states, a �48 SLOVAKIA financing administration supplements the work of the laborers to effect a family wage. It covers its own replacement for this outlay out of taxes that accrue from the entire ., national collective."(39) In a word, the role of a Christian democracy - according to Dr. Tiso - is to build "a State of Christian order in which laws are carried out in spirit of responsibility to the supreme authority of God; in which Christian thoughts of justice and charity are the basic pillars of social and moral order; in which the training of children is carried out in keeping with the eternal principles of Christ, the supreme Pedagogue; in which the fundamental cell of social life, the family, is protected by the defense of unity and indissolubility; in which there reigns not the terror of brute force and physical violence, but the spirit of true moral liberty. "(40) Dr. Tiso ardently promoted a Christian democracy which was supported by both of the Christian components of the Slovak nation, for he was convinced that "along with Catholic universality and Catholic idealism, Lutheran individualism and realism can be used beneficially in politics. When all these attributes are combined then not even the gates of hell can prevail against our common front. Catholic populists and Lutheran Nationalists, we must cooperate and neither covet nor seize. Let us not forget that we are allying ourselves in the cause of national politics and that there is here no possibility of joining with Catholics of other nationalities."(41) What motives prompted this alliance and this insistence that the independent Slovak Republic be organized on Christian-democratic principles? This alone that a Christian world-view and Christian democracy contain lasting values. Dr. Tiso declared: "We do not design our ideological activity for a week or for a month, but we come and we look always - and this is our peculiar characteristic - in a manner which is intended for the ages - eternally. Eternally, as the Slovak nation is to last, and from this eternal existence of the Slovak nation we derive practical applications for our temporal problems and tasks .... Whoever prides himself on being a �SLOVAKIA 49 loyal son of the nation must also consider what he contributes to the nation: whether it is an infection which induces fever, or germs which destroy and can bring the nation to its grave, or labor which abides in the nation eternally like a cell of healthy social and cultural development."( 42) Because of this peculiar feature of Christian democracy, we must return to it repeatedly and draw upon it always. Naturally, the Communists regarded a political leader of this caliber as their key enemy and, consequently, Msgr. Joseph Tiso was the first Catholic prelate from behind the Iron Curtain singled out to make the supreme sacrifice in the struggle with Communism. However, "as a martyr to his love for the nation, Dr. Tiso will continue to live in the nation."(43) Dr. Tiso is a martyr for the cause of freedom and fittingly he ranks with Washington and many other great men of history."(44) ( 1) Daily "Slovak" 1939, No. 189, Bratislava, Slovakia. ( 2) "Slovak" 1924, 92. ( 3) "Tatransky Orol", Vol. VI, No. 4. ( 4) "Slovak" 1939, 197. ( 5) "Slovak" 1934, 113. ( 6) Ideol6gia Slovenskej :Uudovej Strany, pg. 25. ( 7) "Kult ura" 1933, No. 9, Trnava, Slovakia. ( 8) " Slovak" 1940, 227. ( 9) "Slovak" 1938, 293. (10) "Slovak" 1934, 221. (11) "Slovak" 1939, 44. (12) Ideol6gia, pg. 123-124. (13) "Slovak" 1935, 150. (14) "Slovenska Pravda" 1937, No. 74, Bratislava. (15) "Slovak" 1938, 243. (16) "Slovak" 1936, 178. (17) "Slovak" 1924, 92. (18) "Slovak" 1938, 249. (19) Ideol6gia, pg. 118-119. (20) "Slovak" 1938, 283. (21) Ideol6gia, p. 118. (22) "Slovak" 1925, 278. (23) "Slovak" 1938, 283. (24) "Slovak" 1941, 13. (25) Prve Posolstvo. (26) Posolstvo. �SLOVAKIA 50 (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) "Slovak" 1941, 105. "Slovak" 1940, 186. "Slovak" 1938, 243. "Slovak" 1938, 283. "Slovak" 1940, 186. "Slovak" 1939, 44. "Slovak" 1939, 44. "Slovak" 1941, 37. "Slovak" 1939, 44. Ibidem. Ibidem. Ibidem. "Slovak" 1941, 37. "Kultura" 1933, 9. "Slovak" 1932, 237. "Slovak" 1941, 17. Vatican Radio April 28, 1947. Congressman Alvin O'Konski May 31, 1948, at Bedford, 0 . • • Castles of Slovakia: ILA VA The name Ila va may be more familar to the outside world, because it has been mentioned more frequently than names of other castles and citadels of Slovakia. Political prisoners, "enemies of the state," are confined within its walls today by the communist regime of Prague. Just when the Ilava Castle was built is not definitely known; but we do know that it already existed at the end of the twelfth century. The first known written account of Ilava from that time states that "Castrum Ilava" was the property of the Knights Templars, who also occupied other castles in the Vah Valley. Ilava (Trencin County) was held by the Templars until the Order was abolished in 1312. The castle is situated on the left bank of the Vah near the railroad station. Its origin may go back to the times of the Great Moravian Empire. After the dissolution of the Knights Templars, Ilava Castle passed into the hands of the "mighty Lord of the Vah and the Tatras," Matthew Cak (Tchak) of Trencin, who made of it a mighty fortress. It remained in his possession to his death, when all of Ca.k's holdings were seized by the � SLOVAKIA 37 DR. JOSEPH TISO: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT Dr. Joseph Pauco The President of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), who was executed by a pro-Communist regime on April 18, 1947, ranks among the outstanding figures of the centralEuropean Christian Democratic movement. He was Dr. Joseph Tiso, ideologist of the Slovak Populist Party, which fought for the independence of Slovakia and since 1925 represented the majority of Slovak voting power. The philosophy motivating the Slovak Populist Party was For God and Nation, and it was in the spirit of this principle that Dr. Tiso embodied all his Christian Democratic politics. "Let no one pause to wonder," he wrote, "that we work with God for the nation. God does not need the nation. God will be God even without a nation whether we admit the fact or not, but without God there can be no nation .... There is no sinful failing against God in allying the concepts 'For God, For Nation.' It means the binding of human values to values that are eternal, that are divine."(!) Dr. Tiso affirmed that this clarion call "For God, for Nation" should intensify Christian idealism. His own words are: "Putting it in a practical way, this simply means that one (who cultivates Christian idealism) will not frustrate the influence of Christianity upon the life of a nation in its schools, its literature, its parliament; he will, on the contrary, use every opportunity to help Christianity enter more and more significantly into classrooms and lecture halls, into family life and into public life, for it is Christianity alone that can preserve the roots of idealism without which no nation can survive.''(2) Idealism and Christian morality are the sine qua non of the life of nations and society. "I rely on a weak analogy," declared Dr. Tiso, "when I say that if nature cannot survive without the beneficence of heat and sun, neither can human life endure without faith, without moral philosophy. The histories of nations and our personal experiences furnish evidence to substantiate the fact that whatever the light of faith and Christian morals was extinguished, there followed not only a decline in culture, truth and art, but also �38 SLOVAKIA a decay that affected the nation's economic system as well. A social order grounded in gross materialism, devoid of Christian idealism, cannot long endure, and a nation bred in materialism, grasping for matter alone, becomes like a withered shrub that stands in the midst of luxuriant verdure, a thing alien and repulsive to other nations."(3) Christianity imposes the obligation of love for one's nation. "Love for the nation is a religious precept, and anyone who does not foster a love for his nation violates the fourth commandment. He is branded not only as an earthly traitor, but also as a transgressor who profanes the law of God."(4) Chauvinism, on the other hand, he denounced as can be seen from these extracts: "A regulated love of self is the foundation of Christian charity. From this basic tenet there also evolves the proper concept of Christian nationalism. First comes love of one's own nation, then an extension of charity to others. Non-Christian nationalism is of an entirely different stock, loving self and hybridizing into chauvinism. " (5) "Nationalism, a kind of centering on self diffused on a national scale, is not only the indispensable drive in service for the nation, it is also the natural measure of obligation on the part of one nation toward other nations, just as love of self becomes the stimulating force or the incentive for self-improvement and the gauge of human relations. But in order to prevent self-love as well as nationalism from degenerating into formidable media of destruction, there must be an obligation which is expressed in the universally known precept: Love thy neighbor as thyself."(6) According to the teaching of the Church, "nationalism loves its own but it must not hate what is other than its own; it builds its own but it may not destroy another's; it strengthens its own but it does not divide the whole."(7) One who is a believing Christian and a patriot works for the freedom of his nation because "the independence of a nation is a natural good which substantially affects not only the individual and his material and spiritual interests, but it concerns the entire national commonwealth. Since national freedom is then such a natural good that affects the �SLOVAKIA individual, the family and the entire national community, there can be nothing inappropriate in the gratitude which is shown to God in return for it.... "For a nation to exist and yet not be independent means sentencing it to its extinction. If a nation is to exist, and there is proof of this in the fact that it now does exist, then that nation, by the will of God, must be free .... "A nation must be granted its freedom, for without liberty it would in vain have the God-given gift of language; it would be unable to use it. In vain would it have a Godgiven territory; it would be unable to cultivate its land and make a living on it. Consequently if a nation is to live according to its intellectual endowments and character, it must be free in order to fulfill its destiny. The Divine Will, therefore, is for a nation to be independent and free."(8) The liberty of a nation is protected by the State. As Tiso sees it, "The State is an organized body established for the welfare of the citizens. It is founded on the natural law, therefore on the will of the Creator, Who so created man that he can live and develop his mental and moral faculties only in association with other men. The State is a means to an end and not the end of man. It is for the State to serve the welfare of man, not for man to serve the State. This is the original design of the Creator from which, however, the developmental periphery of human society has steadily departed more and more. "The State is founded on the individuality of its citizens whose interests it promotes rather than absorbs. The State does not assume the obligations of individuals but it discharges those functions that are essential for the life of all, tasks for which the capacities of the individual alone are not commensurate. Always and everywhere it must be the individual first and as far as his abilities can reach and only beyond that point may the State enter as a collective unit of strength. It is for the State to serve society, not society the State. The organization of the State is determined by the moral disposition, the physical capacity and the material potential of the nation. What holds in regard to the relationship of the individual to the State, likewise holds in regard to the family and the nation as a biological unit and �40 SLOVAKIA of the Church as a supernatur al institution. The State does not assume and absorb their rights and their functioning ; contrarywis e, it reinforces and as a collective organism it merely supplement s whatever the family or the nation alone cannot provide or whatever would hinder the Church from attaining her mission. The State therefore should be the organ of the nation and not a medium of the arrogance, aggressiven ess and violence of its representat ives in authority. By its collective instrument ality it should promote individual enterprise and not thwart the developmen t of the vigor of the nation by imposing excessive financial burdens. It is an institution of temporal welfare which does not interfere with supernatur al aspirations but respects them because of their delicate bearing on the temporal wellbeing of society."(9) The State should respect the natural law and should not interfere in Church matters: "God is a power greater than man; the Church is more than the State. The State may not meddle in ecclesiastic al affairs."(10 ) The State must submit to Christian ideals. "We subordinate the powers of the State to the laws of morality and justice. In keeping with this principle, the State must respect the rights of individuals, of families, of society and of local self-govern ing entities. It regards as sacred the right of parents to educate their children and the privilege of free religious profession. It guarantees the right of private ownership and insures the peaceful co-existenc e of empolyer and employee."(11) It was only natural for Dr. Tiso as the ideologist of the Slovak Populist Party to conceive of the democratic structure of the State. "Just as it is an axiom for political activity to be concerned above all about the public good and about the common welfare," writes Dr. Tiso, "so it is likewise true that political activity of such a nature is carried on more successfull y on a democratic basis than on any other kind of foundation. The very root of the word, demos - people, signifies the universalit y of all the members of a nation, incidentally of a State, who are to be not merely passive but truly active in this common functioning . A democratic system brings up people for universality , for it �SLOVAKIA 41 draws the widest possible public to share in the governing of the State, and thereby more and more come to be identified with the State. Consequently there is not only an awakening of responsibility in wide circles, but there is also established a definite degree of confidence in the directives that are promulgated, for in them the citizens see an expression of their will and of their effort to attain a better future. It is true that democracy presupposes a people educated for public service lest it degenerate into a mass easily swayed in the hands of oligarchs or political parties. Hence democracy can thrive only under Utopian or eminently ideal conditions. A foundation based on materialism will educe class struggle incited by selfishness and before long it will evolve into a dictatorship. In a democracy, however, this counterbalanc e of an ideally educated people insures a rich burgeoning of life and secures the firm consolidation of the State. "(12) In defining the duties of a democratic government, Dr. Tiso stated: "A democracy is a regime according to the will of the people. It is a regime which makes it possible for the will of the people to be manifest in all that affects public life. Democracy in this sense implies that the citizens do not merely express their will or their preferences in regard to organization and government at election time or in various types of balloting, but in the interests of the people and in the spirit of true democracy as such, the educated stratum, the intellectuals, fully explain to the people the program proposed and the objectives of the political party and thus instruct the citizens."(13) "Democracy means putting into effective use every creative force in the State as well as appraising its every component unit according to its moral worth even in the event that the ruling power does not demand this."(14) Dr. Tiso dedicated himself to service in a Christian democracy: "We uphold the principle of democracy because democracy is consonant with Christian teaching and we will not permit it to become corrupted with Marixist and socialistic appendages."(15) "We Slovaks are from our very souls adherents to this Christian democracy and we condemn every form of dictatorship regardless of the label under �42 SLOVAKIA . which it may try to hide its true nature or identity. We pledge ourselves to stand for democracy but for democracy of the proper stamp." Not a mystified or mystifying democracy. "In the maelstrom of views and opinions on democracy, it seems that there is developing a conscious tendency. Out of an indefinite conception of democracy there is being shaped a mystique of democracy which would affect people and command their reluctant respect; none may dare to voice any question or to protest once the statement is made that democracy requires this or that; none may presume to question an arrangement, for if it is a democratic arrangement, it is the best possible arrangement. And thus there is fabricated the mystique of democracy."(16) In a Christian democracy whatever holds in general extends also into individual departments, branches of public service and activity. Nor is it otherwise in the Christian democracy of Tiso. It may be helpful to examine in this connection a matter as weighty as the social problem. For the Slovak nation which had been so long the victim of foreign exploitation, this question bearing on the disposition of social affairs has been, and even after the overthrow of Communism it will still remain, a vital issue. Prime importance attaches especially to the relation between worker and employer; to the valuation attached not merely to property worth but also to labor; to the extent to which the government will identify itself with private initiative, and similar matters. The Church has long since made a clear pronouncement on this subject. Both the Rerum Novarum and the Quadragesimo Anno are well known encyclicals containing for modern Christian democracy the entire teaching of the Church on socio-economic affairs. Slovak Populists have likewise built on these social encyclicals of the Popes. Hence it was but natural that Dr. Tiso made application from these documents of the Church in the light of Christian philosophy rather than from any other sources when he set about his task of settling the long neglected problem of economics and social justice in Slovakia. He opposed class struggle and class hatred. "Instead of class warfare, we must. cultivate mutual and national �SLOVAKIA 43 Christian charity; by humility, simplicity and industry we must supplant rapaciousness, materialism and voluptousness. "(17) "To every man his due and injustice to none! That is our watchword - no hollow-sounding catchword but an honored principle. If we do not wish to violate tradition, we must tolerate no privileged classes, no privileges of any kind whatever, no indulgence of prerogatives, whatever their origin may have been."(18) Dr. Tiso interprets Christian social politics as "founded on realistic assumption: it takes into account the nature of man composed of body and soul and conscious of this dual basis it classifies among the most potent agencies of the social order not mere material forces but rather spiritual and moral incentives, giving these precedence, in fact. Hence, it is not concerned solely about a crust of bread; it cares also for every man's spirit, for sheer materialism can never satisfy man completely."(19) Christian socialism has always defended man's right to own private property. Dr. Tiso realized that sometimes capitalism can go to extremes, since capitalists are in the money and on occasion "they use wealth only for self aggrandizement and not for the general good."(20) On the other hand, although Dr. Tiso appreciated the deficiencies of capitalism, he consistently defended the principle of private ownership because he knew that the abrogation of ownership "would endanger both economic and cultural progress to a greater extent than does the capitalistic system, hedged about as it is by social policies.' (21) "In regard to the great question of individual ownership, considering it, for example, from the one extreme of liberalism to the opposite extreme of socialist communism," Dr. Tiso emphasized, "we juxtapose our principle which asserts the sacredness of private ownership and the uninviolable right of the individual."(22) On the other hand, however, "let him who has capital make just returns; let him distribute it with labor, and satisfy labor with decent civic gain." (23) A Christian view of capital and the income derived from it differs from that of other systems. "Former systems of liberalism and capitalism," Tiso wrote, "were al- �44 SLOVAKIA ways ready to calculate the profit trhat would accrue from an enterprise or a plant. Superficially it appears that income is the natural end of enterprise, but Catholic morality has long since taught that all the estates and properties of this world exist for man, for life. This truth is supported by the natural law also. Life is of higher value than gain. The theory that gain is of utmost value and importance must be invalidated. What is the world and everything in it for? For life, not for gain. Gain is subordinated to life and it may become an end only to the extent that it promotes life." (24) And where is capital to be sought? "Out of the strong spiritual resources of our national character," declared Dr. Tiso, "not by any exploitation of those who are socially weaker than we ourselves. It is not an international capital, not impersonalized, not embodied in the worship of gold, but the capital of individuals happily at work in the interests of their nation and their State; a capital which is evidenced in morally strong individuals, in numerous families socially secure, in a contented society united in social justice, in the harmonious commerce of all the citizens who work under the aegis of an organized State."(25) Capital and income are not produced except as the fruit of the laborer's toil. "We look upon work in an enlightened manner," Dr. Tiso asserted. "In it we see not only the creative force of economic values but the animate expression of human personality which has moral and social obligations; which a workingman therefore performs as his required contribution for the communal good and for which a wage is paid not only as the countervalue of energy expended or economic income achieved, but rather as a medium which in turn enables the laborer to satisfy all his obligations."(26) "In the light of Christian teaching, work is not a burden; it is not a means for effecting gain; it is rather the life expression of a man who is the inevitable agent under all circumstances. Christianity proceeds from man and says 'God endowed you with physical, spiritual, and intellectual powers and faculties so that you might use them to advantage.' This is a noble and holy thought. Work is a requisite �SLOVAKIA 45 for man even when he is already provided with sufficient resources for his livelihood."(27) He who works is entitled to a just wage. Humanity, in Dr. Tiso's words, "drew out of our venerable Christian socio-national spirit many a fresh impetus for fulfilling the words of Scripture 'The laborer is worthy of his hire'; to abide by the dictum of the same Scripture, 'He who does not work, let him not eat'; to demolish the idol of the golden calf in imitation of the example of Scripture; to measure with the same measure of justice to all, as the Scripture commands for we are all the children of one Father Who is in heaven."(28) Everyone has a claim to work. And "we shall distribute pay only for work." Dr. Tiso stresses this point, adding however, "We shall tolerate no unreasonable fomenting against capital. A workingman must not regard the capitalist as his enemy; on the other hand, a capitalist must realize that the capital, over which he is in reality only an administrator, essentially belongs to the nation in order to provide work and sustenance for all."(29) In short, the Christian-democratic system really "unites all - employers arnd workers - on the groundwork of a common interest: the material and moral well-being of the Slovak nation." (30) In all undertakings there must be effected an attitude in which "each one, regardless of what type of work he does, will come to regard the work as his own and will perform it with that devotion which he would lavish on his own."(31) It is the Christian democracy more than any other political system that cares for "the fundamental cell of the State and of society in general: the family," for the family "is the source from which all life is derived; it is the first school which educates one to think; it is the first temple which teaches one to pray; it is the first workshop which trains one to work; and it is also the first social bond which instructs one to live in the company of others in the spirit of love and equity. For this reason we must resist anything that may tend to ruin or impair the family and we must support everything that shall contribute to its unity and solidarity.... �46 SLOVAKIA "Therefore one prime concern shall be to foster the establishment of the family and to insure the material prerequisites for its existence. For the benefit of every type of employee, then, but especially for the laborer, measures must be taken to legislate a so-called family wage or familial pay to enable a young man to contract marriage and by a suitable scale of subsidies for wife and children (a scale graduated acording to their number) be assured a decent livelihood and proper education. Obviously this measure is also intended to provide a solution to the problem of married women now under employment. The ideal is to return married women to the family circle, for they are called to manage and maintain the government of the household and their proper place is the home."(32) Mankind as a Christian-democratic entity requires for its social security not only a family wage but also a settlement of housing policies. On this score Dr. Tiso observed, "Family life must be encouraged also by providing healthful and reasonably priced living quarters ... . A reasonable and hygienic housing unit is just as essential to family life as a decent income earned by the breadwinner."(33) "A family will be placed on the foundations where it properly belongs only when it has respectable quarters. When I say 'respectable quarters,' I mean that the home must qualify for the occupation of a family. . . . A guiding principle must be: to have a home in keeping with one's social standing."(34) "We must devote considerable attention to educate our people in regard to housing culture. The general cultural level of a nation is often judged by its housing culture and this also enters into the reasons why we are concerned about the living conditions of our Slovak residents in small towns and in the suburbs. Without improving housing conditions, one can hardly raise the level of the population or improve the position of the family."(35) In a Christian State, the family must be an exemplary unit in every respect. That is the reason why so much attention is devoted to preparation for family living. This was Dr. Tiso's attitude on the subject: "We shall provide for the family by supporting the �SLOVAKIA 47 education of youth designedly for family living, by providing moral safeguards for children and by arranging sociomedical conferences for those contemplating marriage as well as for those who are married, especially mothers."(36) Also: "We regard solicitude for the Slovak child as the most .s ublime aspect of social care."(37) The Christian-democratic State watchfully takes note -0f all social problems. It resolves difficulties and extends help to every level of its inhabitants that may require the support of State authority. In this manner it seems even to encroach upon private ownership. But this is really no encroachment in the usually accepted sense of the word; it is rather a kind of mediation and vigilance. Dr. Tiso advocates, fo rexample, that the government "should provide for the unemployed by creating jobs for them" or even by "introducing a working obligation." "The government considers it a duty to feel responsible for the employed as well as for the unemployed. Protection for the workers will be perfected by more thorough supervision in regard to the wage claims of employees as well as in the matter of safety and security measures to safeguard the health and the lives of the workers, but, above all, in provisions to protect the existence of the employees .... "(38) If projects are not managed in accordance with the natural law, the government calls for mediation or collective bargaining. "True, it is not easy to translate the natural law into action. Herein devolves a difficult assignment for the State. The State must put the natural law into concrete expression, an application appropriate to prevailing circumstances. Allow me to illustrate this point by an example: A family wage is obligatory under the natural law. Realizing this and anxious to secure the greatest possible success in his business, a manufacturer plans to hire single men only. This amounts to cudgelling life. The State must find a remedy for such a situation, some means by which to help large families and likewise to secure the prosperity of enterprising business. In some states all the workers are allotted the same pay but a definite portion of their earnings is withheld. Out of this reserve, compensation is then distributed to workers with large families. In other states, a �48 SLOVAKIA financing administration supplements the work of the laborers to effect a family wage. It covers its own replacement for this outlay out of taxes that accrue from the entire ., national collective."(39) In a word, the role of a Christian democracy - according to Dr. Tiso - is to build "a State of Christian order in which laws are carried out in spirit of responsibility to the supreme authority of God; in which Christian thoughts of justice and charity are the basic pillars of social and moral order; in which the training of children is carried out in keeping with the eternal principles of Christ, the supreme Pedagogue; in which the fundamental cell of social life, the family, is protected by the defense of unity and indissolubility; in which there reigns not the terror of brute force and physical violence, but the spirit of true moral liberty. "(40) Dr. Tiso ardently promoted a Christian democracy which was supported by both of the Christian components of the Slovak nation, for he was convinced that "along with Catholic universality and Catholic idealism, Lutheran individualism and realism can be used beneficially in politics. When all these attributes are combined then not even the gates of hell can prevail against our common front. Catholic populists and Lutheran Nationalists, we must cooperate and neither covet nor seize. Let us not forget that we are allying ourselves in the cause of national politics and that there is here no possibility of joining with Catholics of other nationalities."(41) What motives prompted this alliance and this insistence that the independent Slovak Republic be organized on Christian-democratic principles? This alone that a Christian world-view and Christian democracy contain lasting values. Dr. Tiso declared: "We do not design our ideological activity for a week or for a month, but we come and we look always - and this is our peculiar characteristic - in a manner which is intended for the ages - eternally. Eternally, as the Slovak nation is to last, and from this eternal existence of the Slovak nation we derive practical applications for our temporal problems and tasks .... Whoever prides himself on being a �SLOVAKIA 49 loyal son of the nation must also consider what he contributes to the nation: whether it is an infection which induces fever, or germs which destroy and can bring the nation to its grave, or labor which abides in the nation eternally like a cell of healthy social and cultural development."( 42) Because of this peculiar feature of Christian democracy, we must return to it repeatedly and draw upon it always. Naturally, the Communists regarded a political leader of this caliber as their key enemy and, consequently, Msgr. Joseph Tiso was the first Catholic prelate from behind the Iron Curtain singled out to make the supreme sacrifice in the struggle with Communism. However, "as a martyr to his love for the nation, Dr. Tiso will continue to live in the nation."(43) Dr. Tiso is a martyr for the cause of freedom and fittingly he ranks with Washington and many other great men of history."(44) ( 1) Daily "Slovak" 1939, No. 189, Bratislava, Slovakia. ( 2) "Slovak" 1924, 92. ( 3) "Tatransky Orol", Vol. VI, No. 4. ( 4) "Slovak" 1939, 197. ( 5) "Slovak" 1934, 113. ( 6) Ideol6gia Slovenskej :Uudovej Strany, pg. 25. ( 7) "Kult ura" 1933, No. 9, Trnava, Slovakia. ( 8) " Slovak" 1940, 227. ( 9) "Slovak" 1938, 293. (10) "Slovak" 1934, 221. (11) "Slovak" 1939, 44. (12) Ideol6gia, pg. 123-124. (13) "Slovak" 1935, 150. (14) "Slovenska Pravda" 1937, No. 74, Bratislava. (15) "Slovak" 1938, 243. (16) "Slovak" 1936, 178. (17) "Slovak" 1924, 92. (18) "Slovak" 1938, 249. (19) Ideol6gia, pg. 118-119. (20) "Slovak" 1938, 283. (21) Ideol6gia, p. 118. (22) "Slovak" 1925, 278. (23) "Slovak" 1938, 283. (24) "Slovak" 1941, 13. (25) Prve Posolstvo. (26) Posolstvo. �SLOVAKIA 50 (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) "Slovak" 1941, 105. "Slovak" 1940, 186. "Slovak" 1938, 243. "Slovak" 1938, 283. "Slovak" 1940, 186. "Slovak" 1939, 44. "Slovak" 1939, 44. "Slovak" 1941, 37. "Slovak" 1939, 44. Ibidem. Ibidem. Ibidem. "Slovak" 1941, 37. "Kultura" 1933, 9. "Slovak" 1932, 237. "Slovak" 1941, 17. Vatican Radio April 28, 1947. Congressman Alvin O'Konski May 31, 1948, at Bedford, 0 . • • Castles of Slovakia: ILA VA The name Ila va may be more familar to the outside world, because it has been mentioned more frequently than names of other castles and citadels of Slovakia. Political prisoners, "enemies of the state," are confined within its walls today by the communist regime of Prague. Just when the Ilava Castle was built is not definitely known; but we do know that it already existed at the end of the twelfth century. The first known written account of Ilava from that time states that "Castrum Ilava" was the property of the Knights Templars, who also occupied other castles in the Vah Valley. Ilava (Trencin County) was held by the Templars until the Order was abolished in 1312. The castle is situated on the left bank of the Vah near the railroad station. Its origin may go back to the times of the Great Moravian Empire. After the dissolution of the Knights Templars, Ilava Castle passed into the hands of the "mighty Lord of the Vah and the Tatras," Matthew Cak (Tchak) of Trencin, who made of it a mighty fortress. It remained in his possession to his death, when all of Ca.k's holdings were seized by the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1957, Vol. 7 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 22), March 1957.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 23), June 1957.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 24-25), September-December 1957.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 37 DR. JOSEPH TISO: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT Dr. Joseph Pauco The President of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), who was executed by a pro-Communist regime on April 18, 1947, ranks among the outstanding figures of the centralEuropean Christian Democratic movement. He was Dr. Joseph Tiso, ideologist of the Slovak Populist Party, which fought for the independence of Slovakia and since 1925 represented the majority of Slovak voting power. The philosophy motivating the Slovak Populist Party was For God and Nation, and it was in the spirit of this principle that Dr. Tiso embodied all his Christian Democratic politics. "Let no one pause to wonder," he wrote, "that we work with God for the nation. God does not need the nation. God will be God even without a nation whether we admit the fact or not, but without God there can be no nation .... There is no sinful failing against God in allying the concepts 'For God, For Nation.' It means the binding of human values to values that are eternal, that are divine."(!) Dr. Tiso affirmed that this clarion call "For God, for Nation" should intensify Christian idealism. His own words are: "Putting it in a practical way, this simply means that one (who cultivates Christian idealism) will not frustrate the influence of Christianity upon the life of a nation in its schools, its literature, its parliament; he will, on the contrary, use every opportunity to help Christianity enter more and more significantly into classrooms and lecture halls, into family life and into public life, for it is Christianity alone that can preserve the roots of idealism without which no nation can survive.''(2) Idealism and Christian morality are the sine qua non of the life of nations and society. "I rely on a weak analogy," declared Dr. Tiso, "when I say that if nature cannot survive without the beneficence of heat and sun, neither can human life endure without faith, without moral philosophy. The histories of nations and our personal experiences furnish evidence to substantiate the fact that whatever the light of faith and Christian morals was extinguished, there followed not only a decline in culture, truth and art, but also 38 SLOVAKIA a decay that affected the nation's economic system as well. A social order grounded in gross materialism, devoid of Christian idealism, cannot long endure, and a nation bred in materialism, grasping for matter alone, becomes like a withered shrub that stands in the midst of luxuriant verdure, a thing alien and repulsive to other nations."(3) Christianity imposes the obligation of love for one's nation. "Love for the nation is a religious precept, and anyone who does not foster a love for his nation violates the fourth commandment. He is branded not only as an earthly traitor, but also as a transgressor who profanes the law of God."(4) Chauvinism, on the other hand, he denounced as can be seen from these extracts: "A regulated love of self is the foundation of Christian charity. From this basic tenet there also evolves the proper concept of Christian nationalism. First comes love of one's own nation, then an extension of charity to others. Non-Christian nationalism is of an entirely different stock, loving self and hybridizing into chauvinism. " (5) "Nationalism, a kind of centering on self diffused on a national scale, is not only the indispensable drive in service for the nation, it is also the natural measure of obligation on the part of one nation toward other nations, just as love of self becomes the stimulating force or the incentive for self-improvement and the gauge of human relations. But in order to prevent self-love as well as nationalism from degenerating into formidable media of destruction, there must be an obligation which is expressed in the universally known precept: Love thy neighbor as thyself."(6) According to the teaching of the Church, "nationalism loves its own but it must not hate what is other than its own; it builds its own but it may not destroy another's; it strengthens its own but it does not divide the whole."(7) One who is a believing Christian and a patriot works for the freedom of his nation because "the independence of a nation is a natural good which substantially affects not only the individual and his material and spiritual interests, but it concerns the entire national commonwealth. Since national freedom is then such a natural good that affects the SLOVAKIA individual, the family and the entire national community, there can be nothing inappropriate in the gratitude which is shown to God in return for it.... "For a nation to exist and yet not be independent means sentencing it to its extinction. If a nation is to exist, and there is proof of this in the fact that it now does exist, then that nation, by the will of God, must be free .... "A nation must be granted its freedom, for without liberty it would in vain have the God-given gift of language; it would be unable to use it. In vain would it have a Godgiven territory; it would be unable to cultivate its land and make a living on it. Consequently if a nation is to live according to its intellectual endowments and character, it must be free in order to fulfill its destiny. The Divine Will, therefore, is for a nation to be independent and free."(8) The liberty of a nation is protected by the State. As Tiso sees it, "The State is an organized body established for the welfare of the citizens. It is founded on the natural law, therefore on the will of the Creator, Who so created man that he can live and develop his mental and moral faculties only in association with other men. The State is a means to an end and not the end of man. It is for the State to serve the welfare of man, not for man to serve the State. This is the original design of the Creator from which, however, the developmental periphery of human society has steadily departed more and more. "The State is founded on the individuality of its citizens whose interests it promotes rather than absorbs. The State does not assume the obligations of individuals but it discharges those functions that are essential for the life of all, tasks for which the capacities of the individual alone are not commensurate. Always and everywhere it must be the individual first and as far as his abilities can reach and only beyond that point may the State enter as a collective unit of strength. It is for the State to serve society, not society the State. The organization of the State is determined by the moral disposition, the physical capacity and the material potential of the nation. What holds in regard to the relationship of the individual to the State, likewise holds in regard to the family and the nation as a biological unit and 40 SLOVAKIA of the Church as a supernatur al institution. The State does not assume and absorb their rights and their functioning ; contrarywis e, it reinforces and as a collective organism it merely supplement s whatever the family or the nation alone cannot provide or whatever would hinder the Church from attaining her mission. The State therefore should be the organ of the nation and not a medium of the arrogance, aggressiven ess and violence of its representat ives in authority. By its collective instrument ality it should promote individual enterprise and not thwart the developmen t of the vigor of the nation by imposing excessive financial burdens. It is an institution of temporal welfare which does not interfere with supernatur al aspirations but respects them because of their delicate bearing on the temporal wellbeing of society."(9) The State should respect the natural law and should not interfere in Church matters: "God is a power greater than man; the Church is more than the State. The State may not meddle in ecclesiastic al affairs."(10 ) The State must submit to Christian ideals. "We subordinate the powers of the State to the laws of morality and justice. In keeping with this principle, the State must respect the rights of individuals, of families, of society and of local self-govern ing entities. It regards as sacred the right of parents to educate their children and the privilege of free religious profession. It guarantees the right of private ownership and insures the peaceful co-existenc e of empolyer and employee."(11) It was only natural for Dr. Tiso as the ideologist of the Slovak Populist Party to conceive of the democratic structure of the State. "Just as it is an axiom for political activity to be concerned above all about the public good and about the common welfare," writes Dr. Tiso, "so it is likewise true that political activity of such a nature is carried on more successfull y on a democratic basis than on any other kind of foundation. The very root of the word, demos - people, signifies the universalit y of all the members of a nation, incidentally of a State, who are to be not merely passive but truly active in this common functioning . A democratic system brings up people for universality , for it SLOVAKIA 41 draws the widest possible public to share in the governing of the State, and thereby more and more come to be identified with the State. Consequently there is not only an awakening of responsibility in wide circles, but there is also established a definite degree of confidence in the directives that are promulgated, for in them the citizens see an expression of their will and of their effort to attain a better future. It is true that democracy presupposes a people educated for public service lest it degenerate into a mass easily swayed in the hands of oligarchs or political parties. Hence democracy can thrive only under Utopian or eminently ideal conditions. A foundation based on materialism will educe class struggle incited by selfishness and before long it will evolve into a dictatorship. In a democracy, however, this counterbalanc e of an ideally educated people insures a rich burgeoning of life and secures the firm consolidation of the State. "(12) In defining the duties of a democratic government, Dr. Tiso stated: "A democracy is a regime according to the will of the people. It is a regime which makes it possible for the will of the people to be manifest in all that affects public life. Democracy in this sense implies that the citizens do not merely express their will or their preferences in regard to organization and government at election time or in various types of balloting, but in the interests of the people and in the spirit of true democracy as such, the educated stratum, the intellectuals, fully explain to the people the program proposed and the objectives of the political party and thus instruct the citizens."(13) "Democracy means putting into effective use every creative force in the State as well as appraising its every component unit according to its moral worth even in the event that the ruling power does not demand this."(14) Dr. Tiso dedicated himself to service in a Christian democracy: "We uphold the principle of democracy because democracy is consonant with Christian teaching and we will not permit it to become corrupted with Marixist and socialistic appendages."(15) "We Slovaks are from our very souls adherents to this Christian democracy and we condemn every form of dictatorship regardless of the label under 42 SLOVAKIA . which it may try to hide its true nature or identity. We pledge ourselves to stand for democracy but for democracy of the proper stamp." Not a mystified or mystifying democracy. "In the maelstrom of views and opinions on democracy, it seems that there is developing a conscious tendency. Out of an indefinite conception of democracy there is being shaped a mystique of democracy which would affect people and command their reluctant respect; none may dare to voice any question or to protest once the statement is made that democracy requires this or that; none may presume to question an arrangement, for if it is a democratic arrangement, it is the best possible arrangement. And thus there is fabricated the mystique of democracy."(16) In a Christian democracy whatever holds in general extends also into individual departments, branches of public service and activity. Nor is it otherwise in the Christian democracy of Tiso. It may be helpful to examine in this connection a matter as weighty as the social problem. For the Slovak nation which had been so long the victim of foreign exploitation, this question bearing on the disposition of social affairs has been, and even after the overthrow of Communism it will still remain, a vital issue. Prime importance attaches especially to the relation between worker and employer; to the valuation attached not merely to property worth but also to labor; to the extent to which the government will identify itself with private initiative, and similar matters. The Church has long since made a clear pronouncement on this subject. Both the Rerum Novarum and the Quadragesimo Anno are well known encyclicals containing for modern Christian democracy the entire teaching of the Church on socio-economic affairs. Slovak Populists have likewise built on these social encyclicals of the Popes. Hence it was but natural that Dr. Tiso made application from these documents of the Church in the light of Christian philosophy rather than from any other sources when he set about his task of settling the long neglected problem of economics and social justice in Slovakia. He opposed class struggle and class hatred. "Instead of class warfare, we must. cultivate mutual and national SLOVAKIA 43 Christian charity; by humility, simplicity and industry we must supplant rapaciousness, materialism and voluptousness. "(17) "To every man his due and injustice to none! That is our watchword - no hollow-sounding catchword but an honored principle. If we do not wish to violate tradition, we must tolerate no privileged classes, no privileges of any kind whatever, no indulgence of prerogatives, whatever their origin may have been."(18) Dr. Tiso interprets Christian social politics as "founded on realistic assumption: it takes into account the nature of man composed of body and soul and conscious of this dual basis it classifies among the most potent agencies of the social order not mere material forces but rather spiritual and moral incentives, giving these precedence, in fact. Hence, it is not concerned solely about a crust of bread; it cares also for every man's spirit, for sheer materialism can never satisfy man completely."(19) Christian socialism has always defended man's right to own private property. Dr. Tiso realized that sometimes capitalism can go to extremes, since capitalists are in the money and on occasion "they use wealth only for self aggrandizement and not for the general good."(20) On the other hand, although Dr. Tiso appreciated the deficiencies of capitalism, he consistently defended the principle of private ownership because he knew that the abrogation of ownership "would endanger both economic and cultural progress to a greater extent than does the capitalistic system, hedged about as it is by social policies.' (21) "In regard to the great question of individual ownership, considering it, for example, from the one extreme of liberalism to the opposite extreme of socialist communism," Dr. Tiso emphasized, "we juxtapose our principle which asserts the sacredness of private ownership and the uninviolable right of the individual."(22) On the other hand, however, "let him who has capital make just returns; let him distribute it with labor, and satisfy labor with decent civic gain." (23) A Christian view of capital and the income derived from it differs from that of other systems. "Former systems of liberalism and capitalism," Tiso wrote, "were al- 44 SLOVAKIA ways ready to calculate the profit trhat would accrue from an enterprise or a plant. Superficially it appears that income is the natural end of enterprise, but Catholic morality has long since taught that all the estates and properties of this world exist for man, for life. This truth is supported by the natural law also. Life is of higher value than gain. The theory that gain is of utmost value and importance must be invalidated. What is the world and everything in it for? For life, not for gain. Gain is subordinated to life and it may become an end only to the extent that it promotes life." (24) And where is capital to be sought? "Out of the strong spiritual resources of our national character," declared Dr. Tiso, "not by any exploitation of those who are socially weaker than we ourselves. It is not an international capital, not impersonalized, not embodied in the worship of gold, but the capital of individuals happily at work in the interests of their nation and their State; a capital which is evidenced in morally strong individuals, in numerous families socially secure, in a contented society united in social justice, in the harmonious commerce of all the citizens who work under the aegis of an organized State."(25) Capital and income are not produced except as the fruit of the laborer's toil. "We look upon work in an enlightened manner," Dr. Tiso asserted. "In it we see not only the creative force of economic values but the animate expression of human personality which has moral and social obligations; which a workingman therefore performs as his required contribution for the communal good and for which a wage is paid not only as the countervalue of energy expended or economic income achieved, but rather as a medium which in turn enables the laborer to satisfy all his obligations."(26) "In the light of Christian teaching, work is not a burden; it is not a means for effecting gain; it is rather the life expression of a man who is the inevitable agent under all circumstances. Christianity proceeds from man and says 'God endowed you with physical, spiritual, and intellectual powers and faculties so that you might use them to advantage.' This is a noble and holy thought. Work is a requisite SLOVAKIA 45 for man even when he is already provided with sufficient resources for his livelihood."(27) He who works is entitled to a just wage. Humanity, in Dr. Tiso's words, "drew out of our venerable Christian socio-national spirit many a fresh impetus for fulfilling the words of Scripture 'The laborer is worthy of his hire'; to abide by the dictum of the same Scripture, 'He who does not work, let him not eat'; to demolish the idol of the golden calf in imitation of the example of Scripture; to measure with the same measure of justice to all, as the Scripture commands for we are all the children of one Father Who is in heaven."(28) Everyone has a claim to work. And "we shall distribute pay only for work." Dr. Tiso stresses this point, adding however, "We shall tolerate no unreasonable fomenting against capital. A workingman must not regard the capitalist as his enemy; on the other hand, a capitalist must realize that the capital, over which he is in reality only an administrator, essentially belongs to the nation in order to provide work and sustenance for all."(29) In short, the Christian-democratic system really "unites all - employers arnd workers - on the groundwork of a common interest: the material and moral well-being of the Slovak nation." (30) In all undertakings there must be effected an attitude in which "each one, regardless of what type of work he does, will come to regard the work as his own and will perform it with that devotion which he would lavish on his own."(31) It is the Christian democracy more than any other political system that cares for "the fundamental cell of the State and of society in general: the family," for the family "is the source from which all life is derived; it is the first school which educates one to think; it is the first temple which teaches one to pray; it is the first workshop which trains one to work; and it is also the first social bond which instructs one to live in the company of others in the spirit of love and equity. For this reason we must resist anything that may tend to ruin or impair the family and we must support everything that shall contribute to its unity and solidarity.... 46 SLOVAKIA "Therefore one prime concern shall be to foster the establishment of the family and to insure the material prerequisites for its existence. For the benefit of every type of employee, then, but especially for the laborer, measures must be taken to legislate a so-called family wage or familial pay to enable a young man to contract marriage and by a suitable scale of subsidies for wife and children (a scale graduated acording to their number) be assured a decent livelihood and proper education. Obviously this measure is also intended to provide a solution to the problem of married women now under employment. The ideal is to return married women to the family circle, for they are called to manage and maintain the government of the household and their proper place is the home."(32) Mankind as a Christian-democratic entity requires for its social security not only a family wage but also a settlement of housing policies. On this score Dr. Tiso observed, "Family life must be encouraged also by providing healthful and reasonably priced living quarters ... . A reasonable and hygienic housing unit is just as essential to family life as a decent income earned by the breadwinner."(33) "A family will be placed on the foundations where it properly belongs only when it has respectable quarters. When I say 'respectable quarters,' I mean that the home must qualify for the occupation of a family. . . . A guiding principle must be: to have a home in keeping with one's social standing."(34) "We must devote considerable attention to educate our people in regard to housing culture. The general cultural level of a nation is often judged by its housing culture and this also enters into the reasons why we are concerned about the living conditions of our Slovak residents in small towns and in the suburbs. Without improving housing conditions, one can hardly raise the level of the population or improve the position of the family."(35) In a Christian State, the family must be an exemplary unit in every respect. That is the reason why so much attention is devoted to preparation for family living. This was Dr. Tiso's attitude on the subject: "We shall provide for the family by supporting the SLOVAKIA 47 education of youth designedly for family living, by providing moral safeguards for children and by arranging sociomedical conferences for those contemplating marriage as well as for those who are married, especially mothers."(36) Also: "We regard solicitude for the Slovak child as the most .s ublime aspect of social care."(37) The Christian-democratic State watchfully takes note -0f all social problems. It resolves difficulties and extends help to every level of its inhabitants that may require the support of State authority. In this manner it seems even to encroach upon private ownership. But this is really no encroachment in the usually accepted sense of the word; it is rather a kind of mediation and vigilance. Dr. Tiso advocates, fo rexample, that the government "should provide for the unemployed by creating jobs for them" or even by "introducing a working obligation." "The government considers it a duty to feel responsible for the employed as well as for the unemployed. Protection for the workers will be perfected by more thorough supervision in regard to the wage claims of employees as well as in the matter of safety and security measures to safeguard the health and the lives of the workers, but, above all, in provisions to protect the existence of the employees .... "(38) If projects are not managed in accordance with the natural law, the government calls for mediation or collective bargaining. "True, it is not easy to translate the natural law into action. Herein devolves a difficult assignment for the State. The State must put the natural law into concrete expression, an application appropriate to prevailing circumstances. Allow me to illustrate this point by an example: A family wage is obligatory under the natural law. Realizing this and anxious to secure the greatest possible success in his business, a manufacturer plans to hire single men only. This amounts to cudgelling life. The State must find a remedy for such a situation, some means by which to help large families and likewise to secure the prosperity of enterprising business. In some states all the workers are allotted the same pay but a definite portion of their earnings is withheld. Out of this reserve, compensation is then distributed to workers with large families. In other states, a 48 SLOVAKIA financing administration supplements the work of the laborers to effect a family wage. It covers its own replacement for this outlay out of taxes that accrue from the entire ., national collective."(39) In a word, the role of a Christian democracy - according to Dr. Tiso - is to build "a State of Christian order in which laws are carried out in spirit of responsibility to the supreme authority of God; in which Christian thoughts of justice and charity are the basic pillars of social and moral order; in which the training of children is carried out in keeping with the eternal principles of Christ, the supreme Pedagogue; in which the fundamental cell of social life, the family, is protected by the defense of unity and indissolubility; in which there reigns not the terror of brute force and physical violence, but the spirit of true moral liberty. "(40) Dr. Tiso ardently promoted a Christian democracy which was supported by both of the Christian components of the Slovak nation, for he was convinced that "along with Catholic universality and Catholic idealism, Lutheran individualism and realism can be used beneficially in politics. When all these attributes are combined then not even the gates of hell can prevail against our common front. Catholic populists and Lutheran Nationalists, we must cooperate and neither covet nor seize. Let us not forget that we are allying ourselves in the cause of national politics and that there is here no possibility of joining with Catholics of other nationalities."(41) What motives prompted this alliance and this insistence that the independent Slovak Republic be organized on Christian-democratic principles? This alone that a Christian world-view and Christian democracy contain lasting values. Dr. Tiso declared: "We do not design our ideological activity for a week or for a month, but we come and we look always - and this is our peculiar characteristic - in a manner which is intended for the ages - eternally. Eternally, as the Slovak nation is to last, and from this eternal existence of the Slovak nation we derive practical applications for our temporal problems and tasks .... Whoever prides himself on being a SLOVAKIA 49 loyal son of the nation must also consider what he contributes to the nation: whether it is an infection which induces fever, or germs which destroy and can bring the nation to its grave, or labor which abides in the nation eternally like a cell of healthy social and cultural development."( 42) Because of this peculiar feature of Christian democracy, we must return to it repeatedly and draw upon it always. Naturally, the Communists regarded a political leader of this caliber as their key enemy and, consequently, Msgr. Joseph Tiso was the first Catholic prelate from behind the Iron Curtain singled out to make the supreme sacrifice in the struggle with Communism. However, "as a martyr to his love for the nation, Dr. Tiso will continue to live in the nation."(43) Dr. Tiso is a martyr for the cause of freedom and fittingly he ranks with Washington and many other great men of history."(44) ( 1) Daily "Slovak" 1939, No. 189, Bratislava, Slovakia. ( 2) "Slovak" 1924, 92. ( 3) "Tatransky Orol", Vol. VI, No. 4. ( 4) "Slovak" 1939, 197. ( 5) "Slovak" 1934, 113. ( 6) Ideol6gia Slovenskej :Uudovej Strany, pg. 25. ( 7) "Kult ura" 1933, No. 9, Trnava, Slovakia. ( 8) " Slovak" 1940, 227. ( 9) "Slovak" 1938, 293. (10) "Slovak" 1934, 221. (11) "Slovak" 1939, 44. (12) Ideol6gia, pg. 123-124. (13) "Slovak" 1935, 150. (14) "Slovenska Pravda" 1937, No. 74, Bratislava. (15) "Slovak" 1938, 243. (16) "Slovak" 1936, 178. (17) "Slovak" 1924, 92. (18) "Slovak" 1938, 249. (19) Ideol6gia, pg. 118-119. (20) "Slovak" 1938, 283. (21) Ideol6gia, p. 118. (22) "Slovak" 1925, 278. (23) "Slovak" 1938, 283. (24) "Slovak" 1941, 13. (25) Prve Posolstvo. (26) Posolstvo. SLOVAKIA 50 (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) "Slovak" 1941, 105. "Slovak" 1940, 186. "Slovak" 1938, 243. "Slovak" 1938, 283. "Slovak" 1940, 186. "Slovak" 1939, 44. "Slovak" 1939, 44. "Slovak" 1941, 37. "Slovak" 1939, 44. Ibidem. Ibidem. Ibidem. "Slovak" 1941, 37. "Kultura" 1933, 9. "Slovak" 1932, 237. "Slovak" 1941, 17. Vatican Radio April 28, 1947. Congressman Alvin O'Konski May 31, 1948, at Bedford, 0 . • • Castles of Slovakia: ILA VA The name Ila va may be more familar to the outside world, because it has been mentioned more frequently than names of other castles and citadels of Slovakia. Political prisoners, "enemies of the state," are confined within its walls today by the communist regime of Prague. Just when the Ilava Castle was built is not definitely known; but we do know that it already existed at the end of the twelfth century. The first known written account of Ilava from that time states that "Castrum Ilava" was the property of the Knights Templars, who also occupied other castles in the Vah Valley. Ilava (Trencin County) was held by the Templars until the Order was abolished in 1312. The castle is situated on the left bank of the Vah near the railroad station. Its origin may go back to the times of the Great Moravian Empire. After the dissolution of the Knights Templars, Ilava Castle passed into the hands of the "mighty Lord of the Vah and the Tatras," Matthew Cak (Tchak) of Trencin, who made of it a mighty fortress. It remained in his possession to his death, when all of Ca.k's holdings were seized by the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso: Christian Democrat Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Paučo Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 2 (23), June 1957 pp. 37-50 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1957 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/58b55ccc80d01f8f164dc7ee1430c6ab.pdf 6a33bd58852659e830704638b78c6719 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso The Prelate-Politician who Died on the Gallows for His People J. M. Ki rs C h b au m Most wars in history have ended with the morally doubtful "vae victis"; the Second World War was no exception. Twenty-five years ago on April 18th in Bratislava, the picturesque site of the medieval University and later the crowning city of the Hapsburgs as kings of Hungary, a Catholic prelate with rosary in hand was led to the gallows and executed. Fearing German reprisals against the Slovak population, he had refused the Soviet demand to turn against the Germans, as the king of Rumania has done, and thus lost the first chance to save his life. By refusing to recommend Communism to his people and renounce their right to independence , he lost the last chance. It was an early chilling morning on the slopes of the Carpathians and on the shores of the Danube where Bratislava is situated. Only Czech troops and police detachment sent by Prague circulated the city to prevent an uprising or an attempt at freeing the incarcerated prelate. The country had been in a tense and grim mood for several months. Nothing except promises by the government composed of Communists and members of the Democratic Party that Dr. Tiso, President of the short-lived Slovak Republic, would be sentenced but not hanged, kept the population from revolting. Dr. E. Benes, President of the restored Czecho-Slova kia, refused, however, to spare the life of Dr. Tiso because, as he publicly said, "two Presidents could not live in one country," especially when the preferred one in Slovakia was not him but the incarcerated Dr. Tiso. When the news about the execution spread throughout the country, there was anger, sorrow and fear among the population. It was the first time that in Slovakia's long history a political leader had died on the gallows �6 SLOVAKIA for his convictions. Even during the Second World War no execution had been carried out in Slovakia because Dr. Tiso, as a priest, would not sign the order of execution. However, the shock was caused not only by the fact that the Slovaks were deceived, horrified and humiliated in their national pride. Dr. Tiso-until now little known abroad or presented in a distorted light-was the first President the Slovaks ever had. His policy could have been hard to understand or even abhorent to many people in the West, but the Slovak people looked at it from a different angle. He saved them from a division among their neighbors and from an occupation by the German Reich. He led his small Slovak Republic during the calamities of the Second World War without much damage and secured for the population the highest living standards in Europe, including neutral Switzerland. Furthermore, he was a Catholic prelate in a conservative and deeply religious land with over 80 ~'" of the population being devoted Catholics. The vast majority of the Slovak population considered, therefore, the execution as an act of political vengeance. In fact, the members of the government who represented the Democratic Party which, in the 1946 elections had won a 62 ~f, majority, urged Dr. Benes to give amnesty to Dr. Tiso. Only the Communists and the Prague government insisted on his execution. Dr. Tiso was accused of treason and collaboration with Germany. Since Czecho-Slovakia originated with the dismemberment of Austrio-Hungary by the activities of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Benes during the First World War, nobody in Slovakia could take seriously the charge of treason. Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was not as much the result of the activities of Dr. Tiso, as of the international situation. Besides T. G. Masaryk himself, accused of treason, refuted as preposterous any charge of treason for activities leading to independence of an oppressed people. There are some learned paragraphs in his writings about this subject. 1 On the other side, the "collaboration" of Dr. Tiso with Berlin was not that of conspiracy or voluntary acceptance either of German supremacy in Central Europe, or of German Nazi ideology. He went for the first time to Berlin in order to defend Slovakia against Magyar territorial �SLOVAKIA 7 claims and saw Hitler for the first time on March 13, 1939, on the invitation of Hitler and with the consent of the Presidium of the Slovak parliament and the Slovak provincial government. His mission in Berlin was to save Slovakia from dismemberment and occupation and not to ask for German supremacy or for the introduction of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia. In fact, he opposed the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, proof of which can be found in many official German documents published by the American and British governments.2 During the war Dr. Tiso publicly proclaimed that Slovak participation in the war was symbolic and that Slovakia fought Communism and Soviet expansion and not the Russian people. For these pronouncements he had difficulties with Berlin. His envoy in Rome in 1940 informed through the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the British government that Slovakia desired to remain neutral. 3 The Secretary-General of the ruling Party of which Dr. Tiso was chairman, spoke publicly against the introduction of foreign ideologies and insisted on keeping Slovakia out of the conflict of the Great Powers. The pressure of Berlin, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany was, however, too strong to be fully resisted and Dr. Tiso had to deal with a government in Slovakia in which some members were acquiescent to the demands of the Third Reich, especially in solving some internal problems such as the Jewish problem. In this case Dr. Tiso did his best and saved many thousands of Slovak Jews. The international Red Cross report acknowledged that Slovakia had been at times a haven for the Jews of Poland. 4 But those who were saved, and even less Dr. Benes, were willing to consider the real situation in Slovakia during the Second World War. The speeches and addresses Dr. Tiso made during the war were those of a patriot, tempered by the realistic evaluation of Slovakia's situation, by his long political experience and knowledge of the Slovak mentality and, of course, by the precarious conditions of the war and German distrust. 5 According to all who knew Dr. Tiso, political power had no corrupting effect on this quiet, solidly build figure, whose goal in life was to serve God and his nation and who repeatedly proclaimed himself ready to retire to his �8 SLOVAKIA parish if it would serve the interests of his people. He remained what he always had been-a fighter for his beliefs on the pattern of Central European national leaders who combined strong patriotism with their religious vocation and intellectual distinction. 6 His distaste for democratic politics as practised between the two wars in CzechoSlovakia should be judged by taking into account the situation in Slovakia during the 20 years after the First World War. Ruled from Prague, with political power divided between some 30 splinter parties, Slovakia was certainly not happy 7 under a regime where democracy was often nothing less than a series of noisy and incoherent promise, impossible demands and hot-potch of unfortunate ideas and impractical plans. Dr. Tiso was not against criticism or opposition and even less against free discussion, but the war situation everywhere in the world imposed brakes on the democratic way of life. In addition, in Ttso's view, public opinion should have been formed on the basis of solid arguments and knowledge of indisputable and properly interpreted facts and disinterested attitudes, and not on the basis of passions and distortions of truth. He repeated this in many of his speeches and addresses which were based on the doctrine of the Papal encyclicals and works of Western and European sociologists with a mixture of patriotic ideas deeply rooted in Slovak tradition. He wanted to rally his fellow citizens to have them respond to an invocation of national destiny great enough to jolt them out of their passivity and submissivness. If he praised the Germans, as he sometimes did, it was because he felt that such was the price which would have to be paid for his people's salvation from German occupation and division among Slovakia's neighbors. He also had to do it in order to prevent subservient elements from taking into their hands complete power in Slovakia . German ambassadors in Bratislava sent many reports to Berlin against Tiso's politics and tried hard to have put in his place a man who would have been more obedient and more subservient to German demands and pressure.8 There was, in fact, a time when they tried to remove him by an attempt on his life. As a result, Tiso looks in historical perspective more as a Slovak Petain than as any other head �SLOVAKIA 9 of state who during the war had to be on the German side either because of geo-political reasons or by compulsion. II. DR. TISO'S CONCEPT OF SLOVAK POLITICS Dr. Tiso left no compact work about his views on Slovak national life or on the ideological foundations of Slovak politics. Always in the middle of obstinate struggles for the rights of the Slovak people and their national survival, in which he played the foremost role from 1918 on, Dr. Tiso had little time to write books. He postponed the task for a time when he would depart from the political arena, but this was denied him by his execution. Although he formulated the goals of the Slovak national struggle between 1920-1945 and in countless speeches and addresses developed the fundamental principles of a Slovak national ideology more systematically than any other Slovak leader had in this century or in the past, a systematic explanation of Tiso's political views and principles still awaits the efforts of a serious scholar. The first step in this direction was made by Dr. Stefan Polakovic during the lifetime of Dr. Tiso, when he expertly and systematically collected in the work Tiso's Doctrine and From Tiso 's Struggle9 the fundamental concepts of Dr. Tiso's views on the nation, nationalism, the state, religion, and social order. Even though the volumes bear the imprints of war conditions in Slovakia, they remain thus far, along with the final speech of Dr. Tiso before the Bratislava Court, which was edited by Dr. Joseph Pauco,10 the main source of knowledge of the fundamental ideas, aims, and efforts of Slovak political life in the first half of this century. In Slovakia and abroad, Dr. Tiso was accused after the Second World War of being against democracy, favoring dictatorship and of introducing during the war a fascist regime and immitating German Nazi ideology. The perusal of the articles, studies, parliamentary speeches and presidential messages make all these accusations not only foundless, but testify to the fact that Dr. Tiso's ideology was anchored in Papal Encyclicals, in Natural Law, in modern sociological thought. His ideal was a true democracy which he called Christian democracy. German pres- �SLOVAKIA sure, the circumstances of a war which seriously curtailed democracy in England, the U.S.A. or Canada, and many problems of a specific nature facing a new state in a precarious geo-political situation, did not allow Dr. Tiso to implement all his ideas. Furthermore, Dr. Tiso was a president with powers strictly defined by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic 11 and executive powers were vested largely in the hands of the government. Dr. Tiso pointed out this important fact in his last eloquent pladoyer before the Bratislava Court, but it was apparently overlooked by all foreign writers who wrote about Dr. Tiso and wartime Slovakia. As a cabinet minister in pre-war Czecho-Slovakia as well as one of the principal leaders of the Slovak Populist Party which fought for political autonomy within CzechoSlovakia, Dr. Tiso made numerous speeches on democracy and dictatorship, not only a long time before Hitler came to power but also when the Fuehrer's impact on European politics was strong and found imitators and sympathizers in many European countries. In 1936, when democracy in Europe and especially in Central Europe was passing through a crisis, Dr. Tiso, speaking on behalf of the Slovak Populist Party, proclaimed: We Slovaks are adherents of Christian democracy from the depth of our hearts and condemn any dictatorship regardless of its name. We have always been for democracy but a true democracy. We are criticizing our mystified (falsified) democracy exactly for the reaso n that at present, democracy in Czecho-Slovakia, by its methods, actually discredits democracy. At home it shatters faith in democracy in the hearts of the people, and elsewhere, especially abroad , it gives to the adversaries of democracy an efficient weapon against our democracy. We are for such a democracy which is blsed on equal rights for everybody, for a true and sincere democracy which serves the public and protects interests of the nation as a whole. 12 His adverse stand against the ideological principles of Nazism (national socialism) was expressed as late as 1942, when Germany ruled over Europe and tried to impose an ideological "Gleichaltung." In an address to diplomats accredited in Bratislava, Dr. Tiso as President of the Slovak Republic, said among other things: "We cannot accept and implement the political part of national socialism, but its economic and social goals and methods we can follow, because they are in accordance with Natural Law." 13 �SLOVAKIA 11 Social problems, especially just rewards for workers and the equitable distribution of national income were close to the heart of Dr. Tiso during his whole political career. It was apparently his life ambition to implement the social ideas and principles of the Papal Encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno" in the economic and social system of Slovakia. Certain social measures, especially those aiming at improving the lot of the working class, which the Germans had introduced in the late 1930's, were the economic and social goals which Dr. Tiso thought worthwhile to accept from national socialism. In fact, during his term of office, several reforms were introduced such as paid holidays for workers, family wages and a bill introducing the participation of workers on the profits of industrial enterprise. From his deep feeling for social justice stemmed also Dr. Tiso's views on the role of the capital and capitalists in Slovakia: The new Slovakia is not against capital, but she is against the unscrupulous capitalists who would like to continue exploiting Slovakia. Not every,body who has a lot of money is a capitalist in the bad sense of the word. A capitalist is a man who uses his money for personal enrichment and not for the common good. I did not abandon Ohristian principles when I declared that from the invested capital either in industry or in commerce or agriculture the owner can obtain only 10% and the rest he must use for improvement of the enterprise and mainly for the !improvement of the social standards of the employees. The profits should be divided in such a way that not only the investor but also the enterprise and the employees would obtain a proper share of it. This is Christian philosophy.14 Not only Tiso's views regarding social justice and the role of capital but his ideology in a broad sense was anchored in the philosophy of Natural Law and in Christian ethics. In a narrower sense, Slovak national traditions permeated with expressions of patriotism and a selfless dedication to the struggle for national rights, as defined in the political thought of European philosophers and ideologists of the 19th and 20th centuries, were other components of his political philosophy. As if following the Old Testament prophets, Dr. Tiso spoke of his approach to Slovak politics: In profound humility we are ,p aying tribute to our good Lord for the light we receive from the principles of Natural Law, �12 SLOVAKIA according to which we conducted ourselves in the fight for independence, as well as in our work of building our State. A return to the Natural Law can be the only foundation upon which a new world can be built, a world of contentment, order, and permanent peace.15 A practical manifestation of the Natural Law is and shall remain our old goal: Slovakia for the Slovaks. Slovakia in its entirety, indivisible and without reservations in the legal, cultural, economical, and social iields, so that the inde,p endent Slovak nation might be the living bearer of all power and the consumer of all that the Slovak country contains and represents. Placing the foundation of Slovak politics on Natural Law, Dr. Tiso on March 16, 1939, defined the ethical basis of Slovak politics as follows: Our Slovak State was not born out of hatred, but out of our great love for our homeland. Let us above all else be led by this thought: no hatred toward anyone, but love, and ardent love for our State, which inspires us to work and sacrifice .. _16 "Not force, but law which is founded on truth," was the philosophy of Dr. Joseph Tiso, and he followed it in the full sense of the word throughout his life, because he believed that "no one will be mistaken who builds on the nation and always has only the interests of his nation in mind. We have taken over this thesis from stirring times for the future so that we might strengthen ourselves in the old convictions that individuals pass away but the nation remains, and the person who, separated completely from his own interests, stands unconditionally in the service of the nation, knows how to hold his ground and is the only one fit to lead and to speak in the name of the nation." Regarding politics as a service to the nation, Dr. Tiso during his many years of political activity pleaded that political leaders learn to give priority to the interests of the nation over their own interests. His understanding of politics was that "the interest of the nation is the highest directive of political work." Politics is not supposed to be: A medium for several individuals to conceal their own materialistic interests. Politics serves the nation. The politician, more than any one else, must be the guardian of the traditional values of the nation and must be the ever ready intepreter of Natural Law in any given situation. Should any one lack the one or the other, he is not fit to be the representative ,of the nation, because he will either become a figure tossed about by contemporary political or social currents which have no connection with the living body of the nation, or else he will be a museum guardian of the nation who �SLOVAKIA 13 stands afar from contemporary routes along which life flows and on which the fate of the future of the nation is determined. Whoever boasts that he is a loyal son of the nation must also ponder what he is giving to his nation: an ideological infection which causes a fever, or bacteria which causes decay and can bring the nation to the grave; or does he contribute labor which shall forever remain in the nation as a cell of healthy social and cultural development. As Dr. Tiso saw it, "the State should serve the nation, therefore, it has the right to existence only insofar as it does not threaten the interests of the nation." As far as State order is concerned, this must "be subordinated to the principles of morality and law; the State must respect the rights of the individual, the family, society, and hold sacred the right of parents to educate their children, the right of conscience and religious affiliation; it guarantees the right of private ownership and safeguards the peaceful co-existence of labor and capital, of employer and employee." Every loyal son of the Slovak nation, according to Tiso, "sanctifies his nationalism with a Christian spirit, so that nationalism does not remain a slogan or a mantle of dubious aims, but an internal motivating force to create values for the benefit of the national whole. Love for the nation is a religious precept, and a person sins against the Fourth Commandment who does not love his nation. He bears a stigma not only as an earthly traitor, but also as a transgressor who does not keep the Divine Commandment. A nation whose sons do not know how to bear a blow and personal sacrifices, such a nation will not get far. The nation lives, the national whole lives, only by the fight and work of individuals." From the above quotations, it is quite evident that the main principles of Dr. Tiso's ideology were: 1) Natural Law; 2) Love in place of hatred; 3) Right in.stead of violence; 4) Respect for morality; 5) Nation above the State; 6) Loyalty to traditions; 7) The personal selflessness and sacrifice of political leaders; 8) Nationalism sanctified by Christianity; 9) Social justice, and 10) Religious tolerance. During the decades of his political activity, Dr. Tiso developed these ideas not only in his popular speeches to the people, but also in his addresses, parliamentary speeches, and presidential messages, so that a scholar �14 SLOVAKIA will have little difficulty in elaborating Dr. Tiso's ideology. Dr. Tiso himself indicated Christianity as the basis of his ideas, especially the philosophy of St. Thomas 17 and, in the social sphere, the Papal Encyclicals. On the question of nationalism Tiso said that "the symbol of Slovak nationalism was stur," 18 because "stur's nationalism was the dynamic force in individuals whom he prompted to work and sacrifice for the nation; it was the connecting link of individuals into a rock-firm whole with a united aim a united will . . ." 19 A study of Dr. Tiso's political speeches reveals that he frequently tied in his talks with the spiritual-political heritage of the followers of Louis stur, the 19th century Slovak patriot and the "father of modern Slovak nationalism." Dr. Tiso did this consciously to preserve the continuity in Slovak ideological-political development and so that the Slovaks could build on traditions. If we compare the basic ideas of stur's political and philosophical writing and speeches which are dealt with in several published works 20 with Tiso's, the latter, of course, shows more elaborate concepts and deeper sociological insights. Preserving ideological continuity with former Slovak generations, Dr. Tiso draws deeply from a Christian world outlook on the individual and his relation to the State, nation, family and society. His ideology is firmly founded on the principles of modern sociology and political science; it has solid philosophical foundations and a strictly logical system; it emanates from an idea and stresses the primacy of spirituality, but it depends on and respects the reality of life. Tiso's ideology is the result of long years study and political experience, drawn from daily contact with the people and from the unceasing struggle with Slovakia's adversaries. As a result, it is, as it were, an ideology forged in the fire of battles and tested in confrontation with the actual life of the nation in the phase of its political formation, but also in the phase of struggles for its natural rights, and, finally, also in the period of building its own state. In comparison with the ideology of :r.. stur and his followers, we are concerned in Tiso's case with an ideology whose foundations are not only broader but one which was more thought out, mature and tested by life. Dr. Tiso's �SLOVAKIA 15 political activity had almost been as long as Stu.r's entire life 0815-1856) and hence he could see the ideas which he professed and for which he labored and fought, materialized in national life. If we should compare Dr. Tiso as a politician and ideologue with other leaders of Slovak life, then objectively it can be said that during the last 100 year,s there was no political leader in Slovakia who could compare with his thorough preparation for political activity, either theoretically or from parliamentary experience. III. WRITINGS ON PRESIDENT TISO IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES In many West European countries, the President of the Slovak Republic was presented after the war in a distorted way. Journalists and scholars accepted Czech propaganda and Communist accusations and wrote about Slovakia and her President with a definite bias. After 25 years, this trend is changing, as all of us, who knew that the adverse propaganda was not based on facts, believed from the very beginning that it would. In books, periodicals and newpapers, the personality of Dr. Tiso and his politics appear today in a much different light than was the case immediately after the war. European Scholars About Msgr. Tiso In this respect, two recent articles deserve our attention. The French historian, Francois d'Orcival, who published an interesting book on Slovakia about three years ago under the title Le Danube Etait Noir, contributed to the periodical Miroir de l'Histoire (July 1971, No. 259), a lengthy essay in which he set the records straight and presented Dr. Tiso and his politics objectively. Dr. Tiso appears to the French historian as a patriot who did everything possible to save his people from disaster and who applied in his politics as many Christian and humanist principles as the intricate situation of the Second World War allowed him. The essay gives a brief historical background of Slovakia during the centuries and deals with the political events from 1918 to the proclamation of Slovakia's independence, ending with the execution of Msgr. Tiso in 1947. �16 SLOVAKIA The second article "Premesse ideologiche del Federalismo ceco-slovacco (La dottrina politico-sociale di Jozef Tiso)" appeared in Italy in the periodical fl Mondo Slavo (Vol. 2), published by the Centro di Studi Sull' Europa Orientale in Padova. It deals with the political and social doctrines of President Tiso, and was written by Lisa Guarda Nardini. It is a well-written analysis of the politics and ideology of Dr. Tiso. The author of the article also gives many biographical data on the President and dwells on his doctrine about the individual, the family, the nation and the State. The article is written on the basis of many sources published in English, German and Italian languages by foreign or Slovak authors. Writings by Slovak Authors in Foreign Languages Slovak writers, journalists and scholars published during the past 25 years scores of articles in the quarterlies Slovakia and Slowakei, or chapters in books dealing generally with Slovak history. The former Minister of External Affairs, Dr. F . t>urcansky, left some valuable information on Dr. Tiso in his contributions to German historical periodicals. In 1967 two publications appeared, one by Prof. Francis Vnuk and another by Prof. Milan S. Durica. Prof. Vnuk's publication, Dr. Jozef Tiso - President of the Slovak Republic (The Association of Australian Slovaks, Sydney, 1967), is a well-balanced and well-written presentation of Dr. Tiso and his political career. After writing hundreds of articles and two books on political and cultural topics from modern Slovak history, Vnuk had become one of the best qualified persons to seriously tackle the subject. He displays a considerable knowledge of foreign and domestic sources on the crucial years of Slovakia's modern history and uses it with skill and good judgment in summarizing Dr. Tiso's achievements, his role in the struggle of the Slovak people for equality of rights in Czecho-Slovakia and finally for national independence in the troubled period before and during the Second World War. In the sub-title of his work, Prof. Vnuk mentions that it was published " In commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of his (Dr. Tiso's ) death at the hands of his �SLOVAKIA 17 enemies of Slovak independence," but it is not a current commemorative booklet. The author gives the reader in a nutshell a serious and well-documented analysis not only of Dr. Tiso's political life struggle, but also an excellent survey of Slovak politics and the treacheries and perfidy of the adversaries of Slovak independence. The booklet is divided into 15 chapters and also includes several photographs and a map of Slovakia. There could hardly be a better concised presentation of "the case of Tiso," as it has been done by Vnuk. In equally sober manner is written Prof. M. St. i'.>urica's analysis of Slovak politics "in the light of Tiso's political thought and teaching" - Die Slowakische Politik 1938/ 39 im Lichte der Staatslehre Tiso 's (Emil Semmel Verlag, Bonn) , 1967. Both i'.>urica and Vnuk belong to the younger generation of Slovak scholars in the Free World and while they lived in Slovakia during the crucial years of her history, they were too young to be involved personally in politics, which is undoubtedly an advantage. Nobody can seriously accuse them of speaking "pro domo sua," as the adversaries of Slovakia's aspirations for freedom used to do with regard to other Slovak writers on political subjects. i'.>urica also has a thorough preparation for his work and is equipped with probably the best knowledge of German and other European diplomatic sources on Slovakia, as his Italian book and numerous studies in other languages indicate. The present publication is actually his lecture at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat in Bonn to the students of all Faculties on June 12, 1967. Like Vnuk, i'.>urica also gives first a survey of Slovak history to make his subject more intelligible to his readers. Then he speaks about the political thought (he uses the word Lehre-teaching) of Dr. Tiso and about the crisis of 1938/ 39. There are all the elements of a serious study in i'.>urica's publication, and it presents Dr. Tiso and Slovak politics to the Western world in an objective light, fighting only indirectly all the distortions and political propaganda which were spread by the Communists and non-Communists who adopted Czech and anti-Slovak conceptions about modern Slovak history. �18 SLOVAKIA The bulk of writings in the English language will be, of course, found in the American Slovak newspapers especially in Jednota and in the quarterly Oater annual) Slovakia. The late Philip Hrobak, editor of both Slovakia and Jednota was one of the most courageous defenders of the President of the Slovak Republic and there are many articles written by him personally and scores of essays which he translated and published. Some will be a valuable source for historians since they were written by persons who either knew President Tiso personally and worked in some political or cultural institution during the time he was President, or were acquainted with his trial and tragic and as politicians of the restored Czecho-Slovakia under the Soviet tutelage. Of documentary value will especially be two articles by President Tiso's Personal Secretary, Prof. Charles Murin: "Eight Fatal Days in the Life of Dr. Joseph Tiso," Slovakia, Vol. III, March 1957, pp. 13-18, and "A Belated Report," Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 31-36. Prof. Murin was Private Secretary to Dr. Tiso from 1938 until the latter's capture in Austria and extradition to Czecho-Slovakia, and the closest person in the President's entourage. The value of Prof. Murin's articles lies, in addition, in his intergrity and desire to portray the situation objectively. Another article of documentary value was written by an opponent of Slovakia's independence and indirectly of Dr. Tiso, Dr. Michael Zibrin, a member of Prague Parliament, under the title The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Vol. II, August 1952, pp. 1-24. For historians, two articles will be of interest, one by Prof. J. Zubek, O.F.M., S.T.D., Monsignor Jozef TisoControversial Personality, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 1-8, and the other by Prof. Milan St. !>urica Dr'. Joseph Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia, Vol. VII, SeptemberDecember 1957, pp. 1-22. Neither Prof. Zubek nor Prof. !>urica were active in politics and their articles are a result of serious scholarly research. Among the articles by Slovaks who were close to some �SLOVAKIA 19 time to Dr. Tiso during the years 1938-1945, there are two by Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum The Tenth Anniversary of Dr. Joseph Tiso's Execution, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 1-8, and Facts and Events Behind the Scenes of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence, Vol. IX, March 1959, pp. 1-7, and two by Dr. Joseph Pauco Dr. Joseph Tiso: Christian Democrat, Vol. VII, June 1957, pp. 37-49, and / was Editor of President Tiso's Newspaper, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 9-13. The quarterly Slovakia published many other articles which in one way or another shed further information on the personality and politics of Dr. Tiso. In 1957, an entire volume was devoted to the memory of Dr. Tiso and many articles were published in previous or in the following years. At least some of them should be mentioned: The First President of the Slovak Republic, by Dr. Joseph Cieker, Vol. II, March 1952, pp. 1-29. Dr. Joseph Tiso: Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation, Vol. II, March 1952, pp. 45-46. Anniversary of a Murder, Vol. III, April 1953, pp. 28-30, and Dr. Joseph Tiso in Memoriam, Vol. XI, September-December 1961, pp. 1-2. Slovakia: Trial of Dr. Joseph Tiso, March 1957, pp. 19-21. All these writings are an important source of information not only for foreign historians interested in Eastern Europe, but also for the new generation of Slovaks. Nevertheless, there is still need for a comprehensive work on the remarkable personality of Dr. Tiso and his politics during the crucial years before and during the Second World War, as well as on his place in the history of Slovakia. If written without prejudice by an able historian, such a book can be of great service to the Slovak nation and of great value for understanding not only the struggle of a small nation between two great powers, but also of the Communist methods of enslaving people with old traditions and love of freedom and democracy. See T. G. Masaryk, Das neue Europa and Der Agramer Hock- verratsprozess, both published during his struggle fo r the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 2) See Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series 'D', Vol. IX-X. 3) Ibid, Vol. X, No. 205. 1) 4) See the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Geneva, 1947, pp. 957- �20 SLOVAKIA 959, and Milan St. !>urica, "Dr, Jozef Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia," Slovakia, Vol. VII, No. 3-4, 1957. See Francis Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso - President of the Slovak Republic. (Sydney, 1967) and Th. J Zubek, "Monsignor J . Tiso-Controversial Personality," Slovakia, Vol. Vil, March, 1957. 6 ) See quotations from his speeches and addresses in this article, Part II. 7) See Watson Klrkconnell, Canada, Europe and Hitler (Toronto, 1939) , pp. 47-48. 8) See J . M. Klrschbaum, Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (Speller & Sons, New York, 1960), p. 280-283, F . Vnuk, op. cit. , and Francois d'Orcival, Le Danube etait noir, (Paris, 1967 ) and his article in Mirroir de l'Histoire, (No. 259, July 1971). 5) 9 ) Dr. Stefan Polakovic, Tisova Nauka (Tiso's Political Philosophy), and Z Tisovho Boja (From Tiso's Struggle) , Bratislava, 1941. 10) Dr. Jozef Tiso o se be, edited by Dr. Joseph Pauco, Passaic, N. J . 1952. 11) On Slovak Constitution, see Kirschbaum, Slov aki11r-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, (Speller, New York, 1960) . 12) Published in the daily Slovak, No. 177-178, Bratislava, 1936. 13) Quoted from Dr. J . Pauco, op cit. , p. 243. 14) Polakovic, Tisova Nauka, op. cit., p. 324. Originally published in the daily Slovak, No. 283 , 1938. 15) This and the following quotations are taken from the books by Polakovic and Pauco. 16) See Polakovic, Z Tisovho Boja, op. cit. , p. 236-237. 17) "All who recall our thesis that 'the nation is the substance and the state only the form' should know that its state-political formula is the practical consequence of rtihe state-political theory which is built on the foundations of Thomistic philosophy ." - SLOVAK, 1935. 18 ) See "Prve posolstvo" (The First Message), Ruzomberok, August 16, 1939. Already in 1936 Dr. Tiso had proclaimed: "It is this amount of Louis Stur, built in the Banovce county, that shall be the visible proof of the fact that we have progressed so far that only we, Slovak Catholics, have not forgotten our Slovak past and we pay our respects to the memory of our national awakeners even when they are Evangelical (Lutherans) , as was Stur."-SLOVAK, 1936. 19) Dr. Tiso also characterized Stur's nationalism in this manner: " Stur's nationalism-built on the foundation of the independent Slovak nation and the genuine Slovak language, ,b ecause it acknowledges the law of God and the law .of nature-was the natural foundation of the life of the Slovak nation."-SLOVAK, 1936. 20 ) See the works by Profess.or Dr. Cizevsky, Stefan Polakovic, Dr. Samuel S. Osusky, Daniel Rapant, Joseph Pauco, and J . M. Kirschbaum's, ~udovit Slur and His Place in the Slavic World, (Slovak Institute, Cleveland, Ohio), 1956. � SLOVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso The Prelate-Politician who Died on the Gallows for His People J. M. Ki rs C h b au m Most wars in history have ended with the morally doubtful "vae victis"; the Second World War was no exception. Twenty-five years ago on April 18th in Bratislava, the picturesque site of the medieval University and later the crowning city of the Hapsburgs as kings of Hungary, a Catholic prelate with rosary in hand was led to the gallows and executed. Fearing German reprisals against the Slovak population, he had refused the Soviet demand to turn against the Germans, as the king of Rumania has done, and thus lost the first chance to save his life. By refusing to recommend Communism to his people and renounce their right to independence , he lost the last chance. It was an early chilling morning on the slopes of the Carpathians and on the shores of the Danube where Bratislava is situated. Only Czech troops and police detachment sent by Prague circulated the city to prevent an uprising or an attempt at freeing the incarcerated prelate. The country had been in a tense and grim mood for several months. Nothing except promises by the government composed of Communists and members of the Democratic Party that Dr. Tiso, President of the short-lived Slovak Republic, would be sentenced but not hanged, kept the population from revolting. Dr. E. Benes, President of the restored Czecho-Slova kia, refused, however, to spare the life of Dr. Tiso because, as he publicly said, "two Presidents could not live in one country," especially when the preferred one in Slovakia was not him but the incarcerated Dr. Tiso. When the news about the execution spread throughout the country, there was anger, sorrow and fear among the population. It was the first time that in Slovakia's long history a political leader had died on the gallows �6 SLOVAKIA for his convictions. Even during the Second World War no execution had been carried out in Slovakia because Dr. Tiso, as a priest, would not sign the order of execution. However, the shock was caused not only by the fact that the Slovaks were deceived, horrified and humiliated in their national pride. Dr. Tiso-until now little known abroad or presented in a distorted light-was the first President the Slovaks ever had. His policy could have been hard to understand or even abhorent to many people in the West, but the Slovak people looked at it from a different angle. He saved them from a division among their neighbors and from an occupation by the German Reich. He led his small Slovak Republic during the calamities of the Second World War without much damage and secured for the population the highest living standards in Europe, including neutral Switzerland. Furthermore, he was a Catholic prelate in a conservative and deeply religious land with over 80 ~'" of the population being devoted Catholics. The vast majority of the Slovak population considered, therefore, the execution as an act of political vengeance. In fact, the members of the government who represented the Democratic Party which, in the 1946 elections had won a 62 ~f, majority, urged Dr. Benes to give amnesty to Dr. Tiso. Only the Communists and the Prague government insisted on his execution. Dr. Tiso was accused of treason and collaboration with Germany. Since Czecho-Slovakia originated with the dismemberment of Austrio-Hungary by the activities of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Benes during the First World War, nobody in Slovakia could take seriously the charge of treason. Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was not as much the result of the activities of Dr. Tiso, as of the international situation. Besides T. G. Masaryk himself, accused of treason, refuted as preposterous any charge of treason for activities leading to independence of an oppressed people. There are some learned paragraphs in his writings about this subject. 1 On the other side, the "collaboration" of Dr. Tiso with Berlin was not that of conspiracy or voluntary acceptance either of German supremacy in Central Europe, or of German Nazi ideology. He went for the first time to Berlin in order to defend Slovakia against Magyar territorial �SLOVAKIA 7 claims and saw Hitler for the first time on March 13, 1939, on the invitation of Hitler and with the consent of the Presidium of the Slovak parliament and the Slovak provincial government. His mission in Berlin was to save Slovakia from dismemberment and occupation and not to ask for German supremacy or for the introduction of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia. In fact, he opposed the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, proof of which can be found in many official German documents published by the American and British governments.2 During the war Dr. Tiso publicly proclaimed that Slovak participation in the war was symbolic and that Slovakia fought Communism and Soviet expansion and not the Russian people. For these pronouncements he had difficulties with Berlin. His envoy in Rome in 1940 informed through the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the British government that Slovakia desired to remain neutral. 3 The Secretary-General of the ruling Party of which Dr. Tiso was chairman, spoke publicly against the introduction of foreign ideologies and insisted on keeping Slovakia out of the conflict of the Great Powers. The pressure of Berlin, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany was, however, too strong to be fully resisted and Dr. Tiso had to deal with a government in Slovakia in which some members were acquiescent to the demands of the Third Reich, especially in solving some internal problems such as the Jewish problem. In this case Dr. Tiso did his best and saved many thousands of Slovak Jews. The international Red Cross report acknowledged that Slovakia had been at times a haven for the Jews of Poland. 4 But those who were saved, and even less Dr. Benes, were willing to consider the real situation in Slovakia during the Second World War. The speeches and addresses Dr. Tiso made during the war were those of a patriot, tempered by the realistic evaluation of Slovakia's situation, by his long political experience and knowledge of the Slovak mentality and, of course, by the precarious conditions of the war and German distrust. 5 According to all who knew Dr. Tiso, political power had no corrupting effect on this quiet, solidly build figure, whose goal in life was to serve God and his nation and who repeatedly proclaimed himself ready to retire to his �8 SLOVAKIA parish if it would serve the interests of his people. He remained what he always had been-a fighter for his beliefs on the pattern of Central European national leaders who combined strong patriotism with their religious vocation and intellectual distinction. 6 His distaste for democratic politics as practised between the two wars in CzechoSlovakia should be judged by taking into account the situation in Slovakia during the 20 years after the First World War. Ruled from Prague, with political power divided between some 30 splinter parties, Slovakia was certainly not happy 7 under a regime where democracy was often nothing less than a series of noisy and incoherent promise, impossible demands and hot-potch of unfortunate ideas and impractical plans. Dr. Tiso was not against criticism or opposition and even less against free discussion, but the war situation everywhere in the world imposed brakes on the democratic way of life. In addition, in Ttso's view, public opinion should have been formed on the basis of solid arguments and knowledge of indisputable and properly interpreted facts and disinterested attitudes, and not on the basis of passions and distortions of truth. He repeated this in many of his speeches and addresses which were based on the doctrine of the Papal encyclicals and works of Western and European sociologists with a mixture of patriotic ideas deeply rooted in Slovak tradition. He wanted to rally his fellow citizens to have them respond to an invocation of national destiny great enough to jolt them out of their passivity and submissivness. If he praised the Germans, as he sometimes did, it was because he felt that such was the price which would have to be paid for his people's salvation from German occupation and division among Slovakia's neighbors. He also had to do it in order to prevent subservient elements from taking into their hands complete power in Slovakia . German ambassadors in Bratislava sent many reports to Berlin against Tiso's politics and tried hard to have put in his place a man who would have been more obedient and more subservient to German demands and pressure.8 There was, in fact, a time when they tried to remove him by an attempt on his life. As a result, Tiso looks in historical perspective more as a Slovak Petain than as any other head �SLOVAKIA 9 of state who during the war had to be on the German side either because of geo-political reasons or by compulsion. II. DR. TISO'S CONCEPT OF SLOVAK POLITICS Dr. Tiso left no compact work about his views on Slovak national life or on the ideological foundations of Slovak politics. Always in the middle of obstinate struggles for the rights of the Slovak people and their national survival, in which he played the foremost role from 1918 on, Dr. Tiso had little time to write books. He postponed the task for a time when he would depart from the political arena, but this was denied him by his execution. Although he formulated the goals of the Slovak national struggle between 1920-1945 and in countless speeches and addresses developed the fundamental principles of a Slovak national ideology more systematically than any other Slovak leader had in this century or in the past, a systematic explanation of Tiso's political views and principles still awaits the efforts of a serious scholar. The first step in this direction was made by Dr. Stefan Polakovic during the lifetime of Dr. Tiso, when he expertly and systematically collected in the work Tiso's Doctrine and From Tiso 's Struggle9 the fundamental concepts of Dr. Tiso's views on the nation, nationalism, the state, religion, and social order. Even though the volumes bear the imprints of war conditions in Slovakia, they remain thus far, along with the final speech of Dr. Tiso before the Bratislava Court, which was edited by Dr. Joseph Pauco,10 the main source of knowledge of the fundamental ideas, aims, and efforts of Slovak political life in the first half of this century. In Slovakia and abroad, Dr. Tiso was accused after the Second World War of being against democracy, favoring dictatorship and of introducing during the war a fascist regime and immitating German Nazi ideology. The perusal of the articles, studies, parliamentary speeches and presidential messages make all these accusations not only foundless, but testify to the fact that Dr. Tiso's ideology was anchored in Papal Encyclicals, in Natural Law, in modern sociological thought. His ideal was a true democracy which he called Christian democracy. German pres- �SLOVAKIA sure, the circumstances of a war which seriously curtailed democracy in England, the U.S.A. or Canada, and many problems of a specific nature facing a new state in a precarious geo-political situation, did not allow Dr. Tiso to implement all his ideas. Furthermore, Dr. Tiso was a president with powers strictly defined by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic 11 and executive powers were vested largely in the hands of the government. Dr. Tiso pointed out this important fact in his last eloquent pladoyer before the Bratislava Court, but it was apparently overlooked by all foreign writers who wrote about Dr. Tiso and wartime Slovakia. As a cabinet minister in pre-war Czecho-Slovakia as well as one of the principal leaders of the Slovak Populist Party which fought for political autonomy within CzechoSlovakia, Dr. Tiso made numerous speeches on democracy and dictatorship, not only a long time before Hitler came to power but also when the Fuehrer's impact on European politics was strong and found imitators and sympathizers in many European countries. In 1936, when democracy in Europe and especially in Central Europe was passing through a crisis, Dr. Tiso, speaking on behalf of the Slovak Populist Party, proclaimed: We Slovaks are adherents of Christian democracy from the depth of our hearts and condemn any dictatorship regardless of its name. We have always been for democracy but a true democracy. We are criticizing our mystified (falsified) democracy exactly for the reaso n that at present, democracy in Czecho-Slovakia, by its methods, actually discredits democracy. At home it shatters faith in democracy in the hearts of the people, and elsewhere, especially abroad , it gives to the adversaries of democracy an efficient weapon against our democracy. We are for such a democracy which is blsed on equal rights for everybody, for a true and sincere democracy which serves the public and protects interests of the nation as a whole. 12 His adverse stand against the ideological principles of Nazism (national socialism) was expressed as late as 1942, when Germany ruled over Europe and tried to impose an ideological "Gleichaltung." In an address to diplomats accredited in Bratislava, Dr. Tiso as President of the Slovak Republic, said among other things: "We cannot accept and implement the political part of national socialism, but its economic and social goals and methods we can follow, because they are in accordance with Natural Law." 13 �SLOVAKIA 11 Social problems, especially just rewards for workers and the equitable distribution of national income were close to the heart of Dr. Tiso during his whole political career. It was apparently his life ambition to implement the social ideas and principles of the Papal Encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno" in the economic and social system of Slovakia. Certain social measures, especially those aiming at improving the lot of the working class, which the Germans had introduced in the late 1930's, were the economic and social goals which Dr. Tiso thought worthwhile to accept from national socialism. In fact, during his term of office, several reforms were introduced such as paid holidays for workers, family wages and a bill introducing the participation of workers on the profits of industrial enterprise. From his deep feeling for social justice stemmed also Dr. Tiso's views on the role of the capital and capitalists in Slovakia: The new Slovakia is not against capital, but she is against the unscrupulous capitalists who would like to continue exploiting Slovakia. Not every,body who has a lot of money is a capitalist in the bad sense of the word. A capitalist is a man who uses his money for personal enrichment and not for the common good. I did not abandon Ohristian principles when I declared that from the invested capital either in industry or in commerce or agriculture the owner can obtain only 10% and the rest he must use for improvement of the enterprise and mainly for the !improvement of the social standards of the employees. The profits should be divided in such a way that not only the investor but also the enterprise and the employees would obtain a proper share of it. This is Christian philosophy.14 Not only Tiso's views regarding social justice and the role of capital but his ideology in a broad sense was anchored in the philosophy of Natural Law and in Christian ethics. In a narrower sense, Slovak national traditions permeated with expressions of patriotism and a selfless dedication to the struggle for national rights, as defined in the political thought of European philosophers and ideologists of the 19th and 20th centuries, were other components of his political philosophy. As if following the Old Testament prophets, Dr. Tiso spoke of his approach to Slovak politics: In profound humility we are ,p aying tribute to our good Lord for the light we receive from the principles of Natural Law, �12 SLOVAKIA according to which we conducted ourselves in the fight for independence, as well as in our work of building our State. A return to the Natural Law can be the only foundation upon which a new world can be built, a world of contentment, order, and permanent peace.15 A practical manifestation of the Natural Law is and shall remain our old goal: Slovakia for the Slovaks. Slovakia in its entirety, indivisible and without reservations in the legal, cultural, economical, and social iields, so that the inde,p endent Slovak nation might be the living bearer of all power and the consumer of all that the Slovak country contains and represents. Placing the foundation of Slovak politics on Natural Law, Dr. Tiso on March 16, 1939, defined the ethical basis of Slovak politics as follows: Our Slovak State was not born out of hatred, but out of our great love for our homeland. Let us above all else be led by this thought: no hatred toward anyone, but love, and ardent love for our State, which inspires us to work and sacrifice .. _16 "Not force, but law which is founded on truth," was the philosophy of Dr. Joseph Tiso, and he followed it in the full sense of the word throughout his life, because he believed that "no one will be mistaken who builds on the nation and always has only the interests of his nation in mind. We have taken over this thesis from stirring times for the future so that we might strengthen ourselves in the old convictions that individuals pass away but the nation remains, and the person who, separated completely from his own interests, stands unconditionally in the service of the nation, knows how to hold his ground and is the only one fit to lead and to speak in the name of the nation." Regarding politics as a service to the nation, Dr. Tiso during his many years of political activity pleaded that political leaders learn to give priority to the interests of the nation over their own interests. His understanding of politics was that "the interest of the nation is the highest directive of political work." Politics is not supposed to be: A medium for several individuals to conceal their own materialistic interests. Politics serves the nation. The politician, more than any one else, must be the guardian of the traditional values of the nation and must be the ever ready intepreter of Natural Law in any given situation. Should any one lack the one or the other, he is not fit to be the representative ,of the nation, because he will either become a figure tossed about by contemporary political or social currents which have no connection with the living body of the nation, or else he will be a museum guardian of the nation who �SLOVAKIA 13 stands afar from contemporary routes along which life flows and on which the fate of the future of the nation is determined. Whoever boasts that he is a loyal son of the nation must also ponder what he is giving to his nation: an ideological infection which causes a fever, or bacteria which causes decay and can bring the nation to the grave; or does he contribute labor which shall forever remain in the nation as a cell of healthy social and cultural development. As Dr. Tiso saw it, "the State should serve the nation, therefore, it has the right to existence only insofar as it does not threaten the interests of the nation." As far as State order is concerned, this must "be subordinated to the principles of morality and law; the State must respect the rights of the individual, the family, society, and hold sacred the right of parents to educate their children, the right of conscience and religious affiliation; it guarantees the right of private ownership and safeguards the peaceful co-existence of labor and capital, of employer and employee." Every loyal son of the Slovak nation, according to Tiso, "sanctifies his nationalism with a Christian spirit, so that nationalism does not remain a slogan or a mantle of dubious aims, but an internal motivating force to create values for the benefit of the national whole. Love for the nation is a religious precept, and a person sins against the Fourth Commandment who does not love his nation. He bears a stigma not only as an earthly traitor, but also as a transgressor who does not keep the Divine Commandment. A nation whose sons do not know how to bear a blow and personal sacrifices, such a nation will not get far. The nation lives, the national whole lives, only by the fight and work of individuals." From the above quotations, it is quite evident that the main principles of Dr. Tiso's ideology were: 1) Natural Law; 2) Love in place of hatred; 3) Right in.stead of violence; 4) Respect for morality; 5) Nation above the State; 6) Loyalty to traditions; 7) The personal selflessness and sacrifice of political leaders; 8) Nationalism sanctified by Christianity; 9) Social justice, and 10) Religious tolerance. During the decades of his political activity, Dr. Tiso developed these ideas not only in his popular speeches to the people, but also in his addresses, parliamentary speeches, and presidential messages, so that a scholar �14 SLOVAKIA will have little difficulty in elaborating Dr. Tiso's ideology. Dr. Tiso himself indicated Christianity as the basis of his ideas, especially the philosophy of St. Thomas 17 and, in the social sphere, the Papal Encyclicals. On the question of nationalism Tiso said that "the symbol of Slovak nationalism was stur," 18 because "stur's nationalism was the dynamic force in individuals whom he prompted to work and sacrifice for the nation; it was the connecting link of individuals into a rock-firm whole with a united aim a united will . . ." 19 A study of Dr. Tiso's political speeches reveals that he frequently tied in his talks with the spiritual-political heritage of the followers of Louis stur, the 19th century Slovak patriot and the "father of modern Slovak nationalism." Dr. Tiso did this consciously to preserve the continuity in Slovak ideological-political development and so that the Slovaks could build on traditions. If we compare the basic ideas of stur's political and philosophical writing and speeches which are dealt with in several published works 20 with Tiso's, the latter, of course, shows more elaborate concepts and deeper sociological insights. Preserving ideological continuity with former Slovak generations, Dr. Tiso draws deeply from a Christian world outlook on the individual and his relation to the State, nation, family and society. His ideology is firmly founded on the principles of modern sociology and political science; it has solid philosophical foundations and a strictly logical system; it emanates from an idea and stresses the primacy of spirituality, but it depends on and respects the reality of life. Tiso's ideology is the result of long years study and political experience, drawn from daily contact with the people and from the unceasing struggle with Slovakia's adversaries. As a result, it is, as it were, an ideology forged in the fire of battles and tested in confrontation with the actual life of the nation in the phase of its political formation, but also in the phase of struggles for its natural rights, and, finally, also in the period of building its own state. In comparison with the ideology of :r.. stur and his followers, we are concerned in Tiso's case with an ideology whose foundations are not only broader but one which was more thought out, mature and tested by life. Dr. Tiso's �SLOVAKIA 15 political activity had almost been as long as Stu.r's entire life 0815-1856) and hence he could see the ideas which he professed and for which he labored and fought, materialized in national life. If we should compare Dr. Tiso as a politician and ideologue with other leaders of Slovak life, then objectively it can be said that during the last 100 year,s there was no political leader in Slovakia who could compare with his thorough preparation for political activity, either theoretically or from parliamentary experience. III. WRITINGS ON PRESIDENT TISO IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES In many West European countries, the President of the Slovak Republic was presented after the war in a distorted way. Journalists and scholars accepted Czech propaganda and Communist accusations and wrote about Slovakia and her President with a definite bias. After 25 years, this trend is changing, as all of us, who knew that the adverse propaganda was not based on facts, believed from the very beginning that it would. In books, periodicals and newpapers, the personality of Dr. Tiso and his politics appear today in a much different light than was the case immediately after the war. European Scholars About Msgr. Tiso In this respect, two recent articles deserve our attention. The French historian, Francois d'Orcival, who published an interesting book on Slovakia about three years ago under the title Le Danube Etait Noir, contributed to the periodical Miroir de l'Histoire (July 1971, No. 259), a lengthy essay in which he set the records straight and presented Dr. Tiso and his politics objectively. Dr. Tiso appears to the French historian as a patriot who did everything possible to save his people from disaster and who applied in his politics as many Christian and humanist principles as the intricate situation of the Second World War allowed him. The essay gives a brief historical background of Slovakia during the centuries and deals with the political events from 1918 to the proclamation of Slovakia's independence, ending with the execution of Msgr. Tiso in 1947. �16 SLOVAKIA The second article "Premesse ideologiche del Federalismo ceco-slovacco (La dottrina politico-sociale di Jozef Tiso)" appeared in Italy in the periodical fl Mondo Slavo (Vol. 2), published by the Centro di Studi Sull' Europa Orientale in Padova. It deals with the political and social doctrines of President Tiso, and was written by Lisa Guarda Nardini. It is a well-written analysis of the politics and ideology of Dr. Tiso. The author of the article also gives many biographical data on the President and dwells on his doctrine about the individual, the family, the nation and the State. The article is written on the basis of many sources published in English, German and Italian languages by foreign or Slovak authors. Writings by Slovak Authors in Foreign Languages Slovak writers, journalists and scholars published during the past 25 years scores of articles in the quarterlies Slovakia and Slowakei, or chapters in books dealing generally with Slovak history. The former Minister of External Affairs, Dr. F . t>urcansky, left some valuable information on Dr. Tiso in his contributions to German historical periodicals. In 1967 two publications appeared, one by Prof. Francis Vnuk and another by Prof. Milan S. Durica. Prof. Vnuk's publication, Dr. Jozef Tiso - President of the Slovak Republic (The Association of Australian Slovaks, Sydney, 1967), is a well-balanced and well-written presentation of Dr. Tiso and his political career. After writing hundreds of articles and two books on political and cultural topics from modern Slovak history, Vnuk had become one of the best qualified persons to seriously tackle the subject. He displays a considerable knowledge of foreign and domestic sources on the crucial years of Slovakia's modern history and uses it with skill and good judgment in summarizing Dr. Tiso's achievements, his role in the struggle of the Slovak people for equality of rights in Czecho-Slovakia and finally for national independence in the troubled period before and during the Second World War. In the sub-title of his work, Prof. Vnuk mentions that it was published " In commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of his (Dr. Tiso's ) death at the hands of his �SLOVAKIA 17 enemies of Slovak independence," but it is not a current commemorative booklet. The author gives the reader in a nutshell a serious and well-documented analysis not only of Dr. Tiso's political life struggle, but also an excellent survey of Slovak politics and the treacheries and perfidy of the adversaries of Slovak independence. The booklet is divided into 15 chapters and also includes several photographs and a map of Slovakia. There could hardly be a better concised presentation of "the case of Tiso," as it has been done by Vnuk. In equally sober manner is written Prof. M. St. i'.>urica's analysis of Slovak politics "in the light of Tiso's political thought and teaching" - Die Slowakische Politik 1938/ 39 im Lichte der Staatslehre Tiso 's (Emil Semmel Verlag, Bonn) , 1967. Both i'.>urica and Vnuk belong to the younger generation of Slovak scholars in the Free World and while they lived in Slovakia during the crucial years of her history, they were too young to be involved personally in politics, which is undoubtedly an advantage. Nobody can seriously accuse them of speaking "pro domo sua," as the adversaries of Slovakia's aspirations for freedom used to do with regard to other Slovak writers on political subjects. i'.>urica also has a thorough preparation for his work and is equipped with probably the best knowledge of German and other European diplomatic sources on Slovakia, as his Italian book and numerous studies in other languages indicate. The present publication is actually his lecture at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat in Bonn to the students of all Faculties on June 12, 1967. Like Vnuk, i'.>urica also gives first a survey of Slovak history to make his subject more intelligible to his readers. Then he speaks about the political thought (he uses the word Lehre-teaching) of Dr. Tiso and about the crisis of 1938/ 39. There are all the elements of a serious study in i'.>urica's publication, and it presents Dr. Tiso and Slovak politics to the Western world in an objective light, fighting only indirectly all the distortions and political propaganda which were spread by the Communists and non-Communists who adopted Czech and anti-Slovak conceptions about modern Slovak history. �18 SLOVAKIA The bulk of writings in the English language will be, of course, found in the American Slovak newspapers especially in Jednota and in the quarterly Oater annual) Slovakia. The late Philip Hrobak, editor of both Slovakia and Jednota was one of the most courageous defenders of the President of the Slovak Republic and there are many articles written by him personally and scores of essays which he translated and published. Some will be a valuable source for historians since they were written by persons who either knew President Tiso personally and worked in some political or cultural institution during the time he was President, or were acquainted with his trial and tragic and as politicians of the restored Czecho-Slovakia under the Soviet tutelage. Of documentary value will especially be two articles by President Tiso's Personal Secretary, Prof. Charles Murin: "Eight Fatal Days in the Life of Dr. Joseph Tiso," Slovakia, Vol. III, March 1957, pp. 13-18, and "A Belated Report," Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 31-36. Prof. Murin was Private Secretary to Dr. Tiso from 1938 until the latter's capture in Austria and extradition to Czecho-Slovakia, and the closest person in the President's entourage. The value of Prof. Murin's articles lies, in addition, in his intergrity and desire to portray the situation objectively. Another article of documentary value was written by an opponent of Slovakia's independence and indirectly of Dr. Tiso, Dr. Michael Zibrin, a member of Prague Parliament, under the title The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Vol. II, August 1952, pp. 1-24. For historians, two articles will be of interest, one by Prof. J. Zubek, O.F.M., S.T.D., Monsignor Jozef TisoControversial Personality, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 1-8, and the other by Prof. Milan St. !>urica Dr'. Joseph Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia, Vol. VII, SeptemberDecember 1957, pp. 1-22. Neither Prof. Zubek nor Prof. !>urica were active in politics and their articles are a result of serious scholarly research. Among the articles by Slovaks who were close to some �SLOVAKIA 19 time to Dr. Tiso during the years 1938-1945, there are two by Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum The Tenth Anniversary of Dr. Joseph Tiso's Execution, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 1-8, and Facts and Events Behind the Scenes of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence, Vol. IX, March 1959, pp. 1-7, and two by Dr. Joseph Pauco Dr. Joseph Tiso: Christian Democrat, Vol. VII, June 1957, pp. 37-49, and / was Editor of President Tiso's Newspaper, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 9-13. The quarterly Slovakia published many other articles which in one way or another shed further information on the personality and politics of Dr. Tiso. In 1957, an entire volume was devoted to the memory of Dr. Tiso and many articles were published in previous or in the following years. At least some of them should be mentioned: The First President of the Slovak Republic, by Dr. Joseph Cieker, Vol. II, March 1952, pp. 1-29. Dr. Joseph Tiso: Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation, Vol. II, March 1952, pp. 45-46. Anniversary of a Murder, Vol. III, April 1953, pp. 28-30, and Dr. Joseph Tiso in Memoriam, Vol. XI, September-December 1961, pp. 1-2. Slovakia: Trial of Dr. Joseph Tiso, March 1957, pp. 19-21. All these writings are an important source of information not only for foreign historians interested in Eastern Europe, but also for the new generation of Slovaks. Nevertheless, there is still need for a comprehensive work on the remarkable personality of Dr. Tiso and his politics during the crucial years before and during the Second World War, as well as on his place in the history of Slovakia. If written without prejudice by an able historian, such a book can be of great service to the Slovak nation and of great value for understanding not only the struggle of a small nation between two great powers, but also of the Communist methods of enslaving people with old traditions and love of freedom and democracy. See T. G. Masaryk, Das neue Europa and Der Agramer Hock- verratsprozess, both published during his struggle fo r the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 2) See Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series 'D', Vol. IX-X. 3) Ibid, Vol. X, No. 205. 1) 4) See the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Geneva, 1947, pp. 957- �20 SLOVAKIA 959, and Milan St. !>urica, "Dr, Jozef Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia," Slovakia, Vol. VII, No. 3-4, 1957. See Francis Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso - President of the Slovak Republic. (Sydney, 1967) and Th. J Zubek, "Monsignor J . Tiso-Controversial Personality," Slovakia, Vol. Vil, March, 1957. 6 ) See quotations from his speeches and addresses in this article, Part II. 7) See Watson Klrkconnell, Canada, Europe and Hitler (Toronto, 1939) , pp. 47-48. 8) See J . M. Klrschbaum, Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (Speller & Sons, New York, 1960), p. 280-283, F . Vnuk, op. cit. , and Francois d'Orcival, Le Danube etait noir, (Paris, 1967 ) and his article in Mirroir de l'Histoire, (No. 259, July 1971). 5) 9 ) Dr. Stefan Polakovic, Tisova Nauka (Tiso's Political Philosophy), and Z Tisovho Boja (From Tiso's Struggle) , Bratislava, 1941. 10) Dr. Jozef Tiso o se be, edited by Dr. Joseph Pauco, Passaic, N. J . 1952. 11) On Slovak Constitution, see Kirschbaum, Slov aki11r-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, (Speller, New York, 1960) . 12) Published in the daily Slovak, No. 177-178, Bratislava, 1936. 13) Quoted from Dr. J . Pauco, op cit. , p. 243. 14) Polakovic, Tisova Nauka, op. cit., p. 324. Originally published in the daily Slovak, No. 283 , 1938. 15) This and the following quotations are taken from the books by Polakovic and Pauco. 16) See Polakovic, Z Tisovho Boja, op. cit. , p. 236-237. 17) "All who recall our thesis that 'the nation is the substance and the state only the form' should know that its state-political formula is the practical consequence of rtihe state-political theory which is built on the foundations of Thomistic philosophy ." - SLOVAK, 1935. 18 ) See "Prve posolstvo" (The First Message), Ruzomberok, August 16, 1939. Already in 1936 Dr. Tiso had proclaimed: "It is this amount of Louis Stur, built in the Banovce county, that shall be the visible proof of the fact that we have progressed so far that only we, Slovak Catholics, have not forgotten our Slovak past and we pay our respects to the memory of our national awakeners even when they are Evangelical (Lutherans) , as was Stur."-SLOVAK, 1936. 19) Dr. Tiso also characterized Stur's nationalism in this manner: " Stur's nationalism-built on the foundation of the independent Slovak nation and the genuine Slovak language, ,b ecause it acknowledges the law of God and the law .of nature-was the natural foundation of the life of the Slovak nation."-SLOVAK, 1936. 20 ) See the works by Profess.or Dr. Cizevsky, Stefan Polakovic, Dr. Samuel S. Osusky, Daniel Rapant, Joseph Pauco, and J . M. Kirschbaum's, ~udovit Slur and His Place in the Slavic World, (Slovak Institute, Cleveland, Ohio), 1956. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso The Prelate-Politician who Died on the Gallows for His People J. M. Ki rs C h b au m Most wars in history have ended with the morally doubtful "vae victis"; the Second World War was no exception. Twenty-five years ago on April 18th in Bratislava, the picturesque site of the medieval University and later the crowning city of the Hapsburgs as kings of Hungary, a Catholic prelate with rosary in hand was led to the gallows and executed. Fearing German reprisals against the Slovak population, he had refused the Soviet demand to turn against the Germans, as the king of Rumania has done, and thus lost the first chance to save his life. By refusing to recommend Communism to his people and renounce their right to independence , he lost the last chance. It was an early chilling morning on the slopes of the Carpathians and on the shores of the Danube where Bratislava is situated. Only Czech troops and police detachment sent by Prague circulated the city to prevent an uprising or an attempt at freeing the incarcerated prelate. The country had been in a tense and grim mood for several months. Nothing except promises by the government composed of Communists and members of the Democratic Party that Dr. Tiso, President of the short-lived Slovak Republic, would be sentenced but not hanged, kept the population from revolting. Dr. E. Benes, President of the restored Czecho-Slova kia, refused, however, to spare the life of Dr. Tiso because, as he publicly said, "two Presidents could not live in one country," especially when the preferred one in Slovakia was not him but the incarcerated Dr. Tiso. When the news about the execution spread throughout the country, there was anger, sorrow and fear among the population. It was the first time that in Slovakia's long history a political leader had died on the gallows 6 SLOVAKIA for his convictions. Even during the Second World War no execution had been carried out in Slovakia because Dr. Tiso, as a priest, would not sign the order of execution. However, the shock was caused not only by the fact that the Slovaks were deceived, horrified and humiliated in their national pride. Dr. Tiso-until now little known abroad or presented in a distorted light-was the first President the Slovaks ever had. His policy could have been hard to understand or even abhorent to many people in the West, but the Slovak people looked at it from a different angle. He saved them from a division among their neighbors and from an occupation by the German Reich. He led his small Slovak Republic during the calamities of the Second World War without much damage and secured for the population the highest living standards in Europe, including neutral Switzerland. Furthermore, he was a Catholic prelate in a conservative and deeply religious land with over 80 ~'" of the population being devoted Catholics. The vast majority of the Slovak population considered, therefore, the execution as an act of political vengeance. In fact, the members of the government who represented the Democratic Party which, in the 1946 elections had won a 62 ~f, majority, urged Dr. Benes to give amnesty to Dr. Tiso. Only the Communists and the Prague government insisted on his execution. Dr. Tiso was accused of treason and collaboration with Germany. Since Czecho-Slovakia originated with the dismemberment of Austrio-Hungary by the activities of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Benes during the First World War, nobody in Slovakia could take seriously the charge of treason. Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was not as much the result of the activities of Dr. Tiso, as of the international situation. Besides T. G. Masaryk himself, accused of treason, refuted as preposterous any charge of treason for activities leading to independence of an oppressed people. There are some learned paragraphs in his writings about this subject. 1 On the other side, the "collaboration" of Dr. Tiso with Berlin was not that of conspiracy or voluntary acceptance either of German supremacy in Central Europe, or of German Nazi ideology. He went for the first time to Berlin in order to defend Slovakia against Magyar territorial SLOVAKIA 7 claims and saw Hitler for the first time on March 13, 1939, on the invitation of Hitler and with the consent of the Presidium of the Slovak parliament and the Slovak provincial government. His mission in Berlin was to save Slovakia from dismemberment and occupation and not to ask for German supremacy or for the introduction of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia. In fact, he opposed the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, proof of which can be found in many official German documents published by the American and British governments.2 During the war Dr. Tiso publicly proclaimed that Slovak participation in the war was symbolic and that Slovakia fought Communism and Soviet expansion and not the Russian people. For these pronouncements he had difficulties with Berlin. His envoy in Rome in 1940 informed through the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the British government that Slovakia desired to remain neutral. 3 The Secretary-General of the ruling Party of which Dr. Tiso was chairman, spoke publicly against the introduction of foreign ideologies and insisted on keeping Slovakia out of the conflict of the Great Powers. The pressure of Berlin, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany was, however, too strong to be fully resisted and Dr. Tiso had to deal with a government in Slovakia in which some members were acquiescent to the demands of the Third Reich, especially in solving some internal problems such as the Jewish problem. In this case Dr. Tiso did his best and saved many thousands of Slovak Jews. The international Red Cross report acknowledged that Slovakia had been at times a haven for the Jews of Poland. 4 But those who were saved, and even less Dr. Benes, were willing to consider the real situation in Slovakia during the Second World War. The speeches and addresses Dr. Tiso made during the war were those of a patriot, tempered by the realistic evaluation of Slovakia's situation, by his long political experience and knowledge of the Slovak mentality and, of course, by the precarious conditions of the war and German distrust. 5 According to all who knew Dr. Tiso, political power had no corrupting effect on this quiet, solidly build figure, whose goal in life was to serve God and his nation and who repeatedly proclaimed himself ready to retire to his 8 SLOVAKIA parish if it would serve the interests of his people. He remained what he always had been-a fighter for his beliefs on the pattern of Central European national leaders who combined strong patriotism with their religious vocation and intellectual distinction. 6 His distaste for democratic politics as practised between the two wars in CzechoSlovakia should be judged by taking into account the situation in Slovakia during the 20 years after the First World War. Ruled from Prague, with political power divided between some 30 splinter parties, Slovakia was certainly not happy 7 under a regime where democracy was often nothing less than a series of noisy and incoherent promise, impossible demands and hot-potch of unfortunate ideas and impractical plans. Dr. Tiso was not against criticism or opposition and even less against free discussion, but the war situation everywhere in the world imposed brakes on the democratic way of life. In addition, in Ttso's view, public opinion should have been formed on the basis of solid arguments and knowledge of indisputable and properly interpreted facts and disinterested attitudes, and not on the basis of passions and distortions of truth. He repeated this in many of his speeches and addresses which were based on the doctrine of the Papal encyclicals and works of Western and European sociologists with a mixture of patriotic ideas deeply rooted in Slovak tradition. He wanted to rally his fellow citizens to have them respond to an invocation of national destiny great enough to jolt them out of their passivity and submissivness. If he praised the Germans, as he sometimes did, it was because he felt that such was the price which would have to be paid for his people's salvation from German occupation and division among Slovakia's neighbors. He also had to do it in order to prevent subservient elements from taking into their hands complete power in Slovakia . German ambassadors in Bratislava sent many reports to Berlin against Tiso's politics and tried hard to have put in his place a man who would have been more obedient and more subservient to German demands and pressure.8 There was, in fact, a time when they tried to remove him by an attempt on his life. As a result, Tiso looks in historical perspective more as a Slovak Petain than as any other head SLOVAKIA 9 of state who during the war had to be on the German side either because of geo-political reasons or by compulsion. II. DR. TISO'S CONCEPT OF SLOVAK POLITICS Dr. Tiso left no compact work about his views on Slovak national life or on the ideological foundations of Slovak politics. Always in the middle of obstinate struggles for the rights of the Slovak people and their national survival, in which he played the foremost role from 1918 on, Dr. Tiso had little time to write books. He postponed the task for a time when he would depart from the political arena, but this was denied him by his execution. Although he formulated the goals of the Slovak national struggle between 1920-1945 and in countless speeches and addresses developed the fundamental principles of a Slovak national ideology more systematically than any other Slovak leader had in this century or in the past, a systematic explanation of Tiso's political views and principles still awaits the efforts of a serious scholar. The first step in this direction was made by Dr. Stefan Polakovic during the lifetime of Dr. Tiso, when he expertly and systematically collected in the work Tiso's Doctrine and From Tiso 's Struggle9 the fundamental concepts of Dr. Tiso's views on the nation, nationalism, the state, religion, and social order. Even though the volumes bear the imprints of war conditions in Slovakia, they remain thus far, along with the final speech of Dr. Tiso before the Bratislava Court, which was edited by Dr. Joseph Pauco,10 the main source of knowledge of the fundamental ideas, aims, and efforts of Slovak political life in the first half of this century. In Slovakia and abroad, Dr. Tiso was accused after the Second World War of being against democracy, favoring dictatorship and of introducing during the war a fascist regime and immitating German Nazi ideology. The perusal of the articles, studies, parliamentary speeches and presidential messages make all these accusations not only foundless, but testify to the fact that Dr. Tiso's ideology was anchored in Papal Encyclicals, in Natural Law, in modern sociological thought. His ideal was a true democracy which he called Christian democracy. German pres- SLOVAKIA sure, the circumstances of a war which seriously curtailed democracy in England, the U.S.A. or Canada, and many problems of a specific nature facing a new state in a precarious geo-political situation, did not allow Dr. Tiso to implement all his ideas. Furthermore, Dr. Tiso was a president with powers strictly defined by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic 11 and executive powers were vested largely in the hands of the government. Dr. Tiso pointed out this important fact in his last eloquent pladoyer before the Bratislava Court, but it was apparently overlooked by all foreign writers who wrote about Dr. Tiso and wartime Slovakia. As a cabinet minister in pre-war Czecho-Slovakia as well as one of the principal leaders of the Slovak Populist Party which fought for political autonomy within CzechoSlovakia, Dr. Tiso made numerous speeches on democracy and dictatorship, not only a long time before Hitler came to power but also when the Fuehrer's impact on European politics was strong and found imitators and sympathizers in many European countries. In 1936, when democracy in Europe and especially in Central Europe was passing through a crisis, Dr. Tiso, speaking on behalf of the Slovak Populist Party, proclaimed: We Slovaks are adherents of Christian democracy from the depth of our hearts and condemn any dictatorship regardless of its name. We have always been for democracy but a true democracy. We are criticizing our mystified (falsified) democracy exactly for the reaso n that at present, democracy in Czecho-Slovakia, by its methods, actually discredits democracy. At home it shatters faith in democracy in the hearts of the people, and elsewhere, especially abroad , it gives to the adversaries of democracy an efficient weapon against our democracy. We are for such a democracy which is blsed on equal rights for everybody, for a true and sincere democracy which serves the public and protects interests of the nation as a whole. 12 His adverse stand against the ideological principles of Nazism (national socialism) was expressed as late as 1942, when Germany ruled over Europe and tried to impose an ideological "Gleichaltung." In an address to diplomats accredited in Bratislava, Dr. Tiso as President of the Slovak Republic, said among other things: "We cannot accept and implement the political part of national socialism, but its economic and social goals and methods we can follow, because they are in accordance with Natural Law." 13 SLOVAKIA 11 Social problems, especially just rewards for workers and the equitable distribution of national income were close to the heart of Dr. Tiso during his whole political career. It was apparently his life ambition to implement the social ideas and principles of the Papal Encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno" in the economic and social system of Slovakia. Certain social measures, especially those aiming at improving the lot of the working class, which the Germans had introduced in the late 1930's, were the economic and social goals which Dr. Tiso thought worthwhile to accept from national socialism. In fact, during his term of office, several reforms were introduced such as paid holidays for workers, family wages and a bill introducing the participation of workers on the profits of industrial enterprise. From his deep feeling for social justice stemmed also Dr. Tiso's views on the role of the capital and capitalists in Slovakia: The new Slovakia is not against capital, but she is against the unscrupulous capitalists who would like to continue exploiting Slovakia. Not every,body who has a lot of money is a capitalist in the bad sense of the word. A capitalist is a man who uses his money for personal enrichment and not for the common good. I did not abandon Ohristian principles when I declared that from the invested capital either in industry or in commerce or agriculture the owner can obtain only 10% and the rest he must use for improvement of the enterprise and mainly for the !improvement of the social standards of the employees. The profits should be divided in such a way that not only the investor but also the enterprise and the employees would obtain a proper share of it. This is Christian philosophy.14 Not only Tiso's views regarding social justice and the role of capital but his ideology in a broad sense was anchored in the philosophy of Natural Law and in Christian ethics. In a narrower sense, Slovak national traditions permeated with expressions of patriotism and a selfless dedication to the struggle for national rights, as defined in the political thought of European philosophers and ideologists of the 19th and 20th centuries, were other components of his political philosophy. As if following the Old Testament prophets, Dr. Tiso spoke of his approach to Slovak politics: In profound humility we are ,p aying tribute to our good Lord for the light we receive from the principles of Natural Law, 12 SLOVAKIA according to which we conducted ourselves in the fight for independence, as well as in our work of building our State. A return to the Natural Law can be the only foundation upon which a new world can be built, a world of contentment, order, and permanent peace.15 A practical manifestation of the Natural Law is and shall remain our old goal: Slovakia for the Slovaks. Slovakia in its entirety, indivisible and without reservations in the legal, cultural, economical, and social iields, so that the inde,p endent Slovak nation might be the living bearer of all power and the consumer of all that the Slovak country contains and represents. Placing the foundation of Slovak politics on Natural Law, Dr. Tiso on March 16, 1939, defined the ethical basis of Slovak politics as follows: Our Slovak State was not born out of hatred, but out of our great love for our homeland. Let us above all else be led by this thought: no hatred toward anyone, but love, and ardent love for our State, which inspires us to work and sacrifice .. _16 "Not force, but law which is founded on truth," was the philosophy of Dr. Joseph Tiso, and he followed it in the full sense of the word throughout his life, because he believed that "no one will be mistaken who builds on the nation and always has only the interests of his nation in mind. We have taken over this thesis from stirring times for the future so that we might strengthen ourselves in the old convictions that individuals pass away but the nation remains, and the person who, separated completely from his own interests, stands unconditionally in the service of the nation, knows how to hold his ground and is the only one fit to lead and to speak in the name of the nation." Regarding politics as a service to the nation, Dr. Tiso during his many years of political activity pleaded that political leaders learn to give priority to the interests of the nation over their own interests. His understanding of politics was that "the interest of the nation is the highest directive of political work." Politics is not supposed to be: A medium for several individuals to conceal their own materialistic interests. Politics serves the nation. The politician, more than any one else, must be the guardian of the traditional values of the nation and must be the ever ready intepreter of Natural Law in any given situation. Should any one lack the one or the other, he is not fit to be the representative ,of the nation, because he will either become a figure tossed about by contemporary political or social currents which have no connection with the living body of the nation, or else he will be a museum guardian of the nation who SLOVAKIA 13 stands afar from contemporary routes along which life flows and on which the fate of the future of the nation is determined. Whoever boasts that he is a loyal son of the nation must also ponder what he is giving to his nation: an ideological infection which causes a fever, or bacteria which causes decay and can bring the nation to the grave; or does he contribute labor which shall forever remain in the nation as a cell of healthy social and cultural development. As Dr. Tiso saw it, "the State should serve the nation, therefore, it has the right to existence only insofar as it does not threaten the interests of the nation." As far as State order is concerned, this must "be subordinated to the principles of morality and law; the State must respect the rights of the individual, the family, society, and hold sacred the right of parents to educate their children, the right of conscience and religious affiliation; it guarantees the right of private ownership and safeguards the peaceful co-existence of labor and capital, of employer and employee." Every loyal son of the Slovak nation, according to Tiso, "sanctifies his nationalism with a Christian spirit, so that nationalism does not remain a slogan or a mantle of dubious aims, but an internal motivating force to create values for the benefit of the national whole. Love for the nation is a religious precept, and a person sins against the Fourth Commandment who does not love his nation. He bears a stigma not only as an earthly traitor, but also as a transgressor who does not keep the Divine Commandment. A nation whose sons do not know how to bear a blow and personal sacrifices, such a nation will not get far. The nation lives, the national whole lives, only by the fight and work of individuals." From the above quotations, it is quite evident that the main principles of Dr. Tiso's ideology were: 1) Natural Law; 2) Love in place of hatred; 3) Right in.stead of violence; 4) Respect for morality; 5) Nation above the State; 6) Loyalty to traditions; 7) The personal selflessness and sacrifice of political leaders; 8) Nationalism sanctified by Christianity; 9) Social justice, and 10) Religious tolerance. During the decades of his political activity, Dr. Tiso developed these ideas not only in his popular speeches to the people, but also in his addresses, parliamentary speeches, and presidential messages, so that a scholar 14 SLOVAKIA will have little difficulty in elaborating Dr. Tiso's ideology. Dr. Tiso himself indicated Christianity as the basis of his ideas, especially the philosophy of St. Thomas 17 and, in the social sphere, the Papal Encyclicals. On the question of nationalism Tiso said that "the symbol of Slovak nationalism was stur," 18 because "stur's nationalism was the dynamic force in individuals whom he prompted to work and sacrifice for the nation; it was the connecting link of individuals into a rock-firm whole with a united aim a united will . . ." 19 A study of Dr. Tiso's political speeches reveals that he frequently tied in his talks with the spiritual-political heritage of the followers of Louis stur, the 19th century Slovak patriot and the "father of modern Slovak nationalism." Dr. Tiso did this consciously to preserve the continuity in Slovak ideological-political development and so that the Slovaks could build on traditions. If we compare the basic ideas of stur's political and philosophical writing and speeches which are dealt with in several published works 20 with Tiso's, the latter, of course, shows more elaborate concepts and deeper sociological insights. Preserving ideological continuity with former Slovak generations, Dr. Tiso draws deeply from a Christian world outlook on the individual and his relation to the State, nation, family and society. His ideology is firmly founded on the principles of modern sociology and political science; it has solid philosophical foundations and a strictly logical system; it emanates from an idea and stresses the primacy of spirituality, but it depends on and respects the reality of life. Tiso's ideology is the result of long years study and political experience, drawn from daily contact with the people and from the unceasing struggle with Slovakia's adversaries. As a result, it is, as it were, an ideology forged in the fire of battles and tested in confrontation with the actual life of the nation in the phase of its political formation, but also in the phase of struggles for its natural rights, and, finally, also in the period of building its own state. In comparison with the ideology of :r.. stur and his followers, we are concerned in Tiso's case with an ideology whose foundations are not only broader but one which was more thought out, mature and tested by life. Dr. Tiso's SLOVAKIA 15 political activity had almost been as long as Stu.r's entire life 0815-1856) and hence he could see the ideas which he professed and for which he labored and fought, materialized in national life. If we should compare Dr. Tiso as a politician and ideologue with other leaders of Slovak life, then objectively it can be said that during the last 100 year,s there was no political leader in Slovakia who could compare with his thorough preparation for political activity, either theoretically or from parliamentary experience. III. WRITINGS ON PRESIDENT TISO IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES In many West European countries, the President of the Slovak Republic was presented after the war in a distorted way. Journalists and scholars accepted Czech propaganda and Communist accusations and wrote about Slovakia and her President with a definite bias. After 25 years, this trend is changing, as all of us, who knew that the adverse propaganda was not based on facts, believed from the very beginning that it would. In books, periodicals and newpapers, the personality of Dr. Tiso and his politics appear today in a much different light than was the case immediately after the war. European Scholars About Msgr. Tiso In this respect, two recent articles deserve our attention. The French historian, Francois d'Orcival, who published an interesting book on Slovakia about three years ago under the title Le Danube Etait Noir, contributed to the periodical Miroir de l'Histoire (July 1971, No. 259), a lengthy essay in which he set the records straight and presented Dr. Tiso and his politics objectively. Dr. Tiso appears to the French historian as a patriot who did everything possible to save his people from disaster and who applied in his politics as many Christian and humanist principles as the intricate situation of the Second World War allowed him. The essay gives a brief historical background of Slovakia during the centuries and deals with the political events from 1918 to the proclamation of Slovakia's independence, ending with the execution of Msgr. Tiso in 1947. 16 SLOVAKIA The second article "Premesse ideologiche del Federalismo ceco-slovacco (La dottrina politico-sociale di Jozef Tiso)" appeared in Italy in the periodical fl Mondo Slavo (Vol. 2), published by the Centro di Studi Sull' Europa Orientale in Padova. It deals with the political and social doctrines of President Tiso, and was written by Lisa Guarda Nardini. It is a well-written analysis of the politics and ideology of Dr. Tiso. The author of the article also gives many biographical data on the President and dwells on his doctrine about the individual, the family, the nation and the State. The article is written on the basis of many sources published in English, German and Italian languages by foreign or Slovak authors. Writings by Slovak Authors in Foreign Languages Slovak writers, journalists and scholars published during the past 25 years scores of articles in the quarterlies Slovakia and Slowakei, or chapters in books dealing generally with Slovak history. The former Minister of External Affairs, Dr. F . t>urcansky, left some valuable information on Dr. Tiso in his contributions to German historical periodicals. In 1967 two publications appeared, one by Prof. Francis Vnuk and another by Prof. Milan S. Durica. Prof. Vnuk's publication, Dr. Jozef Tiso - President of the Slovak Republic (The Association of Australian Slovaks, Sydney, 1967), is a well-balanced and well-written presentation of Dr. Tiso and his political career. After writing hundreds of articles and two books on political and cultural topics from modern Slovak history, Vnuk had become one of the best qualified persons to seriously tackle the subject. He displays a considerable knowledge of foreign and domestic sources on the crucial years of Slovakia's modern history and uses it with skill and good judgment in summarizing Dr. Tiso's achievements, his role in the struggle of the Slovak people for equality of rights in Czecho-Slovakia and finally for national independence in the troubled period before and during the Second World War. In the sub-title of his work, Prof. Vnuk mentions that it was published " In commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of his (Dr. Tiso's ) death at the hands of his SLOVAKIA 17 enemies of Slovak independence," but it is not a current commemorative booklet. The author gives the reader in a nutshell a serious and well-documented analysis not only of Dr. Tiso's political life struggle, but also an excellent survey of Slovak politics and the treacheries and perfidy of the adversaries of Slovak independence. The booklet is divided into 15 chapters and also includes several photographs and a map of Slovakia. There could hardly be a better concised presentation of "the case of Tiso," as it has been done by Vnuk. In equally sober manner is written Prof. M. St. i'.>urica's analysis of Slovak politics "in the light of Tiso's political thought and teaching" - Die Slowakische Politik 1938/ 39 im Lichte der Staatslehre Tiso 's (Emil Semmel Verlag, Bonn) , 1967. Both i'.>urica and Vnuk belong to the younger generation of Slovak scholars in the Free World and while they lived in Slovakia during the crucial years of her history, they were too young to be involved personally in politics, which is undoubtedly an advantage. Nobody can seriously accuse them of speaking "pro domo sua," as the adversaries of Slovakia's aspirations for freedom used to do with regard to other Slovak writers on political subjects. i'.>urica also has a thorough preparation for his work and is equipped with probably the best knowledge of German and other European diplomatic sources on Slovakia, as his Italian book and numerous studies in other languages indicate. The present publication is actually his lecture at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat in Bonn to the students of all Faculties on June 12, 1967. Like Vnuk, i'.>urica also gives first a survey of Slovak history to make his subject more intelligible to his readers. Then he speaks about the political thought (he uses the word Lehre-teaching) of Dr. Tiso and about the crisis of 1938/ 39. There are all the elements of a serious study in i'.>urica's publication, and it presents Dr. Tiso and Slovak politics to the Western world in an objective light, fighting only indirectly all the distortions and political propaganda which were spread by the Communists and non-Communists who adopted Czech and anti-Slovak conceptions about modern Slovak history. 18 SLOVAKIA The bulk of writings in the English language will be, of course, found in the American Slovak newspapers especially in Jednota and in the quarterly Oater annual) Slovakia. The late Philip Hrobak, editor of both Slovakia and Jednota was one of the most courageous defenders of the President of the Slovak Republic and there are many articles written by him personally and scores of essays which he translated and published. Some will be a valuable source for historians since they were written by persons who either knew President Tiso personally and worked in some political or cultural institution during the time he was President, or were acquainted with his trial and tragic and as politicians of the restored Czecho-Slovakia under the Soviet tutelage. Of documentary value will especially be two articles by President Tiso's Personal Secretary, Prof. Charles Murin: "Eight Fatal Days in the Life of Dr. Joseph Tiso," Slovakia, Vol. III, March 1957, pp. 13-18, and "A Belated Report," Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 31-36. Prof. Murin was Private Secretary to Dr. Tiso from 1938 until the latter's capture in Austria and extradition to Czecho-Slovakia, and the closest person in the President's entourage. The value of Prof. Murin's articles lies, in addition, in his intergrity and desire to portray the situation objectively. Another article of documentary value was written by an opponent of Slovakia's independence and indirectly of Dr. Tiso, Dr. Michael Zibrin, a member of Prague Parliament, under the title The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Vol. II, August 1952, pp. 1-24. For historians, two articles will be of interest, one by Prof. J. Zubek, O.F.M., S.T.D., Monsignor Jozef TisoControversial Personality, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 1-8, and the other by Prof. Milan St. !>urica Dr'. Joseph Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia, Vol. VII, SeptemberDecember 1957, pp. 1-22. Neither Prof. Zubek nor Prof. !>urica were active in politics and their articles are a result of serious scholarly research. Among the articles by Slovaks who were close to some SLOVAKIA 19 time to Dr. Tiso during the years 1938-1945, there are two by Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum The Tenth Anniversary of Dr. Joseph Tiso's Execution, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 1-8, and Facts and Events Behind the Scenes of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence, Vol. IX, March 1959, pp. 1-7, and two by Dr. Joseph Pauco Dr. Joseph Tiso: Christian Democrat, Vol. VII, June 1957, pp. 37-49, and / was Editor of President Tiso's Newspaper, Vol. VII, March 1957, pp. 9-13. The quarterly Slovakia published many other articles which in one way or another shed further information on the personality and politics of Dr. Tiso. In 1957, an entire volume was devoted to the memory of Dr. Tiso and many articles were published in previous or in the following years. At least some of them should be mentioned: The First President of the Slovak Republic, by Dr. Joseph Cieker, Vol. II, March 1952, pp. 1-29. Dr. Joseph Tiso: Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation, Vol. II, March 1952, pp. 45-46. Anniversary of a Murder, Vol. III, April 1953, pp. 28-30, and Dr. Joseph Tiso in Memoriam, Vol. XI, September-December 1961, pp. 1-2. Slovakia: Trial of Dr. Joseph Tiso, March 1957, pp. 19-21. All these writings are an important source of information not only for foreign historians interested in Eastern Europe, but also for the new generation of Slovaks. Nevertheless, there is still need for a comprehensive work on the remarkable personality of Dr. Tiso and his politics during the crucial years before and during the Second World War, as well as on his place in the history of Slovakia. If written without prejudice by an able historian, such a book can be of great service to the Slovak nation and of great value for understanding not only the struggle of a small nation between two great powers, but also of the Communist methods of enslaving people with old traditions and love of freedom and democracy. See T. G. Masaryk, Das neue Europa and Der Agramer Hock- verratsprozess, both published during his struggle fo r the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 2) See Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series 'D', Vol. IX-X. 3) Ibid, Vol. X, No. 205. 1) 4) See the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Geneva, 1947, pp. 957- 20 SLOVAKIA 959, and Milan St. !>urica, "Dr, Jozef Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia," Slovakia, Vol. VII, No. 3-4, 1957. See Francis Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso - President of the Slovak Republic. (Sydney, 1967) and Th. J Zubek, "Monsignor J . Tiso-Controversial Personality," Slovakia, Vol. Vil, March, 1957. 6 ) See quotations from his speeches and addresses in this article, Part II. 7) See Watson Klrkconnell, Canada, Europe and Hitler (Toronto, 1939) , pp. 47-48. 8) See J . M. Klrschbaum, Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (Speller & Sons, New York, 1960), p. 280-283, F . Vnuk, op. cit. , and Francois d'Orcival, Le Danube etait noir, (Paris, 1967 ) and his article in Mirroir de l'Histoire, (No. 259, July 1971). 5) 9 ) Dr. Stefan Polakovic, Tisova Nauka (Tiso's Political Philosophy), and Z Tisovho Boja (From Tiso's Struggle) , Bratislava, 1941. 10) Dr. Jozef Tiso o se be, edited by Dr. Joseph Pauco, Passaic, N. J . 1952. 11) On Slovak Constitution, see Kirschbaum, Slov aki11r-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, (Speller, New York, 1960) . 12) Published in the daily Slovak, No. 177-178, Bratislava, 1936. 13) Quoted from Dr. J . Pauco, op cit. , p. 243. 14) Polakovic, Tisova Nauka, op. cit., p. 324. Originally published in the daily Slovak, No. 283 , 1938. 15) This and the following quotations are taken from the books by Polakovic and Pauco. 16) See Polakovic, Z Tisovho Boja, op. cit. , p. 236-237. 17) "All who recall our thesis that 'the nation is the substance and the state only the form' should know that its state-political formula is the practical consequence of rtihe state-political theory which is built on the foundations of Thomistic philosophy ." - SLOVAK, 1935. 18 ) See "Prve posolstvo" (The First Message), Ruzomberok, August 16, 1939. Already in 1936 Dr. Tiso had proclaimed: "It is this amount of Louis Stur, built in the Banovce county, that shall be the visible proof of the fact that we have progressed so far that only we, Slovak Catholics, have not forgotten our Slovak past and we pay our respects to the memory of our national awakeners even when they are Evangelical (Lutherans) , as was Stur."-SLOVAK, 1936. 19) Dr. Tiso also characterized Stur's nationalism in this manner: " Stur's nationalism-built on the foundation of the independent Slovak nation and the genuine Slovak language, ,b ecause it acknowledges the law of God and the law .of nature-was the natural foundation of the life of the Slovak nation."-SLOVAK, 1936. 20 ) See the works by Profess.or Dr. Cizevsky, Stefan Polakovic, Dr. Samuel S. Osusky, Daniel Rapant, Joseph Pauco, and J . M. Kirschbaum's, ~udovit Slur and His Place in the Slavic World, (Slovak Institute, Cleveland, Ohio), 1956.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso: The Prelate-Politician who Died on the Gallows for His People Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 5-20 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2747f933a62a7f150798c00cc4cb29e5.pdf 107816a44fd98f85db66c1f289bd1ab9 PDF Text Text 50 SLOVAKIA Dr. Jozef Tiso His Political Creed (EXCERPT FROM HIS DEFENSE SPEECH PRESENTED ON MARCH 17, 1947 IN THE POLITICAL TRIAL CONDUCTED BY THE· SO-CALLED SLOVAK NATIONAL COURT IN BRATISLAVA.) My political involvement cannot be examined or judged by the usual norms of political critique because essentially it was not governed by typically prevalent political techniques. I undertake this representation of the motivation and impelling force that prompted my political involvement because as a Catholic priest I feel bound to this formal deposition of testimony not only by the circumstance of my clerical status but also out of regard for a universal Christian outlook. Both of these considerations are cherished as top-ranking principles in my political life, but under some spurious forms of evaluation, my political endeavors could easily be fixed in a very misleading light. The estimable attitude with which the Slovak Catholic clergy is regarded and even more importantly, the exalted position of a universal Christian outlook rightfully expect that I shall make a public statement specifically directed to those who may very likely conclude that in my person they will also humiliate or confound those intrinsic values that always reside above and beyond the person of an individual; in this case, those values that exceed my very person or individual self. When I appeal or draw attention to the reality of my priestly rank and when I testify that all my political activity was guided solely by Christian principles which are always consonant with sound policy making in public affairs whether the active agent be a priest or a lay Christian statesman, I do so with no intent or need to extenuate a fault or disguise a failing. Just as I reprehend denying a priest the right to function in politics simply because of the fact that he is a priest, so do I not condone any theorizing that a priest's �SLOVAKIA . 51 responsibility in public affairs is other than that of any accountable citizen, for after all, that is just what a priest is-a responsible and accountable citizen who is entitled to all the rights of a citizen and is bound by the same sacred obligations and duties that bind every citizen in the land. My reference to the fact that I am a priest sterns from one desire only: let it ever be kept in mind that I engaged in politics as a priest active in politics and for that reason it is imperative that my position and my participation in politics at all times be grasped and assessed as a priest's conscious involvement. Consequently, there must be imputed to my public life that specific type of motivation that is invariably associated with the character of a priest committed to public interests and civic obligation. Open reference to my priestly status is, then, eminently desirable in order to open the way to the clear and only proper and authentic mode of understanding my part in politics. On the other hand, I am thoroughly convinced that a correct appraisal of my political career can never be made by anyone who does not first of all bring attention to bear this special priestly feature of mine, by anyone who does not admit the worthiness of priestly motivation on my part-these attributes ( especially when they are associated with one's public condu~t in matters of state) which can contribute clarification for a line of conduct that otherwise can be construed as incomprehensible or even less than favorable when judged in the light of the average scale of norms, and can focus it into a clearly understandable and acceptable program of responsible action. The life of a goal-conscious individual-and do pardon my saying without any smacking of arrogance or conceit that I consider myself such a one; I assert that I am a goal-conscious person because I know just what it is that I want-the life of such a one is much like a work of art executed with a definite point of view in mind. a given sighting angle for valid critical evaluation that will assure its total appreciation. If a specific work lacks this feature, we can stand before it as before a charmed castle to which we hold no key. There are artistic creations upon which we can look from several varying angles, estimate their merits with critical eye, and yet fail to appreciate them justly and honestly unless we approach �52 SLOVAKIA them from their given point of vantage. This kind of talisman for an unbiased understanding of my public life and activities is my priestly character with all its intrinsic dynamics and principles which have been appointed by the determinants of Christian doctrine on behalf of public service and public servants. It follows very naturally then, that one does not apply the same norms in evaluating the merits of a public minister or a politician who has never subscribed to these tenets. But the fact that such circumstances must be taken into account in judging a politician who does profess this adherence and evidences it in his conduct, this is an indispensable ingredient to that sense of objectivity on which every public court of justice prides itself. And this situation prevails even in cases where the law itself does not concur with given motivating factors or identity with the principles that enter into a specific case. Nevertheless, in the juridical trial of the accused, these circumstances must of necessity be taken into consideration and they must be examined as the intention which influenced and helped to coordinate the motives and the endeavors of the accused. Otherwise a commitment which is not marked with some form of self-interest or some element of redounding glory remains forever incomprehensible or forever doomed to false interpretation of some kind. This, of course, is wholly inadmissible in a totally objective approach to truth. My politics was politics of a unique kind precisely because it was undertaken by an individual who is a priest. All my life's training and preparation was for a career in the priesthood and not in politics. The goal of all my schooling-formal schooling as well as self-education-was directed to spiritual leadership. I dedicated myself to serve God, the Church and the people of whom I was born and among whom I hoped to bring my priestly vocation to fruition. The ringing principles: For God and Nation! With the people and for the people! were no hollow slogans that I had later acquired somehow, absorbed by magnetic acclaim, and appropriated as guiding mottoes in my life. They are and they have ever been universally valid fundamentals. Only by and through these concepts could I have hoped to attain the sublime ultimate objective of all my life: The glory of God first and foremost, and then the common good of the people. �SLOVAKIA 53 This outlook and focus of perspectives in my life was in no way conditioned by demagoguery or a political platform of any kind; it was rooted in my very life's commitment and in my pastoral ethics which mandates my identification with the faithful of my flock together with a complete negation of all self-interest and vain concerns. The logical sequel to such ministerial canons culminates in the moral conviction to represent the valid interests and needs of the people, to further what is of benefit for the people in general, and to support their common welfare. These are the basics which formulated the patent guidelines of all my priestly functioning, my official ministry which was never circumscribed merely to aspects of immediate church and school matters but which, by the ramification of its social and organizational commitments and as concomitant of these,. extended generally into the cultural, social and economic life of my people. I did, of course, further this rule of life theoretically also, acting in my capacity as educator and formation director of a younger priestly generation. In this office I sought to imbue every young cleric who came within the sphere of my influence with this ideal: With the people and on behalf of the people! Later on, in 1918, when the world of politics unmistakably summoned me into active participation, I further elaborated my philosophy of life on the basis of this fundamental principle and I oriented all my political involvement toward it. In this frame of mind and with this sense of dedication, I undertook a role in political service and this principle alone characterized my contribution to the building of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Here again it was concern for the people that urged me on, for by the very dictates of the natural law I reasoned that it will be far better for the Slovak people to co-exist in a federated union with the Czech brother-nation rather than to become allied in a foreign state with a non-Slavic nation, and I moved toward mature diplomatic functioning, especially after the Czechs repudiated any implementing of the Pittsburgh Agreement. After the harsh reality of the first experiences of disenchantment with this arrangement and the increasingly corrupt disregard of the Slovak people as public and state positions were being filled, the more the tempo of political �54 SLOVAKIA activity mounted, the more clearly did I delineate my own course of action in accord with sound norms of Christian ethics and the more readily did I gain acquaintance with state jurisprudence . Let no one be taken aback on realizing that I had had no formal academic schooling in law or diplomacy. I managed to compensate for this lack by relying on applicable theses from Christian doctrine-a practice which was very effective and rewarding. And it was a thoroughly correct procedure, for Christian truth is a fount of principles for public life, all drawn from that same natural law on which solid juristic political science is also founded . On the other hand, too, Christian doctrine with its tenets from the natural law, all precisely formulated, afforded me wholly reliable foundations for outlining and coordinating my line of conduct in my service on behalf of the Slovak state and its rights as well as for its welfare and progress. Christian doctrine advoc~tes that well-recognized hierarchy of values governing right order in matters of natural vital rank : the individual, the family, the nation. God has endowed all three with distinctive individuality and freedom so that each of these entities might within itself and for itself put its energies to good use in order to advance its own development. The duty not only to preserve intact the individuality and freedom of these three but even to secure for each whatever help may be needed that they might attain their life's objective devolves upon them as well as upon the public powers or authorities. Consequently , when Christian teaching develops the principles, rights and duties of these three agents, it likewise establishes norms for the discharge of public power whose responsibility it is to promote the development of all three agents rather than to suppress them in any way. It is from these teachings of Christian doctrine that I have drawn enlightenmen t on the true meaning of various elements in juridical terminology; e. g., the nation, the state, autonomy, concern for the whole; the concern of an individual or of a part, as well as sanctioned means and methods for realizing these principles-a ll this being both morally and politically commendable . Much of my thinking was consistently devoted to this topic and on July 5, 1939, I even chose it as the central theme of an address which I presented at the mass meeting of Slovak Catholic �SLOVAKIA 55 students' organization. And the more deeply I reached into the treasure store of Christian teaching on this score. the more satisfactory did I grasp the authentic concept of the words: nation, state, private and public interests , etc. With these developments I all the more tenaciously adhered to the outlined program for autonomy, for in it I saw clear fulfillment of the natural law. I perceived in it as well the lasting guarantee of peaceful coexistence on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks within the totality of one state largely because this program which encompassed self-determination was intended to guarantee to the Slovak nation its own national individuality, its proper identity and its free right to regulate its life so that its cultural, social and economic evolvement would be in no way impeded by anyone or anything. The scope of Christian teaching, then, was for me not only an interpreter of the natural law but through its specialized directives for public affairs it became as well an effective moderating factor in my political endeavors, guiding me at all times to act with due regard for presciptions fixed by natural law. So it is no personal credit of mine that I advocated that type of political involvement that was characterized as moderate autonomous politics, for this way was distinctly marked out for me by Christian thought and principle under whose influence I was wholesomely indoctrinated to put the interests of the wholethat is, the interest of the entire nation-before any other less universal interest, for the general good can be effective only when the interests of the entire nation suffer no impairment of any kind. I chose to adopt a branch of political science founded on such principles, motivated as I was, by no personal interest or self-seeking, not looking for return in power or glory but rather endeavoring in every undertaking to attain and secure the general welfare of the Slovak nation. Working from the key points of an autonomy program, we set ourselves to formulate a state organism or structure of the kind which Christian principles regard as an instrument in the hands of a nation, a force under whose aegis it may work out its ultimate welfare and progress. It was this kind of distinctively Christian-founded politics �56 SLOVAKIA that I had in view both on March 14, 1939 and throughout the years of Slovak independent statehood. A change was brought about in the situation as the nation lived its life, moving from one segment of time to another. It was not our endeavors or doings that brought about crises or changes; the principles of natural claims or rights-or strictly speaking, the principles of Christian truth-remained unalterable and it was our bounden duty and the burden of our political position to make these norms very much alive and effective in every situation as it developed. We did not create the situation but we were conscience-charged on every occasion as it presented itself to us, to represent and to champion those immutable principles which are destined to come to the fore in the interests of a nation. Today it is this aspect of politics that stands before this legal bench, embodied in my person, though I am improperly charged, for politics is entirely out of place before this tribunal, especially that category of political activity to which I was dedicated in my public life. Translated by Sister M. Constance Yakubov , SS.C.M. Danville, Pennsylvania "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty of justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent his knee to the communist tyrant makes him a martyr of the cause of freedom and religion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political oppressors for centuries, this is the greatest crime against them in their historic struggle for national freedom. His tragic death cannot help but inspire SlovalG for centuries to come to defend their God-given political and religious rights."-Abbot Theodor e Kojis, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio, April 30, 1947. "Eduard Bene~, murderer of the freedom of the Slovak nation, kJ.lled a g,ood man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot, the first president of the Slovak Republic elected by the Slovak nation. The crime of murderer Benes is worse, uglier and more wicked than ~e crime of Cain." - Peter Pridavok, President Slovak National Gouncil, London, England, April 30, 1947. � 50 SLOVAKIA Dr. Jozef Tiso His Political Creed (EXCERPT FROM HIS DEFENSE SPEECH PRESENTED ON MARCH 17, 1947 IN THE POLITICAL TRIAL CONDUCTED BY THE· SO-CALLED SLOVAK NATIONAL COURT IN BRATISLAVA.) My political involvement cannot be examined or judged by the usual norms of political critique because essentially it was not governed by typically prevalent political techniques. I undertake this representation of the motivation and impelling force that prompted my political involvement because as a Catholic priest I feel bound to this formal deposition of testimony not only by the circumstance of my clerical status but also out of regard for a universal Christian outlook. Both of these considerations are cherished as top-ranking principles in my political life, but under some spurious forms of evaluation, my political endeavors could easily be fixed in a very misleading light. The estimable attitude with which the Slovak Catholic clergy is regarded and even more importantly, the exalted position of a universal Christian outlook rightfully expect that I shall make a public statement specifically directed to those who may very likely conclude that in my person they will also humiliate or confound those intrinsic values that always reside above and beyond the person of an individual; in this case, those values that exceed my very person or individual self. When I appeal or draw attention to the reality of my priestly rank and when I testify that all my political activity was guided solely by Christian principles which are always consonant with sound policy making in public affairs whether the active agent be a priest or a lay Christian statesman, I do so with no intent or need to extenuate a fault or disguise a failing. Just as I reprehend denying a priest the right to function in politics simply because of the fact that he is a priest, so do I not condone any theorizing that a priest's �SLOVAKIA . 51 responsibility in public affairs is other than that of any accountable citizen, for after all, that is just what a priest is-a responsible and accountable citizen who is entitled to all the rights of a citizen and is bound by the same sacred obligations and duties that bind every citizen in the land. My reference to the fact that I am a priest sterns from one desire only: let it ever be kept in mind that I engaged in politics as a priest active in politics and for that reason it is imperative that my position and my participation in politics at all times be grasped and assessed as a priest's conscious involvement. Consequently, there must be imputed to my public life that specific type of motivation that is invariably associated with the character of a priest committed to public interests and civic obligation. Open reference to my priestly status is, then, eminently desirable in order to open the way to the clear and only proper and authentic mode of understanding my part in politics. On the other hand, I am thoroughly convinced that a correct appraisal of my political career can never be made by anyone who does not first of all bring attention to bear this special priestly feature of mine, by anyone who does not admit the worthiness of priestly motivation on my part-these attributes ( especially when they are associated with one's public condu~t in matters of state) which can contribute clarification for a line of conduct that otherwise can be construed as incomprehensible or even less than favorable when judged in the light of the average scale of norms, and can focus it into a clearly understandable and acceptable program of responsible action. The life of a goal-conscious individual-and do pardon my saying without any smacking of arrogance or conceit that I consider myself such a one; I assert that I am a goal-conscious person because I know just what it is that I want-the life of such a one is much like a work of art executed with a definite point of view in mind. a given sighting angle for valid critical evaluation that will assure its total appreciation. If a specific work lacks this feature, we can stand before it as before a charmed castle to which we hold no key. There are artistic creations upon which we can look from several varying angles, estimate their merits with critical eye, and yet fail to appreciate them justly and honestly unless we approach �52 SLOVAKIA them from their given point of vantage. This kind of talisman for an unbiased understanding of my public life and activities is my priestly character with all its intrinsic dynamics and principles which have been appointed by the determinants of Christian doctrine on behalf of public service and public servants. It follows very naturally then, that one does not apply the same norms in evaluating the merits of a public minister or a politician who has never subscribed to these tenets. But the fact that such circumstances must be taken into account in judging a politician who does profess this adherence and evidences it in his conduct, this is an indispensable ingredient to that sense of objectivity on which every public court of justice prides itself. And this situation prevails even in cases where the law itself does not concur with given motivating factors or identity with the principles that enter into a specific case. Nevertheless, in the juridical trial of the accused, these circumstances must of necessity be taken into consideration and they must be examined as the intention which influenced and helped to coordinate the motives and the endeavors of the accused. Otherwise a commitment which is not marked with some form of self-interest or some element of redounding glory remains forever incomprehensible or forever doomed to false interpretation of some kind. This, of course, is wholly inadmissible in a totally objective approach to truth. My politics was politics of a unique kind precisely because it was undertaken by an individual who is a priest. All my life's training and preparation was for a career in the priesthood and not in politics. The goal of all my schooling-formal schooling as well as self-education-was directed to spiritual leadership. I dedicated myself to serve God, the Church and the people of whom I was born and among whom I hoped to bring my priestly vocation to fruition. The ringing principles: For God and Nation! With the people and for the people! were no hollow slogans that I had later acquired somehow, absorbed by magnetic acclaim, and appropriated as guiding mottoes in my life. They are and they have ever been universally valid fundamentals. Only by and through these concepts could I have hoped to attain the sublime ultimate objective of all my life: The glory of God first and foremost, and then the common good of the people. �SLOVAKIA 53 This outlook and focus of perspectives in my life was in no way conditioned by demagoguery or a political platform of any kind; it was rooted in my very life's commitment and in my pastoral ethics which mandates my identification with the faithful of my flock together with a complete negation of all self-interest and vain concerns. The logical sequel to such ministerial canons culminates in the moral conviction to represent the valid interests and needs of the people, to further what is of benefit for the people in general, and to support their common welfare. These are the basics which formulated the patent guidelines of all my priestly functioning, my official ministry which was never circumscribed merely to aspects of immediate church and school matters but which, by the ramification of its social and organizational commitments and as concomitant of these,. extended generally into the cultural, social and economic life of my people. I did, of course, further this rule of life theoretically also, acting in my capacity as educator and formation director of a younger priestly generation. In this office I sought to imbue every young cleric who came within the sphere of my influence with this ideal: With the people and on behalf of the people! Later on, in 1918, when the world of politics unmistakably summoned me into active participation, I further elaborated my philosophy of life on the basis of this fundamental principle and I oriented all my political involvement toward it. In this frame of mind and with this sense of dedication, I undertook a role in political service and this principle alone characterized my contribution to the building of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Here again it was concern for the people that urged me on, for by the very dictates of the natural law I reasoned that it will be far better for the Slovak people to co-exist in a federated union with the Czech brother-nation rather than to become allied in a foreign state with a non-Slavic nation, and I moved toward mature diplomatic functioning, especially after the Czechs repudiated any implementing of the Pittsburgh Agreement. After the harsh reality of the first experiences of disenchantment with this arrangement and the increasingly corrupt disregard of the Slovak people as public and state positions were being filled, the more the tempo of political �54 SLOVAKIA activity mounted, the more clearly did I delineate my own course of action in accord with sound norms of Christian ethics and the more readily did I gain acquaintance with state jurisprudence . Let no one be taken aback on realizing that I had had no formal academic schooling in law or diplomacy. I managed to compensate for this lack by relying on applicable theses from Christian doctrine-a practice which was very effective and rewarding. And it was a thoroughly correct procedure, for Christian truth is a fount of principles for public life, all drawn from that same natural law on which solid juristic political science is also founded . On the other hand, too, Christian doctrine with its tenets from the natural law, all precisely formulated, afforded me wholly reliable foundations for outlining and coordinating my line of conduct in my service on behalf of the Slovak state and its rights as well as for its welfare and progress. Christian doctrine advoc~tes that well-recognized hierarchy of values governing right order in matters of natural vital rank : the individual, the family, the nation. God has endowed all three with distinctive individuality and freedom so that each of these entities might within itself and for itself put its energies to good use in order to advance its own development. The duty not only to preserve intact the individuality and freedom of these three but even to secure for each whatever help may be needed that they might attain their life's objective devolves upon them as well as upon the public powers or authorities. Consequently , when Christian teaching develops the principles, rights and duties of these three agents, it likewise establishes norms for the discharge of public power whose responsibility it is to promote the development of all three agents rather than to suppress them in any way. It is from these teachings of Christian doctrine that I have drawn enlightenmen t on the true meaning of various elements in juridical terminology; e. g., the nation, the state, autonomy, concern for the whole; the concern of an individual or of a part, as well as sanctioned means and methods for realizing these principles-a ll this being both morally and politically commendable . Much of my thinking was consistently devoted to this topic and on July 5, 1939, I even chose it as the central theme of an address which I presented at the mass meeting of Slovak Catholic �SLOVAKIA 55 students' organization. And the more deeply I reached into the treasure store of Christian teaching on this score. the more satisfactory did I grasp the authentic concept of the words: nation, state, private and public interests , etc. With these developments I all the more tenaciously adhered to the outlined program for autonomy, for in it I saw clear fulfillment of the natural law. I perceived in it as well the lasting guarantee of peaceful coexistence on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks within the totality of one state largely because this program which encompassed self-determination was intended to guarantee to the Slovak nation its own national individuality, its proper identity and its free right to regulate its life so that its cultural, social and economic evolvement would be in no way impeded by anyone or anything. The scope of Christian teaching, then, was for me not only an interpreter of the natural law but through its specialized directives for public affairs it became as well an effective moderating factor in my political endeavors, guiding me at all times to act with due regard for presciptions fixed by natural law. So it is no personal credit of mine that I advocated that type of political involvement that was characterized as moderate autonomous politics, for this way was distinctly marked out for me by Christian thought and principle under whose influence I was wholesomely indoctrinated to put the interests of the wholethat is, the interest of the entire nation-before any other less universal interest, for the general good can be effective only when the interests of the entire nation suffer no impairment of any kind. I chose to adopt a branch of political science founded on such principles, motivated as I was, by no personal interest or self-seeking, not looking for return in power or glory but rather endeavoring in every undertaking to attain and secure the general welfare of the Slovak nation. Working from the key points of an autonomy program, we set ourselves to formulate a state organism or structure of the kind which Christian principles regard as an instrument in the hands of a nation, a force under whose aegis it may work out its ultimate welfare and progress. It was this kind of distinctively Christian-founded politics �56 SLOVAKIA that I had in view both on March 14, 1939 and throughout the years of Slovak independent statehood. A change was brought about in the situation as the nation lived its life, moving from one segment of time to another. It was not our endeavors or doings that brought about crises or changes; the principles of natural claims or rights-or strictly speaking, the principles of Christian truth-remained unalterable and it was our bounden duty and the burden of our political position to make these norms very much alive and effective in every situation as it developed. We did not create the situation but we were conscience-charged on every occasion as it presented itself to us, to represent and to champion those immutable principles which are destined to come to the fore in the interests of a nation. Today it is this aspect of politics that stands before this legal bench, embodied in my person, though I am improperly charged, for politics is entirely out of place before this tribunal, especially that category of political activity to which I was dedicated in my public life. Translated by Sister M. Constance Yakubov , SS.C.M. Danville, Pennsylvania "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty of justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent his knee to the communist tyrant makes him a martyr of the cause of freedom and religion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political oppressors for centuries, this is the greatest crime against them in their historic struggle for national freedom. His tragic death cannot help but inspire SlovalG for centuries to come to defend their God-given political and religious rights."-Abbot Theodor e Kojis, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio, April 30, 1947. "Eduard Bene~, murderer of the freedom of the Slovak nation, kJ.lled a g,ood man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot, the first president of the Slovak Republic elected by the Slovak nation. The crime of murderer Benes is worse, uglier and more wicked than ~e crime of Cain." - Peter Pridavok, President Slovak National Gouncil, London, England, April 30, 1947. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOVAKIA Dr. Jozef Tiso His Political Creed (EXCERPT FROM HIS DEFENSE SPEECH PRESENTED ON MARCH 17, 1947 IN THE POLITICAL TRIAL CONDUCTED BY THE· SO-CALLED SLOVAK NATIONAL COURT IN BRATISLAVA.) My political involvement cannot be examined or judged by the usual norms of political critique because essentially it was not governed by typically prevalent political techniques. I undertake this representation of the motivation and impelling force that prompted my political involvement because as a Catholic priest I feel bound to this formal deposition of testimony not only by the circumstance of my clerical status but also out of regard for a universal Christian outlook. Both of these considerations are cherished as top-ranking principles in my political life, but under some spurious forms of evaluation, my political endeavors could easily be fixed in a very misleading light. The estimable attitude with which the Slovak Catholic clergy is regarded and even more importantly, the exalted position of a universal Christian outlook rightfully expect that I shall make a public statement specifically directed to those who may very likely conclude that in my person they will also humiliate or confound those intrinsic values that always reside above and beyond the person of an individual; in this case, those values that exceed my very person or individual self. When I appeal or draw attention to the reality of my priestly rank and when I testify that all my political activity was guided solely by Christian principles which are always consonant with sound policy making in public affairs whether the active agent be a priest or a lay Christian statesman, I do so with no intent or need to extenuate a fault or disguise a failing. Just as I reprehend denying a priest the right to function in politics simply because of the fact that he is a priest, so do I not condone any theorizing that a priest's SLOVAKIA . 51 responsibility in public affairs is other than that of any accountable citizen, for after all, that is just what a priest is-a responsible and accountable citizen who is entitled to all the rights of a citizen and is bound by the same sacred obligations and duties that bind every citizen in the land. My reference to the fact that I am a priest sterns from one desire only: let it ever be kept in mind that I engaged in politics as a priest active in politics and for that reason it is imperative that my position and my participation in politics at all times be grasped and assessed as a priest's conscious involvement. Consequently, there must be imputed to my public life that specific type of motivation that is invariably associated with the character of a priest committed to public interests and civic obligation. Open reference to my priestly status is, then, eminently desirable in order to open the way to the clear and only proper and authentic mode of understanding my part in politics. On the other hand, I am thoroughly convinced that a correct appraisal of my political career can never be made by anyone who does not first of all bring attention to bear this special priestly feature of mine, by anyone who does not admit the worthiness of priestly motivation on my part-these attributes ( especially when they are associated with one's public condu~t in matters of state) which can contribute clarification for a line of conduct that otherwise can be construed as incomprehensible or even less than favorable when judged in the light of the average scale of norms, and can focus it into a clearly understandable and acceptable program of responsible action. The life of a goal-conscious individual-and do pardon my saying without any smacking of arrogance or conceit that I consider myself such a one; I assert that I am a goal-conscious person because I know just what it is that I want-the life of such a one is much like a work of art executed with a definite point of view in mind. a given sighting angle for valid critical evaluation that will assure its total appreciation. If a specific work lacks this feature, we can stand before it as before a charmed castle to which we hold no key. There are artistic creations upon which we can look from several varying angles, estimate their merits with critical eye, and yet fail to appreciate them justly and honestly unless we approach 52 SLOVAKIA them from their given point of vantage. This kind of talisman for an unbiased understanding of my public life and activities is my priestly character with all its intrinsic dynamics and principles which have been appointed by the determinants of Christian doctrine on behalf of public service and public servants. It follows very naturally then, that one does not apply the same norms in evaluating the merits of a public minister or a politician who has never subscribed to these tenets. But the fact that such circumstances must be taken into account in judging a politician who does profess this adherence and evidences it in his conduct, this is an indispensable ingredient to that sense of objectivity on which every public court of justice prides itself. And this situation prevails even in cases where the law itself does not concur with given motivating factors or identity with the principles that enter into a specific case. Nevertheless, in the juridical trial of the accused, these circumstances must of necessity be taken into consideration and they must be examined as the intention which influenced and helped to coordinate the motives and the endeavors of the accused. Otherwise a commitment which is not marked with some form of self-interest or some element of redounding glory remains forever incomprehensible or forever doomed to false interpretation of some kind. This, of course, is wholly inadmissible in a totally objective approach to truth. My politics was politics of a unique kind precisely because it was undertaken by an individual who is a priest. All my life's training and preparation was for a career in the priesthood and not in politics. The goal of all my schooling-formal schooling as well as self-education-was directed to spiritual leadership. I dedicated myself to serve God, the Church and the people of whom I was born and among whom I hoped to bring my priestly vocation to fruition. The ringing principles: For God and Nation! With the people and for the people! were no hollow slogans that I had later acquired somehow, absorbed by magnetic acclaim, and appropriated as guiding mottoes in my life. They are and they have ever been universally valid fundamentals. Only by and through these concepts could I have hoped to attain the sublime ultimate objective of all my life: The glory of God first and foremost, and then the common good of the people. SLOVAKIA 53 This outlook and focus of perspectives in my life was in no way conditioned by demagoguery or a political platform of any kind; it was rooted in my very life's commitment and in my pastoral ethics which mandates my identification with the faithful of my flock together with a complete negation of all self-interest and vain concerns. The logical sequel to such ministerial canons culminates in the moral conviction to represent the valid interests and needs of the people, to further what is of benefit for the people in general, and to support their common welfare. These are the basics which formulated the patent guidelines of all my priestly functioning, my official ministry which was never circumscribed merely to aspects of immediate church and school matters but which, by the ramification of its social and organizational commitments and as concomitant of these,. extended generally into the cultural, social and economic life of my people. I did, of course, further this rule of life theoretically also, acting in my capacity as educator and formation director of a younger priestly generation. In this office I sought to imbue every young cleric who came within the sphere of my influence with this ideal: With the people and on behalf of the people! Later on, in 1918, when the world of politics unmistakably summoned me into active participation, I further elaborated my philosophy of life on the basis of this fundamental principle and I oriented all my political involvement toward it. In this frame of mind and with this sense of dedication, I undertook a role in political service and this principle alone characterized my contribution to the building of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Here again it was concern for the people that urged me on, for by the very dictates of the natural law I reasoned that it will be far better for the Slovak people to co-exist in a federated union with the Czech brother-nation rather than to become allied in a foreign state with a non-Slavic nation, and I moved toward mature diplomatic functioning, especially after the Czechs repudiated any implementing of the Pittsburgh Agreement. After the harsh reality of the first experiences of disenchantment with this arrangement and the increasingly corrupt disregard of the Slovak people as public and state positions were being filled, the more the tempo of political 54 SLOVAKIA activity mounted, the more clearly did I delineate my own course of action in accord with sound norms of Christian ethics and the more readily did I gain acquaintance with state jurisprudence . Let no one be taken aback on realizing that I had had no formal academic schooling in law or diplomacy. I managed to compensate for this lack by relying on applicable theses from Christian doctrine-a practice which was very effective and rewarding. And it was a thoroughly correct procedure, for Christian truth is a fount of principles for public life, all drawn from that same natural law on which solid juristic political science is also founded . On the other hand, too, Christian doctrine with its tenets from the natural law, all precisely formulated, afforded me wholly reliable foundations for outlining and coordinating my line of conduct in my service on behalf of the Slovak state and its rights as well as for its welfare and progress. Christian doctrine advoc~tes that well-recognized hierarchy of values governing right order in matters of natural vital rank : the individual, the family, the nation. God has endowed all three with distinctive individuality and freedom so that each of these entities might within itself and for itself put its energies to good use in order to advance its own development. The duty not only to preserve intact the individuality and freedom of these three but even to secure for each whatever help may be needed that they might attain their life's objective devolves upon them as well as upon the public powers or authorities. Consequently , when Christian teaching develops the principles, rights and duties of these three agents, it likewise establishes norms for the discharge of public power whose responsibility it is to promote the development of all three agents rather than to suppress them in any way. It is from these teachings of Christian doctrine that I have drawn enlightenmen t on the true meaning of various elements in juridical terminology; e. g., the nation, the state, autonomy, concern for the whole; the concern of an individual or of a part, as well as sanctioned means and methods for realizing these principles-a ll this being both morally and politically commendable . Much of my thinking was consistently devoted to this topic and on July 5, 1939, I even chose it as the central theme of an address which I presented at the mass meeting of Slovak Catholic SLOVAKIA 55 students' organization. And the more deeply I reached into the treasure store of Christian teaching on this score. the more satisfactory did I grasp the authentic concept of the words: nation, state, private and public interests , etc. With these developments I all the more tenaciously adhered to the outlined program for autonomy, for in it I saw clear fulfillment of the natural law. I perceived in it as well the lasting guarantee of peaceful coexistence on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks within the totality of one state largely because this program which encompassed self-determination was intended to guarantee to the Slovak nation its own national individuality, its proper identity and its free right to regulate its life so that its cultural, social and economic evolvement would be in no way impeded by anyone or anything. The scope of Christian teaching, then, was for me not only an interpreter of the natural law but through its specialized directives for public affairs it became as well an effective moderating factor in my political endeavors, guiding me at all times to act with due regard for presciptions fixed by natural law. So it is no personal credit of mine that I advocated that type of political involvement that was characterized as moderate autonomous politics, for this way was distinctly marked out for me by Christian thought and principle under whose influence I was wholesomely indoctrinated to put the interests of the wholethat is, the interest of the entire nation-before any other less universal interest, for the general good can be effective only when the interests of the entire nation suffer no impairment of any kind. I chose to adopt a branch of political science founded on such principles, motivated as I was, by no personal interest or self-seeking, not looking for return in power or glory but rather endeavoring in every undertaking to attain and secure the general welfare of the Slovak nation. Working from the key points of an autonomy program, we set ourselves to formulate a state organism or structure of the kind which Christian principles regard as an instrument in the hands of a nation, a force under whose aegis it may work out its ultimate welfare and progress. It was this kind of distinctively Christian-founded politics 56 SLOVAKIA that I had in view both on March 14, 1939 and throughout the years of Slovak independent statehood. A change was brought about in the situation as the nation lived its life, moving from one segment of time to another. It was not our endeavors or doings that brought about crises or changes; the principles of natural claims or rights-or strictly speaking, the principles of Christian truth-remained unalterable and it was our bounden duty and the burden of our political position to make these norms very much alive and effective in every situation as it developed. We did not create the situation but we were conscience-charged on every occasion as it presented itself to us, to represent and to champion those immutable principles which are destined to come to the fore in the interests of a nation. Today it is this aspect of politics that stands before this legal bench, embodied in my person, though I am improperly charged, for politics is entirely out of place before this tribunal, especially that category of political activity to which I was dedicated in my public life. Translated by Sister M. Constance Yakubov , SS.C.M. Danville, Pennsylvania "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty of justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent his knee to the communist tyrant makes him a martyr of the cause of freedom and religion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political oppressors for centuries, this is the greatest crime against them in their historic struggle for national freedom. His tragic death cannot help but inspire SlovalG for centuries to come to defend their God-given political and religious rights."-Abbot Theodor e Kojis, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio, April 30, 1947. "Eduard Bene~, murderer of the freedom of the Slovak nation, kJ.lled a g,ood man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot, the first president of the Slovak Republic elected by the Slovak nation. The crime of murderer Benes is worse, uglier and more wicked than ~e crime of Cain." - Peter Pridavok, President Slovak National Gouncil, London, England, April 30, 1947.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Jozef Tiso - His Political Creed Description An account of the resource trans. Sister M. Constance Yakubov, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 50-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Yakubov, Sister M. Constance, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e0d1f2d53ba58b0615f7d1ba9f832aea.pdf 4c29783a5823eb3445e252bd4bbff483 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XI SEPTEMBE1R-'DECEMBER, 1961 NO. 2(34) DR. JOZEF TISO IN MEMORIAM April 18, 1961, marked the 14th anniversary of the death of Monsignor Dr. Jozef Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic, who died a martyr's death at the hands of Benes and the Soviets, a victim of a disastrous policy, the cornerstone of which was laid aJt Yalta in February, 1945. Instead of ushering in freedom, democracy and selfdetermination, it led to the subjugation of an additional 200 million Europeans. On their soil in Northern, Central and Southern Europe, there arose a new Soviet colonial system at a time when 100 millions of people in Asia and Africa began their march ,to independent statehood. It was a policy that destroyed Europe's individuality and enlarged the power of the Kremlin, a power that has kept all humanity under constant tension since 1945 and is a threat to the freedom of all the states it has not yet captured. The Slovak Republic was one of the vidtims of this policy. The invasion of Slovakia by the Red Army crushed its growing individuality and brutally incor-porated that little country into Czecho-Slovakia. A Communist regime was imposed upon Slovakia, supponted and represented by Czech Communists. This regime is able to maintain its power only by employing Czech-Communist commissars. Dr. Jozef Tiso constantly warned the free world of the dual danger inherent in the Soviet system: Moscow's imperialism on the one hand; the tyranny of godless Communism on the other. His warning words unfortunately fell on deaf ears. When Dr. Tiso refused to cooperate with Moscow in spreading the Communist dictatorship, he was treated like a criminal of the worst sort. U. S. Military units, operating against esta'blished international procedures, on order f.rom Washington surrendered Dr. Tiso and a number of Slovak opponents of Soviet Russia to lthe �2 SLOVAKIA Prague Communists. Much effort was expended to degrade Dr. Tiso in the eyes of the rest of the world for the frankness of his convictions and to place him in a bad light. His opponents succeeded in doing so by recourse 1to propaganda. At that time 1the USA lent its support to the policy of Dr. Edward Benes, a pioneer in cooperating with the Soviets, and an ideal representative of the policy of Yalta. The West helped the Communist system to ·e xpand its power and thus took ruthless measures against Dr. Tiso who warned of the consequences of this policy. Events after 1950 documented the correctness of the words of both the Slovak president and the Slovak people. At the same time they disclosed - as convincing arguments - the shont-sightedness, agoistic and immoral policy of Dr. Benes, which today is still erroneously referred to as "democratic." By murdering President Jozef Tiso the Czech-Communist regime hoped to break the anti.-Communist res,i stance of the Slovak people an<l crush their ambitions toward freedom and independence. It did not succeed in doing so and will never succeed. The Slovak people will hold fast to the idea of Slovak statehood throughout all the ruthlessness and terror to which they are submitted and will stand up to the Czech-Communist regime with every bit of resolve they can muster, regardless of the cost. The policy of Yalta spells misfortune not only for the Slovak people but for all mankind. The West dare not lose sight of the fact that tdday neither nazism nor fascism constitutes a danger - they are systems of the past - but Communism, to rid itself of which is the task of the hour. Bearing in mind !the countless martyrs, victims of an "historical error," of the policy of Yalta, the entire free world should resolve to take uncompromising and more energetic steps to oppose the Communist system and do so, as well, in the interest of the enslaved peoples behind the iron curtain. Freedom and independence belong not ,t o a privileged few but to all, including the Slovak people. - A. M. � SLOVAKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XI SEPTEMBE1R-'DECEMBER, 1961 NO. 2(34) DR. JOZEF TISO IN MEMORIAM April 18, 1961, marked the 14th anniversary of the death of Monsignor Dr. Jozef Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic, who died a martyr's death at the hands of Benes and the Soviets, a victim of a disastrous policy, the cornerstone of which was laid aJt Yalta in February, 1945. Instead of ushering in freedom, democracy and selfdetermination, it led to the subjugation of an additional 200 million Europeans. On their soil in Northern, Central and Southern Europe, there arose a new Soviet colonial system at a time when 100 millions of people in Asia and Africa began their march ,to independent statehood. It was a policy that destroyed Europe's individuality and enlarged the power of the Kremlin, a power that has kept all humanity under constant tension since 1945 and is a threat to the freedom of all the states it has not yet captured. The Slovak Republic was one of the vidtims of this policy. The invasion of Slovakia by the Red Army crushed its growing individuality and brutally incor-porated that little country into Czecho-Slovakia. A Communist regime was imposed upon Slovakia, supponted and represented by Czech Communists. This regime is able to maintain its power only by employing Czech-Communist commissars. Dr. Jozef Tiso constantly warned the free world of the dual danger inherent in the Soviet system: Moscow's imperialism on the one hand; the tyranny of godless Communism on the other. His warning words unfortunately fell on deaf ears. When Dr. Tiso refused to cooperate with Moscow in spreading the Communist dictatorship, he was treated like a criminal of the worst sort. U. S. Military units, operating against esta'blished international procedures, on order f.rom Washington surrendered Dr. Tiso and a number of Slovak opponents of Soviet Russia to lthe �2 SLOVAKIA Prague Communists. Much effort was expended to degrade Dr. Tiso in the eyes of the rest of the world for the frankness of his convictions and to place him in a bad light. His opponents succeeded in doing so by recourse 1to propaganda. At that time 1the USA lent its support to the policy of Dr. Edward Benes, a pioneer in cooperating with the Soviets, and an ideal representative of the policy of Yalta. The West helped the Communist system to ·e xpand its power and thus took ruthless measures against Dr. Tiso who warned of the consequences of this policy. Events after 1950 documented the correctness of the words of both the Slovak president and the Slovak people. At the same time they disclosed - as convincing arguments - the shont-sightedness, agoistic and immoral policy of Dr. Benes, which today is still erroneously referred to as "democratic." By murdering President Jozef Tiso the Czech-Communist regime hoped to break the anti.-Communist res,i stance of the Slovak people an<l crush their ambitions toward freedom and independence. It did not succeed in doing so and will never succeed. The Slovak people will hold fast to the idea of Slovak statehood throughout all the ruthlessness and terror to which they are submitted and will stand up to the Czech-Communist regime with every bit of resolve they can muster, regardless of the cost. The policy of Yalta spells misfortune not only for the Slovak people but for all mankind. The West dare not lose sight of the fact that tdday neither nazism nor fascism constitutes a danger - they are systems of the past - but Communism, to rid itself of which is the task of the hour. Bearing in mind !the countless martyrs, victims of an "historical error," of the policy of Yalta, the entire free world should resolve to take uncompromising and more energetic steps to oppose the Communist system and do so, as well, in the interest of the enslaved peoples behind the iron curtain. Freedom and independence belong not ,t o a privileged few but to all, including the Slovak people. - A. M. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1961, Vol. 11 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 33), March-June 1961.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 34), September-December June 1961.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XI SEPTEMBE1R-'DECEMBER, 1961 NO. 2(34) DR. JOZEF TISO IN MEMORIAM April 18, 1961, marked the 14th anniversary of the death of Monsignor Dr. Jozef Tiso, President of the Slovak Republic, who died a martyr's death at the hands of Benes and the Soviets, a victim of a disastrous policy, the cornerstone of which was laid aJt Yalta in February, 1945. Instead of ushering in freedom, democracy and selfdetermination, it led to the subjugation of an additional 200 million Europeans. On their soil in Northern, Central and Southern Europe, there arose a new Soviet colonial system at a time when 100 millions of people in Asia and Africa began their march ,to independent statehood. It was a policy that destroyed Europe's individuality and enlarged the power of the Kremlin, a power that has kept all humanity under constant tension since 1945 and is a threat to the freedom of all the states it has not yet captured. The Slovak Republic was one of the vidtims of this policy. The invasion of Slovakia by the Red Army crushed its growing individuality and brutally incor-porated that little country into Czecho-Slovakia. A Communist regime was imposed upon Slovakia, supponted and represented by Czech Communists. This regime is able to maintain its power only by employing Czech-Communist commissars. Dr. Jozef Tiso constantly warned the free world of the dual danger inherent in the Soviet system: Moscow's imperialism on the one hand; the tyranny of godless Communism on the other. His warning words unfortunately fell on deaf ears. When Dr. Tiso refused to cooperate with Moscow in spreading the Communist dictatorship, he was treated like a criminal of the worst sort. U. S. Military units, operating against esta'blished international procedures, on order f.rom Washington surrendered Dr. Tiso and a number of Slovak opponents of Soviet Russia to lthe 2 SLOVAKIA Prague Communists. Much effort was expended to degrade Dr. Tiso in the eyes of the rest of the world for the frankness of his convictions and to place him in a bad light. His opponents succeeded in doing so by recourse 1to propaganda. At that time 1the USA lent its support to the policy of Dr. Edward Benes, a pioneer in cooperating with the Soviets, and an ideal representative of the policy of Yalta. The West helped the Communist system to ·e xpand its power and thus took ruthless measures against Dr. Tiso who warned of the consequences of this policy. Events after 1950 documented the correctness of the words of both the Slovak president and the Slovak people. At the same time they disclosed - as convincing arguments - the shont-sightedness, agoistic and immoral policy of Dr. Benes, which today is still erroneously referred to as "democratic." By murdering President Jozef Tiso the Czech-Communist regime hoped to break the anti.-Communist res,i stance of the Slovak people an<l crush their ambitions toward freedom and independence. It did not succeed in doing so and will never succeed. The Slovak people will hold fast to the idea of Slovak statehood throughout all the ruthlessness and terror to which they are submitted and will stand up to the Czech-Communist regime with every bit of resolve they can muster, regardless of the cost. The policy of Yalta spells misfortune not only for the Slovak people but for all mankind. The West dare not lose sight of the fact that tdday neither nazism nor fascism constitutes a danger - they are systems of the past - but Communism, to rid itself of which is the task of the hour. Bearing in mind !the countless martyrs, victims of an "historical error," of the policy of Yalta, the entire free world should resolve to take uncompromising and more energetic steps to oppose the Communist system and do so, as well, in the interest of the enslaved peoples behind the iron curtain. Freedom and independence belong not ,t o a privileged few but to all, including the Slovak people. - A. M.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Jozef Tiso In Memoriam Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 11, No. 2 (34), September-December 1961 pp. 1-2 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1961 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/128273b962ed1383557507a6e0186da5.pdf bd587b3aa0f8dadb8a1f82df17e8e5b7 PDF Text Text 30 SLOVAKIA DR. LETTRICH'S PRINCIPLES Dr. Michael Zibrin Jin the beginning cxf January 1948, when the presidium of the ISlOJVaJk Democratfo ,Party met in session at Bratislav:a, Dr. Joseph iLettrich recei,ved an ordinary card frOIIll an aoquatlntance, iDr. Michael Mudry--Selbilk. The latter · bluntly infomned Lettrich -that he was now in ISwitizerland and did not intend to return to Slovak~1a, It was ju.st a short time prior to th:at date, at the end of •Decemlber, 1947, that Ferjenic£k's pdlice ,c alled Miu.dry in twice for a hearing on account of an alleged meeting of Lettrich with Dr. Peter P. Hfotko during Lettrich's visit in Chicago, in 1946, where he had oome escorted by .a Comnnmist, one Rudolph Martanoivic. Miudvy, saying nothing to any one, sold his furniture and made his exit stealthily, escapmg to Switzerland, whence he sent Lettrich the card referred to aJbove. Lettri'ch .·Jbecame excited, criticized Mud.Ty, and said that the Democratic !Party had erred seriously when it toot him in. As f.a,r M Lettrich, was concerned, he was through forever with Mudry, because he did not have to run off as long -as Lettrich and Ferjentellk rprotected him. Of course, Lettrich evidently did not ik.now th.at some two and a ha1f months later he himself would be an escapee and the services of Michael Mu.dry would again lbe welcome and valuaJble. And it so haJppened that Lettrich landed in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of ·1J9148, and ,b egan . to woI'lk togetlier again with his old pal Michael M'lidry. As soon as the so-.called "Council of Free 0.zechoslowkia" was orgarnzed lby Zenkl, Ripka :and other Czech socialists Miudry joined up. Later Lettrich was instrumental in getting iMJudry ,a job !With Radio Free Euro:pe where, together with two Ozech Marxists, Peroutka alild Tigrid, he formed the leading Ozech~lovak trio as an "encouragement" to those deputies Olf the Demooratic Party, who sat in Gottwald's prisons and whom, at the begin.ning cxf October 1938, Benes's police oommissioner, Dr. Michael Mu.dry, so energetically jailed. This jaiJer of Dr. Joseph Stas- �SLOVAKIA 31 ko, who is suffering in LeapoldQIV for his Christian and democratic conivicl.ions, was then 1gi,ven a new distinction by Lettric:h. A London report stated that there were three persons fighting for the leading position. of the 'Slova!k section of the "Ozechoslova.Jk" cliMision of Radio Free Europe. One was the well-&nOIWn distr.ilbu:ter of lands, •t he creator of the ,kolchoses and loy.al commissar of Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Martin Kivetlko; the other, a ser.viant of Lettrich, Dr. John Paulmy.fl'oth; and the third, the clever policeman, Dr. Michael Mu.dry. Radio Free Eu.rope wanted the "Council of Free Ozechoslovrukia" decide the issue; the Council in turn told Lettrich to mruke the choiice. And Lettrich did. Forgetting what he had said and thought a/bout Mudry in January, 1948, :he appointed his old friend and, Benes'a policeman headman Of (uondoo.'s Radio Free Europe. We can well imagine how the ISloviaiks at home felt about this. They were Slhooked iby R:adio Free Europe's action amd left their kinsman in exile know just hoiw they felt rubout it. Protests were shocked by Radio Free Europe's action and let their conspiracy, pardon, a policy od' its oiwn to follow. Lettrich knoiws albout the facts referred to above as well as I do. And yet Michael Miudry, who thereto never had been in London, was ,p referred to Dr. John Bauliny, who had spent eight yeaxs in London and had notaJble connections in English diplomaitic ciroles. Bau.Hny .w as smeared by both the Czech 'Socialists and non-Socialists. They !knew that he had visited (PridaJvak, the "separatist," and had written letters to K!8-rol Sidoir, chairman of the !Slovaik National Council Aibroad and chief "sepairatist," so they plied their smearing trade witll gusto. -Dr. Jan •Pauliny...T6th, the diplomat, who succeeded Mar.tin Razus as chairman of the SlO!Valk Nationa:l Party amd was ibetter known a,t home than Mudry, simply did not rate with Lettrich. · This is lesson rfor Pauliny. Not only for !Pa,uliny .hurt for all Slov.aJks, and R:adio. Free Europe, as well. It would be most fortunaJte IlJOt only for the SlQ)\naJcs, lbut for R•F E itself, if the latter would .aict realistically and put an end to its systematic a!llti~Sl-01Vruk policy. For Pauliny and for a �32 SLOVAKIA every 1Slova'k irt rwould be well, if they would speedily become aiware of the faot that they probably coUJld e~h the:mse1ves lby join.mg the Lettrichrites rand Zeruklites, but onl,y at the ~ of their own nation's interests and for the benefit cxf Czech imperialism. We Slavalks, however, are aware that the association is quite complete: Blaho, aJppointed head of State secw-ity, shall issue a list of the "umeliaJble"; Ferjencik will arrest them - 1some will lose their teeth , others will hwve their arms and ri:bs broken, as they did have prior to 1948; those who .still resist shall face the firing sq,uad of lettrich's consul ,g eneral, Gejza Krno. We certainly have somethtng to live for! The sooner every S1ovak lbecOIIlles aware of this, the better. Then every one will know just where to stand, and the Zenklites will no longer find renegades to serve them for Juda.s's pay. The 1Slova!ks who remain with them are outcasts 'Of the Slov8Jk nation. As many times as :I reproached Dr. Lettrich in exile, I neiver said anything !before the execution of Dr. Tiso, that is, !b efore April 18, 1947, when it was quite olbvious to all of us just iwha.t Benes thought ~bout the SlovaJks and that all his promises were plain humbug. Then, when deputies Kempny, Bugar and Stasko were surrendered to stand trial, lli. 1L e.ttrich did nothing to save -t hem. Shortly after thaJt, on Janiuary 27, 1948, John Ursiny, Lettrich's protector, fell. After these events, iwhen Lettrich still sang praises about our freedOIIll and democracy - saying that "our relationship to, the USSR, !based on the treaty of December 12, 1943, is unalter.alble in the poHtioal life of the future. . . " - I was conrvinced thaJt he could not forget the so-called "Christmas Agreement" of 1943, when his group voluntarily surrendered power over the SlovMcs to the Communists, even though the Communists at that time did not represent even 10 peir cent of the electorate! Returning from Prague, Febnmry 25, 1948, sev~al how-s after Gottwald -t ook over the government, Lettrich wanted to distribute functions on the train. Arriving in Bratislaiva, Lettrich called a secret session rwi-thout inV'it1 �SLOVAKIA 33 ing me; It was at this session that he swrrendered the Democratic Party to Milan Polak, LU!kalcovic rund Sevcik and Lettrich knew that Se:vlcilk was a member of the NKVD. When thls happened, there was no doubt in my mind that Lettrich was maJking great mistakes and was not a man of principle. Therefore, let all my critics a;c,know:ledge that I :had reasons, for parting with Lettrich pohtioolly ruid that I had to quit rum, since I did not want to get into serious conflict with my conscience. After that I met iwith :Or. Le:ttrich once more; that was in November, 1951, alfter the crisis in the "Council of Free Ozechoslorvakia," when I received a report that Lettrich had called Zenkl a H•a r and had come to Chicago to explain his conduct. Before meelting with 'him, I was informed that Lettrich vi,s ited .A!b!bot OndraJk at Lisle, lill., that same day and even told him that Zenkl was a political liar and descrilbed his com'Panions similarly. He asked the .A!bibot for help against the dictate orf these political swindlers. The Ozech Oatholic NAROD wrote aJbout that visit.. Lettri~h aipparooitly was through with Zenkl. And yet he waJs not. After the albove episode, Lettrich made up with the ZenJdites He even accompanied Zen!kl on a visit to Chic.ago sho:rtly after that and with him even dared to visit the very same Albbot Ondrruk before ,w hom he had excoriated Zenkl. Now then, is Lettricli a man o!f princi,ple? God only knows why he still continues to sit in the "Council of Free Ozechoslo:vrulcia" and is ready to do practically anything for Zerukl as long as he is paid for it. Oould it possilbly be the $400.00 monthly, as he himself once ac~ knowl€dged? Furthermore, quite a stir was created when Lettrich att€mpted to• get Fedora Piaul01Va (nee KR!NO), a Communist, into the USA, through his beloved friend, the "shooting consul gene~rul," Geijiza Krno. eiven providing the necessary documents. This he did, even thoug,h a year ear• lier in his OfWil paipeT, the CAS, he excoriated Fedora and one Zora JesenSlky for their lectures in the communist organizations orf S1'oiv;ruk women Weill, how could I be !blamed �34 SLOVAKIA for thinlki.Ing that Lettrich was in the train of Marxists, who are willing to become reconciled even with the devil himse1f a!t the exipense .of .the security of the UISA, just so they might earn $400.00 a mont:h from the government of the USA and the American taxpayers. In the meantime, when iRFE was reorganl:zed, Dr. Mu.dry was ma-de the headman of the Slovak pairt of the "Ozechoslo1Vla2k" division of Radio Free Europe in Munich. We can imrugine jusit how the Slovaks at home felt albout this promotion, which rwas engineered ~ Lettrich. As far as I aim concerned, it iwas at this point that Lettrich discarded the last prindple of de,c ency when he appointed Dr. Mu.dry as the head of the resistance broadcast, the very same M!udry who 'boasted in Chica;go how he arrested Stasko and, get this,, .r efused to free him even on the intervenition of Karol. 1Sidor in 11938, lbut ilnstead ,s urrendered him to the c~ech !State .representatirve in Bratislava. As I had asked my friends before, I ask aJgain - the friends who still stand by Lettrfoh: What was more corred, to quit Lettrich and continue to keep silent? Was there not ,a l.ready too much silence since HH8 to the present time? How could any honest Slo;vailr !keep silent .a f:ter Lettrich's open letter to Coingressman Charles, J. Kersten in whkh he denied ,b oth the existence and the right of the Slovrukis to determine their OM7Il destiny and future? And after his i.atest iversion of the Slovak uprising of 1944 in the NEW Y10RK TI!MElS (August 29, 1954), wherein he still promotes the Jegend faJbricated by his group amd the CommU!Ilists? It is not anger or jealousy that has 1prompted me to write as I hwve. I have 1been ,p rompted. to do so, !because I sincerely feel that it is a duty I awe to my people to shed oome light on the road L-eittrich is traiveling. Principles, it seems, do not coI11Cern Letitrich eiven today when there is so much taJ:k -rubout uniting the ISlova;ks in exile. Ho,w could any honest SlorvaJk, imbued with Christian and democratic principles, unite in any undertaiking with a man like Lettri~h? � 30 SLOVAKIA DR. LETTRICH'S PRINCIPLES Dr. Michael Zibrin Jin the beginning cxf January 1948, when the presidium of the ISlOJVaJk Democratfo ,Party met in session at Bratislav:a, Dr. Joseph iLettrich recei,ved an ordinary card frOIIll an aoquatlntance, iDr. Michael Mudry--Selbilk. The latter · bluntly infomned Lettrich -that he was now in ISwitizerland and did not intend to return to Slovak~1a, It was ju.st a short time prior to th:at date, at the end of •Decemlber, 1947, that Ferjenic£k's pdlice ,c alled Miu.dry in twice for a hearing on account of an alleged meeting of Lettrich with Dr. Peter P. Hfotko during Lettrich's visit in Chicago, in 1946, where he had oome escorted by .a Comnnmist, one Rudolph Martanoivic. Miudvy, saying nothing to any one, sold his furniture and made his exit stealthily, escapmg to Switzerland, whence he sent Lettrich the card referred to aJbove. Lettri'ch .·Jbecame excited, criticized Mud.Ty, and said that the Democratic !Party had erred seriously when it toot him in. As f.a,r M Lettrich, was concerned, he was through forever with Mudry, because he did not have to run off as long -as Lettrich and Ferjentellk rprotected him. Of course, Lettrich evidently did not ik.now th.at some two and a ha1f months later he himself would be an escapee and the services of Michael Mu.dry would again lbe welcome and valuaJble. And it so haJppened that Lettrich landed in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of ·1J9148, and ,b egan . to woI'lk togetlier again with his old pal Michael M'lidry. As soon as the so-.called "Council of Free 0.zechoslowkia" was orgarnzed lby Zenkl, Ripka :and other Czech socialists Miudry joined up. Later Lettrich was instrumental in getting iMJudry ,a job !With Radio Free Euro:pe where, together with two Ozech Marxists, Peroutka alild Tigrid, he formed the leading Ozech~lovak trio as an "encouragement" to those deputies Olf the Demooratic Party, who sat in Gottwald's prisons and whom, at the begin.ning cxf October 1938, Benes's police oommissioner, Dr. Michael Mu.dry, so energetically jailed. This jaiJer of Dr. Joseph Stas- �SLOVAKIA 31 ko, who is suffering in LeapoldQIV for his Christian and democratic conivicl.ions, was then 1gi,ven a new distinction by Lettric:h. A London report stated that there were three persons fighting for the leading position. of the 'Slova!k section of the "Ozechoslova.Jk" cliMision of Radio Free Europe. One was the well-&nOIWn distr.ilbu:ter of lands, •t he creator of the ,kolchoses and loy.al commissar of Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Martin Kivetlko; the other, a ser.viant of Lettrich, Dr. John Paulmy.fl'oth; and the third, the clever policeman, Dr. Michael Mu.dry. Radio Free Eu.rope wanted the "Council of Free Ozechoslovrukia" decide the issue; the Council in turn told Lettrich to mruke the choiice. And Lettrich did. Forgetting what he had said and thought a/bout Mudry in January, 1948, :he appointed his old friend and, Benes'a policeman headman Of (uondoo.'s Radio Free Europe. We can well imagine how the ISloviaiks at home felt about this. They were Slhooked iby R:adio Free Europe's action amd left their kinsman in exile know just hoiw they felt rubout it. Protests were shocked by Radio Free Europe's action and let their conspiracy, pardon, a policy od' its oiwn to follow. Lettrich knoiws albout the facts referred to above as well as I do. And yet Michael Miudry, who thereto never had been in London, was ,p referred to Dr. John Bauliny, who had spent eight yeaxs in London and had notaJble connections in English diplomaitic ciroles. Bau.Hny .w as smeared by both the Czech 'Socialists and non-Socialists. They !knew that he had visited (PridaJvak, the "separatist," and had written letters to K!8-rol Sidoir, chairman of the !Slovaik National Council Aibroad and chief "sepairatist," so they plied their smearing trade witll gusto. -Dr. Jan •Pauliny...T6th, the diplomat, who succeeded Mar.tin Razus as chairman of the SlO!Valk Nationa:l Party amd was ibetter known a,t home than Mudry, simply did not rate with Lettrich. · This is lesson rfor Pauliny. Not only for !Pa,uliny .hurt for all Slov.aJks, and R:adio. Free Europe, as well. It would be most fortunaJte IlJOt only for the SlQ)\naJcs, lbut for R•F E itself, if the latter would .aict realistically and put an end to its systematic a!llti~Sl-01Vruk policy. For Pauliny and for a �32 SLOVAKIA every 1Slova'k irt rwould be well, if they would speedily become aiware of the faot that they probably coUJld e~h the:mse1ves lby join.mg the Lettrichrites rand Zeruklites, but onl,y at the ~ of their own nation's interests and for the benefit cxf Czech imperialism. We Slavalks, however, are aware that the association is quite complete: Blaho, aJppointed head of State secw-ity, shall issue a list of the "umeliaJble"; Ferjencik will arrest them - 1some will lose their teeth , others will hwve their arms and ri:bs broken, as they did have prior to 1948; those who .still resist shall face the firing sq,uad of lettrich's consul ,g eneral, Gejza Krno. We certainly have somethtng to live for! The sooner every S1ovak lbecOIIlles aware of this, the better. Then every one will know just where to stand, and the Zenklites will no longer find renegades to serve them for Juda.s's pay. The 1Slova!ks who remain with them are outcasts 'Of the Slov8Jk nation. As many times as :I reproached Dr. Lettrich in exile, I neiver said anything !before the execution of Dr. Tiso, that is, !b efore April 18, 1947, when it was quite olbvious to all of us just iwha.t Benes thought ~bout the SlovaJks and that all his promises were plain humbug. Then, when deputies Kempny, Bugar and Stasko were surrendered to stand trial, lli. 1L e.ttrich did nothing to save -t hem. Shortly after thaJt, on Janiuary 27, 1948, John Ursiny, Lettrich's protector, fell. After these events, iwhen Lettrich still sang praises about our freedOIIll and democracy - saying that "our relationship to, the USSR, !based on the treaty of December 12, 1943, is unalter.alble in the poHtioal life of the future. . . " - I was conrvinced thaJt he could not forget the so-called "Christmas Agreement" of 1943, when his group voluntarily surrendered power over the SlovMcs to the Communists, even though the Communists at that time did not represent even 10 peir cent of the electorate! Returning from Prague, Febnmry 25, 1948, sev~al how-s after Gottwald -t ook over the government, Lettrich wanted to distribute functions on the train. Arriving in Bratislaiva, Lettrich called a secret session rwi-thout inV'it1 �SLOVAKIA 33 ing me; It was at this session that he swrrendered the Democratic Party to Milan Polak, LU!kalcovic rund Sevcik and Lettrich knew that Se:vlcilk was a member of the NKVD. When thls happened, there was no doubt in my mind that Lettrich was maJking great mistakes and was not a man of principle. Therefore, let all my critics a;c,know:ledge that I :had reasons, for parting with Lettrich pohtioolly ruid that I had to quit rum, since I did not want to get into serious conflict with my conscience. After that I met iwith :Or. Le:ttrich once more; that was in November, 1951, alfter the crisis in the "Council of Free Ozechoslorvakia," when I received a report that Lettrich had called Zenkl a H•a r and had come to Chicago to explain his conduct. Before meelting with 'him, I was informed that Lettrich vi,s ited .A!b!bot OndraJk at Lisle, lill., that same day and even told him that Zenkl was a political liar and descrilbed his com'Panions similarly. He asked the .A!bibot for help against the dictate orf these political swindlers. The Ozech Oatholic NAROD wrote aJbout that visit.. Lettri~h aipparooitly was through with Zenkl. And yet he waJs not. After the albove episode, Lettrich made up with the ZenJdites He even accompanied Zen!kl on a visit to Chic.ago sho:rtly after that and with him even dared to visit the very same Albbot Ondrruk before ,w hom he had excoriated Zenkl. Now then, is Lettricli a man o!f princi,ple? God only knows why he still continues to sit in the "Council of Free Ozechoslo:vrulcia" and is ready to do practically anything for Zerukl as long as he is paid for it. Oould it possilbly be the $400.00 monthly, as he himself once ac~ knowl€dged? Furthermore, quite a stir was created when Lettrich att€mpted to• get Fedora Piaul01Va (nee KR!NO), a Communist, into the USA, through his beloved friend, the "shooting consul gene~rul," Geijiza Krno. eiven providing the necessary documents. This he did, even thoug,h a year ear• lier in his OfWil paipeT, the CAS, he excoriated Fedora and one Zora JesenSlky for their lectures in the communist organizations orf S1'oiv;ruk women Weill, how could I be !blamed �34 SLOVAKIA for thinlki.Ing that Lettrich was in the train of Marxists, who are willing to become reconciled even with the devil himse1f a!t the exipense .of .the security of the UISA, just so they might earn $400.00 a mont:h from the government of the USA and the American taxpayers. In the meantime, when iRFE was reorganl:zed, Dr. Mu.dry was ma-de the headman of the Slovak pairt of the "Ozechoslo1Vla2k" division of Radio Free Europe in Munich. We can imrugine jusit how the Slovaks at home felt albout this promotion, which rwas engineered ~ Lettrich. As far as I aim concerned, it iwas at this point that Lettrich discarded the last prindple of de,c ency when he appointed Dr. Mu.dry as the head of the resistance broadcast, the very same M!udry who 'boasted in Chica;go how he arrested Stasko and, get this,, .r efused to free him even on the intervenition of Karol. 1Sidor in 11938, lbut ilnstead ,s urrendered him to the c~ech !State .representatirve in Bratislava. As I had asked my friends before, I ask aJgain - the friends who still stand by Lettrfoh: What was more corred, to quit Lettrich and continue to keep silent? Was there not ,a l.ready too much silence since HH8 to the present time? How could any honest Slo;vailr !keep silent .a f:ter Lettrich's open letter to Coingressman Charles, J. Kersten in whkh he denied ,b oth the existence and the right of the Slovrukis to determine their OM7Il destiny and future? And after his i.atest iversion of the Slovak uprising of 1944 in the NEW Y10RK TI!MElS (August 29, 1954), wherein he still promotes the Jegend faJbricated by his group amd the CommU!Ilists? It is not anger or jealousy that has 1prompted me to write as I hwve. I have 1been ,p rompted. to do so, !because I sincerely feel that it is a duty I awe to my people to shed oome light on the road L-eittrich is traiveling. Principles, it seems, do not coI11Cern Letitrich eiven today when there is so much taJ:k -rubout uniting the ISlova;ks in exile. Ho,w could any honest SlorvaJk, imbued with Christian and democratic principles, unite in any undertaiking with a man like Lettri~h? � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 30 SLOVAKIA DR. LETTRICH'S PRINCIPLES Dr. Michael Zibrin Jin the beginning cxf January 1948, when the presidium of the ISlOJVaJk Democratfo ,Party met in session at Bratislav:a, Dr. Joseph iLettrich recei,ved an ordinary card frOIIll an aoquatlntance, iDr. Michael Mudry--Selbilk. The latter · bluntly infomned Lettrich -that he was now in ISwitizerland and did not intend to return to Slovak~1a, It was ju.st a short time prior to th:at date, at the end of •Decemlber, 1947, that Ferjenic£k's pdlice ,c alled Miu.dry in twice for a hearing on account of an alleged meeting of Lettrich with Dr. Peter P. Hfotko during Lettrich's visit in Chicago, in 1946, where he had oome escorted by .a Comnnmist, one Rudolph Martanoivic. Miudvy, saying nothing to any one, sold his furniture and made his exit stealthily, escapmg to Switzerland, whence he sent Lettrich the card referred to aJbove. Lettri'ch .·Jbecame excited, criticized Mud.Ty, and said that the Democratic !Party had erred seriously when it toot him in. As f.a,r M Lettrich, was concerned, he was through forever with Mudry, because he did not have to run off as long -as Lettrich and Ferjentellk rprotected him. Of course, Lettrich evidently did not ik.now th.at some two and a ha1f months later he himself would be an escapee and the services of Michael Mu.dry would again lbe welcome and valuaJble. And it so haJppened that Lettrich landed in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of ·1J9148, and ,b egan . to woI'lk togetlier again with his old pal Michael M'lidry. As soon as the so-.called "Council of Free 0.zechoslowkia" was orgarnzed lby Zenkl, Ripka :and other Czech socialists Miudry joined up. Later Lettrich was instrumental in getting iMJudry ,a job !With Radio Free Euro:pe where, together with two Ozech Marxists, Peroutka alild Tigrid, he formed the leading Ozech~lovak trio as an "encouragement" to those deputies Olf the Demooratic Party, who sat in Gottwald's prisons and whom, at the begin.ning cxf October 1938, Benes's police oommissioner, Dr. Michael Mu.dry, so energetically jailed. This jaiJer of Dr. Joseph Stas- SLOVAKIA 31 ko, who is suffering in LeapoldQIV for his Christian and democratic conivicl.ions, was then 1gi,ven a new distinction by Lettric:h. A London report stated that there were three persons fighting for the leading position. of the 'Slova!k section of the "Ozechoslova.Jk" cliMision of Radio Free Europe. One was the well-&nOIWn distr.ilbu:ter of lands, •t he creator of the ,kolchoses and loy.al commissar of Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Martin Kivetlko; the other, a ser.viant of Lettrich, Dr. John Paulmy.fl'oth; and the third, the clever policeman, Dr. Michael Mu.dry. Radio Free Eu.rope wanted the "Council of Free Ozechoslovrukia" decide the issue; the Council in turn told Lettrich to mruke the choiice. And Lettrich did. Forgetting what he had said and thought a/bout Mudry in January, 1948, :he appointed his old friend and, Benes'a policeman headman Of (uondoo.'s Radio Free Europe. We can well imagine how the ISloviaiks at home felt about this. They were Slhooked iby R:adio Free Europe's action amd left their kinsman in exile know just hoiw they felt rubout it. Protests were shocked by Radio Free Europe's action and let their conspiracy, pardon, a policy od' its oiwn to follow. Lettrich knoiws albout the facts referred to above as well as I do. And yet Michael Miudry, who thereto never had been in London, was ,p referred to Dr. John Bauliny, who had spent eight yeaxs in London and had notaJble connections in English diplomaitic ciroles. Bau.Hny .w as smeared by both the Czech 'Socialists and non-Socialists. They !knew that he had visited (PridaJvak, the "separatist," and had written letters to K!8-rol Sidoir, chairman of the !Slovaik National Council Aibroad and chief "sepairatist," so they plied their smearing trade witll gusto. -Dr. Jan •Pauliny...T6th, the diplomat, who succeeded Mar.tin Razus as chairman of the SlO!Valk Nationa:l Party amd was ibetter known a,t home than Mudry, simply did not rate with Lettrich. · This is lesson rfor Pauliny. Not only for !Pa,uliny .hurt for all Slov.aJks, and R:adio. Free Europe, as well. It would be most fortunaJte IlJOt only for the SlQ)\naJcs, lbut for R•F E itself, if the latter would .aict realistically and put an end to its systematic a!llti~Sl-01Vruk policy. For Pauliny and for a 32 SLOVAKIA every 1Slova'k irt rwould be well, if they would speedily become aiware of the faot that they probably coUJld e~h the:mse1ves lby join.mg the Lettrichrites rand Zeruklites, but onl,y at the ~ of their own nation's interests and for the benefit cxf Czech imperialism. We Slavalks, however, are aware that the association is quite complete: Blaho, aJppointed head of State secw-ity, shall issue a list of the "umeliaJble"; Ferjencik will arrest them - 1some will lose their teeth , others will hwve their arms and ri:bs broken, as they did have prior to 1948; those who .still resist shall face the firing sq,uad of lettrich's consul ,g eneral, Gejza Krno. We certainly have somethtng to live for! The sooner every S1ovak lbecOIIlles aware of this, the better. Then every one will know just where to stand, and the Zenklites will no longer find renegades to serve them for Juda.s's pay. The 1Slova!ks who remain with them are outcasts 'Of the Slov8Jk nation. As many times as :I reproached Dr. Lettrich in exile, I neiver said anything !before the execution of Dr. Tiso, that is, !b efore April 18, 1947, when it was quite olbvious to all of us just iwha.t Benes thought ~bout the SlovaJks and that all his promises were plain humbug. Then, when deputies Kempny, Bugar and Stasko were surrendered to stand trial, lli. 1L e.ttrich did nothing to save -t hem. Shortly after thaJt, on Janiuary 27, 1948, John Ursiny, Lettrich's protector, fell. After these events, iwhen Lettrich still sang praises about our freedOIIll and democracy - saying that "our relationship to, the USSR, !based on the treaty of December 12, 1943, is unalter.alble in the poHtioal life of the future. . . " - I was conrvinced thaJt he could not forget the so-called "Christmas Agreement" of 1943, when his group voluntarily surrendered power over the SlovMcs to the Communists, even though the Communists at that time did not represent even 10 peir cent of the electorate! Returning from Prague, Febnmry 25, 1948, sev~al how-s after Gottwald -t ook over the government, Lettrich wanted to distribute functions on the train. Arriving in Bratislaiva, Lettrich called a secret session rwi-thout inV'it1 SLOVAKIA 33 ing me; It was at this session that he swrrendered the Democratic Party to Milan Polak, LU!kalcovic rund Sevcik and Lettrich knew that Se:vlcilk was a member of the NKVD. When thls happened, there was no doubt in my mind that Lettrich was maJking great mistakes and was not a man of principle. Therefore, let all my critics a;c,know:ledge that I :had reasons, for parting with Lettrich pohtioolly ruid that I had to quit rum, since I did not want to get into serious conflict with my conscience. After that I met iwith :Or. Le:ttrich once more; that was in November, 1951, alfter the crisis in the "Council of Free Ozechoslorvakia," when I received a report that Lettrich had called Zenkl a H•a r and had come to Chicago to explain his conduct. Before meelting with 'him, I was informed that Lettrich vi,s ited .A!b!bot OndraJk at Lisle, lill., that same day and even told him that Zenkl was a political liar and descrilbed his com'Panions similarly. He asked the .A!bibot for help against the dictate orf these political swindlers. The Ozech Oatholic NAROD wrote aJbout that visit.. Lettri~h aipparooitly was through with Zenkl. And yet he waJs not. After the albove episode, Lettrich made up with the ZenJdites He even accompanied Zen!kl on a visit to Chic.ago sho:rtly after that and with him even dared to visit the very same Albbot Ondrruk before ,w hom he had excoriated Zenkl. Now then, is Lettricli a man o!f princi,ple? God only knows why he still continues to sit in the "Council of Free Ozechoslo:vrulcia" and is ready to do practically anything for Zerukl as long as he is paid for it. Oould it possilbly be the $400.00 monthly, as he himself once ac~ knowl€dged? Furthermore, quite a stir was created when Lettrich att€mpted to• get Fedora Piaul01Va (nee KR!NO), a Communist, into the USA, through his beloved friend, the "shooting consul gene~rul," Geijiza Krno. eiven providing the necessary documents. This he did, even thoug,h a year ear• lier in his OfWil paipeT, the CAS, he excoriated Fedora and one Zora JesenSlky for their lectures in the communist organizations orf S1'oiv;ruk women Weill, how could I be !blamed 34 SLOVAKIA for thinlki.Ing that Lettrich was in the train of Marxists, who are willing to become reconciled even with the devil himse1f a!t the exipense .of .the security of the UISA, just so they might earn $400.00 a mont:h from the government of the USA and the American taxpayers. In the meantime, when iRFE was reorganl:zed, Dr. Mu.dry was ma-de the headman of the Slovak pairt of the "Ozechoslo1Vla2k" division of Radio Free Europe in Munich. We can imrugine jusit how the Slovaks at home felt albout this promotion, which rwas engineered ~ Lettrich. As far as I aim concerned, it iwas at this point that Lettrich discarded the last prindple of de,c ency when he appointed Dr. Mu.dry as the head of the resistance broadcast, the very same M!udry who 'boasted in Chica;go how he arrested Stasko and, get this,, .r efused to free him even on the intervenition of Karol. 1Sidor in 11938, lbut ilnstead ,s urrendered him to the c~ech !State .representatirve in Bratislava. As I had asked my friends before, I ask aJgain - the friends who still stand by Lettrfoh: What was more corred, to quit Lettrich and continue to keep silent? Was there not ,a l.ready too much silence since HH8 to the present time? How could any honest Slo;vailr !keep silent .a f:ter Lettrich's open letter to Coingressman Charles, J. Kersten in whkh he denied ,b oth the existence and the right of the Slovrukis to determine their OM7Il destiny and future? And after his i.atest iversion of the Slovak uprising of 1944 in the NEW Y10RK TI!MElS (August 29, 1954), wherein he still promotes the Jegend faJbricated by his group amd the CommU!Ilists? It is not anger or jealousy that has 1prompted me to write as I hwve. I have 1been ,p rompted. to do so, !because I sincerely feel that it is a duty I awe to my people to shed oome light on the road L-eittrich is traiveling. Principles, it seems, do not coI11Cern Letitrich eiven today when there is so much taJ:k -rubout uniting the ISlova;ks in exile. Ho,w could any honest SlorvaJk, imbued with Christian and democratic principles, unite in any undertaiking with a man like Lettri~h?  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Lettrich's Principles Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 30-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e09c413c8ec993b1f87997223d7f3734.pdf af7d988263d437dd4ebed5d111b657bd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 57 IN HIS 70TH YEAR Dr. Peter P. Hletko Most Elite of American Slovaks By Joseph C. Krajsa In the course of the history of a people or a nation come individual men, who by the force of their personalities and their endeavors shape and determine the form and direction of the church, their people, their nation and their country. These are men who are dreamers and some who are doers. But the great ones are those who are both--dreamers and doers. They are the one who set alight their hope and hearts upon the heights they seek to scale. They are the ones who light bright fires of their aspirations and give heart and direction to those who follow . Dr. Peter P. Hletko, in his 70th year, is such a man! Peter Paul Hletko, M. D., physician-surgeon, now semiretired, was born June 26, 1902 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Martin and Catherine Hargas Hletko. His home is in Warrenville, Illinois and his office is at 2740 W. 55th Street, Chicago. In 1938 he married Anna E. Remijas. EDUCATION Hletko received his elementary education at Saint Michael's School (1908-1915), Chicago. He attended St. Procopius Academy (1915-1919), Lisle, Illinois, and St. Procopius College (1919-1921 ) . He attended De Paul University in Chicago from 1921 to 1923 and received his Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. In 1927 he received his Medical Degree (M. D.) from Loyola University, Chicago. PROFESSIONAL Dr. Hletko served on the resident staff of Cook County Hospital, Chicago from 1927 to 1928. Besides his private practice, he was an instructor in clinical neurology a t Loyola University Medical School from 1931 to 1935. �58 SLOVAK.IA He served as medical examiner of many insurance companies. From 1934 to 1939 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner for the National Slovak Society and he serves in this capacity today. From 1927 to 1964 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and today is Honorary Medical Examiner for the Society. Dr. Hletko is a member of the American Medical Association; Illinois Medical Association; Chicago Medical Association; and Medical Examiner of Municipal Court and Law Department Benefit and Pension Fund, Chicago, ( 19361961). CIVIC AND CULTURAL In 1938 Dr. Hletko led a Slovak League of America delegation to Czecho-Slovakia in behalf of gaining recognition of the Pittsburgh Pact. Over 100,000 Slovaks gathered in Bratislava, the capitol of Slovakia, as he and Msgr. Andrew Hlinka unveiled the original of the Pittsburgh Pact-an agreement that was to guarantee autonomy for the Slovak nation. The vast crowd roared: "Hlinka, Hletko daju vsetko" ( Hlinka and Hletko will give everything!). The rest of his services for the Slovak people in a span of more than four decades reads like a special "Who's Who": President of the Slovak League of America (1935-1939) and ( 1963-64); Honorary President and Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America ( 1938-); Vice President of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America ( 1934) ; Supreme Officer of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and the National Slovak Society; a Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak Catholic Sokol; organizer and first President of 'Club Furdek' - ( a Catholic Slovak Cultural Society, Chicago, 1929); and President of the Gage Park Savings and Loan Association, Chicago, since 1935. AUTHOR-JOURN ALIST Today, Dr. Hletko has a vast collection of manuscripts, documentary material, books, complete volumes of publications, newspapers, and annuals. To many of these he was a contributor, a columnist, editor, or author. The �SLOVAKIA 59 Dr. Peter P. Hletko ( second from the right ) with Ms~:ir- A·ndrew Hlinka (at Hletko's right ) , leader oif the S l ovak Popu li st Party , and Karol SidOf' (right), former Premier of Slovakia, at the 1938 event in Bratislava when the delegati'on of the Slova~ League of .America c-ame to Slovakia with the origi-nal of the Pittsburgh Pac:t. following is a list of Dr. Hletko's literary efforts: Author: "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact" (1934 ) ; wrote "Iskry"-a reprint of satiro-comic column in the Osadne Hlasy ( Slovak Parish News, 1931); edited the "Slovak Catholic Sokol Cook Book", 1964; was a contributing editor of Osadne Hlasy (Chicago Parish News, 1927-1963 ); editor of "Jaro" (Spring), English supplement to JEDNOTA. official publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1927-1936; eclitor of "Chicagsky Dennik" (Chicago Slovak Daily News, 1926-1927 ); presently serves as the Chairman of the Literary Committee of the National Slovak Society; and is President of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association in America. In honor of his 70th birthday, the Slovak League of America labeled 1972 "Dr. Peter Hletko Year" and designated a special award to him at the Slovak League of America Congress in Chicago in the spring of this year. REFERENCES Slovakia 1965, Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. " Slovaci a ich zivot", Jedtnota, 3/ 17/ 1971, p. 11, by Dr. Joseph Pauco. � SLOVAKIA 57 IN HIS 70TH YEAR Dr. Peter P. Hletko Most Elite of American Slovaks By Joseph C. Krajsa In the course of the history of a people or a nation come individual men, who by the force of their personalities and their endeavors shape and determine the form and direction of the church, their people, their nation and their country. These are men who are dreamers and some who are doers. But the great ones are those who are both--dreamers and doers. They are the one who set alight their hope and hearts upon the heights they seek to scale. They are the ones who light bright fires of their aspirations and give heart and direction to those who follow . Dr. Peter P. Hletko, in his 70th year, is such a man! Peter Paul Hletko, M. D., physician-surgeon, now semiretired, was born June 26, 1902 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Martin and Catherine Hargas Hletko. His home is in Warrenville, Illinois and his office is at 2740 W. 55th Street, Chicago. In 1938 he married Anna E. Remijas. EDUCATION Hletko received his elementary education at Saint Michael's School (1908-1915), Chicago. He attended St. Procopius Academy (1915-1919), Lisle, Illinois, and St. Procopius College (1919-1921 ) . He attended De Paul University in Chicago from 1921 to 1923 and received his Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. In 1927 he received his Medical Degree (M. D.) from Loyola University, Chicago. PROFESSIONAL Dr. Hletko served on the resident staff of Cook County Hospital, Chicago from 1927 to 1928. Besides his private practice, he was an instructor in clinical neurology a t Loyola University Medical School from 1931 to 1935. �58 SLOVAK.IA He served as medical examiner of many insurance companies. From 1934 to 1939 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner for the National Slovak Society and he serves in this capacity today. From 1927 to 1964 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and today is Honorary Medical Examiner for the Society. Dr. Hletko is a member of the American Medical Association; Illinois Medical Association; Chicago Medical Association; and Medical Examiner of Municipal Court and Law Department Benefit and Pension Fund, Chicago, ( 19361961). CIVIC AND CULTURAL In 1938 Dr. Hletko led a Slovak League of America delegation to Czecho-Slovakia in behalf of gaining recognition of the Pittsburgh Pact. Over 100,000 Slovaks gathered in Bratislava, the capitol of Slovakia, as he and Msgr. Andrew Hlinka unveiled the original of the Pittsburgh Pact-an agreement that was to guarantee autonomy for the Slovak nation. The vast crowd roared: "Hlinka, Hletko daju vsetko" ( Hlinka and Hletko will give everything!). The rest of his services for the Slovak people in a span of more than four decades reads like a special "Who's Who": President of the Slovak League of America (1935-1939) and ( 1963-64); Honorary President and Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America ( 1938-); Vice President of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America ( 1934) ; Supreme Officer of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and the National Slovak Society; a Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak Catholic Sokol; organizer and first President of 'Club Furdek' - ( a Catholic Slovak Cultural Society, Chicago, 1929); and President of the Gage Park Savings and Loan Association, Chicago, since 1935. AUTHOR-JOURN ALIST Today, Dr. Hletko has a vast collection of manuscripts, documentary material, books, complete volumes of publications, newspapers, and annuals. To many of these he was a contributor, a columnist, editor, or author. The �SLOVAKIA 59 Dr. Peter P. Hletko ( second from the right ) with Ms~:ir- A·ndrew Hlinka (at Hletko's right ) , leader oif the S l ovak Popu li st Party , and Karol SidOf' (right), former Premier of Slovakia, at the 1938 event in Bratislava when the delegati'on of the Slova~ League of .America c-ame to Slovakia with the origi-nal of the Pittsburgh Pac:t. following is a list of Dr. Hletko's literary efforts: Author: "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact" (1934 ) ; wrote "Iskry"-a reprint of satiro-comic column in the Osadne Hlasy ( Slovak Parish News, 1931); edited the "Slovak Catholic Sokol Cook Book", 1964; was a contributing editor of Osadne Hlasy (Chicago Parish News, 1927-1963 ); editor of "Jaro" (Spring), English supplement to JEDNOTA. official publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1927-1936; eclitor of "Chicagsky Dennik" (Chicago Slovak Daily News, 1926-1927 ); presently serves as the Chairman of the Literary Committee of the National Slovak Society; and is President of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association in America. In honor of his 70th birthday, the Slovak League of America labeled 1972 "Dr. Peter Hletko Year" and designated a special award to him at the Slovak League of America Congress in Chicago in the spring of this year. REFERENCES Slovakia 1965, Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. " Slovaci a ich zivot", Jedtnota, 3/ 17/ 1971, p. 11, by Dr. Joseph Pauco. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 57 IN HIS 70TH YEAR Dr. Peter P. Hletko Most Elite of American Slovaks By Joseph C. Krajsa In the course of the history of a people or a nation come individual men, who by the force of their personalities and their endeavors shape and determine the form and direction of the church, their people, their nation and their country. These are men who are dreamers and some who are doers. But the great ones are those who are both--dreamers and doers. They are the one who set alight their hope and hearts upon the heights they seek to scale. They are the ones who light bright fires of their aspirations and give heart and direction to those who follow . Dr. Peter P. Hletko, in his 70th year, is such a man! Peter Paul Hletko, M. D., physician-surgeon, now semiretired, was born June 26, 1902 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Martin and Catherine Hargas Hletko. His home is in Warrenville, Illinois and his office is at 2740 W. 55th Street, Chicago. In 1938 he married Anna E. Remijas. EDUCATION Hletko received his elementary education at Saint Michael's School (1908-1915), Chicago. He attended St. Procopius Academy (1915-1919), Lisle, Illinois, and St. Procopius College (1919-1921 ) . He attended De Paul University in Chicago from 1921 to 1923 and received his Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. In 1927 he received his Medical Degree (M. D.) from Loyola University, Chicago. PROFESSIONAL Dr. Hletko served on the resident staff of Cook County Hospital, Chicago from 1927 to 1928. Besides his private practice, he was an instructor in clinical neurology a t Loyola University Medical School from 1931 to 1935. 58 SLOVAK.IA He served as medical examiner of many insurance companies. From 1934 to 1939 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner for the National Slovak Society and he serves in this capacity today. From 1927 to 1964 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and today is Honorary Medical Examiner for the Society. Dr. Hletko is a member of the American Medical Association; Illinois Medical Association; Chicago Medical Association; and Medical Examiner of Municipal Court and Law Department Benefit and Pension Fund, Chicago, ( 19361961). CIVIC AND CULTURAL In 1938 Dr. Hletko led a Slovak League of America delegation to Czecho-Slovakia in behalf of gaining recognition of the Pittsburgh Pact. Over 100,000 Slovaks gathered in Bratislava, the capitol of Slovakia, as he and Msgr. Andrew Hlinka unveiled the original of the Pittsburgh Pact-an agreement that was to guarantee autonomy for the Slovak nation. The vast crowd roared: "Hlinka, Hletko daju vsetko" ( Hlinka and Hletko will give everything!). The rest of his services for the Slovak people in a span of more than four decades reads like a special "Who's Who": President of the Slovak League of America (1935-1939) and ( 1963-64); Honorary President and Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America ( 1938-); Vice President of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America ( 1934) ; Supreme Officer of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and the National Slovak Society; a Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak Catholic Sokol; organizer and first President of 'Club Furdek' - ( a Catholic Slovak Cultural Society, Chicago, 1929); and President of the Gage Park Savings and Loan Association, Chicago, since 1935. AUTHOR-JOURN ALIST Today, Dr. Hletko has a vast collection of manuscripts, documentary material, books, complete volumes of publications, newspapers, and annuals. To many of these he was a contributor, a columnist, editor, or author. The SLOVAKIA 59 Dr. Peter P. Hletko ( second from the right ) with Ms~:ir- A·ndrew Hlinka (at Hletko's right ) , leader oif the S l ovak Popu li st Party , and Karol SidOf' (right), former Premier of Slovakia, at the 1938 event in Bratislava when the delegati'on of the Slova~ League of .America c-ame to Slovakia with the origi-nal of the Pittsburgh Pac:t. following is a list of Dr. Hletko's literary efforts: Author: "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact" (1934 ) ; wrote "Iskry"-a reprint of satiro-comic column in the Osadne Hlasy ( Slovak Parish News, 1931); edited the "Slovak Catholic Sokol Cook Book", 1964; was a contributing editor of Osadne Hlasy (Chicago Parish News, 1927-1963 ); editor of "Jaro" (Spring), English supplement to JEDNOTA. official publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1927-1936; eclitor of "Chicagsky Dennik" (Chicago Slovak Daily News, 1926-1927 ); presently serves as the Chairman of the Literary Committee of the National Slovak Society; and is President of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association in America. In honor of his 70th birthday, the Slovak League of America labeled 1972 "Dr. Peter Hletko Year" and designated a special award to him at the Slovak League of America Congress in Chicago in the spring of this year. REFERENCES Slovakia 1965, Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. " Slovaci a ich zivot", Jedtnota, 3/ 17/ 1971, p. 11, by Dr. Joseph Pauco.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Peter P. Hletko Most Elite of American Slovaks Description An account of the resource Joseph C. Krajsa Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 57-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Krajsa, Joseph C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/05830a9f7b1891136ed86a28d6d1e32e.pdf b647e20e2ea1ed7c42b8774a34b61939 PDF Text Text 54 SLOVAKIA DR. PETER P. HLETKO American Slovaks Lost a Great Man With the passing of Dr. Peter P. Hletko on November 4, 1973 in the City of Chicago, the American Slovaks and all freedom loving Slovaks in the world lost one of their most illustrious sons. Exceptionally talented and devoted, he contributed his efforts in helping his beloved Slovak people here and behind the Iron Curtain. Deserving tribute was paid to him by the hierarchy, clergy, civic and business leaders, the Slovak World Congress, the Slovak League of America, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America and all the Slovak fraternal societies that he served so well in various capacities. OUTSTANDING CAREER In the course of the history of a people or a nation come individual man, who by the force of their personalities and their endeavors shape and determine the form and direction of the church, their people and their country. These men who are dreamers and who are doers . But the great ones are those who are both-dreamers and doers. They are the ones who set alight their hope and hearts upon the heights they seek to scale. They are the ones who light bright fires of their aspirations and give heart and direction to those who follow. Dr. Peter P. Hletko was such a man! Peter Paul Hletko, M. D., physician-surgeon, was born June 26, 1902 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Martin and Catherine Hargas Hletko. His home was in Warrenville, Illinois and his office was at 2740 W. 55th Street, Chicago. In 1938 he married Anne E. Remijas. EDUCATION Hletko received his elementary education at St. Michael's School (1908-1915), Chicago. He attended St. Procopius �SLOVAKIA 55 Academy (1915-1919), Lisle, Illinois, and St. Procopius College (1919-1921). He attended De Paul University in Chicago from 1921 to 1923 and received his Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. In 1927 he received his Medical Degree (M.D.) from Loyola University, Chicago. PROFESSIONAL Dr. Hletko served on the resident staff of Cook County Hospital, Chicago, from 1927 to 1928. Besides his private practice, he was an instructor in clinical neurology at Loyola University Medical School from 1931 to 1935. He served as medical examiner of many insurance companies. From 1934 to 1939 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner for the National Slovak Society. From 1927 to 1964 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and was Honorary Medical Examiner for the Society. Dr. Hletko was a member of the American Medical Association; Illinois Medical Association; Chicago Medical Association; and Medical Examiner of Municipal Court and Law Department Benefit and Pension Fund, Chicago, ( 19361961) . CIVIC AND CULTURAL In 1938 Dr. Hletko led a Slovak League of America delegation to Czecho-Slovakia in behalf of gaining recognition of the Pittsburgh Pact. Over 100,000 Slovaks gathered in Bratislava, the capitol of Slovakia as he and Msgr. Andrew Hlinka unveiled the original of the Pittsburgh Pact - an agreement that was to guarantee autonomy for the Slovak nation. The vast crowd roared: "Hlinka, Hletko daju vsetko" (Hlinka and Hletko will give everything!). The rest of his services for the Slovak people in a span of more than four decades reads like a special "Who's Who": President of the Slovak League of America (1935-1939 and 1962-64); Honorary President and Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America (1938-1973); Vice President of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America (1934); Supreme Officer of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and the National Slovak Society; a Member of the Executive �SLOVAKIA 56 Committee of the Slovak Catholic Sokol; organizer and first President of "Club Furdek"-(a Catholic Cultural Society, Chicago, 1929); and President of the Gage Park Savings and Loan Association, Chicago. AUTHOR-JOURN ALIST Dr. Hletko had a vast collection of manuscripts, documentary materials, books, complete volumes of publications, newspapers, and annuals. He made a contribution of his materials to the Jednota Museum in Middletown, Pa. To many of the publications he was a contributor, a columnist, editor, or author. The following is a list of Dr. Hletko's literary efforts: Author: The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (1934); wrote Iskry-a reprint of satirocomic column in the Osadne Hlasy (Slovak Parish News, 1931); edited the Slovak Catholic Sokol Cook Book, 1964; was a contributing editor of Osadne Hlasy (Chicago Parish News, 19271963); editor of Jara (Spring), English supplement to Jednota, official publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1927-1936; editor of Chicagsky Dennik (Chicago Daily News, 1926-1927); served as the Chairman of the Literary Committee of the National Slovak Society, and was President of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association in America. In honor of his 70th birthday the Slovak League of America labeled 1972 "Dr. Peter Hletko Year" and designated a special award to him at the Slovak League of America Congress in Chicago. Joseph C. Kr a j s a REFERENCES Slovakia 1965-Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. Slovakia 1972-Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. "Slovaci a ich zivot," Jednota, March 17, 1971, p. 11, by Dr. Joseph Pauco. � 54 SLOVAKIA DR. PETER P. HLETKO American Slovaks Lost a Great Man With the passing of Dr. Peter P. Hletko on November 4, 1973 in the City of Chicago, the American Slovaks and all freedom loving Slovaks in the world lost one of their most illustrious sons. Exceptionally talented and devoted, he contributed his efforts in helping his beloved Slovak people here and behind the Iron Curtain. Deserving tribute was paid to him by the hierarchy, clergy, civic and business leaders, the Slovak World Congress, the Slovak League of America, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America and all the Slovak fraternal societies that he served so well in various capacities. OUTSTANDING CAREER In the course of the history of a people or a nation come individual man, who by the force of their personalities and their endeavors shape and determine the form and direction of the church, their people and their country. These men who are dreamers and who are doers . But the great ones are those who are both-dreamers and doers. They are the ones who set alight their hope and hearts upon the heights they seek to scale. They are the ones who light bright fires of their aspirations and give heart and direction to those who follow. Dr. Peter P. Hletko was such a man! Peter Paul Hletko, M. D., physician-surgeon, was born June 26, 1902 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Martin and Catherine Hargas Hletko. His home was in Warrenville, Illinois and his office was at 2740 W. 55th Street, Chicago. In 1938 he married Anne E. Remijas. EDUCATION Hletko received his elementary education at St. Michael's School (1908-1915), Chicago. He attended St. Procopius �SLOVAKIA 55 Academy (1915-1919), Lisle, Illinois, and St. Procopius College (1919-1921). He attended De Paul University in Chicago from 1921 to 1923 and received his Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. In 1927 he received his Medical Degree (M.D.) from Loyola University, Chicago. PROFESSIONAL Dr. Hletko served on the resident staff of Cook County Hospital, Chicago, from 1927 to 1928. Besides his private practice, he was an instructor in clinical neurology at Loyola University Medical School from 1931 to 1935. He served as medical examiner of many insurance companies. From 1934 to 1939 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner for the National Slovak Society. From 1927 to 1964 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and was Honorary Medical Examiner for the Society. Dr. Hletko was a member of the American Medical Association; Illinois Medical Association; Chicago Medical Association; and Medical Examiner of Municipal Court and Law Department Benefit and Pension Fund, Chicago, ( 19361961) . CIVIC AND CULTURAL In 1938 Dr. Hletko led a Slovak League of America delegation to Czecho-Slovakia in behalf of gaining recognition of the Pittsburgh Pact. Over 100,000 Slovaks gathered in Bratislava, the capitol of Slovakia as he and Msgr. Andrew Hlinka unveiled the original of the Pittsburgh Pact - an agreement that was to guarantee autonomy for the Slovak nation. The vast crowd roared: "Hlinka, Hletko daju vsetko" (Hlinka and Hletko will give everything!). The rest of his services for the Slovak people in a span of more than four decades reads like a special "Who's Who": President of the Slovak League of America (1935-1939 and 1962-64); Honorary President and Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America (1938-1973); Vice President of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America (1934); Supreme Officer of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and the National Slovak Society; a Member of the Executive �SLOVAKIA 56 Committee of the Slovak Catholic Sokol; organizer and first President of "Club Furdek"-(a Catholic Cultural Society, Chicago, 1929); and President of the Gage Park Savings and Loan Association, Chicago. AUTHOR-JOURN ALIST Dr. Hletko had a vast collection of manuscripts, documentary materials, books, complete volumes of publications, newspapers, and annuals. He made a contribution of his materials to the Jednota Museum in Middletown, Pa. To many of the publications he was a contributor, a columnist, editor, or author. The following is a list of Dr. Hletko's literary efforts: Author: The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (1934); wrote Iskry-a reprint of satirocomic column in the Osadne Hlasy (Slovak Parish News, 1931); edited the Slovak Catholic Sokol Cook Book, 1964; was a contributing editor of Osadne Hlasy (Chicago Parish News, 19271963); editor of Jara (Spring), English supplement to Jednota, official publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1927-1936; editor of Chicagsky Dennik (Chicago Daily News, 1926-1927); served as the Chairman of the Literary Committee of the National Slovak Society, and was President of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association in America. In honor of his 70th birthday the Slovak League of America labeled 1972 "Dr. Peter Hletko Year" and designated a special award to him at the Slovak League of America Congress in Chicago. Joseph C. Kr a j s a REFERENCES Slovakia 1965-Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. Slovakia 1972-Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. "Slovaci a ich zivot," Jednota, March 17, 1971, p. 11, by Dr. Joseph Pauco. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 54 SLOVAKIA DR. PETER P. HLETKO American Slovaks Lost a Great Man With the passing of Dr. Peter P. Hletko on November 4, 1973 in the City of Chicago, the American Slovaks and all freedom loving Slovaks in the world lost one of their most illustrious sons. Exceptionally talented and devoted, he contributed his efforts in helping his beloved Slovak people here and behind the Iron Curtain. Deserving tribute was paid to him by the hierarchy, clergy, civic and business leaders, the Slovak World Congress, the Slovak League of America, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America and all the Slovak fraternal societies that he served so well in various capacities. OUTSTANDING CAREER In the course of the history of a people or a nation come individual man, who by the force of their personalities and their endeavors shape and determine the form and direction of the church, their people and their country. These men who are dreamers and who are doers . But the great ones are those who are both-dreamers and doers. They are the ones who set alight their hope and hearts upon the heights they seek to scale. They are the ones who light bright fires of their aspirations and give heart and direction to those who follow. Dr. Peter P. Hletko was such a man! Peter Paul Hletko, M. D., physician-surgeon, was born June 26, 1902 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Martin and Catherine Hargas Hletko. His home was in Warrenville, Illinois and his office was at 2740 W. 55th Street, Chicago. In 1938 he married Anne E. Remijas. EDUCATION Hletko received his elementary education at St. Michael's School (1908-1915), Chicago. He attended St. Procopius SLOVAKIA 55 Academy (1915-1919), Lisle, Illinois, and St. Procopius College (1919-1921). He attended De Paul University in Chicago from 1921 to 1923 and received his Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. In 1927 he received his Medical Degree (M.D.) from Loyola University, Chicago. PROFESSIONAL Dr. Hletko served on the resident staff of Cook County Hospital, Chicago, from 1927 to 1928. Besides his private practice, he was an instructor in clinical neurology at Loyola University Medical School from 1931 to 1935. He served as medical examiner of many insurance companies. From 1934 to 1939 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner for the National Slovak Society. From 1927 to 1964 he served as Supreme Medical Examiner of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and was Honorary Medical Examiner for the Society. Dr. Hletko was a member of the American Medical Association; Illinois Medical Association; Chicago Medical Association; and Medical Examiner of Municipal Court and Law Department Benefit and Pension Fund, Chicago, ( 19361961) . CIVIC AND CULTURAL In 1938 Dr. Hletko led a Slovak League of America delegation to Czecho-Slovakia in behalf of gaining recognition of the Pittsburgh Pact. Over 100,000 Slovaks gathered in Bratislava, the capitol of Slovakia as he and Msgr. Andrew Hlinka unveiled the original of the Pittsburgh Pact - an agreement that was to guarantee autonomy for the Slovak nation. The vast crowd roared: "Hlinka, Hletko daju vsetko" (Hlinka and Hletko will give everything!). The rest of his services for the Slovak people in a span of more than four decades reads like a special "Who's Who": President of the Slovak League of America (1935-1939 and 1962-64); Honorary President and Member of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America (1938-1973); Vice President of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America (1934); Supreme Officer of the Slovak Catholic Sokol and the National Slovak Society; a Member of the Executive SLOVAKIA 56 Committee of the Slovak Catholic Sokol; organizer and first President of "Club Furdek"-(a Catholic Cultural Society, Chicago, 1929); and President of the Gage Park Savings and Loan Association, Chicago. AUTHOR-JOURN ALIST Dr. Hletko had a vast collection of manuscripts, documentary materials, books, complete volumes of publications, newspapers, and annuals. He made a contribution of his materials to the Jednota Museum in Middletown, Pa. To many of the publications he was a contributor, a columnist, editor, or author. The following is a list of Dr. Hletko's literary efforts: Author: The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (1934); wrote Iskry-a reprint of satirocomic column in the Osadne Hlasy (Slovak Parish News, 1931); edited the Slovak Catholic Sokol Cook Book, 1964; was a contributing editor of Osadne Hlasy (Chicago Parish News, 19271963); editor of Jara (Spring), English supplement to Jednota, official publication of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1927-1936; editor of Chicagsky Dennik (Chicago Daily News, 1926-1927); served as the Chairman of the Literary Committee of the National Slovak Society, and was President of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association in America. In honor of his 70th birthday the Slovak League of America labeled 1972 "Dr. Peter Hletko Year" and designated a special award to him at the Slovak League of America Congress in Chicago. Joseph C. Kr a j s a REFERENCES Slovakia 1965-Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. Slovakia 1972-Published by the Slovak League of America, Middletown, Pennsylvania. "Slovaci a ich zivot," Jednota, March 17, 1971, p. 11, by Dr. Joseph Pauco.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Peter P. Hletko: American Slovaks Lost a Great Man Description An account of the resource Joseph C. Krajsa Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 54-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Krajsa, Joseph C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fe0355c840d12e4ad582c385f3c8f471.pdf 7ea5d1e0e8149451a3c37eaf429c9a58 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 55 DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS The name of Dr. Stephen Osusky, mentioned from time to time in the American press, has a)gam aippeared jll!st recently. Educated in Ameri'oo, Dr. OsUSlky went on a mission foT the Slovak Loogue of America aft~ WoI'ld War I , after Czeoho-lSlOVlaJkia was born, burt did not return to report to the Leaigue. Instead, he was retained by T. G. Masaryk to do special wo:vk and, later, was appointed amb.ass~doir of Czecho-Slovalkiia to F'ran'Ce. OSIUiSky served in that capacity in Paris until the collapse of Czecho...SlwaJkia in 1939 and then fell out with Dr. Edward Benes. Today he is one of the leaders orf the so-called "Council of Free CzechoSlovaki1a ," which is srtiJ1l dominated by the poilitical followers of Dr. Edwiard Benes, the Czech National Socialists. O'bjectiwty would not 'b e serwed if we were to deny that Dr. Stephen Osusky is the best known living personafity of Slo vaik origin in international circles. At the same time, however, we mu:st make it clear that Dr. Stephen Os'USlky is so regarded both in Ozeich as well as international cirrcles only becaJU!se he is of Slwak origin. Lt may be welJ, then, to state cleady o'Il!ce rugain just how the Slovaks view the po1iti~l !Plans and exile actiivity of the contradiotocy personality of Dr. Oswsky. If it were not for the fact that American puiblic opinion suP!I)Orts anti-Oommunisrt politicians from behind the IToo Ourlain and is seelking out a part of the Czooh poUticai exiles - featuriing at ail costs Slovaks who support the plan of contiinuing the Czecho-,Slova)k Repulblic - Dr. Stephen Osusky woUJld not have a pla;tfo:r,m to stand on in foreign circles. lif it were not fOT his "Czeoho.JSIJ.o!Va!kia must be preserved at a1l costs" stand, OSJU:Sky wotrld not eivoo be noticed. His broad education, his professiori,a i and pU!blicationaiJ. activities would hardly be noticed, i.f it were not fo:r the polii.tical ba)cikisitJa!ge scenes in which and f.or which Dr. Osusky is represented in the role of "representatirve of th.e Sl~aks." Keeipmg thls fact in mind, let us at least oorsorily anal,yze the relationshilp of Dr. Osusky to Slovakia and vice- �56 SLOVAKIA versa. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks in the free woTld, many of whom Juwe e:,cpended much effort and surffering in the struggle for the na,tural rights od' the Slovak nation, certaim.y do have a right to speak their minds rubout the question whether Dr. Stephen Osusky has the authority to spealk for the SlovaJk nation, especially as long as his policy is anti-Slaviak . .Several years a:go this writer pointed to the hiStorical opportunity wh:i!ch circumstances in the contemporary sirbuation presented Dr. Osuslky with so that he mi1g ht play a historic role in the Slovalk nation. As I said then I repeat now: Dr. Osusky could have played that role only if his political plans and his political activity were in accord with the aspirations and natural rights of the Slovak nation. We must remetmlber that Dr. Osusky, excepti.ll!g for the mandate giiven him by the Slovaik League oif America af:ter Wodd War I, never possessed, nor does even nOIW poSsess, any mandate or legitimation from the peqple oif SlovaJkia to represenlt it in any manner whatsoever. By the fact that he is o!f Sl'(Walk birth, Osuslky would have the right to speak in the .rra,me of the Slovaks only when wihate;ver he might say, pl1an, or present to the world would be in fuhl accord with the will of the majority oif the SlovaJk nation. Dr. Stephen Osusky grew wp and was educated outside of Slovakia. He did not live in Slo;vakia for over thirty years; he witnessed the temfiic struggle of the Slovak n:atinn for its b,asic ,h uman rights and its intense spiritual and material development from a plush diplomatic chair, or as a professor at various American unilversities. Dr. Osusky, therefore, is not justified in considering his own conceptions better than those of the Slovak nation itsclf and those of the majority oif Sloivak exiles, who during the past thirty years grew up with the Slovak people, suffered with 1t and fOUJght for its freedom and equality. If, .therefore, the politica:l credo of Dr. OsUJSky is expressed by his fUIIllctions and by hls - presence in the "Council of Free Ozeichoslovakia," we must place him in the rruruks of those people oif Slo-vruk origin, who con.scfously or unconsciously are working ag,ainst the moot vital interests of the Slo1Vak nation and, �57 SLOVAKIA therefore, belong not among its representatives, but among its evil-doers and enemies. In the question of whether we are for or against the Ozecho-Slovak Repuiblic, we are not concerned wiith partisan-political d~!fferences, with a diiffereTIJCe of opinion aJbout a poHrtical system o.r administraUve adjustment, but definitely with the elementa!1y rughrt of the Slo.va!ks to their OIW'.Il lid'e, their very own existence and their future as a free nation. After what the Slovaks have gone through and are still suffering in the Ozecho-,Slwak Reipulblic, it is c!1ystal clea:r that the Czechs and Slavak,s can live in one state only at the expense af the Sfovaks. Therefore, flirting with the idea of the cont-in1Ued existence of Ozecho-1SlovaJkia only helps to uphold Ozech imperialistic tendencies in the world which deny even a bare national exfatence to the Slovalk nation. For that reason "Ozechoslovakism" is only a viariation of Magyarism, and, in the last ana'l ysis, a synonym for trea:chery, such as was per.petrated by Kosurth and Masaryk, and many others in the recent past. We do not doubt in the least that these matters are clear to the experienced dlipl'Olmat and learned university professor, Dr. Stephen Osusky, unless his complete separiation from Slovakia during his l,i fetime, or the influences of his enviironment, prevent him from seeing clearly Slovak reality and the aJbiJ.ity of the Slovak nation to live. If, however, Dr. Osusky is not suffering from a feelring of national inferiority and is not looildng at the Slovak Il!ation through the spectacles, of several Slwailc Communist co1l a:borators, who fear that they would niot be alble to return to Slovakia without Czech aid, then we cannot regard his past a:cti,v ity and his present memlbershirp in the "Council of Free CzechoSlovakia" as a matter of ta;c,tJics, as some of his adherents claim. The international puibliic thinks in completely clear categories: if Dr. Osusky is in the "Council of Free O.reohds~ovaJkia," he is for the continuance of Czecho-Slo:vakia, and, therefore, against the effort of the Sl01Vruks to lirve thei'l' own indeipendent life. Inasmuch as the majority of the Slovak nation is for a different solution Of the Slovak problem 1 �58 SLOVAKIA than being included in the framewo:r.k of the Czecho-Slovak Repwblic, Dr. Stephen Osusky, with his presence in the "Cou:nicil .o f Free Ozechoslova!kia," is really woTking against the ldgitimaite aspirations of the Slovak nation for equality with the other nations of central Europe and, consequently, does not have the least authorization to s,pe,ak as a representaJtive of the S101V1ak nation. The SlovaJks in the s.o.- called "Counoil of Free 0zechoslova:kia" are and can only be representaitives of the nation which no longer considers it necessary to delbate with any one aJbout its SlovaJk individuality and its inherent right to its own political life. ATgurrnents that the SlovaJk question can be aided by the "Council of Free Ozecho:s!lova!kia," inasmlllich as oeritain circles on this continent are supporting the Council, are log,icaUy and olbjectively sheer nonsense. It must be quite olbvious to ·a ll concerned that if there were no Slovaks in the service of Czech tendencies, then no democratic power would recogn±ze the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," and the Slovaks would then hawe their own representation recognized and surpported in New York, Washington and elsewihere, just as aN the other natfon:s from behind the Iron CuTtain. Only as long as people a;re found to whom Rtpka, Zenlcl, etc., are dearer than the American Slovaks and the· entire Slovak nation at home, and to whom the 0zechoSlovaJk Repu!blic is closer than the freedom oif the Slovak niation, can the State Dejpartment and the Foreign Office prefer the recognition of the "Council of Free 0zechoslova. kia" to a separate Slova;k representation, without prejudicing the future, as has been told to us on various 0::::::asions. From this viewipoint, the presence of Dr. 0susky in the "Council of Flree 0zecho,slova!kfa" means that he is against the vitaJl interests of the Slovak nation. And his fight with the Czechs for the recognition of Slovak rights, as some would ha;ve us believe, evokes only the view that even in his ~e we are concerned with nothing else than what he himoolf wrote in his book "The Wiaiy of the Free": "His:to-ry teaches, and practiocal eX!perience corroborates, that when politicians are engaged in bitter struggle against their rivals, they never Like to admit plllblicly that they axe fight- �SLO\.AKIA 59 ing for SUlpI'emacy and power. They prefer to disguise their ambiti()IIlS by c1aiming to de.fend high principles." The greatness of people in polii.tics res.ts on the fact that they had recognized the Hand of God in history, the needs of the times, and at critical moments spalce aibout principles clearly and unequiivoca[ly. By cloa!king hiJI:nself in a diplomatic fog and remaining in a Czech exile organization Dr. Osu!Sky can gain only one thing: in Sl0ivak history he will be placed a[ongsride of Derer, Iivanka, Srolbar and J ehl'rcka - and not among the greatest Sloivaks. But that is Dr. Osusky's concern and not ours. The Slmnaik nation will win in its fight for freedom and equality in central Euro,pe even without his help and despite his opposition and treachery. Czecho-SlQIVa/kia is today a Russi:a,n satelilite, and in a free Europe there shall be no place for satellites. - (J. K.) • • • WHO SAID IT? · " On November 23rd at the congress of the National Socialist Agricultural and Forestry Workers the Minister of Education, Stransky, appealed to those present 'not to allow disgust to deprive them of their real love for Russia, or of their admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Government. Nor must they allow disgust to make them lose IDA.ST their understanding of the National Front'." EUROPE, Dec. 4, 1947; London . • • • "Since, in the new situation, it was imposs~ble to colla-borate officially with the Soviet Union, we . . . did nothing which might prejudice or prevent the reim.O!Val of co-0peration at the earliest possible moment; I need on!ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the SQIViet-Finnish War. Morewer, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves. and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London, 1944. 1 � SLOVAKIA 55 DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS The name of Dr. Stephen Osusky, mentioned from time to time in the American press, has a)gam aippeared jll!st recently. Educated in Ameri'oo, Dr. OsUSlky went on a mission foT the Slovak Loogue of America aft~ WoI'ld War I , after Czeoho-lSlOVlaJkia was born, burt did not return to report to the Leaigue. Instead, he was retained by T. G. Masaryk to do special wo:vk and, later, was appointed amb.ass~doir of Czecho-Slovalkiia to F'ran'Ce. OSIUiSky served in that capacity in Paris until the collapse of Czecho...SlwaJkia in 1939 and then fell out with Dr. Edward Benes. Today he is one of the leaders orf the so-called "Council of Free CzechoSlovaki1a ," which is srtiJ1l dominated by the poilitical followers of Dr. Edwiard Benes, the Czech National Socialists. O'bjectiwty would not 'b e serwed if we were to deny that Dr. Stephen Osusky is the best known living personafity of Slo vaik origin in international circles. At the same time, however, we mu:st make it clear that Dr. Stephen Os'USlky is so regarded both in Ozeich as well as international cirrcles only becaJU!se he is of Slwak origin. Lt may be welJ, then, to state cleady o'Il!ce rugain just how the Slovaks view the po1iti~l !Plans and exile actiivity of the contradiotocy personality of Dr. Oswsky. If it were not for the fact that American puiblic opinion suP!I)Orts anti-Oommunisrt politicians from behind the IToo Ourlain and is seelking out a part of the Czooh poUticai exiles - featuriing at ail costs Slovaks who support the plan of contiinuing the Czecho-,Slova)k Repulblic - Dr. Stephen Osusky woUJld not have a pla;tfo:r,m to stand on in foreign circles. lif it were not fOT his "Czeoho.JSIJ.o!Va!kia must be preserved at a1l costs" stand, OSJU:Sky wotrld not eivoo be noticed. His broad education, his professiori,a i and pU!blicationaiJ. activities would hardly be noticed, i.f it were not fo:r the polii.tical ba)cikisitJa!ge scenes in which and f.or which Dr. Osusky is represented in the role of "representatirve of th.e Sl~aks." Keeipmg thls fact in mind, let us at least oorsorily anal,yze the relationshilp of Dr. Osusky to Slovakia and vice- �56 SLOVAKIA versa. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks in the free woTld, many of whom Juwe e:,cpended much effort and surffering in the struggle for the na,tural rights od' the Slovak nation, certaim.y do have a right to speak their minds rubout the question whether Dr. Stephen Osusky has the authority to spealk for the SlovaJk nation, especially as long as his policy is anti-Slaviak . .Several years a:go this writer pointed to the hiStorical opportunity wh:i!ch circumstances in the contemporary sirbuation presented Dr. Osuslky with so that he mi1g ht play a historic role in the Slovalk nation. As I said then I repeat now: Dr. Osusky could have played that role only if his political plans and his political activity were in accord with the aspirations and natural rights of the Slovak nation. We must remetmlber that Dr. Osusky, excepti.ll!g for the mandate giiven him by the Slovaik League oif America af:ter Wodd War I, never possessed, nor does even nOIW poSsess, any mandate or legitimation from the peqple oif SlovaJkia to represenlt it in any manner whatsoever. By the fact that he is o!f Sl'(Walk birth, Osuslky would have the right to speak in the .rra,me of the Slovaks only when wihate;ver he might say, pl1an, or present to the world would be in fuhl accord with the will of the majority oif the SlovaJk nation. Dr. Stephen Osusky grew wp and was educated outside of Slovakia. He did not live in Slo;vakia for over thirty years; he witnessed the temfiic struggle of the Slovak n:atinn for its b,asic ,h uman rights and its intense spiritual and material development from a plush diplomatic chair, or as a professor at various American unilversities. Dr. Osusky, therefore, is not justified in considering his own conceptions better than those of the Slovak nation itsclf and those of the majority oif Sloivak exiles, who during the past thirty years grew up with the Slovak people, suffered with 1t and fOUJght for its freedom and equality. If, .therefore, the politica:l credo of Dr. OsUJSky is expressed by his fUIIllctions and by hls - presence in the "Council of Free Ozeichoslovakia," we must place him in the rruruks of those people oif Slo-vruk origin, who con.scfously or unconsciously are working ag,ainst the moot vital interests of the Slo1Vak nation and, �57 SLOVAKIA therefore, belong not among its representatives, but among its evil-doers and enemies. In the question of whether we are for or against the Ozecho-Slovak Repuiblic, we are not concerned wiith partisan-political d~!fferences, with a diiffereTIJCe of opinion aJbout a poHrtical system o.r administraUve adjustment, but definitely with the elementa!1y rughrt of the Slo.va!ks to their OIW'.Il lid'e, their very own existence and their future as a free nation. After what the Slovaks have gone through and are still suffering in the Ozecho-,Slwak Reipulblic, it is c!1ystal clea:r that the Czechs and Slavak,s can live in one state only at the expense af the Sfovaks. Therefore, flirting with the idea of the cont-in1Ued existence of Ozecho-1SlovaJkia only helps to uphold Ozech imperialistic tendencies in the world which deny even a bare national exfatence to the Slovalk nation. For that reason "Ozechoslovakism" is only a viariation of Magyarism, and, in the last ana'l ysis, a synonym for trea:chery, such as was per.petrated by Kosurth and Masaryk, and many others in the recent past. We do not doubt in the least that these matters are clear to the experienced dlipl'Olmat and learned university professor, Dr. Stephen Osusky, unless his complete separiation from Slovakia during his l,i fetime, or the influences of his enviironment, prevent him from seeing clearly Slovak reality and the aJbiJ.ity of the Slovak nation to live. If, however, Dr. Osusky is not suffering from a feelring of national inferiority and is not looildng at the Slovak Il!ation through the spectacles, of several Slwailc Communist co1l a:borators, who fear that they would niot be alble to return to Slovakia without Czech aid, then we cannot regard his past a:cti,v ity and his present memlbershirp in the "Council of Free CzechoSlovakia" as a matter of ta;c,tJics, as some of his adherents claim. The international puibliic thinks in completely clear categories: if Dr. Osusky is in the "Council of Free O.reohds~ovaJkia," he is for the continuance of Czecho-Slo:vakia, and, therefore, against the effort of the Sl01Vruks to lirve thei'l' own indeipendent life. Inasmuch as the majority of the Slovak nation is for a different solution Of the Slovak problem 1 �58 SLOVAKIA than being included in the framewo:r.k of the Czecho-Slovak Repwblic, Dr. Stephen Osusky, with his presence in the "Cou:nicil .o f Free Ozechoslova!kia," is really woTking against the ldgitimaite aspirations of the Slovak nation for equality with the other nations of central Europe and, consequently, does not have the least authorization to s,pe,ak as a representaJtive of the S101V1ak nation. The SlovaJks in the s.o.- called "Counoil of Free 0zechoslova:kia" are and can only be representaitives of the nation which no longer considers it necessary to delbate with any one aJbout its SlovaJk individuality and its inherent right to its own political life. ATgurrnents that the SlovaJk question can be aided by the "Council of Free Ozecho:s!lova!kia," inasmlllich as oeritain circles on this continent are supporting the Council, are log,icaUy and olbjectively sheer nonsense. It must be quite olbvious to ·a ll concerned that if there were no Slovaks in the service of Czech tendencies, then no democratic power would recogn±ze the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," and the Slovaks would then hawe their own representation recognized and surpported in New York, Washington and elsewihere, just as aN the other natfon:s from behind the Iron CuTtain. Only as long as people a;re found to whom Rtpka, Zenlcl, etc., are dearer than the American Slovaks and the· entire Slovak nation at home, and to whom the 0zechoSlovaJk Repu!blic is closer than the freedom oif the Slovak niation, can the State Dejpartment and the Foreign Office prefer the recognition of the "Council of Free 0zechoslova. kia" to a separate Slova;k representation, without prejudicing the future, as has been told to us on various 0::::::asions. From this viewipoint, the presence of Dr. 0susky in the "Council of Flree 0zecho,slova!kfa" means that he is against the vitaJl interests of the Slovak nation. And his fight with the Czechs for the recognition of Slovak rights, as some would ha;ve us believe, evokes only the view that even in his ~e we are concerned with nothing else than what he himoolf wrote in his book "The Wiaiy of the Free": "His:to-ry teaches, and practiocal eX!perience corroborates, that when politicians are engaged in bitter struggle against their rivals, they never Like to admit plllblicly that they axe fight- �SLO\.AKIA 59 ing for SUlpI'emacy and power. They prefer to disguise their ambiti()IIlS by c1aiming to de.fend high principles." The greatness of people in polii.tics res.ts on the fact that they had recognized the Hand of God in history, the needs of the times, and at critical moments spalce aibout principles clearly and unequiivoca[ly. By cloa!king hiJI:nself in a diplomatic fog and remaining in a Czech exile organization Dr. Osu!Sky can gain only one thing: in Sl0ivak history he will be placed a[ongsride of Derer, Iivanka, Srolbar and J ehl'rcka - and not among the greatest Sloivaks. But that is Dr. Osusky's concern and not ours. The Slmnaik nation will win in its fight for freedom and equality in central Euro,pe even without his help and despite his opposition and treachery. Czecho-SlQIVa/kia is today a Russi:a,n satelilite, and in a free Europe there shall be no place for satellites. - (J. K.) • • • WHO SAID IT? · " On November 23rd at the congress of the National Socialist Agricultural and Forestry Workers the Minister of Education, Stransky, appealed to those present 'not to allow disgust to deprive them of their real love for Russia, or of their admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Government. Nor must they allow disgust to make them lose IDA.ST their understanding of the National Front'." EUROPE, Dec. 4, 1947; London . • • • "Since, in the new situation, it was imposs~ble to colla-borate officially with the Soviet Union, we . . . did nothing which might prejudice or prevent the reim.O!Val of co-0peration at the earliest possible moment; I need on!ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the SQIViet-Finnish War. Morewer, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves. and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London, 1944. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 55 DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS The name of Dr. Stephen Osusky, mentioned from time to time in the American press, has a)gam aippeared jll!st recently. Educated in Ameri'oo, Dr. OsUSlky went on a mission foT the Slovak Loogue of America aft~ WoI'ld War I , after Czeoho-lSlOVlaJkia was born, burt did not return to report to the Leaigue. Instead, he was retained by T. G. Masaryk to do special wo:vk and, later, was appointed amb.ass~doir of Czecho-Slovalkiia to F'ran'Ce. OSIUiSky served in that capacity in Paris until the collapse of Czecho...SlwaJkia in 1939 and then fell out with Dr. Edward Benes. Today he is one of the leaders orf the so-called "Council of Free CzechoSlovaki1a ," which is srtiJ1l dominated by the poilitical followers of Dr. Edwiard Benes, the Czech National Socialists. O'bjectiwty would not 'b e serwed if we were to deny that Dr. Stephen Osusky is the best known living personafity of Slo vaik origin in international circles. At the same time, however, we mu:st make it clear that Dr. Stephen Os'USlky is so regarded both in Ozeich as well as international cirrcles only becaJU!se he is of Slwak origin. Lt may be welJ, then, to state cleady o'Il!ce rugain just how the Slovaks view the po1iti~l !Plans and exile actiivity of the contradiotocy personality of Dr. Oswsky. If it were not for the fact that American puiblic opinion suP!I)Orts anti-Oommunisrt politicians from behind the IToo Ourlain and is seelking out a part of the Czooh poUticai exiles - featuriing at ail costs Slovaks who support the plan of contiinuing the Czecho-,Slova)k Repulblic - Dr. Stephen Osusky woUJld not have a pla;tfo:r,m to stand on in foreign circles. lif it were not fOT his "Czeoho.JSIJ.o!Va!kia must be preserved at a1l costs" stand, OSJU:Sky wotrld not eivoo be noticed. His broad education, his professiori,a i and pU!blicationaiJ. activities would hardly be noticed, i.f it were not fo:r the polii.tical ba)cikisitJa!ge scenes in which and f.or which Dr. Osusky is represented in the role of "representatirve of th.e Sl~aks." Keeipmg thls fact in mind, let us at least oorsorily anal,yze the relationshilp of Dr. Osusky to Slovakia and vice- 56 SLOVAKIA versa. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks in the free woTld, many of whom Juwe e:,cpended much effort and surffering in the struggle for the na,tural rights od' the Slovak nation, certaim.y do have a right to speak their minds rubout the question whether Dr. Stephen Osusky has the authority to spealk for the SlovaJk nation, especially as long as his policy is anti-Slaviak . .Several years a:go this writer pointed to the hiStorical opportunity wh:i!ch circumstances in the contemporary sirbuation presented Dr. Osuslky with so that he mi1g ht play a historic role in the Slovalk nation. As I said then I repeat now: Dr. Osusky could have played that role only if his political plans and his political activity were in accord with the aspirations and natural rights of the Slovak nation. We must remetmlber that Dr. Osusky, excepti.ll!g for the mandate giiven him by the Slovaik League oif America af:ter Wodd War I, never possessed, nor does even nOIW poSsess, any mandate or legitimation from the peqple oif SlovaJkia to represenlt it in any manner whatsoever. By the fact that he is o!f Sl'(Walk birth, Osuslky would have the right to speak in the .rra,me of the Slovaks only when wihate;ver he might say, pl1an, or present to the world would be in fuhl accord with the will of the majority oif the SlovaJk nation. Dr. Stephen Osusky grew wp and was educated outside of Slovakia. He did not live in Slo;vakia for over thirty years; he witnessed the temfiic struggle of the Slovak n:atinn for its b,asic ,h uman rights and its intense spiritual and material development from a plush diplomatic chair, or as a professor at various American unilversities. Dr. Osusky, therefore, is not justified in considering his own conceptions better than those of the Slovak nation itsclf and those of the majority oif Sloivak exiles, who during the past thirty years grew up with the Slovak people, suffered with 1t and fOUJght for its freedom and equality. If, .therefore, the politica:l credo of Dr. OsUJSky is expressed by his fUIIllctions and by hls - presence in the "Council of Free Ozeichoslovakia," we must place him in the rruruks of those people oif Slo-vruk origin, who con.scfously or unconsciously are working ag,ainst the moot vital interests of the Slo1Vak nation and, 57 SLOVAKIA therefore, belong not among its representatives, but among its evil-doers and enemies. In the question of whether we are for or against the Ozecho-Slovak Repuiblic, we are not concerned wiith partisan-political d~!fferences, with a diiffereTIJCe of opinion aJbout a poHrtical system o.r administraUve adjustment, but definitely with the elementa!1y rughrt of the Slo.va!ks to their OIW'.Il lid'e, their very own existence and their future as a free nation. After what the Slovaks have gone through and are still suffering in the Ozecho-,Slwak Reipulblic, it is c!1ystal clea:r that the Czechs and Slavak,s can live in one state only at the expense af the Sfovaks. Therefore, flirting with the idea of the cont-in1Ued existence of Ozecho-1SlovaJkia only helps to uphold Ozech imperialistic tendencies in the world which deny even a bare national exfatence to the Slovalk nation. For that reason "Ozechoslovakism" is only a viariation of Magyarism, and, in the last ana'l ysis, a synonym for trea:chery, such as was per.petrated by Kosurth and Masaryk, and many others in the recent past. We do not doubt in the least that these matters are clear to the experienced dlipl'Olmat and learned university professor, Dr. Stephen Osusky, unless his complete separiation from Slovakia during his l,i fetime, or the influences of his enviironment, prevent him from seeing clearly Slovak reality and the aJbiJ.ity of the Slovak nation to live. If, however, Dr. Osusky is not suffering from a feelring of national inferiority and is not looildng at the Slovak Il!ation through the spectacles, of several Slwailc Communist co1l a:borators, who fear that they would niot be alble to return to Slovakia without Czech aid, then we cannot regard his past a:cti,v ity and his present memlbershirp in the "Council of Free CzechoSlovakia" as a matter of ta;c,tJics, as some of his adherents claim. The international puibliic thinks in completely clear categories: if Dr. Osusky is in the "Council of Free O.reohds~ovaJkia," he is for the continuance of Czecho-Slo:vakia, and, therefore, against the effort of the Sl01Vruks to lirve thei'l' own indeipendent life. Inasmuch as the majority of the Slovak nation is for a different solution Of the Slovak problem 1 58 SLOVAKIA than being included in the framewo:r.k of the Czecho-Slovak Repwblic, Dr. Stephen Osusky, with his presence in the "Cou:nicil .o f Free Ozechoslova!kia," is really woTking against the ldgitimaite aspirations of the Slovak nation for equality with the other nations of central Europe and, consequently, does not have the least authorization to s,pe,ak as a representaJtive of the S101V1ak nation. The SlovaJks in the s.o.- called "Counoil of Free 0zechoslova:kia" are and can only be representaitives of the nation which no longer considers it necessary to delbate with any one aJbout its SlovaJk individuality and its inherent right to its own political life. ATgurrnents that the SlovaJk question can be aided by the "Council of Free Ozecho:s!lova!kia," inasmlllich as oeritain circles on this continent are supporting the Council, are log,icaUy and olbjectively sheer nonsense. It must be quite olbvious to ·a ll concerned that if there were no Slovaks in the service of Czech tendencies, then no democratic power would recogn±ze the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," and the Slovaks would then hawe their own representation recognized and surpported in New York, Washington and elsewihere, just as aN the other natfon:s from behind the Iron CuTtain. Only as long as people a;re found to whom Rtpka, Zenlcl, etc., are dearer than the American Slovaks and the· entire Slovak nation at home, and to whom the 0zechoSlovaJk Repu!blic is closer than the freedom oif the Slovak niation, can the State Dejpartment and the Foreign Office prefer the recognition of the "Council of Free 0zechoslova. kia" to a separate Slova;k representation, without prejudicing the future, as has been told to us on various 0::::::asions. From this viewipoint, the presence of Dr. 0susky in the "Council of Flree 0zecho,slova!kfa" means that he is against the vitaJl interests of the Slovak nation. And his fight with the Czechs for the recognition of Slovak rights, as some would ha;ve us believe, evokes only the view that even in his ~e we are concerned with nothing else than what he himoolf wrote in his book "The Wiaiy of the Free": "His:to-ry teaches, and practiocal eX!perience corroborates, that when politicians are engaged in bitter struggle against their rivals, they never Like to admit plllblicly that they axe fight- SLO\.AKIA 59 ing for SUlpI'emacy and power. They prefer to disguise their ambiti()IIlS by c1aiming to de.fend high principles." The greatness of people in polii.tics res.ts on the fact that they had recognized the Hand of God in history, the needs of the times, and at critical moments spalce aibout principles clearly and unequiivoca[ly. By cloa!king hiJI:nself in a diplomatic fog and remaining in a Czech exile organization Dr. Osu!Sky can gain only one thing: in Sl0ivak history he will be placed a[ongsride of Derer, Iivanka, Srolbar and J ehl'rcka - and not among the greatest Sloivaks. But that is Dr. Osusky's concern and not ours. The Slmnaik nation will win in its fight for freedom and equality in central Euro,pe even without his help and despite his opposition and treachery. Czecho-SlQIVa/kia is today a Russi:a,n satelilite, and in a free Europe there shall be no place for satellites. - (J. K.) • • • WHO SAID IT? · " On November 23rd at the congress of the National Socialist Agricultural and Forestry Workers the Minister of Education, Stransky, appealed to those present 'not to allow disgust to deprive them of their real love for Russia, or of their admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Government. Nor must they allow disgust to make them lose IDA.ST their understanding of the National Front'." EUROPE, Dec. 4, 1947; London . • • • "Since, in the new situation, it was imposs~ble to colla-borate officially with the Soviet Union, we . . . did nothing which might prejudice or prevent the reim.O!Val of co-0peration at the earliest possible moment; I need on!ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the SQIViet-Finnish War. Morewer, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves. and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London, 1944. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Stephen Osuský and the Slovaks Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954 pp. 55-59 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1954 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f9288cf8d18ff709ac08247a75df8ed5.pdf 51bd81874bd9e51112561089d782b497 PDF Text Text SLOVAKlA 3 Dr. Tiso's Last Message to the Slovak People ( Two hours before he died on the gallows, Dr. Joseph Tiso, wartime P resident of the Slovak Republic, wrote the following last message to the Slovak people in Bratislava prison.) In the spirit of this sacrifice which I am about to make, these are my words to the Slovak people: Be unanimous and united in pursuing always, everywhere and in every respect the great principle: "FOR GOD AND FOR THE NATION!" This is not only the unequivocal intent of Slovak history, but also the explicit command of God, who made it the law of nature, and inculcated it in the nation and all its members. This law I have served all my life. And for this r eason I regard myself as a martyr in the defense of Christianity against Bolshevism, against which our nation must in all possible ways defend itself, and only in order to remain true to its Christian character, but also in the interest of its future survival. In the same way as I am asking all of you to remember me in your prayers, so will I also pray to God Almighty on your behalf and supplicate that He bless the Slovak people in their life-struggle for God and for the nation, and that the Slovak nation shall always remain a faithful and devoted son to the Church of Christ. Bratislava. April 18, 1947, 3 o'clock a. m. Dr. Joseph Ti s o � SLOVAKlA 3 Dr. Tiso's Last Message to the Slovak People ( Two hours before he died on the gallows, Dr. Joseph Tiso, wartime P resident of the Slovak Republic, wrote the following last message to the Slovak people in Bratislava prison.) In the spirit of this sacrifice which I am about to make, these are my words to the Slovak people: Be unanimous and united in pursuing always, everywhere and in every respect the great principle: "FOR GOD AND FOR THE NATION!" This is not only the unequivocal intent of Slovak history, but also the explicit command of God, who made it the law of nature, and inculcated it in the nation and all its members. This law I have served all my life. And for this r eason I regard myself as a martyr in the defense of Christianity against Bolshevism, against which our nation must in all possible ways defend itself, and only in order to remain true to its Christian character, but also in the interest of its future survival. In the same way as I am asking all of you to remember me in your prayers, so will I also pray to God Almighty on your behalf and supplicate that He bless the Slovak people in their life-struggle for God and for the nation, and that the Slovak nation shall always remain a faithful and devoted son to the Church of Christ. Bratislava. April 18, 1947, 3 o'clock a. m. Dr. Joseph Ti s o � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKlA 3 Dr. Tiso's Last Message to the Slovak People ( Two hours before he died on the gallows, Dr. Joseph Tiso, wartime P resident of the Slovak Republic, wrote the following last message to the Slovak people in Bratislava prison.) In the spirit of this sacrifice which I am about to make, these are my words to the Slovak people: Be unanimous and united in pursuing always, everywhere and in every respect the great principle: "FOR GOD AND FOR THE NATION!" This is not only the unequivocal intent of Slovak history, but also the explicit command of God, who made it the law of nature, and inculcated it in the nation and all its members. This law I have served all my life. And for this r eason I regard myself as a martyr in the defense of Christianity against Bolshevism, against which our nation must in all possible ways defend itself, and only in order to remain true to its Christian character, but also in the interest of its future survival. In the same way as I am asking all of you to remember me in your prayers, so will I also pray to God Almighty on your behalf and supplicate that He bless the Slovak people in their life-struggle for God and for the nation, and that the Slovak nation shall always remain a faithful and devoted son to the Church of Christ. Bratislava. April 18, 1947, 3 o'clock a. m. Dr. Joseph Ti s o  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Tiso's Last Message to the Slovak People Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 p. 3 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Tiso, Jozef, 1887-1947 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5a80af21bc4bdc2a0d8ebdf6a58b39d4.pdf 68a94f69423288d267fe8620b43373e6 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA Pub lished by the Slovak League of America VOL XV 1965 NO. 38 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE SLOVAKS IN AMERICA By James J. Zatko, Ph.D. , University of Notre Dame Occupying the area enclosed by the Carpathian mountains, the Danube River, and the Theiss River, the Slovaks to the number of two million or 12% of the total population of Hungary, eked out a meagre existence between the two rivers and the mountains. Because the Slovaks had to struggle for a living, men and women were inured to hard work and to a very low standard of living. Their facial features form two general types: the round-faced with wide-set eyes, and the long-headed narrow face with a long nose. The people live in villages consisting of long, low brick or wood houses with hand-made shingles. The interiors were generally neat and tidy, even where there was an earthen floor. 1 Slovakia itself is a geographic unit, whose northern boundary runs along the Carpathian mountains, and whose southern boundary is the Danube River and the Theiss River, which cut deep valleys and ravines through the mountain ridges. The land is divided in the west by the streams flowing to the Danube, by those flowing to the Theiss in eastern Slovakia, with a central Slovak upland lying between. 2 The area consists of about 18,895 square miles of mostly agricultural land, but the land is not the best for cultivation, much of it being woodland and the rest not very fertile. Bratislava was the capital, the ancient coronation city of Hungarian Kings before Budapest, and a great Danubian river port at the cross-roads of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Other important cities in Slovakia are: Trnava in western Slovakia, Nitra in west central Slovakia on the river Nitra, Zilina in northern Slovakia on the river Vah, Turciansky Sv. Martin in north central Slovakia, Zvolen in central Slovakia, and Kosice in eastern Slovakia. 3 Within Slovakia itself population shifted during the �2 SLOVAKIA fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by occupying the northern highlands in Slovakia. The villagers of the central plain and the river valleys created new settlements especially in Orava in the north, Trencin in the west, Zvolen in the central portion; the new settlers on the Carpathian mountainsides began to engage in animal husbandry, especially sheep-raising. 4 At the end of the seventeenth century an emigration strictly so-called began. Only individuals and very small groups left the recently settled highlands at first. The saffron-dealers and dealers in medicinal oils from Turiec county in north central Slovakia carried their home products all over eastern Europe, crossed Asia, as far as the Pacific coast of Siberia. In the business they established in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Siberia, they often employed their own countrymen. Weavers from Orava county in the north and lace makers from the Hron River region sold their wares in Hungary and central Europe generally. Menders with wire and glaziers from Trencin county in the northwest of Slovakia wandered throughout central Europe; the more enterprising settled in Germany and Russia. From the eighteenth century, after the Turk had been expelled from central and southern Hungary, the poverty stricken of Slovakia began to migrate into Hungary in quest of lands and helped to repopulate the area as well as to restore its economic productivity through agriculture. Thus did Slovak settlements originate in Hungary, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and the Banat. 5 The poverty which accelerated this new shift in population was caused by a decline in economic and commercial activity in Slovakia itself. Early in the eighteenth century there had still been considerable export of cattle and wine from Nitra and Bratislava counties, production of cloth in Myjava, forestry and river traffic, mining and textile production. Although Maria Theresa favored Austrian industries against those of Hungary, only during the reign of Joseph II did non-Slovak manufacturers begin to compete effectively with native products; and the soil in Slovakia was insufficient to provide a livelihood for the Slovak masses. 6 A migration began from the Slovak counties across their southern borders into Hungary. In 1787 eleven counties in Hungary had a population of 1,537,969, whereas the counties in Slovakia had 1,535,480. Sixty years afterwards the Hun- �SLOVAKIA 3 garian counties had in 1848 a population of 2,844,830 and the counties of Slovakia had a population of 1,910,000. In 1787 Budin in Hungary had a population of 23,000 and Pest in Hungary, had only 16,000; Presporok in Slovakia had 29,000 and Banska Stiavnica in Slovakia had 24,000. After 83 years, in 1870, the population of Banska Stiavnica had declined to 12,000. 7 This decline in population, as the figures above indicate, extended to the period of the great exodus to America after 1873. As in the migration to Hungary, so in the modern migration to America economic conditions provided the main force that helped to empty Slovakia, but there were other causes, namely, political, social, and economic. The political ambitions of the Slovaks were closely linked with the rise of nationalism in Slovakia, which developed from three factors, contemporary trends of thought in Europe, outside pressure by the Magyars, and Slovak internal life itself. A conviction developed in the people that the country which they occupied was their own and that within it they had rights not to be contravened by any power. This thought was emphasized in a book by John Baltazar Magin who spoke in 1728 of the rights of the Slovak nation . Memories of Slovak antiquity began to be revived. George Papanek published Of Slovak Kings and K ingdoms in 1780; George Sklenar in 1783 wrote of the glories of Greater Moravia, and in 1793 George Fandli published a revision of Papanek's book. The Slovak poet John Holly portrayed the events of the Slovak past in an epic Sviitopluk (1833), in his book Slav (1834), and in Cyrilo-Methodi ada (1835)8 These writings prepared the ground for further studies in the Slovak language. During the Reformation the Czech language had spread in Slovakia among the Slovak Protestants ; but it remained a foreign language in Slovakia. This led to the cultivation of Slovak as the particular language of the Slovak nation. Matthew Bel-Funtik (1687-1749) wrote of the Slovak language that "in no respect does it fall behind the ponderousness of Spanish, the charm and smoothness of English, the richness and emphasis of German, the softness and tenderness of Italian or the imperious sternness of Magyar." Since the Slovaks had no national literary medium as late as the end of the eighteenth century, Anton Bernolak created a national literary language based on the western �4 SLOVAKIA or Trnava dialect. In 1787 he published a grammar of literary Slovak and later also published a six volume SlovakCzech-Latin-German-Magyar dictionary. 9 The greatest writer of the "Bernolakian" school was John Holly, who is described as "in the fullest sense the awakener of national consciousness by right of actualizing what others had planned and dreamed of." 10 Even though a considerable school of "Bernolakian" writers developed, the western Slovak dialect failed to become the national idiom. Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) together with the Lutheran pastors Joseph Miloslav Hurban (18171888) and Michael Miloslav Hurban established the definite form of literary Slovak, based upon a dialect spoken in the eight central counties. Together they founded a literary and publishing society, Tatrin (1844), and began to publish the political journal Slovenske narodnie noviny (1845), and the literary monthly, Slovenske pohl'ady (1846). The use of the Slovak language became an essential demand in Slovak political agitation. In May of 1848 the Slovak nationalist leaders met in the rectory of Michael Miloslav Hodza in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, where they drew up a political program for the Slovaks: "Petitions of the Slovak Nation." They expressed no desire to break away from the Hungarian state; they wanted defined boundaries for Slovak lands, social, political, cultural equality of Slovaks with Hungarians, and official recognition of the Slovak language. When the leaders planned to submit this program for the approval of the Slovak people, the Hungarian government forbade Slovak assemblies and imprisoned the Slovak leaders. 11 The hand of Eudovit Stur was obvious in the program. Already in 1847 he had listed these grievances: manorial courts, maldistribution of public offices, lack of uniform taxation, need of reform in the judicial system, insufficient freedom of the press and speech; he also demanded the use of the Slovak language in schools, churches, and courts. 1 z With the demands of Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas ignored and then repressed, the Slovaks took to revolutionary activity against the Hungarians. Since their only hope of relief lay with the central government at Vienna, they threw in their lot with the imperial forces of Habsburg against the �SLOVAKIA 5 revolution of Kossuth. After the prostration of Magyarism through Russian intervention in 1849, the Slovaks were prepared to accept a limited territorial sovereignty from the imperial government; but even though the assimilative policy of the Magyars was suspended, centralization, not autonomy, remained the order of the day. In the Spring of 1861 the Slovaks renewed their political activity. After their political principles had been published in the newspapers, an assembly was called to meet in Turciansky Sv. Martin. The prominent attorney Stephen Marko Daxner formulated the political program: recognition of the Slovak nation by imperial edict, the constitution of Slovakia as a distinct administrative unit in Hungary, the right of Slovaks to develop their own life without restriction. This "Memorandum of the Slovak People" was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph; the only result was that the Slovaks were allowed to establish the cultural institution, the Matice, Slovenska. 14 Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 forced a settlement with the Magyars. Known as the Compromise of 1867, it granted Magyars internal independence and divided the Empire into two countries under one crown. The Compromise of 1867 and the dualistic sys.tern based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitation, in order to secure its own hegemony against tbe will of the Slav majority.15 Jaszi observes that this artificial dualistic system could be maintained only "by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine." 16 The political injustices after 1867 should therefore be considered not only against a background of Magyarization but also seen as a means used to preserve the structure of the dual monarchy. The electoral laws and improper representation in the Hungarian parliament were among the grievances. For instance, in the 58 electoral areas inhabited by Slovaks for the most part, these deputies were elected: �6 SLOVAKIA ELECTION OF DEPUTIES 1865-1881 Year Magyar Deputies 1865 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 58 58 56 58 58 58 Slovak Deputies 0 0 2 0 0 0 Source: C. J. Street, HU GARY AND DEMOCRACY (London, 1923), PP. 57-58. The constituencies and polling stations were so arranged that Magyar communities were assured of easy access •to the poll, while non-Magyar communities had ,to travel great distances. It wa-s no uncommon trick for the local authorities to declare roads and bridges unsafe for traffic on the day of election, or for all the hors es in non-Magyar districts to be placed under veterinary supervision and forbidd en to move outside the commune.17 The Slovaks had grievances against the judicial system. Until 1871 the judicial and administrative spheres were not separated. In that year judicial reform was inaugurated. Criminal and civil cases were dealt with in the District and Sedrial courts as the first instance, the Tables as the second, and the Royal Curia in Budapest as the final one. 18 The Slovaks complained too that the nationality of the legal officers did not correspond to the national distribution of population. In 1910 there were 2,633 judges and official lawyers in Hungary; 2,601 were Magyars, 31 Germans, 1 Slovak. This was the proportion of legal officers in a country where the Slovaks formed 12 % of the population.19 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the law of Nationalities (1868) admitted other languages to court, 20 the law remained a dead letter, for summonses were issued in Magyar, and verdicts given in Magyar, and the need of an interpreter was disregarded. 21 Slovaks also called for freedom of the press. 22 Between 1905 and 1908 there were 43 court actions against fourteen Slovak newspapers ; sentences totaling eleven years and three months were imposed as well as fines totaling 11,000 crowns for Pan-Slavistic activities. 23 Besides these unsettling political factors, other social causes added to the sense of national frustration. �SLOVAKIA 7 At the basis of the cultural conflict was the idea of the Magyar state. The law of Hungary recognized only one nation in Hungary, and that was the Magyar. To be secure, Hungary had to be Magyar. The objective of political action became to create one nation, Magyar in sentiment and speech, from the multinational and polylingual Hungarian lands. 24 This ideal was pushed by every means: newspapers, the society for the Magyarization of Proper Names founded in 1880, and 1898 law to give all towns Magyar names; suppression of the Slovak language in rail, postal, and telegraph service. 25 As one reaction against the process of forcible assimilation, the Slovak sought comfort and national security in Pan-Slavism. Having become conscious of the larger Slav community, the Slovak nationalist leaders shook off their feeling of inferiority and began to place their hopes of realizing national ideals in the larger Slav group. 26 The Hungarians reacted by denouncing as Pan-Slav any Slovak who refused to renounce his nationality and language. 27 The chief means of transforming Slovaks into Magyars were to be the schools. After the Compromise of 1867, an attack was launched against German, Slovak, and Ruthenian schools. Bela Grunwald in 1873 began publishing Svornost', a bi-monthly, attacking the Slovak gymnasia as hot-beds of Pan-Slavism. 28 The gymnasium at Revuca was closed August 20, 1874; the one at Klastor pod Znievom, on September 21, 1874; and the one at Turciansky Sv. Martin, on December 30, 1874. 29 All Slovak elements were expelled from secondary and technical schools, and permission was refused to erect a chair of Slovak at the University of Budapest.30 The school statistics reveal this Magyarizing tendency: SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA 1910-1918 Schools Primary Grammar Indus., Comm., Agric. Teacher training Middle (High Schools) University Magyar Slovak German 3,777 101 118 419 20 39 �8 SLOVAKIA Source: Nicholas Timashe!f, PEDIA (1948), p. 262. "Education," SLAVONIC ENCYCW- The official statistics of the Hungarian government in 1914 reveal the extent of Magyarization. They list 256,020 children of Slovak language as attending school. Of these, 214,267 Slovak children were in purely Magyar elementary schools, and only 42,186 in 365 Slovak elementary schools. 31 Educational standards were low. Attendance was weakly enforced; in most villages the schools remained open for five or six months per year. In 1913, just before World War I, 32,700 Slovak children of school age were not enrolled.32 Naturally the results were bad. Those able to read and write averaged 63 per cent of the Slovak population; but individual counties had worse records. In the county of Saris, only 48.6 per cent, in Spis 58 per cent, in Zemplin 51.4 per cent, in Ung 43.5 per cent could read and write. 33 The Matica Slovenska or Slovak Institute, a national cultural society founded in 1863, was dissolved in 1875. The charges were unlawful political activity and mismanagement. The government seized not only money and property but also the library and museum. 34 Even the churches were made instruments of Magyarization. The religious history of the period 1867-1914 is dark, indeed. Bishop Parvy of Spis lived in Budapest for many years; Bishop Balasz of Roznava ignored everything Slovak as though it were non-existent. The Cardinal-Primate of Hungary, Czernoch, was of Slovak birth, but Magyar in thought and sentiment. 35 Often other priests felt their people's cultural humiliation and endeavoured to alleviate it, but were placed so that their influence was limited. The Lutheran General Assembly resolved against "Pan-Slavism" in 1882; in no district did the Slovak Lutherans have a majority.36 However, the chief reasons for Slovak emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century seem to have been economic.37 The predominantly agricultural nature of the country's economy is best illustrated by the following chart on agriculture: �SLOVAKIA 9 POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 1910 Total Population in 1,000 Austrian Provinces Counties of Hungarian Crown Bosnia and Herzogovina Total Total engaged in Agriculture in 1,000 Agricultural Percentage 28,572 13,842 48.5 % 20,886 13,470 64.5% 1,932 1,674 86.6 % ----------------- - -- - -- - ----- --- - --51,390 28,982 Source: Oscar Ja,szi, THE DIS,SOLUTION MONARCHY (Chicago, 1929) p. 195. 56.4 % OF THE IHABSBUHG The soil was not of the best quality. Woodland averaged about 15 per cent of the total. In Turiec county 33 per cent was unfit for cultivation; in Orava, 30 per cent; in Zvolen, 32 per cent; in Liptov, 41 per cent; in Novohrad, 26 per cent; in Gerner, 47 per cent; Spis, 37 per cent; in Saris, 43 per cent. In Orava county there were 2761 farms that averaged one to five acres; of this land only 43 per cent was arable. 38 In addition to the problem of poor soil, there existed the problem of the great estates. Speaking of Hungary in general, Jaszi says that 40 per cent of the total area of Hungary was occupied in 1913 by a small number of large and very large estates. The medium sized farms of 142 to 1,420 acres embraced a smaller area, but with the greater estates covered 54.4 per cent of the total territory. Over 64.4 per cent of the country was possessed by small farmers holding less than 142 acres. Moreover, only 34.5 per cent of Hungarian territory belonged to those who actually cultivated the soil. 39 In Hungary proper, without !Croatia, there lived 2,280,000 farmer families. According to the most optimistic calculation only 460,000 families owned property on the average above 20 acres, guaranteeing an independent livelihood, whereas 1,820,000 families, that is to say four fifths of them possessed only so-called "dwarf" properties or no property at all.40 �10 SLOVAKIA If we consider the situation of Slovakia in particular, an equally cheerless picture presents itself. In Slovakia 1,000 persons owned 2,100,000 hectares, that is, about 8,000 square miles; 21.5 per cent of the holdings were less than a half hectare in size; 41 75 per cent of the land was held by the great landlords. 42 The agricultural areas compared unfavorably with the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrialized parts did not exceed three-tenths of the entire territory of the Monarchy, whereas over seven-tenths were populated by peasants, poor, almost on the level of slow starvation. 43 One way to raise the peasant's standard of living was to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and the growth of crops. Between 1850 and 1895 there was progress in agricultural production. Improvements were made in Hungary after 1848, e.g., the iron plow replaced the wooden. The great landlords led the advance and the peasants imitated them. These landlords in Hungary between 1850 and 1890 were deeply interested in improving agricultural production, chiefly because of the high price of wheat in the world market. They were anxious to increase wheat production for export. After 1885 the world market price began to decline and the landlords gradually lost interest. Indeed, they began to cut production. The strategy was to create a domestic scarcity so that wheat would have to be imported. The objective of the policy was to transform a grain exporting country into a grain importing one. This would enable the landlords to raise the price of domestic grain to the world price augmented by the tariff. By 1907 the tariffs began to have a constant effect. In this situation the lot of the agricultural worker grew steadily worse. Unemployment grew, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose. Jaszi observes that the heavy hand of the landlord-controlled economy pushed the Monarchy toward disaster. 44 The workers' wages in Hungary averaged the equivalent of sixty to a hundred dollars a year, while a woman's wages averaged yearly only between forty and fifty dollars. 45 In Slovakia the agricultural worker earned 25 cents a day.46 His staple food in winter was cabbage and potatoes. 47 To the low wages and the agricultural poverty we must �SLOVAKIA 11 add the difficulty of buying land in Slovakia. The price of land in Slovakia by 1906 had risen in some cases 100 percent; the amount of money sent from America helped cause this price rise. The Postal Bank of Kosice received in 1896 six and a half million florins from America. 48 Over and above these burdens, the poor peasant had to bear the load of usurious banking. In pre-war Slovakia almost every town had a little joint-stock institution; although this was called a bank, it did not carry on real banking operations, but was only a savings and loan bank. The majority of these banks dispersed capital which was not available where it was needed. The banks under Magyar control followed a policy of dividends, whereas the Slovak banks paid a lower rate of interest. 49 Virtually no institutions provided long term mortgage credits; in fact, only two banks, both unsound, engaged in this business in Slovakia. Besides these banks, there were cooperative societies which offered limited cr,edit facilities to the peasants. 50 The small farmer ended up borrowing at rates of 7 per cent to 8 per cent, and sometimes rates were as high as 14 per cent. On short term loans rates of 50 per cent were not unknown. Consequently the profits of the banks were high. One bank in Slovakia with a capitalization of 60,000 crowns and reserves of 18,000 profited one year to the amount of 22,000 crowns. The average profit of the banks in 1888 was 29.56 per cent on the capital invested; in 1894 the profit was 13.58 per cent. 51 The economic situation worsened by the national addiction to drink. On this all the sources seem agreed. Impoverishing effects of overindulgence in drink were a factor in driving the Slovaks to seek improved economic conditions in America. 52 This lack of economic opportunity and security led to the migration. The following figures, though somewhat suspect because of the tendency of Magyarization, still tell an eloquent story. This table is a modification of the original. NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY Nationality Slovaks 1880 1,855,000 1890 1,897,000 1900 2,002,000 1910 1,946,000 �12 SLOVAKIA Source: Robert A. Kann, THE -MULTINATIONAL EJMP]RE: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL REF1ORM IN THE HABSBURG MONAROHY 1848-1914 {New York, 19 50) I, 278. The Slovaks in considerable numbers migrated to America after 1880 as part of the "new immigration". Until 1880 the bulk of the new additions to American population by immigration was predominantly either English in speech or at least derived from the northern and western areas of Europe; this was the "old immigration." Thereafter newcomers from southern and eastern Europe arrived, representing peoples who were very different in language, customs, political experiences, and personal standards of living. Italian, Greek, and the confusion of Slavic languages sounded strange indeed to ears attuned to English or Germanic sounds. Invidious comparisons were made. The "Nordic" was more akin to the American in blood; the "new immigrants" had not the Anglo-Saxon training in self-government, and they were merely birds of passage. Besides the fact that he spoke a strange language, the "new immigrant" was more often than not a Catholic. All these things set him apart from the "old immigrant." 53 The year 1873 saw the beginning of the flood. Even though the political, cultural, social, and economic causes were ripe for emigration, other causes operated to bring America to the attention of the hardpressed Slovak immigrants. The steamship company agents urged the peasants to emigrate, for the companies derived a large part of their income from transport of immigrants. In most countries there were laws prohibiting advertisements of prosperous conditions in another country. Two leading steamship companies were reported to have five or six thousand agents in Galicia alone. In Hungary, Immigration Commission members saw letters written by agents instructing prospective immigrants on how to leave the country without the government's consent, what routes to follow, and other related information. 54 Other agents who increased emigration from Hungary after 1870 were labor contractors, who came to hire workers for the mines and steel mills. These agents promised everything. Archduke Rudolph, they said, was living in South America, establishing there a new ideal state; immigrants to, �SLOVAKIA 13 the United States were to receive grants of land and aid in buying equipment and in constructing necessary buildings.55 Many peasants who went with the agents wrote back letters reporting high wages. These lett'ers were undoubtedly one of the most powerful means of persuading the Slovak peasants to cross the ocean. 56 In the earlier phases of immigration many emigrants returned to their native country after they had laid by a sufficiency of this world's goods. The figures given by the Hungarian government for emigration and return for the year of 1905 show the extent of this return movement and suggest the breadth of influence exercised by returning emigrants. In 1905 the Magyar figures list 38,770 as leaving the country, while they give 4,038 as returning to Hungary.57 The news of work and wages certainly had an effect in stimulating further emigration. The Slovak emigrants moved generally westward by rail for German or Dutch ports. During the years 1881-1900 some 372,979 Slovaks were reported to have passed through the port of Hamburg, whereas only 9,501 embarked from Italian ports. 58 During 1886-1907 the German ports handled 348,808 emigrants from Hungary, Antwerp 57,170, Dutch ports 33,762, and Italian ports 3,785. 59 The low cost of steamship crossing attracted many to undertake the difficult journey. Passage from Hamburg on the way out was $20; the return journey as far as Oderburg, a station on the Hungarian frontier, was $23.60. The Hungarian Government granted the Cunard Line the monopoly of transporting emigrants from Hungary. So great was the rush to America that the Cunard Line called on other companies and formed the "Continental Pool" to handle the traffic. This "Pool" provided the worst accommodations, the worst diet, and the worst navigation. 61 The journey's length varied from fifteen to sixty days. The emigrants fortified themselves against sea-sickness with prunes and brought their own supplies of sausage, bacon, plum brandy, and gin. Water was distributed only at intervals, sometimes only once a day. The ventilation in the living quarters was bad. 62 One emigrant described his journey in these words: "It was in the year 1883 that, with three men, I set out from Trebis ov for America. We got on a wagon that took us to Obisovce, �14 SLOVAKIA where we boarded a train and rode to Vrutky. There we obtained travel permits for Bohumfn, and from Bohumin to Bremen, where we boug1hit our steamship tickets, for which we paid 53 ,gold pieces. A chill comes over me even now when I think of that ship of ours. We were afloat almost 18 days and twice the shi p was in danger of sinking. Everything on the deck rwas broken, a nd water poured into it. And as the boat rocked, one could feel that even in one's s-tomach."63 Among the ports of entry New York easily ranked first for the Slovak immigrants; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Portland. 64 Nor did the ills of the immigrants cease when they landed in the United States. Often enough their meagre funds and they were quickly parted. One immigrant paid a fare of $60 for a ride from the harbor to the Lackawanna railroad station. Hotels deliberately detained the immigrants by telling them that the train to their destination made the trip only once a week. Other swindlers met the immigrants as they came ashore and offered to send a telegram to their relatives or friends for the price of twenty five cents ; needless to say, no telegram was sent, and the immigrants were only so much poorer. One porter kidnapped two young girls who ended in brothels.85 The Slovak immigrants of the 1880's were not the first Slovaks to set foot upon American soil. The very first Slovak to come to America, so far as we know, was Andrew Jelik, a tailor on a Dutch ship which sailed to America in 17541755. He did not remain in America and eventually died in Budin, Hungary, 1783.66 Another Slovak who had arrived in America in the eighteenth century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed at Baltimore in 1775. He was but an adventurer whose later career took him to Madagascar where he became king and where he also perished. 67 In the year 1800 a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit in Mexico City by making his confession in Slovak. 68 The first Slovak settlement was made in Philadelphia by drotari, wireworkers, in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street. 69 Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became a citizen in 1879. Making the trip back and forth across the ocean, he was h1 America twenty six times. He died in 1915. 70 In the wake of these individuals the larger numbers began to come, first, from eastern Slovakia, especially from the �SLOVAKIA 15 counties of Zemplin, Sari~, and Spis. 71 Between the years 18691890 the county of Spis lost 14% of her youths between 20 to 25 years of age, and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; Saris lost 34% of those between 20 and 25, 44 % of the men between 26 and 30. 72 Only after the eastern counties did the western ones take to emigration. To give exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 is impossible because prior to 1899 the immigration authorities counted the immigrants according to country of last residence, and many Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. Since 1899 the immigrants are counted according to race or language. Therefore the figures before 1899 do not give us exact data on Slovak immigrants; but according to Emily Green Balch the earlier immigrants from Hungary may be presumed to be Slovaks with some Jews and Magyars included. 73 In 1873 immigrants from Hungary numbered 1,300; in 1880 4,000 entered the United States, and in 1884 the number rose to 15,000. 74 The following table shows the total number of Slovaks coming into this country in the years 1899 to 1909: SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES Year ending June 30 Number 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 15,838 29,243 29,343 36,934 34,427 27,940 52,368 38,221 42,041 16,170 Source: Emily Green Balch, OUR (New York, 1910), P. 103. 22,568 SLAVIC FELLOW CITI ZENS In the period 1899-1910 the total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673; in this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. 75 Consideration of Table 5 shows that �Hl SLOVAKIA 1905 was the peak year for the Slovaks in which 52,368 of them were admitted. Numerically in the twelve years ending June 30, 1910 Slovakia ranked eighth among the nations providing immigrant material. 76 The rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; this was double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3), Croatian-Slovenians (13.1), and South Italians (11.9). The rate was the highest of any group. 77 Having arrived in the United States, the Slovak immigrants began to look for a place to live and to work. The first areas to draw them were the coal mine centers; only in the second instance did the Slovaks settle in the factory cities.78 One focus of settlement was the hard-coal area of northeastern Pennsylvania where the center was Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Before World War I the mines in this district employed 75,000 to 100,000 men; of this group 12% were Slovaks. 79 In the soft coal area of southwestern Pennsylvania Mt. Pleasant was the center of dispersion. From there the Slovaks moved northward to Latrobe or Greensburg, southward to Connellsville and Uniontown. The chief centers of Slovak settlement were: Alice, Standard, Bessemer, Bridgeport, Mammouth, Old Hecla, New Hecla, Calumet, Old Tarrs, Donnelly, Buckeye, Moyer, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Gayette City, Brownsville, Masontown, Fairchance, Point Marion, Cannonsburg, Perryopolis, Republic, and others. 80 Only later did pockets of immigrants form in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. About the geographic dispersion of Slovaks an interesting note occurs in a letter sent to the Jednota in 1913 by a J . P. Kapas, who had been traveling in the west. He wrote: "There had been plenty of Slovak people in the west, but almost all returned to the eastern states, and only for this r eason that in the west the people were all foreigners and wild." 81 Alaska seems to have been the limit of immigration, at least as far as the group was concerned. John Miklas, writing from Alaska, recommended against coming and said that he had not found any Slovaks there as yet. He surmised, however, that after his return from the "Old Country", where he meant to go for a visit, he might settle in Alaska.82 By 1885 large groups of Slovaks had settled in the fol- �SLOVAKIA 17 lowing states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois. 83 In the hard coal area in northeastern Pennsylvania a sub-employment system was used in which an operator hired the men who dug and loaded the coal; the mine company paid the operator and he paid off his hired men. The Slovaks, inexperienced in mine work and unskilled in language, worked merely as the hired men; this left them exposed to the wiles of unscrupulous operators who kept some of the pay from them. 84 In 1856 the Pennsylvania Railroad had reached Pittsburgh from Philadelphia; the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad in 1871 built tracks to Pittsburgh, thus giving Pittsburgh an outlet to Baltimore. The demand for laborers in the mine fields of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties in Pennsylvania was answered by many Slovak men from the hard coal area and "the old country." But who the first Slovak was to enter the Pittsburgh area we do not know. When the agents of the Frick Company from the coke and coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania hired new immigrants · at Castle Garden, but for trivial exceptions the hired men were Slovaks. The company transported them by rail to Alverton, lying between Scottdale and Mt. Pleasant, Pa. Thence they walked to Morewood, Pa., where a company house awaited them. It is impossible to tell how many Slovaks there were in the coke region. We do know that in Morewood by 1893 there were four hundred men engaged in work, and how many Slovaks there were in this group we do not know. As early as 1880 John and Sophia Hvizdo~ had eighteen Slovak boarders in their house. 85 Until 1900 Slovaks worked mostly in the coal mines and at the coke ovens of Frick and Company. This firm had been organized in 1871 as Frick and Company, with about 300 acres of coal area and 50 coke ovens around Connellsville, Pa. By 1889 it had about 35,000 acres and 15,000 coke ovens. The lowest paid worker in 1890 was the "yard worker" who earned $1.40 for a ten hour day; the best wages were paid the "road man" who received $2.10 for nine hours of work. 86 At first the Slovaks worked beside the Czechs in the coal mines, while the Poles worked at the coke ovens; but gradually, the Slovaks too began to work their way up to jobs at the ovens. �18 SLOVAKIA Most Slovaks were satisfied with their wages, which varied from $16.00 to $25.00 every two weeks. Strange as it may seem, it was possible to live and also to lay something by from these wages. A pound of beef soup meat cost three cents; for six dollars a man could dress himself rather well; rent cost three or four dollars a month for a small four room house. Nevertheless, not all miners were satisfied; demands were made for more pay and less work. When the mine operators refused, there were strikes, often riotous and bloody. 87 The Slovaks were also employed in the Egdar Thompson Iron Works of Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie with Frick employed the greatest number of Slovaks; others, like Rainey, Oliver, and Jones and Laughlin also engaged considerable numbers of Slovaks, but the number cannot be exactly stated. However, until 1900 most of the Slovaks worked in the mines and at the coke ovens.88 When the Slovaks got jobs in the mines, they lived in "company houses ",which were built practically at the site of the mine. This was a settlement of large houses built by the company and rented to the worker, who had also to pay for water, gas and coal. 89 To buy his food and other necessities the miner had to patronize the company store. This made the dependence of the worker on the comp:.my complete; the threat of expulsion during a strike was a powerful weapon in keeping the miners submissive. 90 The company r ented a house to a married couple on condition that they take in "boarders," the usual number being ten, but in the larger houses the number varied upward to thirty or forty. 91 The cleanliness d 2p::!nded on the character, ability, or sheer physical strength of the housewife. Within the household food arrangements provided that except for meat, flour, and coffee, the food was purchased in common. One meal a day wa:; eaten together, on Sunday at noon and during the week in the evening. For the other meals the gazdina or housewife cooked individually for the men whatever they bought. Beer by the barrel was also bought in common; sometimes this ran to a hundred barrels per month. At the end of the month the common bill was divided: the housewife did not pay; the men including the husband, paid equally, and two children were counted as one adult. 92 Moreover, on pay day several barrels of beer would be bought as well as whiskey, �SLOVAKIA 19 and much meat was prepared for a gay evening. At first, dancing was the chief recreation. One man pulled out an accordion, and the dancing began, even men dancing with men because of the shortage of women partners; frequently this mixure of drink, food, and music led to drunken brawls sometimes over the excellence of their home towns in Slovakia, often enough over women. Dancing was not limited to pay day; any celebration of even slight importance had to be combined with dancing and shouting of the most vigorous sort. The Cardas was a universal favorite. Family life was injured by many men coming to America without their wives and families and by the dearth of marriageable Slovak girls. To find a wife many young men on week ends went to Passaic, New Jersey, where many Slovak girls worked in the textile mills, and the men watched the girls as they came from work and made their choice. On Sundays in Passaic there often were ten to twenty weddings. Difficult as family life was, the "boarding house," allowing for so little privacy, did not help very much; sometimes it led to the wife's running off with a boarder. 93 Organizational life among the Slovaks began in the lodges and societies so common in America after the Civil War. By 1914 in the United States principal organizations had 15,600,000 members. Economic and social need led the Slovaks to form lodges. Mine disasters often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family not only destitute, but even without the money for a funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits a large number of societies grew up in industrial and .mining towns. The first of these was the Persi Uhorszko-Slovenszky v nemoczi podporujuci Szpolek, established in New York, on March 3, 1883. In this society, which lasted for eight years, Slovak was made the official language. Fraternal and mutual benefit iocieties mushroomed in the Slovak settlements. The Spolok Sv. Stefana in Passaic, N. J. was organized 1884 and already in 1887 was calling for a unification with other Slovak fraternal organizations. Under the influence of a Polish organization whose constituti-on it used, the Cirkevny a v ntmoci pl!>dporujuci spolok arose in Hazleton, Pa., in 1884. The Slovaks in Houtzdale, Pa., organized the Bratstvo Najsvatejsieho Srdca Pana Jezisa, on November 14, 1886; on December 12, 1884 the Spolok Sv. Stefana in Plymouth, Pa., came �20 SLOVAKIA into existence. A touch of humor accompanied the difficulties of the lodge in Bayonne City, N. J., where the Spolok Princa Rudolfa, set up in 1887, had to change its name after the tragic death of Archduke Rudolph of Hapsburg at Mayerling, because the other Slovaks ridiculed the members for having lost their patron. Bayonne City, N. J., had one of the largest mutual benefit societies, the Prvy bednarsky vypomocny spolok, an organization of Coopers engaged in making barrels, staves, chests, boxes; it was organized in 1888 and acted also as a bargaining agent for the membership with their employees. They were the first to have their own flag, whereas the other groups used the Hungarian flag. The Spolok Sv. Cyrila a Methoda in Minneapolis, Minn., and the Slovensky Spolok Sv. Petra i Pavla of McKeesport, Pa., both came into existence in 1888; the Slovensky v nemoci podporujuci spolok in Braddock, Pa., arose in 1889. The chief purpose of these societies was help in need, especially providing an elaborate funeral. In these funerals all the local lodges took part with flags, uniforms, and mourning bands. The secondary purpose was to aid in the organization of parishes, the building of churches and schools and lodge halls. 94 In spite of the success of these lodges, financial problems arose from the system of assessment which they used. The system required a contribution of about fourteen cents a month to meet administrative costs; on the death or sickness of a member the others had to contribute as much as would be needed for the stipulated sum. A considerable number of deaths or cases of sickness within a month or a short time made the financial burden too great for the small lodges. 95 The first appeal for unification came from the Society of St. Stephen in Passaic, N. J., as early as 1887. Julius Schwartz-Markovic in Nova Vlast' (a periodical that lasted only from March to December, 1888) made appeals for consolidation; Peter Rovnianek repeated this appeal in the October issue, as did B. Lajciak in the December issue. The Rev. Joseph Kossalko, a Roman Catholic priest of proMagyar conviction, seeing the nationalist tendency of these lodges in their use of Slovak as the official language and their gradual abandonment of the Hungarian flag, opposed this movement in a new periodical, the Zastava. The consolidation did not come until the 1890's. 96 When the Slovak immigrants, of whom the bulk was �SLOVAKIA 21 Catholic, first came to the United States, they were financially unable to build churches for their own use. Before the Slovak Catholics had their own churches, they attended Polish, German, Czech, or Irish churches; if they happened to be regular attendants at a church where their languago was not understood, they often went a considerable distance to receive the sacraments, especially that of Penance, from someone who understood their language. In the southwestern Pennsylvania mining area the Slovaks were fortunate to have in their midst St. Vincent's Archabbey, a Benedictine institution, which took special care to provide priests who could understand the Slovak language. Priests from this archabbey went from settlement to settlement taking care of the spiritual needs of the Slovaks. The first to do "mission" work among the Slovaks was Rev. Nepomuk Yaeger, O.S.B., who for three years in southwestern Pennsylvania visited the mining camps, where often enough he had to offer the· Mass to the accompaniment of card-playing, drunken singing, swearing and quarreling. 97 First to organize on a religious basis were the Slovak Lutherans. The first Lutheran parish was established in Streator, Illinois, where the church was ready for services on October 5, 1884. Karol Horak, ordained in 1883, was the first minister, but he gave up ministerial work and became a real estate agent. While the parish was withouth a minister's services, the Slovak Lutherans met in the home of Mr. G. Kozlej, who read the Bible to them. A minister, Cyril Droppa, reached Streator on March 26, 1884 and stayed there until 1887; eventually his spiritual labors took him to Russia. This first Lutheran parish had 49 members; the pastor's salary was fixed at forty dollars a month. The name of the parish was the Parish of the Blessed Trinity. Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa., and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minn., in 1888. 98 Almost simultaneously with the Lutherans, the Slovak Catholics organized themselves into parishes. However, before this could go on apace, priests able to speak Slovak were needed. Even among the first priests, 99 the division into Slo·vak nationalists and Madarones disturbed their relations with one another and their work among Slovaks, Protestant as _well as Catholics. In 1882 the Rev. Ignatius Jaskovic, who came to Hazle- �22 SLOVAKIA ton, Pa., was the first active Slovak Catholic priest in the United States. He built St. Joseph's church in Hazleton, where the first Mass was said on December 6, 1885. He stayed in Hazleton until 1890. The Rev. J. Kossalko, arriving in 1884, had his first parish in Streator, Ill.; he said the first Mass in the new church of St. Stephen on December 10, 1885, just four days after the first mass had been said in Hazleton, Pa. The Rev. Samuel Bella, also a Catholic priest, became the pastor of Nanticoke, Pa., and later of Bayonne City, N. J. These three priests were all Madarones, that is, Slovaks with pro-Magyar convictions, and firmly opposed to any Slovak nationalism. 100 This Madarone element introduced the first division of the Slovak group into the factions that played a part among the pre-World War Slovaks of America. In 1887 in Scranton, Pa., the Slovak Calvinists first organized as a religious group. The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa., had a chapel there since 1888, but the building of churches had to wait until the 189O's. To conduct services in their parishes the Calvinists hired Magyar and English ministers; the Slovaks and Magyars fought about the language to be used in the divine service, Slovak or Magyar. There was no general solution for these churches, but the language varied from church to church. 101 At first some Slovaks objected to building schools on the score of uselessness; these untutored peasants had to be taught that schools were important. Some Slovak immigrants had come to make money and were in America only temporarily. Schools meant permanence. Why should they contribute to the education of other people's chidren? However a beginning was made. St. Stephen's parish, Streator, Ill., built the first Slovak Catholic parochial school in 1889, a wooden structure, costing $4,500, a considerable sum for those days. From the very beginning the schools were not strictly Slovak, for there were not enough Slovak teachers; this led to many subjects being taught by "English" teachers and "Irish" nuns. Slovak nationalists were satisfied by having the pastor teach the children on Saturday afternoons, when they studied the Slovak language, Slovak history, and Slovak geography.102 The 11cattered Slovak settlements were brought in touch with one another by newspapers written in the Slovak language. John Slovensky, a trained teacher from Slovakia, had �SLOVAKIA 23 come to the United States in 1879, and had obtained a clerical job in the Austro-Hungarian consulate. This put him in contact with the Slovak immigrants, who came to the consulate often seeking information about conditions in the Monarchy, as for instance, was the Monarchy at war with the Turk? This suggested to Slovensky the idea of a Slovak periodical. In 1885 he launched a lithographed paper called Rulletin, which contained news from Europe and items about Slovak immigrants. Especially the tavern keepers subscribed to it for their taverns where Slovaks met to read it. Success prompted John Slovensky to embark on · a larger enterprise, the publication of Amerikanszko-Slovenszke Noviny. J. Schwartz-Markovic and the Rev. Erwin Gelhoff, a Catholic priest, published the Nova Vlast' in Streator, Illinois, in March 1888; this venture lasted only until December of that very year. The year 1889 saw the birth of two other newspapers, the Slovak v Amerike and Rev. J. Kossalko's Madarone newspaper, Zastava. 103 These newspapers became the sounding boards of popular opinion as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Discussion in the newspapers led to the consolidation of local lodges during the 1890's. With the beginning of the 1890's the Slovaks began to unify the many individual lodges into a federation for greater economic security. However, from the very start factions divided the Slovaks. The leaders of the Slovak immigrants disagreed on whether the principle of organization should be religious or nationalist. The Rev. Stephen Furdek, a Catholic priest, believed that the new national organization should be based upon religious uniformity within the organization; the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists should each have their own organization. Peter Rovnianek, a Slovak nationalist, wanted nationality to be the principle of organization. Any Slovak, no matter what his religious convictions or lack of them, could be a member. 104 Because of this difference of principle, two separate, and in many ways rival, organizations arose. On February 16, 1890, Peter V. Rovnianek led in founding the National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh, Pa. All Slovaks, Catholics, Protestants, Freemasons, Freethinkers or indifferentists, were welcome. Openly nationalist, the National Slovak Society played down religious differences, emphas- �24 SLOVAKIA izing all Slovaks were one. The frank nationalism and liberalism antagonized the Madarone Slovaks and some Catholici. The Rev. J. Kossalko, the most outstanding Madarone, refused absolution to Catholic members of the National Slovak Society. 105 Others besides the Madarone element opposed the liberal National Slovak Society. The Rev. Stephen Furdek established a Catholic fraternal organization, the First Catholic Slovak Union, September 4, 1890. The objectives of this First Catholic Slovak Union were to preserve the Catholic Faith, to support fellow-members, widows, and orphans in need, to preserve and extend the use of the Slovak language and Slovak nationality. Conditions of membership were recognition of the bishop of Rome as head of the Catholic Church, faithful performance of religious duties, attendance of one's children at a Catholic school, support of parish and parochial school, no ridicule of religious ceremonies, and no writing against the Church and the clergy. 106 Slovak women felt that they, too, should have their own organizations independent of male control. They established the Zivena Beneficial Society in the year 1891. In 1892 the Slovak Catholic women organized a similar society, the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union. 107 The Slovak Lutherans organized their own beneficial society in 1893, the Slovak Evangelical Union; and soon afterwards the Slovak Calvinists formed the Slovak Calvinist Union. 108 For reasons that are not evident, almost all these groups felt the strain of internal strife. A split in the First Catholic Slovak Union provided members for a new organization, the Pennsylvania Roman and Greek Catholic Union in 1893. This society intended to encourage religion, temperance, and morality, to train its members in obedience and respect for civil law and in performance of civil duties, to collect funds to pay burial benefits.109 In Chicago the local lodge of the National Slovak Society left the national organization and formed the Slovak National Society. 110 Later a similar break occurred in the Slovak Evangelical Union. In 1890 P. V. Rovnianek and his associates published the First Slovak National Almanac. Almanacs were already a Slovak European tradition. The National Slovak Society first issued its own almanac in 1893; and the First Catholic �SLOVAKIA 25 Slovak Union began its series with the Kalendar Jednota in 1896. These almanacs provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays on conditions in the United States, reviews of the year's important events, religious essays, articles on the Indians and Negroes, moral essays on how to spend Sundays, counseling articles on marriage, and almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. In these almanacs the best Slovak writers reached their limited Slovak American public; eventually the almanacs became so popular that ,twenty-nine were published. 111 Newspapers received the strongest impetus from the national societies. The Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny were the mouthpiece of the National Slovak Society; the First Catholic Slovak Union published an official organ, the Jednota. These were real newspapers with world news, reports from the domestic scene in America, and organization news in their columns. One feature distinguished these papers from the trend turning American newspapers into large business enterprises; the Slovak immigrant papers remained very much the voice of the individual editors. However, many Slovaks had no desire to read a newspaper. The editors, who usually combined editing with other work to earn their living, on Saturday and Sunday toured Slovak settlements to get subscriptions for their periodicals. 112 Very soon after the organization of the two fraternal societies the Slovaks learned how effective and necessary cooperation on a national level can be. When the price of steel billets began to fall, the Edgar Thompson Works in Braddock, Pa., announced a wage cut. This led to a strike late in 1890. On the night of January 1, 1891, Michael Quinn, a guard at the mill was slain. Many Slovaks were arrested, among them persons who had been strolling about after a pleasant evening in a tavern. The police arrested about sixty persons and charged them with being involved in the crime. Most of them received light sentences, but on April 8, 1891, Andrew Toth, Michael Sabol, and George Rusnak received the death sentence for the murder of Michael Quinn. Only by heroic efforts did the Slovak leaders and organizations secure on February 7, 1892 a commutation of sentence to life imprisonment. 113 The efforts of Rev. F. Wider, president of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Peter V. Rovnianek of the National �26 SLOVAKIA Slovak Society, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Julius Wolf, won the release of Michael Sabol, suffering from tuberculosis, in 1895; he died ten days after leaving prison. Peter V. Rovnianek, engaging a lawyer, Clarence Burleigh, secured the freedom of George Rusnak in 1897; George Rusnak, too, had tuberculosis. Andrew Toth left prison only twenty years later, a man sixty two years old. After the efforts of the Slovak League had failed, Edward Goehring, an attorney, succeeded in showing that the evidence which convicted Toth was contradictory. Toth was freed in 1911. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected a motion to give Toth $300.00 for every year he had spent unjustly in jail. However, the Carnegie Foundation fixed a grant of $40 a month on him. 114 During February, 1891, a strike against the firm of Henry Clay Frick, Frick and Company, bec:;_me general in the Connellsville, Pa., area of coke ovens and soft coal. By 1889 Frick had acquired 35,000 acres of coal area and 15,000 coke ovens and employed about 30,000 workers. Andrew Virostek, a worker in the Tip Top Mine and member of the United Mine Workers of America, threatened miners who loaded more coal than union regulations permitted. Then the company fired him. The union fought the mine operators over the dismissal, and by February a strike flared throughout the region. On April 2, 1892 when about five hundred miners attacked the Southwest Company shops in Morewood, Pa., three Slovaks, three Poles, and one Italian were shot to death. The state militia came in to restore order, and some men drifted to work. Frick hired Pinkerton detectives to expel the remaining strikers from the company homes. During the week of April 18, 1892 these detectives were to oust seven hundred families in Fayette county alone. When the agents began the evictions, a Slovak man and woman perished in the violence in Leisenring No. 3, two Slovak women were wounded at Adelaide, and at Trotter, sixteen men and thirteen women were shot. Then in the following month Frick began hiring Negroes and Italians to replace the Slovaks. 115 Julius Wolf and Peter V. Rovnianek figured secretly in the settlement of the strike. The Frick company paid them sums of money for persuading the miners to return to the pits. Unwisely, the two men discussed the deal in letters, �SLOVAKIA 27 which their enemies subsequently published. Slovak immigrant writing has branded these letters as the "Four Letters of Betrayal. " 116 The Slovaks' preoccupation with wages, bad housing, and mine disasters seem to have led to a decline in religious fervor. Causes suggested to explain the decline varied: nonconfessional schools, public schools, neglect by religious authorities, too great preoccupation with earning a living. 117 Evidence exists to show that some Catholics fell away. A "Home Mission among the Slavic Immigrants" in 1885 supported a Congregational Church in Cleveland; it also provided a Presbyterian Church in New York. 118 The effectiveness of these efforts among the Slovaks, it is impossible to judge. In Mt. Pleasant, Pa., a Slovak preacher came to the "Church of God" and succeeded in bringing at least 7 SloYak Catholic families into it. 119 Higganum, Conn., had a Slovak colony of about 20 families; some Slovak Catholics went to church only to keep their benefits in the Jednota; others were entirely indifferent, so far gone that they married in the Lutheran church, even though a Catholic priest was always available. 120 The namecalling contest between P. V. Rovnianek and the Rev. Stephen Furdek, unedifying as it was, certainly spread anti-clericalism among the nationalist element. This apparent religious decline should not blind us to the extensive church building activities of the Slovak immigrants during the 1890's. Frequently the construction of a church or organization of a parish began in cooperation with another national group, Poles, Croatians, Irish, or Germans; sometimes many different nationalities cooperated, Lithuanians, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Often cooperation failed, because each group felt its rights were ignored. 121 Still, for instance, at least eight new Slovak parishes were opened in the Pittsburgh diocese; and in Cleveland from St. Ladislaus' parish St. Martin's was created in 1893. 122 A Slovak parish was organized in Kangley, Ill., as a mission of the Streator congregation, in 1892. 123 The Slovak Catholics of Chicago finally got their own parish in 1898, the Roman Catholic Church of St. Michael the Archangel. 214 Expansion was the keynote. Just after the decade ended, in 1903, there were 78 Roman Catholic Slovak churches. 125 However, the Slovaks failed to build parochial schools; this had to wait for the next decade. �28 SLOVAKIA The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Blessed Trinity in 1893; in 1894 the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor and in that very year began teaching the children of the parish the Slovak language. 126 Hand in hand with progress in organization appeared the elements of culture. Such efforts as the organization of the First Catholic Slovak Band in Johnstown, Pa., in 1892, were only straws in the wind. The Rev. S. Furdek in 1893 led in a move to establish a cultural organization to be called the Matica Slovenska in memory of the Slovak cultural institution disbanded by the Magyars in 1875. It held a convention in Chicago, September 26, 1893, and was incorporated in Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1893. The Matica was to be a central organization to improve the cultural life of the Slovaks in Europe and America. On February 18, 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, not to be behind hand, organized a Majak, literarne kola, that is, the Beacon Literary Circle, partly in opposition to the Matica, although he fervently disavowed any such a purpose. The Majak's objectives were encouragement of Slovak literature and culture, establishment of a Slovak cultural press, and nationalist agitation. The Literary Circle began publishing the first Slovak literary "journal, a forty page periodical, Majak, literary, political, and nationalist. It survived only six months. Both these organizations failed, partly through division of effort, partly through lack of interest among the Slovaks. 127 During this decade another society arose in Chicago, the First Slovak Sokol. The Sokol groups were gymnastic societies with a planned program of calisthenics, track events, and eventually all sports. Just when the first Sokol group was organized is doubtful; one source says that the First Slovak Sokol was organized in Chicago in 1892128 ; another gives the date as 1895. 129 Whatever be the case, the Sokol developed into a federation national in scope. The Slovak Catholic priests, divided though they were on the question of Slovak nationalism, united in an organization known as the Society of Roman Catholic Slovak Priests in 1896. Peter V. Rovnianek originated another club in the same year, the first Slavonic Political Club with 100 members, and its influence was soon felt in politics. 130 Both of these organizations were successful, in contrast to the cul- �SLOVAKIA 29 tural societies; it seems that the early Slovak immigrants were not sufficiently interested to support purely cultural groups. The cultural society and literary circle failed because labor conflicts occupied the Slovaks' attention. The Connellsville mine region was again the scene of a strike and violence that began in April, 1894. On April 4 a Slovak was slain; two days later Joseph Paddock, chief engineer of Frick's company in Davison, Pa., was killed. Blame for this crime fell on the Poles and Slovaks and over a hundred were thrown into the Uniontown jail. The court sentenced John Husar to twelve years and Michael Furin to three years in prison. Violence continued: one Slovak was killed on the main street of Connellsville and two others in the rioting at Stickle Hollow around the Washington Coal and Coke shops. At the beginning of August most of the Strikers had returned to work, but about 5,000 Slovaks remained on strike. These gradually drifted back to work or abandoned the Connellsville mines. The Rev. Orbach, a Lutheran minister, founded a Slovak colony in Wisconsin; on September 4 about 300 Slovaks set out for Wisconsin. Another farm settlement originated from the Connellsville strike. Industrial life was, after all, strange to the Slovak; he had either been a small farmer, peasant, or agricultural worker in Slovakia. His interest in acquiring a farm remained; but he did not become a farmer immediately after he landed simply because he did not have the money to invest in such a project. 131 Besides, the city gave him the companionship he would not find on the farm. Still the desire grew to place as many Slovaks as possible on the land. In the summer of 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. btephen Furdek, Rev. Vaclav Panu~ka, and Rev. Alexander Dzubaj examined land in Arkansas near Grand Prairie; they intended to settle Slovaks on some 40,000 acres of land. Peter Rovnianek and Francis Pucher received a charter for the Slovak Colonization Company of Pittsburgh on September 24, 1894, the land was bought, and sales began. After the prospective settlers had saved enough money, they bought forty or so acre farms from the Slovak Colonization Company. The cost of land was $2 to $3 an acre. 132 �30 SLOVAKIA Slovak settlers established a farm community near Stuttgart, Arkansas, and named their community Slovaktown. The settlers had been born in the "old country" but came to Arkansas chiefly from the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois. The chief produce included corn, oats, hay, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. The children attended the public schools. The settlers were mostly Catholics, but there were a few Lutherans. 133 The new farmers in Slovaktown were more than satisfied with their new lives; their letters continually encouraged their fellow Slovaks to flee from the factories and the mines; but only in the 1900's did anything like a movement to the farm begin. To publicize the project and success of Slovaktown the Slovak Colonization Company began publishing a periodical, Slovaktownske Hlasy, in Pittsburgh in 1896; but it lasted only six months. 134 It might indeed have been well for the Slovaks to leave the mines and go to the farms, for violence once again found them; this time it was in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. One day in September, 1897 a group of strikers set out for Latimer. Sheriff Martin informed of the move, summoned his deputies and attempted to halt the men. Sharp words were exchanged, and Sheriff Martin ordered his deputies to fire upon the unarmed men. Twenty-one fell before the murderous gunfire and died; many others were wounded. Most of the victims were Slovaks. In spite of the unprovoked nature of the attack, the courts declared Sheriff Martin innocent, for he had ordered the shooting while performing his duty. The outcry against this verdict was most violent in the Slav press, but nothing further could be done. 135 Despite the internal dissensions among themselves and difficulties in the mines, a new interest appeared among the Slovaks during this decade; the most public manifestation of their nationalism came in 1899. Strange as it may seem, most Slovaks were not violent nationalists when they came to this country; the growth of nationalism was gradual and almost imperceptible. Slovak became the official language for the lodges; the societies abandoned the Hungarian flag. P. V. Rovnianek, joining the staff of the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny in 1889, infused �31 SLOVAKIA a nationalist spirit into that paper; his National Slovak Society was nationalist in principle. Rev. S. Furdek, whose nationalism was of a very moderate kind, wanted American Slovaks to Americanize themselves; but he also felt it their duty to help the oppressed Slovaks overseas. 136 Under the force of this nationalism the Slovak immigrants gradually became more interested in the fate of Slovakia. In 1899 Father Furdek sent a lengthy memorandum to the Hungarian government, discussing the "Slovak question", but to no avail, except the publicity which such a memorandum aroused. It effected nothing practical; but it was the shadow of coming events; for the "Slovak question", was in the next decades to assume first place among the Slovaks. As the nineties passed, the Slovaks had made solid progress. Their economic and social life had improved through the national fraternal societies, which by 1899 had become important factors in Slovak life. Their membership stood as follows: THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES Society Number of Members First Catholic Slovak Union __ _________ _ National Slovak Society _________ ___ ___ __ Pennsylvania Slovak Union ______ ___ ____ _ Evangelical Slovak Union ____ __ _______ _ First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union _____ _ iivena --------- --- -------------- -- ---Source: "Slovenske (1899), IV, 38. pomery v Amerike", KALENDAR 11,000 9,450 1,727 909 1,600 1,000 JEDNOTA The religious life of the Slovaks had a chance to develop now that churches had been built. For the Roman Catholics there were now in America 33 priests, and for the Greek Catholics 32; and more were needed. 137 However, not all the picture was bright. Indeed, these were the things the Slovaks needed; but it was only after 1900 that the advance in education, the business world, political life, became pronounced. FOOTNOTES 1. Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910), p. 86, pp. 88-89, p. 93. �32 SLOVAKIA 2. •F ranti§ek Hru§ovsky, Slovenske Dejiny (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939), p. 14. 3. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 4. I bid., p . 216. 5. Ibid., pp. 342-S43. 6. Joseph S,k ultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middl etown, 1'930), pp. 106-109. 7. I bid., pp. 109-110. 8. Frantisek •Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia (Scranton, 1953) , p . 40. 9. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 10. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Scranton, 1947), p. 28 . 11. Thomas Capek, The Slovaks of Hungary (New York, 1906), p . 108; 1Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia, pp. 44-46. 12. Frantisek :J3okes, Dejiny Slovenska i Slovakov (;Bratislava, 1946), p . 158. 13. Robert A. ,Ka,nn, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National 'Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914 (New York, 1950), I. 278. 14. Frantisek iHrusovsk y, This Is Slovakia, pp. ,47-48. 15. Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 107. 16. Ibid., p. 108. 17. Ibid., p. 59 . 18 . R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. , Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 244-245. 19. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. ·65 . 20. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 245. 21. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p . 64 . 22. Bokes, Deji ny Slovenska, p. 158. 23. C. J . Stree t, Slovakia: Past and Present (Westmins,ter, n.d .), p. 24. 24 . •Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 96; Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. 323. 25. ,Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 166. 26 . Jirusovsky, Dejiny, p. 252. 27. Ibid., p. 325. 28. Ib i d., p. 319. 29. I bid., p. 319. 30. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 117. 31. Seton•Watson, Slovakia, pp. 117-118. -3•2. I bid., p. 119. 33. I bid., p. 118. 34. Hrus ovsky, Dejiny, pp. 320-321; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 272-273 . 35. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 176. 36 . Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. -329 . 37. Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 276. 38 . Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 150. 39. Jaszi, The Dissolution, p. 222. 40 . Ibid., p . 223 . 41. Street, •Slovakia: Past and Present, p. 56. 42. Harrison 'Thompson, Czechoslovakia in Europe (Princeton, 194-1) , p. 294. 43. Jaszi, The Dissolution, pp . 196-199. H. Ibid., p. 238. 45. Ibid., p. 231. �SLOVAKIA 33 46. F. J . Hask in s, The Immigrant: An Asset and a Liab ility (New York , 1913) , p . 35. 47. Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p . 162. 48. I b id., p. 156. 49. Seton-Watso n , Slovakia, p. 275. 50. Ibid., p. 276. 51. Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 152. 52. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, A u g u st 19, 1897. 53. Geor ge Stephen son , A H istory of American Immigrat ion 18201924 (New Yor k , 1926), P. 61; Carl W ittk e, We Who Built Amer ica (New York , 1939) , p. 405. 54. J eremiah J enk s a nd W. Jebt Lau ck , The Imm igration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs (New York, 1922), pp. 21-22. 55 . Konstantin Culen, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (B r atislava, 1942), I , 38; Caspar Molch an, "Th e Developmen t of the S lovak Community in Pittsburgh 1880-1920", (Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, U n iversity of Notr e Dame, 1948), p. 23. 56. Cul en, Deji ny, I, 38; Stephenson , History of Ame ri can I mm igrat ion , p. 89. 57. Balch , Slav ic Fellow Citizens, p . 102. 58. I bid., p. 25. 69. I b id., p. 437. 60. I bid., p. 101. 61. Culen, Dejiny, I, 60-61. 62. Ibid., I, 67. 63. Ibid., I, 67-68. ~4. Ibid., I, 60. 65. Na rodn e Noviny, Ap ril 9, 1914. 66. Cule n , Dejiny, I, 24-25. -67. Ibid., I , 26; Molchan, "Development of the S lovak Community" , p. 8. 6'8. Konsta'!lltfn Cu len, Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsaf rocn a (Scr anton , 1947). p. 4. 69. Cul e n , Dej i ny , I, 28. 70. Ib id., I , 28-29. 71. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Comr;mnity", p. 25. 72 . Capek, Slovaks of Hunga r y , p. 156. 73. Balch, Sl a vic Fe ! low C itizens, p. 100. 74. Ibid , p. 100. 75 . William P. Dillingham, Reports of the Immigration Commision, Vol. I: Abs t racts of Reports of Immigration Commision (Washington, D . C., 1911), I, 97. 76. I b id., I, 215. 77. Ibid., I, 277. 78. J. A. F., "Nacrtok Dejin Slov. prist'ahovalectva v Amerike", Sborn ik Narodn e ho Slovenske ho Spolku (1915), I, 12. 79. Culen, Deji ny , I, 96. 80. Ib id ., I. 96; Jos e ph Kushn e r, Sl ov a c i ka tol ici pi t t sbu-rghsk e ho b is kupstv a (Passaic, 19 -16), pp. 16-17 ._ 81. J ednota , March 19, 1913. 82. Na rodn e Noviny, May 26, 1910. 83. Culen, Dejiny, I, 99. 84. Kushner, S lov a ci, p. 6. 85. Ibid., p. 12, p. 16. �34 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. l09. ll0. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 7. I bid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. Narodne Noviny, March 12, 19·1.!; April 27, 1911. Narodne Novlny, March 12, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 82-83. Ibid., I, ·82-831; J. A. F., 'INe.crtok Dejin", Sbornik, (1915), I, 11. Culen, Dejiny, I , 82-83; "Jedno-druhe", Narodny Kalendar, (1908), XVIII, 154. Culen, DeJiny, I, 195-199. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 81. Culen, Dejiny, I, 200. Kushner, Slov;ici, pp. 13-14; Jednota, July 15, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 111-114. Culen, Dejiny, I, 108. I bid., I, 111. Ibid., I, 114-115. Ibid., 1, 115; Kon§tantin Culen, Slovaci v Amerike (Tur~lansk:r Sv. Martin, 11138), pp. 384-385. Culen, DeJlny, I, 213-214. Culen, Dejiny, I, 202. Ibid., I, 208-209. Ibid., I, 207-208. Souvenir Program: 19th Regular Convention, The National Slovak Society, (Young~town, 1946), p. i>4; P. V. Rovnianek, "Slovenslce organ!zacie v Amerike", World's Fair -Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (,Chicago, 1933), p . 67 . IP. V. Rovnlanek, op. cit., pp . 67-68. Pennsylvanska Slovenaka Jednota (Wilkes-Barre), June 24, 1943. Jaroslav ·Pelikan, "Cesi a .Slovacl v Chicagu ", World's Fair Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (Oh!cago,1933), p. 9•. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 162. Culen, Dejiny, I, 214-215. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 10; Molchan, ''Development or the Slovak Community", p . 48. Kushner, Slovacl, pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 8. Culen, Dejlny, I, 138-139. :Fr. Sasinek, "Mysllenky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakm!", Kalendar Jednota, (1,8 97), II, 139-140. Narodne Novlny, August 11, 1910. !Kushner, Slov;icl, p. 21. Jednota, March 4, 1914. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 22; Michael J . Hynes, History of the Dioceae of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953), p. 1'53. Hynes, Diocese of Cleveland, p . 255. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 41. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 41. Kalendar J.ednota, (1903), VIII, 210-211. Jaromir Psenka a Jan Pelikan, "<'.:es! a Slovac! v Chicagu", World's Fair Memorial, p . 95 . <'.:ulen, DeJiny, I, 222-227. Pellkan a Paenka, "Cesl a Slovacl v Chicagu", World's Fair Memor ial", p. 94. �35 SLOVAKIA 1211. Joseph Cermak, "·Physical Education among the Czechs and SloTaks", World'• Fair Memorial, p. 44 . 130. Molchan, "Development o! the Slovak Community", p. 67. 131. 1Narodne Noviny, July 17, 1113. 132. Narodne Noviny, May 5, 1910. 133. Kushner, Slovaoi, p. 9; Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, pp. 337-33·8. 134. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p . 115. 185. Culen, Dejlny, I, 162-18'3; Amerlkansk0-Slovenske Novlny, Feb· ruary 5, 1898. 136. Kalendar Jednota, (1899), IV, 37-41. 137. "Slovenske pomery v Amerike", Kalendar Jednota (1899), IV, 39-40. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS U. S. Bureau o! Census Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population Statistics, Vol. I. Washington : Government Printing omce, 1913. U. S. Congress. Senate Documents. 61 Cong., 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing O!f!ce, 1911. Vols. XI and XX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Jednota (Middletown., Pa.), Vols. XXI-XXII (19113cl9H). Kalendar Jednota. Middletown: The First Cathol!c Slovak Union. Vols. I-XXI (1896-1915). Kalendar Narodneho Slovenekeho Spolku. Plit.ts·burgh: National Slovak Society. Vols. XX-XXIV (1912-1!116). Narodne Noviny (Pittsburgh, Pa.), Vols. I·V (1910-1914). SECONDARY SOURCES - BOOKS Abbot, Edith. Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1924. Balch, Emily Green. Our Slavic Fellow Citi.aiens. New York: Charities Publication Company, 11110. Bokes, Frantisek. Dejiny Slovenska t Slovakov. Bratislava: SloTenska Akademia Vied a Umeaii, 1946. Capek, Thomas. The Slovaks of Hrungary, Slavs and Panslavism. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1,906. Culen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike. 2 vols. Bratislava: Matica Slovenskii., 19 42. Culen, Konstantin. Slovaci v Amerilc:e: Crty z kulturnych deJfn. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. Culen, Konstantin. Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna. Scranton : Obrana Press, Lnc., 19,47. Eaton, A. H . Immigrant Gifts to American Life. New York: Russell Sage Foundati,m, 1933. Fairchild, Henry 0. (ed .). Immigrant Backgrounds. New York: Wiley and Sons, lnc., 1927. • Yairchild, Henry 0. (ed.). Immigration: A World Movement and its American Significance. New York: The Mcmillan Company, 1926. i'aulkner, Harold U. The Quest for Social Justice, 189-8-1914. Vol. XI or Hi-story o! America12 Life. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger �36 SLOVAKIA and· Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols . Ne1v York : Macmillan Company, 1931. Handlin, Oscar. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Cam bri dge: . The H arvard Un iversity Press, 1940. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Immigrant in American History. Cambridge : The Harvard Univer sity Press, 1940. Hrusovsky, F rantisek . Slovenske Dejiny. Turcian sky Sv. Martin: Matica Slove'nska, 1939. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. This is Slovakia. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1953. Hynes, Michael J. History of the Diocese of Cleveland. Cleveland : Diocese of •Cleveland, 1953. Jaszi, O'scar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929. Jenks, Jeremiah W. and Lauck, W . Jett. The Immigration Problem . New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 19 22 . Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York: The Columbia U niversity Press, 1950. Kushner, Jos eph. Slovaci katolfci pittsburghskeho b iskup:::tva. P as saic: The Slovak Catholic Sokol, ·1946. Nev ins, Allan. The Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878. Vol. VIII of A History of American Life. Edited by Ar t hur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. . Orth, Samuel P. Our Foreigners: A Chronicle of J).mericans in the Making . Vol. 35 of the .Chronicles of America. Edited by ;\llen Johnson, 56 vols. New Haven ·: Yale University Press, 1920. · Park, •Robert. The lmmigran_t Press an~ its Control. New York: Harper and Bro-thers, 1922. Pauco, J oseph. l.!.udovychova u Sturovcov: Obdobie Slovenskych Na rodnych Novin. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943. Purcell, William J. (ed.). Catholic Pittsburgh 's One Hundred Years. Chicago: Loyola U n iversity Press, 1943. Seton-Watson , R . W. Racial Problems in Hungary. London: Constable, 1908. Seton-Watson, R. W. (ed.). Slovakia Then and Now. Prague: Orb is Publishing Company, 1931. Shaugnessy, . Gerald. Has t he l.mmigrant Kept the Faith ? New York:: The Macmillan Company, 1925 . · Sidor, Karol. Andrej H linka, 1864-1926. Bratislava: St. Andrew's. Press, 1934. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown: The First Catholic Slova~ Union, 1930. Stephenson, George M. A History of American Immigration, 18201924. Boston: Ginn Publishing Company, 1926. Street, C. J.C. Slovakia: Past and Present. Westminster: P . S. Kingston and Son, Ltd., n. d . Tarbell, Ida. The Nationalizing of Business, 1878-1898. V ol. IX of A 'History of Ameri can Life. Edited by Arthur -M. Schlesinger and Dixo~ Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. �SLOVAKIA 37 Thompson, S. Harrison. Czechoslovakia in European History. Princeton: The Princeton U niversity Press, 19-44. Wittke, Carl. We Who Bui It America: The Saga of the Immigrant. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks: Their History and Trad itions. Revised edition. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. ARTICLES F., J. A. "Nacrtok dejin s lov. prisfahovalectva v Amerike", Sbornik Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 20-39 . Jamar ik, Paul. "Zivot Americkych .Slovakov dakedy a teraz_" , Sbornik Na rodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 98-109. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sborn ik Slovensk e ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX. Shipman, Andr ew J . "Slavs ~-n America", The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV (1913). 51-57. Stephenson, George M. "Immigration", Dictionary of American History, III (1940), 73-75. "The Slovak Sokol", Sborn ik S lovenske ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 242-243. Timasheff, Nicholas. "Education", Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by Joseph .S. 1Roucek. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949, pp. 261-269. Ware, Caroline. "Immigration", Encyclopedia of Soc ia l Sc iences, VII (1932), 587-595. World 's Fair Memorial of the Czechos lo va k Group. Chicago: Czechoslovak Group, 1933. Bradac, John S. "Slovenski Evanjelici-Luterani v Spojenych Statoch", pp. 81-83. Cermak, Joseph. "Physical Education among the Czechs and Slovaks in America", pp. 42-45. ·· Pelikan, J. and Psenka, R. Jaromir. "Cesi a Slovaci v Chicagu", pp. 89-97. Rovnianek, Peter V. "Slovenske organizacie v Amerike", pp. 66-68. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Gregorovic, Sister M. Counsuela, SS.C.M . "Father Jankola's Con tribution t0 Catholic Education in America". Unpublis hed Master of Arts dissertation. History Department, Catholic University, 1943. Molchan, Caspar, C.S.C . "The Development of the Slovak Comqiunity in Pittsburgh, 1880-1920". Unp ub lished Master of Arts di sserta·,£ion. History Department, U niversity of Notre Dame, 1948. · Stefan, Sister M. Leocadia, SS.C .M. "The Reverend Stephen Furdek" . Unpublis-h ed Master of Arts dis se r tation. History Depar tment, Catholic University, _ 1952. Teplicky, Sister M. Berchmans, SS .C.M. "Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cy,ril and Methodius". Unpublishe d Master of Arts diss ertation. Education Department, Marywood College, 1945. � SLOV AKIA Pub lished by the Slovak League of America VOL XV 1965 NO. 38 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE SLOVAKS IN AMERICA By James J. Zatko, Ph.D. , University of Notre Dame Occupying the area enclosed by the Carpathian mountains, the Danube River, and the Theiss River, the Slovaks to the number of two million or 12% of the total population of Hungary, eked out a meagre existence between the two rivers and the mountains. Because the Slovaks had to struggle for a living, men and women were inured to hard work and to a very low standard of living. Their facial features form two general types: the round-faced with wide-set eyes, and the long-headed narrow face with a long nose. The people live in villages consisting of long, low brick or wood houses with hand-made shingles. The interiors were generally neat and tidy, even where there was an earthen floor. 1 Slovakia itself is a geographic unit, whose northern boundary runs along the Carpathian mountains, and whose southern boundary is the Danube River and the Theiss River, which cut deep valleys and ravines through the mountain ridges. The land is divided in the west by the streams flowing to the Danube, by those flowing to the Theiss in eastern Slovakia, with a central Slovak upland lying between. 2 The area consists of about 18,895 square miles of mostly agricultural land, but the land is not the best for cultivation, much of it being woodland and the rest not very fertile. Bratislava was the capital, the ancient coronation city of Hungarian Kings before Budapest, and a great Danubian river port at the cross-roads of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Other important cities in Slovakia are: Trnava in western Slovakia, Nitra in west central Slovakia on the river Nitra, Zilina in northern Slovakia on the river Vah, Turciansky Sv. Martin in north central Slovakia, Zvolen in central Slovakia, and Kosice in eastern Slovakia. 3 Within Slovakia itself population shifted during the �2 SLOVAKIA fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by occupying the northern highlands in Slovakia. The villagers of the central plain and the river valleys created new settlements especially in Orava in the north, Trencin in the west, Zvolen in the central portion; the new settlers on the Carpathian mountainsides began to engage in animal husbandry, especially sheep-raising. 4 At the end of the seventeenth century an emigration strictly so-called began. Only individuals and very small groups left the recently settled highlands at first. The saffron-dealers and dealers in medicinal oils from Turiec county in north central Slovakia carried their home products all over eastern Europe, crossed Asia, as far as the Pacific coast of Siberia. In the business they established in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Siberia, they often employed their own countrymen. Weavers from Orava county in the north and lace makers from the Hron River region sold their wares in Hungary and central Europe generally. Menders with wire and glaziers from Trencin county in the northwest of Slovakia wandered throughout central Europe; the more enterprising settled in Germany and Russia. From the eighteenth century, after the Turk had been expelled from central and southern Hungary, the poverty stricken of Slovakia began to migrate into Hungary in quest of lands and helped to repopulate the area as well as to restore its economic productivity through agriculture. Thus did Slovak settlements originate in Hungary, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and the Banat. 5 The poverty which accelerated this new shift in population was caused by a decline in economic and commercial activity in Slovakia itself. Early in the eighteenth century there had still been considerable export of cattle and wine from Nitra and Bratislava counties, production of cloth in Myjava, forestry and river traffic, mining and textile production. Although Maria Theresa favored Austrian industries against those of Hungary, only during the reign of Joseph II did non-Slovak manufacturers begin to compete effectively with native products; and the soil in Slovakia was insufficient to provide a livelihood for the Slovak masses. 6 A migration began from the Slovak counties across their southern borders into Hungary. In 1787 eleven counties in Hungary had a population of 1,537,969, whereas the counties in Slovakia had 1,535,480. Sixty years afterwards the Hun- �SLOVAKIA 3 garian counties had in 1848 a population of 2,844,830 and the counties of Slovakia had a population of 1,910,000. In 1787 Budin in Hungary had a population of 23,000 and Pest in Hungary, had only 16,000; Presporok in Slovakia had 29,000 and Banska Stiavnica in Slovakia had 24,000. After 83 years, in 1870, the population of Banska Stiavnica had declined to 12,000. 7 This decline in population, as the figures above indicate, extended to the period of the great exodus to America after 1873. As in the migration to Hungary, so in the modern migration to America economic conditions provided the main force that helped to empty Slovakia, but there were other causes, namely, political, social, and economic. The political ambitions of the Slovaks were closely linked with the rise of nationalism in Slovakia, which developed from three factors, contemporary trends of thought in Europe, outside pressure by the Magyars, and Slovak internal life itself. A conviction developed in the people that the country which they occupied was their own and that within it they had rights not to be contravened by any power. This thought was emphasized in a book by John Baltazar Magin who spoke in 1728 of the rights of the Slovak nation . Memories of Slovak antiquity began to be revived. George Papanek published Of Slovak Kings and K ingdoms in 1780; George Sklenar in 1783 wrote of the glories of Greater Moravia, and in 1793 George Fandli published a revision of Papanek's book. The Slovak poet John Holly portrayed the events of the Slovak past in an epic Sviitopluk (1833), in his book Slav (1834), and in Cyrilo-Methodi ada (1835)8 These writings prepared the ground for further studies in the Slovak language. During the Reformation the Czech language had spread in Slovakia among the Slovak Protestants ; but it remained a foreign language in Slovakia. This led to the cultivation of Slovak as the particular language of the Slovak nation. Matthew Bel-Funtik (1687-1749) wrote of the Slovak language that "in no respect does it fall behind the ponderousness of Spanish, the charm and smoothness of English, the richness and emphasis of German, the softness and tenderness of Italian or the imperious sternness of Magyar." Since the Slovaks had no national literary medium as late as the end of the eighteenth century, Anton Bernolak created a national literary language based on the western �4 SLOVAKIA or Trnava dialect. In 1787 he published a grammar of literary Slovak and later also published a six volume SlovakCzech-Latin-German-Magyar dictionary. 9 The greatest writer of the "Bernolakian" school was John Holly, who is described as "in the fullest sense the awakener of national consciousness by right of actualizing what others had planned and dreamed of." 10 Even though a considerable school of "Bernolakian" writers developed, the western Slovak dialect failed to become the national idiom. Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) together with the Lutheran pastors Joseph Miloslav Hurban (18171888) and Michael Miloslav Hurban established the definite form of literary Slovak, based upon a dialect spoken in the eight central counties. Together they founded a literary and publishing society, Tatrin (1844), and began to publish the political journal Slovenske narodnie noviny (1845), and the literary monthly, Slovenske pohl'ady (1846). The use of the Slovak language became an essential demand in Slovak political agitation. In May of 1848 the Slovak nationalist leaders met in the rectory of Michael Miloslav Hodza in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, where they drew up a political program for the Slovaks: "Petitions of the Slovak Nation." They expressed no desire to break away from the Hungarian state; they wanted defined boundaries for Slovak lands, social, political, cultural equality of Slovaks with Hungarians, and official recognition of the Slovak language. When the leaders planned to submit this program for the approval of the Slovak people, the Hungarian government forbade Slovak assemblies and imprisoned the Slovak leaders. 11 The hand of Eudovit Stur was obvious in the program. Already in 1847 he had listed these grievances: manorial courts, maldistribution of public offices, lack of uniform taxation, need of reform in the judicial system, insufficient freedom of the press and speech; he also demanded the use of the Slovak language in schools, churches, and courts. 1 z With the demands of Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas ignored and then repressed, the Slovaks took to revolutionary activity against the Hungarians. Since their only hope of relief lay with the central government at Vienna, they threw in their lot with the imperial forces of Habsburg against the �SLOVAKIA 5 revolution of Kossuth. After the prostration of Magyarism through Russian intervention in 1849, the Slovaks were prepared to accept a limited territorial sovereignty from the imperial government; but even though the assimilative policy of the Magyars was suspended, centralization, not autonomy, remained the order of the day. In the Spring of 1861 the Slovaks renewed their political activity. After their political principles had been published in the newspapers, an assembly was called to meet in Turciansky Sv. Martin. The prominent attorney Stephen Marko Daxner formulated the political program: recognition of the Slovak nation by imperial edict, the constitution of Slovakia as a distinct administrative unit in Hungary, the right of Slovaks to develop their own life without restriction. This "Memorandum of the Slovak People" was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph; the only result was that the Slovaks were allowed to establish the cultural institution, the Matice, Slovenska. 14 Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 forced a settlement with the Magyars. Known as the Compromise of 1867, it granted Magyars internal independence and divided the Empire into two countries under one crown. The Compromise of 1867 and the dualistic sys.tern based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitation, in order to secure its own hegemony against tbe will of the Slav majority.15 Jaszi observes that this artificial dualistic system could be maintained only "by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine." 16 The political injustices after 1867 should therefore be considered not only against a background of Magyarization but also seen as a means used to preserve the structure of the dual monarchy. The electoral laws and improper representation in the Hungarian parliament were among the grievances. For instance, in the 58 electoral areas inhabited by Slovaks for the most part, these deputies were elected: �6 SLOVAKIA ELECTION OF DEPUTIES 1865-1881 Year Magyar Deputies 1865 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 58 58 56 58 58 58 Slovak Deputies 0 0 2 0 0 0 Source: C. J. Street, HU GARY AND DEMOCRACY (London, 1923), PP. 57-58. The constituencies and polling stations were so arranged that Magyar communities were assured of easy access •to the poll, while non-Magyar communities had ,to travel great distances. It wa-s no uncommon trick for the local authorities to declare roads and bridges unsafe for traffic on the day of election, or for all the hors es in non-Magyar districts to be placed under veterinary supervision and forbidd en to move outside the commune.17 The Slovaks had grievances against the judicial system. Until 1871 the judicial and administrative spheres were not separated. In that year judicial reform was inaugurated. Criminal and civil cases were dealt with in the District and Sedrial courts as the first instance, the Tables as the second, and the Royal Curia in Budapest as the final one. 18 The Slovaks complained too that the nationality of the legal officers did not correspond to the national distribution of population. In 1910 there were 2,633 judges and official lawyers in Hungary; 2,601 were Magyars, 31 Germans, 1 Slovak. This was the proportion of legal officers in a country where the Slovaks formed 12 % of the population.19 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the law of Nationalities (1868) admitted other languages to court, 20 the law remained a dead letter, for summonses were issued in Magyar, and verdicts given in Magyar, and the need of an interpreter was disregarded. 21 Slovaks also called for freedom of the press. 22 Between 1905 and 1908 there were 43 court actions against fourteen Slovak newspapers ; sentences totaling eleven years and three months were imposed as well as fines totaling 11,000 crowns for Pan-Slavistic activities. 23 Besides these unsettling political factors, other social causes added to the sense of national frustration. �SLOVAKIA 7 At the basis of the cultural conflict was the idea of the Magyar state. The law of Hungary recognized only one nation in Hungary, and that was the Magyar. To be secure, Hungary had to be Magyar. The objective of political action became to create one nation, Magyar in sentiment and speech, from the multinational and polylingual Hungarian lands. 24 This ideal was pushed by every means: newspapers, the society for the Magyarization of Proper Names founded in 1880, and 1898 law to give all towns Magyar names; suppression of the Slovak language in rail, postal, and telegraph service. 25 As one reaction against the process of forcible assimilation, the Slovak sought comfort and national security in Pan-Slavism. Having become conscious of the larger Slav community, the Slovak nationalist leaders shook off their feeling of inferiority and began to place their hopes of realizing national ideals in the larger Slav group. 26 The Hungarians reacted by denouncing as Pan-Slav any Slovak who refused to renounce his nationality and language. 27 The chief means of transforming Slovaks into Magyars were to be the schools. After the Compromise of 1867, an attack was launched against German, Slovak, and Ruthenian schools. Bela Grunwald in 1873 began publishing Svornost', a bi-monthly, attacking the Slovak gymnasia as hot-beds of Pan-Slavism. 28 The gymnasium at Revuca was closed August 20, 1874; the one at Klastor pod Znievom, on September 21, 1874; and the one at Turciansky Sv. Martin, on December 30, 1874. 29 All Slovak elements were expelled from secondary and technical schools, and permission was refused to erect a chair of Slovak at the University of Budapest.30 The school statistics reveal this Magyarizing tendency: SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA 1910-1918 Schools Primary Grammar Indus., Comm., Agric. Teacher training Middle (High Schools) University Magyar Slovak German 3,777 101 118 419 20 39 �8 SLOVAKIA Source: Nicholas Timashe!f, PEDIA (1948), p. 262. "Education," SLAVONIC ENCYCW- The official statistics of the Hungarian government in 1914 reveal the extent of Magyarization. They list 256,020 children of Slovak language as attending school. Of these, 214,267 Slovak children were in purely Magyar elementary schools, and only 42,186 in 365 Slovak elementary schools. 31 Educational standards were low. Attendance was weakly enforced; in most villages the schools remained open for five or six months per year. In 1913, just before World War I, 32,700 Slovak children of school age were not enrolled.32 Naturally the results were bad. Those able to read and write averaged 63 per cent of the Slovak population; but individual counties had worse records. In the county of Saris, only 48.6 per cent, in Spis 58 per cent, in Zemplin 51.4 per cent, in Ung 43.5 per cent could read and write. 33 The Matica Slovenska or Slovak Institute, a national cultural society founded in 1863, was dissolved in 1875. The charges were unlawful political activity and mismanagement. The government seized not only money and property but also the library and museum. 34 Even the churches were made instruments of Magyarization. The religious history of the period 1867-1914 is dark, indeed. Bishop Parvy of Spis lived in Budapest for many years; Bishop Balasz of Roznava ignored everything Slovak as though it were non-existent. The Cardinal-Primate of Hungary, Czernoch, was of Slovak birth, but Magyar in thought and sentiment. 35 Often other priests felt their people's cultural humiliation and endeavoured to alleviate it, but were placed so that their influence was limited. The Lutheran General Assembly resolved against "Pan-Slavism" in 1882; in no district did the Slovak Lutherans have a majority.36 However, the chief reasons for Slovak emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century seem to have been economic.37 The predominantly agricultural nature of the country's economy is best illustrated by the following chart on agriculture: �SLOVAKIA 9 POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 1910 Total Population in 1,000 Austrian Provinces Counties of Hungarian Crown Bosnia and Herzogovina Total Total engaged in Agriculture in 1,000 Agricultural Percentage 28,572 13,842 48.5 % 20,886 13,470 64.5% 1,932 1,674 86.6 % ----------------- - -- - -- - ----- --- - --51,390 28,982 Source: Oscar Ja,szi, THE DIS,SOLUTION MONARCHY (Chicago, 1929) p. 195. 56.4 % OF THE IHABSBUHG The soil was not of the best quality. Woodland averaged about 15 per cent of the total. In Turiec county 33 per cent was unfit for cultivation; in Orava, 30 per cent; in Zvolen, 32 per cent; in Liptov, 41 per cent; in Novohrad, 26 per cent; in Gerner, 47 per cent; Spis, 37 per cent; in Saris, 43 per cent. In Orava county there were 2761 farms that averaged one to five acres; of this land only 43 per cent was arable. 38 In addition to the problem of poor soil, there existed the problem of the great estates. Speaking of Hungary in general, Jaszi says that 40 per cent of the total area of Hungary was occupied in 1913 by a small number of large and very large estates. The medium sized farms of 142 to 1,420 acres embraced a smaller area, but with the greater estates covered 54.4 per cent of the total territory. Over 64.4 per cent of the country was possessed by small farmers holding less than 142 acres. Moreover, only 34.5 per cent of Hungarian territory belonged to those who actually cultivated the soil. 39 In Hungary proper, without !Croatia, there lived 2,280,000 farmer families. According to the most optimistic calculation only 460,000 families owned property on the average above 20 acres, guaranteeing an independent livelihood, whereas 1,820,000 families, that is to say four fifths of them possessed only so-called "dwarf" properties or no property at all.40 �10 SLOVAKIA If we consider the situation of Slovakia in particular, an equally cheerless picture presents itself. In Slovakia 1,000 persons owned 2,100,000 hectares, that is, about 8,000 square miles; 21.5 per cent of the holdings were less than a half hectare in size; 41 75 per cent of the land was held by the great landlords. 42 The agricultural areas compared unfavorably with the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrialized parts did not exceed three-tenths of the entire territory of the Monarchy, whereas over seven-tenths were populated by peasants, poor, almost on the level of slow starvation. 43 One way to raise the peasant's standard of living was to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and the growth of crops. Between 1850 and 1895 there was progress in agricultural production. Improvements were made in Hungary after 1848, e.g., the iron plow replaced the wooden. The great landlords led the advance and the peasants imitated them. These landlords in Hungary between 1850 and 1890 were deeply interested in improving agricultural production, chiefly because of the high price of wheat in the world market. They were anxious to increase wheat production for export. After 1885 the world market price began to decline and the landlords gradually lost interest. Indeed, they began to cut production. The strategy was to create a domestic scarcity so that wheat would have to be imported. The objective of the policy was to transform a grain exporting country into a grain importing one. This would enable the landlords to raise the price of domestic grain to the world price augmented by the tariff. By 1907 the tariffs began to have a constant effect. In this situation the lot of the agricultural worker grew steadily worse. Unemployment grew, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose. Jaszi observes that the heavy hand of the landlord-controlled economy pushed the Monarchy toward disaster. 44 The workers' wages in Hungary averaged the equivalent of sixty to a hundred dollars a year, while a woman's wages averaged yearly only between forty and fifty dollars. 45 In Slovakia the agricultural worker earned 25 cents a day.46 His staple food in winter was cabbage and potatoes. 47 To the low wages and the agricultural poverty we must �SLOVAKIA 11 add the difficulty of buying land in Slovakia. The price of land in Slovakia by 1906 had risen in some cases 100 percent; the amount of money sent from America helped cause this price rise. The Postal Bank of Kosice received in 1896 six and a half million florins from America. 48 Over and above these burdens, the poor peasant had to bear the load of usurious banking. In pre-war Slovakia almost every town had a little joint-stock institution; although this was called a bank, it did not carry on real banking operations, but was only a savings and loan bank. The majority of these banks dispersed capital which was not available where it was needed. The banks under Magyar control followed a policy of dividends, whereas the Slovak banks paid a lower rate of interest. 49 Virtually no institutions provided long term mortgage credits; in fact, only two banks, both unsound, engaged in this business in Slovakia. Besides these banks, there were cooperative societies which offered limited cr,edit facilities to the peasants. 50 The small farmer ended up borrowing at rates of 7 per cent to 8 per cent, and sometimes rates were as high as 14 per cent. On short term loans rates of 50 per cent were not unknown. Consequently the profits of the banks were high. One bank in Slovakia with a capitalization of 60,000 crowns and reserves of 18,000 profited one year to the amount of 22,000 crowns. The average profit of the banks in 1888 was 29.56 per cent on the capital invested; in 1894 the profit was 13.58 per cent. 51 The economic situation worsened by the national addiction to drink. On this all the sources seem agreed. Impoverishing effects of overindulgence in drink were a factor in driving the Slovaks to seek improved economic conditions in America. 52 This lack of economic opportunity and security led to the migration. The following figures, though somewhat suspect because of the tendency of Magyarization, still tell an eloquent story. This table is a modification of the original. NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY Nationality Slovaks 1880 1,855,000 1890 1,897,000 1900 2,002,000 1910 1,946,000 �12 SLOVAKIA Source: Robert A. Kann, THE -MULTINATIONAL EJMP]RE: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL REF1ORM IN THE HABSBURG MONAROHY 1848-1914 {New York, 19 50) I, 278. The Slovaks in considerable numbers migrated to America after 1880 as part of the "new immigration". Until 1880 the bulk of the new additions to American population by immigration was predominantly either English in speech or at least derived from the northern and western areas of Europe; this was the "old immigration." Thereafter newcomers from southern and eastern Europe arrived, representing peoples who were very different in language, customs, political experiences, and personal standards of living. Italian, Greek, and the confusion of Slavic languages sounded strange indeed to ears attuned to English or Germanic sounds. Invidious comparisons were made. The "Nordic" was more akin to the American in blood; the "new immigrants" had not the Anglo-Saxon training in self-government, and they were merely birds of passage. Besides the fact that he spoke a strange language, the "new immigrant" was more often than not a Catholic. All these things set him apart from the "old immigrant." 53 The year 1873 saw the beginning of the flood. Even though the political, cultural, social, and economic causes were ripe for emigration, other causes operated to bring America to the attention of the hardpressed Slovak immigrants. The steamship company agents urged the peasants to emigrate, for the companies derived a large part of their income from transport of immigrants. In most countries there were laws prohibiting advertisements of prosperous conditions in another country. Two leading steamship companies were reported to have five or six thousand agents in Galicia alone. In Hungary, Immigration Commission members saw letters written by agents instructing prospective immigrants on how to leave the country without the government's consent, what routes to follow, and other related information. 54 Other agents who increased emigration from Hungary after 1870 were labor contractors, who came to hire workers for the mines and steel mills. These agents promised everything. Archduke Rudolph, they said, was living in South America, establishing there a new ideal state; immigrants to, �SLOVAKIA 13 the United States were to receive grants of land and aid in buying equipment and in constructing necessary buildings.55 Many peasants who went with the agents wrote back letters reporting high wages. These lett'ers were undoubtedly one of the most powerful means of persuading the Slovak peasants to cross the ocean. 56 In the earlier phases of immigration many emigrants returned to their native country after they had laid by a sufficiency of this world's goods. The figures given by the Hungarian government for emigration and return for the year of 1905 show the extent of this return movement and suggest the breadth of influence exercised by returning emigrants. In 1905 the Magyar figures list 38,770 as leaving the country, while they give 4,038 as returning to Hungary.57 The news of work and wages certainly had an effect in stimulating further emigration. The Slovak emigrants moved generally westward by rail for German or Dutch ports. During the years 1881-1900 some 372,979 Slovaks were reported to have passed through the port of Hamburg, whereas only 9,501 embarked from Italian ports. 58 During 1886-1907 the German ports handled 348,808 emigrants from Hungary, Antwerp 57,170, Dutch ports 33,762, and Italian ports 3,785. 59 The low cost of steamship crossing attracted many to undertake the difficult journey. Passage from Hamburg on the way out was $20; the return journey as far as Oderburg, a station on the Hungarian frontier, was $23.60. The Hungarian Government granted the Cunard Line the monopoly of transporting emigrants from Hungary. So great was the rush to America that the Cunard Line called on other companies and formed the "Continental Pool" to handle the traffic. This "Pool" provided the worst accommodations, the worst diet, and the worst navigation. 61 The journey's length varied from fifteen to sixty days. The emigrants fortified themselves against sea-sickness with prunes and brought their own supplies of sausage, bacon, plum brandy, and gin. Water was distributed only at intervals, sometimes only once a day. The ventilation in the living quarters was bad. 62 One emigrant described his journey in these words: "It was in the year 1883 that, with three men, I set out from Trebis ov for America. We got on a wagon that took us to Obisovce, �14 SLOVAKIA where we boarded a train and rode to Vrutky. There we obtained travel permits for Bohumfn, and from Bohumin to Bremen, where we boug1hit our steamship tickets, for which we paid 53 ,gold pieces. A chill comes over me even now when I think of that ship of ours. We were afloat almost 18 days and twice the shi p was in danger of sinking. Everything on the deck rwas broken, a nd water poured into it. And as the boat rocked, one could feel that even in one's s-tomach."63 Among the ports of entry New York easily ranked first for the Slovak immigrants; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Portland. 64 Nor did the ills of the immigrants cease when they landed in the United States. Often enough their meagre funds and they were quickly parted. One immigrant paid a fare of $60 for a ride from the harbor to the Lackawanna railroad station. Hotels deliberately detained the immigrants by telling them that the train to their destination made the trip only once a week. Other swindlers met the immigrants as they came ashore and offered to send a telegram to their relatives or friends for the price of twenty five cents ; needless to say, no telegram was sent, and the immigrants were only so much poorer. One porter kidnapped two young girls who ended in brothels.85 The Slovak immigrants of the 1880's were not the first Slovaks to set foot upon American soil. The very first Slovak to come to America, so far as we know, was Andrew Jelik, a tailor on a Dutch ship which sailed to America in 17541755. He did not remain in America and eventually died in Budin, Hungary, 1783.66 Another Slovak who had arrived in America in the eighteenth century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed at Baltimore in 1775. He was but an adventurer whose later career took him to Madagascar where he became king and where he also perished. 67 In the year 1800 a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit in Mexico City by making his confession in Slovak. 68 The first Slovak settlement was made in Philadelphia by drotari, wireworkers, in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street. 69 Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became a citizen in 1879. Making the trip back and forth across the ocean, he was h1 America twenty six times. He died in 1915. 70 In the wake of these individuals the larger numbers began to come, first, from eastern Slovakia, especially from the �SLOVAKIA 15 counties of Zemplin, Sari~, and Spis. 71 Between the years 18691890 the county of Spis lost 14% of her youths between 20 to 25 years of age, and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; Saris lost 34% of those between 20 and 25, 44 % of the men between 26 and 30. 72 Only after the eastern counties did the western ones take to emigration. To give exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 is impossible because prior to 1899 the immigration authorities counted the immigrants according to country of last residence, and many Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. Since 1899 the immigrants are counted according to race or language. Therefore the figures before 1899 do not give us exact data on Slovak immigrants; but according to Emily Green Balch the earlier immigrants from Hungary may be presumed to be Slovaks with some Jews and Magyars included. 73 In 1873 immigrants from Hungary numbered 1,300; in 1880 4,000 entered the United States, and in 1884 the number rose to 15,000. 74 The following table shows the total number of Slovaks coming into this country in the years 1899 to 1909: SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES Year ending June 30 Number 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 15,838 29,243 29,343 36,934 34,427 27,940 52,368 38,221 42,041 16,170 Source: Emily Green Balch, OUR (New York, 1910), P. 103. 22,568 SLAVIC FELLOW CITI ZENS In the period 1899-1910 the total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673; in this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. 75 Consideration of Table 5 shows that �Hl SLOVAKIA 1905 was the peak year for the Slovaks in which 52,368 of them were admitted. Numerically in the twelve years ending June 30, 1910 Slovakia ranked eighth among the nations providing immigrant material. 76 The rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; this was double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3), Croatian-Slovenians (13.1), and South Italians (11.9). The rate was the highest of any group. 77 Having arrived in the United States, the Slovak immigrants began to look for a place to live and to work. The first areas to draw them were the coal mine centers; only in the second instance did the Slovaks settle in the factory cities.78 One focus of settlement was the hard-coal area of northeastern Pennsylvania where the center was Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Before World War I the mines in this district employed 75,000 to 100,000 men; of this group 12% were Slovaks. 79 In the soft coal area of southwestern Pennsylvania Mt. Pleasant was the center of dispersion. From there the Slovaks moved northward to Latrobe or Greensburg, southward to Connellsville and Uniontown. The chief centers of Slovak settlement were: Alice, Standard, Bessemer, Bridgeport, Mammouth, Old Hecla, New Hecla, Calumet, Old Tarrs, Donnelly, Buckeye, Moyer, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Gayette City, Brownsville, Masontown, Fairchance, Point Marion, Cannonsburg, Perryopolis, Republic, and others. 80 Only later did pockets of immigrants form in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. About the geographic dispersion of Slovaks an interesting note occurs in a letter sent to the Jednota in 1913 by a J . P. Kapas, who had been traveling in the west. He wrote: "There had been plenty of Slovak people in the west, but almost all returned to the eastern states, and only for this r eason that in the west the people were all foreigners and wild." 81 Alaska seems to have been the limit of immigration, at least as far as the group was concerned. John Miklas, writing from Alaska, recommended against coming and said that he had not found any Slovaks there as yet. He surmised, however, that after his return from the "Old Country", where he meant to go for a visit, he might settle in Alaska.82 By 1885 large groups of Slovaks had settled in the fol- �SLOVAKIA 17 lowing states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois. 83 In the hard coal area in northeastern Pennsylvania a sub-employment system was used in which an operator hired the men who dug and loaded the coal; the mine company paid the operator and he paid off his hired men. The Slovaks, inexperienced in mine work and unskilled in language, worked merely as the hired men; this left them exposed to the wiles of unscrupulous operators who kept some of the pay from them. 84 In 1856 the Pennsylvania Railroad had reached Pittsburgh from Philadelphia; the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad in 1871 built tracks to Pittsburgh, thus giving Pittsburgh an outlet to Baltimore. The demand for laborers in the mine fields of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties in Pennsylvania was answered by many Slovak men from the hard coal area and "the old country." But who the first Slovak was to enter the Pittsburgh area we do not know. When the agents of the Frick Company from the coke and coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania hired new immigrants · at Castle Garden, but for trivial exceptions the hired men were Slovaks. The company transported them by rail to Alverton, lying between Scottdale and Mt. Pleasant, Pa. Thence they walked to Morewood, Pa., where a company house awaited them. It is impossible to tell how many Slovaks there were in the coke region. We do know that in Morewood by 1893 there were four hundred men engaged in work, and how many Slovaks there were in this group we do not know. As early as 1880 John and Sophia Hvizdo~ had eighteen Slovak boarders in their house. 85 Until 1900 Slovaks worked mostly in the coal mines and at the coke ovens of Frick and Company. This firm had been organized in 1871 as Frick and Company, with about 300 acres of coal area and 50 coke ovens around Connellsville, Pa. By 1889 it had about 35,000 acres and 15,000 coke ovens. The lowest paid worker in 1890 was the "yard worker" who earned $1.40 for a ten hour day; the best wages were paid the "road man" who received $2.10 for nine hours of work. 86 At first the Slovaks worked beside the Czechs in the coal mines, while the Poles worked at the coke ovens; but gradually, the Slovaks too began to work their way up to jobs at the ovens. �18 SLOVAKIA Most Slovaks were satisfied with their wages, which varied from $16.00 to $25.00 every two weeks. Strange as it may seem, it was possible to live and also to lay something by from these wages. A pound of beef soup meat cost three cents; for six dollars a man could dress himself rather well; rent cost three or four dollars a month for a small four room house. Nevertheless, not all miners were satisfied; demands were made for more pay and less work. When the mine operators refused, there were strikes, often riotous and bloody. 87 The Slovaks were also employed in the Egdar Thompson Iron Works of Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie with Frick employed the greatest number of Slovaks; others, like Rainey, Oliver, and Jones and Laughlin also engaged considerable numbers of Slovaks, but the number cannot be exactly stated. However, until 1900 most of the Slovaks worked in the mines and at the coke ovens.88 When the Slovaks got jobs in the mines, they lived in "company houses ",which were built practically at the site of the mine. This was a settlement of large houses built by the company and rented to the worker, who had also to pay for water, gas and coal. 89 To buy his food and other necessities the miner had to patronize the company store. This made the dependence of the worker on the comp:.my complete; the threat of expulsion during a strike was a powerful weapon in keeping the miners submissive. 90 The company r ented a house to a married couple on condition that they take in "boarders," the usual number being ten, but in the larger houses the number varied upward to thirty or forty. 91 The cleanliness d 2p::!nded on the character, ability, or sheer physical strength of the housewife. Within the household food arrangements provided that except for meat, flour, and coffee, the food was purchased in common. One meal a day wa:; eaten together, on Sunday at noon and during the week in the evening. For the other meals the gazdina or housewife cooked individually for the men whatever they bought. Beer by the barrel was also bought in common; sometimes this ran to a hundred barrels per month. At the end of the month the common bill was divided: the housewife did not pay; the men including the husband, paid equally, and two children were counted as one adult. 92 Moreover, on pay day several barrels of beer would be bought as well as whiskey, �SLOVAKIA 19 and much meat was prepared for a gay evening. At first, dancing was the chief recreation. One man pulled out an accordion, and the dancing began, even men dancing with men because of the shortage of women partners; frequently this mixure of drink, food, and music led to drunken brawls sometimes over the excellence of their home towns in Slovakia, often enough over women. Dancing was not limited to pay day; any celebration of even slight importance had to be combined with dancing and shouting of the most vigorous sort. The Cardas was a universal favorite. Family life was injured by many men coming to America without their wives and families and by the dearth of marriageable Slovak girls. To find a wife many young men on week ends went to Passaic, New Jersey, where many Slovak girls worked in the textile mills, and the men watched the girls as they came from work and made their choice. On Sundays in Passaic there often were ten to twenty weddings. Difficult as family life was, the "boarding house," allowing for so little privacy, did not help very much; sometimes it led to the wife's running off with a boarder. 93 Organizational life among the Slovaks began in the lodges and societies so common in America after the Civil War. By 1914 in the United States principal organizations had 15,600,000 members. Economic and social need led the Slovaks to form lodges. Mine disasters often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family not only destitute, but even without the money for a funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits a large number of societies grew up in industrial and .mining towns. The first of these was the Persi Uhorszko-Slovenszky v nemoczi podporujuci Szpolek, established in New York, on March 3, 1883. In this society, which lasted for eight years, Slovak was made the official language. Fraternal and mutual benefit iocieties mushroomed in the Slovak settlements. The Spolok Sv. Stefana in Passaic, N. J. was organized 1884 and already in 1887 was calling for a unification with other Slovak fraternal organizations. Under the influence of a Polish organization whose constituti-on it used, the Cirkevny a v ntmoci pl!>dporujuci spolok arose in Hazleton, Pa., in 1884. The Slovaks in Houtzdale, Pa., organized the Bratstvo Najsvatejsieho Srdca Pana Jezisa, on November 14, 1886; on December 12, 1884 the Spolok Sv. Stefana in Plymouth, Pa., came �20 SLOVAKIA into existence. A touch of humor accompanied the difficulties of the lodge in Bayonne City, N. J., where the Spolok Princa Rudolfa, set up in 1887, had to change its name after the tragic death of Archduke Rudolph of Hapsburg at Mayerling, because the other Slovaks ridiculed the members for having lost their patron. Bayonne City, N. J., had one of the largest mutual benefit societies, the Prvy bednarsky vypomocny spolok, an organization of Coopers engaged in making barrels, staves, chests, boxes; it was organized in 1888 and acted also as a bargaining agent for the membership with their employees. They were the first to have their own flag, whereas the other groups used the Hungarian flag. The Spolok Sv. Cyrila a Methoda in Minneapolis, Minn., and the Slovensky Spolok Sv. Petra i Pavla of McKeesport, Pa., both came into existence in 1888; the Slovensky v nemoci podporujuci spolok in Braddock, Pa., arose in 1889. The chief purpose of these societies was help in need, especially providing an elaborate funeral. In these funerals all the local lodges took part with flags, uniforms, and mourning bands. The secondary purpose was to aid in the organization of parishes, the building of churches and schools and lodge halls. 94 In spite of the success of these lodges, financial problems arose from the system of assessment which they used. The system required a contribution of about fourteen cents a month to meet administrative costs; on the death or sickness of a member the others had to contribute as much as would be needed for the stipulated sum. A considerable number of deaths or cases of sickness within a month or a short time made the financial burden too great for the small lodges. 95 The first appeal for unification came from the Society of St. Stephen in Passaic, N. J., as early as 1887. Julius Schwartz-Markovic in Nova Vlast' (a periodical that lasted only from March to December, 1888) made appeals for consolidation; Peter Rovnianek repeated this appeal in the October issue, as did B. Lajciak in the December issue. The Rev. Joseph Kossalko, a Roman Catholic priest of proMagyar conviction, seeing the nationalist tendency of these lodges in their use of Slovak as the official language and their gradual abandonment of the Hungarian flag, opposed this movement in a new periodical, the Zastava. The consolidation did not come until the 1890's. 96 When the Slovak immigrants, of whom the bulk was �SLOVAKIA 21 Catholic, first came to the United States, they were financially unable to build churches for their own use. Before the Slovak Catholics had their own churches, they attended Polish, German, Czech, or Irish churches; if they happened to be regular attendants at a church where their languago was not understood, they often went a considerable distance to receive the sacraments, especially that of Penance, from someone who understood their language. In the southwestern Pennsylvania mining area the Slovaks were fortunate to have in their midst St. Vincent's Archabbey, a Benedictine institution, which took special care to provide priests who could understand the Slovak language. Priests from this archabbey went from settlement to settlement taking care of the spiritual needs of the Slovaks. The first to do "mission" work among the Slovaks was Rev. Nepomuk Yaeger, O.S.B., who for three years in southwestern Pennsylvania visited the mining camps, where often enough he had to offer the· Mass to the accompaniment of card-playing, drunken singing, swearing and quarreling. 97 First to organize on a religious basis were the Slovak Lutherans. The first Lutheran parish was established in Streator, Illinois, where the church was ready for services on October 5, 1884. Karol Horak, ordained in 1883, was the first minister, but he gave up ministerial work and became a real estate agent. While the parish was withouth a minister's services, the Slovak Lutherans met in the home of Mr. G. Kozlej, who read the Bible to them. A minister, Cyril Droppa, reached Streator on March 26, 1884 and stayed there until 1887; eventually his spiritual labors took him to Russia. This first Lutheran parish had 49 members; the pastor's salary was fixed at forty dollars a month. The name of the parish was the Parish of the Blessed Trinity. Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa., and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minn., in 1888. 98 Almost simultaneously with the Lutherans, the Slovak Catholics organized themselves into parishes. However, before this could go on apace, priests able to speak Slovak were needed. Even among the first priests, 99 the division into Slo·vak nationalists and Madarones disturbed their relations with one another and their work among Slovaks, Protestant as _well as Catholics. In 1882 the Rev. Ignatius Jaskovic, who came to Hazle- �22 SLOVAKIA ton, Pa., was the first active Slovak Catholic priest in the United States. He built St. Joseph's church in Hazleton, where the first Mass was said on December 6, 1885. He stayed in Hazleton until 1890. The Rev. J. Kossalko, arriving in 1884, had his first parish in Streator, Ill.; he said the first Mass in the new church of St. Stephen on December 10, 1885, just four days after the first mass had been said in Hazleton, Pa. The Rev. Samuel Bella, also a Catholic priest, became the pastor of Nanticoke, Pa., and later of Bayonne City, N. J. These three priests were all Madarones, that is, Slovaks with pro-Magyar convictions, and firmly opposed to any Slovak nationalism. 100 This Madarone element introduced the first division of the Slovak group into the factions that played a part among the pre-World War Slovaks of America. In 1887 in Scranton, Pa., the Slovak Calvinists first organized as a religious group. The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa., had a chapel there since 1888, but the building of churches had to wait until the 189O's. To conduct services in their parishes the Calvinists hired Magyar and English ministers; the Slovaks and Magyars fought about the language to be used in the divine service, Slovak or Magyar. There was no general solution for these churches, but the language varied from church to church. 101 At first some Slovaks objected to building schools on the score of uselessness; these untutored peasants had to be taught that schools were important. Some Slovak immigrants had come to make money and were in America only temporarily. Schools meant permanence. Why should they contribute to the education of other people's chidren? However a beginning was made. St. Stephen's parish, Streator, Ill., built the first Slovak Catholic parochial school in 1889, a wooden structure, costing $4,500, a considerable sum for those days. From the very beginning the schools were not strictly Slovak, for there were not enough Slovak teachers; this led to many subjects being taught by "English" teachers and "Irish" nuns. Slovak nationalists were satisfied by having the pastor teach the children on Saturday afternoons, when they studied the Slovak language, Slovak history, and Slovak geography.102 The 11cattered Slovak settlements were brought in touch with one another by newspapers written in the Slovak language. John Slovensky, a trained teacher from Slovakia, had �SLOVAKIA 23 come to the United States in 1879, and had obtained a clerical job in the Austro-Hungarian consulate. This put him in contact with the Slovak immigrants, who came to the consulate often seeking information about conditions in the Monarchy, as for instance, was the Monarchy at war with the Turk? This suggested to Slovensky the idea of a Slovak periodical. In 1885 he launched a lithographed paper called Rulletin, which contained news from Europe and items about Slovak immigrants. Especially the tavern keepers subscribed to it for their taverns where Slovaks met to read it. Success prompted John Slovensky to embark on · a larger enterprise, the publication of Amerikanszko-Slovenszke Noviny. J. Schwartz-Markovic and the Rev. Erwin Gelhoff, a Catholic priest, published the Nova Vlast' in Streator, Illinois, in March 1888; this venture lasted only until December of that very year. The year 1889 saw the birth of two other newspapers, the Slovak v Amerike and Rev. J. Kossalko's Madarone newspaper, Zastava. 103 These newspapers became the sounding boards of popular opinion as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Discussion in the newspapers led to the consolidation of local lodges during the 1890's. With the beginning of the 1890's the Slovaks began to unify the many individual lodges into a federation for greater economic security. However, from the very start factions divided the Slovaks. The leaders of the Slovak immigrants disagreed on whether the principle of organization should be religious or nationalist. The Rev. Stephen Furdek, a Catholic priest, believed that the new national organization should be based upon religious uniformity within the organization; the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists should each have their own organization. Peter Rovnianek, a Slovak nationalist, wanted nationality to be the principle of organization. Any Slovak, no matter what his religious convictions or lack of them, could be a member. 104 Because of this difference of principle, two separate, and in many ways rival, organizations arose. On February 16, 1890, Peter V. Rovnianek led in founding the National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh, Pa. All Slovaks, Catholics, Protestants, Freemasons, Freethinkers or indifferentists, were welcome. Openly nationalist, the National Slovak Society played down religious differences, emphas- �24 SLOVAKIA izing all Slovaks were one. The frank nationalism and liberalism antagonized the Madarone Slovaks and some Catholici. The Rev. J. Kossalko, the most outstanding Madarone, refused absolution to Catholic members of the National Slovak Society. 105 Others besides the Madarone element opposed the liberal National Slovak Society. The Rev. Stephen Furdek established a Catholic fraternal organization, the First Catholic Slovak Union, September 4, 1890. The objectives of this First Catholic Slovak Union were to preserve the Catholic Faith, to support fellow-members, widows, and orphans in need, to preserve and extend the use of the Slovak language and Slovak nationality. Conditions of membership were recognition of the bishop of Rome as head of the Catholic Church, faithful performance of religious duties, attendance of one's children at a Catholic school, support of parish and parochial school, no ridicule of religious ceremonies, and no writing against the Church and the clergy. 106 Slovak women felt that they, too, should have their own organizations independent of male control. They established the Zivena Beneficial Society in the year 1891. In 1892 the Slovak Catholic women organized a similar society, the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union. 107 The Slovak Lutherans organized their own beneficial society in 1893, the Slovak Evangelical Union; and soon afterwards the Slovak Calvinists formed the Slovak Calvinist Union. 108 For reasons that are not evident, almost all these groups felt the strain of internal strife. A split in the First Catholic Slovak Union provided members for a new organization, the Pennsylvania Roman and Greek Catholic Union in 1893. This society intended to encourage religion, temperance, and morality, to train its members in obedience and respect for civil law and in performance of civil duties, to collect funds to pay burial benefits.109 In Chicago the local lodge of the National Slovak Society left the national organization and formed the Slovak National Society. 110 Later a similar break occurred in the Slovak Evangelical Union. In 1890 P. V. Rovnianek and his associates published the First Slovak National Almanac. Almanacs were already a Slovak European tradition. The National Slovak Society first issued its own almanac in 1893; and the First Catholic �SLOVAKIA 25 Slovak Union began its series with the Kalendar Jednota in 1896. These almanacs provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays on conditions in the United States, reviews of the year's important events, religious essays, articles on the Indians and Negroes, moral essays on how to spend Sundays, counseling articles on marriage, and almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. In these almanacs the best Slovak writers reached their limited Slovak American public; eventually the almanacs became so popular that ,twenty-nine were published. 111 Newspapers received the strongest impetus from the national societies. The Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny were the mouthpiece of the National Slovak Society; the First Catholic Slovak Union published an official organ, the Jednota. These were real newspapers with world news, reports from the domestic scene in America, and organization news in their columns. One feature distinguished these papers from the trend turning American newspapers into large business enterprises; the Slovak immigrant papers remained very much the voice of the individual editors. However, many Slovaks had no desire to read a newspaper. The editors, who usually combined editing with other work to earn their living, on Saturday and Sunday toured Slovak settlements to get subscriptions for their periodicals. 112 Very soon after the organization of the two fraternal societies the Slovaks learned how effective and necessary cooperation on a national level can be. When the price of steel billets began to fall, the Edgar Thompson Works in Braddock, Pa., announced a wage cut. This led to a strike late in 1890. On the night of January 1, 1891, Michael Quinn, a guard at the mill was slain. Many Slovaks were arrested, among them persons who had been strolling about after a pleasant evening in a tavern. The police arrested about sixty persons and charged them with being involved in the crime. Most of them received light sentences, but on April 8, 1891, Andrew Toth, Michael Sabol, and George Rusnak received the death sentence for the murder of Michael Quinn. Only by heroic efforts did the Slovak leaders and organizations secure on February 7, 1892 a commutation of sentence to life imprisonment. 113 The efforts of Rev. F. Wider, president of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Peter V. Rovnianek of the National �26 SLOVAKIA Slovak Society, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Julius Wolf, won the release of Michael Sabol, suffering from tuberculosis, in 1895; he died ten days after leaving prison. Peter V. Rovnianek, engaging a lawyer, Clarence Burleigh, secured the freedom of George Rusnak in 1897; George Rusnak, too, had tuberculosis. Andrew Toth left prison only twenty years later, a man sixty two years old. After the efforts of the Slovak League had failed, Edward Goehring, an attorney, succeeded in showing that the evidence which convicted Toth was contradictory. Toth was freed in 1911. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected a motion to give Toth $300.00 for every year he had spent unjustly in jail. However, the Carnegie Foundation fixed a grant of $40 a month on him. 114 During February, 1891, a strike against the firm of Henry Clay Frick, Frick and Company, bec:;_me general in the Connellsville, Pa., area of coke ovens and soft coal. By 1889 Frick had acquired 35,000 acres of coal area and 15,000 coke ovens and employed about 30,000 workers. Andrew Virostek, a worker in the Tip Top Mine and member of the United Mine Workers of America, threatened miners who loaded more coal than union regulations permitted. Then the company fired him. The union fought the mine operators over the dismissal, and by February a strike flared throughout the region. On April 2, 1892 when about five hundred miners attacked the Southwest Company shops in Morewood, Pa., three Slovaks, three Poles, and one Italian were shot to death. The state militia came in to restore order, and some men drifted to work. Frick hired Pinkerton detectives to expel the remaining strikers from the company homes. During the week of April 18, 1892 these detectives were to oust seven hundred families in Fayette county alone. When the agents began the evictions, a Slovak man and woman perished in the violence in Leisenring No. 3, two Slovak women were wounded at Adelaide, and at Trotter, sixteen men and thirteen women were shot. Then in the following month Frick began hiring Negroes and Italians to replace the Slovaks. 115 Julius Wolf and Peter V. Rovnianek figured secretly in the settlement of the strike. The Frick company paid them sums of money for persuading the miners to return to the pits. Unwisely, the two men discussed the deal in letters, �SLOVAKIA 27 which their enemies subsequently published. Slovak immigrant writing has branded these letters as the "Four Letters of Betrayal. " 116 The Slovaks' preoccupation with wages, bad housing, and mine disasters seem to have led to a decline in religious fervor. Causes suggested to explain the decline varied: nonconfessional schools, public schools, neglect by religious authorities, too great preoccupation with earning a living. 117 Evidence exists to show that some Catholics fell away. A "Home Mission among the Slavic Immigrants" in 1885 supported a Congregational Church in Cleveland; it also provided a Presbyterian Church in New York. 118 The effectiveness of these efforts among the Slovaks, it is impossible to judge. In Mt. Pleasant, Pa., a Slovak preacher came to the "Church of God" and succeeded in bringing at least 7 SloYak Catholic families into it. 119 Higganum, Conn., had a Slovak colony of about 20 families; some Slovak Catholics went to church only to keep their benefits in the Jednota; others were entirely indifferent, so far gone that they married in the Lutheran church, even though a Catholic priest was always available. 120 The namecalling contest between P. V. Rovnianek and the Rev. Stephen Furdek, unedifying as it was, certainly spread anti-clericalism among the nationalist element. This apparent religious decline should not blind us to the extensive church building activities of the Slovak immigrants during the 1890's. Frequently the construction of a church or organization of a parish began in cooperation with another national group, Poles, Croatians, Irish, or Germans; sometimes many different nationalities cooperated, Lithuanians, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Often cooperation failed, because each group felt its rights were ignored. 121 Still, for instance, at least eight new Slovak parishes were opened in the Pittsburgh diocese; and in Cleveland from St. Ladislaus' parish St. Martin's was created in 1893. 122 A Slovak parish was organized in Kangley, Ill., as a mission of the Streator congregation, in 1892. 123 The Slovak Catholics of Chicago finally got their own parish in 1898, the Roman Catholic Church of St. Michael the Archangel. 214 Expansion was the keynote. Just after the decade ended, in 1903, there were 78 Roman Catholic Slovak churches. 125 However, the Slovaks failed to build parochial schools; this had to wait for the next decade. �28 SLOVAKIA The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Blessed Trinity in 1893; in 1894 the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor and in that very year began teaching the children of the parish the Slovak language. 126 Hand in hand with progress in organization appeared the elements of culture. Such efforts as the organization of the First Catholic Slovak Band in Johnstown, Pa., in 1892, were only straws in the wind. The Rev. S. Furdek in 1893 led in a move to establish a cultural organization to be called the Matica Slovenska in memory of the Slovak cultural institution disbanded by the Magyars in 1875. It held a convention in Chicago, September 26, 1893, and was incorporated in Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1893. The Matica was to be a central organization to improve the cultural life of the Slovaks in Europe and America. On February 18, 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, not to be behind hand, organized a Majak, literarne kola, that is, the Beacon Literary Circle, partly in opposition to the Matica, although he fervently disavowed any such a purpose. The Majak's objectives were encouragement of Slovak literature and culture, establishment of a Slovak cultural press, and nationalist agitation. The Literary Circle began publishing the first Slovak literary "journal, a forty page periodical, Majak, literary, political, and nationalist. It survived only six months. Both these organizations failed, partly through division of effort, partly through lack of interest among the Slovaks. 127 During this decade another society arose in Chicago, the First Slovak Sokol. The Sokol groups were gymnastic societies with a planned program of calisthenics, track events, and eventually all sports. Just when the first Sokol group was organized is doubtful; one source says that the First Slovak Sokol was organized in Chicago in 1892128 ; another gives the date as 1895. 129 Whatever be the case, the Sokol developed into a federation national in scope. The Slovak Catholic priests, divided though they were on the question of Slovak nationalism, united in an organization known as the Society of Roman Catholic Slovak Priests in 1896. Peter V. Rovnianek originated another club in the same year, the first Slavonic Political Club with 100 members, and its influence was soon felt in politics. 130 Both of these organizations were successful, in contrast to the cul- �SLOVAKIA 29 tural societies; it seems that the early Slovak immigrants were not sufficiently interested to support purely cultural groups. The cultural society and literary circle failed because labor conflicts occupied the Slovaks' attention. The Connellsville mine region was again the scene of a strike and violence that began in April, 1894. On April 4 a Slovak was slain; two days later Joseph Paddock, chief engineer of Frick's company in Davison, Pa., was killed. Blame for this crime fell on the Poles and Slovaks and over a hundred were thrown into the Uniontown jail. The court sentenced John Husar to twelve years and Michael Furin to three years in prison. Violence continued: one Slovak was killed on the main street of Connellsville and two others in the rioting at Stickle Hollow around the Washington Coal and Coke shops. At the beginning of August most of the Strikers had returned to work, but about 5,000 Slovaks remained on strike. These gradually drifted back to work or abandoned the Connellsville mines. The Rev. Orbach, a Lutheran minister, founded a Slovak colony in Wisconsin; on September 4 about 300 Slovaks set out for Wisconsin. Another farm settlement originated from the Connellsville strike. Industrial life was, after all, strange to the Slovak; he had either been a small farmer, peasant, or agricultural worker in Slovakia. His interest in acquiring a farm remained; but he did not become a farmer immediately after he landed simply because he did not have the money to invest in such a project. 131 Besides, the city gave him the companionship he would not find on the farm. Still the desire grew to place as many Slovaks as possible on the land. In the summer of 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. btephen Furdek, Rev. Vaclav Panu~ka, and Rev. Alexander Dzubaj examined land in Arkansas near Grand Prairie; they intended to settle Slovaks on some 40,000 acres of land. Peter Rovnianek and Francis Pucher received a charter for the Slovak Colonization Company of Pittsburgh on September 24, 1894, the land was bought, and sales began. After the prospective settlers had saved enough money, they bought forty or so acre farms from the Slovak Colonization Company. The cost of land was $2 to $3 an acre. 132 �30 SLOVAKIA Slovak settlers established a farm community near Stuttgart, Arkansas, and named their community Slovaktown. The settlers had been born in the "old country" but came to Arkansas chiefly from the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois. The chief produce included corn, oats, hay, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. The children attended the public schools. The settlers were mostly Catholics, but there were a few Lutherans. 133 The new farmers in Slovaktown were more than satisfied with their new lives; their letters continually encouraged their fellow Slovaks to flee from the factories and the mines; but only in the 1900's did anything like a movement to the farm begin. To publicize the project and success of Slovaktown the Slovak Colonization Company began publishing a periodical, Slovaktownske Hlasy, in Pittsburgh in 1896; but it lasted only six months. 134 It might indeed have been well for the Slovaks to leave the mines and go to the farms, for violence once again found them; this time it was in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. One day in September, 1897 a group of strikers set out for Latimer. Sheriff Martin informed of the move, summoned his deputies and attempted to halt the men. Sharp words were exchanged, and Sheriff Martin ordered his deputies to fire upon the unarmed men. Twenty-one fell before the murderous gunfire and died; many others were wounded. Most of the victims were Slovaks. In spite of the unprovoked nature of the attack, the courts declared Sheriff Martin innocent, for he had ordered the shooting while performing his duty. The outcry against this verdict was most violent in the Slav press, but nothing further could be done. 135 Despite the internal dissensions among themselves and difficulties in the mines, a new interest appeared among the Slovaks during this decade; the most public manifestation of their nationalism came in 1899. Strange as it may seem, most Slovaks were not violent nationalists when they came to this country; the growth of nationalism was gradual and almost imperceptible. Slovak became the official language for the lodges; the societies abandoned the Hungarian flag. P. V. Rovnianek, joining the staff of the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny in 1889, infused �31 SLOVAKIA a nationalist spirit into that paper; his National Slovak Society was nationalist in principle. Rev. S. Furdek, whose nationalism was of a very moderate kind, wanted American Slovaks to Americanize themselves; but he also felt it their duty to help the oppressed Slovaks overseas. 136 Under the force of this nationalism the Slovak immigrants gradually became more interested in the fate of Slovakia. In 1899 Father Furdek sent a lengthy memorandum to the Hungarian government, discussing the "Slovak question", but to no avail, except the publicity which such a memorandum aroused. It effected nothing practical; but it was the shadow of coming events; for the "Slovak question", was in the next decades to assume first place among the Slovaks. As the nineties passed, the Slovaks had made solid progress. Their economic and social life had improved through the national fraternal societies, which by 1899 had become important factors in Slovak life. Their membership stood as follows: THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES Society Number of Members First Catholic Slovak Union __ _________ _ National Slovak Society _________ ___ ___ __ Pennsylvania Slovak Union ______ ___ ____ _ Evangelical Slovak Union ____ __ _______ _ First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union _____ _ iivena --------- --- -------------- -- ---Source: "Slovenske (1899), IV, 38. pomery v Amerike", KALENDAR 11,000 9,450 1,727 909 1,600 1,000 JEDNOTA The religious life of the Slovaks had a chance to develop now that churches had been built. For the Roman Catholics there were now in America 33 priests, and for the Greek Catholics 32; and more were needed. 137 However, not all the picture was bright. Indeed, these were the things the Slovaks needed; but it was only after 1900 that the advance in education, the business world, political life, became pronounced. FOOTNOTES 1. Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910), p. 86, pp. 88-89, p. 93. �32 SLOVAKIA 2. •F ranti§ek Hru§ovsky, Slovenske Dejiny (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939), p. 14. 3. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 4. I bid., p . 216. 5. Ibid., pp. 342-S43. 6. Joseph S,k ultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middl etown, 1'930), pp. 106-109. 7. I bid., pp. 109-110. 8. Frantisek •Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia (Scranton, 1953) , p . 40. 9. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 10. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Scranton, 1947), p. 28 . 11. Thomas Capek, The Slovaks of Hungary (New York, 1906), p . 108; 1Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia, pp. 44-46. 12. Frantisek :J3okes, Dejiny Slovenska i Slovakov (;Bratislava, 1946), p . 158. 13. Robert A. ,Ka,nn, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National 'Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914 (New York, 1950), I. 278. 14. Frantisek iHrusovsk y, This Is Slovakia, pp. ,47-48. 15. Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 107. 16. Ibid., p. 108. 17. Ibid., p. 59 . 18 . R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. , Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 244-245. 19. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. ·65 . 20. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 245. 21. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p . 64 . 22. Bokes, Deji ny Slovenska, p. 158. 23. C. J . Stree t, Slovakia: Past and Present (Westmins,ter, n.d .), p. 24. 24 . •Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 96; Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. 323. 25. ,Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 166. 26 . Jirusovsky, Dejiny, p. 252. 27. Ibid., p. 325. 28. Ib i d., p. 319. 29. I bid., p. 319. 30. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 117. 31. Seton•Watson, Slovakia, pp. 117-118. -3•2. I bid., p. 119. 33. I bid., p. 118. 34. Hrus ovsky, Dejiny, pp. 320-321; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 272-273 . 35. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 176. 36 . Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. -329 . 37. Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 276. 38 . Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 150. 39. Jaszi, The Dissolution, p. 222. 40 . Ibid., p . 223 . 41. Street, •Slovakia: Past and Present, p. 56. 42. Harrison 'Thompson, Czechoslovakia in Europe (Princeton, 194-1) , p. 294. 43. Jaszi, The Dissolution, pp . 196-199. H. Ibid., p. 238. 45. Ibid., p. 231. �SLOVAKIA 33 46. F. J . Hask in s, The Immigrant: An Asset and a Liab ility (New York , 1913) , p . 35. 47. Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p . 162. 48. I b id., p. 156. 49. Seton-Watso n , Slovakia, p. 275. 50. Ibid., p. 276. 51. Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 152. 52. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, A u g u st 19, 1897. 53. Geor ge Stephen son , A H istory of American Immigrat ion 18201924 (New Yor k , 1926), P. 61; Carl W ittk e, We Who Built Amer ica (New York , 1939) , p. 405. 54. J eremiah J enk s a nd W. Jebt Lau ck , The Imm igration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs (New York, 1922), pp. 21-22. 55 . Konstantin Culen, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (B r atislava, 1942), I , 38; Caspar Molch an, "Th e Developmen t of the S lovak Community in Pittsburgh 1880-1920", (Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, U n iversity of Notr e Dame, 1948), p. 23. 56. Cul en, Deji ny, I, 38; Stephenson , History of Ame ri can I mm igrat ion , p. 89. 57. Balch , Slav ic Fellow Citizens, p . 102. 58. I bid., p. 25. 69. I b id., p. 437. 60. I bid., p. 101. 61. Culen, Dejiny, I, 60-61. 62. Ibid., I, 67. 63. Ibid., I, 67-68. ~4. Ibid., I, 60. 65. Na rodn e Noviny, Ap ril 9, 1914. 66. Cule n , Dejiny, I, 24-25. -67. Ibid., I , 26; Molchan, "Development of the S lovak Community" , p. 8. 6'8. Konsta'!lltfn Cu len, Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsaf rocn a (Scr anton , 1947). p. 4. 69. Cul e n , Dej i ny , I, 28. 70. Ib id., I , 28-29. 71. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Comr;mnity", p. 25. 72 . Capek, Slovaks of Hunga r y , p. 156. 73. Balch, Sl a vic Fe ! low C itizens, p. 100. 74. Ibid , p. 100. 75 . William P. Dillingham, Reports of the Immigration Commision, Vol. I: Abs t racts of Reports of Immigration Commision (Washington, D . C., 1911), I, 97. 76. I b id., I, 215. 77. Ibid., I, 277. 78. J. A. F., "Nacrtok Dejin Slov. prist'ahovalectva v Amerike", Sborn ik Narodn e ho Slovenske ho Spolku (1915), I, 12. 79. Culen, Deji ny , I, 96. 80. Ib id ., I. 96; Jos e ph Kushn e r, Sl ov a c i ka tol ici pi t t sbu-rghsk e ho b is kupstv a (Passaic, 19 -16), pp. 16-17 ._ 81. J ednota , March 19, 1913. 82. Na rodn e Noviny, May 26, 1910. 83. Culen, Dejiny, I, 99. 84. Kushner, S lov a ci, p. 6. 85. Ibid., p. 12, p. 16. �34 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. l09. ll0. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 7. I bid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. Narodne Noviny, March 12, 19·1.!; April 27, 1911. Narodne Novlny, March 12, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 82-83. Ibid., I, ·82-831; J. A. F., 'INe.crtok Dejin", Sbornik, (1915), I, 11. Culen, Dejiny, I , 82-83; "Jedno-druhe", Narodny Kalendar, (1908), XVIII, 154. Culen, DeJiny, I, 195-199. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 81. Culen, Dejiny, I, 200. Kushner, Slov;ici, pp. 13-14; Jednota, July 15, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 111-114. Culen, Dejiny, I, 108. I bid., I, 111. Ibid., I, 114-115. Ibid., 1, 115; Kon§tantin Culen, Slovaci v Amerike (Tur~lansk:r Sv. Martin, 11138), pp. 384-385. Culen, DeJlny, I, 213-214. Culen, Dejiny, I, 202. Ibid., I, 208-209. Ibid., I, 207-208. Souvenir Program: 19th Regular Convention, The National Slovak Society, (Young~town, 1946), p. i>4; P. V. Rovnianek, "Slovenslce organ!zacie v Amerike", World's Fair -Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (,Chicago, 1933), p . 67 . IP. V. Rovnlanek, op. cit., pp . 67-68. Pennsylvanska Slovenaka Jednota (Wilkes-Barre), June 24, 1943. Jaroslav ·Pelikan, "Cesi a .Slovacl v Chicagu ", World's Fair Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (Oh!cago,1933), p. 9•. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 162. Culen, Dejiny, I, 214-215. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 10; Molchan, ''Development or the Slovak Community", p . 48. Kushner, Slovacl, pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 8. Culen, Dejlny, I, 138-139. :Fr. Sasinek, "Mysllenky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakm!", Kalendar Jednota, (1,8 97), II, 139-140. Narodne Novlny, August 11, 1910. !Kushner, Slov;icl, p. 21. Jednota, March 4, 1914. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 22; Michael J . Hynes, History of the Dioceae of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953), p. 1'53. Hynes, Diocese of Cleveland, p . 255. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 41. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 41. Kalendar J.ednota, (1903), VIII, 210-211. Jaromir Psenka a Jan Pelikan, "<'.:es! a Slovac! v Chicagu", World's Fair Memorial, p . 95 . <'.:ulen, DeJiny, I, 222-227. Pellkan a Paenka, "Cesl a Slovacl v Chicagu", World's Fair Memor ial", p. 94. �35 SLOVAKIA 1211. Joseph Cermak, "·Physical Education among the Czechs and SloTaks", World'• Fair Memorial, p. 44 . 130. Molchan, "Development o! the Slovak Community", p. 67. 131. 1Narodne Noviny, July 17, 1113. 132. Narodne Noviny, May 5, 1910. 133. Kushner, Slovaoi, p. 9; Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, pp. 337-33·8. 134. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p . 115. 185. Culen, Dejlny, I, 162-18'3; Amerlkansk0-Slovenske Novlny, Feb· ruary 5, 1898. 136. Kalendar Jednota, (1899), IV, 37-41. 137. "Slovenske pomery v Amerike", Kalendar Jednota (1899), IV, 39-40. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS U. S. Bureau o! Census Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population Statistics, Vol. I. Washington : Government Printing omce, 1913. U. S. Congress. Senate Documents. 61 Cong., 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing O!f!ce, 1911. Vols. XI and XX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Jednota (Middletown., Pa.), Vols. XXI-XXII (19113cl9H). Kalendar Jednota. Middletown: The First Cathol!c Slovak Union. Vols. I-XXI (1896-1915). Kalendar Narodneho Slovenekeho Spolku. Plit.ts·burgh: National Slovak Society. Vols. XX-XXIV (1912-1!116). Narodne Noviny (Pittsburgh, Pa.), Vols. I·V (1910-1914). SECONDARY SOURCES - BOOKS Abbot, Edith. Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1924. Balch, Emily Green. Our Slavic Fellow Citi.aiens. New York: Charities Publication Company, 11110. Bokes, Frantisek. Dejiny Slovenska t Slovakov. Bratislava: SloTenska Akademia Vied a Umeaii, 1946. Capek, Thomas. The Slovaks of Hrungary, Slavs and Panslavism. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1,906. Culen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike. 2 vols. Bratislava: Matica Slovenskii., 19 42. Culen, Konstantin. Slovaci v Amerilc:e: Crty z kulturnych deJfn. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. Culen, Konstantin. Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna. Scranton : Obrana Press, Lnc., 19,47. Eaton, A. H . Immigrant Gifts to American Life. New York: Russell Sage Foundati,m, 1933. Fairchild, Henry 0. (ed .). Immigrant Backgrounds. New York: Wiley and Sons, lnc., 1927. • Yairchild, Henry 0. (ed.). Immigration: A World Movement and its American Significance. New York: The Mcmillan Company, 1926. i'aulkner, Harold U. The Quest for Social Justice, 189-8-1914. Vol. XI or Hi-story o! America12 Life. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger �36 SLOVAKIA and· Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols . Ne1v York : Macmillan Company, 1931. Handlin, Oscar. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Cam bri dge: . The H arvard Un iversity Press, 1940. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Immigrant in American History. Cambridge : The Harvard Univer sity Press, 1940. Hrusovsky, F rantisek . Slovenske Dejiny. Turcian sky Sv. Martin: Matica Slove'nska, 1939. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. This is Slovakia. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1953. Hynes, Michael J. History of the Diocese of Cleveland. Cleveland : Diocese of •Cleveland, 1953. Jaszi, O'scar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929. Jenks, Jeremiah W. and Lauck, W . Jett. The Immigration Problem . New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 19 22 . Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York: The Columbia U niversity Press, 1950. Kushner, Jos eph. Slovaci katolfci pittsburghskeho b iskup:::tva. P as saic: The Slovak Catholic Sokol, ·1946. Nev ins, Allan. The Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878. Vol. VIII of A History of American Life. Edited by Ar t hur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. . Orth, Samuel P. Our Foreigners: A Chronicle of J).mericans in the Making . Vol. 35 of the .Chronicles of America. Edited by ;\llen Johnson, 56 vols. New Haven ·: Yale University Press, 1920. · Park, •Robert. The lmmigran_t Press an~ its Control. New York: Harper and Bro-thers, 1922. Pauco, J oseph. l.!.udovychova u Sturovcov: Obdobie Slovenskych Na rodnych Novin. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943. Purcell, William J. (ed.). Catholic Pittsburgh 's One Hundred Years. Chicago: Loyola U n iversity Press, 1943. Seton-Watson , R . W. Racial Problems in Hungary. London: Constable, 1908. Seton-Watson, R. W. (ed.). Slovakia Then and Now. Prague: Orb is Publishing Company, 1931. Shaugnessy, . Gerald. Has t he l.mmigrant Kept the Faith ? New York:: The Macmillan Company, 1925 . · Sidor, Karol. Andrej H linka, 1864-1926. Bratislava: St. Andrew's. Press, 1934. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown: The First Catholic Slova~ Union, 1930. Stephenson, George M. A History of American Immigration, 18201924. Boston: Ginn Publishing Company, 1926. Street, C. J.C. Slovakia: Past and Present. Westminster: P . S. Kingston and Son, Ltd., n. d . Tarbell, Ida. The Nationalizing of Business, 1878-1898. V ol. IX of A 'History of Ameri can Life. Edited by Arthur -M. Schlesinger and Dixo~ Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. �SLOVAKIA 37 Thompson, S. Harrison. Czechoslovakia in European History. Princeton: The Princeton U niversity Press, 19-44. Wittke, Carl. We Who Bui It America: The Saga of the Immigrant. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks: Their History and Trad itions. Revised edition. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. ARTICLES F., J. A. "Nacrtok dejin s lov. prisfahovalectva v Amerike", Sbornik Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 20-39 . Jamar ik, Paul. "Zivot Americkych .Slovakov dakedy a teraz_" , Sbornik Na rodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 98-109. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sborn ik Slovensk e ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX. Shipman, Andr ew J . "Slavs ~-n America", The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV (1913). 51-57. Stephenson, George M. "Immigration", Dictionary of American History, III (1940), 73-75. "The Slovak Sokol", Sborn ik S lovenske ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 242-243. Timasheff, Nicholas. "Education", Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by Joseph .S. 1Roucek. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949, pp. 261-269. Ware, Caroline. "Immigration", Encyclopedia of Soc ia l Sc iences, VII (1932), 587-595. World 's Fair Memorial of the Czechos lo va k Group. Chicago: Czechoslovak Group, 1933. Bradac, John S. "Slovenski Evanjelici-Luterani v Spojenych Statoch", pp. 81-83. Cermak, Joseph. "Physical Education among the Czechs and Slovaks in America", pp. 42-45. ·· Pelikan, J. and Psenka, R. Jaromir. "Cesi a Slovaci v Chicagu", pp. 89-97. Rovnianek, Peter V. "Slovenske organizacie v Amerike", pp. 66-68. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Gregorovic, Sister M. Counsuela, SS.C.M . "Father Jankola's Con tribution t0 Catholic Education in America". Unpublis hed Master of Arts dissertation. History Department, Catholic University, 1943. Molchan, Caspar, C.S.C . "The Development of the Slovak Comqiunity in Pittsburgh, 1880-1920". Unp ub lished Master of Arts di sserta·,£ion. History Department, U niversity of Notre Dame, 1948. · Stefan, Sister M. Leocadia, SS.C .M. "The Reverend Stephen Furdek" . Unpublis-h ed Master of Arts dis se r tation. History Depar tment, Catholic University, _ 1952. Teplicky, Sister M. Berchmans, SS .C.M. "Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cy,ril and Methodius". Unpublishe d Master of Arts diss ertation. Education Department, Marywood College, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1965, Vol. 15 Description An account of the resource Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA Pub lished by the Slovak League of America VOL XV 1965 NO. 38 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE SLOVAKS IN AMERICA By James J. Zatko, Ph.D. , University of Notre Dame Occupying the area enclosed by the Carpathian mountains, the Danube River, and the Theiss River, the Slovaks to the number of two million or 12% of the total population of Hungary, eked out a meagre existence between the two rivers and the mountains. Because the Slovaks had to struggle for a living, men and women were inured to hard work and to a very low standard of living. Their facial features form two general types: the round-faced with wide-set eyes, and the long-headed narrow face with a long nose. The people live in villages consisting of long, low brick or wood houses with hand-made shingles. The interiors were generally neat and tidy, even where there was an earthen floor. 1 Slovakia itself is a geographic unit, whose northern boundary runs along the Carpathian mountains, and whose southern boundary is the Danube River and the Theiss River, which cut deep valleys and ravines through the mountain ridges. The land is divided in the west by the streams flowing to the Danube, by those flowing to the Theiss in eastern Slovakia, with a central Slovak upland lying between. 2 The area consists of about 18,895 square miles of mostly agricultural land, but the land is not the best for cultivation, much of it being woodland and the rest not very fertile. Bratislava was the capital, the ancient coronation city of Hungarian Kings before Budapest, and a great Danubian river port at the cross-roads of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Other important cities in Slovakia are: Trnava in western Slovakia, Nitra in west central Slovakia on the river Nitra, Zilina in northern Slovakia on the river Vah, Turciansky Sv. Martin in north central Slovakia, Zvolen in central Slovakia, and Kosice in eastern Slovakia. 3 Within Slovakia itself population shifted during the 2 SLOVAKIA fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by occupying the northern highlands in Slovakia. The villagers of the central plain and the river valleys created new settlements especially in Orava in the north, Trencin in the west, Zvolen in the central portion; the new settlers on the Carpathian mountainsides began to engage in animal husbandry, especially sheep-raising. 4 At the end of the seventeenth century an emigration strictly so-called began. Only individuals and very small groups left the recently settled highlands at first. The saffron-dealers and dealers in medicinal oils from Turiec county in north central Slovakia carried their home products all over eastern Europe, crossed Asia, as far as the Pacific coast of Siberia. In the business they established in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Siberia, they often employed their own countrymen. Weavers from Orava county in the north and lace makers from the Hron River region sold their wares in Hungary and central Europe generally. Menders with wire and glaziers from Trencin county in the northwest of Slovakia wandered throughout central Europe; the more enterprising settled in Germany and Russia. From the eighteenth century, after the Turk had been expelled from central and southern Hungary, the poverty stricken of Slovakia began to migrate into Hungary in quest of lands and helped to repopulate the area as well as to restore its economic productivity through agriculture. Thus did Slovak settlements originate in Hungary, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and the Banat. 5 The poverty which accelerated this new shift in population was caused by a decline in economic and commercial activity in Slovakia itself. Early in the eighteenth century there had still been considerable export of cattle and wine from Nitra and Bratislava counties, production of cloth in Myjava, forestry and river traffic, mining and textile production. Although Maria Theresa favored Austrian industries against those of Hungary, only during the reign of Joseph II did non-Slovak manufacturers begin to compete effectively with native products; and the soil in Slovakia was insufficient to provide a livelihood for the Slovak masses. 6 A migration began from the Slovak counties across their southern borders into Hungary. In 1787 eleven counties in Hungary had a population of 1,537,969, whereas the counties in Slovakia had 1,535,480. Sixty years afterwards the Hun- SLOVAKIA 3 garian counties had in 1848 a population of 2,844,830 and the counties of Slovakia had a population of 1,910,000. In 1787 Budin in Hungary had a population of 23,000 and Pest in Hungary, had only 16,000; Presporok in Slovakia had 29,000 and Banska Stiavnica in Slovakia had 24,000. After 83 years, in 1870, the population of Banska Stiavnica had declined to 12,000. 7 This decline in population, as the figures above indicate, extended to the period of the great exodus to America after 1873. As in the migration to Hungary, so in the modern migration to America economic conditions provided the main force that helped to empty Slovakia, but there were other causes, namely, political, social, and economic. The political ambitions of the Slovaks were closely linked with the rise of nationalism in Slovakia, which developed from three factors, contemporary trends of thought in Europe, outside pressure by the Magyars, and Slovak internal life itself. A conviction developed in the people that the country which they occupied was their own and that within it they had rights not to be contravened by any power. This thought was emphasized in a book by John Baltazar Magin who spoke in 1728 of the rights of the Slovak nation . Memories of Slovak antiquity began to be revived. George Papanek published Of Slovak Kings and K ingdoms in 1780; George Sklenar in 1783 wrote of the glories of Greater Moravia, and in 1793 George Fandli published a revision of Papanek's book. The Slovak poet John Holly portrayed the events of the Slovak past in an epic Sviitopluk (1833), in his book Slav (1834), and in Cyrilo-Methodi ada (1835)8 These writings prepared the ground for further studies in the Slovak language. During the Reformation the Czech language had spread in Slovakia among the Slovak Protestants ; but it remained a foreign language in Slovakia. This led to the cultivation of Slovak as the particular language of the Slovak nation. Matthew Bel-Funtik (1687-1749) wrote of the Slovak language that "in no respect does it fall behind the ponderousness of Spanish, the charm and smoothness of English, the richness and emphasis of German, the softness and tenderness of Italian or the imperious sternness of Magyar." Since the Slovaks had no national literary medium as late as the end of the eighteenth century, Anton Bernolak created a national literary language based on the western 4 SLOVAKIA or Trnava dialect. In 1787 he published a grammar of literary Slovak and later also published a six volume SlovakCzech-Latin-German-Magyar dictionary. 9 The greatest writer of the "Bernolakian" school was John Holly, who is described as "in the fullest sense the awakener of national consciousness by right of actualizing what others had planned and dreamed of." 10 Even though a considerable school of "Bernolakian" writers developed, the western Slovak dialect failed to become the national idiom. Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) together with the Lutheran pastors Joseph Miloslav Hurban (18171888) and Michael Miloslav Hurban established the definite form of literary Slovak, based upon a dialect spoken in the eight central counties. Together they founded a literary and publishing society, Tatrin (1844), and began to publish the political journal Slovenske narodnie noviny (1845), and the literary monthly, Slovenske pohl'ady (1846). The use of the Slovak language became an essential demand in Slovak political agitation. In May of 1848 the Slovak nationalist leaders met in the rectory of Michael Miloslav Hodza in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, where they drew up a political program for the Slovaks: "Petitions of the Slovak Nation." They expressed no desire to break away from the Hungarian state; they wanted defined boundaries for Slovak lands, social, political, cultural equality of Slovaks with Hungarians, and official recognition of the Slovak language. When the leaders planned to submit this program for the approval of the Slovak people, the Hungarian government forbade Slovak assemblies and imprisoned the Slovak leaders. 11 The hand of Eudovit Stur was obvious in the program. Already in 1847 he had listed these grievances: manorial courts, maldistribution of public offices, lack of uniform taxation, need of reform in the judicial system, insufficient freedom of the press and speech; he also demanded the use of the Slovak language in schools, churches, and courts. 1 z With the demands of Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas ignored and then repressed, the Slovaks took to revolutionary activity against the Hungarians. Since their only hope of relief lay with the central government at Vienna, they threw in their lot with the imperial forces of Habsburg against the SLOVAKIA 5 revolution of Kossuth. After the prostration of Magyarism through Russian intervention in 1849, the Slovaks were prepared to accept a limited territorial sovereignty from the imperial government; but even though the assimilative policy of the Magyars was suspended, centralization, not autonomy, remained the order of the day. In the Spring of 1861 the Slovaks renewed their political activity. After their political principles had been published in the newspapers, an assembly was called to meet in Turciansky Sv. Martin. The prominent attorney Stephen Marko Daxner formulated the political program: recognition of the Slovak nation by imperial edict, the constitution of Slovakia as a distinct administrative unit in Hungary, the right of Slovaks to develop their own life without restriction. This "Memorandum of the Slovak People" was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph; the only result was that the Slovaks were allowed to establish the cultural institution, the Matice, Slovenska. 14 Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 forced a settlement with the Magyars. Known as the Compromise of 1867, it granted Magyars internal independence and divided the Empire into two countries under one crown. The Compromise of 1867 and the dualistic sys.tern based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitation, in order to secure its own hegemony against tbe will of the Slav majority.15 Jaszi observes that this artificial dualistic system could be maintained only "by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine." 16 The political injustices after 1867 should therefore be considered not only against a background of Magyarization but also seen as a means used to preserve the structure of the dual monarchy. The electoral laws and improper representation in the Hungarian parliament were among the grievances. For instance, in the 58 electoral areas inhabited by Slovaks for the most part, these deputies were elected: 6 SLOVAKIA ELECTION OF DEPUTIES 1865-1881 Year Magyar Deputies 1865 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 58 58 56 58 58 58 Slovak Deputies 0 0 2 0 0 0 Source: C. J. Street, HU GARY AND DEMOCRACY (London, 1923), PP. 57-58. The constituencies and polling stations were so arranged that Magyar communities were assured of easy access •to the poll, while non-Magyar communities had ,to travel great distances. It wa-s no uncommon trick for the local authorities to declare roads and bridges unsafe for traffic on the day of election, or for all the hors es in non-Magyar districts to be placed under veterinary supervision and forbidd en to move outside the commune.17 The Slovaks had grievances against the judicial system. Until 1871 the judicial and administrative spheres were not separated. In that year judicial reform was inaugurated. Criminal and civil cases were dealt with in the District and Sedrial courts as the first instance, the Tables as the second, and the Royal Curia in Budapest as the final one. 18 The Slovaks complained too that the nationality of the legal officers did not correspond to the national distribution of population. In 1910 there were 2,633 judges and official lawyers in Hungary; 2,601 were Magyars, 31 Germans, 1 Slovak. This was the proportion of legal officers in a country where the Slovaks formed 12 % of the population.19 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the law of Nationalities (1868) admitted other languages to court, 20 the law remained a dead letter, for summonses were issued in Magyar, and verdicts given in Magyar, and the need of an interpreter was disregarded. 21 Slovaks also called for freedom of the press. 22 Between 1905 and 1908 there were 43 court actions against fourteen Slovak newspapers ; sentences totaling eleven years and three months were imposed as well as fines totaling 11,000 crowns for Pan-Slavistic activities. 23 Besides these unsettling political factors, other social causes added to the sense of national frustration. SLOVAKIA 7 At the basis of the cultural conflict was the idea of the Magyar state. The law of Hungary recognized only one nation in Hungary, and that was the Magyar. To be secure, Hungary had to be Magyar. The objective of political action became to create one nation, Magyar in sentiment and speech, from the multinational and polylingual Hungarian lands. 24 This ideal was pushed by every means: newspapers, the society for the Magyarization of Proper Names founded in 1880, and 1898 law to give all towns Magyar names; suppression of the Slovak language in rail, postal, and telegraph service. 25 As one reaction against the process of forcible assimilation, the Slovak sought comfort and national security in Pan-Slavism. Having become conscious of the larger Slav community, the Slovak nationalist leaders shook off their feeling of inferiority and began to place their hopes of realizing national ideals in the larger Slav group. 26 The Hungarians reacted by denouncing as Pan-Slav any Slovak who refused to renounce his nationality and language. 27 The chief means of transforming Slovaks into Magyars were to be the schools. After the Compromise of 1867, an attack was launched against German, Slovak, and Ruthenian schools. Bela Grunwald in 1873 began publishing Svornost', a bi-monthly, attacking the Slovak gymnasia as hot-beds of Pan-Slavism. 28 The gymnasium at Revuca was closed August 20, 1874; the one at Klastor pod Znievom, on September 21, 1874; and the one at Turciansky Sv. Martin, on December 30, 1874. 29 All Slovak elements were expelled from secondary and technical schools, and permission was refused to erect a chair of Slovak at the University of Budapest.30 The school statistics reveal this Magyarizing tendency: SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA 1910-1918 Schools Primary Grammar Indus., Comm., Agric. Teacher training Middle (High Schools) University Magyar Slovak German 3,777 101 118 419 20 39 8 SLOVAKIA Source: Nicholas Timashe!f, PEDIA (1948), p. 262. "Education," SLAVONIC ENCYCW- The official statistics of the Hungarian government in 1914 reveal the extent of Magyarization. They list 256,020 children of Slovak language as attending school. Of these, 214,267 Slovak children were in purely Magyar elementary schools, and only 42,186 in 365 Slovak elementary schools. 31 Educational standards were low. Attendance was weakly enforced; in most villages the schools remained open for five or six months per year. In 1913, just before World War I, 32,700 Slovak children of school age were not enrolled.32 Naturally the results were bad. Those able to read and write averaged 63 per cent of the Slovak population; but individual counties had worse records. In the county of Saris, only 48.6 per cent, in Spis 58 per cent, in Zemplin 51.4 per cent, in Ung 43.5 per cent could read and write. 33 The Matica Slovenska or Slovak Institute, a national cultural society founded in 1863, was dissolved in 1875. The charges were unlawful political activity and mismanagement. The government seized not only money and property but also the library and museum. 34 Even the churches were made instruments of Magyarization. The religious history of the period 1867-1914 is dark, indeed. Bishop Parvy of Spis lived in Budapest for many years; Bishop Balasz of Roznava ignored everything Slovak as though it were non-existent. The Cardinal-Primate of Hungary, Czernoch, was of Slovak birth, but Magyar in thought and sentiment. 35 Often other priests felt their people's cultural humiliation and endeavoured to alleviate it, but were placed so that their influence was limited. The Lutheran General Assembly resolved against "Pan-Slavism" in 1882; in no district did the Slovak Lutherans have a majority.36 However, the chief reasons for Slovak emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century seem to have been economic.37 The predominantly agricultural nature of the country's economy is best illustrated by the following chart on agriculture: SLOVAKIA 9 POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 1910 Total Population in 1,000 Austrian Provinces Counties of Hungarian Crown Bosnia and Herzogovina Total Total engaged in Agriculture in 1,000 Agricultural Percentage 28,572 13,842 48.5 % 20,886 13,470 64.5% 1,932 1,674 86.6 % ----------------- - -- - -- - ----- --- - --51,390 28,982 Source: Oscar Ja,szi, THE DIS,SOLUTION MONARCHY (Chicago, 1929) p. 195. 56.4 % OF THE IHABSBUHG The soil was not of the best quality. Woodland averaged about 15 per cent of the total. In Turiec county 33 per cent was unfit for cultivation; in Orava, 30 per cent; in Zvolen, 32 per cent; in Liptov, 41 per cent; in Novohrad, 26 per cent; in Gerner, 47 per cent; Spis, 37 per cent; in Saris, 43 per cent. In Orava county there were 2761 farms that averaged one to five acres; of this land only 43 per cent was arable. 38 In addition to the problem of poor soil, there existed the problem of the great estates. Speaking of Hungary in general, Jaszi says that 40 per cent of the total area of Hungary was occupied in 1913 by a small number of large and very large estates. The medium sized farms of 142 to 1,420 acres embraced a smaller area, but with the greater estates covered 54.4 per cent of the total territory. Over 64.4 per cent of the country was possessed by small farmers holding less than 142 acres. Moreover, only 34.5 per cent of Hungarian territory belonged to those who actually cultivated the soil. 39 In Hungary proper, without !Croatia, there lived 2,280,000 farmer families. According to the most optimistic calculation only 460,000 families owned property on the average above 20 acres, guaranteeing an independent livelihood, whereas 1,820,000 families, that is to say four fifths of them possessed only so-called "dwarf" properties or no property at all.40 10 SLOVAKIA If we consider the situation of Slovakia in particular, an equally cheerless picture presents itself. In Slovakia 1,000 persons owned 2,100,000 hectares, that is, about 8,000 square miles; 21.5 per cent of the holdings were less than a half hectare in size; 41 75 per cent of the land was held by the great landlords. 42 The agricultural areas compared unfavorably with the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrialized parts did not exceed three-tenths of the entire territory of the Monarchy, whereas over seven-tenths were populated by peasants, poor, almost on the level of slow starvation. 43 One way to raise the peasant's standard of living was to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and the growth of crops. Between 1850 and 1895 there was progress in agricultural production. Improvements were made in Hungary after 1848, e.g., the iron plow replaced the wooden. The great landlords led the advance and the peasants imitated them. These landlords in Hungary between 1850 and 1890 were deeply interested in improving agricultural production, chiefly because of the high price of wheat in the world market. They were anxious to increase wheat production for export. After 1885 the world market price began to decline and the landlords gradually lost interest. Indeed, they began to cut production. The strategy was to create a domestic scarcity so that wheat would have to be imported. The objective of the policy was to transform a grain exporting country into a grain importing one. This would enable the landlords to raise the price of domestic grain to the world price augmented by the tariff. By 1907 the tariffs began to have a constant effect. In this situation the lot of the agricultural worker grew steadily worse. Unemployment grew, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose. Jaszi observes that the heavy hand of the landlord-controlled economy pushed the Monarchy toward disaster. 44 The workers' wages in Hungary averaged the equivalent of sixty to a hundred dollars a year, while a woman's wages averaged yearly only between forty and fifty dollars. 45 In Slovakia the agricultural worker earned 25 cents a day.46 His staple food in winter was cabbage and potatoes. 47 To the low wages and the agricultural poverty we must SLOVAKIA 11 add the difficulty of buying land in Slovakia. The price of land in Slovakia by 1906 had risen in some cases 100 percent; the amount of money sent from America helped cause this price rise. The Postal Bank of Kosice received in 1896 six and a half million florins from America. 48 Over and above these burdens, the poor peasant had to bear the load of usurious banking. In pre-war Slovakia almost every town had a little joint-stock institution; although this was called a bank, it did not carry on real banking operations, but was only a savings and loan bank. The majority of these banks dispersed capital which was not available where it was needed. The banks under Magyar control followed a policy of dividends, whereas the Slovak banks paid a lower rate of interest. 49 Virtually no institutions provided long term mortgage credits; in fact, only two banks, both unsound, engaged in this business in Slovakia. Besides these banks, there were cooperative societies which offered limited cr,edit facilities to the peasants. 50 The small farmer ended up borrowing at rates of 7 per cent to 8 per cent, and sometimes rates were as high as 14 per cent. On short term loans rates of 50 per cent were not unknown. Consequently the profits of the banks were high. One bank in Slovakia with a capitalization of 60,000 crowns and reserves of 18,000 profited one year to the amount of 22,000 crowns. The average profit of the banks in 1888 was 29.56 per cent on the capital invested; in 1894 the profit was 13.58 per cent. 51 The economic situation worsened by the national addiction to drink. On this all the sources seem agreed. Impoverishing effects of overindulgence in drink were a factor in driving the Slovaks to seek improved economic conditions in America. 52 This lack of economic opportunity and security led to the migration. The following figures, though somewhat suspect because of the tendency of Magyarization, still tell an eloquent story. This table is a modification of the original. NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY Nationality Slovaks 1880 1,855,000 1890 1,897,000 1900 2,002,000 1910 1,946,000 12 SLOVAKIA Source: Robert A. Kann, THE -MULTINATIONAL EJMP]RE: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL REF1ORM IN THE HABSBURG MONAROHY 1848-1914 {New York, 19 50) I, 278. The Slovaks in considerable numbers migrated to America after 1880 as part of the "new immigration". Until 1880 the bulk of the new additions to American population by immigration was predominantly either English in speech or at least derived from the northern and western areas of Europe; this was the "old immigration." Thereafter newcomers from southern and eastern Europe arrived, representing peoples who were very different in language, customs, political experiences, and personal standards of living. Italian, Greek, and the confusion of Slavic languages sounded strange indeed to ears attuned to English or Germanic sounds. Invidious comparisons were made. The "Nordic" was more akin to the American in blood; the "new immigrants" had not the Anglo-Saxon training in self-government, and they were merely birds of passage. Besides the fact that he spoke a strange language, the "new immigrant" was more often than not a Catholic. All these things set him apart from the "old immigrant." 53 The year 1873 saw the beginning of the flood. Even though the political, cultural, social, and economic causes were ripe for emigration, other causes operated to bring America to the attention of the hardpressed Slovak immigrants. The steamship company agents urged the peasants to emigrate, for the companies derived a large part of their income from transport of immigrants. In most countries there were laws prohibiting advertisements of prosperous conditions in another country. Two leading steamship companies were reported to have five or six thousand agents in Galicia alone. In Hungary, Immigration Commission members saw letters written by agents instructing prospective immigrants on how to leave the country without the government's consent, what routes to follow, and other related information. 54 Other agents who increased emigration from Hungary after 1870 were labor contractors, who came to hire workers for the mines and steel mills. These agents promised everything. Archduke Rudolph, they said, was living in South America, establishing there a new ideal state; immigrants to, SLOVAKIA 13 the United States were to receive grants of land and aid in buying equipment and in constructing necessary buildings.55 Many peasants who went with the agents wrote back letters reporting high wages. These lett'ers were undoubtedly one of the most powerful means of persuading the Slovak peasants to cross the ocean. 56 In the earlier phases of immigration many emigrants returned to their native country after they had laid by a sufficiency of this world's goods. The figures given by the Hungarian government for emigration and return for the year of 1905 show the extent of this return movement and suggest the breadth of influence exercised by returning emigrants. In 1905 the Magyar figures list 38,770 as leaving the country, while they give 4,038 as returning to Hungary.57 The news of work and wages certainly had an effect in stimulating further emigration. The Slovak emigrants moved generally westward by rail for German or Dutch ports. During the years 1881-1900 some 372,979 Slovaks were reported to have passed through the port of Hamburg, whereas only 9,501 embarked from Italian ports. 58 During 1886-1907 the German ports handled 348,808 emigrants from Hungary, Antwerp 57,170, Dutch ports 33,762, and Italian ports 3,785. 59 The low cost of steamship crossing attracted many to undertake the difficult journey. Passage from Hamburg on the way out was $20; the return journey as far as Oderburg, a station on the Hungarian frontier, was $23.60. The Hungarian Government granted the Cunard Line the monopoly of transporting emigrants from Hungary. So great was the rush to America that the Cunard Line called on other companies and formed the "Continental Pool" to handle the traffic. This "Pool" provided the worst accommodations, the worst diet, and the worst navigation. 61 The journey's length varied from fifteen to sixty days. The emigrants fortified themselves against sea-sickness with prunes and brought their own supplies of sausage, bacon, plum brandy, and gin. Water was distributed only at intervals, sometimes only once a day. The ventilation in the living quarters was bad. 62 One emigrant described his journey in these words: "It was in the year 1883 that, with three men, I set out from Trebis ov for America. We got on a wagon that took us to Obisovce, 14 SLOVAKIA where we boarded a train and rode to Vrutky. There we obtained travel permits for Bohumfn, and from Bohumin to Bremen, where we boug1hit our steamship tickets, for which we paid 53 ,gold pieces. A chill comes over me even now when I think of that ship of ours. We were afloat almost 18 days and twice the shi p was in danger of sinking. Everything on the deck rwas broken, a nd water poured into it. And as the boat rocked, one could feel that even in one's s-tomach."63 Among the ports of entry New York easily ranked first for the Slovak immigrants; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Portland. 64 Nor did the ills of the immigrants cease when they landed in the United States. Often enough their meagre funds and they were quickly parted. One immigrant paid a fare of $60 for a ride from the harbor to the Lackawanna railroad station. Hotels deliberately detained the immigrants by telling them that the train to their destination made the trip only once a week. Other swindlers met the immigrants as they came ashore and offered to send a telegram to their relatives or friends for the price of twenty five cents ; needless to say, no telegram was sent, and the immigrants were only so much poorer. One porter kidnapped two young girls who ended in brothels.85 The Slovak immigrants of the 1880's were not the first Slovaks to set foot upon American soil. The very first Slovak to come to America, so far as we know, was Andrew Jelik, a tailor on a Dutch ship which sailed to America in 17541755. He did not remain in America and eventually died in Budin, Hungary, 1783.66 Another Slovak who had arrived in America in the eighteenth century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed at Baltimore in 1775. He was but an adventurer whose later career took him to Madagascar where he became king and where he also perished. 67 In the year 1800 a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit in Mexico City by making his confession in Slovak. 68 The first Slovak settlement was made in Philadelphia by drotari, wireworkers, in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street. 69 Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became a citizen in 1879. Making the trip back and forth across the ocean, he was h1 America twenty six times. He died in 1915. 70 In the wake of these individuals the larger numbers began to come, first, from eastern Slovakia, especially from the SLOVAKIA 15 counties of Zemplin, Sari~, and Spis. 71 Between the years 18691890 the county of Spis lost 14% of her youths between 20 to 25 years of age, and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; Saris lost 34% of those between 20 and 25, 44 % of the men between 26 and 30. 72 Only after the eastern counties did the western ones take to emigration. To give exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 is impossible because prior to 1899 the immigration authorities counted the immigrants according to country of last residence, and many Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. Since 1899 the immigrants are counted according to race or language. Therefore the figures before 1899 do not give us exact data on Slovak immigrants; but according to Emily Green Balch the earlier immigrants from Hungary may be presumed to be Slovaks with some Jews and Magyars included. 73 In 1873 immigrants from Hungary numbered 1,300; in 1880 4,000 entered the United States, and in 1884 the number rose to 15,000. 74 The following table shows the total number of Slovaks coming into this country in the years 1899 to 1909: SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES Year ending June 30 Number 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 15,838 29,243 29,343 36,934 34,427 27,940 52,368 38,221 42,041 16,170 Source: Emily Green Balch, OUR (New York, 1910), P. 103. 22,568 SLAVIC FELLOW CITI ZENS In the period 1899-1910 the total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673; in this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. 75 Consideration of Table 5 shows that Hl SLOVAKIA 1905 was the peak year for the Slovaks in which 52,368 of them were admitted. Numerically in the twelve years ending June 30, 1910 Slovakia ranked eighth among the nations providing immigrant material. 76 The rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; this was double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3), Croatian-Slovenians (13.1), and South Italians (11.9). The rate was the highest of any group. 77 Having arrived in the United States, the Slovak immigrants began to look for a place to live and to work. The first areas to draw them were the coal mine centers; only in the second instance did the Slovaks settle in the factory cities.78 One focus of settlement was the hard-coal area of northeastern Pennsylvania where the center was Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Before World War I the mines in this district employed 75,000 to 100,000 men; of this group 12% were Slovaks. 79 In the soft coal area of southwestern Pennsylvania Mt. Pleasant was the center of dispersion. From there the Slovaks moved northward to Latrobe or Greensburg, southward to Connellsville and Uniontown. The chief centers of Slovak settlement were: Alice, Standard, Bessemer, Bridgeport, Mammouth, Old Hecla, New Hecla, Calumet, Old Tarrs, Donnelly, Buckeye, Moyer, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Gayette City, Brownsville, Masontown, Fairchance, Point Marion, Cannonsburg, Perryopolis, Republic, and others. 80 Only later did pockets of immigrants form in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. About the geographic dispersion of Slovaks an interesting note occurs in a letter sent to the Jednota in 1913 by a J . P. Kapas, who had been traveling in the west. He wrote: "There had been plenty of Slovak people in the west, but almost all returned to the eastern states, and only for this r eason that in the west the people were all foreigners and wild." 81 Alaska seems to have been the limit of immigration, at least as far as the group was concerned. John Miklas, writing from Alaska, recommended against coming and said that he had not found any Slovaks there as yet. He surmised, however, that after his return from the "Old Country", where he meant to go for a visit, he might settle in Alaska.82 By 1885 large groups of Slovaks had settled in the fol- SLOVAKIA 17 lowing states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois. 83 In the hard coal area in northeastern Pennsylvania a sub-employment system was used in which an operator hired the men who dug and loaded the coal; the mine company paid the operator and he paid off his hired men. The Slovaks, inexperienced in mine work and unskilled in language, worked merely as the hired men; this left them exposed to the wiles of unscrupulous operators who kept some of the pay from them. 84 In 1856 the Pennsylvania Railroad had reached Pittsburgh from Philadelphia; the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad in 1871 built tracks to Pittsburgh, thus giving Pittsburgh an outlet to Baltimore. The demand for laborers in the mine fields of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties in Pennsylvania was answered by many Slovak men from the hard coal area and "the old country." But who the first Slovak was to enter the Pittsburgh area we do not know. When the agents of the Frick Company from the coke and coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania hired new immigrants · at Castle Garden, but for trivial exceptions the hired men were Slovaks. The company transported them by rail to Alverton, lying between Scottdale and Mt. Pleasant, Pa. Thence they walked to Morewood, Pa., where a company house awaited them. It is impossible to tell how many Slovaks there were in the coke region. We do know that in Morewood by 1893 there were four hundred men engaged in work, and how many Slovaks there were in this group we do not know. As early as 1880 John and Sophia Hvizdo~ had eighteen Slovak boarders in their house. 85 Until 1900 Slovaks worked mostly in the coal mines and at the coke ovens of Frick and Company. This firm had been organized in 1871 as Frick and Company, with about 300 acres of coal area and 50 coke ovens around Connellsville, Pa. By 1889 it had about 35,000 acres and 15,000 coke ovens. The lowest paid worker in 1890 was the "yard worker" who earned $1.40 for a ten hour day; the best wages were paid the "road man" who received $2.10 for nine hours of work. 86 At first the Slovaks worked beside the Czechs in the coal mines, while the Poles worked at the coke ovens; but gradually, the Slovaks too began to work their way up to jobs at the ovens. 18 SLOVAKIA Most Slovaks were satisfied with their wages, which varied from $16.00 to $25.00 every two weeks. Strange as it may seem, it was possible to live and also to lay something by from these wages. A pound of beef soup meat cost three cents; for six dollars a man could dress himself rather well; rent cost three or four dollars a month for a small four room house. Nevertheless, not all miners were satisfied; demands were made for more pay and less work. When the mine operators refused, there were strikes, often riotous and bloody. 87 The Slovaks were also employed in the Egdar Thompson Iron Works of Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie with Frick employed the greatest number of Slovaks; others, like Rainey, Oliver, and Jones and Laughlin also engaged considerable numbers of Slovaks, but the number cannot be exactly stated. However, until 1900 most of the Slovaks worked in the mines and at the coke ovens.88 When the Slovaks got jobs in the mines, they lived in "company houses ",which were built practically at the site of the mine. This was a settlement of large houses built by the company and rented to the worker, who had also to pay for water, gas and coal. 89 To buy his food and other necessities the miner had to patronize the company store. This made the dependence of the worker on the comp:.my complete; the threat of expulsion during a strike was a powerful weapon in keeping the miners submissive. 90 The company r ented a house to a married couple on condition that they take in "boarders," the usual number being ten, but in the larger houses the number varied upward to thirty or forty. 91 The cleanliness d 2p::!nded on the character, ability, or sheer physical strength of the housewife. Within the household food arrangements provided that except for meat, flour, and coffee, the food was purchased in common. One meal a day wa:; eaten together, on Sunday at noon and during the week in the evening. For the other meals the gazdina or housewife cooked individually for the men whatever they bought. Beer by the barrel was also bought in common; sometimes this ran to a hundred barrels per month. At the end of the month the common bill was divided: the housewife did not pay; the men including the husband, paid equally, and two children were counted as one adult. 92 Moreover, on pay day several barrels of beer would be bought as well as whiskey, SLOVAKIA 19 and much meat was prepared for a gay evening. At first, dancing was the chief recreation. One man pulled out an accordion, and the dancing began, even men dancing with men because of the shortage of women partners; frequently this mixure of drink, food, and music led to drunken brawls sometimes over the excellence of their home towns in Slovakia, often enough over women. Dancing was not limited to pay day; any celebration of even slight importance had to be combined with dancing and shouting of the most vigorous sort. The Cardas was a universal favorite. Family life was injured by many men coming to America without their wives and families and by the dearth of marriageable Slovak girls. To find a wife many young men on week ends went to Passaic, New Jersey, where many Slovak girls worked in the textile mills, and the men watched the girls as they came from work and made their choice. On Sundays in Passaic there often were ten to twenty weddings. Difficult as family life was, the "boarding house," allowing for so little privacy, did not help very much; sometimes it led to the wife's running off with a boarder. 93 Organizational life among the Slovaks began in the lodges and societies so common in America after the Civil War. By 1914 in the United States principal organizations had 15,600,000 members. Economic and social need led the Slovaks to form lodges. Mine disasters often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family not only destitute, but even without the money for a funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits a large number of societies grew up in industrial and .mining towns. The first of these was the Persi Uhorszko-Slovenszky v nemoczi podporujuci Szpolek, established in New York, on March 3, 1883. In this society, which lasted for eight years, Slovak was made the official language. Fraternal and mutual benefit iocieties mushroomed in the Slovak settlements. The Spolok Sv. Stefana in Passaic, N. J. was organized 1884 and already in 1887 was calling for a unification with other Slovak fraternal organizations. Under the influence of a Polish organization whose constituti-on it used, the Cirkevny a v ntmoci pl!>dporujuci spolok arose in Hazleton, Pa., in 1884. The Slovaks in Houtzdale, Pa., organized the Bratstvo Najsvatejsieho Srdca Pana Jezisa, on November 14, 1886; on December 12, 1884 the Spolok Sv. Stefana in Plymouth, Pa., came 20 SLOVAKIA into existence. A touch of humor accompanied the difficulties of the lodge in Bayonne City, N. J., where the Spolok Princa Rudolfa, set up in 1887, had to change its name after the tragic death of Archduke Rudolph of Hapsburg at Mayerling, because the other Slovaks ridiculed the members for having lost their patron. Bayonne City, N. J., had one of the largest mutual benefit societies, the Prvy bednarsky vypomocny spolok, an organization of Coopers engaged in making barrels, staves, chests, boxes; it was organized in 1888 and acted also as a bargaining agent for the membership with their employees. They were the first to have their own flag, whereas the other groups used the Hungarian flag. The Spolok Sv. Cyrila a Methoda in Minneapolis, Minn., and the Slovensky Spolok Sv. Petra i Pavla of McKeesport, Pa., both came into existence in 1888; the Slovensky v nemoci podporujuci spolok in Braddock, Pa., arose in 1889. The chief purpose of these societies was help in need, especially providing an elaborate funeral. In these funerals all the local lodges took part with flags, uniforms, and mourning bands. The secondary purpose was to aid in the organization of parishes, the building of churches and schools and lodge halls. 94 In spite of the success of these lodges, financial problems arose from the system of assessment which they used. The system required a contribution of about fourteen cents a month to meet administrative costs; on the death or sickness of a member the others had to contribute as much as would be needed for the stipulated sum. A considerable number of deaths or cases of sickness within a month or a short time made the financial burden too great for the small lodges. 95 The first appeal for unification came from the Society of St. Stephen in Passaic, N. J., as early as 1887. Julius Schwartz-Markovic in Nova Vlast' (a periodical that lasted only from March to December, 1888) made appeals for consolidation; Peter Rovnianek repeated this appeal in the October issue, as did B. Lajciak in the December issue. The Rev. Joseph Kossalko, a Roman Catholic priest of proMagyar conviction, seeing the nationalist tendency of these lodges in their use of Slovak as the official language and their gradual abandonment of the Hungarian flag, opposed this movement in a new periodical, the Zastava. The consolidation did not come until the 1890's. 96 When the Slovak immigrants, of whom the bulk was SLOVAKIA 21 Catholic, first came to the United States, they were financially unable to build churches for their own use. Before the Slovak Catholics had their own churches, they attended Polish, German, Czech, or Irish churches; if they happened to be regular attendants at a church where their languago was not understood, they often went a considerable distance to receive the sacraments, especially that of Penance, from someone who understood their language. In the southwestern Pennsylvania mining area the Slovaks were fortunate to have in their midst St. Vincent's Archabbey, a Benedictine institution, which took special care to provide priests who could understand the Slovak language. Priests from this archabbey went from settlement to settlement taking care of the spiritual needs of the Slovaks. The first to do "mission" work among the Slovaks was Rev. Nepomuk Yaeger, O.S.B., who for three years in southwestern Pennsylvania visited the mining camps, where often enough he had to offer the· Mass to the accompaniment of card-playing, drunken singing, swearing and quarreling. 97 First to organize on a religious basis were the Slovak Lutherans. The first Lutheran parish was established in Streator, Illinois, where the church was ready for services on October 5, 1884. Karol Horak, ordained in 1883, was the first minister, but he gave up ministerial work and became a real estate agent. While the parish was withouth a minister's services, the Slovak Lutherans met in the home of Mr. G. Kozlej, who read the Bible to them. A minister, Cyril Droppa, reached Streator on March 26, 1884 and stayed there until 1887; eventually his spiritual labors took him to Russia. This first Lutheran parish had 49 members; the pastor's salary was fixed at forty dollars a month. The name of the parish was the Parish of the Blessed Trinity. Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa., and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minn., in 1888. 98 Almost simultaneously with the Lutherans, the Slovak Catholics organized themselves into parishes. However, before this could go on apace, priests able to speak Slovak were needed. Even among the first priests, 99 the division into Slo·vak nationalists and Madarones disturbed their relations with one another and their work among Slovaks, Protestant as _well as Catholics. In 1882 the Rev. Ignatius Jaskovic, who came to Hazle- 22 SLOVAKIA ton, Pa., was the first active Slovak Catholic priest in the United States. He built St. Joseph's church in Hazleton, where the first Mass was said on December 6, 1885. He stayed in Hazleton until 1890. The Rev. J. Kossalko, arriving in 1884, had his first parish in Streator, Ill.; he said the first Mass in the new church of St. Stephen on December 10, 1885, just four days after the first mass had been said in Hazleton, Pa. The Rev. Samuel Bella, also a Catholic priest, became the pastor of Nanticoke, Pa., and later of Bayonne City, N. J. These three priests were all Madarones, that is, Slovaks with pro-Magyar convictions, and firmly opposed to any Slovak nationalism. 100 This Madarone element introduced the first division of the Slovak group into the factions that played a part among the pre-World War Slovaks of America. In 1887 in Scranton, Pa., the Slovak Calvinists first organized as a religious group. The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa., had a chapel there since 1888, but the building of churches had to wait until the 189O's. To conduct services in their parishes the Calvinists hired Magyar and English ministers; the Slovaks and Magyars fought about the language to be used in the divine service, Slovak or Magyar. There was no general solution for these churches, but the language varied from church to church. 101 At first some Slovaks objected to building schools on the score of uselessness; these untutored peasants had to be taught that schools were important. Some Slovak immigrants had come to make money and were in America only temporarily. Schools meant permanence. Why should they contribute to the education of other people's chidren? However a beginning was made. St. Stephen's parish, Streator, Ill., built the first Slovak Catholic parochial school in 1889, a wooden structure, costing $4,500, a considerable sum for those days. From the very beginning the schools were not strictly Slovak, for there were not enough Slovak teachers; this led to many subjects being taught by "English" teachers and "Irish" nuns. Slovak nationalists were satisfied by having the pastor teach the children on Saturday afternoons, when they studied the Slovak language, Slovak history, and Slovak geography.102 The 11cattered Slovak settlements were brought in touch with one another by newspapers written in the Slovak language. John Slovensky, a trained teacher from Slovakia, had SLOVAKIA 23 come to the United States in 1879, and had obtained a clerical job in the Austro-Hungarian consulate. This put him in contact with the Slovak immigrants, who came to the consulate often seeking information about conditions in the Monarchy, as for instance, was the Monarchy at war with the Turk? This suggested to Slovensky the idea of a Slovak periodical. In 1885 he launched a lithographed paper called Rulletin, which contained news from Europe and items about Slovak immigrants. Especially the tavern keepers subscribed to it for their taverns where Slovaks met to read it. Success prompted John Slovensky to embark on · a larger enterprise, the publication of Amerikanszko-Slovenszke Noviny. J. Schwartz-Markovic and the Rev. Erwin Gelhoff, a Catholic priest, published the Nova Vlast' in Streator, Illinois, in March 1888; this venture lasted only until December of that very year. The year 1889 saw the birth of two other newspapers, the Slovak v Amerike and Rev. J. Kossalko's Madarone newspaper, Zastava. 103 These newspapers became the sounding boards of popular opinion as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Discussion in the newspapers led to the consolidation of local lodges during the 1890's. With the beginning of the 1890's the Slovaks began to unify the many individual lodges into a federation for greater economic security. However, from the very start factions divided the Slovaks. The leaders of the Slovak immigrants disagreed on whether the principle of organization should be religious or nationalist. The Rev. Stephen Furdek, a Catholic priest, believed that the new national organization should be based upon religious uniformity within the organization; the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists should each have their own organization. Peter Rovnianek, a Slovak nationalist, wanted nationality to be the principle of organization. Any Slovak, no matter what his religious convictions or lack of them, could be a member. 104 Because of this difference of principle, two separate, and in many ways rival, organizations arose. On February 16, 1890, Peter V. Rovnianek led in founding the National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh, Pa. All Slovaks, Catholics, Protestants, Freemasons, Freethinkers or indifferentists, were welcome. Openly nationalist, the National Slovak Society played down religious differences, emphas- 24 SLOVAKIA izing all Slovaks were one. The frank nationalism and liberalism antagonized the Madarone Slovaks and some Catholici. The Rev. J. Kossalko, the most outstanding Madarone, refused absolution to Catholic members of the National Slovak Society. 105 Others besides the Madarone element opposed the liberal National Slovak Society. The Rev. Stephen Furdek established a Catholic fraternal organization, the First Catholic Slovak Union, September 4, 1890. The objectives of this First Catholic Slovak Union were to preserve the Catholic Faith, to support fellow-members, widows, and orphans in need, to preserve and extend the use of the Slovak language and Slovak nationality. Conditions of membership were recognition of the bishop of Rome as head of the Catholic Church, faithful performance of religious duties, attendance of one's children at a Catholic school, support of parish and parochial school, no ridicule of religious ceremonies, and no writing against the Church and the clergy. 106 Slovak women felt that they, too, should have their own organizations independent of male control. They established the Zivena Beneficial Society in the year 1891. In 1892 the Slovak Catholic women organized a similar society, the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union. 107 The Slovak Lutherans organized their own beneficial society in 1893, the Slovak Evangelical Union; and soon afterwards the Slovak Calvinists formed the Slovak Calvinist Union. 108 For reasons that are not evident, almost all these groups felt the strain of internal strife. A split in the First Catholic Slovak Union provided members for a new organization, the Pennsylvania Roman and Greek Catholic Union in 1893. This society intended to encourage religion, temperance, and morality, to train its members in obedience and respect for civil law and in performance of civil duties, to collect funds to pay burial benefits.109 In Chicago the local lodge of the National Slovak Society left the national organization and formed the Slovak National Society. 110 Later a similar break occurred in the Slovak Evangelical Union. In 1890 P. V. Rovnianek and his associates published the First Slovak National Almanac. Almanacs were already a Slovak European tradition. The National Slovak Society first issued its own almanac in 1893; and the First Catholic SLOVAKIA 25 Slovak Union began its series with the Kalendar Jednota in 1896. These almanacs provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays on conditions in the United States, reviews of the year's important events, religious essays, articles on the Indians and Negroes, moral essays on how to spend Sundays, counseling articles on marriage, and almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. In these almanacs the best Slovak writers reached their limited Slovak American public; eventually the almanacs became so popular that ,twenty-nine were published. 111 Newspapers received the strongest impetus from the national societies. The Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny were the mouthpiece of the National Slovak Society; the First Catholic Slovak Union published an official organ, the Jednota. These were real newspapers with world news, reports from the domestic scene in America, and organization news in their columns. One feature distinguished these papers from the trend turning American newspapers into large business enterprises; the Slovak immigrant papers remained very much the voice of the individual editors. However, many Slovaks had no desire to read a newspaper. The editors, who usually combined editing with other work to earn their living, on Saturday and Sunday toured Slovak settlements to get subscriptions for their periodicals. 112 Very soon after the organization of the two fraternal societies the Slovaks learned how effective and necessary cooperation on a national level can be. When the price of steel billets began to fall, the Edgar Thompson Works in Braddock, Pa., announced a wage cut. This led to a strike late in 1890. On the night of January 1, 1891, Michael Quinn, a guard at the mill was slain. Many Slovaks were arrested, among them persons who had been strolling about after a pleasant evening in a tavern. The police arrested about sixty persons and charged them with being involved in the crime. Most of them received light sentences, but on April 8, 1891, Andrew Toth, Michael Sabol, and George Rusnak received the death sentence for the murder of Michael Quinn. Only by heroic efforts did the Slovak leaders and organizations secure on February 7, 1892 a commutation of sentence to life imprisonment. 113 The efforts of Rev. F. Wider, president of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Peter V. Rovnianek of the National 26 SLOVAKIA Slovak Society, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Julius Wolf, won the release of Michael Sabol, suffering from tuberculosis, in 1895; he died ten days after leaving prison. Peter V. Rovnianek, engaging a lawyer, Clarence Burleigh, secured the freedom of George Rusnak in 1897; George Rusnak, too, had tuberculosis. Andrew Toth left prison only twenty years later, a man sixty two years old. After the efforts of the Slovak League had failed, Edward Goehring, an attorney, succeeded in showing that the evidence which convicted Toth was contradictory. Toth was freed in 1911. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected a motion to give Toth $300.00 for every year he had spent unjustly in jail. However, the Carnegie Foundation fixed a grant of $40 a month on him. 114 During February, 1891, a strike against the firm of Henry Clay Frick, Frick and Company, bec:;_me general in the Connellsville, Pa., area of coke ovens and soft coal. By 1889 Frick had acquired 35,000 acres of coal area and 15,000 coke ovens and employed about 30,000 workers. Andrew Virostek, a worker in the Tip Top Mine and member of the United Mine Workers of America, threatened miners who loaded more coal than union regulations permitted. Then the company fired him. The union fought the mine operators over the dismissal, and by February a strike flared throughout the region. On April 2, 1892 when about five hundred miners attacked the Southwest Company shops in Morewood, Pa., three Slovaks, three Poles, and one Italian were shot to death. The state militia came in to restore order, and some men drifted to work. Frick hired Pinkerton detectives to expel the remaining strikers from the company homes. During the week of April 18, 1892 these detectives were to oust seven hundred families in Fayette county alone. When the agents began the evictions, a Slovak man and woman perished in the violence in Leisenring No. 3, two Slovak women were wounded at Adelaide, and at Trotter, sixteen men and thirteen women were shot. Then in the following month Frick began hiring Negroes and Italians to replace the Slovaks. 115 Julius Wolf and Peter V. Rovnianek figured secretly in the settlement of the strike. The Frick company paid them sums of money for persuading the miners to return to the pits. Unwisely, the two men discussed the deal in letters, SLOVAKIA 27 which their enemies subsequently published. Slovak immigrant writing has branded these letters as the "Four Letters of Betrayal. " 116 The Slovaks' preoccupation with wages, bad housing, and mine disasters seem to have led to a decline in religious fervor. Causes suggested to explain the decline varied: nonconfessional schools, public schools, neglect by religious authorities, too great preoccupation with earning a living. 117 Evidence exists to show that some Catholics fell away. A "Home Mission among the Slavic Immigrants" in 1885 supported a Congregational Church in Cleveland; it also provided a Presbyterian Church in New York. 118 The effectiveness of these efforts among the Slovaks, it is impossible to judge. In Mt. Pleasant, Pa., a Slovak preacher came to the "Church of God" and succeeded in bringing at least 7 SloYak Catholic families into it. 119 Higganum, Conn., had a Slovak colony of about 20 families; some Slovak Catholics went to church only to keep their benefits in the Jednota; others were entirely indifferent, so far gone that they married in the Lutheran church, even though a Catholic priest was always available. 120 The namecalling contest between P. V. Rovnianek and the Rev. Stephen Furdek, unedifying as it was, certainly spread anti-clericalism among the nationalist element. This apparent religious decline should not blind us to the extensive church building activities of the Slovak immigrants during the 1890's. Frequently the construction of a church or organization of a parish began in cooperation with another national group, Poles, Croatians, Irish, or Germans; sometimes many different nationalities cooperated, Lithuanians, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Often cooperation failed, because each group felt its rights were ignored. 121 Still, for instance, at least eight new Slovak parishes were opened in the Pittsburgh diocese; and in Cleveland from St. Ladislaus' parish St. Martin's was created in 1893. 122 A Slovak parish was organized in Kangley, Ill., as a mission of the Streator congregation, in 1892. 123 The Slovak Catholics of Chicago finally got their own parish in 1898, the Roman Catholic Church of St. Michael the Archangel. 214 Expansion was the keynote. Just after the decade ended, in 1903, there were 78 Roman Catholic Slovak churches. 125 However, the Slovaks failed to build parochial schools; this had to wait for the next decade. 28 SLOVAKIA The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Blessed Trinity in 1893; in 1894 the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor and in that very year began teaching the children of the parish the Slovak language. 126 Hand in hand with progress in organization appeared the elements of culture. Such efforts as the organization of the First Catholic Slovak Band in Johnstown, Pa., in 1892, were only straws in the wind. The Rev. S. Furdek in 1893 led in a move to establish a cultural organization to be called the Matica Slovenska in memory of the Slovak cultural institution disbanded by the Magyars in 1875. It held a convention in Chicago, September 26, 1893, and was incorporated in Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1893. The Matica was to be a central organization to improve the cultural life of the Slovaks in Europe and America. On February 18, 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, not to be behind hand, organized a Majak, literarne kola, that is, the Beacon Literary Circle, partly in opposition to the Matica, although he fervently disavowed any such a purpose. The Majak's objectives were encouragement of Slovak literature and culture, establishment of a Slovak cultural press, and nationalist agitation. The Literary Circle began publishing the first Slovak literary "journal, a forty page periodical, Majak, literary, political, and nationalist. It survived only six months. Both these organizations failed, partly through division of effort, partly through lack of interest among the Slovaks. 127 During this decade another society arose in Chicago, the First Slovak Sokol. The Sokol groups were gymnastic societies with a planned program of calisthenics, track events, and eventually all sports. Just when the first Sokol group was organized is doubtful; one source says that the First Slovak Sokol was organized in Chicago in 1892128 ; another gives the date as 1895. 129 Whatever be the case, the Sokol developed into a federation national in scope. The Slovak Catholic priests, divided though they were on the question of Slovak nationalism, united in an organization known as the Society of Roman Catholic Slovak Priests in 1896. Peter V. Rovnianek originated another club in the same year, the first Slavonic Political Club with 100 members, and its influence was soon felt in politics. 130 Both of these organizations were successful, in contrast to the cul- SLOVAKIA 29 tural societies; it seems that the early Slovak immigrants were not sufficiently interested to support purely cultural groups. The cultural society and literary circle failed because labor conflicts occupied the Slovaks' attention. The Connellsville mine region was again the scene of a strike and violence that began in April, 1894. On April 4 a Slovak was slain; two days later Joseph Paddock, chief engineer of Frick's company in Davison, Pa., was killed. Blame for this crime fell on the Poles and Slovaks and over a hundred were thrown into the Uniontown jail. The court sentenced John Husar to twelve years and Michael Furin to three years in prison. Violence continued: one Slovak was killed on the main street of Connellsville and two others in the rioting at Stickle Hollow around the Washington Coal and Coke shops. At the beginning of August most of the Strikers had returned to work, but about 5,000 Slovaks remained on strike. These gradually drifted back to work or abandoned the Connellsville mines. The Rev. Orbach, a Lutheran minister, founded a Slovak colony in Wisconsin; on September 4 about 300 Slovaks set out for Wisconsin. Another farm settlement originated from the Connellsville strike. Industrial life was, after all, strange to the Slovak; he had either been a small farmer, peasant, or agricultural worker in Slovakia. His interest in acquiring a farm remained; but he did not become a farmer immediately after he landed simply because he did not have the money to invest in such a project. 131 Besides, the city gave him the companionship he would not find on the farm. Still the desire grew to place as many Slovaks as possible on the land. In the summer of 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. btephen Furdek, Rev. Vaclav Panu~ka, and Rev. Alexander Dzubaj examined land in Arkansas near Grand Prairie; they intended to settle Slovaks on some 40,000 acres of land. Peter Rovnianek and Francis Pucher received a charter for the Slovak Colonization Company of Pittsburgh on September 24, 1894, the land was bought, and sales began. After the prospective settlers had saved enough money, they bought forty or so acre farms from the Slovak Colonization Company. The cost of land was $2 to $3 an acre. 132 30 SLOVAKIA Slovak settlers established a farm community near Stuttgart, Arkansas, and named their community Slovaktown. The settlers had been born in the "old country" but came to Arkansas chiefly from the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois. The chief produce included corn, oats, hay, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. The children attended the public schools. The settlers were mostly Catholics, but there were a few Lutherans. 133 The new farmers in Slovaktown were more than satisfied with their new lives; their letters continually encouraged their fellow Slovaks to flee from the factories and the mines; but only in the 1900's did anything like a movement to the farm begin. To publicize the project and success of Slovaktown the Slovak Colonization Company began publishing a periodical, Slovaktownske Hlasy, in Pittsburgh in 1896; but it lasted only six months. 134 It might indeed have been well for the Slovaks to leave the mines and go to the farms, for violence once again found them; this time it was in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. One day in September, 1897 a group of strikers set out for Latimer. Sheriff Martin informed of the move, summoned his deputies and attempted to halt the men. Sharp words were exchanged, and Sheriff Martin ordered his deputies to fire upon the unarmed men. Twenty-one fell before the murderous gunfire and died; many others were wounded. Most of the victims were Slovaks. In spite of the unprovoked nature of the attack, the courts declared Sheriff Martin innocent, for he had ordered the shooting while performing his duty. The outcry against this verdict was most violent in the Slav press, but nothing further could be done. 135 Despite the internal dissensions among themselves and difficulties in the mines, a new interest appeared among the Slovaks during this decade; the most public manifestation of their nationalism came in 1899. Strange as it may seem, most Slovaks were not violent nationalists when they came to this country; the growth of nationalism was gradual and almost imperceptible. Slovak became the official language for the lodges; the societies abandoned the Hungarian flag. P. V. Rovnianek, joining the staff of the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny in 1889, infused 31 SLOVAKIA a nationalist spirit into that paper; his National Slovak Society was nationalist in principle. Rev. S. Furdek, whose nationalism was of a very moderate kind, wanted American Slovaks to Americanize themselves; but he also felt it their duty to help the oppressed Slovaks overseas. 136 Under the force of this nationalism the Slovak immigrants gradually became more interested in the fate of Slovakia. In 1899 Father Furdek sent a lengthy memorandum to the Hungarian government, discussing the "Slovak question", but to no avail, except the publicity which such a memorandum aroused. It effected nothing practical; but it was the shadow of coming events; for the "Slovak question", was in the next decades to assume first place among the Slovaks. As the nineties passed, the Slovaks had made solid progress. Their economic and social life had improved through the national fraternal societies, which by 1899 had become important factors in Slovak life. Their membership stood as follows: THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES Society Number of Members First Catholic Slovak Union __ _________ _ National Slovak Society _________ ___ ___ __ Pennsylvania Slovak Union ______ ___ ____ _ Evangelical Slovak Union ____ __ _______ _ First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union _____ _ iivena --------- --- -------------- -- ---Source: "Slovenske (1899), IV, 38. pomery v Amerike", KALENDAR 11,000 9,450 1,727 909 1,600 1,000 JEDNOTA The religious life of the Slovaks had a chance to develop now that churches had been built. For the Roman Catholics there were now in America 33 priests, and for the Greek Catholics 32; and more were needed. 137 However, not all the picture was bright. Indeed, these were the things the Slovaks needed; but it was only after 1900 that the advance in education, the business world, political life, became pronounced. FOOTNOTES 1. Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910), p. 86, pp. 88-89, p. 93. 32 SLOVAKIA 2. •F ranti§ek Hru§ovsky, Slovenske Dejiny (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939), p. 14. 3. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 4. I bid., p . 216. 5. Ibid., pp. 342-S43. 6. Joseph S,k ultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middl etown, 1'930), pp. 106-109. 7. I bid., pp. 109-110. 8. Frantisek •Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia (Scranton, 1953) , p . 40. 9. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 10. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Scranton, 1947), p. 28 . 11. Thomas Capek, The Slovaks of Hungary (New York, 1906), p . 108; 1Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia, pp. 44-46. 12. Frantisek :J3okes, Dejiny Slovenska i Slovakov (;Bratislava, 1946), p . 158. 13. Robert A. ,Ka,nn, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National 'Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914 (New York, 1950), I. 278. 14. Frantisek iHrusovsk y, This Is Slovakia, pp. ,47-48. 15. Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 107. 16. Ibid., p. 108. 17. Ibid., p. 59 . 18 . R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. , Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 244-245. 19. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. ·65 . 20. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 245. 21. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p . 64 . 22. Bokes, Deji ny Slovenska, p. 158. 23. C. J . Stree t, Slovakia: Past and Present (Westmins,ter, n.d .), p. 24. 24 . •Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 96; Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. 323. 25. ,Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 166. 26 . Jirusovsky, Dejiny, p. 252. 27. Ibid., p. 325. 28. Ib i d., p. 319. 29. I bid., p. 319. 30. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 117. 31. Seton•Watson, Slovakia, pp. 117-118. -3•2. I bid., p. 119. 33. I bid., p. 118. 34. Hrus ovsky, Dejiny, pp. 320-321; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 272-273 . 35. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 176. 36 . Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. -329 . 37. Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 276. 38 . Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 150. 39. Jaszi, The Dissolution, p. 222. 40 . Ibid., p . 223 . 41. Street, •Slovakia: Past and Present, p. 56. 42. Harrison 'Thompson, Czechoslovakia in Europe (Princeton, 194-1) , p. 294. 43. Jaszi, The Dissolution, pp . 196-199. H. Ibid., p. 238. 45. Ibid., p. 231. SLOVAKIA 33 46. F. J . Hask in s, The Immigrant: An Asset and a Liab ility (New York , 1913) , p . 35. 47. Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p . 162. 48. I b id., p. 156. 49. Seton-Watso n , Slovakia, p. 275. 50. Ibid., p. 276. 51. Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 152. 52. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, A u g u st 19, 1897. 53. Geor ge Stephen son , A H istory of American Immigrat ion 18201924 (New Yor k , 1926), P. 61; Carl W ittk e, We Who Built Amer ica (New York , 1939) , p. 405. 54. J eremiah J enk s a nd W. Jebt Lau ck , The Imm igration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs (New York, 1922), pp. 21-22. 55 . Konstantin Culen, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (B r atislava, 1942), I , 38; Caspar Molch an, "Th e Developmen t of the S lovak Community in Pittsburgh 1880-1920", (Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, U n iversity of Notr e Dame, 1948), p. 23. 56. Cul en, Deji ny, I, 38; Stephenson , History of Ame ri can I mm igrat ion , p. 89. 57. Balch , Slav ic Fellow Citizens, p . 102. 58. I bid., p. 25. 69. I b id., p. 437. 60. I bid., p. 101. 61. Culen, Dejiny, I, 60-61. 62. Ibid., I, 67. 63. Ibid., I, 67-68. ~4. Ibid., I, 60. 65. Na rodn e Noviny, Ap ril 9, 1914. 66. Cule n , Dejiny, I, 24-25. -67. Ibid., I , 26; Molchan, "Development of the S lovak Community" , p. 8. 6'8. Konsta'!lltfn Cu len, Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsaf rocn a (Scr anton , 1947). p. 4. 69. Cul e n , Dej i ny , I, 28. 70. Ib id., I , 28-29. 71. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Comr;mnity", p. 25. 72 . Capek, Slovaks of Hunga r y , p. 156. 73. Balch, Sl a vic Fe ! low C itizens, p. 100. 74. Ibid , p. 100. 75 . William P. Dillingham, Reports of the Immigration Commision, Vol. I: Abs t racts of Reports of Immigration Commision (Washington, D . C., 1911), I, 97. 76. I b id., I, 215. 77. Ibid., I, 277. 78. J. A. F., "Nacrtok Dejin Slov. prist'ahovalectva v Amerike", Sborn ik Narodn e ho Slovenske ho Spolku (1915), I, 12. 79. Culen, Deji ny , I, 96. 80. Ib id ., I. 96; Jos e ph Kushn e r, Sl ov a c i ka tol ici pi t t sbu-rghsk e ho b is kupstv a (Passaic, 19 -16), pp. 16-17 ._ 81. J ednota , March 19, 1913. 82. Na rodn e Noviny, May 26, 1910. 83. Culen, Dejiny, I, 99. 84. Kushner, S lov a ci, p. 6. 85. Ibid., p. 12, p. 16. 34 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. l09. ll0. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 7. I bid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. Narodne Noviny, March 12, 19·1.!; April 27, 1911. Narodne Novlny, March 12, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 82-83. Ibid., I, ·82-831; J. A. F., 'INe.crtok Dejin", Sbornik, (1915), I, 11. Culen, Dejiny, I , 82-83; "Jedno-druhe", Narodny Kalendar, (1908), XVIII, 154. Culen, DeJiny, I, 195-199. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 81. Culen, Dejiny, I, 200. Kushner, Slov;ici, pp. 13-14; Jednota, July 15, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 111-114. Culen, Dejiny, I, 108. I bid., I, 111. Ibid., I, 114-115. Ibid., 1, 115; Kon§tantin Culen, Slovaci v Amerike (Tur~lansk:r Sv. Martin, 11138), pp. 384-385. Culen, DeJlny, I, 213-214. Culen, Dejiny, I, 202. Ibid., I, 208-209. Ibid., I, 207-208. Souvenir Program: 19th Regular Convention, The National Slovak Society, (Young~town, 1946), p. i>4; P. V. Rovnianek, "Slovenslce organ!zacie v Amerike", World's Fair -Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (,Chicago, 1933), p . 67 . IP. V. Rovnlanek, op. cit., pp . 67-68. Pennsylvanska Slovenaka Jednota (Wilkes-Barre), June 24, 1943. Jaroslav ·Pelikan, "Cesi a .Slovacl v Chicagu ", World's Fair Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (Oh!cago,1933), p. 9•. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 162. Culen, Dejiny, I, 214-215. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 10; Molchan, ''Development or the Slovak Community", p . 48. Kushner, Slovacl, pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 8. Culen, Dejlny, I, 138-139. :Fr. Sasinek, "Mysllenky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakm!", Kalendar Jednota, (1,8 97), II, 139-140. Narodne Novlny, August 11, 1910. !Kushner, Slov;icl, p. 21. Jednota, March 4, 1914. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 22; Michael J . Hynes, History of the Dioceae of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953), p. 1'53. Hynes, Diocese of Cleveland, p . 255. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 41. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 41. Kalendar J.ednota, (1903), VIII, 210-211. Jaromir Psenka a Jan Pelikan, "<'.:es! a Slovac! v Chicagu", World's Fair Memorial, p . 95 . <'.:ulen, DeJiny, I, 222-227. Pellkan a Paenka, "Cesl a Slovacl v Chicagu", World's Fair Memor ial", p. 94. 35 SLOVAKIA 1211. Joseph Cermak, "·Physical Education among the Czechs and SloTaks", World'• Fair Memorial, p. 44 . 130. Molchan, "Development o! the Slovak Community", p. 67. 131. 1Narodne Noviny, July 17, 1113. 132. Narodne Noviny, May 5, 1910. 133. Kushner, Slovaoi, p. 9; Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, pp. 337-33·8. 134. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p . 115. 185. Culen, Dejlny, I, 162-18'3; Amerlkansk0-Slovenske Novlny, Feb· ruary 5, 1898. 136. Kalendar Jednota, (1899), IV, 37-41. 137. "Slovenske pomery v Amerike", Kalendar Jednota (1899), IV, 39-40. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS U. S. Bureau o! Census Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population Statistics, Vol. I. Washington : Government Printing omce, 1913. U. S. Congress. Senate Documents. 61 Cong., 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing O!f!ce, 1911. Vols. XI and XX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Jednota (Middletown., Pa.), Vols. XXI-XXII (19113cl9H). Kalendar Jednota. Middletown: The First Cathol!c Slovak Union. 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The Nationalizing of Business, 1878-1898. V ol. IX of A 'History of Ameri can Life. Edited by Arthur -M. Schlesinger and Dixo~ Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. SLOVAKIA 37 Thompson, S. Harrison. Czechoslovakia in European History. Princeton: The Princeton U niversity Press, 19-44. Wittke, Carl. We Who Bui It America: The Saga of the Immigrant. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks: Their History and Trad itions. Revised edition. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. ARTICLES F., J. A. "Nacrtok dejin s lov. prisfahovalectva v Amerike", Sbornik Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 20-39 . Jamar ik, Paul. "Zivot Americkych .Slovakov dakedy a teraz_" , Sbornik Na rodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 98-109. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sborn ik Slovensk e ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX. Shipman, Andr ew J . "Slavs ~-n America", The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV (1913). 51-57. Stephenson, George M. "Immigration", Dictionary of American History, III (1940), 73-75. "The Slovak Sokol", Sborn ik S lovenske ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 242-243. Timasheff, Nicholas. "Education", Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by Joseph .S. 1Roucek. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949, pp. 261-269. Ware, Caroline. "Immigration", Encyclopedia of Soc ia l Sc iences, VII (1932), 587-595. World 's Fair Memorial of the Czechos lo va k Group. Chicago: Czechoslovak Group, 1933. Bradac, John S. "Slovenski Evanjelici-Luterani v Spojenych Statoch", pp. 81-83. Cermak, Joseph. "Physical Education among the Czechs and Slovaks in America", pp. 42-45. ·· Pelikan, J. and Psenka, R. Jaromir. "Cesi a Slovaci v Chicagu", pp. 89-97. Rovnianek, Peter V. "Slovenske organizacie v Amerike", pp. 66-68. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Gregorovic, Sister M. Counsuela, SS.C.M . "Father Jankola's Con tribution t0 Catholic Education in America". Unpublis hed Master of Arts dissertation. History Department, Catholic University, 1943. Molchan, Caspar, C.S.C . "The Development of the Slovak Comqiunity in Pittsburgh, 1880-1920". Unp ub lished Master of Arts di sserta·,£ion. History Department, U niversity of Notre Dame, 1948. · Stefan, Sister M. Leocadia, SS.C .M. "The Reverend Stephen Furdek" . Unpublis-h ed Master of Arts dis se r tation. History Depar tment, Catholic University, _ 1952. Teplicky, Sister M. Berchmans, SS .C.M. "Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cy,ril and Methodius". Unpublishe d Master of Arts diss ertation. Education Department, Marywood College, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Early Beginnings of the Slovaks in America Description An account of the resource James J. Zatko, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965 pp. 1-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zatko, James J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cff79980f19d781e4cb2beea87219d55.pdf 418c4090d55ecc02637603f5431bf84c PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 52 EASTERN SLOVAK.IA INHABITED FOR CENTURIES BY GREAT SLOVAK MAJORITY Michael S. Macuga HistoricaJlly, Western Uikrainia, extending to the Eastern Canpa;tJhians, haJS no vaiid claim to the Slovaik lands which border on Ruthenia, or Carpathian Russia, the westernmost extension of the Russian racial element. In 1930 the national census of the repU!blic of Crecho~lovakia showed that in eastern Slovakia the counties, of Spis, Saris, Zemplin and Albauj had a population of 408,129 Slovaiks and 81,960 Rusins or Ruthenians (also known as Car,pathoRussians and Little Russians). Despite these significant figures there is a 1propaganda moivement, both here and aJbroad, wibich is designed to inco:nporate these SlolV'aik counties with their predominant Slov ak popuilations in the Soiviert Republic of Ukrainia on the pretext thait they belong to Riuthenia. There is nothing to sulbsta.ntiate this wild claim. Of course, the men of the Kremlin are more than willing to force not only the eastern part but the whole of Slovakia under their dominion, history and statistics no•lJWiithstand!ing. According to the 1930 national census the facts of the case of Eastern SlovaJkia against Ruthenia are confirmed without a doUJbt in S1orvalkia's favor. The figures tell us the nU!IDlber o;f 1SlovaJks and RuitheniaillS living in the various cities and towns. City~Town Bard!io;y HU!Inenne Gelniica Giraltovce Koomarok Levoca !Julbovna Medzilruborce Michailovce P.oprad SlOIViaks Ruthe:nli!ans 21,841 19,551 17,189 15,125 15,43Q 22,1\36 12,742 2,860 41,72,2 19,961 13,216 948 110 736 655 1,008 6,228 14,944 374 99 �53 SLOVAKIA 56,086 30,599 11,388 Snina 22,760 Solhrance 9,335 Stropkw 38,853 Trebisov 29,066 Spisska Nova Ves 7,145 Spissika Stara Ve.s VranOIV (nad To:pl'ou) 24,·594 Pre.sov .Srubinov 1 937 6,797 19,891 1,8!10 16,891 216 1,396 1,192 512 So much for statistics. Furtlhermore, no valid historical arguments exist to bacik Russian views in this matter. Polish philologists tried frequently to estaJblish the Polish origins of Eastern Slovrukian dialects but lin vain. Zd. Stieber of Cracow tried to build up a case for Poland there, as did Samo Ozamlbel, the Slovak linguist. But other philologists, such as the eminent Dutchman, Van Wijk, the Magya.T scholar, Kniesza, the Ozech linguists·, Pastrnek, TralVnii.cek, Smilauer and the .SlON•aJk scholar, Stanislav, rproved satisfaotorily that the Eastern dialects of Slovrukia have a SlOIVaJk origin and fo1mdation. M. Malecki, however, a Polish Slovanic scholar, tried to estaJblish Polish origins in the northern Trenicin area. The Ukrainian sruvants see, on the other hand, onliy Ruithenian and Ulrnamian origins of the dialects in the easiteril regions of Slowklia. These theories of the late nineteenth century rupply not only to Thstern Slovakia, 'but also to the areas near Backa and Sriem where many Greek-Catholi c Slovruks settled. They, too, speak an e<8JS!tern SiovaJk dialect. Vladimir lfuafjuk's views, namely, that the dfalects of eastetn Sl01Vakia were Ukrainian, were dlisproived by Siovaik and Czooh philologists, as well a:s by the Russian 1Slav scholar, Sobolevsiky, and the Norwegian Slavist, Olaf Broch, who knew that part olf the country as weH as Ruthenia. Hnafjwk conslidered even such fundamental Slovak words as biv~ (\byvaf), mae (miae), ocec (otec) dzen (day), hodzina {hodina), pajdzesat (paedesiaf), etc., as Ukrainian! Ewery eastern SlO!Vak uses such language with its peouliar locai flavor, or color. Lt is part of his natirve vocalbulary which is distinctly ~ovak, not Uikirainian. When attention was called �54 SLOVAKIA to this discrepancy, Rn:afju'k revised his analysis and chose the White Russi.am. language as his starting point in which dz is sulbstituted for d' ·a nd c for f, respectively, in conitrast to the Greater RU!SSii. an 1anguruge. But according to his conterntion the western SlovaJk versions, e.g., dzedzina and dzeci, etc., wmtld hruve to ibe explained in the same way. Obviously, such conclusions are fall.se. 1 Professor Fr,anrtisek Pastrnek, the renowned Czech phllologist from Prague, proved in his book Rusini Jazyka Slovenskeho ('Peitrograd, 1907) that these Eastern Slovak dialects were reall,y Slovak in origin and form, not Ruthenian or UJrna:iru·a n as Hnat'juk tried to dem:onstrate.. Jin 1935, Dr. Fr. Tichy, an authority on Slav languages, pointed out (Nas Ziivot, 1935, p. 133) that the la'Illguage of the Ru.sins in Bruoka and Sriem was actually Slovak, although a grammarian, Dr. G. Kostelnik, (his very name is Slov•a k, since the Russian word for church from which it is deri'Ved is cerkev, not kostol, as in SlOWlJk) termed it Russian. Olbse.I"Ve his w,riting: "Ked' se sceme nauoic dobre pisac, abo ked' sceme dobre naucic insi jazyk, ta spredz musime nauci.c hramatiku tej besedy, chtoru najlepse zname. A taka beseda tota, cos chton'i se od dzecinstva posluhujeme - macertiiska beseda." There is ha.roly an,y need orf philologica[ learning to deterun:ine that thiis ,s ample is not Russian at aJl, bu.rt Cilear type of an eastern SlovaJldan dialect. Question Solved Ages Ago Apparently, t'his problem was ironed out many years ago to the satisfaction of intel!ligent Slovanic scholars everywhere. Nevertheless, there are aJLways some who resurrect old errors based on prejudice and ftalse prem~. And it is unfortunate that such linguists get a hearing every time. Genuine scholars, howeiver, trealt their spurioUJS views wiith utter contempt. For politicians of a certain class in Eastern S1ovrukia these incontrovertilble conclusions, based on historical 0vidence and philological research, have no ivalue because they do not oonbri.bute to their selfish interests. But true politicrul policies must ultimate[y be detemiined and sUip- �SLOVAKIA 55 ported by incontestilble scientific data and geinuine historical facts. We are wefil aware of the fact th,a;t in the high forest areas of eastern SlovaJkiia Riuthenian (Rusin) settlements are foll!lld, ,b ut we also know that they are small and few in numlber and that their inhrubi;tanits migrated there recently. We are informed that their Ruthenian stam.d is too often political rather than. national or historical. At a.my rate the pred'OIIllinant popu[aJtiOIIl of Eastern Slovakia is SloV'alk. It is qU!i.te difficult, however, to establish a definite national boundary in the easteI1Illillost !Part of Slov.aJkia, because the Ruthenian and Ukrainiia.n elements harve blended with the Sllovak dialects there, and they haJVe all become closely allied after a period of time. Hence, we have heard U.krruinian,s remark, when they hear the eastern Slovak di·a lect spoken, t118Jt it is quite like their tonigue. And the Slo:vaJks there say the same when they hear the Ukrainian spoken on the !borderline of their country. Dialoots in that area of conflict a:re like lin!ks in a chain which is raised to white heat; ,t he lJinlk.s, fuse and unite, so that no politician, or philologist, can determine precisely where the Ru'thenirun begins and the Slo;vaJk ends, jUJSt as no saivant can estaJb11sh aoowrately the line of differentiation between the French and the Irtalian on their borders, and the German in contrast to the Dutch, or Danish, because these languages unite imperceptibly on their nationrul !boundaries. It is no secret therefore, that there exist some vill:ages alongside many Sllavalk towns in eastern Slovalkia, /but there are also Slovruk towns in Car,patho-Russia, e .g., in Marmaros County. ShouiJ.d we Slovaiks demand that the eastern boundary of their country be pushed as far eastward as Marnnaros COOlllty simply because a few Slovak settlements are foll!lld in the interior of Ruthenia? 'Historica:l evidence ·cOIIltradicts the views and suJbsequent actions of those political leaden; who desire to push the western !boundary of Carpa'tho-1Russian ~nsion to Poprad in SlolV'aiklia. A few Ruthenian colonists ruppeared in eastern Slovalcia in the thirteenth century. The Ruthenians; however, did not come there irn any consideraible numbers until �56 SJ,OVAKIA the si~teenth, seventeenth aJI1d eighteenth centuries. A Russian historian, Andrej Petrov, proved this in his bo()k "Drevnesilja Gr-amoty po Istorii Karpatslroj Rusi" (in the chapter: 0 Nacale Karp. Rusi, plllblrished by the Slavonic Institute, f>mgue, 1930) . Geographical Map - the Best Proof It is unnecessary to study the history of coloniization in Carpath04Rus sia and eastern Slovakia •i n order to show who were the original inha'b,itants there. The fact that the Ruthenian villa:ges are scattered. here ood there in the higher plateaus and forest areas shows them to be of later origin, because the earlier settlers, the Slovaks, already lived on the plains and in the fertile vialleys when the Ruthenians canne. Hence, the latter, as newcomers, had to move on; they went into the hills rund mountains and becaime foresters and sheepherders. Thus, thooe who wish to move the Car-patho-Rus sian bounx1ary-iline westward as far as Poprad do a grruve injustice to Slovrukia; they ignore ages..,old traditions, cultural, social and poliiti.tca;l fiaJOtors. By doing vii.ruence to. history these men are initiating forces which will inevitaJbly bring serious disorders in 1:lhe future. Eastern Slovruks, from St:rlba to Uzhorod, speak a distinct SlOViaJkian dialect whiich iis ahln. to the dialect of the western Slovaks. 'I"hey call -t heir langua;ge, Slovaik, and tha;t is not onil.y an important philological fact, but a sociologicail and political phenomenon that cannot be explained away by those who wish to expand at Slovakia's e~pense. Eastern Slovrukia has always been within the sphere of infiueI11Ce of Slmnalk oultUTe. Consequently, when Czech was adopted for a time 1by some Slo,v-aJks as a literary language, it was introduced into that part of the country, too. And when, finally, the Slovaiks agreed on a centrail SlovaJk literary medium, it became the language of literature of the land. Moreover, Slovak pulblications canne from E:osice as early as the seventeenth aJlld eighteenth centuries, for it was the center of Slovalk culture at that time. The Jesuirts maintained a Slovak press ast their college in Kosice. �SLOVAKIA 57 Art Confirms the Slovak Stand The historiy of art in Sl01Vakia shows the uniforniity of Slov1rl{ culture throughout the country from the earliest beginnings. The difference between Slovak and Ruthenian art is not merely superficial. SloviaJk art sihai,ply tontra:sts with Rutheniian art in origin amd fonm, and the former is a part of western ol.l!lture, while the latter definitely bel01I1gs to the East. This is manifest in the study of creative art. In Kosice and P.resov the churches a.re not Rluthenian or eastern in design, lbut definitely 'belong to the West. Who would dare to cut off that land which has been influenced by a traditional cwlture for a thousand years and p}aice it iruto another cu.!ltural sphere by foree? How tragic and confusing would such an act of fully be for Slova;kia. Strongly imlbedded traditions and customs are such powerrf.1.l!l and vital forces that any attempt to efface them OT diroot them into di.lfferent channels would meet with disaster and add to the comusion already developed lby Mosoow. : .V{tal issues are lbeling consibantrry confused 'by a misuse of terminology siuic:h as, Greek-Catholic 'bemg taken as synonymous with Ruthenian (Rusin). But it .pU12JZles only the people who ha,ve . little knowiedge of the sociologicM, ling,u1sti'C, cm tural and historical elements and the conditions whlch determine true concepts of nationhood. It is we11 known that the Greek-CathoJics in Vernar and Telgart, for example, do not know the Rusin language. The term "Nationa;I Magyar-Ca.1vin Church" has no meaning •b ecause there are Slovaik and Czech Calvinists. AU Ser1bs are not Orthodox; some are Roman Catholics - a fact which few people seem to know. Showl.d the German nation, which is mostly Protestant in its religion, lay claim to our lands because some of our citizenJS profess to be Protestants? Slovanic-!Byrziantine .(Greek-Catholic) lritur.gy is not a specific means of national identity for the Rusins, becaiuse many Slovaks profess the Greek-Cathoiic rite. Anyone who is at least somewhat informed on the subject of the history of church liturgy knows that even non-Slovanic nations arlopted the anoient liturgy of their ~ovanic neighibors. To use liturgy as the basis of political orientation is not in �58 SLOVAKIA keeping with the s3;cred spirit of religion. The Slovaks, therefore, regret to see the Slovanic.Byzantine Rite being employed for political puriposes, ·b ecause they have a warm regard for the Rruthenian nation which has so nobly preserved the ancient ldturgy of the Slovak Apostles, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who introduced this sacred rite to meet the needs of the Slawic nations. The Slwaims are not prejudiced 3;gaimst the Rusin nation which has lived in dose cont8!ct and harmony with the Slovaks for centuries. They wish them success in their social and national endeavors, but will not willingly submit to pressure from any political regime. The Slovaks realize thai this pressure does not have the S8;llction of true Ruthenians, and, therefore, they shall not lose faith in them, fw- they are their brothers. A third party, however, is endearvoring to spJ.it up the SlolV'8llic nations. The Slov8!ks and Ruthenians wiU do weH to remain calm and resolute and avoid useless arguments and misunderstandings. They can and must work together in peace and brotherhood for their common good a.g ainst theio:- common enemy. T}le abQIVe analysis of a crucia;l p11dblem should be sufficiently clear fro'In the facts presented; and it ought to discourage any further attempts to Rusin-ilze the Slovaks of eastern Slovakia. The Slovaks contributed ricltly to Rusin culture, and here, in America, many eminent Ruthenian leaders were Slovaks who did not try to denationalize them. Eastern Slovakia did not and does not belong to Ruthenia historicany. It belongs to the Slovak na,tion, as does the rest of the territory of Slovakia which has been occupied by the SlovaJks for at least the past 1'500 years. • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK NATION, one of the oldest Christian nations of central Europe, is a dis-tinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are Jistinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they no,~. a part o! the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called 'Cze• choslovaks'." - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., 11-18-51) � SLOVAKIA 52 EASTERN SLOVAK.IA INHABITED FOR CENTURIES BY GREAT SLOVAK MAJORITY Michael S. Macuga HistoricaJlly, Western Uikrainia, extending to the Eastern Canpa;tJhians, haJS no vaiid claim to the Slovaik lands which border on Ruthenia, or Carpathian Russia, the westernmost extension of the Russian racial element. In 1930 the national census of the repU!blic of Crecho~lovakia showed that in eastern Slovakia the counties, of Spis, Saris, Zemplin and Albauj had a population of 408,129 Slovaiks and 81,960 Rusins or Ruthenians (also known as Car,pathoRussians and Little Russians). Despite these significant figures there is a 1propaganda moivement, both here and aJbroad, wibich is designed to inco:nporate these SlolV'aik counties with their predominant Slov ak popuilations in the Soiviert Republic of Ukrainia on the pretext thait they belong to Riuthenia. There is nothing to sulbsta.ntiate this wild claim. Of course, the men of the Kremlin are more than willing to force not only the eastern part but the whole of Slovakia under their dominion, history and statistics no•lJWiithstand!ing. According to the 1930 national census the facts of the case of Eastern SlovaJkia against Ruthenia are confirmed without a doUJbt in S1orvalkia's favor. The figures tell us the nU!IDlber o;f 1SlovaJks and RuitheniaillS living in the various cities and towns. City~Town Bard!io;y HU!Inenne Gelniica Giraltovce Koomarok Levoca !Julbovna Medzilruborce Michailovce P.oprad SlOIViaks Ruthe:nli!ans 21,841 19,551 17,189 15,125 15,43Q 22,1\36 12,742 2,860 41,72,2 19,961 13,216 948 110 736 655 1,008 6,228 14,944 374 99 �53 SLOVAKIA 56,086 30,599 11,388 Snina 22,760 Solhrance 9,335 Stropkw 38,853 Trebisov 29,066 Spisska Nova Ves 7,145 Spissika Stara Ve.s VranOIV (nad To:pl'ou) 24,·594 Pre.sov .Srubinov 1 937 6,797 19,891 1,8!10 16,891 216 1,396 1,192 512 So much for statistics. Furtlhermore, no valid historical arguments exist to bacik Russian views in this matter. Polish philologists tried frequently to estaJblish the Polish origins of Eastern Slovrukian dialects but lin vain. Zd. Stieber of Cracow tried to build up a case for Poland there, as did Samo Ozamlbel, the Slovak linguist. But other philologists, such as the eminent Dutchman, Van Wijk, the Magya.T scholar, Kniesza, the Ozech linguists·, Pastrnek, TralVnii.cek, Smilauer and the .SlON•aJk scholar, Stanislav, rproved satisfaotorily that the Eastern dialects of Slovrukia have a SlOIVaJk origin and fo1mdation. M. Malecki, however, a Polish Slovanic scholar, tried to estaJblish Polish origins in the northern Trenicin area. The Ukrainian sruvants see, on the other hand, onliy Ruithenian and Ulrnamian origins of the dialects in the easiteril regions of Slowklia. These theories of the late nineteenth century rupply not only to Thstern Slovakia, 'but also to the areas near Backa and Sriem where many Greek-Catholi c Slovruks settled. They, too, speak an e<8JS!tern SiovaJk dialect. Vladimir lfuafjuk's views, namely, that the dfalects of eastetn Sl01Vakia were Ukrainian, were dlisproived by Siovaik and Czooh philologists, as well a:s by the Russian 1Slav scholar, Sobolevsiky, and the Norwegian Slavist, Olaf Broch, who knew that part olf the country as weH as Ruthenia. Hnafjwk conslidered even such fundamental Slovak words as biv~ (\byvaf), mae (miae), ocec (otec) dzen (day), hodzina {hodina), pajdzesat (paedesiaf), etc., as Ukrainian! Ewery eastern SlO!Vak uses such language with its peouliar locai flavor, or color. Lt is part of his natirve vocalbulary which is distinctly ~ovak, not Uikirainian. When attention was called �54 SLOVAKIA to this discrepancy, Rn:afju'k revised his analysis and chose the White Russi.am. language as his starting point in which dz is sulbstituted for d' ·a nd c for f, respectively, in conitrast to the Greater RU!SSii. an 1anguruge. But according to his conterntion the western SlovaJk versions, e.g., dzedzina and dzeci, etc., wmtld hruve to ibe explained in the same way. Obviously, such conclusions are fall.se. 1 Professor Fr,anrtisek Pastrnek, the renowned Czech phllologist from Prague, proved in his book Rusini Jazyka Slovenskeho ('Peitrograd, 1907) that these Eastern Slovak dialects were reall,y Slovak in origin and form, not Ruthenian or UJrna:iru·a n as Hnat'juk tried to dem:onstrate.. Jin 1935, Dr. Fr. Tichy, an authority on Slav languages, pointed out (Nas Ziivot, 1935, p. 133) that the la'Illguage of the Ru.sins in Bruoka and Sriem was actually Slovak, although a grammarian, Dr. G. Kostelnik, (his very name is Slov•a k, since the Russian word for church from which it is deri'Ved is cerkev, not kostol, as in SlOWlJk) termed it Russian. Olbse.I"Ve his w,riting: "Ked' se sceme nauoic dobre pisac, abo ked' sceme dobre naucic insi jazyk, ta spredz musime nauci.c hramatiku tej besedy, chtoru najlepse zname. A taka beseda tota, cos chton'i se od dzecinstva posluhujeme - macertiiska beseda." There is ha.roly an,y need orf philologica[ learning to deterun:ine that thiis ,s ample is not Russian at aJl, bu.rt Cilear type of an eastern SlovaJldan dialect. Question Solved Ages Ago Apparently, t'his problem was ironed out many years ago to the satisfaction of intel!ligent Slovanic scholars everywhere. Nevertheless, there are aJLways some who resurrect old errors based on prejudice and ftalse prem~. And it is unfortunate that such linguists get a hearing every time. Genuine scholars, howeiver, trealt their spurioUJS views wiith utter contempt. For politicians of a certain class in Eastern S1ovrukia these incontrovertilble conclusions, based on historical 0vidence and philological research, have no ivalue because they do not oonbri.bute to their selfish interests. But true politicrul policies must ultimate[y be detemiined and sUip- �SLOVAKIA 55 ported by incontestilble scientific data and geinuine historical facts. We are wefil aware of the fact th,a;t in the high forest areas of eastern SlovaJkiia Riuthenian (Rusin) settlements are foll!lld, ,b ut we also know that they are small and few in numlber and that their inhrubi;tanits migrated there recently. We are informed that their Ruthenian stam.d is too often political rather than. national or historical. At a.my rate the pred'OIIllinant popu[aJtiOIIl of Eastern Slovakia is SloV'alk. It is qU!i.te difficult, however, to establish a definite national boundary in the easteI1Illillost !Part of Slov.aJkia, because the Ruthenian and Ukrainiia.n elements harve blended with the Sllovak dialects there, and they haJVe all become closely allied after a period of time. Hence, we have heard U.krruinian,s remark, when they hear the eastern Slovak di·a lect spoken, t118Jt it is quite like their tonigue. And the Slo:vaJks there say the same when they hear the Ukrainian spoken on the !borderline of their country. Dialoots in that area of conflict a:re like lin!ks in a chain which is raised to white heat; ,t he lJinlk.s, fuse and unite, so that no politician, or philologist, can determine precisely where the Ru'thenirun begins and the Slo;vaJk ends, jUJSt as no saivant can estaJb11sh aoowrately the line of differentiation between the French and the Irtalian on their borders, and the German in contrast to the Dutch, or Danish, because these languages unite imperceptibly on their nationrul !boundaries. It is no secret therefore, that there exist some vill:ages alongside many Sllavalk towns in eastern Slovalkia, /but there are also Slovruk towns in Car,patho-Russia, e .g., in Marmaros County. ShouiJ.d we Slovaiks demand that the eastern boundary of their country be pushed as far eastward as Marnnaros COOlllty simply because a few Slovak settlements are foll!lld in the interior of Ruthenia? 'Historica:l evidence ·cOIIltradicts the views and suJbsequent actions of those political leaden; who desire to push the western !boundary of Carpa'tho-1Russian ~nsion to Poprad in SlolV'aiklia. A few Ruthenian colonists ruppeared in eastern Slovalcia in the thirteenth century. The Ruthenians; however, did not come there irn any consideraible numbers until �56 SJ,OVAKIA the si~teenth, seventeenth aJI1d eighteenth centuries. A Russian historian, Andrej Petrov, proved this in his bo()k "Drevnesilja Gr-amoty po Istorii Karpatslroj Rusi" (in the chapter: 0 Nacale Karp. Rusi, plllblrished by the Slavonic Institute, f>mgue, 1930) . Geographical Map - the Best Proof It is unnecessary to study the history of coloniization in Carpath04Rus sia and eastern Slovakia •i n order to show who were the original inha'b,itants there. The fact that the Ruthenian villa:ges are scattered. here ood there in the higher plateaus and forest areas shows them to be of later origin, because the earlier settlers, the Slovaks, already lived on the plains and in the fertile vialleys when the Ruthenians canne. Hence, the latter, as newcomers, had to move on; they went into the hills rund mountains and becaime foresters and sheepherders. Thus, thooe who wish to move the Car-patho-Rus sian bounx1ary-iline westward as far as Poprad do a grruve injustice to Slovrukia; they ignore ages..,old traditions, cultural, social and poliiti.tca;l fiaJOtors. By doing vii.ruence to. history these men are initiating forces which will inevitaJbly bring serious disorders in 1:lhe future. Eastern Slovruks, from St:rlba to Uzhorod, speak a distinct SlOViaJkian dialect whiich iis ahln. to the dialect of the western Slovaks. 'I"hey call -t heir langua;ge, Slovaik, and tha;t is not onil.y an important philological fact, but a sociologicail and political phenomenon that cannot be explained away by those who wish to expand at Slovakia's e~pense. Eastern Slovrukia has always been within the sphere of infiueI11Ce of Slmnalk oultUTe. Consequently, when Czech was adopted for a time 1by some Slo,v-aJks as a literary language, it was introduced into that part of the country, too. And when, finally, the Slovaiks agreed on a centrail SlovaJk literary medium, it became the language of literature of the land. Moreover, Slovak pulblications canne from E:osice as early as the seventeenth aJlld eighteenth centuries, for it was the center of Slovalk culture at that time. The Jesuirts maintained a Slovak press ast their college in Kosice. �SLOVAKIA 57 Art Confirms the Slovak Stand The historiy of art in Sl01Vakia shows the uniforniity of Slov1rl{ culture throughout the country from the earliest beginnings. The difference between Slovak and Ruthenian art is not merely superficial. SloviaJk art sihai,ply tontra:sts with Rutheniian art in origin amd fonm, and the former is a part of western ol.l!lture, while the latter definitely bel01I1gs to the East. This is manifest in the study of creative art. In Kosice and P.resov the churches a.re not Rluthenian or eastern in design, lbut definitely 'belong to the West. Who would dare to cut off that land which has been influenced by a traditional cwlture for a thousand years and p}aice it iruto another cu.!ltural sphere by foree? How tragic and confusing would such an act of fully be for Slova;kia. Strongly imlbedded traditions and customs are such powerrf.1.l!l and vital forces that any attempt to efface them OT diroot them into di.lfferent channels would meet with disaster and add to the comusion already developed lby Mosoow. : .V{tal issues are lbeling consibantrry confused 'by a misuse of terminology siuic:h as, Greek-Catholic 'bemg taken as synonymous with Ruthenian (Rusin). But it .pU12JZles only the people who ha,ve . little knowiedge of the sociologicM, ling,u1sti'C, cm tural and historical elements and the conditions whlch determine true concepts of nationhood. It is we11 known that the Greek-CathoJics in Vernar and Telgart, for example, do not know the Rusin language. The term "Nationa;I Magyar-Ca.1vin Church" has no meaning •b ecause there are Slovaik and Czech Calvinists. AU Ser1bs are not Orthodox; some are Roman Catholics - a fact which few people seem to know. Showl.d the German nation, which is mostly Protestant in its religion, lay claim to our lands because some of our citizenJS profess to be Protestants? Slovanic-!Byrziantine .(Greek-Catholic) lritur.gy is not a specific means of national identity for the Rusins, becaiuse many Slovaks profess the Greek-Cathoiic rite. Anyone who is at least somewhat informed on the subject of the history of church liturgy knows that even non-Slovanic nations arlopted the anoient liturgy of their ~ovanic neighibors. To use liturgy as the basis of political orientation is not in �58 SLOVAKIA keeping with the s3;cred spirit of religion. The Slovaks, therefore, regret to see the Slovanic.Byzantine Rite being employed for political puriposes, ·b ecause they have a warm regard for the Rruthenian nation which has so nobly preserved the ancient ldturgy of the Slovak Apostles, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who introduced this sacred rite to meet the needs of the Slawic nations. The Slwaims are not prejudiced 3;gaimst the Rusin nation which has lived in dose cont8!ct and harmony with the Slovaks for centuries. They wish them success in their social and national endeavors, but will not willingly submit to pressure from any political regime. The Slovaks realize thai this pressure does not have the S8;llction of true Ruthenians, and, therefore, they shall not lose faith in them, fw- they are their brothers. A third party, however, is endearvoring to spJ.it up the SlolV'8llic nations. The Slov8!ks and Ruthenians wiU do weH to remain calm and resolute and avoid useless arguments and misunderstandings. They can and must work together in peace and brotherhood for their common good a.g ainst theio:- common enemy. T}le abQIVe analysis of a crucia;l p11dblem should be sufficiently clear fro'In the facts presented; and it ought to discourage any further attempts to Rusin-ilze the Slovaks of eastern Slovakia. The Slovaks contributed ricltly to Rusin culture, and here, in America, many eminent Ruthenian leaders were Slovaks who did not try to denationalize them. Eastern Slovakia did not and does not belong to Ruthenia historicany. It belongs to the Slovak na,tion, as does the rest of the territory of Slovakia which has been occupied by the SlovaJks for at least the past 1'500 years. • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK NATION, one of the oldest Christian nations of central Europe, is a dis-tinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are Jistinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they no,~. a part o! the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called 'Cze• choslovaks'." - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., 11-18-51) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 52 EASTERN SLOVAK.IA INHABITED FOR CENTURIES BY GREAT SLOVAK MAJORITY Michael S. Macuga HistoricaJlly, Western Uikrainia, extending to the Eastern Canpa;tJhians, haJS no vaiid claim to the Slovaik lands which border on Ruthenia, or Carpathian Russia, the westernmost extension of the Russian racial element. In 1930 the national census of the repU!blic of Crecho~lovakia showed that in eastern Slovakia the counties, of Spis, Saris, Zemplin and Albauj had a population of 408,129 Slovaiks and 81,960 Rusins or Ruthenians (also known as Car,pathoRussians and Little Russians). Despite these significant figures there is a 1propaganda moivement, both here and aJbroad, wibich is designed to inco:nporate these SlolV'aik counties with their predominant Slov ak popuilations in the Soiviert Republic of Ukrainia on the pretext thait they belong to Riuthenia. There is nothing to sulbsta.ntiate this wild claim. Of course, the men of the Kremlin are more than willing to force not only the eastern part but the whole of Slovakia under their dominion, history and statistics no•lJWiithstand!ing. According to the 1930 national census the facts of the case of Eastern SlovaJkia against Ruthenia are confirmed without a doUJbt in S1orvalkia's favor. The figures tell us the nU!IDlber o;f 1SlovaJks and RuitheniaillS living in the various cities and towns. City~Town Bard!io;y HU!Inenne Gelniica Giraltovce Koomarok Levoca !Julbovna Medzilruborce Michailovce P.oprad SlOIViaks Ruthe:nli!ans 21,841 19,551 17,189 15,125 15,43Q 22,1\36 12,742 2,860 41,72,2 19,961 13,216 948 110 736 655 1,008 6,228 14,944 374 99 53 SLOVAKIA 56,086 30,599 11,388 Snina 22,760 Solhrance 9,335 Stropkw 38,853 Trebisov 29,066 Spisska Nova Ves 7,145 Spissika Stara Ve.s VranOIV (nad To:pl'ou) 24,·594 Pre.sov .Srubinov 1 937 6,797 19,891 1,8!10 16,891 216 1,396 1,192 512 So much for statistics. Furtlhermore, no valid historical arguments exist to bacik Russian views in this matter. Polish philologists tried frequently to estaJblish the Polish origins of Eastern Slovrukian dialects but lin vain. Zd. Stieber of Cracow tried to build up a case for Poland there, as did Samo Ozamlbel, the Slovak linguist. But other philologists, such as the eminent Dutchman, Van Wijk, the Magya.T scholar, Kniesza, the Ozech linguists·, Pastrnek, TralVnii.cek, Smilauer and the .SlON•aJk scholar, Stanislav, rproved satisfaotorily that the Eastern dialects of Slovrukia have a SlOIVaJk origin and fo1mdation. M. Malecki, however, a Polish Slovanic scholar, tried to estaJblish Polish origins in the northern Trenicin area. The Ukrainian sruvants see, on the other hand, onliy Ruithenian and Ulrnamian origins of the dialects in the easiteril regions of Slowklia. These theories of the late nineteenth century rupply not only to Thstern Slovakia, 'but also to the areas near Backa and Sriem where many Greek-Catholi c Slovruks settled. They, too, speak an e<8JS!tern SiovaJk dialect. Vladimir lfuafjuk's views, namely, that the dfalects of eastetn Sl01Vakia were Ukrainian, were dlisproived by Siovaik and Czooh philologists, as well a:s by the Russian 1Slav scholar, Sobolevsiky, and the Norwegian Slavist, Olaf Broch, who knew that part olf the country as weH as Ruthenia. Hnafjwk conslidered even such fundamental Slovak words as biv~ (\byvaf), mae (miae), ocec (otec) dzen (day), hodzina {hodina), pajdzesat (paedesiaf), etc., as Ukrainian! Ewery eastern SlO!Vak uses such language with its peouliar locai flavor, or color. Lt is part of his natirve vocalbulary which is distinctly ~ovak, not Uikirainian. When attention was called 54 SLOVAKIA to this discrepancy, Rn:afju'k revised his analysis and chose the White Russi.am. language as his starting point in which dz is sulbstituted for d' ·a nd c for f, respectively, in conitrast to the Greater RU!SSii. an 1anguruge. But according to his conterntion the western SlovaJk versions, e.g., dzedzina and dzeci, etc., wmtld hruve to ibe explained in the same way. Obviously, such conclusions are fall.se. 1 Professor Fr,anrtisek Pastrnek, the renowned Czech phllologist from Prague, proved in his book Rusini Jazyka Slovenskeho ('Peitrograd, 1907) that these Eastern Slovak dialects were reall,y Slovak in origin and form, not Ruthenian or UJrna:iru·a n as Hnat'juk tried to dem:onstrate.. Jin 1935, Dr. Fr. Tichy, an authority on Slav languages, pointed out (Nas Ziivot, 1935, p. 133) that the la'Illguage of the Ru.sins in Bruoka and Sriem was actually Slovak, although a grammarian, Dr. G. Kostelnik, (his very name is Slov•a k, since the Russian word for church from which it is deri'Ved is cerkev, not kostol, as in SlOWlJk) termed it Russian. Olbse.I"Ve his w,riting: "Ked' se sceme nauoic dobre pisac, abo ked' sceme dobre naucic insi jazyk, ta spredz musime nauci.c hramatiku tej besedy, chtoru najlepse zname. A taka beseda tota, cos chton'i se od dzecinstva posluhujeme - macertiiska beseda." There is ha.roly an,y need orf philologica[ learning to deterun:ine that thiis ,s ample is not Russian at aJl, bu.rt Cilear type of an eastern SlovaJldan dialect. Question Solved Ages Ago Apparently, t'his problem was ironed out many years ago to the satisfaction of intel!ligent Slovanic scholars everywhere. Nevertheless, there are aJLways some who resurrect old errors based on prejudice and ftalse prem~. And it is unfortunate that such linguists get a hearing every time. Genuine scholars, howeiver, trealt their spurioUJS views wiith utter contempt. For politicians of a certain class in Eastern S1ovrukia these incontrovertilble conclusions, based on historical 0vidence and philological research, have no ivalue because they do not oonbri.bute to their selfish interests. But true politicrul policies must ultimate[y be detemiined and sUip- SLOVAKIA 55 ported by incontestilble scientific data and geinuine historical facts. We are wefil aware of the fact th,a;t in the high forest areas of eastern SlovaJkiia Riuthenian (Rusin) settlements are foll!lld, ,b ut we also know that they are small and few in numlber and that their inhrubi;tanits migrated there recently. We are informed that their Ruthenian stam.d is too often political rather than. national or historical. At a.my rate the pred'OIIllinant popu[aJtiOIIl of Eastern Slovakia is SloV'alk. It is qU!i.te difficult, however, to establish a definite national boundary in the easteI1Illillost !Part of Slov.aJkia, because the Ruthenian and Ukrainiia.n elements harve blended with the Sllovak dialects there, and they haJVe all become closely allied after a period of time. Hence, we have heard U.krruinian,s remark, when they hear the eastern Slovak di·a lect spoken, t118Jt it is quite like their tonigue. And the Slo:vaJks there say the same when they hear the Ukrainian spoken on the !borderline of their country. Dialoots in that area of conflict a:re like lin!ks in a chain which is raised to white heat; ,t he lJinlk.s, fuse and unite, so that no politician, or philologist, can determine precisely where the Ru'thenirun begins and the Slo;vaJk ends, jUJSt as no saivant can estaJb11sh aoowrately the line of differentiation between the French and the Irtalian on their borders, and the German in contrast to the Dutch, or Danish, because these languages unite imperceptibly on their nationrul !boundaries. It is no secret therefore, that there exist some vill:ages alongside many Sllavalk towns in eastern Slovalkia, /but there are also Slovruk towns in Car,patho-Russia, e .g., in Marmaros County. ShouiJ.d we Slovaiks demand that the eastern boundary of their country be pushed as far eastward as Marnnaros COOlllty simply because a few Slovak settlements are foll!lld in the interior of Ruthenia? 'Historica:l evidence ·cOIIltradicts the views and suJbsequent actions of those political leaden; who desire to push the western !boundary of Carpa'tho-1Russian ~nsion to Poprad in SlolV'aiklia. A few Ruthenian colonists ruppeared in eastern Slovalcia in the thirteenth century. The Ruthenians; however, did not come there irn any consideraible numbers until 56 SJ,OVAKIA the si~teenth, seventeenth aJI1d eighteenth centuries. A Russian historian, Andrej Petrov, proved this in his bo()k "Drevnesilja Gr-amoty po Istorii Karpatslroj Rusi" (in the chapter: 0 Nacale Karp. Rusi, plllblrished by the Slavonic Institute, f>mgue, 1930) . Geographical Map - the Best Proof It is unnecessary to study the history of coloniization in Carpath04Rus sia and eastern Slovakia •i n order to show who were the original inha'b,itants there. The fact that the Ruthenian villa:ges are scattered. here ood there in the higher plateaus and forest areas shows them to be of later origin, because the earlier settlers, the Slovaks, already lived on the plains and in the fertile vialleys when the Ruthenians canne. Hence, the latter, as newcomers, had to move on; they went into the hills rund mountains and becaime foresters and sheepherders. Thus, thooe who wish to move the Car-patho-Rus sian bounx1ary-iline westward as far as Poprad do a grruve injustice to Slovrukia; they ignore ages..,old traditions, cultural, social and poliiti.tca;l fiaJOtors. By doing vii.ruence to. history these men are initiating forces which will inevitaJbly bring serious disorders in 1:lhe future. Eastern Slovruks, from St:rlba to Uzhorod, speak a distinct SlOViaJkian dialect whiich iis ahln. to the dialect of the western Slovaks. 'I"hey call -t heir langua;ge, Slovaik, and tha;t is not onil.y an important philological fact, but a sociologicail and political phenomenon that cannot be explained away by those who wish to expand at Slovakia's e~pense. Eastern Slovrukia has always been within the sphere of infiueI11Ce of Slmnalk oultUTe. Consequently, when Czech was adopted for a time 1by some Slo,v-aJks as a literary language, it was introduced into that part of the country, too. And when, finally, the Slovaiks agreed on a centrail SlovaJk literary medium, it became the language of literature of the land. Moreover, Slovak pulblications canne from E:osice as early as the seventeenth aJlld eighteenth centuries, for it was the center of Slovalk culture at that time. The Jesuirts maintained a Slovak press ast their college in Kosice. SLOVAKIA 57 Art Confirms the Slovak Stand The historiy of art in Sl01Vakia shows the uniforniity of Slov1rl{ culture throughout the country from the earliest beginnings. The difference between Slovak and Ruthenian art is not merely superficial. SloviaJk art sihai,ply tontra:sts with Rutheniian art in origin amd fonm, and the former is a part of western ol.l!lture, while the latter definitely bel01I1gs to the East. This is manifest in the study of creative art. In Kosice and P.resov the churches a.re not Rluthenian or eastern in design, lbut definitely 'belong to the West. Who would dare to cut off that land which has been influenced by a traditional cwlture for a thousand years and p}aice it iruto another cu.!ltural sphere by foree? How tragic and confusing would such an act of fully be for Slova;kia. Strongly imlbedded traditions and customs are such powerrf.1.l!l and vital forces that any attempt to efface them OT diroot them into di.lfferent channels would meet with disaster and add to the comusion already developed lby Mosoow. : .V{tal issues are lbeling consibantrry confused 'by a misuse of terminology siuic:h as, Greek-Catholic 'bemg taken as synonymous with Ruthenian (Rusin). But it .pU12JZles only the people who ha,ve . little knowiedge of the sociologicM, ling,u1sti'C, cm tural and historical elements and the conditions whlch determine true concepts of nationhood. It is we11 known that the Greek-CathoJics in Vernar and Telgart, for example, do not know the Rusin language. The term "Nationa;I Magyar-Ca.1vin Church" has no meaning •b ecause there are Slovaik and Czech Calvinists. AU Ser1bs are not Orthodox; some are Roman Catholics - a fact which few people seem to know. Showl.d the German nation, which is mostly Protestant in its religion, lay claim to our lands because some of our citizenJS profess to be Protestants? Slovanic-!Byrziantine .(Greek-Catholic) lritur.gy is not a specific means of national identity for the Rusins, becaiuse many Slovaks profess the Greek-Cathoiic rite. Anyone who is at least somewhat informed on the subject of the history of church liturgy knows that even non-Slovanic nations arlopted the anoient liturgy of their ~ovanic neighibors. To use liturgy as the basis of political orientation is not in 58 SLOVAKIA keeping with the s3;cred spirit of religion. The Slovaks, therefore, regret to see the Slovanic.Byzantine Rite being employed for political puriposes, ·b ecause they have a warm regard for the Rruthenian nation which has so nobly preserved the ancient ldturgy of the Slovak Apostles, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who introduced this sacred rite to meet the needs of the Slawic nations. The Slwaims are not prejudiced 3;gaimst the Rusin nation which has lived in dose cont8!ct and harmony with the Slovaks for centuries. They wish them success in their social and national endeavors, but will not willingly submit to pressure from any political regime. The Slovaks realize thai this pressure does not have the S8;llction of true Ruthenians, and, therefore, they shall not lose faith in them, fw- they are their brothers. A third party, however, is endearvoring to spJ.it up the SlolV'8llic nations. The Slov8!ks and Ruthenians wiU do weH to remain calm and resolute and avoid useless arguments and misunderstandings. They can and must work together in peace and brotherhood for their common good a.g ainst theio:- common enemy. T}le abQIVe analysis of a crucia;l p11dblem should be sufficiently clear fro'In the facts presented; and it ought to discourage any further attempts to Rusin-ilze the Slovaks of eastern Slovakia. The Slovaks contributed ricltly to Rusin culture, and here, in America, many eminent Ruthenian leaders were Slovaks who did not try to denationalize them. Eastern Slovakia did not and does not belong to Ruthenia historicany. It belongs to the Slovak na,tion, as does the rest of the territory of Slovakia which has been occupied by the SlovaJks for at least the past 1'500 years. • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK NATION, one of the oldest Christian nations of central Europe, is a dis-tinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are Jistinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they no,~. a part o! the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called 'Cze• choslovaks'." - (P. A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., 11-18-51)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Eastern Slovakia Inhabited for Centuries by Great Slovak Majority Description An account of the resource Michael S. Mačuga Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 52-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mačuga, Michael S. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/16faceb2c693c090d284a24613828946.pdf 4aff0bc875a90f9d7e3d03d99ed64eaf PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 109 ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATIO N AGAINST SLOVAKIA by Frank Bandar This is a story of how economic inequality - or according to a strong expression, economic discrimination can bring social unrest and, ultimately, antagonism against a ruling ethnic majority. (There are many who claim that it was the antagonism of Slovaks against Czechs that brought the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. The author of this essay, however, believes that the first Republic could not have survived in the international situation even without internal ethnic divisions.) To familiarize the reader with the available evidence in this field : the official Czecho-Slovak interwar statistics distinguished the regions of Czecho-Slovakia according to the ethnic and historical origin, except for production data for Slovakia. Thus we find data explicitly for Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia (sometimes Moravia includes Silesia), Slovakia, and Ruthenia. The first three regions were also officially termed the "historical regions" though the Slovaks also have a history, despite 1,000 years of Magyar occupation. Since World War II, when Ruthenia was annexed by the U.S.S.R., the official statistics refer to the Czech regions and Slovakia. Recent economic data give equal coverage to the Czech regions and Slovakia, in contrast to those published between the two wars, when young Slovak economists had to search for production data on Slovak territory.1 The Background of Slovakia's Industrialization Slovakia was part of "Greater Hungary" from 906 to October 30, 1918, and, indeed, during the 150 years after the battle of Mohacs, in 1526, that Hungary proper was under Turkish domination, Slovakia was the area where independent political and economic life was carried on. When the Turks were driven out at the end of the 17th century, a base for manufacturing in terms of handicraft and artisanship had been firmly laid down in Slovakia. After the AustroHungarian settlement in 1867, when the Monarchy was divided into two administrative and economic units, the Magyar politicians were eager to catch up to the more developed Austria. They started to build industry where con- �110 SLOVAKIA ditions were the most favorable. A cheaper labor market and the availability of raw material - coal, iron, etc., favored the Slovak territory. And, because industries built in Slovakia were of later date, than those in the "historical" regions, they were equipped with more advanced technology. So, immediately after World War I, Slovakia contained 17 .3 % of all former Hungarian industries ( which employed 20 or more workers) employing 20.7 % of all the workers in such industries in former Greater Hungary were employed.2 According to other sources, about 20 % of industry, of 20 or more employees, were in the Slovak territories. The actual total number of industrial workers was much higher, because there were many small workshops of under 20 employees, for which there are no data in the pre-World War I Magyar statistics. In per capita terms, Slovakia seems to have been the most industrialized region in Greater Hungary, for, of the 20.9 million population in Greater Hungary in 1910, 2.9 million lived in the Slovak territory. 3 The Decline of Slovak Industry and Industrial Employment After 1918 The contention of this paper is that, after the First Republic came into existence, the industrial strength of Slovakia declined, for a number of reasons. One of these was the changing structure of industry in Slovakia; the other reason was the policies followed by the economically stronger Czech regions. One writer puts it this way: "The situation in Czecho-Slovakia became critical when all capitalist countries experienced a post-war depression in the winter months of 1922 and 1923. The Czech capitalists tried to overcome the crisis by concentrating industry into the Czech regions ... Industrial production in Slovakia was not so profitable for them, therefore, they stopped production in Slovakia, and industrial equipment was transported to the Czech regions or sold abroad. " 4 Industrial employment indeed declined in the first half of the 1920's and later recovered only very slowly. 1910 85,000 1913 1926 93,000 86,454 �SLOVAKIA (Dec. 31) 1930 1937 111 103,222 104,915 Source: P. Turcan, Socialistickti industrializacia Slovenska, Bratislava: Osveta, 1960, p. 73. Simply the number of workers, however, is misleading. It understates the decline of Slovak industrial strength, for the workers of 1913 were mostly employed in capitalintensive industries, whereas by 1926 and later, they were mostly in labor-intensive industries. Slovak industry underwent a structural change. Capital-intensive heavy industries were moved to the Czech regions and were replaced, partly, with labor-intensive light industries. At the time of the 1930 census, most of Slovak industry consisted of establishments with less than 20 workers, for instance, in stone-clay, graphical, wood and food industries. 5 Of the 3,327 industrial establishments in Slovakia in 1930, 1,624, or about 50%, were in the food industries where many women were employed at lower wages. "The demolition of industry between the years 1921 and 1929 affected about 300 industrial enterprises in Slovakia, mostly iron, textile and wood industries. By this policy, the unequal economic development in the Czech regions and Slovakia deepened. 6 "Demolition and stoppage of metallurgy and iron industries continued. For example, a great part of the production of Podbrezovd (the largest iron industry in Slovakia) was transferred to Vitkovice (Silesia). Plants in Stratend, Pohoreld (towns in Slovakia) and some plants in Gemer (county in Slovakia) were stopped. The blast furnaces in Tisovec (town in Slovakia) stopped production in 1931."7 The question is whether this structural change in industry between the Czech and Slovak regions was in the interest of comparative advantage, i.e., was it in the interest of all Czecho-Slovakia to concentrate heavy industry exclusively in the western regions? This was not so, in my opinion. Before 1918, the Slovak regions had relatively modern and efficient heavy industries and there was a healthy competition with those in the other regions within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Furthermore, Slovakia is endowed with both iron and coal, albeit the coal fields in Silesia ( Czech region) are larger and richer. There was also much surplus agricultural labor- �SLOVAKIA 112 a common problem of East European countries, but in Czecho-Slovakia this surplus was particularly concentrated in Slovakia and Ruthenia. 8 A well-known English economist, P. W. Rosenstein-Rodan, makes the latter statement even more strongly. His estimates show a 13 percent surplus of labor in Czecho-Slovak agriculture in 1937 concentrated exclusively in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. 9 A cross-section comparison gives the picture of industry in 1930 shown in Table 24 . Number of Enterprises and Industrial Employment by Regions in 1930 No. of industrial enterprises Bohemia Moravia & Silesia Slovakia Ruthenia Total No. of workers employed 17,099 6,843 3,327 411 815,016 376,995 103,210 10,699 27,680 1,305,920 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, statisticka rocenka repub• liky ceskoslovenske, 1936, p. 53. This table indicates that in 1930 Slovakia had only 7.9 % of the total industrial employment in the country while she had 24 % of the population.10 Unfortunately, no strictly comparable data are available for the earlier years. In 1937, 10.8 workers out of each 100 population were employed in industry in the Czech regions as against only 3 % in Slovakia. 11 "Slovakian industry undoubtedly did not receive from the Czechoslovak Government the help which it urgently needed to carry it over this difficult period. On the contrary, it was placed in many respects under quite unnecessary disadvantages. Until taxation was unified throughout the Republic (which was not until 1929), it was much more heavily taxed in many respects than the 'Historic lands' ... The rates paid by professional and businessmen were, on the average, three times as high in Slovakia as in Bohemia."12 Hence the economic policy was one reason that led the Slovaks to feel antagonism again.st Czechs. To consider the problems of industry in Slovakia from �SLOVAKIA 113 the purely economic point of view, there were a number of disadvantages : (a ) more expensive transport costs by railway because a substantial part (40 % , see below ) of the railways in Slovakia was in private hands ;13 (b ) lack of capital and high interest rates, about 10 % 14 (c) a small ratio of state orders from the industry in Slovakia; (d ) lack of coke and some raw materials ; (e ) discriminatory taxation policy. The result was a lessening and in some cases stoppage of industrial production in Slovakia.15 Recent authors also add to the list of instances of economic discrimination against the Slovaks during the first Republic with the following considerations: 1. By subsidizing the state railway, which provided most railway transport in the "historical" regions, they favored the Czech industry. The subsidies, meanwhile, were paid for also by the Slovak taxpayers. 2. A high interest rate in Slovakia was not justifiable. 3. The state should have ordered from the industries in Slovakia according to a more equitable ratio. 4. Coke and other raw materials could have been supplied also to industries in Slovakia. 5. Even the recent communist writers acknowledge that the Czech industrialists feared the competition of Slovak industry, whose equipment was modern at that time compared to that in the Czech regions. 16 The discriminatory policy against the industry in Slovakia continued even after the post-war depression was over and world prosperity was near its peak. Thus, the production of pig iron fell in Slovakia accounting for 10-12 % of the total production in Czecho-Slovakia in 1921, to only 2.7 % in 1926. 17 As a consequence of that, between 13 and 17 percent of the industrial production in the Czech region was "exported" to Slovakia during the boom years of 19261929.18 The outcome of the discrimination against Slovak industry was that Slovakia and Ruthenia remained agricultural areas whose employment, or, rather, disguised unemployment in agriculture decreased only slightly. Agricultural occupations accounted for the largest �114 SLOVAKIA single share of employment in post-World War I CzechoSlovakia: an average of 39.6%, including forestry and fishery, for the country as a whole. Geographically, however, the situation was different, as may be seen from this table: Proportion of Employment in Agriculture According to Regions in 1921 and 1930 Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia Ruthenia 1921 1930 29.7% 38.6% 21.9% 60.6% 67.7% 24.1 % 28.6 % 28.6 % 56.8 % 66.3% Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Annuaire Statistique de ia Repubiique Tchecoslovaque, Prague, 1938, p. 15. Thus, while in the Czech regions agriculture represented only about 25 % of employment, in Slovakia and Ruthenia it was about 60 %. Thus far, I have been using the data given by recent authors and the official statistics which, however, lack details concerning industry in Slovakia. Even independent economists, such as I. Karvas, while studying the industries in Slovakia,19 had only one source of employment data: the Workers' Compensation Board of Slovakia. His data, as he himself acknowledges, is one of 79 % coverage concerning the extinguished industrial enterprises and 89 % of the newly established ones. According to I. Karvas, Slovak industry was heavily dependent on railway transportation, because highway conditions were poor in Slovakia. And, because about 48 % of the railway belonged to private companies, transport was more expensive in Slovakia. 20 Railway density was thinnest in Slovakia and Ruthenia throughout the life of the first Republic. In 1933 the situation was this: Railway Density per one square km. Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia, Ruthenia 0.130 0.098 0.136 0.062 km km km km �SLOVAKIA 115 Source : I. Karvas, Sjednoceni vyrobnich podminek v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku, Prague: ORBIS, 1933, p . 11. The other handicap, was that railways were oriented southward toward Budapest, and this handicap was much worse in Slovakia than in the Czech regions. Many localities in Slovakia had railway connections only via Hungary. The only trans-Slovakia line was in the north (KosiceBohumin). The other line that now exists, through the center regions, was completed only during World War II . According to I. Karvas, the decrease of industry in Slovakia had two types of causes, those common to industry in the Czech regions as well, and special causes affecting Slovakia only. 21 Leaving aside the reasons common to all the country's industry, those particular to Slovakia lay in the structure of industry itself, and in the post-war Czecho-Slovak economic policy. When the heavy-capital-intensive industries were demolished, new labor-intensive industries were built, but with less employees, so that loss of employment by demolishing the heavy industries could not have been outweighed by building new industries. In 1929, such was the situation concerning industrial employment. As we can see from next table, about 50 % of Slovak workers lost their jobs from the forced structural change of industry in Slovakia. On balance, many remained unemployed because new entrants into the labor force took jobs in the expanding industries. Loss and Increase of Employment in Slovak Industri es, 1920-1929 Demolished Decrease of Newly built Increase of enterprises employment enterprises employment 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total 5 3 15 22 19 21 27 25 17 13 181 74 1,130 870 3,673 2,056 1,534 1,270 1,232 1,066 21 29 23 21 21 16 342 586 482 311 1,825 1,186 603 560 721 381 167 13,386 184 7,003 9 18 16 10 �SLOVAKIA 116 Source: I. Karvas, Sjednoceni viirobnich podminek v zemi ceskiic h a na Slov ensku, Prague, ORBIS, 1933, p. 54. Expansion of Existing Industry in Slovakia in 1920-1929 Workers after expansion Number of enterprises Workers before expansion 6 8 4 15 12 24 22 23 30 42 583 799 342 2,368 1,730 2,826 1,932 1,747 5,359 5,193 990 1,142 1,296 3,615 2,582 3,459 2,857 2,768 6,947 6,316 168 22,859 31,972 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total Source : I. Karvas, Sj ednoceni v yrobnich podminek v zemi ceskiic h a na Slov ensku, Prague, ORBIS, 1933, p. 57. According to the two previous tables 6,383 workers lost their jobs; according to Table 28, 9,113 found work. For lack of data one cannot compare the incomes in both cases. However, since heavy industries requiring skilled male labor were demolished and light industries, such as food, etc., were built, wages were most probably below their former levels . Next table indicates a decline in general Slovak wageearnings compared to those in the Czech regions. Ratio of Wages in Slovakia in Terms of those in the Czech Regions Year Daily wages Yearly wages 1921 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 92.8 87 .7 89.3 87 .4 87 .6 86.1 86.1 80.0 71.4 72.7 74.6 75.6 75.0 74.8 Source: V. Prucha in Vysoka skola ekonomicka, Pfehled hospodafske ho viiv oje ceskoslov enska v l etech 1918-1945, Prague: NLP, 1963, p . 275. Therefore, it seems a reasonable inference that the income that workers earned in Slovak industry did not increase even during the boom years in interwar Czecho-Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 117 Employment in the State Sector in Slovakia The concept of employment in the state sector covers not only civil service, but also state owned enterprises, which included tobacco, railways (except the 48 % privately owned), Post Savings institutions, state mining and smelting enterprises, the Czecho-Slovak Printing Office, an aircraft factory, state forests and land, state spas and recreation centers, etc. 22 The state sector was thus a substantial entity. Receipts and E xpenditures of State-Owned Enterpri ses, 1927-1938 (In Mill. Kcs ) Receipts Outlays 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 9,222 9,592 10,011 10,396 10,614 10,460 7,670 8,064 8,460 8,834 9,064 8,930 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 Receipts Outlays -- -- 9,074 8,013 8,003 7,973 8,330 9,222 7,867 7,164 7,176 7,230 7,452 7,869 Sources: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Statisticka rocenka republiky Ceskoslovenske, 1936, p. 273. Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tchecoslovaque , 1938, p. 299. While there are no estimates of national income in interwar Czecho-Slovakia, it is the writer's guess that about 25 % of national income originated with state-owned enterprises. In any event, it is evident that employment in the state represented income to a substantial group of wage earners, and it was precisely in this field that some of the more striking evidence of discrimination against Slovaks was to be found. At au levels, from school porters to principals, and in all branches of civil service, as well as the majority of state enterprises, employees were primarily from the Czech regions. Thus, on April 23, 1925, member of Parliament, Mr. Hancko, protesting Czech discrimination against Slovak employees, noted that the employment breakdown in the Railway Management in Bratislava (capital of Slovakia) and in Kosice (the second largest city in Slovakia) was as follows in 1925: 23 of 5,134 clerks of higher ranks - 90 % were Czechs �118 SLOVAKIA of 12,355 clerks of lower ranks - 60 % were Czechs of 16,025 clerks of railway workers 30% were Czechs In addition, the railway departments were proposing to lay off 38 % of the Slovak workers. When there were still unemployed workers, excluding the disguised unemployed in Slovakia, 30 % of the workers came from the Czech regions, not to mention clerks of the highest ranks. Another example is perhaps more striking: Of all civil servants in the central government in Prague (10,825) only 123 or 1.3% were Slovaks, whereas the Slovak population represented 22 .6 % of the national total. 24 Generally, there were no Slovak civil servants in the Czech regions, but a large proportion of the civil servants in the Slovak regions were Czech. No detailed statistics are available because, although data was collected in 1933 by Prime Minister Malypetr, he was persuaded that the Slovak antagonism against the Czechs had a political background, not an economic one. He wanted to publish a table showing how many Slovaks were employed as civil servants, and after having seen the results, he refrained from publishing the figures, although he had promised to the Slovak opposition leaders that he would. The figures cited above are from this originally unpublished report which was eventually released after March 14, 1939, when the Slovaks proclaimed their independence and were entitled to copy all government documents concerning Slovakia. Lack of employment opportunity forced the people in Slovakia to look for jobs outside their mother country. According to recent writers, employment in industry in Slovakia rose by 2,500 persons, or 2.9 % from 1930 to 1937, while it rose in the Czech regions by 10.9 %. Thus lack of opportunity to find income at home caused an emigration from Slovakia that was seven times greater than that from the Czech regions .25 (See next table). Emigration with Valid Passports from Czecho-Slovakia in the Years 1924-1936 Total emigration from Czecho-Slovakia 1924 1925 54,373 19,350 Emigration from Slovakia Ruthenia 35,110 8,700 2,491 475 �SLOVAKIA 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 Total 119 26,129 23,596 24,540 30,715 25,712 9,567 5,165 4,735 5,065 5,685 7,201 14,388 12,053 13,544 19,401 16,682 4,527 2,222 3,009 3,016 3,707 4,831 1,561 2,411 2,286 3,822 2,706 358 123 241 343 445 471 271 ,533 141,190 17,733 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Statisticka rocenka republi- ky ceskos lovenske, Prague, 1936, p. 29. Thus according to the official data, over 50 % of the emigrants during 1924-1937 came from Slovakia whose population was only 22.6 % (Ruthenia's 4.9 % ) of all the CzechoSlovak population. At that time 50,111 workers in the state sector-including civil servants-came form the "historical lands" to Slovakia. The situation was no bet ter concerning the career army officers . Of 139 army generals only one was a Slovak (no Slovak colonels ) . Of 5,439 higher ranking officers , 67 were Slovaks ; of 6,871 lower ranking officers, 356 were Slova ks .26 This unhappy s ituat ion burst int o social u n rest. When the internation al situation w as crit ical to Czecho-Slovakia, the Slovaks, who had only wanted autonom y within the frame of Czecho-Slovakia, acting under th e pressure of Nazi Germany, procla imed themselves independent on March 14, 1939.27 FOOTNOTES 1. Conversa tion with Dr. Josef Stasko, New York P ublic Library. 2. I. A. Karvas, Sjednoceni vyrobnic h podminek v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku, Prague: ORBIS, 1933, pp. 77-78. 3. Magyar statisztikai zsebkonyv, p. 32. 4. K. Golan and Assoc. in ceskoslovenske dejiny, Bratislava: Osveta, 1961, p. 255. 5. Statisticka rocenka, 1936, p. 53. �120 SLOVAKIA 6. K. Golan, op. cit., p. 256. 7. Ibid. , pp. 262-263. 8. G. Lazarcik, The Performance of Socialist Agriculture, New York: L.W. International Financial Research, Inc., 1963, p. 4. 9. P. W. Rosenstein-Rodan, Agricultural Surplus Population in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, (mimeo), London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, as cited by Lazarcik, The Performance ... op. cit., p . 4. 10. Computed on the basis of 1930 census data. 11. P . Turcan, op. cit., p. 73. 12. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, London: Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 131. 13. In the Czech regions where 96% of railways were publicly owned, the cost per ton-mile was 0.5354 Kcs; in the Slovak regions, with only 52%in public hands, the ton-mile cost 1.1218 Kcs. (I. A. Karvas, op. cit., pp. 83-84), although the publicly owned railways received a subsidy. 14. In the Czech regions the prime rate-charged on preferred industrial loans-fluctuated between five and eight percent. 15. A. Dobry in Pf-ehled hospodarskeho vyvoje, pp. 194-195. See also Deset let rozvoje , p. 13. 16. A. Dobry in Prehled hospodarskeho vyvoje, p. 195. 17. Ostredie slovenskeho priemyslu, Slovensky priemysel v.n. 1929, Yearly Report of the Central Slovak Industry, Bratislava-Turciansky Sv. Martin: K.U.S., 1930, pp. 28-29. 18. A. Dobry in Pf-ehled hospodaf-skeho vyvoje, p. 195. 19. I. A. Karvas, op. cit., p. 54. 20. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 21. Ibid. , p. 36. 22. Statisticka rocenka, 1936, p. 275. 23. K. Culen, Slovaci a cesi v statnych sluibach, Bratislava: Vedecky ustav, 1944, p. 70. 24. Ibid., pp. 97-99. 25. Deset let rozvoje, pp. 12-13. 26. K. Culen, Preco Slovaci nechcu ist' s cechmi, pp. 15-16 (mimeo), New York (no publishing date) . 27. J. Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovenska, Cleveland, Ohio: Slovensky ustav, 1958, pp. 62-70. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is interested primarily in promoting the welfare and security of the United States of America. � SLOVAKIA 109 ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATIO N AGAINST SLOVAKIA by Frank Bandar This is a story of how economic inequality - or according to a strong expression, economic discrimination can bring social unrest and, ultimately, antagonism against a ruling ethnic majority. (There are many who claim that it was the antagonism of Slovaks against Czechs that brought the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. The author of this essay, however, believes that the first Republic could not have survived in the international situation even without internal ethnic divisions.) To familiarize the reader with the available evidence in this field : the official Czecho-Slovak interwar statistics distinguished the regions of Czecho-Slovakia according to the ethnic and historical origin, except for production data for Slovakia. Thus we find data explicitly for Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia (sometimes Moravia includes Silesia), Slovakia, and Ruthenia. The first three regions were also officially termed the "historical regions" though the Slovaks also have a history, despite 1,000 years of Magyar occupation. Since World War II, when Ruthenia was annexed by the U.S.S.R., the official statistics refer to the Czech regions and Slovakia. Recent economic data give equal coverage to the Czech regions and Slovakia, in contrast to those published between the two wars, when young Slovak economists had to search for production data on Slovak territory.1 The Background of Slovakia's Industrialization Slovakia was part of "Greater Hungary" from 906 to October 30, 1918, and, indeed, during the 150 years after the battle of Mohacs, in 1526, that Hungary proper was under Turkish domination, Slovakia was the area where independent political and economic life was carried on. When the Turks were driven out at the end of the 17th century, a base for manufacturing in terms of handicraft and artisanship had been firmly laid down in Slovakia. After the AustroHungarian settlement in 1867, when the Monarchy was divided into two administrative and economic units, the Magyar politicians were eager to catch up to the more developed Austria. They started to build industry where con- �110 SLOVAKIA ditions were the most favorable. A cheaper labor market and the availability of raw material - coal, iron, etc., favored the Slovak territory. And, because industries built in Slovakia were of later date, than those in the "historical" regions, they were equipped with more advanced technology. So, immediately after World War I, Slovakia contained 17 .3 % of all former Hungarian industries ( which employed 20 or more workers) employing 20.7 % of all the workers in such industries in former Greater Hungary were employed.2 According to other sources, about 20 % of industry, of 20 or more employees, were in the Slovak territories. The actual total number of industrial workers was much higher, because there were many small workshops of under 20 employees, for which there are no data in the pre-World War I Magyar statistics. In per capita terms, Slovakia seems to have been the most industrialized region in Greater Hungary, for, of the 20.9 million population in Greater Hungary in 1910, 2.9 million lived in the Slovak territory. 3 The Decline of Slovak Industry and Industrial Employment After 1918 The contention of this paper is that, after the First Republic came into existence, the industrial strength of Slovakia declined, for a number of reasons. One of these was the changing structure of industry in Slovakia; the other reason was the policies followed by the economically stronger Czech regions. One writer puts it this way: "The situation in Czecho-Slovakia became critical when all capitalist countries experienced a post-war depression in the winter months of 1922 and 1923. The Czech capitalists tried to overcome the crisis by concentrating industry into the Czech regions ... Industrial production in Slovakia was not so profitable for them, therefore, they stopped production in Slovakia, and industrial equipment was transported to the Czech regions or sold abroad. " 4 Industrial employment indeed declined in the first half of the 1920's and later recovered only very slowly. 1910 85,000 1913 1926 93,000 86,454 �SLOVAKIA (Dec. 31) 1930 1937 111 103,222 104,915 Source: P. Turcan, Socialistickti industrializacia Slovenska, Bratislava: Osveta, 1960, p. 73. Simply the number of workers, however, is misleading. It understates the decline of Slovak industrial strength, for the workers of 1913 were mostly employed in capitalintensive industries, whereas by 1926 and later, they were mostly in labor-intensive industries. Slovak industry underwent a structural change. Capital-intensive heavy industries were moved to the Czech regions and were replaced, partly, with labor-intensive light industries. At the time of the 1930 census, most of Slovak industry consisted of establishments with less than 20 workers, for instance, in stone-clay, graphical, wood and food industries. 5 Of the 3,327 industrial establishments in Slovakia in 1930, 1,624, or about 50%, were in the food industries where many women were employed at lower wages. "The demolition of industry between the years 1921 and 1929 affected about 300 industrial enterprises in Slovakia, mostly iron, textile and wood industries. By this policy, the unequal economic development in the Czech regions and Slovakia deepened. 6 "Demolition and stoppage of metallurgy and iron industries continued. For example, a great part of the production of Podbrezovd (the largest iron industry in Slovakia) was transferred to Vitkovice (Silesia). Plants in Stratend, Pohoreld (towns in Slovakia) and some plants in Gemer (county in Slovakia) were stopped. The blast furnaces in Tisovec (town in Slovakia) stopped production in 1931."7 The question is whether this structural change in industry between the Czech and Slovak regions was in the interest of comparative advantage, i.e., was it in the interest of all Czecho-Slovakia to concentrate heavy industry exclusively in the western regions? This was not so, in my opinion. Before 1918, the Slovak regions had relatively modern and efficient heavy industries and there was a healthy competition with those in the other regions within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Furthermore, Slovakia is endowed with both iron and coal, albeit the coal fields in Silesia ( Czech region) are larger and richer. There was also much surplus agricultural labor- �SLOVAKIA 112 a common problem of East European countries, but in Czecho-Slovakia this surplus was particularly concentrated in Slovakia and Ruthenia. 8 A well-known English economist, P. W. Rosenstein-Rodan, makes the latter statement even more strongly. His estimates show a 13 percent surplus of labor in Czecho-Slovak agriculture in 1937 concentrated exclusively in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. 9 A cross-section comparison gives the picture of industry in 1930 shown in Table 24 . Number of Enterprises and Industrial Employment by Regions in 1930 No. of industrial enterprises Bohemia Moravia & Silesia Slovakia Ruthenia Total No. of workers employed 17,099 6,843 3,327 411 815,016 376,995 103,210 10,699 27,680 1,305,920 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, statisticka rocenka repub• liky ceskoslovenske, 1936, p. 53. This table indicates that in 1930 Slovakia had only 7.9 % of the total industrial employment in the country while she had 24 % of the population.10 Unfortunately, no strictly comparable data are available for the earlier years. In 1937, 10.8 workers out of each 100 population were employed in industry in the Czech regions as against only 3 % in Slovakia. 11 "Slovakian industry undoubtedly did not receive from the Czechoslovak Government the help which it urgently needed to carry it over this difficult period. On the contrary, it was placed in many respects under quite unnecessary disadvantages. Until taxation was unified throughout the Republic (which was not until 1929), it was much more heavily taxed in many respects than the 'Historic lands' ... The rates paid by professional and businessmen were, on the average, three times as high in Slovakia as in Bohemia."12 Hence the economic policy was one reason that led the Slovaks to feel antagonism again.st Czechs. To consider the problems of industry in Slovakia from �SLOVAKIA 113 the purely economic point of view, there were a number of disadvantages : (a ) more expensive transport costs by railway because a substantial part (40 % , see below ) of the railways in Slovakia was in private hands ;13 (b ) lack of capital and high interest rates, about 10 % 14 (c) a small ratio of state orders from the industry in Slovakia; (d ) lack of coke and some raw materials ; (e ) discriminatory taxation policy. The result was a lessening and in some cases stoppage of industrial production in Slovakia.15 Recent authors also add to the list of instances of economic discrimination against the Slovaks during the first Republic with the following considerations: 1. By subsidizing the state railway, which provided most railway transport in the "historical" regions, they favored the Czech industry. The subsidies, meanwhile, were paid for also by the Slovak taxpayers. 2. A high interest rate in Slovakia was not justifiable. 3. The state should have ordered from the industries in Slovakia according to a more equitable ratio. 4. Coke and other raw materials could have been supplied also to industries in Slovakia. 5. Even the recent communist writers acknowledge that the Czech industrialists feared the competition of Slovak industry, whose equipment was modern at that time compared to that in the Czech regions. 16 The discriminatory policy against the industry in Slovakia continued even after the post-war depression was over and world prosperity was near its peak. Thus, the production of pig iron fell in Slovakia accounting for 10-12 % of the total production in Czecho-Slovakia in 1921, to only 2.7 % in 1926. 17 As a consequence of that, between 13 and 17 percent of the industrial production in the Czech region was "exported" to Slovakia during the boom years of 19261929.18 The outcome of the discrimination against Slovak industry was that Slovakia and Ruthenia remained agricultural areas whose employment, or, rather, disguised unemployment in agriculture decreased only slightly. Agricultural occupations accounted for the largest �114 SLOVAKIA single share of employment in post-World War I CzechoSlovakia: an average of 39.6%, including forestry and fishery, for the country as a whole. Geographically, however, the situation was different, as may be seen from this table: Proportion of Employment in Agriculture According to Regions in 1921 and 1930 Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia Ruthenia 1921 1930 29.7% 38.6% 21.9% 60.6% 67.7% 24.1 % 28.6 % 28.6 % 56.8 % 66.3% Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Annuaire Statistique de ia Repubiique Tchecoslovaque, Prague, 1938, p. 15. Thus, while in the Czech regions agriculture represented only about 25 % of employment, in Slovakia and Ruthenia it was about 60 %. Thus far, I have been using the data given by recent authors and the official statistics which, however, lack details concerning industry in Slovakia. Even independent economists, such as I. Karvas, while studying the industries in Slovakia,19 had only one source of employment data: the Workers' Compensation Board of Slovakia. His data, as he himself acknowledges, is one of 79 % coverage concerning the extinguished industrial enterprises and 89 % of the newly established ones. According to I. Karvas, Slovak industry was heavily dependent on railway transportation, because highway conditions were poor in Slovakia. And, because about 48 % of the railway belonged to private companies, transport was more expensive in Slovakia. 20 Railway density was thinnest in Slovakia and Ruthenia throughout the life of the first Republic. In 1933 the situation was this: Railway Density per one square km. Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia, Ruthenia 0.130 0.098 0.136 0.062 km km km km �SLOVAKIA 115 Source : I. Karvas, Sjednoceni vyrobnich podminek v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku, Prague: ORBIS, 1933, p . 11. The other handicap, was that railways were oriented southward toward Budapest, and this handicap was much worse in Slovakia than in the Czech regions. Many localities in Slovakia had railway connections only via Hungary. The only trans-Slovakia line was in the north (KosiceBohumin). The other line that now exists, through the center regions, was completed only during World War II . According to I. Karvas, the decrease of industry in Slovakia had two types of causes, those common to industry in the Czech regions as well, and special causes affecting Slovakia only. 21 Leaving aside the reasons common to all the country's industry, those particular to Slovakia lay in the structure of industry itself, and in the post-war Czecho-Slovak economic policy. When the heavy-capital-intensive industries were demolished, new labor-intensive industries were built, but with less employees, so that loss of employment by demolishing the heavy industries could not have been outweighed by building new industries. In 1929, such was the situation concerning industrial employment. As we can see from next table, about 50 % of Slovak workers lost their jobs from the forced structural change of industry in Slovakia. On balance, many remained unemployed because new entrants into the labor force took jobs in the expanding industries. Loss and Increase of Employment in Slovak Industri es, 1920-1929 Demolished Decrease of Newly built Increase of enterprises employment enterprises employment 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total 5 3 15 22 19 21 27 25 17 13 181 74 1,130 870 3,673 2,056 1,534 1,270 1,232 1,066 21 29 23 21 21 16 342 586 482 311 1,825 1,186 603 560 721 381 167 13,386 184 7,003 9 18 16 10 �SLOVAKIA 116 Source: I. Karvas, Sjednoceni viirobnich podminek v zemi ceskiic h a na Slov ensku, Prague, ORBIS, 1933, p. 54. Expansion of Existing Industry in Slovakia in 1920-1929 Workers after expansion Number of enterprises Workers before expansion 6 8 4 15 12 24 22 23 30 42 583 799 342 2,368 1,730 2,826 1,932 1,747 5,359 5,193 990 1,142 1,296 3,615 2,582 3,459 2,857 2,768 6,947 6,316 168 22,859 31,972 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total Source : I. Karvas, Sj ednoceni v yrobnich podminek v zemi ceskiic h a na Slov ensku, Prague, ORBIS, 1933, p. 57. According to the two previous tables 6,383 workers lost their jobs; according to Table 28, 9,113 found work. For lack of data one cannot compare the incomes in both cases. However, since heavy industries requiring skilled male labor were demolished and light industries, such as food, etc., were built, wages were most probably below their former levels . Next table indicates a decline in general Slovak wageearnings compared to those in the Czech regions. Ratio of Wages in Slovakia in Terms of those in the Czech Regions Year Daily wages Yearly wages 1921 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 92.8 87 .7 89.3 87 .4 87 .6 86.1 86.1 80.0 71.4 72.7 74.6 75.6 75.0 74.8 Source: V. Prucha in Vysoka skola ekonomicka, Pfehled hospodafske ho viiv oje ceskoslov enska v l etech 1918-1945, Prague: NLP, 1963, p . 275. Therefore, it seems a reasonable inference that the income that workers earned in Slovak industry did not increase even during the boom years in interwar Czecho-Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 117 Employment in the State Sector in Slovakia The concept of employment in the state sector covers not only civil service, but also state owned enterprises, which included tobacco, railways (except the 48 % privately owned), Post Savings institutions, state mining and smelting enterprises, the Czecho-Slovak Printing Office, an aircraft factory, state forests and land, state spas and recreation centers, etc. 22 The state sector was thus a substantial entity. Receipts and E xpenditures of State-Owned Enterpri ses, 1927-1938 (In Mill. Kcs ) Receipts Outlays 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 9,222 9,592 10,011 10,396 10,614 10,460 7,670 8,064 8,460 8,834 9,064 8,930 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 Receipts Outlays -- -- 9,074 8,013 8,003 7,973 8,330 9,222 7,867 7,164 7,176 7,230 7,452 7,869 Sources: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Statisticka rocenka republiky Ceskoslovenske, 1936, p. 273. Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tchecoslovaque , 1938, p. 299. While there are no estimates of national income in interwar Czecho-Slovakia, it is the writer's guess that about 25 % of national income originated with state-owned enterprises. In any event, it is evident that employment in the state represented income to a substantial group of wage earners, and it was precisely in this field that some of the more striking evidence of discrimination against Slovaks was to be found. At au levels, from school porters to principals, and in all branches of civil service, as well as the majority of state enterprises, employees were primarily from the Czech regions. Thus, on April 23, 1925, member of Parliament, Mr. Hancko, protesting Czech discrimination against Slovak employees, noted that the employment breakdown in the Railway Management in Bratislava (capital of Slovakia) and in Kosice (the second largest city in Slovakia) was as follows in 1925: 23 of 5,134 clerks of higher ranks - 90 % were Czechs �118 SLOVAKIA of 12,355 clerks of lower ranks - 60 % were Czechs of 16,025 clerks of railway workers 30% were Czechs In addition, the railway departments were proposing to lay off 38 % of the Slovak workers. When there were still unemployed workers, excluding the disguised unemployed in Slovakia, 30 % of the workers came from the Czech regions, not to mention clerks of the highest ranks. Another example is perhaps more striking: Of all civil servants in the central government in Prague (10,825) only 123 or 1.3% were Slovaks, whereas the Slovak population represented 22 .6 % of the national total. 24 Generally, there were no Slovak civil servants in the Czech regions, but a large proportion of the civil servants in the Slovak regions were Czech. No detailed statistics are available because, although data was collected in 1933 by Prime Minister Malypetr, he was persuaded that the Slovak antagonism against the Czechs had a political background, not an economic one. He wanted to publish a table showing how many Slovaks were employed as civil servants, and after having seen the results, he refrained from publishing the figures, although he had promised to the Slovak opposition leaders that he would. The figures cited above are from this originally unpublished report which was eventually released after March 14, 1939, when the Slovaks proclaimed their independence and were entitled to copy all government documents concerning Slovakia. Lack of employment opportunity forced the people in Slovakia to look for jobs outside their mother country. According to recent writers, employment in industry in Slovakia rose by 2,500 persons, or 2.9 % from 1930 to 1937, while it rose in the Czech regions by 10.9 %. Thus lack of opportunity to find income at home caused an emigration from Slovakia that was seven times greater than that from the Czech regions .25 (See next table). Emigration with Valid Passports from Czecho-Slovakia in the Years 1924-1936 Total emigration from Czecho-Slovakia 1924 1925 54,373 19,350 Emigration from Slovakia Ruthenia 35,110 8,700 2,491 475 �SLOVAKIA 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 Total 119 26,129 23,596 24,540 30,715 25,712 9,567 5,165 4,735 5,065 5,685 7,201 14,388 12,053 13,544 19,401 16,682 4,527 2,222 3,009 3,016 3,707 4,831 1,561 2,411 2,286 3,822 2,706 358 123 241 343 445 471 271 ,533 141,190 17,733 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Statisticka rocenka republi- ky ceskos lovenske, Prague, 1936, p. 29. Thus according to the official data, over 50 % of the emigrants during 1924-1937 came from Slovakia whose population was only 22.6 % (Ruthenia's 4.9 % ) of all the CzechoSlovak population. At that time 50,111 workers in the state sector-including civil servants-came form the "historical lands" to Slovakia. The situation was no bet ter concerning the career army officers . Of 139 army generals only one was a Slovak (no Slovak colonels ) . Of 5,439 higher ranking officers , 67 were Slovaks ; of 6,871 lower ranking officers, 356 were Slova ks .26 This unhappy s ituat ion burst int o social u n rest. When the internation al situation w as crit ical to Czecho-Slovakia, the Slovaks, who had only wanted autonom y within the frame of Czecho-Slovakia, acting under th e pressure of Nazi Germany, procla imed themselves independent on March 14, 1939.27 FOOTNOTES 1. Conversa tion with Dr. Josef Stasko, New York P ublic Library. 2. I. A. Karvas, Sjednoceni vyrobnic h podminek v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku, Prague: ORBIS, 1933, pp. 77-78. 3. Magyar statisztikai zsebkonyv, p. 32. 4. K. Golan and Assoc. in ceskoslovenske dejiny, Bratislava: Osveta, 1961, p. 255. 5. Statisticka rocenka, 1936, p. 53. �120 SLOVAKIA 6. K. Golan, op. cit., p. 256. 7. Ibid. , pp. 262-263. 8. G. Lazarcik, The Performance of Socialist Agriculture, New York: L.W. International Financial Research, Inc., 1963, p. 4. 9. P. W. Rosenstein-Rodan, Agricultural Surplus Population in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, (mimeo), London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, as cited by Lazarcik, The Performance ... op. cit., p . 4. 10. Computed on the basis of 1930 census data. 11. P . Turcan, op. cit., p. 73. 12. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, London: Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 131. 13. In the Czech regions where 96% of railways were publicly owned, the cost per ton-mile was 0.5354 Kcs; in the Slovak regions, with only 52%in public hands, the ton-mile cost 1.1218 Kcs. (I. A. Karvas, op. cit., pp. 83-84), although the publicly owned railways received a subsidy. 14. In the Czech regions the prime rate-charged on preferred industrial loans-fluctuated between five and eight percent. 15. A. Dobry in Pf-ehled hospodarskeho vyvoje, pp. 194-195. See also Deset let rozvoje , p. 13. 16. A. Dobry in Prehled hospodarskeho vyvoje, p. 195. 17. Ostredie slovenskeho priemyslu, Slovensky priemysel v.n. 1929, Yearly Report of the Central Slovak Industry, Bratislava-Turciansky Sv. Martin: K.U.S., 1930, pp. 28-29. 18. A. Dobry in Pf-ehled hospodaf-skeho vyvoje, p. 195. 19. I. A. Karvas, op. cit., p. 54. 20. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 21. Ibid. , p. 36. 22. Statisticka rocenka, 1936, p. 275. 23. K. Culen, Slovaci a cesi v statnych sluibach, Bratislava: Vedecky ustav, 1944, p. 70. 24. Ibid., pp. 97-99. 25. Deset let rozvoje, pp. 12-13. 26. K. Culen, Preco Slovaci nechcu ist' s cechmi, pp. 15-16 (mimeo), New York (no publishing date) . 27. J. Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovenska, Cleveland, Ohio: Slovensky ustav, 1958, pp. 62-70. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is interested primarily in promoting the welfare and security of the United States of America. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1968, Vol. 18 Description An account of the resource Vol. 18 (No. 41), 1968. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1968 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 109 ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATIO N AGAINST SLOVAKIA by Frank Bandar This is a story of how economic inequality - or according to a strong expression, economic discrimination can bring social unrest and, ultimately, antagonism against a ruling ethnic majority. (There are many who claim that it was the antagonism of Slovaks against Czechs that brought the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. The author of this essay, however, believes that the first Republic could not have survived in the international situation even without internal ethnic divisions.) To familiarize the reader with the available evidence in this field : the official Czecho-Slovak interwar statistics distinguished the regions of Czecho-Slovakia according to the ethnic and historical origin, except for production data for Slovakia. Thus we find data explicitly for Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia (sometimes Moravia includes Silesia), Slovakia, and Ruthenia. The first three regions were also officially termed the "historical regions" though the Slovaks also have a history, despite 1,000 years of Magyar occupation. Since World War II, when Ruthenia was annexed by the U.S.S.R., the official statistics refer to the Czech regions and Slovakia. Recent economic data give equal coverage to the Czech regions and Slovakia, in contrast to those published between the two wars, when young Slovak economists had to search for production data on Slovak territory.1 The Background of Slovakia's Industrialization Slovakia was part of "Greater Hungary" from 906 to October 30, 1918, and, indeed, during the 150 years after the battle of Mohacs, in 1526, that Hungary proper was under Turkish domination, Slovakia was the area where independent political and economic life was carried on. When the Turks were driven out at the end of the 17th century, a base for manufacturing in terms of handicraft and artisanship had been firmly laid down in Slovakia. After the AustroHungarian settlement in 1867, when the Monarchy was divided into two administrative and economic units, the Magyar politicians were eager to catch up to the more developed Austria. They started to build industry where con- 110 SLOVAKIA ditions were the most favorable. A cheaper labor market and the availability of raw material - coal, iron, etc., favored the Slovak territory. And, because industries built in Slovakia were of later date, than those in the "historical" regions, they were equipped with more advanced technology. So, immediately after World War I, Slovakia contained 17 .3 % of all former Hungarian industries ( which employed 20 or more workers) employing 20.7 % of all the workers in such industries in former Greater Hungary were employed.2 According to other sources, about 20 % of industry, of 20 or more employees, were in the Slovak territories. The actual total number of industrial workers was much higher, because there were many small workshops of under 20 employees, for which there are no data in the pre-World War I Magyar statistics. In per capita terms, Slovakia seems to have been the most industrialized region in Greater Hungary, for, of the 20.9 million population in Greater Hungary in 1910, 2.9 million lived in the Slovak territory. 3 The Decline of Slovak Industry and Industrial Employment After 1918 The contention of this paper is that, after the First Republic came into existence, the industrial strength of Slovakia declined, for a number of reasons. One of these was the changing structure of industry in Slovakia; the other reason was the policies followed by the economically stronger Czech regions. One writer puts it this way: "The situation in Czecho-Slovakia became critical when all capitalist countries experienced a post-war depression in the winter months of 1922 and 1923. The Czech capitalists tried to overcome the crisis by concentrating industry into the Czech regions ... Industrial production in Slovakia was not so profitable for them, therefore, they stopped production in Slovakia, and industrial equipment was transported to the Czech regions or sold abroad. " 4 Industrial employment indeed declined in the first half of the 1920's and later recovered only very slowly. 1910 85,000 1913 1926 93,000 86,454 SLOVAKIA (Dec. 31) 1930 1937 111 103,222 104,915 Source: P. Turcan, Socialistickti industrializacia Slovenska, Bratislava: Osveta, 1960, p. 73. Simply the number of workers, however, is misleading. It understates the decline of Slovak industrial strength, for the workers of 1913 were mostly employed in capitalintensive industries, whereas by 1926 and later, they were mostly in labor-intensive industries. Slovak industry underwent a structural change. Capital-intensive heavy industries were moved to the Czech regions and were replaced, partly, with labor-intensive light industries. At the time of the 1930 census, most of Slovak industry consisted of establishments with less than 20 workers, for instance, in stone-clay, graphical, wood and food industries. 5 Of the 3,327 industrial establishments in Slovakia in 1930, 1,624, or about 50%, were in the food industries where many women were employed at lower wages. "The demolition of industry between the years 1921 and 1929 affected about 300 industrial enterprises in Slovakia, mostly iron, textile and wood industries. By this policy, the unequal economic development in the Czech regions and Slovakia deepened. 6 "Demolition and stoppage of metallurgy and iron industries continued. For example, a great part of the production of Podbrezovd (the largest iron industry in Slovakia) was transferred to Vitkovice (Silesia). Plants in Stratend, Pohoreld (towns in Slovakia) and some plants in Gemer (county in Slovakia) were stopped. The blast furnaces in Tisovec (town in Slovakia) stopped production in 1931."7 The question is whether this structural change in industry between the Czech and Slovak regions was in the interest of comparative advantage, i.e., was it in the interest of all Czecho-Slovakia to concentrate heavy industry exclusively in the western regions? This was not so, in my opinion. Before 1918, the Slovak regions had relatively modern and efficient heavy industries and there was a healthy competition with those in the other regions within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Furthermore, Slovakia is endowed with both iron and coal, albeit the coal fields in Silesia ( Czech region) are larger and richer. There was also much surplus agricultural labor- SLOVAKIA 112 a common problem of East European countries, but in Czecho-Slovakia this surplus was particularly concentrated in Slovakia and Ruthenia. 8 A well-known English economist, P. W. Rosenstein-Rodan, makes the latter statement even more strongly. His estimates show a 13 percent surplus of labor in Czecho-Slovak agriculture in 1937 concentrated exclusively in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. 9 A cross-section comparison gives the picture of industry in 1930 shown in Table 24 . Number of Enterprises and Industrial Employment by Regions in 1930 No. of industrial enterprises Bohemia Moravia & Silesia Slovakia Ruthenia Total No. of workers employed 17,099 6,843 3,327 411 815,016 376,995 103,210 10,699 27,680 1,305,920 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, statisticka rocenka repub• liky ceskoslovenske, 1936, p. 53. This table indicates that in 1930 Slovakia had only 7.9 % of the total industrial employment in the country while she had 24 % of the population.10 Unfortunately, no strictly comparable data are available for the earlier years. In 1937, 10.8 workers out of each 100 population were employed in industry in the Czech regions as against only 3 % in Slovakia. 11 "Slovakian industry undoubtedly did not receive from the Czechoslovak Government the help which it urgently needed to carry it over this difficult period. On the contrary, it was placed in many respects under quite unnecessary disadvantages. Until taxation was unified throughout the Republic (which was not until 1929), it was much more heavily taxed in many respects than the 'Historic lands' ... The rates paid by professional and businessmen were, on the average, three times as high in Slovakia as in Bohemia."12 Hence the economic policy was one reason that led the Slovaks to feel antagonism again.st Czechs. To consider the problems of industry in Slovakia from SLOVAKIA 113 the purely economic point of view, there were a number of disadvantages : (a ) more expensive transport costs by railway because a substantial part (40 % , see below ) of the railways in Slovakia was in private hands ;13 (b ) lack of capital and high interest rates, about 10 % 14 (c) a small ratio of state orders from the industry in Slovakia; (d ) lack of coke and some raw materials ; (e ) discriminatory taxation policy. The result was a lessening and in some cases stoppage of industrial production in Slovakia.15 Recent authors also add to the list of instances of economic discrimination against the Slovaks during the first Republic with the following considerations: 1. By subsidizing the state railway, which provided most railway transport in the "historical" regions, they favored the Czech industry. The subsidies, meanwhile, were paid for also by the Slovak taxpayers. 2. A high interest rate in Slovakia was not justifiable. 3. The state should have ordered from the industries in Slovakia according to a more equitable ratio. 4. Coke and other raw materials could have been supplied also to industries in Slovakia. 5. Even the recent communist writers acknowledge that the Czech industrialists feared the competition of Slovak industry, whose equipment was modern at that time compared to that in the Czech regions. 16 The discriminatory policy against the industry in Slovakia continued even after the post-war depression was over and world prosperity was near its peak. Thus, the production of pig iron fell in Slovakia accounting for 10-12 % of the total production in Czecho-Slovakia in 1921, to only 2.7 % in 1926. 17 As a consequence of that, between 13 and 17 percent of the industrial production in the Czech region was "exported" to Slovakia during the boom years of 19261929.18 The outcome of the discrimination against Slovak industry was that Slovakia and Ruthenia remained agricultural areas whose employment, or, rather, disguised unemployment in agriculture decreased only slightly. Agricultural occupations accounted for the largest 114 SLOVAKIA single share of employment in post-World War I CzechoSlovakia: an average of 39.6%, including forestry and fishery, for the country as a whole. Geographically, however, the situation was different, as may be seen from this table: Proportion of Employment in Agriculture According to Regions in 1921 and 1930 Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia Ruthenia 1921 1930 29.7% 38.6% 21.9% 60.6% 67.7% 24.1 % 28.6 % 28.6 % 56.8 % 66.3% Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Annuaire Statistique de ia Repubiique Tchecoslovaque, Prague, 1938, p. 15. Thus, while in the Czech regions agriculture represented only about 25 % of employment, in Slovakia and Ruthenia it was about 60 %. Thus far, I have been using the data given by recent authors and the official statistics which, however, lack details concerning industry in Slovakia. Even independent economists, such as I. Karvas, while studying the industries in Slovakia,19 had only one source of employment data: the Workers' Compensation Board of Slovakia. His data, as he himself acknowledges, is one of 79 % coverage concerning the extinguished industrial enterprises and 89 % of the newly established ones. According to I. Karvas, Slovak industry was heavily dependent on railway transportation, because highway conditions were poor in Slovakia. And, because about 48 % of the railway belonged to private companies, transport was more expensive in Slovakia. 20 Railway density was thinnest in Slovakia and Ruthenia throughout the life of the first Republic. In 1933 the situation was this: Railway Density per one square km. Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia, Ruthenia 0.130 0.098 0.136 0.062 km km km km SLOVAKIA 115 Source : I. Karvas, Sjednoceni vyrobnich podminek v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku, Prague: ORBIS, 1933, p . 11. The other handicap, was that railways were oriented southward toward Budapest, and this handicap was much worse in Slovakia than in the Czech regions. Many localities in Slovakia had railway connections only via Hungary. The only trans-Slovakia line was in the north (KosiceBohumin). The other line that now exists, through the center regions, was completed only during World War II . According to I. Karvas, the decrease of industry in Slovakia had two types of causes, those common to industry in the Czech regions as well, and special causes affecting Slovakia only. 21 Leaving aside the reasons common to all the country's industry, those particular to Slovakia lay in the structure of industry itself, and in the post-war Czecho-Slovak economic policy. When the heavy-capital-intensive industries were demolished, new labor-intensive industries were built, but with less employees, so that loss of employment by demolishing the heavy industries could not have been outweighed by building new industries. In 1929, such was the situation concerning industrial employment. As we can see from next table, about 50 % of Slovak workers lost their jobs from the forced structural change of industry in Slovakia. On balance, many remained unemployed because new entrants into the labor force took jobs in the expanding industries. Loss and Increase of Employment in Slovak Industri es, 1920-1929 Demolished Decrease of Newly built Increase of enterprises employment enterprises employment 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total 5 3 15 22 19 21 27 25 17 13 181 74 1,130 870 3,673 2,056 1,534 1,270 1,232 1,066 21 29 23 21 21 16 342 586 482 311 1,825 1,186 603 560 721 381 167 13,386 184 7,003 9 18 16 10 SLOVAKIA 116 Source: I. Karvas, Sjednoceni viirobnich podminek v zemi ceskiic h a na Slov ensku, Prague, ORBIS, 1933, p. 54. Expansion of Existing Industry in Slovakia in 1920-1929 Workers after expansion Number of enterprises Workers before expansion 6 8 4 15 12 24 22 23 30 42 583 799 342 2,368 1,730 2,826 1,932 1,747 5,359 5,193 990 1,142 1,296 3,615 2,582 3,459 2,857 2,768 6,947 6,316 168 22,859 31,972 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total Source : I. Karvas, Sj ednoceni v yrobnich podminek v zemi ceskiic h a na Slov ensku, Prague, ORBIS, 1933, p. 57. According to the two previous tables 6,383 workers lost their jobs; according to Table 28, 9,113 found work. For lack of data one cannot compare the incomes in both cases. However, since heavy industries requiring skilled male labor were demolished and light industries, such as food, etc., were built, wages were most probably below their former levels . Next table indicates a decline in general Slovak wageearnings compared to those in the Czech regions. Ratio of Wages in Slovakia in Terms of those in the Czech Regions Year Daily wages Yearly wages 1921 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 92.8 87 .7 89.3 87 .4 87 .6 86.1 86.1 80.0 71.4 72.7 74.6 75.6 75.0 74.8 Source: V. Prucha in Vysoka skola ekonomicka, Pfehled hospodafske ho viiv oje ceskoslov enska v l etech 1918-1945, Prague: NLP, 1963, p . 275. Therefore, it seems a reasonable inference that the income that workers earned in Slovak industry did not increase even during the boom years in interwar Czecho-Slovakia. SLOVAKIA 117 Employment in the State Sector in Slovakia The concept of employment in the state sector covers not only civil service, but also state owned enterprises, which included tobacco, railways (except the 48 % privately owned), Post Savings institutions, state mining and smelting enterprises, the Czecho-Slovak Printing Office, an aircraft factory, state forests and land, state spas and recreation centers, etc. 22 The state sector was thus a substantial entity. Receipts and E xpenditures of State-Owned Enterpri ses, 1927-1938 (In Mill. Kcs ) Receipts Outlays 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 9,222 9,592 10,011 10,396 10,614 10,460 7,670 8,064 8,460 8,834 9,064 8,930 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 Receipts Outlays -- -- 9,074 8,013 8,003 7,973 8,330 9,222 7,867 7,164 7,176 7,230 7,452 7,869 Sources: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Statisticka rocenka republiky Ceskoslovenske, 1936, p. 273. Annuaire statistique de la Republique Tchecoslovaque , 1938, p. 299. While there are no estimates of national income in interwar Czecho-Slovakia, it is the writer's guess that about 25 % of national income originated with state-owned enterprises. In any event, it is evident that employment in the state represented income to a substantial group of wage earners, and it was precisely in this field that some of the more striking evidence of discrimination against Slovaks was to be found. At au levels, from school porters to principals, and in all branches of civil service, as well as the majority of state enterprises, employees were primarily from the Czech regions. Thus, on April 23, 1925, member of Parliament, Mr. Hancko, protesting Czech discrimination against Slovak employees, noted that the employment breakdown in the Railway Management in Bratislava (capital of Slovakia) and in Kosice (the second largest city in Slovakia) was as follows in 1925: 23 of 5,134 clerks of higher ranks - 90 % were Czechs 118 SLOVAKIA of 12,355 clerks of lower ranks - 60 % were Czechs of 16,025 clerks of railway workers 30% were Czechs In addition, the railway departments were proposing to lay off 38 % of the Slovak workers. When there were still unemployed workers, excluding the disguised unemployed in Slovakia, 30 % of the workers came from the Czech regions, not to mention clerks of the highest ranks. Another example is perhaps more striking: Of all civil servants in the central government in Prague (10,825) only 123 or 1.3% were Slovaks, whereas the Slovak population represented 22 .6 % of the national total. 24 Generally, there were no Slovak civil servants in the Czech regions, but a large proportion of the civil servants in the Slovak regions were Czech. No detailed statistics are available because, although data was collected in 1933 by Prime Minister Malypetr, he was persuaded that the Slovak antagonism against the Czechs had a political background, not an economic one. He wanted to publish a table showing how many Slovaks were employed as civil servants, and after having seen the results, he refrained from publishing the figures, although he had promised to the Slovak opposition leaders that he would. The figures cited above are from this originally unpublished report which was eventually released after March 14, 1939, when the Slovaks proclaimed their independence and were entitled to copy all government documents concerning Slovakia. Lack of employment opportunity forced the people in Slovakia to look for jobs outside their mother country. According to recent writers, employment in industry in Slovakia rose by 2,500 persons, or 2.9 % from 1930 to 1937, while it rose in the Czech regions by 10.9 %. Thus lack of opportunity to find income at home caused an emigration from Slovakia that was seven times greater than that from the Czech regions .25 (See next table). Emigration with Valid Passports from Czecho-Slovakia in the Years 1924-1936 Total emigration from Czecho-Slovakia 1924 1925 54,373 19,350 Emigration from Slovakia Ruthenia 35,110 8,700 2,491 475 SLOVAKIA 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 Total 119 26,129 23,596 24,540 30,715 25,712 9,567 5,165 4,735 5,065 5,685 7,201 14,388 12,053 13,544 19,401 16,682 4,527 2,222 3,009 3,016 3,707 4,831 1,561 2,411 2,286 3,822 2,706 358 123 241 343 445 471 271 ,533 141,190 17,733 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office, Statisticka rocenka republi- ky ceskos lovenske, Prague, 1936, p. 29. Thus according to the official data, over 50 % of the emigrants during 1924-1937 came from Slovakia whose population was only 22.6 % (Ruthenia's 4.9 % ) of all the CzechoSlovak population. At that time 50,111 workers in the state sector-including civil servants-came form the "historical lands" to Slovakia. The situation was no bet ter concerning the career army officers . Of 139 army generals only one was a Slovak (no Slovak colonels ) . Of 5,439 higher ranking officers , 67 were Slovaks ; of 6,871 lower ranking officers, 356 were Slova ks .26 This unhappy s ituat ion burst int o social u n rest. When the internation al situation w as crit ical to Czecho-Slovakia, the Slovaks, who had only wanted autonom y within the frame of Czecho-Slovakia, acting under th e pressure of Nazi Germany, procla imed themselves independent on March 14, 1939.27 FOOTNOTES 1. Conversa tion with Dr. Josef Stasko, New York P ublic Library. 2. I. A. Karvas, Sjednoceni vyrobnic h podminek v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku, Prague: ORBIS, 1933, pp. 77-78. 3. Magyar statisztikai zsebkonyv, p. 32. 4. K. Golan and Assoc. in ceskoslovenske dejiny, Bratislava: Osveta, 1961, p. 255. 5. Statisticka rocenka, 1936, p. 53. 120 SLOVAKIA 6. K. Golan, op. cit., p. 256. 7. Ibid. , pp. 262-263. 8. G. Lazarcik, The Performance of Socialist Agriculture, New York: L.W. International Financial Research, Inc., 1963, p. 4. 9. P. W. Rosenstein-Rodan, Agricultural Surplus Population in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, (mimeo), London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, as cited by Lazarcik, The Performance ... op. cit., p . 4. 10. Computed on the basis of 1930 census data. 11. P . Turcan, op. cit., p. 73. 12. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, London: Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 131. 13. In the Czech regions where 96% of railways were publicly owned, the cost per ton-mile was 0.5354 Kcs; in the Slovak regions, with only 52%in public hands, the ton-mile cost 1.1218 Kcs. (I. A. Karvas, op. cit., pp. 83-84), although the publicly owned railways received a subsidy. 14. In the Czech regions the prime rate-charged on preferred industrial loans-fluctuated between five and eight percent. 15. A. Dobry in Pf-ehled hospodarskeho vyvoje, pp. 194-195. See also Deset let rozvoje , p. 13. 16. A. Dobry in Prehled hospodarskeho vyvoje, p. 195. 17. Ostredie slovenskeho priemyslu, Slovensky priemysel v.n. 1929, Yearly Report of the Central Slovak Industry, Bratislava-Turciansky Sv. Martin: K.U.S., 1930, pp. 28-29. 18. A. Dobry in Pf-ehled hospodaf-skeho vyvoje, p. 195. 19. I. A. Karvas, op. cit., p. 54. 20. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 21. Ibid. , p. 36. 22. Statisticka rocenka, 1936, p. 275. 23. K. Culen, Slovaci a cesi v statnych sluibach, Bratislava: Vedecky ustav, 1944, p. 70. 24. Ibid., pp. 97-99. 25. Deset let rozvoje, pp. 12-13. 26. K. Culen, Preco Slovaci nechcu ist' s cechmi, pp. 15-16 (mimeo), New York (no publishing date) . 27. J. Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovenska, Cleveland, Ohio: Slovensky ustav, 1958, pp. 62-70. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is interested primarily in promoting the welfare and security of the United States of America.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Economic Discrimination Against Slovakia Description An account of the resource Frank Bandor Slovakia, Vol. 18 (No. 41), 1968 pp. 109-120 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bandor, Frank Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1968 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c247e2c7570f7bf2de98c9cec570ebf9.pdf 3fdf69d96d085d8b8c30e45e7af4efc8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 35 A. R. NYKL: "EDVARD BENES ON MUNICH DAYS" The article "Edvard Benes on Munich Days" in the "Journal of Central European Affairs," (January, 1957 pp. 384-393), reveals that the author, Otokar Odlozilik, was not an eyewitness of the days between September 4 and 25, 1938, in Bohemia, and especially in the capital. "Rigid precepts of historical scholarship" cannot be applied to documents, even if the latter were bona fide and not doctored up post factum by captious commentaries. Both Edvard Benes and his mentor T. G. Masaryk were great hindsight wizards. It would be idle to cite proofs of this phenomenon here, because hundreds of quotations have appeared and are still appearing in the publications of the Slovak League of America. The diplomats mentioned in the article very wisely kept, and those who are living still keep, quiet which is, they perhaps believe, better than lying. In my opinion Frantisek Chvalkovsky, who with Ha.cha went through the terrible ordeal in Berlin before they finally signed their consent to Hitler's ultimatum of March 14, 1939, at 3 a. m., was the most reliable and honest person whose story might have cleared up many doubts, surmises, and suspicions. Krofta could unfortunately not go beyond the spring of 1938, when in May the first rumors of war began to spread. Henlein and his right hand man Frank were feverishly preparing the ground for autonomy and secession, by speeches and press campaigns, in which they constantly harped on Benes's doctoral thesis, published in 1907 at Dijon, wherein he advocated a complete separation of the German-speaking and the Czech-speaking regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. During the summer months Lord Runciman was sent to the Sudetenland by Chamberlain with the special mission to find the right solution by "fact finding." For the most part he was the guest of German nobility and paid no attention to the claims of the Czech "hranicari," inhabitants of the frontier regions. The Sudeten Germans knew perfectly well that he was �36 SLOVAKIA merely playing a comedy and facetiously spoke of him as Lord "Runzelmann." Because of my absolute command of the German tongue, and as an American visitor, I could engage in countless conversations with the natives of Karlovy Vary, where I was writing a book on Japan and curing my nervous stomach by drinking MUhlbrunn - "Mlynsky prame" - hot alkaline water. Among the Egerlander there reigned an atmosphere of calm optimism: to them the annexation of the Sudeten by the Third Reich was a foregone , conclusion. Some of them even hinted already at a further step - the Protectorate - anticipating March 14, 1939. Nervousness reigned only in the small Czech minority, which was being increasingly frightened by occasional "blackout" exercises and talk about air raid shelters. To me it was quite plain that the Germans were being supplied with oral propaganda, which they called Fllisterpropaganda, and were absolutely convinced that Runciman's antics were a subterfuge to hide a fait accompli: a perfect agreement of the English and French - the latter somewhat sheepishly and reluctantly - that the "phantom" republic should be trimmed to suit the Nazis and the Magyars, in connivance with Mr. Beck, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs whose contempt for Benes knew no bounds. This I knew from my trip through Poland in August, 1936, where Czechs were talked about as "lajdaci" (loafers). Goring was Beck's honored guest, Benes the "cackling pygmy." At Cracow, Moscicki was helping to raise the Pilsudski mound: was he likely to listen to Benes 's plea in 1938? In July 1935, I wrote an article for the "Narodni Listy," recommending a solid steel wall from the Carpathians to Gdynia with a friendly Polish nation, whom Benes and Masaryk, however, regarded as Fascists. Later I was told that the article was suppressed at Benes's orders, who bypassed the Poles and went to see Stalin about that time. It is evident that the ambassadors named in the Odlozilik article (Osusky, Masaryk, Mastny, Chvalkovsky, Hurban, Slavik) must have known the real state of affairs and �SLOVAKIA 37 therefore kept silent. With the help of German and Italian aviation the Nationalists in Spain were pushing the socalled "Loyalists" toward the Pyrenees, ·and Daladier was worried about the impending invasion of the defeated 300,000 "Reds" into southern France, while Charles Maurras in "EAction Francaise" was ridiculing the idea of a war "pour les Tcheques." In the Kurhaus or Lazensky Dum, I could read the "Daily Mail" and "Corriere della Sera." I recall distinctly a map in the former showing the distribution of the three and one-half million Sudeten-Germans along the frontier as reported by Lord Runciman - and an article by Mussolini stating that the artificial and unnatural "sausage" state in Central Europe should be dismembered in the same way as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been. Where is Odlozilik's "authentic description" of events by Benes? If Benes had a "unique knowledge of the situation," he would have had to admit that he knew full well in August that England and France were determined to back Hitler's claims. Krofta wisely kept silent in order not to implicate himself. The important documents sent abroad in the early days of October, 1938, most likely were destroyed, in order not to compromise the guilty parties. It would seem that the German and Italian military aviation was so formidable that the French and still less the British, aviation was no match for it at the time. Mr. Beck's clique in Poland was maliciously rejoicing at Benes's defeat. And Stalin, of course, was not going to help a dying man. My own estimate of the situation, on the basis of my observations and reading of the foreign press - English, French, Italian, Scandinavian, Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslav - was that there would be no war, because the sellout by England and F r ance was an obvious fait accompli. Hence I finished my manuscript and went by bus to Prague, in order to arrange with the publisher the printing of my book. For all eventualities I bought a second-class ticket to Praha-Merano, because my friends recommended to me the "Traubenkur" in Merano as the best thing for a nervous stomach. It consisted in eating plenty of ripe blue grapes and walking in the hills. Another friend - a phy- �38 SLOVAKIA sician - took a good look into my stomach, and finding nothing really serious, recommended that I should go to the Riesengebirge (Krkonose) to a place called Benecko and drink plenty of radioactive water. While the Sudeten-Germans were calm and smiling, awaiting their revanche, the Czech population was naturally feeling uneasy in the expectation of the great Hitler harangue at Nuremberg, listed for September 12. There was a tense atmosphere in Prague. The Communists were dreaming of a great Russian airborne army which would destroy Berlin and of making every town and hamlet in Bohemia a fortress like the "Loyalists" were doing in Spain who, by the way, were being painted as heroes in the Benes-controlled press. Only the "Narodni Listy," the organ of the Czech National Democrats, was favorable to Mussolini and to Franco. The journey on Sunday, September 4, through the fertile fields promising a good harvest, via Chlumec natl Cidlinou, where the peasants once were beaten by the noblemen ("vyhrajes jako sedlak v Chlumce"), north to the Krkonose, was calm and uneventful. After Trutnov-Trautenau, we began to enter the mixed Sudeten region. From what I could see and hear, the German agrarians had no sympathy with the Nazis at all, although in the last moment they joined the Henlein group so as to save themselves from reprisals and persecutions. This very step indicated that Henlein was certain of winning without war. Benecko proved to be a combined summer and winter resort. The summer guests were all gone, and I was the only guest at the hotel. In winter, the place changed into a ski resort. The owner was a sincere man, a great admirer of Kramar, and a great, scathing critic of Benes. The Germans had a nice new school building in the village, "Deutsche Volkschule." Hitler's ravings about the suffer- . ings of the Germans were the invention of his maniacal imagination. The hotel and its immediate neighborhood formed a Czech enclave in a region which further north was inhabited by Sudeten-Germans. From the far distance one could hear the noise of their Henlein meetings. But otherwise, �SLOVAKIA 39 perfect peace reigned in the pine forests and on the green meadows, where I spent most of my time walking between meals and drinking radioactive water. Within a few days my nervous stomach was restored to its normal functions. Sunday, the 11th of September, being a pleasantly warm, sunny day, I decided in the afternoon to walk to the summit of the wooded hill which I well remembered from my school days, reading about the sad departure of Czech Protestants in the years which followed the battle of the White Mountain, in 1620-1628. These emigres had to leave everything behind and seek refuge in the Protestant regions of Germany northeast of the Krkonose. Jan Amos Komensky, later bishop of the Moravian Brethren, was among them. On this hill, named Zaly, according to the legend, they were taking the last look of their native country, and were kissing the snow-covered ground goodbye in tears. Nevzali jsme se sebou nic, nic, po vsem veta jen Bibli Kralickou, Labyrint sveta. "We took nothing along, nothing, all is lost; only the Kraliky Bible, and the Labyrinth of the World." Reference is maqe to the Protestant version of the Bible made at Kraliky (German Grulich) on the Bohemian-Silesian frontier, and the well-known work of Comenius. These memories came to my mind as I slowly walked to the summit where I found a tourist restaurant and a lookout tower. The atmosphere was gloomy, very much in keeping with the name 2aly: the presentiment of grave events reminded me of what it must have been like in 1628 - three centuries ago. The sufferings of the Czech nation were of no concern to France, and still less to England. The large wooden structure of the hotel was silent, when I returned. For supper I had the last but one real Wiener Schnitzel in my memory - or shall I call it costoletta alla milanese? Or vidensky rizek? The owner of the hotel who knew very little German asked me whether I would listen to the radio the next day and tell him what Adolf was going to broadcast from Ntirnberg. Since I was not to be directly affected, I could sleep soundly and in the forenoon take another long walk in the pine woods. �40 SLOVAKIA The great speech was booked for about 2 p. m. sun time, since Germany had not adopted the foolish fad of daylight saving time. If I had my notes at hand, I could recall the situation with more precision, but since I was more intersted in "kava a buchty" (coffee and doughnuts) , my recollection is rather hazy at present. First of all, the reception was very weak and spoiled by frequent static due to thick thunder clouds hanging over the mountain range. Second, Hitler's speeches on the Sudeten question, the same as on the Klajpeda and Gdansk question, were a repetition of dramatically worded accusations of the same content : the Volksgenossen were being persecuted and mistreated, hence they were fleeing in constantly increasing numbers across the border: five thousand, ten thousand, fifty thousand; Long afterwards I saw in the contemporary lliustrierte Zeitung file pictures of these "refugees" being lovingly provided with food and clothing by their brethren in the Third Reich. There could be no doubt as to Adolf's purpose, namely, to convince France and England of the absolute justice of the Nazi position. "We do not ask except what is ours on the basis of selfdetermination - not one inch of a foreign territory. The Czechs will have theirs and we will have ours: after that we will have no further demands. " The next day at night we could hear the rumbling of a thunderstorm in the direction of Harrach's Glass Works at the frontier, but my host and his family were so frightened that they took it for the rumbling of heavy artillery. On Thursday, September 15, I decided that there was no use prolonging my stay and inviting another spell of stomach nervousness: after lunch I took the bus to the railway station and from there the train to Prague. Though there was no panic anywhere, the train was already filled with refugees: the wealthier and white-collared class. In Prague I returned to my hotel on Namesti Petra Osvoboditele (the Square of Peter, the Liberator) - formerly Komensky Square - in the Vinohrady district, where I paid 20 crowns for a single room, the equivalent of 70 cents. Excellent regular meals cost 10 crowns - 35 cents - and read all the Czech, German, French, and English �SLOYAKIA 41 newspapers while sipping excellent coffee. In one of the rooms they had a permanent guest - a frequently tipsy female of unpleasant appearance. She was one of the ten Communist deputies in the Parliament. Unfortunately for me, moratorium had been proclaimed with regard to withdrawals from bank accounts and I could only draw 5000 crowns at the Zivnobanka. One rapid transaction became imperative and unavoidable: I had to go to Karlovy Vary and have several trunks of my books shipped from there to Prague. The dream of staying in the pleasant spa and writing books vanished: where were the solemn promises of "enduring peace" after fighting "the war to end all wars" in 1919? On Friday afternoon I took the "rychlovlak" (express) and arrived at the Karlovy Vary station, which is located at some distance from the center of the town, in the evening. Detachments of Czech troops were already stationed round. No bus was operating. After showing my passport I was allowed to go to the town on foot and there I found another detachment of youthful-looking soldiers round some sort of war machinery, near Park Street. For reasons, which would take long to explain, I decided to go to one of the Kurgas1; rooming houses on Park Street. In situations of this kind one must act with lightning speed and complete calm. I was able to arrange with a shipper to forward my trunks to Prague next Monday, "express," at the fabulous cost of 2000 crowns. Saturday, Sunday, and Monday I spent eating the best food and spending as many crowns as I could, buying the best shirts, socks, a light overcoat, and other articles of clothing at Nastopil's on Alte Wiese. Why not, when I could buy the best shirts at 16 crowns (50 cents) which in America would cost five dollars? I still have two of those. When one sees an inevitable debacle in the offing one can easily adopt the philosophy of "you can't take it with you." While consuming an excellent chicken dinner for 25 crowns (70 cents) in the restaurant of the house "Schwedischer Hof," I was discussing the situation with the waiter, who happened to be a Pole, in Polish. He admired my remarkable calm and sound judgement, and made me the compliment "Pan jest okropny czlowiek." All the Germans I spoke with, showed smiling optimism. �42 SLOVAKIA On Monday evening, September 19th, I was in the "rychlovlak" Eger-Prague, in the company of two lieutenants of the Czechoslovak army, both Czechs less than 25 years of age, hence products of the MasarykBenes regime. There also was a captain of the frontier constabulary (strazmistr - cetnik), a former legionnaire, less than fifty years of age. The "porucici" (second lieutenants) were not exactly in a merry mood, but seemed to face the facts without whimpering and with a sort of grim humor. I knew nothing of what was going on in diplomatic circles, but I can repeat that all the Germans in Karlovy Vary, with whom I spoke about the future , were gloriously optimistic. They already knew that the Nazis would give them 1 mark for ten crowns instead of eight, yet seemed to be quite willing to take the loss. I recall one instance particularly, when I said: "Ich sehe Wolken am Horizont," and my interlocutor said: "Im Gegenthal, ich sehe alles rosig." This opinion was general. Now an expellee in Germany, my young friend may remember our conversation. If the scheme mentioned by Odlozilik on p. 387 ( "to avoid war") was worked out on September 18, "after the conference in London of French and British statesmen," it must have already been known throughout the Sudeten on September 19. And this was also the reason why I met the elderly cetnik on this train; he was leaving his post in Jachymov and was on his way to Slovakia, like the rest of Czech "cetnici" (gendarmes), because it was already known that the territory in which they were employed would be ceded to the Third Reich. This cetnik was very sad and spoke of his ruined existence, with a son in school, and with no future ahead of him. The two "porucici" stated to me emphatically what I later heard so much in Prague: "Uz je to ujednano a uz jsme prodani" (it's all settled and we are already sold out). And their comments on this "noble" action of France and England were rather scathing. Two days later in Prague the Czech legionnaires were in front of the French Legation discarding the medals which they had received from France in 1919. If Mr. Benes devotes a fairly long passage in his "Mnichovske dny" to �SLOVAKIA -13 an audience when "on Wednesday, September 21, in the small hours of that morning the British and French envoys requested it," to me it is quite clear that he is telling a story to cover up what already was a fait accompli. The people in the Sudeten knew that the matter had been settled, and the Czechs living there knew it also. To speak of collecting statements made by Benes and his critics and to "evaluate them in accordance with rigid precepts of historical scholarship" is as idle a talk as that about the authenticity of the Kensington stone and many other legends which need not be mentioned here. Furthermore I, as a personal witness, can say that the news of the sellout was already known in Prague that very evening, September 19, which in my memory is a terrible accusation of the treacherous action of British and French diplomats, not their respective nations. That evening, at about 10 o'clock, Prague was a city of stunned ghosts groping in the darkness under the impact of a deadly blow. I have seen through many situations when a family was suddenly stunned by a tragic blow, but here a whole ancient city with a glorious history, and a trusting people, had been stabbed in the back by those who professed to be their allies. The streets were almost deserted - deadly anguish was visible on all faces. Being a Czech, I fully felt their despair. They already visualized the return of the German conqueror to Praga caput regni, left at the mercy of a horde of fanaticists. The anguish was gripping the souls of the Czechs, together with a hatred of Masaryk and Benes, whose lies had brought the nation into this horrible plight. Only one who has once found himself at the brink of death could approximately realize that tragic, silent grief coupled with dread of an impending, yet inevitable peril. La nu.it porte conseil is a proverb fraught with a deep significance. The morning will· bring a solution. September 20 found the streets filled with milling crowds, hardly listening to the blaring loudspeakers. When passing by the barracks where young soldiers looked nonchalantly from the windows, a group of patriots would yell occasionally: �.J4 SLOVAKIA "Af z1Je armada!" (Long live the army). But there was no real enthusiasm - it seemed as if the soldiers knew that there was not to be any fighting. The anguish and terror of the previous night gave way to the real Czech calm fatalism, bred into the nation by centuries of hard knocks. Hemmed in, right in the heart of Europe, by hostile neighbors, the Czechs were always governed by one uppermost thought, namely, holding their own against terrible odds and in the end surviving their enemies. No one knew anything about what was going on in diplomatic circles, but all the intelligent people with whom I discussed the situation, unanimously and with a quiet, also typically Czech resignation, were saying: "Uz je to ujednano. Uz jsme prodani." In the evening I walked on the Vaclavske namesti (Wenceslaus Square) which was literally packed with people going to and fro without any passionate outbursts. Round the pedestal of Myslbek's famous St. Wenceslaus group, a solid mass of young Communists from Nusle was sitting with a defiant expression on their faces. "Co zde delate"? (What are you doing here?) I asked a group of young men and women. "My chceme bojovat a hajit svateho Vaclava." (We want to fight and to defend St. Wenceslaus). The streets were guarded by a special force of policemen with black helmets calm, young, determined men. I asked one of them: "Prosim vas, co ti mladi blazni zde delaji ?" (Pardon me, what are those young fools doing here?) His answer was typical of a Czech who has seen too many upheavals in his time to be surprised at anything. Just one word: "Para!" If a dictionary linguist would search in a number of volumes, in order to get the full meaning of this simple word, he might find such equivalents as "vapor, steam, fog, mist," but these would not give him the inner vibration. The nearest equivalent in American English would be : "Just generating so much worthless hot air!". The same milling of crowds and blaring of loudspeakers to which no one listened went on the two following days, namely, on Wednesday and Thursday, September 21 and 22. Whatever Mr. Benes says about his conferences and �SLOVAKIA 45 plans must be set aside as a legend and post factum invention to cover up the incontrovertible fact that the final decision had already been made in London on September 18; all these so-called conferences were a mere comedy to deceive the nation, which however, was not deceived at all. I listened to Mr. Benes's broadcast at 7 p. m., on Thursday, September 22. This was the second and last time I ever heard the sound of his voice and his halting way of reading from a typewritten text with his dark-rimmed glasses on his clumsy nose. The first time was on Sunday, September 19, 1937, at Masaryk's funeral. He was either unable or afraid to say anything powerful and sonorous ex-tempore. "Mluvil jako kdyz by to tahal z chlupate rukavice." (He talked as if he were pulling it out of a shaggy glove). Utterly insipid was the boast about having made a plan: "Mam plan pro vsechny pripady." (I have a plan for all eventualities). Then he also said, or rather read something in Slovak in such a poor way that Slovaks must have laughed at his pronunciation. Though the two languages are quite similar, it is extremely difficult for a Czech to speak Slovak with a Slovak intonation, just like a Spaniard is utterly unable to speak Portuguese with a Portuguese intonation. People laughed and repeated in the Prague dialect: "A Benes ma plan a usme prodany," i.e., uz jsme prodani: "Benes has a plan and we are already sold out." This reminded me of Paris and Pichegru. During the night the "civil defense" observers were frequently yelling: "Zhasnout svetla !" (lights out), in order to have a complete blackout. It was utterly amusing - almost as amusing as were the blackouts in Cambridge, Mass., in 1943 - because no sane person could have expected an air attack, which would have killed not only the Czechs, but the VolksgenossE)n as well. Nevertheless, on Friday the 23rd, people were being scared into buying gas masks, and I saw a long line on Betlemske namesti (Bethlehem Square) near the chapel where Hus used to preach in 1400 A.D., waiting to get a gas mask for 150 crowns! However, their number was insignificant in comparison with the whole population. �46 SLOVAKIA The librarian of the Naprstek Museum was to take care of my books, because I planned to leave by the express to Vienna on Saturday afternoon. I visited a few friends at the Orientalni Ustav. In the evening, when walking on Jecna ulice near Karlovo namesti (Charles Square), I met my great friend, the late professor Bedrich Hrozny, who was very calm; he knew as I did that there would be no war and no bombing, because to challenge the German Air Force would have meant useless suicide. He never mentioned anything about Benes's "plan." My publisher, the printer, my physician, repeated colloquially the same refrain "uz jsme prodany." The legionnaires, as I said before, were discarding their French medals in front of the legation. But there was no panic, no passionate outbursts. We are told that general mobilization was promulgated at 10 p. m. that evening. In view of the situation it was an amusing comedy of which I saw a part on Saturday and Sunday. What Benes says is a novelesque invention, calculated to mislead posterity into the belief of his great powers as a thinker: this method he copied from his master and from the French historians who dramatized the German retreat on September 6, 1914, into a great victory on the Marne. The night for me was indeed hectic: All of a sudden bed bugs appeared from nowhere, and the night clerk had to give me another mattress; the night was completely dark, except for an isolated little light that appeared in an attic, and some "civil defense" fool was constantly and uselessly yelling somewhere on the roof "Zhasnete svetlo" (Put out the light) ! When Mr. Benes writes, and the author of the article (Odlozilik) muses on a supposed tenseness in Prague that night, they are telling a story. The tenseness existed only on Monday evening, September 19th: after that the people were fully aware of the great comedy "uz jsme prodani." Friday noon I had my last "pecena husa s knedliky a zelim" (roast goose with dumplings and kraut) in the P. R. D. - Prazsky representacni dfun) - with the usual first class waiter service in coat tails, with Pilsen beer for 35 crowns, about one dollar. At �S LOVAKIA 47 that time we had no inkling of the "vseobecna mobilisace" (general mobilization) being thought of or planned by the great Edvard. As I perfectly recall it, the people as a whole were resigned to see the occupation of the Sudeten as a fait accompli since September 18th. On Saturday morning, when I came down to the cafe, I saw myself in a queer predicament. General mobilization was in progress and, as a consequence, there were no taxis, and even the street cars did not seem to function. Suddenly I saw a familiar face coming into the parlor: Vojta Benes - whom I knew so well since the time he made fiery speeches against Austria, in 1916-1918, in America - then lived like a satrap in a beautiful villa in Jevany as a great Socialist Minister of Education, who fought the Roman Catholic Church, while his brother was a matriculated "paper" Catholic. He was surrounded by a number of friends and they were talking about going abroad. I had to take my two hand bags and walk all the way to the Masaryk - former Franz Josef - station using the trusty power of my arm muscles. The streets were swarming with silent reservists on their way to the railroad stations, each carrying a small hand bag. There was no military preparedness among them: they looked more like excursionists. The whole station was likewise swarming with men between thirty and fifty years of age. Toward noon it became somewhat warm, and these masses of men were quenching their thirst with steins of beer, laughing and joking. The "rychlovlak" Berlin-Vienna was to arrive at about 2 p. m., and was to be the last train leaving the country in that direction. My only concern were my books. At about 1:30 p. m., I telephoned to the shipping agency and was told that my books had arrived in good order and were to be delivered the next week at their destination. The express did not arrive on time and there was an hourly announcement of its being late. If the Czecho-Slovak generals were wondering why the Luftwaffe did not bomb Ceska Trebova - Bohumin, on September 23rd, they must have been completely misled by Benes's comedy. The Luftwaffe knew full well that the occupation of the Sudeten was a fait accompli. The �48 SLOVAKIA whole inside of the station, with thousands of reservists drinking beer, eating frankfurters, and joking, bespoke a total confidence that there would be no war, no air raid, no shooting. The express finally arrived at about six p. m. I had a second class ticket, but found at once that this meant nothing, because all the compartments were being taken by reservists; all seats were occupied and the gangways were likewise filled. In a second class compartment I found two foreigners, a South African of Jewish origin and a young German dancing girl from Budapest. The express soon started on its way in the twilight through the central part of Bohemia, via Kolin and Pardubice to Ceska Trebova. In the fields and meadows the peasants were still working and were waving "Na zdaaar!" (Success!) to the occupants of the train - the defenders of the fatherland on their way to the frontier. As I think of it now, I cannot refrain from shedding tears at recalling how these simple folks were being deceived and sold down the river by England and France as if they were an African Zulu tribe or Gurkhas of India, or Bambaras. These were my people: here I was born, here I grew up, and I knew the simple soul and the good heart of these country people who foolishly trusted Masaryk and Benes. Now I recall that on Friday voices were heard: "Povesit Benese na brane hradu" (Hang Benes on the castle gate). And if, on Monday, General Syrovy urged Benes to leave Prague, it was not because of any fear of the Luftwaffe, but because of the wrath of the people. One of the tricks of the general mobilization was to send the German reservists to Slovakia and the Slovaks to the Sudeten regions. Standing in the gangway, while the express was speeding forward to Ceska Trebova without intermediate stops, I listened to the story of a young German reservist. He seemed to be quite loyal to the Republic and no Nazi enthusiast, but he explained to me the situation which faced all non-Czechs, namely, that of obtaining positions to make a living. The Germans could never hope to become as perfect in Czech as the Czechs and, therefore, where a �SLOVAKIA 49 perfect knowledge of Czech was required, they never could obtain the most advantageous job. Many of the young Sudeten Germans were trying to obtain work in the Third Reich. This was really the primary determining factor of the defection of the Germans, Magyars and Slovaks. Remedy? Either birth control or emigration. The young dancer was quite optimistic: "That whole thing will be settled in two weeks. I am now going to Budapest, and then I will come back to Prague." I had to stand all the way to Brno. There most of the crowd dispersed. From Brno we were to continue to Breclava-Lundenburg, and then on to Vienna. At Breclava we were told that the frontier was closed. We could go to Bratislava if we so wished. The South African found in me a willing cicerone. We had to pay additional fare of some 20 crowns. We arrived in Bratislava about midnight. The station was literally swarming with reservists, each with his little bag, moving to and fro like a mob without any organization. When an elderly man with a small baggage cart came along, in the scanty light, I engaged him to take my two bags and the South African's baggage to the nearest hotel opposite the station. When we arrived there the night clerk told us that all rooms were occupied by Czecho-Slovak army officers. He presumed that all the hotels in the city had been similarly taken over as a mobilization measure, but he volunteered to telephone to Hotel Carlton and find out what the situation was. We were lucky: there were still two single rooms available at 20 crowns (75 cents) with "raiiajky" (breakfast). Carlton Hotel was to send a taxi to bring us downtown which was quite a distance from the station. It was about one a. m., and the city, scantily lighted, was remarkably quiet: one would not have suspected at all that the station was swarming with reservists speeding to their destination, to the frontier. The hotel proved to be quite modern and well appointed. In the morning, when at about 9 a. m. - it was Sunday, September 25th - I came down to have my breakfast, I saw the South African leaving in a great hurry in a taxi. He said he had a visa for Hungary and had tOI �50 SLOVAKIA make haste to reach the frontier before it might be closed. The hotel personnel could not give me any information as to what the situation was on the Austrian frontier. Since March, Austria was a part of the Third Reich. Consequently, I had to set out in an adventurous quest of information by taking the electric tramway to Petrzalka and then walk along the highway to where the frontier could be distinguished by curious quonsset-like structures. Detachments of soldiers were distributed along the road. They were all Magyars and not perturbed in the least: certainly not like troops expecting a sudden attack from anywhere. It was about eleven a. m. and fairly warm, the sun was brightly shining. When I came to a quonsset and asked where I could cross the frontier, I was waved back and asked to try the other quonsset about half a mile further to the right. There I was told that the queer structures were "military objects" or a part of a chain of fortifications. The Czecho-Slovak Magyar soldiers seemed to be quite amused at my confusion seeing me going up and down across fields, but, even though it was quite obvious that I was a foreigner, no one stopped me to ask for identification papers. Finally I emerged from the fields on another main highway which seemed to lose itself among tall poplar trees in the distance. It was about one p. m. The whole countryside was completely deserted. Suddenly I espied a hatless young man walking toward me from the Austrian frontier; he proved to be a German from Vienna who had to escape from the police - he said - because he was a Socialist and not friendly to the Nazis. He hoped to be able to reach Reichenberg (Liberec) in Bohemia where he had friends. This certainly was a lucky encounter. First of all, he told me that the frontier was open, though barricaded on the Slovak side, and that the tramway to Vienna was functioning. Furthermore, he had about 8 marks and needed Czecho-Slovak crowns. I had only 5 marks and about 200 crowns left. I offered to ·buy his marks at 8 crowns. We walked to a restaurant on the right bank of the Danube, opposite the Stefanik monument, and had a good lunch of roast pork, dumplings, and sauerkraut at 10 crowns each, �SLOVAKIA 51 and some beer. After I paid the bill, we crossed the river on a ferry to the monument. It was a beautiful Sunday afternoon and everything was perfectly calm. I returned to the hotel and told the young man to meet me at 3 p. m., when I expected to be ready to leave by taxi for the frontier: the chauffeur asked double fare, because it was Sunday, namely, 66 crowns. The fugitive came to the hotel punctually at 3 p. m. I gave him 60 crowns for his eight marks and he gave me an envelope with a key which he said was from his room in Vienna: all I had to do was to drop it in a post office box after reaching Vienna. We parted. I paid my bill at the hotel, and the taxi took less than half an hour to reach the Austrian frontier. The Czech custom officers at the barricade let me go through after looking at my passport; then I had to carry my two bags to the German Customs quite a ways off. The commanding officer was a Prussian from Berlin; he was supposed to wean the Austrians from their Gemlitlickeit and make them fast and efficient. Occasionally, an airplane lazily crossed the horizon. Not a sign of any soldiers or prepartions for warlike movements. The Berliner looked at my passport, did not even ask me to open my bags. All he wanted to know was what was going on in Bratislava. "General mobilization," I said. He wanted to know whether I had noticed the numbers of the regiments. "I noticed nothing; all I wanted to do was to cross the frontier and go to Vienna by the electric tramway." "Danke, mein Herr," he said very politely, "die elektrische Bahn geht um ungefiihr flinf Uhr ab." I took my bags to a sort of an open waiting room where I found other passengers waiting: Austrians who had the appearance of excursionists, curious about what was going on. During the two-hour wait, which was rather tedious, I noticed another plane lazily patroling the sky. In comparison with the swarming crowds of reservists I had seen on the night previous, this Austrian countryside looked like a calm picnic park. We left toward six p. m. and in all the stations Sunday excursionists were boarding the train. My interrupted ticket to Merano was valid. At about 8 p. m. we were in Vienna. One solitary airplane was circling �52 SLOVAKIA about the city. I took the streetcar to the Slidbahnhof and went to a hotel which I knew from my previous trips. The rooms which formerly cost 6 shillings now cost 6 marks: the clerk told me on the sly that the liberation and incorporation in the Great Fatherland had been a rather costly affair for the gemlitliche Austrians. In the morning, before boarding the train for San Candido (formerly Innichen) in the Dolomites - formerly a part of the Austrian Tyrol - I dropped the envelope containing the key in the post office box. Then the train transported me from a congested military atmosphere into the old time freedom which my soul always craved ever since I left Austria-Hungary in 1903. In many ways it was a memorable day for me this Monday, September 26th. In the soft beams of the morning sun I could see old Vienna for the last time in its stiU gemtitlich aspect - this Vindobona, where Marcus Aurelius jotted down his thoughts in Greek, the Imperial city, saved in 1683 from the Turkish hordes of Kara Mustafa by Czech defenders and Jan Sobieski's Polish army, and the merry center of West-Eastern melodies of Mozart and the Lustige Witwe in 1909, with the rumblings of the first world war in the distance. The city of many races and languages and strange love habits which a Moravian Jewish medic mistook for something universal. Before leaving the hotel at Bratislava on the foregoing Sunday afternoon, I could read my last feuilleton in the Narodni Listy, in which I pleaded for keeping Karlovy Vary free from all political strife and agitation. As the train was speeding through the Austrian and later Styrian country side, I mused over my recollections. The parade in Prague on the first of May, 1934, when at the very end of a long defile of Workers Socialist organizations I was looking, on the corner of Jecna ulice and Karlovo namesti, at the small motley group of Communists guarded by two policemen. They stopped right in front of my vantage point, because the defile had to stop marching somewhere on Vodickova ulice. There must have been a silent mockery in my look which provoked one of the Commies to step forward and come near me with a some- �SLOVAKIA 53 what menacing look. But he had to moderate himself in the policeman's presence. " Co se tak posmesne usmivate ?" (What are you smiling so scoffingly) he asked with a Podskalak accent mixed with Jewish intonation. "Coz kdybych vam tak jednu lajsknul ?" (Suppose I smack you one?) he went on and added: "No jste starej clovek .. .. " (But you are an old man). This was rather ludricous fanfarronade, but indicated how daring a Commie could be at the time, knowing that old Masaryk needed the ten Communist votes in the Parliament for his reelection which was to take place on May 24th. I asked the little Jew what he was so angry about - and he said: "If you had six kids at home and not much to eat ... " and I said - "Why have six kids?" The policeman motioned to him to join his group - about fifty in all - and the defile resumed its march. Who could have dreamt then that this little group of riffraff would one day rule Bohemia? And I recalled October, 1934, when I saw between six and ten thousand German Socialists march along the main street of Karlovy Vary, Vfidelni ulice, with their red flags, boldly sticking out their clenched fists and shouting "Freiheit!" The Czech state police protected their march, a very provocative gesture in a 100 percent rightist, bourgeois city. I asked the policeman: "Proc je zde nechali pochodovat ?" (Why did they let them march here?) - "Protoze jsou statotvorna strana" (because they are a regular political party in the State). This was perhaps intended to discourage the Germans in Karlovy Vary from becoming partisans of Konrad Henlein, Hitler's agent. But the Sudeten Germans had only three choices: Caor as they called it tholic, Socialist or Nationalist "schwarz, Sozi oder Nazi," and this was the reason why a large number voted Nazi without being exactly admirers of Adolf Hitler. To me this Socialist defile was a surprise I had seen the same type of people march in Madrid on May first the year before with clenched fists and shouting: "U Ache Pe" - which stood for "Unios Hermanos Proletarios" or "Proletarians of all lands unite!" And three weeks later after the Socialist march in Karlovy Vary, I happened to be in Munich on the Parteitag, November 8th, �54 SLOVAKIA when that great Catholic city was flooded with huge red flags with the Swastika or Hakenkreuz. On the 9th I was told that university professors had to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler: "Wie werden auf Hitler vereidigt!" After the vote on January 13, 1935, when I was in Rome, France let Hitler occupy the Saar; in March, France and England allowed Hitler to rearm and no energetic steps were taken against the projected invasion of Ethiopia which started on October 3rd. On February 16, 1936, I saw the elections in Spain in Granada. I saw how the socalled Republican government did not stop violent acts against the Rightists, and I left for France at the end of May when I saw that a conflict was imminent. It actually started on July 18th when Berlin was beflagged on the occasion of Olympic games. Paris blamed London quite rightly, but had no courage to act independently And I especially thought of that evening at WUrzburg on May 25, 1935, when I had to sit out the whole radio address by Adolf Hitler about the immense danger which an unarmed Germany was exposed to in view of the Bolshevik menace. Hitler was enumerating the warships which Germany had to sink in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles and emphasized her present helplessness to face the great menace from the East. In view of the mighty Republic of Poland and the Little Entente no such danger existed. One phrase I remember well with all the inner vibration of Hitler's voice: "Wir Nazionalsozialisten sind fanatische Gegner des Bolschewismus: zwischen uns und den Bolschewiken kann nie eine Freundschaft bestehen." (We National Socialists are fanatical opponents of Bolshevism: there can never be friendship between us and the Bolsheviks). The hotel guests had to stand up and sing Horst Wessel Lied - I alone remained seated, no one said a word of protest. They knew I was a foreigner and had nothing to do with their national problems. The next day I was discussing the situation with young Germans. _Not only did they not oppose the rearming of Germany, but strangely enough they had the same argument which I have heard the militarists advance everywhere in the world: "Der Militardienst macht einen Kerl �SLOVAKIA 55 aus Einem." (Military service makes a man out of a boy). In Berlin I saw everywhere defiant posters with the legend: "Die feinen Flugmaschinen, die unserm Flihrer dienen." (Fine airplanes that serve our Flihrer) . And trainloads of huge logs were coming to Germany from Carpatho-Russian forests furnishing wood for the airplanes. Could not the English and French diplomats and military attaches see all this? There still was time for a concerted action to stop the Hitler-Goring madness. In Erlangen - Bavaria - the people were expecting the CzechoSlovak army to march in at any rrioment in accordance with the Versailles Treaty. But nothing happened, because the British opposed strong action in order not to spoil good business. And now I saw my native land sacrificed by Western diplomacy, so the brilliant embassy parties and dances and cocktail drinking could go on undisturbed in Paris and London. And what was true of the Bohemian Crown lands was mutatis mutandis true of Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia. Recollections! The train arrived at Klagenfurt, via Graz and Zidani Most, the territory of germanized Slovenes. I was the only foreigner on board, and when we crossed into the Italian territory I was the only passenger from the frontier to San Candido. When we were somewhere between Klagenfurt and the frontier on the Austrian territory, the conductors would quickly sprint inside the station to listen to the radio which between eight and nine in the evening was blaring Hitler's violent attack on Benes at the Sportpalast. Only once was I sufficiently interested to get off and listen to the shrill tones of Hitler's voice familiar to me since the two and one-half hour speech at Wlirzburg three years before. At Benecko it was dampened by static. By chance I caught exactly the passage when Adolf was roaring in his best form, as if he were challenging Edward to a duel: "Hier stehe ich, dort steht Herr Benesch" (here I stand and there stands Benes) and the rest I do not remember because I had to board the train again. At Innichen - San Candido I found myself in the old Austrian atmosphere of my youth. The hotel was an old �56 SLOVAKIA fashioned Tyrolese inn with large and quiet rooms, without any running water, but a huge comfortable bed. Though it was very late - after eleven p. m. - a good Tyrolese housewife made a Wiener Schnitzel for me which was even better than the one I had eaten at Benecko. I slept wonderfully well and in the morning could admire the splendid sight of the Dolomiten without the slightest thought of war. From there I went to Merano and followed the Traubenkur a whole month while the Munich comedy was being played by Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini, who in the end got the most credit in the Corriere della Sera for having saved the peace. Merano was filled with all types of strange refugees, male and female, of the Milena characteristics which might have interested a Kraft-Ebbing. It is to be deplored that many university professors in Europe and America are muckracking in this sort of "literature." In view of the factual observations of an eyewitness possessing a perfect knowledge of Czech, German, Slovak, Polish, Russian, French, English and Italian - namely the languages involved in the great sellout - the idle musings and speculations both of Benes and the reviewer (Odlozilik) of Mnichovske dny, fade into the realm of Hollywood make-believe of Cecil de Mille's Ten Commandments. The general mobilization did not electrify the people at all, but was a huge comedy smacking to some extent of the good soldier Svejk. The reservists drank beer, ate frankfurters, joked, and knew that the whole thing was a picnic. Those of the Sudeten Germans among them, who knew Czech well, acted as Henlein's spies. The chain of fortifi~ations on which Benes spent over a billion crowns was just as useless as the French Maginot line proved to be later. Nothing could have stopped the Nazi tanks and the Czech regions could have been reduced to ashes by the Luftwaffe which had reportedly 15,000 planes, or ten times more than the reputed Czech air force. The 800,000 reservists were merely a mob compared to the disciplined nazi war machine. All this can be clearly seen from the illustrations showing Adolf "the savior" at the head of his Panzers on the Theaterplatz in Karlovy Vary, speaking to the enthusiastic crowds on October 15th. There is only one "author" whose methods resemble �SLOVAKIA 57 those of Benes, namely Harry Truman, when it comes to complete distortion of facts. However, the Czech people of today, just like the American people of today, will not be easily persuaded to believe fairy tales. • • • MARTIN RAZUS (1883-1937) JOSEPH A. MIKUS The era, which opened for the Slovak nation in 1918, marks a rapid advance in the direction of the realization of its political aspirations. This is indubitably connected with the fall of feudalism and with the over-all extension of the significance of national individualities as political realities in Central Europe. To these external factors there are added also internal forces. And here, from among the many personalities which contributed handsomely to the spiritual and political crystallization of conditions in Slovakia, it behooves us today to recall one name: Martin Razus. While Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest, was becoming the leading figure of the political movement for Slovak autonomy for rather social reasons, in the meantime his contemporary and friend, Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister, poet and writer, was emerging as a defender of the political individuality of the Slovak nation for cultural and psychological reasons. In another respect, while Andrew Hlinka, as a man of action, engages in the fight against the leftist, religious, moral and political relativism of Masaryk's school and is drawn into the violent whirlpool of national activity, thus becoming top guard of national awareness, in the meantime, Martin Razus, with fire in his soul and the laurel of a man of letters on his head, devotes himself, according to his nature, rather to the spiritual processes of the national development of the Slovaks. With his ear close to the bosom of the nation, he catches the spiritual vibrations of the people in order to present them in his work a bit later to the public whom he chose to serve. It was thus that Razus became the "conscience of the nation." Even though the motives of Hlinka and Razus for po- � SLOVAKIA 35 A. R. NYKL: "EDVARD BENES ON MUNICH DAYS" The article "Edvard Benes on Munich Days" in the "Journal of Central European Affairs," (January, 1957 pp. 384-393), reveals that the author, Otokar Odlozilik, was not an eyewitness of the days between September 4 and 25, 1938, in Bohemia, and especially in the capital. "Rigid precepts of historical scholarship" cannot be applied to documents, even if the latter were bona fide and not doctored up post factum by captious commentaries. Both Edvard Benes and his mentor T. G. Masaryk were great hindsight wizards. It would be idle to cite proofs of this phenomenon here, because hundreds of quotations have appeared and are still appearing in the publications of the Slovak League of America. The diplomats mentioned in the article very wisely kept, and those who are living still keep, quiet which is, they perhaps believe, better than lying. In my opinion Frantisek Chvalkovsky, who with Ha.cha went through the terrible ordeal in Berlin before they finally signed their consent to Hitler's ultimatum of March 14, 1939, at 3 a. m., was the most reliable and honest person whose story might have cleared up many doubts, surmises, and suspicions. Krofta could unfortunately not go beyond the spring of 1938, when in May the first rumors of war began to spread. Henlein and his right hand man Frank were feverishly preparing the ground for autonomy and secession, by speeches and press campaigns, in which they constantly harped on Benes's doctoral thesis, published in 1907 at Dijon, wherein he advocated a complete separation of the German-speaking and the Czech-speaking regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. During the summer months Lord Runciman was sent to the Sudetenland by Chamberlain with the special mission to find the right solution by "fact finding." For the most part he was the guest of German nobility and paid no attention to the claims of the Czech "hranicari," inhabitants of the frontier regions. The Sudeten Germans knew perfectly well that he was �36 SLOVAKIA merely playing a comedy and facetiously spoke of him as Lord "Runzelmann." Because of my absolute command of the German tongue, and as an American visitor, I could engage in countless conversations with the natives of Karlovy Vary, where I was writing a book on Japan and curing my nervous stomach by drinking MUhlbrunn - "Mlynsky prame" - hot alkaline water. Among the Egerlander there reigned an atmosphere of calm optimism: to them the annexation of the Sudeten by the Third Reich was a foregone , conclusion. Some of them even hinted already at a further step - the Protectorate - anticipating March 14, 1939. Nervousness reigned only in the small Czech minority, which was being increasingly frightened by occasional "blackout" exercises and talk about air raid shelters. To me it was quite plain that the Germans were being supplied with oral propaganda, which they called Fllisterpropaganda, and were absolutely convinced that Runciman's antics were a subterfuge to hide a fait accompli: a perfect agreement of the English and French - the latter somewhat sheepishly and reluctantly - that the "phantom" republic should be trimmed to suit the Nazis and the Magyars, in connivance with Mr. Beck, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs whose contempt for Benes knew no bounds. This I knew from my trip through Poland in August, 1936, where Czechs were talked about as "lajdaci" (loafers). Goring was Beck's honored guest, Benes the "cackling pygmy." At Cracow, Moscicki was helping to raise the Pilsudski mound: was he likely to listen to Benes 's plea in 1938? In July 1935, I wrote an article for the "Narodni Listy," recommending a solid steel wall from the Carpathians to Gdynia with a friendly Polish nation, whom Benes and Masaryk, however, regarded as Fascists. Later I was told that the article was suppressed at Benes's orders, who bypassed the Poles and went to see Stalin about that time. It is evident that the ambassadors named in the Odlozilik article (Osusky, Masaryk, Mastny, Chvalkovsky, Hurban, Slavik) must have known the real state of affairs and �SLOVAKIA 37 therefore kept silent. With the help of German and Italian aviation the Nationalists in Spain were pushing the socalled "Loyalists" toward the Pyrenees, ·and Daladier was worried about the impending invasion of the defeated 300,000 "Reds" into southern France, while Charles Maurras in "EAction Francaise" was ridiculing the idea of a war "pour les Tcheques." In the Kurhaus or Lazensky Dum, I could read the "Daily Mail" and "Corriere della Sera." I recall distinctly a map in the former showing the distribution of the three and one-half million Sudeten-Germans along the frontier as reported by Lord Runciman - and an article by Mussolini stating that the artificial and unnatural "sausage" state in Central Europe should be dismembered in the same way as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been. Where is Odlozilik's "authentic description" of events by Benes? If Benes had a "unique knowledge of the situation," he would have had to admit that he knew full well in August that England and France were determined to back Hitler's claims. Krofta wisely kept silent in order not to implicate himself. The important documents sent abroad in the early days of October, 1938, most likely were destroyed, in order not to compromise the guilty parties. It would seem that the German and Italian military aviation was so formidable that the French and still less the British, aviation was no match for it at the time. Mr. Beck's clique in Poland was maliciously rejoicing at Benes's defeat. And Stalin, of course, was not going to help a dying man. My own estimate of the situation, on the basis of my observations and reading of the foreign press - English, French, Italian, Scandinavian, Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslav - was that there would be no war, because the sellout by England and F r ance was an obvious fait accompli. Hence I finished my manuscript and went by bus to Prague, in order to arrange with the publisher the printing of my book. For all eventualities I bought a second-class ticket to Praha-Merano, because my friends recommended to me the "Traubenkur" in Merano as the best thing for a nervous stomach. It consisted in eating plenty of ripe blue grapes and walking in the hills. Another friend - a phy- �38 SLOVAKIA sician - took a good look into my stomach, and finding nothing really serious, recommended that I should go to the Riesengebirge (Krkonose) to a place called Benecko and drink plenty of radioactive water. While the Sudeten-Germans were calm and smiling, awaiting their revanche, the Czech population was naturally feeling uneasy in the expectation of the great Hitler harangue at Nuremberg, listed for September 12. There was a tense atmosphere in Prague. The Communists were dreaming of a great Russian airborne army which would destroy Berlin and of making every town and hamlet in Bohemia a fortress like the "Loyalists" were doing in Spain who, by the way, were being painted as heroes in the Benes-controlled press. Only the "Narodni Listy," the organ of the Czech National Democrats, was favorable to Mussolini and to Franco. The journey on Sunday, September 4, through the fertile fields promising a good harvest, via Chlumec natl Cidlinou, where the peasants once were beaten by the noblemen ("vyhrajes jako sedlak v Chlumce"), north to the Krkonose, was calm and uneventful. After Trutnov-Trautenau, we began to enter the mixed Sudeten region. From what I could see and hear, the German agrarians had no sympathy with the Nazis at all, although in the last moment they joined the Henlein group so as to save themselves from reprisals and persecutions. This very step indicated that Henlein was certain of winning without war. Benecko proved to be a combined summer and winter resort. The summer guests were all gone, and I was the only guest at the hotel. In winter, the place changed into a ski resort. The owner was a sincere man, a great admirer of Kramar, and a great, scathing critic of Benes. The Germans had a nice new school building in the village, "Deutsche Volkschule." Hitler's ravings about the suffer- . ings of the Germans were the invention of his maniacal imagination. The hotel and its immediate neighborhood formed a Czech enclave in a region which further north was inhabited by Sudeten-Germans. From the far distance one could hear the noise of their Henlein meetings. But otherwise, �SLOVAKIA 39 perfect peace reigned in the pine forests and on the green meadows, where I spent most of my time walking between meals and drinking radioactive water. Within a few days my nervous stomach was restored to its normal functions. Sunday, the 11th of September, being a pleasantly warm, sunny day, I decided in the afternoon to walk to the summit of the wooded hill which I well remembered from my school days, reading about the sad departure of Czech Protestants in the years which followed the battle of the White Mountain, in 1620-1628. These emigres had to leave everything behind and seek refuge in the Protestant regions of Germany northeast of the Krkonose. Jan Amos Komensky, later bishop of the Moravian Brethren, was among them. On this hill, named Zaly, according to the legend, they were taking the last look of their native country, and were kissing the snow-covered ground goodbye in tears. Nevzali jsme se sebou nic, nic, po vsem veta jen Bibli Kralickou, Labyrint sveta. "We took nothing along, nothing, all is lost; only the Kraliky Bible, and the Labyrinth of the World." Reference is maqe to the Protestant version of the Bible made at Kraliky (German Grulich) on the Bohemian-Silesian frontier, and the well-known work of Comenius. These memories came to my mind as I slowly walked to the summit where I found a tourist restaurant and a lookout tower. The atmosphere was gloomy, very much in keeping with the name 2aly: the presentiment of grave events reminded me of what it must have been like in 1628 - three centuries ago. The sufferings of the Czech nation were of no concern to France, and still less to England. The large wooden structure of the hotel was silent, when I returned. For supper I had the last but one real Wiener Schnitzel in my memory - or shall I call it costoletta alla milanese? Or vidensky rizek? The owner of the hotel who knew very little German asked me whether I would listen to the radio the next day and tell him what Adolf was going to broadcast from Ntirnberg. Since I was not to be directly affected, I could sleep soundly and in the forenoon take another long walk in the pine woods. �40 SLOVAKIA The great speech was booked for about 2 p. m. sun time, since Germany had not adopted the foolish fad of daylight saving time. If I had my notes at hand, I could recall the situation with more precision, but since I was more intersted in "kava a buchty" (coffee and doughnuts) , my recollection is rather hazy at present. First of all, the reception was very weak and spoiled by frequent static due to thick thunder clouds hanging over the mountain range. Second, Hitler's speeches on the Sudeten question, the same as on the Klajpeda and Gdansk question, were a repetition of dramatically worded accusations of the same content : the Volksgenossen were being persecuted and mistreated, hence they were fleeing in constantly increasing numbers across the border: five thousand, ten thousand, fifty thousand; Long afterwards I saw in the contemporary lliustrierte Zeitung file pictures of these "refugees" being lovingly provided with food and clothing by their brethren in the Third Reich. There could be no doubt as to Adolf's purpose, namely, to convince France and England of the absolute justice of the Nazi position. "We do not ask except what is ours on the basis of selfdetermination - not one inch of a foreign territory. The Czechs will have theirs and we will have ours: after that we will have no further demands. " The next day at night we could hear the rumbling of a thunderstorm in the direction of Harrach's Glass Works at the frontier, but my host and his family were so frightened that they took it for the rumbling of heavy artillery. On Thursday, September 15, I decided that there was no use prolonging my stay and inviting another spell of stomach nervousness: after lunch I took the bus to the railway station and from there the train to Prague. Though there was no panic anywhere, the train was already filled with refugees: the wealthier and white-collared class. In Prague I returned to my hotel on Namesti Petra Osvoboditele (the Square of Peter, the Liberator) - formerly Komensky Square - in the Vinohrady district, where I paid 20 crowns for a single room, the equivalent of 70 cents. Excellent regular meals cost 10 crowns - 35 cents - and read all the Czech, German, French, and English �SLOYAKIA 41 newspapers while sipping excellent coffee. In one of the rooms they had a permanent guest - a frequently tipsy female of unpleasant appearance. She was one of the ten Communist deputies in the Parliament. Unfortunately for me, moratorium had been proclaimed with regard to withdrawals from bank accounts and I could only draw 5000 crowns at the Zivnobanka. One rapid transaction became imperative and unavoidable: I had to go to Karlovy Vary and have several trunks of my books shipped from there to Prague. The dream of staying in the pleasant spa and writing books vanished: where were the solemn promises of "enduring peace" after fighting "the war to end all wars" in 1919? On Friday afternoon I took the "rychlovlak" (express) and arrived at the Karlovy Vary station, which is located at some distance from the center of the town, in the evening. Detachments of Czech troops were already stationed round. No bus was operating. After showing my passport I was allowed to go to the town on foot and there I found another detachment of youthful-looking soldiers round some sort of war machinery, near Park Street. For reasons, which would take long to explain, I decided to go to one of the Kurgas1; rooming houses on Park Street. In situations of this kind one must act with lightning speed and complete calm. I was able to arrange with a shipper to forward my trunks to Prague next Monday, "express," at the fabulous cost of 2000 crowns. Saturday, Sunday, and Monday I spent eating the best food and spending as many crowns as I could, buying the best shirts, socks, a light overcoat, and other articles of clothing at Nastopil's on Alte Wiese. Why not, when I could buy the best shirts at 16 crowns (50 cents) which in America would cost five dollars? I still have two of those. When one sees an inevitable debacle in the offing one can easily adopt the philosophy of "you can't take it with you." While consuming an excellent chicken dinner for 25 crowns (70 cents) in the restaurant of the house "Schwedischer Hof," I was discussing the situation with the waiter, who happened to be a Pole, in Polish. He admired my remarkable calm and sound judgement, and made me the compliment "Pan jest okropny czlowiek." All the Germans I spoke with, showed smiling optimism. �42 SLOVAKIA On Monday evening, September 19th, I was in the "rychlovlak" Eger-Prague, in the company of two lieutenants of the Czechoslovak army, both Czechs less than 25 years of age, hence products of the MasarykBenes regime. There also was a captain of the frontier constabulary (strazmistr - cetnik), a former legionnaire, less than fifty years of age. The "porucici" (second lieutenants) were not exactly in a merry mood, but seemed to face the facts without whimpering and with a sort of grim humor. I knew nothing of what was going on in diplomatic circles, but I can repeat that all the Germans in Karlovy Vary, with whom I spoke about the future , were gloriously optimistic. They already knew that the Nazis would give them 1 mark for ten crowns instead of eight, yet seemed to be quite willing to take the loss. I recall one instance particularly, when I said: "Ich sehe Wolken am Horizont," and my interlocutor said: "Im Gegenthal, ich sehe alles rosig." This opinion was general. Now an expellee in Germany, my young friend may remember our conversation. If the scheme mentioned by Odlozilik on p. 387 ( "to avoid war") was worked out on September 18, "after the conference in London of French and British statesmen," it must have already been known throughout the Sudeten on September 19. And this was also the reason why I met the elderly cetnik on this train; he was leaving his post in Jachymov and was on his way to Slovakia, like the rest of Czech "cetnici" (gendarmes), because it was already known that the territory in which they were employed would be ceded to the Third Reich. This cetnik was very sad and spoke of his ruined existence, with a son in school, and with no future ahead of him. The two "porucici" stated to me emphatically what I later heard so much in Prague: "Uz je to ujednano a uz jsme prodani" (it's all settled and we are already sold out). And their comments on this "noble" action of France and England were rather scathing. Two days later in Prague the Czech legionnaires were in front of the French Legation discarding the medals which they had received from France in 1919. If Mr. Benes devotes a fairly long passage in his "Mnichovske dny" to �SLOVAKIA -13 an audience when "on Wednesday, September 21, in the small hours of that morning the British and French envoys requested it," to me it is quite clear that he is telling a story to cover up what already was a fait accompli. The people in the Sudeten knew that the matter had been settled, and the Czechs living there knew it also. To speak of collecting statements made by Benes and his critics and to "evaluate them in accordance with rigid precepts of historical scholarship" is as idle a talk as that about the authenticity of the Kensington stone and many other legends which need not be mentioned here. Furthermore I, as a personal witness, can say that the news of the sellout was already known in Prague that very evening, September 19, which in my memory is a terrible accusation of the treacherous action of British and French diplomats, not their respective nations. That evening, at about 10 o'clock, Prague was a city of stunned ghosts groping in the darkness under the impact of a deadly blow. I have seen through many situations when a family was suddenly stunned by a tragic blow, but here a whole ancient city with a glorious history, and a trusting people, had been stabbed in the back by those who professed to be their allies. The streets were almost deserted - deadly anguish was visible on all faces. Being a Czech, I fully felt their despair. They already visualized the return of the German conqueror to Praga caput regni, left at the mercy of a horde of fanaticists. The anguish was gripping the souls of the Czechs, together with a hatred of Masaryk and Benes, whose lies had brought the nation into this horrible plight. Only one who has once found himself at the brink of death could approximately realize that tragic, silent grief coupled with dread of an impending, yet inevitable peril. La nu.it porte conseil is a proverb fraught with a deep significance. The morning will· bring a solution. September 20 found the streets filled with milling crowds, hardly listening to the blaring loudspeakers. When passing by the barracks where young soldiers looked nonchalantly from the windows, a group of patriots would yell occasionally: �.J4 SLOVAKIA "Af z1Je armada!" (Long live the army). But there was no real enthusiasm - it seemed as if the soldiers knew that there was not to be any fighting. The anguish and terror of the previous night gave way to the real Czech calm fatalism, bred into the nation by centuries of hard knocks. Hemmed in, right in the heart of Europe, by hostile neighbors, the Czechs were always governed by one uppermost thought, namely, holding their own against terrible odds and in the end surviving their enemies. No one knew anything about what was going on in diplomatic circles, but all the intelligent people with whom I discussed the situation, unanimously and with a quiet, also typically Czech resignation, were saying: "Uz je to ujednano. Uz jsme prodani." In the evening I walked on the Vaclavske namesti (Wenceslaus Square) which was literally packed with people going to and fro without any passionate outbursts. Round the pedestal of Myslbek's famous St. Wenceslaus group, a solid mass of young Communists from Nusle was sitting with a defiant expression on their faces. "Co zde delate"? (What are you doing here?) I asked a group of young men and women. "My chceme bojovat a hajit svateho Vaclava." (We want to fight and to defend St. Wenceslaus). The streets were guarded by a special force of policemen with black helmets calm, young, determined men. I asked one of them: "Prosim vas, co ti mladi blazni zde delaji ?" (Pardon me, what are those young fools doing here?) His answer was typical of a Czech who has seen too many upheavals in his time to be surprised at anything. Just one word: "Para!" If a dictionary linguist would search in a number of volumes, in order to get the full meaning of this simple word, he might find such equivalents as "vapor, steam, fog, mist," but these would not give him the inner vibration. The nearest equivalent in American English would be : "Just generating so much worthless hot air!". The same milling of crowds and blaring of loudspeakers to which no one listened went on the two following days, namely, on Wednesday and Thursday, September 21 and 22. Whatever Mr. Benes says about his conferences and �SLOVAKIA 45 plans must be set aside as a legend and post factum invention to cover up the incontrovertible fact that the final decision had already been made in London on September 18; all these so-called conferences were a mere comedy to deceive the nation, which however, was not deceived at all. I listened to Mr. Benes's broadcast at 7 p. m., on Thursday, September 22. This was the second and last time I ever heard the sound of his voice and his halting way of reading from a typewritten text with his dark-rimmed glasses on his clumsy nose. The first time was on Sunday, September 19, 1937, at Masaryk's funeral. He was either unable or afraid to say anything powerful and sonorous ex-tempore. "Mluvil jako kdyz by to tahal z chlupate rukavice." (He talked as if he were pulling it out of a shaggy glove). Utterly insipid was the boast about having made a plan: "Mam plan pro vsechny pripady." (I have a plan for all eventualities). Then he also said, or rather read something in Slovak in such a poor way that Slovaks must have laughed at his pronunciation. Though the two languages are quite similar, it is extremely difficult for a Czech to speak Slovak with a Slovak intonation, just like a Spaniard is utterly unable to speak Portuguese with a Portuguese intonation. People laughed and repeated in the Prague dialect: "A Benes ma plan a usme prodany," i.e., uz jsme prodani: "Benes has a plan and we are already sold out." This reminded me of Paris and Pichegru. During the night the "civil defense" observers were frequently yelling: "Zhasnout svetla !" (lights out), in order to have a complete blackout. It was utterly amusing - almost as amusing as were the blackouts in Cambridge, Mass., in 1943 - because no sane person could have expected an air attack, which would have killed not only the Czechs, but the VolksgenossE)n as well. Nevertheless, on Friday the 23rd, people were being scared into buying gas masks, and I saw a long line on Betlemske namesti (Bethlehem Square) near the chapel where Hus used to preach in 1400 A.D., waiting to get a gas mask for 150 crowns! However, their number was insignificant in comparison with the whole population. �46 SLOVAKIA The librarian of the Naprstek Museum was to take care of my books, because I planned to leave by the express to Vienna on Saturday afternoon. I visited a few friends at the Orientalni Ustav. In the evening, when walking on Jecna ulice near Karlovo namesti (Charles Square), I met my great friend, the late professor Bedrich Hrozny, who was very calm; he knew as I did that there would be no war and no bombing, because to challenge the German Air Force would have meant useless suicide. He never mentioned anything about Benes's "plan." My publisher, the printer, my physician, repeated colloquially the same refrain "uz jsme prodany." The legionnaires, as I said before, were discarding their French medals in front of the legation. But there was no panic, no passionate outbursts. We are told that general mobilization was promulgated at 10 p. m. that evening. In view of the situation it was an amusing comedy of which I saw a part on Saturday and Sunday. What Benes says is a novelesque invention, calculated to mislead posterity into the belief of his great powers as a thinker: this method he copied from his master and from the French historians who dramatized the German retreat on September 6, 1914, into a great victory on the Marne. The night for me was indeed hectic: All of a sudden bed bugs appeared from nowhere, and the night clerk had to give me another mattress; the night was completely dark, except for an isolated little light that appeared in an attic, and some "civil defense" fool was constantly and uselessly yelling somewhere on the roof "Zhasnete svetlo" (Put out the light) ! When Mr. Benes writes, and the author of the article (Odlozilik) muses on a supposed tenseness in Prague that night, they are telling a story. The tenseness existed only on Monday evening, September 19th: after that the people were fully aware of the great comedy "uz jsme prodani." Friday noon I had my last "pecena husa s knedliky a zelim" (roast goose with dumplings and kraut) in the P. R. D. - Prazsky representacni dfun) - with the usual first class waiter service in coat tails, with Pilsen beer for 35 crowns, about one dollar. At �S LOVAKIA 47 that time we had no inkling of the "vseobecna mobilisace" (general mobilization) being thought of or planned by the great Edvard. As I perfectly recall it, the people as a whole were resigned to see the occupation of the Sudeten as a fait accompli since September 18th. On Saturday morning, when I came down to the cafe, I saw myself in a queer predicament. General mobilization was in progress and, as a consequence, there were no taxis, and even the street cars did not seem to function. Suddenly I saw a familiar face coming into the parlor: Vojta Benes - whom I knew so well since the time he made fiery speeches against Austria, in 1916-1918, in America - then lived like a satrap in a beautiful villa in Jevany as a great Socialist Minister of Education, who fought the Roman Catholic Church, while his brother was a matriculated "paper" Catholic. He was surrounded by a number of friends and they were talking about going abroad. I had to take my two hand bags and walk all the way to the Masaryk - former Franz Josef - station using the trusty power of my arm muscles. The streets were swarming with silent reservists on their way to the railroad stations, each carrying a small hand bag. There was no military preparedness among them: they looked more like excursionists. The whole station was likewise swarming with men between thirty and fifty years of age. Toward noon it became somewhat warm, and these masses of men were quenching their thirst with steins of beer, laughing and joking. The "rychlovlak" Berlin-Vienna was to arrive at about 2 p. m., and was to be the last train leaving the country in that direction. My only concern were my books. At about 1:30 p. m., I telephoned to the shipping agency and was told that my books had arrived in good order and were to be delivered the next week at their destination. The express did not arrive on time and there was an hourly announcement of its being late. If the Czecho-Slovak generals were wondering why the Luftwaffe did not bomb Ceska Trebova - Bohumin, on September 23rd, they must have been completely misled by Benes's comedy. The Luftwaffe knew full well that the occupation of the Sudeten was a fait accompli. The �48 SLOVAKIA whole inside of the station, with thousands of reservists drinking beer, eating frankfurters, and joking, bespoke a total confidence that there would be no war, no air raid, no shooting. The express finally arrived at about six p. m. I had a second class ticket, but found at once that this meant nothing, because all the compartments were being taken by reservists; all seats were occupied and the gangways were likewise filled. In a second class compartment I found two foreigners, a South African of Jewish origin and a young German dancing girl from Budapest. The express soon started on its way in the twilight through the central part of Bohemia, via Kolin and Pardubice to Ceska Trebova. In the fields and meadows the peasants were still working and were waving "Na zdaaar!" (Success!) to the occupants of the train - the defenders of the fatherland on their way to the frontier. As I think of it now, I cannot refrain from shedding tears at recalling how these simple folks were being deceived and sold down the river by England and France as if they were an African Zulu tribe or Gurkhas of India, or Bambaras. These were my people: here I was born, here I grew up, and I knew the simple soul and the good heart of these country people who foolishly trusted Masaryk and Benes. Now I recall that on Friday voices were heard: "Povesit Benese na brane hradu" (Hang Benes on the castle gate). And if, on Monday, General Syrovy urged Benes to leave Prague, it was not because of any fear of the Luftwaffe, but because of the wrath of the people. One of the tricks of the general mobilization was to send the German reservists to Slovakia and the Slovaks to the Sudeten regions. Standing in the gangway, while the express was speeding forward to Ceska Trebova without intermediate stops, I listened to the story of a young German reservist. He seemed to be quite loyal to the Republic and no Nazi enthusiast, but he explained to me the situation which faced all non-Czechs, namely, that of obtaining positions to make a living. The Germans could never hope to become as perfect in Czech as the Czechs and, therefore, where a �SLOVAKIA 49 perfect knowledge of Czech was required, they never could obtain the most advantageous job. Many of the young Sudeten Germans were trying to obtain work in the Third Reich. This was really the primary determining factor of the defection of the Germans, Magyars and Slovaks. Remedy? Either birth control or emigration. The young dancer was quite optimistic: "That whole thing will be settled in two weeks. I am now going to Budapest, and then I will come back to Prague." I had to stand all the way to Brno. There most of the crowd dispersed. From Brno we were to continue to Breclava-Lundenburg, and then on to Vienna. At Breclava we were told that the frontier was closed. We could go to Bratislava if we so wished. The South African found in me a willing cicerone. We had to pay additional fare of some 20 crowns. We arrived in Bratislava about midnight. The station was literally swarming with reservists, each with his little bag, moving to and fro like a mob without any organization. When an elderly man with a small baggage cart came along, in the scanty light, I engaged him to take my two bags and the South African's baggage to the nearest hotel opposite the station. When we arrived there the night clerk told us that all rooms were occupied by Czecho-Slovak army officers. He presumed that all the hotels in the city had been similarly taken over as a mobilization measure, but he volunteered to telephone to Hotel Carlton and find out what the situation was. We were lucky: there were still two single rooms available at 20 crowns (75 cents) with "raiiajky" (breakfast). Carlton Hotel was to send a taxi to bring us downtown which was quite a distance from the station. It was about one a. m., and the city, scantily lighted, was remarkably quiet: one would not have suspected at all that the station was swarming with reservists speeding to their destination, to the frontier. The hotel proved to be quite modern and well appointed. In the morning, when at about 9 a. m. - it was Sunday, September 25th - I came down to have my breakfast, I saw the South African leaving in a great hurry in a taxi. He said he had a visa for Hungary and had tOI �50 SLOVAKIA make haste to reach the frontier before it might be closed. The hotel personnel could not give me any information as to what the situation was on the Austrian frontier. Since March, Austria was a part of the Third Reich. Consequently, I had to set out in an adventurous quest of information by taking the electric tramway to Petrzalka and then walk along the highway to where the frontier could be distinguished by curious quonsset-like structures. Detachments of soldiers were distributed along the road. They were all Magyars and not perturbed in the least: certainly not like troops expecting a sudden attack from anywhere. It was about eleven a. m. and fairly warm, the sun was brightly shining. When I came to a quonsset and asked where I could cross the frontier, I was waved back and asked to try the other quonsset about half a mile further to the right. There I was told that the queer structures were "military objects" or a part of a chain of fortifications. The Czecho-Slovak Magyar soldiers seemed to be quite amused at my confusion seeing me going up and down across fields, but, even though it was quite obvious that I was a foreigner, no one stopped me to ask for identification papers. Finally I emerged from the fields on another main highway which seemed to lose itself among tall poplar trees in the distance. It was about one p. m. The whole countryside was completely deserted. Suddenly I espied a hatless young man walking toward me from the Austrian frontier; he proved to be a German from Vienna who had to escape from the police - he said - because he was a Socialist and not friendly to the Nazis. He hoped to be able to reach Reichenberg (Liberec) in Bohemia where he had friends. This certainly was a lucky encounter. First of all, he told me that the frontier was open, though barricaded on the Slovak side, and that the tramway to Vienna was functioning. Furthermore, he had about 8 marks and needed Czecho-Slovak crowns. I had only 5 marks and about 200 crowns left. I offered to ·buy his marks at 8 crowns. We walked to a restaurant on the right bank of the Danube, opposite the Stefanik monument, and had a good lunch of roast pork, dumplings, and sauerkraut at 10 crowns each, �SLOVAKIA 51 and some beer. After I paid the bill, we crossed the river on a ferry to the monument. It was a beautiful Sunday afternoon and everything was perfectly calm. I returned to the hotel and told the young man to meet me at 3 p. m., when I expected to be ready to leave by taxi for the frontier: the chauffeur asked double fare, because it was Sunday, namely, 66 crowns. The fugitive came to the hotel punctually at 3 p. m. I gave him 60 crowns for his eight marks and he gave me an envelope with a key which he said was from his room in Vienna: all I had to do was to drop it in a post office box after reaching Vienna. We parted. I paid my bill at the hotel, and the taxi took less than half an hour to reach the Austrian frontier. The Czech custom officers at the barricade let me go through after looking at my passport; then I had to carry my two bags to the German Customs quite a ways off. The commanding officer was a Prussian from Berlin; he was supposed to wean the Austrians from their Gemlitlickeit and make them fast and efficient. Occasionally, an airplane lazily crossed the horizon. Not a sign of any soldiers or prepartions for warlike movements. The Berliner looked at my passport, did not even ask me to open my bags. All he wanted to know was what was going on in Bratislava. "General mobilization," I said. He wanted to know whether I had noticed the numbers of the regiments. "I noticed nothing; all I wanted to do was to cross the frontier and go to Vienna by the electric tramway." "Danke, mein Herr," he said very politely, "die elektrische Bahn geht um ungefiihr flinf Uhr ab." I took my bags to a sort of an open waiting room where I found other passengers waiting: Austrians who had the appearance of excursionists, curious about what was going on. During the two-hour wait, which was rather tedious, I noticed another plane lazily patroling the sky. In comparison with the swarming crowds of reservists I had seen on the night previous, this Austrian countryside looked like a calm picnic park. We left toward six p. m. and in all the stations Sunday excursionists were boarding the train. My interrupted ticket to Merano was valid. At about 8 p. m. we were in Vienna. One solitary airplane was circling �52 SLOVAKIA about the city. I took the streetcar to the Slidbahnhof and went to a hotel which I knew from my previous trips. The rooms which formerly cost 6 shillings now cost 6 marks: the clerk told me on the sly that the liberation and incorporation in the Great Fatherland had been a rather costly affair for the gemlitliche Austrians. In the morning, before boarding the train for San Candido (formerly Innichen) in the Dolomites - formerly a part of the Austrian Tyrol - I dropped the envelope containing the key in the post office box. Then the train transported me from a congested military atmosphere into the old time freedom which my soul always craved ever since I left Austria-Hungary in 1903. In many ways it was a memorable day for me this Monday, September 26th. In the soft beams of the morning sun I could see old Vienna for the last time in its stiU gemtitlich aspect - this Vindobona, where Marcus Aurelius jotted down his thoughts in Greek, the Imperial city, saved in 1683 from the Turkish hordes of Kara Mustafa by Czech defenders and Jan Sobieski's Polish army, and the merry center of West-Eastern melodies of Mozart and the Lustige Witwe in 1909, with the rumblings of the first world war in the distance. The city of many races and languages and strange love habits which a Moravian Jewish medic mistook for something universal. Before leaving the hotel at Bratislava on the foregoing Sunday afternoon, I could read my last feuilleton in the Narodni Listy, in which I pleaded for keeping Karlovy Vary free from all political strife and agitation. As the train was speeding through the Austrian and later Styrian country side, I mused over my recollections. The parade in Prague on the first of May, 1934, when at the very end of a long defile of Workers Socialist organizations I was looking, on the corner of Jecna ulice and Karlovo namesti, at the small motley group of Communists guarded by two policemen. They stopped right in front of my vantage point, because the defile had to stop marching somewhere on Vodickova ulice. There must have been a silent mockery in my look which provoked one of the Commies to step forward and come near me with a some- �SLOVAKIA 53 what menacing look. But he had to moderate himself in the policeman's presence. " Co se tak posmesne usmivate ?" (What are you smiling so scoffingly) he asked with a Podskalak accent mixed with Jewish intonation. "Coz kdybych vam tak jednu lajsknul ?" (Suppose I smack you one?) he went on and added: "No jste starej clovek .. .. " (But you are an old man). This was rather ludricous fanfarronade, but indicated how daring a Commie could be at the time, knowing that old Masaryk needed the ten Communist votes in the Parliament for his reelection which was to take place on May 24th. I asked the little Jew what he was so angry about - and he said: "If you had six kids at home and not much to eat ... " and I said - "Why have six kids?" The policeman motioned to him to join his group - about fifty in all - and the defile resumed its march. Who could have dreamt then that this little group of riffraff would one day rule Bohemia? And I recalled October, 1934, when I saw between six and ten thousand German Socialists march along the main street of Karlovy Vary, Vfidelni ulice, with their red flags, boldly sticking out their clenched fists and shouting "Freiheit!" The Czech state police protected their march, a very provocative gesture in a 100 percent rightist, bourgeois city. I asked the policeman: "Proc je zde nechali pochodovat ?" (Why did they let them march here?) - "Protoze jsou statotvorna strana" (because they are a regular political party in the State). This was perhaps intended to discourage the Germans in Karlovy Vary from becoming partisans of Konrad Henlein, Hitler's agent. But the Sudeten Germans had only three choices: Caor as they called it tholic, Socialist or Nationalist "schwarz, Sozi oder Nazi," and this was the reason why a large number voted Nazi without being exactly admirers of Adolf Hitler. To me this Socialist defile was a surprise I had seen the same type of people march in Madrid on May first the year before with clenched fists and shouting: "U Ache Pe" - which stood for "Unios Hermanos Proletarios" or "Proletarians of all lands unite!" And three weeks later after the Socialist march in Karlovy Vary, I happened to be in Munich on the Parteitag, November 8th, �54 SLOVAKIA when that great Catholic city was flooded with huge red flags with the Swastika or Hakenkreuz. On the 9th I was told that university professors had to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler: "Wie werden auf Hitler vereidigt!" After the vote on January 13, 1935, when I was in Rome, France let Hitler occupy the Saar; in March, France and England allowed Hitler to rearm and no energetic steps were taken against the projected invasion of Ethiopia which started on October 3rd. On February 16, 1936, I saw the elections in Spain in Granada. I saw how the socalled Republican government did not stop violent acts against the Rightists, and I left for France at the end of May when I saw that a conflict was imminent. It actually started on July 18th when Berlin was beflagged on the occasion of Olympic games. Paris blamed London quite rightly, but had no courage to act independently And I especially thought of that evening at WUrzburg on May 25, 1935, when I had to sit out the whole radio address by Adolf Hitler about the immense danger which an unarmed Germany was exposed to in view of the Bolshevik menace. Hitler was enumerating the warships which Germany had to sink in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles and emphasized her present helplessness to face the great menace from the East. In view of the mighty Republic of Poland and the Little Entente no such danger existed. One phrase I remember well with all the inner vibration of Hitler's voice: "Wir Nazionalsozialisten sind fanatische Gegner des Bolschewismus: zwischen uns und den Bolschewiken kann nie eine Freundschaft bestehen." (We National Socialists are fanatical opponents of Bolshevism: there can never be friendship between us and the Bolsheviks). The hotel guests had to stand up and sing Horst Wessel Lied - I alone remained seated, no one said a word of protest. They knew I was a foreigner and had nothing to do with their national problems. The next day I was discussing the situation with young Germans. _Not only did they not oppose the rearming of Germany, but strangely enough they had the same argument which I have heard the militarists advance everywhere in the world: "Der Militardienst macht einen Kerl �SLOVAKIA 55 aus Einem." (Military service makes a man out of a boy). In Berlin I saw everywhere defiant posters with the legend: "Die feinen Flugmaschinen, die unserm Flihrer dienen." (Fine airplanes that serve our Flihrer) . And trainloads of huge logs were coming to Germany from Carpatho-Russian forests furnishing wood for the airplanes. Could not the English and French diplomats and military attaches see all this? There still was time for a concerted action to stop the Hitler-Goring madness. In Erlangen - Bavaria - the people were expecting the CzechoSlovak army to march in at any rrioment in accordance with the Versailles Treaty. But nothing happened, because the British opposed strong action in order not to spoil good business. And now I saw my native land sacrificed by Western diplomacy, so the brilliant embassy parties and dances and cocktail drinking could go on undisturbed in Paris and London. And what was true of the Bohemian Crown lands was mutatis mutandis true of Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia. Recollections! The train arrived at Klagenfurt, via Graz and Zidani Most, the territory of germanized Slovenes. I was the only foreigner on board, and when we crossed into the Italian territory I was the only passenger from the frontier to San Candido. When we were somewhere between Klagenfurt and the frontier on the Austrian territory, the conductors would quickly sprint inside the station to listen to the radio which between eight and nine in the evening was blaring Hitler's violent attack on Benes at the Sportpalast. Only once was I sufficiently interested to get off and listen to the shrill tones of Hitler's voice familiar to me since the two and one-half hour speech at Wlirzburg three years before. At Benecko it was dampened by static. By chance I caught exactly the passage when Adolf was roaring in his best form, as if he were challenging Edward to a duel: "Hier stehe ich, dort steht Herr Benesch" (here I stand and there stands Benes) and the rest I do not remember because I had to board the train again. At Innichen - San Candido I found myself in the old Austrian atmosphere of my youth. The hotel was an old �56 SLOVAKIA fashioned Tyrolese inn with large and quiet rooms, without any running water, but a huge comfortable bed. Though it was very late - after eleven p. m. - a good Tyrolese housewife made a Wiener Schnitzel for me which was even better than the one I had eaten at Benecko. I slept wonderfully well and in the morning could admire the splendid sight of the Dolomiten without the slightest thought of war. From there I went to Merano and followed the Traubenkur a whole month while the Munich comedy was being played by Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini, who in the end got the most credit in the Corriere della Sera for having saved the peace. Merano was filled with all types of strange refugees, male and female, of the Milena characteristics which might have interested a Kraft-Ebbing. It is to be deplored that many university professors in Europe and America are muckracking in this sort of "literature." In view of the factual observations of an eyewitness possessing a perfect knowledge of Czech, German, Slovak, Polish, Russian, French, English and Italian - namely the languages involved in the great sellout - the idle musings and speculations both of Benes and the reviewer (Odlozilik) of Mnichovske dny, fade into the realm of Hollywood make-believe of Cecil de Mille's Ten Commandments. The general mobilization did not electrify the people at all, but was a huge comedy smacking to some extent of the good soldier Svejk. The reservists drank beer, ate frankfurters, joked, and knew that the whole thing was a picnic. Those of the Sudeten Germans among them, who knew Czech well, acted as Henlein's spies. The chain of fortifi~ations on which Benes spent over a billion crowns was just as useless as the French Maginot line proved to be later. Nothing could have stopped the Nazi tanks and the Czech regions could have been reduced to ashes by the Luftwaffe which had reportedly 15,000 planes, or ten times more than the reputed Czech air force. The 800,000 reservists were merely a mob compared to the disciplined nazi war machine. All this can be clearly seen from the illustrations showing Adolf "the savior" at the head of his Panzers on the Theaterplatz in Karlovy Vary, speaking to the enthusiastic crowds on October 15th. There is only one "author" whose methods resemble �SLOVAKIA 57 those of Benes, namely Harry Truman, when it comes to complete distortion of facts. However, the Czech people of today, just like the American people of today, will not be easily persuaded to believe fairy tales. • • • MARTIN RAZUS (1883-1937) JOSEPH A. MIKUS The era, which opened for the Slovak nation in 1918, marks a rapid advance in the direction of the realization of its political aspirations. This is indubitably connected with the fall of feudalism and with the over-all extension of the significance of national individualities as political realities in Central Europe. To these external factors there are added also internal forces. And here, from among the many personalities which contributed handsomely to the spiritual and political crystallization of conditions in Slovakia, it behooves us today to recall one name: Martin Razus. While Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest, was becoming the leading figure of the political movement for Slovak autonomy for rather social reasons, in the meantime his contemporary and friend, Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister, poet and writer, was emerging as a defender of the political individuality of the Slovak nation for cultural and psychological reasons. In another respect, while Andrew Hlinka, as a man of action, engages in the fight against the leftist, religious, moral and political relativism of Masaryk's school and is drawn into the violent whirlpool of national activity, thus becoming top guard of national awareness, in the meantime, Martin Razus, with fire in his soul and the laurel of a man of letters on his head, devotes himself, according to his nature, rather to the spiritual processes of the national development of the Slovaks. With his ear close to the bosom of the nation, he catches the spiritual vibrations of the people in order to present them in his work a bit later to the public whom he chose to serve. It was thus that Razus became the "conscience of the nation." Even though the motives of Hlinka and Razus for po- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1957, Vol. 7 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 22), March 1957.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 23), June 1957.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 24-25), September-December 1957.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 35 A. R. NYKL: "EDVARD BENES ON MUNICH DAYS" The article "Edvard Benes on Munich Days" in the "Journal of Central European Affairs," (January, 1957 pp. 384-393), reveals that the author, Otokar Odlozilik, was not an eyewitness of the days between September 4 and 25, 1938, in Bohemia, and especially in the capital. "Rigid precepts of historical scholarship" cannot be applied to documents, even if the latter were bona fide and not doctored up post factum by captious commentaries. Both Edvard Benes and his mentor T. G. Masaryk were great hindsight wizards. It would be idle to cite proofs of this phenomenon here, because hundreds of quotations have appeared and are still appearing in the publications of the Slovak League of America. The diplomats mentioned in the article very wisely kept, and those who are living still keep, quiet which is, they perhaps believe, better than lying. In my opinion Frantisek Chvalkovsky, who with Ha.cha went through the terrible ordeal in Berlin before they finally signed their consent to Hitler's ultimatum of March 14, 1939, at 3 a. m., was the most reliable and honest person whose story might have cleared up many doubts, surmises, and suspicions. Krofta could unfortunately not go beyond the spring of 1938, when in May the first rumors of war began to spread. Henlein and his right hand man Frank were feverishly preparing the ground for autonomy and secession, by speeches and press campaigns, in which they constantly harped on Benes's doctoral thesis, published in 1907 at Dijon, wherein he advocated a complete separation of the German-speaking and the Czech-speaking regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. During the summer months Lord Runciman was sent to the Sudetenland by Chamberlain with the special mission to find the right solution by "fact finding." For the most part he was the guest of German nobility and paid no attention to the claims of the Czech "hranicari," inhabitants of the frontier regions. The Sudeten Germans knew perfectly well that he was 36 SLOVAKIA merely playing a comedy and facetiously spoke of him as Lord "Runzelmann." Because of my absolute command of the German tongue, and as an American visitor, I could engage in countless conversations with the natives of Karlovy Vary, where I was writing a book on Japan and curing my nervous stomach by drinking MUhlbrunn - "Mlynsky prame" - hot alkaline water. Among the Egerlander there reigned an atmosphere of calm optimism: to them the annexation of the Sudeten by the Third Reich was a foregone , conclusion. Some of them even hinted already at a further step - the Protectorate - anticipating March 14, 1939. Nervousness reigned only in the small Czech minority, which was being increasingly frightened by occasional "blackout" exercises and talk about air raid shelters. To me it was quite plain that the Germans were being supplied with oral propaganda, which they called Fllisterpropaganda, and were absolutely convinced that Runciman's antics were a subterfuge to hide a fait accompli: a perfect agreement of the English and French - the latter somewhat sheepishly and reluctantly - that the "phantom" republic should be trimmed to suit the Nazis and the Magyars, in connivance with Mr. Beck, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs whose contempt for Benes knew no bounds. This I knew from my trip through Poland in August, 1936, where Czechs were talked about as "lajdaci" (loafers). Goring was Beck's honored guest, Benes the "cackling pygmy." At Cracow, Moscicki was helping to raise the Pilsudski mound: was he likely to listen to Benes 's plea in 1938? In July 1935, I wrote an article for the "Narodni Listy," recommending a solid steel wall from the Carpathians to Gdynia with a friendly Polish nation, whom Benes and Masaryk, however, regarded as Fascists. Later I was told that the article was suppressed at Benes's orders, who bypassed the Poles and went to see Stalin about that time. It is evident that the ambassadors named in the Odlozilik article (Osusky, Masaryk, Mastny, Chvalkovsky, Hurban, Slavik) must have known the real state of affairs and SLOVAKIA 37 therefore kept silent. With the help of German and Italian aviation the Nationalists in Spain were pushing the socalled "Loyalists" toward the Pyrenees, ·and Daladier was worried about the impending invasion of the defeated 300,000 "Reds" into southern France, while Charles Maurras in "EAction Francaise" was ridiculing the idea of a war "pour les Tcheques." In the Kurhaus or Lazensky Dum, I could read the "Daily Mail" and "Corriere della Sera." I recall distinctly a map in the former showing the distribution of the three and one-half million Sudeten-Germans along the frontier as reported by Lord Runciman - and an article by Mussolini stating that the artificial and unnatural "sausage" state in Central Europe should be dismembered in the same way as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been. Where is Odlozilik's "authentic description" of events by Benes? If Benes had a "unique knowledge of the situation," he would have had to admit that he knew full well in August that England and France were determined to back Hitler's claims. Krofta wisely kept silent in order not to implicate himself. The important documents sent abroad in the early days of October, 1938, most likely were destroyed, in order not to compromise the guilty parties. It would seem that the German and Italian military aviation was so formidable that the French and still less the British, aviation was no match for it at the time. Mr. Beck's clique in Poland was maliciously rejoicing at Benes's defeat. And Stalin, of course, was not going to help a dying man. My own estimate of the situation, on the basis of my observations and reading of the foreign press - English, French, Italian, Scandinavian, Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslav - was that there would be no war, because the sellout by England and F r ance was an obvious fait accompli. Hence I finished my manuscript and went by bus to Prague, in order to arrange with the publisher the printing of my book. For all eventualities I bought a second-class ticket to Praha-Merano, because my friends recommended to me the "Traubenkur" in Merano as the best thing for a nervous stomach. It consisted in eating plenty of ripe blue grapes and walking in the hills. Another friend - a phy- 38 SLOVAKIA sician - took a good look into my stomach, and finding nothing really serious, recommended that I should go to the Riesengebirge (Krkonose) to a place called Benecko and drink plenty of radioactive water. While the Sudeten-Germans were calm and smiling, awaiting their revanche, the Czech population was naturally feeling uneasy in the expectation of the great Hitler harangue at Nuremberg, listed for September 12. There was a tense atmosphere in Prague. The Communists were dreaming of a great Russian airborne army which would destroy Berlin and of making every town and hamlet in Bohemia a fortress like the "Loyalists" were doing in Spain who, by the way, were being painted as heroes in the Benes-controlled press. Only the "Narodni Listy," the organ of the Czech National Democrats, was favorable to Mussolini and to Franco. The journey on Sunday, September 4, through the fertile fields promising a good harvest, via Chlumec natl Cidlinou, where the peasants once were beaten by the noblemen ("vyhrajes jako sedlak v Chlumce"), north to the Krkonose, was calm and uneventful. After Trutnov-Trautenau, we began to enter the mixed Sudeten region. From what I could see and hear, the German agrarians had no sympathy with the Nazis at all, although in the last moment they joined the Henlein group so as to save themselves from reprisals and persecutions. This very step indicated that Henlein was certain of winning without war. Benecko proved to be a combined summer and winter resort. The summer guests were all gone, and I was the only guest at the hotel. In winter, the place changed into a ski resort. The owner was a sincere man, a great admirer of Kramar, and a great, scathing critic of Benes. The Germans had a nice new school building in the village, "Deutsche Volkschule." Hitler's ravings about the suffer- . ings of the Germans were the invention of his maniacal imagination. The hotel and its immediate neighborhood formed a Czech enclave in a region which further north was inhabited by Sudeten-Germans. From the far distance one could hear the noise of their Henlein meetings. But otherwise, SLOVAKIA 39 perfect peace reigned in the pine forests and on the green meadows, where I spent most of my time walking between meals and drinking radioactive water. Within a few days my nervous stomach was restored to its normal functions. Sunday, the 11th of September, being a pleasantly warm, sunny day, I decided in the afternoon to walk to the summit of the wooded hill which I well remembered from my school days, reading about the sad departure of Czech Protestants in the years which followed the battle of the White Mountain, in 1620-1628. These emigres had to leave everything behind and seek refuge in the Protestant regions of Germany northeast of the Krkonose. Jan Amos Komensky, later bishop of the Moravian Brethren, was among them. On this hill, named Zaly, according to the legend, they were taking the last look of their native country, and were kissing the snow-covered ground goodbye in tears. Nevzali jsme se sebou nic, nic, po vsem veta jen Bibli Kralickou, Labyrint sveta. "We took nothing along, nothing, all is lost; only the Kraliky Bible, and the Labyrinth of the World." Reference is maqe to the Protestant version of the Bible made at Kraliky (German Grulich) on the Bohemian-Silesian frontier, and the well-known work of Comenius. These memories came to my mind as I slowly walked to the summit where I found a tourist restaurant and a lookout tower. The atmosphere was gloomy, very much in keeping with the name 2aly: the presentiment of grave events reminded me of what it must have been like in 1628 - three centuries ago. The sufferings of the Czech nation were of no concern to France, and still less to England. The large wooden structure of the hotel was silent, when I returned. For supper I had the last but one real Wiener Schnitzel in my memory - or shall I call it costoletta alla milanese? Or vidensky rizek? The owner of the hotel who knew very little German asked me whether I would listen to the radio the next day and tell him what Adolf was going to broadcast from Ntirnberg. Since I was not to be directly affected, I could sleep soundly and in the forenoon take another long walk in the pine woods. 40 SLOVAKIA The great speech was booked for about 2 p. m. sun time, since Germany had not adopted the foolish fad of daylight saving time. If I had my notes at hand, I could recall the situation with more precision, but since I was more intersted in "kava a buchty" (coffee and doughnuts) , my recollection is rather hazy at present. First of all, the reception was very weak and spoiled by frequent static due to thick thunder clouds hanging over the mountain range. Second, Hitler's speeches on the Sudeten question, the same as on the Klajpeda and Gdansk question, were a repetition of dramatically worded accusations of the same content : the Volksgenossen were being persecuted and mistreated, hence they were fleeing in constantly increasing numbers across the border: five thousand, ten thousand, fifty thousand; Long afterwards I saw in the contemporary lliustrierte Zeitung file pictures of these "refugees" being lovingly provided with food and clothing by their brethren in the Third Reich. There could be no doubt as to Adolf's purpose, namely, to convince France and England of the absolute justice of the Nazi position. "We do not ask except what is ours on the basis of selfdetermination - not one inch of a foreign territory. The Czechs will have theirs and we will have ours: after that we will have no further demands. " The next day at night we could hear the rumbling of a thunderstorm in the direction of Harrach's Glass Works at the frontier, but my host and his family were so frightened that they took it for the rumbling of heavy artillery. On Thursday, September 15, I decided that there was no use prolonging my stay and inviting another spell of stomach nervousness: after lunch I took the bus to the railway station and from there the train to Prague. Though there was no panic anywhere, the train was already filled with refugees: the wealthier and white-collared class. In Prague I returned to my hotel on Namesti Petra Osvoboditele (the Square of Peter, the Liberator) - formerly Komensky Square - in the Vinohrady district, where I paid 20 crowns for a single room, the equivalent of 70 cents. Excellent regular meals cost 10 crowns - 35 cents - and read all the Czech, German, French, and English SLOYAKIA 41 newspapers while sipping excellent coffee. In one of the rooms they had a permanent guest - a frequently tipsy female of unpleasant appearance. She was one of the ten Communist deputies in the Parliament. Unfortunately for me, moratorium had been proclaimed with regard to withdrawals from bank accounts and I could only draw 5000 crowns at the Zivnobanka. One rapid transaction became imperative and unavoidable: I had to go to Karlovy Vary and have several trunks of my books shipped from there to Prague. The dream of staying in the pleasant spa and writing books vanished: where were the solemn promises of "enduring peace" after fighting "the war to end all wars" in 1919? On Friday afternoon I took the "rychlovlak" (express) and arrived at the Karlovy Vary station, which is located at some distance from the center of the town, in the evening. Detachments of Czech troops were already stationed round. No bus was operating. After showing my passport I was allowed to go to the town on foot and there I found another detachment of youthful-looking soldiers round some sort of war machinery, near Park Street. For reasons, which would take long to explain, I decided to go to one of the Kurgas1; rooming houses on Park Street. In situations of this kind one must act with lightning speed and complete calm. I was able to arrange with a shipper to forward my trunks to Prague next Monday, "express," at the fabulous cost of 2000 crowns. Saturday, Sunday, and Monday I spent eating the best food and spending as many crowns as I could, buying the best shirts, socks, a light overcoat, and other articles of clothing at Nastopil's on Alte Wiese. Why not, when I could buy the best shirts at 16 crowns (50 cents) which in America would cost five dollars? I still have two of those. When one sees an inevitable debacle in the offing one can easily adopt the philosophy of "you can't take it with you." While consuming an excellent chicken dinner for 25 crowns (70 cents) in the restaurant of the house "Schwedischer Hof," I was discussing the situation with the waiter, who happened to be a Pole, in Polish. He admired my remarkable calm and sound judgement, and made me the compliment "Pan jest okropny czlowiek." All the Germans I spoke with, showed smiling optimism. 42 SLOVAKIA On Monday evening, September 19th, I was in the "rychlovlak" Eger-Prague, in the company of two lieutenants of the Czechoslovak army, both Czechs less than 25 years of age, hence products of the MasarykBenes regime. There also was a captain of the frontier constabulary (strazmistr - cetnik), a former legionnaire, less than fifty years of age. The "porucici" (second lieutenants) were not exactly in a merry mood, but seemed to face the facts without whimpering and with a sort of grim humor. I knew nothing of what was going on in diplomatic circles, but I can repeat that all the Germans in Karlovy Vary, with whom I spoke about the future , were gloriously optimistic. They already knew that the Nazis would give them 1 mark for ten crowns instead of eight, yet seemed to be quite willing to take the loss. I recall one instance particularly, when I said: "Ich sehe Wolken am Horizont," and my interlocutor said: "Im Gegenthal, ich sehe alles rosig." This opinion was general. Now an expellee in Germany, my young friend may remember our conversation. If the scheme mentioned by Odlozilik on p. 387 ( "to avoid war") was worked out on September 18, "after the conference in London of French and British statesmen," it must have already been known throughout the Sudeten on September 19. And this was also the reason why I met the elderly cetnik on this train; he was leaving his post in Jachymov and was on his way to Slovakia, like the rest of Czech "cetnici" (gendarmes), because it was already known that the territory in which they were employed would be ceded to the Third Reich. This cetnik was very sad and spoke of his ruined existence, with a son in school, and with no future ahead of him. The two "porucici" stated to me emphatically what I later heard so much in Prague: "Uz je to ujednano a uz jsme prodani" (it's all settled and we are already sold out). And their comments on this "noble" action of France and England were rather scathing. Two days later in Prague the Czech legionnaires were in front of the French Legation discarding the medals which they had received from France in 1919. If Mr. Benes devotes a fairly long passage in his "Mnichovske dny" to SLOVAKIA -13 an audience when "on Wednesday, September 21, in the small hours of that morning the British and French envoys requested it," to me it is quite clear that he is telling a story to cover up what already was a fait accompli. The people in the Sudeten knew that the matter had been settled, and the Czechs living there knew it also. To speak of collecting statements made by Benes and his critics and to "evaluate them in accordance with rigid precepts of historical scholarship" is as idle a talk as that about the authenticity of the Kensington stone and many other legends which need not be mentioned here. Furthermore I, as a personal witness, can say that the news of the sellout was already known in Prague that very evening, September 19, which in my memory is a terrible accusation of the treacherous action of British and French diplomats, not their respective nations. That evening, at about 10 o'clock, Prague was a city of stunned ghosts groping in the darkness under the impact of a deadly blow. I have seen through many situations when a family was suddenly stunned by a tragic blow, but here a whole ancient city with a glorious history, and a trusting people, had been stabbed in the back by those who professed to be their allies. The streets were almost deserted - deadly anguish was visible on all faces. Being a Czech, I fully felt their despair. They already visualized the return of the German conqueror to Praga caput regni, left at the mercy of a horde of fanaticists. The anguish was gripping the souls of the Czechs, together with a hatred of Masaryk and Benes, whose lies had brought the nation into this horrible plight. Only one who has once found himself at the brink of death could approximately realize that tragic, silent grief coupled with dread of an impending, yet inevitable peril. La nu.it porte conseil is a proverb fraught with a deep significance. The morning will· bring a solution. September 20 found the streets filled with milling crowds, hardly listening to the blaring loudspeakers. When passing by the barracks where young soldiers looked nonchalantly from the windows, a group of patriots would yell occasionally: .J4 SLOVAKIA "Af z1Je armada!" (Long live the army). But there was no real enthusiasm - it seemed as if the soldiers knew that there was not to be any fighting. The anguish and terror of the previous night gave way to the real Czech calm fatalism, bred into the nation by centuries of hard knocks. Hemmed in, right in the heart of Europe, by hostile neighbors, the Czechs were always governed by one uppermost thought, namely, holding their own against terrible odds and in the end surviving their enemies. No one knew anything about what was going on in diplomatic circles, but all the intelligent people with whom I discussed the situation, unanimously and with a quiet, also typically Czech resignation, were saying: "Uz je to ujednano. Uz jsme prodani." In the evening I walked on the Vaclavske namesti (Wenceslaus Square) which was literally packed with people going to and fro without any passionate outbursts. Round the pedestal of Myslbek's famous St. Wenceslaus group, a solid mass of young Communists from Nusle was sitting with a defiant expression on their faces. "Co zde delate"? (What are you doing here?) I asked a group of young men and women. "My chceme bojovat a hajit svateho Vaclava." (We want to fight and to defend St. Wenceslaus). The streets were guarded by a special force of policemen with black helmets calm, young, determined men. I asked one of them: "Prosim vas, co ti mladi blazni zde delaji ?" (Pardon me, what are those young fools doing here?) His answer was typical of a Czech who has seen too many upheavals in his time to be surprised at anything. Just one word: "Para!" If a dictionary linguist would search in a number of volumes, in order to get the full meaning of this simple word, he might find such equivalents as "vapor, steam, fog, mist," but these would not give him the inner vibration. The nearest equivalent in American English would be : "Just generating so much worthless hot air!". The same milling of crowds and blaring of loudspeakers to which no one listened went on the two following days, namely, on Wednesday and Thursday, September 21 and 22. Whatever Mr. Benes says about his conferences and SLOVAKIA 45 plans must be set aside as a legend and post factum invention to cover up the incontrovertible fact that the final decision had already been made in London on September 18; all these so-called conferences were a mere comedy to deceive the nation, which however, was not deceived at all. I listened to Mr. Benes's broadcast at 7 p. m., on Thursday, September 22. This was the second and last time I ever heard the sound of his voice and his halting way of reading from a typewritten text with his dark-rimmed glasses on his clumsy nose. The first time was on Sunday, September 19, 1937, at Masaryk's funeral. He was either unable or afraid to say anything powerful and sonorous ex-tempore. "Mluvil jako kdyz by to tahal z chlupate rukavice." (He talked as if he were pulling it out of a shaggy glove). Utterly insipid was the boast about having made a plan: "Mam plan pro vsechny pripady." (I have a plan for all eventualities). Then he also said, or rather read something in Slovak in such a poor way that Slovaks must have laughed at his pronunciation. Though the two languages are quite similar, it is extremely difficult for a Czech to speak Slovak with a Slovak intonation, just like a Spaniard is utterly unable to speak Portuguese with a Portuguese intonation. People laughed and repeated in the Prague dialect: "A Benes ma plan a usme prodany," i.e., uz jsme prodani: "Benes has a plan and we are already sold out." This reminded me of Paris and Pichegru. During the night the "civil defense" observers were frequently yelling: "Zhasnout svetla !" (lights out), in order to have a complete blackout. It was utterly amusing - almost as amusing as were the blackouts in Cambridge, Mass., in 1943 - because no sane person could have expected an air attack, which would have killed not only the Czechs, but the VolksgenossE)n as well. Nevertheless, on Friday the 23rd, people were being scared into buying gas masks, and I saw a long line on Betlemske namesti (Bethlehem Square) near the chapel where Hus used to preach in 1400 A.D., waiting to get a gas mask for 150 crowns! However, their number was insignificant in comparison with the whole population. 46 SLOVAKIA The librarian of the Naprstek Museum was to take care of my books, because I planned to leave by the express to Vienna on Saturday afternoon. I visited a few friends at the Orientalni Ustav. In the evening, when walking on Jecna ulice near Karlovo namesti (Charles Square), I met my great friend, the late professor Bedrich Hrozny, who was very calm; he knew as I did that there would be no war and no bombing, because to challenge the German Air Force would have meant useless suicide. He never mentioned anything about Benes's "plan." My publisher, the printer, my physician, repeated colloquially the same refrain "uz jsme prodany." The legionnaires, as I said before, were discarding their French medals in front of the legation. But there was no panic, no passionate outbursts. We are told that general mobilization was promulgated at 10 p. m. that evening. In view of the situation it was an amusing comedy of which I saw a part on Saturday and Sunday. What Benes says is a novelesque invention, calculated to mislead posterity into the belief of his great powers as a thinker: this method he copied from his master and from the French historians who dramatized the German retreat on September 6, 1914, into a great victory on the Marne. The night for me was indeed hectic: All of a sudden bed bugs appeared from nowhere, and the night clerk had to give me another mattress; the night was completely dark, except for an isolated little light that appeared in an attic, and some "civil defense" fool was constantly and uselessly yelling somewhere on the roof "Zhasnete svetlo" (Put out the light) ! When Mr. Benes writes, and the author of the article (Odlozilik) muses on a supposed tenseness in Prague that night, they are telling a story. The tenseness existed only on Monday evening, September 19th: after that the people were fully aware of the great comedy "uz jsme prodani." Friday noon I had my last "pecena husa s knedliky a zelim" (roast goose with dumplings and kraut) in the P. R. D. - Prazsky representacni dfun) - with the usual first class waiter service in coat tails, with Pilsen beer for 35 crowns, about one dollar. At S LOVAKIA 47 that time we had no inkling of the "vseobecna mobilisace" (general mobilization) being thought of or planned by the great Edvard. As I perfectly recall it, the people as a whole were resigned to see the occupation of the Sudeten as a fait accompli since September 18th. On Saturday morning, when I came down to the cafe, I saw myself in a queer predicament. General mobilization was in progress and, as a consequence, there were no taxis, and even the street cars did not seem to function. Suddenly I saw a familiar face coming into the parlor: Vojta Benes - whom I knew so well since the time he made fiery speeches against Austria, in 1916-1918, in America - then lived like a satrap in a beautiful villa in Jevany as a great Socialist Minister of Education, who fought the Roman Catholic Church, while his brother was a matriculated "paper" Catholic. He was surrounded by a number of friends and they were talking about going abroad. I had to take my two hand bags and walk all the way to the Masaryk - former Franz Josef - station using the trusty power of my arm muscles. The streets were swarming with silent reservists on their way to the railroad stations, each carrying a small hand bag. There was no military preparedness among them: they looked more like excursionists. The whole station was likewise swarming with men between thirty and fifty years of age. Toward noon it became somewhat warm, and these masses of men were quenching their thirst with steins of beer, laughing and joking. The "rychlovlak" Berlin-Vienna was to arrive at about 2 p. m., and was to be the last train leaving the country in that direction. My only concern were my books. At about 1:30 p. m., I telephoned to the shipping agency and was told that my books had arrived in good order and were to be delivered the next week at their destination. The express did not arrive on time and there was an hourly announcement of its being late. If the Czecho-Slovak generals were wondering why the Luftwaffe did not bomb Ceska Trebova - Bohumin, on September 23rd, they must have been completely misled by Benes's comedy. The Luftwaffe knew full well that the occupation of the Sudeten was a fait accompli. The 48 SLOVAKIA whole inside of the station, with thousands of reservists drinking beer, eating frankfurters, and joking, bespoke a total confidence that there would be no war, no air raid, no shooting. The express finally arrived at about six p. m. I had a second class ticket, but found at once that this meant nothing, because all the compartments were being taken by reservists; all seats were occupied and the gangways were likewise filled. In a second class compartment I found two foreigners, a South African of Jewish origin and a young German dancing girl from Budapest. The express soon started on its way in the twilight through the central part of Bohemia, via Kolin and Pardubice to Ceska Trebova. In the fields and meadows the peasants were still working and were waving "Na zdaaar!" (Success!) to the occupants of the train - the defenders of the fatherland on their way to the frontier. As I think of it now, I cannot refrain from shedding tears at recalling how these simple folks were being deceived and sold down the river by England and France as if they were an African Zulu tribe or Gurkhas of India, or Bambaras. These were my people: here I was born, here I grew up, and I knew the simple soul and the good heart of these country people who foolishly trusted Masaryk and Benes. Now I recall that on Friday voices were heard: "Povesit Benese na brane hradu" (Hang Benes on the castle gate). And if, on Monday, General Syrovy urged Benes to leave Prague, it was not because of any fear of the Luftwaffe, but because of the wrath of the people. One of the tricks of the general mobilization was to send the German reservists to Slovakia and the Slovaks to the Sudeten regions. Standing in the gangway, while the express was speeding forward to Ceska Trebova without intermediate stops, I listened to the story of a young German reservist. He seemed to be quite loyal to the Republic and no Nazi enthusiast, but he explained to me the situation which faced all non-Czechs, namely, that of obtaining positions to make a living. The Germans could never hope to become as perfect in Czech as the Czechs and, therefore, where a SLOVAKIA 49 perfect knowledge of Czech was required, they never could obtain the most advantageous job. Many of the young Sudeten Germans were trying to obtain work in the Third Reich. This was really the primary determining factor of the defection of the Germans, Magyars and Slovaks. Remedy? Either birth control or emigration. The young dancer was quite optimistic: "That whole thing will be settled in two weeks. I am now going to Budapest, and then I will come back to Prague." I had to stand all the way to Brno. There most of the crowd dispersed. From Brno we were to continue to Breclava-Lundenburg, and then on to Vienna. At Breclava we were told that the frontier was closed. We could go to Bratislava if we so wished. The South African found in me a willing cicerone. We had to pay additional fare of some 20 crowns. We arrived in Bratislava about midnight. The station was literally swarming with reservists, each with his little bag, moving to and fro like a mob without any organization. When an elderly man with a small baggage cart came along, in the scanty light, I engaged him to take my two bags and the South African's baggage to the nearest hotel opposite the station. When we arrived there the night clerk told us that all rooms were occupied by Czecho-Slovak army officers. He presumed that all the hotels in the city had been similarly taken over as a mobilization measure, but he volunteered to telephone to Hotel Carlton and find out what the situation was. We were lucky: there were still two single rooms available at 20 crowns (75 cents) with "raiiajky" (breakfast). Carlton Hotel was to send a taxi to bring us downtown which was quite a distance from the station. It was about one a. m., and the city, scantily lighted, was remarkably quiet: one would not have suspected at all that the station was swarming with reservists speeding to their destination, to the frontier. The hotel proved to be quite modern and well appointed. In the morning, when at about 9 a. m. - it was Sunday, September 25th - I came down to have my breakfast, I saw the South African leaving in a great hurry in a taxi. He said he had a visa for Hungary and had tOI 50 SLOVAKIA make haste to reach the frontier before it might be closed. The hotel personnel could not give me any information as to what the situation was on the Austrian frontier. Since March, Austria was a part of the Third Reich. Consequently, I had to set out in an adventurous quest of information by taking the electric tramway to Petrzalka and then walk along the highway to where the frontier could be distinguished by curious quonsset-like structures. Detachments of soldiers were distributed along the road. They were all Magyars and not perturbed in the least: certainly not like troops expecting a sudden attack from anywhere. It was about eleven a. m. and fairly warm, the sun was brightly shining. When I came to a quonsset and asked where I could cross the frontier, I was waved back and asked to try the other quonsset about half a mile further to the right. There I was told that the queer structures were "military objects" or a part of a chain of fortifications. The Czecho-Slovak Magyar soldiers seemed to be quite amused at my confusion seeing me going up and down across fields, but, even though it was quite obvious that I was a foreigner, no one stopped me to ask for identification papers. Finally I emerged from the fields on another main highway which seemed to lose itself among tall poplar trees in the distance. It was about one p. m. The whole countryside was completely deserted. Suddenly I espied a hatless young man walking toward me from the Austrian frontier; he proved to be a German from Vienna who had to escape from the police - he said - because he was a Socialist and not friendly to the Nazis. He hoped to be able to reach Reichenberg (Liberec) in Bohemia where he had friends. This certainly was a lucky encounter. First of all, he told me that the frontier was open, though barricaded on the Slovak side, and that the tramway to Vienna was functioning. Furthermore, he had about 8 marks and needed Czecho-Slovak crowns. I had only 5 marks and about 200 crowns left. I offered to ·buy his marks at 8 crowns. We walked to a restaurant on the right bank of the Danube, opposite the Stefanik monument, and had a good lunch of roast pork, dumplings, and sauerkraut at 10 crowns each, SLOVAKIA 51 and some beer. After I paid the bill, we crossed the river on a ferry to the monument. It was a beautiful Sunday afternoon and everything was perfectly calm. I returned to the hotel and told the young man to meet me at 3 p. m., when I expected to be ready to leave by taxi for the frontier: the chauffeur asked double fare, because it was Sunday, namely, 66 crowns. The fugitive came to the hotel punctually at 3 p. m. I gave him 60 crowns for his eight marks and he gave me an envelope with a key which he said was from his room in Vienna: all I had to do was to drop it in a post office box after reaching Vienna. We parted. I paid my bill at the hotel, and the taxi took less than half an hour to reach the Austrian frontier. The Czech custom officers at the barricade let me go through after looking at my passport; then I had to carry my two bags to the German Customs quite a ways off. The commanding officer was a Prussian from Berlin; he was supposed to wean the Austrians from their Gemlitlickeit and make them fast and efficient. Occasionally, an airplane lazily crossed the horizon. Not a sign of any soldiers or prepartions for warlike movements. The Berliner looked at my passport, did not even ask me to open my bags. All he wanted to know was what was going on in Bratislava. "General mobilization," I said. He wanted to know whether I had noticed the numbers of the regiments. "I noticed nothing; all I wanted to do was to cross the frontier and go to Vienna by the electric tramway." "Danke, mein Herr," he said very politely, "die elektrische Bahn geht um ungefiihr flinf Uhr ab." I took my bags to a sort of an open waiting room where I found other passengers waiting: Austrians who had the appearance of excursionists, curious about what was going on. During the two-hour wait, which was rather tedious, I noticed another plane lazily patroling the sky. In comparison with the swarming crowds of reservists I had seen on the night previous, this Austrian countryside looked like a calm picnic park. We left toward six p. m. and in all the stations Sunday excursionists were boarding the train. My interrupted ticket to Merano was valid. At about 8 p. m. we were in Vienna. One solitary airplane was circling 52 SLOVAKIA about the city. I took the streetcar to the Slidbahnhof and went to a hotel which I knew from my previous trips. The rooms which formerly cost 6 shillings now cost 6 marks: the clerk told me on the sly that the liberation and incorporation in the Great Fatherland had been a rather costly affair for the gemlitliche Austrians. In the morning, before boarding the train for San Candido (formerly Innichen) in the Dolomites - formerly a part of the Austrian Tyrol - I dropped the envelope containing the key in the post office box. Then the train transported me from a congested military atmosphere into the old time freedom which my soul always craved ever since I left Austria-Hungary in 1903. In many ways it was a memorable day for me this Monday, September 26th. In the soft beams of the morning sun I could see old Vienna for the last time in its stiU gemtitlich aspect - this Vindobona, where Marcus Aurelius jotted down his thoughts in Greek, the Imperial city, saved in 1683 from the Turkish hordes of Kara Mustafa by Czech defenders and Jan Sobieski's Polish army, and the merry center of West-Eastern melodies of Mozart and the Lustige Witwe in 1909, with the rumblings of the first world war in the distance. The city of many races and languages and strange love habits which a Moravian Jewish medic mistook for something universal. Before leaving the hotel at Bratislava on the foregoing Sunday afternoon, I could read my last feuilleton in the Narodni Listy, in which I pleaded for keeping Karlovy Vary free from all political strife and agitation. As the train was speeding through the Austrian and later Styrian country side, I mused over my recollections. The parade in Prague on the first of May, 1934, when at the very end of a long defile of Workers Socialist organizations I was looking, on the corner of Jecna ulice and Karlovo namesti, at the small motley group of Communists guarded by two policemen. They stopped right in front of my vantage point, because the defile had to stop marching somewhere on Vodickova ulice. There must have been a silent mockery in my look which provoked one of the Commies to step forward and come near me with a some- SLOVAKIA 53 what menacing look. But he had to moderate himself in the policeman's presence. " Co se tak posmesne usmivate ?" (What are you smiling so scoffingly) he asked with a Podskalak accent mixed with Jewish intonation. "Coz kdybych vam tak jednu lajsknul ?" (Suppose I smack you one?) he went on and added: "No jste starej clovek .. .. " (But you are an old man). This was rather ludricous fanfarronade, but indicated how daring a Commie could be at the time, knowing that old Masaryk needed the ten Communist votes in the Parliament for his reelection which was to take place on May 24th. I asked the little Jew what he was so angry about - and he said: "If you had six kids at home and not much to eat ... " and I said - "Why have six kids?" The policeman motioned to him to join his group - about fifty in all - and the defile resumed its march. Who could have dreamt then that this little group of riffraff would one day rule Bohemia? And I recalled October, 1934, when I saw between six and ten thousand German Socialists march along the main street of Karlovy Vary, Vfidelni ulice, with their red flags, boldly sticking out their clenched fists and shouting "Freiheit!" The Czech state police protected their march, a very provocative gesture in a 100 percent rightist, bourgeois city. I asked the policeman: "Proc je zde nechali pochodovat ?" (Why did they let them march here?) - "Protoze jsou statotvorna strana" (because they are a regular political party in the State). This was perhaps intended to discourage the Germans in Karlovy Vary from becoming partisans of Konrad Henlein, Hitler's agent. But the Sudeten Germans had only three choices: Caor as they called it tholic, Socialist or Nationalist "schwarz, Sozi oder Nazi," and this was the reason why a large number voted Nazi without being exactly admirers of Adolf Hitler. To me this Socialist defile was a surprise I had seen the same type of people march in Madrid on May first the year before with clenched fists and shouting: "U Ache Pe" - which stood for "Unios Hermanos Proletarios" or "Proletarians of all lands unite!" And three weeks later after the Socialist march in Karlovy Vary, I happened to be in Munich on the Parteitag, November 8th, 54 SLOVAKIA when that great Catholic city was flooded with huge red flags with the Swastika or Hakenkreuz. On the 9th I was told that university professors had to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler: "Wie werden auf Hitler vereidigt!" After the vote on January 13, 1935, when I was in Rome, France let Hitler occupy the Saar; in March, France and England allowed Hitler to rearm and no energetic steps were taken against the projected invasion of Ethiopia which started on October 3rd. On February 16, 1936, I saw the elections in Spain in Granada. I saw how the socalled Republican government did not stop violent acts against the Rightists, and I left for France at the end of May when I saw that a conflict was imminent. It actually started on July 18th when Berlin was beflagged on the occasion of Olympic games. Paris blamed London quite rightly, but had no courage to act independently And I especially thought of that evening at WUrzburg on May 25, 1935, when I had to sit out the whole radio address by Adolf Hitler about the immense danger which an unarmed Germany was exposed to in view of the Bolshevik menace. Hitler was enumerating the warships which Germany had to sink in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles and emphasized her present helplessness to face the great menace from the East. In view of the mighty Republic of Poland and the Little Entente no such danger existed. One phrase I remember well with all the inner vibration of Hitler's voice: "Wir Nazionalsozialisten sind fanatische Gegner des Bolschewismus: zwischen uns und den Bolschewiken kann nie eine Freundschaft bestehen." (We National Socialists are fanatical opponents of Bolshevism: there can never be friendship between us and the Bolsheviks). The hotel guests had to stand up and sing Horst Wessel Lied - I alone remained seated, no one said a word of protest. They knew I was a foreigner and had nothing to do with their national problems. The next day I was discussing the situation with young Germans. _Not only did they not oppose the rearming of Germany, but strangely enough they had the same argument which I have heard the militarists advance everywhere in the world: "Der Militardienst macht einen Kerl SLOVAKIA 55 aus Einem." (Military service makes a man out of a boy). In Berlin I saw everywhere defiant posters with the legend: "Die feinen Flugmaschinen, die unserm Flihrer dienen." (Fine airplanes that serve our Flihrer) . And trainloads of huge logs were coming to Germany from Carpatho-Russian forests furnishing wood for the airplanes. Could not the English and French diplomats and military attaches see all this? There still was time for a concerted action to stop the Hitler-Goring madness. In Erlangen - Bavaria - the people were expecting the CzechoSlovak army to march in at any rrioment in accordance with the Versailles Treaty. But nothing happened, because the British opposed strong action in order not to spoil good business. And now I saw my native land sacrificed by Western diplomacy, so the brilliant embassy parties and dances and cocktail drinking could go on undisturbed in Paris and London. And what was true of the Bohemian Crown lands was mutatis mutandis true of Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia. Recollections! The train arrived at Klagenfurt, via Graz and Zidani Most, the territory of germanized Slovenes. I was the only foreigner on board, and when we crossed into the Italian territory I was the only passenger from the frontier to San Candido. When we were somewhere between Klagenfurt and the frontier on the Austrian territory, the conductors would quickly sprint inside the station to listen to the radio which between eight and nine in the evening was blaring Hitler's violent attack on Benes at the Sportpalast. Only once was I sufficiently interested to get off and listen to the shrill tones of Hitler's voice familiar to me since the two and one-half hour speech at Wlirzburg three years before. At Benecko it was dampened by static. By chance I caught exactly the passage when Adolf was roaring in his best form, as if he were challenging Edward to a duel: "Hier stehe ich, dort steht Herr Benesch" (here I stand and there stands Benes) and the rest I do not remember because I had to board the train again. At Innichen - San Candido I found myself in the old Austrian atmosphere of my youth. The hotel was an old 56 SLOVAKIA fashioned Tyrolese inn with large and quiet rooms, without any running water, but a huge comfortable bed. Though it was very late - after eleven p. m. - a good Tyrolese housewife made a Wiener Schnitzel for me which was even better than the one I had eaten at Benecko. I slept wonderfully well and in the morning could admire the splendid sight of the Dolomiten without the slightest thought of war. From there I went to Merano and followed the Traubenkur a whole month while the Munich comedy was being played by Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini, who in the end got the most credit in the Corriere della Sera for having saved the peace. Merano was filled with all types of strange refugees, male and female, of the Milena characteristics which might have interested a Kraft-Ebbing. It is to be deplored that many university professors in Europe and America are muckracking in this sort of "literature." In view of the factual observations of an eyewitness possessing a perfect knowledge of Czech, German, Slovak, Polish, Russian, French, English and Italian - namely the languages involved in the great sellout - the idle musings and speculations both of Benes and the reviewer (Odlozilik) of Mnichovske dny, fade into the realm of Hollywood make-believe of Cecil de Mille's Ten Commandments. The general mobilization did not electrify the people at all, but was a huge comedy smacking to some extent of the good soldier Svejk. The reservists drank beer, ate frankfurters, joked, and knew that the whole thing was a picnic. Those of the Sudeten Germans among them, who knew Czech well, acted as Henlein's spies. The chain of fortifi~ations on which Benes spent over a billion crowns was just as useless as the French Maginot line proved to be later. Nothing could have stopped the Nazi tanks and the Czech regions could have been reduced to ashes by the Luftwaffe which had reportedly 15,000 planes, or ten times more than the reputed Czech air force. The 800,000 reservists were merely a mob compared to the disciplined nazi war machine. All this can be clearly seen from the illustrations showing Adolf "the savior" at the head of his Panzers on the Theaterplatz in Karlovy Vary, speaking to the enthusiastic crowds on October 15th. There is only one "author" whose methods resemble SLOVAKIA 57 those of Benes, namely Harry Truman, when it comes to complete distortion of facts. However, the Czech people of today, just like the American people of today, will not be easily persuaded to believe fairy tales. • • • MARTIN RAZUS (1883-1937) JOSEPH A. MIKUS The era, which opened for the Slovak nation in 1918, marks a rapid advance in the direction of the realization of its political aspirations. This is indubitably connected with the fall of feudalism and with the over-all extension of the significance of national individualities as political realities in Central Europe. To these external factors there are added also internal forces. And here, from among the many personalities which contributed handsomely to the spiritual and political crystallization of conditions in Slovakia, it behooves us today to recall one name: Martin Razus. While Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest, was becoming the leading figure of the political movement for Slovak autonomy for rather social reasons, in the meantime his contemporary and friend, Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister, poet and writer, was emerging as a defender of the political individuality of the Slovak nation for cultural and psychological reasons. In another respect, while Andrew Hlinka, as a man of action, engages in the fight against the leftist, religious, moral and political relativism of Masaryk's school and is drawn into the violent whirlpool of national activity, thus becoming top guard of national awareness, in the meantime, Martin Razus, with fire in his soul and the laurel of a man of letters on his head, devotes himself, according to his nature, rather to the spiritual processes of the national development of the Slovaks. With his ear close to the bosom of the nation, he catches the spiritual vibrations of the people in order to present them in his work a bit later to the public whom he chose to serve. It was thus that Razus became the "conscience of the nation." Even though the motives of Hlinka and Razus for po-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Edvard Beneš on Munich Days Description An account of the resource A. R. Nykl Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (24-25), September-December 1957 pp. 35-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Nykl, A. R. (Alois Richard), 1885-1958 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1957 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f6ae8ca91a79ec7fce08f88c521a2e71.pdf 9c9c0537daff002f613c92fa6496f927 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. 56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Edward Beneš - Stalin's Stooge Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 52-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/96c88b0c43ad0dee0c1922896b17068a.pdf 9a5cce28c1f8b40e16f0754233eab5dc PDF Text Text 58 SLOVAKIA ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG A Survey of Slovak Church Music BY ,SISTE R M. PASCH AL , SS. C. M. Characterized from the very dawn of history as a singing people, the 'S lovaks readily consecrated this talent to God's service when the glad tidings of the Gospel were brought to them more than eleven hundred years ago. Christianization of the Slovaks dates back to the ninth century, to the consecration of the first Catholic church, built by Prince Pribina in Nitra in 833. Thereafter, down through the centuries, the Slovak people have been praising God with hymns and songs. In prosperity and in adversity, in the humble church of an obscure village as well as in a baroque cathedral like that of Kosice, at the simple tasks about the home as well as on festive pilgrimages, centuries ago as well as in our own day the hymn and the chant are offered to God by generation after generation of Slovak Catholics. In recent times Slovak congregational singing attracted considerable attention during the pilgrimages which the Federation of Slovak Catholics sponsored to shrines in Canada, New York, Philadelphia, Scranton, and Washington, D. C. Onlokers were frankly amazed at the spectacle. Rarely, if ever, had they seen such large groups united in prayerful song. It is truly an inspiration to hear the Slovaks sing at their religious services especially where there is congregational participation. How did the ancestors of Modern Slovaks develop their religious music and how closely does it follow the spirit of the liturgy ? From the earliest Christian era the Catholic Church has solicitously guarded the art and purity of music in Her public worship. In this respect Church authori'ties in Slovakia were exceptionally vigilant. The Byzantine rite with its exquisitely melodic liturgy was introduced amonf the Slovaks by SS. Cyril and Methodius in 863. Through their apostles the Slovak people likewise learned to foster a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, a devotion which is so deeply rooted among the �SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks that in most of their churches it is still customary for the Rosary Society to sing Marian hymns in public procession after High Mass on the first Sunday of the month. The saintly brothers translated the missal (Kievsky misal), the ritual (Euchologium Sinajske), the breviary and a collection of liturgical hymns (strumicky oktoich) into Old Slavonic. When they visited Rome to confer with the Holy Father, Pope Adrian LI placed these liturgical books on the Blessed Virgin's altar and blessed them. Then he permitted SS. Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language in the Hturgy. "Hospodine, pomiluj ny," whose author very likely was St. Methodius himself, is the only hymn preserved from that period. For several centuries the development of religious music was halted by persecutions directed against the Old Slavonic liturgy and sterile period followed. By the twelfth century, however, various diocesan synods began to approve directives for liturgical singing. A summary of the most important of these would include the following: In 1114 the Synod of Ostrihom legislated that only hymns approved by Church authorities be used in the churches. In 1494 the Synod of Nitra directed that Holy Mass be accompanied with singing in all parish churches. The Synod of Trnava in 1560 commanded under pain of censure that no hymns either in the vernacular or in Latin be admitted for church use unless it could be ascertained that they had been approved by ecclesiastical authorities over a hundred years ago, lest the faithful by 'their very attraction to exercises of devotion be misled into heresy. In 1638 the Synod of Trnava char.ged a committee of competent musicians to collect liturgical hymns sung by the people and have them presented to Church authorities for approval and publication. This measure was needed to guard against the infiltration of Protestant influence which tried to establish itself with the seventeenth century's creation and importation of new homes. Composers of proved merit contributed to ~andard collections of �60 SLOVAKIA Slovak hymns and preserved acceptable manuscript copies. One such manuscript collection was Antifonae et cantiones variae cum notis musicis Slavonice et latine. rt comprises 338 sheets of copy. Another which is dated 1657 was Cantilenae conventus Lauritani ord. Serv. B. V. M. An even greater revival was brought about when the Slovak Jesuits founded the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent (1545-1'563) they collected the ancient Slovak liturgical hymns and prepared for the press the first printed Slovak hymnal Cantus Catholici. lt was published in two editions: in 1655 and in 1700 and it has been proved that its compiler was a Slovak Jesuit, Benedikt Szollossi (1601:J1656). Cantus Catholici has three hundred eighteen pages of unisonous hymns. Of these, sixty-two are Latin and two hundred twenty-seven are Slovak. In 1937 Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky revived about seventy hymns from the threehundred-year-old Cantus Catholici by introducing a modernized form of them in the Jedno,tny katolicky spevnik of which we shall speak presently. Cantus C3itholici is uniquely valuable from the musical standpoint inasmuch as its sources are traceable to Gregorian Chant. The ancient Slovak hymns preserved in it exemplify the use of tropes among the Slavs as early as the close of the Middle Ages. Tropes, of course, are a more or less poe'tical commentary that is woven into the liturgical text, forming with it a complete unit ; it is an interpolation in a liturgical text or the embellishment brought about by such interpolation, that is, insertions or additions. Let us take the Kyrie E1eison from tlhe Ordinary of the Mass as an example. On the last syllable of the "Kyrie" where a melisma was sung, a phrase or a stanza was composed to fit the melisma. In this way some additional text was inserted between the "Kyrie" and the "eleison." Consequently, a melismatic Kyrie had nine stanzaic insertions. The Gregorian Kyrie II in mode 3 carried this interpolation thus: Kyrie - fons bonitatis, Pater ingeniti, a quo cuncta procedunt - eleison. The Cau.tus Catholici has a �SLOVAKIA 61 closely paralleled translation of this interpolation: Hospodine, studnice dobrotj, Otce nerozeny, od teba wssecko dobre pochazi - smiluj sa natl nami. This is one example of how the ancient vernacular hymns of the Slovaks were developed in Gregorian style, characterized pricipally by the use of modal modulations and cadences ending on the dominant. It is interesting to note that a number of Slovak folk songs (of which there are some 40,000) were also developed in the same manner. The Latin preface of the Cantus Catholici points out the fact that the liturgy was performed in the vernacular at the altar and in choir. The hymns and psalms taug,ht in church were frequently repeated with much spirit at recreation and feasts, in the vineyards and in the field. In the course of time manuscripts of church music were collected by interested individuals. Outstanding among the composers and compilers were Pavlin Bajan (1783), a Franciscan; and later Andrej Radlinsky and Frantisek Sasinek, two priests who made a noteworthy contribution by their 1872 publication of Vseobecna sbierka cirkevnych katolickych pesniciek slovenskych, which contained 1,047 hymns. The Society of St. Adalbert commissioned Frantisek Matzenauer, a priest director, and Joseph Mathulay, an organist, to write the accompaniments for the above mentioned collection. The result was Duchovny spevnik katolicky (1882). In response to the November 22, 1903 "Motu Proprio" of St. Pius X , a national hymnal entitled Nabozny kresfan containing 400 hymns was compiled by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka and Joseph Chladek in 1906. A unique contribution to Catholic Slovak hymnody is the voluminous Jednotny katolicky spevnik (1937). lt was projected at a meeting held by the Society of St. Adalbert on March 8, 1921, when in the presence of three newly consecrated Slovak bishops and at their direction it was resolved to compile and publish a new hymnal. Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky, a highly reputable Slovak composer, was commissioned to harmonize and arrange the Slovak hymns. Committees on liturgy, literature, and hymnody collaborated with Schneider-Trnavs'ky in this re- �62 SLOVAKIA sponsible undertaking. For ten years they devoted themselves to the dedicated work of collecting the treasures of Slovak Church music, to discriminate, to discard whatever might be classified as undesirable and to preserve or to restore all that was worthy. The Committees observed the directives contained in the "Motu Proprio" of Pope Pius X and in the "Apostolic Constitution (December 22, 1928) of Pope Pius XI. The extensive bibliography enumerates references to thirty-three printed hymnals and onehundred-four printed manuals and prayer books; six manuscript collections of hymns without melodies and ten manuscript collections with melodies. All these were studied with scholarly diligence. Of the five hundred forty-one hymns listed in the index of the Jednotny katolicky spevnik those devoted to Christmas, Lent, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin Mary are most largely represented. The contents are arranged according to the liturgical year with specific recommedations for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, for liturgical processions, and for various other religious functions. Out of consideration for the needs of the congregation, the limitations of school children, and the abilities of trained choirs who would use the hymnal, the compiler also included carols, hymns for pilgrimages, choral Slovak Mass hymns, and Latin hymns. It may be asked what qualities characterize Slovak liturgical and reltgious hymns. Careful study will show that it is their singular charm to have those very characteristics which are recommended in the "Musicae Sacrae Disciplina" (December 25, 1955) of Pope Pius Xfil. Slovak hymns confirm fully to Christian teaching, they use simple tunes and simple words, and they possess religious dignity and becoming gravity. They make no provisions for brilliant solos, they exhibit no florid styles, no elaborate cadences, no suggestive worldliness or sentimentality to distract the devotion of the worshippers. The music of the Mass hymns is consonant with the religious expression contained in the texts of the Ordinary of the Mass. As a matter of fact the very text of the �SLOVAKIA 63 Mass hymns is a close paraphrase of the text of the Ordinary. These Mass hymns are still sung in Slovak parish churches both in America and abroad during the Missa Cantata. By them the choir and the congregation are enabled to unite closely with the priest in the sacred action of the Mass. Most of the hymns for Lent and Advent are written in a minor tonality and express sincere expectation, longing, love, hope, and sorrow. Diatonic progressions and sequential melodic passages make the tunes naturally singable, and the inert musical signs of the Christmas and Easter hymns come to life best when they are sung and played by souls radiating a great love for God. Marian hymns expand the praises sung in honor of the Mother of God to very numerous lines comprising more than one hundred hymns. Generally the refrain reiterates the message of her feasts or a particular supplication. Hymns in honor of the Blessed Sacrament and the Saints as well as pilgrimages and processional hymns vary in their messages and expressions but they retain the same commendable simplicity of melody subordinated to the prayerfulness of the words. The melodic structure of the Chant depends on the accent which is the soul of the Latin word. Slovak vernacular hymns which are reliable translations from Latin texts are easily adapted to Gregorian Chant since the accent and the word order of the Slovak language readily correspond to the Latin original in very many instances. A few hymns that illustrate this adaptability from Latin to Slovak are : Stabat Mater - Sta.la Matka (Sequence) Lauda Sion - Chval' Sione (Sequence) Pange Lingua - Javte usta Adore Te - Klaniam sa Ti J esu Dulcis - J ezu sladky The genuineness and the excellence of Slovak hymn tones was recognized by such an authority as Nicola A. Montani, the compiler of the Saint Gregory Hymnal (1920). �64 SLOVAKIA Mr. Montani incorporated into this American hymn book over twenty Slovak hymn tunes for which he adapted English texts and one setting for the "Tantum Ergo." In his encyclical on sacred music the late Pope Pius XII mentioned that hymns are effective in the religious instruction of boys and girls. It is worthy of mention that children in iSlovakia sang their catechism at least as early as 1913. Andrej Camba!, a Slovak Jesuit, translated into Slovak the catechism hymns originally used by Ignac Parhamer, a Jesuit missionary who instructed the people of Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth century. In his preface Father Camba! wrote : "I present this Catechism to you in song, that you may learn Christian Doctrine in a delightful manner and have it well impressed upon your minds." This survey may help to show how rich is the heritage of sacred music which has been preserved by the Slovak people, who justly pride themselves on having 2,000 hymns in their treasury of music. These hymns are the expression of the mind and heart of the Church regarding sacred music. They also embody the joyous and prayerful spirit of a singing people. (Caecilia, Vol. 85, No. 2) • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Iaitest stateanenJts ail.ways stres.setl, tihait OUT pact of alliamce with Soviet Russia and our friendshl!p with other Slav nations mwst not encroa;ch on o:ur friendly and cordiail relations with other dean0teratic states. This is .the natural desire, shared 1b y an enormous majority of our people, and nothing presvents us :fu-oan keeping the cc:xruftdence of the democratic states and stTe:nigthenmg and deepening our friendshl!p with our great western Allies. Moscow, too, wants ro fumow this line of po:lircy. rt will, however, be necessary for certain ,preijrumces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiil existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozeicho-Silovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � 58 SLOVAKIA ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG A Survey of Slovak Church Music BY ,SISTE R M. PASCH AL , SS. C. M. Characterized from the very dawn of history as a singing people, the 'S lovaks readily consecrated this talent to God's service when the glad tidings of the Gospel were brought to them more than eleven hundred years ago. Christianization of the Slovaks dates back to the ninth century, to the consecration of the first Catholic church, built by Prince Pribina in Nitra in 833. Thereafter, down through the centuries, the Slovak people have been praising God with hymns and songs. In prosperity and in adversity, in the humble church of an obscure village as well as in a baroque cathedral like that of Kosice, at the simple tasks about the home as well as on festive pilgrimages, centuries ago as well as in our own day the hymn and the chant are offered to God by generation after generation of Slovak Catholics. In recent times Slovak congregational singing attracted considerable attention during the pilgrimages which the Federation of Slovak Catholics sponsored to shrines in Canada, New York, Philadelphia, Scranton, and Washington, D. C. Onlokers were frankly amazed at the spectacle. Rarely, if ever, had they seen such large groups united in prayerful song. It is truly an inspiration to hear the Slovaks sing at their religious services especially where there is congregational participation. How did the ancestors of Modern Slovaks develop their religious music and how closely does it follow the spirit of the liturgy ? From the earliest Christian era the Catholic Church has solicitously guarded the art and purity of music in Her public worship. In this respect Church authori'ties in Slovakia were exceptionally vigilant. The Byzantine rite with its exquisitely melodic liturgy was introduced amonf the Slovaks by SS. Cyril and Methodius in 863. Through their apostles the Slovak people likewise learned to foster a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, a devotion which is so deeply rooted among the �SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks that in most of their churches it is still customary for the Rosary Society to sing Marian hymns in public procession after High Mass on the first Sunday of the month. The saintly brothers translated the missal (Kievsky misal), the ritual (Euchologium Sinajske), the breviary and a collection of liturgical hymns (strumicky oktoich) into Old Slavonic. When they visited Rome to confer with the Holy Father, Pope Adrian LI placed these liturgical books on the Blessed Virgin's altar and blessed them. Then he permitted SS. Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language in the Hturgy. "Hospodine, pomiluj ny," whose author very likely was St. Methodius himself, is the only hymn preserved from that period. For several centuries the development of religious music was halted by persecutions directed against the Old Slavonic liturgy and sterile period followed. By the twelfth century, however, various diocesan synods began to approve directives for liturgical singing. A summary of the most important of these would include the following: In 1114 the Synod of Ostrihom legislated that only hymns approved by Church authorities be used in the churches. In 1494 the Synod of Nitra directed that Holy Mass be accompanied with singing in all parish churches. The Synod of Trnava in 1560 commanded under pain of censure that no hymns either in the vernacular or in Latin be admitted for church use unless it could be ascertained that they had been approved by ecclesiastical authorities over a hundred years ago, lest the faithful by 'their very attraction to exercises of devotion be misled into heresy. In 1638 the Synod of Trnava char.ged a committee of competent musicians to collect liturgical hymns sung by the people and have them presented to Church authorities for approval and publication. This measure was needed to guard against the infiltration of Protestant influence which tried to establish itself with the seventeenth century's creation and importation of new homes. Composers of proved merit contributed to ~andard collections of �60 SLOVAKIA Slovak hymns and preserved acceptable manuscript copies. One such manuscript collection was Antifonae et cantiones variae cum notis musicis Slavonice et latine. rt comprises 338 sheets of copy. Another which is dated 1657 was Cantilenae conventus Lauritani ord. Serv. B. V. M. An even greater revival was brought about when the Slovak Jesuits founded the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent (1545-1'563) they collected the ancient Slovak liturgical hymns and prepared for the press the first printed Slovak hymnal Cantus Catholici. lt was published in two editions: in 1655 and in 1700 and it has been proved that its compiler was a Slovak Jesuit, Benedikt Szollossi (1601:J1656). Cantus Catholici has three hundred eighteen pages of unisonous hymns. Of these, sixty-two are Latin and two hundred twenty-seven are Slovak. In 1937 Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky revived about seventy hymns from the threehundred-year-old Cantus Catholici by introducing a modernized form of them in the Jedno,tny katolicky spevnik of which we shall speak presently. Cantus C3itholici is uniquely valuable from the musical standpoint inasmuch as its sources are traceable to Gregorian Chant. The ancient Slovak hymns preserved in it exemplify the use of tropes among the Slavs as early as the close of the Middle Ages. Tropes, of course, are a more or less poe'tical commentary that is woven into the liturgical text, forming with it a complete unit ; it is an interpolation in a liturgical text or the embellishment brought about by such interpolation, that is, insertions or additions. Let us take the Kyrie E1eison from tlhe Ordinary of the Mass as an example. On the last syllable of the "Kyrie" where a melisma was sung, a phrase or a stanza was composed to fit the melisma. In this way some additional text was inserted between the "Kyrie" and the "eleison." Consequently, a melismatic Kyrie had nine stanzaic insertions. The Gregorian Kyrie II in mode 3 carried this interpolation thus: Kyrie - fons bonitatis, Pater ingeniti, a quo cuncta procedunt - eleison. The Cau.tus Catholici has a �SLOVAKIA 61 closely paralleled translation of this interpolation: Hospodine, studnice dobrotj, Otce nerozeny, od teba wssecko dobre pochazi - smiluj sa natl nami. This is one example of how the ancient vernacular hymns of the Slovaks were developed in Gregorian style, characterized pricipally by the use of modal modulations and cadences ending on the dominant. It is interesting to note that a number of Slovak folk songs (of which there are some 40,000) were also developed in the same manner. The Latin preface of the Cantus Catholici points out the fact that the liturgy was performed in the vernacular at the altar and in choir. The hymns and psalms taug,ht in church were frequently repeated with much spirit at recreation and feasts, in the vineyards and in the field. In the course of time manuscripts of church music were collected by interested individuals. Outstanding among the composers and compilers were Pavlin Bajan (1783), a Franciscan; and later Andrej Radlinsky and Frantisek Sasinek, two priests who made a noteworthy contribution by their 1872 publication of Vseobecna sbierka cirkevnych katolickych pesniciek slovenskych, which contained 1,047 hymns. The Society of St. Adalbert commissioned Frantisek Matzenauer, a priest director, and Joseph Mathulay, an organist, to write the accompaniments for the above mentioned collection. The result was Duchovny spevnik katolicky (1882). In response to the November 22, 1903 "Motu Proprio" of St. Pius X , a national hymnal entitled Nabozny kresfan containing 400 hymns was compiled by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka and Joseph Chladek in 1906. A unique contribution to Catholic Slovak hymnody is the voluminous Jednotny katolicky spevnik (1937). lt was projected at a meeting held by the Society of St. Adalbert on March 8, 1921, when in the presence of three newly consecrated Slovak bishops and at their direction it was resolved to compile and publish a new hymnal. Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky, a highly reputable Slovak composer, was commissioned to harmonize and arrange the Slovak hymns. Committees on liturgy, literature, and hymnody collaborated with Schneider-Trnavs'ky in this re- �62 SLOVAKIA sponsible undertaking. For ten years they devoted themselves to the dedicated work of collecting the treasures of Slovak Church music, to discriminate, to discard whatever might be classified as undesirable and to preserve or to restore all that was worthy. The Committees observed the directives contained in the "Motu Proprio" of Pope Pius X and in the "Apostolic Constitution (December 22, 1928) of Pope Pius XI. The extensive bibliography enumerates references to thirty-three printed hymnals and onehundred-four printed manuals and prayer books; six manuscript collections of hymns without melodies and ten manuscript collections with melodies. All these were studied with scholarly diligence. Of the five hundred forty-one hymns listed in the index of the Jednotny katolicky spevnik those devoted to Christmas, Lent, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin Mary are most largely represented. The contents are arranged according to the liturgical year with specific recommedations for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, for liturgical processions, and for various other religious functions. Out of consideration for the needs of the congregation, the limitations of school children, and the abilities of trained choirs who would use the hymnal, the compiler also included carols, hymns for pilgrimages, choral Slovak Mass hymns, and Latin hymns. It may be asked what qualities characterize Slovak liturgical and reltgious hymns. Careful study will show that it is their singular charm to have those very characteristics which are recommended in the "Musicae Sacrae Disciplina" (December 25, 1955) of Pope Pius Xfil. Slovak hymns confirm fully to Christian teaching, they use simple tunes and simple words, and they possess religious dignity and becoming gravity. They make no provisions for brilliant solos, they exhibit no florid styles, no elaborate cadences, no suggestive worldliness or sentimentality to distract the devotion of the worshippers. The music of the Mass hymns is consonant with the religious expression contained in the texts of the Ordinary of the Mass. As a matter of fact the very text of the �SLOVAKIA 63 Mass hymns is a close paraphrase of the text of the Ordinary. These Mass hymns are still sung in Slovak parish churches both in America and abroad during the Missa Cantata. By them the choir and the congregation are enabled to unite closely with the priest in the sacred action of the Mass. Most of the hymns for Lent and Advent are written in a minor tonality and express sincere expectation, longing, love, hope, and sorrow. Diatonic progressions and sequential melodic passages make the tunes naturally singable, and the inert musical signs of the Christmas and Easter hymns come to life best when they are sung and played by souls radiating a great love for God. Marian hymns expand the praises sung in honor of the Mother of God to very numerous lines comprising more than one hundred hymns. Generally the refrain reiterates the message of her feasts or a particular supplication. Hymns in honor of the Blessed Sacrament and the Saints as well as pilgrimages and processional hymns vary in their messages and expressions but they retain the same commendable simplicity of melody subordinated to the prayerfulness of the words. The melodic structure of the Chant depends on the accent which is the soul of the Latin word. Slovak vernacular hymns which are reliable translations from Latin texts are easily adapted to Gregorian Chant since the accent and the word order of the Slovak language readily correspond to the Latin original in very many instances. A few hymns that illustrate this adaptability from Latin to Slovak are : Stabat Mater - Sta.la Matka (Sequence) Lauda Sion - Chval' Sione (Sequence) Pange Lingua - Javte usta Adore Te - Klaniam sa Ti J esu Dulcis - J ezu sladky The genuineness and the excellence of Slovak hymn tones was recognized by such an authority as Nicola A. Montani, the compiler of the Saint Gregory Hymnal (1920). �64 SLOVAKIA Mr. Montani incorporated into this American hymn book over twenty Slovak hymn tunes for which he adapted English texts and one setting for the "Tantum Ergo." In his encyclical on sacred music the late Pope Pius XII mentioned that hymns are effective in the religious instruction of boys and girls. It is worthy of mention that children in iSlovakia sang their catechism at least as early as 1913. Andrej Camba!, a Slovak Jesuit, translated into Slovak the catechism hymns originally used by Ignac Parhamer, a Jesuit missionary who instructed the people of Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth century. In his preface Father Camba! wrote : "I present this Catechism to you in song, that you may learn Christian Doctrine in a delightful manner and have it well impressed upon your minds." This survey may help to show how rich is the heritage of sacred music which has been preserved by the Slovak people, who justly pride themselves on having 2,000 hymns in their treasury of music. These hymns are the expression of the mind and heart of the Church regarding sacred music. They also embody the joyous and prayerful spirit of a singing people. (Caecilia, Vol. 85, No. 2) • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Iaitest stateanenJts ail.ways stres.setl, tihait OUT pact of alliamce with Soviet Russia and our friendshl!p with other Slav nations mwst not encroa;ch on o:ur friendly and cordiail relations with other dean0teratic states. This is .the natural desire, shared 1b y an enormous majority of our people, and nothing presvents us :fu-oan keeping the cc:xruftdence of the democratic states and stTe:nigthenmg and deepening our friendshl!p with our great western Allies. Moscow, too, wants ro fumow this line of po:lircy. rt will, however, be necessary for certain ,preijrumces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiil existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozeicho-Silovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVAKIA ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG A Survey of Slovak Church Music BY ,SISTE R M. PASCH AL , SS. C. M. Characterized from the very dawn of history as a singing people, the 'S lovaks readily consecrated this talent to God's service when the glad tidings of the Gospel were brought to them more than eleven hundred years ago. Christianization of the Slovaks dates back to the ninth century, to the consecration of the first Catholic church, built by Prince Pribina in Nitra in 833. Thereafter, down through the centuries, the Slovak people have been praising God with hymns and songs. In prosperity and in adversity, in the humble church of an obscure village as well as in a baroque cathedral like that of Kosice, at the simple tasks about the home as well as on festive pilgrimages, centuries ago as well as in our own day the hymn and the chant are offered to God by generation after generation of Slovak Catholics. In recent times Slovak congregational singing attracted considerable attention during the pilgrimages which the Federation of Slovak Catholics sponsored to shrines in Canada, New York, Philadelphia, Scranton, and Washington, D. C. Onlokers were frankly amazed at the spectacle. Rarely, if ever, had they seen such large groups united in prayerful song. It is truly an inspiration to hear the Slovaks sing at their religious services especially where there is congregational participation. How did the ancestors of Modern Slovaks develop their religious music and how closely does it follow the spirit of the liturgy ? From the earliest Christian era the Catholic Church has solicitously guarded the art and purity of music in Her public worship. In this respect Church authori'ties in Slovakia were exceptionally vigilant. The Byzantine rite with its exquisitely melodic liturgy was introduced amonf the Slovaks by SS. Cyril and Methodius in 863. Through their apostles the Slovak people likewise learned to foster a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, a devotion which is so deeply rooted among the SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks that in most of their churches it is still customary for the Rosary Society to sing Marian hymns in public procession after High Mass on the first Sunday of the month. The saintly brothers translated the missal (Kievsky misal), the ritual (Euchologium Sinajske), the breviary and a collection of liturgical hymns (strumicky oktoich) into Old Slavonic. When they visited Rome to confer with the Holy Father, Pope Adrian LI placed these liturgical books on the Blessed Virgin's altar and blessed them. Then he permitted SS. Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language in the Hturgy. "Hospodine, pomiluj ny," whose author very likely was St. Methodius himself, is the only hymn preserved from that period. For several centuries the development of religious music was halted by persecutions directed against the Old Slavonic liturgy and sterile period followed. By the twelfth century, however, various diocesan synods began to approve directives for liturgical singing. A summary of the most important of these would include the following: In 1114 the Synod of Ostrihom legislated that only hymns approved by Church authorities be used in the churches. In 1494 the Synod of Nitra directed that Holy Mass be accompanied with singing in all parish churches. The Synod of Trnava in 1560 commanded under pain of censure that no hymns either in the vernacular or in Latin be admitted for church use unless it could be ascertained that they had been approved by ecclesiastical authorities over a hundred years ago, lest the faithful by 'their very attraction to exercises of devotion be misled into heresy. In 1638 the Synod of Trnava char.ged a committee of competent musicians to collect liturgical hymns sung by the people and have them presented to Church authorities for approval and publication. This measure was needed to guard against the infiltration of Protestant influence which tried to establish itself with the seventeenth century's creation and importation of new homes. Composers of proved merit contributed to ~andard collections of 60 SLOVAKIA Slovak hymns and preserved acceptable manuscript copies. One such manuscript collection was Antifonae et cantiones variae cum notis musicis Slavonice et latine. rt comprises 338 sheets of copy. Another which is dated 1657 was Cantilenae conventus Lauritani ord. Serv. B. V. M. An even greater revival was brought about when the Slovak Jesuits founded the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent (1545-1'563) they collected the ancient Slovak liturgical hymns and prepared for the press the first printed Slovak hymnal Cantus Catholici. lt was published in two editions: in 1655 and in 1700 and it has been proved that its compiler was a Slovak Jesuit, Benedikt Szollossi (1601:J1656). Cantus Catholici has three hundred eighteen pages of unisonous hymns. Of these, sixty-two are Latin and two hundred twenty-seven are Slovak. In 1937 Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky revived about seventy hymns from the threehundred-year-old Cantus Catholici by introducing a modernized form of them in the Jedno,tny katolicky spevnik of which we shall speak presently. Cantus C3itholici is uniquely valuable from the musical standpoint inasmuch as its sources are traceable to Gregorian Chant. The ancient Slovak hymns preserved in it exemplify the use of tropes among the Slavs as early as the close of the Middle Ages. Tropes, of course, are a more or less poe'tical commentary that is woven into the liturgical text, forming with it a complete unit ; it is an interpolation in a liturgical text or the embellishment brought about by such interpolation, that is, insertions or additions. Let us take the Kyrie E1eison from tlhe Ordinary of the Mass as an example. On the last syllable of the "Kyrie" where a melisma was sung, a phrase or a stanza was composed to fit the melisma. In this way some additional text was inserted between the "Kyrie" and the "eleison." Consequently, a melismatic Kyrie had nine stanzaic insertions. The Gregorian Kyrie II in mode 3 carried this interpolation thus: Kyrie - fons bonitatis, Pater ingeniti, a quo cuncta procedunt - eleison. The Cau.tus Catholici has a SLOVAKIA 61 closely paralleled translation of this interpolation: Hospodine, studnice dobrotj, Otce nerozeny, od teba wssecko dobre pochazi - smiluj sa natl nami. This is one example of how the ancient vernacular hymns of the Slovaks were developed in Gregorian style, characterized pricipally by the use of modal modulations and cadences ending on the dominant. It is interesting to note that a number of Slovak folk songs (of which there are some 40,000) were also developed in the same manner. The Latin preface of the Cantus Catholici points out the fact that the liturgy was performed in the vernacular at the altar and in choir. The hymns and psalms taug,ht in church were frequently repeated with much spirit at recreation and feasts, in the vineyards and in the field. In the course of time manuscripts of church music were collected by interested individuals. Outstanding among the composers and compilers were Pavlin Bajan (1783), a Franciscan; and later Andrej Radlinsky and Frantisek Sasinek, two priests who made a noteworthy contribution by their 1872 publication of Vseobecna sbierka cirkevnych katolickych pesniciek slovenskych, which contained 1,047 hymns. The Society of St. Adalbert commissioned Frantisek Matzenauer, a priest director, and Joseph Mathulay, an organist, to write the accompaniments for the above mentioned collection. The result was Duchovny spevnik katolicky (1882). In response to the November 22, 1903 "Motu Proprio" of St. Pius X , a national hymnal entitled Nabozny kresfan containing 400 hymns was compiled by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka and Joseph Chladek in 1906. A unique contribution to Catholic Slovak hymnody is the voluminous Jednotny katolicky spevnik (1937). lt was projected at a meeting held by the Society of St. Adalbert on March 8, 1921, when in the presence of three newly consecrated Slovak bishops and at their direction it was resolved to compile and publish a new hymnal. Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky, a highly reputable Slovak composer, was commissioned to harmonize and arrange the Slovak hymns. Committees on liturgy, literature, and hymnody collaborated with Schneider-Trnavs'ky in this re- 62 SLOVAKIA sponsible undertaking. For ten years they devoted themselves to the dedicated work of collecting the treasures of Slovak Church music, to discriminate, to discard whatever might be classified as undesirable and to preserve or to restore all that was worthy. The Committees observed the directives contained in the "Motu Proprio" of Pope Pius X and in the "Apostolic Constitution (December 22, 1928) of Pope Pius XI. The extensive bibliography enumerates references to thirty-three printed hymnals and onehundred-four printed manuals and prayer books; six manuscript collections of hymns without melodies and ten manuscript collections with melodies. All these were studied with scholarly diligence. Of the five hundred forty-one hymns listed in the index of the Jednotny katolicky spevnik those devoted to Christmas, Lent, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin Mary are most largely represented. The contents are arranged according to the liturgical year with specific recommedations for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, for liturgical processions, and for various other religious functions. Out of consideration for the needs of the congregation, the limitations of school children, and the abilities of trained choirs who would use the hymnal, the compiler also included carols, hymns for pilgrimages, choral Slovak Mass hymns, and Latin hymns. It may be asked what qualities characterize Slovak liturgical and reltgious hymns. Careful study will show that it is their singular charm to have those very characteristics which are recommended in the "Musicae Sacrae Disciplina" (December 25, 1955) of Pope Pius Xfil. Slovak hymns confirm fully to Christian teaching, they use simple tunes and simple words, and they possess religious dignity and becoming gravity. They make no provisions for brilliant solos, they exhibit no florid styles, no elaborate cadences, no suggestive worldliness or sentimentality to distract the devotion of the worshippers. The music of the Mass hymns is consonant with the religious expression contained in the texts of the Ordinary of the Mass. As a matter of fact the very text of the SLOVAKIA 63 Mass hymns is a close paraphrase of the text of the Ordinary. These Mass hymns are still sung in Slovak parish churches both in America and abroad during the Missa Cantata. By them the choir and the congregation are enabled to unite closely with the priest in the sacred action of the Mass. Most of the hymns for Lent and Advent are written in a minor tonality and express sincere expectation, longing, love, hope, and sorrow. Diatonic progressions and sequential melodic passages make the tunes naturally singable, and the inert musical signs of the Christmas and Easter hymns come to life best when they are sung and played by souls radiating a great love for God. Marian hymns expand the praises sung in honor of the Mother of God to very numerous lines comprising more than one hundred hymns. Generally the refrain reiterates the message of her feasts or a particular supplication. Hymns in honor of the Blessed Sacrament and the Saints as well as pilgrimages and processional hymns vary in their messages and expressions but they retain the same commendable simplicity of melody subordinated to the prayerfulness of the words. The melodic structure of the Chant depends on the accent which is the soul of the Latin word. Slovak vernacular hymns which are reliable translations from Latin texts are easily adapted to Gregorian Chant since the accent and the word order of the Slovak language readily correspond to the Latin original in very many instances. A few hymns that illustrate this adaptability from Latin to Slovak are : Stabat Mater - Sta.la Matka (Sequence) Lauda Sion - Chval' Sione (Sequence) Pange Lingua - Javte usta Adore Te - Klaniam sa Ti J esu Dulcis - J ezu sladky The genuineness and the excellence of Slovak hymn tones was recognized by such an authority as Nicola A. Montani, the compiler of the Saint Gregory Hymnal (1920). 64 SLOVAKIA Mr. Montani incorporated into this American hymn book over twenty Slovak hymn tunes for which he adapted English texts and one setting for the "Tantum Ergo." In his encyclical on sacred music the late Pope Pius XII mentioned that hymns are effective in the religious instruction of boys and girls. It is worthy of mention that children in iSlovakia sang their catechism at least as early as 1913. Andrej Camba!, a Slovak Jesuit, translated into Slovak the catechism hymns originally used by Ignac Parhamer, a Jesuit missionary who instructed the people of Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth century. In his preface Father Camba! wrote : "I present this Catechism to you in song, that you may learn Christian Doctrine in a delightful manner and have it well impressed upon your minds." This survey may help to show how rich is the heritage of sacred music which has been preserved by the Slovak people, who justly pride themselves on having 2,000 hymns in their treasury of music. These hymns are the expression of the mind and heart of the Church regarding sacred music. They also embody the joyous and prayerful spirit of a singing people. (Caecilia, Vol. 85, No. 2) • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Iaitest stateanenJts ail.ways stres.setl, tihait OUT pact of alliamce with Soviet Russia and our friendshl!p with other Slav nations mwst not encroa;ch on o:ur friendly and cordiail relations with other dean0teratic states. This is .the natural desire, shared 1b y an enormous majority of our people, and nothing presvents us :fu-oan keeping the cc:xruftdence of the democratic states and stTe:nigthenmg and deepening our friendshl!p with our great western Allies. Moscow, too, wants ro fumow this line of po:lircy. rt will, however, be necessary for certain ,preijrumces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiil existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozeicho-Silovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Eleven Hundred Years of Prayerful Song: A Survey of Slovak Church Music Description An account of the resource Sister M. Paschal, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 58-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sister M. Paschal, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/435d5e0a1885ef6b9a7b8e06b05bd14d.pdf c5c748f9d85af7e64d5dbc4d33532fa6 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA ENSLAVERS OF THE CZECH NATION: HOW BENES "GOT" STRiBRNf (From the September 23, 1955, issue of "BOHEMIA," Czech monthl,y published by the Czech Democratic Federalists in Munich, Germany.) BY: SIRIUS Flrequently we fail to notice the flow of hi story. What to some of us is iapparently self-evident, that is fo.r many veiled by a cu:rtain of forgetfulness 'rund to the younger generation is something unknown. Forgetfulness and ignorance have created many Je,g ends, which have fatefully extended into the politic~ development of our natiOlll and have placed in ,power forces which had to coMapse again and again, ,b ecause they betrayed everything upon which the state was built .and that which formed its ideological substa:nce. Perhwps dt is ,t imely to remind the Czech public about the tirings we had witnessed, so that it might be able to form its own judgment and to create its own view. When the press reported the death of George Stribrny in the Ilava prison last summer (1955), the news shodked only those who knew him and witnessed his struggles. Not all these struggles were wa,ged "cleverly," ibut they were waged to the end which 'Stribmy ,guessed and supposed more than he reasonably knew: for the consolidation of democracy agai:ns,t aJl'bitrary power and violence. George Strib.rny was one of the "men of October 28th." This designation was no:t simply ,a n empty phvase. The Czecho-Slavak Republic did not come into existence just oult of nothing from the minds of statesmen; in the beginning its existence was doubtfuJ; aJD.d when T. G. Masaryk went out of Austria-Hung ary to attempt to Liberate the Czech nation from aibsolutism, he wanted only to gain respect for the constitutional rights o.f his nation, which aliready were guaranteed by the so-.caJled "October Rescript," in which the emperor solemnly :promised rto have ,h imself crowned as Czech king in /Prague. While aJbroad Masaryk had no other ooorception in the beginning. In a memorandum to the British foreign office, dated in April of 1915, T. G. Masaryk wrote: 1 �SLOVAKIA 53 "We intended to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is wanted only by a few radicals ••• Either the Allied Powers will give us one of their Princes, or there will be a personal union between Bohemia and Serbia ••• A Russian dynasty would be in every way popular ••. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive influence ••• " The idea of ,a Czecho~Slovak State ripened only gradually; the republican concept won out only under the influence of American Czec'llis and Slova!ks.. In the Pit,tsburgh Agreement, concluded by T. G. ,M asaryk with the American Slovaks on May '30, 1918, we read: "The Czecho-.Slovak StaJte shall be a Republic ... " This a,greement guaTanteed the Slovaks equal rights with the Czech nation, tha,t is, their own state government and assembly. Afl later attempts to explain this a;greement as only a private agreement, wihich did not bind in l aw, only sharpened the tensions between the Czechs and Slovaros and led to coil!Sequeinces which are stiH fresh in our minds. 1 Stribrny a Member of the "Committee of Five" During the period that .Masaryk traveled abroad, lectured and organlized the legions, Stffbo:ny was mi active member of the Vienna parliament where he represented the Czech National !Socialist Party, which formerly was called the Czech Nationa;l Labor Parity. This party came into being ais 3Jil opposi,tiO!Il paJrty to the inoceasing :influence of international social democracy, and its founder was the journalist Vaclav Klofac, a convinced anti-militarist. Later he became the fi~st Minister ,o f [Defense in the first Cre<!hoS1o:va;k government of iDr. Chades Kramaf. Klofac and Stfibrny were the two lea,ding personalities of the movement of na;tional workers. During the first World WaT the Czech anarchists joined with them, led by Dr. iBohumil Vrbensky, a dentist, who was named Min:ister of Supplies !in the first Czceho-Slo:va:k government. When Kiofac wa;s jailed by the Austrian authorities soon after the outbreak of the war and later conrvicted, Stfibmy became the leading personality of the Czech National Socialists and represented ,t hem on the "Committee of Five",the other members being: Dr. Alois Rasin (Czech National Democrat), Arrtonirn Svehla (Agrarian), DT. Francis Sou- �54 SLOVAKIA ikup (Soeial Democrat), who was later replaced by deputy Haibrman, :and a depresentative of the Czech People's Party whkh had separated from the conservative wing represented by the perfodicai •~CEoH"; the latter became a member of the committee laiter. Benes Arrives on the Scene A plaque on ,t he House of Deputies in the city of Prague told one (•I do inot know if it is still there) that the Committee of ,F ive, Jin Stribrny among them, had a session in tlris house on October 28, 1918, to proclaim the first la:w of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic, the proclamatioo. of the existence af the new State. This act really was :revolutionary. Even though Czecho-Slovakia was recognized. by the Allied Governments, it was not certain when the practical transfer of power would take place. The seizure of power, which :these men managed, surprised even the Czech ,political delegaitfon which at that moment was in session in the Beau iRivage Hotel in Geneva, where it had gOille with ,t he permission of the Austrian government to ma'ke oontacts with the Czech politicians rub.road, among whom was a new personality, a young docent of sociology at the Prague University, ,D r. Edtwa:rd (Benes. Dr. !Benes was a very ambitious and energetic man. Originally a member of the Social Democratic iPa:rty, like his brother, he became a correspondent for the social-democratic daily •~BRAVIO UIDU" (The People's Right) tn Paris, where his lire waJS anything but pleaSia'D!t. IHe learned French, English much fater, ibut he could never speak it correctly. Benes was attracted ,b y Masaryk's person:ality. Masaryk at that ti.me was iintroducing in the Charles University methods of English p:nactical thought, which are often mistakenly reg,arded rus same kind of independent philosophical system. iMasaryk was quite well known because of his appearrunces before the public, ,b ut he was not too well liked. His ireailism rather shocked Ith.an inspired Czech 111.ationaliism in-Austria-Hunga ry. A reflection of the valiant stand of 'Z ola in France was the participation of Masaryk in the Hilsner murder case, in which he proved the fals1ty of the so'-'Called "Mrunuscripts," but :it evoked �SLOVAKIA 55 a wave of hostility agaJinst him. When deputy Sviil:a sued Alllyz, it.he editor of t:he N.ARODNE DISTY, !because he ac.. cused Sviha of !being an informer for the Austrian police, Masaryk took sides with Anyz and so turned the Czech N atio:rraJ Socialists against himself. Antagonism 'between Masaryk and the N ationai Socialist Party had existed fo~ some time. :Since Benes always sfu'essed 3,nd underil!ined the intention and :aims of his master, it was expected th:a,t !lie would soon get into an a;rgument with ithe National Socialists. 'Dhe fight was a strange one, indeed. When it became clear that the Social Democrats would not place [)r. Benes on ,t he baJlOlt as their candidaite, and since Dr. Benes could not count OIIl being a candidate on the -ballot of the National Democrats, because of his opposition to ,t hem, there rernamed little '1.ef.t for him to do butt try to get on the !ballot as a candidate of the Czech NatiOIIlal 1Socialists. At that time it was still thought that a minister must be a deputy and that it was necessary to uphold the rules of parliamb.'lltary democracy. The National Socialist Party, which Benes wanted to 'balilot him, however, was over:whelmingily a .p arty of the workers and not intellectuals. But danger threatened Benes from another quarter. At t hat time Dr. iKramar was quite a power and naJtional hero. Benes !mnew that. But he also was determined to wreck the prur.ty of Kramar and, if need be, Kramar himself. He set himself to the taslk. The group associated with Dr. Jaro,. slav Stransky, a yoU1I1g deputy of the National Democratic Party, quit the party ,t o, join the so-called "Labor Party" which rwas in a transitiOIIlal stage; it ,w as through this party that the g,roup ent&ed the Czech National Socialist Party. The first attack within the party was made against Stflbrny, directed behind the scenes ,b y !Benes. [t ended with the expulsion ,oif Stribrny from the party. 1 Stfibrny Organizes the "Castle" Opposition Stribmy was hurt, but 111ort helpless. He knew his enemy very well.. In Prague, on Jungman iS treet, he began to build up his own publishing enterprises; his "Vecemi list" (Eveni1nig News) soon ibecame a feared boulevard newspaper. �56 SLOVAKIA Stribrny consolidated practically the entire "am.ti-Castle" opposition. 1Many persons who did not like Benes's methods were aHowed space in his paper, among them: J. S. Machar, fo:mner intimate of T. G. Masaryk, the writer Francis Zavfola, whom Dr. Benes never forgave for criticizing him in the novel "For.tinbras," Arnost Dvorak, author of the co.. medy "Matej 'Poctivy (Honest Matt), and many others. Wlhat did the opposition hold . against the ambitious, vainglorious Benes? IJ:t would take seve,r al pages just to enumerate all reproaches, complaints and charges, but sub.struintially all were concerned with one matter: Benes's dictatorial methods, which he developed throughout his life as ·a confirmed socialist. Dr. Benes came to parliament from the outside; he did not bother attending meetings, did not seek favor of the voters, and thought that his foreign activity was fin itself so great that he should be trusted without question in ·all things. If any one doubted the correotness of his views or of his politics and dared to express an opposite view, Benes considered that as a sign of enmity. Benes had no wide support among the voters; if the system of "binding ballots of candidates" did not exist, Benes never would have become a deputy of pa'I'liament. Benes was conscious of his unpopularity with the voters and his lack of ipoilitical ba:ckg,r ound, and .t his he coil'.Sidoced as his greatest personal defioiency. Naturally, this meant, if he wanted to stay in power - 3Jlld he certainly did Benes would have to find other methods of disposing of his political opponents. Of course, we know he not only found them, but also used them quite effectively. Whi~e Benes studied in Dijon one name attracted his attention: Fouche. The methods applied by th.is man, Na,. poleon's police director, !impressed the youthful, ambitious Benes. He reC"alled them later when he decided to become a power in Czech politics. He knew that a person could be destroyed ,pol1ticailly by malicious smeair and vilification; and he also learned• how the criminal courts aided Fouche, who bought witnesses who were wiHing to testify to anything for pay. Dr. Benes, who tested' this method when he rem()IVed Jirak, sectional ,chief o,f the !M:inistry of Trade, �SLOVAKIA 57 thought he was strong enough to try it against Stribrny. At that itime Dr. K,a,reil Larry in the Ministry oif Justice was Benes's righit hand. ·L awyer Drobny, who complained of a meagre law practice, !became an all-powerful perso.., nalii.ty in the Ministry of Justice and Bene.s's willing servant. It was not easy to fabric-a te a ca:se against Stribrny; Benes knew he had to be very cautions. Stribrny was a publisher and was ba,cked by a small burt very ·a ctive political party; Dr. Charles iPergler, American-born Czech and outspoken adversary of Benes's policies, rulso joined •t he opposition headed by Stribmy. Dr. Lany worked haTd and long to come up with something against Stfibmy and ,so to please Benes. Finally, he cooked up something which Be111es thought would finish Stribrny: Larry said Stribrny had perjured ihimseJf during one of his trials. A great number of witnesses was rounded up to testify as l.<I1Slbructed by 'Larry; the trial got under way ·a nd the press featured it. Everything seemed to be running smoothly for Lany until a certain detective was called upon to testify; that detective sruid thait he saw Stribrny with the accused Sichrovsky in the Hotel de Saxe in Prague; he mentioned the point from which he saw them; it was from not rtoo, great a di,s tance, but a corner came into the picture. O.vdinary people cannot see a-r ound a corner, but the detective Lany produced as a witness was blessed, it •seems, with airOU!Ild-the-corner-sighrt. The court at thart time could not 1b e influenced; it did not believe thaJt the detective could see aToun.d corners. So the court threw out the case against Strib,rny. 1 Benes was :fm-ious, but he was by no means through with 1Stfibrny. '.I1lwough the staJte pmcUI1ator he made application for -a wrirt of error, which was gra111ted; the request rto ihave the trial tramsferred to another city "to re.., move the influence of the iPrague street" was also granted - Jihlava was ,given the honor. The second .part of the drarrna dragged on .in Ji'hlava · a nd caused no end of worry to Stribrny. Benes, however, had nothing to lose, except possibly a: ,b it of face. When the trial ended, Stribmy won out -again. �58 SLOVAKIA In the meantime, time marched on. Benes was kept busy with the cOI11sequences of his polides MJ.d ideological constructions. Afraid of 1osing his influence, he still thoug,ht that the [Habsburgs were 's till dangerous, so he oreated the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumamfa ·a nd Czecho-!Slova'kia:) , wh!ich f,1opped when faced with rthe first crisis. Autocrat that he was, Benes ,a lways waited nntil he was forced to negotirution or to 0.!g.reement. No matter :how we judge the event,s of that time, one thing stands: out quite clear and certain: Benes failed to ;recognize two problems whicli were of vital .importance to the Repuiblic - the German p:mblem and the Slovak problem. He thought both would be solved by silence and proCTaJStination. Because he was a man who iregaroed discussion ·a s a personal atta0k, there never were any objective discussions about the vital proiblerns orf the country. Truthfully speaking, it must be said that Benes did not even have the desired understanding for those two problems. He was a man who gloried in moving in foreign circles; he saiw his strength on the diplomatic parquets among his a,oquaintances, club, colleagues, wd hi-red journ.ailists. Problems of internal politics neveir reaJ.Iy interested Benes. Una:ble to tolerate criticism, he contriived the laiw "for the protection of the (Republic," which was enthusiastically endorsed by the other "coalition" parties, becall!Se it put a perfect muzZJle io n the mouths o.f the opposition. Benes paid lip service to democracy, but sinned against it gravely. P&haps inexperience, a ilaclr of honest courage to give in when wrong, affiliaiting politics too much with person:al advantages run:d gains, commerc.iali·z ing politics at the ~nse of the ideal interests of ,t he nation - all this .became the hot/bed of dictatorial whims which culminated in whait Benes began rto do in 1945, when without even consuWng the nation he pu:bli,s:hed -and enforC"ed his famous- "decrees." He had become a dictator, something he had always striven for. To Benes it did not matter that he served the forces which ilater rwere to orvercome him, ibeca:use rthey were more powerful, experienced .and tactically more mature. The Czech nation tolerated dictatorship. Wea:kened by the war, �SLOVAKIA 69 confused and befuddled by the political situation which was not presented in its :tirue colors, and led by ·a personality who thought he had won the war, the nation hum!bly sue.. cumbed to serious breaches and limitations of its rights and freedoms. Benes Finally "Gets" Stribrny Just before the war ended, as I recaill, while several of us were discussing the future, one of iBenes's very close friends Temarked: "Things will not be as they were under Masairyk. Benes is a vengeful man and will not forgive any one!" This characterization of Benes hit me hard later, when I learned that Stfibrny was arrested at the Grii.fenberg Baths in Silesia. Every one was convinced that this was a m~staJke. Wha;t could any o.ne have against Stribrny? During the war he was not active politically ·a t all. Benes nevertheless came out against Stribrny because of his pre ...war activity, which did not fall under the notion of "retribution" at all. Stfibrny's journalists, we know, frequently criticized Benes, as did many others. The court could not resolve whether the criticism was proper or not, but omy whether criticism was allowed and whether free criticism comes under the notion of "retribution." The defendant's counsel, a brilliant iPrague lawyer, was convinced that Stribrny could not be convicted. When the trial was over and tha,t lawyer heard the verdiot of life in jail, he wanted to give up his law practice. Stfibrny's son, hearing ,t he verdict, said only one word: "Dad!" and for that he was accused of disturbing public order and later sentenced to 18 months in jail. Jin 1S tribrny probably could have gotten out of the ·n ava prison, if he would have requested amnesty. But he refused to ask Benes for mercy. Stfibrny was not indicted and tried ·e ven by the Oommunists. "The mrun of October 28th," one of the founders of the Republic, apparently did not consider it dignified and proper to ask any one for mercy, for pardon for anything that he did not commit, for pardon because at the moment his antagonist was stronger than he was. �60 SLOVAKIA Let people think what they like a;bout Stribrny. One. thlng .they ml.l!st admit: he was am enthusiastic and stouthearted man. If he did do wrong, he was willing to admit it; often he may have attacked hairder than he should have and let himself be guided ,b y personal bitterness more than by political motive, but he was one orf the few moo who did found the Republic. The founders of states of civilized nations ·a re usualty glorified by monuments and a;rticles in school reade:ra. But Sitribrrny was allowed to die in jail. A shame? !indeed, it was a shame, but it was not Stribrny's shame. Getting rid of opponents. by any and all methods leads in ,p olitics to dictatorship. As soon as "liberaito:ris" cha:nge into enslavers of their nation, it is up to the na,tion to defend its rig,hts.. It cannot stand idly on the sidelines. Tihe ipeople who do that beair the responsibility for the victims of dictatorship. Stribrny was one of the victims. His deeply furrowed countenance will be long remembered iby those who knew him. His high forehead was crowned with a rich set of hair - ,w avy, beautiful lrair. 'Dhe physic,a l personality of Stribrny is slowly disappearing in the chasms of oblivion, ibut hiis hair still waves as if it were a li'Viing torch! • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Irutest statemenJts rulways stressed, tiliait ouir pact of a.Hiance with Soviet Russia and ouir friendshiip with other S1 av Ill8.tions must not encrooch on o.ur friendly and cordirul relations with other democratic states. This is .t he natuiral desire, shared by an enormous ma;jority of oor people, and nothing .p revents us from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and stroogthenmg and deepening OUT friendship with ouT great western Allies. Moscow, too, wanlts tio ful~ow thi s line of poliic y. rt will., however, be necessary for certain prejudices of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozecho-Slorvakia, OW7I Bulletin, June 1, 194'5. 1 1 � 52 SLOVAKIA ENSLAVERS OF THE CZECH NATION: HOW BENES "GOT" STRiBRNf (From the September 23, 1955, issue of "BOHEMIA," Czech monthl,y published by the Czech Democratic Federalists in Munich, Germany.) BY: SIRIUS Flrequently we fail to notice the flow of hi story. What to some of us is iapparently self-evident, that is fo.r many veiled by a cu:rtain of forgetfulness 'rund to the younger generation is something unknown. Forgetfulness and ignorance have created many Je,g ends, which have fatefully extended into the politic~ development of our natiOlll and have placed in ,power forces which had to coMapse again and again, ,b ecause they betrayed everything upon which the state was built .and that which formed its ideological substa:nce. Perhwps dt is ,t imely to remind the Czech public about the tirings we had witnessed, so that it might be able to form its own judgment and to create its own view. When the press reported the death of George Stribrny in the Ilava prison last summer (1955), the news shodked only those who knew him and witnessed his struggles. Not all these struggles were wa,ged "cleverly," ibut they were waged to the end which 'Stribmy ,guessed and supposed more than he reasonably knew: for the consolidation of democracy agai:ns,t aJl'bitrary power and violence. George Strib.rny was one of the "men of October 28th." This designation was no:t simply ,a n empty phvase. The Czecho-Slavak Republic did not come into existence just oult of nothing from the minds of statesmen; in the beginning its existence was doubtfuJ; aJD.d when T. G. Masaryk went out of Austria-Hung ary to attempt to Liberate the Czech nation from aibsolutism, he wanted only to gain respect for the constitutional rights o.f his nation, which aliready were guaranteed by the so-.caJled "October Rescript," in which the emperor solemnly :promised rto have ,h imself crowned as Czech king in /Prague. While aJbroad Masaryk had no other ooorception in the beginning. In a memorandum to the British foreign office, dated in April of 1915, T. G. Masaryk wrote: 1 �SLOVAKIA 53 "We intended to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is wanted only by a few radicals ••• Either the Allied Powers will give us one of their Princes, or there will be a personal union between Bohemia and Serbia ••• A Russian dynasty would be in every way popular ••. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive influence ••• " The idea of ,a Czecho~Slovak State ripened only gradually; the republican concept won out only under the influence of American Czec'llis and Slova!ks.. In the Pit,tsburgh Agreement, concluded by T. G. ,M asaryk with the American Slovaks on May '30, 1918, we read: "The Czecho-.Slovak StaJte shall be a Republic ... " This a,greement guaTanteed the Slovaks equal rights with the Czech nation, tha,t is, their own state government and assembly. Afl later attempts to explain this a;greement as only a private agreement, wihich did not bind in l aw, only sharpened the tensions between the Czechs and Slovaros and led to coil!Sequeinces which are stiH fresh in our minds. 1 Stribrny a Member of the "Committee of Five" During the period that .Masaryk traveled abroad, lectured and organlized the legions, Stffbo:ny was mi active member of the Vienna parliament where he represented the Czech National !Socialist Party, which formerly was called the Czech Nationa;l Labor Parity. This party came into being ais 3Jil opposi,tiO!Il paJrty to the inoceasing :influence of international social democracy, and its founder was the journalist Vaclav Klofac, a convinced anti-militarist. Later he became the fi~st Minister ,o f [Defense in the first Cre<!hoS1o:va;k government of iDr. Chades Kramaf. Klofac and Stfibrny were the two lea,ding personalities of the movement of na;tional workers. During the first World WaT the Czech anarchists joined with them, led by Dr. iBohumil Vrbensky, a dentist, who was named Min:ister of Supplies !in the first Czceho-Slo:va:k government. When Kiofac wa;s jailed by the Austrian authorities soon after the outbreak of the war and later conrvicted, Stfibmy became the leading personality of the Czech National Socialists and represented ,t hem on the "Committee of Five",the other members being: Dr. Alois Rasin (Czech National Democrat), Arrtonirn Svehla (Agrarian), DT. Francis Sou- �54 SLOVAKIA ikup (Soeial Democrat), who was later replaced by deputy Haibrman, :and a depresentative of the Czech People's Party whkh had separated from the conservative wing represented by the perfodicai •~CEoH"; the latter became a member of the committee laiter. Benes Arrives on the Scene A plaque on ,t he House of Deputies in the city of Prague told one (•I do inot know if it is still there) that the Committee of ,F ive, Jin Stribrny among them, had a session in tlris house on October 28, 1918, to proclaim the first la:w of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic, the proclamatioo. of the existence af the new State. This act really was :revolutionary. Even though Czecho-Slovakia was recognized. by the Allied Governments, it was not certain when the practical transfer of power would take place. The seizure of power, which :these men managed, surprised even the Czech ,political delegaitfon which at that moment was in session in the Beau iRivage Hotel in Geneva, where it had gOille with ,t he permission of the Austrian government to ma'ke oontacts with the Czech politicians rub.road, among whom was a new personality, a young docent of sociology at the Prague University, ,D r. Edtwa:rd (Benes. Dr. !Benes was a very ambitious and energetic man. Originally a member of the Social Democratic iPa:rty, like his brother, he became a correspondent for the social-democratic daily •~BRAVIO UIDU" (The People's Right) tn Paris, where his lire waJS anything but pleaSia'D!t. IHe learned French, English much fater, ibut he could never speak it correctly. Benes was attracted ,b y Masaryk's person:ality. Masaryk at that ti.me was iintroducing in the Charles University methods of English p:nactical thought, which are often mistakenly reg,arded rus same kind of independent philosophical system. iMasaryk was quite well known because of his appearrunces before the public, ,b ut he was not too well liked. His ireailism rather shocked Ith.an inspired Czech 111.ationaliism in-Austria-Hunga ry. A reflection of the valiant stand of 'Z ola in France was the participation of Masaryk in the Hilsner murder case, in which he proved the fals1ty of the so'-'Called "Mrunuscripts," but :it evoked �SLOVAKIA 55 a wave of hostility agaJinst him. When deputy Sviil:a sued Alllyz, it.he editor of t:he N.ARODNE DISTY, !because he ac.. cused Sviha of !being an informer for the Austrian police, Masaryk took sides with Anyz and so turned the Czech N atio:rraJ Socialists against himself. Antagonism 'between Masaryk and the N ationai Socialist Party had existed fo~ some time. :Since Benes always sfu'essed 3,nd underil!ined the intention and :aims of his master, it was expected th:a,t !lie would soon get into an a;rgument with ithe National Socialists. 'Dhe fight was a strange one, indeed. When it became clear that the Social Democrats would not place [)r. Benes on ,t he baJlOlt as their candidaite, and since Dr. Benes could not count OIIl being a candidate on the -ballot of the National Democrats, because of his opposition to ,t hem, there rernamed little '1.ef.t for him to do butt try to get on the !ballot as a candidate of the Czech NatiOIIlal 1Socialists. At that time it was still thought that a minister must be a deputy and that it was necessary to uphold the rules of parliamb.'lltary democracy. The National Socialist Party, which Benes wanted to 'balilot him, however, was over:whelmingily a .p arty of the workers and not intellectuals. But danger threatened Benes from another quarter. At t hat time Dr. iKramar was quite a power and naJtional hero. Benes !mnew that. But he also was determined to wreck the prur.ty of Kramar and, if need be, Kramar himself. He set himself to the taslk. The group associated with Dr. Jaro,. slav Stransky, a yoU1I1g deputy of the National Democratic Party, quit the party ,t o, join the so-called "Labor Party" which rwas in a transitiOIIlal stage; it ,w as through this party that the g,roup ent&ed the Czech National Socialist Party. The first attack within the party was made against Stflbrny, directed behind the scenes ,b y !Benes. [t ended with the expulsion ,oif Stribrny from the party. 1 Stfibrny Organizes the "Castle" Opposition Stribmy was hurt, but 111ort helpless. He knew his enemy very well.. In Prague, on Jungman iS treet, he began to build up his own publishing enterprises; his "Vecemi list" (Eveni1nig News) soon ibecame a feared boulevard newspaper. �56 SLOVAKIA Stribrny consolidated practically the entire "am.ti-Castle" opposition. 1Many persons who did not like Benes's methods were aHowed space in his paper, among them: J. S. Machar, fo:mner intimate of T. G. Masaryk, the writer Francis Zavfola, whom Dr. Benes never forgave for criticizing him in the novel "For.tinbras," Arnost Dvorak, author of the co.. medy "Matej 'Poctivy (Honest Matt), and many others. Wlhat did the opposition hold . against the ambitious, vainglorious Benes? IJ:t would take seve,r al pages just to enumerate all reproaches, complaints and charges, but sub.struintially all were concerned with one matter: Benes's dictatorial methods, which he developed throughout his life as ·a confirmed socialist. Dr. Benes came to parliament from the outside; he did not bother attending meetings, did not seek favor of the voters, and thought that his foreign activity was fin itself so great that he should be trusted without question in ·all things. If any one doubted the correotness of his views or of his politics and dared to express an opposite view, Benes considered that as a sign of enmity. Benes had no wide support among the voters; if the system of "binding ballots of candidates" did not exist, Benes never would have become a deputy of pa'I'liament. Benes was conscious of his unpopularity with the voters and his lack of ipoilitical ba:ckg,r ound, and .t his he coil'.Sidoced as his greatest personal defioiency. Naturally, this meant, if he wanted to stay in power - 3Jlld he certainly did Benes would have to find other methods of disposing of his political opponents. Of course, we know he not only found them, but also used them quite effectively. Whi~e Benes studied in Dijon one name attracted his attention: Fouche. The methods applied by th.is man, Na,. poleon's police director, !impressed the youthful, ambitious Benes. He reC"alled them later when he decided to become a power in Czech politics. He knew that a person could be destroyed ,pol1ticailly by malicious smeair and vilification; and he also learned• how the criminal courts aided Fouche, who bought witnesses who were wiHing to testify to anything for pay. Dr. Benes, who tested' this method when he rem()IVed Jirak, sectional ,chief o,f the !M:inistry of Trade, �SLOVAKIA 57 thought he was strong enough to try it against Stribrny. At that itime Dr. K,a,reil Larry in the Ministry oif Justice was Benes's righit hand. ·L awyer Drobny, who complained of a meagre law practice, !became an all-powerful perso.., nalii.ty in the Ministry of Justice and Bene.s's willing servant. It was not easy to fabric-a te a ca:se against Stribrny; Benes knew he had to be very cautions. Stribrny was a publisher and was ba,cked by a small burt very ·a ctive political party; Dr. Charles iPergler, American-born Czech and outspoken adversary of Benes's policies, rulso joined •t he opposition headed by Stribmy. Dr. Lany worked haTd and long to come up with something against Stfibmy and ,so to please Benes. Finally, he cooked up something which Be111es thought would finish Stribrny: Larry said Stribrny had perjured ihimseJf during one of his trials. A great number of witnesses was rounded up to testify as l.<I1Slbructed by 'Larry; the trial got under way ·a nd the press featured it. Everything seemed to be running smoothly for Lany until a certain detective was called upon to testify; that detective sruid thait he saw Stribrny with the accused Sichrovsky in the Hotel de Saxe in Prague; he mentioned the point from which he saw them; it was from not rtoo, great a di,s tance, but a corner came into the picture. O.vdinary people cannot see a-r ound a corner, but the detective Lany produced as a witness was blessed, it •seems, with airOU!Ild-the-corner-sighrt. The court at thart time could not 1b e influenced; it did not believe thaJt the detective could see aToun.d corners. So the court threw out the case against Strib,rny. 1 Benes was :fm-ious, but he was by no means through with 1Stfibrny. '.I1lwough the staJte pmcUI1ator he made application for -a wrirt of error, which was gra111ted; the request rto ihave the trial tramsferred to another city "to re.., move the influence of the iPrague street" was also granted - Jihlava was ,given the honor. The second .part of the drarrna dragged on .in Ji'hlava · a nd caused no end of worry to Stribrny. Benes, however, had nothing to lose, except possibly a: ,b it of face. When the trial ended, Stribmy won out -again. �58 SLOVAKIA In the meantime, time marched on. Benes was kept busy with the cOI11sequences of his polides MJ.d ideological constructions. Afraid of 1osing his influence, he still thoug,ht that the [Habsburgs were 's till dangerous, so he oreated the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumamfa ·a nd Czecho-!Slova'kia:) , wh!ich f,1opped when faced with rthe first crisis. Autocrat that he was, Benes ,a lways waited nntil he was forced to negotirution or to 0.!g.reement. No matter :how we judge the event,s of that time, one thing stands: out quite clear and certain: Benes failed to ;recognize two problems whicli were of vital .importance to the Repuiblic - the German p:mblem and the Slovak problem. He thought both would be solved by silence and proCTaJStination. Because he was a man who iregaroed discussion ·a s a personal atta0k, there never were any objective discussions about the vital proiblerns orf the country. Truthfully speaking, it must be said that Benes did not even have the desired understanding for those two problems. He was a man who gloried in moving in foreign circles; he saiw his strength on the diplomatic parquets among his a,oquaintances, club, colleagues, wd hi-red journ.ailists. Problems of internal politics neveir reaJ.Iy interested Benes. Una:ble to tolerate criticism, he contriived the laiw "for the protection of the (Republic," which was enthusiastically endorsed by the other "coalition" parties, becall!Se it put a perfect muzZJle io n the mouths o.f the opposition. Benes paid lip service to democracy, but sinned against it gravely. P&haps inexperience, a ilaclr of honest courage to give in when wrong, affiliaiting politics too much with person:al advantages run:d gains, commerc.iali·z ing politics at the ~nse of the ideal interests of ,t he nation - all this .became the hot/bed of dictatorial whims which culminated in whait Benes began rto do in 1945, when without even consuWng the nation he pu:bli,s:hed -and enforC"ed his famous- "decrees." He had become a dictator, something he had always striven for. To Benes it did not matter that he served the forces which ilater rwere to orvercome him, ibeca:use rthey were more powerful, experienced .and tactically more mature. The Czech nation tolerated dictatorship. Wea:kened by the war, �SLOVAKIA 69 confused and befuddled by the political situation which was not presented in its :tirue colors, and led by ·a personality who thought he had won the war, the nation hum!bly sue.. cumbed to serious breaches and limitations of its rights and freedoms. Benes Finally "Gets" Stribrny Just before the war ended, as I recaill, while several of us were discussing the future, one of iBenes's very close friends Temarked: "Things will not be as they were under Masairyk. Benes is a vengeful man and will not forgive any one!" This characterization of Benes hit me hard later, when I learned that Stfibrny was arrested at the Grii.fenberg Baths in Silesia. Every one was convinced that this was a m~staJke. Wha;t could any o.ne have against Stribrny? During the war he was not active politically ·a t all. Benes nevertheless came out against Stribrny because of his pre ...war activity, which did not fall under the notion of "retribution" at all. Stfibrny's journalists, we know, frequently criticized Benes, as did many others. The court could not resolve whether the criticism was proper or not, but omy whether criticism was allowed and whether free criticism comes under the notion of "retribution." The defendant's counsel, a brilliant iPrague lawyer, was convinced that Stribrny could not be convicted. When the trial was over and tha,t lawyer heard the verdiot of life in jail, he wanted to give up his law practice. Stfibrny's son, hearing ,t he verdict, said only one word: "Dad!" and for that he was accused of disturbing public order and later sentenced to 18 months in jail. Jin 1S tribrny probably could have gotten out of the ·n ava prison, if he would have requested amnesty. But he refused to ask Benes for mercy. Stfibrny was not indicted and tried ·e ven by the Oommunists. "The mrun of October 28th," one of the founders of the Republic, apparently did not consider it dignified and proper to ask any one for mercy, for pardon for anything that he did not commit, for pardon because at the moment his antagonist was stronger than he was. �60 SLOVAKIA Let people think what they like a;bout Stribrny. One. thlng .they ml.l!st admit: he was am enthusiastic and stouthearted man. If he did do wrong, he was willing to admit it; often he may have attacked hairder than he should have and let himself be guided ,b y personal bitterness more than by political motive, but he was one orf the few moo who did found the Republic. The founders of states of civilized nations ·a re usualty glorified by monuments and a;rticles in school reade:ra. But Sitribrrny was allowed to die in jail. A shame? !indeed, it was a shame, but it was not Stribrny's shame. Getting rid of opponents. by any and all methods leads in ,p olitics to dictatorship. As soon as "liberaito:ris" cha:nge into enslavers of their nation, it is up to the na,tion to defend its rig,hts.. It cannot stand idly on the sidelines. Tihe ipeople who do that beair the responsibility for the victims of dictatorship. Stribrny was one of the victims. His deeply furrowed countenance will be long remembered iby those who knew him. His high forehead was crowned with a rich set of hair - ,w avy, beautiful lrair. 'Dhe physic,a l personality of Stribrny is slowly disappearing in the chasms of oblivion, ibut hiis hair still waves as if it were a li'Viing torch! • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Irutest statemenJts rulways stressed, tiliait ouir pact of a.Hiance with Soviet Russia and ouir friendshiip with other S1 av Ill8.tions must not encrooch on o.ur friendly and cordirul relations with other democratic states. This is .t he natuiral desire, shared by an enormous ma;jority of oor people, and nothing .p revents us from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and stroogthenmg and deepening OUT friendship with ouT great western Allies. Moscow, too, wanlts tio ful~ow thi s line of poliic y. rt will., however, be necessary for certain prejudices of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozecho-Slorvakia, OW7I Bulletin, June 1, 194'5. 1 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA ENSLAVERS OF THE CZECH NATION: HOW BENES "GOT" STRiBRNf (From the September 23, 1955, issue of "BOHEMIA," Czech monthl,y published by the Czech Democratic Federalists in Munich, Germany.) BY: SIRIUS Flrequently we fail to notice the flow of hi story. What to some of us is iapparently self-evident, that is fo.r many veiled by a cu:rtain of forgetfulness 'rund to the younger generation is something unknown. Forgetfulness and ignorance have created many Je,g ends, which have fatefully extended into the politic~ development of our natiOlll and have placed in ,power forces which had to coMapse again and again, ,b ecause they betrayed everything upon which the state was built .and that which formed its ideological substa:nce. Perhwps dt is ,t imely to remind the Czech public about the tirings we had witnessed, so that it might be able to form its own judgment and to create its own view. When the press reported the death of George Stribrny in the Ilava prison last summer (1955), the news shodked only those who knew him and witnessed his struggles. Not all these struggles were wa,ged "cleverly," ibut they were waged to the end which 'Stribmy ,guessed and supposed more than he reasonably knew: for the consolidation of democracy agai:ns,t aJl'bitrary power and violence. George Strib.rny was one of the "men of October 28th." This designation was no:t simply ,a n empty phvase. The Czecho-Slavak Republic did not come into existence just oult of nothing from the minds of statesmen; in the beginning its existence was doubtfuJ; aJD.d when T. G. Masaryk went out of Austria-Hung ary to attempt to Liberate the Czech nation from aibsolutism, he wanted only to gain respect for the constitutional rights o.f his nation, which aliready were guaranteed by the so-.caJled "October Rescript," in which the emperor solemnly :promised rto have ,h imself crowned as Czech king in /Prague. While aJbroad Masaryk had no other ooorception in the beginning. In a memorandum to the British foreign office, dated in April of 1915, T. G. Masaryk wrote: 1 SLOVAKIA 53 "We intended to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is wanted only by a few radicals ••• Either the Allied Powers will give us one of their Princes, or there will be a personal union between Bohemia and Serbia ••• A Russian dynasty would be in every way popular ••. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive influence ••• " The idea of ,a Czecho~Slovak State ripened only gradually; the republican concept won out only under the influence of American Czec'llis and Slova!ks.. In the Pit,tsburgh Agreement, concluded by T. G. ,M asaryk with the American Slovaks on May '30, 1918, we read: "The Czecho-.Slovak StaJte shall be a Republic ... " This a,greement guaTanteed the Slovaks equal rights with the Czech nation, tha,t is, their own state government and assembly. Afl later attempts to explain this a;greement as only a private agreement, wihich did not bind in l aw, only sharpened the tensions between the Czechs and Slovaros and led to coil!Sequeinces which are stiH fresh in our minds. 1 Stribrny a Member of the "Committee of Five" During the period that .Masaryk traveled abroad, lectured and organlized the legions, Stffbo:ny was mi active member of the Vienna parliament where he represented the Czech National !Socialist Party, which formerly was called the Czech Nationa;l Labor Parity. This party came into being ais 3Jil opposi,tiO!Il paJrty to the inoceasing :influence of international social democracy, and its founder was the journalist Vaclav Klofac, a convinced anti-militarist. Later he became the fi~st Minister ,o f [Defense in the first Cre<!hoS1o:va;k government of iDr. Chades Kramaf. Klofac and Stfibrny were the two lea,ding personalities of the movement of na;tional workers. During the first World WaT the Czech anarchists joined with them, led by Dr. iBohumil Vrbensky, a dentist, who was named Min:ister of Supplies !in the first Czceho-Slo:va:k government. When Kiofac wa;s jailed by the Austrian authorities soon after the outbreak of the war and later conrvicted, Stfibmy became the leading personality of the Czech National Socialists and represented ,t hem on the "Committee of Five",the other members being: Dr. Alois Rasin (Czech National Democrat), Arrtonirn Svehla (Agrarian), DT. Francis Sou- 54 SLOVAKIA ikup (Soeial Democrat), who was later replaced by deputy Haibrman, :and a depresentative of the Czech People's Party whkh had separated from the conservative wing represented by the perfodicai •~CEoH"; the latter became a member of the committee laiter. Benes Arrives on the Scene A plaque on ,t he House of Deputies in the city of Prague told one (•I do inot know if it is still there) that the Committee of ,F ive, Jin Stribrny among them, had a session in tlris house on October 28, 1918, to proclaim the first la:w of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic, the proclamatioo. of the existence af the new State. This act really was :revolutionary. Even though Czecho-Slovakia was recognized. by the Allied Governments, it was not certain when the practical transfer of power would take place. The seizure of power, which :these men managed, surprised even the Czech ,political delegaitfon which at that moment was in session in the Beau iRivage Hotel in Geneva, where it had gOille with ,t he permission of the Austrian government to ma'ke oontacts with the Czech politicians rub.road, among whom was a new personality, a young docent of sociology at the Prague University, ,D r. Edtwa:rd (Benes. Dr. !Benes was a very ambitious and energetic man. Originally a member of the Social Democratic iPa:rty, like his brother, he became a correspondent for the social-democratic daily •~BRAVIO UIDU" (The People's Right) tn Paris, where his lire waJS anything but pleaSia'D!t. IHe learned French, English much fater, ibut he could never speak it correctly. Benes was attracted ,b y Masaryk's person:ality. Masaryk at that ti.me was iintroducing in the Charles University methods of English p:nactical thought, which are often mistakenly reg,arded rus same kind of independent philosophical system. iMasaryk was quite well known because of his appearrunces before the public, ,b ut he was not too well liked. His ireailism rather shocked Ith.an inspired Czech 111.ationaliism in-Austria-Hunga ry. A reflection of the valiant stand of 'Z ola in France was the participation of Masaryk in the Hilsner murder case, in which he proved the fals1ty of the so'-'Called "Mrunuscripts," but :it evoked SLOVAKIA 55 a wave of hostility agaJinst him. When deputy Sviil:a sued Alllyz, it.he editor of t:he N.ARODNE DISTY, !because he ac.. cused Sviha of !being an informer for the Austrian police, Masaryk took sides with Anyz and so turned the Czech N atio:rraJ Socialists against himself. Antagonism 'between Masaryk and the N ationai Socialist Party had existed fo~ some time. :Since Benes always sfu'essed 3,nd underil!ined the intention and :aims of his master, it was expected th:a,t !lie would soon get into an a;rgument with ithe National Socialists. 'Dhe fight was a strange one, indeed. When it became clear that the Social Democrats would not place [)r. Benes on ,t he baJlOlt as their candidaite, and since Dr. Benes could not count OIIl being a candidate on the -ballot of the National Democrats, because of his opposition to ,t hem, there rernamed little '1.ef.t for him to do butt try to get on the !ballot as a candidate of the Czech NatiOIIlal 1Socialists. At that time it was still thought that a minister must be a deputy and that it was necessary to uphold the rules of parliamb.'lltary democracy. The National Socialist Party, which Benes wanted to 'balilot him, however, was over:whelmingily a .p arty of the workers and not intellectuals. But danger threatened Benes from another quarter. At t hat time Dr. iKramar was quite a power and naJtional hero. Benes !mnew that. But he also was determined to wreck the prur.ty of Kramar and, if need be, Kramar himself. He set himself to the taslk. The group associated with Dr. Jaro,. slav Stransky, a yoU1I1g deputy of the National Democratic Party, quit the party ,t o, join the so-called "Labor Party" which rwas in a transitiOIIlal stage; it ,w as through this party that the g,roup ent&ed the Czech National Socialist Party. The first attack within the party was made against Stflbrny, directed behind the scenes ,b y !Benes. [t ended with the expulsion ,oif Stribrny from the party. 1 Stfibrny Organizes the "Castle" Opposition Stribmy was hurt, but 111ort helpless. He knew his enemy very well.. In Prague, on Jungman iS treet, he began to build up his own publishing enterprises; his "Vecemi list" (Eveni1nig News) soon ibecame a feared boulevard newspaper. 56 SLOVAKIA Stribrny consolidated practically the entire "am.ti-Castle" opposition. 1Many persons who did not like Benes's methods were aHowed space in his paper, among them: J. S. Machar, fo:mner intimate of T. G. Masaryk, the writer Francis Zavfola, whom Dr. Benes never forgave for criticizing him in the novel "For.tinbras," Arnost Dvorak, author of the co.. medy "Matej 'Poctivy (Honest Matt), and many others. Wlhat did the opposition hold . against the ambitious, vainglorious Benes? IJ:t would take seve,r al pages just to enumerate all reproaches, complaints and charges, but sub.struintially all were concerned with one matter: Benes's dictatorial methods, which he developed throughout his life as ·a confirmed socialist. Dr. Benes came to parliament from the outside; he did not bother attending meetings, did not seek favor of the voters, and thought that his foreign activity was fin itself so great that he should be trusted without question in ·all things. If any one doubted the correotness of his views or of his politics and dared to express an opposite view, Benes considered that as a sign of enmity. Benes had no wide support among the voters; if the system of "binding ballots of candidates" did not exist, Benes never would have become a deputy of pa'I'liament. Benes was conscious of his unpopularity with the voters and his lack of ipoilitical ba:ckg,r ound, and .t his he coil'.Sidoced as his greatest personal defioiency. Naturally, this meant, if he wanted to stay in power - 3Jlld he certainly did Benes would have to find other methods of disposing of his political opponents. Of course, we know he not only found them, but also used them quite effectively. Whi~e Benes studied in Dijon one name attracted his attention: Fouche. The methods applied by th.is man, Na,. poleon's police director, !impressed the youthful, ambitious Benes. He reC"alled them later when he decided to become a power in Czech politics. He knew that a person could be destroyed ,pol1ticailly by malicious smeair and vilification; and he also learned• how the criminal courts aided Fouche, who bought witnesses who were wiHing to testify to anything for pay. Dr. Benes, who tested' this method when he rem()IVed Jirak, sectional ,chief o,f the !M:inistry of Trade, SLOVAKIA 57 thought he was strong enough to try it against Stribrny. At that itime Dr. K,a,reil Larry in the Ministry oif Justice was Benes's righit hand. ·L awyer Drobny, who complained of a meagre law practice, !became an all-powerful perso.., nalii.ty in the Ministry of Justice and Bene.s's willing servant. It was not easy to fabric-a te a ca:se against Stribrny; Benes knew he had to be very cautions. Stribrny was a publisher and was ba,cked by a small burt very ·a ctive political party; Dr. Charles iPergler, American-born Czech and outspoken adversary of Benes's policies, rulso joined •t he opposition headed by Stribmy. Dr. Lany worked haTd and long to come up with something against Stfibmy and ,so to please Benes. Finally, he cooked up something which Be111es thought would finish Stribrny: Larry said Stribrny had perjured ihimseJf during one of his trials. A great number of witnesses was rounded up to testify as l.<I1Slbructed by 'Larry; the trial got under way ·a nd the press featured it. Everything seemed to be running smoothly for Lany until a certain detective was called upon to testify; that detective sruid thait he saw Stribrny with the accused Sichrovsky in the Hotel de Saxe in Prague; he mentioned the point from which he saw them; it was from not rtoo, great a di,s tance, but a corner came into the picture. O.vdinary people cannot see a-r ound a corner, but the detective Lany produced as a witness was blessed, it •seems, with airOU!Ild-the-corner-sighrt. The court at thart time could not 1b e influenced; it did not believe thaJt the detective could see aToun.d corners. So the court threw out the case against Strib,rny. 1 Benes was :fm-ious, but he was by no means through with 1Stfibrny. '.I1lwough the staJte pmcUI1ator he made application for -a wrirt of error, which was gra111ted; the request rto ihave the trial tramsferred to another city "to re.., move the influence of the iPrague street" was also granted - Jihlava was ,given the honor. The second .part of the drarrna dragged on .in Ji'hlava · a nd caused no end of worry to Stribrny. Benes, however, had nothing to lose, except possibly a: ,b it of face. When the trial ended, Stribmy won out -again. 58 SLOVAKIA In the meantime, time marched on. Benes was kept busy with the cOI11sequences of his polides MJ.d ideological constructions. Afraid of 1osing his influence, he still thoug,ht that the [Habsburgs were 's till dangerous, so he oreated the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumamfa ·a nd Czecho-!Slova'kia:) , wh!ich f,1opped when faced with rthe first crisis. Autocrat that he was, Benes ,a lways waited nntil he was forced to negotirution or to 0.!g.reement. No matter :how we judge the event,s of that time, one thing stands: out quite clear and certain: Benes failed to ;recognize two problems whicli were of vital .importance to the Repuiblic - the German p:mblem and the Slovak problem. He thought both would be solved by silence and proCTaJStination. Because he was a man who iregaroed discussion ·a s a personal atta0k, there never were any objective discussions about the vital proiblerns orf the country. Truthfully speaking, it must be said that Benes did not even have the desired understanding for those two problems. He was a man who gloried in moving in foreign circles; he saiw his strength on the diplomatic parquets among his a,oquaintances, club, colleagues, wd hi-red journ.ailists. Problems of internal politics neveir reaJ.Iy interested Benes. Una:ble to tolerate criticism, he contriived the laiw "for the protection of the (Republic," which was enthusiastically endorsed by the other "coalition" parties, becall!Se it put a perfect muzZJle io n the mouths o.f the opposition. Benes paid lip service to democracy, but sinned against it gravely. P&haps inexperience, a ilaclr of honest courage to give in when wrong, affiliaiting politics too much with person:al advantages run:d gains, commerc.iali·z ing politics at the ~nse of the ideal interests of ,t he nation - all this .became the hot/bed of dictatorial whims which culminated in whait Benes began rto do in 1945, when without even consuWng the nation he pu:bli,s:hed -and enforC"ed his famous- "decrees." He had become a dictator, something he had always striven for. To Benes it did not matter that he served the forces which ilater rwere to orvercome him, ibeca:use rthey were more powerful, experienced .and tactically more mature. The Czech nation tolerated dictatorship. Wea:kened by the war, SLOVAKIA 69 confused and befuddled by the political situation which was not presented in its :tirue colors, and led by ·a personality who thought he had won the war, the nation hum!bly sue.. cumbed to serious breaches and limitations of its rights and freedoms. Benes Finally "Gets" Stribrny Just before the war ended, as I recaill, while several of us were discussing the future, one of iBenes's very close friends Temarked: "Things will not be as they were under Masairyk. Benes is a vengeful man and will not forgive any one!" This characterization of Benes hit me hard later, when I learned that Stfibrny was arrested at the Grii.fenberg Baths in Silesia. Every one was convinced that this was a m~staJke. Wha;t could any o.ne have against Stribrny? During the war he was not active politically ·a t all. Benes nevertheless came out against Stribrny because of his pre ...war activity, which did not fall under the notion of "retribution" at all. Stfibrny's journalists, we know, frequently criticized Benes, as did many others. The court could not resolve whether the criticism was proper or not, but omy whether criticism was allowed and whether free criticism comes under the notion of "retribution." The defendant's counsel, a brilliant iPrague lawyer, was convinced that Stribrny could not be convicted. When the trial was over and tha,t lawyer heard the verdiot of life in jail, he wanted to give up his law practice. Stfibrny's son, hearing ,t he verdict, said only one word: "Dad!" and for that he was accused of disturbing public order and later sentenced to 18 months in jail. Jin 1S tribrny probably could have gotten out of the ·n ava prison, if he would have requested amnesty. But he refused to ask Benes for mercy. Stfibrny was not indicted and tried ·e ven by the Oommunists. "The mrun of October 28th," one of the founders of the Republic, apparently did not consider it dignified and proper to ask any one for mercy, for pardon for anything that he did not commit, for pardon because at the moment his antagonist was stronger than he was. 60 SLOVAKIA Let people think what they like a;bout Stribrny. One. thlng .they ml.l!st admit: he was am enthusiastic and stouthearted man. If he did do wrong, he was willing to admit it; often he may have attacked hairder than he should have and let himself be guided ,b y personal bitterness more than by political motive, but he was one orf the few moo who did found the Republic. The founders of states of civilized nations ·a re usualty glorified by monuments and a;rticles in school reade:ra. But Sitribrrny was allowed to die in jail. A shame? !indeed, it was a shame, but it was not Stribrny's shame. Getting rid of opponents. by any and all methods leads in ,p olitics to dictatorship. As soon as "liberaito:ris" cha:nge into enslavers of their nation, it is up to the na,tion to defend its rig,hts.. It cannot stand idly on the sidelines. Tihe ipeople who do that beair the responsibility for the victims of dictatorship. Stribrny was one of the victims. His deeply furrowed countenance will be long remembered iby those who knew him. His high forehead was crowned with a rich set of hair - ,w avy, beautiful lrair. 'Dhe physic,a l personality of Stribrny is slowly disappearing in the chasms of oblivion, ibut hiis hair still waves as if it were a li'Viing torch! • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Irutest statemenJts rulways stressed, tiliait ouir pact of a.Hiance with Soviet Russia and ouir friendshiip with other S1 av Ill8.tions must not encrooch on o.ur friendly and cordirul relations with other democratic states. This is .t he natuiral desire, shared by an enormous ma;jority of oor people, and nothing .p revents us from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and stroogthenmg and deepening OUT friendship with ouT great western Allies. Moscow, too, wanlts tio ful~ow thi s line of poliic y. rt will., however, be necessary for certain prejudices of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozecho-Slorvakia, OW7I Bulletin, June 1, 194'5. 1 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Enslavers of the Czech Nation: How Beneš "Got" Stříbrný Description An account of the resource Sirius Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), June 1956 pp. 52-60 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1956 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/24c0ac872e7ac6795b014bdd4fddb951.pdf cdf811185b2d67c56e5303bd487cfc0e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 27 ENVISIONING A HOMELAND: CARPATHO-RUSYN IMMIGRANTS IN THE USA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPTION 1 Richard D. Custer In the earliest decades of their life in the United States, relations between Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants were frequent and generally productive. But Czech immigrants neither settled in the same places most Rusyn immigrants went, nor had any notable higherlevel contacts with them. Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant newspapers, which were an important means for their readers to become aware of immigrant issues outside their own ethnic group, rarely made mention of Czechs until 19 16. Yet by late 1918, American Rusyn leaders were laying a foundation for their homeland countrymen entering into a new state with the Czechs and Slovaks. In the space of just a few months of the concept of the first Czechoslovak Republic being known to American Rusyns, a plebiscite conducted in some segments of the community resulted in a strong, though not overwhelming, preference for inclusion into the nascent Czechoslovak state. The results would prove decisive in the fate of post-Austro-Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus'. This article will examine why Czechoslovakia became and did, or did not, remain their preferred option. Early Settlement of Carpatho-Rusyns, Slovaks, and Czechs in the U.S.A. [n the formative years of the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant communities, these two Slavic peoples, in many cases already having occasional contact in their shared homeland, experienced times of cooperation and conflict that helped to firmly define their respective identities. Historic "U pper Hungary," specificall y the counties of Abauj /Abov, Szepes/Spis, Saras/Saris, Zemplen/Zemplin, and Ung/ Uz, 1 O ri gi nally presented at "Czec hoslovakia at I 00: Envisioning and Imagi ng Subcarpathian Rus"' panel , Association fo r Slavic, East European, and Euras ian Studies (ASEEES) annua l convention, Boston , MA, 6 December 2018. �28 SLOVAKIA 2021 experienced the highest rate of poverty and thus the highest rate of emigration to the United States starting in the late 19th century. In these counties - for the most part present-day eastern Slovakia - Slovaks were the majority, and Rusyns were a substantial minority. Some villages were ethnically mixed, or neighboring vil lages inhabited mostly by the other ethnic group. The first Slovak immigrants to the United States from Upper Hungary began to arrive in the late 1860s, and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants from Upper Hungary and Austrian Galicia began to arrive in the latter 1870s, but significant numbers of both were not found in the U.S.A. until the 1880s. The communities of both groups began to organize in the early 1880s. In general , Slovaks (particularly those from eastern Slovakia) and Carpatho-Rusyns settled in the same towns and cities in the U.S.A.: metropolitan New York City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; the anthracite coa l mining region of northeastern Pennsylvania; Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania; western Pennsy lvania; C leveland ; Chicago and northwestern Indiana; St. Louis; Minneapolis; and Detroit. 2 These areas were home to the vast majority of both Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn parishes and other organizations. The places where Slovaks were established that had no Carpatho-Rusyn presence were few, primarily in upstate New York and the Midwest. Specifically Slovak Roman Catholic parishes were founded in Haz leton , Pennsylvania. and Streator, Illinois ( 1885), and a Lutheran parish was founded also in Streator ( 1884), whi le the first CarpathoRusyn Greek Catholic parish was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1884. Their respective mutual-aid "buria l societies," or fraternal insurance lodges, were also founded at around the same time, the first such Slovak society being founded in New York City in 1883 3 , while the first such Ru syn soc iety was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1885 4 . 2 Konstantin Cul en, History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul, Minn .: Czechoslovak Genea logical Society International, 2007), 67-70; Paul R. Magocsi, Our People: Carpatho-Rusvns and Their Descendant.,· in North America. Fourth rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill .: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 20-22. 3 M. Mark Sto larik, "A Place fo r Everyone: Slovak Fraternal-Benefit Societies" in Scott Cummings ed., Se(f-Help in America: Patterns of Minoritv Business Ente1prise (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 130- 141. 4 Magocsi, 49. �SLOVAKIA 2021 29 In the homeland, Carpatho- Ru syns probably would have never met an ethnic Czech/ Bohemian or Moravian, except perhaps as young conscripts serving together in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War 1. 5 (And it is further unlikely that these men wou ld have found their way to the United States until after the end of the war.) Contact between Carpatho-Ru syn and Czech immigrants in the U.S.A. was similarly unlikely, and the two immigrant groups were of substantiall y different character. Czech immigrants began to arrive in the United States much earl ier: the largest number came in the late 1860s. A substantial portion of these immigrants were at least middle class and artisans, in strong contrast to the mostly peasant Slovak and CarpathoRusyn immigrants who took on unskilled jobs in the mines and mills. Finally, Czech settlements were generally in the Midwest and Texas, where farm land was easi ly obtai ned, far from the industrial setting that defined the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant experience.6 Only in cities like Ch icago, C leveland, and Pittsburgh were eastern S lovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns likely to encounter Czech immigrants, if at all. Additionally, Czech immigrants were increasingly less likely to worship in (Roman) Catholic churc hes and thus their contact with Slovak or (i n certain situations) Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants was not frequent. The early Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants, then, in addition to frequent and essential contact with their Lemko Rusyn , Boiko, and Ukrainian co-religionists from Galicia in Greek Catholic parishes and fraternal organizations, were far more familiar with Slovak immigra nts as their neighbors, work friends , and perhaps spouses or extended family. To some extent, Carpatho-Rusyns' and Slovaks' fraternal benefit organizations developed along the same lines and in cooperation. Fraternal organizations were usually the first community institution estab lished in the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant settlements. These were built on the model of simi lar organizations in the homeland, in part as a replacement for the American insurance that was not usually ava il ab le to S lavic immigrants, and out of a need for 5 Magocsi, " The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovaki a," Sla vic Review, Vol. 34, o. 2 (June 1975), 364. 6 Thoma s Capek, The Cechs (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 36-51 , 60-68. �30 SLOVAKIA 2021 an organization to rally the immigrants on an ethnic basis. The first of these societies arose in pioneer Slovak and Rusyn settlements in the 1880s and 1890s. Some were founded by Roman and Greek Catholics together, e.g., in Bridgeport, Connecticut ( 1888), Kingston, Pennsylvania ( 1887 or 1888), Streator, Illinois ( 1889), McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, Allegheny/Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Passaic, New Jersey ( 1890). Some or most of these organizations would likely have joined the national Slovak organizations founded around that time: the National Slavonic Society of the United States (renamed National Slovak Society of the United States of America in 1913), or the First Catholic Slovak Union, FCSU/"Jednota," both founded in 1890.7 Rusyns would not have their own comparable organization until 1892. But the most striking example of a shared Slovak/Rusyn fraternal society was the Pennsylvania Slovak Roman & Greek Catholic Union (aka Pennsylvania Slovak Union or PSJ). Of all the Slovak-American fraternal societies this organization would count the largest number of Rusyn members, and more than 20 PSJ lodges were identified specifically as Greek Catholic or were based at a Greek Catholic church. 8 Despite having a generally common cultural background, and some shared religious affiliation and shared organizations, on an official level , the political goals of the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants did not always coincide, even as the idea of a Czechoslovak republic began to materiali ze. American Carpatho-Rusyn Fraternal Benefit Societies Greek Catholic Union (GCU). The GCU was the sec ul ar organization with the largest membership and widest geographical reach in the American Rusyn community. Its leadership, and editorial stance of its Amerikansky Russky Viestnik newspaper (ARV) , were generally anti-Hungarian, vehemently anti-Ukrainian, and mildly Russophil e, though never politically inclined to union with Russia. While its 1902 spinoff United Societies, loyal to America's first Greek Catholic 7 Stolarik, 130- 141. Ri chard D. Custer, "Old Countrymen, New Neighbors: Early Carpatho- Rusyn and Slovak Immigra nt Relations in the United States" in S/ovo (National Czech & Slovak Museum & Library, Cedar Rap ids, IA), Summer 2016. Unabridged version on line at https://www .ncsml .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Old-Countrymen-New-Neighbors.pdf, 6-7. 8 �SLOVAKIA 2021 31 Bishop Soter Ortynsky (an ethnic Ukrainian) since his arrival in 1907 and friendly to the Ga lician clergy, was the GCU 's antagonist on paper, they wou ld prove to be the al li es that would make possible a stronger voice that proved to be the one that caught the ear of the creators of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Slovaks - those who were Greek Catholics as we ll as Roman Catholics - made up a not insignificant portion of the GCU ' s membership, but early on the GCU took a strong stand against the idea that there were actually ethnic S lovak Greek Catholics.9 United Societies of the Greek Catholic Religion. The United Societies spun off from the GCU in 1902 and maintained a loya li st position toward the Greek Catholic Church, at times in opposition to what was perceived as the rebel li ous or disloyal GCU. In its support for Bishop Ortynsky, the society, its newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian ( 1910- 19 17), and its editor, Father Joseph Hanulya, were castigated by the GCU as Ukrainian sympathi zers. Around 1918, the United Societies had about 9,000 members including youth 10 , and published a newspaper, Prosvita, that remained often at odds w ith the GCU and its ARV. Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz (RNS) / Ukrainian National Association (UNA). The GCU in its early years, under c lerically-dominated leadership, became preoccupied with Rusyn affairs in Hungary and enunciated a generally pro-Hungarian political stance. This ali enated the significant membership from Galicia (most of whom were Lemkos), and many lodges, some even with substantial Subcarpathian membership, seceded from the GCU in 1894 to form a new organization . That organization, founded in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was the Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz, or in English, Russian National Union . It we lcomed as members Rusyns from Hungary and Galicia who had a strong sense of national identity, whether "Rusyn," " Russian," or "Ruthenian ." As the organization and its Svoboda newspaper became more Ukrainian-oriented, and the terms Ukraine and Ukrainian increasing ly used alongside Rus' and Rusyn, those with Russophil e or Old-Ruthenian views wou ld transfer to other organizations, primarily 9 Custer, '" No Such Thing as Greek Catholic Slovaks: ' The GCU's Polemic," The Carpatho-Rusyns of Pennsylvania, http://rusynsofpa. blogspot.com/2 014/12/no-suchthing-as-greek-catholic-slovaks.html. Accessed December I, 201 8. 10 Magocsi, " Political Activity," 398. �32 SLOVAKIA 2021 the Russian Brotherhood Organization. The dominant "Ruthenian" segment would eventually lead the organization to change its name in September 1914 to the Ukrainian National Association. Alienated by this change, approximately 17 UNA lodges, 15 of which had a primarily Subcarpathian Rusyn membership, joined the United Societies between October 1914 and February 1915, resulting in 2 1 new regular United Societies lodges and 6 new United Societies youth lodges. Onl y a few such lodges would remain in the UNA, and so the organization's influence among American Subcarpathian Rusyns had almost entirely di ssipated. Russian Brotherhood Organization (RBO). Some members of GCU and RNS in 1900 gathered in Mahanoy City, Pa ., to form a new fraternal organization that would resist clerical domination, have no requirement of church membership, and avoid both pro-Hungarian and pro-Ukrainian political stands. Most of its early lodges were located in northeastern Pennsylvania and some had left the GCU or RNS to join. Religiously, the society remained officially neutral , but as a Ukrainian orientation came to dominate Ga lician Greek Catholic circles in the U.S.A. and in the homeland, the organization became much more supportive of the Orthodox Church, and an increasing portion of its membership reflected that. The RBO 's consistent stand on Ukrainianism was very negative, but simi larly, it opposed the idea that the Rusyn people's regional distinctions justified separation from Great Russians. While the majority of RBO members originated in the Lemko Region of Galicia, many of its founders and largest lodges originated in Hungary/Subcarpathia. In fact, in 1918 nearly 40 RBO lodges had a Subcarpathian majority, and a comparable number of lodges were loosely affiliated with Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes. Ru ssian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society (ROCMAS). A convention of church brotherhoods that had converted to Orthodoxy took place in September 1895 in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , the center of the Rusyn movement to Orthodoxy led by Father Alexis Toth. They formed a federation, and by the first national convention in 1896, eighteen brotherhoods were members. The Society issued a newspaper, Svit, written in a mixture of Galician Ukrainian and Russian . While somewhat concerned with cultural matters, the Society's primary goal was the defense and promotion of Orthodoxy among socalled " Little Russian" immigrants. It vehemently opposed Ukrainia- �SLOVAKIA 2021 33 nism and the Greek Catholic Church, and promoted a strict Russian identity almost as a necessary feature of Orthodoxy, to the detriment of the local or regional linguistic and cultural traits of its Rusyn membership. Many of its larger and older lodges were primarily Subcarpathian, e.g., Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Scranton , Catasauqua, and Berwick. United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood of America. The organization, at its founding known as the Greek Catholic Pravoslavny Brotherhood, was established in 1915 mainly by former members of the GCU in southwestern Penn sylvania who had recently joined the Ru ssian Orthodox Church. The vast majority of its members hip was of Subcarpathian origin, particularly from the more eastern counties of Uz, Bereg and Maramoros. Within two decades it grew to around 20,000 members 11 . Position of Slovak Fraternals "There is no 'Slovak ' people" - so titled was an art icle in the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik, Aug. 29, 1918. The postwar years and the struggles over the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic would involve back-and-forth arguments between Ru syn American and Slovak American leaders, in print and, no doubt, in face-to-face meetings. But the root of the di strust undoubtedly was the early conflicts in these communities. The National Slovak Society, for its part, both supported the Rusyn people and disagreed at times with the position of the Rusyn leaders: National Slovak Society members expressed their concern for the fate of their brother Slavs, the Rusyns, who were now [World War I] experiencing the brunt of persecution in wartime Europe. Not only were repressive measures being taken against Rusyns in Carpathian Hungary, but in neighboring Galicia, Magyar troops were perpetrating wholesale massac res. This did not mean that the N.S.S. was conceding to th e claims of a Rusyn nationalism in Eastern Slovakia. Although support for the Slovak ca use in the region had been growing - largely thanks to the financi al support of the American Slovak community - certain elements considered the "S lovjaks" (i .e., Greek Catholics speaking the dial ect of the 11 Magocs i, Our People, 57. �34 SLOVAKIA 2021 eastern regions) as a separate nationality. The official N.S.S. policy was that the Slovjaks were Slovak, not Rusyn, Russian , or any other Slav people. 12 Political Actions During and Toward the End of World War I The Rus 'ko-Amerykans 'ka Rada (Rusyn/Ruthenian American Council) was established at a gathering in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. By design it was to give equal leadership voice to Subcarpathian and Galician Rusyns, and under the patronage of Bishop Ortynsky, its directors included clerical and lay leaders from the Subcarpathian Rusyn community, especially Father Joseph Hanulya, editor of the United Societies newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian , George Gulanich and Ivan Zeedick of the GCU , and John Branik, president of the United Societies. At its Philadelphia meeting it condemned Russia and advocated for support of the political and cultural union of "Ukrainian (Rusyn)"-inhabited Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. 13 This entity ceased to exist with the death of Ortynsky in 1916, but not without drawing ire upon Father Hanulya for his participation. The American-Russian National Defense (ARND) / Narodna Obrana was founded in 1915 in Braddock, Pa. , near Pittsburgh, by Nicholas Pachuta. At the time Pachuta was assistant editor of the ARV, a post he held until 1918, under Michael Hanchin . National Defense styled itself the defender of Rus ' -ness against Magyarism in the Greek Catholic Church, was also critical of Slovakophiles and Ukrainophiles, and picked up members who were recent converts to Orthodoxy in the era of Bishop Stephen Dzubay. In May of 19 18 he met with Thomas G. Masaryk, the leader of the movement for a new state to be called Czechoslovakia, in Pittsburgh and began a discussion around the fate of Uhro-Rus ' (the Rusyn lands south of the Carpathians, historically part of Hungary). At that time Masaryk disregarded Pachuta's goals because his group "had no following or 12 R. Vl adimir Baumgarten and Joseph Ste fka , The National Slovak Society : 100 Year Histmy. 1890-/990. (Pittsburgh: Nation al Slovak Society, 1990), 76. 13 " Narodnyi z' "izd u Filiadel'fii"," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ ), 19 December 1914, 2; Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884- 1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 35 support among the broad masses of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants." 14 National Defense came around to the Czechoslovak option and delivered a memorandum to Masaryk in October endorsing autonomy within a Czechoslovak state. Around that time Pachuta converted to Orthodoxy, and in 1921 he united the National Defense with the American Russian Brotherhood based in C leve land. From 1922 until 1935 he was editor of the Russkij Vistnik newspaper of U ROBA. The League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia was a strictly Russophile political organization that drew most of its participation from individuals who were already active in organizations like ROCMAS and especially RBO. The vast majority of its members were of Galician background, but about 25% of delegates to its congresses were Subcarpathian Rusyns . 15 It held congresses in 19 17, 1918, and 1919 and made proclamations that Carpatho-Rusyn territory, a long with the who le of Galicia and Bukovina, should be part of Russia. The American National Counci l of Uhro-Rusins was founded in July of 1918 in Pittsburgh, with strong support from the United Societies and eventually the GCU . It grew to more than 100 branches, some of which had I 00 or even 200+ members. This was the organization in which the Pittsburgh attorney Gregory Zatkovich rose to leadership, began meetings with Masaryk, and which led to his post as the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus' . In Philadelphia on October 23, 1918, Zatkovich participated in the Mid-European Democratic Union in the presence of Masaryk . At that time Uhro-Rusyns - Rusyns of Hungary - were accepted as a distinct nationa lity, apart from Ukrainians who were already members. The National Counci l met at Scranton, Pa., on November 12, and formulated its final recommendation that Rusyn territory south of the Carpathians, including all of the original Uhro-Rusyn counties, be united in a Czechoslovak state with broad autonomy. The next day, the resolution was presented to Masaryk, who recommended that a plebiscite be held among American Uhro-Rusyns. 14 Joseph Danko, "Plebiscite of Carpath o- Ruthenians in the United States Recommendin g Union of Carpatho-Rutheni a with the Czec hoslovak Republic," Annals of !he Ukrainian Academy of Aris and Sciences, 11 , nos. 1-2 ( 1964-68), 186. 15 Prikarpalskaia Rus • (New York), Vol. I, o. I, October 191 8. �36 SLOVAKIA 2021 The American Uhro-Rusyn Plebiscite of December 1918 The American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, in conjunction with Masaryk's advice to Zatkovich, resolved to conduct a vote in Subcarpathian Rusyn parishes and fraternal lodges to determine their preferred action with respect to the homeland, among the options it had previously agreed to. Of course, they expected that the result would need to support what had already been decided: that Subcarpathian Rusyn territory should join the Czech and Slovak republic. This vote, then, was limited to the National Council's constituency: Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes - no Orthodox parishes and no Galician-majority parishes would be involved, even if they had substantial numbers of Subcarpathian Rusyn members; and lodges of the GCU and United Societies only, who were already seen to be inclined toward their leadership's preference for Czechoslovakia. The plebiscite was announced in only one issue of the ARV (Nov. 14, 1918), and commenced almost immediately thereafter. There is no extant evidence that there was campaigning within the communities to select a particular option; certainly there would have been very little time for that. We do have results of the vote, which was published in several installments in the ARV and Prosvita, and which were collected in "Plebiscite ofCarpatho-Ruthenians in the United States Recommending Union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic" authored by Joseph Danko in 1968. 16 Option Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic Union with the Ukrainian Republic Total independence Union with Carpatho-Russians Union with Russi a Union with Magyar Land fHungaryl Union with Galicia Total Votes (% of tota l) 732 (66.4%) 310 (28. 1%) 27 (2.5%) 13 ( 1.2%) 10 (0.9%) 9 (0.8%) I (0. 1%) I , 102(/00.0%) Unsurprisingly, the organizers' preferred option won decisively, but not overwhelmingly. Based on the individual vote counts by parish and lodge provided by Danko, I would like to comment on some of 16 Danko, 200. �SLOVAKIA 2021 37 the more interesting things I observed. Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic (rank: I} As we will see, each of the options had some very surprising entities voting for them. This option's supporters included two parishes founded as Greek Catholic but which at the time of the vote had Orthodox pastors: Elkhorn, West Virginia (Father John Gratson) and Elizabeth, New Jersey (Father Gregory Varho l). Not very surprising was a vote by a large, mostly Subcarpathian parish of Rusyns from Spis, Saris and Zemplin Counties (Holy Ghost in Tremont), but whose pastor was Father Hanulya, former editor of the United Societies' first newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian - who for years as a supporter of Bishop Ortynsky had been attacked by the GCU in the pages of ARV for being a quasi-Ukrainian . Fourteen of the GCU lodges were based at majority-Galician parishes, although some of these lodges were primari ly Subcarpathian in membership. Union with the Ukrainian Republic (rank: 2) Figure 1. A portion of the American Rusyn communities that voted for union of Uhro-Rusyns with the Ukrainian Republic (66% of tota l votes cast). (Source: Danko, 196-198) The following voted for Uni on of Uhro-Rusins with Ukraini an Republic Societies of the Greek Catholic of Rusin Brothe rhoods in the USA 4 6 17 19 24 28 32 50 Mahoney City, Pa. Donmore , Pa. Rendham, Pa. Lansing, Pa . Eckle y , Pa. Glenlien, Pa. Sheppton, Pa. Mahoney Plane, Pa. (Figure I continues) 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 242 267 292 295 298 324 379 390 St. Clair , Pa. Hannastown, Pa. Wilkes-Barre , Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Baggaley, PP a . New Salem, Pa. Kester, Pa. McKees Rocks, Pa. 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 5 �38 SLOVAKIA 2021 Uhro-Rusins Greek Catholic United Congregations. I St. Johna SL Johna B. V. M. Bleaed TrinitY B. V. M. B. V. M. SL Michael B. V. M. Holy Ghost L Michael hen Scnnton, Pa. Bridgeport, Conn. New Salem, Pa. New Britain, Conn. Freebnd,PL Whitting, Ind. Ref. &am>lky P.ev. Cbomoc:t Rev.~ 400- 8 500-10 400- 8 Blnghamtoo, N.Y. Taylor, Pa. McKeca Rocb, PL St. Clair Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Rev. Thq2t Rev. Petraaovich Rev. A. Suba Rev. Ribovsk Rev. N. Chopey 550- 7 Lt Lansford, Pa. Rev. Martyak 550- 7 ~udloning, Pa. Ha eton, Pa. Rn. p ch Rev. Brinaky llef. Choarboch 500- 6 500· 6 600-12 600-12 550- 7 Rev. FeiuG !&J- s Overall this was the most surprising result, having the second highest number of votes. Some votes came from additionally surprising places. For example: the parish in New Britain had experienced an ugly split with Galician Ukrainians just eight years before, yet they still had a Galician pastor. The Wilkes-Barre parish ' s pastor was Father Nicholas Chopey, who had a few years before been numbered among the pro-Hungary clergy. The Lansford parish ' s pastor was Father Gabriel Martyak, administrator of the Uhro-Rusyn parishes in the wake of Bishop Ortynsky's death two years before. And the Hazleton parish that voted for this option, pastored by the Lemko priest Father John Fekula? This was actually the Galician parish (St. Michael) that split off from two existing Subcarpathian parishes in the same city. We must wonder how this parish had the opportunity to vote at all. The lodges that voted this way included largely-Galician GCU lodges in Glen Lyon (based at an old mostlyGalician parish) and Rankin (based at a mostly-Subcarpathian parish), �39 SLOVAKIA 2021 five other GC U lodges based at Galician-majority pari shes but with mostl y Subcarpathi an members, and a GCU lodge from Father Martyak's paris h in Lansford whose members were mostl y from Sari s and Zemplin Counti es. The following voted for Tou.l Independence of Uhro-Rusins. Societies of the Greek C. Union. ):: ~~•:· an !Im , a. \ Eynon, Pa. lmon, Pa. ~nton, ra. 2 1 I Gymnastic Branches. I61 11 Scranton, Pa. 67 Mahonoy City, Pa. 1 United Societies of Greek C. Religion I ss K.ingaton, Pa. 1 II 60 Edwardavillc, Pa. 2 j Uhro-Rusin Congregations 11 ¥ M : Holy Gbolt iililUIIII t11 Jcaup, Pa. 1&11 li•1 :Rev. Ivan I= i I Figure 2. The Ameri can Rusyn communities whi ch voted fo r tota l indepe ndence of Uhro-Rusyns (3 % of votes cast). (Danko, 198) Total independence of Uhro- Rusyns (rank: 3) Without any traditi on of self-rule, and without any real advocates fo r thi s pos ition, it is not surpri sing that it rece ived so few votes. It 's notable that not only did the pari sh and a GCU lodge in Jessup, Pennsy lvani a, contribute a number of the votes fo r thi s option, but two additional GC U lodges that did , in Eynon , Pennsyl va ni a, were a ffili ated wi th the Jessup pari sh as we ll. Jessup a lso had a large RBO lodge, but it is unlike ly that independence would have been the ir preference. �40 SLOVAKIA 2021 Union with Carpatho-Russians (i.e., Galicians, Bukovinians, UhroRusyns) (rank: 4) This position was represented among American Carpatho-Rusyns mainly by the League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia, although evidently few Subcarpathian Rusyns belonged to that organization, and to some extent originally by the American-Russian National Defense. The few votes for this option came mainly from Gary, Indiana 's GCU Lodge 469 and its Greek Catholic parish, which was primarily of Subcarpathian origin (in its western counties that would be incorporated into Slovakia) although it is not clear to this author why that would have been their choice. Union with Russia (rank: 5) The FolJowing voted for Union with Russia Greek Catholic Union. 550 Olyphant, Pa. 1 Gymnastic Branch 121 Jerome, Pa. I Uhro-Rusin Congregations a. V. M. Mahoooy City, Pa. lln. I. lubck 400- a Figure 3. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Russia (I % of votes cast). (Danko. 199) Among the votes for this option were GCU Lodge 530 in Olyphant, Pennsylvania, mostly Lemko in membership and based at a Galician-majority parish, and perhaps most curious of all , St. Mary 's Greek Catholi c Church in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, whose pastor was the noted Rusyn-language author and cultural patriot Father Emil Kubek. Kubek was also part of the leadership of the American I �41 SLOVAKIA 2021 National Council, which was not supportive of union with Russia at all. While he was not a Russophile, his relative lack of involvement with the GCU (and perhaps due to the RBO being founded in his parish) may have encouraged him to advocate for this option . Or more likely the decisive factor was the RBO's founding president, John Zincak Smith, also being the president of St. Mary's parish. Union with Magyar land (i.e., Hungary) (rank: 6) The Following voted for Union of Uhro-Rwins with Magyar Land Greek Catholic Union. 50 2 181 Clevdand, Ohio Clndand, Ohio Uhro-Rusin Congregations. St. John'• , ClcYeland, Ohio llev. Ballog soo- 6 I Figure 4. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Hungary (I % of votes cast). (Danko, 199) Even though many of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy in the U.S. were Magyarized (if not outright Magyarone), it doesn't seem that any attempt there may have been on their part to influence their parishioners to vote for this option was successful. The ARV denounced Hungary's policy toward its ethnic minorities for years in the lead up to the war. Despite Hungary's liberalized ethnic minority policy that began in 1915, inclination toward Hungary from American Rusyns seems to have changed little. Two GCU lodges voted for this option, but most striking is that six votes came from St. John's Church in Cleveland - not the Rusyn one that in 1918 had hired an Orthodox priest as its pastor - but the Magyar parish, pastored by Father Michael Balogh. This was the only ethnic-Hungarian parish to vote, and it's unlikely that Zatkovich and the American National Council had intended the plebiscite to include the Magyar parishes. (It's possible that they did, we just have no evidence on either side to say for sure.) Union with Galicia (rank: 7) Given the still substantial portion of the GCU's membership either �42 SLOVAKIA 2021 from Galicia or belonging to lodges based at Galician-majority parishes, we could have expected more votes for this option than were returned. However, a number of GCU lodges that were mostly or entirely Galician in membership (e.g., McKeesport Lodge 782, Wilmerding, Pa. , Lodges 348 and 360) - and based at Galician parishes - did not vote. It must be underscored that the plebiscite was not truly representative of the range of religious congregations and fraternal lodges found in the American Carpatho-Rusyn community, not even when speaking exclusively of those from Subcarpathia - the "Uhro-Rusyns." The Orthodox (except for two parishes which inexplicably did vote) were wholly unrepresented, and the significant fraternals RBO, ROCMAS , and fledgling UROBA were likewise ignored. Clearly it was meant to produce the additional justification Zatkovich needed to present the Scranton resolution to the Paris Peace Conference. 17 Understandably alarmed by this development, the activist Ukrainian American community opposed what they had hoped would be an outcome supporting their goal to unite so-called Ukrainian-Ruthenian ethnographic territory in a Ukrainian state. In so doing, they provided what seems to be the only eyewitness account of how the plebiscite was conducted in a Rusyn parish. Here writes a Ukrainian from Bridgeport, Conn .: Our Hungarian brother Rusyns want to unite Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine. On December 8 of this year, a parish meeting was held in Bridgeport, Conn. , right after the Divine Liturgy, in the parish school. The meeting was very interesting for every Ukrainian, because our brother Uhro-Rusyns decided on the fate of our and their brothers across the sea. Local speakers and Father Orest Cornjak [Chornock], local pastor, spoke. The meeting was convened for the purpose of deciding where Hungarian Rus' shou ld belong: whether to Ukraine or to the Czecho-Slovak state. Father Orest Cornjak stated his preference, that he would vote to belong to his brothers, that is, to the Ukrainians, rather than to the Czecho-Slovaks . After much discussion , it turned out that the Uhro-Rusyn 17 Victor S. Mamatey, "The Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians," in Joseph F. O'Grady, ed .. The Immigrants· Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 245-246. �SLOVAKIA 2021 43 leaders wanted to lead the Uhro-Rusyns to the Czecho-Slovaks, without questioning the Uhro-Rusyn people. And again the speakers protested against the "American National Council of UhroRusins" in America that no one has elected; its members of that Council are self-appointed leaders, that they have chosen themselves and have no right to speak in the name of the Uhro-Rusyn people, and further that they proposed an amendment so as not to vote either for Ukraine or against, nor to take a position against the Czecho-Slovak state, and so let it be as Uhro-Rusyns will decide in the old country. They also complained to the Ukrainians that at the founding of the " Mid-European Union" at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa., they had to say that the Uhro-Rusyns are "a different people" from the Ukrainians, and thus the Ukrainians do not want to accept the UhroRusyns as an equal among equals and so for that reason will not vote in that way. When people were already wanting to leave, Mr. Ivan Boyko, head of the Ukrainian Athletic Association (Sich) in America, while asking forgiveness for the slurs that were committed by Ukrainians, and explaining that the Uhro-Rusyns had already decided at the founding council meetings in L'viv that Hungarian Rus ' should belong to Ukraine together with Galicia and Bukovina, said he did not see the reasons why the Uhro-Rusyns should not vote for the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine. He laid out what benefits the Uhro-Rusyns would have in a Ukrainian state, and what benefits they would have from the Czecho-Slovaks .. .. We Ukrainians, said Mr. Bojko, can never agree that our Hungarian brothers will be in the Czecho-Slovak state. [... ] It should be noted that the audience very intently listened to Mr. Bojko and took his every word to heart. After the speech the audience rewarded him with applause when the other speakers received no applause. Here Mr. Bojko did a great service to the Ukrainian people by proclaiming this speech to the Hungarian brothers, because then now the entire hall of people began to speak differently about it after the speech, because it was moved to vote by secret ballot, about where Hungarian Rus' should belong: whether to Ukraine, or to the Czecho-Slovak state, and another motion, to vote by roll call , so that you know who is against your brothers (Ukrainians). Father Comjak led by saying: Who is for �44 SLOVAKIA 2021 uniting Hungarian Rus' with Ukraine? It was decided unanimously on the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine, and then came the second ballot: Who is for uniting Hungarian Rus' with the Czecho-Slovaks? For this union with the Czecho-Slovaks there was only one vote. So, evidently, the Uhro-Rusyns want to unite with Ukraine. The statement made in Philadelphia by Misters M. Sichynsky and N. Ceglinsky, recognizing the Uhro-Rusyns as a separate nationality, with their representative as Mr. Zatkovich in the "MidEuropean Union," should be retracted for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Uhro-Rusyns . Instead, let them declare that the Uhro-Rusyns are our brothers by blood and by faith , and we can never agree that a second nationality would rule over our Hungarian brothers, even if it were Czecho-Slovakia. In Bridgeport, Conn ., Uhro-Rusyns do not recognize the "American National Council of Uhro-Rusins" because their people did not select them , and that self-styled Counci l has no right to push them into a Czecho-Slovak state, because the Uhro-Rusyn brothers want to unite Hungarian Rus ' with Ukraine. Glory to them for this! 18 The Ukrainian National Association's newspaper Svoboda reported on a Ukrainian National Congress that took place in January 1919. This congress included speakers on the situation in the Subcarpath ian Rusyn community in the U.S. and its recent Scranton resolution and fol low-on plebiscite. Father Kubek , editor of the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik [this is an error, he was not] was supposed to speak, but at the last moment he informed that he was not able to do so. His place was taken by a Galician priest, Father Vasyl' Merenkiv, who said, among other things: "In recent days I was in several Uhro-Rusyn parishes and spoke with several Uhro-Rusyn priest-leaders . We spoke about the idea of uniting Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine . I can assure the esteemed delegates that they are all committed to joining Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine more so than with Czec hoslovak ia. But still, I noticed that American Uhro-Rusyns are sti ll wavering." Mr. Ivan Hajovyc (of Maramoros), a delegate from the Chicago Uhro-Rusyns, was called to speak. He revealed his joy that he has an 18 "Svobidna vo lia uhors' kykh Ru syniv," Svoboda, 14 December 19 I 8, 2. �SLOVAKIA 2021 45 opportunity to speak to so many people who are interested in the fate of Uhro-Rusyns. He talked about the oppression that Uhro-Rusyns suffered from the Magyars. " We, Hungarian Ukrainians," said Mr. Hajovyc, "stand body and soul for the unity of Ukraine.We want to join with Ukraine! We are protesting against the plebiscite conducted among American UhroRusyn s, which was set up for the sake of uniting Uhro-Rus' with Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Ukrainians want to be united with Ukraine. We do not know what Czechoslovakia is and who CzechoSlovaks are. We never want to hear anything about joining them." Mr. Ivan Hundjak (a Galician) argued using statistics that the plebiscite initiated by Masaryk among American Uhro-Rusyns was conducted in a deceptive manner. Finally Mr. Ivan Skakandij, an Uhro-Rusyn cantor-teacher and delegate from Nesquehoning, Pa . was called to speak He regretted that in such an important moment Hungarian Ukrainians in America have not yet all been awakened to a life of national consciousness. " It is the fault of the Uhro-Rusyn clergy, who in the old country were led around by the Magyars and now by the Czechoslovaks. But nationally conscious Hungarian Ukrainians in America want to unite with Ukraine. We are just now awakening to life and there is hope that in a short time we will all be awakened." One speaker (Father Merenkiv) said " Hungarian Ukrainians in America are still waking up, but remember, that as we wake up , Masaryk will do nothing to help." 19 My observations about the results, it turns out, while I arrived at them independently, were noted to some extent already in 1919 in an article in the Ukrainian press. This is the speech by Ivan Hundjak (mentioned previously) in which he analyzed the resu lts and pointed out, among other criticisms, that if a person happened to be a member of a GCU lodge and the United Societies lodge in the same place, and the local Subcarpathian Greek Catholic parish, conceivably that person could vote up to three times. He noted as well (as Danko did) that participation among those eligible to vote was fairly low. He asserted that had these irregularities been taken into account, the leading result 19 "Z narodnohu z'izdu," Svoboda, 18 January 19 19, 2. �46 SLOVAKIA 2021 probably would have been for union with Ukraine. I would counter that had there been time, or the will, to more inclusively offer the vote to all American Subcarpathian Rusyn institutions, and not just the ones affiliated with the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, the results may indeed have been different, but more likely toward union with Russia, as impractical as that might have been. Reception of Czechoslovakia in the Rusyn American Community In May of 19 I 9, the cornerstone was laid in Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the Rusin Peoples Home. This event, under the patronage of the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, occurred just days before the National Counci l in Uzhorod, Subcarpathian Rus ', would accept the American Rusyns ' proposal to unite with Czechoslovakia. The commemorative booklet for this event 20 prominently featured a page with the American, Czechoslovak, and "Rusin" flags entwined, with the slogan "Old Glory Has Made This Federation (Czech-SlovakRusin) Possible." The pages following showed photographs of Zatkovich signing the declaration of the Mid-European Nationalities and Masaryk reading the declaration at a public manifestation in Philadelphia. The book ' s last page is a map showing Europe ' s ethnic groups within the new postwar borders, with Czechoslovakia labeled "Czechoslovaks" and to its east, "Uhro-Rusinia." It's not clear whether UhroRusinia is meant to be depicted as part of Czechoslovakia or not. Whatever the interpretation, this is probably the lone celebratory publication of American Rusyns to mark the decision to join the Czechoslovak Republic. A delegation of American Rusyn gymnasts affiliated with the GCU Sokol division travelled to Prague in the summer of 1920 to participate in a Pan-Slavic Gymnastics exhibition. As part of the trip they also visited Subcarpathian Rus ' and had an audience with Governor Zatkovich. One member of the delegation wrote, " In Prague we were 20 Souvenir Issued by the Rusin Peoples Home, Inc. on the Occasion of the Dedication ofthe Corner-Stone I Pamiatnik izdan ko,poratsieiu Russkii Narodny i Dom iz sluchai posviashcheniia kraeugol 'nago kamen 'ia. Homestead. Pa .. I 9 I 9 (Homestead, Pa., 19 19). �SLOVAKIA 2021 47 warmly welcomed by the Czechs and everything we saw in Prague and the way we were treated , we enjoyed ... " oi...o OLO ..... .. , . . MAO• T .. , . rcDll:.. 4Tt0N ie&&CW·~YAK "v.lNI ~ . . . • 1..• Figure 5. Page from the commemorative booklet for the cornerstone laying ofthe Rusin Peoples Home in Homestead, Pa., May 1919. Another wrote, " With thanks to God , with our appearance at the Pan-Slavic Sokol Meet in Prague, we made a mark in the history of our Sokol Branch which wi ll be permanent proof that we accomplished our mission , that we entered into the order of the Czechoslovak Sokol movement. . . We also left a lasting impression on the youth of Subcarpathian Rus ' ." The trip was promoted in the pages of ARV and chronicled fully in the 1921 almanac of the Sokol division. 2 1 It wou ld not be long before frustration over the lack of autonomy promised Subcarpathian Rus' by Masaryk would boil over in the American Carpatho-Rusyn press, especially when Zatkovich resigned in 1921 , and would continue at least until the late 1920s among Greek Catholics. The GCU printed a number of publications critical of Czechoslovak policy: Zatkovich's Otkrytie-Expose by vseho g ubernatora Podkarpatskoj Rus i, o Podkarpatskoj Rusi ( 1921 ), Wilson's Prin21 C heryl We ller Beck et al. , Opportuni~v Realized: The Greek Catholic Union 's First One Hundred Years, / 892-1992. (Beaver, Pa.: Gree k Catholic Uni on o f the U.S.A. , 1994), 75 . �48 SLOVAKIA 2021 ciples in Czechoslovak Practice: The Situation of the Carpatho-Russian People Under the Czech Yoke ( 1929) and Beskid's Karpatorusskaja pravda ( 1932). They would also lead a National Congress of Rusins in Pittsburgh in November 1922, which issued a memorandum to Prague condemning their policy toward Subcarpathian Rus '. American Rusyns in the Russian Orthodox Church and others of Russophile orientation would take up the opposition to Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus' through the 1930s. 22 I did not find any evidence - written or photographic - in Carpatho-Rusyn communities or parishes of widespread adoption of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic "homeland." There is certain ly no oral folklore around portraits of Masaryk (or Zatkovich, for that matter) being hung in parish halls as there is of portraits of Maria Theresa and Franz Josef from the early immigration. Lasting Impressions on Rusyn Americans of a Czechoslovak "Homeland" A list on the Wikipedia entry for Czech Americans of "The top 50 U.S. communities with the highest percentage of people claiming Czech ancestry" 23 (based on the 2000 U.S . census) contains mostly predictable results - locations in North Dakota, Texas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin , et al. An accompanying list, " U.S. communities with the most residents born in the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia)," however, contains a curious entry: tied for number IO was the little town of Colver, Pennsylvania, about 20 miles north of Johnstown in the west central part of the state. Colver, a former coal mining company town , had just a few primary ethnic groups : among these were Slovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns. It may we ll have sti ll had a few residents in 2000 who were born in the former Czechos lovakia. It is not clear that these results came from responses declaring their birthplace as "Czech Republic" or "Czechoslovakia," or either, but surely this population in Colver, Pennsylvania, was not ethnic Czechs. 22 Magocsi, Our People, 88-89. "Czech Americans", https ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech Americans. Accessed December I, 201 8. 23 �SLOVAKIA 2021 49 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for ancestry 24 (estimated from its 20 I 3 American Community Survey) show that Pennsylvania, historically the state with the largest number of Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants, had more than 52,142 residents with Czech ancestry, or 0.3% of Pennsylvania residents. This is much less than those who indicated Slovak or Ukrainian ancestry, many of which are likely of Carpatho-Rusyn background (or the completely unreali stic 193 ,000 with "Russian" ancestry), but still far higher than the hi storically low Czech settlement of the state would imply. In addition, "Czechoslovak ian" ancestry was estimated at 22,904, which could conceivably include any of Czech, Slovak, or Carpatho-Rusyn-descended individuals, although the much lower national consciousness of CarpathoRusyn Americans - reflected by the miniscule estimated 2,050 of that background - would lead one to expect most of those "Czechoslovak" individuals to have Carpatho-Rusyn ancestry. That many Carpatho-Rusyn Americans of any particular geographic background in Carpathian Rus ' still exhibit confusion about their ethnic and geographical origins is not news to anyone. But it may be that Subcarpathian Rus ' belonging for 20 years to Czechoslovakia created a lingering geographic attachment to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as the ancestral land of American Carpatho-Rusyns. Consider these newspaper clippings, maybe the most extreme examples of this phenomenon I've encountered. A perhaps unintended corollary to this phenomenon is the everincreasing use of genealogy websites where obituaries, gravestones, and other data are collected; many of the individuals - Carpatho-Rusyns and others - whose ge nealogical data is found on these sites have had their birthplace, which was probably entered by their descendant researcher as "Czechoslovakia," transposed by the site into "Czech Republic," further muddling Carpatho-Rusyn identity by placing Czechoslovak natives into the wrong modem-day country. Thus the main legacy of Carpatho-Rusyns' Czechoslovak homeland may well be their descendants eventually needing to educate themselves about 24 U.S. Census Bureau, Total Ancestry Reported: Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported, 2013 American Community Survey I- Year Estimates. https :// factfinder.census.gov/ faces/tableservices/ jsf/pages/productview.xhtml ?pid=ACS 13 I YR B04003&prodType=table. Accessed I December 2018. �50 SLOVAKIA 2021 the fact that Subcarpathian Rus ' was indeed part of Czechoslovakia and is not the modem day Czechia, nor Slovakia, for that matter. rites _____§s:,vtces for Mary - • 93, of 1220 Valley Road, Duncott, who died Friday morning at Pottsville Hospital, will be held at 9 :15 a.m. Tuesday !rom Dutcavich Funeral Home, Minersville. Further services will be held at 10 a .m . in Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville . The Very Rev. Michael Hatrak will officiate. Interment will be in the parish cemetery, Branch Township. Born public, sh late Metro and Sophie She came to the United States as a child, resided in the Heckscherville and Duncott areas and attended Heckscherville schools. She was a member of Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville, and was active in numerous church functions for many years. Figure 6. 1998 obituary of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant born in Lochovo, Bereg County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was " born in Lockaway, Czech Republic In any case, on this centennial of the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, we can happily remember Mamatey's remark about the significance of American Carpatho-Rusyns' activities around this creation : "while the Slovak immigration in the United States affected Wilson's peace policies only indirectly ... the Carpatho-Ruthenian immigrants did so directly." 25 25 Mamatey, 249. �SLOVAKIA 2021 MARI( 51 R0CMR8ISlalf Pholo Woman celebrates turning 103 Mary 11111111 • l'Nident at York Terrace, Pottsville, wavee to ad- =:~==bi~ le now the Cziech Republ 1891, ahe larecenUy. • member of Sa. Born In Pa,1 ; lie Church, Mlnersvllle, and atlll enjoya muak:al and cooking actlvltlea at York Terrace. 7. 200 I news article of a birthday celebration of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant centenarian born in Cyganovci , Uz County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was "born in what is now the Czech Republic." Figure �52 SLOVAKIA 2021 "UIIRO . RUSINIA, PROPOSED THIUD STATE OF TUE CZl',()JJO!!LO'\"AK REPUBLIC " • 0 ...... ,,.....,....-_-...):/ ~ ( • • • ,. 1'14"-t.~ Figure 8. Map prepared in 1918 by Gregory Zatkovich depicting the proposed future state of "Uhro-Rusinia" within a federal Czechoslovakia, in which all Rusyn-inhabited lands on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were to be included. (Archive of Paul R. Magocsi , used with permission) � SLOVAKIA 2021 27 ENVISIONING A HOMELAND: CARPATHO-RUSYN IMMIGRANTS IN THE USA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPTION 1 Richard D. Custer In the earliest decades of their life in the United States, relations between Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants were frequent and generally productive. But Czech immigrants neither settled in the same places most Rusyn immigrants went, nor had any notable higherlevel contacts with them. Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant newspapers, which were an important means for their readers to become aware of immigrant issues outside their own ethnic group, rarely made mention of Czechs until 19 16. Yet by late 1918, American Rusyn leaders were laying a foundation for their homeland countrymen entering into a new state with the Czechs and Slovaks. In the space of just a few months of the concept of the first Czechoslovak Republic being known to American Rusyns, a plebiscite conducted in some segments of the community resulted in a strong, though not overwhelming, preference for inclusion into the nascent Czechoslovak state. The results would prove decisive in the fate of post-Austro-Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus'. This article will examine why Czechoslovakia became and did, or did not, remain their preferred option. Early Settlement of Carpatho-Rusyns, Slovaks, and Czechs in the U.S.A. [n the formative years of the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant communities, these two Slavic peoples, in many cases already having occasional contact in their shared homeland, experienced times of cooperation and conflict that helped to firmly define their respective identities. Historic "U pper Hungary," specificall y the counties of Abauj /Abov, Szepes/Spis, Saras/Saris, Zemplen/Zemplin, and Ung/ Uz, 1 O ri gi nally presented at "Czec hoslovakia at I 00: Envisioning and Imagi ng Subcarpathian Rus"' panel , Association fo r Slavic, East European, and Euras ian Studies (ASEEES) annua l convention, Boston , MA, 6 December 2018. �28 SLOVAKIA 2021 experienced the highest rate of poverty and thus the highest rate of emigration to the United States starting in the late 19th century. In these counties - for the most part present-day eastern Slovakia - Slovaks were the majority, and Rusyns were a substantial minority. Some villages were ethnically mixed, or neighboring vil lages inhabited mostly by the other ethnic group. The first Slovak immigrants to the United States from Upper Hungary began to arrive in the late 1860s, and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants from Upper Hungary and Austrian Galicia began to arrive in the latter 1870s, but significant numbers of both were not found in the U.S.A. until the 1880s. The communities of both groups began to organize in the early 1880s. In general , Slovaks (particularly those from eastern Slovakia) and Carpatho-Rusyns settled in the same towns and cities in the U.S.A.: metropolitan New York City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; the anthracite coa l mining region of northeastern Pennsylvania; Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania; western Pennsy lvania; C leveland ; Chicago and northwestern Indiana; St. Louis; Minneapolis; and Detroit. 2 These areas were home to the vast majority of both Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn parishes and other organizations. The places where Slovaks were established that had no Carpatho-Rusyn presence were few, primarily in upstate New York and the Midwest. Specifically Slovak Roman Catholic parishes were founded in Haz leton , Pennsylvania. and Streator, Illinois ( 1885), and a Lutheran parish was founded also in Streator ( 1884), whi le the first CarpathoRusyn Greek Catholic parish was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1884. Their respective mutual-aid "buria l societies," or fraternal insurance lodges, were also founded at around the same time, the first such Slovak society being founded in New York City in 1883 3 , while the first such Ru syn soc iety was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1885 4 . 2 Konstantin Cul en, History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul, Minn .: Czechoslovak Genea logical Society International, 2007), 67-70; Paul R. Magocsi, Our People: Carpatho-Rusvns and Their Descendant.,· in North America. Fourth rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill .: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 20-22. 3 M. Mark Sto larik, "A Place fo r Everyone: Slovak Fraternal-Benefit Societies" in Scott Cummings ed., Se(f-Help in America: Patterns of Minoritv Business Ente1prise (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 130- 141. 4 Magocsi, 49. �SLOVAKIA 2021 29 In the homeland, Carpatho- Ru syns probably would have never met an ethnic Czech/ Bohemian or Moravian, except perhaps as young conscripts serving together in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War 1. 5 (And it is further unlikely that these men wou ld have found their way to the United States until after the end of the war.) Contact between Carpatho-Ru syn and Czech immigrants in the U.S.A. was similarly unlikely, and the two immigrant groups were of substantiall y different character. Czech immigrants began to arrive in the United States much earl ier: the largest number came in the late 1860s. A substantial portion of these immigrants were at least middle class and artisans, in strong contrast to the mostly peasant Slovak and CarpathoRusyn immigrants who took on unskilled jobs in the mines and mills. Finally, Czech settlements were generally in the Midwest and Texas, where farm land was easi ly obtai ned, far from the industrial setting that defined the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant experience.6 Only in cities like Ch icago, C leveland, and Pittsburgh were eastern S lovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns likely to encounter Czech immigrants, if at all. Additionally, Czech immigrants were increasingly less likely to worship in (Roman) Catholic churc hes and thus their contact with Slovak or (i n certain situations) Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants was not frequent. The early Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants, then, in addition to frequent and essential contact with their Lemko Rusyn , Boiko, and Ukrainian co-religionists from Galicia in Greek Catholic parishes and fraternal organizations, were far more familiar with Slovak immigra nts as their neighbors, work friends , and perhaps spouses or extended family. To some extent, Carpatho-Rusyns' and Slovaks' fraternal benefit organizations developed along the same lines and in cooperation. Fraternal organizations were usually the first community institution estab lished in the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant settlements. These were built on the model of simi lar organizations in the homeland, in part as a replacement for the American insurance that was not usually ava il ab le to S lavic immigrants, and out of a need for 5 Magocsi, " The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovaki a," Sla vic Review, Vol. 34, o. 2 (June 1975), 364. 6 Thoma s Capek, The Cechs (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 36-51 , 60-68. �30 SLOVAKIA 2021 an organization to rally the immigrants on an ethnic basis. The first of these societies arose in pioneer Slovak and Rusyn settlements in the 1880s and 1890s. Some were founded by Roman and Greek Catholics together, e.g., in Bridgeport, Connecticut ( 1888), Kingston, Pennsylvania ( 1887 or 1888), Streator, Illinois ( 1889), McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, Allegheny/Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Passaic, New Jersey ( 1890). Some or most of these organizations would likely have joined the national Slovak organizations founded around that time: the National Slavonic Society of the United States (renamed National Slovak Society of the United States of America in 1913), or the First Catholic Slovak Union, FCSU/"Jednota," both founded in 1890.7 Rusyns would not have their own comparable organization until 1892. But the most striking example of a shared Slovak/Rusyn fraternal society was the Pennsylvania Slovak Roman & Greek Catholic Union (aka Pennsylvania Slovak Union or PSJ). Of all the Slovak-American fraternal societies this organization would count the largest number of Rusyn members, and more than 20 PSJ lodges were identified specifically as Greek Catholic or were based at a Greek Catholic church. 8 Despite having a generally common cultural background, and some shared religious affiliation and shared organizations, on an official level , the political goals of the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants did not always coincide, even as the idea of a Czechoslovak republic began to materiali ze. American Carpatho-Rusyn Fraternal Benefit Societies Greek Catholic Union (GCU). The GCU was the sec ul ar organization with the largest membership and widest geographical reach in the American Rusyn community. Its leadership, and editorial stance of its Amerikansky Russky Viestnik newspaper (ARV) , were generally anti-Hungarian, vehemently anti-Ukrainian, and mildly Russophil e, though never politically inclined to union with Russia. While its 1902 spinoff United Societies, loyal to America's first Greek Catholic 7 Stolarik, 130- 141. Ri chard D. Custer, "Old Countrymen, New Neighbors: Early Carpatho- Rusyn and Slovak Immigra nt Relations in the United States" in S/ovo (National Czech & Slovak Museum & Library, Cedar Rap ids, IA), Summer 2016. Unabridged version on line at https://www .ncsml .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Old-Countrymen-New-Neighbors.pdf, 6-7. 8 �SLOVAKIA 2021 31 Bishop Soter Ortynsky (an ethnic Ukrainian) since his arrival in 1907 and friendly to the Ga lician clergy, was the GCU 's antagonist on paper, they wou ld prove to be the al li es that would make possible a stronger voice that proved to be the one that caught the ear of the creators of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Slovaks - those who were Greek Catholics as we ll as Roman Catholics - made up a not insignificant portion of the GCU ' s membership, but early on the GCU took a strong stand against the idea that there were actually ethnic S lovak Greek Catholics.9 United Societies of the Greek Catholic Religion. The United Societies spun off from the GCU in 1902 and maintained a loya li st position toward the Greek Catholic Church, at times in opposition to what was perceived as the rebel li ous or disloyal GCU. In its support for Bishop Ortynsky, the society, its newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian ( 1910- 19 17), and its editor, Father Joseph Hanulya, were castigated by the GCU as Ukrainian sympathi zers. Around 1918, the United Societies had about 9,000 members including youth 10 , and published a newspaper, Prosvita, that remained often at odds w ith the GCU and its ARV. Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz (RNS) / Ukrainian National Association (UNA). The GCU in its early years, under c lerically-dominated leadership, became preoccupied with Rusyn affairs in Hungary and enunciated a generally pro-Hungarian political stance. This ali enated the significant membership from Galicia (most of whom were Lemkos), and many lodges, some even with substantial Subcarpathian membership, seceded from the GCU in 1894 to form a new organization . That organization, founded in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was the Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz, or in English, Russian National Union . It we lcomed as members Rusyns from Hungary and Galicia who had a strong sense of national identity, whether "Rusyn," " Russian," or "Ruthenian ." As the organization and its Svoboda newspaper became more Ukrainian-oriented, and the terms Ukraine and Ukrainian increasing ly used alongside Rus' and Rusyn, those with Russophil e or Old-Ruthenian views wou ld transfer to other organizations, primarily 9 Custer, '" No Such Thing as Greek Catholic Slovaks: ' The GCU's Polemic," The Carpatho-Rusyns of Pennsylvania, http://rusynsofpa. blogspot.com/2 014/12/no-suchthing-as-greek-catholic-slovaks.html. Accessed December I, 201 8. 10 Magocsi, " Political Activity," 398. �32 SLOVAKIA 2021 the Russian Brotherhood Organization. The dominant "Ruthenian" segment would eventually lead the organization to change its name in September 1914 to the Ukrainian National Association. Alienated by this change, approximately 17 UNA lodges, 15 of which had a primarily Subcarpathian Rusyn membership, joined the United Societies between October 1914 and February 1915, resulting in 2 1 new regular United Societies lodges and 6 new United Societies youth lodges. Onl y a few such lodges would remain in the UNA, and so the organization's influence among American Subcarpathian Rusyns had almost entirely di ssipated. Russian Brotherhood Organization (RBO). Some members of GCU and RNS in 1900 gathered in Mahanoy City, Pa ., to form a new fraternal organization that would resist clerical domination, have no requirement of church membership, and avoid both pro-Hungarian and pro-Ukrainian political stands. Most of its early lodges were located in northeastern Pennsylvania and some had left the GCU or RNS to join. Religiously, the society remained officially neutral , but as a Ukrainian orientation came to dominate Ga lician Greek Catholic circles in the U.S.A. and in the homeland, the organization became much more supportive of the Orthodox Church, and an increasing portion of its membership reflected that. The RBO 's consistent stand on Ukrainianism was very negative, but simi larly, it opposed the idea that the Rusyn people's regional distinctions justified separation from Great Russians. While the majority of RBO members originated in the Lemko Region of Galicia, many of its founders and largest lodges originated in Hungary/Subcarpathia. In fact, in 1918 nearly 40 RBO lodges had a Subcarpathian majority, and a comparable number of lodges were loosely affiliated with Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes. Ru ssian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society (ROCMAS). A convention of church brotherhoods that had converted to Orthodoxy took place in September 1895 in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , the center of the Rusyn movement to Orthodoxy led by Father Alexis Toth. They formed a federation, and by the first national convention in 1896, eighteen brotherhoods were members. The Society issued a newspaper, Svit, written in a mixture of Galician Ukrainian and Russian . While somewhat concerned with cultural matters, the Society's primary goal was the defense and promotion of Orthodoxy among socalled " Little Russian" immigrants. It vehemently opposed Ukrainia- �SLOVAKIA 2021 33 nism and the Greek Catholic Church, and promoted a strict Russian identity almost as a necessary feature of Orthodoxy, to the detriment of the local or regional linguistic and cultural traits of its Rusyn membership. Many of its larger and older lodges were primarily Subcarpathian, e.g., Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Scranton , Catasauqua, and Berwick. United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood of America. The organization, at its founding known as the Greek Catholic Pravoslavny Brotherhood, was established in 1915 mainly by former members of the GCU in southwestern Penn sylvania who had recently joined the Ru ssian Orthodox Church. The vast majority of its members hip was of Subcarpathian origin, particularly from the more eastern counties of Uz, Bereg and Maramoros. Within two decades it grew to around 20,000 members 11 . Position of Slovak Fraternals "There is no 'Slovak ' people" - so titled was an art icle in the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik, Aug. 29, 1918. The postwar years and the struggles over the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic would involve back-and-forth arguments between Ru syn American and Slovak American leaders, in print and, no doubt, in face-to-face meetings. But the root of the di strust undoubtedly was the early conflicts in these communities. The National Slovak Society, for its part, both supported the Rusyn people and disagreed at times with the position of the Rusyn leaders: National Slovak Society members expressed their concern for the fate of their brother Slavs, the Rusyns, who were now [World War I] experiencing the brunt of persecution in wartime Europe. Not only were repressive measures being taken against Rusyns in Carpathian Hungary, but in neighboring Galicia, Magyar troops were perpetrating wholesale massac res. This did not mean that the N.S.S. was conceding to th e claims of a Rusyn nationalism in Eastern Slovakia. Although support for the Slovak ca use in the region had been growing - largely thanks to the financi al support of the American Slovak community - certain elements considered the "S lovjaks" (i .e., Greek Catholics speaking the dial ect of the 11 Magocs i, Our People, 57. �34 SLOVAKIA 2021 eastern regions) as a separate nationality. The official N.S.S. policy was that the Slovjaks were Slovak, not Rusyn, Russian , or any other Slav people. 12 Political Actions During and Toward the End of World War I The Rus 'ko-Amerykans 'ka Rada (Rusyn/Ruthenian American Council) was established at a gathering in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. By design it was to give equal leadership voice to Subcarpathian and Galician Rusyns, and under the patronage of Bishop Ortynsky, its directors included clerical and lay leaders from the Subcarpathian Rusyn community, especially Father Joseph Hanulya, editor of the United Societies newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian , George Gulanich and Ivan Zeedick of the GCU , and John Branik, president of the United Societies. At its Philadelphia meeting it condemned Russia and advocated for support of the political and cultural union of "Ukrainian (Rusyn)"-inhabited Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. 13 This entity ceased to exist with the death of Ortynsky in 1916, but not without drawing ire upon Father Hanulya for his participation. The American-Russian National Defense (ARND) / Narodna Obrana was founded in 1915 in Braddock, Pa. , near Pittsburgh, by Nicholas Pachuta. At the time Pachuta was assistant editor of the ARV, a post he held until 1918, under Michael Hanchin . National Defense styled itself the defender of Rus ' -ness against Magyarism in the Greek Catholic Church, was also critical of Slovakophiles and Ukrainophiles, and picked up members who were recent converts to Orthodoxy in the era of Bishop Stephen Dzubay. In May of 19 18 he met with Thomas G. Masaryk, the leader of the movement for a new state to be called Czechoslovakia, in Pittsburgh and began a discussion around the fate of Uhro-Rus ' (the Rusyn lands south of the Carpathians, historically part of Hungary). At that time Masaryk disregarded Pachuta's goals because his group "had no following or 12 R. Vl adimir Baumgarten and Joseph Ste fka , The National Slovak Society : 100 Year Histmy. 1890-/990. (Pittsburgh: Nation al Slovak Society, 1990), 76. 13 " Narodnyi z' "izd u Filiadel'fii"," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ ), 19 December 1914, 2; Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884- 1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 35 support among the broad masses of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants." 14 National Defense came around to the Czechoslovak option and delivered a memorandum to Masaryk in October endorsing autonomy within a Czechoslovak state. Around that time Pachuta converted to Orthodoxy, and in 1921 he united the National Defense with the American Russian Brotherhood based in C leve land. From 1922 until 1935 he was editor of the Russkij Vistnik newspaper of U ROBA. The League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia was a strictly Russophile political organization that drew most of its participation from individuals who were already active in organizations like ROCMAS and especially RBO. The vast majority of its members were of Galician background, but about 25% of delegates to its congresses were Subcarpathian Rusyns . 15 It held congresses in 19 17, 1918, and 1919 and made proclamations that Carpatho-Rusyn territory, a long with the who le of Galicia and Bukovina, should be part of Russia. The American National Counci l of Uhro-Rusins was founded in July of 1918 in Pittsburgh, with strong support from the United Societies and eventually the GCU . It grew to more than 100 branches, some of which had I 00 or even 200+ members. This was the organization in which the Pittsburgh attorney Gregory Zatkovich rose to leadership, began meetings with Masaryk, and which led to his post as the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus' . In Philadelphia on October 23, 1918, Zatkovich participated in the Mid-European Democratic Union in the presence of Masaryk . At that time Uhro-Rusyns - Rusyns of Hungary - were accepted as a distinct nationa lity, apart from Ukrainians who were already members. The National Counci l met at Scranton, Pa., on November 12, and formulated its final recommendation that Rusyn territory south of the Carpathians, including all of the original Uhro-Rusyn counties, be united in a Czechoslovak state with broad autonomy. The next day, the resolution was presented to Masaryk, who recommended that a plebiscite be held among American Uhro-Rusyns. 14 Joseph Danko, "Plebiscite of Carpath o- Ruthenians in the United States Recommendin g Union of Carpatho-Rutheni a with the Czec hoslovak Republic," Annals of !he Ukrainian Academy of Aris and Sciences, 11 , nos. 1-2 ( 1964-68), 186. 15 Prikarpalskaia Rus • (New York), Vol. I, o. I, October 191 8. �36 SLOVAKIA 2021 The American Uhro-Rusyn Plebiscite of December 1918 The American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, in conjunction with Masaryk's advice to Zatkovich, resolved to conduct a vote in Subcarpathian Rusyn parishes and fraternal lodges to determine their preferred action with respect to the homeland, among the options it had previously agreed to. Of course, they expected that the result would need to support what had already been decided: that Subcarpathian Rusyn territory should join the Czech and Slovak republic. This vote, then, was limited to the National Council's constituency: Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes - no Orthodox parishes and no Galician-majority parishes would be involved, even if they had substantial numbers of Subcarpathian Rusyn members; and lodges of the GCU and United Societies only, who were already seen to be inclined toward their leadership's preference for Czechoslovakia. The plebiscite was announced in only one issue of the ARV (Nov. 14, 1918), and commenced almost immediately thereafter. There is no extant evidence that there was campaigning within the communities to select a particular option; certainly there would have been very little time for that. We do have results of the vote, which was published in several installments in the ARV and Prosvita, and which were collected in "Plebiscite ofCarpatho-Ruthenians in the United States Recommending Union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic" authored by Joseph Danko in 1968. 16 Option Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic Union with the Ukrainian Republic Total independence Union with Carpatho-Russians Union with Russi a Union with Magyar Land fHungaryl Union with Galicia Total Votes (% of tota l) 732 (66.4%) 310 (28. 1%) 27 (2.5%) 13 ( 1.2%) 10 (0.9%) 9 (0.8%) I (0. 1%) I , 102(/00.0%) Unsurprisingly, the organizers' preferred option won decisively, but not overwhelmingly. Based on the individual vote counts by parish and lodge provided by Danko, I would like to comment on some of 16 Danko, 200. �SLOVAKIA 2021 37 the more interesting things I observed. Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic (rank: I} As we will see, each of the options had some very surprising entities voting for them. This option's supporters included two parishes founded as Greek Catholic but which at the time of the vote had Orthodox pastors: Elkhorn, West Virginia (Father John Gratson) and Elizabeth, New Jersey (Father Gregory Varho l). Not very surprising was a vote by a large, mostly Subcarpathian parish of Rusyns from Spis, Saris and Zemplin Counties (Holy Ghost in Tremont), but whose pastor was Father Hanulya, former editor of the United Societies' first newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian - who for years as a supporter of Bishop Ortynsky had been attacked by the GCU in the pages of ARV for being a quasi-Ukrainian . Fourteen of the GCU lodges were based at majority-Galician parishes, although some of these lodges were primari ly Subcarpathian in membership. Union with the Ukrainian Republic (rank: 2) Figure 1. A portion of the American Rusyn communities that voted for union of Uhro-Rusyns with the Ukrainian Republic (66% of tota l votes cast). (Source: Danko, 196-198) The following voted for Uni on of Uhro-Rusins with Ukraini an Republic Societies of the Greek Catholic of Rusin Brothe rhoods in the USA 4 6 17 19 24 28 32 50 Mahoney City, Pa. Donmore , Pa. Rendham, Pa. Lansing, Pa . Eckle y , Pa. Glenlien, Pa. Sheppton, Pa. Mahoney Plane, Pa. (Figure I continues) 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 242 267 292 295 298 324 379 390 St. Clair , Pa. Hannastown, Pa. Wilkes-Barre , Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Baggaley, PP a . New Salem, Pa. Kester, Pa. McKees Rocks, Pa. 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 5 �38 SLOVAKIA 2021 Uhro-Rusins Greek Catholic United Congregations. I St. Johna SL Johna B. V. M. Bleaed TrinitY B. V. M. B. V. M. SL Michael B. V. M. Holy Ghost L Michael hen Scnnton, Pa. Bridgeport, Conn. New Salem, Pa. New Britain, Conn. Freebnd,PL Whitting, Ind. Ref. &am>lky P.ev. Cbomoc:t Rev.~ 400- 8 500-10 400- 8 Blnghamtoo, N.Y. Taylor, Pa. McKeca Rocb, PL St. Clair Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Rev. Thq2t Rev. Petraaovich Rev. A. Suba Rev. Ribovsk Rev. N. Chopey 550- 7 Lt Lansford, Pa. Rev. Martyak 550- 7 ~udloning, Pa. Ha eton, Pa. Rn. p ch Rev. Brinaky llef. Choarboch 500- 6 500· 6 600-12 600-12 550- 7 Rev. FeiuG !&J- s Overall this was the most surprising result, having the second highest number of votes. Some votes came from additionally surprising places. For example: the parish in New Britain had experienced an ugly split with Galician Ukrainians just eight years before, yet they still had a Galician pastor. The Wilkes-Barre parish ' s pastor was Father Nicholas Chopey, who had a few years before been numbered among the pro-Hungary clergy. The Lansford parish ' s pastor was Father Gabriel Martyak, administrator of the Uhro-Rusyn parishes in the wake of Bishop Ortynsky's death two years before. And the Hazleton parish that voted for this option, pastored by the Lemko priest Father John Fekula? This was actually the Galician parish (St. Michael) that split off from two existing Subcarpathian parishes in the same city. We must wonder how this parish had the opportunity to vote at all. The lodges that voted this way included largely-Galician GCU lodges in Glen Lyon (based at an old mostlyGalician parish) and Rankin (based at a mostly-Subcarpathian parish), �39 SLOVAKIA 2021 five other GC U lodges based at Galician-majority pari shes but with mostl y Subcarpathi an members, and a GCU lodge from Father Martyak's paris h in Lansford whose members were mostl y from Sari s and Zemplin Counti es. The following voted for Tou.l Independence of Uhro-Rusins. Societies of the Greek C. Union. ):: ~~•:· an !Im , a. \ Eynon, Pa. lmon, Pa. ~nton, ra. 2 1 I Gymnastic Branches. I61 11 Scranton, Pa. 67 Mahonoy City, Pa. 1 United Societies of Greek C. Religion I ss K.ingaton, Pa. 1 II 60 Edwardavillc, Pa. 2 j Uhro-Rusin Congregations 11 ¥ M : Holy Gbolt iililUIIII t11 Jcaup, Pa. 1&11 li•1 :Rev. Ivan I= i I Figure 2. The Ameri can Rusyn communities whi ch voted fo r tota l indepe ndence of Uhro-Rusyns (3 % of votes cast). (Danko, 198) Total independence of Uhro- Rusyns (rank: 3) Without any traditi on of self-rule, and without any real advocates fo r thi s pos ition, it is not surpri sing that it rece ived so few votes. It 's notable that not only did the pari sh and a GCU lodge in Jessup, Pennsy lvani a, contribute a number of the votes fo r thi s option, but two additional GC U lodges that did , in Eynon , Pennsyl va ni a, were a ffili ated wi th the Jessup pari sh as we ll. Jessup a lso had a large RBO lodge, but it is unlike ly that independence would have been the ir preference. �40 SLOVAKIA 2021 Union with Carpatho-Russians (i.e., Galicians, Bukovinians, UhroRusyns) (rank: 4) This position was represented among American Carpatho-Rusyns mainly by the League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia, although evidently few Subcarpathian Rusyns belonged to that organization, and to some extent originally by the American-Russian National Defense. The few votes for this option came mainly from Gary, Indiana 's GCU Lodge 469 and its Greek Catholic parish, which was primarily of Subcarpathian origin (in its western counties that would be incorporated into Slovakia) although it is not clear to this author why that would have been their choice. Union with Russia (rank: 5) The FolJowing voted for Union with Russia Greek Catholic Union. 550 Olyphant, Pa. 1 Gymnastic Branch 121 Jerome, Pa. I Uhro-Rusin Congregations a. V. M. Mahoooy City, Pa. lln. I. lubck 400- a Figure 3. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Russia (I % of votes cast). (Danko. 199) Among the votes for this option were GCU Lodge 530 in Olyphant, Pennsylvania, mostly Lemko in membership and based at a Galician-majority parish, and perhaps most curious of all , St. Mary 's Greek Catholi c Church in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, whose pastor was the noted Rusyn-language author and cultural patriot Father Emil Kubek. Kubek was also part of the leadership of the American I �41 SLOVAKIA 2021 National Council, which was not supportive of union with Russia at all. While he was not a Russophile, his relative lack of involvement with the GCU (and perhaps due to the RBO being founded in his parish) may have encouraged him to advocate for this option . Or more likely the decisive factor was the RBO's founding president, John Zincak Smith, also being the president of St. Mary's parish. Union with Magyar land (i.e., Hungary) (rank: 6) The Following voted for Union of Uhro-Rwins with Magyar Land Greek Catholic Union. 50 2 181 Clevdand, Ohio Clndand, Ohio Uhro-Rusin Congregations. St. John'• , ClcYeland, Ohio llev. Ballog soo- 6 I Figure 4. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Hungary (I % of votes cast). (Danko, 199) Even though many of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy in the U.S. were Magyarized (if not outright Magyarone), it doesn't seem that any attempt there may have been on their part to influence their parishioners to vote for this option was successful. The ARV denounced Hungary's policy toward its ethnic minorities for years in the lead up to the war. Despite Hungary's liberalized ethnic minority policy that began in 1915, inclination toward Hungary from American Rusyns seems to have changed little. Two GCU lodges voted for this option, but most striking is that six votes came from St. John's Church in Cleveland - not the Rusyn one that in 1918 had hired an Orthodox priest as its pastor - but the Magyar parish, pastored by Father Michael Balogh. This was the only ethnic-Hungarian parish to vote, and it's unlikely that Zatkovich and the American National Council had intended the plebiscite to include the Magyar parishes. (It's possible that they did, we just have no evidence on either side to say for sure.) Union with Galicia (rank: 7) Given the still substantial portion of the GCU's membership either �42 SLOVAKIA 2021 from Galicia or belonging to lodges based at Galician-majority parishes, we could have expected more votes for this option than were returned. However, a number of GCU lodges that were mostly or entirely Galician in membership (e.g., McKeesport Lodge 782, Wilmerding, Pa. , Lodges 348 and 360) - and based at Galician parishes - did not vote. It must be underscored that the plebiscite was not truly representative of the range of religious congregations and fraternal lodges found in the American Carpatho-Rusyn community, not even when speaking exclusively of those from Subcarpathia - the "Uhro-Rusyns." The Orthodox (except for two parishes which inexplicably did vote) were wholly unrepresented, and the significant fraternals RBO, ROCMAS , and fledgling UROBA were likewise ignored. Clearly it was meant to produce the additional justification Zatkovich needed to present the Scranton resolution to the Paris Peace Conference. 17 Understandably alarmed by this development, the activist Ukrainian American community opposed what they had hoped would be an outcome supporting their goal to unite so-called Ukrainian-Ruthenian ethnographic territory in a Ukrainian state. In so doing, they provided what seems to be the only eyewitness account of how the plebiscite was conducted in a Rusyn parish. Here writes a Ukrainian from Bridgeport, Conn .: Our Hungarian brother Rusyns want to unite Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine. On December 8 of this year, a parish meeting was held in Bridgeport, Conn. , right after the Divine Liturgy, in the parish school. The meeting was very interesting for every Ukrainian, because our brother Uhro-Rusyns decided on the fate of our and their brothers across the sea. Local speakers and Father Orest Cornjak [Chornock], local pastor, spoke. The meeting was convened for the purpose of deciding where Hungarian Rus' shou ld belong: whether to Ukraine or to the Czecho-Slovak state. Father Orest Cornjak stated his preference, that he would vote to belong to his brothers, that is, to the Ukrainians, rather than to the Czecho-Slovaks . After much discussion , it turned out that the Uhro-Rusyn 17 Victor S. Mamatey, "The Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians," in Joseph F. O'Grady, ed .. The Immigrants· Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 245-246. �SLOVAKIA 2021 43 leaders wanted to lead the Uhro-Rusyns to the Czecho-Slovaks, without questioning the Uhro-Rusyn people. And again the speakers protested against the "American National Council of UhroRusins" in America that no one has elected; its members of that Council are self-appointed leaders, that they have chosen themselves and have no right to speak in the name of the Uhro-Rusyn people, and further that they proposed an amendment so as not to vote either for Ukraine or against, nor to take a position against the Czecho-Slovak state, and so let it be as Uhro-Rusyns will decide in the old country. They also complained to the Ukrainians that at the founding of the " Mid-European Union" at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa., they had to say that the Uhro-Rusyns are "a different people" from the Ukrainians, and thus the Ukrainians do not want to accept the UhroRusyns as an equal among equals and so for that reason will not vote in that way. When people were already wanting to leave, Mr. Ivan Boyko, head of the Ukrainian Athletic Association (Sich) in America, while asking forgiveness for the slurs that were committed by Ukrainians, and explaining that the Uhro-Rusyns had already decided at the founding council meetings in L'viv that Hungarian Rus ' should belong to Ukraine together with Galicia and Bukovina, said he did not see the reasons why the Uhro-Rusyns should not vote for the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine. He laid out what benefits the Uhro-Rusyns would have in a Ukrainian state, and what benefits they would have from the Czecho-Slovaks .. .. We Ukrainians, said Mr. Bojko, can never agree that our Hungarian brothers will be in the Czecho-Slovak state. [... ] It should be noted that the audience very intently listened to Mr. Bojko and took his every word to heart. After the speech the audience rewarded him with applause when the other speakers received no applause. Here Mr. Bojko did a great service to the Ukrainian people by proclaiming this speech to the Hungarian brothers, because then now the entire hall of people began to speak differently about it after the speech, because it was moved to vote by secret ballot, about where Hungarian Rus' should belong: whether to Ukraine, or to the Czecho-Slovak state, and another motion, to vote by roll call , so that you know who is against your brothers (Ukrainians). Father Comjak led by saying: Who is for �44 SLOVAKIA 2021 uniting Hungarian Rus' with Ukraine? It was decided unanimously on the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine, and then came the second ballot: Who is for uniting Hungarian Rus' with the Czecho-Slovaks? For this union with the Czecho-Slovaks there was only one vote. So, evidently, the Uhro-Rusyns want to unite with Ukraine. The statement made in Philadelphia by Misters M. Sichynsky and N. Ceglinsky, recognizing the Uhro-Rusyns as a separate nationality, with their representative as Mr. Zatkovich in the "MidEuropean Union," should be retracted for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Uhro-Rusyns . Instead, let them declare that the Uhro-Rusyns are our brothers by blood and by faith , and we can never agree that a second nationality would rule over our Hungarian brothers, even if it were Czecho-Slovakia. In Bridgeport, Conn ., Uhro-Rusyns do not recognize the "American National Council of Uhro-Rusins" because their people did not select them , and that self-styled Counci l has no right to push them into a Czecho-Slovak state, because the Uhro-Rusyn brothers want to unite Hungarian Rus ' with Ukraine. Glory to them for this! 18 The Ukrainian National Association's newspaper Svoboda reported on a Ukrainian National Congress that took place in January 1919. This congress included speakers on the situation in the Subcarpath ian Rusyn community in the U.S. and its recent Scranton resolution and fol low-on plebiscite. Father Kubek , editor of the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik [this is an error, he was not] was supposed to speak, but at the last moment he informed that he was not able to do so. His place was taken by a Galician priest, Father Vasyl' Merenkiv, who said, among other things: "In recent days I was in several Uhro-Rusyn parishes and spoke with several Uhro-Rusyn priest-leaders . We spoke about the idea of uniting Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine . I can assure the esteemed delegates that they are all committed to joining Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine more so than with Czec hoslovak ia. But still, I noticed that American Uhro-Rusyns are sti ll wavering." Mr. Ivan Hajovyc (of Maramoros), a delegate from the Chicago Uhro-Rusyns, was called to speak. He revealed his joy that he has an 18 "Svobidna vo lia uhors' kykh Ru syniv," Svoboda, 14 December 19 I 8, 2. �SLOVAKIA 2021 45 opportunity to speak to so many people who are interested in the fate of Uhro-Rusyns. He talked about the oppression that Uhro-Rusyns suffered from the Magyars. " We, Hungarian Ukrainians," said Mr. Hajovyc, "stand body and soul for the unity of Ukraine.We want to join with Ukraine! We are protesting against the plebiscite conducted among American UhroRusyn s, which was set up for the sake of uniting Uhro-Rus' with Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Ukrainians want to be united with Ukraine. We do not know what Czechoslovakia is and who CzechoSlovaks are. We never want to hear anything about joining them." Mr. Ivan Hundjak (a Galician) argued using statistics that the plebiscite initiated by Masaryk among American Uhro-Rusyns was conducted in a deceptive manner. Finally Mr. Ivan Skakandij, an Uhro-Rusyn cantor-teacher and delegate from Nesquehoning, Pa . was called to speak He regretted that in such an important moment Hungarian Ukrainians in America have not yet all been awakened to a life of national consciousness. " It is the fault of the Uhro-Rusyn clergy, who in the old country were led around by the Magyars and now by the Czechoslovaks. But nationally conscious Hungarian Ukrainians in America want to unite with Ukraine. We are just now awakening to life and there is hope that in a short time we will all be awakened." One speaker (Father Merenkiv) said " Hungarian Ukrainians in America are still waking up, but remember, that as we wake up , Masaryk will do nothing to help." 19 My observations about the results, it turns out, while I arrived at them independently, were noted to some extent already in 1919 in an article in the Ukrainian press. This is the speech by Ivan Hundjak (mentioned previously) in which he analyzed the resu lts and pointed out, among other criticisms, that if a person happened to be a member of a GCU lodge and the United Societies lodge in the same place, and the local Subcarpathian Greek Catholic parish, conceivably that person could vote up to three times. He noted as well (as Danko did) that participation among those eligible to vote was fairly low. He asserted that had these irregularities been taken into account, the leading result 19 "Z narodnohu z'izdu," Svoboda, 18 January 19 19, 2. �46 SLOVAKIA 2021 probably would have been for union with Ukraine. I would counter that had there been time, or the will, to more inclusively offer the vote to all American Subcarpathian Rusyn institutions, and not just the ones affiliated with the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, the results may indeed have been different, but more likely toward union with Russia, as impractical as that might have been. Reception of Czechoslovakia in the Rusyn American Community In May of 19 I 9, the cornerstone was laid in Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the Rusin Peoples Home. This event, under the patronage of the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, occurred just days before the National Counci l in Uzhorod, Subcarpathian Rus ', would accept the American Rusyns ' proposal to unite with Czechoslovakia. The commemorative booklet for this event 20 prominently featured a page with the American, Czechoslovak, and "Rusin" flags entwined, with the slogan "Old Glory Has Made This Federation (Czech-SlovakRusin) Possible." The pages following showed photographs of Zatkovich signing the declaration of the Mid-European Nationalities and Masaryk reading the declaration at a public manifestation in Philadelphia. The book ' s last page is a map showing Europe ' s ethnic groups within the new postwar borders, with Czechoslovakia labeled "Czechoslovaks" and to its east, "Uhro-Rusinia." It's not clear whether UhroRusinia is meant to be depicted as part of Czechoslovakia or not. Whatever the interpretation, this is probably the lone celebratory publication of American Rusyns to mark the decision to join the Czechoslovak Republic. A delegation of American Rusyn gymnasts affiliated with the GCU Sokol division travelled to Prague in the summer of 1920 to participate in a Pan-Slavic Gymnastics exhibition. As part of the trip they also visited Subcarpathian Rus ' and had an audience with Governor Zatkovich. One member of the delegation wrote, " In Prague we were 20 Souvenir Issued by the Rusin Peoples Home, Inc. on the Occasion of the Dedication ofthe Corner-Stone I Pamiatnik izdan ko,poratsieiu Russkii Narodny i Dom iz sluchai posviashcheniia kraeugol 'nago kamen 'ia. Homestead. Pa .. I 9 I 9 (Homestead, Pa., 19 19). �SLOVAKIA 2021 47 warmly welcomed by the Czechs and everything we saw in Prague and the way we were treated , we enjoyed ... " oi...o OLO ..... .. , . . MAO• T .. , . rcDll:.. 4Tt0N ie&&CW·~YAK "v.lNI ~ . . . • 1..• Figure 5. Page from the commemorative booklet for the cornerstone laying ofthe Rusin Peoples Home in Homestead, Pa., May 1919. Another wrote, " With thanks to God , with our appearance at the Pan-Slavic Sokol Meet in Prague, we made a mark in the history of our Sokol Branch which wi ll be permanent proof that we accomplished our mission , that we entered into the order of the Czechoslovak Sokol movement. . . We also left a lasting impression on the youth of Subcarpathian Rus ' ." The trip was promoted in the pages of ARV and chronicled fully in the 1921 almanac of the Sokol division. 2 1 It wou ld not be long before frustration over the lack of autonomy promised Subcarpathian Rus' by Masaryk would boil over in the American Carpatho-Rusyn press, especially when Zatkovich resigned in 1921 , and would continue at least until the late 1920s among Greek Catholics. The GCU printed a number of publications critical of Czechoslovak policy: Zatkovich's Otkrytie-Expose by vseho g ubernatora Podkarpatskoj Rus i, o Podkarpatskoj Rusi ( 1921 ), Wilson's Prin21 C heryl We ller Beck et al. , Opportuni~v Realized: The Greek Catholic Union 's First One Hundred Years, / 892-1992. (Beaver, Pa.: Gree k Catholic Uni on o f the U.S.A. , 1994), 75 . �48 SLOVAKIA 2021 ciples in Czechoslovak Practice: The Situation of the Carpatho-Russian People Under the Czech Yoke ( 1929) and Beskid's Karpatorusskaja pravda ( 1932). They would also lead a National Congress of Rusins in Pittsburgh in November 1922, which issued a memorandum to Prague condemning their policy toward Subcarpathian Rus '. American Rusyns in the Russian Orthodox Church and others of Russophile orientation would take up the opposition to Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus' through the 1930s. 22 I did not find any evidence - written or photographic - in Carpatho-Rusyn communities or parishes of widespread adoption of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic "homeland." There is certain ly no oral folklore around portraits of Masaryk (or Zatkovich, for that matter) being hung in parish halls as there is of portraits of Maria Theresa and Franz Josef from the early immigration. Lasting Impressions on Rusyn Americans of a Czechoslovak "Homeland" A list on the Wikipedia entry for Czech Americans of "The top 50 U.S. communities with the highest percentage of people claiming Czech ancestry" 23 (based on the 2000 U.S . census) contains mostly predictable results - locations in North Dakota, Texas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin , et al. An accompanying list, " U.S. communities with the most residents born in the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia)," however, contains a curious entry: tied for number IO was the little town of Colver, Pennsylvania, about 20 miles north of Johnstown in the west central part of the state. Colver, a former coal mining company town , had just a few primary ethnic groups : among these were Slovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns. It may we ll have sti ll had a few residents in 2000 who were born in the former Czechos lovakia. It is not clear that these results came from responses declaring their birthplace as "Czech Republic" or "Czechoslovakia," or either, but surely this population in Colver, Pennsylvania, was not ethnic Czechs. 22 Magocsi, Our People, 88-89. "Czech Americans", https ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech Americans. Accessed December I, 201 8. 23 �SLOVAKIA 2021 49 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for ancestry 24 (estimated from its 20 I 3 American Community Survey) show that Pennsylvania, historically the state with the largest number of Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants, had more than 52,142 residents with Czech ancestry, or 0.3% of Pennsylvania residents. This is much less than those who indicated Slovak or Ukrainian ancestry, many of which are likely of Carpatho-Rusyn background (or the completely unreali stic 193 ,000 with "Russian" ancestry), but still far higher than the hi storically low Czech settlement of the state would imply. In addition, "Czechoslovak ian" ancestry was estimated at 22,904, which could conceivably include any of Czech, Slovak, or Carpatho-Rusyn-descended individuals, although the much lower national consciousness of CarpathoRusyn Americans - reflected by the miniscule estimated 2,050 of that background - would lead one to expect most of those "Czechoslovak" individuals to have Carpatho-Rusyn ancestry. That many Carpatho-Rusyn Americans of any particular geographic background in Carpathian Rus ' still exhibit confusion about their ethnic and geographical origins is not news to anyone. But it may be that Subcarpathian Rus ' belonging for 20 years to Czechoslovakia created a lingering geographic attachment to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as the ancestral land of American Carpatho-Rusyns. Consider these newspaper clippings, maybe the most extreme examples of this phenomenon I've encountered. A perhaps unintended corollary to this phenomenon is the everincreasing use of genealogy websites where obituaries, gravestones, and other data are collected; many of the individuals - Carpatho-Rusyns and others - whose ge nealogical data is found on these sites have had their birthplace, which was probably entered by their descendant researcher as "Czechoslovakia," transposed by the site into "Czech Republic," further muddling Carpatho-Rusyn identity by placing Czechoslovak natives into the wrong modem-day country. Thus the main legacy of Carpatho-Rusyns' Czechoslovak homeland may well be their descendants eventually needing to educate themselves about 24 U.S. Census Bureau, Total Ancestry Reported: Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported, 2013 American Community Survey I- Year Estimates. https :// factfinder.census.gov/ faces/tableservices/ jsf/pages/productview.xhtml ?pid=ACS 13 I YR B04003&prodType=table. Accessed I December 2018. �50 SLOVAKIA 2021 the fact that Subcarpathian Rus ' was indeed part of Czechoslovakia and is not the modem day Czechia, nor Slovakia, for that matter. rites _____§s:,vtces for Mary - • 93, of 1220 Valley Road, Duncott, who died Friday morning at Pottsville Hospital, will be held at 9 :15 a.m. Tuesday !rom Dutcavich Funeral Home, Minersville. Further services will be held at 10 a .m . in Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville . The Very Rev. Michael Hatrak will officiate. Interment will be in the parish cemetery, Branch Township. Born public, sh late Metro and Sophie She came to the United States as a child, resided in the Heckscherville and Duncott areas and attended Heckscherville schools. She was a member of Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville, and was active in numerous church functions for many years. Figure 6. 1998 obituary of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant born in Lochovo, Bereg County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was " born in Lockaway, Czech Republic In any case, on this centennial of the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, we can happily remember Mamatey's remark about the significance of American Carpatho-Rusyns' activities around this creation : "while the Slovak immigration in the United States affected Wilson's peace policies only indirectly ... the Carpatho-Ruthenian immigrants did so directly." 25 25 Mamatey, 249. �SLOVAKIA 2021 MARI( 51 R0CMR8ISlalf Pholo Woman celebrates turning 103 Mary 11111111 • l'Nident at York Terrace, Pottsville, wavee to ad- =:~==bi~ le now the Cziech Republ 1891, ahe larecenUy. • member of Sa. Born In Pa,1 ; lie Church, Mlnersvllle, and atlll enjoya muak:al and cooking actlvltlea at York Terrace. 7. 200 I news article of a birthday celebration of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant centenarian born in Cyganovci , Uz County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was "born in what is now the Czech Republic." Figure �52 SLOVAKIA 2021 "UIIRO . RUSINIA, PROPOSED THIUD STATE OF TUE CZl',()JJO!!LO'\"AK REPUBLIC " • 0 ...... ,,.....,....-_-...):/ ~ ( • • • ,. 1'14"-t.~ Figure 8. Map prepared in 1918 by Gregory Zatkovich depicting the proposed future state of "Uhro-Rusinia" within a federal Czechoslovakia, in which all Rusyn-inhabited lands on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were to be included. (Archive of Paul R. Magocsi , used with permission) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 27 ENVISIONING A HOMELAND: CARPATHO-RUSYN IMMIGRANTS IN THE USA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPTION 1 Richard D. Custer In the earliest decades of their life in the United States, relations between Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants were frequent and generally productive. But Czech immigrants neither settled in the same places most Rusyn immigrants went, nor had any notable higherlevel contacts with them. Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant newspapers, which were an important means for their readers to become aware of immigrant issues outside their own ethnic group, rarely made mention of Czechs until 19 16. Yet by late 1918, American Rusyn leaders were laying a foundation for their homeland countrymen entering into a new state with the Czechs and Slovaks. In the space of just a few months of the concept of the first Czechoslovak Republic being known to American Rusyns, a plebiscite conducted in some segments of the community resulted in a strong, though not overwhelming, preference for inclusion into the nascent Czechoslovak state. The results would prove decisive in the fate of post-Austro-Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus'. This article will examine why Czechoslovakia became and did, or did not, remain their preferred option. Early Settlement of Carpatho-Rusyns, Slovaks, and Czechs in the U.S.A. [n the formative years of the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant communities, these two Slavic peoples, in many cases already having occasional contact in their shared homeland, experienced times of cooperation and conflict that helped to firmly define their respective identities. Historic "U pper Hungary," specificall y the counties of Abauj /Abov, Szepes/Spis, Saras/Saris, Zemplen/Zemplin, and Ung/ Uz, 1 O ri gi nally presented at "Czec hoslovakia at I 00: Envisioning and Imagi ng Subcarpathian Rus"' panel , Association fo r Slavic, East European, and Euras ian Studies (ASEEES) annua l convention, Boston , MA, 6 December 2018. 28 SLOVAKIA 2021 experienced the highest rate of poverty and thus the highest rate of emigration to the United States starting in the late 19th century. In these counties - for the most part present-day eastern Slovakia - Slovaks were the majority, and Rusyns were a substantial minority. Some villages were ethnically mixed, or neighboring vil lages inhabited mostly by the other ethnic group. The first Slovak immigrants to the United States from Upper Hungary began to arrive in the late 1860s, and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants from Upper Hungary and Austrian Galicia began to arrive in the latter 1870s, but significant numbers of both were not found in the U.S.A. until the 1880s. The communities of both groups began to organize in the early 1880s. In general , Slovaks (particularly those from eastern Slovakia) and Carpatho-Rusyns settled in the same towns and cities in the U.S.A.: metropolitan New York City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; the anthracite coa l mining region of northeastern Pennsylvania; Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania; western Pennsy lvania; C leveland ; Chicago and northwestern Indiana; St. Louis; Minneapolis; and Detroit. 2 These areas were home to the vast majority of both Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn parishes and other organizations. The places where Slovaks were established that had no Carpatho-Rusyn presence were few, primarily in upstate New York and the Midwest. Specifically Slovak Roman Catholic parishes were founded in Haz leton , Pennsylvania. and Streator, Illinois ( 1885), and a Lutheran parish was founded also in Streator ( 1884), whi le the first CarpathoRusyn Greek Catholic parish was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1884. Their respective mutual-aid "buria l societies," or fraternal insurance lodges, were also founded at around the same time, the first such Slovak society being founded in New York City in 1883 3 , while the first such Ru syn soc iety was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1885 4 . 2 Konstantin Cul en, History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul, Minn .: Czechoslovak Genea logical Society International, 2007), 67-70; Paul R. Magocsi, Our People: Carpatho-Rusvns and Their Descendant.,· in North America. Fourth rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill .: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 20-22. 3 M. Mark Sto larik, "A Place fo r Everyone: Slovak Fraternal-Benefit Societies" in Scott Cummings ed., Se(f-Help in America: Patterns of Minoritv Business Ente1prise (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 130- 141. 4 Magocsi, 49. SLOVAKIA 2021 29 In the homeland, Carpatho- Ru syns probably would have never met an ethnic Czech/ Bohemian or Moravian, except perhaps as young conscripts serving together in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War 1. 5 (And it is further unlikely that these men wou ld have found their way to the United States until after the end of the war.) Contact between Carpatho-Ru syn and Czech immigrants in the U.S.A. was similarly unlikely, and the two immigrant groups were of substantiall y different character. Czech immigrants began to arrive in the United States much earl ier: the largest number came in the late 1860s. A substantial portion of these immigrants were at least middle class and artisans, in strong contrast to the mostly peasant Slovak and CarpathoRusyn immigrants who took on unskilled jobs in the mines and mills. Finally, Czech settlements were generally in the Midwest and Texas, where farm land was easi ly obtai ned, far from the industrial setting that defined the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant experience.6 Only in cities like Ch icago, C leveland, and Pittsburgh were eastern S lovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns likely to encounter Czech immigrants, if at all. Additionally, Czech immigrants were increasingly less likely to worship in (Roman) Catholic churc hes and thus their contact with Slovak or (i n certain situations) Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants was not frequent. The early Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants, then, in addition to frequent and essential contact with their Lemko Rusyn , Boiko, and Ukrainian co-religionists from Galicia in Greek Catholic parishes and fraternal organizations, were far more familiar with Slovak immigra nts as their neighbors, work friends , and perhaps spouses or extended family. To some extent, Carpatho-Rusyns' and Slovaks' fraternal benefit organizations developed along the same lines and in cooperation. Fraternal organizations were usually the first community institution estab lished in the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant settlements. These were built on the model of simi lar organizations in the homeland, in part as a replacement for the American insurance that was not usually ava il ab le to S lavic immigrants, and out of a need for 5 Magocsi, " The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovaki a," Sla vic Review, Vol. 34, o. 2 (June 1975), 364. 6 Thoma s Capek, The Cechs (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 36-51 , 60-68. 30 SLOVAKIA 2021 an organization to rally the immigrants on an ethnic basis. The first of these societies arose in pioneer Slovak and Rusyn settlements in the 1880s and 1890s. Some were founded by Roman and Greek Catholics together, e.g., in Bridgeport, Connecticut ( 1888), Kingston, Pennsylvania ( 1887 or 1888), Streator, Illinois ( 1889), McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, Allegheny/Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Passaic, New Jersey ( 1890). Some or most of these organizations would likely have joined the national Slovak organizations founded around that time: the National Slavonic Society of the United States (renamed National Slovak Society of the United States of America in 1913), or the First Catholic Slovak Union, FCSU/"Jednota," both founded in 1890.7 Rusyns would not have their own comparable organization until 1892. But the most striking example of a shared Slovak/Rusyn fraternal society was the Pennsylvania Slovak Roman & Greek Catholic Union (aka Pennsylvania Slovak Union or PSJ). Of all the Slovak-American fraternal societies this organization would count the largest number of Rusyn members, and more than 20 PSJ lodges were identified specifically as Greek Catholic or were based at a Greek Catholic church. 8 Despite having a generally common cultural background, and some shared religious affiliation and shared organizations, on an official level , the political goals of the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants did not always coincide, even as the idea of a Czechoslovak republic began to materiali ze. American Carpatho-Rusyn Fraternal Benefit Societies Greek Catholic Union (GCU). The GCU was the sec ul ar organization with the largest membership and widest geographical reach in the American Rusyn community. Its leadership, and editorial stance of its Amerikansky Russky Viestnik newspaper (ARV) , were generally anti-Hungarian, vehemently anti-Ukrainian, and mildly Russophil e, though never politically inclined to union with Russia. While its 1902 spinoff United Societies, loyal to America's first Greek Catholic 7 Stolarik, 130- 141. Ri chard D. Custer, "Old Countrymen, New Neighbors: Early Carpatho- Rusyn and Slovak Immigra nt Relations in the United States" in S/ovo (National Czech & Slovak Museum & Library, Cedar Rap ids, IA), Summer 2016. Unabridged version on line at https://www .ncsml .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Old-Countrymen-New-Neighbors.pdf, 6-7. 8 SLOVAKIA 2021 31 Bishop Soter Ortynsky (an ethnic Ukrainian) since his arrival in 1907 and friendly to the Ga lician clergy, was the GCU 's antagonist on paper, they wou ld prove to be the al li es that would make possible a stronger voice that proved to be the one that caught the ear of the creators of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Slovaks - those who were Greek Catholics as we ll as Roman Catholics - made up a not insignificant portion of the GCU ' s membership, but early on the GCU took a strong stand against the idea that there were actually ethnic S lovak Greek Catholics.9 United Societies of the Greek Catholic Religion. The United Societies spun off from the GCU in 1902 and maintained a loya li st position toward the Greek Catholic Church, at times in opposition to what was perceived as the rebel li ous or disloyal GCU. In its support for Bishop Ortynsky, the society, its newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian ( 1910- 19 17), and its editor, Father Joseph Hanulya, were castigated by the GCU as Ukrainian sympathi zers. Around 1918, the United Societies had about 9,000 members including youth 10 , and published a newspaper, Prosvita, that remained often at odds w ith the GCU and its ARV. Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz (RNS) / Ukrainian National Association (UNA). The GCU in its early years, under c lerically-dominated leadership, became preoccupied with Rusyn affairs in Hungary and enunciated a generally pro-Hungarian political stance. This ali enated the significant membership from Galicia (most of whom were Lemkos), and many lodges, some even with substantial Subcarpathian membership, seceded from the GCU in 1894 to form a new organization . That organization, founded in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was the Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz, or in English, Russian National Union . It we lcomed as members Rusyns from Hungary and Galicia who had a strong sense of national identity, whether "Rusyn," " Russian," or "Ruthenian ." As the organization and its Svoboda newspaper became more Ukrainian-oriented, and the terms Ukraine and Ukrainian increasing ly used alongside Rus' and Rusyn, those with Russophil e or Old-Ruthenian views wou ld transfer to other organizations, primarily 9 Custer, '" No Such Thing as Greek Catholic Slovaks: ' The GCU's Polemic," The Carpatho-Rusyns of Pennsylvania, http://rusynsofpa. blogspot.com/2 014/12/no-suchthing-as-greek-catholic-slovaks.html. Accessed December I, 201 8. 10 Magocsi, " Political Activity," 398. 32 SLOVAKIA 2021 the Russian Brotherhood Organization. The dominant "Ruthenian" segment would eventually lead the organization to change its name in September 1914 to the Ukrainian National Association. Alienated by this change, approximately 17 UNA lodges, 15 of which had a primarily Subcarpathian Rusyn membership, joined the United Societies between October 1914 and February 1915, resulting in 2 1 new regular United Societies lodges and 6 new United Societies youth lodges. Onl y a few such lodges would remain in the UNA, and so the organization's influence among American Subcarpathian Rusyns had almost entirely di ssipated. Russian Brotherhood Organization (RBO). Some members of GCU and RNS in 1900 gathered in Mahanoy City, Pa ., to form a new fraternal organization that would resist clerical domination, have no requirement of church membership, and avoid both pro-Hungarian and pro-Ukrainian political stands. Most of its early lodges were located in northeastern Pennsylvania and some had left the GCU or RNS to join. Religiously, the society remained officially neutral , but as a Ukrainian orientation came to dominate Ga lician Greek Catholic circles in the U.S.A. and in the homeland, the organization became much more supportive of the Orthodox Church, and an increasing portion of its membership reflected that. The RBO 's consistent stand on Ukrainianism was very negative, but simi larly, it opposed the idea that the Rusyn people's regional distinctions justified separation from Great Russians. While the majority of RBO members originated in the Lemko Region of Galicia, many of its founders and largest lodges originated in Hungary/Subcarpathia. In fact, in 1918 nearly 40 RBO lodges had a Subcarpathian majority, and a comparable number of lodges were loosely affiliated with Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes. Ru ssian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society (ROCMAS). A convention of church brotherhoods that had converted to Orthodoxy took place in September 1895 in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , the center of the Rusyn movement to Orthodoxy led by Father Alexis Toth. They formed a federation, and by the first national convention in 1896, eighteen brotherhoods were members. The Society issued a newspaper, Svit, written in a mixture of Galician Ukrainian and Russian . While somewhat concerned with cultural matters, the Society's primary goal was the defense and promotion of Orthodoxy among socalled " Little Russian" immigrants. It vehemently opposed Ukrainia- SLOVAKIA 2021 33 nism and the Greek Catholic Church, and promoted a strict Russian identity almost as a necessary feature of Orthodoxy, to the detriment of the local or regional linguistic and cultural traits of its Rusyn membership. Many of its larger and older lodges were primarily Subcarpathian, e.g., Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Scranton , Catasauqua, and Berwick. United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood of America. The organization, at its founding known as the Greek Catholic Pravoslavny Brotherhood, was established in 1915 mainly by former members of the GCU in southwestern Penn sylvania who had recently joined the Ru ssian Orthodox Church. The vast majority of its members hip was of Subcarpathian origin, particularly from the more eastern counties of Uz, Bereg and Maramoros. Within two decades it grew to around 20,000 members 11 . Position of Slovak Fraternals "There is no 'Slovak ' people" - so titled was an art icle in the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik, Aug. 29, 1918. The postwar years and the struggles over the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic would involve back-and-forth arguments between Ru syn American and Slovak American leaders, in print and, no doubt, in face-to-face meetings. But the root of the di strust undoubtedly was the early conflicts in these communities. The National Slovak Society, for its part, both supported the Rusyn people and disagreed at times with the position of the Rusyn leaders: National Slovak Society members expressed their concern for the fate of their brother Slavs, the Rusyns, who were now [World War I] experiencing the brunt of persecution in wartime Europe. Not only were repressive measures being taken against Rusyns in Carpathian Hungary, but in neighboring Galicia, Magyar troops were perpetrating wholesale massac res. This did not mean that the N.S.S. was conceding to th e claims of a Rusyn nationalism in Eastern Slovakia. Although support for the Slovak ca use in the region had been growing - largely thanks to the financi al support of the American Slovak community - certain elements considered the "S lovjaks" (i .e., Greek Catholics speaking the dial ect of the 11 Magocs i, Our People, 57. 34 SLOVAKIA 2021 eastern regions) as a separate nationality. The official N.S.S. policy was that the Slovjaks were Slovak, not Rusyn, Russian , or any other Slav people. 12 Political Actions During and Toward the End of World War I The Rus 'ko-Amerykans 'ka Rada (Rusyn/Ruthenian American Council) was established at a gathering in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. By design it was to give equal leadership voice to Subcarpathian and Galician Rusyns, and under the patronage of Bishop Ortynsky, its directors included clerical and lay leaders from the Subcarpathian Rusyn community, especially Father Joseph Hanulya, editor of the United Societies newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian , George Gulanich and Ivan Zeedick of the GCU , and John Branik, president of the United Societies. At its Philadelphia meeting it condemned Russia and advocated for support of the political and cultural union of "Ukrainian (Rusyn)"-inhabited Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. 13 This entity ceased to exist with the death of Ortynsky in 1916, but not without drawing ire upon Father Hanulya for his participation. The American-Russian National Defense (ARND) / Narodna Obrana was founded in 1915 in Braddock, Pa. , near Pittsburgh, by Nicholas Pachuta. At the time Pachuta was assistant editor of the ARV, a post he held until 1918, under Michael Hanchin . National Defense styled itself the defender of Rus ' -ness against Magyarism in the Greek Catholic Church, was also critical of Slovakophiles and Ukrainophiles, and picked up members who were recent converts to Orthodoxy in the era of Bishop Stephen Dzubay. In May of 19 18 he met with Thomas G. Masaryk, the leader of the movement for a new state to be called Czechoslovakia, in Pittsburgh and began a discussion around the fate of Uhro-Rus ' (the Rusyn lands south of the Carpathians, historically part of Hungary). At that time Masaryk disregarded Pachuta's goals because his group "had no following or 12 R. Vl adimir Baumgarten and Joseph Ste fka , The National Slovak Society : 100 Year Histmy. 1890-/990. (Pittsburgh: Nation al Slovak Society, 1990), 76. 13 " Narodnyi z' "izd u Filiadel'fii"," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ ), 19 December 1914, 2; Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884- 1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ), 134. SLOVAKIA 2021 35 support among the broad masses of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants." 14 National Defense came around to the Czechoslovak option and delivered a memorandum to Masaryk in October endorsing autonomy within a Czechoslovak state. Around that time Pachuta converted to Orthodoxy, and in 1921 he united the National Defense with the American Russian Brotherhood based in C leve land. From 1922 until 1935 he was editor of the Russkij Vistnik newspaper of U ROBA. The League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia was a strictly Russophile political organization that drew most of its participation from individuals who were already active in organizations like ROCMAS and especially RBO. The vast majority of its members were of Galician background, but about 25% of delegates to its congresses were Subcarpathian Rusyns . 15 It held congresses in 19 17, 1918, and 1919 and made proclamations that Carpatho-Rusyn territory, a long with the who le of Galicia and Bukovina, should be part of Russia. The American National Counci l of Uhro-Rusins was founded in July of 1918 in Pittsburgh, with strong support from the United Societies and eventually the GCU . It grew to more than 100 branches, some of which had I 00 or even 200+ members. This was the organization in which the Pittsburgh attorney Gregory Zatkovich rose to leadership, began meetings with Masaryk, and which led to his post as the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus' . In Philadelphia on October 23, 1918, Zatkovich participated in the Mid-European Democratic Union in the presence of Masaryk . At that time Uhro-Rusyns - Rusyns of Hungary - were accepted as a distinct nationa lity, apart from Ukrainians who were already members. The National Counci l met at Scranton, Pa., on November 12, and formulated its final recommendation that Rusyn territory south of the Carpathians, including all of the original Uhro-Rusyn counties, be united in a Czechoslovak state with broad autonomy. The next day, the resolution was presented to Masaryk, who recommended that a plebiscite be held among American Uhro-Rusyns. 14 Joseph Danko, "Plebiscite of Carpath o- Ruthenians in the United States Recommendin g Union of Carpatho-Rutheni a with the Czec hoslovak Republic," Annals of !he Ukrainian Academy of Aris and Sciences, 11 , nos. 1-2 ( 1964-68), 186. 15 Prikarpalskaia Rus • (New York), Vol. I, o. I, October 191 8. 36 SLOVAKIA 2021 The American Uhro-Rusyn Plebiscite of December 1918 The American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, in conjunction with Masaryk's advice to Zatkovich, resolved to conduct a vote in Subcarpathian Rusyn parishes and fraternal lodges to determine their preferred action with respect to the homeland, among the options it had previously agreed to. Of course, they expected that the result would need to support what had already been decided: that Subcarpathian Rusyn territory should join the Czech and Slovak republic. This vote, then, was limited to the National Council's constituency: Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes - no Orthodox parishes and no Galician-majority parishes would be involved, even if they had substantial numbers of Subcarpathian Rusyn members; and lodges of the GCU and United Societies only, who were already seen to be inclined toward their leadership's preference for Czechoslovakia. The plebiscite was announced in only one issue of the ARV (Nov. 14, 1918), and commenced almost immediately thereafter. There is no extant evidence that there was campaigning within the communities to select a particular option; certainly there would have been very little time for that. We do have results of the vote, which was published in several installments in the ARV and Prosvita, and which were collected in "Plebiscite ofCarpatho-Ruthenians in the United States Recommending Union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic" authored by Joseph Danko in 1968. 16 Option Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic Union with the Ukrainian Republic Total independence Union with Carpatho-Russians Union with Russi a Union with Magyar Land fHungaryl Union with Galicia Total Votes (% of tota l) 732 (66.4%) 310 (28. 1%) 27 (2.5%) 13 ( 1.2%) 10 (0.9%) 9 (0.8%) I (0. 1%) I , 102(/00.0%) Unsurprisingly, the organizers' preferred option won decisively, but not overwhelmingly. Based on the individual vote counts by parish and lodge provided by Danko, I would like to comment on some of 16 Danko, 200. SLOVAKIA 2021 37 the more interesting things I observed. Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic (rank: I} As we will see, each of the options had some very surprising entities voting for them. This option's supporters included two parishes founded as Greek Catholic but which at the time of the vote had Orthodox pastors: Elkhorn, West Virginia (Father John Gratson) and Elizabeth, New Jersey (Father Gregory Varho l). Not very surprising was a vote by a large, mostly Subcarpathian parish of Rusyns from Spis, Saris and Zemplin Counties (Holy Ghost in Tremont), but whose pastor was Father Hanulya, former editor of the United Societies' first newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian - who for years as a supporter of Bishop Ortynsky had been attacked by the GCU in the pages of ARV for being a quasi-Ukrainian . Fourteen of the GCU lodges were based at majority-Galician parishes, although some of these lodges were primari ly Subcarpathian in membership. Union with the Ukrainian Republic (rank: 2) Figure 1. A portion of the American Rusyn communities that voted for union of Uhro-Rusyns with the Ukrainian Republic (66% of tota l votes cast). (Source: Danko, 196-198) The following voted for Uni on of Uhro-Rusins with Ukraini an Republic Societies of the Greek Catholic of Rusin Brothe rhoods in the USA 4 6 17 19 24 28 32 50 Mahoney City, Pa. Donmore , Pa. Rendham, Pa. Lansing, Pa . Eckle y , Pa. Glenlien, Pa. Sheppton, Pa. Mahoney Plane, Pa. (Figure I continues) 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 242 267 292 295 298 324 379 390 St. Clair , Pa. Hannastown, Pa. Wilkes-Barre , Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Baggaley, PP a . New Salem, Pa. Kester, Pa. McKees Rocks, Pa. 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 5 38 SLOVAKIA 2021 Uhro-Rusins Greek Catholic United Congregations. I St. Johna SL Johna B. V. M. Bleaed TrinitY B. V. M. B. V. M. SL Michael B. V. M. Holy Ghost L Michael hen Scnnton, Pa. Bridgeport, Conn. New Salem, Pa. New Britain, Conn. Freebnd,PL Whitting, Ind. Ref. &am>lky P.ev. Cbomoc:t Rev.~ 400- 8 500-10 400- 8 Blnghamtoo, N.Y. Taylor, Pa. McKeca Rocb, PL St. Clair Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Rev. Thq2t Rev. Petraaovich Rev. A. Suba Rev. Ribovsk Rev. N. Chopey 550- 7 Lt Lansford, Pa. Rev. Martyak 550- 7 ~udloning, Pa. Ha eton, Pa. Rn. p ch Rev. Brinaky llef. Choarboch 500- 6 500· 6 600-12 600-12 550- 7 Rev. FeiuG !&J- s Overall this was the most surprising result, having the second highest number of votes. Some votes came from additionally surprising places. For example: the parish in New Britain had experienced an ugly split with Galician Ukrainians just eight years before, yet they still had a Galician pastor. The Wilkes-Barre parish ' s pastor was Father Nicholas Chopey, who had a few years before been numbered among the pro-Hungary clergy. The Lansford parish ' s pastor was Father Gabriel Martyak, administrator of the Uhro-Rusyn parishes in the wake of Bishop Ortynsky's death two years before. And the Hazleton parish that voted for this option, pastored by the Lemko priest Father John Fekula? This was actually the Galician parish (St. Michael) that split off from two existing Subcarpathian parishes in the same city. We must wonder how this parish had the opportunity to vote at all. The lodges that voted this way included largely-Galician GCU lodges in Glen Lyon (based at an old mostlyGalician parish) and Rankin (based at a mostly-Subcarpathian parish), 39 SLOVAKIA 2021 five other GC U lodges based at Galician-majority pari shes but with mostl y Subcarpathi an members, and a GCU lodge from Father Martyak's paris h in Lansford whose members were mostl y from Sari s and Zemplin Counti es. The following voted for Tou.l Independence of Uhro-Rusins. Societies of the Greek C. Union. ):: ~~•:· an !Im , a. \ Eynon, Pa. lmon, Pa. ~nton, ra. 2 1 I Gymnastic Branches. I61 11 Scranton, Pa. 67 Mahonoy City, Pa. 1 United Societies of Greek C. Religion I ss K.ingaton, Pa. 1 II 60 Edwardavillc, Pa. 2 j Uhro-Rusin Congregations 11 ¥ M : Holy Gbolt iililUIIII t11 Jcaup, Pa. 1&11 li•1 :Rev. Ivan I= i I Figure 2. The Ameri can Rusyn communities whi ch voted fo r tota l indepe ndence of Uhro-Rusyns (3 % of votes cast). (Danko, 198) Total independence of Uhro- Rusyns (rank: 3) Without any traditi on of self-rule, and without any real advocates fo r thi s pos ition, it is not surpri sing that it rece ived so few votes. It 's notable that not only did the pari sh and a GCU lodge in Jessup, Pennsy lvani a, contribute a number of the votes fo r thi s option, but two additional GC U lodges that did , in Eynon , Pennsyl va ni a, were a ffili ated wi th the Jessup pari sh as we ll. Jessup a lso had a large RBO lodge, but it is unlike ly that independence would have been the ir preference. 40 SLOVAKIA 2021 Union with Carpatho-Russians (i.e., Galicians, Bukovinians, UhroRusyns) (rank: 4) This position was represented among American Carpatho-Rusyns mainly by the League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia, although evidently few Subcarpathian Rusyns belonged to that organization, and to some extent originally by the American-Russian National Defense. The few votes for this option came mainly from Gary, Indiana 's GCU Lodge 469 and its Greek Catholic parish, which was primarily of Subcarpathian origin (in its western counties that would be incorporated into Slovakia) although it is not clear to this author why that would have been their choice. Union with Russia (rank: 5) The FolJowing voted for Union with Russia Greek Catholic Union. 550 Olyphant, Pa. 1 Gymnastic Branch 121 Jerome, Pa. I Uhro-Rusin Congregations a. V. M. Mahoooy City, Pa. lln. I. lubck 400- a Figure 3. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Russia (I % of votes cast). (Danko. 199) Among the votes for this option were GCU Lodge 530 in Olyphant, Pennsylvania, mostly Lemko in membership and based at a Galician-majority parish, and perhaps most curious of all , St. Mary 's Greek Catholi c Church in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, whose pastor was the noted Rusyn-language author and cultural patriot Father Emil Kubek. Kubek was also part of the leadership of the American I 41 SLOVAKIA 2021 National Council, which was not supportive of union with Russia at all. While he was not a Russophile, his relative lack of involvement with the GCU (and perhaps due to the RBO being founded in his parish) may have encouraged him to advocate for this option . Or more likely the decisive factor was the RBO's founding president, John Zincak Smith, also being the president of St. Mary's parish. Union with Magyar land (i.e., Hungary) (rank: 6) The Following voted for Union of Uhro-Rwins with Magyar Land Greek Catholic Union. 50 2 181 Clevdand, Ohio Clndand, Ohio Uhro-Rusin Congregations. St. John'• , ClcYeland, Ohio llev. Ballog soo- 6 I Figure 4. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Hungary (I % of votes cast). (Danko, 199) Even though many of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy in the U.S. were Magyarized (if not outright Magyarone), it doesn't seem that any attempt there may have been on their part to influence their parishioners to vote for this option was successful. The ARV denounced Hungary's policy toward its ethnic minorities for years in the lead up to the war. Despite Hungary's liberalized ethnic minority policy that began in 1915, inclination toward Hungary from American Rusyns seems to have changed little. Two GCU lodges voted for this option, but most striking is that six votes came from St. John's Church in Cleveland - not the Rusyn one that in 1918 had hired an Orthodox priest as its pastor - but the Magyar parish, pastored by Father Michael Balogh. This was the only ethnic-Hungarian parish to vote, and it's unlikely that Zatkovich and the American National Council had intended the plebiscite to include the Magyar parishes. (It's possible that they did, we just have no evidence on either side to say for sure.) Union with Galicia (rank: 7) Given the still substantial portion of the GCU's membership either 42 SLOVAKIA 2021 from Galicia or belonging to lodges based at Galician-majority parishes, we could have expected more votes for this option than were returned. However, a number of GCU lodges that were mostly or entirely Galician in membership (e.g., McKeesport Lodge 782, Wilmerding, Pa. , Lodges 348 and 360) - and based at Galician parishes - did not vote. It must be underscored that the plebiscite was not truly representative of the range of religious congregations and fraternal lodges found in the American Carpatho-Rusyn community, not even when speaking exclusively of those from Subcarpathia - the "Uhro-Rusyns." The Orthodox (except for two parishes which inexplicably did vote) were wholly unrepresented, and the significant fraternals RBO, ROCMAS , and fledgling UROBA were likewise ignored. Clearly it was meant to produce the additional justification Zatkovich needed to present the Scranton resolution to the Paris Peace Conference. 17 Understandably alarmed by this development, the activist Ukrainian American community opposed what they had hoped would be an outcome supporting their goal to unite so-called Ukrainian-Ruthenian ethnographic territory in a Ukrainian state. In so doing, they provided what seems to be the only eyewitness account of how the plebiscite was conducted in a Rusyn parish. Here writes a Ukrainian from Bridgeport, Conn .: Our Hungarian brother Rusyns want to unite Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine. On December 8 of this year, a parish meeting was held in Bridgeport, Conn. , right after the Divine Liturgy, in the parish school. The meeting was very interesting for every Ukrainian, because our brother Uhro-Rusyns decided on the fate of our and their brothers across the sea. Local speakers and Father Orest Cornjak [Chornock], local pastor, spoke. The meeting was convened for the purpose of deciding where Hungarian Rus' shou ld belong: whether to Ukraine or to the Czecho-Slovak state. Father Orest Cornjak stated his preference, that he would vote to belong to his brothers, that is, to the Ukrainians, rather than to the Czecho-Slovaks . After much discussion , it turned out that the Uhro-Rusyn 17 Victor S. Mamatey, "The Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians," in Joseph F. O'Grady, ed .. The Immigrants· Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 245-246. SLOVAKIA 2021 43 leaders wanted to lead the Uhro-Rusyns to the Czecho-Slovaks, without questioning the Uhro-Rusyn people. And again the speakers protested against the "American National Council of UhroRusins" in America that no one has elected; its members of that Council are self-appointed leaders, that they have chosen themselves and have no right to speak in the name of the Uhro-Rusyn people, and further that they proposed an amendment so as not to vote either for Ukraine or against, nor to take a position against the Czecho-Slovak state, and so let it be as Uhro-Rusyns will decide in the old country. They also complained to the Ukrainians that at the founding of the " Mid-European Union" at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa., they had to say that the Uhro-Rusyns are "a different people" from the Ukrainians, and thus the Ukrainians do not want to accept the UhroRusyns as an equal among equals and so for that reason will not vote in that way. When people were already wanting to leave, Mr. Ivan Boyko, head of the Ukrainian Athletic Association (Sich) in America, while asking forgiveness for the slurs that were committed by Ukrainians, and explaining that the Uhro-Rusyns had already decided at the founding council meetings in L'viv that Hungarian Rus ' should belong to Ukraine together with Galicia and Bukovina, said he did not see the reasons why the Uhro-Rusyns should not vote for the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine. He laid out what benefits the Uhro-Rusyns would have in a Ukrainian state, and what benefits they would have from the Czecho-Slovaks .. .. We Ukrainians, said Mr. Bojko, can never agree that our Hungarian brothers will be in the Czecho-Slovak state. [... ] It should be noted that the audience very intently listened to Mr. Bojko and took his every word to heart. After the speech the audience rewarded him with applause when the other speakers received no applause. Here Mr. Bojko did a great service to the Ukrainian people by proclaiming this speech to the Hungarian brothers, because then now the entire hall of people began to speak differently about it after the speech, because it was moved to vote by secret ballot, about where Hungarian Rus' should belong: whether to Ukraine, or to the Czecho-Slovak state, and another motion, to vote by roll call , so that you know who is against your brothers (Ukrainians). Father Comjak led by saying: Who is for 44 SLOVAKIA 2021 uniting Hungarian Rus' with Ukraine? It was decided unanimously on the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine, and then came the second ballot: Who is for uniting Hungarian Rus' with the Czecho-Slovaks? For this union with the Czecho-Slovaks there was only one vote. So, evidently, the Uhro-Rusyns want to unite with Ukraine. The statement made in Philadelphia by Misters M. Sichynsky and N. Ceglinsky, recognizing the Uhro-Rusyns as a separate nationality, with their representative as Mr. Zatkovich in the "MidEuropean Union," should be retracted for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Uhro-Rusyns . Instead, let them declare that the Uhro-Rusyns are our brothers by blood and by faith , and we can never agree that a second nationality would rule over our Hungarian brothers, even if it were Czecho-Slovakia. In Bridgeport, Conn ., Uhro-Rusyns do not recognize the "American National Council of Uhro-Rusins" because their people did not select them , and that self-styled Counci l has no right to push them into a Czecho-Slovak state, because the Uhro-Rusyn brothers want to unite Hungarian Rus ' with Ukraine. Glory to them for this! 18 The Ukrainian National Association's newspaper Svoboda reported on a Ukrainian National Congress that took place in January 1919. This congress included speakers on the situation in the Subcarpath ian Rusyn community in the U.S. and its recent Scranton resolution and fol low-on plebiscite. Father Kubek , editor of the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik [this is an error, he was not] was supposed to speak, but at the last moment he informed that he was not able to do so. His place was taken by a Galician priest, Father Vasyl' Merenkiv, who said, among other things: "In recent days I was in several Uhro-Rusyn parishes and spoke with several Uhro-Rusyn priest-leaders . We spoke about the idea of uniting Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine . I can assure the esteemed delegates that they are all committed to joining Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine more so than with Czec hoslovak ia. But still, I noticed that American Uhro-Rusyns are sti ll wavering." Mr. Ivan Hajovyc (of Maramoros), a delegate from the Chicago Uhro-Rusyns, was called to speak. He revealed his joy that he has an 18 "Svobidna vo lia uhors' kykh Ru syniv," Svoboda, 14 December 19 I 8, 2. SLOVAKIA 2021 45 opportunity to speak to so many people who are interested in the fate of Uhro-Rusyns. He talked about the oppression that Uhro-Rusyns suffered from the Magyars. " We, Hungarian Ukrainians," said Mr. Hajovyc, "stand body and soul for the unity of Ukraine.We want to join with Ukraine! We are protesting against the plebiscite conducted among American UhroRusyn s, which was set up for the sake of uniting Uhro-Rus' with Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Ukrainians want to be united with Ukraine. We do not know what Czechoslovakia is and who CzechoSlovaks are. We never want to hear anything about joining them." Mr. Ivan Hundjak (a Galician) argued using statistics that the plebiscite initiated by Masaryk among American Uhro-Rusyns was conducted in a deceptive manner. Finally Mr. Ivan Skakandij, an Uhro-Rusyn cantor-teacher and delegate from Nesquehoning, Pa . was called to speak He regretted that in such an important moment Hungarian Ukrainians in America have not yet all been awakened to a life of national consciousness. " It is the fault of the Uhro-Rusyn clergy, who in the old country were led around by the Magyars and now by the Czechoslovaks. But nationally conscious Hungarian Ukrainians in America want to unite with Ukraine. We are just now awakening to life and there is hope that in a short time we will all be awakened." One speaker (Father Merenkiv) said " Hungarian Ukrainians in America are still waking up, but remember, that as we wake up , Masaryk will do nothing to help." 19 My observations about the results, it turns out, while I arrived at them independently, were noted to some extent already in 1919 in an article in the Ukrainian press. This is the speech by Ivan Hundjak (mentioned previously) in which he analyzed the resu lts and pointed out, among other criticisms, that if a person happened to be a member of a GCU lodge and the United Societies lodge in the same place, and the local Subcarpathian Greek Catholic parish, conceivably that person could vote up to three times. He noted as well (as Danko did) that participation among those eligible to vote was fairly low. He asserted that had these irregularities been taken into account, the leading result 19 "Z narodnohu z'izdu," Svoboda, 18 January 19 19, 2. 46 SLOVAKIA 2021 probably would have been for union with Ukraine. I would counter that had there been time, or the will, to more inclusively offer the vote to all American Subcarpathian Rusyn institutions, and not just the ones affiliated with the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, the results may indeed have been different, but more likely toward union with Russia, as impractical as that might have been. Reception of Czechoslovakia in the Rusyn American Community In May of 19 I 9, the cornerstone was laid in Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the Rusin Peoples Home. This event, under the patronage of the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, occurred just days before the National Counci l in Uzhorod, Subcarpathian Rus ', would accept the American Rusyns ' proposal to unite with Czechoslovakia. The commemorative booklet for this event 20 prominently featured a page with the American, Czechoslovak, and "Rusin" flags entwined, with the slogan "Old Glory Has Made This Federation (Czech-SlovakRusin) Possible." The pages following showed photographs of Zatkovich signing the declaration of the Mid-European Nationalities and Masaryk reading the declaration at a public manifestation in Philadelphia. The book ' s last page is a map showing Europe ' s ethnic groups within the new postwar borders, with Czechoslovakia labeled "Czechoslovaks" and to its east, "Uhro-Rusinia." It's not clear whether UhroRusinia is meant to be depicted as part of Czechoslovakia or not. Whatever the interpretation, this is probably the lone celebratory publication of American Rusyns to mark the decision to join the Czechoslovak Republic. A delegation of American Rusyn gymnasts affiliated with the GCU Sokol division travelled to Prague in the summer of 1920 to participate in a Pan-Slavic Gymnastics exhibition. As part of the trip they also visited Subcarpathian Rus ' and had an audience with Governor Zatkovich. One member of the delegation wrote, " In Prague we were 20 Souvenir Issued by the Rusin Peoples Home, Inc. on the Occasion of the Dedication ofthe Corner-Stone I Pamiatnik izdan ko,poratsieiu Russkii Narodny i Dom iz sluchai posviashcheniia kraeugol 'nago kamen 'ia. Homestead. Pa .. I 9 I 9 (Homestead, Pa., 19 19). SLOVAKIA 2021 47 warmly welcomed by the Czechs and everything we saw in Prague and the way we were treated , we enjoyed ... " oi...o OLO ..... .. , . . MAO• T .. , . rcDll:.. 4Tt0N ie&&CW·~YAK "v.lNI ~ . . . • 1..• Figure 5. Page from the commemorative booklet for the cornerstone laying ofthe Rusin Peoples Home in Homestead, Pa., May 1919. Another wrote, " With thanks to God , with our appearance at the Pan-Slavic Sokol Meet in Prague, we made a mark in the history of our Sokol Branch which wi ll be permanent proof that we accomplished our mission , that we entered into the order of the Czechoslovak Sokol movement. . . We also left a lasting impression on the youth of Subcarpathian Rus ' ." The trip was promoted in the pages of ARV and chronicled fully in the 1921 almanac of the Sokol division. 2 1 It wou ld not be long before frustration over the lack of autonomy promised Subcarpathian Rus' by Masaryk would boil over in the American Carpatho-Rusyn press, especially when Zatkovich resigned in 1921 , and would continue at least until the late 1920s among Greek Catholics. The GCU printed a number of publications critical of Czechoslovak policy: Zatkovich's Otkrytie-Expose by vseho g ubernatora Podkarpatskoj Rus i, o Podkarpatskoj Rusi ( 1921 ), Wilson's Prin21 C heryl We ller Beck et al. , Opportuni~v Realized: The Greek Catholic Union 's First One Hundred Years, / 892-1992. (Beaver, Pa.: Gree k Catholic Uni on o f the U.S.A. , 1994), 75 . 48 SLOVAKIA 2021 ciples in Czechoslovak Practice: The Situation of the Carpatho-Russian People Under the Czech Yoke ( 1929) and Beskid's Karpatorusskaja pravda ( 1932). They would also lead a National Congress of Rusins in Pittsburgh in November 1922, which issued a memorandum to Prague condemning their policy toward Subcarpathian Rus '. American Rusyns in the Russian Orthodox Church and others of Russophile orientation would take up the opposition to Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus' through the 1930s. 22 I did not find any evidence - written or photographic - in Carpatho-Rusyn communities or parishes of widespread adoption of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic "homeland." There is certain ly no oral folklore around portraits of Masaryk (or Zatkovich, for that matter) being hung in parish halls as there is of portraits of Maria Theresa and Franz Josef from the early immigration. Lasting Impressions on Rusyn Americans of a Czechoslovak "Homeland" A list on the Wikipedia entry for Czech Americans of "The top 50 U.S. communities with the highest percentage of people claiming Czech ancestry" 23 (based on the 2000 U.S . census) contains mostly predictable results - locations in North Dakota, Texas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin , et al. An accompanying list, " U.S. communities with the most residents born in the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia)," however, contains a curious entry: tied for number IO was the little town of Colver, Pennsylvania, about 20 miles north of Johnstown in the west central part of the state. Colver, a former coal mining company town , had just a few primary ethnic groups : among these were Slovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns. It may we ll have sti ll had a few residents in 2000 who were born in the former Czechos lovakia. It is not clear that these results came from responses declaring their birthplace as "Czech Republic" or "Czechoslovakia," or either, but surely this population in Colver, Pennsylvania, was not ethnic Czechs. 22 Magocsi, Our People, 88-89. "Czech Americans", https ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech Americans. Accessed December I, 201 8. 23 SLOVAKIA 2021 49 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for ancestry 24 (estimated from its 20 I 3 American Community Survey) show that Pennsylvania, historically the state with the largest number of Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants, had more than 52,142 residents with Czech ancestry, or 0.3% of Pennsylvania residents. This is much less than those who indicated Slovak or Ukrainian ancestry, many of which are likely of Carpatho-Rusyn background (or the completely unreali stic 193 ,000 with "Russian" ancestry), but still far higher than the hi storically low Czech settlement of the state would imply. In addition, "Czechoslovak ian" ancestry was estimated at 22,904, which could conceivably include any of Czech, Slovak, or Carpatho-Rusyn-descended individuals, although the much lower national consciousness of CarpathoRusyn Americans - reflected by the miniscule estimated 2,050 of that background - would lead one to expect most of those "Czechoslovak" individuals to have Carpatho-Rusyn ancestry. That many Carpatho-Rusyn Americans of any particular geographic background in Carpathian Rus ' still exhibit confusion about their ethnic and geographical origins is not news to anyone. But it may be that Subcarpathian Rus ' belonging for 20 years to Czechoslovakia created a lingering geographic attachment to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as the ancestral land of American Carpatho-Rusyns. Consider these newspaper clippings, maybe the most extreme examples of this phenomenon I've encountered. A perhaps unintended corollary to this phenomenon is the everincreasing use of genealogy websites where obituaries, gravestones, and other data are collected; many of the individuals - Carpatho-Rusyns and others - whose ge nealogical data is found on these sites have had their birthplace, which was probably entered by their descendant researcher as "Czechoslovakia," transposed by the site into "Czech Republic," further muddling Carpatho-Rusyn identity by placing Czechoslovak natives into the wrong modem-day country. Thus the main legacy of Carpatho-Rusyns' Czechoslovak homeland may well be their descendants eventually needing to educate themselves about 24 U.S. Census Bureau, Total Ancestry Reported: Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported, 2013 American Community Survey I- Year Estimates. https :// factfinder.census.gov/ faces/tableservices/ jsf/pages/productview.xhtml ?pid=ACS 13 I YR B04003&prodType=table. Accessed I December 2018. 50 SLOVAKIA 2021 the fact that Subcarpathian Rus ' was indeed part of Czechoslovakia and is not the modem day Czechia, nor Slovakia, for that matter. rites _____§s:,vtces for Mary - • 93, of 1220 Valley Road, Duncott, who died Friday morning at Pottsville Hospital, will be held at 9 :15 a.m. Tuesday !rom Dutcavich Funeral Home, Minersville. Further services will be held at 10 a .m . in Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville . The Very Rev. Michael Hatrak will officiate. Interment will be in the parish cemetery, Branch Township. Born public, sh late Metro and Sophie She came to the United States as a child, resided in the Heckscherville and Duncott areas and attended Heckscherville schools. She was a member of Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville, and was active in numerous church functions for many years. Figure 6. 1998 obituary of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant born in Lochovo, Bereg County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was " born in Lockaway, Czech Republic In any case, on this centennial of the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, we can happily remember Mamatey's remark about the significance of American Carpatho-Rusyns' activities around this creation : "while the Slovak immigration in the United States affected Wilson's peace policies only indirectly ... the Carpatho-Ruthenian immigrants did so directly." 25 25 Mamatey, 249. SLOVAKIA 2021 MARI( 51 R0CMR8ISlalf Pholo Woman celebrates turning 103 Mary 11111111 • l'Nident at York Terrace, Pottsville, wavee to ad- =:~==bi~ le now the Cziech Republ 1891, ahe larecenUy. • member of Sa. Born In Pa,1 ; lie Church, Mlnersvllle, and atlll enjoya muak:al and cooking actlvltlea at York Terrace. 7. 200 I news article of a birthday celebration of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant centenarian born in Cyganovci , Uz County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was "born in what is now the Czech Republic." Figure 52 SLOVAKIA 2021 "UIIRO . RUSINIA, PROPOSED THIUD STATE OF TUE CZl',()JJO!!LO'\"AK REPUBLIC " • 0 ...... ,,.....,....-_-...):/ ~ ( • • • ,. 1'14"-t.~ Figure 8. Map prepared in 1918 by Gregory Zatkovich depicting the proposed future state of "Uhro-Rusinia" within a federal Czechoslovakia, in which all Rusyn-inhabited lands on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were to be included. (Archive of Paul R. Magocsi , used with permission)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Envisioning a Homeland: Carpatho-Rusyn Immigrants in the USA and the Czechoslovak Option Description An account of the resource Richard D. Custer Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 27-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Custer, Richard D. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/93d25643c736c60e0f09c83d1947ff2d.pdf d9fee3b411ca29bd0ae94db7de238cd7 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Dr. Steven I. M i l l e r : Ethnicity and Research SOME COMMENTS ON MICHAEL NOVAK'S THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS There has recently been an upsurge of thinking and writing in terms of ethnicity. The most recent, and perhaps one of the most persuasive, has been by the Slovak-American Michael Novak, in his volume, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics. 1 Novak's thesis is that there exists in America a large group of people that is of a unique ethnic background most likely Catholic, and generally "blue collar" or lower middle class. Novak contends that these groups made up of Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slovaks constitute an important and neglected segment of our population, who have been historically exploited by the WASPS and are now being identified as right-wing bigots. Novak contends that it is now time to recognize the unique identity and composition of these ethnic groups and, hopefully, mold them into a viable political force that reflects their national origins and religious preference. While Novak makes an important contribution to the ethnic literature, one often receives the impression while reading the book that something is lacking; that the ethnic concern is a springboard for certain personal ethical and political preferences. There is not, for instance, an in-depth investigation of any of the ethnic groups that is supposedly under study. For instance, no in-depth analysis is given of such a classic work as Thomas and Znaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. 2 Surely, these volumes would have provided some additional insight into the problem. What we have, rather, is a documented but largely anecdotal work purporting to penetrate into the "mysteries" of the ethnic psyche. And, yet, the work does at least bring about an awareness of the fact that ethnicity may be an important contemporary phenomenon. However, by emphasizing the �142 SLOVAKIA reality of ethnicity, Novak leaves unsolved as many issues as he raises. This is the result of several factors: 1) the general methodological approach of the work; 2) certain ambiguities in terms of definitions, and 3) a larger vision of the ethnic reality (if, indeed, there actually is one). These points will be elaborated on below. Again, the work is a very valuable one but it could have been considerably strengthened if some of these factors had been taken into consideration. Perhaps some of these considerations will more appropriately be explored in future works on the subject. METHODOLOGY AND ETHNIC STUDIES As I pointed out in a previous work,3 one of the crucial handicaps facing ethnic studies is the paucity of adequate methodology. More accurately, one could argue that the methodology is available but has not been utilized effectively in ethnic studies. What I am opting for is a more rigorous use of historiography and especially the extended use of social science methodology. It is only through good methodology that the study of ethnic groups ( and especially the ones cited by Novak), becomes systematized and incorporated at all levels of the educational process. Prof. Novak's methodological approach is, I believe, broadly historical. He indicates (xv) that he will approach the topic in terms of "systematic theology" and his personal label of "intelligent subjectivity." While the former definition is perhaps not well defined, I take the second (and equivalent definition of "intelligent subjectivity" to be somewhat akin to Max Weber's idea of verstehen4-although there are some crucial differences. However, one does not know by the context whether this type of methodological approach is implied. While this may be a minor point, it does have bearing on the shape and direction of the work. One of the major difficulties, however, lies in the structure of the argument itself. That is, there may be operating throughout the book a rather subtle logical fallacy that, by the way, plagues much of social science reasoning, also. The fallacy is called by logicians "the fallacy of affirming the consequent." 5 It involves valid and invalid forms of argument based on "conditionals" that havli the �SLOVAKIA 143 form "if p, then q." Thus, one of the basic arguments here runs something like this: "if there is a unique ethnic identity, then it is found in the existence of such groups as Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs. But such groups do exist; therefore, they must exhibit a unique ethnic consciousness." The fallacy being that the existence of any or all of these groups does not give us a basis for concluding the existence of some special identity or consciousness. Indeed, the existence of these groups would constitute a necessary condition for an ethnic consciousness, but surely, not a sufficient one. The important point here is that one then attempts to specify by way of evidence ( or the inductive process), the probability that some sort of meaningful relationship does in fact exist.6 While Professor Novak does, in part, fulfill this evidence condition, he does not extend it in any unique methodological fashion. For example, four propositions are set forth (pp. 8-9) that are supposedly associated with ethnic identity. The first two propositions imply the necessity of examining one's ethnic heritage to gain a deeper insight into one's (supposedly) psychological makeup; and that this enhanced self-awareness will do no harm to this country's vision of the world, in terms of foreign policy (although I must admit I fail to see how the second proposition follows from the first). The last two propositions, however, are the interesting ones since they are presumably direct effects of one's ethnic identity. Proposition three makes the claim that "persons who are secure in their identity act with greater freedom, greater flexibility, greater openness to others. People who feel inferior or unacceptable lash out in anger." Proposition four states "a politics based on family and neighborhood is far stronger socially and psychologically than a politics based on bureaucracy." Now these propositions are important in that they are the supposed consequences of ethnicity as studied through the perspective of "intelligent subjectivity." But if we examine the last two propositions, the question immediately arises as to whether the assertions are meant to be "causative" in nature or, perhaps, co,rrelational. It appears that they are put forth with the force �SLOVAKIA of causal statements: ethnic identity (consciousness) causes a healthier self-concept which in turn leads to (for instance) a unique kind of political commitment. These types of inferences are easily asserted but are substantiated with great difficulty. What is needed in these types of assertions, as we shall see, is either fairly strong historical evidence or, more pertinently, methods for operationalizing these assertions. In the same vein, Prof. Novak attempts to substantiate his thesis by claiming that the groups he is speaking of are identifiable on at least three characteristics: ethnicity, religion, and social class position (pp. 14, 20). This, of course, is an important assertion since it defines the characteristics of the population under study. Although there are presumably seventy million Americans who can be classified as Catholic, ethnic and within the $5,000$10,000 income range, this in itself does not mean that these people form a distinct group in terms of any of the three characteristics, let alone as being distinct in any political sense. There undoubtedly is a great deal of potential (economic, social, religious), but this does not mean it has become actualized in any specific manner. In addition, one would need much more specific information on this group before generalizations could be forwarded. What is the specific ethnic breakdown? What is the median income within any given group and between the groups? How many of each generation are in any given group? How are they distributed in any particular city? What is needed, then, is a more specific delineation of this large "ethnic group." Many other issues come to mind in this connection. Assuming that any given ethnic group can also be characterized as Catholic and having a median income of $8,000, is there any way in which these (and other) variables came together to produce the ethnic consciousness? Thus, it may be the case that Catholicism may be more important than ethnicity or income in predicting particular ethnic attitudes. Or it may be child rearing patterns or perhaps occupational structure. For instance, do third generation Poles who are middle class and Catholic, hold similar political attitudes as blue-collar Lutheran (or Catholic) Slovak~. �SLOVAKIA 145 It becomes readily obvious that what is needed is a more s ophisticated methodology to handle some of these problems. Likewise, Professor Novak's definition of an ethnic :group (pp. 47-48) is much too vague. One is not quite sure what an "historical memory" is to begin with, but the -concept is further confused by including nearly all things under the sun: instincts, feelings, intimacies, etc. It is difficult to see how some of these statements go beyond, for instance, Gordon's theory on assimilation in America. 7 The weakness in some of these assertions is that they may be perpetuating certain ethnic stereotypes under the guise of pointing out their uniqueness (p. 23). Does one really gain additional insight into ethnicity by stating that ethnic families have many family pictures in their homes and spend much of their free time with their families? Or such dangerous generalizations as "Jews and Italians we know are highly dramatic people. Their self-consciousness is different from that of other groups (p. 38)." This may be an indicator of the uniqueness of different forms of ethnic "consciousness," but it is rather difficult to see how. THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE OPERATIONALIZATION Returning to an earlier point, the real need in Prof. Novak's work is some attempt to operationalize his key assertions. That is, there should be some way to state more precisely those propositions that are central to the work and to imply some possible means of measuring them. 8 When one attempts to do this, it becomes clear that the issues under study are indeed of a very complex nature. This approach does not mean that if one tries to look at an issue (or a series of issues empirically, let us say from a social science point of view), that there is automatically a depersonalization of the group under study. There may be but this is not necessarily the case. In addition, if there is some "loss" in the sense that one cannot explore all the psychological complexities of any given group or individual, there is also a "gain" in that one can obtain more precise information on the group and use this information as a stepping stone to further research. �146 SLOVAKIA Now, indeed, this approach to ethnicity is a consequence of certain WASP connected attitudes about "universality'' and professionalization, but I hardly believe this is the case. What social science research attempts to do (sometimes with poor results) is to precisely rid people of certain stereotypic notions (let us say about ethnicity) that have been prevalent for too long. Conversely' social science research can bring to light the uniqueness of any given group. There are, for example, certain important conceptual clarifications that Professor Novak should have addressed. himself to. One, first of all, would like some additional clarification as to the nature of "ethnic consciousness." If it is postulated as being important, and a causal factor in the development of other conditions (i.e., political power), then it should be capable of operationalization. How does one know if one has it? Do some groups have it more than others? Does it differ in terms of social clas5 differences, for instance? These are not moot questions. Rather, they must be answered if one is to make a case for ethnic consciousness. There are other statements that are in need of clarification which are also premised on the existence of this ethnic consciousness. For instance, the statement, "the rise of ethnic consciousness today is also due to disillusionment with the universality, too thinly rational culture of professional elites (p. 32)." And again, "the rise in ethnic consciousness is, then, part of a more general cultural revolution (p. 32)." How is one to determine the relationship in the first statement between one's ethnic consciousness and the disillusionment with professional elites? There may indeed be such a relationship but the context does not clarify it, nor the possible strength of the relationship. In the second statement, it is asserted that there is some type of a relationship between ethnic consciousness and the more "general cultural revolution" (whatever that might be). In this instance, however, some directionality is implied: ethnic consciousness seems to be the result, or perhaps the by-product, of some larger cultural transformation. This may, once more, be the case but it would be extremely helpful if one could place such a statement in a broader �SLOVAKIA 147 theoretical framework; perhaps the work of Emile Durkheim,9 or Robert K. Merton's reference group theory. 10 Without a general theoretical framework, it becomes increasingly difficult to place the above statement into any type of meaningful categorization. Although the issue of theory building is very pertinent to the discussion, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 11 RESEARCH DESIGNS AND ETHNIC STUDIES One possible way of gaining important information related to the study of ethnic groups would be to con-ceptualize the problem in another way. Again, this would be an alternative method of looking at some of the claims forwarded by Professor Novak. An important preliminary step would be to state an initial dependent variable. The -dependent variable is the condition we are trying to .explain.12 It is the issue we are interested in examining, -explaining, and possibly predicting from. The independent variable, on the other hand, is the presumed "cause" of the dependent variable. 13 What we should then be looking for would be the relationship of the dependent variable(s) with the independent variable(s). If some relationship does exist, we can then better attempt to explain these hypotheses under investigation. In a broad sense, the dependent variable here would be "ethnic consciousness." It is this factor or condition that we wish to account for as accurately as possible, because the assumption is that this condition is now responsible for many other conditions. But what is necessary to give added meaning to this concept? One would, first of all, attempt to define more precisely with some such statement as, "Ethnic consciousness is a psychological state X, resulting from Y and exhibited in certain types of behavior pattern in group Z." However, even if a definition of this type is possible, one is still under the obligation t o give supporting evidence for it. One way of providing for this supporting evidence is to first operationalize (measure) the concept. And this is where the task now becomes increasingly difficult. Put very �148 SLOVAKIA simply, how can one get a measure of ethnic consciousnes s? (We are not even asking at this point if there are differing degrees or amounts of it.) What would be needed, then, is the creation of some type of instrument that gives an indication of this attribute. We might, for example devise a test that would measure conservative or liberal, democratic or authoritarian political attitudes, and then infer that those scoring "high" on, let us say, the democratic dimension would also be exhibiting "ethnic consciousnes s." (We are presumably administering the instrument to some ethnic group.) Of course, ethnic consciousnes s could conceivably be indicated by a large number of factors individually, or several kinds of factors. collectively. However, the issue is finally settled, it must be done for the research to proceed. The same issues are brought to the fore when one attempts to identify and specify the independent variable(s). Thus the rise of ethnic consciousnes s may be directly related to 1) anemic strain within institutions; 2) increasing displeasure with bureaucratic means of doing things; and 3) the decrease or increase of religious commitment and so forth. If one, for example, indicates that the rise in ethnic consciousnes s is related to increasing bureaucratic complexity, then some means must be devised to conceptualize bureaucratic structures (and then relate them to ethnic consciousnes s). To do this, one would have to specify, first of all, the organizationa l level that may be important. Are we speaking of bureaucracy in general, in society, or bureaucratic organization in terms of higher education and its effects on blocking admission to ethnic groups. or some other sense of bureaucracy? One would also have to assume that there is some way of measuring this bureaucratic effect. THE STUDY OF SLOVAKS Let us now assume that we would want to test Prof. Novak's thesis concerning the rise of ethnic consciousnes s. How could one go about doing this? The problem becomes highly complex in studying one group. It would be a monu- �SLOVAKIA 149 mental task to study the remaining ethnic groups either cross-sectionally ( at one point in time), or longitudinally ( over a period of time). Let us delineate our problem, however, to studying the Slovaks, let us say, in Chicago. Let us further assume that we have developed a reliable and valid instrument that we can use as a measure of ethnic consciousness. The problem then would have to be approached in somewhat the following manner: 1. We would have to · specify the population under study. Presumably, we would want to look at native-born Slovaks, as well as second and third generation Slovaks. However, difficulties soon arise: if both of your grandparents were Slovaks, but your father was Slovak and your mother Irish, do we include you in the population as a Slovak? Some de.c ision would have to be reached on matters or definition such as this. 2. We would want a breakdown demographically of where Slovaks resided in Chicago. This information might be easily obtained for some native-born Slovaks and their children, but others would have to be located if we were to have a representative sample. Other information would then have to be gathered: importantly the age range of Slovaks and how many within certain age groups; other valuable information would include educational background, occupation, place of residence, income level, religious preference, and so on. This demographic data would be a vital first step in describing the nature of our population. Depending on the size of the population, decisions would have to be made a5 to the most appropriate sampling techniques and the best methods of obtaining this information, i. e., questionnaires, interviews, a combination of these. 3. Assuming these conditions could be met, there have been developed within the social sciences certain rather powerful statistical techniques that could be utilized in developing this type of analysis. We would want to, for instance, use certain correlation techniques to explore the nature and strength of certain relationship. We would �150 SLOVAKIA want to see if ethnic consciousness is related to certain other factors such as education level, occupation, income, religion, and so forth. Again, we would want to see how "strong" these relationships were. We would also want to examine these factors within certain age groups, for instance, or between males and females. Other techniques could be brought to bear on the problem, namely, those statistical manipulations which include regression analysis, partial and multiple correlation.14 For example, if Slovaks in the thirty-five to fifty age group scored "high" on ethnic consciousness, and if these scores correlated positively with education, religion and income, we might want to ask if any of these variables are more "important" than the others; or how well, if taken together, do they allow us to say that persons having these characteristics will also have ethnic consciousness. Thus, it would be interesting to know what the influence of a person's occupation was on his ethnic identity while at the same time "holding constant" other influences, such as education and income. Or we may want to know how much of the "variance" in our dependent variable is attributable to the combined effects of age, income, religion, and education. While some of these techniques are fairly sophisticated, they are needed to gather accurate data on the composition of any given ethnic group, its self-identity and possible political or economic influences. SUMMARY Being of Slovak ancestry, my personal feeling is that Professor Novak has done a service in bringing to light the existence of these ethnic groups that are usually not recognized as having a unique cultural heritage and identity. They, indeed, constitute a large proportion of the American population. It is further accurate to say that these groups have contributed a large share to the building of this country. There is no denying this fact. My major objections to Professor Novak's thesis are as follows: 1) I am not truly convinced that there is a unique ethnic consciousness among the groups about which he is �SLOVAKIA 151 speaking. While indeed there may be, I do not believe it is a strong homogeneous force either within any particular group, or between the various groups. In either case, there is simply not enough information to support the thesis one way or the other. 2) While ethnic consciousness may be an important social and political force in the seventies, we do not have enough evidence as to what constitutes it. My own guess is that this "identity" may be merely a backlash reaction to certain groups of people who feel neglected and socially and economically exploited. Thas, the "identity" may be more a function of socioeconomic status than of a unique ethnic consciousness. I would venture to guess there are also many "non-ethnic" groups who are feeling the effects of exploitation. 3) What Professor Novak is describing is probably the pressures working class people are experiencing in tllis country, generally, while their ethnicity may be secondary. 4) Again, I believe the type of ethnic identity he mentions may be more strongly a function of those ethnic groups who maintain close geographical and language ties. But the rate of mobility (even the more limited mobility of blue-collar workers) is - such that the viability of these close-knit groups as centers of ethnic identity is open to question. 5) We have very little information as to the ethnic consciousness of those persons in the eighteen to twentyfive year age group. Here we may have outward "ethnic identification" in the sense of taking courses, let us say, concerning one's cultural background, but I am not convinced that this constitutes a unique "ethnic consciousness." And 6) I do not believe the seventy million Americans Novak mentions will constitute a viable political force based on ethnic lines alone. The political coalition, if indeed there ever is one, will develop probably along socioeconomic and perhaps ideological-religious lines. While being of Slovak heritage, being raised in a Slovak home, and having some limited facility in the language, I still do not see myself as having a unique "ethnic consciousness." While being subject to the "pressures" of professionalization, I do not feel that I have somehow �SLOVAKIA 152 lost my "true" ethnic identity. My Slovak heritage forms an important part of my cultural past, but it does not completely determine my immediate present. My Slovak background is important, but I do not feel this entitles me to become an Ethnic Everyman. REFERENCES 1) Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York : Macmillan, 1972). 2) William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Vols. I and II (New York: Dover, 19~). 3) Steven I. Miller, "Historical and Empirical Methods ·of Studying Slovak-Americans as a Distinct Ethnic Group," Slovakia, Vol. XXII, No. 45, pp. 116-124. 4) S. M. Miller, Max Weber (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), Ch. I. 5) Robert H. Ennis, Logic in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentioo-Hall, 1969), pp. 13-26. 6) Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1966), Chs. 4 and 5. 7) Milton M. Gordon, "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality," Daedalus, Vol. XC, No. 2 (Spring, 1961) and The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series, S-407, pp. 263-283. 8 ) Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New .York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1965), Ch. 2. 9) Emile Durkheim, "Suicide" in The Origins of Scientific Sociology, ed. by John Madge (New York: The Free Press, 1962) , pp. 17-51. 10) Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed. ; New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1957). 11) Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free Press, 1969), Chs. 3, 6, and 8. 12) Kerlinger, p. 39. 13) Ibid. 14) Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (2d ed.; New York : McGrawHill, 1972), Chs. 17, 18, and 19. N . B. An important volume in this area is Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1963) . � SLOVAKIA Dr. Steven I. M i l l e r : Ethnicity and Research SOME COMMENTS ON MICHAEL NOVAK'S THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS There has recently been an upsurge of thinking and writing in terms of ethnicity. The most recent, and perhaps one of the most persuasive, has been by the Slovak-American Michael Novak, in his volume, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics. 1 Novak's thesis is that there exists in America a large group of people that is of a unique ethnic background most likely Catholic, and generally "blue collar" or lower middle class. Novak contends that these groups made up of Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slovaks constitute an important and neglected segment of our population, who have been historically exploited by the WASPS and are now being identified as right-wing bigots. Novak contends that it is now time to recognize the unique identity and composition of these ethnic groups and, hopefully, mold them into a viable political force that reflects their national origins and religious preference. While Novak makes an important contribution to the ethnic literature, one often receives the impression while reading the book that something is lacking; that the ethnic concern is a springboard for certain personal ethical and political preferences. There is not, for instance, an in-depth investigation of any of the ethnic groups that is supposedly under study. For instance, no in-depth analysis is given of such a classic work as Thomas and Znaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. 2 Surely, these volumes would have provided some additional insight into the problem. What we have, rather, is a documented but largely anecdotal work purporting to penetrate into the "mysteries" of the ethnic psyche. And, yet, the work does at least bring about an awareness of the fact that ethnicity may be an important contemporary phenomenon. However, by emphasizing the �142 SLOVAKIA reality of ethnicity, Novak leaves unsolved as many issues as he raises. This is the result of several factors: 1) the general methodological approach of the work; 2) certain ambiguities in terms of definitions, and 3) a larger vision of the ethnic reality (if, indeed, there actually is one). These points will be elaborated on below. Again, the work is a very valuable one but it could have been considerably strengthened if some of these factors had been taken into consideration. Perhaps some of these considerations will more appropriately be explored in future works on the subject. METHODOLOGY AND ETHNIC STUDIES As I pointed out in a previous work,3 one of the crucial handicaps facing ethnic studies is the paucity of adequate methodology. More accurately, one could argue that the methodology is available but has not been utilized effectively in ethnic studies. What I am opting for is a more rigorous use of historiography and especially the extended use of social science methodology. It is only through good methodology that the study of ethnic groups ( and especially the ones cited by Novak), becomes systematized and incorporated at all levels of the educational process. Prof. Novak's methodological approach is, I believe, broadly historical. He indicates (xv) that he will approach the topic in terms of "systematic theology" and his personal label of "intelligent subjectivity." While the former definition is perhaps not well defined, I take the second (and equivalent definition of "intelligent subjectivity" to be somewhat akin to Max Weber's idea of verstehen4-although there are some crucial differences. However, one does not know by the context whether this type of methodological approach is implied. While this may be a minor point, it does have bearing on the shape and direction of the work. One of the major difficulties, however, lies in the structure of the argument itself. That is, there may be operating throughout the book a rather subtle logical fallacy that, by the way, plagues much of social science reasoning, also. The fallacy is called by logicians "the fallacy of affirming the consequent." 5 It involves valid and invalid forms of argument based on "conditionals" that havli the �SLOVAKIA 143 form "if p, then q." Thus, one of the basic arguments here runs something like this: "if there is a unique ethnic identity, then it is found in the existence of such groups as Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs. But such groups do exist; therefore, they must exhibit a unique ethnic consciousness." The fallacy being that the existence of any or all of these groups does not give us a basis for concluding the existence of some special identity or consciousness. Indeed, the existence of these groups would constitute a necessary condition for an ethnic consciousness, but surely, not a sufficient one. The important point here is that one then attempts to specify by way of evidence ( or the inductive process), the probability that some sort of meaningful relationship does in fact exist.6 While Professor Novak does, in part, fulfill this evidence condition, he does not extend it in any unique methodological fashion. For example, four propositions are set forth (pp. 8-9) that are supposedly associated with ethnic identity. The first two propositions imply the necessity of examining one's ethnic heritage to gain a deeper insight into one's (supposedly) psychological makeup; and that this enhanced self-awareness will do no harm to this country's vision of the world, in terms of foreign policy (although I must admit I fail to see how the second proposition follows from the first). The last two propositions, however, are the interesting ones since they are presumably direct effects of one's ethnic identity. Proposition three makes the claim that "persons who are secure in their identity act with greater freedom, greater flexibility, greater openness to others. People who feel inferior or unacceptable lash out in anger." Proposition four states "a politics based on family and neighborhood is far stronger socially and psychologically than a politics based on bureaucracy." Now these propositions are important in that they are the supposed consequences of ethnicity as studied through the perspective of "intelligent subjectivity." But if we examine the last two propositions, the question immediately arises as to whether the assertions are meant to be "causative" in nature or, perhaps, co,rrelational. It appears that they are put forth with the force �SLOVAKIA of causal statements: ethnic identity (consciousness) causes a healthier self-concept which in turn leads to (for instance) a unique kind of political commitment. These types of inferences are easily asserted but are substantiated with great difficulty. What is needed in these types of assertions, as we shall see, is either fairly strong historical evidence or, more pertinently, methods for operationalizing these assertions. In the same vein, Prof. Novak attempts to substantiate his thesis by claiming that the groups he is speaking of are identifiable on at least three characteristics: ethnicity, religion, and social class position (pp. 14, 20). This, of course, is an important assertion since it defines the characteristics of the population under study. Although there are presumably seventy million Americans who can be classified as Catholic, ethnic and within the $5,000$10,000 income range, this in itself does not mean that these people form a distinct group in terms of any of the three characteristics, let alone as being distinct in any political sense. There undoubtedly is a great deal of potential (economic, social, religious), but this does not mean it has become actualized in any specific manner. In addition, one would need much more specific information on this group before generalizations could be forwarded. What is the specific ethnic breakdown? What is the median income within any given group and between the groups? How many of each generation are in any given group? How are they distributed in any particular city? What is needed, then, is a more specific delineation of this large "ethnic group." Many other issues come to mind in this connection. Assuming that any given ethnic group can also be characterized as Catholic and having a median income of $8,000, is there any way in which these (and other) variables came together to produce the ethnic consciousness? Thus, it may be the case that Catholicism may be more important than ethnicity or income in predicting particular ethnic attitudes. Or it may be child rearing patterns or perhaps occupational structure. For instance, do third generation Poles who are middle class and Catholic, hold similar political attitudes as blue-collar Lutheran (or Catholic) Slovak~. �SLOVAKIA 145 It becomes readily obvious that what is needed is a more s ophisticated methodology to handle some of these problems. Likewise, Professor Novak's definition of an ethnic :group (pp. 47-48) is much too vague. One is not quite sure what an "historical memory" is to begin with, but the -concept is further confused by including nearly all things under the sun: instincts, feelings, intimacies, etc. It is difficult to see how some of these statements go beyond, for instance, Gordon's theory on assimilation in America. 7 The weakness in some of these assertions is that they may be perpetuating certain ethnic stereotypes under the guise of pointing out their uniqueness (p. 23). Does one really gain additional insight into ethnicity by stating that ethnic families have many family pictures in their homes and spend much of their free time with their families? Or such dangerous generalizations as "Jews and Italians we know are highly dramatic people. Their self-consciousness is different from that of other groups (p. 38)." This may be an indicator of the uniqueness of different forms of ethnic "consciousness," but it is rather difficult to see how. THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE OPERATIONALIZATION Returning to an earlier point, the real need in Prof. Novak's work is some attempt to operationalize his key assertions. That is, there should be some way to state more precisely those propositions that are central to the work and to imply some possible means of measuring them. 8 When one attempts to do this, it becomes clear that the issues under study are indeed of a very complex nature. This approach does not mean that if one tries to look at an issue (or a series of issues empirically, let us say from a social science point of view), that there is automatically a depersonalization of the group under study. There may be but this is not necessarily the case. In addition, if there is some "loss" in the sense that one cannot explore all the psychological complexities of any given group or individual, there is also a "gain" in that one can obtain more precise information on the group and use this information as a stepping stone to further research. �146 SLOVAKIA Now, indeed, this approach to ethnicity is a consequence of certain WASP connected attitudes about "universality'' and professionalization, but I hardly believe this is the case. What social science research attempts to do (sometimes with poor results) is to precisely rid people of certain stereotypic notions (let us say about ethnicity) that have been prevalent for too long. Conversely' social science research can bring to light the uniqueness of any given group. There are, for example, certain important conceptual clarifications that Professor Novak should have addressed. himself to. One, first of all, would like some additional clarification as to the nature of "ethnic consciousness." If it is postulated as being important, and a causal factor in the development of other conditions (i.e., political power), then it should be capable of operationalization. How does one know if one has it? Do some groups have it more than others? Does it differ in terms of social clas5 differences, for instance? These are not moot questions. Rather, they must be answered if one is to make a case for ethnic consciousness. There are other statements that are in need of clarification which are also premised on the existence of this ethnic consciousness. For instance, the statement, "the rise of ethnic consciousness today is also due to disillusionment with the universality, too thinly rational culture of professional elites (p. 32)." And again, "the rise in ethnic consciousness is, then, part of a more general cultural revolution (p. 32)." How is one to determine the relationship in the first statement between one's ethnic consciousness and the disillusionment with professional elites? There may indeed be such a relationship but the context does not clarify it, nor the possible strength of the relationship. In the second statement, it is asserted that there is some type of a relationship between ethnic consciousness and the more "general cultural revolution" (whatever that might be). In this instance, however, some directionality is implied: ethnic consciousness seems to be the result, or perhaps the by-product, of some larger cultural transformation. This may, once more, be the case but it would be extremely helpful if one could place such a statement in a broader �SLOVAKIA 147 theoretical framework; perhaps the work of Emile Durkheim,9 or Robert K. Merton's reference group theory. 10 Without a general theoretical framework, it becomes increasingly difficult to place the above statement into any type of meaningful categorization. Although the issue of theory building is very pertinent to the discussion, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 11 RESEARCH DESIGNS AND ETHNIC STUDIES One possible way of gaining important information related to the study of ethnic groups would be to con-ceptualize the problem in another way. Again, this would be an alternative method of looking at some of the claims forwarded by Professor Novak. An important preliminary step would be to state an initial dependent variable. The -dependent variable is the condition we are trying to .explain.12 It is the issue we are interested in examining, -explaining, and possibly predicting from. The independent variable, on the other hand, is the presumed "cause" of the dependent variable. 13 What we should then be looking for would be the relationship of the dependent variable(s) with the independent variable(s). If some relationship does exist, we can then better attempt to explain these hypotheses under investigation. In a broad sense, the dependent variable here would be "ethnic consciousness." It is this factor or condition that we wish to account for as accurately as possible, because the assumption is that this condition is now responsible for many other conditions. But what is necessary to give added meaning to this concept? One would, first of all, attempt to define more precisely with some such statement as, "Ethnic consciousness is a psychological state X, resulting from Y and exhibited in certain types of behavior pattern in group Z." However, even if a definition of this type is possible, one is still under the obligation t o give supporting evidence for it. One way of providing for this supporting evidence is to first operationalize (measure) the concept. And this is where the task now becomes increasingly difficult. Put very �148 SLOVAKIA simply, how can one get a measure of ethnic consciousnes s? (We are not even asking at this point if there are differing degrees or amounts of it.) What would be needed, then, is the creation of some type of instrument that gives an indication of this attribute. We might, for example devise a test that would measure conservative or liberal, democratic or authoritarian political attitudes, and then infer that those scoring "high" on, let us say, the democratic dimension would also be exhibiting "ethnic consciousnes s." (We are presumably administering the instrument to some ethnic group.) Of course, ethnic consciousnes s could conceivably be indicated by a large number of factors individually, or several kinds of factors. collectively. However, the issue is finally settled, it must be done for the research to proceed. The same issues are brought to the fore when one attempts to identify and specify the independent variable(s). Thus the rise of ethnic consciousnes s may be directly related to 1) anemic strain within institutions; 2) increasing displeasure with bureaucratic means of doing things; and 3) the decrease or increase of religious commitment and so forth. If one, for example, indicates that the rise in ethnic consciousnes s is related to increasing bureaucratic complexity, then some means must be devised to conceptualize bureaucratic structures (and then relate them to ethnic consciousnes s). To do this, one would have to specify, first of all, the organizationa l level that may be important. Are we speaking of bureaucracy in general, in society, or bureaucratic organization in terms of higher education and its effects on blocking admission to ethnic groups. or some other sense of bureaucracy? One would also have to assume that there is some way of measuring this bureaucratic effect. THE STUDY OF SLOVAKS Let us now assume that we would want to test Prof. Novak's thesis concerning the rise of ethnic consciousnes s. How could one go about doing this? The problem becomes highly complex in studying one group. It would be a monu- �SLOVAKIA 149 mental task to study the remaining ethnic groups either cross-sectionally ( at one point in time), or longitudinally ( over a period of time). Let us delineate our problem, however, to studying the Slovaks, let us say, in Chicago. Let us further assume that we have developed a reliable and valid instrument that we can use as a measure of ethnic consciousness. The problem then would have to be approached in somewhat the following manner: 1. We would have to · specify the population under study. Presumably, we would want to look at native-born Slovaks, as well as second and third generation Slovaks. However, difficulties soon arise: if both of your grandparents were Slovaks, but your father was Slovak and your mother Irish, do we include you in the population as a Slovak? Some de.c ision would have to be reached on matters or definition such as this. 2. We would want a breakdown demographically of where Slovaks resided in Chicago. This information might be easily obtained for some native-born Slovaks and their children, but others would have to be located if we were to have a representative sample. Other information would then have to be gathered: importantly the age range of Slovaks and how many within certain age groups; other valuable information would include educational background, occupation, place of residence, income level, religious preference, and so on. This demographic data would be a vital first step in describing the nature of our population. Depending on the size of the population, decisions would have to be made a5 to the most appropriate sampling techniques and the best methods of obtaining this information, i. e., questionnaires, interviews, a combination of these. 3. Assuming these conditions could be met, there have been developed within the social sciences certain rather powerful statistical techniques that could be utilized in developing this type of analysis. We would want to, for instance, use certain correlation techniques to explore the nature and strength of certain relationship. We would �150 SLOVAKIA want to see if ethnic consciousness is related to certain other factors such as education level, occupation, income, religion, and so forth. Again, we would want to see how "strong" these relationships were. We would also want to examine these factors within certain age groups, for instance, or between males and females. Other techniques could be brought to bear on the problem, namely, those statistical manipulations which include regression analysis, partial and multiple correlation.14 For example, if Slovaks in the thirty-five to fifty age group scored "high" on ethnic consciousness, and if these scores correlated positively with education, religion and income, we might want to ask if any of these variables are more "important" than the others; or how well, if taken together, do they allow us to say that persons having these characteristics will also have ethnic consciousness. Thus, it would be interesting to know what the influence of a person's occupation was on his ethnic identity while at the same time "holding constant" other influences, such as education and income. Or we may want to know how much of the "variance" in our dependent variable is attributable to the combined effects of age, income, religion, and education. While some of these techniques are fairly sophisticated, they are needed to gather accurate data on the composition of any given ethnic group, its self-identity and possible political or economic influences. SUMMARY Being of Slovak ancestry, my personal feeling is that Professor Novak has done a service in bringing to light the existence of these ethnic groups that are usually not recognized as having a unique cultural heritage and identity. They, indeed, constitute a large proportion of the American population. It is further accurate to say that these groups have contributed a large share to the building of this country. There is no denying this fact. My major objections to Professor Novak's thesis are as follows: 1) I am not truly convinced that there is a unique ethnic consciousness among the groups about which he is �SLOVAKIA 151 speaking. While indeed there may be, I do not believe it is a strong homogeneous force either within any particular group, or between the various groups. In either case, there is simply not enough information to support the thesis one way or the other. 2) While ethnic consciousness may be an important social and political force in the seventies, we do not have enough evidence as to what constitutes it. My own guess is that this "identity" may be merely a backlash reaction to certain groups of people who feel neglected and socially and economically exploited. Thas, the "identity" may be more a function of socioeconomic status than of a unique ethnic consciousness. I would venture to guess there are also many "non-ethnic" groups who are feeling the effects of exploitation. 3) What Professor Novak is describing is probably the pressures working class people are experiencing in tllis country, generally, while their ethnicity may be secondary. 4) Again, I believe the type of ethnic identity he mentions may be more strongly a function of those ethnic groups who maintain close geographical and language ties. But the rate of mobility (even the more limited mobility of blue-collar workers) is - such that the viability of these close-knit groups as centers of ethnic identity is open to question. 5) We have very little information as to the ethnic consciousness of those persons in the eighteen to twentyfive year age group. Here we may have outward "ethnic identification" in the sense of taking courses, let us say, concerning one's cultural background, but I am not convinced that this constitutes a unique "ethnic consciousness." And 6) I do not believe the seventy million Americans Novak mentions will constitute a viable political force based on ethnic lines alone. The political coalition, if indeed there ever is one, will develop probably along socioeconomic and perhaps ideological-religious lines. While being of Slovak heritage, being raised in a Slovak home, and having some limited facility in the language, I still do not see myself as having a unique "ethnic consciousness." While being subject to the "pressures" of professionalization, I do not feel that I have somehow �SLOVAKIA 152 lost my "true" ethnic identity. My Slovak heritage forms an important part of my cultural past, but it does not completely determine my immediate present. My Slovak background is important, but I do not feel this entitles me to become an Ethnic Everyman. REFERENCES 1) Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York : Macmillan, 1972). 2) William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Vols. I and II (New York: Dover, 19~). 3) Steven I. Miller, "Historical and Empirical Methods ·of Studying Slovak-Americans as a Distinct Ethnic Group," Slovakia, Vol. XXII, No. 45, pp. 116-124. 4) S. M. Miller, Max Weber (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), Ch. I. 5) Robert H. Ennis, Logic in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentioo-Hall, 1969), pp. 13-26. 6) Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1966), Chs. 4 and 5. 7) Milton M. Gordon, "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality," Daedalus, Vol. XC, No. 2 (Spring, 1961) and The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series, S-407, pp. 263-283. 8 ) Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New .York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1965), Ch. 2. 9) Emile Durkheim, "Suicide" in The Origins of Scientific Sociology, ed. by John Madge (New York: The Free Press, 1962) , pp. 17-51. 10) Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed. ; New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1957). 11) Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free Press, 1969), Chs. 3, 6, and 8. 12) Kerlinger, p. 39. 13) Ibid. 14) Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (2d ed.; New York : McGrawHill, 1972), Chs. 17, 18, and 19. N . B. An important volume in this area is Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1963) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Dr. Steven I. M i l l e r : Ethnicity and Research SOME COMMENTS ON MICHAEL NOVAK'S THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS There has recently been an upsurge of thinking and writing in terms of ethnicity. The most recent, and perhaps one of the most persuasive, has been by the Slovak-American Michael Novak, in his volume, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics. 1 Novak's thesis is that there exists in America a large group of people that is of a unique ethnic background most likely Catholic, and generally "blue collar" or lower middle class. Novak contends that these groups made up of Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slovaks constitute an important and neglected segment of our population, who have been historically exploited by the WASPS and are now being identified as right-wing bigots. Novak contends that it is now time to recognize the unique identity and composition of these ethnic groups and, hopefully, mold them into a viable political force that reflects their national origins and religious preference. While Novak makes an important contribution to the ethnic literature, one often receives the impression while reading the book that something is lacking; that the ethnic concern is a springboard for certain personal ethical and political preferences. There is not, for instance, an in-depth investigation of any of the ethnic groups that is supposedly under study. For instance, no in-depth analysis is given of such a classic work as Thomas and Znaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. 2 Surely, these volumes would have provided some additional insight into the problem. What we have, rather, is a documented but largely anecdotal work purporting to penetrate into the "mysteries" of the ethnic psyche. And, yet, the work does at least bring about an awareness of the fact that ethnicity may be an important contemporary phenomenon. However, by emphasizing the 142 SLOVAKIA reality of ethnicity, Novak leaves unsolved as many issues as he raises. This is the result of several factors: 1) the general methodological approach of the work; 2) certain ambiguities in terms of definitions, and 3) a larger vision of the ethnic reality (if, indeed, there actually is one). These points will be elaborated on below. Again, the work is a very valuable one but it could have been considerably strengthened if some of these factors had been taken into consideration. Perhaps some of these considerations will more appropriately be explored in future works on the subject. METHODOLOGY AND ETHNIC STUDIES As I pointed out in a previous work,3 one of the crucial handicaps facing ethnic studies is the paucity of adequate methodology. More accurately, one could argue that the methodology is available but has not been utilized effectively in ethnic studies. What I am opting for is a more rigorous use of historiography and especially the extended use of social science methodology. It is only through good methodology that the study of ethnic groups ( and especially the ones cited by Novak), becomes systematized and incorporated at all levels of the educational process. Prof. Novak's methodological approach is, I believe, broadly historical. He indicates (xv) that he will approach the topic in terms of "systematic theology" and his personal label of "intelligent subjectivity." While the former definition is perhaps not well defined, I take the second (and equivalent definition of "intelligent subjectivity" to be somewhat akin to Max Weber's idea of verstehen4-although there are some crucial differences. However, one does not know by the context whether this type of methodological approach is implied. While this may be a minor point, it does have bearing on the shape and direction of the work. One of the major difficulties, however, lies in the structure of the argument itself. That is, there may be operating throughout the book a rather subtle logical fallacy that, by the way, plagues much of social science reasoning, also. The fallacy is called by logicians "the fallacy of affirming the consequent." 5 It involves valid and invalid forms of argument based on "conditionals" that havli the SLOVAKIA 143 form "if p, then q." Thus, one of the basic arguments here runs something like this: "if there is a unique ethnic identity, then it is found in the existence of such groups as Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs. But such groups do exist; therefore, they must exhibit a unique ethnic consciousness." The fallacy being that the existence of any or all of these groups does not give us a basis for concluding the existence of some special identity or consciousness. Indeed, the existence of these groups would constitute a necessary condition for an ethnic consciousness, but surely, not a sufficient one. The important point here is that one then attempts to specify by way of evidence ( or the inductive process), the probability that some sort of meaningful relationship does in fact exist.6 While Professor Novak does, in part, fulfill this evidence condition, he does not extend it in any unique methodological fashion. For example, four propositions are set forth (pp. 8-9) that are supposedly associated with ethnic identity. The first two propositions imply the necessity of examining one's ethnic heritage to gain a deeper insight into one's (supposedly) psychological makeup; and that this enhanced self-awareness will do no harm to this country's vision of the world, in terms of foreign policy (although I must admit I fail to see how the second proposition follows from the first). The last two propositions, however, are the interesting ones since they are presumably direct effects of one's ethnic identity. Proposition three makes the claim that "persons who are secure in their identity act with greater freedom, greater flexibility, greater openness to others. People who feel inferior or unacceptable lash out in anger." Proposition four states "a politics based on family and neighborhood is far stronger socially and psychologically than a politics based on bureaucracy." Now these propositions are important in that they are the supposed consequences of ethnicity as studied through the perspective of "intelligent subjectivity." But if we examine the last two propositions, the question immediately arises as to whether the assertions are meant to be "causative" in nature or, perhaps, co,rrelational. It appears that they are put forth with the force SLOVAKIA of causal statements: ethnic identity (consciousness) causes a healthier self-concept which in turn leads to (for instance) a unique kind of political commitment. These types of inferences are easily asserted but are substantiated with great difficulty. What is needed in these types of assertions, as we shall see, is either fairly strong historical evidence or, more pertinently, methods for operationalizing these assertions. In the same vein, Prof. Novak attempts to substantiate his thesis by claiming that the groups he is speaking of are identifiable on at least three characteristics: ethnicity, religion, and social class position (pp. 14, 20). This, of course, is an important assertion since it defines the characteristics of the population under study. Although there are presumably seventy million Americans who can be classified as Catholic, ethnic and within the $5,000$10,000 income range, this in itself does not mean that these people form a distinct group in terms of any of the three characteristics, let alone as being distinct in any political sense. There undoubtedly is a great deal of potential (economic, social, religious), but this does not mean it has become actualized in any specific manner. In addition, one would need much more specific information on this group before generalizations could be forwarded. What is the specific ethnic breakdown? What is the median income within any given group and between the groups? How many of each generation are in any given group? How are they distributed in any particular city? What is needed, then, is a more specific delineation of this large "ethnic group." Many other issues come to mind in this connection. Assuming that any given ethnic group can also be characterized as Catholic and having a median income of $8,000, is there any way in which these (and other) variables came together to produce the ethnic consciousness? Thus, it may be the case that Catholicism may be more important than ethnicity or income in predicting particular ethnic attitudes. Or it may be child rearing patterns or perhaps occupational structure. For instance, do third generation Poles who are middle class and Catholic, hold similar political attitudes as blue-collar Lutheran (or Catholic) Slovak~. SLOVAKIA 145 It becomes readily obvious that what is needed is a more s ophisticated methodology to handle some of these problems. Likewise, Professor Novak's definition of an ethnic :group (pp. 47-48) is much too vague. One is not quite sure what an "historical memory" is to begin with, but the -concept is further confused by including nearly all things under the sun: instincts, feelings, intimacies, etc. It is difficult to see how some of these statements go beyond, for instance, Gordon's theory on assimilation in America. 7 The weakness in some of these assertions is that they may be perpetuating certain ethnic stereotypes under the guise of pointing out their uniqueness (p. 23). Does one really gain additional insight into ethnicity by stating that ethnic families have many family pictures in their homes and spend much of their free time with their families? Or such dangerous generalizations as "Jews and Italians we know are highly dramatic people. Their self-consciousness is different from that of other groups (p. 38)." This may be an indicator of the uniqueness of different forms of ethnic "consciousness," but it is rather difficult to see how. THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE OPERATIONALIZATION Returning to an earlier point, the real need in Prof. Novak's work is some attempt to operationalize his key assertions. That is, there should be some way to state more precisely those propositions that are central to the work and to imply some possible means of measuring them. 8 When one attempts to do this, it becomes clear that the issues under study are indeed of a very complex nature. This approach does not mean that if one tries to look at an issue (or a series of issues empirically, let us say from a social science point of view), that there is automatically a depersonalization of the group under study. There may be but this is not necessarily the case. In addition, if there is some "loss" in the sense that one cannot explore all the psychological complexities of any given group or individual, there is also a "gain" in that one can obtain more precise information on the group and use this information as a stepping stone to further research. 146 SLOVAKIA Now, indeed, this approach to ethnicity is a consequence of certain WASP connected attitudes about "universality'' and professionalization, but I hardly believe this is the case. What social science research attempts to do (sometimes with poor results) is to precisely rid people of certain stereotypic notions (let us say about ethnicity) that have been prevalent for too long. Conversely' social science research can bring to light the uniqueness of any given group. There are, for example, certain important conceptual clarifications that Professor Novak should have addressed. himself to. One, first of all, would like some additional clarification as to the nature of "ethnic consciousness." If it is postulated as being important, and a causal factor in the development of other conditions (i.e., political power), then it should be capable of operationalization. How does one know if one has it? Do some groups have it more than others? Does it differ in terms of social clas5 differences, for instance? These are not moot questions. Rather, they must be answered if one is to make a case for ethnic consciousness. There are other statements that are in need of clarification which are also premised on the existence of this ethnic consciousness. For instance, the statement, "the rise of ethnic consciousness today is also due to disillusionment with the universality, too thinly rational culture of professional elites (p. 32)." And again, "the rise in ethnic consciousness is, then, part of a more general cultural revolution (p. 32)." How is one to determine the relationship in the first statement between one's ethnic consciousness and the disillusionment with professional elites? There may indeed be such a relationship but the context does not clarify it, nor the possible strength of the relationship. In the second statement, it is asserted that there is some type of a relationship between ethnic consciousness and the more "general cultural revolution" (whatever that might be). In this instance, however, some directionality is implied: ethnic consciousness seems to be the result, or perhaps the by-product, of some larger cultural transformation. This may, once more, be the case but it would be extremely helpful if one could place such a statement in a broader SLOVAKIA 147 theoretical framework; perhaps the work of Emile Durkheim,9 or Robert K. Merton's reference group theory. 10 Without a general theoretical framework, it becomes increasingly difficult to place the above statement into any type of meaningful categorization. Although the issue of theory building is very pertinent to the discussion, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 11 RESEARCH DESIGNS AND ETHNIC STUDIES One possible way of gaining important information related to the study of ethnic groups would be to con-ceptualize the problem in another way. Again, this would be an alternative method of looking at some of the claims forwarded by Professor Novak. An important preliminary step would be to state an initial dependent variable. The -dependent variable is the condition we are trying to .explain.12 It is the issue we are interested in examining, -explaining, and possibly predicting from. The independent variable, on the other hand, is the presumed "cause" of the dependent variable. 13 What we should then be looking for would be the relationship of the dependent variable(s) with the independent variable(s). If some relationship does exist, we can then better attempt to explain these hypotheses under investigation. In a broad sense, the dependent variable here would be "ethnic consciousness." It is this factor or condition that we wish to account for as accurately as possible, because the assumption is that this condition is now responsible for many other conditions. But what is necessary to give added meaning to this concept? One would, first of all, attempt to define more precisely with some such statement as, "Ethnic consciousness is a psychological state X, resulting from Y and exhibited in certain types of behavior pattern in group Z." However, even if a definition of this type is possible, one is still under the obligation t o give supporting evidence for it. One way of providing for this supporting evidence is to first operationalize (measure) the concept. And this is where the task now becomes increasingly difficult. Put very 148 SLOVAKIA simply, how can one get a measure of ethnic consciousnes s? (We are not even asking at this point if there are differing degrees or amounts of it.) What would be needed, then, is the creation of some type of instrument that gives an indication of this attribute. We might, for example devise a test that would measure conservative or liberal, democratic or authoritarian political attitudes, and then infer that those scoring "high" on, let us say, the democratic dimension would also be exhibiting "ethnic consciousnes s." (We are presumably administering the instrument to some ethnic group.) Of course, ethnic consciousnes s could conceivably be indicated by a large number of factors individually, or several kinds of factors. collectively. However, the issue is finally settled, it must be done for the research to proceed. The same issues are brought to the fore when one attempts to identify and specify the independent variable(s). Thus the rise of ethnic consciousnes s may be directly related to 1) anemic strain within institutions; 2) increasing displeasure with bureaucratic means of doing things; and 3) the decrease or increase of religious commitment and so forth. If one, for example, indicates that the rise in ethnic consciousnes s is related to increasing bureaucratic complexity, then some means must be devised to conceptualize bureaucratic structures (and then relate them to ethnic consciousnes s). To do this, one would have to specify, first of all, the organizationa l level that may be important. Are we speaking of bureaucracy in general, in society, or bureaucratic organization in terms of higher education and its effects on blocking admission to ethnic groups. or some other sense of bureaucracy? One would also have to assume that there is some way of measuring this bureaucratic effect. THE STUDY OF SLOVAKS Let us now assume that we would want to test Prof. Novak's thesis concerning the rise of ethnic consciousnes s. How could one go about doing this? The problem becomes highly complex in studying one group. It would be a monu- SLOVAKIA 149 mental task to study the remaining ethnic groups either cross-sectionally ( at one point in time), or longitudinally ( over a period of time). Let us delineate our problem, however, to studying the Slovaks, let us say, in Chicago. Let us further assume that we have developed a reliable and valid instrument that we can use as a measure of ethnic consciousness. The problem then would have to be approached in somewhat the following manner: 1. We would have to · specify the population under study. Presumably, we would want to look at native-born Slovaks, as well as second and third generation Slovaks. However, difficulties soon arise: if both of your grandparents were Slovaks, but your father was Slovak and your mother Irish, do we include you in the population as a Slovak? Some de.c ision would have to be reached on matters or definition such as this. 2. We would want a breakdown demographically of where Slovaks resided in Chicago. This information might be easily obtained for some native-born Slovaks and their children, but others would have to be located if we were to have a representative sample. Other information would then have to be gathered: importantly the age range of Slovaks and how many within certain age groups; other valuable information would include educational background, occupation, place of residence, income level, religious preference, and so on. This demographic data would be a vital first step in describing the nature of our population. Depending on the size of the population, decisions would have to be made a5 to the most appropriate sampling techniques and the best methods of obtaining this information, i. e., questionnaires, interviews, a combination of these. 3. Assuming these conditions could be met, there have been developed within the social sciences certain rather powerful statistical techniques that could be utilized in developing this type of analysis. We would want to, for instance, use certain correlation techniques to explore the nature and strength of certain relationship. We would 150 SLOVAKIA want to see if ethnic consciousness is related to certain other factors such as education level, occupation, income, religion, and so forth. Again, we would want to see how "strong" these relationships were. We would also want to examine these factors within certain age groups, for instance, or between males and females. Other techniques could be brought to bear on the problem, namely, those statistical manipulations which include regression analysis, partial and multiple correlation.14 For example, if Slovaks in the thirty-five to fifty age group scored "high" on ethnic consciousness, and if these scores correlated positively with education, religion and income, we might want to ask if any of these variables are more "important" than the others; or how well, if taken together, do they allow us to say that persons having these characteristics will also have ethnic consciousness. Thus, it would be interesting to know what the influence of a person's occupation was on his ethnic identity while at the same time "holding constant" other influences, such as education and income. Or we may want to know how much of the "variance" in our dependent variable is attributable to the combined effects of age, income, religion, and education. While some of these techniques are fairly sophisticated, they are needed to gather accurate data on the composition of any given ethnic group, its self-identity and possible political or economic influences. SUMMARY Being of Slovak ancestry, my personal feeling is that Professor Novak has done a service in bringing to light the existence of these ethnic groups that are usually not recognized as having a unique cultural heritage and identity. They, indeed, constitute a large proportion of the American population. It is further accurate to say that these groups have contributed a large share to the building of this country. There is no denying this fact. My major objections to Professor Novak's thesis are as follows: 1) I am not truly convinced that there is a unique ethnic consciousness among the groups about which he is SLOVAKIA 151 speaking. While indeed there may be, I do not believe it is a strong homogeneous force either within any particular group, or between the various groups. In either case, there is simply not enough information to support the thesis one way or the other. 2) While ethnic consciousness may be an important social and political force in the seventies, we do not have enough evidence as to what constitutes it. My own guess is that this "identity" may be merely a backlash reaction to certain groups of people who feel neglected and socially and economically exploited. Thas, the "identity" may be more a function of socioeconomic status than of a unique ethnic consciousness. I would venture to guess there are also many "non-ethnic" groups who are feeling the effects of exploitation. 3) What Professor Novak is describing is probably the pressures working class people are experiencing in tllis country, generally, while their ethnicity may be secondary. 4) Again, I believe the type of ethnic identity he mentions may be more strongly a function of those ethnic groups who maintain close geographical and language ties. But the rate of mobility (even the more limited mobility of blue-collar workers) is - such that the viability of these close-knit groups as centers of ethnic identity is open to question. 5) We have very little information as to the ethnic consciousness of those persons in the eighteen to twentyfive year age group. Here we may have outward "ethnic identification" in the sense of taking courses, let us say, concerning one's cultural background, but I am not convinced that this constitutes a unique "ethnic consciousness." And 6) I do not believe the seventy million Americans Novak mentions will constitute a viable political force based on ethnic lines alone. The political coalition, if indeed there ever is one, will develop probably along socioeconomic and perhaps ideological-religious lines. While being of Slovak heritage, being raised in a Slovak home, and having some limited facility in the language, I still do not see myself as having a unique "ethnic consciousness." While being subject to the "pressures" of professionalization, I do not feel that I have somehow SLOVAKIA 152 lost my "true" ethnic identity. My Slovak heritage forms an important part of my cultural past, but it does not completely determine my immediate present. My Slovak background is important, but I do not feel this entitles me to become an Ethnic Everyman. REFERENCES 1) Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York : Macmillan, 1972). 2) William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Vols. I and II (New York: Dover, 19~). 3) Steven I. Miller, "Historical and Empirical Methods ·of Studying Slovak-Americans as a Distinct Ethnic Group," Slovakia, Vol. XXII, No. 45, pp. 116-124. 4) S. M. Miller, Max Weber (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), Ch. I. 5) Robert H. Ennis, Logic in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentioo-Hall, 1969), pp. 13-26. 6) Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1966), Chs. 4 and 5. 7) Milton M. Gordon, "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality," Daedalus, Vol. XC, No. 2 (Spring, 1961) and The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series, S-407, pp. 263-283. 8 ) Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New .York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1965), Ch. 2. 9) Emile Durkheim, "Suicide" in The Origins of Scientific Sociology, ed. by John Madge (New York: The Free Press, 1962) , pp. 17-51. 10) Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed. ; New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1957). 11) Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free Press, 1969), Chs. 3, 6, and 8. 12) Kerlinger, p. 39. 13) Ibid. 14) Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (2d ed.; New York : McGrawHill, 1972), Chs. 17, 18, and 19. N . B. An important volume in this area is Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1963) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Ethnicity and Research Description An account of the resource Dr. Steven I. Miller Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 141-152 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Miller, Steven I. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/502fb4d5b5c80fb99d377f160300963a.pdf 286946a1c4f4e21d86360ffb11a028dc PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 153 Ethnics Work Hard Msgr. James T. Mc Hugh Back in the early 60s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan maintained that ethnicity would continue to play an important part in the social organization of New York City. They focused on the Black and Puerto Rican ascendancy and probably did not foresee the present emphasis on ethnic individualism as it now exists. With the 70s, national and ethnic origin matters-even if it goes back to great grand-parents. But the lines are fudged. It's hard to distinguish ethnic groups from middle Americans, blue-collar workers, lower socio-economic groups. And Spanish-surnamed Americans, though the largest immigrant group with a different language, actually comprise four or more distinct groups. However, following Robert Hill's analysis of the strengths of the black family, it's important to take a look at the family life of ethnics, middle Americans and Spanishspeaking groups. The criteria chosen by Hill are generally applicable, and the description can be drawn from the more popularly written description of the new ethnic Americans. First of all, ethnic families show a strong sense of kinship. Family unity, family relatedness and inter-family cooperation show up clearly. Mike Novak, in the Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics tells us that ethnics spend most of their free time with their families, and that many visit their parents at least once a week. Novak also maintains that ethnics tend to have relatives as best friends. Weddings-and wakes-are family reunions. Ethnics also tend to help each other. There's always a cousin or uncle who is a plumber, a couple of relatives to help paint the house, a brother-in-law who knows about cars. And the special jobs are taken care of on the weekends at minimal expense. �154 SLOVAKIA Strong work orientation seems almost to be the lifeblood of ethnics. Robert Coles captures this in his book on the middle-Americans. In his own style-accompanied by photographs by Jon Erikson-Coles has the people speak out. Joe and Doris-a typical couple-don't have too much time to waste. Joe works almost all the time-at his regular job and at second jobs that he always has. Doris is busy with the house and children. Increasingly, middle American wives are taking jobs outside the home, and many of them give willingly to help the school, the church or the community. Middle Americans and ethnics reject the welfare state-and are much more determined to work than accept money from the government. They believe "that it's not right that a man shouldn't be able to earn a living for his family." There may be more rigidity in regard to rules and tasks in ethnic and middle American families, but this doesn't seem to weaken the family structure. Children are expected to perform some tasks, and teen-agers have generally been given a good degree of responsibility. It seems that role expectations of the young have broken down with the move to the suburbs. There's a strong emphasis on achievement, but much of the expectation is tranferred to children. Ethnic and middle Americans find their jobs boring and uncertain, and they hope to educate their children so that they won't be trapped in a dead-end job. Police and firemen-who once enjoyed status-are made the scapegoats for society's problems, and take a disproportionate measure of criticism from the nouveau riche. But most of the police and other civil servants are people of integrity, and do receive some recognition and praise from neighbors and friends. Religious tradition runs hand in hand with ethnic traditions, though the young are less dedicated to any type of tradition. But the family engenders regular religious practice, and the Catholic school-which serves ethnics and middle Americans-tends to strengthen religious identification. Yet, the schools themselves are undergoing an identity crisis and the erosion is beginning to show through. �SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. � SLOVAKIA 153 Ethnics Work Hard Msgr. James T. Mc Hugh Back in the early 60s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan maintained that ethnicity would continue to play an important part in the social organization of New York City. They focused on the Black and Puerto Rican ascendancy and probably did not foresee the present emphasis on ethnic individualism as it now exists. With the 70s, national and ethnic origin matters-even if it goes back to great grand-parents. But the lines are fudged. It's hard to distinguish ethnic groups from middle Americans, blue-collar workers, lower socio-economic groups. And Spanish-surnamed Americans, though the largest immigrant group with a different language, actually comprise four or more distinct groups. However, following Robert Hill's analysis of the strengths of the black family, it's important to take a look at the family life of ethnics, middle Americans and Spanishspeaking groups. The criteria chosen by Hill are generally applicable, and the description can be drawn from the more popularly written description of the new ethnic Americans. First of all, ethnic families show a strong sense of kinship. Family unity, family relatedness and inter-family cooperation show up clearly. Mike Novak, in the Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics tells us that ethnics spend most of their free time with their families, and that many visit their parents at least once a week. Novak also maintains that ethnics tend to have relatives as best friends. Weddings-and wakes-are family reunions. Ethnics also tend to help each other. There's always a cousin or uncle who is a plumber, a couple of relatives to help paint the house, a brother-in-law who knows about cars. And the special jobs are taken care of on the weekends at minimal expense. �154 SLOVAKIA Strong work orientation seems almost to be the lifeblood of ethnics. Robert Coles captures this in his book on the middle-Americans. In his own style-accompanied by photographs by Jon Erikson-Coles has the people speak out. Joe and Doris-a typical couple-don't have too much time to waste. Joe works almost all the time-at his regular job and at second jobs that he always has. Doris is busy with the house and children. Increasingly, middle American wives are taking jobs outside the home, and many of them give willingly to help the school, the church or the community. Middle Americans and ethnics reject the welfare state-and are much more determined to work than accept money from the government. They believe "that it's not right that a man shouldn't be able to earn a living for his family." There may be more rigidity in regard to rules and tasks in ethnic and middle American families, but this doesn't seem to weaken the family structure. Children are expected to perform some tasks, and teen-agers have generally been given a good degree of responsibility. It seems that role expectations of the young have broken down with the move to the suburbs. There's a strong emphasis on achievement, but much of the expectation is tranferred to children. Ethnic and middle Americans find their jobs boring and uncertain, and they hope to educate their children so that they won't be trapped in a dead-end job. Police and firemen-who once enjoyed status-are made the scapegoats for society's problems, and take a disproportionate measure of criticism from the nouveau riche. But most of the police and other civil servants are people of integrity, and do receive some recognition and praise from neighbors and friends. Religious tradition runs hand in hand with ethnic traditions, though the young are less dedicated to any type of tradition. But the family engenders regular religious practice, and the Catholic school-which serves ethnics and middle Americans-tends to strengthen religious identification. Yet, the schools themselves are undergoing an identity crisis and the erosion is beginning to show through. �SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 153 Ethnics Work Hard Msgr. James T. Mc Hugh Back in the early 60s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan maintained that ethnicity would continue to play an important part in the social organization of New York City. They focused on the Black and Puerto Rican ascendancy and probably did not foresee the present emphasis on ethnic individualism as it now exists. With the 70s, national and ethnic origin matters-even if it goes back to great grand-parents. But the lines are fudged. It's hard to distinguish ethnic groups from middle Americans, blue-collar workers, lower socio-economic groups. And Spanish-surnamed Americans, though the largest immigrant group with a different language, actually comprise four or more distinct groups. However, following Robert Hill's analysis of the strengths of the black family, it's important to take a look at the family life of ethnics, middle Americans and Spanishspeaking groups. The criteria chosen by Hill are generally applicable, and the description can be drawn from the more popularly written description of the new ethnic Americans. First of all, ethnic families show a strong sense of kinship. Family unity, family relatedness and inter-family cooperation show up clearly. Mike Novak, in the Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics tells us that ethnics spend most of their free time with their families, and that many visit their parents at least once a week. Novak also maintains that ethnics tend to have relatives as best friends. Weddings-and wakes-are family reunions. Ethnics also tend to help each other. There's always a cousin or uncle who is a plumber, a couple of relatives to help paint the house, a brother-in-law who knows about cars. And the special jobs are taken care of on the weekends at minimal expense. 154 SLOVAKIA Strong work orientation seems almost to be the lifeblood of ethnics. Robert Coles captures this in his book on the middle-Americans. In his own style-accompanied by photographs by Jon Erikson-Coles has the people speak out. Joe and Doris-a typical couple-don't have too much time to waste. Joe works almost all the time-at his regular job and at second jobs that he always has. Doris is busy with the house and children. Increasingly, middle American wives are taking jobs outside the home, and many of them give willingly to help the school, the church or the community. Middle Americans and ethnics reject the welfare state-and are much more determined to work than accept money from the government. They believe "that it's not right that a man shouldn't be able to earn a living for his family." There may be more rigidity in regard to rules and tasks in ethnic and middle American families, but this doesn't seem to weaken the family structure. Children are expected to perform some tasks, and teen-agers have generally been given a good degree of responsibility. It seems that role expectations of the young have broken down with the move to the suburbs. There's a strong emphasis on achievement, but much of the expectation is tranferred to children. Ethnic and middle Americans find their jobs boring and uncertain, and they hope to educate their children so that they won't be trapped in a dead-end job. Police and firemen-who once enjoyed status-are made the scapegoats for society's problems, and take a disproportionate measure of criticism from the nouveau riche. But most of the police and other civil servants are people of integrity, and do receive some recognition and praise from neighbors and friends. Religious tradition runs hand in hand with ethnic traditions, though the young are less dedicated to any type of tradition. But the family engenders regular religious practice, and the Catholic school-which serves ethnics and middle Americans-tends to strengthen religious identification. Yet, the schools themselves are undergoing an identity crisis and the erosion is beginning to show through. SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Ethnics Work Hard Description An account of the resource Msgr. James T. McHugh Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 153-155 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource McHugh, James T. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5501516c5f28bfe92eb5574292d7398c.pdf b7957a4f19929718a0af9fd23019fdfa PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 101 Samo Falt'an, Slovenska otazka v teskoslovensku (The Slovak Question in Czechoslovakia), (Bratislava, 1968), 352 p. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XIX, No. 42, 1969, p. 200. Emilia Duchajova, Slovenskci slavistika 1968, Matica slovenska, Martin, 1970, p. 336. Reviewed in Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. Xlll, 4, 197. Stefan Moyses 1869-1969, Edicia Literarneho archlvu, zviizok 7. Zbornik z vedeckej konferencie MS, Martin, 1971, stran 174, litogr. Reviewed in Most, Vol. 19, 1-2, 1972. Jan Chovan, Letopis pamatnika slovenskej literatury 1970, MS, Martin, 1970, p. 94. Reviewed in Most, Vol. 19, 1-2, 1972. Jan Okal', Voda a vino (Water and Wine, United States, 1970), p. 70. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XX, 1970 No. 43. Eugen Vesnin, Aj v etrurskych zahradach (Also in the Gardens of Etruria), Buenos Aires, 1970. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XX, 1970, No. 43. Evaluation of Dr. Kirschbaum's Writings by Critics Dr. Kirschbaum's writings were bound to provoke favorable as well as unfavorable reaction. All his books and publications challenged numerous erroneous views on Slovakia's history and culture accepted in the West by scholars and political writers alike. Dr. Kirschbaum challenged these views by works with serious academic background and solid knowledge of matters discussed. In such a situation it was only natural that the reaction was on one hand favorable and on the other hand the author was unscrupulously attacked_. by adversaries of Slovakia's struggle for independence. *) After the publication of the book Slovakia--Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, to which the Hon. Alvin M. Bentley, member of the Committee of Foreign Affaires of tae U. S. Congress, wrote an approving preface, Prague Government supplied some Czech and Communist newspapers in Canada and the U.S.A. with falsified documents destined to prevent Dr. Kirschbaum from teaching at universities or taking part in public life. A smear campaign on a large scale was organized against him especially in the Canadian press, and made news on radio and television. At the same time, pressure was excercised on the university authorities and academic associations. Even though it was clear that the campaign was politically motivated by the Prague Communist regime and had all the characteristics of "character assassination," Dr. Kirschbaum had to take legal action to clear his name. �102 SLOVAKIA Scholars and experts in history of Central Europe accepted Dr. Kirschbaum's first English book favorably and, as years pass, it is more and more referred to as a source to modern history of Slovakia. IN EUROPE the book was reviewed in two academic periodicals, one published in London, England, and one in Padova, Italy, in the official organ of European federalist, European Bulletin (Jan.-Feb. 1961), published in Roma, Italy, and by experts on Central European affairs in Germany and Spain. In his French article George Kallay wrote in the European Bulletin: "One of the most eminent representatives of the federal thesis among his advocates in Central Europe, is a historian who now lives in Canada, Joseph M. Kirschbaum. Born at the time of the AustroHungarian Monarchy, he was only six years old when it collapsed and, consequently, officially he became a "Czechoslovak". When Slovakia gained tts independence, Kirschbaum, 25 years of age, became one of the most prominent representatives in Slovak politics. Slovak national politics condemned Czech domination as well as German domination which equally sought to subjugate the Slovak people. In many of his political works, Kirschbaum affirms the necessity of a Central European Federation. His most recent work, Slovakia, Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, is but the expression of his federal thesis. He points out that the countries of Central and Oriental Europe must come to understand that they must unite if they do not wish to play the role of satellites of a foreign power." F. McPoyne in Central Europe Journal Sudeten Bulletin (Munich, December 1960) wrote about the book as follows: "Although written to enlighten and correct the warped political vision of those still convinced that Czechoslovakia was a "little Switzerland in the heart of Europe," this book may be recommended as a compact political history of Slovakia. It is amazing that Czech propaganda was, and to a large extent still is, able to influence the thinking of millions of people-particularly the Anglo-Saxon world-to believe a myth that there is one "Czechoslovak" people. Kirschbaum explodes this myth and traces the origins of Slovakia from its historic beginnings, unfolding before the reader a detailed and soundly referenced account of a proud, vital and highly cultured people from their earliest origins to the declaration of their independence in 1939, pleading for a new order in Central Europe where two world wars were touched off. A dual leitmotiv throughout is the thesis that Slovakia has at all eras of its history been a western-oriented people and has been sought after by other surrounding peoples who attempted, but unsuccessfully, to assimilate it. Today the Slovaks are still western-oriented interiorly and not assimilated, either by the Czechs or by the Soviets. Kirschbaum's book is another reminder and a convincing one, that fires are still burning in the hearts of a little people in Central Europe who, �SLOVAKIA 103 like the Irish whom so strongly r esemble, are keeping the faith that independence shall one day be theirs. Though captured by Communists, they have not compl'Omised with them. May Joseph Kirschbaum's meritorious volume win friends for Slovakia and for their cause." More critical opinion was expressed in The Slavonic Review (Vol. 4, 1962-3) published in London, by Prof. W. V. Wallace. This had to be, however, expected from an academic journal behind which was Prof. Seton-Watson. According to the reviewer, Dr. Kirschbaum set out "to make known the truth about Slovakia, and especially about the crucial years of 1939-1945," which in his opinion was "a laudable aim, but a demanding one." Arguing with the text on the cover of the book rather than with the contents, Prof. Wallace could not deny that "Kirschbaum's book has some interest," but did not accept it "as a last word" in which respect he was right. However, the fact that the Slavonic Review dedicated two pages long article to the book, is a clear indication that the book could not be overlooked and has its value in the eyes of people who disagreed with Slovakia's aspirations for independence. IN THE UNITED STATES the book was received with enthusiasm by a number of Slovak periodicals, published in Slovak and English, as a "brilliant defense of the Slovak cause and an overdue scholarly work on Slovakia." Nobody more than American Slovaks felt the need for a book which would tell Americans and the second and third generation of American Slovaks the truth about Slovakia in a comprehensive English work. Dr. Kirschbaum's book filled the gap not only according to many articles in Slovak American newspapers, but also according to the director of the Slovak Institute in Cleveland, Ohio, Rev. A. Pier, O.S.B. who revieved the book in the quarterly Slovakia (Vol. X, No. 6), a1, follows: "This latest work by the distinguished professor of Slavic Studies at the University of Montreal is a well-balanced, co-Ordinated and well-calculated effort to give thinking people a true picture of the Slovak nation struggling for national freedom and survival since the dawn of western civilization. In his introduction, Kirschbaum gives the reader a genuine historical perspective of the land and its people in a few pages. In a concise sweep of centuries of history, the author traces the fateful course of this small but dynamic nation from the sixth century to the present. Never before has a reader of Slovak historical development had the opportunity to learn so quickly the real story of a country whose destiny has been and still is closely associated with the lite of its neighbors, namely, Czechs, Austrians, Germans, Poles, Russians, and Magyars, for here, in a compact volume, the author has compressed centuries of history as it occured in the heart of Europe. Slovak culture, literature and the language of the oldest people in the Danube region, as well as the democratic traditions of the Slovak nation, are presented in an intelligible way. Moreover, the complex events that created and shaped Czecho-Slovakia and then led to the declaration �104 SLOVAKIA of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939 (six months before the outbreak of the War) are so arranged and explained as to give the reader a factual and masterful survey of a hectic period in modern history. Documents and letters relating to the struggle of the Slovaks for their right to self-government and a free statehood are quoted as far back as April 13, 1849, when a group of Slovak deputies submitted a petition to the Ministry in Vienna for national recognition. These, a total of 72, are up to 1955. Thus, not only is this book designate<i'-for popular reading but also for serious study by students of history. ·. It will serve to provide them with a basic historical knowledge of the Slovak nation, and will give them a reliable insight into the incredibly fascinating story of Slovakia on the Danube." Several periodicals reprinted Congressman Bentley's opinion that: "Professor Kirschbaum in his book Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe has well and effectively argued the case for Slovak independence. He has pointed out the geographlcal importance of Slovakia and, to my way of thinking, clearly established the fact that these proud people have every right to make a free choice of their political future when the time comes which will permit them to do so. Perhaps even more important, he has laid great emphasis upon the eventual necessity of a commonwealth of European nations of Central Europe, an organization which would, while permitting free expression of nationalistic tendencies, giv,e to this area the cohesive strength which it has lacked ever since the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It would mean to me that his book should be required reading for all those who have an interest in the future of the captive peoples of this great region." In the literary quarterly Most the book was reviewed by the nestor of Slovak emigre writers and publicists Konstantin Culen (Vol VII, No. 3-4). The English quarterly Slovakia published several reviews of Dr. Kirschbaum's book, all of them favorable (see Vol. X, No. 6-7, Vol. XI, No. 2). Academic periodicals recorded publication of the book and the SI.a.vie and East European Journal, published at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana, reviewed the book favorably. More important, however, is the fact that hundreds of university libraries and public libraries made the book available to students and professors of Central European history. The success of the book bothered so much the adversaries of Slovak national aspirations, that the book was repeatedly stolen from some libraries or filled with abusive comments. There were three prints of the book within five years. IN CANADA the book Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe was reviewed very favorably in the bilingual quarterly Etudes slaves et est-europeennes, published at the Universite de Montreal, by Prof V. Lalic (Vol. V, 1960), by Prof. Charles Murin and Prof. Watson Kirkconnell who positively commented also on Dr. KiriChbamn's �105 SLOVAKIA - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - -- - - - - - - cultural publications and essays (University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. XX.XI, XXXII and XXIV, No. 4). In his extensive review, Prof. V. Lalich dwelt especially on the value of Prof. Kirschbaum's book for Slavists. In his opinion "For many Slavists who were interested in Slovakia only because of the role she played in the epoch of Great Moravia or in Pan-Slavism and later in Czechoslovakia, Professor Kirschbaum's book will represent the needed filling of a gap, which one felt when speaking or writing about the Slavic world. At the same time, however, it will appear as a controversial treatise on many questions pertaining to the history and national identity of the Slovak people. "Using quotations and references profusely, Dr. Kirschbaum's book challenges the erroneous or opposing views and theories, and makes an honest effort to shed a new light on the principal problems of Slovak national development and the modern history of Slovakia. His picture is, understandably, in many regards different from what we were presented with, during the last four decades, as an objective image. But in view of the fact that his work is based on a thorough knowledge of original works, long research and personal experience, it is worth paying attention to this new interpretation of Slovak history and its new presentation of Slovak cultural life." According to Prof. Lalich, "For Slavists, the value of the book lies especially in its first part, in which the author writes on cultural, literary, social and general political issues, and in which he used a scholarly method in presenting Slovakia's contribution to Slavic civilization (pp. 25-26, 40-49). In works on Slavic literature there was, until now, considerable confusion as to the literary language used by the Slovaks and if, or how far, the Slovak language was a distinct Slavic tongue. These questions as well as many others pertaining to the Slovak national and cultural heritage, are answered on the basis of recent research in Dr. Kirschbaum's book. He supports his conclusions by many quotations and documents translated from originals." Nevertheless, Prof. Lalich thinks that the substance of Dr. Kirschbaum's book is "in Part II, in which the author deals extensively with the origin of Czechoslovakia and of the Slovak Republic, and offers quite a different picture from that presented by others during or after the war. Since the author undoubtedly has the necessary background to write on this subject with authority, and because he has based his conclusions on references to a large number of documents, his new presentation of modern Slovak history will not be without value, though it may not or will not satisfy some editors of symposia on Central European countries, whose views the author attacks and rejects as having been motivated by politics and not by facts or scholarly research. In presenting the case of Slovakia, the author tends, however, to engage in an argument rather than in an impartial explanation of faots, 11s if he were intentionally trying to provoke a controversy instead of trying to achieve the acceptance of his views. Repetition of evident �106 SLOVAKIA inaccuracies in many works dealing with Slovakia can certainly irritate the Slovaks, but to readers who are far from resentments, which the Slovaks may rightly feel towards some of their neighbours or politicians, a less emotional presentation would probably be more efficient. The author appears more of a politician than a scholar in this part of his work; nevertheless, he still respects the facts and the truth, and the large documentation he has used makes the book an honest and courageous attempt at a new presentation of Slovakia." Prof. Charles Murin analyzed and evaluated the book in a lenghty scholarly analysis. In his view, "Prof. Kirschbaum's book is written for both the intelligent observer of the international politics and those whose task it is to participate in the shaping of the current international situation which seems to contain an amount of irrational elements to a degree probably never equalled in the period of modern history." "Kirschbaum's book," Prof. Murin continues, "is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the premises and origins of the present day situation, restricted to one of its sections: Central Europe. Genetically this seems to be the most important field through the quantitive aspects of the problems in Asia and Africa overshadow the European problems. The author relates the political history of Slovakia and of Central Europe. The period described, however, happens to be the one which preceded the Soviet hegemony over half of Europe. Thus the book contains excellent material offered to the English reader who wants to trace down the errors of the past and is willing both to learn from the past errors and re-think the categories of living ideas and forces which simultane-0usly are being shaped by and are shaping this world of ours. The basic service this book renders to the reader is that it shows him to what degree the conceptions of the West in regard to the political organization of one of the neuralgic spots in Europe were dominated by facts and to what degree by fancy. To show the interplay of reality and illusion, the genuine and the phony in the official views of the state departments of the West in regard to Central Europe seems to be to be the aim of the book. Further the author shows to what extent these conceptions contained inherent contradictions and were, therefore, doomed in the long run. Be it noted that some of the prejudices discussed in the book represent an inheritance from the post-World War I arrangements." In the opinion of Professor Murin the author "has mastered more than sufficiently the material he is dealing with and is in a solid position to give an accurate account on Slovak history, an account on a sober relativistic character of historical events, thus avoiding the peculiar exclusivities not only of the Czech and Magyar writers, but also of their Slovak antipodes." Publications on cultural matters, four of which Dr. Kirschbaum published in the series Slavistica, edited by Prof. J. B. Rudnyckyj from the University of Manitoba, were reviewed in Slavic Review, University of Toronto quarterly, Slavica Canadiana, Revista de Estudion Politicos �SLOVAKIA 107 (Vol. 117-118, 125), Slovakia, Slowakei, Most, as well as in numerous Slovak newspapers and periodicals. Foreign and Slovak reviewers (Dr. S. Glejdura, Rev. A. Pier, Dr. J. Rekem), welcomed these studies as a valuable contribution to scholarly literature on Slovakia destined to acquaint Western Slavists with Slovak culture. Several essays dealing with the Slovak language, philology and literary history, which Dr. Kirschbaum published in academic reviews (Canadian Slavonic Papers, Etudes slaves et est-europeennes) or in Slovak Studies (Vol. ill) and Most, appeared also in reprints and were favorably commented upon by reviewers in Canada, the U.S.A. and Europe. In view of the fact that even among Western Slavists there were many misconceptions .about Slovak language and literatur,e, Dr. Kirschbaum's writings were the first ones in foreign languages to shed an objective light on Slovak language and literature. Several of these essays were originally papers delivered and discussed at annual meetings of Canadian and American :Slavists and performed a useful role of acquainting professors of Slavic studies with Slovak history and literature. The largest and, in the opinion of some critics, the best work by Dr. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, was received as a model for history books on ethnic groups. In addition to numerous reviews in Slovak, over 30 book reviews in not less than 15 languages were published within a year of the publication of the book. And all were exceptionally favorable. The Minister of Education of Ontario spoke about the book in Parliament and one of the best known Canadian radio and television commentators, Gordon Sinclair, analyzed and praised the book as o particular contribution to Canadian history. Even though the topic of the book had a limited scope, the number of academic periodicals which reviewed it favorably, was greater than in the case of the first English book by Dr. Kirschbaum. Moreover, the reviews were written by professors known as experts and were published in the official organs of American and Canadian associations ,of Slavists: the Slavic Review (Prof. Taborsky); Canadian Slavonic Papers (Prof. J. V. Kaye) ; Etudes slaves et est-europeennes (Prof. R. <::ujes); Slavica Canadiana (Prof. Charles Murin); University of Ottawa Quarterly (Prof. E. Buydosh). From a number of reviews by professors at American and Canadian universities at least a few should be mentioned. Prof E. Taborsky of the University of Texas, assessed the book in the Slavic Review (Vol. 29, No. 2), as follows: "Professor Kirschbaum divides his "saga of a small group of people in a new land who preserved their identity and achieved success" into four parts. Part I describes the historical, ethnic, cultural, political, 1·eligious, and economic ground of the Slovak immigrants and concludes with a brief sketch of the Slovak national character. Based on a wealth of sources, including the archives of various Canadian Slovak organizations, the Slovak press in Canada, and interviews with Slovak settlers in many parts· of Canada, Kirschbaum's study is a useful contribution to the literature on the Cenh·al European �108 SLOVAKIA immigration to the Western Hemisphere. It is only a pity that the volume is marred by occasional remarks revealing the author's antiCrech bias and detracting thus from the objectivity promised in the book's preface." Dr. V. J. Kaye of the Ottawa University welcomed the book as "the first detailed, well-documented, and excellently written history in the English language of the Slovak ethnic group in Canada." And after giving the perusal of individual chapters saying that "Dr. Kirschbaum's study is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the history of Slavic groups in Canada, and he deserves full recognition for his achievement." (Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. XI, 1, 1969). In the Etudes siaves et est europeennes (Vol. XIII, 1968), Professor R. Cujes of the St. Francis Xavier University wrote about the book as follows: "Centennial year served as an opportune stimulus for informing Canadians of the many and diverse ethnic contributions evident in contemporary Canada. An outstanding example, and one which has been favorably reviewed in several ethnic publications across Canada, is Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum's "Slovaks in Canada." The author certainly succeeded in his task of uncovering and preserving much historical data which will be of interest not only to Canadians of Slovak origin, but also to Canadian historians who have still to write a truly Canadian history. He achieved a good balance between the two extremes possible in such works: either to be too general to have documentary value or to become so detailed that the book becomes source material and too heavy for the general reader. By writing this book, Dr. Kirschbaum rendered invaluable services not only to Slovaks in Canada whose deeds he faithfully recorded but also to all Canadians. Some other ethnic groups, especially the smaller ones which have had, in many ways, similar experience as the Slovaks, may become encouraged to undertake a similar publication of their own. The fact that Dr. Kirschbaum is one of the most important Slovak personalities in Canada, a:nd that he plays an important role among Slovaks abroad, enabled him to present a very clear and complete picture. Nevertheless, the book suffers from one defect; Dr. Kirschbaum's own contributions are much too attenuated. They are an essential and very important I')art of the Slovak scene and should have been presented at greater length in the text and not confined to footnotes and bibliography." Prof J. Roucek, known by his anti-Slovak bias, reviewed the book in Inter1tationai Migration Review (Vol. III, 9, 1969), together with another book on Slovaks and Czechs in Canada by J. Gellner-J. Smerek. In Roucek's opinion Dr. Kirschbaum "certainly stresses his filiopietism" and is "promoting Slovak separatism," to which Prof. Roucek obje~ts, he nevertheless writes: "Since both of these studies are the first systematic surveys of their subject in English, their appearance must be welcomed by all students �SLOVAKIA 109 interested in the growing number of immigrants in Canada. Both are filled with valuable information which is hardly acoessible to the average scholar not able to read Czech and Slovak, and both have been prepared by Czechs and Slovaks intimately acquainted with the communities of their countrymen in Canada. Nevertheless, both also suffer when we compare them with each other. In general, Kirschbaum's study, in spite of its weaknesses, is much better and more exhaustive that Gellner-Smerek's work, since it is better documented (as shown by its bibliography, pp. 441-455), and contains reprints of 24 memoranda, petitions, pleas, and resolutions either to the Canadian authorities or to the United Nations by the Slovak Canadian organizations, as well as by individual members of the Canadian Slovak League and the First Catholic Slovak Union during the past three decaaes." On the part of American Slovaks the book was received with the mixture of enthusiasm and envy, expressed not only in a great number of newspapers but also by the poet Mikulas Sprinc in Most, and two ,t eachers at the SS. Cyril and Methodius Academy, Sisters M. Y. Lederleitner and M. M. Tybor. In their thorough analysis of the book they wrote: "A historical survey of Slovaks living anywhere outside their native Slovakia must of necessity follow a certain pattern of development. For the benefit of uniformed readers, the opening of the work must be expository-a delineation of the historic background of the Slovak people and their position with a historic perspective. Then there logically follows a record of their uprooting within the scope of the given consideration, as well as their trials and tribulations in a new environment, an evaluation of what forces worked for or against them, and an assessment of their achievements in the new land. In his book Slovaks in Canada, Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum has effectively met this challenge. We who are privileged to look upon the accomplished fact of a finished project presenting to the public the aches and the trials, the hopes and the promises, the opportunities and the fulfillment up to triumph, the gifts received and the gifts given, the moral as well as the material investments made and the dividends garnered-we are grateful to Dr. Kirschbaum whose scholarly initiative and ac\.lmen together with his indefatigable industry and talent has made this book a reality. It deserves more than one reading since it is an informative and bigly interesting account of Slovak life in a new world setting. In all honesty, we must admit an undenied regret that the Slovaks in the U. S. have not produced a similar or parallel history of their own to match Slovaks in Canada while at the same time we cherish a justifiable pride in Dr. Kirschbaum because he has done a good work well." The book was very positively evaluated even by the official organ of Slovak Protestants in the United States, The Zion (September 1971 ). In the opinion of the editor, Pastor John Adam, Dr. Kirschbaum "has, in his book, Slovaks in Canada, given all Slovaks a valuable history �110 SLOVAKIA which will stand for decades as the work on the immigration of Slovaks to Canada in the first 60 years of this century. He has captured the trials, tribulations and triumphs of Slovaks who came to Canada in three separate waves of immigration. The account of the struggle of the pioneers has thorough documentation, which will help even Americans of Slovak ancestry understand a part of their past for the experience in Canada, in many respects, is a reflection of the struggle in America." In the opinion of the Hon. R. S. Welch, Minister of Education of the Ontario Government, "Slovaks in Canada, as its title suggests, is a comprehensive account of Slovak migrations to Canada, of the trials and successes the Slovak people have experienced here, and of their important contributions to our land. Its author is Slovakian-born Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum, a former diplomat who has achieved great distinction in Canada as an editor, author, schol,a r and university professor of Slavic-Slovak studies. Its sponsor is the Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario. It should, therefore, be a source of satisfaction to all of us when scholars of other ethnic origins, equally proud of both their ancestry and of the contributions made by members of their race to the Canadian nation, choose to chronicle the histories of their people in Canada." (From a speech in Parliament on July 15, 1968). SLOVAKIA is published annually iby the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Arnerican'S of Slovwk descent. One of i:Jhe purposes of SLOVAKIA is to promote ,a bebter U'llderst anding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and jiJs long struggle for freedom and inde-pendeuce. Subscription to Slovrukia $3.00 per year in the U.S.A. - $4.00 elsewhere. Sen<l subscription to: SLOVAKIA 313 Ridge A venue Middletown, P a. 17057 � SLOVAKIA 101 Samo Falt'an, Slovenska otazka v teskoslovensku (The Slovak Question in Czechoslovakia), (Bratislava, 1968), 352 p. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XIX, No. 42, 1969, p. 200. Emilia Duchajova, Slovenskci slavistika 1968, Matica slovenska, Martin, 1970, p. 336. Reviewed in Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. Xlll, 4, 197. Stefan Moyses 1869-1969, Edicia Literarneho archlvu, zviizok 7. Zbornik z vedeckej konferencie MS, Martin, 1971, stran 174, litogr. Reviewed in Most, Vol. 19, 1-2, 1972. Jan Chovan, Letopis pamatnika slovenskej literatury 1970, MS, Martin, 1970, p. 94. Reviewed in Most, Vol. 19, 1-2, 1972. Jan Okal', Voda a vino (Water and Wine, United States, 1970), p. 70. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XX, 1970 No. 43. Eugen Vesnin, Aj v etrurskych zahradach (Also in the Gardens of Etruria), Buenos Aires, 1970. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XX, 1970, No. 43. Evaluation of Dr. Kirschbaum's Writings by Critics Dr. Kirschbaum's writings were bound to provoke favorable as well as unfavorable reaction. All his books and publications challenged numerous erroneous views on Slovakia's history and culture accepted in the West by scholars and political writers alike. Dr. Kirschbaum challenged these views by works with serious academic background and solid knowledge of matters discussed. In such a situation it was only natural that the reaction was on one hand favorable and on the other hand the author was unscrupulously attacked_. by adversaries of Slovakia's struggle for independence. *) After the publication of the book Slovakia--Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, to which the Hon. Alvin M. Bentley, member of the Committee of Foreign Affaires of tae U. S. Congress, wrote an approving preface, Prague Government supplied some Czech and Communist newspapers in Canada and the U.S.A. with falsified documents destined to prevent Dr. Kirschbaum from teaching at universities or taking part in public life. A smear campaign on a large scale was organized against him especially in the Canadian press, and made news on radio and television. At the same time, pressure was excercised on the university authorities and academic associations. Even though it was clear that the campaign was politically motivated by the Prague Communist regime and had all the characteristics of "character assassination," Dr. Kirschbaum had to take legal action to clear his name. �102 SLOVAKIA Scholars and experts in history of Central Europe accepted Dr. Kirschbaum's first English book favorably and, as years pass, it is more and more referred to as a source to modern history of Slovakia. IN EUROPE the book was reviewed in two academic periodicals, one published in London, England, and one in Padova, Italy, in the official organ of European federalist, European Bulletin (Jan.-Feb. 1961), published in Roma, Italy, and by experts on Central European affairs in Germany and Spain. In his French article George Kallay wrote in the European Bulletin: "One of the most eminent representatives of the federal thesis among his advocates in Central Europe, is a historian who now lives in Canada, Joseph M. Kirschbaum. Born at the time of the AustroHungarian Monarchy, he was only six years old when it collapsed and, consequently, officially he became a "Czechoslovak". When Slovakia gained tts independence, Kirschbaum, 25 years of age, became one of the most prominent representatives in Slovak politics. Slovak national politics condemned Czech domination as well as German domination which equally sought to subjugate the Slovak people. In many of his political works, Kirschbaum affirms the necessity of a Central European Federation. His most recent work, Slovakia, Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, is but the expression of his federal thesis. He points out that the countries of Central and Oriental Europe must come to understand that they must unite if they do not wish to play the role of satellites of a foreign power." F. McPoyne in Central Europe Journal Sudeten Bulletin (Munich, December 1960) wrote about the book as follows: "Although written to enlighten and correct the warped political vision of those still convinced that Czechoslovakia was a "little Switzerland in the heart of Europe," this book may be recommended as a compact political history of Slovakia. It is amazing that Czech propaganda was, and to a large extent still is, able to influence the thinking of millions of people-particularly the Anglo-Saxon world-to believe a myth that there is one "Czechoslovak" people. Kirschbaum explodes this myth and traces the origins of Slovakia from its historic beginnings, unfolding before the reader a detailed and soundly referenced account of a proud, vital and highly cultured people from their earliest origins to the declaration of their independence in 1939, pleading for a new order in Central Europe where two world wars were touched off. A dual leitmotiv throughout is the thesis that Slovakia has at all eras of its history been a western-oriented people and has been sought after by other surrounding peoples who attempted, but unsuccessfully, to assimilate it. Today the Slovaks are still western-oriented interiorly and not assimilated, either by the Czechs or by the Soviets. Kirschbaum's book is another reminder and a convincing one, that fires are still burning in the hearts of a little people in Central Europe who, �SLOVAKIA 103 like the Irish whom so strongly r esemble, are keeping the faith that independence shall one day be theirs. Though captured by Communists, they have not compl'Omised with them. May Joseph Kirschbaum's meritorious volume win friends for Slovakia and for their cause." More critical opinion was expressed in The Slavonic Review (Vol. 4, 1962-3) published in London, by Prof. W. V. Wallace. This had to be, however, expected from an academic journal behind which was Prof. Seton-Watson. According to the reviewer, Dr. Kirschbaum set out "to make known the truth about Slovakia, and especially about the crucial years of 1939-1945," which in his opinion was "a laudable aim, but a demanding one." Arguing with the text on the cover of the book rather than with the contents, Prof. Wallace could not deny that "Kirschbaum's book has some interest," but did not accept it "as a last word" in which respect he was right. However, the fact that the Slavonic Review dedicated two pages long article to the book, is a clear indication that the book could not be overlooked and has its value in the eyes of people who disagreed with Slovakia's aspirations for independence. IN THE UNITED STATES the book was received with enthusiasm by a number of Slovak periodicals, published in Slovak and English, as a "brilliant defense of the Slovak cause and an overdue scholarly work on Slovakia." Nobody more than American Slovaks felt the need for a book which would tell Americans and the second and third generation of American Slovaks the truth about Slovakia in a comprehensive English work. Dr. Kirschbaum's book filled the gap not only according to many articles in Slovak American newspapers, but also according to the director of the Slovak Institute in Cleveland, Ohio, Rev. A. Pier, O.S.B. who revieved the book in the quarterly Slovakia (Vol. X, No. 6), a1, follows: "This latest work by the distinguished professor of Slavic Studies at the University of Montreal is a well-balanced, co-Ordinated and well-calculated effort to give thinking people a true picture of the Slovak nation struggling for national freedom and survival since the dawn of western civilization. In his introduction, Kirschbaum gives the reader a genuine historical perspective of the land and its people in a few pages. In a concise sweep of centuries of history, the author traces the fateful course of this small but dynamic nation from the sixth century to the present. Never before has a reader of Slovak historical development had the opportunity to learn so quickly the real story of a country whose destiny has been and still is closely associated with the lite of its neighbors, namely, Czechs, Austrians, Germans, Poles, Russians, and Magyars, for here, in a compact volume, the author has compressed centuries of history as it occured in the heart of Europe. Slovak culture, literature and the language of the oldest people in the Danube region, as well as the democratic traditions of the Slovak nation, are presented in an intelligible way. Moreover, the complex events that created and shaped Czecho-Slovakia and then led to the declaration �104 SLOVAKIA of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939 (six months before the outbreak of the War) are so arranged and explained as to give the reader a factual and masterful survey of a hectic period in modern history. Documents and letters relating to the struggle of the Slovaks for their right to self-government and a free statehood are quoted as far back as April 13, 1849, when a group of Slovak deputies submitted a petition to the Ministry in Vienna for national recognition. These, a total of 72, are up to 1955. Thus, not only is this book designate<i'-for popular reading but also for serious study by students of history. ·. It will serve to provide them with a basic historical knowledge of the Slovak nation, and will give them a reliable insight into the incredibly fascinating story of Slovakia on the Danube." Several periodicals reprinted Congressman Bentley's opinion that: "Professor Kirschbaum in his book Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe has well and effectively argued the case for Slovak independence. He has pointed out the geographlcal importance of Slovakia and, to my way of thinking, clearly established the fact that these proud people have every right to make a free choice of their political future when the time comes which will permit them to do so. Perhaps even more important, he has laid great emphasis upon the eventual necessity of a commonwealth of European nations of Central Europe, an organization which would, while permitting free expression of nationalistic tendencies, giv,e to this area the cohesive strength which it has lacked ever since the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It would mean to me that his book should be required reading for all those who have an interest in the future of the captive peoples of this great region." In the literary quarterly Most the book was reviewed by the nestor of Slovak emigre writers and publicists Konstantin Culen (Vol VII, No. 3-4). The English quarterly Slovakia published several reviews of Dr. Kirschbaum's book, all of them favorable (see Vol. X, No. 6-7, Vol. XI, No. 2). Academic periodicals recorded publication of the book and the SI.a.vie and East European Journal, published at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana, reviewed the book favorably. More important, however, is the fact that hundreds of university libraries and public libraries made the book available to students and professors of Central European history. The success of the book bothered so much the adversaries of Slovak national aspirations, that the book was repeatedly stolen from some libraries or filled with abusive comments. There were three prints of the book within five years. IN CANADA the book Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe was reviewed very favorably in the bilingual quarterly Etudes slaves et est-europeennes, published at the Universite de Montreal, by Prof V. Lalic (Vol. V, 1960), by Prof. Charles Murin and Prof. Watson Kirkconnell who positively commented also on Dr. KiriChbamn's �105 SLOVAKIA - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - -- - - - - - - cultural publications and essays (University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. XX.XI, XXXII and XXIV, No. 4). In his extensive review, Prof. V. Lalich dwelt especially on the value of Prof. Kirschbaum's book for Slavists. In his opinion "For many Slavists who were interested in Slovakia only because of the role she played in the epoch of Great Moravia or in Pan-Slavism and later in Czechoslovakia, Professor Kirschbaum's book will represent the needed filling of a gap, which one felt when speaking or writing about the Slavic world. At the same time, however, it will appear as a controversial treatise on many questions pertaining to the history and national identity of the Slovak people. "Using quotations and references profusely, Dr. Kirschbaum's book challenges the erroneous or opposing views and theories, and makes an honest effort to shed a new light on the principal problems of Slovak national development and the modern history of Slovakia. His picture is, understandably, in many regards different from what we were presented with, during the last four decades, as an objective image. But in view of the fact that his work is based on a thorough knowledge of original works, long research and personal experience, it is worth paying attention to this new interpretation of Slovak history and its new presentation of Slovak cultural life." According to Prof. Lalich, "For Slavists, the value of the book lies especially in its first part, in which the author writes on cultural, literary, social and general political issues, and in which he used a scholarly method in presenting Slovakia's contribution to Slavic civilization (pp. 25-26, 40-49). In works on Slavic literature there was, until now, considerable confusion as to the literary language used by the Slovaks and if, or how far, the Slovak language was a distinct Slavic tongue. These questions as well as many others pertaining to the Slovak national and cultural heritage, are answered on the basis of recent research in Dr. Kirschbaum's book. He supports his conclusions by many quotations and documents translated from originals." Nevertheless, Prof. Lalich thinks that the substance of Dr. Kirschbaum's book is "in Part II, in which the author deals extensively with the origin of Czechoslovakia and of the Slovak Republic, and offers quite a different picture from that presented by others during or after the war. Since the author undoubtedly has the necessary background to write on this subject with authority, and because he has based his conclusions on references to a large number of documents, his new presentation of modern Slovak history will not be without value, though it may not or will not satisfy some editors of symposia on Central European countries, whose views the author attacks and rejects as having been motivated by politics and not by facts or scholarly research. In presenting the case of Slovakia, the author tends, however, to engage in an argument rather than in an impartial explanation of faots, 11s if he were intentionally trying to provoke a controversy instead of trying to achieve the acceptance of his views. Repetition of evident �106 SLOVAKIA inaccuracies in many works dealing with Slovakia can certainly irritate the Slovaks, but to readers who are far from resentments, which the Slovaks may rightly feel towards some of their neighbours or politicians, a less emotional presentation would probably be more efficient. The author appears more of a politician than a scholar in this part of his work; nevertheless, he still respects the facts and the truth, and the large documentation he has used makes the book an honest and courageous attempt at a new presentation of Slovakia." Prof. Charles Murin analyzed and evaluated the book in a lenghty scholarly analysis. In his view, "Prof. Kirschbaum's book is written for both the intelligent observer of the international politics and those whose task it is to participate in the shaping of the current international situation which seems to contain an amount of irrational elements to a degree probably never equalled in the period of modern history." "Kirschbaum's book," Prof. Murin continues, "is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the premises and origins of the present day situation, restricted to one of its sections: Central Europe. Genetically this seems to be the most important field through the quantitive aspects of the problems in Asia and Africa overshadow the European problems. The author relates the political history of Slovakia and of Central Europe. The period described, however, happens to be the one which preceded the Soviet hegemony over half of Europe. Thus the book contains excellent material offered to the English reader who wants to trace down the errors of the past and is willing both to learn from the past errors and re-think the categories of living ideas and forces which simultane-0usly are being shaped by and are shaping this world of ours. The basic service this book renders to the reader is that it shows him to what degree the conceptions of the West in regard to the political organization of one of the neuralgic spots in Europe were dominated by facts and to what degree by fancy. To show the interplay of reality and illusion, the genuine and the phony in the official views of the state departments of the West in regard to Central Europe seems to be to be the aim of the book. Further the author shows to what extent these conceptions contained inherent contradictions and were, therefore, doomed in the long run. Be it noted that some of the prejudices discussed in the book represent an inheritance from the post-World War I arrangements." In the opinion of Professor Murin the author "has mastered more than sufficiently the material he is dealing with and is in a solid position to give an accurate account on Slovak history, an account on a sober relativistic character of historical events, thus avoiding the peculiar exclusivities not only of the Czech and Magyar writers, but also of their Slovak antipodes." Publications on cultural matters, four of which Dr. Kirschbaum published in the series Slavistica, edited by Prof. J. B. Rudnyckyj from the University of Manitoba, were reviewed in Slavic Review, University of Toronto quarterly, Slavica Canadiana, Revista de Estudion Politicos �SLOVAKIA 107 (Vol. 117-118, 125), Slovakia, Slowakei, Most, as well as in numerous Slovak newspapers and periodicals. Foreign and Slovak reviewers (Dr. S. Glejdura, Rev. A. Pier, Dr. J. Rekem), welcomed these studies as a valuable contribution to scholarly literature on Slovakia destined to acquaint Western Slavists with Slovak culture. Several essays dealing with the Slovak language, philology and literary history, which Dr. Kirschbaum published in academic reviews (Canadian Slavonic Papers, Etudes slaves et est-europeennes) or in Slovak Studies (Vol. ill) and Most, appeared also in reprints and were favorably commented upon by reviewers in Canada, the U.S.A. and Europe. In view of the fact that even among Western Slavists there were many misconceptions .about Slovak language and literatur,e, Dr. Kirschbaum's writings were the first ones in foreign languages to shed an objective light on Slovak language and literature. Several of these essays were originally papers delivered and discussed at annual meetings of Canadian and American :Slavists and performed a useful role of acquainting professors of Slavic studies with Slovak history and literature. The largest and, in the opinion of some critics, the best work by Dr. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, was received as a model for history books on ethnic groups. In addition to numerous reviews in Slovak, over 30 book reviews in not less than 15 languages were published within a year of the publication of the book. And all were exceptionally favorable. The Minister of Education of Ontario spoke about the book in Parliament and one of the best known Canadian radio and television commentators, Gordon Sinclair, analyzed and praised the book as o particular contribution to Canadian history. Even though the topic of the book had a limited scope, the number of academic periodicals which reviewed it favorably, was greater than in the case of the first English book by Dr. Kirschbaum. Moreover, the reviews were written by professors known as experts and were published in the official organs of American and Canadian associations ,of Slavists: the Slavic Review (Prof. Taborsky); Canadian Slavonic Papers (Prof. J. V. Kaye) ; Etudes slaves et est-europeennes (Prof. R. <::ujes); Slavica Canadiana (Prof. Charles Murin); University of Ottawa Quarterly (Prof. E. Buydosh). From a number of reviews by professors at American and Canadian universities at least a few should be mentioned. Prof E. Taborsky of the University of Texas, assessed the book in the Slavic Review (Vol. 29, No. 2), as follows: "Professor Kirschbaum divides his "saga of a small group of people in a new land who preserved their identity and achieved success" into four parts. Part I describes the historical, ethnic, cultural, political, 1·eligious, and economic ground of the Slovak immigrants and concludes with a brief sketch of the Slovak national character. Based on a wealth of sources, including the archives of various Canadian Slovak organizations, the Slovak press in Canada, and interviews with Slovak settlers in many parts· of Canada, Kirschbaum's study is a useful contribution to the literature on the Cenh·al European �108 SLOVAKIA immigration to the Western Hemisphere. It is only a pity that the volume is marred by occasional remarks revealing the author's antiCrech bias and detracting thus from the objectivity promised in the book's preface." Dr. V. J. Kaye of the Ottawa University welcomed the book as "the first detailed, well-documented, and excellently written history in the English language of the Slovak ethnic group in Canada." And after giving the perusal of individual chapters saying that "Dr. Kirschbaum's study is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the history of Slavic groups in Canada, and he deserves full recognition for his achievement." (Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. XI, 1, 1969). In the Etudes siaves et est europeennes (Vol. XIII, 1968), Professor R. Cujes of the St. Francis Xavier University wrote about the book as follows: "Centennial year served as an opportune stimulus for informing Canadians of the many and diverse ethnic contributions evident in contemporary Canada. An outstanding example, and one which has been favorably reviewed in several ethnic publications across Canada, is Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum's "Slovaks in Canada." The author certainly succeeded in his task of uncovering and preserving much historical data which will be of interest not only to Canadians of Slovak origin, but also to Canadian historians who have still to write a truly Canadian history. He achieved a good balance between the two extremes possible in such works: either to be too general to have documentary value or to become so detailed that the book becomes source material and too heavy for the general reader. By writing this book, Dr. Kirschbaum rendered invaluable services not only to Slovaks in Canada whose deeds he faithfully recorded but also to all Canadians. Some other ethnic groups, especially the smaller ones which have had, in many ways, similar experience as the Slovaks, may become encouraged to undertake a similar publication of their own. The fact that Dr. Kirschbaum is one of the most important Slovak personalities in Canada, a:nd that he plays an important role among Slovaks abroad, enabled him to present a very clear and complete picture. Nevertheless, the book suffers from one defect; Dr. Kirschbaum's own contributions are much too attenuated. They are an essential and very important I')art of the Slovak scene and should have been presented at greater length in the text and not confined to footnotes and bibliography." Prof J. Roucek, known by his anti-Slovak bias, reviewed the book in Inter1tationai Migration Review (Vol. III, 9, 1969), together with another book on Slovaks and Czechs in Canada by J. Gellner-J. Smerek. In Roucek's opinion Dr. Kirschbaum "certainly stresses his filiopietism" and is "promoting Slovak separatism," to which Prof. Roucek obje~ts, he nevertheless writes: "Since both of these studies are the first systematic surveys of their subject in English, their appearance must be welcomed by all students �SLOVAKIA 109 interested in the growing number of immigrants in Canada. Both are filled with valuable information which is hardly acoessible to the average scholar not able to read Czech and Slovak, and both have been prepared by Czechs and Slovaks intimately acquainted with the communities of their countrymen in Canada. Nevertheless, both also suffer when we compare them with each other. In general, Kirschbaum's study, in spite of its weaknesses, is much better and more exhaustive that Gellner-Smerek's work, since it is better documented (as shown by its bibliography, pp. 441-455), and contains reprints of 24 memoranda, petitions, pleas, and resolutions either to the Canadian authorities or to the United Nations by the Slovak Canadian organizations, as well as by individual members of the Canadian Slovak League and the First Catholic Slovak Union during the past three decaaes." On the part of American Slovaks the book was received with the mixture of enthusiasm and envy, expressed not only in a great number of newspapers but also by the poet Mikulas Sprinc in Most, and two ,t eachers at the SS. Cyril and Methodius Academy, Sisters M. Y. Lederleitner and M. M. Tybor. In their thorough analysis of the book they wrote: "A historical survey of Slovaks living anywhere outside their native Slovakia must of necessity follow a certain pattern of development. For the benefit of uniformed readers, the opening of the work must be expository-a delineation of the historic background of the Slovak people and their position with a historic perspective. Then there logically follows a record of their uprooting within the scope of the given consideration, as well as their trials and tribulations in a new environment, an evaluation of what forces worked for or against them, and an assessment of their achievements in the new land. In his book Slovaks in Canada, Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum has effectively met this challenge. We who are privileged to look upon the accomplished fact of a finished project presenting to the public the aches and the trials, the hopes and the promises, the opportunities and the fulfillment up to triumph, the gifts received and the gifts given, the moral as well as the material investments made and the dividends garnered-we are grateful to Dr. Kirschbaum whose scholarly initiative and ac\.lmen together with his indefatigable industry and talent has made this book a reality. It deserves more than one reading since it is an informative and bigly interesting account of Slovak life in a new world setting. In all honesty, we must admit an undenied regret that the Slovaks in the U. S. have not produced a similar or parallel history of their own to match Slovaks in Canada while at the same time we cherish a justifiable pride in Dr. Kirschbaum because he has done a good work well." The book was very positively evaluated even by the official organ of Slovak Protestants in the United States, The Zion (September 1971 ). In the opinion of the editor, Pastor John Adam, Dr. Kirschbaum "has, in his book, Slovaks in Canada, given all Slovaks a valuable history �110 SLOVAKIA which will stand for decades as the work on the immigration of Slovaks to Canada in the first 60 years of this century. He has captured the trials, tribulations and triumphs of Slovaks who came to Canada in three separate waves of immigration. The account of the struggle of the pioneers has thorough documentation, which will help even Americans of Slovak ancestry understand a part of their past for the experience in Canada, in many respects, is a reflection of the struggle in America." In the opinion of the Hon. R. S. Welch, Minister of Education of the Ontario Government, "Slovaks in Canada, as its title suggests, is a comprehensive account of Slovak migrations to Canada, of the trials and successes the Slovak people have experienced here, and of their important contributions to our land. Its author is Slovakian-born Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum, a former diplomat who has achieved great distinction in Canada as an editor, author, schol,a r and university professor of Slavic-Slovak studies. Its sponsor is the Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario. It should, therefore, be a source of satisfaction to all of us when scholars of other ethnic origins, equally proud of both their ancestry and of the contributions made by members of their race to the Canadian nation, choose to chronicle the histories of their people in Canada." (From a speech in Parliament on July 15, 1968). SLOVAKIA is published annually iby the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Arnerican'S of Slovwk descent. One of i:Jhe purposes of SLOVAKIA is to promote ,a bebter U'llderst anding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and jiJs long struggle for freedom and inde-pendeuce. Subscription to Slovrukia $3.00 per year in the U.S.A. - $4.00 elsewhere. Sen<l subscription to: SLOVAKIA 313 Ridge A venue Middletown, P a. 17057 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 101 Samo Falt'an, Slovenska otazka v teskoslovensku (The Slovak Question in Czechoslovakia), (Bratislava, 1968), 352 p. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XIX, No. 42, 1969, p. 200. Emilia Duchajova, Slovenskci slavistika 1968, Matica slovenska, Martin, 1970, p. 336. Reviewed in Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. Xlll, 4, 197. Stefan Moyses 1869-1969, Edicia Literarneho archlvu, zviizok 7. Zbornik z vedeckej konferencie MS, Martin, 1971, stran 174, litogr. Reviewed in Most, Vol. 19, 1-2, 1972. Jan Chovan, Letopis pamatnika slovenskej literatury 1970, MS, Martin, 1970, p. 94. Reviewed in Most, Vol. 19, 1-2, 1972. Jan Okal', Voda a vino (Water and Wine, United States, 1970), p. 70. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XX, 1970 No. 43. Eugen Vesnin, Aj v etrurskych zahradach (Also in the Gardens of Etruria), Buenos Aires, 1970. Reviewed in Slovakia, Vol. XX, 1970, No. 43. Evaluation of Dr. Kirschbaum's Writings by Critics Dr. Kirschbaum's writings were bound to provoke favorable as well as unfavorable reaction. All his books and publications challenged numerous erroneous views on Slovakia's history and culture accepted in the West by scholars and political writers alike. Dr. Kirschbaum challenged these views by works with serious academic background and solid knowledge of matters discussed. In such a situation it was only natural that the reaction was on one hand favorable and on the other hand the author was unscrupulously attacked_. by adversaries of Slovakia's struggle for independence. *) After the publication of the book Slovakia--Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, to which the Hon. Alvin M. Bentley, member of the Committee of Foreign Affaires of tae U. S. Congress, wrote an approving preface, Prague Government supplied some Czech and Communist newspapers in Canada and the U.S.A. with falsified documents destined to prevent Dr. Kirschbaum from teaching at universities or taking part in public life. A smear campaign on a large scale was organized against him especially in the Canadian press, and made news on radio and television. At the same time, pressure was excercised on the university authorities and academic associations. Even though it was clear that the campaign was politically motivated by the Prague Communist regime and had all the characteristics of "character assassination," Dr. Kirschbaum had to take legal action to clear his name. 102 SLOVAKIA Scholars and experts in history of Central Europe accepted Dr. Kirschbaum's first English book favorably and, as years pass, it is more and more referred to as a source to modern history of Slovakia. IN EUROPE the book was reviewed in two academic periodicals, one published in London, England, and one in Padova, Italy, in the official organ of European federalist, European Bulletin (Jan.-Feb. 1961), published in Roma, Italy, and by experts on Central European affairs in Germany and Spain. In his French article George Kallay wrote in the European Bulletin: "One of the most eminent representatives of the federal thesis among his advocates in Central Europe, is a historian who now lives in Canada, Joseph M. Kirschbaum. Born at the time of the AustroHungarian Monarchy, he was only six years old when it collapsed and, consequently, officially he became a "Czechoslovak". When Slovakia gained tts independence, Kirschbaum, 25 years of age, became one of the most prominent representatives in Slovak politics. Slovak national politics condemned Czech domination as well as German domination which equally sought to subjugate the Slovak people. In many of his political works, Kirschbaum affirms the necessity of a Central European Federation. His most recent work, Slovakia, Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, is but the expression of his federal thesis. He points out that the countries of Central and Oriental Europe must come to understand that they must unite if they do not wish to play the role of satellites of a foreign power." F. McPoyne in Central Europe Journal Sudeten Bulletin (Munich, December 1960) wrote about the book as follows: "Although written to enlighten and correct the warped political vision of those still convinced that Czechoslovakia was a "little Switzerland in the heart of Europe," this book may be recommended as a compact political history of Slovakia. It is amazing that Czech propaganda was, and to a large extent still is, able to influence the thinking of millions of people-particularly the Anglo-Saxon world-to believe a myth that there is one "Czechoslovak" people. Kirschbaum explodes this myth and traces the origins of Slovakia from its historic beginnings, unfolding before the reader a detailed and soundly referenced account of a proud, vital and highly cultured people from their earliest origins to the declaration of their independence in 1939, pleading for a new order in Central Europe where two world wars were touched off. A dual leitmotiv throughout is the thesis that Slovakia has at all eras of its history been a western-oriented people and has been sought after by other surrounding peoples who attempted, but unsuccessfully, to assimilate it. Today the Slovaks are still western-oriented interiorly and not assimilated, either by the Czechs or by the Soviets. Kirschbaum's book is another reminder and a convincing one, that fires are still burning in the hearts of a little people in Central Europe who, SLOVAKIA 103 like the Irish whom so strongly r esemble, are keeping the faith that independence shall one day be theirs. Though captured by Communists, they have not compl'Omised with them. May Joseph Kirschbaum's meritorious volume win friends for Slovakia and for their cause." More critical opinion was expressed in The Slavonic Review (Vol. 4, 1962-3) published in London, by Prof. W. V. Wallace. This had to be, however, expected from an academic journal behind which was Prof. Seton-Watson. According to the reviewer, Dr. Kirschbaum set out "to make known the truth about Slovakia, and especially about the crucial years of 1939-1945," which in his opinion was "a laudable aim, but a demanding one." Arguing with the text on the cover of the book rather than with the contents, Prof. Wallace could not deny that "Kirschbaum's book has some interest," but did not accept it "as a last word" in which respect he was right. However, the fact that the Slavonic Review dedicated two pages long article to the book, is a clear indication that the book could not be overlooked and has its value in the eyes of people who disagreed with Slovakia's aspirations for independence. IN THE UNITED STATES the book was received with enthusiasm by a number of Slovak periodicals, published in Slovak and English, as a "brilliant defense of the Slovak cause and an overdue scholarly work on Slovakia." Nobody more than American Slovaks felt the need for a book which would tell Americans and the second and third generation of American Slovaks the truth about Slovakia in a comprehensive English work. Dr. Kirschbaum's book filled the gap not only according to many articles in Slovak American newspapers, but also according to the director of the Slovak Institute in Cleveland, Ohio, Rev. A. Pier, O.S.B. who revieved the book in the quarterly Slovakia (Vol. X, No. 6), a1, follows: "This latest work by the distinguished professor of Slavic Studies at the University of Montreal is a well-balanced, co-Ordinated and well-calculated effort to give thinking people a true picture of the Slovak nation struggling for national freedom and survival since the dawn of western civilization. In his introduction, Kirschbaum gives the reader a genuine historical perspective of the land and its people in a few pages. In a concise sweep of centuries of history, the author traces the fateful course of this small but dynamic nation from the sixth century to the present. Never before has a reader of Slovak historical development had the opportunity to learn so quickly the real story of a country whose destiny has been and still is closely associated with the lite of its neighbors, namely, Czechs, Austrians, Germans, Poles, Russians, and Magyars, for here, in a compact volume, the author has compressed centuries of history as it occured in the heart of Europe. Slovak culture, literature and the language of the oldest people in the Danube region, as well as the democratic traditions of the Slovak nation, are presented in an intelligible way. Moreover, the complex events that created and shaped Czecho-Slovakia and then led to the declaration 104 SLOVAKIA of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939 (six months before the outbreak of the War) are so arranged and explained as to give the reader a factual and masterful survey of a hectic period in modern history. Documents and letters relating to the struggle of the Slovaks for their right to self-government and a free statehood are quoted as far back as April 13, 1849, when a group of Slovak deputies submitted a petition to the Ministry in Vienna for national recognition. These, a total of 72, are up to 1955. Thus, not only is this book designate<i'-for popular reading but also for serious study by students of history. ·. It will serve to provide them with a basic historical knowledge of the Slovak nation, and will give them a reliable insight into the incredibly fascinating story of Slovakia on the Danube." Several periodicals reprinted Congressman Bentley's opinion that: "Professor Kirschbaum in his book Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe has well and effectively argued the case for Slovak independence. He has pointed out the geographlcal importance of Slovakia and, to my way of thinking, clearly established the fact that these proud people have every right to make a free choice of their political future when the time comes which will permit them to do so. Perhaps even more important, he has laid great emphasis upon the eventual necessity of a commonwealth of European nations of Central Europe, an organization which would, while permitting free expression of nationalistic tendencies, giv,e to this area the cohesive strength which it has lacked ever since the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It would mean to me that his book should be required reading for all those who have an interest in the future of the captive peoples of this great region." In the literary quarterly Most the book was reviewed by the nestor of Slovak emigre writers and publicists Konstantin Culen (Vol VII, No. 3-4). The English quarterly Slovakia published several reviews of Dr. Kirschbaum's book, all of them favorable (see Vol. X, No. 6-7, Vol. XI, No. 2). Academic periodicals recorded publication of the book and the SI.a.vie and East European Journal, published at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana, reviewed the book favorably. More important, however, is the fact that hundreds of university libraries and public libraries made the book available to students and professors of Central European history. The success of the book bothered so much the adversaries of Slovak national aspirations, that the book was repeatedly stolen from some libraries or filled with abusive comments. There were three prints of the book within five years. IN CANADA the book Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe was reviewed very favorably in the bilingual quarterly Etudes slaves et est-europeennes, published at the Universite de Montreal, by Prof V. Lalic (Vol. V, 1960), by Prof. Charles Murin and Prof. Watson Kirkconnell who positively commented also on Dr. KiriChbamn's 105 SLOVAKIA - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - -- - - - - - - cultural publications and essays (University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. XX.XI, XXXII and XXIV, No. 4). In his extensive review, Prof. V. Lalich dwelt especially on the value of Prof. Kirschbaum's book for Slavists. In his opinion "For many Slavists who were interested in Slovakia only because of the role she played in the epoch of Great Moravia or in Pan-Slavism and later in Czechoslovakia, Professor Kirschbaum's book will represent the needed filling of a gap, which one felt when speaking or writing about the Slavic world. At the same time, however, it will appear as a controversial treatise on many questions pertaining to the history and national identity of the Slovak people. "Using quotations and references profusely, Dr. Kirschbaum's book challenges the erroneous or opposing views and theories, and makes an honest effort to shed a new light on the principal problems of Slovak national development and the modern history of Slovakia. His picture is, understandably, in many regards different from what we were presented with, during the last four decades, as an objective image. But in view of the fact that his work is based on a thorough knowledge of original works, long research and personal experience, it is worth paying attention to this new interpretation of Slovak history and its new presentation of Slovak cultural life." According to Prof. Lalich, "For Slavists, the value of the book lies especially in its first part, in which the author writes on cultural, literary, social and general political issues, and in which he used a scholarly method in presenting Slovakia's contribution to Slavic civilization (pp. 25-26, 40-49). In works on Slavic literature there was, until now, considerable confusion as to the literary language used by the Slovaks and if, or how far, the Slovak language was a distinct Slavic tongue. These questions as well as many others pertaining to the Slovak national and cultural heritage, are answered on the basis of recent research in Dr. Kirschbaum's book. He supports his conclusions by many quotations and documents translated from originals." Nevertheless, Prof. Lalich thinks that the substance of Dr. Kirschbaum's book is "in Part II, in which the author deals extensively with the origin of Czechoslovakia and of the Slovak Republic, and offers quite a different picture from that presented by others during or after the war. Since the author undoubtedly has the necessary background to write on this subject with authority, and because he has based his conclusions on references to a large number of documents, his new presentation of modern Slovak history will not be without value, though it may not or will not satisfy some editors of symposia on Central European countries, whose views the author attacks and rejects as having been motivated by politics and not by facts or scholarly research. In presenting the case of Slovakia, the author tends, however, to engage in an argument rather than in an impartial explanation of faots, 11s if he were intentionally trying to provoke a controversy instead of trying to achieve the acceptance of his views. Repetition of evident 106 SLOVAKIA inaccuracies in many works dealing with Slovakia can certainly irritate the Slovaks, but to readers who are far from resentments, which the Slovaks may rightly feel towards some of their neighbours or politicians, a less emotional presentation would probably be more efficient. The author appears more of a politician than a scholar in this part of his work; nevertheless, he still respects the facts and the truth, and the large documentation he has used makes the book an honest and courageous attempt at a new presentation of Slovakia." Prof. Charles Murin analyzed and evaluated the book in a lenghty scholarly analysis. In his view, "Prof. Kirschbaum's book is written for both the intelligent observer of the international politics and those whose task it is to participate in the shaping of the current international situation which seems to contain an amount of irrational elements to a degree probably never equalled in the period of modern history." "Kirschbaum's book," Prof. Murin continues, "is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the premises and origins of the present day situation, restricted to one of its sections: Central Europe. Genetically this seems to be the most important field through the quantitive aspects of the problems in Asia and Africa overshadow the European problems. The author relates the political history of Slovakia and of Central Europe. The period described, however, happens to be the one which preceded the Soviet hegemony over half of Europe. Thus the book contains excellent material offered to the English reader who wants to trace down the errors of the past and is willing both to learn from the past errors and re-think the categories of living ideas and forces which simultane-0usly are being shaped by and are shaping this world of ours. The basic service this book renders to the reader is that it shows him to what degree the conceptions of the West in regard to the political organization of one of the neuralgic spots in Europe were dominated by facts and to what degree by fancy. To show the interplay of reality and illusion, the genuine and the phony in the official views of the state departments of the West in regard to Central Europe seems to be to be the aim of the book. Further the author shows to what extent these conceptions contained inherent contradictions and were, therefore, doomed in the long run. Be it noted that some of the prejudices discussed in the book represent an inheritance from the post-World War I arrangements." In the opinion of Professor Murin the author "has mastered more than sufficiently the material he is dealing with and is in a solid position to give an accurate account on Slovak history, an account on a sober relativistic character of historical events, thus avoiding the peculiar exclusivities not only of the Czech and Magyar writers, but also of their Slovak antipodes." Publications on cultural matters, four of which Dr. Kirschbaum published in the series Slavistica, edited by Prof. J. B. Rudnyckyj from the University of Manitoba, were reviewed in Slavic Review, University of Toronto quarterly, Slavica Canadiana, Revista de Estudion Politicos SLOVAKIA 107 (Vol. 117-118, 125), Slovakia, Slowakei, Most, as well as in numerous Slovak newspapers and periodicals. Foreign and Slovak reviewers (Dr. S. Glejdura, Rev. A. Pier, Dr. J. Rekem), welcomed these studies as a valuable contribution to scholarly literature on Slovakia destined to acquaint Western Slavists with Slovak culture. Several essays dealing with the Slovak language, philology and literary history, which Dr. Kirschbaum published in academic reviews (Canadian Slavonic Papers, Etudes slaves et est-europeennes) or in Slovak Studies (Vol. ill) and Most, appeared also in reprints and were favorably commented upon by reviewers in Canada, the U.S.A. and Europe. In view of the fact that even among Western Slavists there were many misconceptions .about Slovak language and literatur,e, Dr. Kirschbaum's writings were the first ones in foreign languages to shed an objective light on Slovak language and literature. Several of these essays were originally papers delivered and discussed at annual meetings of Canadian and American :Slavists and performed a useful role of acquainting professors of Slavic studies with Slovak history and literature. The largest and, in the opinion of some critics, the best work by Dr. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, was received as a model for history books on ethnic groups. In addition to numerous reviews in Slovak, over 30 book reviews in not less than 15 languages were published within a year of the publication of the book. And all were exceptionally favorable. The Minister of Education of Ontario spoke about the book in Parliament and one of the best known Canadian radio and television commentators, Gordon Sinclair, analyzed and praised the book as o particular contribution to Canadian history. Even though the topic of the book had a limited scope, the number of academic periodicals which reviewed it favorably, was greater than in the case of the first English book by Dr. Kirschbaum. Moreover, the reviews were written by professors known as experts and were published in the official organs of American and Canadian associations ,of Slavists: the Slavic Review (Prof. Taborsky); Canadian Slavonic Papers (Prof. J. V. Kaye) ; Etudes slaves et est-europeennes (Prof. R. <::ujes); Slavica Canadiana (Prof. Charles Murin); University of Ottawa Quarterly (Prof. E. Buydosh). From a number of reviews by professors at American and Canadian universities at least a few should be mentioned. Prof E. Taborsky of the University of Texas, assessed the book in the Slavic Review (Vol. 29, No. 2), as follows: "Professor Kirschbaum divides his "saga of a small group of people in a new land who preserved their identity and achieved success" into four parts. Part I describes the historical, ethnic, cultural, political, 1·eligious, and economic ground of the Slovak immigrants and concludes with a brief sketch of the Slovak national character. Based on a wealth of sources, including the archives of various Canadian Slovak organizations, the Slovak press in Canada, and interviews with Slovak settlers in many parts· of Canada, Kirschbaum's study is a useful contribution to the literature on the Cenh·al European 108 SLOVAKIA immigration to the Western Hemisphere. It is only a pity that the volume is marred by occasional remarks revealing the author's antiCrech bias and detracting thus from the objectivity promised in the book's preface." Dr. V. J. Kaye of the Ottawa University welcomed the book as "the first detailed, well-documented, and excellently written history in the English language of the Slovak ethnic group in Canada." And after giving the perusal of individual chapters saying that "Dr. Kirschbaum's study is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the history of Slavic groups in Canada, and he deserves full recognition for his achievement." (Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. XI, 1, 1969). In the Etudes siaves et est europeennes (Vol. XIII, 1968), Professor R. Cujes of the St. Francis Xavier University wrote about the book as follows: "Centennial year served as an opportune stimulus for informing Canadians of the many and diverse ethnic contributions evident in contemporary Canada. An outstanding example, and one which has been favorably reviewed in several ethnic publications across Canada, is Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum's "Slovaks in Canada." The author certainly succeeded in his task of uncovering and preserving much historical data which will be of interest not only to Canadians of Slovak origin, but also to Canadian historians who have still to write a truly Canadian history. He achieved a good balance between the two extremes possible in such works: either to be too general to have documentary value or to become so detailed that the book becomes source material and too heavy for the general reader. By writing this book, Dr. Kirschbaum rendered invaluable services not only to Slovaks in Canada whose deeds he faithfully recorded but also to all Canadians. Some other ethnic groups, especially the smaller ones which have had, in many ways, similar experience as the Slovaks, may become encouraged to undertake a similar publication of their own. The fact that Dr. Kirschbaum is one of the most important Slovak personalities in Canada, a:nd that he plays an important role among Slovaks abroad, enabled him to present a very clear and complete picture. Nevertheless, the book suffers from one defect; Dr. Kirschbaum's own contributions are much too attenuated. They are an essential and very important I')art of the Slovak scene and should have been presented at greater length in the text and not confined to footnotes and bibliography." Prof J. Roucek, known by his anti-Slovak bias, reviewed the book in Inter1tationai Migration Review (Vol. III, 9, 1969), together with another book on Slovaks and Czechs in Canada by J. Gellner-J. Smerek. In Roucek's opinion Dr. Kirschbaum "certainly stresses his filiopietism" and is "promoting Slovak separatism," to which Prof. Roucek obje~ts, he nevertheless writes: "Since both of these studies are the first systematic surveys of their subject in English, their appearance must be welcomed by all students SLOVAKIA 109 interested in the growing number of immigrants in Canada. Both are filled with valuable information which is hardly acoessible to the average scholar not able to read Czech and Slovak, and both have been prepared by Czechs and Slovaks intimately acquainted with the communities of their countrymen in Canada. Nevertheless, both also suffer when we compare them with each other. In general, Kirschbaum's study, in spite of its weaknesses, is much better and more exhaustive that Gellner-Smerek's work, since it is better documented (as shown by its bibliography, pp. 441-455), and contains reprints of 24 memoranda, petitions, pleas, and resolutions either to the Canadian authorities or to the United Nations by the Slovak Canadian organizations, as well as by individual members of the Canadian Slovak League and the First Catholic Slovak Union during the past three decaaes." On the part of American Slovaks the book was received with the mixture of enthusiasm and envy, expressed not only in a great number of newspapers but also by the poet Mikulas Sprinc in Most, and two ,t eachers at the SS. Cyril and Methodius Academy, Sisters M. Y. Lederleitner and M. M. Tybor. In their thorough analysis of the book they wrote: "A historical survey of Slovaks living anywhere outside their native Slovakia must of necessity follow a certain pattern of development. For the benefit of uniformed readers, the opening of the work must be expository-a delineation of the historic background of the Slovak people and their position with a historic perspective. Then there logically follows a record of their uprooting within the scope of the given consideration, as well as their trials and tribulations in a new environment, an evaluation of what forces worked for or against them, and an assessment of their achievements in the new land. In his book Slovaks in Canada, Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum has effectively met this challenge. We who are privileged to look upon the accomplished fact of a finished project presenting to the public the aches and the trials, the hopes and the promises, the opportunities and the fulfillment up to triumph, the gifts received and the gifts given, the moral as well as the material investments made and the dividends garnered-we are grateful to Dr. Kirschbaum whose scholarly initiative and ac\.lmen together with his indefatigable industry and talent has made this book a reality. It deserves more than one reading since it is an informative and bigly interesting account of Slovak life in a new world setting. In all honesty, we must admit an undenied regret that the Slovaks in the U. S. have not produced a similar or parallel history of their own to match Slovaks in Canada while at the same time we cherish a justifiable pride in Dr. Kirschbaum because he has done a good work well." The book was very positively evaluated even by the official organ of Slovak Protestants in the United States, The Zion (September 1971 ). In the opinion of the editor, Pastor John Adam, Dr. Kirschbaum "has, in his book, Slovaks in Canada, given all Slovaks a valuable history 110 SLOVAKIA which will stand for decades as the work on the immigration of Slovaks to Canada in the first 60 years of this century. He has captured the trials, tribulations and triumphs of Slovaks who came to Canada in three separate waves of immigration. The account of the struggle of the pioneers has thorough documentation, which will help even Americans of Slovak ancestry understand a part of their past for the experience in Canada, in many respects, is a reflection of the struggle in America." In the opinion of the Hon. R. S. Welch, Minister of Education of the Ontario Government, "Slovaks in Canada, as its title suggests, is a comprehensive account of Slovak migrations to Canada, of the trials and successes the Slovak people have experienced here, and of their important contributions to our land. Its author is Slovakian-born Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum, a former diplomat who has achieved great distinction in Canada as an editor, author, schol,a r and university professor of Slavic-Slovak studies. Its sponsor is the Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario. It should, therefore, be a source of satisfaction to all of us when scholars of other ethnic origins, equally proud of both their ancestry and of the contributions made by members of their race to the Canadian nation, choose to chronicle the histories of their people in Canada." (From a speech in Parliament on July 15, 1968). SLOVAKIA is published annually iby the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Arnerican'S of Slovwk descent. One of i:Jhe purposes of SLOVAKIA is to promote ,a bebter U'llderst anding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and jiJs long struggle for freedom and inde-pendeuce. Subscription to Slovrukia $3.00 per year in the U.S.A. - $4.00 elsewhere. Sen<l subscription to: SLOVAKIA 313 Ridge A venue Middletown, P a. 17057  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Evaluation of Dr. Kirschbaum's Writings by Critics Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 101-110 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8db2a792fb292ff3053ab1e8cca1b257.pdf e05652a9ced880bbf4115561a359e20f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 87 Excerpt from In Due Season Paul Wilkes "Is ... is he home? Pan Vlasek?" '' No, no, in the field,'' Dusan replied impatiently, stuffing two huge loaves of bread into a sack . "Stara?" "Yes, yes. Matka moja, what you girls won't do ; you are the third one today.'' ''Oh,'' she breathed, as if by her late arrival she might already have lost out. "I won't stay long. I have a heap of washing to do. So high I can't even see over the top of it.' ' "They are good to you, those Magyars?" "Oh yes, Pan Vlasek. When they have roast, we have roast. And as many potatoes as you can eat." "So you are happy up there on the hill?" "For now." "And?" '' Someday I want to live again in the valley in my own house and raise children; eight, ten, maybe an even dozen . I do not want a fancy life. " "For such a family you need a strong back and a wealthy husband . " "Just one who works hard, Pan Vlasek. I already know the one. And I am strong, stronger than the other girls. I will make a good wife.'' "You children. So eager to grow up . If you only knew . Well, Kubo will be back soon and he should not find you here. He is not used to the ways of females . " Dusan put on his hat and tossed the bag to his shoulder. "By the way," he said, lowering his voice, "is it true what they do up there ; the drinking, the sins of the flesh , all that?" "My parents tell me little , but in the morning, cleaning up the great hall, there are signs, Pan Vlasek," she said, lowering her eyes in shame. �88 SLOVAKIA ''Terrible , awful,'' Dusan said, and passing through the d oor added , "and worse yet not be able to a fford it. Good lu ck, girl." The old woman was sitting on a b ench in the corner of the room, lost in the shadows beneath the holy pictures. A s the rosary bead s slipped throu gh her fingers , her wrinkled lips m oved quickly, giving off the sound of something sizzling, like w et wood add ed to a hot fire. Step b y step Zu zka Tavelcako va a pproach ed he r , lookin g for som e sign that the woman kn ew she was there. She h a d grown in the years she'd lived with he r family in the castle of Count Szepesy a nd was indeed n ot only stron ger but considerably larger than other girls of her age, which was fifteen . H er shoulders were broad , he r hands , already red and calloused from hours of scrubbing clothes a nd peeling vege ta bl es and h auling wood to the many fireplaces , were so able that even her older broth er s would call upon Zuzka when they needed to pull a balking cow into a stall or when the last sacks of fl our h ad to be stacked near the crossp iece of the hu ge sypanec. But , as much as God ha d blessed her with a n abundan ce of good h ealth a nd strength , H e had not bee n so gen erou s with he r appearance. H er forehead was too large, and a certain puffiness above her eyes m ade h er appear to be con sta ntly scowlin g. Although her mouth was full a nd well formed, her upper lip had a tendency to pu sh up the skin b eneath her nose, the force of which formed two d eep lines that curled ben eath her ch eeks . Zuzka Tavelcakova was a good-natured , ch eerful girl in her heart a nd in her actio n s, but her face did not represent her justly. " I have brought a forint, P ani Micekova," Zuzka said softly, bendin g at the knee in a quick curtsy before the old woman . The old woman ' s eyes did not open; her lip s moved more quickly, as if she would h ave to be furt her coaxed from her religious reverie. "Teta? " she said with greatest respect. " Y ou are the o nly one who can help .'' " Did yo u d o exactly as I told yo u ? " the old woman snapped, continuing w ith her rosary as she awaited the suppli can t's reply. " Oh, yes, everyth in g," Zuzka said excitedly. She began her reci ta tion, graspin g first he r sm allest fin ger, holdin g it tightly as she savored h er exact ness, her fervidness, as she un abash edly displayed her girl ish hope . "Last night, in the moonlight , the brightest moonlight - I waited - I picked zemezlce by the river. I picked a nd I picked until my zajda was filled. �SLOVAKIA 89 "A littl e is all tha t is n eed ed ." She dismissed h e r exuberance . " I didn ' t want to take chances; I didn ' t think it would hurt." '' Then ?'' She grasped the n ext finger . " Then I went to the fi eld of konope wi th the other girls and I rolled and rolled . Each of us put a stick with a different-colored ribbon in the ground so we would know wh ere we h ad been .'' She ra n her h ands over the front of her apron . '' The konope sta nd s straight ... well , almost straight , thi s m ornin g." " Better tha t it is n ot perfect; tha t would m ean you m a rry in a year. T oo youn g ." " And we all m ad e wreath s with branches of the willow , a nd when we threw them in the rive r , pani , mine was the first to reach th e great rock . The first!" '' So you will m a rry first , but n ot n ext year. '' She grasped h er fourth fin ge r , but h er h ands soon slid toge ther , locked in their own praye r. " I knelt befo re the Virgin a nd p romised that if she heard m y plea I would n ot let Kubo tou ch a n ythin g more tha n m y a rm until we we re m a n a nd wife. I vowed it, teta, under p ain of m ortal sin 1 " The old wom an ' s eyes fli ckered open , glistenin g in their d a rk sockets. Zu zka could not look into those eyes; sh e peered down , intentl y foll owin g a ha irline crack in the dirt floo r. " You mu st swear it again , Zu zka, swear tha t n o impure thou ghts will co m e into your mind. T h a t if Kubo so mu ch as tou ches you a bove here," she said , layin g h er gna rl ed h a nd on the opposite elbow , "you will sla p him as if he we re the d evil him self. '' " Oh , I do swear it! Unde r pa in of th e etern al fi res of hell 1" " You h ave th ose la r ge breas ts." The old wom a n n odded gravely towa rd Zu zka's blouse. " The boys will wa n t to touch them; even him ." " T eta, I have dedicated them to the Virgin ; they a re hers, n ot his," she said , takin g in h er breath a nd pullin g he r ves t ti ghtly against her body. " Oh , I a m so rry they h ave grown so." " I don ' t know wh y you want the b oy a nyh ow ," the old wom a n said . '' H e is neither b ig nor clever.'' " I am stron g," a n d Zu zka's vo ice becam e so ft e r , th at of a m other spea kin g to her in fa nt , "and h e is kind a nd ge ntl e, n ot like the other boys ." T he to ne aga in was firm. " And I can pu sh him , help him to be a m a n , sta nd up ." �90 SLOVAKIA The old woman's hands, the rosary still entwined in her fingers, disappeared beneath her threadbare shawl. Zuzka stood still, her heart pounding, her breath escaping from her mouth in a series of sharp, moist gasps. "Please, God, please . . . " she whispered. ''Through . . . the . .. Christ . . . bring . . . '' Zuzka leaned forward, straining to hear, but she could only understand a few words as they rasped forth from deep in the old woman's throat. '' . . . drawn to . . . let his . . . Holy Ghost, Amen.'' Zuzka took a step forward, the forint in hand. "From the drippings at Our Lady's altar. The most blessed wax at Our Lady's feet, ' ' the old woman said with a certain pride of craftsmanship . But when she saw the hand stretched out to her with the coin, her own hand snapped shut. "So, little foolish girl, you think you can buy this? Pay the bosorka and laugh to your friends about the old fool? You have your nerve!'' "No, no, teta," Zuzka pleaded. "I know that. Look. I place the coin here, on the bench. I do not give it to you. No, nothing this sacred can be bought.'' "Leave no doubt about it." The hand opened again. Squarely in the middle of the old woman's palm lay the figure of a man, no bigger than a thumball, fashioned from pale yellow beeswax. When Kubo returned from the fields he found the house empty, the ashes in the fireplace cool. He splashed water on his face, neck , and arms and dressed hurriedly, silently cursing the hundreds of tiny shoots that had virtually sprung up overnight among the potato plants. His father had drummed into his head the old saying, ''Cut the weed today and spare the plant tomorrow , " and Kubo, whose main task at this time of the year was weeding, sometimes had to be prodded to maintain his vigilance against the tiny green enemies that sapped the nourishment of the crops . But not on that day, for Kubo wanted to impress upon his father how responsible, how serious he was about work. Although his family left early Kubo remained behind and made sure that the field was clean, the soil broken with his hoe to receive whatever rain might fall. Kubo shoved his blouse into the clean white woolen britches with the thick black embroidery and reached up to the shelf above the bed �SLOVAKIA 91 to take down his ciapka. He looked at the foolish little brimless pillbox , the two silken ribbons that trailed behind . A boy' s cap. A child's. As he plopped it on the back of his head, the dismal thought came to his mind that it could still be on his head when St. John 's Day came next year. By the time Kubo arrived, out of breath from his run , the pasture to the north of the village was already filled with people, and the Feast of St. John 's had begun. The cows, Gizela among them, grazed peacefully in the afternoon light, with wreaths of daisies over their horns, which Anna and the girls her age had made. The older, unmarried girls had woven a long chain of daisies and took turns flinging it up into the tall oak . It was an important ritual, for the number of branches the chain covered would be the years each maiden would have to wait for marriage . Up to a certain age, young girls threw the chain of daisies with all their might, but the older maidens, like Justina Marusakova, now twenty-three, whose half-closed eyes and stuttering, dull speech had failed to attract a spouse, aimed for a single low branch and prayed that the superstition bore truth . Everyone got a turn , even Zuzka's oldest sister , Dorota, who was past forty but whose brain had remained that of a child's. As Kubo walked by the group of girls, Zuzka eagerly took the chain of daisies in her large hands and puffed out the chest she had sworn hours before would not be violated. But marriage and carnal thoughts were the farthest things from his mind , and he did not look as the daisies and her prayers fluttered toward heaven . He went directly to the huge , square stack of neatly cut logs and bent his head back to take in the dozens of small fir trees that had been placed on top. As the sun set on this, the longest day of the year, the day of Jana, the pagan god who was Christianized into the good St. John , the dry wood would burst into flame and the yearly pageant would be performed. At its end, Kubo well knew, a brave few, who up to this night had been called boys and treated as such, would henceforth walk the village streets as men. Kubo gulped and stooped down, stretching the muscles of his legs . Off to the side of the huge stack the V adasz brothers and other boys just a year or two younger than Kubo were playing a game he had played many times himself. And even with some of them . One boy would bend down and another would leap upon him like a frog , and be carried for �92 SLOVAKIA as long a di stance as youn g legs could hold up . Still other boys were imitating the cows grazin g, complete with mooin g sounds . The young C ernetsky boy had borrowed the d a isy wreath from their cow , Sargula , and the other boys cla pped with glee at the silly sigh t. " Kubo, come , com e , " they called to him , but Kubo acted as if he could not hear them. H e threw his shoulders back, strainin g his bod y to be as tall as he possibly could , and walked to a spot near the tables of food and drink where his fa ther was sta ndin g, hi s pipe in ha nd , talkin g to som e men . '' This is m y Kubo ,'' Du san said to a short m an wh o wore a long ostrich feather in his hat, " the best weed puller south of the High T atras. M eet P an Bozek and hi s boy P avel, " he said, m otionin g to a boy a bout Kubo's age . On th e boy's head was a ha t and feather similar to his father 's, a nd he nodded withou t say in g a word. It was another humilia tin g reminder. " W e were ju st talking a bout the first m arket in Bard ejov," Du san said. '' P an Bozek is a great landowner in M ala M aca and plans to sell mu ch . " " N o, no, not a great landowner ," P an Bozek said . " Ju st a simple peasant like yourself, blessed with a few m eters of God's precious earth , who works hi s fool head off. '' '' For yourself, a nd if a neighbor need s a hand ... '' ' ' ... well , thi s is our way, it is nothing to b rag .. . '' ' ' .. . D o you hear of su ch things from those who have gone to A m erika? Answe r m e tha t one.' ' Du san j abbed at the space in fron t of P an Bozek 's nose. " They all work for them selves, neve r help a friend to ha rvest or give a loaf of b read to one who need s it. You , Pan Bozek , are a fine exam pie to put in the face of all those vypasen f A m ericania. T ake notice of this m an , Kubo.'' " L ast year we took three wagonload s of wheat and l'an to Bardej ov and sold everything," Pavel said , putting his hands on his hips. " Our horse d anced all the way hom e.'' " Ju st forin ts and crowns to bring hom e," Du san said . "A ligh t load ." " W ell . .. " P a n Bozek said , tryin g to a ppear modest. " I have neve r seen you at the m arket," Pavel said to Kubo . " M y boy is not yet ready," Dusan said before Kubo could answer. " There is no hurry. Som e d ay . . . Now , som e p alenka, m y fri end , and �SLOVAKIA 93 some of the fine kolace from the village o f Zbudza. You boys run off a nd play. '' A s the sun linge red capri ciou sly in the sky, P avel a nd Kubo w alked a mon g the revelers , drank the sweet berry juices and a te hu ge hunks of the la mb tha t Banfk had brought only to h ave so m e villagers refuse to to uch it , calling it a "guilt offering." Whe n the two boys came close to the group of young girls who had started to d a n ce with each othe r , Eta Min arovicova and Julia Vadaszova looked toward Kubo , but he knew it was for a n introdu ction to the h a ndsom e stra nge r a nd not for him self. R egardless, Kubo was more inte res ted in P avel's stories of the market a t Bardejov, of the hu ge wheels of cheese that the shepherds m ad e, of the m agnifice nt church th a t could hold all the people from five la rge vill ages. Pavel did n ot do it in the boastful fashion of Fra nko Hruscak , who made boys just a year o r two younger than him self feel like mere b a bies because they had never been to Bardejov and he had . P avel talked quietly , directly, but almost reli giou sly about the la nd t hat hi s fa mil y owned in M ala Maca, a nd how som ed ay, as the eldest son , it would be hi s. " And I will h ave more each year ," he said with suren ess in hi s voice. "There is no thing I love more than work. " H e add ed with a smile, " And a little slivovica n ow and then when m y fa the r doesn't fini sh hi s gla ss. All these p eople going to Amerika! Hah , m y father is right , yours too . Wh at cou ld be a b etter life than we have?" As Kubo tried not to loo k envious, P avel went on to tell him that he was coming hom e late r a nd la ter a t ni ght , and so m et imes his parents were a lready in bed , so he slept in the barn . Kubo had slept in the barn o fte n o n hot summ er ni ghts , but th e idea of slee pin g there a fter spe ndin g a ni ght in the foothills, sm okin g cigarettes with hi s friends, or after makin g wolf call s a t a girl' s window, was a forbidden pleasure so swee t he co uld not believe it would ever ha ppen . " Who ' s that?" P a vel motioned . " The little o ne? M y sister, Anna. Why? " " I' ve n eve r seen ha ir like he rs ; stra n ge color. " '' Baby h a ir , just a streak . '' " H ow old is she a n yhow ?" P avel said , hi s eyes n o t leav ing Anna until she disappeared into the crowd that h ad gathered a round the stack of wood. '' Almost eleve n .'' �94 SLOVAKIA "Skinny legs." ''I guess. She's a dreamer.'' '' AAAHHHH ! '' The sound echoed over the meadow to the tall junipers, sending a flock of bluejays into the purple night air. "AAAHHHH!" It rumbled down the slope to where the river Laborec wound its way through the thickets ofreeds. "AAAHHHH!" the chorus of voices breathed as the flames licked at the neatly stacked logs and suddenly burst skyward in a mammoth orange ball as the sap-filled branches, the needles and cones of the fur trees caught fire . Kubo's throat went dry. Pavel put his arm over the shoulder of the boy he'd met just a short time before. "Not yet . It will die down. There is time to be a man." Other boys, some Kubo's age, like Franko Hruscak andjozefKralik also stood around the fire, carefully eyeing the flames and casting sidelong glances to see if anyone was ready to try . Cyril Gasparovic was also there, a frail boy already three years older than Kubo, who had never danced or jumped over the fire and whose mother was known to be making a novena to the Blessed Lady . The firs burned off quickly, leaving shimmering red skeletons, but flames from the logs were still at least as high as the top of his head as Kubo walked a slow circle around the fire, eyeing it with the intensity and dread of a baca faced with a hungry wolf. It was a delicate issue, one, down through the centuries that the tradition had been practiced, that required the judgment only a mature man would have . There was a point, just one point, when the flames receded enough to be traversed but when a boy could be seriously burned or, as the story was told of the arrogant richtar 's son many years ago, killed . There would always be one person who knew that point, took the chance, and the others who followed would go through life remembering his bravery and bemoaning their lack of it. It was sometimes better to wait until the next St. John ' s Day rather than risk the humiliation of being one of the last, the least brave . For as the fire died down , even the tiny boys of the village would jump over the embers in childish practice for the day some years away when they would risk painful burns to gain their manhood. The gypsy band struck up the first tunes, and it was mostly the older people, singing and clapping their hands, who began to flatten the thick grass with their dancing feet . The rest of the people from Zbud- �SLOVAKIA 95 za, those with young sons and those from Mala Maca and V el'ka Maca who had made a pilgrimage for the feast days stayed close to that fire, talking among themselves, waiting, but making no reference to the drama that was building moment by moment. Kubo had made a complete circle, and finally he stood before his father, his arms at his sides, like a soldier in ranks. "Otec," he said, using the formal address, "will you please hold my ciapka?" Dusan looked over his son's shoulder to the leaping yellow and red flames of the fire. He squinted so that he could see it better. Then he extended his hand without saying a word, either of encouragement or caution, and took the hat from his son, placing it under his arm. One by one, the people moved to the side, clearing a path. Except for a low, haunting gypsy love song and the crackling of dry wood, the meadow was quiet, and nothing stood between Kubo Vlasek and the state he so desired, nothing but the fire that had purged and proven men of Zbudza for countless generations. His heart pounding, his mouth full of cotton, Kubo made the sign of the cross. His first steps were almost his undoing as his krpce slipped on grass, moist from spilled beer. But then he lengthened his stride and by the time he had reached the edge of the crowd, he was running as fast as he could. Logs tumbled together at the fire's core and a huge tongue of flame leaped out, but it was too late . Kubo 's krpce had left the ground. "AAAHHHH," the sound - a cheer, a moan - rose up from the lips of men and women and children as a form, black against the bright flames, seemed to hang in the air. The gypsy band stopped in mid-song . "AAAHHHH ! " Women crossed themselves and men's lips tightened . The mouths of small children gaped open . "AAAAAAHHHHHH !" The fire crackled angrily, spitting hot sparks into the cool night air. Dusan fingered the ciapka beneath his arm, then grasped it firmly . His son stood before him, eyebrows vanished from his pink face, his hair a mass of tiny burnt and frizzy curls, one leg of his while trousers browned , like the top of a loaf of bread. Dusan could smell the hair , the cloth, the flesh that had passed through the St. John's fire . He extended the ciapka to his son , looking at it , turning it in his hand . "Perhaps a bit too small, Kubo . I think in Bardejov they might �96 SLOVAKIA have some bigge r ones ; more like . . " Whateve r words follow ed were lost in the deafening accolade rendered to J a kub Vlasek . After hi s awesome display of b ravery, Kubo could seemingl y d o nothing wrong as the sun set and the evenin g of dancin g began in earnest. His krpce kicked hi gh in the a ir but la nd ed with a feather's li ghtness so close to the fl asks of vino a nd borovicka th a t gasps were heard from the young girls who stood in a group eyeing the b oys who would somed ay be th eir hu sbands . Even Eta Min arovicova a nd Julia Vad aszova, b y far the pretti es t a nd most choosy girls in Zbudza on feas t days in th e pas t acted as if Kubo Vl ase k had some co n tagious disease, co uld n ot kee p their eyes off him . Their hands behind th eir backs, th eir hips swayin g ge ntly to the musi c, they waited, as did all their girl fri ends, for the m ost impor tant d a nce in the li fe of eve ry b oy who jumped ove r the fire on St. J ohn 's D ay. The gy psies kn ew it. Their gold tee th fl ashin g beneath bl ack mu staches, they would tease with th e first ba rs of a popula r tun e . But the n they would break into a nothe r so n g th at onl y the boys cou ld dan ce to, a nd display their prowess st ill more, d elay in g th e mom ent when the eager young girls and the proud young boys would have a dance together. The b a nd stru ck up a d a nce don e entirely on one foot. Boys shoved and j ostl ed, feinted a nd du cked , a nd th e less agil e we re se n t sprawling into th e grass . And , a t the da n ce's e nd , the re was ju st one who h ad not resorted to u sin g hi s oth er foot , who had not bee n kn ocked ove r. Kubo Vl asek twirl ed a round on the b all of hi s foot, with a n agilit y eve n his fath er had to applaud. Th e gypse husle pl aye r kept Kubo dan cin g , in creas in g the beat , but Ku bo, lost in the ecstasy of th e m agic ni ght , would not lose hi s bal a nce. Hi s mind was already in Ba rdej ov, hi s head already cove red in a fin e n ew hat. H e could feel the jin gle of co ins in hi s pocket , straw und er hi s b ack in th e b a rn. Th e bea t cha n ged so su b tl y that Kubo was not even awa re o f it. H e kept twirlin g a nd twirlin g. It was alread y pitch d a rk , but logs had bee n h eaped on th e fire, a nd as Kubo 's eyes, fogged with pe rspiration , took in the blur of faces standin g aro und the dan cin g a rea, fl ashes of color sta rted swirlin g a bout him , in th e opposite d irection . Lik e great red a nd yell ow and gree n eels sw immin g in a shall ow strea m , the o rnate p arta stream in g dow n from th e braided heads of th e un married �SLOVAKIA 97 girls shimmered in the fire's light , each offerin g the ni ght 's h ero th e m a iden of his choosin g. All the rituals h e h ad prepared for , jumping over the fire, the o n elegged dan ce, but Kubo Vlasek had not , up to that very moment, decided whi ch girl would have the h onor of hi s first dan ce as a man . H e twirled faster a nd became dizzie r in hi s deliciou s mom ent of triumph , in his hour of indecision . The parta flutte red by, the tip s flickering a t his nose. The gypsy band picked up the beat. Faster and faster. His a rm reached out to the fl ashing colors. And it was soundly m et. " Oh , thank you , I would be m ost honored ." The vill agers applauded still louder while Kubo 's frie nds hooted a nd whistled . And Zu zka Tavelcakova, her great eyebrows arched over a huge smile, her free arm s swin ging in wild exultation , her huge breasts threatening release from the rest of h er body, d a n ced about the circle. She held on to Kubo tightly a nd , as they n eared the fire, reached into her apron pocket a nd withdrew a clenched fist , with which she bl essed herself. Then th e h a nd fl ew o pe n - and a small obj ect disappeared into th e flam es. Around, around h e twirled Zuzka until finally the gypsy playing the cymbal ran th e soft felt hammers from the low notes to the high, signaling the n ext dan ce would begin . But , befor e they could launch into it , several pa irs of ha nds reached out to Kubo , and sudde nl y he was be ing ho isted into th e a ir. ' ']eden! " " D va! 1 " " Tri 11 ! " And with th e third toss the loud est chee r - fu eled b y boro vicka and bee r and tradition - rippl ed across the m eadow and down to the ri ver whe re a fl ock of tin y doves bolted from the reed s a nd fl ew towa rd th e d a rkne ss of th e hu ge junipe rs . '' Y AAA Y AA AAA Y AAAAAAAAA 1 ' ' " And now th e new m a n bu ys th e nex t bottle of pa.lenka," Mlad en shouted at Kubo, whose wet, sin ged ha ir was bein g tou sled by hi s young fri e nd s, whose ha nd s were be in g pressed with ha nd sh akes . One ha ndsh a ke was stronge r , lo n ger than the others, a nd as Kubo blink ed through the sweat a nd ash in hi s eyes, he co uld see th at it was hi s fat he r who stood befo re him. Whe n at least he was released , Kubo had a k orun ak in hi s ha nd . �98 SLOVAKIA " You a re a m an , m y son , a nd you will from thi s day be pa id wages," Du san said, talkin g slowing so as not to slur hi s words. " You will inherit the land , you will care for this fam ily ... but now, first things first. Buy the palenka!" The fire died down and was fed with fresh logs. Boys sneaked off with girls and nuzzled in the darkness. The gypsy band played and drank and played still more . The old woman , Micekova, nodded without sayin g a word when Zuzka's mother said that her d au ghter a nd the young Vlasek boy made a fine couple. The young teacher danced with some of the v ill age women, but only when they asked him . And a small boy, whose emerald eyes glistened when the flame s rose, stood a top the hill in the shadow of the giant lindens , his thumb s locked in hi s belt. When it came time to return home, Kubo eventually found his father lyin g on the ground , a n empty bottle in his ha nd, his head propped against the thick exposed roots of an oak tree, hi s eyes barely visible through sm all slits. H e motioned for hi s son to sit b y him . " I have only a year , perhaps two in this vale of tears, " Dusan began, we ighing each word somberly and pattin g hi s so n on the knee. "You mu st rem ain stron g, my so n , my only son , and believe in what is right and decent , what has bee n ha nded down from generation to generation. " His eyes fli ckered open wider. " Father , why this talk? You a re healthy; you will live to be one hundred ." " Place your hand on my heart." '' Father ?'' " Your ha nd ." Kubo did as he was told. Dusan pressed the boy's hand onto the fa ncy embroidery of hi s shirt , now soaked with sweat and borovicka, stain ed wi th berry wines and grease from the lamb, tainted as it was. '' R epeat afte r me . . . " I .. . Ku bo Vlasek ... vow on m y father's heart ... on the day I became a man ... to love this land . . . never to turn from it ... To listen to God and not the foo lish tal es of the world outs ide ... To care for children and a nimals ... because each co m es from God ever to strike my woman without good reason ... To kee p this sac red pledge ... as pledged on my father's heart ... that the cursed word 'Amerika ' wi ll never ... never . . . be heard in the house ... �SLOVAKIA 99 our esteem ed Milos Vlasek built . .. with his bare hands ... years and years ago.'' Dusan ' s voice became lower and lower as if he were ready to cry. " Do you promise all this my son, unde r pain of mortal sin, eternal damnation and the fires of hell ?" "I do, Father ," Kubo said evenly, " I promise this before God ." "Good ." Dusan slumped back onto the roots . " Now, fetch the wagon. Your father is too tired to be walking this night." �� SLOVAKIA 87 Excerpt from In Due Season Paul Wilkes "Is ... is he home? Pan Vlasek?" '' No, no, in the field,'' Dusan replied impatiently, stuffing two huge loaves of bread into a sack . "Stara?" "Yes, yes. Matka moja, what you girls won't do ; you are the third one today.'' ''Oh,'' she breathed, as if by her late arrival she might already have lost out. "I won't stay long. I have a heap of washing to do. So high I can't even see over the top of it.' ' "They are good to you, those Magyars?" "Oh yes, Pan Vlasek. When they have roast, we have roast. And as many potatoes as you can eat." "So you are happy up there on the hill?" "For now." "And?" '' Someday I want to live again in the valley in my own house and raise children; eight, ten, maybe an even dozen . I do not want a fancy life. " "For such a family you need a strong back and a wealthy husband . " "Just one who works hard, Pan Vlasek. I already know the one. And I am strong, stronger than the other girls. I will make a good wife.'' "You children. So eager to grow up . If you only knew . Well, Kubo will be back soon and he should not find you here. He is not used to the ways of females . " Dusan put on his hat and tossed the bag to his shoulder. "By the way," he said, lowering his voice, "is it true what they do up there ; the drinking, the sins of the flesh , all that?" "My parents tell me little , but in the morning, cleaning up the great hall, there are signs, Pan Vlasek," she said, lowering her eyes in shame. �88 SLOVAKIA ''Terrible , awful,'' Dusan said, and passing through the d oor added , "and worse yet not be able to a fford it. Good lu ck, girl." The old woman was sitting on a b ench in the corner of the room, lost in the shadows beneath the holy pictures. A s the rosary bead s slipped throu gh her fingers , her wrinkled lips m oved quickly, giving off the sound of something sizzling, like w et wood add ed to a hot fire. Step b y step Zu zka Tavelcako va a pproach ed he r , lookin g for som e sign that the woman kn ew she was there. She h a d grown in the years she'd lived with he r family in the castle of Count Szepesy a nd was indeed n ot only stron ger but considerably larger than other girls of her age, which was fifteen . H er shoulders were broad , he r hands , already red and calloused from hours of scrubbing clothes a nd peeling vege ta bl es and h auling wood to the many fireplaces , were so able that even her older broth er s would call upon Zuzka when they needed to pull a balking cow into a stall or when the last sacks of fl our h ad to be stacked near the crossp iece of the hu ge sypanec. But , as much as God ha d blessed her with a n abundan ce of good h ealth a nd strength , H e had not bee n so gen erou s with he r appearance. H er forehead was too large, and a certain puffiness above her eyes m ade h er appear to be con sta ntly scowlin g. Although her mouth was full a nd well formed, her upper lip had a tendency to pu sh up the skin b eneath her nose, the force of which formed two d eep lines that curled ben eath her ch eeks . Zuzka Tavelcakova was a good-natured , ch eerful girl in her heart a nd in her actio n s, but her face did not represent her justly. " I have brought a forint, P ani Micekova," Zuzka said softly, bendin g at the knee in a quick curtsy before the old woman . The old woman ' s eyes did not open; her lip s moved more quickly, as if she would h ave to be furt her coaxed from her religious reverie. "Teta? " she said with greatest respect. " Y ou are the o nly one who can help .'' " Did yo u d o exactly as I told yo u ? " the old woman snapped, continuing w ith her rosary as she awaited the suppli can t's reply. " Oh, yes, everyth in g," Zuzka said excitedly. She began her reci ta tion, graspin g first he r sm allest fin ger, holdin g it tightly as she savored h er exact ness, her fervidness, as she un abash edly displayed her girl ish hope . "Last night, in the moonlight , the brightest moonlight - I waited - I picked zemezlce by the river. I picked a nd I picked until my zajda was filled. �SLOVAKIA 89 "A littl e is all tha t is n eed ed ." She dismissed h e r exuberance . " I didn ' t want to take chances; I didn ' t think it would hurt." '' Then ?'' She grasped the n ext finger . " Then I went to the fi eld of konope wi th the other girls and I rolled and rolled . Each of us put a stick with a different-colored ribbon in the ground so we would know wh ere we h ad been .'' She ra n her h ands over the front of her apron . '' The konope sta nd s straight ... well , almost straight , thi s m ornin g." " Better tha t it is n ot perfect; tha t would m ean you m a rry in a year. T oo youn g ." " And we all m ad e wreath s with branches of the willow , a nd when we threw them in the rive r , pani , mine was the first to reach th e great rock . The first!" '' So you will m a rry first , but n ot n ext year. '' She grasped h er fourth fin ge r , but h er h ands soon slid toge ther , locked in their own praye r. " I knelt befo re the Virgin a nd p romised that if she heard m y plea I would n ot let Kubo tou ch a n ythin g more tha n m y a rm until we we re m a n a nd wife. I vowed it, teta, under p ain of m ortal sin 1 " The old wom an ' s eyes fli ckered open , glistenin g in their d a rk sockets. Zu zka could not look into those eyes; sh e peered down , intentl y foll owin g a ha irline crack in the dirt floo r. " You mu st swear it again , Zu zka, swear tha t n o impure thou ghts will co m e into your mind. T h a t if Kubo so mu ch as tou ches you a bove here," she said , layin g h er gna rl ed h a nd on the opposite elbow , "you will sla p him as if he we re the d evil him self. '' " Oh , I do swear it! Unde r pa in of th e etern al fi res of hell 1" " You h ave th ose la r ge breas ts." The old wom a n n odded gravely towa rd Zu zka's blouse. " The boys will wa n t to touch them; even him ." " T eta, I have dedicated them to the Virgin ; they a re hers, n ot his," she said , takin g in h er breath a nd pullin g he r ves t ti ghtly against her body. " Oh , I a m so rry they h ave grown so." " I don ' t know wh y you want the b oy a nyh ow ," the old wom a n said . '' H e is neither b ig nor clever.'' " I am stron g," a n d Zu zka's vo ice becam e so ft e r , th at of a m other spea kin g to her in fa nt , "and h e is kind a nd ge ntl e, n ot like the other boys ." T he to ne aga in was firm. " And I can pu sh him , help him to be a m a n , sta nd up ." �90 SLOVAKIA The old woman's hands, the rosary still entwined in her fingers, disappeared beneath her threadbare shawl. Zuzka stood still, her heart pounding, her breath escaping from her mouth in a series of sharp, moist gasps. "Please, God, please . . . " she whispered. ''Through . . . the . .. Christ . . . bring . . . '' Zuzka leaned forward, straining to hear, but she could only understand a few words as they rasped forth from deep in the old woman's throat. '' . . . drawn to . . . let his . . . Holy Ghost, Amen.'' Zuzka took a step forward, the forint in hand. "From the drippings at Our Lady's altar. The most blessed wax at Our Lady's feet, ' ' the old woman said with a certain pride of craftsmanship . But when she saw the hand stretched out to her with the coin, her own hand snapped shut. "So, little foolish girl, you think you can buy this? Pay the bosorka and laugh to your friends about the old fool? You have your nerve!'' "No, no, teta," Zuzka pleaded. "I know that. Look. I place the coin here, on the bench. I do not give it to you. No, nothing this sacred can be bought.'' "Leave no doubt about it." The hand opened again. Squarely in the middle of the old woman's palm lay the figure of a man, no bigger than a thumball, fashioned from pale yellow beeswax. When Kubo returned from the fields he found the house empty, the ashes in the fireplace cool. He splashed water on his face, neck , and arms and dressed hurriedly, silently cursing the hundreds of tiny shoots that had virtually sprung up overnight among the potato plants. His father had drummed into his head the old saying, ''Cut the weed today and spare the plant tomorrow , " and Kubo, whose main task at this time of the year was weeding, sometimes had to be prodded to maintain his vigilance against the tiny green enemies that sapped the nourishment of the crops . But not on that day, for Kubo wanted to impress upon his father how responsible, how serious he was about work. Although his family left early Kubo remained behind and made sure that the field was clean, the soil broken with his hoe to receive whatever rain might fall. Kubo shoved his blouse into the clean white woolen britches with the thick black embroidery and reached up to the shelf above the bed �SLOVAKIA 91 to take down his ciapka. He looked at the foolish little brimless pillbox , the two silken ribbons that trailed behind . A boy' s cap. A child's. As he plopped it on the back of his head, the dismal thought came to his mind that it could still be on his head when St. John 's Day came next year. By the time Kubo arrived, out of breath from his run , the pasture to the north of the village was already filled with people, and the Feast of St. John 's had begun. The cows, Gizela among them, grazed peacefully in the afternoon light, with wreaths of daisies over their horns, which Anna and the girls her age had made. The older, unmarried girls had woven a long chain of daisies and took turns flinging it up into the tall oak . It was an important ritual, for the number of branches the chain covered would be the years each maiden would have to wait for marriage . Up to a certain age, young girls threw the chain of daisies with all their might, but the older maidens, like Justina Marusakova, now twenty-three, whose half-closed eyes and stuttering, dull speech had failed to attract a spouse, aimed for a single low branch and prayed that the superstition bore truth . Everyone got a turn , even Zuzka's oldest sister , Dorota, who was past forty but whose brain had remained that of a child's. As Kubo walked by the group of girls, Zuzka eagerly took the chain of daisies in her large hands and puffed out the chest she had sworn hours before would not be violated. But marriage and carnal thoughts were the farthest things from his mind , and he did not look as the daisies and her prayers fluttered toward heaven . He went directly to the huge , square stack of neatly cut logs and bent his head back to take in the dozens of small fir trees that had been placed on top. As the sun set on this, the longest day of the year, the day of Jana, the pagan god who was Christianized into the good St. John , the dry wood would burst into flame and the yearly pageant would be performed. At its end, Kubo well knew, a brave few, who up to this night had been called boys and treated as such, would henceforth walk the village streets as men. Kubo gulped and stooped down, stretching the muscles of his legs . Off to the side of the huge stack the V adasz brothers and other boys just a year or two younger than Kubo were playing a game he had played many times himself. And even with some of them . One boy would bend down and another would leap upon him like a frog , and be carried for �92 SLOVAKIA as long a di stance as youn g legs could hold up . Still other boys were imitating the cows grazin g, complete with mooin g sounds . The young C ernetsky boy had borrowed the d a isy wreath from their cow , Sargula , and the other boys cla pped with glee at the silly sigh t. " Kubo, come , com e , " they called to him , but Kubo acted as if he could not hear them. H e threw his shoulders back, strainin g his bod y to be as tall as he possibly could , and walked to a spot near the tables of food and drink where his fa ther was sta ndin g, hi s pipe in ha nd , talkin g to som e men . '' This is m y Kubo ,'' Du san said to a short m an wh o wore a long ostrich feather in his hat, " the best weed puller south of the High T atras. M eet P an Bozek and hi s boy P avel, " he said, m otionin g to a boy a bout Kubo's age . On th e boy's head was a ha t and feather similar to his father 's, a nd he nodded withou t say in g a word. It was another humilia tin g reminder. " W e were ju st talking a bout the first m arket in Bard ejov," Du san said. '' P an Bozek is a great landowner in M ala M aca and plans to sell mu ch . " " N o, no, not a great landowner ," P an Bozek said . " Ju st a simple peasant like yourself, blessed with a few m eters of God's precious earth , who works hi s fool head off. '' '' For yourself, a nd if a neighbor need s a hand ... '' ' ' ... well , thi s is our way, it is nothing to b rag .. . '' ' ' .. . D o you hear of su ch things from those who have gone to A m erika? Answe r m e tha t one.' ' Du san j abbed at the space in fron t of P an Bozek 's nose. " They all work for them selves, neve r help a friend to ha rvest or give a loaf of b read to one who need s it. You , Pan Bozek , are a fine exam pie to put in the face of all those vypasen f A m ericania. T ake notice of this m an , Kubo.'' " L ast year we took three wagonload s of wheat and l'an to Bardej ov and sold everything," Pavel said , putting his hands on his hips. " Our horse d anced all the way hom e.'' " Ju st forin ts and crowns to bring hom e," Du san said . "A ligh t load ." " W ell . .. " P a n Bozek said , tryin g to a ppear modest. " I have neve r seen you at the m arket," Pavel said to Kubo . " M y boy is not yet ready," Dusan said before Kubo could answer. " There is no hurry. Som e d ay . . . Now , som e p alenka, m y fri end , and �SLOVAKIA 93 some of the fine kolace from the village o f Zbudza. You boys run off a nd play. '' A s the sun linge red capri ciou sly in the sky, P avel a nd Kubo w alked a mon g the revelers , drank the sweet berry juices and a te hu ge hunks of the la mb tha t Banfk had brought only to h ave so m e villagers refuse to to uch it , calling it a "guilt offering." Whe n the two boys came close to the group of young girls who had started to d a n ce with each othe r , Eta Min arovicova and Julia Vadaszova looked toward Kubo , but he knew it was for a n introdu ction to the h a ndsom e stra nge r a nd not for him self. R egardless, Kubo was more inte res ted in P avel's stories of the market a t Bardejov, of the hu ge wheels of cheese that the shepherds m ad e, of the m agnifice nt church th a t could hold all the people from five la rge vill ages. Pavel did n ot do it in the boastful fashion of Fra nko Hruscak , who made boys just a year o r two younger than him self feel like mere b a bies because they had never been to Bardejov and he had . P avel talked quietly , directly, but almost reli giou sly about the la nd t hat hi s fa mil y owned in M ala Maca, a nd how som ed ay, as the eldest son , it would be hi s. " And I will h ave more each year ," he said with suren ess in hi s voice. "There is no thing I love more than work. " H e add ed with a smile, " And a little slivovica n ow and then when m y fa the r doesn't fini sh hi s gla ss. All these p eople going to Amerika! Hah , m y father is right , yours too . Wh at cou ld be a b etter life than we have?" As Kubo tried not to loo k envious, P avel went on to tell him that he was coming hom e late r a nd la ter a t ni ght , and so m et imes his parents were a lready in bed , so he slept in the barn . Kubo had slept in the barn o fte n o n hot summ er ni ghts , but th e idea of slee pin g there a fter spe ndin g a ni ght in the foothills, sm okin g cigarettes with hi s friends, or after makin g wolf call s a t a girl' s window, was a forbidden pleasure so swee t he co uld not believe it would ever ha ppen . " Who ' s that?" P a vel motioned . " The little o ne? M y sister, Anna. Why? " " I' ve n eve r seen ha ir like he rs ; stra n ge color. " '' Baby h a ir , just a streak . '' " H ow old is she a n yhow ?" P avel said , hi s eyes n o t leav ing Anna until she disappeared into the crowd that h ad gathered a round the stack of wood. '' Almost eleve n .'' �94 SLOVAKIA "Skinny legs." ''I guess. She's a dreamer.'' '' AAAHHHH ! '' The sound echoed over the meadow to the tall junipers, sending a flock of bluejays into the purple night air. "AAAHHHH!" It rumbled down the slope to where the river Laborec wound its way through the thickets ofreeds. "AAAHHHH!" the chorus of voices breathed as the flames licked at the neatly stacked logs and suddenly burst skyward in a mammoth orange ball as the sap-filled branches, the needles and cones of the fur trees caught fire . Kubo's throat went dry. Pavel put his arm over the shoulder of the boy he'd met just a short time before. "Not yet . It will die down. There is time to be a man." Other boys, some Kubo's age, like Franko Hruscak andjozefKralik also stood around the fire, carefully eyeing the flames and casting sidelong glances to see if anyone was ready to try . Cyril Gasparovic was also there, a frail boy already three years older than Kubo, who had never danced or jumped over the fire and whose mother was known to be making a novena to the Blessed Lady . The firs burned off quickly, leaving shimmering red skeletons, but flames from the logs were still at least as high as the top of his head as Kubo walked a slow circle around the fire, eyeing it with the intensity and dread of a baca faced with a hungry wolf. It was a delicate issue, one, down through the centuries that the tradition had been practiced, that required the judgment only a mature man would have . There was a point, just one point, when the flames receded enough to be traversed but when a boy could be seriously burned or, as the story was told of the arrogant richtar 's son many years ago, killed . There would always be one person who knew that point, took the chance, and the others who followed would go through life remembering his bravery and bemoaning their lack of it. It was sometimes better to wait until the next St. John ' s Day rather than risk the humiliation of being one of the last, the least brave . For as the fire died down , even the tiny boys of the village would jump over the embers in childish practice for the day some years away when they would risk painful burns to gain their manhood. The gypsy band struck up the first tunes, and it was mostly the older people, singing and clapping their hands, who began to flatten the thick grass with their dancing feet . The rest of the people from Zbud- �SLOVAKIA 95 za, those with young sons and those from Mala Maca and V el'ka Maca who had made a pilgrimage for the feast days stayed close to that fire, talking among themselves, waiting, but making no reference to the drama that was building moment by moment. Kubo had made a complete circle, and finally he stood before his father, his arms at his sides, like a soldier in ranks. "Otec," he said, using the formal address, "will you please hold my ciapka?" Dusan looked over his son's shoulder to the leaping yellow and red flames of the fire. He squinted so that he could see it better. Then he extended his hand without saying a word, either of encouragement or caution, and took the hat from his son, placing it under his arm. One by one, the people moved to the side, clearing a path. Except for a low, haunting gypsy love song and the crackling of dry wood, the meadow was quiet, and nothing stood between Kubo Vlasek and the state he so desired, nothing but the fire that had purged and proven men of Zbudza for countless generations. His heart pounding, his mouth full of cotton, Kubo made the sign of the cross. His first steps were almost his undoing as his krpce slipped on grass, moist from spilled beer. But then he lengthened his stride and by the time he had reached the edge of the crowd, he was running as fast as he could. Logs tumbled together at the fire's core and a huge tongue of flame leaped out, but it was too late . Kubo 's krpce had left the ground. "AAAHHHH," the sound - a cheer, a moan - rose up from the lips of men and women and children as a form, black against the bright flames, seemed to hang in the air. The gypsy band stopped in mid-song . "AAAHHHH ! " Women crossed themselves and men's lips tightened . The mouths of small children gaped open . "AAAAAAHHHHHH !" The fire crackled angrily, spitting hot sparks into the cool night air. Dusan fingered the ciapka beneath his arm, then grasped it firmly . His son stood before him, eyebrows vanished from his pink face, his hair a mass of tiny burnt and frizzy curls, one leg of his while trousers browned , like the top of a loaf of bread. Dusan could smell the hair , the cloth, the flesh that had passed through the St. John's fire . He extended the ciapka to his son , looking at it , turning it in his hand . "Perhaps a bit too small, Kubo . I think in Bardejov they might �96 SLOVAKIA have some bigge r ones ; more like . . " Whateve r words follow ed were lost in the deafening accolade rendered to J a kub Vlasek . After hi s awesome display of b ravery, Kubo could seemingl y d o nothing wrong as the sun set and the evenin g of dancin g began in earnest. His krpce kicked hi gh in the a ir but la nd ed with a feather's li ghtness so close to the fl asks of vino a nd borovicka th a t gasps were heard from the young girls who stood in a group eyeing the b oys who would somed ay be th eir hu sbands . Even Eta Min arovicova a nd Julia Vad aszova, b y far the pretti es t a nd most choosy girls in Zbudza on feas t days in th e pas t acted as if Kubo Vl ase k had some co n tagious disease, co uld n ot kee p their eyes off him . Their hands behind th eir backs, th eir hips swayin g ge ntly to the musi c, they waited, as did all their girl fri ends, for the m ost impor tant d a nce in the li fe of eve ry b oy who jumped ove r the fire on St. J ohn 's D ay. The gy psies kn ew it. Their gold tee th fl ashin g beneath bl ack mu staches, they would tease with th e first ba rs of a popula r tun e . But the n they would break into a nothe r so n g th at onl y the boys cou ld dan ce to, a nd display their prowess st ill more, d elay in g th e mom ent when the eager young girls and the proud young boys would have a dance together. The b a nd stru ck up a d a nce don e entirely on one foot. Boys shoved and j ostl ed, feinted a nd du cked , a nd th e less agil e we re se n t sprawling into th e grass . And , a t the da n ce's e nd , the re was ju st one who h ad not resorted to u sin g hi s oth er foot , who had not bee n kn ocked ove r. Kubo Vl asek twirl ed a round on the b all of hi s foot, with a n agilit y eve n his fath er had to applaud. Th e gypse husle pl aye r kept Kubo dan cin g , in creas in g the beat , but Ku bo, lost in the ecstasy of th e m agic ni ght , would not lose hi s bal a nce. Hi s mind was already in Ba rdej ov, hi s head already cove red in a fin e n ew hat. H e could feel the jin gle of co ins in hi s pocket , straw und er hi s b ack in th e b a rn. Th e bea t cha n ged so su b tl y that Kubo was not even awa re o f it. H e kept twirlin g a nd twirlin g. It was alread y pitch d a rk , but logs had bee n h eaped on th e fire, a nd as Kubo 's eyes, fogged with pe rspiration , took in the blur of faces standin g aro und the dan cin g a rea, fl ashes of color sta rted swirlin g a bout him , in th e opposite d irection . Lik e great red a nd yell ow and gree n eels sw immin g in a shall ow strea m , the o rnate p arta stream in g dow n from th e braided heads of th e un married �SLOVAKIA 97 girls shimmered in the fire's light , each offerin g the ni ght 's h ero th e m a iden of his choosin g. All the rituals h e h ad prepared for , jumping over the fire, the o n elegged dan ce, but Kubo Vlasek had not , up to that very moment, decided whi ch girl would have the h onor of hi s first dan ce as a man . H e twirled faster a nd became dizzie r in hi s deliciou s mom ent of triumph , in his hour of indecision . The parta flutte red by, the tip s flickering a t his nose. The gypsy band picked up the beat. Faster and faster. His a rm reached out to the fl ashing colors. And it was soundly m et. " Oh , thank you , I would be m ost honored ." The vill agers applauded still louder while Kubo 's frie nds hooted a nd whistled . And Zu zka Tavelcakova, her great eyebrows arched over a huge smile, her free arm s swin ging in wild exultation , her huge breasts threatening release from the rest of h er body, d a n ced about the circle. She held on to Kubo tightly a nd , as they n eared the fire, reached into her apron pocket a nd withdrew a clenched fist , with which she bl essed herself. Then th e h a nd fl ew o pe n - and a small obj ect disappeared into th e flam es. Around, around h e twirled Zuzka until finally the gypsy playing the cymbal ran th e soft felt hammers from the low notes to the high, signaling the n ext dan ce would begin . But , befor e they could launch into it , several pa irs of ha nds reached out to Kubo , and sudde nl y he was be ing ho isted into th e a ir. ' ']eden! " " D va! 1 " " Tri 11 ! " And with th e third toss the loud est chee r - fu eled b y boro vicka and bee r and tradition - rippl ed across the m eadow and down to the ri ver whe re a fl ock of tin y doves bolted from the reed s a nd fl ew towa rd th e d a rkne ss of th e hu ge junipe rs . '' Y AAA Y AA AAA Y AAAAAAAAA 1 ' ' " And now th e new m a n bu ys th e nex t bottle of pa.lenka," Mlad en shouted at Kubo, whose wet, sin ged ha ir was bein g tou sled by hi s young fri e nd s, whose ha nd s were be in g pressed with ha nd sh akes . One ha ndsh a ke was stronge r , lo n ger than the others, a nd as Kubo blink ed through the sweat a nd ash in hi s eyes, he co uld see th at it was hi s fat he r who stood befo re him. Whe n at least he was released , Kubo had a k orun ak in hi s ha nd . �98 SLOVAKIA " You a re a m an , m y son , a nd you will from thi s day be pa id wages," Du san said, talkin g slowing so as not to slur hi s words. " You will inherit the land , you will care for this fam ily ... but now, first things first. Buy the palenka!" The fire died down and was fed with fresh logs. Boys sneaked off with girls and nuzzled in the darkness. The gypsy band played and drank and played still more . The old woman , Micekova, nodded without sayin g a word when Zuzka's mother said that her d au ghter a nd the young Vlasek boy made a fine couple. The young teacher danced with some of the v ill age women, but only when they asked him . And a small boy, whose emerald eyes glistened when the flame s rose, stood a top the hill in the shadow of the giant lindens , his thumb s locked in hi s belt. When it came time to return home, Kubo eventually found his father lyin g on the ground , a n empty bottle in his ha nd, his head propped against the thick exposed roots of an oak tree, hi s eyes barely visible through sm all slits. H e motioned for hi s son to sit b y him . " I have only a year , perhaps two in this vale of tears, " Dusan began, we ighing each word somberly and pattin g hi s so n on the knee. "You mu st rem ain stron g, my so n , my only son , and believe in what is right and decent , what has bee n ha nded down from generation to generation. " His eyes fli ckered open wider. " Father , why this talk? You a re healthy; you will live to be one hundred ." " Place your hand on my heart." '' Father ?'' " Your ha nd ." Kubo did as he was told. Dusan pressed the boy's hand onto the fa ncy embroidery of hi s shirt , now soaked with sweat and borovicka, stain ed wi th berry wines and grease from the lamb, tainted as it was. '' R epeat afte r me . . . " I .. . Ku bo Vlasek ... vow on m y father's heart ... on the day I became a man ... to love this land . . . never to turn from it ... To listen to God and not the foo lish tal es of the world outs ide ... To care for children and a nimals ... because each co m es from God ever to strike my woman without good reason ... To kee p this sac red pledge ... as pledged on my father's heart ... that the cursed word 'Amerika ' wi ll never ... never . . . be heard in the house ... �SLOVAKIA 99 our esteem ed Milos Vlasek built . .. with his bare hands ... years and years ago.'' Dusan ' s voice became lower and lower as if he were ready to cry. " Do you promise all this my son, unde r pain of mortal sin, eternal damnation and the fires of hell ?" "I do, Father ," Kubo said evenly, " I promise this before God ." "Good ." Dusan slumped back onto the roots . " Now, fetch the wagon. Your father is too tired to be walking this night." �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1984, Vol. 31 Description An account of the resource Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 87 Excerpt from In Due Season Paul Wilkes "Is ... is he home? Pan Vlasek?" '' No, no, in the field,'' Dusan replied impatiently, stuffing two huge loaves of bread into a sack . "Stara?" "Yes, yes. Matka moja, what you girls won't do ; you are the third one today.'' ''Oh,'' she breathed, as if by her late arrival she might already have lost out. "I won't stay long. I have a heap of washing to do. So high I can't even see over the top of it.' ' "They are good to you, those Magyars?" "Oh yes, Pan Vlasek. When they have roast, we have roast. And as many potatoes as you can eat." "So you are happy up there on the hill?" "For now." "And?" '' Someday I want to live again in the valley in my own house and raise children; eight, ten, maybe an even dozen . I do not want a fancy life. " "For such a family you need a strong back and a wealthy husband . " "Just one who works hard, Pan Vlasek. I already know the one. And I am strong, stronger than the other girls. I will make a good wife.'' "You children. So eager to grow up . If you only knew . Well, Kubo will be back soon and he should not find you here. He is not used to the ways of females . " Dusan put on his hat and tossed the bag to his shoulder. "By the way," he said, lowering his voice, "is it true what they do up there ; the drinking, the sins of the flesh , all that?" "My parents tell me little , but in the morning, cleaning up the great hall, there are signs, Pan Vlasek," she said, lowering her eyes in shame. 88 SLOVAKIA ''Terrible , awful,'' Dusan said, and passing through the d oor added , "and worse yet not be able to a fford it. Good lu ck, girl." The old woman was sitting on a b ench in the corner of the room, lost in the shadows beneath the holy pictures. A s the rosary bead s slipped throu gh her fingers , her wrinkled lips m oved quickly, giving off the sound of something sizzling, like w et wood add ed to a hot fire. Step b y step Zu zka Tavelcako va a pproach ed he r , lookin g for som e sign that the woman kn ew she was there. She h a d grown in the years she'd lived with he r family in the castle of Count Szepesy a nd was indeed n ot only stron ger but considerably larger than other girls of her age, which was fifteen . H er shoulders were broad , he r hands , already red and calloused from hours of scrubbing clothes a nd peeling vege ta bl es and h auling wood to the many fireplaces , were so able that even her older broth er s would call upon Zuzka when they needed to pull a balking cow into a stall or when the last sacks of fl our h ad to be stacked near the crossp iece of the hu ge sypanec. But , as much as God ha d blessed her with a n abundan ce of good h ealth a nd strength , H e had not bee n so gen erou s with he r appearance. H er forehead was too large, and a certain puffiness above her eyes m ade h er appear to be con sta ntly scowlin g. Although her mouth was full a nd well formed, her upper lip had a tendency to pu sh up the skin b eneath her nose, the force of which formed two d eep lines that curled ben eath her ch eeks . Zuzka Tavelcakova was a good-natured , ch eerful girl in her heart a nd in her actio n s, but her face did not represent her justly. " I have brought a forint, P ani Micekova," Zuzka said softly, bendin g at the knee in a quick curtsy before the old woman . The old woman ' s eyes did not open; her lip s moved more quickly, as if she would h ave to be furt her coaxed from her religious reverie. "Teta? " she said with greatest respect. " Y ou are the o nly one who can help .'' " Did yo u d o exactly as I told yo u ? " the old woman snapped, continuing w ith her rosary as she awaited the suppli can t's reply. " Oh, yes, everyth in g," Zuzka said excitedly. She began her reci ta tion, graspin g first he r sm allest fin ger, holdin g it tightly as she savored h er exact ness, her fervidness, as she un abash edly displayed her girl ish hope . "Last night, in the moonlight , the brightest moonlight - I waited - I picked zemezlce by the river. I picked a nd I picked until my zajda was filled. SLOVAKIA 89 "A littl e is all tha t is n eed ed ." She dismissed h e r exuberance . " I didn ' t want to take chances; I didn ' t think it would hurt." '' Then ?'' She grasped the n ext finger . " Then I went to the fi eld of konope wi th the other girls and I rolled and rolled . Each of us put a stick with a different-colored ribbon in the ground so we would know wh ere we h ad been .'' She ra n her h ands over the front of her apron . '' The konope sta nd s straight ... well , almost straight , thi s m ornin g." " Better tha t it is n ot perfect; tha t would m ean you m a rry in a year. T oo youn g ." " And we all m ad e wreath s with branches of the willow , a nd when we threw them in the rive r , pani , mine was the first to reach th e great rock . The first!" '' So you will m a rry first , but n ot n ext year. '' She grasped h er fourth fin ge r , but h er h ands soon slid toge ther , locked in their own praye r. " I knelt befo re the Virgin a nd p romised that if she heard m y plea I would n ot let Kubo tou ch a n ythin g more tha n m y a rm until we we re m a n a nd wife. I vowed it, teta, under p ain of m ortal sin 1 " The old wom an ' s eyes fli ckered open , glistenin g in their d a rk sockets. Zu zka could not look into those eyes; sh e peered down , intentl y foll owin g a ha irline crack in the dirt floo r. " You mu st swear it again , Zu zka, swear tha t n o impure thou ghts will co m e into your mind. T h a t if Kubo so mu ch as tou ches you a bove here," she said , layin g h er gna rl ed h a nd on the opposite elbow , "you will sla p him as if he we re the d evil him self. '' " Oh , I do swear it! Unde r pa in of th e etern al fi res of hell 1" " You h ave th ose la r ge breas ts." The old wom a n n odded gravely towa rd Zu zka's blouse. " The boys will wa n t to touch them; even him ." " T eta, I have dedicated them to the Virgin ; they a re hers, n ot his," she said , takin g in h er breath a nd pullin g he r ves t ti ghtly against her body. " Oh , I a m so rry they h ave grown so." " I don ' t know wh y you want the b oy a nyh ow ," the old wom a n said . '' H e is neither b ig nor clever.'' " I am stron g," a n d Zu zka's vo ice becam e so ft e r , th at of a m other spea kin g to her in fa nt , "and h e is kind a nd ge ntl e, n ot like the other boys ." T he to ne aga in was firm. " And I can pu sh him , help him to be a m a n , sta nd up ." 90 SLOVAKIA The old woman's hands, the rosary still entwined in her fingers, disappeared beneath her threadbare shawl. Zuzka stood still, her heart pounding, her breath escaping from her mouth in a series of sharp, moist gasps. "Please, God, please . . . " she whispered. ''Through . . . the . .. Christ . . . bring . . . '' Zuzka leaned forward, straining to hear, but she could only understand a few words as they rasped forth from deep in the old woman's throat. '' . . . drawn to . . . let his . . . Holy Ghost, Amen.'' Zuzka took a step forward, the forint in hand. "From the drippings at Our Lady's altar. The most blessed wax at Our Lady's feet, ' ' the old woman said with a certain pride of craftsmanship . But when she saw the hand stretched out to her with the coin, her own hand snapped shut. "So, little foolish girl, you think you can buy this? Pay the bosorka and laugh to your friends about the old fool? You have your nerve!'' "No, no, teta," Zuzka pleaded. "I know that. Look. I place the coin here, on the bench. I do not give it to you. No, nothing this sacred can be bought.'' "Leave no doubt about it." The hand opened again. Squarely in the middle of the old woman's palm lay the figure of a man, no bigger than a thumball, fashioned from pale yellow beeswax. When Kubo returned from the fields he found the house empty, the ashes in the fireplace cool. He splashed water on his face, neck , and arms and dressed hurriedly, silently cursing the hundreds of tiny shoots that had virtually sprung up overnight among the potato plants. His father had drummed into his head the old saying, ''Cut the weed today and spare the plant tomorrow , " and Kubo, whose main task at this time of the year was weeding, sometimes had to be prodded to maintain his vigilance against the tiny green enemies that sapped the nourishment of the crops . But not on that day, for Kubo wanted to impress upon his father how responsible, how serious he was about work. Although his family left early Kubo remained behind and made sure that the field was clean, the soil broken with his hoe to receive whatever rain might fall. Kubo shoved his blouse into the clean white woolen britches with the thick black embroidery and reached up to the shelf above the bed SLOVAKIA 91 to take down his ciapka. He looked at the foolish little brimless pillbox , the two silken ribbons that trailed behind . A boy' s cap. A child's. As he plopped it on the back of his head, the dismal thought came to his mind that it could still be on his head when St. John 's Day came next year. By the time Kubo arrived, out of breath from his run , the pasture to the north of the village was already filled with people, and the Feast of St. John 's had begun. The cows, Gizela among them, grazed peacefully in the afternoon light, with wreaths of daisies over their horns, which Anna and the girls her age had made. The older, unmarried girls had woven a long chain of daisies and took turns flinging it up into the tall oak . It was an important ritual, for the number of branches the chain covered would be the years each maiden would have to wait for marriage . Up to a certain age, young girls threw the chain of daisies with all their might, but the older maidens, like Justina Marusakova, now twenty-three, whose half-closed eyes and stuttering, dull speech had failed to attract a spouse, aimed for a single low branch and prayed that the superstition bore truth . Everyone got a turn , even Zuzka's oldest sister , Dorota, who was past forty but whose brain had remained that of a child's. As Kubo walked by the group of girls, Zuzka eagerly took the chain of daisies in her large hands and puffed out the chest she had sworn hours before would not be violated. But marriage and carnal thoughts were the farthest things from his mind , and he did not look as the daisies and her prayers fluttered toward heaven . He went directly to the huge , square stack of neatly cut logs and bent his head back to take in the dozens of small fir trees that had been placed on top. As the sun set on this, the longest day of the year, the day of Jana, the pagan god who was Christianized into the good St. John , the dry wood would burst into flame and the yearly pageant would be performed. At its end, Kubo well knew, a brave few, who up to this night had been called boys and treated as such, would henceforth walk the village streets as men. Kubo gulped and stooped down, stretching the muscles of his legs . Off to the side of the huge stack the V adasz brothers and other boys just a year or two younger than Kubo were playing a game he had played many times himself. And even with some of them . One boy would bend down and another would leap upon him like a frog , and be carried for 92 SLOVAKIA as long a di stance as youn g legs could hold up . Still other boys were imitating the cows grazin g, complete with mooin g sounds . The young C ernetsky boy had borrowed the d a isy wreath from their cow , Sargula , and the other boys cla pped with glee at the silly sigh t. " Kubo, come , com e , " they called to him , but Kubo acted as if he could not hear them. H e threw his shoulders back, strainin g his bod y to be as tall as he possibly could , and walked to a spot near the tables of food and drink where his fa ther was sta ndin g, hi s pipe in ha nd , talkin g to som e men . '' This is m y Kubo ,'' Du san said to a short m an wh o wore a long ostrich feather in his hat, " the best weed puller south of the High T atras. M eet P an Bozek and hi s boy P avel, " he said, m otionin g to a boy a bout Kubo's age . On th e boy's head was a ha t and feather similar to his father 's, a nd he nodded withou t say in g a word. It was another humilia tin g reminder. " W e were ju st talking a bout the first m arket in Bard ejov," Du san said. '' P an Bozek is a great landowner in M ala M aca and plans to sell mu ch . " " N o, no, not a great landowner ," P an Bozek said . " Ju st a simple peasant like yourself, blessed with a few m eters of God's precious earth , who works hi s fool head off. '' '' For yourself, a nd if a neighbor need s a hand ... '' ' ' ... well , thi s is our way, it is nothing to b rag .. . '' ' ' .. . D o you hear of su ch things from those who have gone to A m erika? Answe r m e tha t one.' ' Du san j abbed at the space in fron t of P an Bozek 's nose. " They all work for them selves, neve r help a friend to ha rvest or give a loaf of b read to one who need s it. You , Pan Bozek , are a fine exam pie to put in the face of all those vypasen f A m ericania. T ake notice of this m an , Kubo.'' " L ast year we took three wagonload s of wheat and l'an to Bardej ov and sold everything," Pavel said , putting his hands on his hips. " Our horse d anced all the way hom e.'' " Ju st forin ts and crowns to bring hom e," Du san said . "A ligh t load ." " W ell . .. " P a n Bozek said , tryin g to a ppear modest. " I have neve r seen you at the m arket," Pavel said to Kubo . " M y boy is not yet ready," Dusan said before Kubo could answer. " There is no hurry. Som e d ay . . . Now , som e p alenka, m y fri end , and SLOVAKIA 93 some of the fine kolace from the village o f Zbudza. You boys run off a nd play. '' A s the sun linge red capri ciou sly in the sky, P avel a nd Kubo w alked a mon g the revelers , drank the sweet berry juices and a te hu ge hunks of the la mb tha t Banfk had brought only to h ave so m e villagers refuse to to uch it , calling it a "guilt offering." Whe n the two boys came close to the group of young girls who had started to d a n ce with each othe r , Eta Min arovicova and Julia Vadaszova looked toward Kubo , but he knew it was for a n introdu ction to the h a ndsom e stra nge r a nd not for him self. R egardless, Kubo was more inte res ted in P avel's stories of the market a t Bardejov, of the hu ge wheels of cheese that the shepherds m ad e, of the m agnifice nt church th a t could hold all the people from five la rge vill ages. Pavel did n ot do it in the boastful fashion of Fra nko Hruscak , who made boys just a year o r two younger than him self feel like mere b a bies because they had never been to Bardejov and he had . P avel talked quietly , directly, but almost reli giou sly about the la nd t hat hi s fa mil y owned in M ala Maca, a nd how som ed ay, as the eldest son , it would be hi s. " And I will h ave more each year ," he said with suren ess in hi s voice. "There is no thing I love more than work. " H e add ed with a smile, " And a little slivovica n ow and then when m y fa the r doesn't fini sh hi s gla ss. All these p eople going to Amerika! Hah , m y father is right , yours too . Wh at cou ld be a b etter life than we have?" As Kubo tried not to loo k envious, P avel went on to tell him that he was coming hom e late r a nd la ter a t ni ght , and so m et imes his parents were a lready in bed , so he slept in the barn . Kubo had slept in the barn o fte n o n hot summ er ni ghts , but th e idea of slee pin g there a fter spe ndin g a ni ght in the foothills, sm okin g cigarettes with hi s friends, or after makin g wolf call s a t a girl' s window, was a forbidden pleasure so swee t he co uld not believe it would ever ha ppen . " Who ' s that?" P a vel motioned . " The little o ne? M y sister, Anna. Why? " " I' ve n eve r seen ha ir like he rs ; stra n ge color. " '' Baby h a ir , just a streak . '' " H ow old is she a n yhow ?" P avel said , hi s eyes n o t leav ing Anna until she disappeared into the crowd that h ad gathered a round the stack of wood. '' Almost eleve n .'' 94 SLOVAKIA "Skinny legs." ''I guess. She's a dreamer.'' '' AAAHHHH ! '' The sound echoed over the meadow to the tall junipers, sending a flock of bluejays into the purple night air. "AAAHHHH!" It rumbled down the slope to where the river Laborec wound its way through the thickets ofreeds. "AAAHHHH!" the chorus of voices breathed as the flames licked at the neatly stacked logs and suddenly burst skyward in a mammoth orange ball as the sap-filled branches, the needles and cones of the fur trees caught fire . Kubo's throat went dry. Pavel put his arm over the shoulder of the boy he'd met just a short time before. "Not yet . It will die down. There is time to be a man." Other boys, some Kubo's age, like Franko Hruscak andjozefKralik also stood around the fire, carefully eyeing the flames and casting sidelong glances to see if anyone was ready to try . Cyril Gasparovic was also there, a frail boy already three years older than Kubo, who had never danced or jumped over the fire and whose mother was known to be making a novena to the Blessed Lady . The firs burned off quickly, leaving shimmering red skeletons, but flames from the logs were still at least as high as the top of his head as Kubo walked a slow circle around the fire, eyeing it with the intensity and dread of a baca faced with a hungry wolf. It was a delicate issue, one, down through the centuries that the tradition had been practiced, that required the judgment only a mature man would have . There was a point, just one point, when the flames receded enough to be traversed but when a boy could be seriously burned or, as the story was told of the arrogant richtar 's son many years ago, killed . There would always be one person who knew that point, took the chance, and the others who followed would go through life remembering his bravery and bemoaning their lack of it. It was sometimes better to wait until the next St. John ' s Day rather than risk the humiliation of being one of the last, the least brave . For as the fire died down , even the tiny boys of the village would jump over the embers in childish practice for the day some years away when they would risk painful burns to gain their manhood. The gypsy band struck up the first tunes, and it was mostly the older people, singing and clapping their hands, who began to flatten the thick grass with their dancing feet . The rest of the people from Zbud- SLOVAKIA 95 za, those with young sons and those from Mala Maca and V el'ka Maca who had made a pilgrimage for the feast days stayed close to that fire, talking among themselves, waiting, but making no reference to the drama that was building moment by moment. Kubo had made a complete circle, and finally he stood before his father, his arms at his sides, like a soldier in ranks. "Otec," he said, using the formal address, "will you please hold my ciapka?" Dusan looked over his son's shoulder to the leaping yellow and red flames of the fire. He squinted so that he could see it better. Then he extended his hand without saying a word, either of encouragement or caution, and took the hat from his son, placing it under his arm. One by one, the people moved to the side, clearing a path. Except for a low, haunting gypsy love song and the crackling of dry wood, the meadow was quiet, and nothing stood between Kubo Vlasek and the state he so desired, nothing but the fire that had purged and proven men of Zbudza for countless generations. His heart pounding, his mouth full of cotton, Kubo made the sign of the cross. His first steps were almost his undoing as his krpce slipped on grass, moist from spilled beer. But then he lengthened his stride and by the time he had reached the edge of the crowd, he was running as fast as he could. Logs tumbled together at the fire's core and a huge tongue of flame leaped out, but it was too late . Kubo 's krpce had left the ground. "AAAHHHH," the sound - a cheer, a moan - rose up from the lips of men and women and children as a form, black against the bright flames, seemed to hang in the air. The gypsy band stopped in mid-song . "AAAHHHH ! " Women crossed themselves and men's lips tightened . The mouths of small children gaped open . "AAAAAAHHHHHH !" The fire crackled angrily, spitting hot sparks into the cool night air. Dusan fingered the ciapka beneath his arm, then grasped it firmly . His son stood before him, eyebrows vanished from his pink face, his hair a mass of tiny burnt and frizzy curls, one leg of his while trousers browned , like the top of a loaf of bread. Dusan could smell the hair , the cloth, the flesh that had passed through the St. John's fire . He extended the ciapka to his son , looking at it , turning it in his hand . "Perhaps a bit too small, Kubo . I think in Bardejov they might 96 SLOVAKIA have some bigge r ones ; more like . . " Whateve r words follow ed were lost in the deafening accolade rendered to J a kub Vlasek . After hi s awesome display of b ravery, Kubo could seemingl y d o nothing wrong as the sun set and the evenin g of dancin g began in earnest. His krpce kicked hi gh in the a ir but la nd ed with a feather's li ghtness so close to the fl asks of vino a nd borovicka th a t gasps were heard from the young girls who stood in a group eyeing the b oys who would somed ay be th eir hu sbands . Even Eta Min arovicova a nd Julia Vad aszova, b y far the pretti es t a nd most choosy girls in Zbudza on feas t days in th e pas t acted as if Kubo Vl ase k had some co n tagious disease, co uld n ot kee p their eyes off him . Their hands behind th eir backs, th eir hips swayin g ge ntly to the musi c, they waited, as did all their girl fri ends, for the m ost impor tant d a nce in the li fe of eve ry b oy who jumped ove r the fire on St. J ohn 's D ay. The gy psies kn ew it. Their gold tee th fl ashin g beneath bl ack mu staches, they would tease with th e first ba rs of a popula r tun e . But the n they would break into a nothe r so n g th at onl y the boys cou ld dan ce to, a nd display their prowess st ill more, d elay in g th e mom ent when the eager young girls and the proud young boys would have a dance together. The b a nd stru ck up a d a nce don e entirely on one foot. Boys shoved and j ostl ed, feinted a nd du cked , a nd th e less agil e we re se n t sprawling into th e grass . And , a t the da n ce's e nd , the re was ju st one who h ad not resorted to u sin g hi s oth er foot , who had not bee n kn ocked ove r. Kubo Vl asek twirl ed a round on the b all of hi s foot, with a n agilit y eve n his fath er had to applaud. Th e gypse husle pl aye r kept Kubo dan cin g , in creas in g the beat , but Ku bo, lost in the ecstasy of th e m agic ni ght , would not lose hi s bal a nce. Hi s mind was already in Ba rdej ov, hi s head already cove red in a fin e n ew hat. H e could feel the jin gle of co ins in hi s pocket , straw und er hi s b ack in th e b a rn. Th e bea t cha n ged so su b tl y that Kubo was not even awa re o f it. H e kept twirlin g a nd twirlin g. It was alread y pitch d a rk , but logs had bee n h eaped on th e fire, a nd as Kubo 's eyes, fogged with pe rspiration , took in the blur of faces standin g aro und the dan cin g a rea, fl ashes of color sta rted swirlin g a bout him , in th e opposite d irection . Lik e great red a nd yell ow and gree n eels sw immin g in a shall ow strea m , the o rnate p arta stream in g dow n from th e braided heads of th e un married SLOVAKIA 97 girls shimmered in the fire's light , each offerin g the ni ght 's h ero th e m a iden of his choosin g. All the rituals h e h ad prepared for , jumping over the fire, the o n elegged dan ce, but Kubo Vlasek had not , up to that very moment, decided whi ch girl would have the h onor of hi s first dan ce as a man . H e twirled faster a nd became dizzie r in hi s deliciou s mom ent of triumph , in his hour of indecision . The parta flutte red by, the tip s flickering a t his nose. The gypsy band picked up the beat. Faster and faster. His a rm reached out to the fl ashing colors. And it was soundly m et. " Oh , thank you , I would be m ost honored ." The vill agers applauded still louder while Kubo 's frie nds hooted a nd whistled . And Zu zka Tavelcakova, her great eyebrows arched over a huge smile, her free arm s swin ging in wild exultation , her huge breasts threatening release from the rest of h er body, d a n ced about the circle. She held on to Kubo tightly a nd , as they n eared the fire, reached into her apron pocket a nd withdrew a clenched fist , with which she bl essed herself. Then th e h a nd fl ew o pe n - and a small obj ect disappeared into th e flam es. Around, around h e twirled Zuzka until finally the gypsy playing the cymbal ran th e soft felt hammers from the low notes to the high, signaling the n ext dan ce would begin . But , befor e they could launch into it , several pa irs of ha nds reached out to Kubo , and sudde nl y he was be ing ho isted into th e a ir. ' ']eden! " " D va! 1 " " Tri 11 ! " And with th e third toss the loud est chee r - fu eled b y boro vicka and bee r and tradition - rippl ed across the m eadow and down to the ri ver whe re a fl ock of tin y doves bolted from the reed s a nd fl ew towa rd th e d a rkne ss of th e hu ge junipe rs . '' Y AAA Y AA AAA Y AAAAAAAAA 1 ' ' " And now th e new m a n bu ys th e nex t bottle of pa.lenka," Mlad en shouted at Kubo, whose wet, sin ged ha ir was bein g tou sled by hi s young fri e nd s, whose ha nd s were be in g pressed with ha nd sh akes . One ha ndsh a ke was stronge r , lo n ger than the others, a nd as Kubo blink ed through the sweat a nd ash in hi s eyes, he co uld see th at it was hi s fat he r who stood befo re him. Whe n at least he was released , Kubo had a k orun ak in hi s ha nd . 98 SLOVAKIA " You a re a m an , m y son , a nd you will from thi s day be pa id wages," Du san said, talkin g slowing so as not to slur hi s words. " You will inherit the land , you will care for this fam ily ... but now, first things first. Buy the palenka!" The fire died down and was fed with fresh logs. Boys sneaked off with girls and nuzzled in the darkness. The gypsy band played and drank and played still more . The old woman , Micekova, nodded without sayin g a word when Zuzka's mother said that her d au ghter a nd the young Vlasek boy made a fine couple. The young teacher danced with some of the v ill age women, but only when they asked him . And a small boy, whose emerald eyes glistened when the flame s rose, stood a top the hill in the shadow of the giant lindens , his thumb s locked in hi s belt. When it came time to return home, Kubo eventually found his father lyin g on the ground , a n empty bottle in his ha nd, his head propped against the thick exposed roots of an oak tree, hi s eyes barely visible through sm all slits. H e motioned for hi s son to sit b y him . " I have only a year , perhaps two in this vale of tears, " Dusan began, we ighing each word somberly and pattin g hi s so n on the knee. "You mu st rem ain stron g, my so n , my only son , and believe in what is right and decent , what has bee n ha nded down from generation to generation. " His eyes fli ckered open wider. " Father , why this talk? You a re healthy; you will live to be one hundred ." " Place your hand on my heart." '' Father ?'' " Your ha nd ." Kubo did as he was told. Dusan pressed the boy's hand onto the fa ncy embroidery of hi s shirt , now soaked with sweat and borovicka, stain ed wi th berry wines and grease from the lamb, tainted as it was. '' R epeat afte r me . . . " I .. . Ku bo Vlasek ... vow on m y father's heart ... on the day I became a man ... to love this land . . . never to turn from it ... To listen to God and not the foo lish tal es of the world outs ide ... To care for children and a nimals ... because each co m es from God ever to strike my woman without good reason ... To kee p this sac red pledge ... as pledged on my father's heart ... that the cursed word 'Amerika ' wi ll never ... never . . . be heard in the house ... SLOVAKIA 99 our esteem ed Milos Vlasek built . .. with his bare hands ... years and years ago.'' Dusan ' s voice became lower and lower as if he were ready to cry. " Do you promise all this my son, unde r pain of mortal sin, eternal damnation and the fires of hell ?" "I do, Father ," Kubo said evenly, " I promise this before God ." "Good ." Dusan slumped back onto the roots . " Now, fetch the wagon. Your father is too tired to be walking this night."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Excerpt from "In Due Season" Description An account of the resource Paul Wilkes Slovakia, Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984 pp. 87-99 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wilkes, Paul, 1938- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a086bddb4a2d2ec3a4e99a8e97533558.pdf e57a8aff85949ef83f5a4101189c6652 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 73 Excerpt from In Due Season (II) BY PAUL WILKES (Author's note: The year is 1899, the setting is a tiny, poor village in Eastern Slovakia.) ©Copyright, 1985 Paul Wilkes Metod burst through the door. "Mama, Papa, Pan .. . Pan .. Pan Vadasz. He's dead! I saw it right through the window." he said breathlessly. "Quiet, son!" Kubo said, his finger in front of his mouth, "your brother is sleeping ." "Papa, Papa," the boy whispered , "Rezso said Pan Vadasz just got up from his bed and lay down on the floor . . . " "I want no t~lk of death in this house ," Kubo said sternly. "None!" In those days , Vadasz was not the only one in the village of Zbudza to " lie between the beams ," showing that they no longer hoped to be cured. They, who had come from the earth, in their fevered and aching state, wished to return, knowing that every day they lived they were a burden to those who hoped to survive. Every day they required tending - and there was precious little time for this - and they needed nourishment. In many houses the bread was already crumbly from too much bark. In the next five days the somber bells of St. Joseph's tolled nine times; on one day three times, as the twins of Pani Gasparoyicova 's daughters died , one with the sunrise, the other just after the Angelus had rung . And before the sun set, Banik fell from his stool at the front of his house, blood running from his mouth . �74 SLOVAKIA Although the villagers were not sure if Banik had died from the cholera, he was buried along with the others in a shallow gully, far to the side of the cemetery. It had been set aside not for any health reason but for fear that the curse would somehow seep through the ground to infect the souls of villagers who now slept in peace. In those five days Belo ate no food, drank no water, his eyes grew dry and sunken in his face, and his every breath was a struggle, as if some great hand were pressing on his chest. Kubo did not leave the boy's side and barely ate himself. Only on the sixth day, when Belo was too weak even to cry did Kubo leave , returning a short while later. He had borrowed Loebl's horse and was going to take the boy to the nearest doctor, in Plavnica , a trip of some ten hours. Loebl had a friend there, a rabbi, who kept the special medicines that Jews used, and he asked Kubo to bring something for someone in his house, sick with the croup . Dusan, clenched teeth holding his pipe, fixed his eyes on Kubo. "You don't even know the way. What is this 'doktor' business? What do they know that we don't?" The old woman moved her head slowly in assent. ''When God calls, sinful humans must not hold on; it is His will. And that little one could die outside his own house ... it is not right.'' Zuzka said nothing. She pulled down another worn lambswool guba from the shelf above the bed and then her extra shawl. Into a small hemp sack she placed half a loaf of bread and an apple she had hidden away for the day that Belo would be well enough to eat it. Still without saying a word, she helped her husband bundle the child into the first guba , then the second, and tied the shawl into a sling around his shoulders . Neither Dusan nor Helena , nor the old woman , would help him, nor even look in his direction . About to leave, he said to their turned backs , " I ask for your prayers. Because if this child dies , I die .'' Zuzka gasped , putting her hand to her mouth, and his mother made a sign of the cross, here eyes turned toward the heaven her son had just challenged . As the first pellets of a freezing rain rattled against the windowpanes, Kubo rode into the black, moonless night. At first he �SLOVAKIA 75 went slowly, to be sure the child was secure on his back, then he kicked at the sides of the brown mare. The rain stung his face, blinding him at times. In the cold damp air of the night he could smell the child, the sickly sour brown odor that covered Belo each time another issue of water gurgled from his trembling bottom. Kubo could barely hear his breathing, and once when he looked over his shoulder into the dark bundle, he could hear nothing. He pulled the horse to a halt and listened for the breathing . After ·a painful pause, Belo drew in some air. By the time they reached the turnoff beyond the village of Svinne, the horse 's nostrils were flared, its gait slowed to little more than a walk. On both sides of Kubo's neck the shawl had worn against his skin, leaving an angry red bruise , beginning to weep droplets of blood. As the first gray light of morning began to outline the foothills and mighty Tatras beyond Kubo could see that he was approaching a town , for houses were closer and closer together. In the pale light he could see a low, sand-colored wall , covered with red tiles. At an opening in the wall a huge gateway marked with wrought iron twisted into the shapes of huge pheasants and flying geese , Kubo saw the town's vartas. ''Plavnica?'' " Yes ." "Doktor Stofcik?" One of the old man's eyes was frosted over, sightless , but the other eye regarded this strange rider with a huge bundle at his back, the collar of his jacket now soaked with blood. " Past the church, on the right. " Kubo looked over his shoulder and finally, as faint as the whisper of a summer wind on a hot day , came the breath of the child. " Sick one? " "Yes ," said Kubo , urging the horse over the cobblestones. " From where ?" the man called after him . ' 'Zbudza. '' ''Jesus and Mary! Go away!'' he screamed. Zbudza! Oh my God!" Waving his hands , the man ran after the slowly moving horse . �76 SLOVAKIA He caught up with Kubo and ran alongside. " Go! Get out! You bring the plague. OUT!" Kubo kicked at the sides of the horse, but the mare would not move faster. The old man grabbed at the horse 's tail and yanked, ending up on the cobblestones with a handful of long hairs. Howling like a wounded animal, he rose and grabbed again, this time holding on as the horse pulled him along the bumpy street. Shutters banged open along the square and heads popped out into the damp morning air. The old horse plodded on, slowed still more by his additional burden, past the church, past a row of houses the same color as the walls, each with a red-tile roof, and some with wooden signs hanging from wrought-iron posts. The old man let go of the tail and ran ahead to a house where a sign hung, stating: "Doktor Stofcik." He stabbed at the air in Kubo's direction. " ZBUDZA! CHOLERA! '' His voice resounded with stark terror down the narrow alley. A man appeared, rubbed his eyes, then put a tiny pair of okuliare on his nose. His wife, a bonnet over her hair, a single long braid tumbling over her shoulders, tied to pull him back in. ''My son is ill,'' Kubo said calmly and with respect. ' ' Some say it is the fever." Lather dripped from the horse's mouth and steam rose from its back. Kubo , his wet hair plastered askew on his forehead, his hands trembling on the reins, painfully moved his neck to peer into the bundle and to listen once more . "Haven't you heard , you fool?" the doctor shouted down to him. " Your village is infected. Epidemia! It 's cholera! No one is to leave. Help is on the way, yes, go home. Get out, immediately.'' "Go away! Leave us! Plague!" Other voices rained down upon the rider whose face was turned from them , transfixed on the dark opening in the guba . The shouting became even louder, the curses stronger as the head of the rider slowly turned and looked up toward the doctor's window. It was only when the doctor put up his hands. "Quiet, everyone, stop it! Now you, go back; I cannot treat your child. You will spread the epidemia if you stay one instant longer. " �SLOVAKIA 77 Kubo's hands trembled uncontrollably. He dropped the reins and buried his face in the rain-soaked sleeve of his jacket. When he looked up to the window once again tears were streaming down his face. "There is no need ," he said , "any longer." Kubo did not take the bundle from his back when he knocked on the door of the Jew Teitlebaum, nor did he say what it contained. He took the small vial of liquid, tucked it into his trousers, and mounted the horse. The Jew asked him if he wanted food or some dry clothes , but Kubo shook his head , paid him with Loebl's money , and turned the horse toward the village gate. When Pani Spisakova came to the Vlasek house,,to prepare the child for burial , Kubo would not let her touch him . He asked for the special bowl used for bathing the dead and told her she could leave . His family watched in stunned silence as Kubo, saying no more, heated the water and with a soft linen cloth careful1y washed the emaciated body. He took the small door from the grain bin and laid it between two benches and made a mattress of dry, fragrant straw. He dressed Belo in a fine white linen shirt, whose cuffs and collar Zuzka had embroidered in swirls of reds and yellows and blues, and laid him upon the straw. He worked throughout the day and until the morning light to make the coffin, and when he brought it into the house the black lacquer and the dozens of tiny painted rosebuds and linden blossoms were still wet. He gently lifted the child, as if Belo were sleeping, and placed him within. He draped the fine lace coverlet, which had been made by his great-grandmother, over the boy, leaving only his arms and face , with neatly combed hair, showing. In the coffin, Kubo carefully arranged the animals he had carved for Belo . Near the boy' s face, three proud roosters , a pig, then a cow, a horse , a vag6nik. The plow with a tiny piece of metal for a blade was pulled by the muscular ox and from its halter Kubo led the piece of twine under the coverlet, and wrapped it around the boy' s cold, stiff hands . His task completed, Kubo pulled up a chair beside the coffin and sat, the flickering candle lighting his face. Mourners came and touched him on the shoulder and offered their sympathies , �78 SLOVAKIA but he neither looked up from the still form in the black casket, nor did he talk. When Father Slobodnik entered on the morning of the third day, Kubo rose , genuflected before the priest and kissed his hand . Then he stood back, chin and cheeks dark with four days of growth, his eyes red but dry, his face so stricken with grief that not even his wife stood close to him as the old priest intoned the Latin prayers . There was a soft rustle of wood against wood. Then the sharp metallic sound of Kubo's hammer on the iron nails pierced the silence. Again and again the hammer came down, sure and true , and the green wood squeaked as the nails penetrated it. Sniffles became sobs and sobs soon aching moans before the high-pitched wails of the women of Zbudza filled the room, mourning the child and venting the fear each had for his own life and soul. Kubo carried the coffin in his arms toward the door, where he placed it on the doorstep three times before hoisting it to his shoulder. Then, as tradition dictated , Belo Vlasek, aged 18 months , left his house for the last time , feet first. As Kubo had asked, Franko Hruscak had dug the grave at the farthest end of the area that had been marked off for the victims of the plague. Under a young linden tree , a freshly turned mound of the dark, damp soil, studded with the stones and rocks that were -the bane of farmers, sat waiting to be returned to its rightful place. The ropes slid on the muddy ground, barely leaving a mark as the slight, small box, no larger or heavier than a baby 's cradle , was lowered into the hole. And one by one the people of Zbudza, from the smallest child to the eldest stara matka took handfulls of the moist dirt and threw it upon the coffin, each with the same ancient farewell: " That the earth will be light on you." The last was Kubo. His hand reached to the mound and taking but a few granules of the soil , he stood above the dark hole. His hand trembled as it hovered over the grave, and slowly balled into a tight fist. The gumless lips of old mouths moved in prayer, sending puffs of white into the damp air, and children shuffled restlessly , looking at their parents for a sign they could leave. Zuzka's face was buried in her handkerchief, her muffled sobs closer and closer together, her shoulders shuddering. �SLOVAKIA 79 Kubo's hand slowly tilted forward, and the dirt trickled through his fingers, falling soundlessly in to the grave. He stood there as if carved from stone, his open hand pleadingly outstretched as the mourners turned and began to walk back toward the village. Soon everyone had left except Kubo and his family. Dusan placed his hands on his son's shoulder. "Come, they'll all be waiting at the krcma for us . Loebl's very thankful for what you, did. He pays for the wake." "Soon, Father," Kubo said in a hoarse voice, his first words in three days. "Don't linger, son, the soul must depart. If you stand here, it becomes as grief-stricken as you; the box will fill up with the child's tears and the ghost will return. The dead m~st bury the dead and life must go on. '' ''I want to be with him for just a little while yet.'' "He's in a better place than us; you should be celebrating. Just think, he is well and pink and warm with Jesus and ... '' Kubo looked up to his father with the bloodshot eyes , from which no more tears could be wrung, his face like ashes in the blacksmith's forge . Dusan gathered the family and started down the hill . By the time Kubo walked through the door of the krcma, voices were already loud and thick with palenka, and old adversaries had found a new battle to wage. "We must send word to Bardejov, to Presov; we need medicine , a doktor immediately," the rich tar said, his finger stabbing at the smoky air. "Soon we'll all be dead of this thing, snuffed out like a hill of ants in a forest fire." "We pay our taxes to you, you thief, and what the hell do we get when we need help?" said Dusan, as he downed a large glass of beer. " You go! Now!" "Don't call me a thief, Vlasek. If you . . . " "Father, I want to speak to you." Kubo's voice was firm and strong , louder then he normally spoke , and the men who were talking at the tables turned toward him. "Well, speak, son, we have no secrets here ." �80 SLOVAKIA Kubo's eyes moved from man to man, then rested on his father. " I made a decision at my son's grave. No more of my children are going to be buried on that hill. Belo is the last. '' " For generations this is our resting place; where else is there , son? Please, don't speak now , your heart is still top heavy. " "I'm going to Amerika." As if a gong had been sounded, silence descended on the krcma. Dusan rose to his feet. " Don't confront your father as you are doing , not even on a day so sad as this one." Kubo's eyes did not blink. He did not look down. " You 're my son, my heir, you share my roof. You will do my bidding.'' ' 'I'm an heir to sickness and death and hunger and I want none of them." A low murmur of voices rippled through the room. " This isn't the time, son; besides, there is a tax and they mean to collect it these days. And fare . They don't take you for free on the boat. " "There's no better time, Father. I'll get the money somehow. " " I, who gave you life; this is my thanks? To spit in my face in front of the whole village , to take away my pride like this?" " I thank you for my life and I thank all of you for every kindness to me , -to Zuzka, my children. I'm not going to this Amerika forever; I'll come back someday and we'll again have land and food and live like humans , not some animals scraping for every morsel of food.' ' "To Amerika, eh? " A bitter smile tugged at the corners of Dusan 's mouth. " Just like you went to Perun 's Wood with the cows. Reaching for too much. Remember what happened then?" Kubo's large brown eyes blinked. For an instant he had to turn from his father 's hard stare. " You hit below the belt, Father." He fingered the rim of his klobuk , which he held in his hands . "But I have to try ," he said, returning his father's look. Dusan 's body sagged, his chest heaved, and he sighed aloud. ''I asked but one thing , son, all my life, and that is for you to bury me on that hill. This is too much? As you loved your Belicko I loved you. And now, this , this . . . " �SLOVAKIA 81 "It's not too much to ask, but I have to go ." "Then who's going to bury me? Who is going to tend the graves of your children?' ' In the back of the krcma Anastazia's eyes were bright, expectant. She leaned forward on the bench so as not to miss a single word. " I must live, my family must live. In your own words and the words of the Holy Scripture, God will tend to the graves. And the dead will bury the dead. '' �� SLOVAKIA 73 Excerpt from In Due Season (II) BY PAUL WILKES (Author's note: The year is 1899, the setting is a tiny, poor village in Eastern Slovakia.) ©Copyright, 1985 Paul Wilkes Metod burst through the door. "Mama, Papa, Pan .. . Pan .. Pan Vadasz. He's dead! I saw it right through the window." he said breathlessly. "Quiet, son!" Kubo said, his finger in front of his mouth, "your brother is sleeping ." "Papa, Papa," the boy whispered , "Rezso said Pan Vadasz just got up from his bed and lay down on the floor . . . " "I want no t~lk of death in this house ," Kubo said sternly. "None!" In those days , Vadasz was not the only one in the village of Zbudza to " lie between the beams ," showing that they no longer hoped to be cured. They, who had come from the earth, in their fevered and aching state, wished to return, knowing that every day they lived they were a burden to those who hoped to survive. Every day they required tending - and there was precious little time for this - and they needed nourishment. In many houses the bread was already crumbly from too much bark. In the next five days the somber bells of St. Joseph's tolled nine times; on one day three times, as the twins of Pani Gasparoyicova 's daughters died , one with the sunrise, the other just after the Angelus had rung . And before the sun set, Banik fell from his stool at the front of his house, blood running from his mouth . �74 SLOVAKIA Although the villagers were not sure if Banik had died from the cholera, he was buried along with the others in a shallow gully, far to the side of the cemetery. It had been set aside not for any health reason but for fear that the curse would somehow seep through the ground to infect the souls of villagers who now slept in peace. In those five days Belo ate no food, drank no water, his eyes grew dry and sunken in his face, and his every breath was a struggle, as if some great hand were pressing on his chest. Kubo did not leave the boy's side and barely ate himself. Only on the sixth day, when Belo was too weak even to cry did Kubo leave , returning a short while later. He had borrowed Loebl's horse and was going to take the boy to the nearest doctor, in Plavnica , a trip of some ten hours. Loebl had a friend there, a rabbi, who kept the special medicines that Jews used, and he asked Kubo to bring something for someone in his house, sick with the croup . Dusan, clenched teeth holding his pipe, fixed his eyes on Kubo. "You don't even know the way. What is this 'doktor' business? What do they know that we don't?" The old woman moved her head slowly in assent. ''When God calls, sinful humans must not hold on; it is His will. And that little one could die outside his own house ... it is not right.'' Zuzka said nothing. She pulled down another worn lambswool guba from the shelf above the bed and then her extra shawl. Into a small hemp sack she placed half a loaf of bread and an apple she had hidden away for the day that Belo would be well enough to eat it. Still without saying a word, she helped her husband bundle the child into the first guba , then the second, and tied the shawl into a sling around his shoulders . Neither Dusan nor Helena , nor the old woman , would help him, nor even look in his direction . About to leave, he said to their turned backs , " I ask for your prayers. Because if this child dies , I die .'' Zuzka gasped , putting her hand to her mouth, and his mother made a sign of the cross, here eyes turned toward the heaven her son had just challenged . As the first pellets of a freezing rain rattled against the windowpanes, Kubo rode into the black, moonless night. At first he �SLOVAKIA 75 went slowly, to be sure the child was secure on his back, then he kicked at the sides of the brown mare. The rain stung his face, blinding him at times. In the cold damp air of the night he could smell the child, the sickly sour brown odor that covered Belo each time another issue of water gurgled from his trembling bottom. Kubo could barely hear his breathing, and once when he looked over his shoulder into the dark bundle, he could hear nothing. He pulled the horse to a halt and listened for the breathing . After ·a painful pause, Belo drew in some air. By the time they reached the turnoff beyond the village of Svinne, the horse 's nostrils were flared, its gait slowed to little more than a walk. On both sides of Kubo's neck the shawl had worn against his skin, leaving an angry red bruise , beginning to weep droplets of blood. As the first gray light of morning began to outline the foothills and mighty Tatras beyond Kubo could see that he was approaching a town , for houses were closer and closer together. In the pale light he could see a low, sand-colored wall , covered with red tiles. At an opening in the wall a huge gateway marked with wrought iron twisted into the shapes of huge pheasants and flying geese , Kubo saw the town's vartas. ''Plavnica?'' " Yes ." "Doktor Stofcik?" One of the old man's eyes was frosted over, sightless , but the other eye regarded this strange rider with a huge bundle at his back, the collar of his jacket now soaked with blood. " Past the church, on the right. " Kubo looked over his shoulder and finally, as faint as the whisper of a summer wind on a hot day , came the breath of the child. " Sick one? " "Yes ," said Kubo , urging the horse over the cobblestones. " From where ?" the man called after him . ' 'Zbudza. '' ''Jesus and Mary! Go away!'' he screamed. Zbudza! Oh my God!" Waving his hands , the man ran after the slowly moving horse . �76 SLOVAKIA He caught up with Kubo and ran alongside. " Go! Get out! You bring the plague. OUT!" Kubo kicked at the sides of the horse, but the mare would not move faster. The old man grabbed at the horse 's tail and yanked, ending up on the cobblestones with a handful of long hairs. Howling like a wounded animal, he rose and grabbed again, this time holding on as the horse pulled him along the bumpy street. Shutters banged open along the square and heads popped out into the damp morning air. The old horse plodded on, slowed still more by his additional burden, past the church, past a row of houses the same color as the walls, each with a red-tile roof, and some with wooden signs hanging from wrought-iron posts. The old man let go of the tail and ran ahead to a house where a sign hung, stating: "Doktor Stofcik." He stabbed at the air in Kubo's direction. " ZBUDZA! CHOLERA! '' His voice resounded with stark terror down the narrow alley. A man appeared, rubbed his eyes, then put a tiny pair of okuliare on his nose. His wife, a bonnet over her hair, a single long braid tumbling over her shoulders, tied to pull him back in. ''My son is ill,'' Kubo said calmly and with respect. ' ' Some say it is the fever." Lather dripped from the horse's mouth and steam rose from its back. Kubo , his wet hair plastered askew on his forehead, his hands trembling on the reins, painfully moved his neck to peer into the bundle and to listen once more . "Haven't you heard , you fool?" the doctor shouted down to him. " Your village is infected. Epidemia! It 's cholera! No one is to leave. Help is on the way, yes, go home. Get out, immediately.'' "Go away! Leave us! Plague!" Other voices rained down upon the rider whose face was turned from them , transfixed on the dark opening in the guba . The shouting became even louder, the curses stronger as the head of the rider slowly turned and looked up toward the doctor's window. It was only when the doctor put up his hands. "Quiet, everyone, stop it! Now you, go back; I cannot treat your child. You will spread the epidemia if you stay one instant longer. " �SLOVAKIA 77 Kubo's hands trembled uncontrollably. He dropped the reins and buried his face in the rain-soaked sleeve of his jacket. When he looked up to the window once again tears were streaming down his face. "There is no need ," he said , "any longer." Kubo did not take the bundle from his back when he knocked on the door of the Jew Teitlebaum, nor did he say what it contained. He took the small vial of liquid, tucked it into his trousers, and mounted the horse. The Jew asked him if he wanted food or some dry clothes , but Kubo shook his head , paid him with Loebl's money , and turned the horse toward the village gate. When Pani Spisakova came to the Vlasek house,,to prepare the child for burial , Kubo would not let her touch him . He asked for the special bowl used for bathing the dead and told her she could leave . His family watched in stunned silence as Kubo, saying no more, heated the water and with a soft linen cloth careful1y washed the emaciated body. He took the small door from the grain bin and laid it between two benches and made a mattress of dry, fragrant straw. He dressed Belo in a fine white linen shirt, whose cuffs and collar Zuzka had embroidered in swirls of reds and yellows and blues, and laid him upon the straw. He worked throughout the day and until the morning light to make the coffin, and when he brought it into the house the black lacquer and the dozens of tiny painted rosebuds and linden blossoms were still wet. He gently lifted the child, as if Belo were sleeping, and placed him within. He draped the fine lace coverlet, which had been made by his great-grandmother, over the boy, leaving only his arms and face , with neatly combed hair, showing. In the coffin, Kubo carefully arranged the animals he had carved for Belo . Near the boy' s face, three proud roosters , a pig, then a cow, a horse , a vag6nik. The plow with a tiny piece of metal for a blade was pulled by the muscular ox and from its halter Kubo led the piece of twine under the coverlet, and wrapped it around the boy' s cold, stiff hands . His task completed, Kubo pulled up a chair beside the coffin and sat, the flickering candle lighting his face. Mourners came and touched him on the shoulder and offered their sympathies , �78 SLOVAKIA but he neither looked up from the still form in the black casket, nor did he talk. When Father Slobodnik entered on the morning of the third day, Kubo rose , genuflected before the priest and kissed his hand . Then he stood back, chin and cheeks dark with four days of growth, his eyes red but dry, his face so stricken with grief that not even his wife stood close to him as the old priest intoned the Latin prayers . There was a soft rustle of wood against wood. Then the sharp metallic sound of Kubo's hammer on the iron nails pierced the silence. Again and again the hammer came down, sure and true , and the green wood squeaked as the nails penetrated it. Sniffles became sobs and sobs soon aching moans before the high-pitched wails of the women of Zbudza filled the room, mourning the child and venting the fear each had for his own life and soul. Kubo carried the coffin in his arms toward the door, where he placed it on the doorstep three times before hoisting it to his shoulder. Then, as tradition dictated , Belo Vlasek, aged 18 months , left his house for the last time , feet first. As Kubo had asked, Franko Hruscak had dug the grave at the farthest end of the area that had been marked off for the victims of the plague. Under a young linden tree , a freshly turned mound of the dark, damp soil, studded with the stones and rocks that were -the bane of farmers, sat waiting to be returned to its rightful place. The ropes slid on the muddy ground, barely leaving a mark as the slight, small box, no larger or heavier than a baby 's cradle , was lowered into the hole. And one by one the people of Zbudza, from the smallest child to the eldest stara matka took handfulls of the moist dirt and threw it upon the coffin, each with the same ancient farewell: " That the earth will be light on you." The last was Kubo. His hand reached to the mound and taking but a few granules of the soil , he stood above the dark hole. His hand trembled as it hovered over the grave, and slowly balled into a tight fist. The gumless lips of old mouths moved in prayer, sending puffs of white into the damp air, and children shuffled restlessly , looking at their parents for a sign they could leave. Zuzka's face was buried in her handkerchief, her muffled sobs closer and closer together, her shoulders shuddering. �SLOVAKIA 79 Kubo's hand slowly tilted forward, and the dirt trickled through his fingers, falling soundlessly in to the grave. He stood there as if carved from stone, his open hand pleadingly outstretched as the mourners turned and began to walk back toward the village. Soon everyone had left except Kubo and his family. Dusan placed his hands on his son's shoulder. "Come, they'll all be waiting at the krcma for us . Loebl's very thankful for what you, did. He pays for the wake." "Soon, Father," Kubo said in a hoarse voice, his first words in three days. "Don't linger, son, the soul must depart. If you stand here, it becomes as grief-stricken as you; the box will fill up with the child's tears and the ghost will return. The dead m~st bury the dead and life must go on. '' ''I want to be with him for just a little while yet.'' "He's in a better place than us; you should be celebrating. Just think, he is well and pink and warm with Jesus and ... '' Kubo looked up to his father with the bloodshot eyes , from which no more tears could be wrung, his face like ashes in the blacksmith's forge . Dusan gathered the family and started down the hill . By the time Kubo walked through the door of the krcma, voices were already loud and thick with palenka, and old adversaries had found a new battle to wage. "We must send word to Bardejov, to Presov; we need medicine , a doktor immediately," the rich tar said, his finger stabbing at the smoky air. "Soon we'll all be dead of this thing, snuffed out like a hill of ants in a forest fire." "We pay our taxes to you, you thief, and what the hell do we get when we need help?" said Dusan, as he downed a large glass of beer. " You go! Now!" "Don't call me a thief, Vlasek. If you . . . " "Father, I want to speak to you." Kubo's voice was firm and strong , louder then he normally spoke , and the men who were talking at the tables turned toward him. "Well, speak, son, we have no secrets here ." �80 SLOVAKIA Kubo's eyes moved from man to man, then rested on his father. " I made a decision at my son's grave. No more of my children are going to be buried on that hill. Belo is the last. '' " For generations this is our resting place; where else is there , son? Please, don't speak now , your heart is still top heavy. " "I'm going to Amerika." As if a gong had been sounded, silence descended on the krcma. Dusan rose to his feet. " Don't confront your father as you are doing , not even on a day so sad as this one." Kubo's eyes did not blink. He did not look down. " You 're my son, my heir, you share my roof. You will do my bidding.'' ' 'I'm an heir to sickness and death and hunger and I want none of them." A low murmur of voices rippled through the room. " This isn't the time, son; besides, there is a tax and they mean to collect it these days. And fare . They don't take you for free on the boat. " "There's no better time, Father. I'll get the money somehow. " " I, who gave you life; this is my thanks? To spit in my face in front of the whole village , to take away my pride like this?" " I thank you for my life and I thank all of you for every kindness to me , -to Zuzka, my children. I'm not going to this Amerika forever; I'll come back someday and we'll again have land and food and live like humans , not some animals scraping for every morsel of food.' ' "To Amerika, eh? " A bitter smile tugged at the corners of Dusan 's mouth. " Just like you went to Perun 's Wood with the cows. Reaching for too much. Remember what happened then?" Kubo's large brown eyes blinked. For an instant he had to turn from his father 's hard stare. " You hit below the belt, Father." He fingered the rim of his klobuk , which he held in his hands . "But I have to try ," he said, returning his father's look. Dusan 's body sagged, his chest heaved, and he sighed aloud. ''I asked but one thing , son, all my life, and that is for you to bury me on that hill. This is too much? As you loved your Belicko I loved you. And now, this , this . . . " �SLOVAKIA 81 "It's not too much to ask, but I have to go ." "Then who's going to bury me? Who is going to tend the graves of your children?' ' In the back of the krcma Anastazia's eyes were bright, expectant. She leaned forward on the bench so as not to miss a single word. " I must live, my family must live. In your own words and the words of the Holy Scripture, God will tend to the graves. And the dead will bury the dead. '' �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1985-86, Vol. 32 Description An account of the resource Vol. 32 (No. 58-59), 1985-86. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985-86 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 73 Excerpt from In Due Season (II) BY PAUL WILKES (Author's note: The year is 1899, the setting is a tiny, poor village in Eastern Slovakia.) ©Copyright, 1985 Paul Wilkes Metod burst through the door. "Mama, Papa, Pan .. . Pan .. Pan Vadasz. He's dead! I saw it right through the window." he said breathlessly. "Quiet, son!" Kubo said, his finger in front of his mouth, "your brother is sleeping ." "Papa, Papa," the boy whispered , "Rezso said Pan Vadasz just got up from his bed and lay down on the floor . . . " "I want no t~lk of death in this house ," Kubo said sternly. "None!" In those days , Vadasz was not the only one in the village of Zbudza to " lie between the beams ," showing that they no longer hoped to be cured. They, who had come from the earth, in their fevered and aching state, wished to return, knowing that every day they lived they were a burden to those who hoped to survive. Every day they required tending - and there was precious little time for this - and they needed nourishment. In many houses the bread was already crumbly from too much bark. In the next five days the somber bells of St. Joseph's tolled nine times; on one day three times, as the twins of Pani Gasparoyicova 's daughters died , one with the sunrise, the other just after the Angelus had rung . And before the sun set, Banik fell from his stool at the front of his house, blood running from his mouth . 74 SLOVAKIA Although the villagers were not sure if Banik had died from the cholera, he was buried along with the others in a shallow gully, far to the side of the cemetery. It had been set aside not for any health reason but for fear that the curse would somehow seep through the ground to infect the souls of villagers who now slept in peace. In those five days Belo ate no food, drank no water, his eyes grew dry and sunken in his face, and his every breath was a struggle, as if some great hand were pressing on his chest. Kubo did not leave the boy's side and barely ate himself. Only on the sixth day, when Belo was too weak even to cry did Kubo leave , returning a short while later. He had borrowed Loebl's horse and was going to take the boy to the nearest doctor, in Plavnica , a trip of some ten hours. Loebl had a friend there, a rabbi, who kept the special medicines that Jews used, and he asked Kubo to bring something for someone in his house, sick with the croup . Dusan, clenched teeth holding his pipe, fixed his eyes on Kubo. "You don't even know the way. What is this 'doktor' business? What do they know that we don't?" The old woman moved her head slowly in assent. ''When God calls, sinful humans must not hold on; it is His will. And that little one could die outside his own house ... it is not right.'' Zuzka said nothing. She pulled down another worn lambswool guba from the shelf above the bed and then her extra shawl. Into a small hemp sack she placed half a loaf of bread and an apple she had hidden away for the day that Belo would be well enough to eat it. Still without saying a word, she helped her husband bundle the child into the first guba , then the second, and tied the shawl into a sling around his shoulders . Neither Dusan nor Helena , nor the old woman , would help him, nor even look in his direction . About to leave, he said to their turned backs , " I ask for your prayers. Because if this child dies , I die .'' Zuzka gasped , putting her hand to her mouth, and his mother made a sign of the cross, here eyes turned toward the heaven her son had just challenged . As the first pellets of a freezing rain rattled against the windowpanes, Kubo rode into the black, moonless night. At first he SLOVAKIA 75 went slowly, to be sure the child was secure on his back, then he kicked at the sides of the brown mare. The rain stung his face, blinding him at times. In the cold damp air of the night he could smell the child, the sickly sour brown odor that covered Belo each time another issue of water gurgled from his trembling bottom. Kubo could barely hear his breathing, and once when he looked over his shoulder into the dark bundle, he could hear nothing. He pulled the horse to a halt and listened for the breathing . After ·a painful pause, Belo drew in some air. By the time they reached the turnoff beyond the village of Svinne, the horse 's nostrils were flared, its gait slowed to little more than a walk. On both sides of Kubo's neck the shawl had worn against his skin, leaving an angry red bruise , beginning to weep droplets of blood. As the first gray light of morning began to outline the foothills and mighty Tatras beyond Kubo could see that he was approaching a town , for houses were closer and closer together. In the pale light he could see a low, sand-colored wall , covered with red tiles. At an opening in the wall a huge gateway marked with wrought iron twisted into the shapes of huge pheasants and flying geese , Kubo saw the town's vartas. ''Plavnica?'' " Yes ." "Doktor Stofcik?" One of the old man's eyes was frosted over, sightless , but the other eye regarded this strange rider with a huge bundle at his back, the collar of his jacket now soaked with blood. " Past the church, on the right. " Kubo looked over his shoulder and finally, as faint as the whisper of a summer wind on a hot day , came the breath of the child. " Sick one? " "Yes ," said Kubo , urging the horse over the cobblestones. " From where ?" the man called after him . ' 'Zbudza. '' ''Jesus and Mary! Go away!'' he screamed. Zbudza! Oh my God!" Waving his hands , the man ran after the slowly moving horse . 76 SLOVAKIA He caught up with Kubo and ran alongside. " Go! Get out! You bring the plague. OUT!" Kubo kicked at the sides of the horse, but the mare would not move faster. The old man grabbed at the horse 's tail and yanked, ending up on the cobblestones with a handful of long hairs. Howling like a wounded animal, he rose and grabbed again, this time holding on as the horse pulled him along the bumpy street. Shutters banged open along the square and heads popped out into the damp morning air. The old horse plodded on, slowed still more by his additional burden, past the church, past a row of houses the same color as the walls, each with a red-tile roof, and some with wooden signs hanging from wrought-iron posts. The old man let go of the tail and ran ahead to a house where a sign hung, stating: "Doktor Stofcik." He stabbed at the air in Kubo's direction. " ZBUDZA! CHOLERA! '' His voice resounded with stark terror down the narrow alley. A man appeared, rubbed his eyes, then put a tiny pair of okuliare on his nose. His wife, a bonnet over her hair, a single long braid tumbling over her shoulders, tied to pull him back in. ''My son is ill,'' Kubo said calmly and with respect. ' ' Some say it is the fever." Lather dripped from the horse's mouth and steam rose from its back. Kubo , his wet hair plastered askew on his forehead, his hands trembling on the reins, painfully moved his neck to peer into the bundle and to listen once more . "Haven't you heard , you fool?" the doctor shouted down to him. " Your village is infected. Epidemia! It 's cholera! No one is to leave. Help is on the way, yes, go home. Get out, immediately.'' "Go away! Leave us! Plague!" Other voices rained down upon the rider whose face was turned from them , transfixed on the dark opening in the guba . The shouting became even louder, the curses stronger as the head of the rider slowly turned and looked up toward the doctor's window. It was only when the doctor put up his hands. "Quiet, everyone, stop it! Now you, go back; I cannot treat your child. You will spread the epidemia if you stay one instant longer. " SLOVAKIA 77 Kubo's hands trembled uncontrollably. He dropped the reins and buried his face in the rain-soaked sleeve of his jacket. When he looked up to the window once again tears were streaming down his face. "There is no need ," he said , "any longer." Kubo did not take the bundle from his back when he knocked on the door of the Jew Teitlebaum, nor did he say what it contained. He took the small vial of liquid, tucked it into his trousers, and mounted the horse. The Jew asked him if he wanted food or some dry clothes , but Kubo shook his head , paid him with Loebl's money , and turned the horse toward the village gate. When Pani Spisakova came to the Vlasek house,,to prepare the child for burial , Kubo would not let her touch him . He asked for the special bowl used for bathing the dead and told her she could leave . His family watched in stunned silence as Kubo, saying no more, heated the water and with a soft linen cloth careful1y washed the emaciated body. He took the small door from the grain bin and laid it between two benches and made a mattress of dry, fragrant straw. He dressed Belo in a fine white linen shirt, whose cuffs and collar Zuzka had embroidered in swirls of reds and yellows and blues, and laid him upon the straw. He worked throughout the day and until the morning light to make the coffin, and when he brought it into the house the black lacquer and the dozens of tiny painted rosebuds and linden blossoms were still wet. He gently lifted the child, as if Belo were sleeping, and placed him within. He draped the fine lace coverlet, which had been made by his great-grandmother, over the boy, leaving only his arms and face , with neatly combed hair, showing. In the coffin, Kubo carefully arranged the animals he had carved for Belo . Near the boy' s face, three proud roosters , a pig, then a cow, a horse , a vag6nik. The plow with a tiny piece of metal for a blade was pulled by the muscular ox and from its halter Kubo led the piece of twine under the coverlet, and wrapped it around the boy' s cold, stiff hands . His task completed, Kubo pulled up a chair beside the coffin and sat, the flickering candle lighting his face. Mourners came and touched him on the shoulder and offered their sympathies , 78 SLOVAKIA but he neither looked up from the still form in the black casket, nor did he talk. When Father Slobodnik entered on the morning of the third day, Kubo rose , genuflected before the priest and kissed his hand . Then he stood back, chin and cheeks dark with four days of growth, his eyes red but dry, his face so stricken with grief that not even his wife stood close to him as the old priest intoned the Latin prayers . There was a soft rustle of wood against wood. Then the sharp metallic sound of Kubo's hammer on the iron nails pierced the silence. Again and again the hammer came down, sure and true , and the green wood squeaked as the nails penetrated it. Sniffles became sobs and sobs soon aching moans before the high-pitched wails of the women of Zbudza filled the room, mourning the child and venting the fear each had for his own life and soul. Kubo carried the coffin in his arms toward the door, where he placed it on the doorstep three times before hoisting it to his shoulder. Then, as tradition dictated , Belo Vlasek, aged 18 months , left his house for the last time , feet first. As Kubo had asked, Franko Hruscak had dug the grave at the farthest end of the area that had been marked off for the victims of the plague. Under a young linden tree , a freshly turned mound of the dark, damp soil, studded with the stones and rocks that were -the bane of farmers, sat waiting to be returned to its rightful place. The ropes slid on the muddy ground, barely leaving a mark as the slight, small box, no larger or heavier than a baby 's cradle , was lowered into the hole. And one by one the people of Zbudza, from the smallest child to the eldest stara matka took handfulls of the moist dirt and threw it upon the coffin, each with the same ancient farewell: " That the earth will be light on you." The last was Kubo. His hand reached to the mound and taking but a few granules of the soil , he stood above the dark hole. His hand trembled as it hovered over the grave, and slowly balled into a tight fist. The gumless lips of old mouths moved in prayer, sending puffs of white into the damp air, and children shuffled restlessly , looking at their parents for a sign they could leave. Zuzka's face was buried in her handkerchief, her muffled sobs closer and closer together, her shoulders shuddering. SLOVAKIA 79 Kubo's hand slowly tilted forward, and the dirt trickled through his fingers, falling soundlessly in to the grave. He stood there as if carved from stone, his open hand pleadingly outstretched as the mourners turned and began to walk back toward the village. Soon everyone had left except Kubo and his family. Dusan placed his hands on his son's shoulder. "Come, they'll all be waiting at the krcma for us . Loebl's very thankful for what you, did. He pays for the wake." "Soon, Father," Kubo said in a hoarse voice, his first words in three days. "Don't linger, son, the soul must depart. If you stand here, it becomes as grief-stricken as you; the box will fill up with the child's tears and the ghost will return. The dead m~st bury the dead and life must go on. '' ''I want to be with him for just a little while yet.'' "He's in a better place than us; you should be celebrating. Just think, he is well and pink and warm with Jesus and ... '' Kubo looked up to his father with the bloodshot eyes , from which no more tears could be wrung, his face like ashes in the blacksmith's forge . Dusan gathered the family and started down the hill . By the time Kubo walked through the door of the krcma, voices were already loud and thick with palenka, and old adversaries had found a new battle to wage. "We must send word to Bardejov, to Presov; we need medicine , a doktor immediately," the rich tar said, his finger stabbing at the smoky air. "Soon we'll all be dead of this thing, snuffed out like a hill of ants in a forest fire." "We pay our taxes to you, you thief, and what the hell do we get when we need help?" said Dusan, as he downed a large glass of beer. " You go! Now!" "Don't call me a thief, Vlasek. If you . . . " "Father, I want to speak to you." Kubo's voice was firm and strong , louder then he normally spoke , and the men who were talking at the tables turned toward him. "Well, speak, son, we have no secrets here ." 80 SLOVAKIA Kubo's eyes moved from man to man, then rested on his father. " I made a decision at my son's grave. No more of my children are going to be buried on that hill. Belo is the last. '' " For generations this is our resting place; where else is there , son? Please, don't speak now , your heart is still top heavy. " "I'm going to Amerika." As if a gong had been sounded, silence descended on the krcma. Dusan rose to his feet. " Don't confront your father as you are doing , not even on a day so sad as this one." Kubo's eyes did not blink. He did not look down. " You 're my son, my heir, you share my roof. You will do my bidding.'' ' 'I'm an heir to sickness and death and hunger and I want none of them." A low murmur of voices rippled through the room. " This isn't the time, son; besides, there is a tax and they mean to collect it these days. And fare . They don't take you for free on the boat. " "There's no better time, Father. I'll get the money somehow. " " I, who gave you life; this is my thanks? To spit in my face in front of the whole village , to take away my pride like this?" " I thank you for my life and I thank all of you for every kindness to me , -to Zuzka, my children. I'm not going to this Amerika forever; I'll come back someday and we'll again have land and food and live like humans , not some animals scraping for every morsel of food.' ' "To Amerika, eh? " A bitter smile tugged at the corners of Dusan 's mouth. " Just like you went to Perun 's Wood with the cows. Reaching for too much. Remember what happened then?" Kubo's large brown eyes blinked. For an instant he had to turn from his father 's hard stare. " You hit below the belt, Father." He fingered the rim of his klobuk , which he held in his hands . "But I have to try ," he said, returning his father's look. Dusan 's body sagged, his chest heaved, and he sighed aloud. ''I asked but one thing , son, all my life, and that is for you to bury me on that hill. This is too much? As you loved your Belicko I loved you. And now, this , this . . . " SLOVAKIA 81 "It's not too much to ask, but I have to go ." "Then who's going to bury me? Who is going to tend the graves of your children?' ' In the back of the krcma Anastazia's eyes were bright, expectant. She leaned forward on the bench so as not to miss a single word. " I must live, my family must live. In your own words and the words of the Holy Scripture, God will tend to the graves. And the dead will bury the dead. ''  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Excerpt from "In Due Season" (II) Description An account of the resource Paul Wilkes Slovakia, Vol. 32 (No. 58-59), 1985-86 pp. 73-81 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wilkes, Paul, 1938- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985-86 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/31714ad1d6b23fd43bd6f8538cf2d938.pdf b187a10d4dac6e68a438fb9bf008f94f PDF Text Text \ LITERATURE ��SLOVAKIA 105 Excerpt from Michal: Biography of a Galician Coal Miner, 1906-1933 VASIL S. KOBAN CHAPTER 1 - ONE MORE SPRAG Thursday, May 24, 1906 It was just after two o'clock when Michal Kohan , mule skinner at Mine No. 1 in Conemaugh, Pennsylvania, started down the incline pulling the three coal cars out of the mine behind two mules. " You got three sprags on the three cars, Kelly? " he asked in Rusin . He put up three fingers so Kelly could not fail to understand. Kelly, an Irishman just turned sixteen and starting on his new job in the mines, rubbed his alcohol-bleared head. ''Sure , sure , begorrah, I got enough sprags, '' he said in a half stupor. He put up two fingers and shook them at Michal . The mules would never hold the downhill run of the three coal cars unless there were enough tapered wooden sprags between the wheels to drag on the cars like brakes and hold them back. " You need three!" Michal yelled in Rusin. "Three, you lummox! Or else she 'll never hold ." The Irishman waved cheerfully, " G'wan!" (Two fingers) Michal fumed: (Three fingers!) Kelly laughed: (Two fingers!) Michal withheld his curse because the cars were already starting down , and he had to whip the mules to keep them ahead. As the cars gathered speed Michal struggled to keep the mules ahead of the surging coal projectiles. "Prekliaty blbec/" Michal yelled. "She won't hold, you idiot! " The cars gathered momentum and pushed up against the struggling mules , Michal slashing away at them with the whip to push them ahead . "Son of a bitch! " he yelled. " You 'll kill them! " '' Harrarrarrahh ! ' ' he yelled at the mules , urging them on to do the impossible. The Irish kid just laughed. �106 SLOVAKIA As Michal got half-way down the grade he saw it would be impossible to hold the cars back with only two sprags. He did the only thing left for him to do. He leaped for his life. The coal cars smashed into the mules and ground them into instant hamburger of broken flesh and spitting blood. The mules screamed and clawed for what seemed like hours, but which only lasted a few seconds. They were soon mangled mounds of bloody mash. Michal lay beside the track, his leg caught under the coal cars as they passed by. "God damn bastard!" he yelled in outraged disbelief at what had happened. Then he blacked out. Michal woke up in a lily-white hospital room in Johnstown, three miles downriver from Conemaugh and site of the famous Johnstown flood of 1889. Michal looked around dazedly, his heart mounting in his throat. He was only 21, and had been in America since he was 15 in 1900. This was his first experience in a hospital. A pert little nurse in a peaked cap came in to take his pulse and speak to him reassuringly in his native Rusin. "Nurse, I --" "Now, now, just be calm. You survived the accident," she said cheerfully, '' and that 's most of the battle right there I ' ' " How - how long have I been here?" "Just a day or two," she shrugged. "You were kept under sedation. " Michal plucked at the white sheet with his fingers , his little mustache twitching nervously. "How long will I be here? I have to get back to work. I have to pay my rent.'' The nurse smiled. "That will take a little while ," she said. " But don 't worry about the time or the expense. The Cambria Coal Mine is taking care of everything. ' ' Michal frowned. " But -- " " Ohl" she exclaimed, glad to change the subject , "you have visitors.'' She stepped aside and the little round face of Marienka Kinda appeared, followed by her husband Ivan, grumpy and straight-backed. " How are you , Michal? " she asked .with concern in Slovak, her only language. \ , '' All right , I think. But why did you come here just for me? I will be out in a few hours at the most. " Marienka smiled through her tears, and Ivan grumped, "Sure, �SLOVAKIA 107 son, just a short time. But you have to do what the doctors tell you. My God, what is that sickly swe~ smell_around here?" The nurse left nervously to seek the doctor. Ivan stuck his nose up, sniffed, and marched around the room like the old Hussar he was - a veteran of the Austrian Emperor's army. Michal had met Marienka, along with Marienka's sister, Jacka, on the ship taking them to America six years before. Marienka had left Ivan in the United States to see her sick father in Slovakia and had returned with her younger sister. Michal fell in love with Jacka at first sight. So he boarded with the Kindas to be near his love while he worked as a mule skinner in the coal mine. "Where's Jacka?" "Uh -- she had to make sandwiches for the men," Marienka said hastily. "And besides, you'll be out of here so fast it would not give Jacka time to come over!" The door opened and a doctor in a white jacket hurried in, '' sluchatko'' hanging from his side pocket to indicate the badge of this profession. He wrinkled his nose and tugged at his little beard, then pulled back the bedclothes to examine Michal's leg. "Hmmm," he said, "this doesn't look good at all." It was in English, so Ivan could understand only dimly. The nurse hurried over to interpret. They did not have Slovak or Rusin doctors to talk to the immigrants in their own language. "Nurse," said the doctor, sighing, "you'll have to tell this young man his leg has to go.'' He palpated the pulpy black right leg, drew a line with his finger above the knee. "Right here," the doctor said. "Now you tell him," and he hurried away. The nurse gulped. Then she took a deep breath and told Michal the doctor's decision in halting Rusin. ''Cut off my leg? No, never! Oh, God, no!'' Michal tried to struggle out of bed to run away, to get away from here where they would take away his leg and his chance to make a living and to marry Jacka. Marienka and Ivan moved quickly to hold him down. "Please, Michal," said Marienka in great concern. "If it must be done to save your life, then it will be for the best. You'll see that everything will turn out all right.'' But Michal's face froze in a faraway look. The look of death. Where he came from, most of the people who had their legs cut off �108 SLOVAKIA - died. And the rest were beggars and the laughingstock of the uneasy townspeople. One-legged people were better off dead. And Michal wanted to die. There was nothing left for him, even in America. Nothing. CHAPTER2 - ONE LEG, PEGLEG Friday, May 25 , 1906 Michal came out of a daze like dragging himself doggedly out of the depths of a deep coal mine, with a white light shining at the top. He groped his way up and up, his brain hitching itself from one ladder rung to the other, until he finally broke out into the light and found himself in the brightly lit hospital room, whiter still than it had been the first time. And there was the tugging, nagging, pulling pain in his right leg, straight down to his toes. He tried to feel them, but his mind swirled as he sat up. He gasped and fell back on the pillows, sweating. A little boy ran in the room, tugging at his mother's hand. "Where's daddy?" he said in English. She pulled him back into the hall. "Otec is down further," she said in Slovak. But the boy broke away and staggerred onto Michal's bed, right over his right leg. Michal howled in pain . The mother hastily pulled the child away with abject Slovak humiliation, and said in English: " Don 't you know this man had his leg taken off?'' The child stared , and ran to her in tears . Michal could only make out half the conversation , but he was more concerned with the pain in his leg. The little nurse hurried in and clucked about Michal like a mother hen. "You will be fine in a little while, just you see." ''But my leg - it hurts so much, '' Michal said . The nurse looked at the blank space where his leg had been , and she looked at Michal's intense face. "You have to know," she said deliberately, ''that the doctor had to stop the anesthetics and that you feel the pain of your leg being taken off. You have a stump right above your right knee , and it is the nerve there that hurts you and makes you think you still have the leg." Michal was horrified. " Then my leg is. gone!" For the first time the word "operation" really struck home to ltm, an<l he knew that now he was only half a man. ''I can't live with one leg,'' he· sobbed. ''I can't work, I can't get married, I can 't make a living, I can't do anything." �SLOVAKIA 109 \ He hid his face in his hands and sobbed like a broken-hearted little boy . The nurse left him alone for a while. She let him cry it out . It would be better for him . Then she gently put her arm around his shoulder and cradled his head against her breast. " You will be fine , my priatel'," she said softly. " Just give yourself a little time. You will get a new leg and you will walk almost as well as you ever did. And you will live and marry and have children and enjoy life . You'll see. " Just then the door flew open and a giant of a man strode in, all 6 feet 4 inches of him; he looked around briefly, saw Michal Kohan , and strode over. He stuck out a hammy paw. " McCloskey's the name ," he roared . "Mike McCloskey . I'm your superintendent at Mine No. 1, in case you forgot .'' The flustered nurse translated the gist of what he said. Michal smiled at McCloskey and for an instant a flicker of happiness came over him, but then he remembered the situation and became glum again. McCloskey pulled up a chair. ' 'Don't let this get you down, Bonnie Michal. We 've got a place for you at the mine for the rest of your life. We 'll find you a job you can do well - and you 're set, believe me ." The nurse translated breathlessly. · '' And I see the company has got you a private room and nurse , and you 're getting the best of everything. The company doesn 't usually do this, my lad, you can bet; those bastards wouldn't pay for their mothers ' funeral if they could get away with it. But I went to bat for you - you fully deserve it - and I'll see you come off as well as possible from all this. But I hate to talk to you through an interpreter. You 're the kind of determined man I like to chaw with man-to-man. ' ' And maybe you can get chances for promotion. Now, if you could talk my language - really talk my language , English - we could boost you some more, eh lad? '' He winked , got up as abruptly as he sat down, and barrelled out of the room with a roar and a laugh and a mighty wave of his hand . The nurse beamed. " You see , Michal , things aren 't as bad as you thought, " she said. " You 'll have a job , and you can get better jobs as you learn more English and learn how to get along in America - the real land of opportunity . '' Michal looked up at her. ''You really believe America is the land of opportunity, no matter what happens to you?" " Of course , or I wouldn 't be here . I'd still be slopping hogs in Galicia. " The days wore on. Michal clung to the new idea of a job and maybe �110 SLOVAKIA - maybe a chance to make something of himself. Maybe it wasn't too late, and if he learned English . . . Michal's thoughts went back to his origins , and how far he had travelled since. He was born in Habowa, a little village in the Galician area of Austria, one of four children - two boys and two girls. At 12 he was put out as a servant on a farm, to work from sunup to sundown. He remembered how he cried, not wanting to leave home, but it was a way of life for the poor peasants of the 1880s. Then at 15, in 1900, he had a chance to put his meager resources together and migrate to America. He boarded in Marienka Kinda's house - Marienka, who was nine years older - and stuck close to his love, Jacka. In 1905 he and other Galicians put up some money and proudly helped build the Russian Orthodox Church, St. John the Baptist, in Conemaugh. He was beginning to feel a real part of the community. Now he had lost his leg, and McCloskey said he could learn English and work again. He clung to the idea as his leg stump sometimes almost pulled him from the bed with throbbing and pain. And he had Marienka, who came to visit him religiously, and held his hand shyly. " Come, Marienka," said Michal jokingly. "You 're a married woman, you know.'' "Veru , and you had better remember, too ," she said, smiling, and patted his arm. "But I must take care of my star boarder. And remember," she added, her eyes twinkling, "Jacka is still there making the sandwiches for the men." "Oh, she asked about me? " Michal asked eagerly. Marienka looked away . ' 'She talks about you, and the other men. You know how busy she is. " " And so are you, Marienka. But you find time to see me ." Michal was now convinced he would really have to impress Jacka with his new knowledge of English to get her to notice him. The next morning, after his breakfast and bath, Michal grimly decided to start on the long road back. He took the crutches from behind his bed, eased himself up , and sat on the bed with his left leg dangling close to the floor . Then he slipped on the crutches and turned around, facing the bed, and eased himself upright, standing wobbily on his left leg and his two crutches. The blood drained from his head and. he swayed dizzily. He felt himself falling when a strong arm caught his elbow and pushed him back, sprawling across the bed . �SLOVAKIA 111 \ A young black-haired girl with an oval face stood there glaring at him and stomping her foot in anger. " Don't you ever do that again without someone to help you! ' ' she cried. Michal looked at her and realized that she had spoken Rusin. "You are Rusin? " he asked. " Oh!" she said, her hand flying to her mouth . " I forget myself and speak Rusin when I get angry. I really want to speak American English, I mean - as much as I can . I'm an English teacher, you know. " Michal's ears perked up and he pulled himself up painfully on the bed , his eyes staying on her oval face all the while . " You - you speak English well? " ' ' Perfectly, '' she said, with a proud toss of her head. She answered his unspoken question, "I came here from Eastern Galicia with my family in 1890, when I was four . So I spoke Rusin and Slovak at home and learned English almost from the cradle. Now I teach it to the children here and to any adult who wants to learn English and become a part of this great America - with all its challenges and its benefits and its great heart." She lowered her eyes shyly. " I speak too much when I speak about being part of America.'' " No , no, go on, go on ," said Michal, bobbing his head in agreement as a plan to learn English formed in his mind. Here was McCloskey' s idea come true! " Would - would you teach me English? " '' Of course ,'' she said. ' 'Oh - my name is Tressa Hruska. ' ' '' And mine is Michal Ko ban.'' '' I will give you a short lesson right now, Michal, and when you can leave the hospital you can come and learn in my little school in Conemaugh while you get better so you can go back to work . Michal agreed enthusiastically with this little animated doll of a girl. A heaven-sent opportunity to get ahead and make a new life for himself! ' ' All right.'' Tressa was suddenly all business. ' 'I give you one lesson here - and I teach English a special way so you can learn fast.'' She switched to English. " Do you know what this is? " she asked, patting the bed . Michal stared. " I don 't know what you said. Please translate it for me into Rusin. " Tressa crossed her arms and glared at Michal. "No, Michal , I translate nothing. You have to learn from - like they say here scratch." �112 SLOVAKIA Michal looked bewildered again, so she returned to Rusin. ''Okay, okay - I will explain once in Rusin, and then you will learn by doing." " Huh?" Tressa said with some patience: "Michal, when you learned Rusin did you translate from anything?" ' ' No - I did not know any language. ''Correct. So now you do the same thing. You learn English just as you learned Rusin, and you will learn it just as well - with perhaps a small accent." Michal nodded slowly. "I see. It makes sense. But it would be so much easier to '' - no, it wouldn't,' ' she finished firmly. ' 'Now, watch.'' And she slipped into English. Tressa patted the bed and said slowly : "Michal, this is a B-E-D." And she motioned for him to repeat. " Dis - Bett," said Michal in English. " This is a bed." " This is - bed. " '' Good! Great!' ' She clapped her hands in enthusiasm. ''Now, this is a bed post." " Na-o-w, dis is - " " - This is - " ''This is a bed host . ' ' "Bed post." '' Bed post. ' ' Tressa squealed in delight and clapped her hands . Michal was making a very good student. She looked around, then bent to the floor and patted her hand on the floor. " This is the floor - f-1-o-o-r, " she said distinctly and spelled it out. Michal saw her lovely round rear end, with her dress hitched up as she bent in concentration towards the floor, and he said distinctly in Rusin : ''This is a pretty panty . '' " No - this is .. . ! " Tressa suddenly realized what had happened and straightened up in confusion , her face flaming a dark, brilliant red. Michal laughed heartily for the first time since the accident. Then Tressa broke down and smiled, giggled , and soon both were laughing hysterically. People from the ward across the hall shuffled over in their bathrobes to see what was going on in th'is crazy room. �SLOVAKIA 113 CHAPTER 3 - JACKA DECIDES Monday, September 10 Summer arrived and turned into fall before Michal could go home. He returned that day to Marienka Kinda's boarding house, carefully placing one crutch ahead of the other as the doctors had told him, keeping weight off his pegleg. A farmer had given him a buggy lift almost to the door, so he was that much ahead. He squared his shoulders and tried to walk with great decision, heartened by the fact that he would soon see Jacka for the first time in months. As he started in the door it was suddenly opened wide, and Jacka swept out on Adam Drotar's arm. Caught by surprise as she brushed past him, Michal dropped one crutch to grasp the porch post as he staggered to one side. "Sorry, Michal," Jacka said. "I didn't see you." "H-Hello, Jacka," Michal said shyly. Jacka stared through him. "You're going back to work in those things?" she said. ''Oh yes. And soon. But I'll get rid of these crutches with a little more practice - you'll see." "I'm sure," she said mechanically. Then Jacka turned away and smiled at Adam as he swept her down the steps and into the street. Michal stared after them for a long time, a lump forming in his throat and tears in his eyes, wondering if he would ever be worthy of Jacka truly becoming his friend and, and - wife. Just wait till he got his English diploma, he thought. Then Jacka would know he was truly someone important and she would come to him. He stood there staring at the rapidly disappearing figures who were laughing at some private joke. The laughter finally died down, and Michal still kept staring after them. ''Michal.'' Michal turned around. Marienka stood at the door, all round and rosy-cheeked. She was a truly handsome girl, with a twinkle in her eye that was lost on Michal. "Come in and take a rest," she said. " You shouldn 't stand up so long at the beginning." Michal nodded and reluctantly allowed himself to be taken inside , where he sank into the living-room chair usually occupied by Marienka' s husband , Ivan, who was now away at work. Michal propped his chin in the palm of his hand. "Marienka, will Jacka ever - like me? " Marienka cleared her throat but before she �114 SLOVAKIA could answer, Michal had answered himself. "Yes she will, when I learn English well and will be an important man in the mines. Then she will like me - won't she?" Marienka patted his arm. "Of course," she said. "What's there not to like about you?'' The next days were hectic. Michal went down by hitched buggy ride to Tressa's little schoolhouse in Conemaugh, a mile away from Marienka's boarding house. When he reached the door he straightened up , took both crutches in his left hand, and opened the door and walked in as straight as possible on his pegleg, trying not to wince at the pain. "Here's Pegleg Mike! " yelled two of the children. Tressa looked around from the blackboard, and she spoke sharply to the two children: "That's not a polite way to talk. Now apologize to Mr. Kohan." The children looked contrite. "We' re sorry, Mr. Ko ban." Michal waved a hand. "It's nothing. And it's true, isn't it? I do have a pegleg. But this won't stop me from succeeding in America. When you grow up things will happen to you too, but they should never stop you from succeeding in this fine country.'' The children looked even more contrite. Tressa's face broke into a broad smile. "Well said, Michal!" she exclaimed. "Come in and make yourself at home at one of the desks in the back. Use two of them if you want.' ' There were 22 children of various ages in the room, all following schooling of their own, each in different classes following different subjects under Tressa's supervision. They learned not only from the books and the teacher, but also from each other, as they watched others in the throes of learning Eng_lish, history, arithmetic, and a brush-up on customs of the Old World. There were children from every possible group in Central, Western, and Eastern Europe - Slovaks, Irish, Rusins, Poles, Germans all learning to be Americans and take advantage of the glorious American opportunity to better themselves . Now they stared at Michal and snickered. ''Children! ' ' Now they simply stared, but with their hands over their mouths. "Michal Kohan is a little older than most of you" - laughter ' 'but give him credit, because he too wants to be part of the American dream, and he has as much right to do it as any of you have ." Anger rose in Tressa's throat. "And don't you forge6'_ it!" �SLOVAKIA 115 '' Sit down, Michal,'' Tressa indicated, '' and I will be with you in a moment. Michal eased himself into a little chair and put his crutches out of sight on the floor. Tressa had spoken Rusin to him, but her words to the children were in English, so he had understood little but the snickers. No matter. Only his job and Jacka mattered. He had to learn English for them. " Michal got an hour's special instruction that day and stayed the rest of the time listening to the children recite their lessons and learning the cadence and rhythm of English. He was surprised to catch the meaning of a word or two and to feel the English idiom as they babbled on. It was a weary day. Michal felt his leg throbbing as it wore on, and he finally made his excuses and left. Outside, weary beyond words at dragging himself along, he decided to try something new. He put both crutches under his left shoulder and took the pressure off his right leg by bearing down on his left side. It seemed crazy - it was just what the doctors had told him not to do - but it worked! The doctors told him he would have to use both crutches for a long while, but Michal was forever trying things out for himself. Why not take advantage of the newness of America and try out new things? He found that now he could work his way down the street much better, and with a minimum of pain. "Hey, Michal! Wait a minute!" Michal did not recognize the Slovak voice, so he turned around. A fattish man with white hair hobbled up to him on a pegleg just like his, but on the left leg. "You don't know me, Michal, but I heard about you in town. I've been retired for a while and - here, let's go in this "karchma" and talk. I want to ask you something." Puzzled, Michal followed. The tavern was a mishmash of Old World nationalities even more pronounced than in the schoolhouse, but with a definite bent toward the Slovak. Stale beer smells and the choking pile and cigarette smoke filled the polluted air as they made their way to their chairs. Michal wondered what the man wanted, but he felt he would have to order a drink. He fingered the change in his pocket and tried to count them with his fingers. "Slivovica," ordered the white-haired man. Michal nodded the same. At least he knew he could drink plum brandy, the Slovak national drink. �116 SLOVAKIA The waiter waved his towel, disappeared and reappeared as if by magic with the two drinks. You never got served so fast when you ordered food, thought Michal . " So, Michal, " the man said, putting a hand on his arm. "My name ' s Bodnak, and I come from a region of Galicia not too far from where I hear you come from . Habowa, isn't it?' ' Michal nodded, but said nothing. " Well, what I want to say was - I notice you limp too, and because of a pegleg on your right side. Right? ' ' "Yes. " ''Well, I had my left leg amputated above the knee , another stupid mine accident , and I wear a pegleg too. " Michal looked down and noticed his pegleg for the first time. He had been so preoccupied with his own problem he had failed to recognize the other man's . And he thought he was the only pegleg in the world. Bodnak leaned over. " Maybe we can help each other, friend ." He took a slurp of slivovica. " I need new shoes, and I'm sure you 'll be needing shoes too pretty soon. What do you wear? '' "Size eight, " said Michal. Bodnak slapped him delightedly on the back . " Good! Good! I thought so! So do I," he enthused. " Don 't you realize we can buy one pair of shoes for both of us and save a lot of money each time?' ' The light dawned on Michal. Of course! "A very good idea," he said . ' 'Then we have only to worry about some way to keep our peglegs from slipping so much. Bodnak winked broadly . " Easily fixed , my friend . I've had this problem for years, and I've worked out the angles. I just take the rubber from an old bicycle tire on the tip , and that old tire will last for up to a year!' ' Michal returned home all fired up and at last ready to face life again. He had learned more English, his shoe problem had been solved, and he could walk with only one crutch! And all this had happened in one day . Soon he could use only a cane for support - then nothing! Exhilaration surged through him as life pumped back into his tired body and mind. The next weeks were a growing revelation to Michal as he learned more and more English, until he found he could talk English to the English group of miners and be actual~y understood. Tressa 's patience was remarkable. \ " You feel the table ," she said. ''I feel the table ,' ' said Michal, feeling the table . �SLOVAKIA 117 \ "Very good!" She clapped her hands in glee. "Now how do you feel about your English?'' Michal looked bewildered. ' 'Feel table - feel English? How can I feel English?" "No," said Tressa. "Feel is also an emotion, something inside us.'' "How can that be?" asked Michal. "How can the same word 'feel' mean touch the table and touch English?" Tressa laughed. ''That's one of the problems about studying a new language . Things don 't always make sense. There are many words like that in Rusin, too, but you've never thought about it, and you take them for granted. English is the same!" Six weeks later Michal was walking with only a cane, and using it very little, and his leg was almost healed. He could speak English so well that Tressa had met him that morning with the announcement that this was his last day in class because he had earned his "Diploma" in English. · She whisked out a Diploma from behind her back, all inscribed with '' MICHAL KO BAN'' on it and attesting to the fact that Michal could speak English! "Of course you can always come back for questions and help whenever you need it," said Tressa in English, "but now you can speak English well enough to get along. And this Diploma is your going-away present . '' Michal shook hands delightedly with her, then hurried away to tell the great news to Jacka. He shot through the door , almost falling as he balanced on one leg, and danced the surprised Marienka around in a Slovak knee-slapper. " I have my Diploma! " he shouted. " Now I can speak English. I will run up and tell Jacka and she will be proud of me.'' '' . .. but Michal, '' said Marienka. Michal did not hear her. He hurried up the steps , pulling himself up hand over hand on the railing, and hurried to Jacka's room and knocked on the door. ' 'Jacka , Jacka! I have something wonderful to tell you! ' ' No answer. " Jacka! Look at my English Diploma! " He pushed the door open, diploma in hand, with Marienka right behind him, and stared dumbfounded at the empty room, stripped of all clothes . Even the curtains had been taken down. �118 SLOVAKIA Michal turned to Marienka like a hurt little boy whose mother isn 't home to hear of his success in school. " What . . . what? " " Michal," said Marienka softly , her hand on his arm . " Jacka is gone. " " Gone? " " Jacka ran away today with Adam Drotar to get married and go with him to the iron ore mines in Minnesota. '' CHAPTER 4 - BONEY COME , BONEY STAY Monday, Junell, 1906 Michal turned without a word and shuffled out towards his own room at the rear. He closed the door behind the anxious, hovering Marienka, and sat down heavily on the bed. He stared out the window at the gathering gray sky, the black roofs and the black streets and the black lawns and the black feelings he had about the coal-black town of Conemaugh. Life was a bucket of coal ash. The girl of his dreams had gone had left him for another man. Or was she ever his except in his own imagination? He was worthless and useless. Why had he come to America? Why had he bothered to do anything with his life? What dreams were there in America that he could fulfill? It was all a farce . A sham. A deception! He was 21, in a strange country, with nothing to look forward to but a bleak future of shattered dreams. He lay back on the bed , covered his eyes, and his jumbled thoughts turned to new crazy, jumbled dreams. He slept fitfully until the gray dawn struggled to show itself about the ugly piles of slag everywhere in town. Michal woke up with a start to the tune of a bird singing squeakily outside his window . The coal dust had gotten to its little lungs , and the best it could do was a poor imitation of a chirp . But the bird tried! And Michal would try too. His natural positive attitude reasserted itself. He looked again on the bright side of t~ ngs. He had his health, a chance for a job in the mines , and the ability to speak the language of the land of opportunity - English! · Heartened , he got up , washed and dressed , and went down to breakfast with the boarders - all miners getting ready for work . �SLOVAKIA 119 Marienka had to work overtime making the sandwiches and preparing the table, because Jacka had left her job as completely as she had left Michal. ''I'll help you, Marienka,'' he said. And he pitched in, feeding the hungry men at the table and hurrying to fill their dinner pails with sandwiches and the precious water they would need in the mine. Ivan, Marienka's husband, was the first to leave for his job in the mine. His life was divided between working at the mine and working overtime drinking at the ''karchma'' in town. He loved to tell the stories of his days as a horse soldier in the Emperor's army and regale the men with well-told tales through the evening - while ignoring work at home. After the last man had left, Marienka was alone with Michal and her three sons: young Michal, 13; Mikulas, 11; and Janik, nine. The three boys adored Michal and wanted to stay and play with him. But they had to go to school. "And don't forget to learn English well," Michal called after them. "It will be the foundation of all your success in life." "I'm glad you sound better," said Marienka. "I was really worried last night. " Michal looked at her. "It is strange to have someone worry about me." Marienka blushed. ''Oh - you know what I mean.'' Michal sighed. "Yes, I know. I only wish Jacka had worried just a little. She is my first love, and I will never forget her - but that part of my life is over. Now I start out all over, really start out, with a new language and a new chance in the land of opportunity. America doesn't give you only one chance to get ahead. It gives you many. And if you miss the first one - why, then, you can take the next, and the next." Michal laughed. "Maybe then you can start out by being my sandwich-maker," said Marienka. "And I will give you a discount on your rent, too," she said, winking. After all, he wasn't getting much disability pay from the company, even with McCloskey's help. Michal sobered up. ''Thank you, Marienka, but no thank you.'' He put a hand on her shoulder in a friendly fashion . '' I must get away from here,'' he said. '' From this house. I will get another room where I can forget these events more quickly , but of course I will never forget your kindness. Already I sense a kind of distant dislike of some men, because of my pegleg, and I have to work that out in my own mind and fight it and get the better of myself in my own way.'' �120 SLOVAKIA Marienka nodded. ''If that is to be, then let it be .'' Michal got a room in a boarding house a few blocks from Marienka and Ivan, and within a half mile of Mine No. 1 in Conemaugh. The next morning he checked his carbide lamp, with the kernels of carbon at the bottom, all about half the size of a peanut. He put some water in the top and watched the water drip onto the kernels, forming a gas. Then he lit the gas and checked the flame coming out about three inches through a fine hole in the center of the reflector. There was no glass in the front - a constant danger of fire. But this was one of the dangers of a coal miner's life. He got paid well for this dangerous work six days a week, and who else among working men could command so much money? Many men got killed and maimed for life, but they still kept working in the mines, because it was the best way they could provide for their families - at least while they could work. Michal felt the old pride in his work returning as he adjusted the lamp and watched it flare brightly. Then he switched it down, put it on his head, and dressed in his miner's clothes so he could feel more and more like the miner he was going to continue to be! After all, McCloskey had promised him a job for life - and he had to start by looking the part, even with his pegleg. He cocked his lamp at a jaunty angle, squared his shoulders, and stepped out the door. "Ahh, there's my little bairn Michal," yelled McCloskey when he looked up to see the slight man with a mustache walk steadily up to him. "It's a fine man you look like," he said, grabbing Michal by both his shoulders. "And I feel fine," said Michal in good English. McCloskey's eyes opened wide. "You talk great! You talk real English!'' Michal bobbed his head happily. "That I do. I do that," he said. '' How could you learn in so short a time?'' ''I had a good teacher,'' said Michal. ''Tressa Hruska.'' "And I have a good job for you," McCloskey winked, "just like I promised. How would you like to be a mule skinner?" Michal's jaw dropped. That he could never do. McCloskey laughed. "No, no, not the k\nd you think . That's the old-fashioned method. Now we have just started to use modern mule skinners. But we don't call them mule skinners anymore, even though they haul the men and the coal into and out of the mine just like before. �SLOVAKIA 121 ' ' Now we call them Hoist Engineers . '' Michal look bewildered. "What 's a Hoist Engineer? " McCloskey gestured to him. "Come on , Michal. I'll show you. It's the perfect job for you. It 'll put you right in the middle of the men, many of them Rusins and Slovaks , and you can talk to them and interpret to the supers , and act as a go-between while you do your job. It'll be a very important step up in the mine. ' ' The two men walked into the dry drift mine, and up - slowly. Michal tried not to look tired and he tried not to puff, but it wasn't easy. " Take it easy, lad, " said McCloskey. " We'll soon be there . You see , the man who had this job was just here for a short time, and he didn't know the ropes too well - and couldn 't speak English - so you'll be the perfect man. " They arrived at a clearing in the mine, with a huge machine hung with ropes and levers standing there like an iron monster. ' ' With this you can control the coal cars going down the slope to the outside , and you also bring the men up in the morning and let them down at night. You have to be here very early so you can do that, and when they get to your hoist they disperse to the various coal rooms along the pathways. "So this is called the Hoist , and you will be the Hoist Engineer." ''It is like being a mule skinner, but without the mules! '' "Right!" McCloskey laughed. And Michal worked the levers to and fro, testing the machinery for cars going up and down until he soon had them working almost to perfection . "See, it's easy! I knew you were the man . Now you 've got yourself a good job, just like I promised you," said McCloskey . He winked. "Don 't tell them, but you'll soon get a raise." Michal's eyes widened. He could put away more money, and maybe make some of his new dreams come true. America was truly going to be the land of opportunity! CHAPTER 5 - CA VE IN! Tuesday, December 7, 1909 ''Cave-in!' ' The cry roared and pounded through Conemaugh like the cold wind of death. Everyone knew what it meant - it meant only one thing - and the women and children surged out of their homes and hurried to the billowing clouds that pointed to the position of the mine. �122 SLOVAKIA Marienka was in the Catholic church for the Presentation of the Virgin Mary. She heard the terrible cry and her throat tightened. "Oh Jesus, Mary, Joseph," she cried, crossing herself quickly, "please don 't make it serious. Please!" Then she hurried to the house and gathered her children together, as the women did in these times of stress. Michal, Janik, and Mikulas, with Jozef toddling at her heels. She swept up the baby Jurko and held him at her breast as she hurried the children down to the mine site. The large crowd already there saw Marienka at a distance and parted for her like the Red Sea for Moses - except that this was not an escape for Marienka. It was a descent into hell. Her heart pounding, she made her way through, feeling more and more dread as she approached her goal. A hand took her arm, and she looked up into Michal Koban's sympathetic eyes. "Thank God you're safe," cried Marienka. "I'm glad nothing happened to you! " ' ' Marienka, '' said Michal quietly, ''nothing happened to the other men either. Most of them. They had all moved on to new passages this morning - all except Ivan." Marienka felt faint. The boys cried at her side, and she shushed them. Ivan had been told to stay on at the old passage to pound out the props before moving on. So Michal nodded. " Ivan knocked out a prop and the roof fell in on him. I'm so sorry. But there may still be a chance. " There was a commotion at the entrance of the dust-choked mine, and two men came out carrying a stretcher. Marienka ran up to them, leaving the children with Michal. "Don't look, Mrs . Kinda," one of the men said. "He was - pretty badly mangled by the cave-in. He 's dead." Michal came up and put an arm on her sobbing shoulder, and gathered the five children around him as Marienka wept uncontrollably. He took Jurko from his mother' s failing arm. " Janik, hold on to Jozef," he said. "Yes , otec ," said Janik without thinking. Otec was the Slovak name for father. Slovak wakes seemed to have been developed by the Devil himself, with the express purpose of causing the wife and family of the deceased as much trouble and mental anguish as possible . Of course, it really wasn 't done that way ,on purpose. It was simply ''tradition,'• and tradition has to be served\ Ivan was laid out in the small living room ; with flowers all around �SLOVAKIA 123 \ the casket, and exposed for viewing to all the friends and relatives and any curious stranger in town. They would come up to the casket, genuflect, and kneel on the prie-dieu and pray while gazing at the mortal remains of the exposed. And at the photo behind the casket of Ivan Kinda in full Hussar regalia. Then they would get up and turn to their friends and whisper, ''He looks so natural, almost as if he were sleeping." This was too painful for Marienka to see. She had ushered her children in to see their "otec" at the begining, and then told them to stay away. The large kitchen then became the center of activities for three days and nights. People straggled in at all hours, paid their respects to the deceased, then quickly returned to the kitchen for a meal and to hear various ribald and obscene stories told by several expert storytellers. Marienka spent her time at the hot stove, damp hair hanging down in strands over her forehead, and made eggs and little Slovak pancakes, and cutting "kolace" and ladling out the butter, and setting the table, and clearing the table, and washing the dishes, and setting up the table, and ... It was an endless round of senseless meal-serving, night and day, for three days. "Marienka, you've got to take a rest," Michal said, after hours of feeding starving miners. He had helped a lot. And so had the three older boys - Michal, Mikulas, and Janik. Marienka shook her head. "I can't," she said. "I have to feed them as come in and view Ivan. It is the tradition." ''Damn the tradition!'' Michal exploded. ''You go to bed right now and get some sleep. I'll handle this for a while." Marienka allowed herself to be led away, protesting feebly, stumbling, bleary-eyed. But she knew she was exhausted, so she did not protest too much. "So Michal, you already take over, eh?" roared a miner as he saw Michal put on the apron. Michal had a hot answer ready, but he just turned beet-red and doggedly said nothing. ' 'Lemme have three eggs, sunny-side up, lots of Slovak bread and butter, and - make it six pancakes. I've got to remember poor Ivan Kinda the best way I can, by eating." Michal seethed. "You'll remember him with a bump on your noggin from my skillet if you don't shut up." "Oh, ho ," the miner said amiably. "We do have a temper, don't �124 SLOVAKIA we? Maybe you 'll feel better when I tell you this joke about the miner and the Irish whore. Seems she spread out her goodies - ' ' he winked - "on the table, when ... " " Oh, shut up!" growled Michal, his mustache bristling. "Don't you realize a man is lying dead in the next room, and his family is going through a trying time. They 'll be destitute after this. Haven't you stopped to think of that? " The miner sobered up, and several others joined in. "We know all that, Michal," they said, with some care in their voices. " We know, but we laugh so we will not cry. Who knows - tomorrow it may happen to us." Michal bit his lip. They were right. He had no right to lecture them. They meant well. They were just rough men living a rough life, and the wake was a traditional part of their lives, where the people could come together and joke and laugh so they could forget what had happened . But they remembered still. Marienka somehow got through the next three days, and Michal escorted her and the children to the funeral in the little Catholic church Marienka and Ivan had helped to build in 1901. That afternoon was also a trial. The women of Conemaugh, which was 90 percent Slavic, came parading into the house to see Marienka and leave their condolences and their little Slovak "kolace" - jelly rolls with nuts and apples - that they had cooked for the occasion . '' God bless you, Marienka.'' · " May God be with you, Marienka." '' Everything will be all right , Marienka. God will provide.' ' Marienka nodded mechanically to all, as if in a daze. Finally the ordeal was over and the house was empty. Too empty. Even Jurko wasn't crying. And Jozef played quietly in the comer. The other three boys were in school. Michal stopped by after work . '' How are things going? '' he asked. " All right, " said Marienka, forcing a smile . " The insurance company paid for all the funeral expenses , plus $50 left. But no benefits , of course. '' " Of course . Nice of them. Now they pay nothing. You get no widow ' s benefits and you 're entirely on your own ." ''I have five children to help me ,'' Marienka grinned . Michal did not grin. " What I meant to .say is, what with the children and - and everything - you will neec:N o get something to - to tide you over a bit.'' · ' '' Michal - '' �SLOVAKIA 125 " - No, please. He heh;! up a hand. "What I meant is the children will need food and things while you get yourself together , and I thought - " His hand went into his pocket , and he took out a small bundle wrapped in a handkerchief. " Well, here 's a little something to help you. '' " Michal! " Marienka cried as she took the bundle dumbly. This was the first useful gesture anyone had made to her since Ivan 's death. Tears welled in her eyes, finally trickled down her cheeks. She took out her hankie and blew mightily. The three boys poured through the door and happily embraced Michal . " Put that away - quickly," said Michal . And he got up. At the door he paused. ''Things aren't easy for a widow woman without a man to support her, " he said. "I mean , people will look down on you , just as they have looked down on me for my pegleg . What I want to say is , I understand what will happen. And I know you can pull through it . I know . ' ' He took her hand. " I'll see you again, Marienka, God willing. " Mikulas piped up, in his boyish soprano . "Why don 't you and matka marry, and you can stay here with us always? '' Marienka choked. The boys all laughed and clapped . They danced around the bewildered couple with their flaming cheeks . ' ' Boys , stop it! ' ' commanded Marienka in her voice that they knew had to be obeyed . They stopped and stood with their hands behind their backs, trying to look regretful. " Now go outside this minute ," commanded Marienka, " and don 't you dare say a word about this to anybody, hear? '' The boys filed out, and Michal started to follow. '' Not you, Michal! I'm sorry for their actions . It was really uncalled for ." Michal shrugged, a string in his heart still tugging for his old love, Jacka . " People will talk about single people ," he said . " People always talk. It is the way of the world .'' � \ LITERATURE ��SLOVAKIA 105 Excerpt from Michal: Biography of a Galician Coal Miner, 1906-1933 VASIL S. KOBAN CHAPTER 1 - ONE MORE SPRAG Thursday, May 24, 1906 It was just after two o'clock when Michal Kohan , mule skinner at Mine No. 1 in Conemaugh, Pennsylvania, started down the incline pulling the three coal cars out of the mine behind two mules. " You got three sprags on the three cars, Kelly? " he asked in Rusin . He put up three fingers so Kelly could not fail to understand. Kelly, an Irishman just turned sixteen and starting on his new job in the mines, rubbed his alcohol-bleared head. ''Sure , sure , begorrah, I got enough sprags, '' he said in a half stupor. He put up two fingers and shook them at Michal . The mules would never hold the downhill run of the three coal cars unless there were enough tapered wooden sprags between the wheels to drag on the cars like brakes and hold them back. " You need three!" Michal yelled in Rusin. "Three, you lummox! Or else she 'll never hold ." The Irishman waved cheerfully, " G'wan!" (Two fingers) Michal fumed: (Three fingers!) Kelly laughed: (Two fingers!) Michal withheld his curse because the cars were already starting down , and he had to whip the mules to keep them ahead. As the cars gathered speed Michal struggled to keep the mules ahead of the surging coal projectiles. "Prekliaty blbec/" Michal yelled. "She won't hold, you idiot! " The cars gathered momentum and pushed up against the struggling mules , Michal slashing away at them with the whip to push them ahead . "Son of a bitch! " he yelled. " You 'll kill them! " '' Harrarrarrahh ! ' ' he yelled at the mules , urging them on to do the impossible. The Irish kid just laughed. �106 SLOVAKIA As Michal got half-way down the grade he saw it would be impossible to hold the cars back with only two sprags. He did the only thing left for him to do. He leaped for his life. The coal cars smashed into the mules and ground them into instant hamburger of broken flesh and spitting blood. The mules screamed and clawed for what seemed like hours, but which only lasted a few seconds. They were soon mangled mounds of bloody mash. Michal lay beside the track, his leg caught under the coal cars as they passed by. "God damn bastard!" he yelled in outraged disbelief at what had happened. Then he blacked out. Michal woke up in a lily-white hospital room in Johnstown, three miles downriver from Conemaugh and site of the famous Johnstown flood of 1889. Michal looked around dazedly, his heart mounting in his throat. He was only 21, and had been in America since he was 15 in 1900. This was his first experience in a hospital. A pert little nurse in a peaked cap came in to take his pulse and speak to him reassuringly in his native Rusin. "Nurse, I --" "Now, now, just be calm. You survived the accident," she said cheerfully, '' and that 's most of the battle right there I ' ' " How - how long have I been here?" "Just a day or two," she shrugged. "You were kept under sedation. " Michal plucked at the white sheet with his fingers , his little mustache twitching nervously. "How long will I be here? I have to get back to work. I have to pay my rent.'' The nurse smiled. "That will take a little while ," she said. " But don 't worry about the time or the expense. The Cambria Coal Mine is taking care of everything. ' ' Michal frowned. " But -- " " Ohl" she exclaimed, glad to change the subject , "you have visitors.'' She stepped aside and the little round face of Marienka Kinda appeared, followed by her husband Ivan, grumpy and straight-backed. " How are you , Michal? " she asked .with concern in Slovak, her only language. \ , '' All right , I think. But why did you come here just for me? I will be out in a few hours at the most. " Marienka smiled through her tears, and Ivan grumped, "Sure, �SLOVAKIA 107 son, just a short time. But you have to do what the doctors tell you. My God, what is that sickly swe~ smell_around here?" The nurse left nervously to seek the doctor. Ivan stuck his nose up, sniffed, and marched around the room like the old Hussar he was - a veteran of the Austrian Emperor's army. Michal had met Marienka, along with Marienka's sister, Jacka, on the ship taking them to America six years before. Marienka had left Ivan in the United States to see her sick father in Slovakia and had returned with her younger sister. Michal fell in love with Jacka at first sight. So he boarded with the Kindas to be near his love while he worked as a mule skinner in the coal mine. "Where's Jacka?" "Uh -- she had to make sandwiches for the men," Marienka said hastily. "And besides, you'll be out of here so fast it would not give Jacka time to come over!" The door opened and a doctor in a white jacket hurried in, '' sluchatko'' hanging from his side pocket to indicate the badge of this profession. He wrinkled his nose and tugged at his little beard, then pulled back the bedclothes to examine Michal's leg. "Hmmm," he said, "this doesn't look good at all." It was in English, so Ivan could understand only dimly. The nurse hurried over to interpret. They did not have Slovak or Rusin doctors to talk to the immigrants in their own language. "Nurse," said the doctor, sighing, "you'll have to tell this young man his leg has to go.'' He palpated the pulpy black right leg, drew a line with his finger above the knee. "Right here," the doctor said. "Now you tell him," and he hurried away. The nurse gulped. Then she took a deep breath and told Michal the doctor's decision in halting Rusin. ''Cut off my leg? No, never! Oh, God, no!'' Michal tried to struggle out of bed to run away, to get away from here where they would take away his leg and his chance to make a living and to marry Jacka. Marienka and Ivan moved quickly to hold him down. "Please, Michal," said Marienka in great concern. "If it must be done to save your life, then it will be for the best. You'll see that everything will turn out all right.'' But Michal's face froze in a faraway look. The look of death. Where he came from, most of the people who had their legs cut off �108 SLOVAKIA - died. And the rest were beggars and the laughingstock of the uneasy townspeople. One-legged people were better off dead. And Michal wanted to die. There was nothing left for him, even in America. Nothing. CHAPTER2 - ONE LEG, PEGLEG Friday, May 25 , 1906 Michal came out of a daze like dragging himself doggedly out of the depths of a deep coal mine, with a white light shining at the top. He groped his way up and up, his brain hitching itself from one ladder rung to the other, until he finally broke out into the light and found himself in the brightly lit hospital room, whiter still than it had been the first time. And there was the tugging, nagging, pulling pain in his right leg, straight down to his toes. He tried to feel them, but his mind swirled as he sat up. He gasped and fell back on the pillows, sweating. A little boy ran in the room, tugging at his mother's hand. "Where's daddy?" he said in English. She pulled him back into the hall. "Otec is down further," she said in Slovak. But the boy broke away and staggerred onto Michal's bed, right over his right leg. Michal howled in pain . The mother hastily pulled the child away with abject Slovak humiliation, and said in English: " Don 't you know this man had his leg taken off?'' The child stared , and ran to her in tears . Michal could only make out half the conversation , but he was more concerned with the pain in his leg. The little nurse hurried in and clucked about Michal like a mother hen. "You will be fine in a little while, just you see." ''But my leg - it hurts so much, '' Michal said . The nurse looked at the blank space where his leg had been , and she looked at Michal's intense face. "You have to know," she said deliberately, ''that the doctor had to stop the anesthetics and that you feel the pain of your leg being taken off. You have a stump right above your right knee , and it is the nerve there that hurts you and makes you think you still have the leg." Michal was horrified. " Then my leg is. gone!" For the first time the word "operation" really struck home to ltm, an<l he knew that now he was only half a man. ''I can't live with one leg,'' he· sobbed. ''I can't work, I can't get married, I can 't make a living, I can't do anything." �SLOVAKIA 109 \ He hid his face in his hands and sobbed like a broken-hearted little boy . The nurse left him alone for a while. She let him cry it out . It would be better for him . Then she gently put her arm around his shoulder and cradled his head against her breast. " You will be fine , my priatel'," she said softly. " Just give yourself a little time. You will get a new leg and you will walk almost as well as you ever did. And you will live and marry and have children and enjoy life . You'll see. " Just then the door flew open and a giant of a man strode in, all 6 feet 4 inches of him; he looked around briefly, saw Michal Kohan , and strode over. He stuck out a hammy paw. " McCloskey's the name ," he roared . "Mike McCloskey . I'm your superintendent at Mine No. 1, in case you forgot .'' The flustered nurse translated the gist of what he said. Michal smiled at McCloskey and for an instant a flicker of happiness came over him, but then he remembered the situation and became glum again. McCloskey pulled up a chair. ' 'Don't let this get you down, Bonnie Michal. We 've got a place for you at the mine for the rest of your life. We 'll find you a job you can do well - and you 're set, believe me ." The nurse translated breathlessly. · '' And I see the company has got you a private room and nurse , and you 're getting the best of everything. The company doesn 't usually do this, my lad, you can bet; those bastards wouldn't pay for their mothers ' funeral if they could get away with it. But I went to bat for you - you fully deserve it - and I'll see you come off as well as possible from all this. But I hate to talk to you through an interpreter. You 're the kind of determined man I like to chaw with man-to-man. ' ' And maybe you can get chances for promotion. Now, if you could talk my language - really talk my language , English - we could boost you some more, eh lad? '' He winked , got up as abruptly as he sat down, and barrelled out of the room with a roar and a laugh and a mighty wave of his hand . The nurse beamed. " You see , Michal , things aren 't as bad as you thought, " she said. " You 'll have a job , and you can get better jobs as you learn more English and learn how to get along in America - the real land of opportunity . '' Michal looked up at her. ''You really believe America is the land of opportunity, no matter what happens to you?" " Of course , or I wouldn 't be here . I'd still be slopping hogs in Galicia. " The days wore on. Michal clung to the new idea of a job and maybe �110 SLOVAKIA - maybe a chance to make something of himself. Maybe it wasn't too late, and if he learned English . . . Michal's thoughts went back to his origins , and how far he had travelled since. He was born in Habowa, a little village in the Galician area of Austria, one of four children - two boys and two girls. At 12 he was put out as a servant on a farm, to work from sunup to sundown. He remembered how he cried, not wanting to leave home, but it was a way of life for the poor peasants of the 1880s. Then at 15, in 1900, he had a chance to put his meager resources together and migrate to America. He boarded in Marienka Kinda's house - Marienka, who was nine years older - and stuck close to his love, Jacka. In 1905 he and other Galicians put up some money and proudly helped build the Russian Orthodox Church, St. John the Baptist, in Conemaugh. He was beginning to feel a real part of the community. Now he had lost his leg, and McCloskey said he could learn English and work again. He clung to the idea as his leg stump sometimes almost pulled him from the bed with throbbing and pain. And he had Marienka, who came to visit him religiously, and held his hand shyly. " Come, Marienka," said Michal jokingly. "You 're a married woman, you know.'' "Veru , and you had better remember, too ," she said, smiling, and patted his arm. "But I must take care of my star boarder. And remember," she added, her eyes twinkling, "Jacka is still there making the sandwiches for the men." "Oh, she asked about me? " Michal asked eagerly. Marienka looked away . ' 'She talks about you, and the other men. You know how busy she is. " " And so are you, Marienka. But you find time to see me ." Michal was now convinced he would really have to impress Jacka with his new knowledge of English to get her to notice him. The next morning, after his breakfast and bath, Michal grimly decided to start on the long road back. He took the crutches from behind his bed, eased himself up , and sat on the bed with his left leg dangling close to the floor . Then he slipped on the crutches and turned around, facing the bed, and eased himself upright, standing wobbily on his left leg and his two crutches. The blood drained from his head and. he swayed dizzily. He felt himself falling when a strong arm caught his elbow and pushed him back, sprawling across the bed . �SLOVAKIA 111 \ A young black-haired girl with an oval face stood there glaring at him and stomping her foot in anger. " Don't you ever do that again without someone to help you! ' ' she cried. Michal looked at her and realized that she had spoken Rusin. "You are Rusin? " he asked. " Oh!" she said, her hand flying to her mouth . " I forget myself and speak Rusin when I get angry. I really want to speak American English, I mean - as much as I can . I'm an English teacher, you know. " Michal's ears perked up and he pulled himself up painfully on the bed , his eyes staying on her oval face all the while . " You - you speak English well? " ' ' Perfectly, '' she said, with a proud toss of her head. She answered his unspoken question, "I came here from Eastern Galicia with my family in 1890, when I was four . So I spoke Rusin and Slovak at home and learned English almost from the cradle. Now I teach it to the children here and to any adult who wants to learn English and become a part of this great America - with all its challenges and its benefits and its great heart." She lowered her eyes shyly. " I speak too much when I speak about being part of America.'' " No , no, go on, go on ," said Michal, bobbing his head in agreement as a plan to learn English formed in his mind. Here was McCloskey' s idea come true! " Would - would you teach me English? " '' Of course ,'' she said. ' 'Oh - my name is Tressa Hruska. ' ' '' And mine is Michal Ko ban.'' '' I will give you a short lesson right now, Michal, and when you can leave the hospital you can come and learn in my little school in Conemaugh while you get better so you can go back to work . Michal agreed enthusiastically with this little animated doll of a girl. A heaven-sent opportunity to get ahead and make a new life for himself! ' ' All right.'' Tressa was suddenly all business. ' 'I give you one lesson here - and I teach English a special way so you can learn fast.'' She switched to English. " Do you know what this is? " she asked, patting the bed . Michal stared. " I don 't know what you said. Please translate it for me into Rusin. " Tressa crossed her arms and glared at Michal. "No, Michal , I translate nothing. You have to learn from - like they say here scratch." �112 SLOVAKIA Michal looked bewildered again, so she returned to Rusin. ''Okay, okay - I will explain once in Rusin, and then you will learn by doing." " Huh?" Tressa said with some patience: "Michal, when you learned Rusin did you translate from anything?" ' ' No - I did not know any language. ''Correct. So now you do the same thing. You learn English just as you learned Rusin, and you will learn it just as well - with perhaps a small accent." Michal nodded slowly. "I see. It makes sense. But it would be so much easier to '' - no, it wouldn't,' ' she finished firmly. ' 'Now, watch.'' And she slipped into English. Tressa patted the bed and said slowly : "Michal, this is a B-E-D." And she motioned for him to repeat. " Dis - Bett," said Michal in English. " This is a bed." " This is - bed. " '' Good! Great!' ' She clapped her hands in enthusiasm. ''Now, this is a bed post." " Na-o-w, dis is - " " - This is - " ''This is a bed host . ' ' "Bed post." '' Bed post. ' ' Tressa squealed in delight and clapped her hands . Michal was making a very good student. She looked around, then bent to the floor and patted her hand on the floor. " This is the floor - f-1-o-o-r, " she said distinctly and spelled it out. Michal saw her lovely round rear end, with her dress hitched up as she bent in concentration towards the floor, and he said distinctly in Rusin : ''This is a pretty panty . '' " No - this is .. . ! " Tressa suddenly realized what had happened and straightened up in confusion , her face flaming a dark, brilliant red. Michal laughed heartily for the first time since the accident. Then Tressa broke down and smiled, giggled , and soon both were laughing hysterically. People from the ward across the hall shuffled over in their bathrobes to see what was going on in th'is crazy room. �SLOVAKIA 113 CHAPTER 3 - JACKA DECIDES Monday, September 10 Summer arrived and turned into fall before Michal could go home. He returned that day to Marienka Kinda's boarding house, carefully placing one crutch ahead of the other as the doctors had told him, keeping weight off his pegleg. A farmer had given him a buggy lift almost to the door, so he was that much ahead. He squared his shoulders and tried to walk with great decision, heartened by the fact that he would soon see Jacka for the first time in months. As he started in the door it was suddenly opened wide, and Jacka swept out on Adam Drotar's arm. Caught by surprise as she brushed past him, Michal dropped one crutch to grasp the porch post as he staggered to one side. "Sorry, Michal," Jacka said. "I didn't see you." "H-Hello, Jacka," Michal said shyly. Jacka stared through him. "You're going back to work in those things?" she said. ''Oh yes. And soon. But I'll get rid of these crutches with a little more practice - you'll see." "I'm sure," she said mechanically. Then Jacka turned away and smiled at Adam as he swept her down the steps and into the street. Michal stared after them for a long time, a lump forming in his throat and tears in his eyes, wondering if he would ever be worthy of Jacka truly becoming his friend and, and - wife. Just wait till he got his English diploma, he thought. Then Jacka would know he was truly someone important and she would come to him. He stood there staring at the rapidly disappearing figures who were laughing at some private joke. The laughter finally died down, and Michal still kept staring after them. ''Michal.'' Michal turned around. Marienka stood at the door, all round and rosy-cheeked. She was a truly handsome girl, with a twinkle in her eye that was lost on Michal. "Come in and take a rest," she said. " You shouldn 't stand up so long at the beginning." Michal nodded and reluctantly allowed himself to be taken inside , where he sank into the living-room chair usually occupied by Marienka' s husband , Ivan, who was now away at work. Michal propped his chin in the palm of his hand. "Marienka, will Jacka ever - like me? " Marienka cleared her throat but before she �114 SLOVAKIA could answer, Michal had answered himself. "Yes she will, when I learn English well and will be an important man in the mines. Then she will like me - won't she?" Marienka patted his arm. "Of course," she said. "What's there not to like about you?'' The next days were hectic. Michal went down by hitched buggy ride to Tressa's little schoolhouse in Conemaugh, a mile away from Marienka's boarding house. When he reached the door he straightened up , took both crutches in his left hand, and opened the door and walked in as straight as possible on his pegleg, trying not to wince at the pain. "Here's Pegleg Mike! " yelled two of the children. Tressa looked around from the blackboard, and she spoke sharply to the two children: "That's not a polite way to talk. Now apologize to Mr. Kohan." The children looked contrite. "We' re sorry, Mr. Ko ban." Michal waved a hand. "It's nothing. And it's true, isn't it? I do have a pegleg. But this won't stop me from succeeding in America. When you grow up things will happen to you too, but they should never stop you from succeeding in this fine country.'' The children looked even more contrite. Tressa's face broke into a broad smile. "Well said, Michal!" she exclaimed. "Come in and make yourself at home at one of the desks in the back. Use two of them if you want.' ' There were 22 children of various ages in the room, all following schooling of their own, each in different classes following different subjects under Tressa's supervision. They learned not only from the books and the teacher, but also from each other, as they watched others in the throes of learning Eng_lish, history, arithmetic, and a brush-up on customs of the Old World. There were children from every possible group in Central, Western, and Eastern Europe - Slovaks, Irish, Rusins, Poles, Germans all learning to be Americans and take advantage of the glorious American opportunity to better themselves . Now they stared at Michal and snickered. ''Children! ' ' Now they simply stared, but with their hands over their mouths. "Michal Kohan is a little older than most of you" - laughter ' 'but give him credit, because he too wants to be part of the American dream, and he has as much right to do it as any of you have ." Anger rose in Tressa's throat. "And don't you forge6'_ it!" �SLOVAKIA 115 '' Sit down, Michal,'' Tressa indicated, '' and I will be with you in a moment. Michal eased himself into a little chair and put his crutches out of sight on the floor. Tressa had spoken Rusin to him, but her words to the children were in English, so he had understood little but the snickers. No matter. Only his job and Jacka mattered. He had to learn English for them. " Michal got an hour's special instruction that day and stayed the rest of the time listening to the children recite their lessons and learning the cadence and rhythm of English. He was surprised to catch the meaning of a word or two and to feel the English idiom as they babbled on. It was a weary day. Michal felt his leg throbbing as it wore on, and he finally made his excuses and left. Outside, weary beyond words at dragging himself along, he decided to try something new. He put both crutches under his left shoulder and took the pressure off his right leg by bearing down on his left side. It seemed crazy - it was just what the doctors had told him not to do - but it worked! The doctors told him he would have to use both crutches for a long while, but Michal was forever trying things out for himself. Why not take advantage of the newness of America and try out new things? He found that now he could work his way down the street much better, and with a minimum of pain. "Hey, Michal! Wait a minute!" Michal did not recognize the Slovak voice, so he turned around. A fattish man with white hair hobbled up to him on a pegleg just like his, but on the left leg. "You don't know me, Michal, but I heard about you in town. I've been retired for a while and - here, let's go in this "karchma" and talk. I want to ask you something." Puzzled, Michal followed. The tavern was a mishmash of Old World nationalities even more pronounced than in the schoolhouse, but with a definite bent toward the Slovak. Stale beer smells and the choking pile and cigarette smoke filled the polluted air as they made their way to their chairs. Michal wondered what the man wanted, but he felt he would have to order a drink. He fingered the change in his pocket and tried to count them with his fingers. "Slivovica," ordered the white-haired man. Michal nodded the same. At least he knew he could drink plum brandy, the Slovak national drink. �116 SLOVAKIA The waiter waved his towel, disappeared and reappeared as if by magic with the two drinks. You never got served so fast when you ordered food, thought Michal . " So, Michal, " the man said, putting a hand on his arm. "My name ' s Bodnak, and I come from a region of Galicia not too far from where I hear you come from . Habowa, isn't it?' ' Michal nodded, but said nothing. " Well, what I want to say was - I notice you limp too, and because of a pegleg on your right side. Right? ' ' "Yes. " ''Well, I had my left leg amputated above the knee , another stupid mine accident , and I wear a pegleg too. " Michal looked down and noticed his pegleg for the first time. He had been so preoccupied with his own problem he had failed to recognize the other man's . And he thought he was the only pegleg in the world. Bodnak leaned over. " Maybe we can help each other, friend ." He took a slurp of slivovica. " I need new shoes, and I'm sure you 'll be needing shoes too pretty soon. What do you wear? '' "Size eight, " said Michal. Bodnak slapped him delightedly on the back . " Good! Good! I thought so! So do I," he enthused. " Don 't you realize we can buy one pair of shoes for both of us and save a lot of money each time?' ' The light dawned on Michal. Of course! "A very good idea," he said . ' 'Then we have only to worry about some way to keep our peglegs from slipping so much. Bodnak winked broadly . " Easily fixed , my friend . I've had this problem for years, and I've worked out the angles. I just take the rubber from an old bicycle tire on the tip , and that old tire will last for up to a year!' ' Michal returned home all fired up and at last ready to face life again. He had learned more English, his shoe problem had been solved, and he could walk with only one crutch! And all this had happened in one day . Soon he could use only a cane for support - then nothing! Exhilaration surged through him as life pumped back into his tired body and mind. The next weeks were a growing revelation to Michal as he learned more and more English, until he found he could talk English to the English group of miners and be actual~y understood. Tressa 's patience was remarkable. \ " You feel the table ," she said. ''I feel the table ,' ' said Michal, feeling the table . �SLOVAKIA 117 \ "Very good!" She clapped her hands in glee. "Now how do you feel about your English?'' Michal looked bewildered. ' 'Feel table - feel English? How can I feel English?" "No," said Tressa. "Feel is also an emotion, something inside us.'' "How can that be?" asked Michal. "How can the same word 'feel' mean touch the table and touch English?" Tressa laughed. ''That's one of the problems about studying a new language . Things don 't always make sense. There are many words like that in Rusin, too, but you've never thought about it, and you take them for granted. English is the same!" Six weeks later Michal was walking with only a cane, and using it very little, and his leg was almost healed. He could speak English so well that Tressa had met him that morning with the announcement that this was his last day in class because he had earned his "Diploma" in English. · She whisked out a Diploma from behind her back, all inscribed with '' MICHAL KO BAN'' on it and attesting to the fact that Michal could speak English! "Of course you can always come back for questions and help whenever you need it," said Tressa in English, "but now you can speak English well enough to get along. And this Diploma is your going-away present . '' Michal shook hands delightedly with her, then hurried away to tell the great news to Jacka. He shot through the door , almost falling as he balanced on one leg, and danced the surprised Marienka around in a Slovak knee-slapper. " I have my Diploma! " he shouted. " Now I can speak English. I will run up and tell Jacka and she will be proud of me.'' '' . .. but Michal, '' said Marienka. Michal did not hear her. He hurried up the steps , pulling himself up hand over hand on the railing, and hurried to Jacka's room and knocked on the door. ' 'Jacka , Jacka! I have something wonderful to tell you! ' ' No answer. " Jacka! Look at my English Diploma! " He pushed the door open, diploma in hand, with Marienka right behind him, and stared dumbfounded at the empty room, stripped of all clothes . Even the curtains had been taken down. �118 SLOVAKIA Michal turned to Marienka like a hurt little boy whose mother isn 't home to hear of his success in school. " What . . . what? " " Michal," said Marienka softly , her hand on his arm . " Jacka is gone. " " Gone? " " Jacka ran away today with Adam Drotar to get married and go with him to the iron ore mines in Minnesota. '' CHAPTER 4 - BONEY COME , BONEY STAY Monday, Junell, 1906 Michal turned without a word and shuffled out towards his own room at the rear. He closed the door behind the anxious, hovering Marienka, and sat down heavily on the bed. He stared out the window at the gathering gray sky, the black roofs and the black streets and the black lawns and the black feelings he had about the coal-black town of Conemaugh. Life was a bucket of coal ash. The girl of his dreams had gone had left him for another man. Or was she ever his except in his own imagination? He was worthless and useless. Why had he come to America? Why had he bothered to do anything with his life? What dreams were there in America that he could fulfill? It was all a farce . A sham. A deception! He was 21, in a strange country, with nothing to look forward to but a bleak future of shattered dreams. He lay back on the bed , covered his eyes, and his jumbled thoughts turned to new crazy, jumbled dreams. He slept fitfully until the gray dawn struggled to show itself about the ugly piles of slag everywhere in town. Michal woke up with a start to the tune of a bird singing squeakily outside his window . The coal dust had gotten to its little lungs , and the best it could do was a poor imitation of a chirp . But the bird tried! And Michal would try too. His natural positive attitude reasserted itself. He looked again on the bright side of t~ ngs. He had his health, a chance for a job in the mines , and the ability to speak the language of the land of opportunity - English! · Heartened , he got up , washed and dressed , and went down to breakfast with the boarders - all miners getting ready for work . �SLOVAKIA 119 Marienka had to work overtime making the sandwiches and preparing the table, because Jacka had left her job as completely as she had left Michal. ''I'll help you, Marienka,'' he said. And he pitched in, feeding the hungry men at the table and hurrying to fill their dinner pails with sandwiches and the precious water they would need in the mine. Ivan, Marienka's husband, was the first to leave for his job in the mine. His life was divided between working at the mine and working overtime drinking at the ''karchma'' in town. He loved to tell the stories of his days as a horse soldier in the Emperor's army and regale the men with well-told tales through the evening - while ignoring work at home. After the last man had left, Marienka was alone with Michal and her three sons: young Michal, 13; Mikulas, 11; and Janik, nine. The three boys adored Michal and wanted to stay and play with him. But they had to go to school. "And don't forget to learn English well," Michal called after them. "It will be the foundation of all your success in life." "I'm glad you sound better," said Marienka. "I was really worried last night. " Michal looked at her. "It is strange to have someone worry about me." Marienka blushed. ''Oh - you know what I mean.'' Michal sighed. "Yes, I know. I only wish Jacka had worried just a little. She is my first love, and I will never forget her - but that part of my life is over. Now I start out all over, really start out, with a new language and a new chance in the land of opportunity. America doesn't give you only one chance to get ahead. It gives you many. And if you miss the first one - why, then, you can take the next, and the next." Michal laughed. "Maybe then you can start out by being my sandwich-maker," said Marienka. "And I will give you a discount on your rent, too," she said, winking. After all, he wasn't getting much disability pay from the company, even with McCloskey's help. Michal sobered up. ''Thank you, Marienka, but no thank you.'' He put a hand on her shoulder in a friendly fashion . '' I must get away from here,'' he said. '' From this house. I will get another room where I can forget these events more quickly , but of course I will never forget your kindness. Already I sense a kind of distant dislike of some men, because of my pegleg, and I have to work that out in my own mind and fight it and get the better of myself in my own way.'' �120 SLOVAKIA Marienka nodded. ''If that is to be, then let it be .'' Michal got a room in a boarding house a few blocks from Marienka and Ivan, and within a half mile of Mine No. 1 in Conemaugh. The next morning he checked his carbide lamp, with the kernels of carbon at the bottom, all about half the size of a peanut. He put some water in the top and watched the water drip onto the kernels, forming a gas. Then he lit the gas and checked the flame coming out about three inches through a fine hole in the center of the reflector. There was no glass in the front - a constant danger of fire. But this was one of the dangers of a coal miner's life. He got paid well for this dangerous work six days a week, and who else among working men could command so much money? Many men got killed and maimed for life, but they still kept working in the mines, because it was the best way they could provide for their families - at least while they could work. Michal felt the old pride in his work returning as he adjusted the lamp and watched it flare brightly. Then he switched it down, put it on his head, and dressed in his miner's clothes so he could feel more and more like the miner he was going to continue to be! After all, McCloskey had promised him a job for life - and he had to start by looking the part, even with his pegleg. He cocked his lamp at a jaunty angle, squared his shoulders, and stepped out the door. "Ahh, there's my little bairn Michal," yelled McCloskey when he looked up to see the slight man with a mustache walk steadily up to him. "It's a fine man you look like," he said, grabbing Michal by both his shoulders. "And I feel fine," said Michal in good English. McCloskey's eyes opened wide. "You talk great! You talk real English!'' Michal bobbed his head happily. "That I do. I do that," he said. '' How could you learn in so short a time?'' ''I had a good teacher,'' said Michal. ''Tressa Hruska.'' "And I have a good job for you," McCloskey winked, "just like I promised. How would you like to be a mule skinner?" Michal's jaw dropped. That he could never do. McCloskey laughed. "No, no, not the k\nd you think . That's the old-fashioned method. Now we have just started to use modern mule skinners. But we don't call them mule skinners anymore, even though they haul the men and the coal into and out of the mine just like before. �SLOVAKIA 121 ' ' Now we call them Hoist Engineers . '' Michal look bewildered. "What 's a Hoist Engineer? " McCloskey gestured to him. "Come on , Michal. I'll show you. It's the perfect job for you. It 'll put you right in the middle of the men, many of them Rusins and Slovaks , and you can talk to them and interpret to the supers , and act as a go-between while you do your job. It'll be a very important step up in the mine. ' ' The two men walked into the dry drift mine, and up - slowly. Michal tried not to look tired and he tried not to puff, but it wasn't easy. " Take it easy, lad, " said McCloskey. " We'll soon be there . You see , the man who had this job was just here for a short time, and he didn't know the ropes too well - and couldn 't speak English - so you'll be the perfect man. " They arrived at a clearing in the mine, with a huge machine hung with ropes and levers standing there like an iron monster. ' ' With this you can control the coal cars going down the slope to the outside , and you also bring the men up in the morning and let them down at night. You have to be here very early so you can do that, and when they get to your hoist they disperse to the various coal rooms along the pathways. "So this is called the Hoist , and you will be the Hoist Engineer." ''It is like being a mule skinner, but without the mules! '' "Right!" McCloskey laughed. And Michal worked the levers to and fro, testing the machinery for cars going up and down until he soon had them working almost to perfection . "See, it's easy! I knew you were the man . Now you 've got yourself a good job, just like I promised you," said McCloskey . He winked. "Don 't tell them, but you'll soon get a raise." Michal's eyes widened. He could put away more money, and maybe make some of his new dreams come true. America was truly going to be the land of opportunity! CHAPTER 5 - CA VE IN! Tuesday, December 7, 1909 ''Cave-in!' ' The cry roared and pounded through Conemaugh like the cold wind of death. Everyone knew what it meant - it meant only one thing - and the women and children surged out of their homes and hurried to the billowing clouds that pointed to the position of the mine. �122 SLOVAKIA Marienka was in the Catholic church for the Presentation of the Virgin Mary. She heard the terrible cry and her throat tightened. "Oh Jesus, Mary, Joseph," she cried, crossing herself quickly, "please don 't make it serious. Please!" Then she hurried to the house and gathered her children together, as the women did in these times of stress. Michal, Janik, and Mikulas, with Jozef toddling at her heels. She swept up the baby Jurko and held him at her breast as she hurried the children down to the mine site. The large crowd already there saw Marienka at a distance and parted for her like the Red Sea for Moses - except that this was not an escape for Marienka. It was a descent into hell. Her heart pounding, she made her way through, feeling more and more dread as she approached her goal. A hand took her arm, and she looked up into Michal Koban's sympathetic eyes. "Thank God you're safe," cried Marienka. "I'm glad nothing happened to you! " ' ' Marienka, '' said Michal quietly, ''nothing happened to the other men either. Most of them. They had all moved on to new passages this morning - all except Ivan." Marienka felt faint. The boys cried at her side, and she shushed them. Ivan had been told to stay on at the old passage to pound out the props before moving on. So Michal nodded. " Ivan knocked out a prop and the roof fell in on him. I'm so sorry. But there may still be a chance. " There was a commotion at the entrance of the dust-choked mine, and two men came out carrying a stretcher. Marienka ran up to them, leaving the children with Michal. "Don't look, Mrs . Kinda," one of the men said. "He was - pretty badly mangled by the cave-in. He 's dead." Michal came up and put an arm on her sobbing shoulder, and gathered the five children around him as Marienka wept uncontrollably. He took Jurko from his mother' s failing arm. " Janik, hold on to Jozef," he said. "Yes , otec ," said Janik without thinking. Otec was the Slovak name for father. Slovak wakes seemed to have been developed by the Devil himself, with the express purpose of causing the wife and family of the deceased as much trouble and mental anguish as possible . Of course, it really wasn 't done that way ,on purpose. It was simply ''tradition,'• and tradition has to be served\ Ivan was laid out in the small living room ; with flowers all around �SLOVAKIA 123 \ the casket, and exposed for viewing to all the friends and relatives and any curious stranger in town. They would come up to the casket, genuflect, and kneel on the prie-dieu and pray while gazing at the mortal remains of the exposed. And at the photo behind the casket of Ivan Kinda in full Hussar regalia. Then they would get up and turn to their friends and whisper, ''He looks so natural, almost as if he were sleeping." This was too painful for Marienka to see. She had ushered her children in to see their "otec" at the begining, and then told them to stay away. The large kitchen then became the center of activities for three days and nights. People straggled in at all hours, paid their respects to the deceased, then quickly returned to the kitchen for a meal and to hear various ribald and obscene stories told by several expert storytellers. Marienka spent her time at the hot stove, damp hair hanging down in strands over her forehead, and made eggs and little Slovak pancakes, and cutting "kolace" and ladling out the butter, and setting the table, and clearing the table, and washing the dishes, and setting up the table, and ... It was an endless round of senseless meal-serving, night and day, for three days. "Marienka, you've got to take a rest," Michal said, after hours of feeding starving miners. He had helped a lot. And so had the three older boys - Michal, Mikulas, and Janik. Marienka shook her head. "I can't," she said. "I have to feed them as come in and view Ivan. It is the tradition." ''Damn the tradition!'' Michal exploded. ''You go to bed right now and get some sleep. I'll handle this for a while." Marienka allowed herself to be led away, protesting feebly, stumbling, bleary-eyed. But she knew she was exhausted, so she did not protest too much. "So Michal, you already take over, eh?" roared a miner as he saw Michal put on the apron. Michal had a hot answer ready, but he just turned beet-red and doggedly said nothing. ' 'Lemme have three eggs, sunny-side up, lots of Slovak bread and butter, and - make it six pancakes. I've got to remember poor Ivan Kinda the best way I can, by eating." Michal seethed. "You'll remember him with a bump on your noggin from my skillet if you don't shut up." "Oh, ho ," the miner said amiably. "We do have a temper, don't �124 SLOVAKIA we? Maybe you 'll feel better when I tell you this joke about the miner and the Irish whore. Seems she spread out her goodies - ' ' he winked - "on the table, when ... " " Oh, shut up!" growled Michal, his mustache bristling. "Don't you realize a man is lying dead in the next room, and his family is going through a trying time. They 'll be destitute after this. Haven't you stopped to think of that? " The miner sobered up, and several others joined in. "We know all that, Michal," they said, with some care in their voices. " We know, but we laugh so we will not cry. Who knows - tomorrow it may happen to us." Michal bit his lip. They were right. He had no right to lecture them. They meant well. They were just rough men living a rough life, and the wake was a traditional part of their lives, where the people could come together and joke and laugh so they could forget what had happened . But they remembered still. Marienka somehow got through the next three days, and Michal escorted her and the children to the funeral in the little Catholic church Marienka and Ivan had helped to build in 1901. That afternoon was also a trial. The women of Conemaugh, which was 90 percent Slavic, came parading into the house to see Marienka and leave their condolences and their little Slovak "kolace" - jelly rolls with nuts and apples - that they had cooked for the occasion . '' God bless you, Marienka.'' · " May God be with you, Marienka." '' Everything will be all right , Marienka. God will provide.' ' Marienka nodded mechanically to all, as if in a daze. Finally the ordeal was over and the house was empty. Too empty. Even Jurko wasn't crying. And Jozef played quietly in the comer. The other three boys were in school. Michal stopped by after work . '' How are things going? '' he asked. " All right, " said Marienka, forcing a smile . " The insurance company paid for all the funeral expenses , plus $50 left. But no benefits , of course. '' " Of course . Nice of them. Now they pay nothing. You get no widow ' s benefits and you 're entirely on your own ." ''I have five children to help me ,'' Marienka grinned . Michal did not grin. " What I meant to .say is, what with the children and - and everything - you will neec:N o get something to - to tide you over a bit.'' · ' '' Michal - '' �SLOVAKIA 125 " - No, please. He heh;! up a hand. "What I meant is the children will need food and things while you get yourself together , and I thought - " His hand went into his pocket , and he took out a small bundle wrapped in a handkerchief. " Well, here 's a little something to help you. '' " Michal! " Marienka cried as she took the bundle dumbly. This was the first useful gesture anyone had made to her since Ivan 's death. Tears welled in her eyes, finally trickled down her cheeks. She took out her hankie and blew mightily. The three boys poured through the door and happily embraced Michal . " Put that away - quickly," said Michal . And he got up. At the door he paused. ''Things aren't easy for a widow woman without a man to support her, " he said. "I mean , people will look down on you , just as they have looked down on me for my pegleg . What I want to say is , I understand what will happen. And I know you can pull through it . I know . ' ' He took her hand. " I'll see you again, Marienka, God willing. " Mikulas piped up, in his boyish soprano . "Why don 't you and matka marry, and you can stay here with us always? '' Marienka choked. The boys all laughed and clapped . They danced around the bewildered couple with their flaming cheeks . ' ' Boys , stop it! ' ' commanded Marienka in her voice that they knew had to be obeyed . They stopped and stood with their hands behind their backs, trying to look regretful. " Now go outside this minute ," commanded Marienka, " and don 't you dare say a word about this to anybody, hear? '' The boys filed out, and Michal started to follow. '' Not you, Michal! I'm sorry for their actions . It was really uncalled for ." Michal shrugged, a string in his heart still tugging for his old love, Jacka . " People will talk about single people ," he said . " People always talk. It is the way of the world .'' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1980-81, Vol. 29 Description An account of the resource Vol. 29 (No. 53-54), 1980-81. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-81 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document \ LITERATURE SLOVAKIA 105 Excerpt from Michal: Biography of a Galician Coal Miner, 1906-1933 VASIL S. KOBAN CHAPTER 1 - ONE MORE SPRAG Thursday, May 24, 1906 It was just after two o'clock when Michal Kohan , mule skinner at Mine No. 1 in Conemaugh, Pennsylvania, started down the incline pulling the three coal cars out of the mine behind two mules. " You got three sprags on the three cars, Kelly? " he asked in Rusin . He put up three fingers so Kelly could not fail to understand. Kelly, an Irishman just turned sixteen and starting on his new job in the mines, rubbed his alcohol-bleared head. ''Sure , sure , begorrah, I got enough sprags, '' he said in a half stupor. He put up two fingers and shook them at Michal . The mules would never hold the downhill run of the three coal cars unless there were enough tapered wooden sprags between the wheels to drag on the cars like brakes and hold them back. " You need three!" Michal yelled in Rusin. "Three, you lummox! Or else she 'll never hold ." The Irishman waved cheerfully, " G'wan!" (Two fingers) Michal fumed: (Three fingers!) Kelly laughed: (Two fingers!) Michal withheld his curse because the cars were already starting down , and he had to whip the mules to keep them ahead. As the cars gathered speed Michal struggled to keep the mules ahead of the surging coal projectiles. "Prekliaty blbec/" Michal yelled. "She won't hold, you idiot! " The cars gathered momentum and pushed up against the struggling mules , Michal slashing away at them with the whip to push them ahead . "Son of a bitch! " he yelled. " You 'll kill them! " '' Harrarrarrahh ! ' ' he yelled at the mules , urging them on to do the impossible. The Irish kid just laughed. 106 SLOVAKIA As Michal got half-way down the grade he saw it would be impossible to hold the cars back with only two sprags. He did the only thing left for him to do. He leaped for his life. The coal cars smashed into the mules and ground them into instant hamburger of broken flesh and spitting blood. The mules screamed and clawed for what seemed like hours, but which only lasted a few seconds. They were soon mangled mounds of bloody mash. Michal lay beside the track, his leg caught under the coal cars as they passed by. "God damn bastard!" he yelled in outraged disbelief at what had happened. Then he blacked out. Michal woke up in a lily-white hospital room in Johnstown, three miles downriver from Conemaugh and site of the famous Johnstown flood of 1889. Michal looked around dazedly, his heart mounting in his throat. He was only 21, and had been in America since he was 15 in 1900. This was his first experience in a hospital. A pert little nurse in a peaked cap came in to take his pulse and speak to him reassuringly in his native Rusin. "Nurse, I --" "Now, now, just be calm. You survived the accident," she said cheerfully, '' and that 's most of the battle right there I ' ' " How - how long have I been here?" "Just a day or two," she shrugged. "You were kept under sedation. " Michal plucked at the white sheet with his fingers , his little mustache twitching nervously. "How long will I be here? I have to get back to work. I have to pay my rent.'' The nurse smiled. "That will take a little while ," she said. " But don 't worry about the time or the expense. The Cambria Coal Mine is taking care of everything. ' ' Michal frowned. " But -- " " Ohl" she exclaimed, glad to change the subject , "you have visitors.'' She stepped aside and the little round face of Marienka Kinda appeared, followed by her husband Ivan, grumpy and straight-backed. " How are you , Michal? " she asked .with concern in Slovak, her only language. \ , '' All right , I think. But why did you come here just for me? I will be out in a few hours at the most. " Marienka smiled through her tears, and Ivan grumped, "Sure, SLOVAKIA 107 son, just a short time. But you have to do what the doctors tell you. My God, what is that sickly swe~ smell_around here?" The nurse left nervously to seek the doctor. Ivan stuck his nose up, sniffed, and marched around the room like the old Hussar he was - a veteran of the Austrian Emperor's army. Michal had met Marienka, along with Marienka's sister, Jacka, on the ship taking them to America six years before. Marienka had left Ivan in the United States to see her sick father in Slovakia and had returned with her younger sister. Michal fell in love with Jacka at first sight. So he boarded with the Kindas to be near his love while he worked as a mule skinner in the coal mine. "Where's Jacka?" "Uh -- she had to make sandwiches for the men," Marienka said hastily. "And besides, you'll be out of here so fast it would not give Jacka time to come over!" The door opened and a doctor in a white jacket hurried in, '' sluchatko'' hanging from his side pocket to indicate the badge of this profession. He wrinkled his nose and tugged at his little beard, then pulled back the bedclothes to examine Michal's leg. "Hmmm," he said, "this doesn't look good at all." It was in English, so Ivan could understand only dimly. The nurse hurried over to interpret. They did not have Slovak or Rusin doctors to talk to the immigrants in their own language. "Nurse," said the doctor, sighing, "you'll have to tell this young man his leg has to go.'' He palpated the pulpy black right leg, drew a line with his finger above the knee. "Right here," the doctor said. "Now you tell him," and he hurried away. The nurse gulped. Then she took a deep breath and told Michal the doctor's decision in halting Rusin. ''Cut off my leg? No, never! Oh, God, no!'' Michal tried to struggle out of bed to run away, to get away from here where they would take away his leg and his chance to make a living and to marry Jacka. Marienka and Ivan moved quickly to hold him down. "Please, Michal," said Marienka in great concern. "If it must be done to save your life, then it will be for the best. You'll see that everything will turn out all right.'' But Michal's face froze in a faraway look. The look of death. Where he came from, most of the people who had their legs cut off 108 SLOVAKIA - died. And the rest were beggars and the laughingstock of the uneasy townspeople. One-legged people were better off dead. And Michal wanted to die. There was nothing left for him, even in America. Nothing. CHAPTER2 - ONE LEG, PEGLEG Friday, May 25 , 1906 Michal came out of a daze like dragging himself doggedly out of the depths of a deep coal mine, with a white light shining at the top. He groped his way up and up, his brain hitching itself from one ladder rung to the other, until he finally broke out into the light and found himself in the brightly lit hospital room, whiter still than it had been the first time. And there was the tugging, nagging, pulling pain in his right leg, straight down to his toes. He tried to feel them, but his mind swirled as he sat up. He gasped and fell back on the pillows, sweating. A little boy ran in the room, tugging at his mother's hand. "Where's daddy?" he said in English. She pulled him back into the hall. "Otec is down further," she said in Slovak. But the boy broke away and staggerred onto Michal's bed, right over his right leg. Michal howled in pain . The mother hastily pulled the child away with abject Slovak humiliation, and said in English: " Don 't you know this man had his leg taken off?'' The child stared , and ran to her in tears . Michal could only make out half the conversation , but he was more concerned with the pain in his leg. The little nurse hurried in and clucked about Michal like a mother hen. "You will be fine in a little while, just you see." ''But my leg - it hurts so much, '' Michal said . The nurse looked at the blank space where his leg had been , and she looked at Michal's intense face. "You have to know," she said deliberately, ''that the doctor had to stop the anesthetics and that you feel the pain of your leg being taken off. You have a stump right above your right knee , and it is the nerve there that hurts you and makes you think you still have the leg." Michal was horrified. " Then my leg is. gone!" For the first time the word "operation" really struck home to ltm, an<l he knew that now he was only half a man. ''I can't live with one leg,'' he· sobbed. ''I can't work, I can't get married, I can 't make a living, I can't do anything." SLOVAKIA 109 \ He hid his face in his hands and sobbed like a broken-hearted little boy . The nurse left him alone for a while. She let him cry it out . It would be better for him . Then she gently put her arm around his shoulder and cradled his head against her breast. " You will be fine , my priatel'," she said softly. " Just give yourself a little time. You will get a new leg and you will walk almost as well as you ever did. And you will live and marry and have children and enjoy life . You'll see. " Just then the door flew open and a giant of a man strode in, all 6 feet 4 inches of him; he looked around briefly, saw Michal Kohan , and strode over. He stuck out a hammy paw. " McCloskey's the name ," he roared . "Mike McCloskey . I'm your superintendent at Mine No. 1, in case you forgot .'' The flustered nurse translated the gist of what he said. Michal smiled at McCloskey and for an instant a flicker of happiness came over him, but then he remembered the situation and became glum again. McCloskey pulled up a chair. ' 'Don't let this get you down, Bonnie Michal. We 've got a place for you at the mine for the rest of your life. We 'll find you a job you can do well - and you 're set, believe me ." The nurse translated breathlessly. · '' And I see the company has got you a private room and nurse , and you 're getting the best of everything. The company doesn 't usually do this, my lad, you can bet; those bastards wouldn't pay for their mothers ' funeral if they could get away with it. But I went to bat for you - you fully deserve it - and I'll see you come off as well as possible from all this. But I hate to talk to you through an interpreter. You 're the kind of determined man I like to chaw with man-to-man. ' ' And maybe you can get chances for promotion. Now, if you could talk my language - really talk my language , English - we could boost you some more, eh lad? '' He winked , got up as abruptly as he sat down, and barrelled out of the room with a roar and a laugh and a mighty wave of his hand . The nurse beamed. " You see , Michal , things aren 't as bad as you thought, " she said. " You 'll have a job , and you can get better jobs as you learn more English and learn how to get along in America - the real land of opportunity . '' Michal looked up at her. ''You really believe America is the land of opportunity, no matter what happens to you?" " Of course , or I wouldn 't be here . I'd still be slopping hogs in Galicia. " The days wore on. Michal clung to the new idea of a job and maybe 110 SLOVAKIA - maybe a chance to make something of himself. Maybe it wasn't too late, and if he learned English . . . Michal's thoughts went back to his origins , and how far he had travelled since. He was born in Habowa, a little village in the Galician area of Austria, one of four children - two boys and two girls. At 12 he was put out as a servant on a farm, to work from sunup to sundown. He remembered how he cried, not wanting to leave home, but it was a way of life for the poor peasants of the 1880s. Then at 15, in 1900, he had a chance to put his meager resources together and migrate to America. He boarded in Marienka Kinda's house - Marienka, who was nine years older - and stuck close to his love, Jacka. In 1905 he and other Galicians put up some money and proudly helped build the Russian Orthodox Church, St. John the Baptist, in Conemaugh. He was beginning to feel a real part of the community. Now he had lost his leg, and McCloskey said he could learn English and work again. He clung to the idea as his leg stump sometimes almost pulled him from the bed with throbbing and pain. And he had Marienka, who came to visit him religiously, and held his hand shyly. " Come, Marienka," said Michal jokingly. "You 're a married woman, you know.'' "Veru , and you had better remember, too ," she said, smiling, and patted his arm. "But I must take care of my star boarder. And remember," she added, her eyes twinkling, "Jacka is still there making the sandwiches for the men." "Oh, she asked about me? " Michal asked eagerly. Marienka looked away . ' 'She talks about you, and the other men. You know how busy she is. " " And so are you, Marienka. But you find time to see me ." Michal was now convinced he would really have to impress Jacka with his new knowledge of English to get her to notice him. The next morning, after his breakfast and bath, Michal grimly decided to start on the long road back. He took the crutches from behind his bed, eased himself up , and sat on the bed with his left leg dangling close to the floor . Then he slipped on the crutches and turned around, facing the bed, and eased himself upright, standing wobbily on his left leg and his two crutches. The blood drained from his head and. he swayed dizzily. He felt himself falling when a strong arm caught his elbow and pushed him back, sprawling across the bed . SLOVAKIA 111 \ A young black-haired girl with an oval face stood there glaring at him and stomping her foot in anger. " Don't you ever do that again without someone to help you! ' ' she cried. Michal looked at her and realized that she had spoken Rusin. "You are Rusin? " he asked. " Oh!" she said, her hand flying to her mouth . " I forget myself and speak Rusin when I get angry. I really want to speak American English, I mean - as much as I can . I'm an English teacher, you know. " Michal's ears perked up and he pulled himself up painfully on the bed , his eyes staying on her oval face all the while . " You - you speak English well? " ' ' Perfectly, '' she said, with a proud toss of her head. She answered his unspoken question, "I came here from Eastern Galicia with my family in 1890, when I was four . So I spoke Rusin and Slovak at home and learned English almost from the cradle. Now I teach it to the children here and to any adult who wants to learn English and become a part of this great America - with all its challenges and its benefits and its great heart." She lowered her eyes shyly. " I speak too much when I speak about being part of America.'' " No , no, go on, go on ," said Michal, bobbing his head in agreement as a plan to learn English formed in his mind. Here was McCloskey' s idea come true! " Would - would you teach me English? " '' Of course ,'' she said. ' 'Oh - my name is Tressa Hruska. ' ' '' And mine is Michal Ko ban.'' '' I will give you a short lesson right now, Michal, and when you can leave the hospital you can come and learn in my little school in Conemaugh while you get better so you can go back to work . Michal agreed enthusiastically with this little animated doll of a girl. A heaven-sent opportunity to get ahead and make a new life for himself! ' ' All right.'' Tressa was suddenly all business. ' 'I give you one lesson here - and I teach English a special way so you can learn fast.'' She switched to English. " Do you know what this is? " she asked, patting the bed . Michal stared. " I don 't know what you said. Please translate it for me into Rusin. " Tressa crossed her arms and glared at Michal. "No, Michal , I translate nothing. You have to learn from - like they say here scratch." 112 SLOVAKIA Michal looked bewildered again, so she returned to Rusin. ''Okay, okay - I will explain once in Rusin, and then you will learn by doing." " Huh?" Tressa said with some patience: "Michal, when you learned Rusin did you translate from anything?" ' ' No - I did not know any language. ''Correct. So now you do the same thing. You learn English just as you learned Rusin, and you will learn it just as well - with perhaps a small accent." Michal nodded slowly. "I see. It makes sense. But it would be so much easier to '' - no, it wouldn't,' ' she finished firmly. ' 'Now, watch.'' And she slipped into English. Tressa patted the bed and said slowly : "Michal, this is a B-E-D." And she motioned for him to repeat. " Dis - Bett," said Michal in English. " This is a bed." " This is - bed. " '' Good! Great!' ' She clapped her hands in enthusiasm. ''Now, this is a bed post." " Na-o-w, dis is - " " - This is - " ''This is a bed host . ' ' "Bed post." '' Bed post. ' ' Tressa squealed in delight and clapped her hands . Michal was making a very good student. She looked around, then bent to the floor and patted her hand on the floor. " This is the floor - f-1-o-o-r, " she said distinctly and spelled it out. Michal saw her lovely round rear end, with her dress hitched up as she bent in concentration towards the floor, and he said distinctly in Rusin : ''This is a pretty panty . '' " No - this is .. . ! " Tressa suddenly realized what had happened and straightened up in confusion , her face flaming a dark, brilliant red. Michal laughed heartily for the first time since the accident. Then Tressa broke down and smiled, giggled , and soon both were laughing hysterically. People from the ward across the hall shuffled over in their bathrobes to see what was going on in th'is crazy room. SLOVAKIA 113 CHAPTER 3 - JACKA DECIDES Monday, September 10 Summer arrived and turned into fall before Michal could go home. He returned that day to Marienka Kinda's boarding house, carefully placing one crutch ahead of the other as the doctors had told him, keeping weight off his pegleg. A farmer had given him a buggy lift almost to the door, so he was that much ahead. He squared his shoulders and tried to walk with great decision, heartened by the fact that he would soon see Jacka for the first time in months. As he started in the door it was suddenly opened wide, and Jacka swept out on Adam Drotar's arm. Caught by surprise as she brushed past him, Michal dropped one crutch to grasp the porch post as he staggered to one side. "Sorry, Michal," Jacka said. "I didn't see you." "H-Hello, Jacka," Michal said shyly. Jacka stared through him. "You're going back to work in those things?" she said. ''Oh yes. And soon. But I'll get rid of these crutches with a little more practice - you'll see." "I'm sure," she said mechanically. Then Jacka turned away and smiled at Adam as he swept her down the steps and into the street. Michal stared after them for a long time, a lump forming in his throat and tears in his eyes, wondering if he would ever be worthy of Jacka truly becoming his friend and, and - wife. Just wait till he got his English diploma, he thought. Then Jacka would know he was truly someone important and she would come to him. He stood there staring at the rapidly disappearing figures who were laughing at some private joke. The laughter finally died down, and Michal still kept staring after them. ''Michal.'' Michal turned around. Marienka stood at the door, all round and rosy-cheeked. She was a truly handsome girl, with a twinkle in her eye that was lost on Michal. "Come in and take a rest," she said. " You shouldn 't stand up so long at the beginning." Michal nodded and reluctantly allowed himself to be taken inside , where he sank into the living-room chair usually occupied by Marienka' s husband , Ivan, who was now away at work. Michal propped his chin in the palm of his hand. "Marienka, will Jacka ever - like me? " Marienka cleared her throat but before she 114 SLOVAKIA could answer, Michal had answered himself. "Yes she will, when I learn English well and will be an important man in the mines. Then she will like me - won't she?" Marienka patted his arm. "Of course," she said. "What's there not to like about you?'' The next days were hectic. Michal went down by hitched buggy ride to Tressa's little schoolhouse in Conemaugh, a mile away from Marienka's boarding house. When he reached the door he straightened up , took both crutches in his left hand, and opened the door and walked in as straight as possible on his pegleg, trying not to wince at the pain. "Here's Pegleg Mike! " yelled two of the children. Tressa looked around from the blackboard, and she spoke sharply to the two children: "That's not a polite way to talk. Now apologize to Mr. Kohan." The children looked contrite. "We' re sorry, Mr. Ko ban." Michal waved a hand. "It's nothing. And it's true, isn't it? I do have a pegleg. But this won't stop me from succeeding in America. When you grow up things will happen to you too, but they should never stop you from succeeding in this fine country.'' The children looked even more contrite. Tressa's face broke into a broad smile. "Well said, Michal!" she exclaimed. "Come in and make yourself at home at one of the desks in the back. Use two of them if you want.' ' There were 22 children of various ages in the room, all following schooling of their own, each in different classes following different subjects under Tressa's supervision. They learned not only from the books and the teacher, but also from each other, as they watched others in the throes of learning Eng_lish, history, arithmetic, and a brush-up on customs of the Old World. There were children from every possible group in Central, Western, and Eastern Europe - Slovaks, Irish, Rusins, Poles, Germans all learning to be Americans and take advantage of the glorious American opportunity to better themselves . Now they stared at Michal and snickered. ''Children! ' ' Now they simply stared, but with their hands over their mouths. "Michal Kohan is a little older than most of you" - laughter ' 'but give him credit, because he too wants to be part of the American dream, and he has as much right to do it as any of you have ." Anger rose in Tressa's throat. "And don't you forge6'_ it!" SLOVAKIA 115 '' Sit down, Michal,'' Tressa indicated, '' and I will be with you in a moment. Michal eased himself into a little chair and put his crutches out of sight on the floor. Tressa had spoken Rusin to him, but her words to the children were in English, so he had understood little but the snickers. No matter. Only his job and Jacka mattered. He had to learn English for them. " Michal got an hour's special instruction that day and stayed the rest of the time listening to the children recite their lessons and learning the cadence and rhythm of English. He was surprised to catch the meaning of a word or two and to feel the English idiom as they babbled on. It was a weary day. Michal felt his leg throbbing as it wore on, and he finally made his excuses and left. Outside, weary beyond words at dragging himself along, he decided to try something new. He put both crutches under his left shoulder and took the pressure off his right leg by bearing down on his left side. It seemed crazy - it was just what the doctors had told him not to do - but it worked! The doctors told him he would have to use both crutches for a long while, but Michal was forever trying things out for himself. Why not take advantage of the newness of America and try out new things? He found that now he could work his way down the street much better, and with a minimum of pain. "Hey, Michal! Wait a minute!" Michal did not recognize the Slovak voice, so he turned around. A fattish man with white hair hobbled up to him on a pegleg just like his, but on the left leg. "You don't know me, Michal, but I heard about you in town. I've been retired for a while and - here, let's go in this "karchma" and talk. I want to ask you something." Puzzled, Michal followed. The tavern was a mishmash of Old World nationalities even more pronounced than in the schoolhouse, but with a definite bent toward the Slovak. Stale beer smells and the choking pile and cigarette smoke filled the polluted air as they made their way to their chairs. Michal wondered what the man wanted, but he felt he would have to order a drink. He fingered the change in his pocket and tried to count them with his fingers. "Slivovica," ordered the white-haired man. Michal nodded the same. At least he knew he could drink plum brandy, the Slovak national drink. 116 SLOVAKIA The waiter waved his towel, disappeared and reappeared as if by magic with the two drinks. You never got served so fast when you ordered food, thought Michal . " So, Michal, " the man said, putting a hand on his arm. "My name ' s Bodnak, and I come from a region of Galicia not too far from where I hear you come from . Habowa, isn't it?' ' Michal nodded, but said nothing. " Well, what I want to say was - I notice you limp too, and because of a pegleg on your right side. Right? ' ' "Yes. " ''Well, I had my left leg amputated above the knee , another stupid mine accident , and I wear a pegleg too. " Michal looked down and noticed his pegleg for the first time. He had been so preoccupied with his own problem he had failed to recognize the other man's . And he thought he was the only pegleg in the world. Bodnak leaned over. " Maybe we can help each other, friend ." He took a slurp of slivovica. " I need new shoes, and I'm sure you 'll be needing shoes too pretty soon. What do you wear? '' "Size eight, " said Michal. Bodnak slapped him delightedly on the back . " Good! Good! I thought so! So do I," he enthused. " Don 't you realize we can buy one pair of shoes for both of us and save a lot of money each time?' ' The light dawned on Michal. Of course! "A very good idea," he said . ' 'Then we have only to worry about some way to keep our peglegs from slipping so much. Bodnak winked broadly . " Easily fixed , my friend . I've had this problem for years, and I've worked out the angles. I just take the rubber from an old bicycle tire on the tip , and that old tire will last for up to a year!' ' Michal returned home all fired up and at last ready to face life again. He had learned more English, his shoe problem had been solved, and he could walk with only one crutch! And all this had happened in one day . Soon he could use only a cane for support - then nothing! Exhilaration surged through him as life pumped back into his tired body and mind. The next weeks were a growing revelation to Michal as he learned more and more English, until he found he could talk English to the English group of miners and be actual~y understood. Tressa 's patience was remarkable. \ " You feel the table ," she said. ''I feel the table ,' ' said Michal, feeling the table . SLOVAKIA 117 \ "Very good!" She clapped her hands in glee. "Now how do you feel about your English?'' Michal looked bewildered. ' 'Feel table - feel English? How can I feel English?" "No," said Tressa. "Feel is also an emotion, something inside us.'' "How can that be?" asked Michal. "How can the same word 'feel' mean touch the table and touch English?" Tressa laughed. ''That's one of the problems about studying a new language . Things don 't always make sense. There are many words like that in Rusin, too, but you've never thought about it, and you take them for granted. English is the same!" Six weeks later Michal was walking with only a cane, and using it very little, and his leg was almost healed. He could speak English so well that Tressa had met him that morning with the announcement that this was his last day in class because he had earned his "Diploma" in English. · She whisked out a Diploma from behind her back, all inscribed with '' MICHAL KO BAN'' on it and attesting to the fact that Michal could speak English! "Of course you can always come back for questions and help whenever you need it," said Tressa in English, "but now you can speak English well enough to get along. And this Diploma is your going-away present . '' Michal shook hands delightedly with her, then hurried away to tell the great news to Jacka. He shot through the door , almost falling as he balanced on one leg, and danced the surprised Marienka around in a Slovak knee-slapper. " I have my Diploma! " he shouted. " Now I can speak English. I will run up and tell Jacka and she will be proud of me.'' '' . .. but Michal, '' said Marienka. Michal did not hear her. He hurried up the steps , pulling himself up hand over hand on the railing, and hurried to Jacka's room and knocked on the door. ' 'Jacka , Jacka! I have something wonderful to tell you! ' ' No answer. " Jacka! Look at my English Diploma! " He pushed the door open, diploma in hand, with Marienka right behind him, and stared dumbfounded at the empty room, stripped of all clothes . Even the curtains had been taken down. 118 SLOVAKIA Michal turned to Marienka like a hurt little boy whose mother isn 't home to hear of his success in school. " What . . . what? " " Michal," said Marienka softly , her hand on his arm . " Jacka is gone. " " Gone? " " Jacka ran away today with Adam Drotar to get married and go with him to the iron ore mines in Minnesota. '' CHAPTER 4 - BONEY COME , BONEY STAY Monday, Junell, 1906 Michal turned without a word and shuffled out towards his own room at the rear. He closed the door behind the anxious, hovering Marienka, and sat down heavily on the bed. He stared out the window at the gathering gray sky, the black roofs and the black streets and the black lawns and the black feelings he had about the coal-black town of Conemaugh. Life was a bucket of coal ash. The girl of his dreams had gone had left him for another man. Or was she ever his except in his own imagination? He was worthless and useless. Why had he come to America? Why had he bothered to do anything with his life? What dreams were there in America that he could fulfill? It was all a farce . A sham. A deception! He was 21, in a strange country, with nothing to look forward to but a bleak future of shattered dreams. He lay back on the bed , covered his eyes, and his jumbled thoughts turned to new crazy, jumbled dreams. He slept fitfully until the gray dawn struggled to show itself about the ugly piles of slag everywhere in town. Michal woke up with a start to the tune of a bird singing squeakily outside his window . The coal dust had gotten to its little lungs , and the best it could do was a poor imitation of a chirp . But the bird tried! And Michal would try too. His natural positive attitude reasserted itself. He looked again on the bright side of t~ ngs. He had his health, a chance for a job in the mines , and the ability to speak the language of the land of opportunity - English! · Heartened , he got up , washed and dressed , and went down to breakfast with the boarders - all miners getting ready for work . SLOVAKIA 119 Marienka had to work overtime making the sandwiches and preparing the table, because Jacka had left her job as completely as she had left Michal. ''I'll help you, Marienka,'' he said. And he pitched in, feeding the hungry men at the table and hurrying to fill their dinner pails with sandwiches and the precious water they would need in the mine. Ivan, Marienka's husband, was the first to leave for his job in the mine. His life was divided between working at the mine and working overtime drinking at the ''karchma'' in town. He loved to tell the stories of his days as a horse soldier in the Emperor's army and regale the men with well-told tales through the evening - while ignoring work at home. After the last man had left, Marienka was alone with Michal and her three sons: young Michal, 13; Mikulas, 11; and Janik, nine. The three boys adored Michal and wanted to stay and play with him. But they had to go to school. "And don't forget to learn English well," Michal called after them. "It will be the foundation of all your success in life." "I'm glad you sound better," said Marienka. "I was really worried last night. " Michal looked at her. "It is strange to have someone worry about me." Marienka blushed. ''Oh - you know what I mean.'' Michal sighed. "Yes, I know. I only wish Jacka had worried just a little. She is my first love, and I will never forget her - but that part of my life is over. Now I start out all over, really start out, with a new language and a new chance in the land of opportunity. America doesn't give you only one chance to get ahead. It gives you many. And if you miss the first one - why, then, you can take the next, and the next." Michal laughed. "Maybe then you can start out by being my sandwich-maker," said Marienka. "And I will give you a discount on your rent, too," she said, winking. After all, he wasn't getting much disability pay from the company, even with McCloskey's help. Michal sobered up. ''Thank you, Marienka, but no thank you.'' He put a hand on her shoulder in a friendly fashion . '' I must get away from here,'' he said. '' From this house. I will get another room where I can forget these events more quickly , but of course I will never forget your kindness. Already I sense a kind of distant dislike of some men, because of my pegleg, and I have to work that out in my own mind and fight it and get the better of myself in my own way.'' 120 SLOVAKIA Marienka nodded. ''If that is to be, then let it be .'' Michal got a room in a boarding house a few blocks from Marienka and Ivan, and within a half mile of Mine No. 1 in Conemaugh. The next morning he checked his carbide lamp, with the kernels of carbon at the bottom, all about half the size of a peanut. He put some water in the top and watched the water drip onto the kernels, forming a gas. Then he lit the gas and checked the flame coming out about three inches through a fine hole in the center of the reflector. There was no glass in the front - a constant danger of fire. But this was one of the dangers of a coal miner's life. He got paid well for this dangerous work six days a week, and who else among working men could command so much money? Many men got killed and maimed for life, but they still kept working in the mines, because it was the best way they could provide for their families - at least while they could work. Michal felt the old pride in his work returning as he adjusted the lamp and watched it flare brightly. Then he switched it down, put it on his head, and dressed in his miner's clothes so he could feel more and more like the miner he was going to continue to be! After all, McCloskey had promised him a job for life - and he had to start by looking the part, even with his pegleg. He cocked his lamp at a jaunty angle, squared his shoulders, and stepped out the door. "Ahh, there's my little bairn Michal," yelled McCloskey when he looked up to see the slight man with a mustache walk steadily up to him. "It's a fine man you look like," he said, grabbing Michal by both his shoulders. "And I feel fine," said Michal in good English. McCloskey's eyes opened wide. "You talk great! You talk real English!'' Michal bobbed his head happily. "That I do. I do that," he said. '' How could you learn in so short a time?'' ''I had a good teacher,'' said Michal. ''Tressa Hruska.'' "And I have a good job for you," McCloskey winked, "just like I promised. How would you like to be a mule skinner?" Michal's jaw dropped. That he could never do. McCloskey laughed. "No, no, not the k\nd you think . That's the old-fashioned method. Now we have just started to use modern mule skinners. But we don't call them mule skinners anymore, even though they haul the men and the coal into and out of the mine just like before. SLOVAKIA 121 ' ' Now we call them Hoist Engineers . '' Michal look bewildered. "What 's a Hoist Engineer? " McCloskey gestured to him. "Come on , Michal. I'll show you. It's the perfect job for you. It 'll put you right in the middle of the men, many of them Rusins and Slovaks , and you can talk to them and interpret to the supers , and act as a go-between while you do your job. It'll be a very important step up in the mine. ' ' The two men walked into the dry drift mine, and up - slowly. Michal tried not to look tired and he tried not to puff, but it wasn't easy. " Take it easy, lad, " said McCloskey. " We'll soon be there . You see , the man who had this job was just here for a short time, and he didn't know the ropes too well - and couldn 't speak English - so you'll be the perfect man. " They arrived at a clearing in the mine, with a huge machine hung with ropes and levers standing there like an iron monster. ' ' With this you can control the coal cars going down the slope to the outside , and you also bring the men up in the morning and let them down at night. You have to be here very early so you can do that, and when they get to your hoist they disperse to the various coal rooms along the pathways. "So this is called the Hoist , and you will be the Hoist Engineer." ''It is like being a mule skinner, but without the mules! '' "Right!" McCloskey laughed. And Michal worked the levers to and fro, testing the machinery for cars going up and down until he soon had them working almost to perfection . "See, it's easy! I knew you were the man . Now you 've got yourself a good job, just like I promised you," said McCloskey . He winked. "Don 't tell them, but you'll soon get a raise." Michal's eyes widened. He could put away more money, and maybe make some of his new dreams come true. America was truly going to be the land of opportunity! CHAPTER 5 - CA VE IN! Tuesday, December 7, 1909 ''Cave-in!' ' The cry roared and pounded through Conemaugh like the cold wind of death. Everyone knew what it meant - it meant only one thing - and the women and children surged out of their homes and hurried to the billowing clouds that pointed to the position of the mine. 122 SLOVAKIA Marienka was in the Catholic church for the Presentation of the Virgin Mary. She heard the terrible cry and her throat tightened. "Oh Jesus, Mary, Joseph," she cried, crossing herself quickly, "please don 't make it serious. Please!" Then she hurried to the house and gathered her children together, as the women did in these times of stress. Michal, Janik, and Mikulas, with Jozef toddling at her heels. She swept up the baby Jurko and held him at her breast as she hurried the children down to the mine site. The large crowd already there saw Marienka at a distance and parted for her like the Red Sea for Moses - except that this was not an escape for Marienka. It was a descent into hell. Her heart pounding, she made her way through, feeling more and more dread as she approached her goal. A hand took her arm, and she looked up into Michal Koban's sympathetic eyes. "Thank God you're safe," cried Marienka. "I'm glad nothing happened to you! " ' ' Marienka, '' said Michal quietly, ''nothing happened to the other men either. Most of them. They had all moved on to new passages this morning - all except Ivan." Marienka felt faint. The boys cried at her side, and she shushed them. Ivan had been told to stay on at the old passage to pound out the props before moving on. So Michal nodded. " Ivan knocked out a prop and the roof fell in on him. I'm so sorry. But there may still be a chance. " There was a commotion at the entrance of the dust-choked mine, and two men came out carrying a stretcher. Marienka ran up to them, leaving the children with Michal. "Don't look, Mrs . Kinda," one of the men said. "He was - pretty badly mangled by the cave-in. He 's dead." Michal came up and put an arm on her sobbing shoulder, and gathered the five children around him as Marienka wept uncontrollably. He took Jurko from his mother' s failing arm. " Janik, hold on to Jozef," he said. "Yes , otec ," said Janik without thinking. Otec was the Slovak name for father. Slovak wakes seemed to have been developed by the Devil himself, with the express purpose of causing the wife and family of the deceased as much trouble and mental anguish as possible . Of course, it really wasn 't done that way ,on purpose. It was simply ''tradition,'• and tradition has to be served\ Ivan was laid out in the small living room ; with flowers all around SLOVAKIA 123 \ the casket, and exposed for viewing to all the friends and relatives and any curious stranger in town. They would come up to the casket, genuflect, and kneel on the prie-dieu and pray while gazing at the mortal remains of the exposed. And at the photo behind the casket of Ivan Kinda in full Hussar regalia. Then they would get up and turn to their friends and whisper, ''He looks so natural, almost as if he were sleeping." This was too painful for Marienka to see. She had ushered her children in to see their "otec" at the begining, and then told them to stay away. The large kitchen then became the center of activities for three days and nights. People straggled in at all hours, paid their respects to the deceased, then quickly returned to the kitchen for a meal and to hear various ribald and obscene stories told by several expert storytellers. Marienka spent her time at the hot stove, damp hair hanging down in strands over her forehead, and made eggs and little Slovak pancakes, and cutting "kolace" and ladling out the butter, and setting the table, and clearing the table, and washing the dishes, and setting up the table, and ... It was an endless round of senseless meal-serving, night and day, for three days. "Marienka, you've got to take a rest," Michal said, after hours of feeding starving miners. He had helped a lot. And so had the three older boys - Michal, Mikulas, and Janik. Marienka shook her head. "I can't," she said. "I have to feed them as come in and view Ivan. It is the tradition." ''Damn the tradition!'' Michal exploded. ''You go to bed right now and get some sleep. I'll handle this for a while." Marienka allowed herself to be led away, protesting feebly, stumbling, bleary-eyed. But she knew she was exhausted, so she did not protest too much. "So Michal, you already take over, eh?" roared a miner as he saw Michal put on the apron. Michal had a hot answer ready, but he just turned beet-red and doggedly said nothing. ' 'Lemme have three eggs, sunny-side up, lots of Slovak bread and butter, and - make it six pancakes. I've got to remember poor Ivan Kinda the best way I can, by eating." Michal seethed. "You'll remember him with a bump on your noggin from my skillet if you don't shut up." "Oh, ho ," the miner said amiably. "We do have a temper, don't 124 SLOVAKIA we? Maybe you 'll feel better when I tell you this joke about the miner and the Irish whore. Seems she spread out her goodies - ' ' he winked - "on the table, when ... " " Oh, shut up!" growled Michal, his mustache bristling. "Don't you realize a man is lying dead in the next room, and his family is going through a trying time. They 'll be destitute after this. Haven't you stopped to think of that? " The miner sobered up, and several others joined in. "We know all that, Michal," they said, with some care in their voices. " We know, but we laugh so we will not cry. Who knows - tomorrow it may happen to us." Michal bit his lip. They were right. He had no right to lecture them. They meant well. They were just rough men living a rough life, and the wake was a traditional part of their lives, where the people could come together and joke and laugh so they could forget what had happened . But they remembered still. Marienka somehow got through the next three days, and Michal escorted her and the children to the funeral in the little Catholic church Marienka and Ivan had helped to build in 1901. That afternoon was also a trial. The women of Conemaugh, which was 90 percent Slavic, came parading into the house to see Marienka and leave their condolences and their little Slovak "kolace" - jelly rolls with nuts and apples - that they had cooked for the occasion . '' God bless you, Marienka.'' · " May God be with you, Marienka." '' Everything will be all right , Marienka. God will provide.' ' Marienka nodded mechanically to all, as if in a daze. Finally the ordeal was over and the house was empty. Too empty. Even Jurko wasn't crying. And Jozef played quietly in the comer. The other three boys were in school. Michal stopped by after work . '' How are things going? '' he asked. " All right, " said Marienka, forcing a smile . " The insurance company paid for all the funeral expenses , plus $50 left. But no benefits , of course. '' " Of course . Nice of them. Now they pay nothing. You get no widow ' s benefits and you 're entirely on your own ." ''I have five children to help me ,'' Marienka grinned . Michal did not grin. " What I meant to .say is, what with the children and - and everything - you will neec:N o get something to - to tide you over a bit.'' · ' '' Michal - '' SLOVAKIA 125 " - No, please. He heh;! up a hand. "What I meant is the children will need food and things while you get yourself together , and I thought - " His hand went into his pocket , and he took out a small bundle wrapped in a handkerchief. " Well, here 's a little something to help you. '' " Michal! " Marienka cried as she took the bundle dumbly. This was the first useful gesture anyone had made to her since Ivan 's death. Tears welled in her eyes, finally trickled down her cheeks. She took out her hankie and blew mightily. The three boys poured through the door and happily embraced Michal . " Put that away - quickly," said Michal . And he got up. At the door he paused. ''Things aren't easy for a widow woman without a man to support her, " he said. "I mean , people will look down on you , just as they have looked down on me for my pegleg . What I want to say is , I understand what will happen. And I know you can pull through it . I know . ' ' He took her hand. " I'll see you again, Marienka, God willing. " Mikulas piped up, in his boyish soprano . "Why don 't you and matka marry, and you can stay here with us always? '' Marienka choked. The boys all laughed and clapped . They danced around the bewildered couple with their flaming cheeks . ' ' Boys , stop it! ' ' commanded Marienka in her voice that they knew had to be obeyed . They stopped and stood with their hands behind their backs, trying to look regretful. " Now go outside this minute ," commanded Marienka, " and don 't you dare say a word about this to anybody, hear? '' The boys filed out, and Michal started to follow. '' Not you, Michal! I'm sorry for their actions . It was really uncalled for ." Michal shrugged, a string in his heart still tugging for his old love, Jacka . " People will talk about single people ," he said . " People always talk. It is the way of the world .''  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Exerpt from Michal: Biography of a Galician Coal Miner, 1906-1933 Description An account of the resource Vasil S. Koban Slovakia, Vol. 29 (No. 53-54), 1980-81 pp. 105-125 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Koban, Vasil S. (Vasil Stefan), 1918-2007 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-81 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5122f120baea7fd9398a1b9cfe3e3e6d.pdf 8a89012ad1d7dbff82f8306a3b8ec037 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 65 EXIT CZECHO-SLOVAKIA'S "BERIA" By Wolfgang E. Oberleitner Czecho-Slovakia has so far appeared to be the most stable of the "People's Democracies," more so than the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev's battles with his adversaries have been going on for years and are still not settled. In Czecho-Slovakia, however, the ruling clique has so far managed to face the public as a monolithic block, welded together by the awareness of the liability of dictatorial regimes, even if they do come off with 98 per cent of the votes at every election. Ever since the major crisis of 1952 that ended in the denunciation of Deputy Minister President Slansky and his cosmopolitan entourage, there have been no further symptoms of internal tension in the CSR. That explains Moscow's ability to rely at all times on its Czech ally and to point him out to other satellites as an example of what communist regime consolidation is like. This optimistic picture of the situation in CzechoSlovakia is actually deceptive. The case of erstwhile Deputy Minister President Barak, dubbed by State President and First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny as a "political adventurer and criminal" points to chinks that cannot easily be puttied up. Novotny's accusations are all the more surprising since Barak is a man who for eight years was in control of the entire State and Party apparatus and knew, as hardly anyone else, just what was going on and would perhaps have been in a position to take over the reins of power himself. His meteoric rise from a simple worker to one of the big ten in the Czech Politburo may have caused him to believe that the moment had come to reach for the top party position first secretary - which Novotny, a man ten years his senior (60), was naturally unwilling to yield. Barak was clever enough to stay in the background and seldom made a speech lest one day, when the wind blew the other way, it be held against him. To be sure, he �66 SLOVAKIA could point to achievements, but these proved to be more of a burden to the department of justice than to himself. Right after he took over the Ministry of the Interior in September 1953, Barak began to weed out communist opposition. First on the agenda was the trial of Bishop Trochta, whom he had sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. He then turned the .guns on the Catholic People's Party - it had already been put out of commission and the leaders were given heavy terms in the penitentiary. That same year the Social Democrats were brought • before the tribunal; 24 of their functionaries were given long prison terms. The full storm of hatred of the police minister, whose methods strongly resembled those of his Soviet colleague Beria, was directed against the Slovak "separatists," four of whom he sentenced to death as late as 1958 and many others got long prison terms. It was not the terrorist methods, however, employed by Barak's henchmen, that proved fateful, but the calumniations of the People's Councils subordinate to · him. Novotny, who of course, knew about all this, now brought charges against his one-time colleague for "broadly plotted violations of the laiw." The president of the State who the year before had seen how Barak was trying to wangle himself into a position from which he could outmaneuver Novotny, a man who spoke much of de.:Stalinization but did nothing about it - repeated the same game th'a t had been used against Slansky in 1951, namely, removal from office while giving the incumbent the decorative post of Deputy Minister President, only to arrest him a few months later and have him executed. In June, 1961, Barak was forced to give up the Ministry of the Interior in exchange for a government commission for the People's Councils. As early as September, 1960, the dark clouds started to form over Barak's head when remarks were made in parliament by Novotny's representative Vavra about "socialist legality" being violated by members of the People's Councils "whose functionaries are only too little acquainted with the legal regulations." A few days later the communist Rude Pravo pre- �SLOVAKIA 67 sented examples to shed more light on scandals which, though not begun under Barak, continued under his administration. It was learned that strange business was being conducted at the machinery and tractor stations in Znaim. Instead of repairing the mowers, trade was booming in ladies lingerie. Pullovers, coats and silk stockings were being bought up from large firms and immediately r esold to their industrial enterprisers with a boost in price of 10 per cent. The profit of 226,000 crowns was divided up. Since the district "People's Council" was proba:bly bribed, there was, it was thought, small likelihood of being caught. In the fall of 1961, the National Assembly even passed a resolution in which it indirectly invited Barak to clean up the thievings and damage to socialist property and to put a stop to the plethora of "unjustified local interests" wherever it was taking place at the expense of the overall economy. Even with the best of intentions Barak could not possibly have righted the situation in such a short time, partly because many of his people were among the People's Councils and he did not want to or could not. be too rough with th0m, since they knew too much. While in office, Barak spoke of many existent abuses that ought to be corrected. The "people's " court wanted to know why he did practically nothing to solve the problems he so frequently spoke of ... and then sentenced him to 16 years in jail. Communism devours its own children! Simon Jurovsky, head o'f the S:1o- thr-0wn out of bhe Czech Red Parvak National Theater opera pro- ty, and condemned to 15 years i'Il ductions, celebrated h is 50th birth- jail. According to t'he Pr:a,gue r adaty in Bratislava. He was born dio broadcast of February 8, Bain Ul'anlka, near Banska Bystri<:a, rak had misused and abused :his I power amid hel<P'ed himselif to moFebruaror 8, 1'912. ney th,at belonged to the socialisill! ill! il!! Rudolph Barak, Czech COIIllmu- tic state. l!(! l!(! l!(! nist and sadist, who served the SLOVA:IGIA, according to statisPra,gue re~me as Minister Olf the Interior before he was kiiclced "up- tics recentliy released, had a popustairs" t-0 become Deputy Premier, lation, of 4',220,000 art the end of was arrested eady in 1lhe year, December, '11961. � SLOVAKIA 65 EXIT CZECHO-SLOVAKIA'S "BERIA" By Wolfgang E. Oberleitner Czecho-Slovakia has so far appeared to be the most stable of the "People's Democracies," more so than the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev's battles with his adversaries have been going on for years and are still not settled. In Czecho-Slovakia, however, the ruling clique has so far managed to face the public as a monolithic block, welded together by the awareness of the liability of dictatorial regimes, even if they do come off with 98 per cent of the votes at every election. Ever since the major crisis of 1952 that ended in the denunciation of Deputy Minister President Slansky and his cosmopolitan entourage, there have been no further symptoms of internal tension in the CSR. That explains Moscow's ability to rely at all times on its Czech ally and to point him out to other satellites as an example of what communist regime consolidation is like. This optimistic picture of the situation in CzechoSlovakia is actually deceptive. The case of erstwhile Deputy Minister President Barak, dubbed by State President and First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny as a "political adventurer and criminal" points to chinks that cannot easily be puttied up. Novotny's accusations are all the more surprising since Barak is a man who for eight years was in control of the entire State and Party apparatus and knew, as hardly anyone else, just what was going on and would perhaps have been in a position to take over the reins of power himself. His meteoric rise from a simple worker to one of the big ten in the Czech Politburo may have caused him to believe that the moment had come to reach for the top party position first secretary - which Novotny, a man ten years his senior (60), was naturally unwilling to yield. Barak was clever enough to stay in the background and seldom made a speech lest one day, when the wind blew the other way, it be held against him. To be sure, he �66 SLOVAKIA could point to achievements, but these proved to be more of a burden to the department of justice than to himself. Right after he took over the Ministry of the Interior in September 1953, Barak began to weed out communist opposition. First on the agenda was the trial of Bishop Trochta, whom he had sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. He then turned the .guns on the Catholic People's Party - it had already been put out of commission and the leaders were given heavy terms in the penitentiary. That same year the Social Democrats were brought • before the tribunal; 24 of their functionaries were given long prison terms. The full storm of hatred of the police minister, whose methods strongly resembled those of his Soviet colleague Beria, was directed against the Slovak "separatists," four of whom he sentenced to death as late as 1958 and many others got long prison terms. It was not the terrorist methods, however, employed by Barak's henchmen, that proved fateful, but the calumniations of the People's Councils subordinate to · him. Novotny, who of course, knew about all this, now brought charges against his one-time colleague for "broadly plotted violations of the laiw." The president of the State who the year before had seen how Barak was trying to wangle himself into a position from which he could outmaneuver Novotny, a man who spoke much of de.:Stalinization but did nothing about it - repeated the same game th'a t had been used against Slansky in 1951, namely, removal from office while giving the incumbent the decorative post of Deputy Minister President, only to arrest him a few months later and have him executed. In June, 1961, Barak was forced to give up the Ministry of the Interior in exchange for a government commission for the People's Councils. As early as September, 1960, the dark clouds started to form over Barak's head when remarks were made in parliament by Novotny's representative Vavra about "socialist legality" being violated by members of the People's Councils "whose functionaries are only too little acquainted with the legal regulations." A few days later the communist Rude Pravo pre- �SLOVAKIA 67 sented examples to shed more light on scandals which, though not begun under Barak, continued under his administration. It was learned that strange business was being conducted at the machinery and tractor stations in Znaim. Instead of repairing the mowers, trade was booming in ladies lingerie. Pullovers, coats and silk stockings were being bought up from large firms and immediately r esold to their industrial enterprisers with a boost in price of 10 per cent. The profit of 226,000 crowns was divided up. Since the district "People's Council" was proba:bly bribed, there was, it was thought, small likelihood of being caught. In the fall of 1961, the National Assembly even passed a resolution in which it indirectly invited Barak to clean up the thievings and damage to socialist property and to put a stop to the plethora of "unjustified local interests" wherever it was taking place at the expense of the overall economy. Even with the best of intentions Barak could not possibly have righted the situation in such a short time, partly because many of his people were among the People's Councils and he did not want to or could not. be too rough with th0m, since they knew too much. While in office, Barak spoke of many existent abuses that ought to be corrected. The "people's " court wanted to know why he did practically nothing to solve the problems he so frequently spoke of ... and then sentenced him to 16 years in jail. Communism devours its own children! Simon Jurovsky, head o'f the S:1o- thr-0wn out of bhe Czech Red Parvak National Theater opera pro- ty, and condemned to 15 years i'Il ductions, celebrated h is 50th birth- jail. According to t'he Pr:a,gue r adaty in Bratislava. He was born dio broadcast of February 8, Bain Ul'anlka, near Banska Bystri<:a, rak had misused and abused :his I power amid hel<P'ed himselif to moFebruaror 8, 1'912. ney th,at belonged to the socialisill! ill! il!! Rudolph Barak, Czech COIIllmu- tic state. l!(! l!(! l!(! nist and sadist, who served the SLOVA:IGIA, according to statisPra,gue re~me as Minister Olf the Interior before he was kiiclced "up- tics recentliy released, had a popustairs" t-0 become Deputy Premier, lation, of 4',220,000 art the end of was arrested eady in 1lhe year, December, '11961. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1962, Vol. 12 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 35), March-June 1962. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 65 EXIT CZECHO-SLOVAKIA'S "BERIA" By Wolfgang E. Oberleitner Czecho-Slovakia has so far appeared to be the most stable of the "People's Democracies," more so than the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev's battles with his adversaries have been going on for years and are still not settled. In Czecho-Slovakia, however, the ruling clique has so far managed to face the public as a monolithic block, welded together by the awareness of the liability of dictatorial regimes, even if they do come off with 98 per cent of the votes at every election. Ever since the major crisis of 1952 that ended in the denunciation of Deputy Minister President Slansky and his cosmopolitan entourage, there have been no further symptoms of internal tension in the CSR. That explains Moscow's ability to rely at all times on its Czech ally and to point him out to other satellites as an example of what communist regime consolidation is like. This optimistic picture of the situation in CzechoSlovakia is actually deceptive. The case of erstwhile Deputy Minister President Barak, dubbed by State President and First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny as a "political adventurer and criminal" points to chinks that cannot easily be puttied up. Novotny's accusations are all the more surprising since Barak is a man who for eight years was in control of the entire State and Party apparatus and knew, as hardly anyone else, just what was going on and would perhaps have been in a position to take over the reins of power himself. His meteoric rise from a simple worker to one of the big ten in the Czech Politburo may have caused him to believe that the moment had come to reach for the top party position first secretary - which Novotny, a man ten years his senior (60), was naturally unwilling to yield. Barak was clever enough to stay in the background and seldom made a speech lest one day, when the wind blew the other way, it be held against him. To be sure, he 66 SLOVAKIA could point to achievements, but these proved to be more of a burden to the department of justice than to himself. Right after he took over the Ministry of the Interior in September 1953, Barak began to weed out communist opposition. First on the agenda was the trial of Bishop Trochta, whom he had sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. He then turned the .guns on the Catholic People's Party - it had already been put out of commission and the leaders were given heavy terms in the penitentiary. That same year the Social Democrats were brought • before the tribunal; 24 of their functionaries were given long prison terms. The full storm of hatred of the police minister, whose methods strongly resembled those of his Soviet colleague Beria, was directed against the Slovak "separatists," four of whom he sentenced to death as late as 1958 and many others got long prison terms. It was not the terrorist methods, however, employed by Barak's henchmen, that proved fateful, but the calumniations of the People's Councils subordinate to · him. Novotny, who of course, knew about all this, now brought charges against his one-time colleague for "broadly plotted violations of the laiw." The president of the State who the year before had seen how Barak was trying to wangle himself into a position from which he could outmaneuver Novotny, a man who spoke much of de.:Stalinization but did nothing about it - repeated the same game th'a t had been used against Slansky in 1951, namely, removal from office while giving the incumbent the decorative post of Deputy Minister President, only to arrest him a few months later and have him executed. In June, 1961, Barak was forced to give up the Ministry of the Interior in exchange for a government commission for the People's Councils. As early as September, 1960, the dark clouds started to form over Barak's head when remarks were made in parliament by Novotny's representative Vavra about "socialist legality" being violated by members of the People's Councils "whose functionaries are only too little acquainted with the legal regulations." A few days later the communist Rude Pravo pre- SLOVAKIA 67 sented examples to shed more light on scandals which, though not begun under Barak, continued under his administration. It was learned that strange business was being conducted at the machinery and tractor stations in Znaim. Instead of repairing the mowers, trade was booming in ladies lingerie. Pullovers, coats and silk stockings were being bought up from large firms and immediately r esold to their industrial enterprisers with a boost in price of 10 per cent. The profit of 226,000 crowns was divided up. Since the district "People's Council" was proba:bly bribed, there was, it was thought, small likelihood of being caught. In the fall of 1961, the National Assembly even passed a resolution in which it indirectly invited Barak to clean up the thievings and damage to socialist property and to put a stop to the plethora of "unjustified local interests" wherever it was taking place at the expense of the overall economy. Even with the best of intentions Barak could not possibly have righted the situation in such a short time, partly because many of his people were among the People's Councils and he did not want to or could not. be too rough with th0m, since they knew too much. While in office, Barak spoke of many existent abuses that ought to be corrected. The "people's " court wanted to know why he did practically nothing to solve the problems he so frequently spoke of ... and then sentenced him to 16 years in jail. Communism devours its own children! Simon Jurovsky, head o'f the S:1o- thr-0wn out of bhe Czech Red Parvak National Theater opera pro- ty, and condemned to 15 years i'Il ductions, celebrated h is 50th birth- jail. According to t'he Pr:a,gue r adaty in Bratislava. He was born dio broadcast of February 8, Bain Ul'anlka, near Banska Bystri<:a, rak had misused and abused :his I power amid hel<P'ed himselif to moFebruaror 8, 1'912. ney th,at belonged to the socialisill! ill! il!! Rudolph Barak, Czech COIIllmu- tic state. l!(! l!(! l!(! nist and sadist, who served the SLOVA:IGIA, according to statisPra,gue re~me as Minister Olf the Interior before he was kiiclced "up- tics recentliy released, had a popustairs" t-0 become Deputy Premier, lation, of 4',220,000 art the end of was arrested eady in 1lhe year, December, '11961.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Exit Czecho-Slovakia's "Beria" Description An account of the resource Wolfgang E. Oberleitner Slovakia, Vol. 12, No. 1 (35), March-June 1962 pp. 65-67 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Oberleitner, Wolfgang, 1918-2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1962 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4fdb5b8a3698d657769feb8089d33775.pdf ae6040e523fce94e9f61c6090ba446d6 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA EXPELLEES AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA BY OTTO VON HAIB,SBUiRG When Joseph Stalin seized upon the plan of Edward Benes to expel the Germans from the Bohemian lands, and when Communism expanded the idea to include the entire "Intermare" area between the Baltic and the Adriatic, his intention was not only to do his faithful vassals a favor. All political measures adopted by Communist politicians have their place in the great plan of world revolution. The expulsion of German ethnic groups from CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which is continued in the indirect but uninterrupted flight of Germans from the German Soviet Zone, was supposed to render more difficult the stabi1ization of West Germany and that of all Europe, if not hinder it altogether. It was supposed, furthermore, to pave the way for Communism. Moscow expected, as a consequence of the flooding of West Germany with expellees, that an "imminent revolutionary situation" would develop. It is perhaps Stalin's biggest disappointment after Potsdam that the hopes he pinned on the masses of pauperized and expropriated expellees were never realized. It is in fact the greatest "miracle" that has happened in West Germany - far greater and more meaningful than the "economic miracle" - that the expeHees did not become the reserve army of communism but, on the contrary, a constructive force and the bearers of constructive thinking for all of Europe. Moscow counted on it becoming impossible to integrate the expellees into the economy and society of West Germany. The West German State, it figured, or West German society would perhaps be incapable of adequately caring for the masses of expellees housed in vast barracks. Filled with resentment and bitterness, doubtful of a chance for return as well as of a new means of livelihood, overcome by camp psychoses and the will to destroy, the millions of expellees were expected in the eyes of the general staff of the world revolution, to become partisans and outriders of the Red offensive. �SLOVAKIA 19 While the West Germans were being bled white on the modest attempt to provide for these homeless persons or at least keeip them from starving to death, the victims themselves were expected, as social outcasts and expellees, to undermine legal security, prevent every form of political sta;bilization, burden the economy unendurably and thus succumb to the whi.sperings of Communist agents. The "solution" of the refugee problem in the Soviet occupied zone, where they wanted to create an example of Marxist social policy by "land reform" and the settling of expellees as "new settlers," was supposed to entice those expellees residing in the West likewise to become champions of Communism. Hatred of the Americans, who by their "betrayal of humanity" were the alleged cause of all the trouble, the rupture of national solidarity of the German people by an unbridgeaJble gap between old and new citizens, the hopelessness of a situation from which revolution seemed but the only way out, and the classic union of national or nationalist passions with social-revolutionary impulses to national Bolshevism - all that appeared i.n 1945 to be a guarantee that the Communist revolution would advance to the Rhine within a very short time, and soon would go beyond the Rhine. It seemed, too, that irts strongest pillars would be those who had caused their own misery. There was a catchword that e:xipressed everything the Communists expected from the expellees at thait time : Macedonians. Just as pro-Bulgarian elements within Macedonia, which had become Sel'lbian in 1913, not only fought against Serbian rule in the old homeland but became a constant revolutionary danger in their host counfu'y of Bulgaria, too, overthrowing governments, forming conspiracies, stirring up the people and trying to implicate the State in a policy fraught with risks, so the East Germans, the Sudetens, the Carpait·hians, Hungarian and Banat Germans were to have formed the e:x:plosive, with its fuse in Moscow, that would completely destroy Europe. Many are the reasons for things haviing turned out differently, motives that coincided to give developments a turn �20 SLOVAKIA unforeseen by Moscow. First of all was the lack of caution by Stalin, wh.o prematurely took off his mask in the Greek civil war; tJhen the Czech putsch of February 1948, followed by the blockade of Berlin, the Bolshevization CYf China, and, finally, with the invasion of Korea, in this way touching off America's reaction to his policy of permanent revolution by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the German currency reform and the re-estaiblishment of a German State. Nor should we forget either, the sober attitude of the American nation, which was prepared to revise dangerous mistakes just as radically as it had once succumbed to them, or the talents of the German people in the organizational, technical and economic field. The rapidly widening gap in the standard of living between people this side and the other side of the iron curtain was also important. All this and still more combined to cause Stalin's hopes to wither toward the end of his life, leading to a serious crisis of Communism between 1952 and 1956, which the West, however, did not know how to take proper advantage of. The ohief merit in the failure of the Benes-Stalin concept is to be attriibuted to the eX:pellees themselves, who, by remarkable self-discipline, moderation and objectivity, refrained from any policy of daring and revenge and, with minor exceptions, remained completely immune to Communist attempts at infiltration. They did not succumb for a minute to the danger of becoming the "Macedonians" of West Germany, but, instead, became the supporters of constructive European ideas. It is one of the most significant achievements of the expellees that t'hey have whetted the conscience of the free peoples and continually exhorted them to self-examination. International law, ever since the first world war, has increasingly fallen into decay, the concepts of riight and wrong have become confused ever since they were turned over to the propaganda apparatuses and the whim of mass passions to interpret them according to their own discretion and misuse them for the interests of power. In particular the motto of self-determination of peo- �SLOVAKIA ples, even during the interpretation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, was distorted beyond recognition and actually twisted to the opposite. 'Dhe expellees have not simply stanted at the po,i nt at which the concept was perverted and hence d~based. They related the demand for the right of self-determination to a large extent to a critical examination of German poLicy and to the political attitude of ethnic groups in the period prior to the first world war and in the thirties. They have seriously and in a thoroughgoing manner concerned themselves with the ethical motivation of the right to the homeland and have encouraged not only the experts on international and constitutional law in the free world, but, to an ever-growing degree, the t heologians to explore the right to the homeland in conjunction with the right to self-determination, self-government and self- administration, and to acquire, by so-doing, guiding principles for a new order in Europe. In the Charter of the Expellees we find the first results of that process of examination of conscience, of historic study, and of practical political consideraJt.ion of the possible and attainable. That was but the beginning. With the renouncing of revenge and retaliation, an ethical principle was anchored >in politics which had never before appeared with such clarity in the realm of international-legal considerations and in political aims. Today we can see in the Algerian issue that it was not just a question of problems touohing on East Germany and the Danubian area. It is a -suriprising fact, and may well fill with satisfaction those expellees W\ho come from old Austria, to know tihat the plans and proposals that were introduced by the French government toward a solut ion of the Algerian problem, approach those ideas that matured on Austrian soil between 1848 and 1918 and which were furtiher developed by the Sudeten Germans and could be matured in the struggle for the recognition of the right to the homeland. What formerly was a matter thaJt. concerned or appeared to concern only the Austrians and was understood by the peoples and ethnic groups of the Danubian Monarchy and of the German-Polish bovder area or the Baltic �22 SLOVAKIA States, today has become a question of the destiny of the free world and of Europe in particular. Africa, the Near East, India, and in Europe the regions in which there are still national issues this side of the iron curtain (South Tyrol), all need certain binding international-legal and constitutional-legal ideas and principles for solution and a new order, for satisfaobion and settlement. German e~pellees were the first to turn the attention of the free world to this vital problem and produced the first fruitful stimu~i. The contri'butions to thoughts on solving the nationalities problem made by Karl Renner and Ritter von Lodgman, Ignaz Seipel and Josef Redlich, Adolf Fisohhof and Franz Palacky, Aurel Popovici and Heinrich Lammasch, and, a:bove all, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his "workshop," are today acqui:r,ing world-wide importance. It was tJhe expellees who bridged the gap between past and present, between a territorially limited e:x!perimental station of co-living of various peoples in a State Community and the present global aspects of the question. As Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, stated at the Sudeten German Day in Munich, 1960, it is important not only to proclaim a right but to examine within wihat framework and within what higher legal order it can most ideally be reaHzed. At this very juncture the moderated conduct of the expellees proved a valua;ble maxim for all Europe. There are those who never tire of painting the expellee associations ·in Germany as disturber.s of the peace, "revengists," and nationalists. Only the reverse, however, is true. 'Dhe expellees were the first sizeable groups among the German people who displayed understanding for the integration policy of Adenauer and Sohuman, who supported it and ciharacterized the formation of supra-naJtional European arrangements as a condition for a new peaceful order for all Europe, in particular for East Central Europe. In the Eichstatt Declaration of 1949, in the Detmold Declaration, and in the rapidly ensuing resolutions and decisions of numerous associations - particularly the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in exile - there appeared for the first time propo- �SLOVAKIA 23 sals for a new European legal and State order within the framework of supra-State and supra-national organizations. And that is quite natural, too. The expellees bring from their homeland a rich storehouse of experiences and traditions which are directed to the necessity of international and supra-national agreements and organizations, to the dovetailing of autonomous, State and supra.:state faci'lities, to a common destiny and inseparability of vital communities in which different languages are spoken, with the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy, minority rights, and the complemenlting of territorial with personal selfadministration. In the areas where once the expellees had lived for centuries, the national.,State idea early proved to be problematical. The principal West European peoples looked upon the integral national State as an ideal ever since 1789, and retained their views into the 191:Jh Century. Whereas in France, Germany, and Italy tJhe ideas of the great Europeans met with tough opposition, since people simply could not imagine that portions of national sovereignty could and must be yielded, the expellees very quickly realized that this was a viltal condition for the realizaition of their claims to recognition of the right to the homeland and they unreservedly offered their services to the Europe of tomorrow. For them federalism was never a mere substrat-ificaition of the over-all State into bureaucratically administered areas of sovereignty, but was always linked to a maximum measure of self-administration and responsibility of the lower strata. From this treasury of experience they could and still can give Europe very much. In addition thereto are the temperament, spirit of enterprise, and economic adaptability of old pioneer and colonizing races. The German "economic miracle," particularly in its incipiency, needed certain attributes which the Germans from the East possessed to a high degree. Plus the fact, that they had nothing to lose and a new live1ihood to gain. Henice they were courageous enough to build a new economy from the ruins. The ambition to dispel the prejudices against those who arrived as "beggars," to �24 SLOVAKIA prove their ability, and not just to acquire formal political equality but the respeot of their fellow citizens as well all this contributed to the expellees' becoming a constructive European force in the economic sphere. Finally, one may point to their importance as conoisseurs of the Eastern peoples and political conditions of East European life. Thus in a certain sense one can speak of a re-colonizaJtion. IDight centuries ago the big trek began: Germans and Dutch colonists bore European civilizat ion eastwards. The progeny of these colonists came back to the West after 1945 as ex;pellees. They did not come as beneficiaries but brought with them as working people, politically active leaders and the bearers of a culture, tihe readiness to rebuild a new ·Europe. Tihey brought experience, skills, courage, and the concept of surpra..national legal order. One hundred years ago on Decemlber 12, 1861 - Btshop Stephen Moyses cxf Slovakia led a delegation, of Slovaks to Emperor Franois Jloseph to protest against Magyarization and the oppression of his Slovak people. The Memorandum presented the Emperor requested equa'l rights for the Slovaks and that the territory of the Slovaks becoone a separate adminisitrative unit, that is, tihalt it become autonoonous. anested again in 1950, and in the beginning of 11951 placed on trial with Bishops Vojtassak and Gojdic. The kalllgaroo court sentenced him to life imprisonment as ail• "enemy of the State." With amnesty in 1'961, Bi.shop Buzalka left prison to live under surveillance of the police at all times. Tihey found him dead, kneeling by his bed, hands clasped in prayer. Significant it is that even the "Katolicke Noviny" (The• Catholic ~ :IC :IC News) did not report the death Bishop Michael Buzalka, Auxili- of Bishop Buzal!ka, patriot amd ary of the Trnava Apostolic Ad- martyr for the cause of his Church ministrature, died on Dec. 7, 'liOOl, and his Slovak people. :IC :IC :IC according to a very belated report. Born in Sviity Anton, Slov,aBishop Joseph t arsky, Titular kia, Sept. 18, 11885, Bishop Buzal- Bishop of Tagora and apostolic adka was ordained priest July 14, ministr-ator for t he diocese of Ko1908, and consecrated Bishop in sice, Slovakia, died March 1•2, Riome on May '1'5, 1938. He was 1962, and was buried four days rector of the Bratislava Seminariy Iat,e r in the cathedral cr,yipt after and, during the war, Militazy Oir- appropriate religious servwes. Bidiir.iary for the Slovak Republic. shoip Carsky was born in G!bely, In 1•945, Bishop Buzalka was im- Slovakia, May 9, 1886, ordained prisoned, with two other Bishops priest Jiu}y 26, 1909, and named and many Slovak priests by ,t he bishop by the Vatican July 14, Reds, but later released. He was 1925. � 18 SLOVAKIA EXPELLEES AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA BY OTTO VON HAIB,SBUiRG When Joseph Stalin seized upon the plan of Edward Benes to expel the Germans from the Bohemian lands, and when Communism expanded the idea to include the entire "Intermare" area between the Baltic and the Adriatic, his intention was not only to do his faithful vassals a favor. All political measures adopted by Communist politicians have their place in the great plan of world revolution. The expulsion of German ethnic groups from CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which is continued in the indirect but uninterrupted flight of Germans from the German Soviet Zone, was supposed to render more difficult the stabi1ization of West Germany and that of all Europe, if not hinder it altogether. It was supposed, furthermore, to pave the way for Communism. Moscow expected, as a consequence of the flooding of West Germany with expellees, that an "imminent revolutionary situation" would develop. It is perhaps Stalin's biggest disappointment after Potsdam that the hopes he pinned on the masses of pauperized and expropriated expellees were never realized. It is in fact the greatest "miracle" that has happened in West Germany - far greater and more meaningful than the "economic miracle" - that the expeHees did not become the reserve army of communism but, on the contrary, a constructive force and the bearers of constructive thinking for all of Europe. Moscow counted on it becoming impossible to integrate the expellees into the economy and society of West Germany. The West German State, it figured, or West German society would perhaps be incapable of adequately caring for the masses of expellees housed in vast barracks. Filled with resentment and bitterness, doubtful of a chance for return as well as of a new means of livelihood, overcome by camp psychoses and the will to destroy, the millions of expellees were expected in the eyes of the general staff of the world revolution, to become partisans and outriders of the Red offensive. �SLOVAKIA 19 While the West Germans were being bled white on the modest attempt to provide for these homeless persons or at least keeip them from starving to death, the victims themselves were expected, as social outcasts and expellees, to undermine legal security, prevent every form of political sta;bilization, burden the economy unendurably and thus succumb to the whi.sperings of Communist agents. The "solution" of the refugee problem in the Soviet occupied zone, where they wanted to create an example of Marxist social policy by "land reform" and the settling of expellees as "new settlers," was supposed to entice those expellees residing in the West likewise to become champions of Communism. Hatred of the Americans, who by their "betrayal of humanity" were the alleged cause of all the trouble, the rupture of national solidarity of the German people by an unbridgeaJble gap between old and new citizens, the hopelessness of a situation from which revolution seemed but the only way out, and the classic union of national or nationalist passions with social-revolutionary impulses to national Bolshevism - all that appeared i.n 1945 to be a guarantee that the Communist revolution would advance to the Rhine within a very short time, and soon would go beyond the Rhine. It seemed, too, that irts strongest pillars would be those who had caused their own misery. There was a catchword that e:xipressed everything the Communists expected from the expellees at thait time : Macedonians. Just as pro-Bulgarian elements within Macedonia, which had become Sel'lbian in 1913, not only fought against Serbian rule in the old homeland but became a constant revolutionary danger in their host counfu'y of Bulgaria, too, overthrowing governments, forming conspiracies, stirring up the people and trying to implicate the State in a policy fraught with risks, so the East Germans, the Sudetens, the Carpait·hians, Hungarian and Banat Germans were to have formed the e:x:plosive, with its fuse in Moscow, that would completely destroy Europe. Many are the reasons for things haviing turned out differently, motives that coincided to give developments a turn �20 SLOVAKIA unforeseen by Moscow. First of all was the lack of caution by Stalin, wh.o prematurely took off his mask in the Greek civil war; tJhen the Czech putsch of February 1948, followed by the blockade of Berlin, the Bolshevization CYf China, and, finally, with the invasion of Korea, in this way touching off America's reaction to his policy of permanent revolution by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the German currency reform and the re-estaiblishment of a German State. Nor should we forget either, the sober attitude of the American nation, which was prepared to revise dangerous mistakes just as radically as it had once succumbed to them, or the talents of the German people in the organizational, technical and economic field. The rapidly widening gap in the standard of living between people this side and the other side of the iron curtain was also important. All this and still more combined to cause Stalin's hopes to wither toward the end of his life, leading to a serious crisis of Communism between 1952 and 1956, which the West, however, did not know how to take proper advantage of. The ohief merit in the failure of the Benes-Stalin concept is to be attriibuted to the eX:pellees themselves, who, by remarkable self-discipline, moderation and objectivity, refrained from any policy of daring and revenge and, with minor exceptions, remained completely immune to Communist attempts at infiltration. They did not succumb for a minute to the danger of becoming the "Macedonians" of West Germany, but, instead, became the supporters of constructive European ideas. It is one of the most significant achievements of the expellees that t'hey have whetted the conscience of the free peoples and continually exhorted them to self-examination. International law, ever since the first world war, has increasingly fallen into decay, the concepts of riight and wrong have become confused ever since they were turned over to the propaganda apparatuses and the whim of mass passions to interpret them according to their own discretion and misuse them for the interests of power. In particular the motto of self-determination of peo- �SLOVAKIA ples, even during the interpretation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, was distorted beyond recognition and actually twisted to the opposite. 'Dhe expellees have not simply stanted at the po,i nt at which the concept was perverted and hence d~based. They related the demand for the right of self-determination to a large extent to a critical examination of German poLicy and to the political attitude of ethnic groups in the period prior to the first world war and in the thirties. They have seriously and in a thoroughgoing manner concerned themselves with the ethical motivation of the right to the homeland and have encouraged not only the experts on international and constitutional law in the free world, but, to an ever-growing degree, the t heologians to explore the right to the homeland in conjunction with the right to self-determination, self-government and self- administration, and to acquire, by so-doing, guiding principles for a new order in Europe. In the Charter of the Expellees we find the first results of that process of examination of conscience, of historic study, and of practical political consideraJt.ion of the possible and attainable. That was but the beginning. With the renouncing of revenge and retaliation, an ethical principle was anchored >in politics which had never before appeared with such clarity in the realm of international-legal considerations and in political aims. Today we can see in the Algerian issue that it was not just a question of problems touohing on East Germany and the Danubian area. It is a -suriprising fact, and may well fill with satisfaction those expellees W\ho come from old Austria, to know tihat the plans and proposals that were introduced by the French government toward a solut ion of the Algerian problem, approach those ideas that matured on Austrian soil between 1848 and 1918 and which were furtiher developed by the Sudeten Germans and could be matured in the struggle for the recognition of the right to the homeland. What formerly was a matter thaJt. concerned or appeared to concern only the Austrians and was understood by the peoples and ethnic groups of the Danubian Monarchy and of the German-Polish bovder area or the Baltic �22 SLOVAKIA States, today has become a question of the destiny of the free world and of Europe in particular. Africa, the Near East, India, and in Europe the regions in which there are still national issues this side of the iron curtain (South Tyrol), all need certain binding international-legal and constitutional-legal ideas and principles for solution and a new order, for satisfaobion and settlement. German e~pellees were the first to turn the attention of the free world to this vital problem and produced the first fruitful stimu~i. The contri'butions to thoughts on solving the nationalities problem made by Karl Renner and Ritter von Lodgman, Ignaz Seipel and Josef Redlich, Adolf Fisohhof and Franz Palacky, Aurel Popovici and Heinrich Lammasch, and, a:bove all, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his "workshop," are today acqui:r,ing world-wide importance. It was tJhe expellees who bridged the gap between past and present, between a territorially limited e:x!perimental station of co-living of various peoples in a State Community and the present global aspects of the question. As Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, stated at the Sudeten German Day in Munich, 1960, it is important not only to proclaim a right but to examine within wihat framework and within what higher legal order it can most ideally be reaHzed. At this very juncture the moderated conduct of the expellees proved a valua;ble maxim for all Europe. There are those who never tire of painting the expellee associations ·in Germany as disturber.s of the peace, "revengists," and nationalists. Only the reverse, however, is true. 'Dhe expellees were the first sizeable groups among the German people who displayed understanding for the integration policy of Adenauer and Sohuman, who supported it and ciharacterized the formation of supra-naJtional European arrangements as a condition for a new peaceful order for all Europe, in particular for East Central Europe. In the Eichstatt Declaration of 1949, in the Detmold Declaration, and in the rapidly ensuing resolutions and decisions of numerous associations - particularly the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in exile - there appeared for the first time propo- �SLOVAKIA 23 sals for a new European legal and State order within the framework of supra-State and supra-national organizations. And that is quite natural, too. The expellees bring from their homeland a rich storehouse of experiences and traditions which are directed to the necessity of international and supra-national agreements and organizations, to the dovetailing of autonomous, State and supra.:state faci'lities, to a common destiny and inseparability of vital communities in which different languages are spoken, with the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy, minority rights, and the complemenlting of territorial with personal selfadministration. In the areas where once the expellees had lived for centuries, the national.,State idea early proved to be problematical. The principal West European peoples looked upon the integral national State as an ideal ever since 1789, and retained their views into the 191:Jh Century. Whereas in France, Germany, and Italy tJhe ideas of the great Europeans met with tough opposition, since people simply could not imagine that portions of national sovereignty could and must be yielded, the expellees very quickly realized that this was a viltal condition for the realizaition of their claims to recognition of the right to the homeland and they unreservedly offered their services to the Europe of tomorrow. For them federalism was never a mere substrat-ificaition of the over-all State into bureaucratically administered areas of sovereignty, but was always linked to a maximum measure of self-administration and responsibility of the lower strata. From this treasury of experience they could and still can give Europe very much. In addition thereto are the temperament, spirit of enterprise, and economic adaptability of old pioneer and colonizing races. The German "economic miracle," particularly in its incipiency, needed certain attributes which the Germans from the East possessed to a high degree. Plus the fact, that they had nothing to lose and a new live1ihood to gain. Henice they were courageous enough to build a new economy from the ruins. The ambition to dispel the prejudices against those who arrived as "beggars," to �24 SLOVAKIA prove their ability, and not just to acquire formal political equality but the respeot of their fellow citizens as well all this contributed to the expellees' becoming a constructive European force in the economic sphere. Finally, one may point to their importance as conoisseurs of the Eastern peoples and political conditions of East European life. Thus in a certain sense one can speak of a re-colonizaJtion. IDight centuries ago the big trek began: Germans and Dutch colonists bore European civilizat ion eastwards. The progeny of these colonists came back to the West after 1945 as ex;pellees. They did not come as beneficiaries but brought with them as working people, politically active leaders and the bearers of a culture, tihe readiness to rebuild a new ·Europe. Tihey brought experience, skills, courage, and the concept of surpra..national legal order. One hundred years ago on Decemlber 12, 1861 - Btshop Stephen Moyses cxf Slovakia led a delegation, of Slovaks to Emperor Franois Jloseph to protest against Magyarization and the oppression of his Slovak people. The Memorandum presented the Emperor requested equa'l rights for the Slovaks and that the territory of the Slovaks becoone a separate adminisitrative unit, that is, tihalt it become autonoonous. anested again in 1950, and in the beginning of 11951 placed on trial with Bishops Vojtassak and Gojdic. The kalllgaroo court sentenced him to life imprisonment as ail• "enemy of the State." With amnesty in 1'961, Bi.shop Buzalka left prison to live under surveillance of the police at all times. Tihey found him dead, kneeling by his bed, hands clasped in prayer. Significant it is that even the "Katolicke Noviny" (The• Catholic ~ :IC :IC News) did not report the death Bishop Michael Buzalka, Auxili- of Bishop Buzal!ka, patriot amd ary of the Trnava Apostolic Ad- martyr for the cause of his Church ministrature, died on Dec. 7, 'liOOl, and his Slovak people. :IC :IC :IC according to a very belated report. Born in Sviity Anton, Slov,aBishop Joseph t arsky, Titular kia, Sept. 18, 11885, Bishop Buzal- Bishop of Tagora and apostolic adka was ordained priest July 14, ministr-ator for t he diocese of Ko1908, and consecrated Bishop in sice, Slovakia, died March 1•2, Riome on May '1'5, 1938. He was 1962, and was buried four days rector of the Bratislava Seminariy Iat,e r in the cathedral cr,yipt after and, during the war, Militazy Oir- appropriate religious servwes. Bidiir.iary for the Slovak Republic. shoip Carsky was born in G!bely, In 1•945, Bishop Buzalka was im- Slovakia, May 9, 1886, ordained prisoned, with two other Bishops priest Jiu}y 26, 1909, and named and many Slovak priests by ,t he bishop by the Vatican July 14, Reds, but later released. He was 1925. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1962, Vol. 12 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 35), March-June 1962. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA EXPELLEES AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA BY OTTO VON HAIB,SBUiRG When Joseph Stalin seized upon the plan of Edward Benes to expel the Germans from the Bohemian lands, and when Communism expanded the idea to include the entire "Intermare" area between the Baltic and the Adriatic, his intention was not only to do his faithful vassals a favor. All political measures adopted by Communist politicians have their place in the great plan of world revolution. The expulsion of German ethnic groups from CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which is continued in the indirect but uninterrupted flight of Germans from the German Soviet Zone, was supposed to render more difficult the stabi1ization of West Germany and that of all Europe, if not hinder it altogether. It was supposed, furthermore, to pave the way for Communism. Moscow expected, as a consequence of the flooding of West Germany with expellees, that an "imminent revolutionary situation" would develop. It is perhaps Stalin's biggest disappointment after Potsdam that the hopes he pinned on the masses of pauperized and expropriated expellees were never realized. It is in fact the greatest "miracle" that has happened in West Germany - far greater and more meaningful than the "economic miracle" - that the expeHees did not become the reserve army of communism but, on the contrary, a constructive force and the bearers of constructive thinking for all of Europe. Moscow counted on it becoming impossible to integrate the expellees into the economy and society of West Germany. The West German State, it figured, or West German society would perhaps be incapable of adequately caring for the masses of expellees housed in vast barracks. Filled with resentment and bitterness, doubtful of a chance for return as well as of a new means of livelihood, overcome by camp psychoses and the will to destroy, the millions of expellees were expected in the eyes of the general staff of the world revolution, to become partisans and outriders of the Red offensive. SLOVAKIA 19 While the West Germans were being bled white on the modest attempt to provide for these homeless persons or at least keeip them from starving to death, the victims themselves were expected, as social outcasts and expellees, to undermine legal security, prevent every form of political sta;bilization, burden the economy unendurably and thus succumb to the whi.sperings of Communist agents. The "solution" of the refugee problem in the Soviet occupied zone, where they wanted to create an example of Marxist social policy by "land reform" and the settling of expellees as "new settlers," was supposed to entice those expellees residing in the West likewise to become champions of Communism. Hatred of the Americans, who by their "betrayal of humanity" were the alleged cause of all the trouble, the rupture of national solidarity of the German people by an unbridgeaJble gap between old and new citizens, the hopelessness of a situation from which revolution seemed but the only way out, and the classic union of national or nationalist passions with social-revolutionary impulses to national Bolshevism - all that appeared i.n 1945 to be a guarantee that the Communist revolution would advance to the Rhine within a very short time, and soon would go beyond the Rhine. It seemed, too, that irts strongest pillars would be those who had caused their own misery. There was a catchword that e:xipressed everything the Communists expected from the expellees at thait time : Macedonians. Just as pro-Bulgarian elements within Macedonia, which had become Sel'lbian in 1913, not only fought against Serbian rule in the old homeland but became a constant revolutionary danger in their host counfu'y of Bulgaria, too, overthrowing governments, forming conspiracies, stirring up the people and trying to implicate the State in a policy fraught with risks, so the East Germans, the Sudetens, the Carpait·hians, Hungarian and Banat Germans were to have formed the e:x:plosive, with its fuse in Moscow, that would completely destroy Europe. Many are the reasons for things haviing turned out differently, motives that coincided to give developments a turn 20 SLOVAKIA unforeseen by Moscow. First of all was the lack of caution by Stalin, wh.o prematurely took off his mask in the Greek civil war; tJhen the Czech putsch of February 1948, followed by the blockade of Berlin, the Bolshevization CYf China, and, finally, with the invasion of Korea, in this way touching off America's reaction to his policy of permanent revolution by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the German currency reform and the re-estaiblishment of a German State. Nor should we forget either, the sober attitude of the American nation, which was prepared to revise dangerous mistakes just as radically as it had once succumbed to them, or the talents of the German people in the organizational, technical and economic field. The rapidly widening gap in the standard of living between people this side and the other side of the iron curtain was also important. All this and still more combined to cause Stalin's hopes to wither toward the end of his life, leading to a serious crisis of Communism between 1952 and 1956, which the West, however, did not know how to take proper advantage of. The ohief merit in the failure of the Benes-Stalin concept is to be attriibuted to the eX:pellees themselves, who, by remarkable self-discipline, moderation and objectivity, refrained from any policy of daring and revenge and, with minor exceptions, remained completely immune to Communist attempts at infiltration. They did not succumb for a minute to the danger of becoming the "Macedonians" of West Germany, but, instead, became the supporters of constructive European ideas. It is one of the most significant achievements of the expellees that t'hey have whetted the conscience of the free peoples and continually exhorted them to self-examination. International law, ever since the first world war, has increasingly fallen into decay, the concepts of riight and wrong have become confused ever since they were turned over to the propaganda apparatuses and the whim of mass passions to interpret them according to their own discretion and misuse them for the interests of power. In particular the motto of self-determination of peo- SLOVAKIA ples, even during the interpretation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, was distorted beyond recognition and actually twisted to the opposite. 'Dhe expellees have not simply stanted at the po,i nt at which the concept was perverted and hence d~based. They related the demand for the right of self-determination to a large extent to a critical examination of German poLicy and to the political attitude of ethnic groups in the period prior to the first world war and in the thirties. They have seriously and in a thoroughgoing manner concerned themselves with the ethical motivation of the right to the homeland and have encouraged not only the experts on international and constitutional law in the free world, but, to an ever-growing degree, the t heologians to explore the right to the homeland in conjunction with the right to self-determination, self-government and self- administration, and to acquire, by so-doing, guiding principles for a new order in Europe. In the Charter of the Expellees we find the first results of that process of examination of conscience, of historic study, and of practical political consideraJt.ion of the possible and attainable. That was but the beginning. With the renouncing of revenge and retaliation, an ethical principle was anchored >in politics which had never before appeared with such clarity in the realm of international-legal considerations and in political aims. Today we can see in the Algerian issue that it was not just a question of problems touohing on East Germany and the Danubian area. It is a -suriprising fact, and may well fill with satisfaction those expellees W\ho come from old Austria, to know tihat the plans and proposals that were introduced by the French government toward a solut ion of the Algerian problem, approach those ideas that matured on Austrian soil between 1848 and 1918 and which were furtiher developed by the Sudeten Germans and could be matured in the struggle for the recognition of the right to the homeland. What formerly was a matter thaJt. concerned or appeared to concern only the Austrians and was understood by the peoples and ethnic groups of the Danubian Monarchy and of the German-Polish bovder area or the Baltic 22 SLOVAKIA States, today has become a question of the destiny of the free world and of Europe in particular. Africa, the Near East, India, and in Europe the regions in which there are still national issues this side of the iron curtain (South Tyrol), all need certain binding international-legal and constitutional-legal ideas and principles for solution and a new order, for satisfaobion and settlement. German e~pellees were the first to turn the attention of the free world to this vital problem and produced the first fruitful stimu~i. The contri'butions to thoughts on solving the nationalities problem made by Karl Renner and Ritter von Lodgman, Ignaz Seipel and Josef Redlich, Adolf Fisohhof and Franz Palacky, Aurel Popovici and Heinrich Lammasch, and, a:bove all, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his "workshop," are today acqui:r,ing world-wide importance. It was tJhe expellees who bridged the gap between past and present, between a territorially limited e:x!perimental station of co-living of various peoples in a State Community and the present global aspects of the question. As Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, stated at the Sudeten German Day in Munich, 1960, it is important not only to proclaim a right but to examine within wihat framework and within what higher legal order it can most ideally be reaHzed. At this very juncture the moderated conduct of the expellees proved a valua;ble maxim for all Europe. There are those who never tire of painting the expellee associations ·in Germany as disturber.s of the peace, "revengists," and nationalists. Only the reverse, however, is true. 'Dhe expellees were the first sizeable groups among the German people who displayed understanding for the integration policy of Adenauer and Sohuman, who supported it and ciharacterized the formation of supra-naJtional European arrangements as a condition for a new peaceful order for all Europe, in particular for East Central Europe. In the Eichstatt Declaration of 1949, in the Detmold Declaration, and in the rapidly ensuing resolutions and decisions of numerous associations - particularly the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in exile - there appeared for the first time propo- SLOVAKIA 23 sals for a new European legal and State order within the framework of supra-State and supra-national organizations. And that is quite natural, too. The expellees bring from their homeland a rich storehouse of experiences and traditions which are directed to the necessity of international and supra-national agreements and organizations, to the dovetailing of autonomous, State and supra.:state faci'lities, to a common destiny and inseparability of vital communities in which different languages are spoken, with the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy, minority rights, and the complemenlting of territorial with personal selfadministration. In the areas where once the expellees had lived for centuries, the national.,State idea early proved to be problematical. The principal West European peoples looked upon the integral national State as an ideal ever since 1789, and retained their views into the 191:Jh Century. Whereas in France, Germany, and Italy tJhe ideas of the great Europeans met with tough opposition, since people simply could not imagine that portions of national sovereignty could and must be yielded, the expellees very quickly realized that this was a viltal condition for the realizaition of their claims to recognition of the right to the homeland and they unreservedly offered their services to the Europe of tomorrow. For them federalism was never a mere substrat-ificaition of the over-all State into bureaucratically administered areas of sovereignty, but was always linked to a maximum measure of self-administration and responsibility of the lower strata. From this treasury of experience they could and still can give Europe very much. In addition thereto are the temperament, spirit of enterprise, and economic adaptability of old pioneer and colonizing races. The German "economic miracle," particularly in its incipiency, needed certain attributes which the Germans from the East possessed to a high degree. Plus the fact, that they had nothing to lose and a new live1ihood to gain. Henice they were courageous enough to build a new economy from the ruins. The ambition to dispel the prejudices against those who arrived as "beggars," to 24 SLOVAKIA prove their ability, and not just to acquire formal political equality but the respeot of their fellow citizens as well all this contributed to the expellees' becoming a constructive European force in the economic sphere. Finally, one may point to their importance as conoisseurs of the Eastern peoples and political conditions of East European life. Thus in a certain sense one can speak of a re-colonizaJtion. IDight centuries ago the big trek began: Germans and Dutch colonists bore European civilizat ion eastwards. The progeny of these colonists came back to the West after 1945 as ex;pellees. They did not come as beneficiaries but brought with them as working people, politically active leaders and the bearers of a culture, tihe readiness to rebuild a new ·Europe. Tihey brought experience, skills, courage, and the concept of surpra..national legal order. One hundred years ago on Decemlber 12, 1861 - Btshop Stephen Moyses cxf Slovakia led a delegation, of Slovaks to Emperor Franois Jloseph to protest against Magyarization and the oppression of his Slovak people. The Memorandum presented the Emperor requested equa'l rights for the Slovaks and that the territory of the Slovaks becoone a separate adminisitrative unit, that is, tihalt it become autonoonous. anested again in 1950, and in the beginning of 11951 placed on trial with Bishops Vojtassak and Gojdic. The kalllgaroo court sentenced him to life imprisonment as ail• "enemy of the State." With amnesty in 1'961, Bi.shop Buzalka left prison to live under surveillance of the police at all times. Tihey found him dead, kneeling by his bed, hands clasped in prayer. Significant it is that even the "Katolicke Noviny" (The• Catholic ~ :IC :IC News) did not report the death Bishop Michael Buzalka, Auxili- of Bishop Buzal!ka, patriot amd ary of the Trnava Apostolic Ad- martyr for the cause of his Church ministrature, died on Dec. 7, 'liOOl, and his Slovak people. :IC :IC :IC according to a very belated report. Born in Sviity Anton, Slov,aBishop Joseph t arsky, Titular kia, Sept. 18, 11885, Bishop Buzal- Bishop of Tagora and apostolic adka was ordained priest July 14, ministr-ator for t he diocese of Ko1908, and consecrated Bishop in sice, Slovakia, died March 1•2, Riome on May '1'5, 1938. He was 1962, and was buried four days rector of the Bratislava Seminariy Iat,e r in the cathedral cr,yipt after and, during the war, Militazy Oir- appropriate religious servwes. Bidiir.iary for the Slovak Republic. shoip Carsky was born in G!bely, In 1•945, Bishop Buzalka was im- Slovakia, May 9, 1886, ordained prisoned, with two other Bishops priest Jiu}y 26, 1909, and named and many Slovak priests by ,t he bishop by the Vatican July 14, Reds, but later released. He was 1925.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Expellees and the European Idea Description An account of the resource Otto von Habsburg Slovakia, Vol. 12, No. 1 (35), March-June 1962 pp. 18-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Habsburg, Otto von, 1912-2011 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1962 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d1cc0a93dbd95bd1b1fbd778b50e6325.pdf 65f52a16a669273bb3ae5d3524330cae PDF Text Text SL OV AK IA Published by the Slovak League of America VOrL. IX MARCH, 1959 NO. 4 (29) FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DEOLAR ATION OF INDEPE NDENCE (A chapter from the book "The Case of Slovakia" to be published on the occasion of the twentieth anniversar y of Slovakia's declaration of Independen ce ) By J. M. Kirschba um The presentat ion of events which led to Slovakia' s declaration of independe nce needs some comment s and explanation in order to be properly understoo d. Some American historian s accepted, without the necessary caution, the one-sided Czech presentat ion of the political causes, as well as of the activities of individua l Slovak politician s and their intentions . Three things are to be particula rly comment ed upon: 1) the imminent menace of Hungaria n occupatio n; 2) the visit of Keppler-S eyss-Inqu art-Biirck el to Bratislav a, or the so-called Sidor episode; and, 3) attitudes and activities of the prinicpal Slovak leaders. The writer, though too young according to the American standard s to play a role in national politics, was, in many respects, involved in the ,M arch imbroglio as a former member of the editorial staff of the Slovak People's Party newspape rs, as a leader of universit y and youth organizatio ns, and since October 1938 as the Executiv e Secretary to the Minister of Justice and, finally, as a close friend of Alexande r Mach and Dr. Ferdinan d Durcansk y. Being one of those on the list of the Prague's government who was supposed to be arrested on March 10, 1939, the writer was from the first moment in continuou s contact with Dr. Joseph Tiso and Karol 1Sidor, on the one hand, and with Dr. Durcansk y over the border in Vienna, on the other, and, of course, with Alexande r Mach and the leaders of the Universit y Hlinka Guards, as well. �SLOVAKIA 2 Was there any serious Hungarian menace? Did Ribbentrop use Horthy's telegram as part of a premeditated trick in order to influence Dr. Tiso and :Durcansky, or did the Hungarians really intend to occupy Slovakia? All documents and published memoirs prove that the Hungarian government undoubtedly aimed at the annexation of Slovakia in 1938-1939; this was a twenty-year effort on the part of Magyar politicians and diplomats, in 1938 strongly supported by Mussolini and Ciano, and never denied by any Magyar. The slogan of Magyar politics between the wars was "Mindent visza" - everything returned that Hungary "lost" at the 'P eace Conference of 1919 or prior to that time. In 1938-1939 the Magyars saw, for the first time, an opportunity for their dreams and desires to be realized. According to published documents of the Nurenberg Trials, the telegram sent to Hitler by Hungary's Regent Nicholas Horthy and mentioned during the conversations between the Chancellor Hitler and the Slovak representatives, reads as follows : Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headI dislike using big words water region is, in fact, for Hungary a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but five weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude. In friendly devotion Horthy Budapest, March 13, 1939. The term "headwater region" means Slovakia, and, since the Slovak leaders were informed by Dr. Vehsenmeyer already in February of a planned invasion of Slovakia by Hungary about March 15, they definitely could not doubt the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the Hungarian menace played quite an important role before Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were invited by Chancellor Hitler to Berlin. When President Ha.cha, on March 10, deposed the Slovak autonomous government and 1 �SLOVAKIA 3 issued orders for the arrest over 300 Slovak leaders, including the members of Dr. Tiso's government and the Slovak Diet, Dr. :Durcansky fled to Vienna in order to save Slovakia from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors. :Durcansky was one of the Slovak politicians who knew of German plans with regard to Bohemia, since he was also present at the meeting with Dr. Vehsenmeyer, on February 13, at which the latter informed Slovak leaders of Hungary's plans. After a long discussion with deposed premier Msgr. Tiso, the writer, on the afternoon of March 10, crossed the Danube in order to meet :Durcansky on Austrian territory and discuss the proper steps to be taken. There was no doubt that Germany would, within two or three days, occupy Bohemia and Slovakia's fate depended on Slovakia's decision and political adroitness. For :Durcansky and the writer it was clear that the hour of decision in regard to Slovakia's independence had arrived. In our eyes, it was one of the historical opportunities which numerically small, dominated peoples cannot bypass without paying heavy penalties. Long before March, we spoke and wrote on Slovakia's right to independence and definitely no hatred toward the Czechs or sympathy for Germany or Nazism played any role in our minds. As members of the conservative Slovak People's Party with a Christian democratic world outlook, we were opposed to the Nazi ideology or political system from all points of view. We were both former functionaries of Catholic University organizations (1), who received their political schooling in Paris and we were adherents to the philosophy of the natural right of peoples to self-government. In our opinion, and such was the case with many educated Slovaks of our generation, the March events presented to Slovaks the first international opportunity to apply the right to independence. When we saw that Slovakia could be saved at the same time from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors, we feverishly worked on preparing Slovakia's declaration of independence. A draft of a government of Independent Slovakia was prepared by :Durcansky, and we discussed what steps to take in Slova- �4 SLOVAKIA kia and what to do in Vienna and Berlin where, since Munich, there was undoubtedl y a new "Versailles " for Central Europe, with a German free hand in disposing of the future of Central European peoples. While Durcansky returned to Vienna, the writer crossed the Danube with the draft of the new governmen t and had a task to obtain Dr. Tiso's consent and to convince Karol Sidor that the hour had struck for declaring Slovakia's independen ce ; that it was the only way to save Slovakia and that we should not hesitate to seize a historical opportunity to achieve what peoples of the globe, including the Americans, tried to achieve by blood and bitter battle as the highest ideal of their national aspirations . Back in Bratislava I found the situation a little confused but no longer in the hands of the Czech gendarmer ie and army. The Hlinka Guards and university students were openly manifestat ing for independen ce. Dr. Tiso left Bratislava in the meantime, for his parish town Banovce, and I was able to reach him only through messengers and by the telephone. My long discussion with Karol Sidor, who was on the list of the future governmen t of independen t Slovakia as Prime Minister, was not successful He was reluctant to give a written statement that he was in favor of Slovakia's independen ce, though he agreed with our activities for independen ce. Sidor feared that I could be arrested and such a statement, if found by the police would cause more harm than good. He feared particularl y that the Czechs would execute the 300 Slovak political prisoners among whom he had many personal friends. ,Sidor was not against Slovakia's independen ce in principle and had previous contacts with German representat ives, the last on March 7 with Seyss-Inqu art with whom he discussed such a possibility. According to his views, expressed during our conversation, the situation was not yet ripe and, therefore, he said he would neither hinder nor help if anyone else were to try to make Slovakia independen t (2). Sidor's behavior was also caused, as I learned during my second conversatio n with him, by the fact that he knew that Prague would appoint him Prime Minister of the Slovak Autonomou s Governmen t. In the middle of our second �SLOVAKIA 5 discussion, Prague's radio actually announced that President Ha.cha nominated him head of the Slovak Autonomous Government. Sidor got off his seat after the news and sa~d to me: "For the time being, I am decided to accept this . premiership." My secretary and several officers of the A c a d e m 1 c Guard were waiting in front of Sidor's residence and one of them was sent to bring the news to Dr. :Durcansky who, in the firm hope that my mission was successful, in the meantime, informed the German representative s in Vienna that Slovakia would declare independence and handed them the draft of the proposed Slovak government headed by Dr. Tiso as President and Sidor as Prime Minister (3). The radio news of Sidor's acceptance of Hacha's nomination caused confusion in Vienna and Berlin about the Slovak situation and it was for this reason that Hitler send Keppler to Bratislava to learn from Sidor what was the intention of :Slovak leaders. W. Keppler, who was at that time Secretary of State, accompanied by Reichs Governor, Seyss-Inquart , the Gauleiter of Astria, Joseph Biirckel, Franz Karmasin, and Rudolf Vavra, an active leader of the Slovak group in Vienna, paid a midnight visit to Sidor in the government building in Bratislava. Sidor expected the visitors and to the contrary of what was unobjectively reported about impolite behavior and pressure, Keppler behaved politely, did not insist and did not threaten. He informed Sidor, apologizing for his late visit, that Chancellor Hitler received telegrams urging him to support Slovakia's claim for independence and, therefore, sent him to ascertain the real state of affairs. Sidor at first argued evasively through an interpreter and tried to convince his visitors that Slovakia was not yet prepared, according to his views, and that the Parliament and not individuals had the right to declare independence. The discussion became less diplomatic only when Biirckel, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol, began to talk loudly and showed Sidor the list of government which Dr. :Durcansky had sent to Berlin, relying on the success of my earlier discussions with Sidor. Bfirckel, undiplomatica lly and not quite in line with the truth, in- �6 SLOVAKIA sisted that Sidor had already given his consent "when Dr. Kirschbaum visited you". Sidor declared that it was not true. Biirckel, surprised and irate, retorted that "the Fuhrer must not be embarrasse d and deceived". Though Sidor tried to explain that he had neither embarrasse d nor deceived Chancellor Hitler, Keppler and his entourage seemed apparently diappointed and disillusioned, and Keppler later reported to Hitler that Sidor was a "soldier of Prague and had been bribed". It was this failure of Keppler's mission which motivated Hitler to send an invitation to Dr. Joseph Tiso. The writer was asked by :Durcansky from Vienna to find out if Tiso would accept such an invitation. I called Dr. Tiso at about midnight and mentioned that I wished to discuss matters of utmost importance with him. Dr. Tiso answered that it was too late to discuss serious matters and asked me to call the next morning. I immediatel y sent two reliable officers of the Acandemic Guards and my chauffeur with a message to Dr. Tiso's parish town and informed Dr. :Durcansky in Vienna. Another messenger was, however, also enroute with two formal invitations through Consular channels. Dr. Tiso asked the writer to inform the president of The Slovak Diet, the Slovak Governmen t and the leadership of the Hlinka Party that he would be back in Bratislava for consultatio n in the morning. At a joint meeting of all the leaders of Parliament , Governmen t, and the Party - it was decided, on the morning of March 13, to accept the invitation. Accompani ed by a member of Parliament , Dr. Tiso left for Vienna and from Vienna, joined by Dr. :Durcansky and Keppler, flew to Berlin. For truth's sake, the writer adds that Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were received in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic protocol, as representat ives of foreign nations were accustomed to being received. From many discussions which the writer had with Dr. Tiso on this subject and from Dr. Tiso's report to the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939, it is clear that the Slovak representat ives were received politely and no pressure or arrogant behavior (such as adversaries of Slovak independen ce tried to make the Western World believe) ( 4) was resorted to on that occasion. �SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up � SL OV AK IA Published by the Slovak League of America VOrL. IX MARCH, 1959 NO. 4 (29) FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DEOLAR ATION OF INDEPE NDENCE (A chapter from the book "The Case of Slovakia" to be published on the occasion of the twentieth anniversar y of Slovakia's declaration of Independen ce ) By J. M. Kirschba um The presentat ion of events which led to Slovakia' s declaration of independe nce needs some comment s and explanation in order to be properly understoo d. Some American historian s accepted, without the necessary caution, the one-sided Czech presentat ion of the political causes, as well as of the activities of individua l Slovak politician s and their intentions . Three things are to be particula rly comment ed upon: 1) the imminent menace of Hungaria n occupatio n; 2) the visit of Keppler-S eyss-Inqu art-Biirck el to Bratislav a, or the so-called Sidor episode; and, 3) attitudes and activities of the prinicpal Slovak leaders. The writer, though too young according to the American standard s to play a role in national politics, was, in many respects, involved in the ,M arch imbroglio as a former member of the editorial staff of the Slovak People's Party newspape rs, as a leader of universit y and youth organizatio ns, and since October 1938 as the Executiv e Secretary to the Minister of Justice and, finally, as a close friend of Alexande r Mach and Dr. Ferdinan d Durcansk y. Being one of those on the list of the Prague's government who was supposed to be arrested on March 10, 1939, the writer was from the first moment in continuou s contact with Dr. Joseph Tiso and Karol 1Sidor, on the one hand, and with Dr. Durcansk y over the border in Vienna, on the other, and, of course, with Alexande r Mach and the leaders of the Universit y Hlinka Guards, as well. �SLOVAKIA 2 Was there any serious Hungarian menace? Did Ribbentrop use Horthy's telegram as part of a premeditated trick in order to influence Dr. Tiso and :Durcansky, or did the Hungarians really intend to occupy Slovakia? All documents and published memoirs prove that the Hungarian government undoubtedly aimed at the annexation of Slovakia in 1938-1939; this was a twenty-year effort on the part of Magyar politicians and diplomats, in 1938 strongly supported by Mussolini and Ciano, and never denied by any Magyar. The slogan of Magyar politics between the wars was "Mindent visza" - everything returned that Hungary "lost" at the 'P eace Conference of 1919 or prior to that time. In 1938-1939 the Magyars saw, for the first time, an opportunity for their dreams and desires to be realized. According to published documents of the Nurenberg Trials, the telegram sent to Hitler by Hungary's Regent Nicholas Horthy and mentioned during the conversations between the Chancellor Hitler and the Slovak representatives, reads as follows : Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headI dislike using big words water region is, in fact, for Hungary a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but five weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude. In friendly devotion Horthy Budapest, March 13, 1939. The term "headwater region" means Slovakia, and, since the Slovak leaders were informed by Dr. Vehsenmeyer already in February of a planned invasion of Slovakia by Hungary about March 15, they definitely could not doubt the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the Hungarian menace played quite an important role before Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were invited by Chancellor Hitler to Berlin. When President Ha.cha, on March 10, deposed the Slovak autonomous government and 1 �SLOVAKIA 3 issued orders for the arrest over 300 Slovak leaders, including the members of Dr. Tiso's government and the Slovak Diet, Dr. :Durcansky fled to Vienna in order to save Slovakia from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors. :Durcansky was one of the Slovak politicians who knew of German plans with regard to Bohemia, since he was also present at the meeting with Dr. Vehsenmeyer, on February 13, at which the latter informed Slovak leaders of Hungary's plans. After a long discussion with deposed premier Msgr. Tiso, the writer, on the afternoon of March 10, crossed the Danube in order to meet :Durcansky on Austrian territory and discuss the proper steps to be taken. There was no doubt that Germany would, within two or three days, occupy Bohemia and Slovakia's fate depended on Slovakia's decision and political adroitness. For :Durcansky and the writer it was clear that the hour of decision in regard to Slovakia's independence had arrived. In our eyes, it was one of the historical opportunities which numerically small, dominated peoples cannot bypass without paying heavy penalties. Long before March, we spoke and wrote on Slovakia's right to independence and definitely no hatred toward the Czechs or sympathy for Germany or Nazism played any role in our minds. As members of the conservative Slovak People's Party with a Christian democratic world outlook, we were opposed to the Nazi ideology or political system from all points of view. We were both former functionaries of Catholic University organizations (1), who received their political schooling in Paris and we were adherents to the philosophy of the natural right of peoples to self-government. In our opinion, and such was the case with many educated Slovaks of our generation, the March events presented to Slovaks the first international opportunity to apply the right to independence. When we saw that Slovakia could be saved at the same time from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors, we feverishly worked on preparing Slovakia's declaration of independence. A draft of a government of Independent Slovakia was prepared by :Durcansky, and we discussed what steps to take in Slova- �4 SLOVAKIA kia and what to do in Vienna and Berlin where, since Munich, there was undoubtedl y a new "Versailles " for Central Europe, with a German free hand in disposing of the future of Central European peoples. While Durcansky returned to Vienna, the writer crossed the Danube with the draft of the new governmen t and had a task to obtain Dr. Tiso's consent and to convince Karol Sidor that the hour had struck for declaring Slovakia's independen ce ; that it was the only way to save Slovakia and that we should not hesitate to seize a historical opportunity to achieve what peoples of the globe, including the Americans, tried to achieve by blood and bitter battle as the highest ideal of their national aspirations . Back in Bratislava I found the situation a little confused but no longer in the hands of the Czech gendarmer ie and army. The Hlinka Guards and university students were openly manifestat ing for independen ce. Dr. Tiso left Bratislava in the meantime, for his parish town Banovce, and I was able to reach him only through messengers and by the telephone. My long discussion with Karol Sidor, who was on the list of the future governmen t of independen t Slovakia as Prime Minister, was not successful He was reluctant to give a written statement that he was in favor of Slovakia's independen ce, though he agreed with our activities for independen ce. Sidor feared that I could be arrested and such a statement, if found by the police would cause more harm than good. He feared particularl y that the Czechs would execute the 300 Slovak political prisoners among whom he had many personal friends. ,Sidor was not against Slovakia's independen ce in principle and had previous contacts with German representat ives, the last on March 7 with Seyss-Inqu art with whom he discussed such a possibility. According to his views, expressed during our conversation, the situation was not yet ripe and, therefore, he said he would neither hinder nor help if anyone else were to try to make Slovakia independen t (2). Sidor's behavior was also caused, as I learned during my second conversatio n with him, by the fact that he knew that Prague would appoint him Prime Minister of the Slovak Autonomou s Governmen t. In the middle of our second �SLOVAKIA 5 discussion, Prague's radio actually announced that President Ha.cha nominated him head of the Slovak Autonomous Government. Sidor got off his seat after the news and sa~d to me: "For the time being, I am decided to accept this . premiership." My secretary and several officers of the A c a d e m 1 c Guard were waiting in front of Sidor's residence and one of them was sent to bring the news to Dr. :Durcansky who, in the firm hope that my mission was successful, in the meantime, informed the German representative s in Vienna that Slovakia would declare independence and handed them the draft of the proposed Slovak government headed by Dr. Tiso as President and Sidor as Prime Minister (3). The radio news of Sidor's acceptance of Hacha's nomination caused confusion in Vienna and Berlin about the Slovak situation and it was for this reason that Hitler send Keppler to Bratislava to learn from Sidor what was the intention of :Slovak leaders. W. Keppler, who was at that time Secretary of State, accompanied by Reichs Governor, Seyss-Inquart , the Gauleiter of Astria, Joseph Biirckel, Franz Karmasin, and Rudolf Vavra, an active leader of the Slovak group in Vienna, paid a midnight visit to Sidor in the government building in Bratislava. Sidor expected the visitors and to the contrary of what was unobjectively reported about impolite behavior and pressure, Keppler behaved politely, did not insist and did not threaten. He informed Sidor, apologizing for his late visit, that Chancellor Hitler received telegrams urging him to support Slovakia's claim for independence and, therefore, sent him to ascertain the real state of affairs. Sidor at first argued evasively through an interpreter and tried to convince his visitors that Slovakia was not yet prepared, according to his views, and that the Parliament and not individuals had the right to declare independence. The discussion became less diplomatic only when Biirckel, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol, began to talk loudly and showed Sidor the list of government which Dr. :Durcansky had sent to Berlin, relying on the success of my earlier discussions with Sidor. Bfirckel, undiplomatica lly and not quite in line with the truth, in- �6 SLOVAKIA sisted that Sidor had already given his consent "when Dr. Kirschbaum visited you". Sidor declared that it was not true. Biirckel, surprised and irate, retorted that "the Fuhrer must not be embarrasse d and deceived". Though Sidor tried to explain that he had neither embarrasse d nor deceived Chancellor Hitler, Keppler and his entourage seemed apparently diappointed and disillusioned, and Keppler later reported to Hitler that Sidor was a "soldier of Prague and had been bribed". It was this failure of Keppler's mission which motivated Hitler to send an invitation to Dr. Joseph Tiso. The writer was asked by :Durcansky from Vienna to find out if Tiso would accept such an invitation. I called Dr. Tiso at about midnight and mentioned that I wished to discuss matters of utmost importance with him. Dr. Tiso answered that it was too late to discuss serious matters and asked me to call the next morning. I immediatel y sent two reliable officers of the Acandemic Guards and my chauffeur with a message to Dr. Tiso's parish town and informed Dr. :Durcansky in Vienna. Another messenger was, however, also enroute with two formal invitations through Consular channels. Dr. Tiso asked the writer to inform the president of The Slovak Diet, the Slovak Governmen t and the leadership of the Hlinka Party that he would be back in Bratislava for consultatio n in the morning. At a joint meeting of all the leaders of Parliament , Governmen t, and the Party - it was decided, on the morning of March 13, to accept the invitation. Accompani ed by a member of Parliament , Dr. Tiso left for Vienna and from Vienna, joined by Dr. :Durcansky and Keppler, flew to Berlin. For truth's sake, the writer adds that Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were received in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic protocol, as representat ives of foreign nations were accustomed to being received. From many discussions which the writer had with Dr. Tiso on this subject and from Dr. Tiso's report to the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939, it is clear that the Slovak representat ives were received politely and no pressure or arrogant behavior (such as adversaries of Slovak independen ce tried to make the Western World believe) ( 4) was resorted to on that occasion. �SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SL OV AK IA Published by the Slovak League of America VOrL. IX MARCH, 1959 NO. 4 (29) FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DEOLAR ATION OF INDEPE NDENCE (A chapter from the book "The Case of Slovakia" to be published on the occasion of the twentieth anniversar y of Slovakia's declaration of Independen ce ) By J. M. Kirschba um The presentat ion of events which led to Slovakia' s declaration of independe nce needs some comment s and explanation in order to be properly understoo d. Some American historian s accepted, without the necessary caution, the one-sided Czech presentat ion of the political causes, as well as of the activities of individua l Slovak politician s and their intentions . Three things are to be particula rly comment ed upon: 1) the imminent menace of Hungaria n occupatio n; 2) the visit of Keppler-S eyss-Inqu art-Biirck el to Bratislav a, or the so-called Sidor episode; and, 3) attitudes and activities of the prinicpal Slovak leaders. The writer, though too young according to the American standard s to play a role in national politics, was, in many respects, involved in the ,M arch imbroglio as a former member of the editorial staff of the Slovak People's Party newspape rs, as a leader of universit y and youth organizatio ns, and since October 1938 as the Executiv e Secretary to the Minister of Justice and, finally, as a close friend of Alexande r Mach and Dr. Ferdinan d Durcansk y. Being one of those on the list of the Prague's government who was supposed to be arrested on March 10, 1939, the writer was from the first moment in continuou s contact with Dr. Joseph Tiso and Karol 1Sidor, on the one hand, and with Dr. Durcansk y over the border in Vienna, on the other, and, of course, with Alexande r Mach and the leaders of the Universit y Hlinka Guards, as well. SLOVAKIA 2 Was there any serious Hungarian menace? Did Ribbentrop use Horthy's telegram as part of a premeditated trick in order to influence Dr. Tiso and :Durcansky, or did the Hungarians really intend to occupy Slovakia? All documents and published memoirs prove that the Hungarian government undoubtedly aimed at the annexation of Slovakia in 1938-1939; this was a twenty-year effort on the part of Magyar politicians and diplomats, in 1938 strongly supported by Mussolini and Ciano, and never denied by any Magyar. The slogan of Magyar politics between the wars was "Mindent visza" - everything returned that Hungary "lost" at the 'P eace Conference of 1919 or prior to that time. In 1938-1939 the Magyars saw, for the first time, an opportunity for their dreams and desires to be realized. According to published documents of the Nurenberg Trials, the telegram sent to Hitler by Hungary's Regent Nicholas Horthy and mentioned during the conversations between the Chancellor Hitler and the Slovak representatives, reads as follows : Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headI dislike using big words water region is, in fact, for Hungary a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but five weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude. In friendly devotion Horthy Budapest, March 13, 1939. The term "headwater region" means Slovakia, and, since the Slovak leaders were informed by Dr. Vehsenmeyer already in February of a planned invasion of Slovakia by Hungary about March 15, they definitely could not doubt the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the Hungarian menace played quite an important role before Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were invited by Chancellor Hitler to Berlin. When President Ha.cha, on March 10, deposed the Slovak autonomous government and 1 SLOVAKIA 3 issued orders for the arrest over 300 Slovak leaders, including the members of Dr. Tiso's government and the Slovak Diet, Dr. :Durcansky fled to Vienna in order to save Slovakia from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors. :Durcansky was one of the Slovak politicians who knew of German plans with regard to Bohemia, since he was also present at the meeting with Dr. Vehsenmeyer, on February 13, at which the latter informed Slovak leaders of Hungary's plans. After a long discussion with deposed premier Msgr. Tiso, the writer, on the afternoon of March 10, crossed the Danube in order to meet :Durcansky on Austrian territory and discuss the proper steps to be taken. There was no doubt that Germany would, within two or three days, occupy Bohemia and Slovakia's fate depended on Slovakia's decision and political adroitness. For :Durcansky and the writer it was clear that the hour of decision in regard to Slovakia's independence had arrived. In our eyes, it was one of the historical opportunities which numerically small, dominated peoples cannot bypass without paying heavy penalties. Long before March, we spoke and wrote on Slovakia's right to independence and definitely no hatred toward the Czechs or sympathy for Germany or Nazism played any role in our minds. As members of the conservative Slovak People's Party with a Christian democratic world outlook, we were opposed to the Nazi ideology or political system from all points of view. We were both former functionaries of Catholic University organizations (1), who received their political schooling in Paris and we were adherents to the philosophy of the natural right of peoples to self-government. In our opinion, and such was the case with many educated Slovaks of our generation, the March events presented to Slovaks the first international opportunity to apply the right to independence. When we saw that Slovakia could be saved at the same time from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors, we feverishly worked on preparing Slovakia's declaration of independence. A draft of a government of Independent Slovakia was prepared by :Durcansky, and we discussed what steps to take in Slova- 4 SLOVAKIA kia and what to do in Vienna and Berlin where, since Munich, there was undoubtedl y a new "Versailles " for Central Europe, with a German free hand in disposing of the future of Central European peoples. While Durcansky returned to Vienna, the writer crossed the Danube with the draft of the new governmen t and had a task to obtain Dr. Tiso's consent and to convince Karol Sidor that the hour had struck for declaring Slovakia's independen ce ; that it was the only way to save Slovakia and that we should not hesitate to seize a historical opportunity to achieve what peoples of the globe, including the Americans, tried to achieve by blood and bitter battle as the highest ideal of their national aspirations . Back in Bratislava I found the situation a little confused but no longer in the hands of the Czech gendarmer ie and army. The Hlinka Guards and university students were openly manifestat ing for independen ce. Dr. Tiso left Bratislava in the meantime, for his parish town Banovce, and I was able to reach him only through messengers and by the telephone. My long discussion with Karol Sidor, who was on the list of the future governmen t of independen t Slovakia as Prime Minister, was not successful He was reluctant to give a written statement that he was in favor of Slovakia's independen ce, though he agreed with our activities for independen ce. Sidor feared that I could be arrested and such a statement, if found by the police would cause more harm than good. He feared particularl y that the Czechs would execute the 300 Slovak political prisoners among whom he had many personal friends. ,Sidor was not against Slovakia's independen ce in principle and had previous contacts with German representat ives, the last on March 7 with Seyss-Inqu art with whom he discussed such a possibility. According to his views, expressed during our conversation, the situation was not yet ripe and, therefore, he said he would neither hinder nor help if anyone else were to try to make Slovakia independen t (2). Sidor's behavior was also caused, as I learned during my second conversatio n with him, by the fact that he knew that Prague would appoint him Prime Minister of the Slovak Autonomou s Governmen t. In the middle of our second SLOVAKIA 5 discussion, Prague's radio actually announced that President Ha.cha nominated him head of the Slovak Autonomous Government. Sidor got off his seat after the news and sa~d to me: "For the time being, I am decided to accept this . premiership." My secretary and several officers of the A c a d e m 1 c Guard were waiting in front of Sidor's residence and one of them was sent to bring the news to Dr. :Durcansky who, in the firm hope that my mission was successful, in the meantime, informed the German representative s in Vienna that Slovakia would declare independence and handed them the draft of the proposed Slovak government headed by Dr. Tiso as President and Sidor as Prime Minister (3). The radio news of Sidor's acceptance of Hacha's nomination caused confusion in Vienna and Berlin about the Slovak situation and it was for this reason that Hitler send Keppler to Bratislava to learn from Sidor what was the intention of :Slovak leaders. W. Keppler, who was at that time Secretary of State, accompanied by Reichs Governor, Seyss-Inquart , the Gauleiter of Astria, Joseph Biirckel, Franz Karmasin, and Rudolf Vavra, an active leader of the Slovak group in Vienna, paid a midnight visit to Sidor in the government building in Bratislava. Sidor expected the visitors and to the contrary of what was unobjectively reported about impolite behavior and pressure, Keppler behaved politely, did not insist and did not threaten. He informed Sidor, apologizing for his late visit, that Chancellor Hitler received telegrams urging him to support Slovakia's claim for independence and, therefore, sent him to ascertain the real state of affairs. Sidor at first argued evasively through an interpreter and tried to convince his visitors that Slovakia was not yet prepared, according to his views, and that the Parliament and not individuals had the right to declare independence. The discussion became less diplomatic only when Biirckel, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol, began to talk loudly and showed Sidor the list of government which Dr. :Durcansky had sent to Berlin, relying on the success of my earlier discussions with Sidor. Bfirckel, undiplomatica lly and not quite in line with the truth, in- 6 SLOVAKIA sisted that Sidor had already given his consent "when Dr. Kirschbaum visited you". Sidor declared that it was not true. Biirckel, surprised and irate, retorted that "the Fuhrer must not be embarrasse d and deceived". Though Sidor tried to explain that he had neither embarrasse d nor deceived Chancellor Hitler, Keppler and his entourage seemed apparently diappointed and disillusioned, and Keppler later reported to Hitler that Sidor was a "soldier of Prague and had been bribed". It was this failure of Keppler's mission which motivated Hitler to send an invitation to Dr. Joseph Tiso. The writer was asked by :Durcansky from Vienna to find out if Tiso would accept such an invitation. I called Dr. Tiso at about midnight and mentioned that I wished to discuss matters of utmost importance with him. Dr. Tiso answered that it was too late to discuss serious matters and asked me to call the next morning. I immediatel y sent two reliable officers of the Acandemic Guards and my chauffeur with a message to Dr. Tiso's parish town and informed Dr. :Durcansky in Vienna. Another messenger was, however, also enroute with two formal invitations through Consular channels. Dr. Tiso asked the writer to inform the president of The Slovak Diet, the Slovak Governmen t and the leadership of the Hlinka Party that he would be back in Bratislava for consultatio n in the morning. At a joint meeting of all the leaders of Parliament , Governmen t, and the Party - it was decided, on the morning of March 13, to accept the invitation. Accompani ed by a member of Parliament , Dr. Tiso left for Vienna and from Vienna, joined by Dr. :Durcansky and Keppler, flew to Berlin. For truth's sake, the writer adds that Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were received in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic protocol, as representat ives of foreign nations were accustomed to being received. From many discussions which the writer had with Dr. Tiso on this subject and from Dr. Tiso's report to the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939, it is clear that the Slovak representat ives were received politely and no pressure or arrogant behavior (such as adversaries of Slovak independen ce tried to make the Western World believe) ( 4) was resorted to on that occasion. SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Facts and Events Behind the Scenes of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 1-7 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/67a71766807f746825c0f4f6587618a4.pdf f0d1736d284a8276bfdba5d1f1dacd6a PDF Text Text 156 SLOVAKIA Famous Slovak Inventors Long before the arrival of the Slovaks in central Europer the Celts who inhabited the area, mined iron-ore, silver, gold and lead and utilized these minerals in making various instruments, ornaments and utensils. As newcomers, the Slovaks continued to use these minerals centuries before the coming of the Turkish-Mongol tribes. Technically, both the mining and metal industries remained rather primitive until modern times. New methods and techniques which were developed outside the· country were not introduced until quite recently. Modernization of the mining industry in Slovakia, though of recent data, was preceded in the 17th and 18th centuries by several notable processes. In 1627, for example, it was K. Wendler, a Tyrolean explosive expert, who detonated the first black-powder charge in the Banska stiavnica mines in Slovakia; incidentally, the first of its kind in mining history. Then, J. A. Born (1742-1791), a Saxon from Transylvania, in the latter half of the 18th century introduced the quicksilver (mercury) amalgamation process of refining gold, silver and lead. At the end of the 17th century most of the Slovak mines were flooded because continual warfare caused them to be neglected. Primitive methods of pumping out the water proved inefficient and expensive. They required an outlay of money for wood, men-power and horses. The cost was prohibitive. Water-wheels proved unsatisfactory and mining engineers decided to try the new atmospheric-fire invention of Newcombe. Potter, an Englishman, came to install the new machinery in the Nova Ban.a mine. It was put into operation in 1724. But when it proved to be a failure it was dismantled. In 1733 a series of modified methods were introduced but all proved inadequate. Finally, J. K. Hell (1713-1789), a native Slovak engineer and machinist, installed his own machinery at the entrance of the mine in Banska stiavnica in 1749. It proved successful, and soon afterwards he installed his invention in a �SLOVAKIA 157 number of deep mine shafts. Later Hell developed a better atmospheric type of mine-pump. Mining methods for gold, silver and lead remained primitive and time consuming. It was Born's amalgamation process, developed and adapted from the Spanish types employed in the mines of South America, which reduced the time of processing silver from six weeks to approximately twelve hours. Moreover, wood was reduced to a minimum and lead was saved in the process. A silver metallurgical plant was built in Sklene Teplice, Slovakia, in 1785, and a lead mill or foundry was constructed in Ulmanka, near Stare Hory, in 1788. Sometime in the 14th century the manufacture of glass was introduced into Slovakia, most likely from the Czech plants in Bohemia. At first, ordinary glass was made, and only later quality glassware was produced for use in the metal and chemical plants in the country. We present a brief summary of the life-work of the following Slovak pioneers in technology. Some of these early scientific technicians are known, some but little known, but their work has all been at least partially evaluated. STEFAN A. JEDLfK Among the earliest inventors in Slovakia was Stefan Ananian Jedlik (1800-1896), who came from the village of Zemne, near Kollarovo, Slovakia. A talented youth he chose the priesthood as a life's vocation. In 1831 he was assigned as a teacher to the Gymnasium ( Junior College ) in Bratislava. Soon his work in Physics won the attention of the administration at the University of Budapest, where he was destined to teach for the next four decades. That is why the Magyars claim him as a Hungarian scientist although he stoutly maintained he was a Slovak. As an electro-technician Jedlik won wide acclaim when electricity was still in its infancy. As early as 1829 in his research in electro-magnetism, he hit upon the theory that an electro-magnet must oscillate simultaneously around another electro-magnet once the current is turned on. His experiments proved the theory true and his primitive motor was the forerunner of the induction motor. �158 SLOVAKIA Although Arag, a French physicist, is credited with the discovery of the theory of electro-magnetism , Jedlik's first motor was certainly closer to the idea of the induction motor than Arag's ideas in theoretical form. Unfortunately, the Slovak scientific genius did not publicize his discovery because he dismissed the motor as economically impractical because it depended on power from an expensive source he himself developed, and which a railroad firm adopted not merely for its own use for its telegraph system but actually put it on the market for general use later. In the late 1850's Jedlik discovered the principle of the self-generating dynamo in which a spark at the magnetic pole is sufficient to give it the initial impetus and gradually the electric current generated will attain maximum power. Werner Siemens, a German pioneer in this field, is given credit for the discovery of the dynamo-electric principle which he patented in 1866 despite the fact that Jedlik and others had actually made the discovery before Siemens registered his patent rights. So far it has been ascertained that Jedlik patented approximately eighty (80 ) patents, mostly in the electromagnetic field. Atoms, Jedlik declared, could be split by a high electric current. Matter, he said, consisted of a radio-active primate, later confirmed by the discovery of radium. AUREL STODOLA World renown was won by another Slovak, namely, Aurel Stodola (1859-1942) in the field of electro-technology indirectly, for he developed the idea of the extensive industrial use of electricity by inventing the steam and gas turbines. He always made it quite clear that he was a Slovak who was born in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, Slovakia. His first studies in Levoca were supplemented at the technological institute in Budapest. Here he won a scholarship to study at the technological school in Zilrich, Switzerland. After two years of work on the railways of Hungary, Stodola went for further study at the technical college in Charlotteburg in Germany, and then in Paris. He returned to his native homeland where he remained only a short time �SLOVAKIA 159 because his services were required by the Rustanka firm in Prague. In the 1880's Parsons and Laval's steam turbines caught the interest of Stodola who now began concentrating upon perfecting their theoretical ideas and putting them into practical use. His success won him a professorship at the Technological Institute in Ztirich, Switzerland in 1892. Here he remained until 1929. During this period he trained hundreds of experts of two generations in the field of steam and gas turbines. Stodola's life-work in the design and manufacture of turbine engines, which he continued to perfect constantly, remains unique in the scientific world. He won the Watt medal and the Nobel prize in science. JOZEF MURGAS Jozef Murgas (1864-1929), world famous pioneer in wireless telegraphy, was born in Tajov, near Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He was born of a peasant family and early in life was destined to study for the priesthood. His talents were many, however, particularly in art. Soon after ordination he was sent by his bishop to study at the Academy of Art in Munich. For some reason shortly before completing his course of study at the Academy, he was recalled to Slovakia for pastoral work. Because of his ardent patriotism he incurred the hostility of the pro-Magyar ecclesiastical authorities. Upon hearing of the need for priests for Slovak immigrant communities, he immediately applied for this apostolate. Accordingly, he was sent to the anthracite city of Wilkes-Barre in northeastern Pennsylvania. Father Murgas' apostolate as pastor of a thriving Slovak parish was marked by devoted service to his Slovak people. In his spare time he did some painting, but his experiments in wireless teiegraphy began to take up most of his leisure moments. In his scientific laboratory, which he built himself at one end of the parsonage, the priest-scientist experimented in attempts to send messages by air. At first he used the Morse code but later replaced it with a tone system, which he patented in 1904. By 1911 he obtained about a dozen additional patents. Private speculators and syndicates sensed that his experiments were on the right track to revolutionize the communications' system, and they bombarded Father Mur- �160 SLOVAKIA gas with offers. Finally, the inventor accepted the bid from a Philadelphia syndicate, the Aether or Ether Telegraph Company, which furnished him with a new laboratory in return for his patent rights. But he had to erect the necessary towers for transmitting and receiving the messages. This Father Murgas did by constructing twin towers, each 60 meters in height, one near his home in Wilkes-Barre and the other about ten miles distant near Scranton, Pa. It is a matter of historical record that in 1905 Father Murgas succeeded in sending a message from his hometower to Scranton. Before he could pursue his experimentation further, however, a violent storm damaged the wooden towers and destroyed the antenas. His company refused to advance the money necessary for repairs and soon after the syndicate was dissolved. Apparently, Father Murgas was unable to raise enough money to make the repairs himself. Moreover, he became embroiled in a patent suit with Marconi (who was subsequently to be credited with the invention of modern radio) and Fessenden. Although Father Murgas won the law-suit, the government controls imposed on all means of communicati on at the outbreak of World War I prevented him from following up his initial success. Thus ended the scientific career of the great Slovak pioneer in wireless telegraphy. From this time until his death in 1929 he devoted all his time exclusively to pastoral service and patriotic work among his Slovak people. JOZEF M. PETZVAL Jozef Maximilian Petzval (Pecval)-180 7-1895-was a Slovak despite claims by Magyars and Austrians to the contrary. He was born in Spisska Bela in Slovakia. After completing his schooling in Podolinec, Levoca and the Lyceum in Kosice (in Slovakia) he attended the polytechnical institute at the University of Budapest. He paid his own way from his salary as a city engineer. After receiving his doctorate in mathematics he obtained a professorship at the University of Vienna in 1836. Petzval secured living quarters in an abandoned monastery on Kahlenberg hill above the city. Here he established his own mechanical laboratory where he began producing �SLOVAKIA 161 special optical lens of such quality so that soon they were in demand in all parts of the world. When the daguerrotype photo apparatus appeared on the scene in the 1830's Petzval opened his own studio where he made invaluable contributions to modern photography. By 1840 he developed a photo lens that increased the degree of light ten-fold, thereby considerably decreasing the time of exposure. Voigtlander, an optician in Vienna, became the recipient of a real windfall when Petzval surrendered his formulas in the science of optics to him in return for a contract. Voigtlander refused to live up to the agreement. Accordingly, Petzval became so bitterly involved in litigation that this caused him to become a recluse . .. a final outcome of his misanthropic tendencies. Petzval developed the basics for the production of lens for people afflicted with astigmatism, and his process was adopted in the 1880's by the great Zeiss corporation in Jena. From Petzval's laboratories came the first high-power telescopes and fieldglasses, super electric spotlights and other improvements in the field of optics, as well as new developments in the mathematical sciences. It was only during World War II that Petzval's name was discovered inscribed (in German) on a memorial tablet in his birthplace in Spisska Bela, Slovakia. STEFAN BANIC stefan Banic, the inventor of the parachute, emigrated from his native Slovakia in search of a job in the U.S. He worked at odd jobs and tinkered with an invention that resulted in the making of the first real, workable parachute for which he obtained patent rights from the U.S. Patent Office in 1914. Banic sold the patent rights to a company for a mere pittance and the company made millions on government orders from the U.S. Army Air force during the first World War. (A. A. Hoch, Vyndlezy, ktore zmenili svet (Inventions which changed the world). Published by Mlade Leta, Bratislava, 1959). � 156 SLOVAKIA Famous Slovak Inventors Long before the arrival of the Slovaks in central Europer the Celts who inhabited the area, mined iron-ore, silver, gold and lead and utilized these minerals in making various instruments, ornaments and utensils. As newcomers, the Slovaks continued to use these minerals centuries before the coming of the Turkish-Mongol tribes. Technically, both the mining and metal industries remained rather primitive until modern times. New methods and techniques which were developed outside the· country were not introduced until quite recently. Modernization of the mining industry in Slovakia, though of recent data, was preceded in the 17th and 18th centuries by several notable processes. In 1627, for example, it was K. Wendler, a Tyrolean explosive expert, who detonated the first black-powder charge in the Banska stiavnica mines in Slovakia; incidentally, the first of its kind in mining history. Then, J. A. Born (1742-1791), a Saxon from Transylvania, in the latter half of the 18th century introduced the quicksilver (mercury) amalgamation process of refining gold, silver and lead. At the end of the 17th century most of the Slovak mines were flooded because continual warfare caused them to be neglected. Primitive methods of pumping out the water proved inefficient and expensive. They required an outlay of money for wood, men-power and horses. The cost was prohibitive. Water-wheels proved unsatisfactory and mining engineers decided to try the new atmospheric-fire invention of Newcombe. Potter, an Englishman, came to install the new machinery in the Nova Ban.a mine. It was put into operation in 1724. But when it proved to be a failure it was dismantled. In 1733 a series of modified methods were introduced but all proved inadequate. Finally, J. K. Hell (1713-1789), a native Slovak engineer and machinist, installed his own machinery at the entrance of the mine in Banska stiavnica in 1749. It proved successful, and soon afterwards he installed his invention in a �SLOVAKIA 157 number of deep mine shafts. Later Hell developed a better atmospheric type of mine-pump. Mining methods for gold, silver and lead remained primitive and time consuming. It was Born's amalgamation process, developed and adapted from the Spanish types employed in the mines of South America, which reduced the time of processing silver from six weeks to approximately twelve hours. Moreover, wood was reduced to a minimum and lead was saved in the process. A silver metallurgical plant was built in Sklene Teplice, Slovakia, in 1785, and a lead mill or foundry was constructed in Ulmanka, near Stare Hory, in 1788. Sometime in the 14th century the manufacture of glass was introduced into Slovakia, most likely from the Czech plants in Bohemia. At first, ordinary glass was made, and only later quality glassware was produced for use in the metal and chemical plants in the country. We present a brief summary of the life-work of the following Slovak pioneers in technology. Some of these early scientific technicians are known, some but little known, but their work has all been at least partially evaluated. STEFAN A. JEDLfK Among the earliest inventors in Slovakia was Stefan Ananian Jedlik (1800-1896), who came from the village of Zemne, near Kollarovo, Slovakia. A talented youth he chose the priesthood as a life's vocation. In 1831 he was assigned as a teacher to the Gymnasium ( Junior College ) in Bratislava. Soon his work in Physics won the attention of the administration at the University of Budapest, where he was destined to teach for the next four decades. That is why the Magyars claim him as a Hungarian scientist although he stoutly maintained he was a Slovak. As an electro-technician Jedlik won wide acclaim when electricity was still in its infancy. As early as 1829 in his research in electro-magnetism, he hit upon the theory that an electro-magnet must oscillate simultaneously around another electro-magnet once the current is turned on. His experiments proved the theory true and his primitive motor was the forerunner of the induction motor. �158 SLOVAKIA Although Arag, a French physicist, is credited with the discovery of the theory of electro-magnetism , Jedlik's first motor was certainly closer to the idea of the induction motor than Arag's ideas in theoretical form. Unfortunately, the Slovak scientific genius did not publicize his discovery because he dismissed the motor as economically impractical because it depended on power from an expensive source he himself developed, and which a railroad firm adopted not merely for its own use for its telegraph system but actually put it on the market for general use later. In the late 1850's Jedlik discovered the principle of the self-generating dynamo in which a spark at the magnetic pole is sufficient to give it the initial impetus and gradually the electric current generated will attain maximum power. Werner Siemens, a German pioneer in this field, is given credit for the discovery of the dynamo-electric principle which he patented in 1866 despite the fact that Jedlik and others had actually made the discovery before Siemens registered his patent rights. So far it has been ascertained that Jedlik patented approximately eighty (80 ) patents, mostly in the electromagnetic field. Atoms, Jedlik declared, could be split by a high electric current. Matter, he said, consisted of a radio-active primate, later confirmed by the discovery of radium. AUREL STODOLA World renown was won by another Slovak, namely, Aurel Stodola (1859-1942) in the field of electro-technology indirectly, for he developed the idea of the extensive industrial use of electricity by inventing the steam and gas turbines. He always made it quite clear that he was a Slovak who was born in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, Slovakia. His first studies in Levoca were supplemented at the technological institute in Budapest. Here he won a scholarship to study at the technological school in Zilrich, Switzerland. After two years of work on the railways of Hungary, Stodola went for further study at the technical college in Charlotteburg in Germany, and then in Paris. He returned to his native homeland where he remained only a short time �SLOVAKIA 159 because his services were required by the Rustanka firm in Prague. In the 1880's Parsons and Laval's steam turbines caught the interest of Stodola who now began concentrating upon perfecting their theoretical ideas and putting them into practical use. His success won him a professorship at the Technological Institute in Ztirich, Switzerland in 1892. Here he remained until 1929. During this period he trained hundreds of experts of two generations in the field of steam and gas turbines. Stodola's life-work in the design and manufacture of turbine engines, which he continued to perfect constantly, remains unique in the scientific world. He won the Watt medal and the Nobel prize in science. JOZEF MURGAS Jozef Murgas (1864-1929), world famous pioneer in wireless telegraphy, was born in Tajov, near Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He was born of a peasant family and early in life was destined to study for the priesthood. His talents were many, however, particularly in art. Soon after ordination he was sent by his bishop to study at the Academy of Art in Munich. For some reason shortly before completing his course of study at the Academy, he was recalled to Slovakia for pastoral work. Because of his ardent patriotism he incurred the hostility of the pro-Magyar ecclesiastical authorities. Upon hearing of the need for priests for Slovak immigrant communities, he immediately applied for this apostolate. Accordingly, he was sent to the anthracite city of Wilkes-Barre in northeastern Pennsylvania. Father Murgas' apostolate as pastor of a thriving Slovak parish was marked by devoted service to his Slovak people. In his spare time he did some painting, but his experiments in wireless teiegraphy began to take up most of his leisure moments. In his scientific laboratory, which he built himself at one end of the parsonage, the priest-scientist experimented in attempts to send messages by air. At first he used the Morse code but later replaced it with a tone system, which he patented in 1904. By 1911 he obtained about a dozen additional patents. Private speculators and syndicates sensed that his experiments were on the right track to revolutionize the communications' system, and they bombarded Father Mur- �160 SLOVAKIA gas with offers. Finally, the inventor accepted the bid from a Philadelphia syndicate, the Aether or Ether Telegraph Company, which furnished him with a new laboratory in return for his patent rights. But he had to erect the necessary towers for transmitting and receiving the messages. This Father Murgas did by constructing twin towers, each 60 meters in height, one near his home in Wilkes-Barre and the other about ten miles distant near Scranton, Pa. It is a matter of historical record that in 1905 Father Murgas succeeded in sending a message from his hometower to Scranton. Before he could pursue his experimentation further, however, a violent storm damaged the wooden towers and destroyed the antenas. His company refused to advance the money necessary for repairs and soon after the syndicate was dissolved. Apparently, Father Murgas was unable to raise enough money to make the repairs himself. Moreover, he became embroiled in a patent suit with Marconi (who was subsequently to be credited with the invention of modern radio) and Fessenden. Although Father Murgas won the law-suit, the government controls imposed on all means of communicati on at the outbreak of World War I prevented him from following up his initial success. Thus ended the scientific career of the great Slovak pioneer in wireless telegraphy. From this time until his death in 1929 he devoted all his time exclusively to pastoral service and patriotic work among his Slovak people. JOZEF M. PETZVAL Jozef Maximilian Petzval (Pecval)-180 7-1895-was a Slovak despite claims by Magyars and Austrians to the contrary. He was born in Spisska Bela in Slovakia. After completing his schooling in Podolinec, Levoca and the Lyceum in Kosice (in Slovakia) he attended the polytechnical institute at the University of Budapest. He paid his own way from his salary as a city engineer. After receiving his doctorate in mathematics he obtained a professorship at the University of Vienna in 1836. Petzval secured living quarters in an abandoned monastery on Kahlenberg hill above the city. Here he established his own mechanical laboratory where he began producing �SLOVAKIA 161 special optical lens of such quality so that soon they were in demand in all parts of the world. When the daguerrotype photo apparatus appeared on the scene in the 1830's Petzval opened his own studio where he made invaluable contributions to modern photography. By 1840 he developed a photo lens that increased the degree of light ten-fold, thereby considerably decreasing the time of exposure. Voigtlander, an optician in Vienna, became the recipient of a real windfall when Petzval surrendered his formulas in the science of optics to him in return for a contract. Voigtlander refused to live up to the agreement. Accordingly, Petzval became so bitterly involved in litigation that this caused him to become a recluse . .. a final outcome of his misanthropic tendencies. Petzval developed the basics for the production of lens for people afflicted with astigmatism, and his process was adopted in the 1880's by the great Zeiss corporation in Jena. From Petzval's laboratories came the first high-power telescopes and fieldglasses, super electric spotlights and other improvements in the field of optics, as well as new developments in the mathematical sciences. It was only during World War II that Petzval's name was discovered inscribed (in German) on a memorial tablet in his birthplace in Spisska Bela, Slovakia. STEFAN BANIC stefan Banic, the inventor of the parachute, emigrated from his native Slovakia in search of a job in the U.S. He worked at odd jobs and tinkered with an invention that resulted in the making of the first real, workable parachute for which he obtained patent rights from the U.S. Patent Office in 1914. Banic sold the patent rights to a company for a mere pittance and the company made millions on government orders from the U.S. Army Air force during the first World War. (A. A. Hoch, Vyndlezy, ktore zmenili svet (Inventions which changed the world). Published by Mlade Leta, Bratislava, 1959). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 156 SLOVAKIA Famous Slovak Inventors Long before the arrival of the Slovaks in central Europer the Celts who inhabited the area, mined iron-ore, silver, gold and lead and utilized these minerals in making various instruments, ornaments and utensils. As newcomers, the Slovaks continued to use these minerals centuries before the coming of the Turkish-Mongol tribes. Technically, both the mining and metal industries remained rather primitive until modern times. New methods and techniques which were developed outside the· country were not introduced until quite recently. Modernization of the mining industry in Slovakia, though of recent data, was preceded in the 17th and 18th centuries by several notable processes. In 1627, for example, it was K. Wendler, a Tyrolean explosive expert, who detonated the first black-powder charge in the Banska stiavnica mines in Slovakia; incidentally, the first of its kind in mining history. Then, J. A. Born (1742-1791), a Saxon from Transylvania, in the latter half of the 18th century introduced the quicksilver (mercury) amalgamation process of refining gold, silver and lead. At the end of the 17th century most of the Slovak mines were flooded because continual warfare caused them to be neglected. Primitive methods of pumping out the water proved inefficient and expensive. They required an outlay of money for wood, men-power and horses. The cost was prohibitive. Water-wheels proved unsatisfactory and mining engineers decided to try the new atmospheric-fire invention of Newcombe. Potter, an Englishman, came to install the new machinery in the Nova Ban.a mine. It was put into operation in 1724. But when it proved to be a failure it was dismantled. In 1733 a series of modified methods were introduced but all proved inadequate. Finally, J. K. Hell (1713-1789), a native Slovak engineer and machinist, installed his own machinery at the entrance of the mine in Banska stiavnica in 1749. It proved successful, and soon afterwards he installed his invention in a SLOVAKIA 157 number of deep mine shafts. Later Hell developed a better atmospheric type of mine-pump. Mining methods for gold, silver and lead remained primitive and time consuming. It was Born's amalgamation process, developed and adapted from the Spanish types employed in the mines of South America, which reduced the time of processing silver from six weeks to approximately twelve hours. Moreover, wood was reduced to a minimum and lead was saved in the process. A silver metallurgical plant was built in Sklene Teplice, Slovakia, in 1785, and a lead mill or foundry was constructed in Ulmanka, near Stare Hory, in 1788. Sometime in the 14th century the manufacture of glass was introduced into Slovakia, most likely from the Czech plants in Bohemia. At first, ordinary glass was made, and only later quality glassware was produced for use in the metal and chemical plants in the country. We present a brief summary of the life-work of the following Slovak pioneers in technology. Some of these early scientific technicians are known, some but little known, but their work has all been at least partially evaluated. STEFAN A. JEDLfK Among the earliest inventors in Slovakia was Stefan Ananian Jedlik (1800-1896), who came from the village of Zemne, near Kollarovo, Slovakia. A talented youth he chose the priesthood as a life's vocation. In 1831 he was assigned as a teacher to the Gymnasium ( Junior College ) in Bratislava. Soon his work in Physics won the attention of the administration at the University of Budapest, where he was destined to teach for the next four decades. That is why the Magyars claim him as a Hungarian scientist although he stoutly maintained he was a Slovak. As an electro-technician Jedlik won wide acclaim when electricity was still in its infancy. As early as 1829 in his research in electro-magnetism, he hit upon the theory that an electro-magnet must oscillate simultaneously around another electro-magnet once the current is turned on. His experiments proved the theory true and his primitive motor was the forerunner of the induction motor. 158 SLOVAKIA Although Arag, a French physicist, is credited with the discovery of the theory of electro-magnetism , Jedlik's first motor was certainly closer to the idea of the induction motor than Arag's ideas in theoretical form. Unfortunately, the Slovak scientific genius did not publicize his discovery because he dismissed the motor as economically impractical because it depended on power from an expensive source he himself developed, and which a railroad firm adopted not merely for its own use for its telegraph system but actually put it on the market for general use later. In the late 1850's Jedlik discovered the principle of the self-generating dynamo in which a spark at the magnetic pole is sufficient to give it the initial impetus and gradually the electric current generated will attain maximum power. Werner Siemens, a German pioneer in this field, is given credit for the discovery of the dynamo-electric principle which he patented in 1866 despite the fact that Jedlik and others had actually made the discovery before Siemens registered his patent rights. So far it has been ascertained that Jedlik patented approximately eighty (80 ) patents, mostly in the electromagnetic field. Atoms, Jedlik declared, could be split by a high electric current. Matter, he said, consisted of a radio-active primate, later confirmed by the discovery of radium. AUREL STODOLA World renown was won by another Slovak, namely, Aurel Stodola (1859-1942) in the field of electro-technology indirectly, for he developed the idea of the extensive industrial use of electricity by inventing the steam and gas turbines. He always made it quite clear that he was a Slovak who was born in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, Slovakia. His first studies in Levoca were supplemented at the technological institute in Budapest. Here he won a scholarship to study at the technological school in Zilrich, Switzerland. After two years of work on the railways of Hungary, Stodola went for further study at the technical college in Charlotteburg in Germany, and then in Paris. He returned to his native homeland where he remained only a short time SLOVAKIA 159 because his services were required by the Rustanka firm in Prague. In the 1880's Parsons and Laval's steam turbines caught the interest of Stodola who now began concentrating upon perfecting their theoretical ideas and putting them into practical use. His success won him a professorship at the Technological Institute in Ztirich, Switzerland in 1892. Here he remained until 1929. During this period he trained hundreds of experts of two generations in the field of steam and gas turbines. Stodola's life-work in the design and manufacture of turbine engines, which he continued to perfect constantly, remains unique in the scientific world. He won the Watt medal and the Nobel prize in science. JOZEF MURGAS Jozef Murgas (1864-1929), world famous pioneer in wireless telegraphy, was born in Tajov, near Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He was born of a peasant family and early in life was destined to study for the priesthood. His talents were many, however, particularly in art. Soon after ordination he was sent by his bishop to study at the Academy of Art in Munich. For some reason shortly before completing his course of study at the Academy, he was recalled to Slovakia for pastoral work. Because of his ardent patriotism he incurred the hostility of the pro-Magyar ecclesiastical authorities. Upon hearing of the need for priests for Slovak immigrant communities, he immediately applied for this apostolate. Accordingly, he was sent to the anthracite city of Wilkes-Barre in northeastern Pennsylvania. Father Murgas' apostolate as pastor of a thriving Slovak parish was marked by devoted service to his Slovak people. In his spare time he did some painting, but his experiments in wireless teiegraphy began to take up most of his leisure moments. In his scientific laboratory, which he built himself at one end of the parsonage, the priest-scientist experimented in attempts to send messages by air. At first he used the Morse code but later replaced it with a tone system, which he patented in 1904. By 1911 he obtained about a dozen additional patents. Private speculators and syndicates sensed that his experiments were on the right track to revolutionize the communications' system, and they bombarded Father Mur- 160 SLOVAKIA gas with offers. Finally, the inventor accepted the bid from a Philadelphia syndicate, the Aether or Ether Telegraph Company, which furnished him with a new laboratory in return for his patent rights. But he had to erect the necessary towers for transmitting and receiving the messages. This Father Murgas did by constructing twin towers, each 60 meters in height, one near his home in Wilkes-Barre and the other about ten miles distant near Scranton, Pa. It is a matter of historical record that in 1905 Father Murgas succeeded in sending a message from his hometower to Scranton. Before he could pursue his experimentation further, however, a violent storm damaged the wooden towers and destroyed the antenas. His company refused to advance the money necessary for repairs and soon after the syndicate was dissolved. Apparently, Father Murgas was unable to raise enough money to make the repairs himself. Moreover, he became embroiled in a patent suit with Marconi (who was subsequently to be credited with the invention of modern radio) and Fessenden. Although Father Murgas won the law-suit, the government controls imposed on all means of communicati on at the outbreak of World War I prevented him from following up his initial success. Thus ended the scientific career of the great Slovak pioneer in wireless telegraphy. From this time until his death in 1929 he devoted all his time exclusively to pastoral service and patriotic work among his Slovak people. JOZEF M. PETZVAL Jozef Maximilian Petzval (Pecval)-180 7-1895-was a Slovak despite claims by Magyars and Austrians to the contrary. He was born in Spisska Bela in Slovakia. After completing his schooling in Podolinec, Levoca and the Lyceum in Kosice (in Slovakia) he attended the polytechnical institute at the University of Budapest. He paid his own way from his salary as a city engineer. After receiving his doctorate in mathematics he obtained a professorship at the University of Vienna in 1836. Petzval secured living quarters in an abandoned monastery on Kahlenberg hill above the city. Here he established his own mechanical laboratory where he began producing SLOVAKIA 161 special optical lens of such quality so that soon they were in demand in all parts of the world. When the daguerrotype photo apparatus appeared on the scene in the 1830's Petzval opened his own studio where he made invaluable contributions to modern photography. By 1840 he developed a photo lens that increased the degree of light ten-fold, thereby considerably decreasing the time of exposure. Voigtlander, an optician in Vienna, became the recipient of a real windfall when Petzval surrendered his formulas in the science of optics to him in return for a contract. Voigtlander refused to live up to the agreement. Accordingly, Petzval became so bitterly involved in litigation that this caused him to become a recluse . .. a final outcome of his misanthropic tendencies. Petzval developed the basics for the production of lens for people afflicted with astigmatism, and his process was adopted in the 1880's by the great Zeiss corporation in Jena. From Petzval's laboratories came the first high-power telescopes and fieldglasses, super electric spotlights and other improvements in the field of optics, as well as new developments in the mathematical sciences. It was only during World War II that Petzval's name was discovered inscribed (in German) on a memorial tablet in his birthplace in Spisska Bela, Slovakia. STEFAN BANIC stefan Banic, the inventor of the parachute, emigrated from his native Slovakia in search of a job in the U.S. He worked at odd jobs and tinkered with an invention that resulted in the making of the first real, workable parachute for which he obtained patent rights from the U.S. Patent Office in 1914. Banic sold the patent rights to a company for a mere pittance and the company made millions on government orders from the U.S. Army Air force during the first World War. (A. A. Hoch, Vyndlezy, ktore zmenili svet (Inventions which changed the world). Published by Mlade Leta, Bratislava, 1959).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Famous Slovak Inventors Description An account of the resource from A. A. Hoch, Vynálezy, ktoré zmenili svet (Inventions Which Changed the World), pub. Mladé Letá, Bratislava, 1959. covers Štefan A. Jedlík, Aurel Stodola, Jozef Murgaš, Jozef M. Petzval, Štefan Banič Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 156-161 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hoch, Alois Adalbert, 1888-1978 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b1a85b1b41473f73a2afecfbab35cd9a.pdf 5690363428fb0764a76a83ea53c572bc PDF Text Text 68 SLOVAKIA FATHER ANDREW HLINKA - - An Unspent Martyr - A Slovak Soul on Slovak Soil - A Heart of Gold in a Humble Body A Leader of Men, Led by the Spirit of His People - Who is this man who after a quarter century is yet cherished in the memories of the young adult generation of Slovak descent ? Who is he, so loved by his contemporaries in Slovakia, whom he stiirred to zeal for the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God in a nation of their own choice? Who is the man that suffered humiliatioo and degradation to free the Slovaks from political and economic enslavement? 'J.'lhese questions are answerable in the life and activirties of Father Andrew Hlinka, born a Slovak peasant in the village of Cernova on September 27, 1864, and died a Monsignor of the Catholic Church on August 16, 1938, at the age of 74, in Ruzomberok, seven months before the Declaration of Independence of Slovrukia and its proclama~ tion to -the world of ia Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939. Father Hlinka did not live to see or participate in a selfgoverning, free and independent Slovakia, recognized •b y 27 countries from Rome through Russia. Nor did Father Hlinka live to see or experience the invasion of Slovakia by Communist armies in May of 1945, or the execution of his beloved friend and successor, Monsignor Joseph Tiso, the first President of Slovakia. For over 50 years Father Hlinka fought for the rights of the Slovaks - as people of self-determination, of civic, cultural and economic ·pursuit in which they were suppressed, first, before World War I by the Magyar overlords of Hungary in the Monarchy of ·Austria-Hungary, and then until 1938 entrapped in a ~ohemian political machine maneuvered by Thomas Masaryk and Edwar:a Benes in the newly created state of Czecho-Slovakia, in which the hyphen was deliberately deleted and the Slovaks proclaimed to be "Czechs" by their new masters. Just as there a �SLOVAKIA 69 were Sloviaks who sold their birthrights to the Magyar overlords for political and economic privileges, so there were Slovaks who ran to the Czech ringmasters to be deJhyphenated and absorbed as "Czechoslovaks". But Father Hlinka was a true Slovak heart, soul and body, sufi'ering discouragement, humiliation, torment and imprisonment at the •h ands both of the Magyars and of the Czechs, and he epitomizes the Slovak in the history of the world. Karol Sidor concludes his biogra;phy of Father Hlinka with the following tribute: "There he stands as lhough less a mortal man than an enshrined symbol, as one not formed of earth's clay but woven of the noblest feelings and thoughts of man. Consequently, in Hlinka, each Slovak recognized himself and in every Slovak there was something of Hlinka , gilded with heroism, goodness, loyalty, courage, and the nobility of Hlinka's heart. Thus did Andrew Hlinka live, and thus will he remain as long as even one Slovak remains." At the age of twenty Hlinka was expelled from the seminary by the Hungarian authorities on charges of PanSlavism, of promoting the study of Slovak, both }anguage and literature, and of fostering loyalty to their ancestry among the Slovak seminarians. Later he was recalled and on June 19, 1889 1he was ordained a priest. In Cernova, the vmage of his birth, Hlinka helped and encouraged his people to erect a church, but he was not permitted to· participate in its consecration, for he was under suspension (unjustly) already a year and a half. The villagers, who had expected his reinstatement, held a demonstmtion in protest. Without warning the government ·gendarmes · fired into the crowd, killing fifteen persons and wounding several others. The incident is remembered as the Cernova Massacre of October 27, 1907. In March, 1909 the Vatican exonerated Hlinka, who was in prison at the time, and lifted the suspension. In June of the same year Father Hlinka was delegated to consecrate the church in Cernova. During one of his prison terms under the Hungarian regime, loather Hlinka translated the Old Testament of the Holy Bible into Slovak, and during another prison term he completed his "Apologia for Christianity" in Slovak. At the age of 55 he was arrested and imprisoned by �70 SLOVAKIA the "Czechoslovak" government for fighting the anti-clerica1ism of Czech rp oliticians, a drive to Czech-ize the Sfovaks and economioally force their submission. Rioting, demonstrations ,a nd the ele0tion ,b y the Slovaks of Hlinka to the "Czechoslova;k" Parliament necessitated 'his release from prison in 1920. It is true that as early as 1908 Fabher Hlinka looked to a union with the Moravians and Ozechs to strengthen the Slav position, with the understanding however, that the Slovaks would enjoy autonomy and cultural and political freedom. The Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 indicated that we in America agreed with what ouT brothers and ancestors in Slovakiia desired. However, once Masaryk and Benes were in power, Father Hlinka was chagrined to see that the Slovaks continued to be the victims of harsh discrimination in all phases of government, education and 'Public life. Diplomatic documents in the British archives attest to the errors of the Czech administration by corruption in public office, attempts to substitute Czech for the Slovak language, hostility of Czedh soldiers and officials to the Catholic Church, which included desecration and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, intemerence in marriages and similiaT offenses against the principles of culture and decency. It was also officially reported by the British Minister, Cecil Gosling, who witnessed conditions in Slovakia in late 1919, that Slovakia was flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if employed, they received from ½ to ¾ ~ess pay than the Czechs. The Benes-Masaryk intrigue led to .flirtini with and fawning over Rrussiain Communism and its religious, social and economic fallacies. Father Hlinka's h eart and soul were tormented ,b y the God-less and inhuman policies emamating from Prague and found it necessary to organize his Slova,k people for their own well-being, and his "Hlin:ka's People's Party" became a ,p olitical success in 1925. Protesting the activities and genocidal efforts first af the Magyars and then of the Czechs Father Hlinka became the savior of his people. He adopted as his motto "For God rand n at i o n" and showed whi:wt love of God and fuith in humanity can accmnrplish. One u1nfamiliar with S 1 o v a k ,feeling1S and sentiments may ~ why a priest should have to be the leader of his nation and participate �SLOVAKIA 71 in civic affairs - even unto degradation and imprisonment? The answer is simply that a Catholic priest takes ian oath to God to minister to the people and cannot countenance injustice or inhumanity. As a human •b eing man is worthy of dignity, respect and ,p ossesses the right to live a life worbhy of his reward in heaven. For over a thousand years under ,t:Jhe Magyaris, the only educated group were the priests - bhey were the healers of the mi111d as well as of the soul. The priests were the leaders, the counselors of the people in civic as well as in religious matters. It is true that while the past two generations of laity in SloV'akia produced an educated intelligentsia, in the years prior to World War I. our Slovak ancestors were serfs, peasants, yes, slaves of the soil owned by their ancestors. On the occasion of the death of Fr. Hlinka the American journalist, Stephen J. Palickar, wrote as follows (Jednota, August 24, 1938) : "Father 1Hlinka has departed from our midst, but his spirit has not. And while God in His Divine Providence has removed him in the .flower of his activity, we, of the loyal Slovaks, whether in Europe or America, will continue to use the spirit of Hllnka as an instrument of battle untll such time when the Slovaks have regained that whlol;I rightfully !belongs to them, namely, their freedom in the Fatherland of Slovensko." There are great Slovak leaders among our Catholic priests today, particularly in the U.S.A. and Canada, thougih they ·p refer to •h ave laymen lead in social and civic affairs, as witness the great fraternal orgianizations and prominent elected public officials. But we are graiteful for the initiative and zeal that serve as a pattern for us. Father Stephen Furdek founded the Slovak League of America in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 26, 1907. It has the greatest representation of Slovaks in the world today, and interesting to say, it is non-denominational, though Christian. Some 17 years earlier, Father Furdek had organized the First Catholic Slovak Union and a sister Jednota two years later. The spirit of Fr. Hlinka permeated Fr. Furdek, and that spirit of a "slovensky duch" can be seen in such men of cloth as Bishops Andrew G. Grutka, of Gary, Indiana, Paul Hnilica (Jesutt) of Rome and Michael Rusnak (Redemptorist) of Canada, Rt. Rev. Theodore G. Kojis (Benedictine Abbot), Cleveland, Rt. Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca. �72 SLOVAKIA (A:bbot), Monsignors Dubosh, Mlynarovic, Krasula, Petro, and many others. Another kindred spirit of Hlinka was found in Dr. Karol Kmefiko, who was appointed Archbishop of Nitra, in Slovakia, in 1944, which is the same ancient Nitra of which St. Methodius was first Archbishop over 1,000 years before. You will recall the brothers Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Slova:kia in 863 AD. These Arpostles were Greeks, but certainly Ohristlike in spirit in their love for the Slovaks, since they Christianized our Slovak ancestors and compiled an alphalbet from the linguistic sounds, which to this day is the basis of Slovak culture and civilization. Again an echo of Fr. Hlinka's words, Za Borhra a rnirod. No doubt any Slovak can think of dedicated Slovak priests whom he admires, respects, and loves. Three wonderfu!l priests who left their impreissfon on me through personal associiaJt.ion are Frs. Florian C. Bihly (Franciscan) of Lisbon Falls, Me., who pours out rhis heart and soul in Slovak sermons and songs; Andrew V. Pier (Benedictine) of the Abbey in Cleveland, a schol•ar, educator and prolific chronicler of "Slovakiama", and Gerald P. Brennan (Jesuit) of Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis., an Irishman who stimulated the students of Slovak ancestry to organize the Father Hlinka Club at Marquette in February of 1939, some six months after Father Hlinka's death in Slovakia. One of the first presidents of the Flather Hlinka Club was Joseph Labaj, then a journalism student, who shortly thereafter left us to enter the Jesuit novitiate and is todray "Father Joe" Labaj, S.J., ,t he principal of Marquette University High School, at Milwaukee. The Constitution of the Father Hlinka Club, signed by the student organizers on February 6, 1939, stated as its purpose : Catholic action among the Slovaik people to be accomplished with the cooperation of the SloV1a:k parish priests; and the statement of intention, Article 1, parag. 4 reads: "To counter a ct any subversive actiTities a mong our people which might tend to undermine their faith or ,the democratic principles of our governm e nt, a nd to expose and expla in any activities which might place our people in dangerous or embarrassing circumstances" . Marquette University approved the Faither Hlinka Club on February 14, 1939; it affiliated itself with Sodality �SLOVAKIA 73 activities, and the following month, on St. Piatrick's day, Dr. Raphael C. McCarthy, President of the University, accepted ,the offer and became the first 1honorary member of the Father Hlinka Club. Father McCarthy became enthusiastic wbout the aims of this Slovak Catholic students' group and predicted i,t would afford real laboratory training and develop leadersihip among the Slovak people. Since then numerous educators, lawyers, doctors, dentists, journalists and engineers have gone through the club. At ,the time the U.S.A. entered World War II, all nationality clubs were deacti\nated at Marquette with attendrunt difficulties in reorganizing later. Attorney John F. Spacek and Dr. Albert Nemcek, as M.U. students were early ,p ost-war presidents of the Father Hlinka Olub. Father Oasimir Cvercko, O.F.M. Conv., pastor of St. Stephen's (Slovak) Church in Milwaukee at that time, gave much encouragement to the M. U. Slovak students, ,and iit is recalled that one year the Hlinka Club entered a "float" and won first place in the clubs and societies division of the University Homecoming (football) parade. A "Father Hlinka Club Scholarship Fund" was started many years ago, to which the national Jednota and Sokol societies contributed money, insufficient, however, for a permanent scholarship, thereby necessitating only partial grants to Oathoiic students of Slovak origin or descent. A few years ago, this author recalls, Miss Carol Zvara of Milwaukee was publicized in the metropolitan press as recipient of ia Father Hlinka Scholarship grant, Which I 'believe to !have been merely ,a modest honorarium. At the present time the Father Hlinka Club is inactive, but with the help of Marquette Slovak alumni, iit can certainly be reactivated, and no doubt the Slovak people and Slovak societies throughout the U.S.A. would contribute funds to reinvigorate the :Blather Hlinka Club Scholarship Fund at Marquette University. The help would have to come from outside as most of our students there are present through the sacrifices of their Slov,ak ,parents and lack time for solicitation of funds for future scholars. We have since infancy heard our parents speak of "nasa mladez" and "buducnosf nasho slovenskeho naroda", i. e. our youth and the future of the Slovaks. The thought has been e~ressed that scholarship help should �74 SLOVAKIA be on a college level because nowadays public high schools are available to anyone of average intelligence, and that it is in college that leadership and professionalism can be developed for ,t he Slovaks. A recent aTtiC'le in Jednota by Daniel Tanzone, Jr., of Yonkers, N. Y., ,a high school senior of Slovak-Italian descent, tells Editor Krajsa of the interest 'he has in past and present Slova;k life, and pleads for the donation of Slovak books in English for the library of the good Slovak Sisters of SS CYTil and Method1us at the Slovak school of the Most Holy Trinity. This is a good example of a student of Slovak origin or descent, who should ,b e benefited by the Father Hlink<a Club Scholarship Fund. This young man has a real zeal for rhis Slovak ancestry which he expresses without shame or reservation. Konstantin Culen, journailist and authority on Slovak culture and political histOTy, a man who was schooled under the Magyar and Czech regimes, and who died in New York last year, credited American Slovaks with great influence, saying, "What the Slovaks brought frem America they sought to validate at home. The American way of life encouraged and dir ected their plans in Slovakia. Slovak life waxed strong even during the hardest times, because H was nourished materially and ideologically by a current of material and spiri,tual wea1th from America". Culen and Sidor, in the spirit of F'ather Hlin'ka were joined by the late Philip Hroba:k, an American of Slovak descent, an educator, a writer of materials rich in cultural, social, historical and political "Slovakiana". Hrobak was the first American leader, in 1957, to receive the Hlinka Silver Award. Is the Slovak heritage to be submerged? Is Slovak ancestry to be denied? Is Slovakia in Europe any less entitled to self-determined, self-governed statehood than any other nationality on earth? Scores of "new nations" have been recognized and added to the roster of the United Nations, but the Slov,ruks get little sympathy from the political sophisticates of today, ,p articularly those who show a peculiar affinity with the aims and ideals of the red tyrants of Russia. Well-meaning people would not deprive Slovaks of �SLOVARlA 75 their God-given rights, even if they never heard the word Slovak. Eleven hundred years ago, two non-Sloviak Greek brothers, Sts. Cyril and Methodius, recognized the rights of the Slovaks and compiled the ancient Cyrillic alphabet so that the people could extend and per,petuate their culture. 'l'he Greeks had a word for it as did Ohrist the Leader 863 years before, - "Teach ye all nations." Pope Paul VI, in speaking to a Slovia!k assemblage, led by the Slovak Bishop Andrew Grutka of Gary, gathered at the Vaticam on September 14, 1963, spoke to them as "dear Slovak children" and referred to their "centuries-old traditions." Further, the Pope lauded them: "Dear Sons of the Slovak nation, to our satisfaction and to our praise, for reasons already explained, allow us to add a werd of paternal recommendation - perseverance. Continue to cultivate the mem©ry, the cult, the imitaition of your Saints (Cyril and Methodius), who from the di-stant Middle Ages even now light the path along which the spirLt of the Slovak people must pass in our time and in the fut ure ... " And obviously aware of us over here, the Pope interjected: "We want to be mindful specially of the Slovak people resident in the United States of America ... " In his closing remarks, His Holiness said: "We will invoke the Sorrowful Mother whom the Slovaks consider their heavenly Patroness." Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the U.S., speaking for his brother, President John F. Kennedy, to the Slovak OatJholic Sokols at the July 14, 1963 gymnastics at Youngstown, Ohio, stated: "As a representative of the Un~ted States government, the President has asked me to tell you that ,the United !States rwill continue to support the jus,t aspirations of all people in the world for independenee and liberty - aspirations which the Slovaks share today with many other captive nations." Hon. Michael A. Feig,han, U.S. Representative from Ohio, addressing the Lakewood, Ohio Slovaks on Slovak Independence, last year, said: "Slovakia today suffers under the harsh heel of Ru ssian Communist occupation. That occupaJtion has sought to rob the Slovak people of their ancient traditions, their r eligious, aBd their heritage as well as their political liberties. But the Slovak people are steeled in ,their tactics which must be employed against a foreign. occupier. Time and the experience of centuries has prepared them well for �76 SLOVAKIA the tests they now endure. It Is !Lttle wond er that the . spirit of r esistance to ,tyranny runs so strong in !Slovakia today. The Russians as well as their rCzech quislings in Prague, know the power of Slovak national aspirations." On Easter of 1963, Pope John XXIII, spoke a greeting in "Slovaik" to be faithful, wherever they mig,ht live. In July of 1963, the St. Stephen's Catholic Social Club of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in a Commemorative publication then edited ,b y Mary Liptaik, quotes Bishop Walter W. CuTtis of Bridgeport, Conn. as exhorting: " . . . 1:Jhe task of keeping the fiaith in Slovakia and elsewhere does not rest only with the people of Slovak origin ... it belongs to everyone, regardless of national origin." Mrs. Mina Haas, present editor of the St. Stephen's Social Club Commentary, quotes U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, as pointedly reflecting that: " Th e U nited •States would be a poorer nation today, economically, intellectually, culturally and in every other way, if it we re not for the two milion of our citizens who are of Slovak bir th or ancestry." The above paragraphs are given as examples of nonSlovak intelligentsia who r ecognize the Slovaks. The spirited writer, Faither B. S. Bue (Franciscan), says Slovak nationalism in the U .S.A. is described as the condition of being of Slovak descent, and asks, "Do we prefer to be known as Slova:ks, or do we consider our Slovak nationality as an irritant from the past?" Father Bue cautions that we should not attempt to conceal our Slovail{ identity and that we should not abandon our Slovak roots. '!'hough Father Bue feels the Slovak language, native in Slovakia, but not the "native tongue" of the United States, is falling in usage through speedy Americanizaition, he does say we must foster the Slovak language, having in mind its promotion in our schools like any foreign language. This pr ogram of ,t eaching Slovak in colleges, high schools and grade schools is more apparent in the eastern United Stat es. Father Bue states, as we know, that prejudices exist among minority groups which psychologically may ciause an inferiority complex, the rapid solution by rationale may include subservience to a considered superior nil,tionalism, which confronts all ethnic groups in America. "As in the case of competition, so in regard to prejudice", says Father Bue, "weak characters manifest an inferiority complex and �SLOVAKIA 77 strong cha r ac te r s show greater res olu ten ess in accep ti ng thei r Godgiven na tiona l id entity ... L et us therefore w ork for t he p rese r vation and continuity of Slova k, a s a m a tter o! tru th , w isdom a nd justice." The above analysis makes an impact upon us adults of Slovak origin amd descent, but is it assuring enough for our youngsters of the third and fourth generations? Surely they are not all like D8.1Jlny Tanzone of Yonkers, New York, mentioned above. ~a,t will ha n to the Slovak schools, churche institutions until refurbished ·b S'1ovak immigration after the fall of the communist iron-curtain, ~ hic'h we feel God will decr..ee ? I spea:k of an insidious influence rancored •b r e ·udi e if not b actual intent 0Jnd desi against the Slovaks. We know of the attempted genocide under the Magyar rulers and - t lieBohemian politicians, but are we aware of the da r of non-Slovrul_{s who cleverly demoralize with snide remarks, uncomplimentary jokes, derisioo,inlluendo, - actually forcing us out of "'k ey posts in clubs, lodges, institutions and even churches! , Me&nwhil~, let us trust to our faith and the prevailing spirit of Father Hlinka among Slovak leaders, let us hold to o ur l•a n u e, our culture:-our ·institutions and let us be Slova f radle rave with the g ui ance of the Slovak L eague of .America. Joseph N. Misany REC OMMEN DEID RE}ADINGS: Slovak s of H u ngary, Th omas Capek, N. Y., 19 06. Scotus Viator (R. W . Seton-Watson), Racial Problems in Hunga r y, 1908. Hungar y a nd Her Successors, C. A. Macartney, Oxford Press , 193 7. Th e Slovak s, 1Peter P. Yurcha k, Whiting, Indiana, F r . Lach, 1946. Andrew H lin ka (Biogr a phy), K a rol Sidor, Br atislava/ J ednota P ress. Slovak ia an d Its People , ,Prof. Gilb er t L. Oddo, Slovak I nstitute. 2900 E. Blvd., Clevela nd, Ohio, 1960. Slova kia, - A Poli tical H is<tory (1918-50), J oseph A. Mikus , 1963, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee , Wis. Slovak ia, 1962, Dr. John R ek em, -Mid dl etown, Pa., Slova k League o! America. An Ou tline of Slovakia's Struggle fo r In depend ence, J . M. Kirsch ba um, 1964, Canadian Slovak League. Was Czech th e Veh icle of Slovak Liter ature? iPhilip A. Hrobak, 1962. Slovak Grammar, J . J . Konu s, P ittsburgh, 1939. Slovak Dictionary, Lessons, Grammar & Rea dillgs, J ednota Press (Hrobak) . Slovak Newspaper s and P er iodicals (U.S.A., Canada, Sou th America ); r efer Drs. J oseph P a 11.co, Joseph M. Kir schba u m, Konstantin Culen. � 68 SLOVAKIA FATHER ANDREW HLINKA - - An Unspent Martyr - A Slovak Soul on Slovak Soil - A Heart of Gold in a Humble Body A Leader of Men, Led by the Spirit of His People - Who is this man who after a quarter century is yet cherished in the memories of the young adult generation of Slovak descent ? Who is he, so loved by his contemporaries in Slovakia, whom he stiirred to zeal for the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God in a nation of their own choice? Who is the man that suffered humiliatioo and degradation to free the Slovaks from political and economic enslavement? 'J.'lhese questions are answerable in the life and activirties of Father Andrew Hlinka, born a Slovak peasant in the village of Cernova on September 27, 1864, and died a Monsignor of the Catholic Church on August 16, 1938, at the age of 74, in Ruzomberok, seven months before the Declaration of Independence of Slovrukia and its proclama~ tion to -the world of ia Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939. Father Hlinka did not live to see or participate in a selfgoverning, free and independent Slovakia, recognized •b y 27 countries from Rome through Russia. Nor did Father Hlinka live to see or experience the invasion of Slovakia by Communist armies in May of 1945, or the execution of his beloved friend and successor, Monsignor Joseph Tiso, the first President of Slovakia. For over 50 years Father Hlinka fought for the rights of the Slovaks - as people of self-determination, of civic, cultural and economic ·pursuit in which they were suppressed, first, before World War I by the Magyar overlords of Hungary in the Monarchy of ·Austria-Hungary, and then until 1938 entrapped in a ~ohemian political machine maneuvered by Thomas Masaryk and Edwar:a Benes in the newly created state of Czecho-Slovakia, in which the hyphen was deliberately deleted and the Slovaks proclaimed to be "Czechs" by their new masters. Just as there a �SLOVAKIA 69 were Sloviaks who sold their birthrights to the Magyar overlords for political and economic privileges, so there were Slovaks who ran to the Czech ringmasters to be deJhyphenated and absorbed as "Czechoslovaks". But Father Hlinka was a true Slovak heart, soul and body, sufi'ering discouragement, humiliation, torment and imprisonment at the •h ands both of the Magyars and of the Czechs, and he epitomizes the Slovak in the history of the world. Karol Sidor concludes his biogra;phy of Father Hlinka with the following tribute: "There he stands as lhough less a mortal man than an enshrined symbol, as one not formed of earth's clay but woven of the noblest feelings and thoughts of man. Consequently, in Hlinka, each Slovak recognized himself and in every Slovak there was something of Hlinka , gilded with heroism, goodness, loyalty, courage, and the nobility of Hlinka's heart. Thus did Andrew Hlinka live, and thus will he remain as long as even one Slovak remains." At the age of twenty Hlinka was expelled from the seminary by the Hungarian authorities on charges of PanSlavism, of promoting the study of Slovak, both }anguage and literature, and of fostering loyalty to their ancestry among the Slovak seminarians. Later he was recalled and on June 19, 1889 1he was ordained a priest. In Cernova, the vmage of his birth, Hlinka helped and encouraged his people to erect a church, but he was not permitted to· participate in its consecration, for he was under suspension (unjustly) already a year and a half. The villagers, who had expected his reinstatement, held a demonstmtion in protest. Without warning the government ·gendarmes · fired into the crowd, killing fifteen persons and wounding several others. The incident is remembered as the Cernova Massacre of October 27, 1907. In March, 1909 the Vatican exonerated Hlinka, who was in prison at the time, and lifted the suspension. In June of the same year Father Hlinka was delegated to consecrate the church in Cernova. During one of his prison terms under the Hungarian regime, loather Hlinka translated the Old Testament of the Holy Bible into Slovak, and during another prison term he completed his "Apologia for Christianity" in Slovak. At the age of 55 he was arrested and imprisoned by �70 SLOVAKIA the "Czechoslovak" government for fighting the anti-clerica1ism of Czech rp oliticians, a drive to Czech-ize the Sfovaks and economioally force their submission. Rioting, demonstrations ,a nd the ele0tion ,b y the Slovaks of Hlinka to the "Czechoslova;k" Parliament necessitated 'his release from prison in 1920. It is true that as early as 1908 Fabher Hlinka looked to a union with the Moravians and Ozechs to strengthen the Slav position, with the understanding however, that the Slovaks would enjoy autonomy and cultural and political freedom. The Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 indicated that we in America agreed with what ouT brothers and ancestors in Slovakiia desired. However, once Masaryk and Benes were in power, Father Hlinka was chagrined to see that the Slovaks continued to be the victims of harsh discrimination in all phases of government, education and 'Public life. Diplomatic documents in the British archives attest to the errors of the Czech administration by corruption in public office, attempts to substitute Czech for the Slovak language, hostility of Czedh soldiers and officials to the Catholic Church, which included desecration and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, intemerence in marriages and similiaT offenses against the principles of culture and decency. It was also officially reported by the British Minister, Cecil Gosling, who witnessed conditions in Slovakia in late 1919, that Slovakia was flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if employed, they received from ½ to ¾ ~ess pay than the Czechs. The Benes-Masaryk intrigue led to .flirtini with and fawning over Rrussiain Communism and its religious, social and economic fallacies. Father Hlinka's h eart and soul were tormented ,b y the God-less and inhuman policies emamating from Prague and found it necessary to organize his Slova,k people for their own well-being, and his "Hlin:ka's People's Party" became a ,p olitical success in 1925. Protesting the activities and genocidal efforts first af the Magyars and then of the Czechs Father Hlinka became the savior of his people. He adopted as his motto "For God rand n at i o n" and showed whi:wt love of God and fuith in humanity can accmnrplish. One u1nfamiliar with S 1 o v a k ,feeling1S and sentiments may ~ why a priest should have to be the leader of his nation and participate �SLOVAKIA 71 in civic affairs - even unto degradation and imprisonment? The answer is simply that a Catholic priest takes ian oath to God to minister to the people and cannot countenance injustice or inhumanity. As a human •b eing man is worthy of dignity, respect and ,p ossesses the right to live a life worbhy of his reward in heaven. For over a thousand years under ,t:Jhe Magyaris, the only educated group were the priests - bhey were the healers of the mi111d as well as of the soul. The priests were the leaders, the counselors of the people in civic as well as in religious matters. It is true that while the past two generations of laity in SloV'akia produced an educated intelligentsia, in the years prior to World War I. our Slovak ancestors were serfs, peasants, yes, slaves of the soil owned by their ancestors. On the occasion of the death of Fr. Hlinka the American journalist, Stephen J. Palickar, wrote as follows (Jednota, August 24, 1938) : "Father 1Hlinka has departed from our midst, but his spirit has not. And while God in His Divine Providence has removed him in the .flower of his activity, we, of the loyal Slovaks, whether in Europe or America, will continue to use the spirit of Hllnka as an instrument of battle untll such time when the Slovaks have regained that whlol;I rightfully !belongs to them, namely, their freedom in the Fatherland of Slovensko." There are great Slovak leaders among our Catholic priests today, particularly in the U.S.A. and Canada, thougih they ·p refer to •h ave laymen lead in social and civic affairs, as witness the great fraternal orgianizations and prominent elected public officials. But we are graiteful for the initiative and zeal that serve as a pattern for us. Father Stephen Furdek founded the Slovak League of America in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 26, 1907. It has the greatest representation of Slovaks in the world today, and interesting to say, it is non-denominational, though Christian. Some 17 years earlier, Father Furdek had organized the First Catholic Slovak Union and a sister Jednota two years later. The spirit of Fr. Hlinka permeated Fr. Furdek, and that spirit of a "slovensky duch" can be seen in such men of cloth as Bishops Andrew G. Grutka, of Gary, Indiana, Paul Hnilica (Jesutt) of Rome and Michael Rusnak (Redemptorist) of Canada, Rt. Rev. Theodore G. Kojis (Benedictine Abbot), Cleveland, Rt. Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca. �72 SLOVAKIA (A:bbot), Monsignors Dubosh, Mlynarovic, Krasula, Petro, and many others. Another kindred spirit of Hlinka was found in Dr. Karol Kmefiko, who was appointed Archbishop of Nitra, in Slovakia, in 1944, which is the same ancient Nitra of which St. Methodius was first Archbishop over 1,000 years before. You will recall the brothers Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Slova:kia in 863 AD. These Arpostles were Greeks, but certainly Ohristlike in spirit in their love for the Slovaks, since they Christianized our Slovak ancestors and compiled an alphalbet from the linguistic sounds, which to this day is the basis of Slovak culture and civilization. Again an echo of Fr. Hlinka's words, Za Borhra a rnirod. No doubt any Slovak can think of dedicated Slovak priests whom he admires, respects, and loves. Three wonderfu!l priests who left their impreissfon on me through personal associiaJt.ion are Frs. Florian C. Bihly (Franciscan) of Lisbon Falls, Me., who pours out rhis heart and soul in Slovak sermons and songs; Andrew V. Pier (Benedictine) of the Abbey in Cleveland, a schol•ar, educator and prolific chronicler of "Slovakiama", and Gerald P. Brennan (Jesuit) of Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis., an Irishman who stimulated the students of Slovak ancestry to organize the Father Hlinka Club at Marquette in February of 1939, some six months after Father Hlinka's death in Slovakia. One of the first presidents of the Flather Hlinka Club was Joseph Labaj, then a journalism student, who shortly thereafter left us to enter the Jesuit novitiate and is todray "Father Joe" Labaj, S.J., ,t he principal of Marquette University High School, at Milwaukee. The Constitution of the Father Hlinka Club, signed by the student organizers on February 6, 1939, stated as its purpose : Catholic action among the Slovaik people to be accomplished with the cooperation of the SloV1a:k parish priests; and the statement of intention, Article 1, parag. 4 reads: "To counter a ct any subversive actiTities a mong our people which might tend to undermine their faith or ,the democratic principles of our governm e nt, a nd to expose and expla in any activities which might place our people in dangerous or embarrassing circumstances" . Marquette University approved the Faither Hlinka Club on February 14, 1939; it affiliated itself with Sodality �SLOVAKIA 73 activities, and the following month, on St. Piatrick's day, Dr. Raphael C. McCarthy, President of the University, accepted ,the offer and became the first 1honorary member of the Father Hlinka Club. Father McCarthy became enthusiastic wbout the aims of this Slovak Catholic students' group and predicted i,t would afford real laboratory training and develop leadersihip among the Slovak people. Since then numerous educators, lawyers, doctors, dentists, journalists and engineers have gone through the club. At ,the time the U.S.A. entered World War II, all nationality clubs were deacti\nated at Marquette with attendrunt difficulties in reorganizing later. Attorney John F. Spacek and Dr. Albert Nemcek, as M.U. students were early ,p ost-war presidents of the Father Hlinka Olub. Father Oasimir Cvercko, O.F.M. Conv., pastor of St. Stephen's (Slovak) Church in Milwaukee at that time, gave much encouragement to the M. U. Slovak students, ,and iit is recalled that one year the Hlinka Club entered a "float" and won first place in the clubs and societies division of the University Homecoming (football) parade. A "Father Hlinka Club Scholarship Fund" was started many years ago, to which the national Jednota and Sokol societies contributed money, insufficient, however, for a permanent scholarship, thereby necessitating only partial grants to Oathoiic students of Slovak origin or descent. A few years ago, this author recalls, Miss Carol Zvara of Milwaukee was publicized in the metropolitan press as recipient of ia Father Hlinka Scholarship grant, Which I 'believe to !have been merely ,a modest honorarium. At the present time the Father Hlinka Club is inactive, but with the help of Marquette Slovak alumni, iit can certainly be reactivated, and no doubt the Slovak people and Slovak societies throughout the U.S.A. would contribute funds to reinvigorate the :Blather Hlinka Club Scholarship Fund at Marquette University. The help would have to come from outside as most of our students there are present through the sacrifices of their Slov,ak ,parents and lack time for solicitation of funds for future scholars. We have since infancy heard our parents speak of "nasa mladez" and "buducnosf nasho slovenskeho naroda", i. e. our youth and the future of the Slovaks. The thought has been e~ressed that scholarship help should �74 SLOVAKIA be on a college level because nowadays public high schools are available to anyone of average intelligence, and that it is in college that leadership and professionalism can be developed for ,t he Slovaks. A recent aTtiC'le in Jednota by Daniel Tanzone, Jr., of Yonkers, N. Y., ,a high school senior of Slovak-Italian descent, tells Editor Krajsa of the interest 'he has in past and present Slova;k life, and pleads for the donation of Slovak books in English for the library of the good Slovak Sisters of SS CYTil and Method1us at the Slovak school of the Most Holy Trinity. This is a good example of a student of Slovak origin or descent, who should ,b e benefited by the Father Hlink<a Club Scholarship Fund. This young man has a real zeal for rhis Slovak ancestry which he expresses without shame or reservation. Konstantin Culen, journailist and authority on Slovak culture and political histOTy, a man who was schooled under the Magyar and Czech regimes, and who died in New York last year, credited American Slovaks with great influence, saying, "What the Slovaks brought frem America they sought to validate at home. The American way of life encouraged and dir ected their plans in Slovakia. Slovak life waxed strong even during the hardest times, because H was nourished materially and ideologically by a current of material and spiri,tual wea1th from America". Culen and Sidor, in the spirit of F'ather Hlin'ka were joined by the late Philip Hroba:k, an American of Slovak descent, an educator, a writer of materials rich in cultural, social, historical and political "Slovakiana". Hrobak was the first American leader, in 1957, to receive the Hlinka Silver Award. Is the Slovak heritage to be submerged? Is Slovak ancestry to be denied? Is Slovakia in Europe any less entitled to self-determined, self-governed statehood than any other nationality on earth? Scores of "new nations" have been recognized and added to the roster of the United Nations, but the Slov,ruks get little sympathy from the political sophisticates of today, ,p articularly those who show a peculiar affinity with the aims and ideals of the red tyrants of Russia. Well-meaning people would not deprive Slovaks of �SLOVARlA 75 their God-given rights, even if they never heard the word Slovak. Eleven hundred years ago, two non-Sloviak Greek brothers, Sts. Cyril and Methodius, recognized the rights of the Slovaks and compiled the ancient Cyrillic alphabet so that the people could extend and per,petuate their culture. 'l'he Greeks had a word for it as did Ohrist the Leader 863 years before, - "Teach ye all nations." Pope Paul VI, in speaking to a Slovia!k assemblage, led by the Slovak Bishop Andrew Grutka of Gary, gathered at the Vaticam on September 14, 1963, spoke to them as "dear Slovak children" and referred to their "centuries-old traditions." Further, the Pope lauded them: "Dear Sons of the Slovak nation, to our satisfaction and to our praise, for reasons already explained, allow us to add a werd of paternal recommendation - perseverance. Continue to cultivate the mem©ry, the cult, the imitaition of your Saints (Cyril and Methodius), who from the di-stant Middle Ages even now light the path along which the spirLt of the Slovak people must pass in our time and in the fut ure ... " And obviously aware of us over here, the Pope interjected: "We want to be mindful specially of the Slovak people resident in the United States of America ... " In his closing remarks, His Holiness said: "We will invoke the Sorrowful Mother whom the Slovaks consider their heavenly Patroness." Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the U.S., speaking for his brother, President John F. Kennedy, to the Slovak OatJholic Sokols at the July 14, 1963 gymnastics at Youngstown, Ohio, stated: "As a representative of the Un~ted States government, the President has asked me to tell you that ,the United !States rwill continue to support the jus,t aspirations of all people in the world for independenee and liberty - aspirations which the Slovaks share today with many other captive nations." Hon. Michael A. Feig,han, U.S. Representative from Ohio, addressing the Lakewood, Ohio Slovaks on Slovak Independence, last year, said: "Slovakia today suffers under the harsh heel of Ru ssian Communist occupation. That occupaJtion has sought to rob the Slovak people of their ancient traditions, their r eligious, aBd their heritage as well as their political liberties. But the Slovak people are steeled in ,their tactics which must be employed against a foreign. occupier. Time and the experience of centuries has prepared them well for �76 SLOVAKIA the tests they now endure. It Is !Lttle wond er that the . spirit of r esistance to ,tyranny runs so strong in !Slovakia today. The Russians as well as their rCzech quislings in Prague, know the power of Slovak national aspirations." On Easter of 1963, Pope John XXIII, spoke a greeting in "Slovaik" to be faithful, wherever they mig,ht live. In July of 1963, the St. Stephen's Catholic Social Club of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in a Commemorative publication then edited ,b y Mary Liptaik, quotes Bishop Walter W. CuTtis of Bridgeport, Conn. as exhorting: " . . . 1:Jhe task of keeping the fiaith in Slovakia and elsewhere does not rest only with the people of Slovak origin ... it belongs to everyone, regardless of national origin." Mrs. Mina Haas, present editor of the St. Stephen's Social Club Commentary, quotes U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, as pointedly reflecting that: " Th e U nited •States would be a poorer nation today, economically, intellectually, culturally and in every other way, if it we re not for the two milion of our citizens who are of Slovak bir th or ancestry." The above paragraphs are given as examples of nonSlovak intelligentsia who r ecognize the Slovaks. The spirited writer, Faither B. S. Bue (Franciscan), says Slovak nationalism in the U .S.A. is described as the condition of being of Slovak descent, and asks, "Do we prefer to be known as Slova:ks, or do we consider our Slovak nationality as an irritant from the past?" Father Bue cautions that we should not attempt to conceal our Slovail{ identity and that we should not abandon our Slovak roots. '!'hough Father Bue feels the Slovak language, native in Slovakia, but not the "native tongue" of the United States, is falling in usage through speedy Americanizaition, he does say we must foster the Slovak language, having in mind its promotion in our schools like any foreign language. This pr ogram of ,t eaching Slovak in colleges, high schools and grade schools is more apparent in the eastern United Stat es. Father Bue states, as we know, that prejudices exist among minority groups which psychologically may ciause an inferiority complex, the rapid solution by rationale may include subservience to a considered superior nil,tionalism, which confronts all ethnic groups in America. "As in the case of competition, so in regard to prejudice", says Father Bue, "weak characters manifest an inferiority complex and �SLOVAKIA 77 strong cha r ac te r s show greater res olu ten ess in accep ti ng thei r Godgiven na tiona l id entity ... L et us therefore w ork for t he p rese r vation and continuity of Slova k, a s a m a tter o! tru th , w isdom a nd justice." The above analysis makes an impact upon us adults of Slovak origin amd descent, but is it assuring enough for our youngsters of the third and fourth generations? Surely they are not all like D8.1Jlny Tanzone of Yonkers, New York, mentioned above. ~a,t will ha n to the Slovak schools, churche institutions until refurbished ·b S'1ovak immigration after the fall of the communist iron-curtain, ~ hic'h we feel God will decr..ee ? I spea:k of an insidious influence rancored •b r e ·udi e if not b actual intent 0Jnd desi against the Slovaks. We know of the attempted genocide under the Magyar rulers and - t lieBohemian politicians, but are we aware of the da r of non-Slovrul_{s who cleverly demoralize with snide remarks, uncomplimentary jokes, derisioo,inlluendo, - actually forcing us out of "'k ey posts in clubs, lodges, institutions and even churches! , Me&nwhil~, let us trust to our faith and the prevailing spirit of Father Hlinka among Slovak leaders, let us hold to o ur l•a n u e, our culture:-our ·institutions and let us be Slova f radle rave with the g ui ance of the Slovak L eague of .America. Joseph N. Misany REC OMMEN DEID RE}ADINGS: Slovak s of H u ngary, Th omas Capek, N. Y., 19 06. Scotus Viator (R. W . Seton-Watson), Racial Problems in Hunga r y, 1908. Hungar y a nd Her Successors, C. A. Macartney, Oxford Press , 193 7. Th e Slovak s, 1Peter P. Yurcha k, Whiting, Indiana, F r . Lach, 1946. Andrew H lin ka (Biogr a phy), K a rol Sidor, Br atislava/ J ednota P ress. Slovak ia an d Its People , ,Prof. Gilb er t L. Oddo, Slovak I nstitute. 2900 E. Blvd., Clevela nd, Ohio, 1960. Slova kia, - A Poli tical H is<tory (1918-50), J oseph A. Mikus , 1963, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee , Wis. Slovak ia, 1962, Dr. John R ek em, -Mid dl etown, Pa., Slova k League o! America. An Ou tline of Slovakia's Struggle fo r In depend ence, J . M. Kirsch ba um, 1964, Canadian Slovak League. Was Czech th e Veh icle of Slovak Liter ature? iPhilip A. Hrobak, 1962. Slovak Grammar, J . J . Konu s, P ittsburgh, 1939. Slovak Dictionary, Lessons, Grammar & Rea dillgs, J ednota Press (Hrobak) . Slovak Newspaper s and P er iodicals (U.S.A., Canada, Sou th America ); r efer Drs. J oseph P a 11.co, Joseph M. Kir schba u m, Konstantin Culen. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1965, Vol. 15 Description An account of the resource Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 68 SLOVAKIA FATHER ANDREW HLINKA - - An Unspent Martyr - A Slovak Soul on Slovak Soil - A Heart of Gold in a Humble Body A Leader of Men, Led by the Spirit of His People - Who is this man who after a quarter century is yet cherished in the memories of the young adult generation of Slovak descent ? Who is he, so loved by his contemporaries in Slovakia, whom he stiirred to zeal for the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God in a nation of their own choice? Who is the man that suffered humiliatioo and degradation to free the Slovaks from political and economic enslavement? 'J.'lhese questions are answerable in the life and activirties of Father Andrew Hlinka, born a Slovak peasant in the village of Cernova on September 27, 1864, and died a Monsignor of the Catholic Church on August 16, 1938, at the age of 74, in Ruzomberok, seven months before the Declaration of Independence of Slovrukia and its proclama~ tion to -the world of ia Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939. Father Hlinka did not live to see or participate in a selfgoverning, free and independent Slovakia, recognized •b y 27 countries from Rome through Russia. Nor did Father Hlinka live to see or experience the invasion of Slovakia by Communist armies in May of 1945, or the execution of his beloved friend and successor, Monsignor Joseph Tiso, the first President of Slovakia. For over 50 years Father Hlinka fought for the rights of the Slovaks - as people of self-determination, of civic, cultural and economic ·pursuit in which they were suppressed, first, before World War I by the Magyar overlords of Hungary in the Monarchy of ·Austria-Hungary, and then until 1938 entrapped in a ~ohemian political machine maneuvered by Thomas Masaryk and Edwar:a Benes in the newly created state of Czecho-Slovakia, in which the hyphen was deliberately deleted and the Slovaks proclaimed to be "Czechs" by their new masters. Just as there a SLOVAKIA 69 were Sloviaks who sold their birthrights to the Magyar overlords for political and economic privileges, so there were Slovaks who ran to the Czech ringmasters to be deJhyphenated and absorbed as "Czechoslovaks". But Father Hlinka was a true Slovak heart, soul and body, sufi'ering discouragement, humiliation, torment and imprisonment at the •h ands both of the Magyars and of the Czechs, and he epitomizes the Slovak in the history of the world. Karol Sidor concludes his biogra;phy of Father Hlinka with the following tribute: "There he stands as lhough less a mortal man than an enshrined symbol, as one not formed of earth's clay but woven of the noblest feelings and thoughts of man. Consequently, in Hlinka, each Slovak recognized himself and in every Slovak there was something of Hlinka , gilded with heroism, goodness, loyalty, courage, and the nobility of Hlinka's heart. Thus did Andrew Hlinka live, and thus will he remain as long as even one Slovak remains." At the age of twenty Hlinka was expelled from the seminary by the Hungarian authorities on charges of PanSlavism, of promoting the study of Slovak, both }anguage and literature, and of fostering loyalty to their ancestry among the Slovak seminarians. Later he was recalled and on June 19, 1889 1he was ordained a priest. In Cernova, the vmage of his birth, Hlinka helped and encouraged his people to erect a church, but he was not permitted to· participate in its consecration, for he was under suspension (unjustly) already a year and a half. The villagers, who had expected his reinstatement, held a demonstmtion in protest. Without warning the government ·gendarmes · fired into the crowd, killing fifteen persons and wounding several others. The incident is remembered as the Cernova Massacre of October 27, 1907. In March, 1909 the Vatican exonerated Hlinka, who was in prison at the time, and lifted the suspension. In June of the same year Father Hlinka was delegated to consecrate the church in Cernova. During one of his prison terms under the Hungarian regime, loather Hlinka translated the Old Testament of the Holy Bible into Slovak, and during another prison term he completed his "Apologia for Christianity" in Slovak. At the age of 55 he was arrested and imprisoned by 70 SLOVAKIA the "Czechoslovak" government for fighting the anti-clerica1ism of Czech rp oliticians, a drive to Czech-ize the Sfovaks and economioally force their submission. Rioting, demonstrations ,a nd the ele0tion ,b y the Slovaks of Hlinka to the "Czechoslova;k" Parliament necessitated 'his release from prison in 1920. It is true that as early as 1908 Fabher Hlinka looked to a union with the Moravians and Ozechs to strengthen the Slav position, with the understanding however, that the Slovaks would enjoy autonomy and cultural and political freedom. The Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 indicated that we in America agreed with what ouT brothers and ancestors in Slovakiia desired. However, once Masaryk and Benes were in power, Father Hlinka was chagrined to see that the Slovaks continued to be the victims of harsh discrimination in all phases of government, education and 'Public life. Diplomatic documents in the British archives attest to the errors of the Czech administration by corruption in public office, attempts to substitute Czech for the Slovak language, hostility of Czedh soldiers and officials to the Catholic Church, which included desecration and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, intemerence in marriages and similiaT offenses against the principles of culture and decency. It was also officially reported by the British Minister, Cecil Gosling, who witnessed conditions in Slovakia in late 1919, that Slovakia was flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if employed, they received from ½ to ¾ ~ess pay than the Czechs. The Benes-Masaryk intrigue led to .flirtini with and fawning over Rrussiain Communism and its religious, social and economic fallacies. Father Hlinka's h eart and soul were tormented ,b y the God-less and inhuman policies emamating from Prague and found it necessary to organize his Slova,k people for their own well-being, and his "Hlin:ka's People's Party" became a ,p olitical success in 1925. Protesting the activities and genocidal efforts first af the Magyars and then of the Czechs Father Hlinka became the savior of his people. He adopted as his motto "For God rand n at i o n" and showed whi:wt love of God and fuith in humanity can accmnrplish. One u1nfamiliar with S 1 o v a k ,feeling1S and sentiments may ~ why a priest should have to be the leader of his nation and participate SLOVAKIA 71 in civic affairs - even unto degradation and imprisonment? The answer is simply that a Catholic priest takes ian oath to God to minister to the people and cannot countenance injustice or inhumanity. As a human •b eing man is worthy of dignity, respect and ,p ossesses the right to live a life worbhy of his reward in heaven. For over a thousand years under ,t:Jhe Magyaris, the only educated group were the priests - bhey were the healers of the mi111d as well as of the soul. The priests were the leaders, the counselors of the people in civic as well as in religious matters. It is true that while the past two generations of laity in SloV'akia produced an educated intelligentsia, in the years prior to World War I. our Slovak ancestors were serfs, peasants, yes, slaves of the soil owned by their ancestors. On the occasion of the death of Fr. Hlinka the American journalist, Stephen J. Palickar, wrote as follows (Jednota, August 24, 1938) : "Father 1Hlinka has departed from our midst, but his spirit has not. And while God in His Divine Providence has removed him in the .flower of his activity, we, of the loyal Slovaks, whether in Europe or America, will continue to use the spirit of Hllnka as an instrument of battle untll such time when the Slovaks have regained that whlol;I rightfully !belongs to them, namely, their freedom in the Fatherland of Slovensko." There are great Slovak leaders among our Catholic priests today, particularly in the U.S.A. and Canada, thougih they ·p refer to •h ave laymen lead in social and civic affairs, as witness the great fraternal orgianizations and prominent elected public officials. But we are graiteful for the initiative and zeal that serve as a pattern for us. Father Stephen Furdek founded the Slovak League of America in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 26, 1907. It has the greatest representation of Slovaks in the world today, and interesting to say, it is non-denominational, though Christian. Some 17 years earlier, Father Furdek had organized the First Catholic Slovak Union and a sister Jednota two years later. The spirit of Fr. Hlinka permeated Fr. Furdek, and that spirit of a "slovensky duch" can be seen in such men of cloth as Bishops Andrew G. Grutka, of Gary, Indiana, Paul Hnilica (Jesutt) of Rome and Michael Rusnak (Redemptorist) of Canada, Rt. Rev. Theodore G. Kojis (Benedictine Abbot), Cleveland, Rt. Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca. 72 SLOVAKIA (A:bbot), Monsignors Dubosh, Mlynarovic, Krasula, Petro, and many others. Another kindred spirit of Hlinka was found in Dr. Karol Kmefiko, who was appointed Archbishop of Nitra, in Slovakia, in 1944, which is the same ancient Nitra of which St. Methodius was first Archbishop over 1,000 years before. You will recall the brothers Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Slova:kia in 863 AD. These Arpostles were Greeks, but certainly Ohristlike in spirit in their love for the Slovaks, since they Christianized our Slovak ancestors and compiled an alphalbet from the linguistic sounds, which to this day is the basis of Slovak culture and civilization. Again an echo of Fr. Hlinka's words, Za Borhra a rnirod. No doubt any Slovak can think of dedicated Slovak priests whom he admires, respects, and loves. Three wonderfu!l priests who left their impreissfon on me through personal associiaJt.ion are Frs. Florian C. Bihly (Franciscan) of Lisbon Falls, Me., who pours out rhis heart and soul in Slovak sermons and songs; Andrew V. Pier (Benedictine) of the Abbey in Cleveland, a schol•ar, educator and prolific chronicler of "Slovakiama", and Gerald P. Brennan (Jesuit) of Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis., an Irishman who stimulated the students of Slovak ancestry to organize the Father Hlinka Club at Marquette in February of 1939, some six months after Father Hlinka's death in Slovakia. One of the first presidents of the Flather Hlinka Club was Joseph Labaj, then a journalism student, who shortly thereafter left us to enter the Jesuit novitiate and is todray "Father Joe" Labaj, S.J., ,t he principal of Marquette University High School, at Milwaukee. The Constitution of the Father Hlinka Club, signed by the student organizers on February 6, 1939, stated as its purpose : Catholic action among the Slovaik people to be accomplished with the cooperation of the SloV1a:k parish priests; and the statement of intention, Article 1, parag. 4 reads: "To counter a ct any subversive actiTities a mong our people which might tend to undermine their faith or ,the democratic principles of our governm e nt, a nd to expose and expla in any activities which might place our people in dangerous or embarrassing circumstances" . Marquette University approved the Faither Hlinka Club on February 14, 1939; it affiliated itself with Sodality SLOVAKIA 73 activities, and the following month, on St. Piatrick's day, Dr. Raphael C. McCarthy, President of the University, accepted ,the offer and became the first 1honorary member of the Father Hlinka Club. Father McCarthy became enthusiastic wbout the aims of this Slovak Catholic students' group and predicted i,t would afford real laboratory training and develop leadersihip among the Slovak people. Since then numerous educators, lawyers, doctors, dentists, journalists and engineers have gone through the club. At ,the time the U.S.A. entered World War II, all nationality clubs were deacti\nated at Marquette with attendrunt difficulties in reorganizing later. Attorney John F. Spacek and Dr. Albert Nemcek, as M.U. students were early ,p ost-war presidents of the Father Hlinka Olub. Father Oasimir Cvercko, O.F.M. Conv., pastor of St. Stephen's (Slovak) Church in Milwaukee at that time, gave much encouragement to the M. U. Slovak students, ,and iit is recalled that one year the Hlinka Club entered a "float" and won first place in the clubs and societies division of the University Homecoming (football) parade. A "Father Hlinka Club Scholarship Fund" was started many years ago, to which the national Jednota and Sokol societies contributed money, insufficient, however, for a permanent scholarship, thereby necessitating only partial grants to Oathoiic students of Slovak origin or descent. A few years ago, this author recalls, Miss Carol Zvara of Milwaukee was publicized in the metropolitan press as recipient of ia Father Hlinka Scholarship grant, Which I 'believe to !have been merely ,a modest honorarium. At the present time the Father Hlinka Club is inactive, but with the help of Marquette Slovak alumni, iit can certainly be reactivated, and no doubt the Slovak people and Slovak societies throughout the U.S.A. would contribute funds to reinvigorate the :Blather Hlinka Club Scholarship Fund at Marquette University. The help would have to come from outside as most of our students there are present through the sacrifices of their Slov,ak ,parents and lack time for solicitation of funds for future scholars. We have since infancy heard our parents speak of "nasa mladez" and "buducnosf nasho slovenskeho naroda", i. e. our youth and the future of the Slovaks. The thought has been e~ressed that scholarship help should 74 SLOVAKIA be on a college level because nowadays public high schools are available to anyone of average intelligence, and that it is in college that leadership and professionalism can be developed for ,t he Slovaks. A recent aTtiC'le in Jednota by Daniel Tanzone, Jr., of Yonkers, N. Y., ,a high school senior of Slovak-Italian descent, tells Editor Krajsa of the interest 'he has in past and present Slova;k life, and pleads for the donation of Slovak books in English for the library of the good Slovak Sisters of SS CYTil and Method1us at the Slovak school of the Most Holy Trinity. This is a good example of a student of Slovak origin or descent, who should ,b e benefited by the Father Hlink<a Club Scholarship Fund. This young man has a real zeal for rhis Slovak ancestry which he expresses without shame or reservation. Konstantin Culen, journailist and authority on Slovak culture and political histOTy, a man who was schooled under the Magyar and Czech regimes, and who died in New York last year, credited American Slovaks with great influence, saying, "What the Slovaks brought frem America they sought to validate at home. The American way of life encouraged and dir ected their plans in Slovakia. Slovak life waxed strong even during the hardest times, because H was nourished materially and ideologically by a current of material and spiri,tual wea1th from America". Culen and Sidor, in the spirit of F'ather Hlin'ka were joined by the late Philip Hroba:k, an American of Slovak descent, an educator, a writer of materials rich in cultural, social, historical and political "Slovakiana". Hrobak was the first American leader, in 1957, to receive the Hlinka Silver Award. Is the Slovak heritage to be submerged? Is Slovak ancestry to be denied? Is Slovakia in Europe any less entitled to self-determined, self-governed statehood than any other nationality on earth? Scores of "new nations" have been recognized and added to the roster of the United Nations, but the Slov,ruks get little sympathy from the political sophisticates of today, ,p articularly those who show a peculiar affinity with the aims and ideals of the red tyrants of Russia. Well-meaning people would not deprive Slovaks of SLOVARlA 75 their God-given rights, even if they never heard the word Slovak. Eleven hundred years ago, two non-Sloviak Greek brothers, Sts. Cyril and Methodius, recognized the rights of the Slovaks and compiled the ancient Cyrillic alphabet so that the people could extend and per,petuate their culture. 'l'he Greeks had a word for it as did Ohrist the Leader 863 years before, - "Teach ye all nations." Pope Paul VI, in speaking to a Slovia!k assemblage, led by the Slovak Bishop Andrew Grutka of Gary, gathered at the Vaticam on September 14, 1963, spoke to them as "dear Slovak children" and referred to their "centuries-old traditions." Further, the Pope lauded them: "Dear Sons of the Slovak nation, to our satisfaction and to our praise, for reasons already explained, allow us to add a werd of paternal recommendation - perseverance. Continue to cultivate the mem©ry, the cult, the imitaition of your Saints (Cyril and Methodius), who from the di-stant Middle Ages even now light the path along which the spirLt of the Slovak people must pass in our time and in the fut ure ... " And obviously aware of us over here, the Pope interjected: "We want to be mindful specially of the Slovak people resident in the United States of America ... " In his closing remarks, His Holiness said: "We will invoke the Sorrowful Mother whom the Slovaks consider their heavenly Patroness." Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the U.S., speaking for his brother, President John F. Kennedy, to the Slovak OatJholic Sokols at the July 14, 1963 gymnastics at Youngstown, Ohio, stated: "As a representative of the Un~ted States government, the President has asked me to tell you that ,the United !States rwill continue to support the jus,t aspirations of all people in the world for independenee and liberty - aspirations which the Slovaks share today with many other captive nations." Hon. Michael A. Feig,han, U.S. Representative from Ohio, addressing the Lakewood, Ohio Slovaks on Slovak Independence, last year, said: "Slovakia today suffers under the harsh heel of Ru ssian Communist occupation. That occupaJtion has sought to rob the Slovak people of their ancient traditions, their r eligious, aBd their heritage as well as their political liberties. But the Slovak people are steeled in ,their tactics which must be employed against a foreign. occupier. Time and the experience of centuries has prepared them well for 76 SLOVAKIA the tests they now endure. It Is !Lttle wond er that the . spirit of r esistance to ,tyranny runs so strong in !Slovakia today. The Russians as well as their rCzech quislings in Prague, know the power of Slovak national aspirations." On Easter of 1963, Pope John XXIII, spoke a greeting in "Slovaik" to be faithful, wherever they mig,ht live. In July of 1963, the St. Stephen's Catholic Social Club of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in a Commemorative publication then edited ,b y Mary Liptaik, quotes Bishop Walter W. CuTtis of Bridgeport, Conn. as exhorting: " . . . 1:Jhe task of keeping the fiaith in Slovakia and elsewhere does not rest only with the people of Slovak origin ... it belongs to everyone, regardless of national origin." Mrs. Mina Haas, present editor of the St. Stephen's Social Club Commentary, quotes U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, as pointedly reflecting that: " Th e U nited •States would be a poorer nation today, economically, intellectually, culturally and in every other way, if it we re not for the two milion of our citizens who are of Slovak bir th or ancestry." The above paragraphs are given as examples of nonSlovak intelligentsia who r ecognize the Slovaks. The spirited writer, Faither B. S. Bue (Franciscan), says Slovak nationalism in the U .S.A. is described as the condition of being of Slovak descent, and asks, "Do we prefer to be known as Slova:ks, or do we consider our Slovak nationality as an irritant from the past?" Father Bue cautions that we should not attempt to conceal our Slovail{ identity and that we should not abandon our Slovak roots. '!'hough Father Bue feels the Slovak language, native in Slovakia, but not the "native tongue" of the United States, is falling in usage through speedy Americanizaition, he does say we must foster the Slovak language, having in mind its promotion in our schools like any foreign language. This pr ogram of ,t eaching Slovak in colleges, high schools and grade schools is more apparent in the eastern United Stat es. Father Bue states, as we know, that prejudices exist among minority groups which psychologically may ciause an inferiority complex, the rapid solution by rationale may include subservience to a considered superior nil,tionalism, which confronts all ethnic groups in America. "As in the case of competition, so in regard to prejudice", says Father Bue, "weak characters manifest an inferiority complex and SLOVAKIA 77 strong cha r ac te r s show greater res olu ten ess in accep ti ng thei r Godgiven na tiona l id entity ... L et us therefore w ork for t he p rese r vation and continuity of Slova k, a s a m a tter o! tru th , w isdom a nd justice." The above analysis makes an impact upon us adults of Slovak origin amd descent, but is it assuring enough for our youngsters of the third and fourth generations? Surely they are not all like D8.1Jlny Tanzone of Yonkers, New York, mentioned above. ~a,t will ha n to the Slovak schools, churche institutions until refurbished ·b S'1ovak immigration after the fall of the communist iron-curtain, ~ hic'h we feel God will decr..ee ? I spea:k of an insidious influence rancored •b r e ·udi e if not b actual intent 0Jnd desi against the Slovaks. We know of the attempted genocide under the Magyar rulers and - t lieBohemian politicians, but are we aware of the da r of non-Slovrul_{s who cleverly demoralize with snide remarks, uncomplimentary jokes, derisioo,inlluendo, - actually forcing us out of "'k ey posts in clubs, lodges, institutions and even churches! , Me&nwhil~, let us trust to our faith and the prevailing spirit of Father Hlinka among Slovak leaders, let us hold to o ur l•a n u e, our culture:-our ·institutions and let us be Slova f radle rave with the g ui ance of the Slovak L eague of .America. Joseph N. Misany REC OMMEN DEID RE}ADINGS: Slovak s of H u ngary, Th omas Capek, N. Y., 19 06. Scotus Viator (R. W . Seton-Watson), Racial Problems in Hunga r y, 1908. Hungar y a nd Her Successors, C. A. Macartney, Oxford Press , 193 7. Th e Slovak s, 1Peter P. Yurcha k, Whiting, Indiana, F r . Lach, 1946. Andrew H lin ka (Biogr a phy), K a rol Sidor, Br atislava/ J ednota P ress. Slovak ia an d Its People , ,Prof. Gilb er t L. Oddo, Slovak I nstitute. 2900 E. Blvd., Clevela nd, Ohio, 1960. Slova kia, - A Poli tical H is<tory (1918-50), J oseph A. Mikus , 1963, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee , Wis. Slovak ia, 1962, Dr. John R ek em, -Mid dl etown, Pa., Slova k League o! America. An Ou tline of Slovakia's Struggle fo r In depend ence, J . M. Kirsch ba um, 1964, Canadian Slovak League. Was Czech th e Veh icle of Slovak Liter ature? iPhilip A. Hrobak, 1962. Slovak Grammar, J . J . Konu s, P ittsburgh, 1939. Slovak Dictionary, Lessons, Grammar & Rea dillgs, J ednota Press (Hrobak) . Slovak Newspaper s and P er iodicals (U.S.A., Canada, Sou th America ); r efer Drs. J oseph P a 11.co, Joseph M. Kir schba u m, Konstantin Culen.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Father Andrew Hlinka Description An account of the resource Joseph N. Misany Slovakia, Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965 pp. 68-77 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Misany, Joseph N. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/937f986bc1dbfefde3d1b863b9010fed.pdf 81ffe9bd306ab625c3f9f7dfafb1b744 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 25 FATHER OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS By Si ster M . Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. The noisy night tra1n daittered out of Cleveland, Ohio. Its pa;sse:ngers -by tmns re'la.xed or braced tfuemselves in keepin1g with tihe jo1ti1Ilg ThytJhms of the orange-eyed monster as it spumed spat1ks and ,c inders and hurtled along the shiny rails toward Pennsylvania. Among the travelers, it ca·ITied a thougihllful priest wihose quiet eyes looked upon liife with a wisdom born of natural gifts and rich exiperience. 'l'he tr,ain ste adied itself to ain even speed. A conductor came down the aisle punohirng tiokets and as ihe took U!p Fatller's, the yehlow gleam from tfue ga:s jet ovet1head showed that it was daited early iJil September 1906 and was made ourt for Wilkes-Barre. '11he dim light also reveailed the identirf,ication tag on Father's traveling bag marked Rev. Stephen Furdek Our Lady of Lou'I'ldes Church Cleveland, Ohio For a few moments after the conductoT moved on, Father fingered the gold cross that huing from his watoh chain. Then he studied some letters and paipers from his porbfolio, and finally he reached into ihis pocket for his prayer beads. From early dhi:1dhood lh e had Oll'ltivated a m3/I'lked dev,otion to OuT Lady and he 1ha,d in her a sure refuge and he'lp in every need. He had grown up amid hardships and difificuUies of aH kinds ·b ut the wais not hurt or wa11ped lby them. In fact, crosses had only made him the stronger to endure more. Let us trace some of ihis growing-up days a:nd you wihl see fOT yourself. September 2, 1855 was the date of Stephen furdek's bir,tJh, and Tr,s tena in Orava County, 1Sloviakia, was the phaoe. In maiteTial resouTces Oreva ,is one of tlh.e poorest regions orf central Europe but it has given -tfue Slovak people a remairkaJble number orf intellectuails and leaders. Stephen Furdelk, too, 'becairne one of tihese grea,t men of his people, for God had fitted him for a parti!oohar work amd lh.e was reaidy when the time was right. His scholastic career was bri.ililianrt even from his ele- �26 SLOVAKIA merutaTy grades at the villaige sdhool where he was ta'l.tght by 1:Jhe Franciscans. For his ,hig1h school courses Stephen went to Bamska Bystrioa amd then to the gymnazium or senior high sdhool in Nitra. lt was m Nitra, too, tihat he begoo 'his semim.ary training for the priestlhood. Because of his outstandin1g success in phHosophy and -theology, howeveT, his bishop singled out Stephen FuTdek for special studies at tJhe univemity in Budapest. This 'hirg,h honor and distinction was especially gratifying to lris parents who were providi!ng for ihirs education at the cost of great sacrifice. Unfortunately, the young student took sick in Buda,pe,st and iha:d to return home. On recovering, he resumed hirs studies ·but he decided to Teturn to itlhe Nirtra seminary r-atiher tham ,to tlle university in Budapest. He <Xmcenrtrated on his lessoos 'but politiml troubles dirstu111bed the times very much and the spirit of unrest and hosthl:ity reached even into the seminary. ,Stephen Fu<rdek's tempernment preferred peace to contention. Y oll!Ilg as he was, he h,ad a sixth sense whiic:ih directed birm toward a tactful line of CO'lldruct, toward a decisiion wihioh would avoid tmUJble wiitlhout sia,crifici111g principle. Besi<les, he enjoyed the fatfuerly guidance of the Trstemiborn Dr. Martin Hattala, an eminent priest-philologist who was at tlhis time a professor of languages at ChaTles University in Pr-ague. Acti'lllg under these two iin:filuences, tJhe student Furdek withdrew from see1:1hirng Nitra. 'Dhis step demanded the sacrifice of ihis priestly ideal! but the ·s pirit of the times was such thaJt a SlovaJk patriot was denied the opportunity to complete his studies for professional work. 'Dhe overlords demanded that you eicf:lher tramsfex- your ai1legiamoe or surrender academic pur~suit. Ln leaving the semin,a.ry, Stephen did what he 1!hougiht was •r ight and he firmly trusted in God. FoT some time after he left Nitra, Furdek was a teacher in Stramirl.ce, MoraViia. This took him out of t!he region of trouble 1b ut his new work did not satisfy him. Realizing thaJt this was not really his vocation, he decided to return to 1his books. Perhaps he felt 1!hat iif he had to be denied the privfiledge of serving his people as a priest, he wOIU!ld .t ry to serve them as a fully ti,ained professionaJl, a specia:liized teaC'heT, pemaps one Hke Dr. Haittala whose distiinction it was to be both a priest and a teac!her. �SLOVAKIA 27 F,or tihree years F1t.mieJk diligently studied classical laJnguages and ,philology at OhaI'les Universiity. Dlll'ing this tirme he ibecame acquainted wiith Dr. Flrancis Bauer who was rector of the diocesan seminary in P,r ague amd was deslbined to •b ecome camdmaJl ar<fub1slhop of O1omoUJc in Moravia. Dr. Bauer saw ilrl the promising s.tudenit the greaiter promise of service for botJh God amd country. He advised Furdek .to Teturn to his seminary couTses and lh e suggested that it would be well for him to do so rig.ht there in Prague. F1uridek was haJppy to have this encouraigement. It retll!I'ned to him tJhe hope dearest ito his th eart and brought him oloser to its Tealiization. He followed Dr. Bauer's advice e8)gerly . .AJbout four years lateT, w!hen he was in hls last year of theology, FuTdek learned tlhat an urgent appe81l from America rea•o hed his superiors. lt 08)me from Bishop Riobard Gi:lrmour of Cleveland, Ohio, and eXJpressed ,h is concern foT the spirituaJ care of many Slavic immigrants lirvmg in his diocese wrthout a priest of their OWtil tongue to minister to their needs. Bishop GilmoUT ha;d written to severau European bishops amd to various religious orders beg,gi:ng for priests and for advanced students who wouid be ruble to finish their studies ilrl America 01nd serve these people in Christ's narrne. 'Dhis was a caJ!l for generous and missiona,rysouled worikers. Who would be foU1I1d willing to answer? Who would be qualified? Father Francis Sasinek, am eXJperiienced and soholtarly Slovak priest, recommended tJhe semi.nariam Furdek for this responsible work. Furrdek's superions at the seminary endorsed the recommenda:tion, for they knew that ,t his young man had 'tJhe spiTituaJ.ity and the tiauenrt:s to succeed in such an assig,nmenrt of pionem-ing for Ohrist among the immigramts in America. The prospects were ma:de known to him and though it cost muoh to part frcxm al!l that was so dear to him, Stephen Furdek generously mrade the sa,cr.iifice. It was tJhe g,uiding prindple of his lirfe to wol'k for God amd for country, and here is taJil'gilble proof tJhat he did not merely iderulize t,hat motto; he lived it wibh aU its implioations. He bade farewell to ,his famhly and friends in tJhe spring of 1882 and embanked for .America. By March 15 he w,as in Cleveland, strengtihened by itihe ,g ,ra,ce of God and seasoned by past hardships for whatever trials might lie in the years �28 SLOVAKIA aJhead. Jin tfuis new and wondel'fttl though still st'l'!all!ge world, he completed his studies in a few montlhs and was ordained by Bishop Gilmour in St. Wenceslaus Church on JUJly 1 of t!he same year. This was tJhe fulfillment of hi:s fondest dreams. For aibout ten months a;fter ordination, Father Furdek served as an assistant at St. Wenceslaus. At the same bme, however, he arranged for the Slova!ks of the area to attend Sunday mass offered by a non.,SloV1aJk Franciscan Father at St. Joseph's ohurch in Clevelailld where he himself would come every week to prea•ch, to inst'I'll'ct, and to hea:r confessions in Slovak. This 1kind of dual apostolate •becaJme FatJher Furdek's liifework. For all his priesi'ly yeiars dati:ng from April 1883 until his death on J ,a nuary 18, 1915, he was pastor of Our Lady of Lourdes par~sh which the bishop authori!zed him to organize, and he devoted hims~Lf to the care and guidance of countless Sloy,a•IDs throughout America. For what do we remeimbeT him most? He was an exemplary pr,iest, educator, leader, organizer, journalist, novelist, poet, paitriot - and he merited every one of these distmctions folly. Yet over and a:bove aill this, he was in the true sense of 1Jhe word t!he F'atJher of Amerioan Slovaks. He ha:d 'haroly orientiated h~mself i:n this adopted coootry when he reaJLized that his God.igiven mission extended beyond the immediate needs of the parish work that was a:ssi:gned to him. He always discharged his pastora.'l duties conscientiously ,but parish wonk was not hiiis one falent to be hidden safely m a napkin and retu:rmed to the Master at His coming. Fat!her Furdek was entrusted v,ivh mamy talents and he zealously trafficked with the much that had been g,iven him. Besides ,buildi:ng a maignificent church and a modem school of sixteen classrooms, besides managing all the interests of Our Lady of Lourdes parish and its sohool witlh an enrollment of a thousand pupils, Father Furdek heliped to organize many Slovruk parishes ·both in Clevelaind and in other widely scattered Slovak •s ettlements. The need of the hour was to help these Sloviak immigrants to achieve a sense of belongiiing, to giive them a bond of unity, to satisfy their spiriturul cravmg a.ind their sociail needs amd to educaJte tJhem. It was important to teach them cooperation in wmikiing for common i:nterests and mutual helpfuhl.ess. Solicitous F1ather �SLOVAKIA 29 of all the Slova:ks in America that he was, Father Furdek took each of these problems to heaTt and worked for its soliution. To iprovide priests for newly organized and organi,z ing panishes, Father Furdek undertook more th3Jn one trip to Slova,kia because both hiis bishop a,nd he realized that personal conta,ct would be more effectiv,e than any ot her type of solicitation. And he did succeed in interesting a number of worthy priests a,nd derics from abroad to come to these pioneer parishes a,mong the immigrants. But even wi1:Jh individuail parishes organized here and there a,s circumstances warranited it, the entire ,problem of the Slovak immigrant in America was not solved. Father Furdek in hi:s missionary travels among the people witnessed their efforts to for,m local fraternal and benefiicial societies. He saw a:lso that his countrymen needed to 1be safeguarded from leaders and movements that threatened their spiritua[ outlook while pretending to offer them materiaJl advantages. Before ,}ong he realized, too, that most of those newcomers were going to establish permanent homes in America; they needed to plan for a secure future and a wlholesome heritage for their posteriity :iin the new world. Riis keen vision sa,w 'beyond the immediate present, 0JS does every true leader's. Beg,inning wi:th a nucleus of pioneers in Clevela,nd, Father Furdek in 1890 founded a men's organization called the First Catholic Slova,k Union or the Jednota. Two years later a similia:r ladies' organization wa;s began. The Jecmota grew to be the largest Slovak fratemal bene£it organization in the world. It is also a strong pillar of Slova:k Ca,t;Jholicity in America. 'J1hrough it, Father Furdeik propag,ated the vivifying ti deal "For God and N ruti001." On this Chri:stiain prin~ ciple is formulated the entire philosophy a;nd structure of the Jednota aind this is what ,g ives tJhe body its stabi'Li:ty and strength. To a people making history in a la:nd where they were without traditions, without established precedent, it was essentiall to build wisely and well. Father Furdeik with his gift of vision prepared that ·b luepriint for them e~ceptiona1ly wel!l. His firm hut tactflllil leadershiip directed the early funmigrants toward healthy progress. 'Dhe Jeiooota pmvided aU tlhe ·benefits of a mutual aid society, it brought the mem- �30 SLOVAKIA hers of a local branch together for periodic meetings and conferences, it ,s pomored national conventions and its bylaws emphasrzed fidelity to reliigious duty. This was putting first thing,s first. Flather Furdelk repeatedly msisted that it was imperative for Cathollics to jom Catlholic societies because non-sectarian infiJ.uences, innocuous as they may seem to be, have a tendency to cool fervor and lead to indifference in the spiritual liife. AIS a matter of fuct, there were some sad instaJn ces to prove that suoh Hberallism even resulted in ag,nostici,s,m aJild free thinikling. These were the rugged days of early pioneering for great numbe11s of :immigrants. In theiT period of adjustment they were e~osed to both adva,ntJa:ges and <lis•a dvanta,ges. Men who 'had 'been iong suppressed and oppressed found themselves sudden,l y free amd they couM have leaned over too far, disregaroing or discoun:tin:g some forms of autJhority completely, claiming an Ulllcontro:J.lled emancipation. Father FuTdek's presence and influence among them was the needed leaven. Patiently and finnJ.y he worlked to balance their outlook. CourageQIUJS•l y he set himself again,s t tJhe forces that advocated a ,c omplete libera!l<tsm or secuffiarism, tJhat disregard for spiritual discipline that would have resulted in crass materialism. Wit'h the gnts of a !born tea·o her he rooched his people and restrained tJhem from becoming the victims of such errors. He saved them from tJhe influence of false ,l eaders and besides ta<king a necessa11Hy agressive stand in these ma;tters, he also stimll'lated lay acti'Vity. In teaching the meaning of 1iib erty, Father Furde'k stressed the opportunities wthich his peo'.)le should use here for self-improvement amd cultural adva;ncement. One year after founding the Jednota o:t1ganization, he launched tlhe J,ffiDNOTA weekly (1891) whi-dh 1became the offici~l organ of tJhe society. In 1896 at his own e~ense he gave his people their first JE}DNOTA iK:ALffiNDAiR, an annrua•l or a!hnanac. llil t his way :h e brought into the homes of ha:t1d-worlcing common people press materials whioh became a medium of culture and a weHspring of spiritual refreshment. The duties of editing and publicrution were his and althougih it meant a tremendous demand on his time, energy and talent to compose rund expedite a newspaper every week 8.llld a ri~h almanac every year, he aJSSumed this blll'den and responsibility in addition to his pastoral wook be- �SLOVAKIA 31 cause he knew how mu,~h the Slovairos in Ameriica needed such wholesome reading matter. He also invited quaJlirfied oontriibutors to send mainuscriipts and it was usually our priests both here and from aibr-oad wiho did sulbmit some exceHent articles for the Jednota publication. Slov,aJk immigr,ants with theiir new privilege of reading t!heir own newspapers in America were being instructed amd infoI1llled lb y them. A Jedinotar w,ho took up his copy alter a day's strenuous wcmk on the furm or in a mine, mill or factory, found relaxation and enjoyment in reading its columns. His Catholic weekly broug1ht him news items, editoriials, tJhe Sunday epistle amd gospel wiibh a homhly, e~lanations of the oatMhism and of tJhe Hturgical year, interesting lessons on :the duties and privileges of American citizenship, and a survey of American history presented eit!her topicaHy or serially or throug.h biographical sketches. Father Furdek's admiration for America and his devotion to the ideal of democr,acy prompted him to write on this subject repeatedly and to urge Slovaks in America to become natlurcli1irzed. His patriotism to two countries was baJlanced with an uneXJceiled nicety and with demoeratic expertness which 'he e~ressed very a:ptly in the poem "Amerika, zem velilka" ("America, Great Land") which was awarded first honors in a competition sponsored by P. V. Rovnianek. In th4:s poem Furdek sings the glories of America - her progress, her emancipation of the slave, her democracy, her greaJt native sons, her mothering of the oppressed who come to her shores, the opportunities she o:fifera to all witJhout discrimination. Then he voices a touohilllg apostrophe to his homeland, characterized by the snow-ca:pped Tatry, as if he wished to e~ress the assurance that the ocean may separate but it does not divide a loyial people. Poetically and neatly he arigues that a son still. loves his mother tJhoug,h he gives his heart to his wife, and that it is by just such a pa,ra'Hel that loyial emigrants love the land they left as well as the country of their adoption. 'Dhe more he studied the problems of the day, the more he became convinced that practica11y all the Slovak :immigrants in America were here to stay. This reaili2Jation made him aiH the more eager to he]Jp them :to become intelligent .American citizens, men and women capaible of a great love �32 SLOVAKIA for this democratic new wonld yet mindful and proud of their ancestry. He often reminded them to note how muoh ilm.iproved their living cO'llditions were here over w'ihat ~hey had been under the MaJgy,a r regime at home. He urged them to compare America's repulblicaJn fomn orf government with Hungary's despotism. He repeatedly pointed out that there is no subject class in this country aJnd 1Jhat ruH wiho enjoyed America's freedom have many opportunities to advance and improve themselves. Furdek's articles represented America as a great school w;here t!he iimmig:r,ant could learn out orf the book of actuaJ living amd doing. He pointed out that here even an unschooled SlovaJk w011ker learns rhow to mine ores, he comes to understand the intricacies amd 1:Jhe operation of simple and orf complex machines, he reads aind he learns from his newspapers, he travels free1y and cain master basic geography, he struggles with tJhe fanguage problem and everutua:lly he can come to sipea:k English as well a:s a teacher. In short, whatever he needs to know, he can learn in 1:Jhe scthool of Amerioan 1ife. Furdek thad am unlbound patriotism which is reflected in all his journaJlistic output. As a matter of fact, he was no mere journa:list; he was a pub1ioist who propagiated his open admiration aind devotion to America togetJher with a steady remembrance and love for Slovalkia. He forecast the Americanization of the Slovaks - not becaJUse America is a melting pot but because it is irmposs~ble for human life and thoug,ht to withsbrund the tide of change and the demands of reasona1ble adjustment. But he did not favor a sudden and complete sundering from home ties. Wisely he urged his people to preserve a love for ancestraJl roots and an appreciation of their national culture aJnd to transmit this devotion to future generations. It is not without cause that we look upon him ais the Father of American Slovaks. There was no problem of American Stlovak life that escruped his serious study and analysis. He took a definite stand in every sigmificant isSl\le and wherever the need required it, he was bhe spiI'itual a:dviser, prime mover, •a nd inspiration to thousands of people. His was a many-sided creatiwiess and 1he had a genius for keeping pace with the progress orf time. '!'he Jednota, whiclh he founded, preserved the ideals of Fu11dek because he himself �SLOVAKIA 33 was so deeply imbued with the spiriit which he imparted to it. It was a spirit which even reac'hed from America to Silovakia and supported national movements there. See him now as he blesses himself on finishing his rosary. He looks caJlm and untroubled but a heavy oross lies upon his heart. "How wiU this affair end?" he asks himself. Here he is coming to a rally intended to alleviate suffering abroad and to strengthen the spirit of his people on this new soil, aind yet this very ceil~ration threatens to brmg about undesirable Tesults. He and his brother.,priests have designated the gathering to which he is going as a Slovak Catho1ic Congress, but enemies - like the GOiSpel sowers of tares among the wheat - have been busy noi:sing it abroad that Father Furdek and his al'lies planned this mass meeting in order to launch a new heresy and to effect a schism of Slovak Catholics. And the wi1d rumor was reported officiail!ly even to the Apostolic Delegate in W a:sihimgton and to various bisihops and archbishops, urging t:Jhem to suspend and penalize all those priests wlho were in any way associa,ted with the affair. Father Furdek's name, namuraUy, led the rest in the list of tJhose who were marked to be proscribed. What was the outcome to 1be? The great S,lova1k Catholic Co'lligress took pla:ce on La:bor Day, September 3, 1906 in Wrl1kes-Barre. It attraoted oveT ten thousand Slovaks from all parts of Amedca and that in a day when traveling was time-consuming, tiresome, imconvenient, a:nd much of a humry for people wi1lh limited earnings. The program of tJhe day was planned to irndude religious services a1nd a series of addresses both in English and in Slovak on subjects of vital interest and conseque-nce to the Slovruk people. 1 Father Furdek arranged for representatives of the daily newspapers as well as editors of leading SlovaJk publications to be present in order to cover t'he story. Tihis would provide a greater circUJlation of reports on Slova1k matters among ,a little-informed American iputbHc as well as among an interested Slovruk audience. It was for this reasorn also that he arranged for notable American officiaJls and dignitaries to attend. It would be very he1pful to 'have tJhem become acquaimted with the Slovruk question. Bishop Hoban of Scranton had agreed to preside. �34 SLOVAKIA WihaJt was Fa!tlher Furdek to eX!pect of his plans now that such damaging stories were ma!king their rounds in o,nficia:l circles as well as among the common people? Would Bishop Hdban honor the occasion with rhis presence? And if he came, would it lbe to censure or to question or to approve tJhe true effort of Father Flurdek and his co-wo!1kers? One could not very welll iknow before hand. On the morning of the Congress, Father Furdek and Faltlher Murgas set out by horise and carriage for Sugar Notc'h where tJhey were to call for Bishop Hoban and drive Mm to the Congress. They went with mixed emotions but they were fortified by the consciousness of upright motives 0Jnd blameless conduct. Bislhop Hoban did not disaippoint them. He graciously accepted their offer of a ride and showed that he was eager to act as chairman of the event which they had prepared. As he mounted the carriage 8/Ild sat between the two priests, he put ithem at ease by p1ungilllg at once into the subject of their to:r,menting thoug,hts, the painful topic of the accusations whicih had 1been made against them. He discussed some of the charges at length and judiciously disposed of them. For inst8Jllce, he found it ridiculous that in America where liberty prevaiils someone shOU!ld giloaJt ilil laibeling them PianSlavs (because of their a:Megiance to tJheir native lamd. "I iknow yoUT people well, " Bishop Hdban said wit!h gentle UIIlderstanding in tJhe couTISe of itihi s conversation. Then as they were passing the Ashley ohurcih he added, "l built tfuis ohur,c'h when I was pastor here. Among my parishioners were m8/Ily Slova:k,s and I became wel!l. acquainted wiibh them. I have great sympathy for the SlovaJks." 1 "I am an American althoug;h my ancestors came from Irel81Ild," the Bishop continued as though he were marshalli!ng faots in a debate. "The Irish have a long history of political persecution; tlle Irish :kin.ow wlhat it is to be oppressed. I have great sympa:tJhy for every oppressed nation whetlher irt be Armeruam, Polish, kish or whatever it may be. There a,re many nationalities in my diocese and I do not discriminate. We are all OatJhoHcs." Bishop Hoban could not undel'Stand why the idea of Pan-Slav should figure in an indictment presented to eccles- �35 SLOVAKIA iastical superiors. "What has that to do wit'h it? fo America one may be a Pan-American; ilil Germany, let him wiho wishes ,b e a Pan-Gennam. It is no crime or sin to be a Pam-S[av. 'l'he term has political implication only." He was shrewd enoug,h to perceive that the charges which had ,been trumped up under c-lerical pretentiOIIlS were 1basicaJBy of a politicall nature and tha;t they were essentially distortions or gross misrepresentations. Im the course of this ride, Bishop Hobim also showed FaJther Furdek a communication from t!he Apostolic Delegate inqu~riD'g ililto the nature of the accusations. But Bishop Hoban assured both priests that he had already sent to Washington a complete report vindicating the acoused and exiplainililg the motives that had prompted 1:Jhe effort to foil 1:Jhe success of the Catholic Congress. And they were, in fact, extreme measures to which the p'lotJters had resorted. At the last moment they even tried to intimidate Bishop Hoban by sendililg him a telegram warning that his presence at the Silovak Catholic Congress wou[d reflect discredit UipOn t!he American Catholic hierarchy. But BiSlhop Hobam was not to be deterred by t!hreats. In fact, he justly resented the attempts to put pressure on him from un8Juthor1zed quarters. Becaiuse of Bishop Hoban's fundaJmental ohaTity for ahl, his sympathy for the downtrodden and his unbiased sense of democracy, the Catholic Congress of Slovak Americans was a more glorious event than even Father Furdek had hoped it would be. It wa•s a complete vindicatiO!Il of the priests who 'had ,b een maJligned and it was am unqoo:lified triumph for the Slova:k people. Bishop Hoban openly championed their cause, the press gave the even.rt fulil coverage, and the SlovaJk people themselves were iby this huge gatJhering more closely bound to one amother than they had ever been before. The manifestation was a Catiholic Congress but it attracted many Slovruk•s of other religious denominrutions, too, as well as from various fraternall orgaJnizations both Ca:tholic and non-sectarian. This triumph of September 3, 1906 marked a lmld of renaissamce in Slovak life on two continents and it inspired Father Fourdek to urge upon Slovaik leaders iJil publ-ic life the formation of a national SloV0Jk organizrution to unify 1 �36 SLOVAKIA the American effort on behalf of Slov,a;kia. The outcome was the S1ovaik League of America which iin time evolved from suClh pre1i1minary movements as Furdek's drive "Za tu nasu slovenicinu !" (Jin defense of the Slovak cause!) which netted some ten thousand doll,ars for 1:Jhe na,t ional aid in the home1a:nd; the National Fund which sUJbsidized at least two hundred Slovruk students abroad rund brought relief to very many Slovak political leaders ,t hen houinded by unjust persecution, a:nd the lawnching of "Indignation Meetings" or pwbli,c demonstrations throughout the United States in order to protest the injushce and 1:Jhe human cruelty which viotimiized the Slovak people in their own homeland. 'I1hese tokens of help from America re-vitaUzed the crushed spirit and the depleted energies of S1ova!k patriots who were driven almost to t:he brilllk of despair iin fueir efiforts to save Silova kia. Costly :fii:nes and unrelenting pressure were syistematicaUy draining their resources and counteracting their achievements. American interest and Americain slllpport were their only encouraigement and mainstay. FiinanciaJ help came from tJhe drives which were organized expressly to raise funds. Morrul support was won by the Indignation Raillies, seven of which were originally planned to be held in key cities of the United States. T:he first of these was arranged by Father Furdek in 0levelaind. 1 LiJke all of Father Furdek's projects, tMs Indignation RaHy, too, was staimped with his spirit. Jit was an inspired and an inspiring demonstration, and it set 1:Jhe pattern for similar puiblic meetings. It:s puripose was to publicize Slov,aJkia's grievances against autocratic Hungarian agression, to prove t:hat Hungary was not in reality that "islallld of liberty" in central Europe which it gloried in caiHing itself, and to solicit the sympathy and the understanding of true leaders of liberty among the Americam people. Outstanding representatives of Americain 1ife amd thought participated in these rallies. For example, at the Cleveland gathering held on February 10, 1907, a crupaoity audience in Gray's Armory gave speHbo·u nd attention to addresses delivered by Professor Bourine, by three attorneys, three priests, and seveml journailists. The American public and especially the American thinking :public was quickly beginning to see the truth. At the �37 SLOVAKIA same time, the f,ire of truth amd the justified indignarti<on orf all lovers of justice was rea,ching out among S'loV'aJks and non-Slo'V'aJks alike, to enkindJe effective means for the triumph of true Iiiberty and fairness. ~he time seemed to be right then for Father FuTdek to try again to efifect a nationwide unification of the Slovak people in America. He had attempted it before when he founded the Matica S•l ovenska, a cultural society which did not thrive lonig because new world cond~tions were not yet favo:r,a!ble for such am undertwkrng (1893). Thi:s newer effort originated at a Pittsburgh meeting of SlovaJk journalisrts convened at Fa,ther Furdek's iinvitation on April 7, 1907 where it wa,,s agreed to stage a SlovaJk Congress in May for the purpose of founding the Slovak League of America. The time was ausipi'Cious, the attitude was enthusiastic, the fruit of the movement was good. 1 The Slovak L eague of America became a civic and cultural organization with a dual objective: 1) to advaJnce American interests and security and 2) to create a better understanding and ruppredation of the islova•k nation - its history, culture, traditions, achievements, and its long, bitter struggle for freedom and autonomy. The first president of the Slovak League was Father Furdelk and he aJbly guided its interests and its efforts and helped to launch it very successfully upon its fruitful career. Furdek 's spirit of self-sacrifice and his relentless drive took :lwavy toH on his physical resources. He burned out his life young but the flame of his ardor would allow no sparing of self when there was so much to be done for God and nation, for bme and for eternity. And even when it was apparent that his energies were faiNng, he did not stop to think of himself. Always his dominant thought was for others and for the general good. Extensive traveling, constant literary production, frequent appearances as a pubEc spewker or a church preacher, steady devotion to the management of his parish, constant attention to the needs of his school and its advancement , concern for the welrfare of a,,11 his people - these and many related issues crowded his days and his nights. 1 It is difficult to realize how he managed such a rich and fruitful life, how he provided in it for projects of nat - �38 SLOVAKIA ionail scope and significance as weM as for close and immediate needs such as tJhe compiling of three textbooks, a gra,matiJka and two citamky of such S'lllperior practicail use and benefit thaJt they served .s everal generations with soUJDd advantage. He also experimented wibh a patented pedaJgogic,rul device for fille teadhring of a,:r,~tlhmetic. A,s early as 1906 Father Fur<lek had brought about officiail aotion for the founding of a home for oriphans. F\inaiHy in 1914 he had the joy of seeing such a home a reality ilrl Middletown, Pennsylv,ania where Phili,p and Mary Hroba!k of Lakewood, Ohio were the first children under J ednota care in a home manruged by tlhe S1isters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Father Furdeik was also deeply initerested in t!lris new Slovak Community of Sisters and he endorsed the efforts of the Jednota ovgani21ation to adv,am,ce it and its wovks. After 1912 FatJher Furoek's healit:Jh was so much on the declrine that hris vision became imiparirred. Yet he carnied on heroicailly and even shortly after the New Year 1915 he accepted an invitation to preacll at a Forty Hours' Devotion ;in LoraJin, Ohio. It wrus on his retmm fr.om t!his priestly servke that he suffered eX)posure in a wintry storm amd on January 18, 1915, in t!he fifty-lllinbh year of his life, the thirty-second of his priesthood, he was called to his eternal reward. Fi,fty thousand Jedn<Ybars and cowntless friends and adirniirers on both sides of the Ati1'amtic mourned his death. 1 The tvue greatness of Father Furdek is made more digtJin:ct to us as it stamds in the perspective of years since his death. T,he void left by his deparrture to etemal life has IIlever been fiiil.led, and we see now tJhat it was with prophetic appreciaition and with some degree of regrettruble lament that Father J anikola spdke 1:Jhese words in his euJlogy on t'he day orf Father Furdek's funeral, "We wiH never see his like again. Slovrukia shall not send us another Furdek; America wi:Jil not produce another." 1 The greaJtness of Father Furdek's achievements derives from fille gifts of hi:s mind rund Clharrucl:er not from a mere aiccident of circumstances. We have even now ,t he need for ArrneriJcan Slovruks of uncommon gifts and moral stature to foad on in a modem world of mrugni:fl1cent opport.ll!Ilities. We need leaders who are seers and doe11s, wtho can vi:talli:ze and �SLOVAKIA 3g inspire, who can hold before us the V1s1on and dispel our lethargy so that we American Slova!ks will want to :reaclh out for the attaiinment, will want to assert a pride of aincestry and a new hig,h of national greatness. But it has not been given us to have a second Furdelk in America. God grant that a younger geineration may pl'O'V'ide fuat in,s piration end greatness. As we survey Father FuTdek's place and his merits in American Slovalk history, we come to realize how well he deserves to be honored 8Jlld remembeTed as tlhe Father of American Sllovaks. BIBLIOGRAPHY Capek, Thomas, The Slovaks of Hungary. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1906. 214 pp. Cooke, Vincent, "Catholic Objectives in the Care of Children," Catholic Action, XXXII (May, 1950), 8. Culen Konlitantin, "American Slovaks and Slovak Statehood," Slovakia, I (May, 1951), 18. Culen, Konl;tantin, Slovcici v Amerike, Turciansky Sv. Martin, Slovakia, Matica Slovenska Press, 1938. 519 pp. Culen. Konstantin, "Stefan Furdek," Kultura, VII (September 1935), 377-386. Emerentia, Mother M., History of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Unpublished Master's thesis, Marywood College. Falcon, The, (Katolicky Sokol), Passaic, N. J ., July 5, 1944. Fortieth Anniversary Souvenir 1907-1947, Saints Cyril and Methodius Church, Bridgeport, Connecticut. Furdek, Stephen, Prvci Citanka pre Slovenske Skoly, Cleveland: Furdek, 1913. 125 pp. Furdek, Stephen, Druhci Citanka pre Slovenske Skoly, Cleveland: Furdek, 1913. 125 pp. Furdek, Stephen, "Hymna americkych Slovakov," Kalendcir Jednota, I (January, 1896), 22. Furdek, Stephen, Kalendcir Jednota, 19 Vol. (1896-1915 ). Furdek, Stephen, "Katolicka Jednota vo Spojenych Statoch," Kalendcir Jednota, I (1896 ), 26-37. Furdek, Stephen, "Katolicky Slovensky Kongress," Kalendcir Jednota, XII (1907), 145-155. Furdek, Stephen, "Keby nie jeho, nepotreboval by som dnes ziadneho -Ostavu," Kalendcir Jednota, (1914), 69. �40 SLOVAKIA Furdek, Stephen, Sv et a jeho zahady. Cleveland: Furdek, 1910. 250 pp. Hlinka, Andrew, "K jubileu striebornej konvencie Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty v Amerike," Kalendar Jednota, (1935) , 35. Hrobak, Philip, Ed., Editorial, Slov akia, I, (May, 1951). Hrobak, Philip, "The First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S.A. ," Slov ak Record, (September, 1943) . Rusek, Joseph, "K dvadsat'pat'rocnici I. Kat. Slov. Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, (January, 1916) 30-59. Rusek, Stephanie, "The Slovaks in America," Kalendar Jednota, Golden Jubilee, (September 2, 1940) 111-116. J ednota, Middletown, Pa., Dec. 17, 1913; Mar. 11, 1914; June 17, 1914; June 17, 1914; Sept. 23, 1914; Jan. 20, 1915; Jan. 27, 1915; Feb. 11, 1915; Apr. 24, 1935; June 18, 1952. K niha dejin Spolku sv. Jozefa, cislo 1. Z prilezitosti oslavy 50. rocneho jubileuma. Cleveland: 1939. Kozak, A. V., "-Ostav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, ( 1912) 19-24. Leech, George L. , Letter to First Catholic Slovak Union on the Occasion of Its Golden Jubilee, 1940. Liscinsky, John Method, "Katolicka Slovenska 2enska Jednota," ( 1911 ) 180-184. Martvon, John, "Autobiograficky nacrt," Kale ndar Jednota, Golden Jubilee, (September 2, 1940) 19. Mulcahy, George, "Life of Saints Cyril and Methodius," Radio Broadcast on Diocesan Catholic Hour, WHP, Feb. 13, 1940. Palickar, Stephen J., " Father Furdek, Leader," Commonweal, VI (June 8, 1927) 126. Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, "Kulturny Program Prvej Kat. Slov. Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, (1935) 31. Rovnianek, P . V., Zapi sky za ziva pochovaneho. Pittsburgh: Rovnianek Press, 1924. Slovak League of America, Editorial, "What Is It?" The Slov ak Digest, I, (November-December, 1946) . Slovak v Amerike, New York, N. Y., August 30, 1949. Spolok Panny Marie Ruzencovej , Z Dejin I .K.S.J. , Pamatnik Slavnej XVII. Konvencie I.K.S.J., (September, 1925), Scranton, Pa. Tybor, Caroline, " Slovak Language in Our Academy," Fialky, IV (December, 1924) 71-72. Yurchak, Peter J. , The Slovaks, Their History and Tradition, Whiting : John J . Lach, 1946. 278 pp. Zlamal, Oldrich, "Life of Reverend Stephen Furdek," Sixtieth Anniv ersary of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, (Svet Publishing Co. , Cleveland, Ohio) 1943. � SLOVAKIA 25 FATHER OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS By Si ster M . Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. The noisy night tra1n daittered out of Cleveland, Ohio. Its pa;sse:ngers -by tmns re'la.xed or braced tfuemselves in keepin1g with tihe jo1ti1Ilg ThytJhms of the orange-eyed monster as it spumed spat1ks and ,c inders and hurtled along the shiny rails toward Pennsylvania. Among the travelers, it ca·ITied a thougihllful priest wihose quiet eyes looked upon liife with a wisdom born of natural gifts and rich exiperience. 'l'he tr,ain ste adied itself to ain even speed. A conductor came down the aisle punohirng tiokets and as ihe took U!p Fatller's, the yehlow gleam from tfue ga:s jet ovet1head showed that it was daited early iJil September 1906 and was made ourt for Wilkes-Barre. '11he dim light also reveailed the identirf,ication tag on Father's traveling bag marked Rev. Stephen Furdek Our Lady of Lou'I'ldes Church Cleveland, Ohio For a few moments after the conductoT moved on, Father fingered the gold cross that huing from his watoh chain. Then he studied some letters and paipers from his porbfolio, and finally he reached into ihis pocket for his prayer beads. From early dhi:1dhood lh e had Oll'ltivated a m3/I'lked dev,otion to OuT Lady and he 1ha,d in her a sure refuge and he'lp in every need. He had grown up amid hardships and difificuUies of aH kinds ·b ut the wais not hurt or wa11ped lby them. In fact, crosses had only made him the stronger to endure more. Let us trace some of ihis growing-up days a:nd you wihl see fOT yourself. September 2, 1855 was the date of Stephen furdek's bir,tJh, and Tr,s tena in Orava County, 1Sloviakia, was the phaoe. In maiteTial resouTces Oreva ,is one of tlh.e poorest regions orf central Europe but it has given -tfue Slovak people a remairkaJble number orf intellectuails and leaders. Stephen Furdelk, too, 'becairne one of tihese grea,t men of his people, for God had fitted him for a parti!oohar work amd lh.e was reaidy when the time was right. His scholastic career was bri.ililianrt even from his ele- �26 SLOVAKIA merutaTy grades at the villaige sdhool where he was ta'l.tght by 1:Jhe Franciscans. For his ,hig1h school courses Stephen went to Bamska Bystrioa amd then to the gymnazium or senior high sdhool in Nitra. lt was m Nitra, too, tihat he begoo 'his semim.ary training for the priestlhood. Because of his outstandin1g success in phHosophy and -theology, howeveT, his bishop singled out Stephen FuTdek for special studies at tJhe univemity in Budapest. This 'hirg,h honor and distinction was especially gratifying to lris parents who were providi!ng for ihirs education at the cost of great sacrifice. Unfortunately, the young student took sick in Buda,pe,st and iha:d to return home. On recovering, he resumed hirs studies ·but he decided to Teturn to itlhe Nirtra seminary r-atiher tham ,to tlle university in Budapest. He <Xmcenrtrated on his lessoos 'but politiml troubles dirstu111bed the times very much and the spirit of unrest and hosthl:ity reached even into the seminary. ,Stephen Fu<rdek's tempernment preferred peace to contention. Y oll!Ilg as he was, he h,ad a sixth sense whiic:ih directed birm toward a tactful line of CO'lldruct, toward a decisiion wihioh would avoid tmUJble wiitlhout sia,crifici111g principle. Besi<les, he enjoyed the fatfuerly guidance of the Trstemiborn Dr. Martin Hattala, an eminent priest-philologist who was at tlhis time a professor of languages at ChaTles University in Pr-ague. Acti'lllg under these two iin:filuences, tJhe student Furdek withdrew from see1:1hirng Nitra. 'Dhis step demanded the sacrifice of ihis priestly ideal! but the ·s pirit of the times was such thaJt a SlovaJk patriot was denied the opportunity to complete his studies for professional work. 'Dhe overlords demanded that you eicf:lher tramsfex- your ai1legiamoe or surrender academic pur~suit. Ln leaving the semin,a.ry, Stephen did what he 1!hougiht was •r ight and he firmly trusted in God. FoT some time after he left Nitra, Furdek was a teacher in Stramirl.ce, MoraViia. This took him out of t!he region of trouble 1b ut his new work did not satisfy him. Realizing thaJt this was not really his vocation, he decided to return to 1his books. Perhaps he felt 1!hat iif he had to be denied the privfiledge of serving his people as a priest, he wOIU!ld .t ry to serve them as a fully ti,ained professionaJl, a specia:liized teaC'heT, pemaps one Hke Dr. Haittala whose distiinction it was to be both a priest and a teac!her. �SLOVAKIA 27 F,or tihree years F1t.mieJk diligently studied classical laJnguages and ,philology at OhaI'les Universiity. Dlll'ing this tirme he ibecame acquainted wiith Dr. Flrancis Bauer who was rector of the diocesan seminary in P,r ague amd was deslbined to •b ecome camdmaJl ar<fub1slhop of O1omoUJc in Moravia. Dr. Bauer saw ilrl the promising s.tudenit the greaiter promise of service for botJh God amd country. He advised Furdek .to Teturn to his seminary couTses and lh e suggested that it would be well for him to do so rig.ht there in Prague. F1uridek was haJppy to have this encouraigement. It retll!I'ned to him tJhe hope dearest ito his th eart and brought him oloser to its Tealiization. He followed Dr. Bauer's advice e8)gerly . .AJbout four years lateT, w!hen he was in hls last year of theology, FuTdek learned tlhat an urgent appe81l from America rea•o hed his superiors. lt 08)me from Bishop Riobard Gi:lrmour of Cleveland, Ohio, and eXJpressed ,h is concern foT the spirituaJ care of many Slavic immigrants lirvmg in his diocese wrthout a priest of their OWtil tongue to minister to their needs. Bishop GilmoUT ha;d written to severau European bishops amd to various religious orders beg,gi:ng for priests and for advanced students who wouid be ruble to finish their studies ilrl America 01nd serve these people in Christ's narrne. 'Dhis was a caJ!l for generous and missiona,rysouled worikers. Who would be foU1I1d willing to answer? Who would be qualified? Father Francis Sasinek, am eXJperiienced and soholtarly Slovak priest, recommended tJhe semi.nariam Furdek for this responsible work. Furrdek's superions at the seminary endorsed the recommenda:tion, for they knew that ,t his young man had 'tJhe spiTituaJ.ity and the tiauenrt:s to succeed in such an assig,nmenrt of pionem-ing for Ohrist among the immigramts in America. The prospects were ma:de known to him and though it cost muoh to part frcxm al!l that was so dear to him, Stephen Furdek generously mrade the sa,cr.iifice. It was tJhe g,uiding prindple of his lirfe to wol'k for God amd for country, and here is taJil'gilble proof tJhat he did not merely iderulize t,hat motto; he lived it wibh aU its implioations. He bade farewell to ,his famhly and friends in tJhe spring of 1882 and embanked for .America. By March 15 he w,as in Cleveland, strengtihened by itihe ,g ,ra,ce of God and seasoned by past hardships for whatever trials might lie in the years �28 SLOVAKIA aJhead. Jin tfuis new and wondel'fttl though still st'l'!all!ge world, he completed his studies in a few montlhs and was ordained by Bishop Gilmour in St. Wenceslaus Church on JUJly 1 of t!he same year. This was tJhe fulfillment of hi:s fondest dreams. For aibout ten months a;fter ordination, Father Furdek served as an assistant at St. Wenceslaus. At the same bme, however, he arranged for the Slova!ks of the area to attend Sunday mass offered by a non.,SloV1aJk Franciscan Father at St. Joseph's ohurch in Clevelailld where he himself would come every week to prea•ch, to inst'I'll'ct, and to hea:r confessions in Slovak. This 1kind of dual apostolate •becaJme FatJher Furdek's liifework. For all his priesi'ly yeiars dati:ng from April 1883 until his death on J ,a nuary 18, 1915, he was pastor of Our Lady of Lourdes par~sh which the bishop authori!zed him to organize, and he devoted hims~Lf to the care and guidance of countless Sloy,a•IDs throughout America. For what do we remeimbeT him most? He was an exemplary pr,iest, educator, leader, organizer, journalist, novelist, poet, paitriot - and he merited every one of these distmctions folly. Yet over and a:bove aill this, he was in the true sense of 1Jhe word t!he F'atJher of Amerioan Slovaks. He ha:d 'haroly orientiated h~mself i:n this adopted coootry when he reaJLized that his God.igiven mission extended beyond the immediate needs of the parish work that was a:ssi:gned to him. He always discharged his pastora.'l duties conscientiously ,but parish wonk was not hiiis one falent to be hidden safely m a napkin and retu:rmed to the Master at His coming. Fat!her Furdek was entrusted v,ivh mamy talents and he zealously trafficked with the much that had been g,iven him. Besides ,buildi:ng a maignificent church and a modem school of sixteen classrooms, besides managing all the interests of Our Lady of Lourdes parish and its sohool witlh an enrollment of a thousand pupils, Father Furdek heliped to organize many Slovruk parishes ·both in Clevelaind and in other widely scattered Slovak •s ettlements. The need of the hour was to help these Sloviak immigrants to achieve a sense of belongiiing, to giive them a bond of unity, to satisfy their spiriturul cravmg a.ind their sociail needs amd to educaJte tJhem. It was important to teach them cooperation in wmikiing for common i:nterests and mutual helpfuhl.ess. Solicitous F1ather �SLOVAKIA 29 of all the Slova:ks in America that he was, Father Furdek took each of these problems to heaTt and worked for its soliution. To iprovide priests for newly organized and organi,z ing panishes, Father Furdek undertook more th3Jn one trip to Slova,kia because both hiis bishop a,nd he realized that personal conta,ct would be more effectiv,e than any ot her type of solicitation. And he did succeed in interesting a number of worthy priests a,nd derics from abroad to come to these pioneer parishes a,mong the immigrants. But even wi1:Jh individuail parishes organized here and there a,s circumstances warranited it, the entire ,problem of the Slovak immigrant in America was not solved. Father Furdek in hi:s missionary travels among the people witnessed their efforts to for,m local fraternal and benefiicial societies. He saw a:lso that his countrymen needed to 1be safeguarded from leaders and movements that threatened their spiritua[ outlook while pretending to offer them materiaJl advantages. Before ,}ong he realized, too, that most of those newcomers were going to establish permanent homes in America; they needed to plan for a secure future and a wlholesome heritage for their posteriity :iin the new world. Riis keen vision sa,w 'beyond the immediate present, 0JS does every true leader's. Beg,inning wi:th a nucleus of pioneers in Clevela,nd, Father Furdek in 1890 founded a men's organization called the First Catholic Slova,k Union or the Jednota. Two years later a similia:r ladies' organization wa;s began. The Jecmota grew to be the largest Slovak fratemal bene£it organization in the world. It is also a strong pillar of Slova:k Ca,t;Jholicity in America. 'J1hrough it, Father Furdeik propag,ated the vivifying ti deal "For God and N ruti001." On this Chri:stiain prin~ ciple is formulated the entire philosophy a;nd structure of the Jednota aind this is what ,g ives tJhe body its stabi'Li:ty and strength. To a people making history in a la:nd where they were without traditions, without established precedent, it was essentiall to build wisely and well. Father Furdeik with his gift of vision prepared that ·b luepriint for them e~ceptiona1ly wel!l. His firm hut tactflllil leadershiip directed the early funmigrants toward healthy progress. 'Dhe Jeiooota pmvided aU tlhe ·benefits of a mutual aid society, it brought the mem- �30 SLOVAKIA hers of a local branch together for periodic meetings and conferences, it ,s pomored national conventions and its bylaws emphasrzed fidelity to reliigious duty. This was putting first thing,s first. Flather Furdelk repeatedly msisted that it was imperative for Cathollics to jom Catlholic societies because non-sectarian infiJ.uences, innocuous as they may seem to be, have a tendency to cool fervor and lead to indifference in the spiritual liife. AIS a matter of fuct, there were some sad instaJn ces to prove that suoh Hberallism even resulted in ag,nostici,s,m aJild free thinikling. These were the rugged days of early pioneering for great numbe11s of :immigrants. In theiT period of adjustment they were e~osed to both adva,ntJa:ges and <lis•a dvanta,ges. Men who 'had 'been iong suppressed and oppressed found themselves sudden,l y free amd they couM have leaned over too far, disregaroing or discoun:tin:g some forms of autJhority completely, claiming an Ulllcontro:J.lled emancipation. Father FuTdek's presence and influence among them was the needed leaven. Patiently and finnJ.y he worlked to balance their outlook. CourageQIUJS•l y he set himself again,s t tJhe forces that advocated a ,c omplete libera!l<tsm or secuffiarism, tJhat disregard for spiritual discipline that would have resulted in crass materialism. Wit'h the gnts of a !born tea·o her he rooched his people and restrained tJhem from becoming the victims of such errors. He saved them from tJhe influence of false ,l eaders and besides ta<king a necessa11Hy agressive stand in these ma;tters, he also stimll'lated lay acti'Vity. In teaching the meaning of 1iib erty, Father Furde'k stressed the opportunities wthich his peo'.)le should use here for self-improvement amd cultural adva;ncement. One year after founding the Jednota o:t1ganization, he launched tlhe J,ffiDNOTA weekly (1891) whi-dh 1became the offici~l organ of tJhe society. In 1896 at his own e~ense he gave his people their first JE}DNOTA iK:ALffiNDAiR, an annrua•l or a!hnanac. llil t his way :h e brought into the homes of ha:t1d-worlcing common people press materials whioh became a medium of culture and a weHspring of spiritual refreshment. The duties of editing and publicrution were his and althougih it meant a tremendous demand on his time, energy and talent to compose rund expedite a newspaper every week 8.llld a ri~h almanac every year, he aJSSumed this blll'den and responsibility in addition to his pastoral wook be- �SLOVAKIA 31 cause he knew how mu,~h the Slovairos in Ameriica needed such wholesome reading matter. He also invited quaJlirfied oontriibutors to send mainuscriipts and it was usually our priests both here and from aibr-oad wiho did sulbmit some exceHent articles for the Jednota publication. Slov,aJk immigr,ants with theiir new privilege of reading t!heir own newspapers in America were being instructed amd infoI1llled lb y them. A Jedinotar w,ho took up his copy alter a day's strenuous wcmk on the furm or in a mine, mill or factory, found relaxation and enjoyment in reading its columns. His Catholic weekly broug1ht him news items, editoriials, tJhe Sunday epistle amd gospel wiibh a homhly, e~lanations of the oatMhism and of tJhe Hturgical year, interesting lessons on :the duties and privileges of American citizenship, and a survey of American history presented eit!her topicaHy or serially or throug.h biographical sketches. Father Furdek's admiration for America and his devotion to the ideal of democr,acy prompted him to write on this subject repeatedly and to urge Slovaks in America to become natlurcli1irzed. His patriotism to two countries was baJlanced with an uneXJceiled nicety and with demoeratic expertness which 'he e~ressed very a:ptly in the poem "Amerika, zem velilka" ("America, Great Land") which was awarded first honors in a competition sponsored by P. V. Rovnianek. In th4:s poem Furdek sings the glories of America - her progress, her emancipation of the slave, her democracy, her greaJt native sons, her mothering of the oppressed who come to her shores, the opportunities she o:fifera to all witJhout discrimination. Then he voices a touohilllg apostrophe to his homeland, characterized by the snow-ca:pped Tatry, as if he wished to e~ress the assurance that the ocean may separate but it does not divide a loyial people. Poetically and neatly he arigues that a son still. loves his mother tJhoug,h he gives his heart to his wife, and that it is by just such a pa,ra'Hel that loyial emigrants love the land they left as well as the country of their adoption. 'Dhe more he studied the problems of the day, the more he became convinced that practica11y all the Slovak :immigrants in America were here to stay. This reaili2Jation made him aiH the more eager to he]Jp them :to become intelligent .American citizens, men and women capaible of a great love �32 SLOVAKIA for this democratic new wonld yet mindful and proud of their ancestry. He often reminded them to note how muoh ilm.iproved their living cO'llditions were here over w'ihat ~hey had been under the MaJgy,a r regime at home. He urged them to compare America's repulblicaJn fomn orf government with Hungary's despotism. He repeatedly pointed out that there is no subject class in this country aJnd 1Jhat ruH wiho enjoyed America's freedom have many opportunities to advance and improve themselves. Furdek's articles represented America as a great school w;here t!he iimmig:r,ant could learn out orf the book of actuaJ living amd doing. He pointed out that here even an unschooled SlovaJk w011ker learns rhow to mine ores, he comes to understand the intricacies amd 1:Jhe operation of simple and orf complex machines, he reads aind he learns from his newspapers, he travels free1y and cain master basic geography, he struggles with tJhe fanguage problem and everutua:lly he can come to sipea:k English as well a:s a teacher. In short, whatever he needs to know, he can learn in 1:Jhe scthool of Amerioan 1ife. Furdek thad am unlbound patriotism which is reflected in all his journaJlistic output. As a matter of fact, he was no mere journa:list; he was a pub1ioist who propagiated his open admiration aind devotion to America togetJher with a steady remembrance and love for Slovalkia. He forecast the Americanization of the Slovaks - not becaJUse America is a melting pot but because it is irmposs~ble for human life and thoug,ht to withsbrund the tide of change and the demands of reasona1ble adjustment. But he did not favor a sudden and complete sundering from home ties. Wisely he urged his people to preserve a love for ancestraJl roots and an appreciation of their national culture aJnd to transmit this devotion to future generations. It is not without cause that we look upon him ais the Father of American Slovaks. There was no problem of American Stlovak life that escruped his serious study and analysis. He took a definite stand in every sigmificant isSl\le and wherever the need required it, he was bhe spiI'itual a:dviser, prime mover, •a nd inspiration to thousands of people. His was a many-sided creatiwiess and 1he had a genius for keeping pace with the progress orf time. '!'he Jednota, whiclh he founded, preserved the ideals of Fu11dek because he himself �SLOVAKIA 33 was so deeply imbued with the spiriit which he imparted to it. It was a spirit which even reac'hed from America to Silovakia and supported national movements there. See him now as he blesses himself on finishing his rosary. He looks caJlm and untroubled but a heavy oross lies upon his heart. "How wiU this affair end?" he asks himself. Here he is coming to a rally intended to alleviate suffering abroad and to strengthen the spirit of his people on this new soil, aind yet this very ceil~ration threatens to brmg about undesirable Tesults. He and his brother.,priests have designated the gathering to which he is going as a Slovak Catho1ic Congress, but enemies - like the GOiSpel sowers of tares among the wheat - have been busy noi:sing it abroad that Father Furdek and his al'lies planned this mass meeting in order to launch a new heresy and to effect a schism of Slovak Catholics. And the wi1d rumor was reported officiail!ly even to the Apostolic Delegate in W a:sihimgton and to various bisihops and archbishops, urging t:Jhem to suspend and penalize all those priests wlho were in any way associa,ted with the affair. Father Furdek's name, namuraUy, led the rest in the list of tJhose who were marked to be proscribed. What was the outcome to 1be? The great S,lova1k Catholic Co'lligress took pla:ce on La:bor Day, September 3, 1906 in Wrl1kes-Barre. It attraoted oveT ten thousand Slovaks from all parts of Amedca and that in a day when traveling was time-consuming, tiresome, imconvenient, a:nd much of a humry for people wi1lh limited earnings. The program of tJhe day was planned to irndude religious services a1nd a series of addresses both in English and in Slovak on subjects of vital interest and conseque-nce to the Slovruk people. 1 Father Furdek arranged for representatives of the daily newspapers as well as editors of leading SlovaJk publications to be present in order to cover t'he story. Tihis would provide a greater circUJlation of reports on Slova1k matters among ,a little-informed American iputbHc as well as among an interested Slovruk audience. It was for this reasorn also that he arranged for notable American officiaJls and dignitaries to attend. It would be very he1pful to 'have tJhem become acquaimted with the Slovruk question. Bishop Hoban of Scranton had agreed to preside. �34 SLOVAKIA WihaJt was Fa!tlher Furdek to eX!pect of his plans now that such damaging stories were ma!king their rounds in o,nficia:l circles as well as among the common people? Would Bishop Hdban honor the occasion with rhis presence? And if he came, would it lbe to censure or to question or to approve tJhe true effort of Father Flurdek and his co-wo!1kers? One could not very welll iknow before hand. On the morning of the Congress, Father Furdek and Faltlher Murgas set out by horise and carriage for Sugar Notc'h where tJhey were to call for Bishop Hoban and drive Mm to the Congress. They went with mixed emotions but they were fortified by the consciousness of upright motives 0Jnd blameless conduct. Bislhop Hoban did not disaippoint them. He graciously accepted their offer of a ride and showed that he was eager to act as chairman of the event which they had prepared. As he mounted the carriage 8/Ild sat between the two priests, he put ithem at ease by p1ungilllg at once into the subject of their to:r,menting thoug,hts, the painful topic of the accusations whicih had 1been made against them. He discussed some of the charges at length and judiciously disposed of them. For inst8Jllce, he found it ridiculous that in America where liberty prevaiils someone shOU!ld giloaJt ilil laibeling them PianSlavs (because of their a:Megiance to tJheir native lamd. "I iknow yoUT people well, " Bishop Hdban said wit!h gentle UIIlderstanding in tJhe couTISe of itihi s conversation. Then as they were passing the Ashley ohurcih he added, "l built tfuis ohur,c'h when I was pastor here. Among my parishioners were m8/Ily Slova:k,s and I became wel!l. acquainted wiibh them. I have great sympathy for the SlovaJks." 1 "I am an American althoug;h my ancestors came from Irel81Ild," the Bishop continued as though he were marshalli!ng faots in a debate. "The Irish have a long history of political persecution; tlle Irish :kin.ow wlhat it is to be oppressed. I have great sympa:tJhy for every oppressed nation whetlher irt be Armeruam, Polish, kish or whatever it may be. There a,re many nationalities in my diocese and I do not discriminate. We are all OatJhoHcs." Bishop Hoban could not undel'Stand why the idea of Pan-Slav should figure in an indictment presented to eccles- �35 SLOVAKIA iastical superiors. "What has that to do wit'h it? fo America one may be a Pan-American; ilil Germany, let him wiho wishes ,b e a Pan-Gennam. It is no crime or sin to be a Pam-S[av. 'l'he term has political implication only." He was shrewd enoug,h to perceive that the charges which had ,been trumped up under c-lerical pretentiOIIlS were 1basicaJBy of a politicall nature and tha;t they were essentially distortions or gross misrepresentations. Im the course of this ride, Bishop Hobim also showed FaJther Furdek a communication from t!he Apostolic Delegate inqu~riD'g ililto the nature of the accusations. But Bishop Hoban assured both priests that he had already sent to Washington a complete report vindicating the acoused and exiplainililg the motives that had prompted 1:Jhe effort to foil 1:Jhe success of the Catholic Congress. And they were, in fact, extreme measures to which the p'lotJters had resorted. At the last moment they even tried to intimidate Bishop Hoban by sendililg him a telegram warning that his presence at the Silovak Catholic Congress wou[d reflect discredit UipOn t!he American Catholic hierarchy. But BiSlhop Hobam was not to be deterred by t!hreats. In fact, he justly resented the attempts to put pressure on him from un8Juthor1zed quarters. Becaiuse of Bishop Hoban's fundaJmental ohaTity for ahl, his sympathy for the downtrodden and his unbiased sense of democracy, the Catholic Congress of Slovak Americans was a more glorious event than even Father Furdek had hoped it would be. It wa•s a complete vindicatiO!Il of the priests who 'had ,b een maJligned and it was am unqoo:lified triumph for the Slova:k people. Bishop Hoban openly championed their cause, the press gave the even.rt fulil coverage, and the SlovaJk people themselves were iby this huge gatJhering more closely bound to one amother than they had ever been before. The manifestation was a Catiholic Congress but it attracted many Slovruk•s of other religious denominrutions, too, as well as from various fraternall orgaJnizations both Ca:tholic and non-sectarian. This triumph of September 3, 1906 marked a lmld of renaissamce in Slovak life on two continents and it inspired Father Fourdek to urge upon Slovaik leaders iJil publ-ic life the formation of a national SloV0Jk organizrution to unify 1 �36 SLOVAKIA the American effort on behalf of Slov,a;kia. The outcome was the S1ovaik League of America which iin time evolved from suClh pre1i1minary movements as Furdek's drive "Za tu nasu slovenicinu !" (Jin defense of the Slovak cause!) which netted some ten thousand doll,ars for 1:Jhe na,t ional aid in the home1a:nd; the National Fund which sUJbsidized at least two hundred Slovruk students abroad rund brought relief to very many Slovak political leaders ,t hen houinded by unjust persecution, a:nd the lawnching of "Indignation Meetings" or pwbli,c demonstrations throughout the United States in order to protest the injushce and 1:Jhe human cruelty which viotimiized the Slovak people in their own homeland. 'I1hese tokens of help from America re-vitaUzed the crushed spirit and the depleted energies of S1ova!k patriots who were driven almost to t:he brilllk of despair iin fueir efiforts to save Silova kia. Costly :fii:nes and unrelenting pressure were syistematicaUy draining their resources and counteracting their achievements. American interest and Americain slllpport were their only encouraigement and mainstay. FiinanciaJ help came from tJhe drives which were organized expressly to raise funds. Morrul support was won by the Indignation Raillies, seven of which were originally planned to be held in key cities of the United States. T:he first of these was arranged by Father Furdek in 0levelaind. 1 LiJke all of Father Furdek's projects, tMs Indignation RaHy, too, was staimped with his spirit. Jit was an inspired and an inspiring demonstration, and it set 1:Jhe pattern for similar puiblic meetings. It:s puripose was to publicize Slov,aJkia's grievances against autocratic Hungarian agression, to prove t:hat Hungary was not in reality that "islallld of liberty" in central Europe which it gloried in caiHing itself, and to solicit the sympathy and the understanding of true leaders of liberty among the Americam people. Outstanding representatives of Americain 1ife amd thought participated in these rallies. For example, at the Cleveland gathering held on February 10, 1907, a crupaoity audience in Gray's Armory gave speHbo·u nd attention to addresses delivered by Professor Bourine, by three attorneys, three priests, and seveml journailists. The American public and especially the American thinking :public was quickly beginning to see the truth. At the �37 SLOVAKIA same time, the f,ire of truth amd the justified indignarti<on orf all lovers of justice was rea,ching out among S'loV'aJks and non-Slo'V'aJks alike, to enkindJe effective means for the triumph of true Iiiberty and fairness. ~he time seemed to be right then for Father FuTdek to try again to efifect a nationwide unification of the Slovak people in America. He had attempted it before when he founded the Matica S•l ovenska, a cultural society which did not thrive lonig because new world cond~tions were not yet favo:r,a!ble for such am undertwkrng (1893). Thi:s newer effort originated at a Pittsburgh meeting of SlovaJk journalisrts convened at Fa,ther Furdek's iinvitation on April 7, 1907 where it wa,,s agreed to stage a SlovaJk Congress in May for the purpose of founding the Slovak League of America. The time was ausipi'Cious, the attitude was enthusiastic, the fruit of the movement was good. 1 The Slovak L eague of America became a civic and cultural organization with a dual objective: 1) to advaJnce American interests and security and 2) to create a better understanding and ruppredation of the islova•k nation - its history, culture, traditions, achievements, and its long, bitter struggle for freedom and autonomy. The first president of the Slovak League was Father Furdelk and he aJbly guided its interests and its efforts and helped to launch it very successfully upon its fruitful career. Furdek 's spirit of self-sacrifice and his relentless drive took :lwavy toH on his physical resources. He burned out his life young but the flame of his ardor would allow no sparing of self when there was so much to be done for God and nation, for bme and for eternity. And even when it was apparent that his energies were faiNng, he did not stop to think of himself. Always his dominant thought was for others and for the general good. Extensive traveling, constant literary production, frequent appearances as a pubEc spewker or a church preacher, steady devotion to the management of his parish, constant attention to the needs of his school and its advancement , concern for the welrfare of a,,11 his people - these and many related issues crowded his days and his nights. 1 It is difficult to realize how he managed such a rich and fruitful life, how he provided in it for projects of nat - �38 SLOVAKIA ionail scope and significance as weM as for close and immediate needs such as tJhe compiling of three textbooks, a gra,matiJka and two citamky of such S'lllperior practicail use and benefit thaJt they served .s everal generations with soUJDd advantage. He also experimented wibh a patented pedaJgogic,rul device for fille teadhring of a,:r,~tlhmetic. A,s early as 1906 Father Fur<lek had brought about officiail aotion for the founding of a home for oriphans. F\inaiHy in 1914 he had the joy of seeing such a home a reality ilrl Middletown, Pennsylv,ania where Phili,p and Mary Hroba!k of Lakewood, Ohio were the first children under J ednota care in a home manruged by tlhe S1isters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Father Furdeik was also deeply initerested in t!lris new Slovak Community of Sisters and he endorsed the efforts of the Jednota ovgani21ation to adv,am,ce it and its wovks. After 1912 FatJher Furoek's healit:Jh was so much on the declrine that hris vision became imiparirred. Yet he carnied on heroicailly and even shortly after the New Year 1915 he accepted an invitation to preacll at a Forty Hours' Devotion ;in LoraJin, Ohio. It wrus on his retmm fr.om t!his priestly servke that he suffered eX)posure in a wintry storm amd on January 18, 1915, in t!he fifty-lllinbh year of his life, the thirty-second of his priesthood, he was called to his eternal reward. Fi,fty thousand Jedn<Ybars and cowntless friends and adirniirers on both sides of the Ati1'amtic mourned his death. 1 The tvue greatness of Father Furdek is made more digtJin:ct to us as it stamds in the perspective of years since his death. T,he void left by his deparrture to etemal life has IIlever been fiiil.led, and we see now tJhat it was with prophetic appreciaition and with some degree of regrettruble lament that Father J anikola spdke 1:Jhese words in his euJlogy on t'he day orf Father Furdek's funeral, "We wiH never see his like again. Slovrukia shall not send us another Furdek; America wi:Jil not produce another." 1 The greaJtness of Father Furdek's achievements derives from fille gifts of hi:s mind rund Clharrucl:er not from a mere aiccident of circumstances. We have even now ,t he need for ArrneriJcan Slovruks of uncommon gifts and moral stature to foad on in a modem world of mrugni:fl1cent opport.ll!Ilities. We need leaders who are seers and doe11s, wtho can vi:talli:ze and �SLOVAKIA 3g inspire, who can hold before us the V1s1on and dispel our lethargy so that we American Slova!ks will want to :reaclh out for the attaiinment, will want to assert a pride of aincestry and a new hig,h of national greatness. But it has not been given us to have a second Furdelk in America. God grant that a younger geineration may pl'O'V'ide fuat in,s piration end greatness. As we survey Father FuTdek's place and his merits in American Slovalk history, we come to realize how well he deserves to be honored 8Jlld remembeTed as tlhe Father of American Sllovaks. BIBLIOGRAPHY Capek, Thomas, The Slovaks of Hungary. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1906. 214 pp. Cooke, Vincent, "Catholic Objectives in the Care of Children," Catholic Action, XXXII (May, 1950), 8. Culen Konlitantin, "American Slovaks and Slovak Statehood," Slovakia, I (May, 1951), 18. Culen, Konl;tantin, Slovcici v Amerike, Turciansky Sv. Martin, Slovakia, Matica Slovenska Press, 1938. 519 pp. Culen. Konstantin, "Stefan Furdek," Kultura, VII (September 1935), 377-386. Emerentia, Mother M., History of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Unpublished Master's thesis, Marywood College. Falcon, The, (Katolicky Sokol), Passaic, N. J ., July 5, 1944. Fortieth Anniversary Souvenir 1907-1947, Saints Cyril and Methodius Church, Bridgeport, Connecticut. Furdek, Stephen, Prvci Citanka pre Slovenske Skoly, Cleveland: Furdek, 1913. 125 pp. Furdek, Stephen, Druhci Citanka pre Slovenske Skoly, Cleveland: Furdek, 1913. 125 pp. Furdek, Stephen, "Hymna americkych Slovakov," Kalendcir Jednota, I (January, 1896), 22. Furdek, Stephen, Kalendcir Jednota, 19 Vol. (1896-1915 ). Furdek, Stephen, "Katolicka Jednota vo Spojenych Statoch," Kalendcir Jednota, I (1896 ), 26-37. Furdek, Stephen, "Katolicky Slovensky Kongress," Kalendcir Jednota, XII (1907), 145-155. Furdek, Stephen, "Keby nie jeho, nepotreboval by som dnes ziadneho -Ostavu," Kalendcir Jednota, (1914), 69. �40 SLOVAKIA Furdek, Stephen, Sv et a jeho zahady. Cleveland: Furdek, 1910. 250 pp. Hlinka, Andrew, "K jubileu striebornej konvencie Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty v Amerike," Kalendar Jednota, (1935) , 35. Hrobak, Philip, Ed., Editorial, Slov akia, I, (May, 1951). Hrobak, Philip, "The First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S.A. ," Slov ak Record, (September, 1943) . Rusek, Joseph, "K dvadsat'pat'rocnici I. Kat. Slov. Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, (January, 1916) 30-59. Rusek, Stephanie, "The Slovaks in America," Kalendar Jednota, Golden Jubilee, (September 2, 1940) 111-116. J ednota, Middletown, Pa., Dec. 17, 1913; Mar. 11, 1914; June 17, 1914; June 17, 1914; Sept. 23, 1914; Jan. 20, 1915; Jan. 27, 1915; Feb. 11, 1915; Apr. 24, 1935; June 18, 1952. K niha dejin Spolku sv. Jozefa, cislo 1. Z prilezitosti oslavy 50. rocneho jubileuma. Cleveland: 1939. Kozak, A. V., "-Ostav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, ( 1912) 19-24. Leech, George L. , Letter to First Catholic Slovak Union on the Occasion of Its Golden Jubilee, 1940. Liscinsky, John Method, "Katolicka Slovenska 2enska Jednota," ( 1911 ) 180-184. Martvon, John, "Autobiograficky nacrt," Kale ndar Jednota, Golden Jubilee, (September 2, 1940) 19. Mulcahy, George, "Life of Saints Cyril and Methodius," Radio Broadcast on Diocesan Catholic Hour, WHP, Feb. 13, 1940. Palickar, Stephen J., " Father Furdek, Leader," Commonweal, VI (June 8, 1927) 126. Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, "Kulturny Program Prvej Kat. Slov. Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, (1935) 31. Rovnianek, P . V., Zapi sky za ziva pochovaneho. Pittsburgh: Rovnianek Press, 1924. Slovak League of America, Editorial, "What Is It?" The Slov ak Digest, I, (November-December, 1946) . Slovak v Amerike, New York, N. Y., August 30, 1949. Spolok Panny Marie Ruzencovej , Z Dejin I .K.S.J. , Pamatnik Slavnej XVII. Konvencie I.K.S.J., (September, 1925), Scranton, Pa. Tybor, Caroline, " Slovak Language in Our Academy," Fialky, IV (December, 1924) 71-72. Yurchak, Peter J. , The Slovaks, Their History and Tradition, Whiting : John J . Lach, 1946. 278 pp. Zlamal, Oldrich, "Life of Reverend Stephen Furdek," Sixtieth Anniv ersary of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, (Svet Publishing Co. , Cleveland, Ohio) 1943. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1966, Vol. 16 Description An account of the resource Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 25 FATHER OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS By Si ster M . Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. The noisy night tra1n daittered out of Cleveland, Ohio. Its pa;sse:ngers -by tmns re'la.xed or braced tfuemselves in keepin1g with tihe jo1ti1Ilg ThytJhms of the orange-eyed monster as it spumed spat1ks and ,c inders and hurtled along the shiny rails toward Pennsylvania. Among the travelers, it ca·ITied a thougihllful priest wihose quiet eyes looked upon liife with a wisdom born of natural gifts and rich exiperience. 'l'he tr,ain ste adied itself to ain even speed. A conductor came down the aisle punohirng tiokets and as ihe took U!p Fatller's, the yehlow gleam from tfue ga:s jet ovet1head showed that it was daited early iJil September 1906 and was made ourt for Wilkes-Barre. '11he dim light also reveailed the identirf,ication tag on Father's traveling bag marked Rev. Stephen Furdek Our Lady of Lou'I'ldes Church Cleveland, Ohio For a few moments after the conductoT moved on, Father fingered the gold cross that huing from his watoh chain. Then he studied some letters and paipers from his porbfolio, and finally he reached into ihis pocket for his prayer beads. From early dhi:1dhood lh e had Oll'ltivated a m3/I'lked dev,otion to OuT Lady and he 1ha,d in her a sure refuge and he'lp in every need. He had grown up amid hardships and difificuUies of aH kinds ·b ut the wais not hurt or wa11ped lby them. In fact, crosses had only made him the stronger to endure more. Let us trace some of ihis growing-up days a:nd you wihl see fOT yourself. September 2, 1855 was the date of Stephen furdek's bir,tJh, and Tr,s tena in Orava County, 1Sloviakia, was the phaoe. In maiteTial resouTces Oreva ,is one of tlh.e poorest regions orf central Europe but it has given -tfue Slovak people a remairkaJble number orf intellectuails and leaders. Stephen Furdelk, too, 'becairne one of tihese grea,t men of his people, for God had fitted him for a parti!oohar work amd lh.e was reaidy when the time was right. His scholastic career was bri.ililianrt even from his ele- 26 SLOVAKIA merutaTy grades at the villaige sdhool where he was ta'l.tght by 1:Jhe Franciscans. For his ,hig1h school courses Stephen went to Bamska Bystrioa amd then to the gymnazium or senior high sdhool in Nitra. lt was m Nitra, too, tihat he begoo 'his semim.ary training for the priestlhood. Because of his outstandin1g success in phHosophy and -theology, howeveT, his bishop singled out Stephen FuTdek for special studies at tJhe univemity in Budapest. This 'hirg,h honor and distinction was especially gratifying to lris parents who were providi!ng for ihirs education at the cost of great sacrifice. Unfortunately, the young student took sick in Buda,pe,st and iha:d to return home. On recovering, he resumed hirs studies ·but he decided to Teturn to itlhe Nirtra seminary r-atiher tham ,to tlle university in Budapest. He <Xmcenrtrated on his lessoos 'but politiml troubles dirstu111bed the times very much and the spirit of unrest and hosthl:ity reached even into the seminary. ,Stephen Fu<rdek's tempernment preferred peace to contention. Y oll!Ilg as he was, he h,ad a sixth sense whiic:ih directed birm toward a tactful line of CO'lldruct, toward a decisiion wihioh would avoid tmUJble wiitlhout sia,crifici111g principle. Besi<les, he enjoyed the fatfuerly guidance of the Trstemiborn Dr. Martin Hattala, an eminent priest-philologist who was at tlhis time a professor of languages at ChaTles University in Pr-ague. Acti'lllg under these two iin:filuences, tJhe student Furdek withdrew from see1:1hirng Nitra. 'Dhis step demanded the sacrifice of ihis priestly ideal! but the ·s pirit of the times was such thaJt a SlovaJk patriot was denied the opportunity to complete his studies for professional work. 'Dhe overlords demanded that you eicf:lher tramsfex- your ai1legiamoe or surrender academic pur~suit. Ln leaving the semin,a.ry, Stephen did what he 1!hougiht was •r ight and he firmly trusted in God. FoT some time after he left Nitra, Furdek was a teacher in Stramirl.ce, MoraViia. This took him out of t!he region of trouble 1b ut his new work did not satisfy him. Realizing thaJt this was not really his vocation, he decided to return to 1his books. Perhaps he felt 1!hat iif he had to be denied the privfiledge of serving his people as a priest, he wOIU!ld .t ry to serve them as a fully ti,ained professionaJl, a specia:liized teaC'heT, pemaps one Hke Dr. Haittala whose distiinction it was to be both a priest and a teac!her. SLOVAKIA 27 F,or tihree years F1t.mieJk diligently studied classical laJnguages and ,philology at OhaI'les Universiity. Dlll'ing this tirme he ibecame acquainted wiith Dr. Flrancis Bauer who was rector of the diocesan seminary in P,r ague amd was deslbined to •b ecome camdmaJl ar<fub1slhop of O1omoUJc in Moravia. Dr. Bauer saw ilrl the promising s.tudenit the greaiter promise of service for botJh God amd country. He advised Furdek .to Teturn to his seminary couTses and lh e suggested that it would be well for him to do so rig.ht there in Prague. F1uridek was haJppy to have this encouraigement. It retll!I'ned to him tJhe hope dearest ito his th eart and brought him oloser to its Tealiization. He followed Dr. Bauer's advice e8)gerly . .AJbout four years lateT, w!hen he was in hls last year of theology, FuTdek learned tlhat an urgent appe81l from America rea•o hed his superiors. lt 08)me from Bishop Riobard Gi:lrmour of Cleveland, Ohio, and eXJpressed ,h is concern foT the spirituaJ care of many Slavic immigrants lirvmg in his diocese wrthout a priest of their OWtil tongue to minister to their needs. Bishop GilmoUT ha;d written to severau European bishops amd to various religious orders beg,gi:ng for priests and for advanced students who wouid be ruble to finish their studies ilrl America 01nd serve these people in Christ's narrne. 'Dhis was a caJ!l for generous and missiona,rysouled worikers. Who would be foU1I1d willing to answer? Who would be qualified? Father Francis Sasinek, am eXJperiienced and soholtarly Slovak priest, recommended tJhe semi.nariam Furdek for this responsible work. Furrdek's superions at the seminary endorsed the recommenda:tion, for they knew that ,t his young man had 'tJhe spiTituaJ.ity and the tiauenrt:s to succeed in such an assig,nmenrt of pionem-ing for Ohrist among the immigramts in America. The prospects were ma:de known to him and though it cost muoh to part frcxm al!l that was so dear to him, Stephen Furdek generously mrade the sa,cr.iifice. It was tJhe g,uiding prindple of his lirfe to wol'k for God amd for country, and here is taJil'gilble proof tJhat he did not merely iderulize t,hat motto; he lived it wibh aU its implioations. He bade farewell to ,his famhly and friends in tJhe spring of 1882 and embanked for .America. By March 15 he w,as in Cleveland, strengtihened by itihe ,g ,ra,ce of God and seasoned by past hardships for whatever trials might lie in the years 28 SLOVAKIA aJhead. Jin tfuis new and wondel'fttl though still st'l'!all!ge world, he completed his studies in a few montlhs and was ordained by Bishop Gilmour in St. Wenceslaus Church on JUJly 1 of t!he same year. This was tJhe fulfillment of hi:s fondest dreams. For aibout ten months a;fter ordination, Father Furdek served as an assistant at St. Wenceslaus. At the same bme, however, he arranged for the Slova!ks of the area to attend Sunday mass offered by a non.,SloV1aJk Franciscan Father at St. Joseph's ohurch in Clevelailld where he himself would come every week to prea•ch, to inst'I'll'ct, and to hea:r confessions in Slovak. This 1kind of dual apostolate •becaJme FatJher Furdek's liifework. For all his priesi'ly yeiars dati:ng from April 1883 until his death on J ,a nuary 18, 1915, he was pastor of Our Lady of Lourdes par~sh which the bishop authori!zed him to organize, and he devoted hims~Lf to the care and guidance of countless Sloy,a•IDs throughout America. For what do we remeimbeT him most? He was an exemplary pr,iest, educator, leader, organizer, journalist, novelist, poet, paitriot - and he merited every one of these distmctions folly. Yet over and a:bove aill this, he was in the true sense of 1Jhe word t!he F'atJher of Amerioan Slovaks. He ha:d 'haroly orientiated h~mself i:n this adopted coootry when he reaJLized that his God.igiven mission extended beyond the immediate needs of the parish work that was a:ssi:gned to him. He always discharged his pastora.'l duties conscientiously ,but parish wonk was not hiiis one falent to be hidden safely m a napkin and retu:rmed to the Master at His coming. Fat!her Furdek was entrusted v,ivh mamy talents and he zealously trafficked with the much that had been g,iven him. Besides ,buildi:ng a maignificent church and a modem school of sixteen classrooms, besides managing all the interests of Our Lady of Lourdes parish and its sohool witlh an enrollment of a thousand pupils, Father Furdek heliped to organize many Slovruk parishes ·both in Clevelaind and in other widely scattered Slovak •s ettlements. The need of the hour was to help these Sloviak immigrants to achieve a sense of belongiiing, to giive them a bond of unity, to satisfy their spiriturul cravmg a.ind their sociail needs amd to educaJte tJhem. It was important to teach them cooperation in wmikiing for common i:nterests and mutual helpfuhl.ess. Solicitous F1ather SLOVAKIA 29 of all the Slova:ks in America that he was, Father Furdek took each of these problems to heaTt and worked for its soliution. To iprovide priests for newly organized and organi,z ing panishes, Father Furdek undertook more th3Jn one trip to Slova,kia because both hiis bishop a,nd he realized that personal conta,ct would be more effectiv,e than any ot her type of solicitation. And he did succeed in interesting a number of worthy priests a,nd derics from abroad to come to these pioneer parishes a,mong the immigrants. But even wi1:Jh individuail parishes organized here and there a,s circumstances warranited it, the entire ,problem of the Slovak immigrant in America was not solved. Father Furdek in hi:s missionary travels among the people witnessed their efforts to for,m local fraternal and benefiicial societies. He saw a:lso that his countrymen needed to 1be safeguarded from leaders and movements that threatened their spiritua[ outlook while pretending to offer them materiaJl advantages. Before ,}ong he realized, too, that most of those newcomers were going to establish permanent homes in America; they needed to plan for a secure future and a wlholesome heritage for their posteriity :iin the new world. Riis keen vision sa,w 'beyond the immediate present, 0JS does every true leader's. Beg,inning wi:th a nucleus of pioneers in Clevela,nd, Father Furdek in 1890 founded a men's organization called the First Catholic Slova,k Union or the Jednota. Two years later a similia:r ladies' organization wa;s began. The Jecmota grew to be the largest Slovak fratemal bene£it organization in the world. It is also a strong pillar of Slova:k Ca,t;Jholicity in America. 'J1hrough it, Father Furdeik propag,ated the vivifying ti deal "For God and N ruti001." On this Chri:stiain prin~ ciple is formulated the entire philosophy a;nd structure of the Jednota aind this is what ,g ives tJhe body its stabi'Li:ty and strength. To a people making history in a la:nd where they were without traditions, without established precedent, it was essentiall to build wisely and well. Father Furdeik with his gift of vision prepared that ·b luepriint for them e~ceptiona1ly wel!l. His firm hut tactflllil leadershiip directed the early funmigrants toward healthy progress. 'Dhe Jeiooota pmvided aU tlhe ·benefits of a mutual aid society, it brought the mem- 30 SLOVAKIA hers of a local branch together for periodic meetings and conferences, it ,s pomored national conventions and its bylaws emphasrzed fidelity to reliigious duty. This was putting first thing,s first. Flather Furdelk repeatedly msisted that it was imperative for Cathollics to jom Catlholic societies because non-sectarian infiJ.uences, innocuous as they may seem to be, have a tendency to cool fervor and lead to indifference in the spiritual liife. AIS a matter of fuct, there were some sad instaJn ces to prove that suoh Hberallism even resulted in ag,nostici,s,m aJild free thinikling. These were the rugged days of early pioneering for great numbe11s of :immigrants. In theiT period of adjustment they were e~osed to both adva,ntJa:ges and <lis•a dvanta,ges. Men who 'had 'been iong suppressed and oppressed found themselves sudden,l y free amd they couM have leaned over too far, disregaroing or discoun:tin:g some forms of autJhority completely, claiming an Ulllcontro:J.lled emancipation. Father FuTdek's presence and influence among them was the needed leaven. Patiently and finnJ.y he worlked to balance their outlook. CourageQIUJS•l y he set himself again,s t tJhe forces that advocated a ,c omplete libera!l<tsm or secuffiarism, tJhat disregard for spiritual discipline that would have resulted in crass materialism. Wit'h the gnts of a !born tea·o her he rooched his people and restrained tJhem from becoming the victims of such errors. He saved them from tJhe influence of false ,l eaders and besides ta<king a necessa11Hy agressive stand in these ma;tters, he also stimll'lated lay acti'Vity. In teaching the meaning of 1iib erty, Father Furde'k stressed the opportunities wthich his peo'.)le should use here for self-improvement amd cultural adva;ncement. One year after founding the Jednota o:t1ganization, he launched tlhe J,ffiDNOTA weekly (1891) whi-dh 1became the offici~l organ of tJhe society. In 1896 at his own e~ense he gave his people their first JE}DNOTA iK:ALffiNDAiR, an annrua•l or a!hnanac. llil t his way :h e brought into the homes of ha:t1d-worlcing common people press materials whioh became a medium of culture and a weHspring of spiritual refreshment. The duties of editing and publicrution were his and althougih it meant a tremendous demand on his time, energy and talent to compose rund expedite a newspaper every week 8.llld a ri~h almanac every year, he aJSSumed this blll'den and responsibility in addition to his pastoral wook be- SLOVAKIA 31 cause he knew how mu,~h the Slovairos in Ameriica needed such wholesome reading matter. He also invited quaJlirfied oontriibutors to send mainuscriipts and it was usually our priests both here and from aibr-oad wiho did sulbmit some exceHent articles for the Jednota publication. Slov,aJk immigr,ants with theiir new privilege of reading t!heir own newspapers in America were being instructed amd infoI1llled lb y them. A Jedinotar w,ho took up his copy alter a day's strenuous wcmk on the furm or in a mine, mill or factory, found relaxation and enjoyment in reading its columns. His Catholic weekly broug1ht him news items, editoriials, tJhe Sunday epistle amd gospel wiibh a homhly, e~lanations of the oatMhism and of tJhe Hturgical year, interesting lessons on :the duties and privileges of American citizenship, and a survey of American history presented eit!her topicaHy or serially or throug.h biographical sketches. Father Furdek's admiration for America and his devotion to the ideal of democr,acy prompted him to write on this subject repeatedly and to urge Slovaks in America to become natlurcli1irzed. His patriotism to two countries was baJlanced with an uneXJceiled nicety and with demoeratic expertness which 'he e~ressed very a:ptly in the poem "Amerika, zem velilka" ("America, Great Land") which was awarded first honors in a competition sponsored by P. V. Rovnianek. In th4:s poem Furdek sings the glories of America - her progress, her emancipation of the slave, her democracy, her greaJt native sons, her mothering of the oppressed who come to her shores, the opportunities she o:fifera to all witJhout discrimination. Then he voices a touohilllg apostrophe to his homeland, characterized by the snow-ca:pped Tatry, as if he wished to e~ress the assurance that the ocean may separate but it does not divide a loyial people. Poetically and neatly he arigues that a son still. loves his mother tJhoug,h he gives his heart to his wife, and that it is by just such a pa,ra'Hel that loyial emigrants love the land they left as well as the country of their adoption. 'Dhe more he studied the problems of the day, the more he became convinced that practica11y all the Slovak :immigrants in America were here to stay. This reaili2Jation made him aiH the more eager to he]Jp them :to become intelligent .American citizens, men and women capaible of a great love 32 SLOVAKIA for this democratic new wonld yet mindful and proud of their ancestry. He often reminded them to note how muoh ilm.iproved their living cO'llditions were here over w'ihat ~hey had been under the MaJgy,a r regime at home. He urged them to compare America's repulblicaJn fomn orf government with Hungary's despotism. He repeatedly pointed out that there is no subject class in this country aJnd 1Jhat ruH wiho enjoyed America's freedom have many opportunities to advance and improve themselves. Furdek's articles represented America as a great school w;here t!he iimmig:r,ant could learn out orf the book of actuaJ living amd doing. He pointed out that here even an unschooled SlovaJk w011ker learns rhow to mine ores, he comes to understand the intricacies amd 1:Jhe operation of simple and orf complex machines, he reads aind he learns from his newspapers, he travels free1y and cain master basic geography, he struggles with tJhe fanguage problem and everutua:lly he can come to sipea:k English as well a:s a teacher. In short, whatever he needs to know, he can learn in 1:Jhe scthool of Amerioan 1ife. Furdek thad am unlbound patriotism which is reflected in all his journaJlistic output. As a matter of fact, he was no mere journa:list; he was a pub1ioist who propagiated his open admiration aind devotion to America togetJher with a steady remembrance and love for Slovalkia. He forecast the Americanization of the Slovaks - not becaJUse America is a melting pot but because it is irmposs~ble for human life and thoug,ht to withsbrund the tide of change and the demands of reasona1ble adjustment. But he did not favor a sudden and complete sundering from home ties. Wisely he urged his people to preserve a love for ancestraJl roots and an appreciation of their national culture aJnd to transmit this devotion to future generations. It is not without cause that we look upon him ais the Father of American Slovaks. There was no problem of American Stlovak life that escruped his serious study and analysis. He took a definite stand in every sigmificant isSl\le and wherever the need required it, he was bhe spiI'itual a:dviser, prime mover, •a nd inspiration to thousands of people. His was a many-sided creatiwiess and 1he had a genius for keeping pace with the progress orf time. '!'he Jednota, whiclh he founded, preserved the ideals of Fu11dek because he himself SLOVAKIA 33 was so deeply imbued with the spiriit which he imparted to it. It was a spirit which even reac'hed from America to Silovakia and supported national movements there. See him now as he blesses himself on finishing his rosary. He looks caJlm and untroubled but a heavy oross lies upon his heart. "How wiU this affair end?" he asks himself. Here he is coming to a rally intended to alleviate suffering abroad and to strengthen the spirit of his people on this new soil, aind yet this very ceil~ration threatens to brmg about undesirable Tesults. He and his brother.,priests have designated the gathering to which he is going as a Slovak Catho1ic Congress, but enemies - like the GOiSpel sowers of tares among the wheat - have been busy noi:sing it abroad that Father Furdek and his al'lies planned this mass meeting in order to launch a new heresy and to effect a schism of Slovak Catholics. And the wi1d rumor was reported officiail!ly even to the Apostolic Delegate in W a:sihimgton and to various bisihops and archbishops, urging t:Jhem to suspend and penalize all those priests wlho were in any way associa,ted with the affair. Father Furdek's name, namuraUy, led the rest in the list of tJhose who were marked to be proscribed. What was the outcome to 1be? The great S,lova1k Catholic Co'lligress took pla:ce on La:bor Day, September 3, 1906 in Wrl1kes-Barre. It attraoted oveT ten thousand Slovaks from all parts of Amedca and that in a day when traveling was time-consuming, tiresome, imconvenient, a:nd much of a humry for people wi1lh limited earnings. The program of tJhe day was planned to irndude religious services a1nd a series of addresses both in English and in Slovak on subjects of vital interest and conseque-nce to the Slovruk people. 1 Father Furdek arranged for representatives of the daily newspapers as well as editors of leading SlovaJk publications to be present in order to cover t'he story. Tihis would provide a greater circUJlation of reports on Slova1k matters among ,a little-informed American iputbHc as well as among an interested Slovruk audience. It was for this reasorn also that he arranged for notable American officiaJls and dignitaries to attend. It would be very he1pful to 'have tJhem become acquaimted with the Slovruk question. Bishop Hoban of Scranton had agreed to preside. 34 SLOVAKIA WihaJt was Fa!tlher Furdek to eX!pect of his plans now that such damaging stories were ma!king their rounds in o,nficia:l circles as well as among the common people? Would Bishop Hdban honor the occasion with rhis presence? And if he came, would it lbe to censure or to question or to approve tJhe true effort of Father Flurdek and his co-wo!1kers? One could not very welll iknow before hand. On the morning of the Congress, Father Furdek and Faltlher Murgas set out by horise and carriage for Sugar Notc'h where tJhey were to call for Bishop Hoban and drive Mm to the Congress. They went with mixed emotions but they were fortified by the consciousness of upright motives 0Jnd blameless conduct. Bislhop Hoban did not disaippoint them. He graciously accepted their offer of a ride and showed that he was eager to act as chairman of the event which they had prepared. As he mounted the carriage 8/Ild sat between the two priests, he put ithem at ease by p1ungilllg at once into the subject of their to:r,menting thoug,hts, the painful topic of the accusations whicih had 1been made against them. He discussed some of the charges at length and judiciously disposed of them. For inst8Jllce, he found it ridiculous that in America where liberty prevaiils someone shOU!ld giloaJt ilil laibeling them PianSlavs (because of their a:Megiance to tJheir native lamd. "I iknow yoUT people well, " Bishop Hdban said wit!h gentle UIIlderstanding in tJhe couTISe of itihi s conversation. Then as they were passing the Ashley ohurcih he added, "l built tfuis ohur,c'h when I was pastor here. Among my parishioners were m8/Ily Slova:k,s and I became wel!l. acquainted wiibh them. I have great sympathy for the SlovaJks." 1 "I am an American althoug;h my ancestors came from Irel81Ild," the Bishop continued as though he were marshalli!ng faots in a debate. "The Irish have a long history of political persecution; tlle Irish :kin.ow wlhat it is to be oppressed. I have great sympa:tJhy for every oppressed nation whetlher irt be Armeruam, Polish, kish or whatever it may be. There a,re many nationalities in my diocese and I do not discriminate. We are all OatJhoHcs." Bishop Hoban could not undel'Stand why the idea of Pan-Slav should figure in an indictment presented to eccles- 35 SLOVAKIA iastical superiors. "What has that to do wit'h it? fo America one may be a Pan-American; ilil Germany, let him wiho wishes ,b e a Pan-Gennam. It is no crime or sin to be a Pam-S[av. 'l'he term has political implication only." He was shrewd enoug,h to perceive that the charges which had ,been trumped up under c-lerical pretentiOIIlS were 1basicaJBy of a politicall nature and tha;t they were essentially distortions or gross misrepresentations. Im the course of this ride, Bishop Hobim also showed FaJther Furdek a communication from t!he Apostolic Delegate inqu~riD'g ililto the nature of the accusations. But Bishop Hoban assured both priests that he had already sent to Washington a complete report vindicating the acoused and exiplainililg the motives that had prompted 1:Jhe effort to foil 1:Jhe success of the Catholic Congress. And they were, in fact, extreme measures to which the p'lotJters had resorted. At the last moment they even tried to intimidate Bishop Hoban by sendililg him a telegram warning that his presence at the Silovak Catholic Congress wou[d reflect discredit UipOn t!he American Catholic hierarchy. But BiSlhop Hobam was not to be deterred by t!hreats. In fact, he justly resented the attempts to put pressure on him from un8Juthor1zed quarters. Becaiuse of Bishop Hoban's fundaJmental ohaTity for ahl, his sympathy for the downtrodden and his unbiased sense of democracy, the Catholic Congress of Slovak Americans was a more glorious event than even Father Furdek had hoped it would be. It wa•s a complete vindicatiO!Il of the priests who 'had ,b een maJligned and it was am unqoo:lified triumph for the Slova:k people. Bishop Hoban openly championed their cause, the press gave the even.rt fulil coverage, and the SlovaJk people themselves were iby this huge gatJhering more closely bound to one amother than they had ever been before. The manifestation was a Catiholic Congress but it attracted many Slovruk•s of other religious denominrutions, too, as well as from various fraternall orgaJnizations both Ca:tholic and non-sectarian. This triumph of September 3, 1906 marked a lmld of renaissamce in Slovak life on two continents and it inspired Father Fourdek to urge upon Slovaik leaders iJil publ-ic life the formation of a national SloV0Jk organizrution to unify 1 36 SLOVAKIA the American effort on behalf of Slov,a;kia. The outcome was the S1ovaik League of America which iin time evolved from suClh pre1i1minary movements as Furdek's drive "Za tu nasu slovenicinu !" (Jin defense of the Slovak cause!) which netted some ten thousand doll,ars for 1:Jhe na,t ional aid in the home1a:nd; the National Fund which sUJbsidized at least two hundred Slovruk students abroad rund brought relief to very many Slovak political leaders ,t hen houinded by unjust persecution, a:nd the lawnching of "Indignation Meetings" or pwbli,c demonstrations throughout the United States in order to protest the injushce and 1:Jhe human cruelty which viotimiized the Slovak people in their own homeland. 'I1hese tokens of help from America re-vitaUzed the crushed spirit and the depleted energies of S1ova!k patriots who were driven almost to t:he brilllk of despair iin fueir efiforts to save Silova kia. Costly :fii:nes and unrelenting pressure were syistematicaUy draining their resources and counteracting their achievements. American interest and Americain slllpport were their only encouraigement and mainstay. FiinanciaJ help came from tJhe drives which were organized expressly to raise funds. Morrul support was won by the Indignation Raillies, seven of which were originally planned to be held in key cities of the United States. T:he first of these was arranged by Father Furdek in 0levelaind. 1 LiJke all of Father Furdek's projects, tMs Indignation RaHy, too, was staimped with his spirit. Jit was an inspired and an inspiring demonstration, and it set 1:Jhe pattern for similar puiblic meetings. It:s puripose was to publicize Slov,aJkia's grievances against autocratic Hungarian agression, to prove t:hat Hungary was not in reality that "islallld of liberty" in central Europe which it gloried in caiHing itself, and to solicit the sympathy and the understanding of true leaders of liberty among the Americam people. Outstanding representatives of Americain 1ife amd thought participated in these rallies. For example, at the Cleveland gathering held on February 10, 1907, a crupaoity audience in Gray's Armory gave speHbo·u nd attention to addresses delivered by Professor Bourine, by three attorneys, three priests, and seveml journailists. The American public and especially the American thinking :public was quickly beginning to see the truth. At the 37 SLOVAKIA same time, the f,ire of truth amd the justified indignarti<on orf all lovers of justice was rea,ching out among S'loV'aJks and non-Slo'V'aJks alike, to enkindJe effective means for the triumph of true Iiiberty and fairness. ~he time seemed to be right then for Father FuTdek to try again to efifect a nationwide unification of the Slovak people in America. He had attempted it before when he founded the Matica S•l ovenska, a cultural society which did not thrive lonig because new world cond~tions were not yet favo:r,a!ble for such am undertwkrng (1893). Thi:s newer effort originated at a Pittsburgh meeting of SlovaJk journalisrts convened at Fa,ther Furdek's iinvitation on April 7, 1907 where it wa,,s agreed to stage a SlovaJk Congress in May for the purpose of founding the Slovak League of America. The time was ausipi'Cious, the attitude was enthusiastic, the fruit of the movement was good. 1 The Slovak L eague of America became a civic and cultural organization with a dual objective: 1) to advaJnce American interests and security and 2) to create a better understanding and ruppredation of the islova•k nation - its history, culture, traditions, achievements, and its long, bitter struggle for freedom and autonomy. The first president of the Slovak League was Father Furdelk and he aJbly guided its interests and its efforts and helped to launch it very successfully upon its fruitful career. Furdek 's spirit of self-sacrifice and his relentless drive took :lwavy toH on his physical resources. He burned out his life young but the flame of his ardor would allow no sparing of self when there was so much to be done for God and nation, for bme and for eternity. And even when it was apparent that his energies were faiNng, he did not stop to think of himself. Always his dominant thought was for others and for the general good. Extensive traveling, constant literary production, frequent appearances as a pubEc spewker or a church preacher, steady devotion to the management of his parish, constant attention to the needs of his school and its advancement , concern for the welrfare of a,,11 his people - these and many related issues crowded his days and his nights. 1 It is difficult to realize how he managed such a rich and fruitful life, how he provided in it for projects of nat - 38 SLOVAKIA ionail scope and significance as weM as for close and immediate needs such as tJhe compiling of three textbooks, a gra,matiJka and two citamky of such S'lllperior practicail use and benefit thaJt they served .s everal generations with soUJDd advantage. He also experimented wibh a patented pedaJgogic,rul device for fille teadhring of a,:r,~tlhmetic. A,s early as 1906 Father Fur<lek had brought about officiail aotion for the founding of a home for oriphans. F\inaiHy in 1914 he had the joy of seeing such a home a reality ilrl Middletown, Pennsylv,ania where Phili,p and Mary Hroba!k of Lakewood, Ohio were the first children under J ednota care in a home manruged by tlhe S1isters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Father Furdeik was also deeply initerested in t!lris new Slovak Community of Sisters and he endorsed the efforts of the Jednota ovgani21ation to adv,am,ce it and its wovks. After 1912 FatJher Furoek's healit:Jh was so much on the declrine that hris vision became imiparirred. Yet he carnied on heroicailly and even shortly after the New Year 1915 he accepted an invitation to preacll at a Forty Hours' Devotion ;in LoraJin, Ohio. It wrus on his retmm fr.om t!his priestly servke that he suffered eX)posure in a wintry storm amd on January 18, 1915, in t!he fifty-lllinbh year of his life, the thirty-second of his priesthood, he was called to his eternal reward. Fi,fty thousand Jedn<Ybars and cowntless friends and adirniirers on both sides of the Ati1'amtic mourned his death. 1 The tvue greatness of Father Furdek is made more digtJin:ct to us as it stamds in the perspective of years since his death. T,he void left by his deparrture to etemal life has IIlever been fiiil.led, and we see now tJhat it was with prophetic appreciaition and with some degree of regrettruble lament that Father J anikola spdke 1:Jhese words in his euJlogy on t'he day orf Father Furdek's funeral, "We wiH never see his like again. Slovrukia shall not send us another Furdek; America wi:Jil not produce another." 1 The greaJtness of Father Furdek's achievements derives from fille gifts of hi:s mind rund Clharrucl:er not from a mere aiccident of circumstances. We have even now ,t he need for ArrneriJcan Slovruks of uncommon gifts and moral stature to foad on in a modem world of mrugni:fl1cent opport.ll!Ilities. We need leaders who are seers and doe11s, wtho can vi:talli:ze and SLOVAKIA 3g inspire, who can hold before us the V1s1on and dispel our lethargy so that we American Slova!ks will want to :reaclh out for the attaiinment, will want to assert a pride of aincestry and a new hig,h of national greatness. But it has not been given us to have a second Furdelk in America. God grant that a younger geineration may pl'O'V'ide fuat in,s piration end greatness. As we survey Father FuTdek's place and his merits in American Slovalk history, we come to realize how well he deserves to be honored 8Jlld remembeTed as tlhe Father of American Sllovaks. BIBLIOGRAPHY Capek, Thomas, The Slovaks of Hungary. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1906. 214 pp. Cooke, Vincent, "Catholic Objectives in the Care of Children," Catholic Action, XXXII (May, 1950), 8. Culen Konlitantin, "American Slovaks and Slovak Statehood," Slovakia, I (May, 1951), 18. Culen, Konl;tantin, Slovcici v Amerike, Turciansky Sv. Martin, Slovakia, Matica Slovenska Press, 1938. 519 pp. Culen. Konstantin, "Stefan Furdek," Kultura, VII (September 1935), 377-386. Emerentia, Mother M., History of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Unpublished Master's thesis, Marywood College. Falcon, The, (Katolicky Sokol), Passaic, N. J ., July 5, 1944. Fortieth Anniversary Souvenir 1907-1947, Saints Cyril and Methodius Church, Bridgeport, Connecticut. Furdek, Stephen, Prvci Citanka pre Slovenske Skoly, Cleveland: Furdek, 1913. 125 pp. Furdek, Stephen, Druhci Citanka pre Slovenske Skoly, Cleveland: Furdek, 1913. 125 pp. Furdek, Stephen, "Hymna americkych Slovakov," Kalendcir Jednota, I (January, 1896), 22. Furdek, Stephen, Kalendcir Jednota, 19 Vol. (1896-1915 ). Furdek, Stephen, "Katolicka Jednota vo Spojenych Statoch," Kalendcir Jednota, I (1896 ), 26-37. Furdek, Stephen, "Katolicky Slovensky Kongress," Kalendcir Jednota, XII (1907), 145-155. Furdek, Stephen, "Keby nie jeho, nepotreboval by som dnes ziadneho -Ostavu," Kalendcir Jednota, (1914), 69. 40 SLOVAKIA Furdek, Stephen, Sv et a jeho zahady. Cleveland: Furdek, 1910. 250 pp. Hlinka, Andrew, "K jubileu striebornej konvencie Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty v Amerike," Kalendar Jednota, (1935) , 35. Hrobak, Philip, Ed., Editorial, Slov akia, I, (May, 1951). Hrobak, Philip, "The First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S.A. ," Slov ak Record, (September, 1943) . Rusek, Joseph, "K dvadsat'pat'rocnici I. Kat. Slov. Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, (January, 1916) 30-59. Rusek, Stephanie, "The Slovaks in America," Kalendar Jednota, Golden Jubilee, (September 2, 1940) 111-116. J ednota, Middletown, Pa., Dec. 17, 1913; Mar. 11, 1914; June 17, 1914; June 17, 1914; Sept. 23, 1914; Jan. 20, 1915; Jan. 27, 1915; Feb. 11, 1915; Apr. 24, 1935; June 18, 1952. K niha dejin Spolku sv. Jozefa, cislo 1. Z prilezitosti oslavy 50. rocneho jubileuma. Cleveland: 1939. Kozak, A. V., "-Ostav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, ( 1912) 19-24. Leech, George L. , Letter to First Catholic Slovak Union on the Occasion of Its Golden Jubilee, 1940. Liscinsky, John Method, "Katolicka Slovenska 2enska Jednota," ( 1911 ) 180-184. Martvon, John, "Autobiograficky nacrt," Kale ndar Jednota, Golden Jubilee, (September 2, 1940) 19. Mulcahy, George, "Life of Saints Cyril and Methodius," Radio Broadcast on Diocesan Catholic Hour, WHP, Feb. 13, 1940. Palickar, Stephen J., " Father Furdek, Leader," Commonweal, VI (June 8, 1927) 126. Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, "Kulturny Program Prvej Kat. Slov. Jednoty," Kalendar Jednota, (1935) 31. Rovnianek, P . V., Zapi sky za ziva pochovaneho. Pittsburgh: Rovnianek Press, 1924. Slovak League of America, Editorial, "What Is It?" The Slov ak Digest, I, (November-December, 1946) . Slovak v Amerike, New York, N. Y., August 30, 1949. Spolok Panny Marie Ruzencovej , Z Dejin I .K.S.J. , Pamatnik Slavnej XVII. Konvencie I.K.S.J., (September, 1925), Scranton, Pa. Tybor, Caroline, " Slovak Language in Our Academy," Fialky, IV (December, 1924) 71-72. Yurchak, Peter J. , The Slovaks, Their History and Tradition, Whiting : John J . Lach, 1946. 278 pp. Zlamal, Oldrich, "Life of Reverend Stephen Furdek," Sixtieth Anniv ersary of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, (Svet Publishing Co. , Cleveland, Ohio) 1943.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Father of American Slovaks Description An account of the resource Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966 pp. 25-40 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Tybor, Sister M. Martina, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/aebf66a905109a14ec9e6bc1165cc6c8.pdf 2771a004fd5d14b75a05d156558182f8 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs �SLOVAKIA 53 approximately $175 - if the ordinary persons can afford to buy them. Cheap sweaters cost $35, and shoes cost $30. In general, Father Seginak notes, the populace is dressed in a markedly drab manner. The trip to Presov was made in a two engine plane. Since it was dark when the plane was landing, Father Seginak remarked to his traveling companion how bumpy the landing was. "Little wonder," said Father Michnik. "look out the window, we're landing in a cow pasture." There was no concrete or asphalt runway - just a muddy field. This was the Presov airport. Upon landing the first impression was the number of policemen and soldiers who guarded the field with machine guns. A bus immediately picked up the plane passengers and hustled them through guarded areas. One could not help but feel that they didn't want prying eyes to ferret out some sort of dark secret to be found there. Loudspeakers were in prominence everywhere. The presence of the hammer and sickle with an abundance of red stars left little doubt as to who ran the country. In Presov itself there is but one hotel at which one may stay - the Hotel Dukla. There is inconvenience after inconvenience. The telephone may be used only between the hours of 8 a. m. and 6 p. m. The radio in the threadbare room did little to relieve the monotony - one station blared forth propaganda incessantly. Contrary to the idea the communists would like to foist upon the world that it is the land of the workers' paradise - the raw facts of life do not substantiate it. A 57-year-old woman told of how she began her day at 4 a. m., and after a two mile walk to the potato field she worked until darkness. For lunch she was permitted to build a fire and eat a few of the potatoes with bread and barley coffee. Meat in the diet is simply non-existent. An 80-year-old woman was assigned the task of caring for the chickens and livestock. The chickens were given a communist mandate to produce a certain quota of eggs or else. The "or else" meant that the 80-year-old woman was forced to beg, borrow or steal the eggs if her quota was not filled. In the communist scheme of things four- �54 SLOVAKIA fifths of a head of steer belongs to the government. Which fifth belongs to the down-trodden peasants was not made too clear. If a head of steer dies the peasant is held responsible and must replace it. By this arrangement the government never loses. The homes of the village people are very poor. In a four-room house it is ordinary to quarter two families. They use a common kitchen and each family has one room. This apparently is Khrushchev's idea of perfect living quarters for the working people while he enjoys his dacha outside Moscow. There is no running water, heating is primitive, and sidewalks are non-existent. Electricity has been promised - probably for the purpose of installing more loudspeakers to drone the glories of communism incessantly. American movies are not shown for fear that the populace would see how well Americans live. It is a fact that the people have been led to believe utter poverty reigns in the United States. The ruthless persecution of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the Presov district has taken its toll. One example is given of the village priest who was called by a well-dressed man from the confessional on Holy Saturday. He claimed he had spiritual problems. The priest walked with him a short distance where an armored car and two motorcycles whisked him away. He was never heard from again. A communist agent in the guise of an Orthodox priest took his place. The people do not attend the church now because they know that the "priest" in reality is a communist spy in their midst. With a great deal of relief did the two priests leave this land of the living-dead. As tourists they had been warned to take no maps with them, have no prayer books and stay away from relatives, lest they implicate them as spies against the peoples' government. Father Minchik remarked to his superior that one never leaves an Iron Curtain country quite the same person he was upon entering it. A hatred and revulsion for the tyranny of communism seems to pervade a person's soul after a close contact with this social sickness of our day. - "Byzantine Catholic World." � 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs �SLOVAKIA 53 approximately $175 - if the ordinary persons can afford to buy them. Cheap sweaters cost $35, and shoes cost $30. In general, Father Seginak notes, the populace is dressed in a markedly drab manner. The trip to Presov was made in a two engine plane. Since it was dark when the plane was landing, Father Seginak remarked to his traveling companion how bumpy the landing was. "Little wonder," said Father Michnik. "look out the window, we're landing in a cow pasture." There was no concrete or asphalt runway - just a muddy field. This was the Presov airport. Upon landing the first impression was the number of policemen and soldiers who guarded the field with machine guns. A bus immediately picked up the plane passengers and hustled them through guarded areas. One could not help but feel that they didn't want prying eyes to ferret out some sort of dark secret to be found there. Loudspeakers were in prominence everywhere. The presence of the hammer and sickle with an abundance of red stars left little doubt as to who ran the country. In Presov itself there is but one hotel at which one may stay - the Hotel Dukla. There is inconvenience after inconvenience. The telephone may be used only between the hours of 8 a. m. and 6 p. m. The radio in the threadbare room did little to relieve the monotony - one station blared forth propaganda incessantly. Contrary to the idea the communists would like to foist upon the world that it is the land of the workers' paradise - the raw facts of life do not substantiate it. A 57-year-old woman told of how she began her day at 4 a. m., and after a two mile walk to the potato field she worked until darkness. For lunch she was permitted to build a fire and eat a few of the potatoes with bread and barley coffee. Meat in the diet is simply non-existent. An 80-year-old woman was assigned the task of caring for the chickens and livestock. The chickens were given a communist mandate to produce a certain quota of eggs or else. The "or else" meant that the 80-year-old woman was forced to beg, borrow or steal the eggs if her quota was not filled. In the communist scheme of things four- �54 SLOVAKIA fifths of a head of steer belongs to the government. Which fifth belongs to the down-trodden peasants was not made too clear. If a head of steer dies the peasant is held responsible and must replace it. By this arrangement the government never loses. The homes of the village people are very poor. In a four-room house it is ordinary to quarter two families. They use a common kitchen and each family has one room. This apparently is Khrushchev's idea of perfect living quarters for the working people while he enjoys his dacha outside Moscow. There is no running water, heating is primitive, and sidewalks are non-existent. Electricity has been promised - probably for the purpose of installing more loudspeakers to drone the glories of communism incessantly. American movies are not shown for fear that the populace would see how well Americans live. It is a fact that the people have been led to believe utter poverty reigns in the United States. The ruthless persecution of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the Presov district has taken its toll. One example is given of the village priest who was called by a well-dressed man from the confessional on Holy Saturday. He claimed he had spiritual problems. The priest walked with him a short distance where an armored car and two motorcycles whisked him away. He was never heard from again. A communist agent in the guise of an Orthodox priest took his place. The people do not attend the church now because they know that the "priest" in reality is a communist spy in their midst. With a great deal of relief did the two priests leave this land of the living-dead. As tourists they had been warned to take no maps with them, have no prayer books and stay away from relatives, lest they implicate them as spies against the peoples' government. Father Minchik remarked to his superior that one never leaves an Iron Curtain country quite the same person he was upon entering it. A hatred and revulsion for the tyranny of communism seems to pervade a person's soul after a close contact with this social sickness of our day. - "Byzantine Catholic World." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs SLOVAKIA 53 approximately $175 - if the ordinary persons can afford to buy them. Cheap sweaters cost $35, and shoes cost $30. In general, Father Seginak notes, the populace is dressed in a markedly drab manner. The trip to Presov was made in a two engine plane. Since it was dark when the plane was landing, Father Seginak remarked to his traveling companion how bumpy the landing was. "Little wonder," said Father Michnik. "look out the window, we're landing in a cow pasture." There was no concrete or asphalt runway - just a muddy field. This was the Presov airport. Upon landing the first impression was the number of policemen and soldiers who guarded the field with machine guns. A bus immediately picked up the plane passengers and hustled them through guarded areas. One could not help but feel that they didn't want prying eyes to ferret out some sort of dark secret to be found there. Loudspeakers were in prominence everywhere. The presence of the hammer and sickle with an abundance of red stars left little doubt as to who ran the country. In Presov itself there is but one hotel at which one may stay - the Hotel Dukla. There is inconvenience after inconvenience. The telephone may be used only between the hours of 8 a. m. and 6 p. m. The radio in the threadbare room did little to relieve the monotony - one station blared forth propaganda incessantly. Contrary to the idea the communists would like to foist upon the world that it is the land of the workers' paradise - the raw facts of life do not substantiate it. A 57-year-old woman told of how she began her day at 4 a. m., and after a two mile walk to the potato field she worked until darkness. For lunch she was permitted to build a fire and eat a few of the potatoes with bread and barley coffee. Meat in the diet is simply non-existent. An 80-year-old woman was assigned the task of caring for the chickens and livestock. The chickens were given a communist mandate to produce a certain quota of eggs or else. The "or else" meant that the 80-year-old woman was forced to beg, borrow or steal the eggs if her quota was not filled. In the communist scheme of things four- 54 SLOVAKIA fifths of a head of steer belongs to the government. Which fifth belongs to the down-trodden peasants was not made too clear. If a head of steer dies the peasant is held responsible and must replace it. By this arrangement the government never loses. The homes of the village people are very poor. In a four-room house it is ordinary to quarter two families. They use a common kitchen and each family has one room. This apparently is Khrushchev's idea of perfect living quarters for the working people while he enjoys his dacha outside Moscow. There is no running water, heating is primitive, and sidewalks are non-existent. Electricity has been promised - probably for the purpose of installing more loudspeakers to drone the glories of communism incessantly. American movies are not shown for fear that the populace would see how well Americans live. It is a fact that the people have been led to believe utter poverty reigns in the United States. The ruthless persecution of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the Presov district has taken its toll. One example is given of the village priest who was called by a well-dressed man from the confessional on Holy Saturday. He claimed he had spiritual problems. The priest walked with him a short distance where an armored car and two motorcycles whisked him away. He was never heard from again. A communist agent in the guise of an Orthodox priest took his place. The people do not attend the church now because they know that the "priest" in reality is a communist spy in their midst. With a great deal of relief did the two priests leave this land of the living-dead. As tourists they had been warned to take no maps with them, have no prayer books and stay away from relatives, lest they implicate them as spies against the peoples' government. Father Minchik remarked to his superior that one never leaves an Iron Curtain country quite the same person he was upon entering it. A hatred and revulsion for the tyranny of communism seems to pervade a person's soul after a close contact with this social sickness of our day. - "Byzantine Catholic World."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Father Seginak's Impression of Prague and Presov Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 52-54 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3d2608382e5e1506d6ea3aa964680705.pdf 91ce7adcf88ddff23c5135867a1d78e7 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 23 Federalist Thought in Czechoslovakia During the lnterwar Years JOSEF KALVODA For centuries Central Europe has been an area ,of mixed nationalities and both Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, when the latter was established in 1918-1919, were multi-national states. The need for peace and cooperation among the many national groups gave rise to several proposals for a federal solution of the problems of small nations living in the area. One may recall that on January 23, 1849 the Czech historian and political leader Frantisek Palacky proposed the reorganization of the Austrian Empire along federal lines. 1 One can also cite a statement by the known Czech journalist Karel Havlicek Borovsky who argued against Bohemia's joining the German Reich proposed by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849 . He wrote: ''Our federation is Austria. '' 2 The struggle for the state right by the National (Old) Czech party , led by Frantisek Ladislav Rieger, in the nineteenth century was also a reflection of the Czech nation's desire to federalize the Austrian state. Until World War I the struggle for the ' ' state right '' was continued by the Young Czech party, as well as by the other Czech political parties with the exception of the Social Democrats and Professor Thomas G. Masaryk who advocated federalization of the state along ethnic lines. 3 In the interwar years several proposals for a federal solution of the Czech-Slovak problem and the problem of "Balkanized" East Central Europe and Europe in general were made by some citizens and political leaders in Czechoslovakia. These ideas will be briefly considered in this paper. A discussion of federalist thought in Czechoslovakia ought �24 SLOVAKIA to begin with the first plans for establishment of a state that would include the Czech historical lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia) and Slovakia, known originally as Upper Hungary. During World War I the idea of an independent Czecho-Slovak state was endorsed by some Czech groups both at home and abroad , including the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America. In order to promote the independence movement , representatives of the two organizations met in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 15, 1915 , where they agreed on what they believed their countrymen in Austria-Hungary would accept in the event of their liberation. The ' 'Cleveland Agreement'' provided for the autonomy of both the Czech lands and Slovakia, proclaiming that the union of the Czech and Slovak peoples will be in a '' federative union of states, ' ' with complete national autonomy for Slovakia. Slovakia would have its own schools, its own state administration, cultural freedom and Slovak would be the official language.4 A few years later the agreement was presented to Thomas G. Masaryk in Pittsburgh at a meeting of representatives of the Bohemian National Alliance , the Slovak League , and the National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics. Since some Slovaks expressed an apprehension that in the future Czecho-Slovak state the Slovaks might be enveloped ("Czechified" ), Masaryk, the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council seated in Paris, decided to revise it. He wrote in Slovak the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed by him and 6ther Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918. 5 The agreement stated that representatives of the named organizations ' ' approve of a political program aiming to unite the Czechs and Slovaks into an independent state comprising the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration , its own diet, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in schools , in government offices , and in public life generally. The Czecho-Slovak state shall be a republic ; its constitution shall be democratic .' ' The document was destined to have far-reaching consequences in the history of Czechoslovakia. In their struggle for selfgovernment and their efforts to change the centralist constitution of 1920, the Slovak autonomists invoked the Pittsburgh Agreement. One may argue that the idea of a federal union of the Czechs �SLOVAKIA 25 and Slovaks in the Cleveland Agreement, as well as the autonomous arrangement promised by the Pittsburgh Agreement, were manifestations of the influence of the United States federal system of government on the thinking of those who signed them. Similarly, as it is in the states of the American federation, the Pittsburgh Agreement stipulated that Slovakia "shall have its own administration, its own diet, and its own courts.'' Since Czechs and Slovaks are two different nations speaking similar but different languages, it was necessary to make the Slovak language in Slovakia "the official language in schools, in governmental offices, and in public life generally." In view of the fact that in 1915, in a memorandum to the British government, Masaryk stated that the new s·tate (' 'Independent Bohemia") would be a monarchy, because only a small group of "radicals" favored a republic, 6 and that most of the leaders of the independence movement in the Czech lands and Milan R. Stefanik, who represented the Slovaks in the CzechoSlovak National Council, were monarchists, it would seem that the American environment influenced Masaryk's decision to proclaim the new state a republic. The principles stated in the Pittsburgh Agreement were not implemented in the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920; the latter established a centralist state administration. Autonomy for Ruthenia, the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, provided for in the constitution, was not realized either until the collapse of the First Republic in October 1938. (Incidentally, the Slovaks had autonomy during the Second Republic that came to its end in March, 1939.) Champions of the autonomist movement in Slovakia, the Slovak People's party and the Slovak National party, constantly emphasized the need for a federal arrangement in the state that they supported. In May 1936, in a parliamentary discussion of the proposed Law for the Defense of the State (Law 131 of May 13, 1936), a Slovak People's party deputy and a former member of government, Jozef Tiso, declared that the Slovak nation considered the state of the Czechs and Slovaks their own state and that his party supported the law. As on many other occasions, Tiso discussed the Slovak problem and the demand for the implementation of the �26 SLOVAKIA Pittsburgh Agreement. As he put it, "Autonomy is education of the Slovak nation toward seeing in this state its own state in which it rules ... Autonomy is education for state-forming thinking of the Slovaks" . .. " 7 The autonomist program, he emphasized, made the Slovaks conscious of the fact that Czechoslovakia was their state, and that the latter did not mean the merging of the . two nations, but a unity of the two nations in one common state. In the discussion of the same legislative proposal a Senator of the Slovak People's party, Gejza Fritz, emphasized that the "root of the autonomy is the Pittsburgh Agreement, concluded and signed by Czechs and Slovaks and the then president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council,'' Masaryk. The autonomy was to be within the boundaries of the state, not outside of it. As he put it, ''We demand self-government that is not incompatible with the state unity. That such an autonomy is possible is evidenced by the fact that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to CarpathoRussia (Ruthenia) within the framework of the united Czechoslovak republic.' ' 9 He pointed out that the president of the state had signed the agreement and that for ''those reasons it is not logical to claim that autonomy is separatism.'' In its substance, "autonomy means decentralization." In addition, the Slovaks demand equal rights for the Slovak language, he said , pointing out that ''to strive for a united Czechoslovak nation would mean to increase the antagonism of all Slovaks.' ' 9 * * * * * During. World War I Masaryk's objective was the establishment of an independent state. However, until the summer of 1918 he was prepared to accept autonomy for the Czechs within the framework of Austria-Hungary if independence were not attainable.10 By this time France and the United States had already parted with the idea of preserving a federalized Austria-Hungary; the latter collapsed by the end of October 1918. But even after the declaration of Czecho-Slovak independence by Masaryk in Washington, D.C., on October 18 , the Czech leader presided over a meeting of representatives of several national groups from Central Europe between October 23 and 26, 1918, that announced the intention to establish a Democratic Mid-European Union. This �SLOVAKIA 27 meeting, held at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, led some people in Washington, D.C., to believe that on the ruins of AustriaHungary a new central european federation would emerge. The final resolution produced by the conference, called the ''Declaration of Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations,'' was read by Masaryk in front of Independence Hall and was hailed by the American press as something approaching a declaration of a united Europe. 11 · On November 1, 1918, the original of the declaration was submitted to President Woodrow Wilson by Masaryk, who was the first of its twelve signatories. In the accompanying letter to Wilson Masaryk stated that the union ''tries to replace the German Plan of Mittel-Europe by a positive plan of reorganization of the many smaller nations which are located between the Germans (in Germany and Austria) and Russians; there are about eighteen such nations, beginning with the Finns and ending with the Greeks. . . . The primary aim of the war and the coming peace is the reorganization of the East, including now Russia; and the first condition of this reorganization of Eastern Europe and through it of Europe and mankind, is the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, composed of eight non-German nations, oppressed and exploited by a degenerate dynasty and reckless feudal aristocracy supported by the Germans and Magyars.'' 12 In the last paragraph of the letter Masaryk proclaimed: "Mr. President, we see in you one of the greatest leaders of modern democracy and constructive policy; it is in making a sincere attempt to apply such a policy to our particular nations and to the whole of Europe that we hope you will engage your interest in our Union's endeavors." The signatories of the declaration, claiming to represent ''more than fifty million people constituting a chain of nations lying between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas, comprising Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, Jugoslavs , Ukrainians, UhroRusins, Lithuanians, Roumanians and Italian Irredentists , Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians, Zionists and Armenians, wholly or partly subject to alien domination ... accept and subscribe to the following as basic principles for all free peoples." �28 SLOVAKIA ''First. That all governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed. Second. That it is the inalienable right of every people to organize their own government on such principles and in such form as they believe will best promote their welfare, safety and happiness. Third. That the free and natural development of the ideals of any state should be allowed to pursue their normal and unhindered course unless such course harms or threatens the common interest of all. Fourth. That there should be no secret diplomacy, and all proposed treaties and agreements between nations should be made public - prior to their adoption and ratification. Fifth. That we believe our peoples, having kindred ideals and purposes, should coordinate their efforts to insure the liberties of their individual nations for the furtherance of their own common welfare, provided such a union contributes to the peace and welfare of the world. Sixth. That there should be formed a league of the nations of the world in a common and binding agreement for genuine and practical cooperation to secure justice and therefore peace among nations .'' The signatories of the declaration pledged '' on behalf of their respective nations'' that the principles set forth in it '' shall be incorporated in the organic laws of whatever government our respective peoples may hereafter establish.'' As it happened, the vast majority of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary (Constituent) National Assembly , established after the war, followed Masaryk's views and paid no attention to the principles stated in the Declaration of the Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations. The assembly did not derive its powers from the consent of the governed; it was not elected by the peoples living in Czechoslovakia; the Germans , Hungarians , Poles , and Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia were not represented in it at all; and the Germans, Hungarians , Slovaks , and Ruthenians living in the country were not allowed to "organize their own government on such principles and in such form as they believe will best promote their welfare , safety and happiness . " 13 �SLOVAKIA 29 * * * * * While visiting the United States in the fall of 1918, Roman Dmowski, the head to the Polish National Committee Abroad, seated in Paris, suggested to Masaryk the formation of a Federation consisting of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Masaryk refused the proposal, but favored "a certain kind of Economic Union, to be worked out; and a military defense against Germany, essentially non-aggressive." Not farseeing the problem of frontier adjustment with Poland, Masaryk asked Dmowski "to write out text of agreement on these lines.'' The Polish leader, however, did not formulate such an agreement, since he, apparently, was not interested in anything short of Federation. 14 The proposed Federation of the three Western Slavic nations, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, could have provided an ample guarantee of peace in Central Europe, since the three nations could have faced together the prospective threats coming from either east or west, and could have jointly resolved the national minority problem. In the 1930s the idea of close cooperation with Poland was endorsed by the leader of the Czechoslovak National Democratic party, Karel Kramaf, and the leader of the Slovak People's party, Andrej Hlinka. At that time, due to hostility between Czechoslovakia's foreign minister Edvard Benes, and the Polish foreign minister Jozef Beck, such a policy was not practical and could not be implemented. 15 * * * * * At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Czecho-Slovakia was represented by a delegation of which the principal spokesman was Edvard Benes. InMemoire No. 3, one of the documents submitted by him to the conference, addressing itself to "The lot of the Germans in the Czecho-Slovak Republic," a promise was made that ''the Germans of Bohemia [sic] would have the same rights as the Czecho-Slovaks themselves. The German tongue would be the second tongue of the land .... The regime adopted would be similar to that of Switzerland. " 16 In his note of May 20, 1919, Benes elaborated on the latter point, announcing the intention of the state to apply the principles of the Swiss Republic in creating the organs of the new state that would be '' a sort of Switzerland.'' In the con- �30 SLOVAKIA clusion of his memorandum Benes promised ''an extremely liberal regime, which will very much resemble that of Switzerland. " 17 This was a statement of intention - one of those by which the way to hell is paved. It was not implemented and a centralistic Constitution was adopted in Czechoslovakia in 1920. One may speculate, as did Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, that ''had the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia at the time of its organization in 1919 been based upon the cantonal system, its history . . . might have been very different and far happier.'' 18 * * * * * Dr. Milan Hodza, a Slovak by birth, was a well-known exponent of the idea of establishing a Central European or a Danubian Federation. 19 He proceeded from the assumption that the League of Nations and the Little Entente were ineffective and inadequate for preserving peace in Europe. The latter had to unite in order to maintain peace and advance prosperity. However, Europe's final unification presupposes, first of all, an effective regional cooperation. Therefore, Hodza developed the theme of the union of Central Europe when the new order was established in Europe after World War I. As a prominent politician of the Republican (agrarian) party, he propagated the idea of a federated Central Europe numbering about 110 million people, stretching from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea and covering the region between Germany and Soviet Russia. 20 Since the states in the region were predominantly agrarian, the federation had to be based on agrarian democracy. 21 Already in 1925, at the national congress of the Republican party, Hodza declared that there was a need for Central European solidarity; the latter would save Czechoslovakia from either Bolshevik or imperialistic attack. 22 He believed that the interests of Czechoslovakia and Poland could be reconcilled and their close cooperation with the other nations in the area would benefit all of Europe. In his lecture, delivered in London in 1930, Hodza stated: ''It is universally an international danger when dictatorship becomes a contagious disease, which weakens the organism of states and nations. Thus one day we could expose ourselves to the danger which might infect Central Europe with Moscow's �SLOVAKIA 31 dictatorship. Therefore, it is important that Central Europe does not become the carrier of dictatorial bacilli, but rather a trench, or barrier, against dictatorship. " 23 In Hodza's view, the national sovereignty of small nations should not be construed as isolationism, but rather a foundation stone for international cooperation. Since the nations of Central Europe have mutual interests and similar traditions , they have to come closer together and work for a wider international cooperation. A federation of states from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea, united on the basis of democratic principles, would be a barrier against Bolshevism and the first step toward establishing a United States of Europe. 24 Hodza became prime minister of Czechoslovakia in November 1935 and Benes was elected the state's president in the middle of December 1935. When from December 20, 1935, to February 29, 1936, Hodza was also the acting minister of foreign affairs, he tried very hard to get his favorite project off the ground. In an attempt to implement it, he visited Vienna on January 17 , 1936, Paris, February 8-15, Belgrade, February 21-25, and again Vienna, March 8-10, 1936. 25 The Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg fully endorsed Hodza's project, but it was viewed skeptically in other countries and, above all, in the Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs staffed by Benes appointees. The new president was especially annoyed by Hodza's conduct of foreign policy. Later Benes commented with disdain on the prime minister's activities as follows: "Hodza went to Vienna, had lunch with Schuschnigg, told him that something should be done in Central Europe to remove the German threat to Austria. Upon his return to Prague he told me that he had negotiated an alliance with Austria. It caused alarm in France and in England, because these countries were informed to the effect that everything would be signed, sealed and delivered in three weeks . Of course it was a bluff. " 26 When in the summer of 1938 a large demonstration in favor of autonomy of Slovakia took place in the capital city of Bratislava, Hodza made an attempt to take the wind out of the autonomist sails. He revealed his own plan for self-government in Slovakia. This proposal, known as the ''Hodza Plan,'' was revealed in detail �32 SLOVAKIA in his Slovensky dennik. The key provision in it was as follows: "Slovakia will have her own diet with legislative powers, her own government of six ministers to deal exclusively with Slovak matters. The Slovak language will be the only official language in Slovakia. A separate Slovak commission will supervise and decide the personal questions connected with appointments of the state employees to eliminate irregularities and to see that Slovak claims are not bypassed.' •21 After the Munich settlement, on October 6, 1938, Slovak autonomy was proclaimed. The manifest was signed by seven nonSocialist parties (including the Slovak People's party), representing about 75 percent of the Slovak electorate. The Czecho-Slovak National Assembly approved the Constitutional Law of Slovak selfrule on November 22 , 1938 by a unanimous vote. (The deputies of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia left the Chamber before the voting. )2 8 * * * * * In the interwar years a prominent federalist advocating the establishment of a United States of Europe, Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, lived in Czechoslovakia. He became famous after World War II, when many Americans and West Europeans embraced his ideas. 29 His pioneering work did bring fruits when the West European community was established. Czechoslovakia, however, was a member of the Soviet bloc , and did not benefit from it. ,· Born in Tokyo on November 17, 1894, Coudenhove-Kalergi's mother was Japanese and his father was an Austrian diplomat. The Coudenhove-Kalergi's home was the old Castle of Ronsperk in Bohemia. The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 made the Count a citizen of Czechoslovakia. 30 When the Nazis occupied the country in 1939 , he accepted French citizenship and, eventually, left Europe for the United States. During the interwar years Coudenhove-Kalergi was the leading theoretician and founder of the Pan-European movement. He devoted his talents and efforts to the cause of European federation. Among those whom he inspired and persuaded to support the movement was Edouard Herriot, a one-time prime minister �SLOVAKIA 33 and minister of foreign affairs in France, and the author of The United States of Europe. Herriot was the first European statesman who appealed openly for a United States of Europe. 31 A student of history, Coudenhove-Kalergi was familiar with attempts to unify Europe made over the centuries by writers and kings, including George Podiebrad, a famous King of Bohemia in the fifteenth century. His first article on ''The European Question" appeared in the summer of 1922 in the Berlin Volkische Zeitung and the Vienna Neue Freie Presse.32 After finding some influential supporters among political leaders of the time, the first issue of the movements's new periodical, Pan-Europe, came out in April 1924. It contained an article entitled "The European Manifesto.'' Due to extensive publicity generated by the movement, his book on Pan-Europe began to appear in several languages. 33 The English language edition, with an introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, was published in 1926 in New York. 34 In Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi noticed the political decline of Europe as a consequence of the World War: "From the center of the world Europe has moved to its periphery. The world hegemony of Europe is overthrown for all time .'' The validity of the last sentence was called to doubt by some, when Germany rose again as a great power in the 1930s. Yet the outcome of World War II confirmed his observation that "the United States of America has developed into the leading World Power." As he observed in his book first published in 1923, in the World War the United States " proved the decisive factor . Today , the United States of America is the wealthiest, the most powerful, and the most advanced country in the world." At the same time, however, "Europe's power of action in world politics is paralyzed by her disunion.' ' 35 In advocating the consolidation of Europe into a politicoeconomic federation, Coudenhove-Kalergi encountered objection from several quarters branding Pan-Europe a utopia. To this he replied that "every great historical happening began as a utopia and ended as a reality." He pointed out that in 1913 the Polish and Czecho-Slovak republics were utopias; "in 1918 they became realities. In 1916 the victory of the communists in Russia was a �34 SLOVAKIA utopia; in 1917 it was an accomplished fact. " 36 Whether PanEurope would be realized depended on the will of the Europeans; if the latter would support the idea and work for it, a utopia would become a reality. As he put it, ''While thousands believe in PanEurope, it is a utopia; so long as millions believe in it, it is a program; but once a hundred million believe in it, it becomes a fact." Thus in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi called upon the youth of Europe ''to convert the utopia of yesterday into a reality of tomorrow.' ' 37 Constantly referring to historical events, Coudenhove-Kalergi emphasized that power-relationships among countries have been changing with time. For example, the Bohemian empire of King Ottokar was a great power stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and was about the size of European Russia; Bohemia of the 1920s was as small as was the Grand Duchy of Weimar a century earlier. According to him, ''Time works for Russia and against Europe," This was an observation not shared by many people at that time. He also pointed out how the United States became a great power and how this technically most advanced country was ''the first to try the new method of political organization, namely, a system of peaceful federations, culminating in the PanAmerican Union and in the idea of a League of Nations. Although the American conditions are different than those in Europe, states that are small may not be able to lead an independent existence and, therefore, they have to establish federations." As he saw it, "The leading World powers of today are federations: Russia, England, America. Political rapprochement of neighboring countries must be realized, if conflicts are to be avoided.' ' 38 Coudenhove-Kalergi observed that the formation of the PanAmerican League was not directed against any other state system, but solely against war, and "toward furthering the cultural progress of all." The American example should be followed by Europe. The latter must supplement "its modern science of communications by a modern science of politics, else it will be in danger of blindly staggering into another war and of suffocating in a very sea of gas-bombs.' •39 The Count regretted that Europe was regressing further and further toward atomization, since Austria-Hungary, Western �SLOVAKIA 35 Russia, and European Turkey dissolved themselves into a multitude of petty states. This process needs to be reversed by promoting integration, otherwise, if the liberation of European peoples is not completed by their unification, '' sooner or later the European state will be swallowed up by the growing World Powers.' ' 40 Europe must find a means of harmonizing freedom with organization, that is to follow the example of America in establishing a federation. Coudenhove-Kalergi presented a plan for the establishment of such a federation and discussed several reasons for which the nations of Europe should unite. First, Bolshevik Russia made no secret of her aggressive intentions: Bolshevism fights with propaganda in the one hand and with sword in the other; "it resorts to violence, terrorism and militarism.' ' 41 Therefore, the aim of all Europeans, regardless of party or nation, should be the prevention of a Soviet invasion that would bring about the destruction of liberty and the other cherished values. A Pan-European security pact guaranteeing the protection of European eastern frontiers would lay the foundation for an understanding with Soviet Russia. He suggested that if Texas, New Mexico, and California were independent states, they would be in constant danger from Mexico. But "as states of the American federal union they are secure against any such danger. " 42 Similarly, the Soviet threat to Romania, Poland, and Finland would disappear as soon as they would become members of the United States of Europe. As long as they were isolated, they represented a constant temptation for Soviet Russia. Furthermore, Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested that the quarrels among the European states weakened their power defense against Soviet Russia. Therefore, there was a need for European solidarity for an effective defense of the eastern frontiers of Europe. Any war in Europe would offer the Soviets a welcome opportunity for intervention; "and once Russian armies have secured a footing in Europe, they will scarcely relinquish it of their own free will.'' He also saw a danger in the pro-Russian orientation of some states, notably Germany. He suggested that there was a large number of Germans who hoped, "through an alliance with Russia, to tear up the Treaty of Versailles and once more partition Poland. " 43 �36 SLOVAKIA Whether Germany would be saved or estranged from Europe depended on the Western powers, above all on France, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, and he predicted that in the FrancoGerman conflict neither Germany nor France, "but Russia will in the long run be victorious. ' ' He warned that France still had time to preserve ''the German sister republic for the family of European states; tomorrow it may be already too late.'' He added that "upon this question hinges the future of Europe. " 44 Though less immediate, there was a danger "from forcible separation of eastern Europe,'' should there be a sudden change in the internal policy of Russia, and should the latter return to Pan-Slavism. In that case the Pan-Slav memories of the Southern and Western Slavs would be revived and Hungary and Bulgaria would try to recover lost territories ' 'by means of an alliance with the Russian reaction. In that event Russia's power would extend as far as the Adriatic Sea. " 4 5 These dangers, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed, could be averted by the timely creation of the Pan-European Federation. In his view, the historical moment in the time of his writing (1923) was more favorable than it ever was before. The situation would likely worsen every month and ''it is more than doubtful whether after a victory of the Russian reaction a Pan-European Federation would still l)e possible, " 46 he wrote. The formation of the United States of Europe would make possible an agreement on disarmament and economic cooperation with Soviet Russia. Since united Europe would possess great military and economic power, the danger of war with Russia would be removed. As long as Europe was divided , he said, there was a danger of a new war. A united Europe would have a larger population and incomparably more highly developed industries and, therefore, Soviet Russia "would realize the hopelessness of war and will be ready to disarm." But, he writes , as long as the regime in Russia is organized on a Soviet basis , it would be better for ''Russo-European peace if these two federations remain separate.' ' 47 The Soviet regime endeavored to overthrow the democratic order in Europe and, therefore , a merging of the two federations was not practical. However, '' Should Russia become democratic, a new situation would result.' ' Then it would be possi- �SLOVAKIA 37 ble to consider the question of Russia's joining the European federation. Turning to Europe's relations with the United States, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that "The economic model for PanEurope is provided by the United States of America; the political model for Pan-Europe's development, by the Pan-American Union.' ' 48 Since its origin, with the exception of the Civil War era, the United States has been a political and economic unity. Europeans should realize that the success of the American dream has been due to the existence of a common market and the political unity of the continent. They should utilize the experiences gathered in the United States and the entire American continent in their efforts to build Pan-Europe. Though Pan-Americanism was still in the process of development , it had a head start over PanEuropeanism. The history of the development of Pan-Americanism has great significance for Pan-Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that the League of Nations, as conceived by President Woodrow Wilson, was a utopia. 49 Two great powers, Russia and the United States, did not belong to it, and Germany was excluded from it. The League should be reorganized, he suggested, and the Europeans should work for its strengthening in order to avoid war. While World War I weakened Europe , " the War of the Future would inflict the deathblow upon it. " 50 In his view , " Only Pan-European federation , by the introduction and joint guarantee of a compulsory court arbitration, can definitely secure the internal peace of Europe." Coudenhove-Kalergi regretted the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy. While the peace of 1919 signified an advance over prewar conditions politically, economically it was a step backward. As he put it , nationalistic demagogues "have brought disaster to millions of people , and the threat of economic ruin to the continent. " 51 The many opponents of Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi divided into four categories: the National Chauvinists , the Communists , the Militarists, and the Protected Industries. 52 He realized the difficulty of combatting them with his idea that rejected conflict and promoted cooperaton among European nations. His idea, indeed, did not overcome the odds represented by the mentioned �38 SLOVAKIA opponents and national (state) sovereignty. Coudenhove-Kalergi realized that the greatest obstacle to the formation of a United States of Europe lay in the thousand-yearold rivalry between France and Germany. 53 Therefore, the PanEuropeans would have to strive for reconciliation of these two nations in order to prevent a future catastrophy. His own efforts were directed at winning over for his idea both the French and German political leaders. He was more successful in France than in Germany. According to an old Czech proverb, ''Nobody is a prophet in his own fatherland.'' It applied to the fullest extent to Coudenhove-Kalergi. After publishing several articles on Paneuropa in 1922, he decided to try to persuade a well-known European personality ''with vision and authority'' to sponsor the Paneuropean idea. As a citizen of Czechoslovakia, he turned first to that country's president, Thomas G. Masaryk. The latter was sympathetic to the idea of European union but unwilling to associate himself with a crusade for Pan-Europe. 54 In order to obtain the blessing of the Prague government for the movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi dedicated one of the first copies of his book to Masaryk with whom he subsequently met on several 9ccasions. Masaryk introduced him to the foreign minister Edvard Benes, an acknowledged leader of the Little Entente and a well-known figure in international politics. According to the Count, ''unlike Masaryk, Benes was not a genuine European. Fundamentally, he was a Czech nationalist . .. . He spoke the language of Pan-Europe because he believed that to do so was good for his country. But he had no intention of sacrificing a single Czech interest on the altar of European unity. " 55 While he favored '' a collective guarantee of Czechoslovakia's frontiers,'' Benes opposed ''effective protection of the German minorities.'' While he favored ''the dismantling of custom barriers towards Eastern Europe so as to widen the market for Czech goods," he opposed "customs union with Germany for fear of competition from that quarter." Thus Benes 's attitude toward the Pan-European movement tended to be ambiguous; "in theory he was Pan-European, but in practice a Czech nationalist. " 56 After Coudenhove's manuscript on Pan-Europe came out in �SLOVAKIA 39 Vienna in 1923, Chancellor Ignaz Seipel of Austria, who was concerned with the future of his country, was willing to support the European idea and, moreover, offered Coudenhove-Kalergi space for his projected organization in the Hofburg Palace. 57 Since the palace was the seat of the Austrian government and the movement had now an official sponsor, Coudenhove-Kalergi announced the establishment of the Paneuropean Union and a Paneuropean press with headquarters in cosmopolitan Vienna. Coudenhove-Kalergi found prominent supporters of the European idea in France in Edouard Herriot, who had strong European impulses and became prime minister, and Aristide Briand, who became foreign minister, and Alex Leger. It was clear to the young enthusiast that in order to bring about European unity it was necessary to find support for the idea also in Gefmany. With France being the leader in building a European movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to persuade German political leaders, first of all Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, to support the movement. 58 France was the country in search of European security and all political parties, except the Communist, supported the European idea, but in Germany the support was less pronounced, despite Coudenhove-Kalergi's efforts to persuade the Germans that they would benefit from close Paneuropean cooperation both politically and economically. Indeed , the Count pointed out that the success of the United States was due to the customs union, to the vast free market, and that the United States ought to be a model for Europe. He repeatedly stated that Europe could become as peaceful as Switzerland and as prosperous as the United States if it would unite. 59 As a result of long and careful planning by CoudenhoveKalergi, the First Congress of the Paneuropean Union was held in Vienna , October 3-6 , 1926 . He had hoped to persuade a large number of European political leaders to take part in it. Since success of his plans for a united Europe depended primarily on the cooperation of France and Germany, Coudenhove-Kalergi was most anxious to have at the congress Aristide Briand , Edouard Herriot , and Paul Painleve (the premier) of France, and Chancellor Wilhelm Marx an d foreign minister Gustav Stresemann of Germany. While none of them actually attended the congress , the �40 SLOVAKIA three French politicians sent warm greetings and the French government was officially represented at the congress by the French minister in Vienna. The Germans were less cooperative, though Chancellor Marx sent the young Count a short telegram wishing him success and stating that the Reich Chancellor would follow the course of the congress with great interest. 60 Coudenhove-Kalergi was not completely unsuccessful in Germany. On the eve of the congress Thomas Mann joined the Paneuropean Union and Paul Lobe agreed to serve as an honorary president of the congress along with Edvard Benes, Joseph Caillaux, Nicholas Politis, Francesco Nitti, and Ignaz Seipel. Austria seemed to be the greatest supporter of the movement. Chancellor Rudolph Ramek welcomed the delegates, including those from France, Belgium, Norway, and Czechoslovakia, where chapters of the movement had been established. 61 The congress was hailed as a great success in many leading European newspapers. According to an editorial in the Manchester Guardian Weekly of October 8, 1926, "The United States of Europe is no longer a dream; it has entered on the world of realities." Yet, the reality of the situation was such that even CoudenhoveKalergi realized that the reserved attitude of the German government and the agitation for Anschluss were stumbling blocs for the realization of his dream. He said that the Anschluss was a PanGerman not a Paneuropean idea and that some German politicians were using Paneuropean slogans to cloak their nationalist demands for power. 62 At the same time the Paneuropean Union was growing in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and even in Germany new people were joining the movement. 63 In France Aristide Briand was an honorary president of the Paneuropean Union and a strong advocate of the European idea. Indeed , with the exception of the Communist party, political parties in France looked very favorably on the Paneuropean movement. 64 The latter had some grass roots and official support in Czechoslovakia, whose foreign policy was oriented towards France. As Coudenhove-Kalergi put it, Benes believed in " the eventual establishment of a European Federation, but doubted whether it could be achieved in the short run . . . it was this doubt which induced him to give support to our project. Had-he believed �SLOVAKIA 41 in its immediate realization, he would probably have opposed it.' '65 Since Ignaz Seipel and Karl Renner of Austria had come out openly in support of European Federation, Benes did not wish to appear less European-minded. Therefore, he accepted "the honorary chairmanship of the Czech committee and wrote an excellent preface for the Czech edition of Pan-Europe.'' He helped to organize the committee and "secured for it the co-operation of outstanding politicians of Czech and German descent.' ' 66 He also furnished Coudenhove-Kalergi with a diplomatic passport which was extremely useful to him. Benes also opened for him many doors in France and other Entente states, thus helping him overcome ''the double handicap'' of his Austrian origin and his German mother-tongue.6 7 Among the Paneuropeans were also those who advocated a gradual approach to European federation and envisaged a federation of Danubian states. Among the most active champions of Danubian federation were Milan Hodza and Vaclav Schuster in Czechoslovakia, Elemer Hantos and Erno Bleier in Hungary, and Barons van Barolin and van Mises in Austria. Some of the supporters of the larger European idea argued that a Danubian federation would be a step toward a European federation. 68 The second Paneuropean Congress was held in Berlin in May, 1930. Prior to it, the French Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on a European federal system. The Briand memorandum was hailed by the congress as ''the first step toward the fulfillment . . . of an European federation,' ' 69 and interested powers were urged to accept the French proposals. Briand's proposals were taken seriously by the British Foreign Office, but the German government's response was that some basic changes in the postwar settlement were a condition for its participation in a federal system. Replies of other countries were also conditional and, as history tells us, the Briand plan was never implemented. The arrival of the Nazi regime in Germany was a very serious setback for Coudenhove's Paneurope. Indeed, the Nazi-projected Pan-Europe meant the domination of the continent by one nation and not a cooperation of all European nations as equals. Since Coudenhove-Kalergi was a persona non grata in the Third Reich, �42 SLOVAKIA he accepted French citizenship when Bohemia-Moravia became a part of it in 1939.7° Eventually, he left Europe for the United States where he continued his work and where, in 1943, he published his autobiography, Crusade for Pan-Europe. In 1944 New York University appointed him Professor of History. In New York he also established contacts with many European statesmen, including General de Gaule, and discussed with them post-war problems.7 1 * * * * * Needless to say, conditions in Central Europe are different from those in the United States where the traditional policy of assimilation has resulted in a multi-cultural society speaking the same language. With its heterogeneous population and traditions of nationalistic conflicts and cooperation in national and multinational states, federalism is the solution proposed for the unyielding problem of nationalities and minorities in Europe. While in the United States individual immigrants have been and can be assimilated, since such adjustment on the part of the immigrant is a prerequisite for finding his/her place in the new land of opportunity, it is not possible to assimilate nations or national groups possessing strong national consciousness and conscious of their national identity. Therefore, national federalism which tolerates differences in language and culture can be the only practical and feasible arrangement in East Central Europe, just as it has been the case in Switzerland. National federalism would bring economic prosperity, national freedom and regional security to nations living in the area. When the facade of national states in East Central Europe crumbled at the beginning of World War II, individuals concerned with the long-range policies in the area began to assess the national requirements of majorities and minorities in the area. Stefan Osusky, former Czechoslovak minister in Paris, presented a summary of these requirements: 72 Undoubtedly, the nations in Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe have a right to their national liberty. But the interests of the European peoples require that those nations should not be encouraged in the dream of bringing about national uniformity within their States . Not �SLOVAKIA 43 on national uniformity but on national liberty depends the existence and the future of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. It is by guaranteeing the peoples of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe their freedom of national consciousness that the foundation of the peace of Europe will be laid. Furthermore, national uniformity would mean the elimination of every authority except that of the State. In countries with different religions, languages, customs and traditions, this is not desirable. For the preservation of religious, linguistic and cultural liberty means not only that individuals have a right to profess the religion of their choice, speak the lapguage of their mothers and live according to the traditions and customs of their ancestors; it means the practical possibility of associating together and administering their own particular affairs. These requirements for cooperation among the nations living in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were valid then as they are today. Let us hope that one day the small nations in the area will reject conflict and chose cooperation and that they will find a federal solution to the problem that is common to all of them: they are too weak to stand alone between the solid masses of Germans and Russians. NOTES 1 Frantisek Palacky and Ludwig van Lohner formulated a plan for redivision of the Habsburg Empire into national territories: German Austria, Bohemia including Slovakia, the Polish provinces, the Illyrian provinces, the Italian provinces, the South Slavic area, the Hungarian area, and the Wallachian (Romanian) provinces. This plan was endorsed by the Austrian Reichstag , dominated by federalist thinking, meeting in Kromeffz late in 1848 and early 1849 to draw up a new constitution for the empire. However, the Vienna government, after suppressing the revolution of 1848, dissolved the Reichstag and imposed a centralistic constitution. Wenzel Jaksch, Europe 's Road to Potsdam . Translated and edited by Kurt Glaser. (New York, 1963) , pp . 26-27 . For details and documents see Bohus Rieger, Franti§ka Palackeho spisy drobne [Small Works of Frantisek Palacky] (Prague , 1898, vol. I) pp . 59ff. Also Karel Kramaf, Geske statnf pravo (Prague, 1896) . �SLOVAKIA 44 As the leader of the Czech National party, Palacky in 1848 was invited to join those who later met in the Frankfurt Parliament, but he refused . At that time Palacky wrote that, had the Austrian Empire not existed, it would have been necessary to create it . 2 H. Raupach, Der tschechische Friihnationalism (Essen, 1939), p. 92 . On May 29, 1849, Havlicek wrote in Narodnf Noviny: "We want an association of free nations in Austria , in Central Europe." 3 Jaksch, Europe's Road, pp . 70-71; also Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (New York, 1986), p. 32. 4 Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks (Whiting, Ind . 1957) p. 210; Kon~tantln Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava , 1937), p. 78. Also , Kalvoda , The Genesis, pp. 69-70 . 5 Culen, p . 177; Yurchak, pp . 212-214; Kalvoda , pp . 284-285 . 6 Kalvoda, The Genesis, pp. 76-77. 7 Frantgek Berdych, ed. , Obrana statu a na~e politicke strany (Prague, 1938), pp. 168-169. a Ibid., p. 171. 9 Ibid., p. 172. Incidentally, only two major groups in the Czechoslovak parliament voted against the law: the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, and the Sudeten German party led by Konrad Henlein . See ibid. , pp . 207ff. 10 Ira E. Bennett, "The Czechs Will Rise Again," The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1941; J.B. Kozak, T.G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonske deklarace v ffjnu 1918 (Prague, 1968), p . 40. 11 Kalvoda , The Genesis, p. 426. 12 Masaryk to Wilson, November 1, 1918; Wilson to Masaryk, November 5, 1918; and Masaryk to Wilson, November 7, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers (The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 13 Kalvoda, The Genesis, p . 427. 14 Josef Kalvoda, "The Czechoslovak Problem, " Nationalities Papers, Vol. XIl, No. 2 (Fall 1984), p. 245. 15 Ibid. 16 Delegation Propaganda: Czechoslovak Republic, Memoire No . III, The Hoover Institution, quoted in Kalvoda , The Genesis, p. 445 . 17 Ibid. (The Genesis). 18 Nicholas Murray Butler, Why War? (New York, 1940), p . 20 . 19 Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscences (London , 1942). 20 Michal Mu.dry , Milan Hodia v Amerike (Chicago , 1949). p. 231. 21 Ibid., p . 177 . 22 23 Ibid . Ibid., p. 231. 24 Ibid., p . 232 . 25 R. Kravcek, "Hodzuv plan," Slovansky pfehled, No . 6, 1967, pp. 347-3 53 ; also Hodza 's book, Federation . �SLOVAKIA 45 26 Libuse Otahalova a Milada Cervinkova, eds., Dokumenty z historie teskoslovenske politiky 1939-1943 (Prague 1966), vol. I, p. 293 . 27 Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike, p. 58. Joseph M. Kirschbaum, ed. , Slovakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries (Toronto, Ont., 1978), p . 123 . See also a book by the same author, Slovakia. Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York, 1960), pp. 78-84; Joachim Kuhl, Federationsplane in Donauraum und in Ost mitteleuropa (Miinchen, 1958); and Rudolf Wierer, Der Federalism im Donauraum (Graz-Koln, 1960). 29 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers the World (London, 1953) . 28 30 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe. Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York, 1943). 31 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, p . 109. 32 Ibid., p. 91. 33 Ibid., p. 102. 34 35 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York, 1926) . Ibid. , pp . 6-8. 36 Ibid. , p. xv. 31 Ibid., p. xvi. 36Ibid., pp . 10-11. 39 Ibid. , p . 11. 40 Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 58. 41 43 Ibid., p . 62. Ibid ., p . 63. 44 Ibid. , p. 64. 45 46 Ibid. Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 67-69 48 Ibid., p. 74 . 42 Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., p . 112 . 5 1 Ibid., p . 122 . 49 50 52 Ibid., pp. 186-190. 53 Ibid., pp . 132-147 . 54 Coudenhove-Kalergi , Crusade for Pan-Europe, p. 88. 55 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, p. 103. Ibid., pp. 103-104. 56 57 Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea , 1914-1932 (Chapel Hill and London , 1983) p . 29 . 58 Ibid., p . 41. �46 59 SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 63 . so Ibid., p . 70. 62 Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., p . 88. 63 Ibid., p . 89 . 61 Coudenhove-Kalergi , An Idea Conquers, p. 104. Ibid., p . 105 . 66 Ibid. , p. 104. 64 65 67 Ibid., p . 105 . 68 Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea , p. 99 . Ibid., p. 145. 69 °Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 7 pp . 208-209. 71 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, pp. 254-255 . 72 ~tefan Osusky, The Contemporary Review, November, 1941 , pp . 280-281, cited in Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (With special Reference to East-Central Europe) (New York, 1945), pp. 167-168. � SLOVAKIA 23 Federalist Thought in Czechoslovakia During the lnterwar Years JOSEF KALVODA For centuries Central Europe has been an area ,of mixed nationalities and both Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, when the latter was established in 1918-1919, were multi-national states. The need for peace and cooperation among the many national groups gave rise to several proposals for a federal solution of the problems of small nations living in the area. One may recall that on January 23, 1849 the Czech historian and political leader Frantisek Palacky proposed the reorganization of the Austrian Empire along federal lines. 1 One can also cite a statement by the known Czech journalist Karel Havlicek Borovsky who argued against Bohemia's joining the German Reich proposed by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849 . He wrote: ''Our federation is Austria. '' 2 The struggle for the state right by the National (Old) Czech party , led by Frantisek Ladislav Rieger, in the nineteenth century was also a reflection of the Czech nation's desire to federalize the Austrian state. Until World War I the struggle for the ' ' state right '' was continued by the Young Czech party, as well as by the other Czech political parties with the exception of the Social Democrats and Professor Thomas G. Masaryk who advocated federalization of the state along ethnic lines. 3 In the interwar years several proposals for a federal solution of the Czech-Slovak problem and the problem of "Balkanized" East Central Europe and Europe in general were made by some citizens and political leaders in Czechoslovakia. These ideas will be briefly considered in this paper. A discussion of federalist thought in Czechoslovakia ought �24 SLOVAKIA to begin with the first plans for establishment of a state that would include the Czech historical lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia) and Slovakia, known originally as Upper Hungary. During World War I the idea of an independent Czecho-Slovak state was endorsed by some Czech groups both at home and abroad , including the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America. In order to promote the independence movement , representatives of the two organizations met in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 15, 1915 , where they agreed on what they believed their countrymen in Austria-Hungary would accept in the event of their liberation. The ' 'Cleveland Agreement'' provided for the autonomy of both the Czech lands and Slovakia, proclaiming that the union of the Czech and Slovak peoples will be in a '' federative union of states, ' ' with complete national autonomy for Slovakia. Slovakia would have its own schools, its own state administration, cultural freedom and Slovak would be the official language.4 A few years later the agreement was presented to Thomas G. Masaryk in Pittsburgh at a meeting of representatives of the Bohemian National Alliance , the Slovak League , and the National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics. Since some Slovaks expressed an apprehension that in the future Czecho-Slovak state the Slovaks might be enveloped ("Czechified" ), Masaryk, the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council seated in Paris, decided to revise it. He wrote in Slovak the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed by him and 6ther Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918. 5 The agreement stated that representatives of the named organizations ' ' approve of a political program aiming to unite the Czechs and Slovaks into an independent state comprising the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration , its own diet, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in schools , in government offices , and in public life generally. The Czecho-Slovak state shall be a republic ; its constitution shall be democratic .' ' The document was destined to have far-reaching consequences in the history of Czechoslovakia. In their struggle for selfgovernment and their efforts to change the centralist constitution of 1920, the Slovak autonomists invoked the Pittsburgh Agreement. One may argue that the idea of a federal union of the Czechs �SLOVAKIA 25 and Slovaks in the Cleveland Agreement, as well as the autonomous arrangement promised by the Pittsburgh Agreement, were manifestations of the influence of the United States federal system of government on the thinking of those who signed them. Similarly, as it is in the states of the American federation, the Pittsburgh Agreement stipulated that Slovakia "shall have its own administration, its own diet, and its own courts.'' Since Czechs and Slovaks are two different nations speaking similar but different languages, it was necessary to make the Slovak language in Slovakia "the official language in schools, in governmental offices, and in public life generally." In view of the fact that in 1915, in a memorandum to the British government, Masaryk stated that the new s·tate (' 'Independent Bohemia") would be a monarchy, because only a small group of "radicals" favored a republic, 6 and that most of the leaders of the independence movement in the Czech lands and Milan R. Stefanik, who represented the Slovaks in the CzechoSlovak National Council, were monarchists, it would seem that the American environment influenced Masaryk's decision to proclaim the new state a republic. The principles stated in the Pittsburgh Agreement were not implemented in the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920; the latter established a centralist state administration. Autonomy for Ruthenia, the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, provided for in the constitution, was not realized either until the collapse of the First Republic in October 1938. (Incidentally, the Slovaks had autonomy during the Second Republic that came to its end in March, 1939.) Champions of the autonomist movement in Slovakia, the Slovak People's party and the Slovak National party, constantly emphasized the need for a federal arrangement in the state that they supported. In May 1936, in a parliamentary discussion of the proposed Law for the Defense of the State (Law 131 of May 13, 1936), a Slovak People's party deputy and a former member of government, Jozef Tiso, declared that the Slovak nation considered the state of the Czechs and Slovaks their own state and that his party supported the law. As on many other occasions, Tiso discussed the Slovak problem and the demand for the implementation of the �26 SLOVAKIA Pittsburgh Agreement. As he put it, "Autonomy is education of the Slovak nation toward seeing in this state its own state in which it rules ... Autonomy is education for state-forming thinking of the Slovaks" . .. " 7 The autonomist program, he emphasized, made the Slovaks conscious of the fact that Czechoslovakia was their state, and that the latter did not mean the merging of the . two nations, but a unity of the two nations in one common state. In the discussion of the same legislative proposal a Senator of the Slovak People's party, Gejza Fritz, emphasized that the "root of the autonomy is the Pittsburgh Agreement, concluded and signed by Czechs and Slovaks and the then president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council,'' Masaryk. The autonomy was to be within the boundaries of the state, not outside of it. As he put it, ''We demand self-government that is not incompatible with the state unity. That such an autonomy is possible is evidenced by the fact that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to CarpathoRussia (Ruthenia) within the framework of the united Czechoslovak republic.' ' 9 He pointed out that the president of the state had signed the agreement and that for ''those reasons it is not logical to claim that autonomy is separatism.'' In its substance, "autonomy means decentralization." In addition, the Slovaks demand equal rights for the Slovak language, he said , pointing out that ''to strive for a united Czechoslovak nation would mean to increase the antagonism of all Slovaks.' ' 9 * * * * * During. World War I Masaryk's objective was the establishment of an independent state. However, until the summer of 1918 he was prepared to accept autonomy for the Czechs within the framework of Austria-Hungary if independence were not attainable.10 By this time France and the United States had already parted with the idea of preserving a federalized Austria-Hungary; the latter collapsed by the end of October 1918. But even after the declaration of Czecho-Slovak independence by Masaryk in Washington, D.C., on October 18 , the Czech leader presided over a meeting of representatives of several national groups from Central Europe between October 23 and 26, 1918, that announced the intention to establish a Democratic Mid-European Union. This �SLOVAKIA 27 meeting, held at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, led some people in Washington, D.C., to believe that on the ruins of AustriaHungary a new central european federation would emerge. The final resolution produced by the conference, called the ''Declaration of Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations,'' was read by Masaryk in front of Independence Hall and was hailed by the American press as something approaching a declaration of a united Europe. 11 · On November 1, 1918, the original of the declaration was submitted to President Woodrow Wilson by Masaryk, who was the first of its twelve signatories. In the accompanying letter to Wilson Masaryk stated that the union ''tries to replace the German Plan of Mittel-Europe by a positive plan of reorganization of the many smaller nations which are located between the Germans (in Germany and Austria) and Russians; there are about eighteen such nations, beginning with the Finns and ending with the Greeks. . . . The primary aim of the war and the coming peace is the reorganization of the East, including now Russia; and the first condition of this reorganization of Eastern Europe and through it of Europe and mankind, is the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, composed of eight non-German nations, oppressed and exploited by a degenerate dynasty and reckless feudal aristocracy supported by the Germans and Magyars.'' 12 In the last paragraph of the letter Masaryk proclaimed: "Mr. President, we see in you one of the greatest leaders of modern democracy and constructive policy; it is in making a sincere attempt to apply such a policy to our particular nations and to the whole of Europe that we hope you will engage your interest in our Union's endeavors." The signatories of the declaration, claiming to represent ''more than fifty million people constituting a chain of nations lying between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas, comprising Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, Jugoslavs , Ukrainians, UhroRusins, Lithuanians, Roumanians and Italian Irredentists , Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians, Zionists and Armenians, wholly or partly subject to alien domination ... accept and subscribe to the following as basic principles for all free peoples." �28 SLOVAKIA ''First. That all governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed. Second. That it is the inalienable right of every people to organize their own government on such principles and in such form as they believe will best promote their welfare, safety and happiness. Third. That the free and natural development of the ideals of any state should be allowed to pursue their normal and unhindered course unless such course harms or threatens the common interest of all. Fourth. That there should be no secret diplomacy, and all proposed treaties and agreements between nations should be made public - prior to their adoption and ratification. Fifth. That we believe our peoples, having kindred ideals and purposes, should coordinate their efforts to insure the liberties of their individual nations for the furtherance of their own common welfare, provided such a union contributes to the peace and welfare of the world. Sixth. That there should be formed a league of the nations of the world in a common and binding agreement for genuine and practical cooperation to secure justice and therefore peace among nations .'' The signatories of the declaration pledged '' on behalf of their respective nations'' that the principles set forth in it '' shall be incorporated in the organic laws of whatever government our respective peoples may hereafter establish.'' As it happened, the vast majority of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary (Constituent) National Assembly , established after the war, followed Masaryk's views and paid no attention to the principles stated in the Declaration of the Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations. The assembly did not derive its powers from the consent of the governed; it was not elected by the peoples living in Czechoslovakia; the Germans , Hungarians , Poles , and Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia were not represented in it at all; and the Germans, Hungarians , Slovaks , and Ruthenians living in the country were not allowed to "organize their own government on such principles and in such form as they believe will best promote their welfare , safety and happiness . " 13 �SLOVAKIA 29 * * * * * While visiting the United States in the fall of 1918, Roman Dmowski, the head to the Polish National Committee Abroad, seated in Paris, suggested to Masaryk the formation of a Federation consisting of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Masaryk refused the proposal, but favored "a certain kind of Economic Union, to be worked out; and a military defense against Germany, essentially non-aggressive." Not farseeing the problem of frontier adjustment with Poland, Masaryk asked Dmowski "to write out text of agreement on these lines.'' The Polish leader, however, did not formulate such an agreement, since he, apparently, was not interested in anything short of Federation. 14 The proposed Federation of the three Western Slavic nations, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, could have provided an ample guarantee of peace in Central Europe, since the three nations could have faced together the prospective threats coming from either east or west, and could have jointly resolved the national minority problem. In the 1930s the idea of close cooperation with Poland was endorsed by the leader of the Czechoslovak National Democratic party, Karel Kramaf, and the leader of the Slovak People's party, Andrej Hlinka. At that time, due to hostility between Czechoslovakia's foreign minister Edvard Benes, and the Polish foreign minister Jozef Beck, such a policy was not practical and could not be implemented. 15 * * * * * At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Czecho-Slovakia was represented by a delegation of which the principal spokesman was Edvard Benes. InMemoire No. 3, one of the documents submitted by him to the conference, addressing itself to "The lot of the Germans in the Czecho-Slovak Republic," a promise was made that ''the Germans of Bohemia [sic] would have the same rights as the Czecho-Slovaks themselves. The German tongue would be the second tongue of the land .... The regime adopted would be similar to that of Switzerland. " 16 In his note of May 20, 1919, Benes elaborated on the latter point, announcing the intention of the state to apply the principles of the Swiss Republic in creating the organs of the new state that would be '' a sort of Switzerland.'' In the con- �30 SLOVAKIA clusion of his memorandum Benes promised ''an extremely liberal regime, which will very much resemble that of Switzerland. " 17 This was a statement of intention - one of those by which the way to hell is paved. It was not implemented and a centralistic Constitution was adopted in Czechoslovakia in 1920. One may speculate, as did Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, that ''had the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia at the time of its organization in 1919 been based upon the cantonal system, its history . . . might have been very different and far happier.'' 18 * * * * * Dr. Milan Hodza, a Slovak by birth, was a well-known exponent of the idea of establishing a Central European or a Danubian Federation. 19 He proceeded from the assumption that the League of Nations and the Little Entente were ineffective and inadequate for preserving peace in Europe. The latter had to unite in order to maintain peace and advance prosperity. However, Europe's final unification presupposes, first of all, an effective regional cooperation. Therefore, Hodza developed the theme of the union of Central Europe when the new order was established in Europe after World War I. As a prominent politician of the Republican (agrarian) party, he propagated the idea of a federated Central Europe numbering about 110 million people, stretching from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea and covering the region between Germany and Soviet Russia. 20 Since the states in the region were predominantly agrarian, the federation had to be based on agrarian democracy. 21 Already in 1925, at the national congress of the Republican party, Hodza declared that there was a need for Central European solidarity; the latter would save Czechoslovakia from either Bolshevik or imperialistic attack. 22 He believed that the interests of Czechoslovakia and Poland could be reconcilled and their close cooperation with the other nations in the area would benefit all of Europe. In his lecture, delivered in London in 1930, Hodza stated: ''It is universally an international danger when dictatorship becomes a contagious disease, which weakens the organism of states and nations. Thus one day we could expose ourselves to the danger which might infect Central Europe with Moscow's �SLOVAKIA 31 dictatorship. Therefore, it is important that Central Europe does not become the carrier of dictatorial bacilli, but rather a trench, or barrier, against dictatorship. " 23 In Hodza's view, the national sovereignty of small nations should not be construed as isolationism, but rather a foundation stone for international cooperation. Since the nations of Central Europe have mutual interests and similar traditions , they have to come closer together and work for a wider international cooperation. A federation of states from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea, united on the basis of democratic principles, would be a barrier against Bolshevism and the first step toward establishing a United States of Europe. 24 Hodza became prime minister of Czechoslovakia in November 1935 and Benes was elected the state's president in the middle of December 1935. When from December 20, 1935, to February 29, 1936, Hodza was also the acting minister of foreign affairs, he tried very hard to get his favorite project off the ground. In an attempt to implement it, he visited Vienna on January 17 , 1936, Paris, February 8-15, Belgrade, February 21-25, and again Vienna, March 8-10, 1936. 25 The Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg fully endorsed Hodza's project, but it was viewed skeptically in other countries and, above all, in the Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs staffed by Benes appointees. The new president was especially annoyed by Hodza's conduct of foreign policy. Later Benes commented with disdain on the prime minister's activities as follows: "Hodza went to Vienna, had lunch with Schuschnigg, told him that something should be done in Central Europe to remove the German threat to Austria. Upon his return to Prague he told me that he had negotiated an alliance with Austria. It caused alarm in France and in England, because these countries were informed to the effect that everything would be signed, sealed and delivered in three weeks . Of course it was a bluff. " 26 When in the summer of 1938 a large demonstration in favor of autonomy of Slovakia took place in the capital city of Bratislava, Hodza made an attempt to take the wind out of the autonomist sails. He revealed his own plan for self-government in Slovakia. This proposal, known as the ''Hodza Plan,'' was revealed in detail �32 SLOVAKIA in his Slovensky dennik. The key provision in it was as follows: "Slovakia will have her own diet with legislative powers, her own government of six ministers to deal exclusively with Slovak matters. The Slovak language will be the only official language in Slovakia. A separate Slovak commission will supervise and decide the personal questions connected with appointments of the state employees to eliminate irregularities and to see that Slovak claims are not bypassed.' •21 After the Munich settlement, on October 6, 1938, Slovak autonomy was proclaimed. The manifest was signed by seven nonSocialist parties (including the Slovak People's party), representing about 75 percent of the Slovak electorate. The Czecho-Slovak National Assembly approved the Constitutional Law of Slovak selfrule on November 22 , 1938 by a unanimous vote. (The deputies of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia left the Chamber before the voting. )2 8 * * * * * In the interwar years a prominent federalist advocating the establishment of a United States of Europe, Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, lived in Czechoslovakia. He became famous after World War II, when many Americans and West Europeans embraced his ideas. 29 His pioneering work did bring fruits when the West European community was established. Czechoslovakia, however, was a member of the Soviet bloc , and did not benefit from it. ,· Born in Tokyo on November 17, 1894, Coudenhove-Kalergi's mother was Japanese and his father was an Austrian diplomat. The Coudenhove-Kalergi's home was the old Castle of Ronsperk in Bohemia. The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 made the Count a citizen of Czechoslovakia. 30 When the Nazis occupied the country in 1939 , he accepted French citizenship and, eventually, left Europe for the United States. During the interwar years Coudenhove-Kalergi was the leading theoretician and founder of the Pan-European movement. He devoted his talents and efforts to the cause of European federation. Among those whom he inspired and persuaded to support the movement was Edouard Herriot, a one-time prime minister �SLOVAKIA 33 and minister of foreign affairs in France, and the author of The United States of Europe. Herriot was the first European statesman who appealed openly for a United States of Europe. 31 A student of history, Coudenhove-Kalergi was familiar with attempts to unify Europe made over the centuries by writers and kings, including George Podiebrad, a famous King of Bohemia in the fifteenth century. His first article on ''The European Question" appeared in the summer of 1922 in the Berlin Volkische Zeitung and the Vienna Neue Freie Presse.32 After finding some influential supporters among political leaders of the time, the first issue of the movements's new periodical, Pan-Europe, came out in April 1924. It contained an article entitled "The European Manifesto.'' Due to extensive publicity generated by the movement, his book on Pan-Europe began to appear in several languages. 33 The English language edition, with an introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, was published in 1926 in New York. 34 In Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi noticed the political decline of Europe as a consequence of the World War: "From the center of the world Europe has moved to its periphery. The world hegemony of Europe is overthrown for all time .'' The validity of the last sentence was called to doubt by some, when Germany rose again as a great power in the 1930s. Yet the outcome of World War II confirmed his observation that "the United States of America has developed into the leading World Power." As he observed in his book first published in 1923, in the World War the United States " proved the decisive factor . Today , the United States of America is the wealthiest, the most powerful, and the most advanced country in the world." At the same time, however, "Europe's power of action in world politics is paralyzed by her disunion.' ' 35 In advocating the consolidation of Europe into a politicoeconomic federation, Coudenhove-Kalergi encountered objection from several quarters branding Pan-Europe a utopia. To this he replied that "every great historical happening began as a utopia and ended as a reality." He pointed out that in 1913 the Polish and Czecho-Slovak republics were utopias; "in 1918 they became realities. In 1916 the victory of the communists in Russia was a �34 SLOVAKIA utopia; in 1917 it was an accomplished fact. " 36 Whether PanEurope would be realized depended on the will of the Europeans; if the latter would support the idea and work for it, a utopia would become a reality. As he put it, ''While thousands believe in PanEurope, it is a utopia; so long as millions believe in it, it is a program; but once a hundred million believe in it, it becomes a fact." Thus in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi called upon the youth of Europe ''to convert the utopia of yesterday into a reality of tomorrow.' ' 37 Constantly referring to historical events, Coudenhove-Kalergi emphasized that power-relationships among countries have been changing with time. For example, the Bohemian empire of King Ottokar was a great power stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and was about the size of European Russia; Bohemia of the 1920s was as small as was the Grand Duchy of Weimar a century earlier. According to him, ''Time works for Russia and against Europe," This was an observation not shared by many people at that time. He also pointed out how the United States became a great power and how this technically most advanced country was ''the first to try the new method of political organization, namely, a system of peaceful federations, culminating in the PanAmerican Union and in the idea of a League of Nations. Although the American conditions are different than those in Europe, states that are small may not be able to lead an independent existence and, therefore, they have to establish federations." As he saw it, "The leading World powers of today are federations: Russia, England, America. Political rapprochement of neighboring countries must be realized, if conflicts are to be avoided.' ' 38 Coudenhove-Kalergi observed that the formation of the PanAmerican League was not directed against any other state system, but solely against war, and "toward furthering the cultural progress of all." The American example should be followed by Europe. The latter must supplement "its modern science of communications by a modern science of politics, else it will be in danger of blindly staggering into another war and of suffocating in a very sea of gas-bombs.' •39 The Count regretted that Europe was regressing further and further toward atomization, since Austria-Hungary, Western �SLOVAKIA 35 Russia, and European Turkey dissolved themselves into a multitude of petty states. This process needs to be reversed by promoting integration, otherwise, if the liberation of European peoples is not completed by their unification, '' sooner or later the European state will be swallowed up by the growing World Powers.' ' 40 Europe must find a means of harmonizing freedom with organization, that is to follow the example of America in establishing a federation. Coudenhove-Kalergi presented a plan for the establishment of such a federation and discussed several reasons for which the nations of Europe should unite. First, Bolshevik Russia made no secret of her aggressive intentions: Bolshevism fights with propaganda in the one hand and with sword in the other; "it resorts to violence, terrorism and militarism.' ' 41 Therefore, the aim of all Europeans, regardless of party or nation, should be the prevention of a Soviet invasion that would bring about the destruction of liberty and the other cherished values. A Pan-European security pact guaranteeing the protection of European eastern frontiers would lay the foundation for an understanding with Soviet Russia. He suggested that if Texas, New Mexico, and California were independent states, they would be in constant danger from Mexico. But "as states of the American federal union they are secure against any such danger. " 42 Similarly, the Soviet threat to Romania, Poland, and Finland would disappear as soon as they would become members of the United States of Europe. As long as they were isolated, they represented a constant temptation for Soviet Russia. Furthermore, Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested that the quarrels among the European states weakened their power defense against Soviet Russia. Therefore, there was a need for European solidarity for an effective defense of the eastern frontiers of Europe. Any war in Europe would offer the Soviets a welcome opportunity for intervention; "and once Russian armies have secured a footing in Europe, they will scarcely relinquish it of their own free will.'' He also saw a danger in the pro-Russian orientation of some states, notably Germany. He suggested that there was a large number of Germans who hoped, "through an alliance with Russia, to tear up the Treaty of Versailles and once more partition Poland. " 43 �36 SLOVAKIA Whether Germany would be saved or estranged from Europe depended on the Western powers, above all on France, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, and he predicted that in the FrancoGerman conflict neither Germany nor France, "but Russia will in the long run be victorious. ' ' He warned that France still had time to preserve ''the German sister republic for the family of European states; tomorrow it may be already too late.'' He added that "upon this question hinges the future of Europe. " 44 Though less immediate, there was a danger "from forcible separation of eastern Europe,'' should there be a sudden change in the internal policy of Russia, and should the latter return to Pan-Slavism. In that case the Pan-Slav memories of the Southern and Western Slavs would be revived and Hungary and Bulgaria would try to recover lost territories ' 'by means of an alliance with the Russian reaction. In that event Russia's power would extend as far as the Adriatic Sea. " 4 5 These dangers, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed, could be averted by the timely creation of the Pan-European Federation. In his view, the historical moment in the time of his writing (1923) was more favorable than it ever was before. The situation would likely worsen every month and ''it is more than doubtful whether after a victory of the Russian reaction a Pan-European Federation would still l)e possible, " 46 he wrote. The formation of the United States of Europe would make possible an agreement on disarmament and economic cooperation with Soviet Russia. Since united Europe would possess great military and economic power, the danger of war with Russia would be removed. As long as Europe was divided , he said, there was a danger of a new war. A united Europe would have a larger population and incomparably more highly developed industries and, therefore, Soviet Russia "would realize the hopelessness of war and will be ready to disarm." But, he writes , as long as the regime in Russia is organized on a Soviet basis , it would be better for ''Russo-European peace if these two federations remain separate.' ' 47 The Soviet regime endeavored to overthrow the democratic order in Europe and, therefore , a merging of the two federations was not practical. However, '' Should Russia become democratic, a new situation would result.' ' Then it would be possi- �SLOVAKIA 37 ble to consider the question of Russia's joining the European federation. Turning to Europe's relations with the United States, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that "The economic model for PanEurope is provided by the United States of America; the political model for Pan-Europe's development, by the Pan-American Union.' ' 48 Since its origin, with the exception of the Civil War era, the United States has been a political and economic unity. Europeans should realize that the success of the American dream has been due to the existence of a common market and the political unity of the continent. They should utilize the experiences gathered in the United States and the entire American continent in their efforts to build Pan-Europe. Though Pan-Americanism was still in the process of development , it had a head start over PanEuropeanism. The history of the development of Pan-Americanism has great significance for Pan-Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that the League of Nations, as conceived by President Woodrow Wilson, was a utopia. 49 Two great powers, Russia and the United States, did not belong to it, and Germany was excluded from it. The League should be reorganized, he suggested, and the Europeans should work for its strengthening in order to avoid war. While World War I weakened Europe , " the War of the Future would inflict the deathblow upon it. " 50 In his view , " Only Pan-European federation , by the introduction and joint guarantee of a compulsory court arbitration, can definitely secure the internal peace of Europe." Coudenhove-Kalergi regretted the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy. While the peace of 1919 signified an advance over prewar conditions politically, economically it was a step backward. As he put it , nationalistic demagogues "have brought disaster to millions of people , and the threat of economic ruin to the continent. " 51 The many opponents of Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi divided into four categories: the National Chauvinists , the Communists , the Militarists, and the Protected Industries. 52 He realized the difficulty of combatting them with his idea that rejected conflict and promoted cooperaton among European nations. His idea, indeed, did not overcome the odds represented by the mentioned �38 SLOVAKIA opponents and national (state) sovereignty. Coudenhove-Kalergi realized that the greatest obstacle to the formation of a United States of Europe lay in the thousand-yearold rivalry between France and Germany. 53 Therefore, the PanEuropeans would have to strive for reconciliation of these two nations in order to prevent a future catastrophy. His own efforts were directed at winning over for his idea both the French and German political leaders. He was more successful in France than in Germany. According to an old Czech proverb, ''Nobody is a prophet in his own fatherland.'' It applied to the fullest extent to Coudenhove-Kalergi. After publishing several articles on Paneuropa in 1922, he decided to try to persuade a well-known European personality ''with vision and authority'' to sponsor the Paneuropean idea. As a citizen of Czechoslovakia, he turned first to that country's president, Thomas G. Masaryk. The latter was sympathetic to the idea of European union but unwilling to associate himself with a crusade for Pan-Europe. 54 In order to obtain the blessing of the Prague government for the movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi dedicated one of the first copies of his book to Masaryk with whom he subsequently met on several 9ccasions. Masaryk introduced him to the foreign minister Edvard Benes, an acknowledged leader of the Little Entente and a well-known figure in international politics. According to the Count, ''unlike Masaryk, Benes was not a genuine European. Fundamentally, he was a Czech nationalist . .. . He spoke the language of Pan-Europe because he believed that to do so was good for his country. But he had no intention of sacrificing a single Czech interest on the altar of European unity. " 55 While he favored '' a collective guarantee of Czechoslovakia's frontiers,'' Benes opposed ''effective protection of the German minorities.'' While he favored ''the dismantling of custom barriers towards Eastern Europe so as to widen the market for Czech goods," he opposed "customs union with Germany for fear of competition from that quarter." Thus Benes 's attitude toward the Pan-European movement tended to be ambiguous; "in theory he was Pan-European, but in practice a Czech nationalist. " 56 After Coudenhove's manuscript on Pan-Europe came out in �SLOVAKIA 39 Vienna in 1923, Chancellor Ignaz Seipel of Austria, who was concerned with the future of his country, was willing to support the European idea and, moreover, offered Coudenhove-Kalergi space for his projected organization in the Hofburg Palace. 57 Since the palace was the seat of the Austrian government and the movement had now an official sponsor, Coudenhove-Kalergi announced the establishment of the Paneuropean Union and a Paneuropean press with headquarters in cosmopolitan Vienna. Coudenhove-Kalergi found prominent supporters of the European idea in France in Edouard Herriot, who had strong European impulses and became prime minister, and Aristide Briand, who became foreign minister, and Alex Leger. It was clear to the young enthusiast that in order to bring about European unity it was necessary to find support for the idea also in Gefmany. With France being the leader in building a European movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to persuade German political leaders, first of all Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, to support the movement. 58 France was the country in search of European security and all political parties, except the Communist, supported the European idea, but in Germany the support was less pronounced, despite Coudenhove-Kalergi's efforts to persuade the Germans that they would benefit from close Paneuropean cooperation both politically and economically. Indeed , the Count pointed out that the success of the United States was due to the customs union, to the vast free market, and that the United States ought to be a model for Europe. He repeatedly stated that Europe could become as peaceful as Switzerland and as prosperous as the United States if it would unite. 59 As a result of long and careful planning by CoudenhoveKalergi, the First Congress of the Paneuropean Union was held in Vienna , October 3-6 , 1926 . He had hoped to persuade a large number of European political leaders to take part in it. Since success of his plans for a united Europe depended primarily on the cooperation of France and Germany, Coudenhove-Kalergi was most anxious to have at the congress Aristide Briand , Edouard Herriot , and Paul Painleve (the premier) of France, and Chancellor Wilhelm Marx an d foreign minister Gustav Stresemann of Germany. While none of them actually attended the congress , the �40 SLOVAKIA three French politicians sent warm greetings and the French government was officially represented at the congress by the French minister in Vienna. The Germans were less cooperative, though Chancellor Marx sent the young Count a short telegram wishing him success and stating that the Reich Chancellor would follow the course of the congress with great interest. 60 Coudenhove-Kalergi was not completely unsuccessful in Germany. On the eve of the congress Thomas Mann joined the Paneuropean Union and Paul Lobe agreed to serve as an honorary president of the congress along with Edvard Benes, Joseph Caillaux, Nicholas Politis, Francesco Nitti, and Ignaz Seipel. Austria seemed to be the greatest supporter of the movement. Chancellor Rudolph Ramek welcomed the delegates, including those from France, Belgium, Norway, and Czechoslovakia, where chapters of the movement had been established. 61 The congress was hailed as a great success in many leading European newspapers. According to an editorial in the Manchester Guardian Weekly of October 8, 1926, "The United States of Europe is no longer a dream; it has entered on the world of realities." Yet, the reality of the situation was such that even CoudenhoveKalergi realized that the reserved attitude of the German government and the agitation for Anschluss were stumbling blocs for the realization of his dream. He said that the Anschluss was a PanGerman not a Paneuropean idea and that some German politicians were using Paneuropean slogans to cloak their nationalist demands for power. 62 At the same time the Paneuropean Union was growing in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and even in Germany new people were joining the movement. 63 In France Aristide Briand was an honorary president of the Paneuropean Union and a strong advocate of the European idea. Indeed , with the exception of the Communist party, political parties in France looked very favorably on the Paneuropean movement. 64 The latter had some grass roots and official support in Czechoslovakia, whose foreign policy was oriented towards France. As Coudenhove-Kalergi put it, Benes believed in " the eventual establishment of a European Federation, but doubted whether it could be achieved in the short run . . . it was this doubt which induced him to give support to our project. Had-he believed �SLOVAKIA 41 in its immediate realization, he would probably have opposed it.' '65 Since Ignaz Seipel and Karl Renner of Austria had come out openly in support of European Federation, Benes did not wish to appear less European-minded. Therefore, he accepted "the honorary chairmanship of the Czech committee and wrote an excellent preface for the Czech edition of Pan-Europe.'' He helped to organize the committee and "secured for it the co-operation of outstanding politicians of Czech and German descent.' ' 66 He also furnished Coudenhove-Kalergi with a diplomatic passport which was extremely useful to him. Benes also opened for him many doors in France and other Entente states, thus helping him overcome ''the double handicap'' of his Austrian origin and his German mother-tongue.6 7 Among the Paneuropeans were also those who advocated a gradual approach to European federation and envisaged a federation of Danubian states. Among the most active champions of Danubian federation were Milan Hodza and Vaclav Schuster in Czechoslovakia, Elemer Hantos and Erno Bleier in Hungary, and Barons van Barolin and van Mises in Austria. Some of the supporters of the larger European idea argued that a Danubian federation would be a step toward a European federation. 68 The second Paneuropean Congress was held in Berlin in May, 1930. Prior to it, the French Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on a European federal system. The Briand memorandum was hailed by the congress as ''the first step toward the fulfillment . . . of an European federation,' ' 69 and interested powers were urged to accept the French proposals. Briand's proposals were taken seriously by the British Foreign Office, but the German government's response was that some basic changes in the postwar settlement were a condition for its participation in a federal system. Replies of other countries were also conditional and, as history tells us, the Briand plan was never implemented. The arrival of the Nazi regime in Germany was a very serious setback for Coudenhove's Paneurope. Indeed, the Nazi-projected Pan-Europe meant the domination of the continent by one nation and not a cooperation of all European nations as equals. Since Coudenhove-Kalergi was a persona non grata in the Third Reich, �42 SLOVAKIA he accepted French citizenship when Bohemia-Moravia became a part of it in 1939.7° Eventually, he left Europe for the United States where he continued his work and where, in 1943, he published his autobiography, Crusade for Pan-Europe. In 1944 New York University appointed him Professor of History. In New York he also established contacts with many European statesmen, including General de Gaule, and discussed with them post-war problems.7 1 * * * * * Needless to say, conditions in Central Europe are different from those in the United States where the traditional policy of assimilation has resulted in a multi-cultural society speaking the same language. With its heterogeneous population and traditions of nationalistic conflicts and cooperation in national and multinational states, federalism is the solution proposed for the unyielding problem of nationalities and minorities in Europe. While in the United States individual immigrants have been and can be assimilated, since such adjustment on the part of the immigrant is a prerequisite for finding his/her place in the new land of opportunity, it is not possible to assimilate nations or national groups possessing strong national consciousness and conscious of their national identity. Therefore, national federalism which tolerates differences in language and culture can be the only practical and feasible arrangement in East Central Europe, just as it has been the case in Switzerland. National federalism would bring economic prosperity, national freedom and regional security to nations living in the area. When the facade of national states in East Central Europe crumbled at the beginning of World War II, individuals concerned with the long-range policies in the area began to assess the national requirements of majorities and minorities in the area. Stefan Osusky, former Czechoslovak minister in Paris, presented a summary of these requirements: 72 Undoubtedly, the nations in Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe have a right to their national liberty. But the interests of the European peoples require that those nations should not be encouraged in the dream of bringing about national uniformity within their States . Not �SLOVAKIA 43 on national uniformity but on national liberty depends the existence and the future of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. It is by guaranteeing the peoples of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe their freedom of national consciousness that the foundation of the peace of Europe will be laid. Furthermore, national uniformity would mean the elimination of every authority except that of the State. In countries with different religions, languages, customs and traditions, this is not desirable. For the preservation of religious, linguistic and cultural liberty means not only that individuals have a right to profess the religion of their choice, speak the lapguage of their mothers and live according to the traditions and customs of their ancestors; it means the practical possibility of associating together and administering their own particular affairs. These requirements for cooperation among the nations living in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were valid then as they are today. Let us hope that one day the small nations in the area will reject conflict and chose cooperation and that they will find a federal solution to the problem that is common to all of them: they are too weak to stand alone between the solid masses of Germans and Russians. NOTES 1 Frantisek Palacky and Ludwig van Lohner formulated a plan for redivision of the Habsburg Empire into national territories: German Austria, Bohemia including Slovakia, the Polish provinces, the Illyrian provinces, the Italian provinces, the South Slavic area, the Hungarian area, and the Wallachian (Romanian) provinces. This plan was endorsed by the Austrian Reichstag , dominated by federalist thinking, meeting in Kromeffz late in 1848 and early 1849 to draw up a new constitution for the empire. However, the Vienna government, after suppressing the revolution of 1848, dissolved the Reichstag and imposed a centralistic constitution. Wenzel Jaksch, Europe 's Road to Potsdam . Translated and edited by Kurt Glaser. (New York, 1963) , pp . 26-27 . For details and documents see Bohus Rieger, Franti§ka Palackeho spisy drobne [Small Works of Frantisek Palacky] (Prague , 1898, vol. I) pp . 59ff. Also Karel Kramaf, Geske statnf pravo (Prague, 1896) . �SLOVAKIA 44 As the leader of the Czech National party, Palacky in 1848 was invited to join those who later met in the Frankfurt Parliament, but he refused . At that time Palacky wrote that, had the Austrian Empire not existed, it would have been necessary to create it . 2 H. Raupach, Der tschechische Friihnationalism (Essen, 1939), p. 92 . On May 29, 1849, Havlicek wrote in Narodnf Noviny: "We want an association of free nations in Austria , in Central Europe." 3 Jaksch, Europe's Road, pp . 70-71; also Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (New York, 1986), p. 32. 4 Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks (Whiting, Ind . 1957) p. 210; Kon~tantln Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava , 1937), p. 78. Also , Kalvoda , The Genesis, pp. 69-70 . 5 Culen, p . 177; Yurchak, pp . 212-214; Kalvoda , pp . 284-285 . 6 Kalvoda, The Genesis, pp. 76-77. 7 Frantgek Berdych, ed. , Obrana statu a na~e politicke strany (Prague, 1938), pp. 168-169. a Ibid., p. 171. 9 Ibid., p. 172. Incidentally, only two major groups in the Czechoslovak parliament voted against the law: the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, and the Sudeten German party led by Konrad Henlein . See ibid. , pp . 207ff. 10 Ira E. Bennett, "The Czechs Will Rise Again," The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1941; J.B. Kozak, T.G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonske deklarace v ffjnu 1918 (Prague, 1968), p . 40. 11 Kalvoda , The Genesis, p. 426. 12 Masaryk to Wilson, November 1, 1918; Wilson to Masaryk, November 5, 1918; and Masaryk to Wilson, November 7, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers (The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 13 Kalvoda, The Genesis, p . 427. 14 Josef Kalvoda, "The Czechoslovak Problem, " Nationalities Papers, Vol. XIl, No. 2 (Fall 1984), p. 245. 15 Ibid. 16 Delegation Propaganda: Czechoslovak Republic, Memoire No . III, The Hoover Institution, quoted in Kalvoda , The Genesis, p. 445 . 17 Ibid. (The Genesis). 18 Nicholas Murray Butler, Why War? (New York, 1940), p . 20 . 19 Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscences (London , 1942). 20 Michal Mu.dry , Milan Hodia v Amerike (Chicago , 1949). p. 231. 21 Ibid., p . 177 . 22 23 Ibid . Ibid., p. 231. 24 Ibid., p . 232 . 25 R. Kravcek, "Hodzuv plan," Slovansky pfehled, No . 6, 1967, pp. 347-3 53 ; also Hodza 's book, Federation . �SLOVAKIA 45 26 Libuse Otahalova a Milada Cervinkova, eds., Dokumenty z historie teskoslovenske politiky 1939-1943 (Prague 1966), vol. I, p. 293 . 27 Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike, p. 58. Joseph M. Kirschbaum, ed. , Slovakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries (Toronto, Ont., 1978), p . 123 . See also a book by the same author, Slovakia. Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York, 1960), pp. 78-84; Joachim Kuhl, Federationsplane in Donauraum und in Ost mitteleuropa (Miinchen, 1958); and Rudolf Wierer, Der Federalism im Donauraum (Graz-Koln, 1960). 29 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers the World (London, 1953) . 28 30 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe. Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York, 1943). 31 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, p . 109. 32 Ibid., p. 91. 33 Ibid., p. 102. 34 35 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York, 1926) . Ibid. , pp . 6-8. 36 Ibid. , p. xv. 31 Ibid., p. xvi. 36Ibid., pp . 10-11. 39 Ibid. , p . 11. 40 Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 58. 41 43 Ibid., p . 62. Ibid ., p . 63. 44 Ibid. , p. 64. 45 46 Ibid. Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 67-69 48 Ibid., p. 74 . 42 Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., p . 112 . 5 1 Ibid., p . 122 . 49 50 52 Ibid., pp. 186-190. 53 Ibid., pp . 132-147 . 54 Coudenhove-Kalergi , Crusade for Pan-Europe, p. 88. 55 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, p. 103. Ibid., pp. 103-104. 56 57 Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea , 1914-1932 (Chapel Hill and London , 1983) p . 29 . 58 Ibid., p . 41. �46 59 SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 63 . so Ibid., p . 70. 62 Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., p . 88. 63 Ibid., p . 89 . 61 Coudenhove-Kalergi , An Idea Conquers, p. 104. Ibid., p . 105 . 66 Ibid. , p. 104. 64 65 67 Ibid., p . 105 . 68 Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea , p. 99 . Ibid., p. 145. 69 °Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 7 pp . 208-209. 71 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, pp. 254-255 . 72 ~tefan Osusky, The Contemporary Review, November, 1941 , pp . 280-281, cited in Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (With special Reference to East-Central Europe) (New York, 1945), pp. 167-168. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1987-88, Vol. 33 Description An account of the resource Vol. 33 (No. 60-61), 1987-88. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1987-88 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 23 Federalist Thought in Czechoslovakia During the lnterwar Years JOSEF KALVODA For centuries Central Europe has been an area ,of mixed nationalities and both Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, when the latter was established in 1918-1919, were multi-national states. The need for peace and cooperation among the many national groups gave rise to several proposals for a federal solution of the problems of small nations living in the area. One may recall that on January 23, 1849 the Czech historian and political leader Frantisek Palacky proposed the reorganization of the Austrian Empire along federal lines. 1 One can also cite a statement by the known Czech journalist Karel Havlicek Borovsky who argued against Bohemia's joining the German Reich proposed by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849 . He wrote: ''Our federation is Austria. '' 2 The struggle for the state right by the National (Old) Czech party , led by Frantisek Ladislav Rieger, in the nineteenth century was also a reflection of the Czech nation's desire to federalize the Austrian state. Until World War I the struggle for the ' ' state right '' was continued by the Young Czech party, as well as by the other Czech political parties with the exception of the Social Democrats and Professor Thomas G. Masaryk who advocated federalization of the state along ethnic lines. 3 In the interwar years several proposals for a federal solution of the Czech-Slovak problem and the problem of "Balkanized" East Central Europe and Europe in general were made by some citizens and political leaders in Czechoslovakia. These ideas will be briefly considered in this paper. A discussion of federalist thought in Czechoslovakia ought 24 SLOVAKIA to begin with the first plans for establishment of a state that would include the Czech historical lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia) and Slovakia, known originally as Upper Hungary. During World War I the idea of an independent Czecho-Slovak state was endorsed by some Czech groups both at home and abroad , including the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America. In order to promote the independence movement , representatives of the two organizations met in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 15, 1915 , where they agreed on what they believed their countrymen in Austria-Hungary would accept in the event of their liberation. The ' 'Cleveland Agreement'' provided for the autonomy of both the Czech lands and Slovakia, proclaiming that the union of the Czech and Slovak peoples will be in a '' federative union of states, ' ' with complete national autonomy for Slovakia. Slovakia would have its own schools, its own state administration, cultural freedom and Slovak would be the official language.4 A few years later the agreement was presented to Thomas G. Masaryk in Pittsburgh at a meeting of representatives of the Bohemian National Alliance , the Slovak League , and the National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics. Since some Slovaks expressed an apprehension that in the future Czecho-Slovak state the Slovaks might be enveloped ("Czechified" ), Masaryk, the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council seated in Paris, decided to revise it. He wrote in Slovak the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed by him and 6ther Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918. 5 The agreement stated that representatives of the named organizations ' ' approve of a political program aiming to unite the Czechs and Slovaks into an independent state comprising the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration , its own diet, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in schools , in government offices , and in public life generally. The Czecho-Slovak state shall be a republic ; its constitution shall be democratic .' ' The document was destined to have far-reaching consequences in the history of Czechoslovakia. In their struggle for selfgovernment and their efforts to change the centralist constitution of 1920, the Slovak autonomists invoked the Pittsburgh Agreement. One may argue that the idea of a federal union of the Czechs SLOVAKIA 25 and Slovaks in the Cleveland Agreement, as well as the autonomous arrangement promised by the Pittsburgh Agreement, were manifestations of the influence of the United States federal system of government on the thinking of those who signed them. Similarly, as it is in the states of the American federation, the Pittsburgh Agreement stipulated that Slovakia "shall have its own administration, its own diet, and its own courts.'' Since Czechs and Slovaks are two different nations speaking similar but different languages, it was necessary to make the Slovak language in Slovakia "the official language in schools, in governmental offices, and in public life generally." In view of the fact that in 1915, in a memorandum to the British government, Masaryk stated that the new s·tate (' 'Independent Bohemia") would be a monarchy, because only a small group of "radicals" favored a republic, 6 and that most of the leaders of the independence movement in the Czech lands and Milan R. Stefanik, who represented the Slovaks in the CzechoSlovak National Council, were monarchists, it would seem that the American environment influenced Masaryk's decision to proclaim the new state a republic. The principles stated in the Pittsburgh Agreement were not implemented in the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920; the latter established a centralist state administration. Autonomy for Ruthenia, the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, provided for in the constitution, was not realized either until the collapse of the First Republic in October 1938. (Incidentally, the Slovaks had autonomy during the Second Republic that came to its end in March, 1939.) Champions of the autonomist movement in Slovakia, the Slovak People's party and the Slovak National party, constantly emphasized the need for a federal arrangement in the state that they supported. In May 1936, in a parliamentary discussion of the proposed Law for the Defense of the State (Law 131 of May 13, 1936), a Slovak People's party deputy and a former member of government, Jozef Tiso, declared that the Slovak nation considered the state of the Czechs and Slovaks their own state and that his party supported the law. As on many other occasions, Tiso discussed the Slovak problem and the demand for the implementation of the 26 SLOVAKIA Pittsburgh Agreement. As he put it, "Autonomy is education of the Slovak nation toward seeing in this state its own state in which it rules ... Autonomy is education for state-forming thinking of the Slovaks" . .. " 7 The autonomist program, he emphasized, made the Slovaks conscious of the fact that Czechoslovakia was their state, and that the latter did not mean the merging of the . two nations, but a unity of the two nations in one common state. In the discussion of the same legislative proposal a Senator of the Slovak People's party, Gejza Fritz, emphasized that the "root of the autonomy is the Pittsburgh Agreement, concluded and signed by Czechs and Slovaks and the then president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council,'' Masaryk. The autonomy was to be within the boundaries of the state, not outside of it. As he put it, ''We demand self-government that is not incompatible with the state unity. That such an autonomy is possible is evidenced by the fact that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to CarpathoRussia (Ruthenia) within the framework of the united Czechoslovak republic.' ' 9 He pointed out that the president of the state had signed the agreement and that for ''those reasons it is not logical to claim that autonomy is separatism.'' In its substance, "autonomy means decentralization." In addition, the Slovaks demand equal rights for the Slovak language, he said , pointing out that ''to strive for a united Czechoslovak nation would mean to increase the antagonism of all Slovaks.' ' 9 * * * * * During. World War I Masaryk's objective was the establishment of an independent state. However, until the summer of 1918 he was prepared to accept autonomy for the Czechs within the framework of Austria-Hungary if independence were not attainable.10 By this time France and the United States had already parted with the idea of preserving a federalized Austria-Hungary; the latter collapsed by the end of October 1918. But even after the declaration of Czecho-Slovak independence by Masaryk in Washington, D.C., on October 18 , the Czech leader presided over a meeting of representatives of several national groups from Central Europe between October 23 and 26, 1918, that announced the intention to establish a Democratic Mid-European Union. This SLOVAKIA 27 meeting, held at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, led some people in Washington, D.C., to believe that on the ruins of AustriaHungary a new central european federation would emerge. The final resolution produced by the conference, called the ''Declaration of Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations,'' was read by Masaryk in front of Independence Hall and was hailed by the American press as something approaching a declaration of a united Europe. 11 · On November 1, 1918, the original of the declaration was submitted to President Woodrow Wilson by Masaryk, who was the first of its twelve signatories. In the accompanying letter to Wilson Masaryk stated that the union ''tries to replace the German Plan of Mittel-Europe by a positive plan of reorganization of the many smaller nations which are located between the Germans (in Germany and Austria) and Russians; there are about eighteen such nations, beginning with the Finns and ending with the Greeks. . . . The primary aim of the war and the coming peace is the reorganization of the East, including now Russia; and the first condition of this reorganization of Eastern Europe and through it of Europe and mankind, is the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, composed of eight non-German nations, oppressed and exploited by a degenerate dynasty and reckless feudal aristocracy supported by the Germans and Magyars.'' 12 In the last paragraph of the letter Masaryk proclaimed: "Mr. President, we see in you one of the greatest leaders of modern democracy and constructive policy; it is in making a sincere attempt to apply such a policy to our particular nations and to the whole of Europe that we hope you will engage your interest in our Union's endeavors." The signatories of the declaration, claiming to represent ''more than fifty million people constituting a chain of nations lying between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas, comprising Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, Jugoslavs , Ukrainians, UhroRusins, Lithuanians, Roumanians and Italian Irredentists , Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians, Zionists and Armenians, wholly or partly subject to alien domination ... accept and subscribe to the following as basic principles for all free peoples." 28 SLOVAKIA ''First. That all governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed. Second. That it is the inalienable right of every people to organize their own government on such principles and in such form as they believe will best promote their welfare, safety and happiness. Third. That the free and natural development of the ideals of any state should be allowed to pursue their normal and unhindered course unless such course harms or threatens the common interest of all. Fourth. That there should be no secret diplomacy, and all proposed treaties and agreements between nations should be made public - prior to their adoption and ratification. Fifth. That we believe our peoples, having kindred ideals and purposes, should coordinate their efforts to insure the liberties of their individual nations for the furtherance of their own common welfare, provided such a union contributes to the peace and welfare of the world. Sixth. That there should be formed a league of the nations of the world in a common and binding agreement for genuine and practical cooperation to secure justice and therefore peace among nations .'' The signatories of the declaration pledged '' on behalf of their respective nations'' that the principles set forth in it '' shall be incorporated in the organic laws of whatever government our respective peoples may hereafter establish.'' As it happened, the vast majority of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary (Constituent) National Assembly , established after the war, followed Masaryk's views and paid no attention to the principles stated in the Declaration of the Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations. The assembly did not derive its powers from the consent of the governed; it was not elected by the peoples living in Czechoslovakia; the Germans , Hungarians , Poles , and Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia were not represented in it at all; and the Germans, Hungarians , Slovaks , and Ruthenians living in the country were not allowed to "organize their own government on such principles and in such form as they believe will best promote their welfare , safety and happiness . " 13 SLOVAKIA 29 * * * * * While visiting the United States in the fall of 1918, Roman Dmowski, the head to the Polish National Committee Abroad, seated in Paris, suggested to Masaryk the formation of a Federation consisting of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Masaryk refused the proposal, but favored "a certain kind of Economic Union, to be worked out; and a military defense against Germany, essentially non-aggressive." Not farseeing the problem of frontier adjustment with Poland, Masaryk asked Dmowski "to write out text of agreement on these lines.'' The Polish leader, however, did not formulate such an agreement, since he, apparently, was not interested in anything short of Federation. 14 The proposed Federation of the three Western Slavic nations, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, could have provided an ample guarantee of peace in Central Europe, since the three nations could have faced together the prospective threats coming from either east or west, and could have jointly resolved the national minority problem. In the 1930s the idea of close cooperation with Poland was endorsed by the leader of the Czechoslovak National Democratic party, Karel Kramaf, and the leader of the Slovak People's party, Andrej Hlinka. At that time, due to hostility between Czechoslovakia's foreign minister Edvard Benes, and the Polish foreign minister Jozef Beck, such a policy was not practical and could not be implemented. 15 * * * * * At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Czecho-Slovakia was represented by a delegation of which the principal spokesman was Edvard Benes. InMemoire No. 3, one of the documents submitted by him to the conference, addressing itself to "The lot of the Germans in the Czecho-Slovak Republic," a promise was made that ''the Germans of Bohemia [sic] would have the same rights as the Czecho-Slovaks themselves. The German tongue would be the second tongue of the land .... The regime adopted would be similar to that of Switzerland. " 16 In his note of May 20, 1919, Benes elaborated on the latter point, announcing the intention of the state to apply the principles of the Swiss Republic in creating the organs of the new state that would be '' a sort of Switzerland.'' In the con- 30 SLOVAKIA clusion of his memorandum Benes promised ''an extremely liberal regime, which will very much resemble that of Switzerland. " 17 This was a statement of intention - one of those by which the way to hell is paved. It was not implemented and a centralistic Constitution was adopted in Czechoslovakia in 1920. One may speculate, as did Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, that ''had the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia at the time of its organization in 1919 been based upon the cantonal system, its history . . . might have been very different and far happier.'' 18 * * * * * Dr. Milan Hodza, a Slovak by birth, was a well-known exponent of the idea of establishing a Central European or a Danubian Federation. 19 He proceeded from the assumption that the League of Nations and the Little Entente were ineffective and inadequate for preserving peace in Europe. The latter had to unite in order to maintain peace and advance prosperity. However, Europe's final unification presupposes, first of all, an effective regional cooperation. Therefore, Hodza developed the theme of the union of Central Europe when the new order was established in Europe after World War I. As a prominent politician of the Republican (agrarian) party, he propagated the idea of a federated Central Europe numbering about 110 million people, stretching from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea and covering the region between Germany and Soviet Russia. 20 Since the states in the region were predominantly agrarian, the federation had to be based on agrarian democracy. 21 Already in 1925, at the national congress of the Republican party, Hodza declared that there was a need for Central European solidarity; the latter would save Czechoslovakia from either Bolshevik or imperialistic attack. 22 He believed that the interests of Czechoslovakia and Poland could be reconcilled and their close cooperation with the other nations in the area would benefit all of Europe. In his lecture, delivered in London in 1930, Hodza stated: ''It is universally an international danger when dictatorship becomes a contagious disease, which weakens the organism of states and nations. Thus one day we could expose ourselves to the danger which might infect Central Europe with Moscow's SLOVAKIA 31 dictatorship. Therefore, it is important that Central Europe does not become the carrier of dictatorial bacilli, but rather a trench, or barrier, against dictatorship. " 23 In Hodza's view, the national sovereignty of small nations should not be construed as isolationism, but rather a foundation stone for international cooperation. Since the nations of Central Europe have mutual interests and similar traditions , they have to come closer together and work for a wider international cooperation. A federation of states from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea, united on the basis of democratic principles, would be a barrier against Bolshevism and the first step toward establishing a United States of Europe. 24 Hodza became prime minister of Czechoslovakia in November 1935 and Benes was elected the state's president in the middle of December 1935. When from December 20, 1935, to February 29, 1936, Hodza was also the acting minister of foreign affairs, he tried very hard to get his favorite project off the ground. In an attempt to implement it, he visited Vienna on January 17 , 1936, Paris, February 8-15, Belgrade, February 21-25, and again Vienna, March 8-10, 1936. 25 The Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg fully endorsed Hodza's project, but it was viewed skeptically in other countries and, above all, in the Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs staffed by Benes appointees. The new president was especially annoyed by Hodza's conduct of foreign policy. Later Benes commented with disdain on the prime minister's activities as follows: "Hodza went to Vienna, had lunch with Schuschnigg, told him that something should be done in Central Europe to remove the German threat to Austria. Upon his return to Prague he told me that he had negotiated an alliance with Austria. It caused alarm in France and in England, because these countries were informed to the effect that everything would be signed, sealed and delivered in three weeks . Of course it was a bluff. " 26 When in the summer of 1938 a large demonstration in favor of autonomy of Slovakia took place in the capital city of Bratislava, Hodza made an attempt to take the wind out of the autonomist sails. He revealed his own plan for self-government in Slovakia. This proposal, known as the ''Hodza Plan,'' was revealed in detail 32 SLOVAKIA in his Slovensky dennik. The key provision in it was as follows: "Slovakia will have her own diet with legislative powers, her own government of six ministers to deal exclusively with Slovak matters. The Slovak language will be the only official language in Slovakia. A separate Slovak commission will supervise and decide the personal questions connected with appointments of the state employees to eliminate irregularities and to see that Slovak claims are not bypassed.' •21 After the Munich settlement, on October 6, 1938, Slovak autonomy was proclaimed. The manifest was signed by seven nonSocialist parties (including the Slovak People's party), representing about 75 percent of the Slovak electorate. The Czecho-Slovak National Assembly approved the Constitutional Law of Slovak selfrule on November 22 , 1938 by a unanimous vote. (The deputies of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia left the Chamber before the voting. )2 8 * * * * * In the interwar years a prominent federalist advocating the establishment of a United States of Europe, Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, lived in Czechoslovakia. He became famous after World War II, when many Americans and West Europeans embraced his ideas. 29 His pioneering work did bring fruits when the West European community was established. Czechoslovakia, however, was a member of the Soviet bloc , and did not benefit from it. ,· Born in Tokyo on November 17, 1894, Coudenhove-Kalergi's mother was Japanese and his father was an Austrian diplomat. The Coudenhove-Kalergi's home was the old Castle of Ronsperk in Bohemia. The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 made the Count a citizen of Czechoslovakia. 30 When the Nazis occupied the country in 1939 , he accepted French citizenship and, eventually, left Europe for the United States. During the interwar years Coudenhove-Kalergi was the leading theoretician and founder of the Pan-European movement. He devoted his talents and efforts to the cause of European federation. Among those whom he inspired and persuaded to support the movement was Edouard Herriot, a one-time prime minister SLOVAKIA 33 and minister of foreign affairs in France, and the author of The United States of Europe. Herriot was the first European statesman who appealed openly for a United States of Europe. 31 A student of history, Coudenhove-Kalergi was familiar with attempts to unify Europe made over the centuries by writers and kings, including George Podiebrad, a famous King of Bohemia in the fifteenth century. His first article on ''The European Question" appeared in the summer of 1922 in the Berlin Volkische Zeitung and the Vienna Neue Freie Presse.32 After finding some influential supporters among political leaders of the time, the first issue of the movements's new periodical, Pan-Europe, came out in April 1924. It contained an article entitled "The European Manifesto.'' Due to extensive publicity generated by the movement, his book on Pan-Europe began to appear in several languages. 33 The English language edition, with an introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, was published in 1926 in New York. 34 In Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi noticed the political decline of Europe as a consequence of the World War: "From the center of the world Europe has moved to its periphery. The world hegemony of Europe is overthrown for all time .'' The validity of the last sentence was called to doubt by some, when Germany rose again as a great power in the 1930s. Yet the outcome of World War II confirmed his observation that "the United States of America has developed into the leading World Power." As he observed in his book first published in 1923, in the World War the United States " proved the decisive factor . Today , the United States of America is the wealthiest, the most powerful, and the most advanced country in the world." At the same time, however, "Europe's power of action in world politics is paralyzed by her disunion.' ' 35 In advocating the consolidation of Europe into a politicoeconomic federation, Coudenhove-Kalergi encountered objection from several quarters branding Pan-Europe a utopia. To this he replied that "every great historical happening began as a utopia and ended as a reality." He pointed out that in 1913 the Polish and Czecho-Slovak republics were utopias; "in 1918 they became realities. In 1916 the victory of the communists in Russia was a 34 SLOVAKIA utopia; in 1917 it was an accomplished fact. " 36 Whether PanEurope would be realized depended on the will of the Europeans; if the latter would support the idea and work for it, a utopia would become a reality. As he put it, ''While thousands believe in PanEurope, it is a utopia; so long as millions believe in it, it is a program; but once a hundred million believe in it, it becomes a fact." Thus in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi called upon the youth of Europe ''to convert the utopia of yesterday into a reality of tomorrow.' ' 37 Constantly referring to historical events, Coudenhove-Kalergi emphasized that power-relationships among countries have been changing with time. For example, the Bohemian empire of King Ottokar was a great power stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and was about the size of European Russia; Bohemia of the 1920s was as small as was the Grand Duchy of Weimar a century earlier. According to him, ''Time works for Russia and against Europe," This was an observation not shared by many people at that time. He also pointed out how the United States became a great power and how this technically most advanced country was ''the first to try the new method of political organization, namely, a system of peaceful federations, culminating in the PanAmerican Union and in the idea of a League of Nations. Although the American conditions are different than those in Europe, states that are small may not be able to lead an independent existence and, therefore, they have to establish federations." As he saw it, "The leading World powers of today are federations: Russia, England, America. Political rapprochement of neighboring countries must be realized, if conflicts are to be avoided.' ' 38 Coudenhove-Kalergi observed that the formation of the PanAmerican League was not directed against any other state system, but solely against war, and "toward furthering the cultural progress of all." The American example should be followed by Europe. The latter must supplement "its modern science of communications by a modern science of politics, else it will be in danger of blindly staggering into another war and of suffocating in a very sea of gas-bombs.' •39 The Count regretted that Europe was regressing further and further toward atomization, since Austria-Hungary, Western SLOVAKIA 35 Russia, and European Turkey dissolved themselves into a multitude of petty states. This process needs to be reversed by promoting integration, otherwise, if the liberation of European peoples is not completed by their unification, '' sooner or later the European state will be swallowed up by the growing World Powers.' ' 40 Europe must find a means of harmonizing freedom with organization, that is to follow the example of America in establishing a federation. Coudenhove-Kalergi presented a plan for the establishment of such a federation and discussed several reasons for which the nations of Europe should unite. First, Bolshevik Russia made no secret of her aggressive intentions: Bolshevism fights with propaganda in the one hand and with sword in the other; "it resorts to violence, terrorism and militarism.' ' 41 Therefore, the aim of all Europeans, regardless of party or nation, should be the prevention of a Soviet invasion that would bring about the destruction of liberty and the other cherished values. A Pan-European security pact guaranteeing the protection of European eastern frontiers would lay the foundation for an understanding with Soviet Russia. He suggested that if Texas, New Mexico, and California were independent states, they would be in constant danger from Mexico. But "as states of the American federal union they are secure against any such danger. " 42 Similarly, the Soviet threat to Romania, Poland, and Finland would disappear as soon as they would become members of the United States of Europe. As long as they were isolated, they represented a constant temptation for Soviet Russia. Furthermore, Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested that the quarrels among the European states weakened their power defense against Soviet Russia. Therefore, there was a need for European solidarity for an effective defense of the eastern frontiers of Europe. Any war in Europe would offer the Soviets a welcome opportunity for intervention; "and once Russian armies have secured a footing in Europe, they will scarcely relinquish it of their own free will.'' He also saw a danger in the pro-Russian orientation of some states, notably Germany. He suggested that there was a large number of Germans who hoped, "through an alliance with Russia, to tear up the Treaty of Versailles and once more partition Poland. " 43 36 SLOVAKIA Whether Germany would be saved or estranged from Europe depended on the Western powers, above all on France, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, and he predicted that in the FrancoGerman conflict neither Germany nor France, "but Russia will in the long run be victorious. ' ' He warned that France still had time to preserve ''the German sister republic for the family of European states; tomorrow it may be already too late.'' He added that "upon this question hinges the future of Europe. " 44 Though less immediate, there was a danger "from forcible separation of eastern Europe,'' should there be a sudden change in the internal policy of Russia, and should the latter return to Pan-Slavism. In that case the Pan-Slav memories of the Southern and Western Slavs would be revived and Hungary and Bulgaria would try to recover lost territories ' 'by means of an alliance with the Russian reaction. In that event Russia's power would extend as far as the Adriatic Sea. " 4 5 These dangers, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed, could be averted by the timely creation of the Pan-European Federation. In his view, the historical moment in the time of his writing (1923) was more favorable than it ever was before. The situation would likely worsen every month and ''it is more than doubtful whether after a victory of the Russian reaction a Pan-European Federation would still l)e possible, " 46 he wrote. The formation of the United States of Europe would make possible an agreement on disarmament and economic cooperation with Soviet Russia. Since united Europe would possess great military and economic power, the danger of war with Russia would be removed. As long as Europe was divided , he said, there was a danger of a new war. A united Europe would have a larger population and incomparably more highly developed industries and, therefore, Soviet Russia "would realize the hopelessness of war and will be ready to disarm." But, he writes , as long as the regime in Russia is organized on a Soviet basis , it would be better for ''Russo-European peace if these two federations remain separate.' ' 47 The Soviet regime endeavored to overthrow the democratic order in Europe and, therefore , a merging of the two federations was not practical. However, '' Should Russia become democratic, a new situation would result.' ' Then it would be possi- SLOVAKIA 37 ble to consider the question of Russia's joining the European federation. Turning to Europe's relations with the United States, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that "The economic model for PanEurope is provided by the United States of America; the political model for Pan-Europe's development, by the Pan-American Union.' ' 48 Since its origin, with the exception of the Civil War era, the United States has been a political and economic unity. Europeans should realize that the success of the American dream has been due to the existence of a common market and the political unity of the continent. They should utilize the experiences gathered in the United States and the entire American continent in their efforts to build Pan-Europe. Though Pan-Americanism was still in the process of development , it had a head start over PanEuropeanism. The history of the development of Pan-Americanism has great significance for Pan-Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that the League of Nations, as conceived by President Woodrow Wilson, was a utopia. 49 Two great powers, Russia and the United States, did not belong to it, and Germany was excluded from it. The League should be reorganized, he suggested, and the Europeans should work for its strengthening in order to avoid war. While World War I weakened Europe , " the War of the Future would inflict the deathblow upon it. " 50 In his view , " Only Pan-European federation , by the introduction and joint guarantee of a compulsory court arbitration, can definitely secure the internal peace of Europe." Coudenhove-Kalergi regretted the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy. While the peace of 1919 signified an advance over prewar conditions politically, economically it was a step backward. As he put it , nationalistic demagogues "have brought disaster to millions of people , and the threat of economic ruin to the continent. " 51 The many opponents of Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi divided into four categories: the National Chauvinists , the Communists , the Militarists, and the Protected Industries. 52 He realized the difficulty of combatting them with his idea that rejected conflict and promoted cooperaton among European nations. His idea, indeed, did not overcome the odds represented by the mentioned 38 SLOVAKIA opponents and national (state) sovereignty. Coudenhove-Kalergi realized that the greatest obstacle to the formation of a United States of Europe lay in the thousand-yearold rivalry between France and Germany. 53 Therefore, the PanEuropeans would have to strive for reconciliation of these two nations in order to prevent a future catastrophy. His own efforts were directed at winning over for his idea both the French and German political leaders. He was more successful in France than in Germany. According to an old Czech proverb, ''Nobody is a prophet in his own fatherland.'' It applied to the fullest extent to Coudenhove-Kalergi. After publishing several articles on Paneuropa in 1922, he decided to try to persuade a well-known European personality ''with vision and authority'' to sponsor the Paneuropean idea. As a citizen of Czechoslovakia, he turned first to that country's president, Thomas G. Masaryk. The latter was sympathetic to the idea of European union but unwilling to associate himself with a crusade for Pan-Europe. 54 In order to obtain the blessing of the Prague government for the movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi dedicated one of the first copies of his book to Masaryk with whom he subsequently met on several 9ccasions. Masaryk introduced him to the foreign minister Edvard Benes, an acknowledged leader of the Little Entente and a well-known figure in international politics. According to the Count, ''unlike Masaryk, Benes was not a genuine European. Fundamentally, he was a Czech nationalist . .. . He spoke the language of Pan-Europe because he believed that to do so was good for his country. But he had no intention of sacrificing a single Czech interest on the altar of European unity. " 55 While he favored '' a collective guarantee of Czechoslovakia's frontiers,'' Benes opposed ''effective protection of the German minorities.'' While he favored ''the dismantling of custom barriers towards Eastern Europe so as to widen the market for Czech goods," he opposed "customs union with Germany for fear of competition from that quarter." Thus Benes 's attitude toward the Pan-European movement tended to be ambiguous; "in theory he was Pan-European, but in practice a Czech nationalist. " 56 After Coudenhove's manuscript on Pan-Europe came out in SLOVAKIA 39 Vienna in 1923, Chancellor Ignaz Seipel of Austria, who was concerned with the future of his country, was willing to support the European idea and, moreover, offered Coudenhove-Kalergi space for his projected organization in the Hofburg Palace. 57 Since the palace was the seat of the Austrian government and the movement had now an official sponsor, Coudenhove-Kalergi announced the establishment of the Paneuropean Union and a Paneuropean press with headquarters in cosmopolitan Vienna. Coudenhove-Kalergi found prominent supporters of the European idea in France in Edouard Herriot, who had strong European impulses and became prime minister, and Aristide Briand, who became foreign minister, and Alex Leger. It was clear to the young enthusiast that in order to bring about European unity it was necessary to find support for the idea also in Gefmany. With France being the leader in building a European movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to persuade German political leaders, first of all Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, to support the movement. 58 France was the country in search of European security and all political parties, except the Communist, supported the European idea, but in Germany the support was less pronounced, despite Coudenhove-Kalergi's efforts to persuade the Germans that they would benefit from close Paneuropean cooperation both politically and economically. Indeed , the Count pointed out that the success of the United States was due to the customs union, to the vast free market, and that the United States ought to be a model for Europe. He repeatedly stated that Europe could become as peaceful as Switzerland and as prosperous as the United States if it would unite. 59 As a result of long and careful planning by CoudenhoveKalergi, the First Congress of the Paneuropean Union was held in Vienna , October 3-6 , 1926 . He had hoped to persuade a large number of European political leaders to take part in it. Since success of his plans for a united Europe depended primarily on the cooperation of France and Germany, Coudenhove-Kalergi was most anxious to have at the congress Aristide Briand , Edouard Herriot , and Paul Painleve (the premier) of France, and Chancellor Wilhelm Marx an d foreign minister Gustav Stresemann of Germany. While none of them actually attended the congress , the 40 SLOVAKIA three French politicians sent warm greetings and the French government was officially represented at the congress by the French minister in Vienna. The Germans were less cooperative, though Chancellor Marx sent the young Count a short telegram wishing him success and stating that the Reich Chancellor would follow the course of the congress with great interest. 60 Coudenhove-Kalergi was not completely unsuccessful in Germany. On the eve of the congress Thomas Mann joined the Paneuropean Union and Paul Lobe agreed to serve as an honorary president of the congress along with Edvard Benes, Joseph Caillaux, Nicholas Politis, Francesco Nitti, and Ignaz Seipel. Austria seemed to be the greatest supporter of the movement. Chancellor Rudolph Ramek welcomed the delegates, including those from France, Belgium, Norway, and Czechoslovakia, where chapters of the movement had been established. 61 The congress was hailed as a great success in many leading European newspapers. According to an editorial in the Manchester Guardian Weekly of October 8, 1926, "The United States of Europe is no longer a dream; it has entered on the world of realities." Yet, the reality of the situation was such that even CoudenhoveKalergi realized that the reserved attitude of the German government and the agitation for Anschluss were stumbling blocs for the realization of his dream. He said that the Anschluss was a PanGerman not a Paneuropean idea and that some German politicians were using Paneuropean slogans to cloak their nationalist demands for power. 62 At the same time the Paneuropean Union was growing in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and even in Germany new people were joining the movement. 63 In France Aristide Briand was an honorary president of the Paneuropean Union and a strong advocate of the European idea. Indeed , with the exception of the Communist party, political parties in France looked very favorably on the Paneuropean movement. 64 The latter had some grass roots and official support in Czechoslovakia, whose foreign policy was oriented towards France. As Coudenhove-Kalergi put it, Benes believed in " the eventual establishment of a European Federation, but doubted whether it could be achieved in the short run . . . it was this doubt which induced him to give support to our project. Had-he believed SLOVAKIA 41 in its immediate realization, he would probably have opposed it.' '65 Since Ignaz Seipel and Karl Renner of Austria had come out openly in support of European Federation, Benes did not wish to appear less European-minded. Therefore, he accepted "the honorary chairmanship of the Czech committee and wrote an excellent preface for the Czech edition of Pan-Europe.'' He helped to organize the committee and "secured for it the co-operation of outstanding politicians of Czech and German descent.' ' 66 He also furnished Coudenhove-Kalergi with a diplomatic passport which was extremely useful to him. Benes also opened for him many doors in France and other Entente states, thus helping him overcome ''the double handicap'' of his Austrian origin and his German mother-tongue.6 7 Among the Paneuropeans were also those who advocated a gradual approach to European federation and envisaged a federation of Danubian states. Among the most active champions of Danubian federation were Milan Hodza and Vaclav Schuster in Czechoslovakia, Elemer Hantos and Erno Bleier in Hungary, and Barons van Barolin and van Mises in Austria. Some of the supporters of the larger European idea argued that a Danubian federation would be a step toward a European federation. 68 The second Paneuropean Congress was held in Berlin in May, 1930. Prior to it, the French Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on a European federal system. The Briand memorandum was hailed by the congress as ''the first step toward the fulfillment . . . of an European federation,' ' 69 and interested powers were urged to accept the French proposals. Briand's proposals were taken seriously by the British Foreign Office, but the German government's response was that some basic changes in the postwar settlement were a condition for its participation in a federal system. Replies of other countries were also conditional and, as history tells us, the Briand plan was never implemented. The arrival of the Nazi regime in Germany was a very serious setback for Coudenhove's Paneurope. Indeed, the Nazi-projected Pan-Europe meant the domination of the continent by one nation and not a cooperation of all European nations as equals. Since Coudenhove-Kalergi was a persona non grata in the Third Reich, 42 SLOVAKIA he accepted French citizenship when Bohemia-Moravia became a part of it in 1939.7° Eventually, he left Europe for the United States where he continued his work and where, in 1943, he published his autobiography, Crusade for Pan-Europe. In 1944 New York University appointed him Professor of History. In New York he also established contacts with many European statesmen, including General de Gaule, and discussed with them post-war problems.7 1 * * * * * Needless to say, conditions in Central Europe are different from those in the United States where the traditional policy of assimilation has resulted in a multi-cultural society speaking the same language. With its heterogeneous population and traditions of nationalistic conflicts and cooperation in national and multinational states, federalism is the solution proposed for the unyielding problem of nationalities and minorities in Europe. While in the United States individual immigrants have been and can be assimilated, since such adjustment on the part of the immigrant is a prerequisite for finding his/her place in the new land of opportunity, it is not possible to assimilate nations or national groups possessing strong national consciousness and conscious of their national identity. Therefore, national federalism which tolerates differences in language and culture can be the only practical and feasible arrangement in East Central Europe, just as it has been the case in Switzerland. National federalism would bring economic prosperity, national freedom and regional security to nations living in the area. When the facade of national states in East Central Europe crumbled at the beginning of World War II, individuals concerned with the long-range policies in the area began to assess the national requirements of majorities and minorities in the area. Stefan Osusky, former Czechoslovak minister in Paris, presented a summary of these requirements: 72 Undoubtedly, the nations in Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe have a right to their national liberty. But the interests of the European peoples require that those nations should not be encouraged in the dream of bringing about national uniformity within their States . Not SLOVAKIA 43 on national uniformity but on national liberty depends the existence and the future of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. It is by guaranteeing the peoples of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe their freedom of national consciousness that the foundation of the peace of Europe will be laid. Furthermore, national uniformity would mean the elimination of every authority except that of the State. In countries with different religions, languages, customs and traditions, this is not desirable. For the preservation of religious, linguistic and cultural liberty means not only that individuals have a right to profess the religion of their choice, speak the lapguage of their mothers and live according to the traditions and customs of their ancestors; it means the practical possibility of associating together and administering their own particular affairs. These requirements for cooperation among the nations living in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were valid then as they are today. Let us hope that one day the small nations in the area will reject conflict and chose cooperation and that they will find a federal solution to the problem that is common to all of them: they are too weak to stand alone between the solid masses of Germans and Russians. NOTES 1 Frantisek Palacky and Ludwig van Lohner formulated a plan for redivision of the Habsburg Empire into national territories: German Austria, Bohemia including Slovakia, the Polish provinces, the Illyrian provinces, the Italian provinces, the South Slavic area, the Hungarian area, and the Wallachian (Romanian) provinces. This plan was endorsed by the Austrian Reichstag , dominated by federalist thinking, meeting in Kromeffz late in 1848 and early 1849 to draw up a new constitution for the empire. However, the Vienna government, after suppressing the revolution of 1848, dissolved the Reichstag and imposed a centralistic constitution. Wenzel Jaksch, Europe 's Road to Potsdam . Translated and edited by Kurt Glaser. (New York, 1963) , pp . 26-27 . For details and documents see Bohus Rieger, Franti§ka Palackeho spisy drobne [Small Works of Frantisek Palacky] (Prague , 1898, vol. I) pp . 59ff. Also Karel Kramaf, Geske statnf pravo (Prague, 1896) . SLOVAKIA 44 As the leader of the Czech National party, Palacky in 1848 was invited to join those who later met in the Frankfurt Parliament, but he refused . At that time Palacky wrote that, had the Austrian Empire not existed, it would have been necessary to create it . 2 H. Raupach, Der tschechische Friihnationalism (Essen, 1939), p. 92 . On May 29, 1849, Havlicek wrote in Narodnf Noviny: "We want an association of free nations in Austria , in Central Europe." 3 Jaksch, Europe's Road, pp . 70-71; also Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (New York, 1986), p. 32. 4 Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks (Whiting, Ind . 1957) p. 210; Kon~tantln Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava , 1937), p. 78. Also , Kalvoda , The Genesis, pp. 69-70 . 5 Culen, p . 177; Yurchak, pp . 212-214; Kalvoda , pp . 284-285 . 6 Kalvoda, The Genesis, pp. 76-77. 7 Frantgek Berdych, ed. , Obrana statu a na~e politicke strany (Prague, 1938), pp. 168-169. a Ibid., p. 171. 9 Ibid., p. 172. Incidentally, only two major groups in the Czechoslovak parliament voted against the law: the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, and the Sudeten German party led by Konrad Henlein . See ibid. , pp . 207ff. 10 Ira E. Bennett, "The Czechs Will Rise Again," The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1941; J.B. Kozak, T.G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonske deklarace v ffjnu 1918 (Prague, 1968), p . 40. 11 Kalvoda , The Genesis, p. 426. 12 Masaryk to Wilson, November 1, 1918; Wilson to Masaryk, November 5, 1918; and Masaryk to Wilson, November 7, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers (The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 13 Kalvoda, The Genesis, p . 427. 14 Josef Kalvoda, "The Czechoslovak Problem, " Nationalities Papers, Vol. XIl, No. 2 (Fall 1984), p. 245. 15 Ibid. 16 Delegation Propaganda: Czechoslovak Republic, Memoire No . III, The Hoover Institution, quoted in Kalvoda , The Genesis, p. 445 . 17 Ibid. (The Genesis). 18 Nicholas Murray Butler, Why War? (New York, 1940), p . 20 . 19 Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscences (London , 1942). 20 Michal Mu.dry , Milan Hodia v Amerike (Chicago , 1949). p. 231. 21 Ibid., p . 177 . 22 23 Ibid . Ibid., p. 231. 24 Ibid., p . 232 . 25 R. Kravcek, "Hodzuv plan," Slovansky pfehled, No . 6, 1967, pp. 347-3 53 ; also Hodza 's book, Federation . SLOVAKIA 45 26 Libuse Otahalova a Milada Cervinkova, eds., Dokumenty z historie teskoslovenske politiky 1939-1943 (Prague 1966), vol. I, p. 293 . 27 Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike, p. 58. Joseph M. Kirschbaum, ed. , Slovakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries (Toronto, Ont., 1978), p . 123 . See also a book by the same author, Slovakia. Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York, 1960), pp. 78-84; Joachim Kuhl, Federationsplane in Donauraum und in Ost mitteleuropa (Miinchen, 1958); and Rudolf Wierer, Der Federalism im Donauraum (Graz-Koln, 1960). 29 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers the World (London, 1953) . 28 30 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe. Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York, 1943). 31 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, p . 109. 32 Ibid., p. 91. 33 Ibid., p. 102. 34 35 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York, 1926) . Ibid. , pp . 6-8. 36 Ibid. , p. xv. 31 Ibid., p. xvi. 36Ibid., pp . 10-11. 39 Ibid. , p . 11. 40 Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 58. 41 43 Ibid., p . 62. Ibid ., p . 63. 44 Ibid. , p. 64. 45 46 Ibid. Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 67-69 48 Ibid., p. 74 . 42 Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., p . 112 . 5 1 Ibid., p . 122 . 49 50 52 Ibid., pp. 186-190. 53 Ibid., pp . 132-147 . 54 Coudenhove-Kalergi , Crusade for Pan-Europe, p. 88. 55 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, p. 103. Ibid., pp. 103-104. 56 57 Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea , 1914-1932 (Chapel Hill and London , 1983) p . 29 . 58 Ibid., p . 41. 46 59 SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 63 . so Ibid., p . 70. 62 Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., p . 88. 63 Ibid., p . 89 . 61 Coudenhove-Kalergi , An Idea Conquers, p. 104. Ibid., p . 105 . 66 Ibid. , p. 104. 64 65 67 Ibid., p . 105 . 68 Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea , p. 99 . Ibid., p. 145. 69 °Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 7 pp . 208-209. 71 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers, pp. 254-255 . 72 ~tefan Osusky, The Contemporary Review, November, 1941 , pp . 280-281, cited in Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (With special Reference to East-Central Europe) (New York, 1945), pp. 167-168.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Federalist Thought in Czechoslovakia During the Interwar Years Description An account of the resource Josef Kalvoda Slovakia, Vol. 33 (No. 60-61), 1987-88 pp. 23-46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kalvoda, Josef, 1923-1999 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1987-88 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5d7d83191ff3756fa07719e9931ff0c6.pdf 0787d759935b60ff7d0ae7a59471c828 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 125 F. Vnuk: Fifty Years of Comn1unist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) The first notable Slovak commentary on Communism was made by Marx's contemporary, :Cudovit stur. His assessment of Communism was an outright condemnation: "Communism, in spite of all efforts and false pretences to win for mankind its rights, only brings about its degradation, since it has no sound knowledge of mankind. Because of its insistence on principles which are impractical and unattainable Communism is one of the maddest figments ever originating in the human brain." 1 In the past forty years stur was much abused by the Slovak Communist intellectuals because of his alleged reactionary thinking. 2 Yet Stu.r's rejection of Communism seems to epitomize the Slovak attitude more fittingly than all the recent attempts by Communist historians to present Communism as a progressive ideology destined to uplift and enrich the Slovak nation. The inescapable geography which put Slovakia in Central Europe exposed the Slovaks to direct contact with political Communism as far back as 1918-19. Since then the Slovak nation has undergone the complete range of relations which can exist between a nation trying to assert its political identity and an aggressive ideology. These relations, full of drama, paradox and tragedy, are briefly outlined in this short history of the Communist Patry of Slovakia ( KSS). I. 1918-1921 The very beginning of the KSS is characteristic. The Party started its existence outside Slovakia, in Budapest. 1) In his major work, Slawentum imd die Welt der Zukunft, Quoted by D. Okali in Dav; spomienky a studie (Bratislava, 1965), p. 284. 2) e.g. L. Novomesky, in his pamphlet, Marx a slovensky narod (Mala kniznica Davu, 1933) and in his article, Karol Marx reviduje hist6riu Slovakov (Dav, 2/ 1933, pp. 18-19). �126 SLOVAKIA There in November 1918 Erno P6r, Minister for Foreign Propaganda in the Communist Government of Hungary, was entrusted by Bela Kun and Tibor Szamuely to organize the Slovak Communist Party as a section of the Communist Party of Hungary. 3 The Party conscripted into its ranks Slovak workers, apprentices and soldiers living in those days in defeated Hungary (particularly in Budapest, Ostrihom-Esztergom, Bekes-Csaba, etc. ). On March 27th, 1919 it began publication of its own daily, "Cervene noviny" (Red News ). 4 But the Party ran into difficulties when it had to find leaders for the conscripted Slovak proletarian masses. There was hardly a single Slovak of rank and stature to lend his name to the movement. Thus the reins were initially given into the hands of Jewish Socialist and Communist organizers in Budapest who could speak Slovak. To overcome this deficiency Bela Kun requested Lenin to send him some able Slovak Communist leaders from Russia, where a "Czecho-Slovak" Communist Party formed from the Czech and Slovak prisoners of war had been functioning since May 1918.5 But since there were no prominent Slovak personalities among these either, Lenin sent to Budapest the next best thing: the Czechs. Among these the most dynamic was one Antonin Janousek who arrived in Budapest in January 1919.6 After some disagreement with B. Kun (Janousek wanted to lead a Czecho-Slovak section; Kun and his advisors were strongly against it, seeing in it implicit recognition of the imperialistic policies of the Entente ) he 3 ) M. Vietor, Slovenska soviets/ca r epub lika (Bratislava, 1959), p. 53. 4) P. A. Toma, Slovak Soviet Repu blic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, p. 203 ). 5 ) D ej iny K SC (P raha, 1961 ), p. 17. 6) See: Z. Horeni, Antonin Jan ousek, predseda revolucnej v lady Slovenskej r epubliky rad (Bratislava, 1964). This accoun t of t he Slovak Soviet Republic is abstracted from the following books: K. A. Medvecky: Slovensk y prevrat I -IV (Trnava , 1930-31 ); Vpad bol'sevikov na Slov ensko ro ku 1919 (Trnava, 1936) : M. Vietor, Slovenskci soviet ska r epu bli ka 1919 (Bratislava, 1955); C. Holotik, 0 Slovenskej repub like rad r . 1919 (Historicky casopi s 2/ 1959); V. Kr al, lntervencni val ka cs. burzoazie proti mad'arske sovetske r epublice r . 1919 (Praha, 1954); K. Culen, 0 Slovenskej soviet ske j republike z ro ku 1919 (Kanadsky Slovak, May 19-June 9, 1956); P. A. Toma , Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, pp. 203-215 ). �SLOVAKIA 127 was made head of the Czech section of the Communist Party of Hungary on April 12, 1919. Towards the end of April the Slovak and the Czech sections were brought under common leadership but it was plainly stated that the Slovak section was to maintain its independence and individuality. There was never a Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist Party of Hungary. The most important .went in the life of this Slovak section was thf, proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic which lasted only two weeks but which has become a source of confused pride and political embarrassment to the contemporary Czech and Slovak socialist historiographers. On May 20th, 1919 the Hungarian Communist government, accusing the Czecho-Slovak armed forces of violation of the Paris Agreement, ordered its Red Army to invade Slovakia. Carried on the wave of proud Magyar national ism, humiliated by the 1918 defeat, the Magyar troops swept the southern and eastern plains of Slovakia. They took Lucenec on May 30th, Levice on June 1st, Nove Zamky on June 2nd, Kosice and Banska stiavnica on June 6th, Presov on June 8th, Bardejov on June 11th and penetrated as far into Central Slovakia as Zvolen. On June 3rd, 1919 "Oervene noviny" wrote exultantly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is being established in Slovakia." The actual proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic took place at Presov on June 16th, 1919. It was ruled by the Provisional Revolutionary Executive Committee made up largely of Magyar-Jewish and Czech left-wingers. The only Slovak member of some significance was Stefan Stehlik. On June 20th, 1919 the Committee elected a Slovak Revolutionary governmem headed by Antonin Janousek. To T. G. Masaryk, who was residing in Prague as the elected President of Czecho-Slovakia, Janousek sent this challenging message: "We explicitly declare that from now on Slovakia belongs exclusively to the Slovak working class." 7 The donstitutional status of this short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic was obscure, but one thing was beyond doubt: it was violently anti-Czech and fiercely pro-Magyar. It aimed at the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia and was 7) Quoted by. K. culen in Kanadsky Slovak (of May 26, 1956), p . 3. �128 SLOVAKIA openly and aggressively separatist. Both Kun and Lenin considered Czecho-Slovakia as a wilful creation of capitalist Powers and as a tool of imperialist policies in Central Europe. Czecho-Slovakia was alleged to deny the Slovak people "its inalienable right of self-determination" and the Communists in establishing the Slovak Soviet Republic were rectifying this injustice. 8 In spite of all its revolutionary zeal the Communistsponsored separatism did not strike roots among the Slovak masses. They were not only apathetic but manifestly hostile to the venture in which they saw only an ill-disguised attempt of the moribund Hungary to save its territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the Hungarian Red Army from Slovakia (June 28-July 4, 1919) spelled the inevitable end of both the Slovak Soviet Republic and the Slovak section of the Communist-Socialist Party of Hungary. The Slovak decision in 1918 to exchange their hopeless life tinder the Magyars for a hopeful life with the Czechs was final and irreversible. 9 But it was a decision fraught with problems and difficulties. Slovakia entered the newly formed Czecho-Slovakia as a land of poor peasants with practically no Slovak urban proletariat. The adherents and disseminators of the Socialist ideas were largely the German and Magyar ( or magyarized) workers who were as contemptuous of their Slovak comrades as Marx and Engels had been of the Czechs and Russians. This antipathy was 8) Stefan Stehlik wrote in Cervene noviny (of July 7, 1919) : " On Slovak soil, freed from imperialism, today there was created an independent Slovak Soviet Republic. The first impulsive action of the proletariat liberated from t he yoke of Czech imperialism was to realize the right of self-determination which is being exhorted by the oppressors with such a great glory; in reality however, it is being perverted by them . . . Slovak Soviet Republic turns its weapons ... against all who threaten this real unpe rverted democracy, this inallienable right of self-determination" (by which at that time they could have meant only the Prague Government). Quoted by P . A. Toma , op. cit. pp. 208-209. 9) The first years of the Slovak-Czech relationship and its reflection in Slovak political, social and economic life, are described at length in several authoritative works, e.g.: F . Peroutka, Budovani statu I -IV ( Praha 1933-36 ) ; J . Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko -tihorske ( Praha, 1928) . V. Chaloupecky, Zapas o Slovensko (Praha, 1930 ), I. Derer, siovensko v prevrate a po nom (Bratislava, 1924) ; K. Sidor, Andrej Hiinka 1864-1926 (Bratislava, 1936) . �SLOVAKIA 129 mutual and in their anti-Magyar feelings the leaders of the Slovak Social Democrats (Derer, Lehotsky, Markovic) were indistinguisha ble from their bourgeois counterparts (Hlinka, srobar, Hodza). Thus in the political sense the parties contesting the first post-war elections in Slovakia offered very much the same program. It was only in the field of social reform that they differed. Here the Social Democrats surpassed everybody in generosity, promising to implement many far-reaching social and economic measures. Their radical policies appealed to the people dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions. Thus in the general election of April, 1920 the Slovak people gave their votes to the Social Democratic Party led by Ivan Derer. 10 The Magyars and Germans of Slovakia who refused to join Derer's political platform founded a Social Democratic Party of their own. 11 After its electoral victory the Slovak Social Democratic Party lost much of its fighting spirit, adopted many right-wing policies of moderation and even passivity while the Magyar and German Social Democratic Party moved further to the left towards radicalism and turbulent activities. It was led by an able group of ruthless leaders (most of them Jews, several served as Commissars in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun) who were constantly harassing "the reformist Social Democratic government" of V. Tusar by fomenting strikes, unrests and other forms of trouble. 12 Their activities 13 became fatal to the Slovak Social Democratic Party which was rapidly sliding under Czech control and soon became identical with all the unpopular measures of the Government. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's inability to fulfil its pre-election promises or to prevent the economic ruination of Slovakia, and the subsequent wholesale unemploymen t, brought about a massive 10) The Social Democratic Party polled 510,341 out of 1,341,191 valid votes and obtained 23 deputies in the Prague National Assembly. 11) They received 108,546 votes and obtained 4 deputies. 12) J. Mlynarik, Robotnicke hn•itie na Slovensku roku 1920 (od parla• mentnych volieb do decembroveho genercilneho strajku). Historick)' casopis, I/ 1960, pp. 26-27) . 13) Their strongholds were four population centres in the Slovak-Magyar borderland: Bratislava, where the German-languag e, "Volksstimme" was published, Komarno, Gelnica and Ko~ice, where the Magyarlanguage, "Kassai Munkas", was published. �130 SLOVAKIA desertion of the rank anc'l file members within months after the election. 14 In the meantime the Magyar Social Democratic Party at Kosice joined (in May 1920) the Third International and invited the other proletarian parties of Slovakia to follow suit. This proclamation was eagerly listened to by many Social Democratic leaders dissatisfied with Derer's weak and inept leadership. 15 In September 1920 at the Party Congress at Turciansky Svaty Martin Derer failed to win a vote of confidence ( out of 132 delegates only 15 voted for him). Unwilling to accept defeat he proclaimed the handful of his followers to be the only true Slovaks and true Social Democrats by which he drove the dissidents into a coalition with the Magyar and German left-wing radicals. The fruits of this coalition ripened rapidly. On January 16-17, 1920 the left-wingers of the Slovak, Magyar and German Social Democracy, as well as the Jewish Poale Sion, met at ~ubochna and founded the Communist Party of Slovakia in everything but name. 16 It is interesting to look at the national composition of the delegates participating at this Congress. Out of 149 delegates with voting rights 88 were Slovaks, 36 Magyars, 15 Germans, 6 Ruthenes, 4 Jews. 17 The omission to register under its own name proved a very serious one for the future destinies of the KSS. Against 14 ) M. Strhan, Kriza priemyslu na Slov ensku v rokoch 1921-23 (Bratislava , 1960, pp. 15-80), J . Kramer, K dejinam priemyslu na Slovensku za prvej CSR (Bratislava, 1955). 15 ) ~- Holotik, Sjazd socialno-demokratickej strany (l'avice) na Slov ensku v januciri 1921 (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1963) , pp. 340-341. 16 ) 1921. Spomienky na vznik KS(: (Bratislava, 1962). The Czech dele gate at the Congress, I. Olbracht, requested the assembled repre- sentatives of the Slovak Left to postpone the adoption of the name " Communist Party of Slovakia" in order to be able to adopt the name " Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia" later on. See also Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 165-166. 17 ) From the report of the voting commission, as quoted by M. Dzvonik 0 istom zakladajucom sjazde (Kulturny zivot, 7/ 1966, p. 6) . See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (Slavic Review, 14/ 1955, p. 353). Skilling gives slightly different figures, viz. 92 Slovaks. However, it must be mentioned that these numbers are somewhat misleading, especially with regard to the Jews who were present in every national group, and the Magyars, many of whom were counted as Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 131 the opposition of the Magyar delegates the Congress agreed to keep the question of the Party's name in abeyance. They decided to wait for developments in the Czech lands where the situation was ripening at a less r~pid rate. Finally at its XIVth Congress (in May 1921) the Czech Social Democratic Party formally accepted the ideological split in its ranks. Its left wing reconstituted itself as the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia ( KSc) immediately absorbing the Slovak section which, nameless and unaffiliated, had been waiting for four months for this moment.18 By this process the KSS lost its identity, becoming an anonymous partner in an unequal partnership. II. 1921-1929 The newly constituted KSC was from its beginning dominated by Czech-German leadership and looking largely after Czech national interest. Slovakia-because of the lack of native leading cadres-soon became a battlefield where the Czech and Magyar elements were fighting for influence . The Czechs were trying to woo the Slovak electorate by defending the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and the integrity of its territories. Already in September 1921 Klement Gottwald had become editor of a Slovak language Party paper, "Hlas l'udu" (People's Voice), and later in 1923 editor-inchief of another Commun.ist paper, "Pravda chudoby" (Poor Man's Truth). Other prominent Czech Party organizers who came to Slovakia in the early twenties included Karel Bacilek, Karel Schmidke and others. 19 While the Czechs concentrated mainly on the Slovak electorate, the Magyars tried to hold together a sizeable portion of the Magyar electorate by advocating revisionism, self-determination for ethnic minorities, etc. In the meantime Slovakia was becoming restive and in18) Dejiny KS(; (Praha , 1961) , pp. 170-172. While the Communist Party of Slovakia fused into the KSC smoothly and without murmur, the Communist Party of the Sudeten Germans (formed in March 1921 ) refused to amalgamate with the KSC . Its resistance was broken in November 1921 but only after Lenin's intervention. 19) Gottwald's activities in Slovakia, adorned with the socialist glamou;: of the cult era, are the object of a book by Z. Holotikova, Kl ement Gottwald na Slovensku v rokoch 1921-24 (Bratislava, 1953). Karel Schmidtke began to write his name as Karol Smidke only after 1945. �13l2 SLOVAKIA creasingly discontented with Czech administrative methods. economic and social discrimination and especially with the crude disregard of the Prague Government for the political aspirations of the Slovak natibn. The Slovaks were putting forward their demands for the promised autonomy but no one would listen. Even the KSC, dominated at the time by Czech nationalists, had only scorn for the Slovak demands. At its First Congress it declared: "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation." 20 This mistaken and unrealistic attitude was severely censured at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow (June-July 1924) where the following resolution was adopted: 1. The Congress affirms that in Czecho-Slovakia there does not exist a single Czechoslovak nation and that the Czechoslovak state, in addition to the Czech nationality, consist of the following nationali ties: Slovak, German, Magyar, Ukrainian and Polish. 2. The Congress considers it necessary for the KSC, in connection with these national minorities, to proclaim and to follow the slogan of the right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession. In particular the KSC must support the struggle of the Slovaks for their independence and it must strive continuously to wrest this movement for independence out of the control of the nationalist bourgeoisie and to bring it into a common struggle of the working class against capitalism ... 21 For the Czech Communists it was a bitter pill to swallow. Under its impact the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow was split into a majority and minority, the majori20) Protokol I. radneho sjezdu KSC (Praha, 1923 ), p. 14. In practice the KSC plainly demonstrated its Czechoslovakist and centralized tendencies. On January 1st, 1922 the KSC abolished the provincial Party structure in Slovakia, splitting the country into four regions directly subordinated to the Central Executive Committee in Prague. Shortly afterwards it abolished Slovak trade union organizations. Such moves seriously hindered the Party activities in Slovakia and antagonized many honest and sincere Slovak left-winge rs. These either left in disgust (like J . Schiffel, who returned to the U.S.A.) or were expelled as agents of the nationalist bourgeoisie (like Culen, Vercik and others ). 21) Pjatyj vsemirnyj kongress komunisticeskogo intenacionala, 17. ijuna - 8. ijttlia 1924 g. Stenografisceskij otcot, Cast' II. (Prilozenija) , ( Moskva, 1925 ), p. 129. �SLOVAKIA 133 ty refusing to accept the resolution of the Comintern. Among the ranks of the KSC the interference of the Comintern produced a serious crisis. The Second Congress of the KS(; was hurriedly convened in November 1924 to deal with the issue. The Congress met in the presence of a leading Comintern official, D. Z. Manuilskij. It was mainly due to his presence that the resolution issued at the end of the Congress proclaimed: "The Party cannot accept the bourgeois lie about the official Czechoslovak nation. By this ruse the Czech bourgeoisie wants to hide its colonial exploitation and bloody oppression of Ruthenia and Slovakia as well as other national minorities". 21 a But as it turned out even he was powerless to shake the dominating influence of the Czech nationalist right-wingers who in complete disregard of their own resolution continued in the old-style policies of ignoring the legitimate demands of the national minorities even within the Party.22 A dramatic development took place in March 1925. The Czech rightists and their arrogant attitude towards other nationalities, especially towards the Slovaks, were openly critized on the pages of "Pravda" by the Soviet expert on the nationalities problem, J. V. Stalin. Stalin saw the narrow-minded and selfish Czech nationalism as the roots of the right-wing deviationism in the KSC. He wrote: The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation ... And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Right and Left took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank . .. Such division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.23 Stalin's arguments were further developed by D. Z. Manuilskij who quoted, among others, such flagrant examples of national discrimination as the composition of the Politburo of the KSC which consisted of seven Czechs 21a) Protokol II. fadneho sjezdu KSt, (Praha, 1925) , p. 8. 22) Dejiny KSt (Praha, 1961), pp. 213-216. 23) J. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1954), Vol. VII., p. 61. See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism 1921-1929 (Slavic Review, 19/ 1960, pp. 238-239 ). �134 SLOVAKIA and two Germans but no Slovaks, Magyars, Poles or Ruthenes. 24 The elections in 1925 were the first real test of the Party's hold on the masses. On the whole the Party did not score badly: it emerged as the second strongest party in Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia the election results were a telling commentary on the existing situation. The Social Democratic Party practically disappeared (from 510,341 votes in 1920 to 60,581 votes in 1925). But its voters joined mainly the Hlinka People's Party which captured 489,027 votes (2 35,389 in 1920), i.e. 34.3 % of the Slovak electorate thus becoming the largest Slovak party.25 The Communist Party gained 198,212 votes in Slovakia but its support came mostly from the non-Slovak voters as can be seen from a closer look at the districts which voted for the Communists and at the men who were elected into the Parliament26 ( out of 8 deputies 3 were of Magyar nationality: Kopasz, Major and Steiner). The failure to capture the masses of the Slovak rural proletariat was openly admitted in Moscow and was attributed to the Party's omission to adopt the correct position towards the nationalities problem in Czecho-Slovakia and in particular towards the Slovaks: In Slovakia . .. under the influence of the revolution, in 1920 the peasant masses moved strongly to the left, but in the course of the last four years, owing to the passivity of the Communist P arty in the national question, 200,000 peasants passed from the Socialist 24) D. Z. Manuilskij, Uroki ceskogo krizisa, (Moskva, 1925) . It was the Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the IIIrd Party Congress (Sept. 1925) which consisted of: K. Gottwald, J . Hais, J . Haken ( President) , J . Harus, B. Jilek, A. Neurath, V. Stern, B. Smeral and A. Zapotocky. 25) Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1926 ( Bratislava, 1936), pp. 535-538. 26) El•ectoral Corn. % % % d is trict vote of •totail :Mandates :.\1:agy ars German5 1. ove Zamky 2 20.0 61 ,577 62.3 6.8 2. Ko§ice 20.9 40,095 2 41.6 9.9 3. Trnava 28,606 13.9 2.3 1 1.8 4. Banska Bystrica 17,694 11.0 2.2 1 5.6 5. Turc. Sv. Martin 22,355 1 9.5 0.5 5.1 6. Lipt. Sv. Mikula§ 15,697 1 7.4 1.4 1.7 7. Prefov 6.2 12,206 2.6 0 0.7 �SLOVAKIA 135 Party into a party, which, although it is clerical, fight for the autonomy.27 In spite of the impressive overall election results the Party was torn internally by rival factions. After ridding itself of the right wing (Bubnik) a new struggle developed between the so-called "ultraleft" (B. Jilek and V. Bolen) and "centre" (B. t5meral, K. Kreibich, A. Zapotocky). 28 These ideological conflicts touched the Party's life in Slovakia only marginally and even then the Czech leaders of the KSc in Slovakia (K. Gottwald in particular) were supporting the "centre" aginst the "left". In Slovakia the burning issues were not of ideological but of political and economic character. The continuous closing down of factories and industrial plants, growing unemployment, agricultural crisis, emigration, etc. were leaving little time for ideological disputes. 29 After 1926, when the Hlinka People's Party decided to join the government benches, the Communists tried hard to be the spokesmen of the Slovak people against the political wrongs and social injustices of the Czech bourgeoisie. Complete independence of Slovakia was advocated, Czecho-Slovakia was denounced as the offspring of an imperialist war. 30 In January 1927 the Party 27) G. Volkov, Ugnetennaja Prikarpatskaja Rus (Krestjanskij International, 3-5/ 1926, p. 126). ( Quoted in G. D. Jackson's Comintern and Peasant) (London, 1966), p. 288. 28) Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 249-269. 29) The economic situation of this period has been extensively studied by socialist historians, e. g. J . Mlynarik, Strajkove hnutie na Slovenska II. Zemerobotnici v obdobi 1919 az 1929 (Bratislava, 1961) ; P. Rapos, Priemysel Slovenska za kapitalizmu (Bratislava, 1957) ; J . Mlynarik, N ezamestnanost' na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1964) ; V. Plevza, K niektorym otazkam agrarnej krizy v rokoch 1924-34 na Slovensku (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1966, pp. 203-233); etc. 30) At this time the KSC in Slovakia at its National Conference at 2ilina (on July 25th, 1925) , launched, on Gottwald's instigation a massive campaign aimed at the expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia. The battle-cry of the Communist propagandists became : " Vypracte Slovensko! " ( Clea;: out of Slovakia!) . The full wording of the slogan was, "Vypracte Slovensko od potlacovacieho aparatu ceskej burzoazie", according to V. Plevza (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1965, p. 510) and "Vypracte Slovensko od nasilnickeho aparatu", according to J. Kramer and .J. Mlynarik (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, p. 438). Though there was no doubt about Gottwald's authorship of this slogan, the blame for the embarrassing "mistake" was put later �136 SLOVAKIA convoked a regional conference at Plesivec where it attempted to lead a nation-wide protest against the industrial decline of Slovakia. 31 But all with little success. In February 1929 the Fifth Congress of the KSC met. It passed into Party history as the final battleground where the splinter-groups of the Party dissidents were defeated and the "true bolshevist nucleus" of the Party came out victorious. But in spite of the intense ideological wrangle the Slovak question did appear on the agenda. The Slovak cause was defend by none less than K. Gottwald ( who was to emerge as the new leader of the Party) proclaiming before the Congress: "The !Ind Congress of the KSC declared null and void the theses of the Ist Party Congress (i.e. concerning the unitary "Czechoslovak" nation) but this was in words only . . . The ratification of the First Party Congress theses was only on paper, a mere formality".31a By promising new corrective measures Gottwald (who--it should be remembered-in those days was acting for the Party in Slovakia and was the spokesman for the Slovaks) swayed the overwhelming majority of the Slovak section of the KSC to the side of the victorious "bolshevist on J. Vercik, "the agent of nationalist bourgeoisie" (e.g. M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; ( ceskoslovensky casopis historicky), 1/ 1954, p. 4-15) . While attacking the Czech bourgeoisie for its oppression of the Slovak masses, the KSC leaders did not relax their centralist hold on their Slovak comrades. At each Party Congress the Slovak delegates complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs (See : Protokol III. fadneho sjezdu KSc [Praha, 1925] , pp. 41 and 73 ; Protokol IV. fadneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1927], p. 33 ; Protokol V . f<idneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1929] , pp. 40 and 50) , but in vain. This aspect of the Party history has been neglected by the socialist historians except a brief and restrained comment by J . Kramer and .J. Mlynarik, Revolucne hnutie a narodnostna ot<izka na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, pp. 423-443). For more recent writings on the theme see: Z. Holotikova, 0 rieseni narodnostnej otazky v KSc (Referat na konferencii Hist. ustavu SAV a ustavu dejin KSS, jun 1966) and J. Mlynarik, Dr. B. Smeml a slovensk<i n<irodnostn<i otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia (Cs. casopis historicky, 5/ 1967, pp. 653-666 ). 31 ) J . Pleva, Vy znam Plesiveckej konferencie v januari 1927 (Bratislava, 1958) . According to Kramer and Mlynarik (loc. cit. , p. 442, footnote 32 ) the importance of this conference was disproportio n ately inflated because of Gottwald's participation at it. 31a) Protokol V. f<idneho sjezdu KS(; (Praha, 1929) , p. 12. �SLOVAK.IA 137 faction". 32 However, one point is worth noting: while the "bolshevist nucleus of the Party in Slovakia was made up of Bacilek, Siroky, Steiner, Urx" 33 (i.e. two Czechs and two Magyars), the dissidents ("nationalists and liquidators") who were expelled from the Party amidst a storm of abuse ( culen, Felcan, Vercik) were Slovaks. 34 III. 1929-1938 The internal struggle inside the Party was fought bitterly and not always behind closed doors . Inevitably it undermined the Party's image in the voters' eyes. In the 1929 elections it gained 152,242 votes ( 10.55 % ) in Slovakia, a considerable decline in voting strength when compared with the 1925 election results ( 13.41 % ) .35 Yet in Parliament the new "bolshevist cadres" displayed fierce and sanguinary pugnacity epitomized in the words of the new Party leader, K. Gottwald, addressed in December 1929 to the coalition benches: We are the revolutionary Party of Czechoslovak proletariat and in Moscow we have, indeed, our revolutionary General Staff. Yes we go to Moscow in order to learn. Would you like to know what we learn"! We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian bolsheviks how to break your necks. And you must admit that the Russian bolsheviks are very good at it.36 32) Z. Holotikova, Bol"sevizacny proces KS(; v rokoch 1924-29 (Historicky casopis 2/1957, pp. 204-210); M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; (Cs. casopis historicky, 1/ 1954, pp. 4-15). 33) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), p. 256. 34) Vercik, Mlynarik, Koren, etc. were branded as "nationalists" and expelled; Culen, Felcan, Kolarikova, etc. were branded as "liquidators" and expelled also. The latter were the authors of the so-called "Hlohovecke memorandum" (of December 1928) in which they requested the reorganization of the Party structure in Slovakia and complete freedom of action in specifically Slov~k matters. (See : Pravda of January 31, and February 7th, 1929). In 1930 the KSC finally consented to a limited decentralization and a Slovak province ("celoslovensky kraj") of the KS(; was instituted. S. Major (of Magyar nationality) and K. Bacilek (of Czech nationality) were put in charge. See: V. Plevza, Vytvorenie celoslovenskeho kraja a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku na zaciatku tridsiatych rokov (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1962, p. 184). 35) For an interesting statistical analysis of the 1929 election results see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern E urope (Princeton, N. J ., 1961 ), pp. 150-158 and 216-219. 36) K. Gottwald , Spisy I (Praha, 1953), p. 322. �138 SLOVAK.IA During the severe economic depression which swept the Western world in the late twenties and early thirties and which caused acute unemployment in Slovakia (some 250,000 in 1933) 37 the Communists organized hunger marches, protest meetings and strikes. A meeting in May 1931 at a small village in southern Slovakia, Kosuty, ended with a shooting fray resulting in the death of three demonstrators. The Party skilfully exploited the incident to advertize the social plight of rural workers in the Slovak countryside. 38 In the years 1929-33 the Communist press paid much attention to the political solution of the Slovak question and Slovak grievances were repeatedly aired on its pages. But as V. Kopecky confessed at the Vrth Party Congress (1931) it was more in the nature of lip service than anything else: "The decisions of the Vth Party Congress concerning the solution of the nationalities problem remained on paper only and in spite of repeated emphasizing of their importance by the central leadership of the Party there was no practical indication that we were fighting for the right of self-determination of the nations." 38a This national inequality was demonstrated even in the Party hierarchy. The higher Party ranks were-as beforean almost exclusive monopoly of the Czech and German comrades. The Presidium constituted at the Vrth Party 37) Pfehled ceskoslovenskych ilejin III (1918-1945) (Praha , 1960) , p. 325. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the emigration figures which were considerably greater for Slovakia (where only about 25 % of the total population lived) than for the Czech lands: Emigration from C-SR: from Slovakia: 1928 24,540 13,544 1929 30,715 19,401 1930 25,712 16,682 1931 9,567 4,527 1932 5,165 2,222 1933 4,735 3,099 38) The shooting at Kosuty has attracted unusually great attention from Communist propagandists and publicists, e.g. the pamphlet, Nyn·i je v Kosv,tech pofcidek a klid (1931); V. Plevza, Kosutska trag edia (Prispevky k dejinam KSC, 8/ 1959, pp. 91-107) ; E. Pauliny, Kosutske udalosti v maji 1931 (Bratislava-Martin, 1961) ; E. Kadnar, Krvave Kosuty ( Bratislava, 1963) . It is perhaps worthwhile to note that the inhabitants of Kosuty were of Magyar nationality and so was S. Major, the convicted instigator of the disturbance. 38a ) Protokol VI. fcidneho sjezdn KSC, (Praha , 1931), p. 143. �SLOVAKIA 139 Congress had only one representative from Slovakia among its 15 members. 39 This omission was quite a serious matter, because by the midthirties the Communist Party of Slovakia was already producing its own native leaders. The young Slovak Communist students who in 1924 grouped in Prague around the quarterly Oater monthly), "Dav" (1924-1937), were growing up in stature and outlook and were ready and eager to take over from the Czech, Magyar and Jewish spokesmen of the Slovak proletariat. 40 Unfortunately they were striving for power at a time when the Party was purging itself of intellectual and other non-proletarian ballast, so that their hopes and expectations were frustrated.41 Other important changes in the Party line were also in the offing. The Party was directed by the Comintern to adopt new attitudes to a number of political issues. Up to 1933 the Communists considered democracy (i.e. bourgeois democracy) and fascism as "the children of the same mother, the bourgeoisie". 42 Masaryk, Benes, Hlinka, Kramaf were all Fascists of the same brand as Hitler and Mussolini. But by the summer of 1933 Stalin realized that Hitler was a much greater evil. Looking for new allies Stalin selected two of the most likely states worried by the growing power of Hitler's Germany: France and CzechoSlovakia. The KSc was instructed to take a more positive stand towards the official Czech foreign and domestic 39) It was E. Fried of Magyar-Jewish origin. Accordind to H. G. Skilling the ethnic composition of the 60-member Central Committee was as follows: 37 Czechs, 10 Germans, 8 Slovaks (and Magyars ), 4 Ukrainians and 1 Pole. See : H. Gordon Skilling, Gottwald and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1929-39 (Slavic Review, 20/ 1961, pp. 644-645) . The inadequate representation of Slovaks in the top P,0verning bodies of the Party apparatus (i.e. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo) is statistically summed up in Appendix I. 40) These young Communist intellectuals of the early twenties had their hey-day in the late forties and met a tragic fate in the early fifties. In the years 1950-54 they became the victims of purges and their rehabilitation began ,mly in 1963. For a post-rehabilitation view of the Dav-group see: S. Drug, Dav a davisti (Bratislava, 1965). 41) V. Plevza, Prispevok o cinnosti davistov v revolucnom hnuti za predmnichovskej CSR (Historicky casopis, 1/1964), pp. 20-21. 42) K. Gottwald , Spisy IV (Praha, 1951) , p. 212. �140 SLOVAKIA policies. This, of course, meant that the Slovak guestion and the nationalities problem in general had to be played down and the Party soon nodded its appproval where only a few months ago it used to voice its sharp criticism. 43 The signing of the Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Treaty in May 1935 marked a milestone in the Party's policy. The Party put on a mask of loyal respectability and replaced its internationalism by a newly-discovered patriotism. It conveniently forgot its past hostilities to "the imperialist agent Benes" and supported him in the presidential election in December 1935. At the Seventh Congress of the KSc (April 1936) the Party took a firm position "to defend CzechoSlovakia against Hitler". It became a zealous exponent of the Popular Front against Fascism and reaction, and the Slovak grievances once so prominent in its program were now hardly mentioned. The militant cry for "self-determination including the right to secede" was now replaced with much softer demands voiced by Gottwald at the VIIth Party Congress: "The Party will strive to achieve the realization of minimal requirements for normal coexistence of all nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia by insisting on a democratic policy towards nationalities and on equal rights for all nations ( of Czecho-Slovakia) in all spheres of public life." 44 The approaching municipal elections made the Party somewhat wary and hurriedly it came forward with a "plan for the economic, social and cultural advancement of Slovakia" announced at Banska Bystrica in May 1937.45 But the plan did not excite anybody. It was unrealistic and was looked upon as one of the many grandiose schemes which the Party submitted with monotonous regularity year after 43) A somewhat confused picture of the situation can be found in V. Plevza's KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1 938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 237-420. 44 ) K. Gottwald, Spisy VIII (Bratislava, 1953) , p. 167. This phase of Party activities is discussed at length in a number of publications such as Na obranu republiky proti fasizmu a v ojne (Bratislava, 1955) ; M . Filo, Boj KSC na Slovensku na obranu republiky (Bratislava, 1960) ; I. Kolesar, Otazka obnovy demokracie a demokratickych prciv i slobod proti fasizmu ( od VII. kongresu Kominterny r . 1935 ) Sbornik FFUK, 10/ 1959, pp. 163-181). 45 ) Deji11y KSc (Praha, 1961) , p. 359. Also V . Siroky, Za st'astne Slove nsko v socialistickom Ceslcoslovensku (Bratislava, 1952). �141 SLOVAKIA year, knowing well that it would never be called upon to implement them. The turns and twists in the Party line could not pos• sibly impress the Slovak electorate. In the municipal elections (May 1938) the Party found itself deserted by its erstwhile supporters. Its advocacy of pro-Benes and antiautonomist policies46 estranged it from the Slovak voters, while its noisy denunciations of the revisionist claims by Hungary, Germany and Poland antagonized its non-Slovak voters. The overwhelming electoral defeat in Slovakia (in the Czech lands the Party maintained its support) alarmed the Slovak Party leaders who clearly read the writing on the wall. 47 And thus on the eve of Czecho-Slovakia's disintegration the Party attempted another somersault and tried to sponsor the autonomistic cause, even if it meant forming a common front with Hlinka's Party. But it was now too late. No party in Slovakia cared for partnership with the Communists and Hlinka's Party least of all. The speed with which events marched by-passed the Party altogether. 46) J. U§iak, Boj KS(: s Hlinkovou slovenskou l'udovou stranou a vplyv na masy v obdobi ndstupu fasizmu (Pfispevky k dejindm KSC, 5/ 1963, pp. 710-29). Also V. Plevza, KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 462-474. 47 ) The Communist historians merely record the electoral defeat without going into details, without drawing any conclusion (e. g. Plevza, op. cit., p. 471 ). In many small towns the Communist vote virtually disappeared and in bigger towns it was severely reduced. On the whole the proportion of those who voted Communist dropped from 14% in 1935 to something like 8.9 % in 1938. No comprehensive results have been compiled so far; the Party historians carefully avoid this area. A brief glance at the election results in a few Slovak cities shows convincingly how the Party fared at the polls. (The results are compared with those of the Hlinka People's Party, the main beneficiary of the Communist loss. Figures are taken from Slovensky dennik of June 12, 1938): People's Party votes KSS votes Gain in% --19_3_5_[1938 ' ....Jl % _in--'l .... _L_o_s_s I _1_93_8__,_ 1 __,__1_93_5_ _ _ _T_o_w_n_ 2,493 I 44.3 j 1 8,133 5,640 45,7 2,399 1 2,856 i 5,255 Bratislava 333 I 37.91 910 1,243 88 13.5 554 Nove Mesto n / V I 642 44 I 607 I 563 I 1098 76 I 167 68.8 I 243 Snina 1 849 I 363 62.0I 586 4,658 2,098 I 2,560 55.0 Star11. !>ala I 1,064 1 ? 64 I ? Modra I 1,253 j ? 79 I ? Michalovce I 3,471 1 ? 777 I ? Trebgov (dist. ) I I I I I 1 �142 SLOVAKIA The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia found the Party's fortunes in Slovakia at their lowest ebb. This was openly acknowledged by the Party leadership in its report to the Executive of the Comintern in December 1938. With a remorseful self-criticism V. Siroky confessed: We Comm un ists represe nted in Slovakia the national interests of the Czech nation, while the Slovak national interests were furth er represented by Hlinka's Party ... Only at the last moment as the Czechoslovak crisis was reaching its climax did we put forward a demand for the democratic solution of the Slovak problem, i. e. the granting of full autonomy.48 IV. 1938-1944 The declaration of autonomy on October 6th, 1938 was shortly followed by the suppression of Party activities and in January 1939 the Party was disbanded. The Party leaders escaped abroad and with regard to Party leadership in Slovakia, it is interesting to note that the Slovak nationals, if they got away at all, fled mainly to the West (Valo, Clementis ), while the non-Slovak leaders sought their refuge in the Soviet Union (smidke, Bacilek, Major. Siroky went first to Paris, then to Moscow) .49 Drawing conclusions from the rejection of the Party policies by the Slovak people and facing the new situation fairly and squarely, the Comintern decided on the last and long-delayed step : it gave its approval to the founding of an independent ( albeit illegal) Communist Party of Slovakia ( in May 1939 ). 50 Its leadership was entrusted to three relatively minor and unknown functionaries: J. Duris, L. Benada, J. Osoha. Of these the ablest and most dynamic was Jan Osoha, a Czech by birth. The leadership faced a tremendous task of building a network of illegal cells from the fragments and remains of what once was a Party organization in Slovakia. Traditional Party strongholds went to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938.50 a The 48 ) Deji~nii krizov atka (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 27-28. 49 ) Slovak Studies IV (Rome, 1964) , p. 30. 50) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961 ), p. 399. 50a) Interesting evidence of the solid support the Party received from t he Magyar-speaking population of Slovakia can be found in the recently published bibliography, Zoznam komunistickych novin a casopisov marxi.stickej l' avice z rokov 1919-38 (Martin, 1961). The bibliography lists 125 separate newspapers and periodicals of which �SLOVAKIA 143 newly-acquired independence of Slovakia (in March 1939) was a powerful stabilizing factor on the political scene leaving very little scope for the subversive activities of the Communists.51 For the Communists the situation was further aggravated by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939), the Soviet participation in the Fourth partition of Poland and the Soviet recognition, both 'de facto' and 'de jure', of the independent Slovak state. Under the impact of these events the Slovak Communist leadership in the West (Paris) disintegrated.52 At home the Party leaders were even more confused and completely at a loss. The illegal handbills and propaganda pamphlets betray the prevalent mood of perplexity and obvious embarrassment of the underground Party organizers in their desperate attempts to explain away the things they could not comprehend. In the Soviet attitude towards the Slovak state they saw a sure sign of Soviet approval of the new geographicopolitical reorganization of Central Europe. In response to it they drew up, sometime in October 1939, a new political program, the key-note of which was: "The free and independent Soviet Slovakia." 53 This program became a dominant feature of all the illegal Communist activities in Slovakia up to 1944. It was only natural for an independent Party to sponsor such a policy in an independent state. But the scheme did not pass 71 were published in the Slovak language, 50 (i. e. 40 %) in Magyar, 3 in German and 1 in Ukrainian. 51) A. Huckova-Stvrtecka, cinnost' prveho ilegalneho Ostredneho vyboru KSS (Bratislava, 1959). 52) Clementis denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact for which he was expelled from the Pai ty, Siroky rapidly departed to Moscow and Valo retired into neutral passivity. About the impact of this infamous alliance on the Slovak (and Czech ) Communists in Paris, see Theo. I-I. Florin, S Vladom Clementisom v Parizi a v Lon.dyne (Dav, spomienky a studie, [Brati~ava, 1965), p. 467) . 53) Confiscated Communist propaganda handbills in the Archives of the German F'oreign Ministry, 56/ 38606-15. These documents help to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign for an independent Soviet Slovakia which was not later than in October 1939. At that time the Communists went to considerable trouble to explain that the Soviet Union had not exchanged Communism for the National Socialism of Hitler. �144 SLOVAKIA by unchallenged. The first to protest against this line was-as might have been expected-the illegal Communist Party in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia lead by Edo Urx who as a Party functionary had spent a number of years in Slovakia. The Party in the Protectorate continued to call itself the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It claimed to be the direct successor of the banned Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and a parent organization of the Communist Party of Slovakia. It advocated the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and objected to any policy promulgation which was not consistent with its current Party line. The Slovaks on the other hand were rejecting any kind of affiliation and insisted on equality and independence. After prolonged disagreement the dispute was referred to Moscow for arbitration 54 and there Gottwald issued a ruling completely vindicating the stand of the Slovak Communists. He sent the following message to Urx (in March 1940): Your pre-war pattern of thinking must change. Behind the slogan "Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia" are hidden imperialistic and antiSoviet schemes . .. We expressly emphasize that our Party fully accepts the right of self-determination both for the Czechs and fo r the Slovaks. This right of self-detevmination implies the right to live in an independent state. We fight for the restoration of the national freedom and territorial independence of the Czechs. As far as the Slovaks are concerned we fight for the complete sovereignity of the present-day Slovak state. It is this struggle for the right of self-determination which differentiates our road from that of Benes a nd world imperialism. The relation between the Czechs and Slovaks stand now on a new footing. Slovak separatism plays today a different role. That is why we are giving up the old slogans concerning Slovakia.ss Encouraged by this message the Slovak Communists tried to outdo in nationalist zeal everybody including the official Slovak propaganda. The only criticism they received from Moscow was the advice not to stress too much the Soviet character of their "independent Soviet Slovakia" program.56 54 ) The dispute is summarized in D ejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 63-88. 55) Deji nna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , p. 61. 56 ) S. Falt'an, Ku Kral'ov ej recenzii trochu inak (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1966, p. 58S. �SLOVAKIA 145 The idea of national independence being at the root of the Party's illegal activities was not given up even when the Soviet Union gave its official recognition to Benes and his government then in exile in London. The clandestine journal, "Hlas l'udu" (Voice of the people ), commented on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benes and the Kremlin: The pact between the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile is not seen by the Communist Party of Slovakia as a pact with the government of a future state which has its established boundaries, its established regime. The (Czecho-Slovak) government in London was created without the participation and without the will of the working people in Slovakia . . . The question of an independent (Slovak) state, or autonomy, or federation with the fraternal Czech nation is now of secondary importance and it will be settled after the defeat and destruction of German imperialism.56a Slovak police and security organs who had infiltrated the illegal Communist organizations57 watched this development with keen interest. When the Soviet-German conflict broke out (June, 1941) the Slovak police within a few hours arrested all the members of the illegal Central Committee (except J. Osoha) and some 1,100 illegal Party activists. 58 Most of these were released from detention after three or four weeks and lost no time in regrouping and starting again. A new Central Committee was set up by J . Osoha and this in turn was broken up by the police in April 1942. J. Osoha again eluded the dragnet and at56a) Quoted by M. Gosiorovsky in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 371. 57) In this connection it is worth quoting from a report of the German Minister to Slovakia, M. v. Killinger (of August 19th, 1940): "Die ... in die kommunistische Zellen geschickten Leute bewiihren sich sehr gut, so dass der Erfolg der Arbeit gesichert und alle Zellen der hier, wieder erstehenden kommunistischen Organisationen erfasst werden. Die inzwischen festgestellten kommunistische Funktioniire werden listenmiissig geftihrt und laufend ergiinzt" (2276/ 47987684). 58) German documents 610/ 248627. At this time the Russians parachuted into Slovakia V. Siroky and V. Skrabala. But they were discovered very soon after their arrival and put in prison where Siroky stayed until 1945. When in 1949 Siroky emerged as the most powerful man in Slovakia trusted by both Moscow and Prague, legendary stories were written about his underground and illegal activities which lasted-when all said and done-some fi ve weeks. �146 SLOVAKIA tempted to organize the third Central Committee of the KSS. But in July he was caught and imprisoned together with the other members of the Committee. 59 These police actions deprived the illegal Party organization in Slovakia of all its old leaders trained in the Stalinist mould of blind and unquestioning obedience. Continuity with the pre-war Party politics was thus broken and the way was cleared for new men to emerge at the top. As it happened they were almost without exception the younger generation of the Party intellectuals, recruited and groomed by Vlado Clemen tis ( then in London). They lacked the rugged working-class background but they possessed the self-assertive spirit of intense national pride. One of them, Stefan Bast'ovansky, tried to continue (against his better judgement) with the illegal activities in the old traditional style (handbills and pamphlets read by very few, incitement to sabotage obeyed by nobody) only to find himself in prison by May 1943.60 The leadership of the demoralized and decimated ranks now passed into the hands of G. Husak and L. Novomesky, who disagreed with those tactics and methods which were costing the Party so much and achieved nothing. As the men on the spot they proposed a more subtle and unorthodox approach which took into account the political and social conditions in Slovakia, the mentality and sentiments of the masses and the weakness of Slovak war-time administration. The Party really went underground and the outward signs of activities almost disappeared. Moscow, disturbed by the apparent lack of fighting spirit, decided to send to Slovakia two trusted emissaries to revive the dormant proletarian masses. They were K. smidke and K. Bacilek. Neither of them was Slovak but both had worked in Slovakia in the interwar period. smidke, the more experienced of the two, listened with interest to the suggestions of the Slovak intellectuals and to their amazement he agreed with them. 61 smidke set up a new Central Committee of the KSS 59) 0 . Krajnak, Protifasisticke hnutie na Slovensku. (Nova mys! , 8/ 1964, pp. 695-703); G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964 ), pp. 33-36; Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 122-126. 60) Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964), p. 126. 61) G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 51-56. �SLOVAKIA 147 (which included himself, Husak and Novomesky) re-established and revived the network of illegal Party organizations and directed their activities along a new and more realistic path. He entered into close collaboration with the bourgeois illegal groups (and, through them, with the army) and did not scruple to exploit to the full the nationalist sentiments and aspirations of the Slovaks. 62 The last thing was, of course, not an easy task, because in the meantime the Soviet Union had promised Benes to restore pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. And not only that. As revealed recently, Benes was given by Stalin, in December 1943, virtually a free hand in his dealings with the Slovaks. According to Fierlinger (Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Moscow) Stalin allegedly told Benes "to keep the Slovaks firmly in hand.''62 a By these tactics of exploiting nationalistic feeling in the country and with the military defeat of Germany looming larger and closer every day, the Communists and their bourgeois allies were preparing an armed uprising in Slovakia. Their conspiratory efforts were partly frustrated by an untimely start, triggered off by Soviet partisans, which doomed the venture to failure. But while it lasted (August-October 1944) "the Slovak national uprising" (as this revolt became officially known after 1945) was a remarkable achievement in several respects. 63 Its effect on the future political development of Slovakia was to be farreaching and lasting. Right at the beginning of the uprising the Communist Party of Slovakia came into the open and published ( on September 2nd, 1944) its proclamation in which it implied that Slovakia--though a part of Czechoslovakia-would have a very broad autonomy which would include even a sepa62) Slovenske ruirodne povstanie 1944 (Bratislava 1965), pp. 191-221. 62a) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava, 1968) . p. 11. 63) This event is by far the most written-about subject in modern Slovak history. For a critical review of bibliography on this theme see: F . Vnuk, Neuveritel'ne sprisahanie (Middletown, Pa., 1964) , pp. 181-191. Also S. Falt'an, Niektore otazky okolo hodnotenia SNP (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1964, pp. 161-185) . A complete bibliography of books and articles on the subject in 1963-64 was compiled by A. Kociska (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1965, pp. 309-328) . �148 SLOVAKIA rate army. 64 On September 9, 1944 the KSS began to publish the daily, "Pravda", proudly branded as "the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia".65 On September 17th, 1944 it arranged a joint Party Congress with the Social Democratic Party at which the Social Democratic Party merged into the KSS. It elected its own Central Committee with smidke as President, Husak and cech (Social Democrat) as Vice-Presidents. The Party displayed vigour and independence to a degree which both the Czech and the Soviet commissars found disquieting. The Czech Communists who were spending the war years in Moscow thought it necessary to reaffirm their primacy before it was too late and promptly dispatched to Slovakia two "experienced comrades", R. Slansky and J. sverma, to see that the Party line was correctly drawn and properly applied. After their arrival ( September 28th, 1944) the Slovak Communist leadership had to do as it was told. As a result there followed a great deal of retracting especially in those fields where exuberant nationalism had carried the home-grown leaders too far. The uprising revealed with startling clarity the secondary role and subordinate position to which the KSS was now relegated. In proclaiming their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Slovak Communists were negating the only positive asset of their political program so loudly advertised in 1939-44 under the slogan of an independent Soviet Slovakia. The blow was shattering not only to the Slovak people at large but also to the less doctrinaire Party members.66 In order to make the best of a bad job the Communists kept on assuring the people that the new Czecho-Slovak Republic would be incomparably better than the old one, 64) The proclamation persistently talks about " our Slovak (not Czechoslovak) army". For the full text of the document see: G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 257-258. 65) The daily, "Pravda", as it appeared during the uprising (September - October 1944) was recently reprinted and is available in a convenient form , Pravda v obdobi SNP (Bratislava, 1964) . 66) There were reports that workers at several places proclaimed a Slovak Soviet Republic (e.g. at Nemecke Pravno) ; in other places (Podbrezova) there was strong agitation for the proclamation of Soviet Slovakia. This unwillingness of the working class to return to a common state with the Czechs is most telling. �SLOVAKIA 149 that the excesses of the Czech administration would not be repeated, that the Slovak national individuality would be unquestionably accepted, etc. In other words they were posing as the guarantors of all those rights and achievements which the Hlinka People's Party had secured for the Slovak nation when declaring autonomy (October 1938). They openly advocated a federated Czecho-Slovakia.67 Unfortunately for them in 1944-45 the Slovaks were past the autonomy stage and were thinking in terms of state independence. Against the opposition of many Czech politicians, including Benes himself, the Slovak Communists succeeded in retrieving from the wreckage of the Slovak independence some of those prerequisites which gave post-war Slovakia a quasi-autonomous status.68 What is even more surprising, they were able to preserve their own independence. And thus one finds in post-war Czecho-Slovakia a somewhat anomalous situation. Alongside the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there existed a Communist Party of Slovakia (with no regional equivalent in the Czech lands ) which to all intents and purposes was treated as a separate political party. As it happened it was a most expedient arrangement because it enabled the Communists in the critical post-war months (April 1945-May 1946) to have two Deputy Prime Ministers in the Provisional Government (instead of one) and almost twice as many ministers, parliamentarians, etc. as any other political party. V. 1945-1949 In the years 1945-6 the KSS was without doubt the most nationalistic party ever to enter the Slovak political scene. It was vehemently anti-German and anti-Magyar, and there seemed to be no limits to its nationalistic ex cesses. It lured into its camp Slovak voters by the promise of agrarian and wide-spread social reforms, it appealed 67) Thus spoke G. Husak at Kosice on February 28th, 1945: "We wan t to have a federated state ... in which each nation will be master in his own house."- See: G. Husak, Za narodnu a l'udovu demo kraciu (Kosice, 1945), p. 14. Also J. Jablonicky, Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 248-296. 68 ) Program prvej dorruicej vlady narodneho frontu cechov a Slovcikov (Kosice, 1945) . �150 SLOVAKIA to the nationalist and even the religious feeling of the people, it was willing to overlook anybody's past, no matter how compromising.69 Outwardly the KSS was united, but, as it transpired later, inside it was torn with internal jealousies which very soon decomposed its ranks and paralysed its strength as an independent political force. The old-guard leaders ( Siroky, Duris, etc.) who spent their war years in prison did not see eye to eye with the leadership which had been put together during the 1944 uprising (Husak, smidke, etc.). The Siroky-group intrigued against the smidke-Husakgroup and in their schemes they had the support of the Czech Communist leadership. In May 1945 at the joint session of both Party Presidia the Slovaks were compelled to adopt a common policy with their Czech comrades on all public issues of the day. The role of the KSS was defined as being "a part of a unitary KSC with a united leadership".70 In practice it meant a complete subjugation of the KSS to the dictatorial authority of the KSC. This was the end of the short-lived independence of the KSS (19391945). One of the first moves of Gottwald was to impose on the KSS a more amenable leadership to replace the smidkeHusak-group. In July 1945 Gottwald delegated Siroky to take over the Party affairs in Slovakia. 71 Siroky hurriedly convened a Party conference at Zilina (Aug. 11-12, 1945) where he was confirmed in his position as the Party President. Siroky saw to it that the top Party positions were filled with his men. Thus he had become, already in Aug. 1945, the undisputed authority in Party matters in Slovakia. "Siroky concentrated in his own hands and in the hands of his own group of collaborators in the apparatus of the KSS Central Committee factual decisions about Party 69) This is again another neglected chapter of the Party history. The nationalist excesses, especially against the Magyar minority, formed a part of the accusation levelled at the " bourgeois nationalists" in 1950-54. An oblique reference to the nationalist policies of the KSS has been made recently in the book of J. Zvara, A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes melogdasa Szlovakuiban (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 22-69. Also J . Jablonicky in Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) pp . 396-409. 70) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava 1968) , p. 55. 71 ) ib., p. 99. �SLOVAKIA 151 policies, about the Party itself and about its leading cadres. These men were selected by Siroky himself according to his own personal likings", complained G. Husak recently. 72 Out of 9 men in the Party Presidium Husak identified these as the members of the Siroky group: Siroky, Duris, Bast'ovansky, Valachovic, Holdos. This leaves on the other side Husak, soltesz, smidke and Zupka. While acting as a strong man of the KSS, Siroky realized that he owed his position to the Czech Communists and consequently he was an ever-obedient executor of their wishes. In this way the policy of the KSS became divorced from the current needs and realities of the Slovaks. The policies of the KSc were designed to attract the Czech masses and paid very little attention to the Slovak national interests. The Party faced the first post-war electoral contest in a state of internal disunity, with a program which lacked conviction, realism and electoral appeal. Its only competitor for the allegiance of the Slovak electorate was the Democratic Party (heir and successor of the old Agrarian Party of M. Hodza) dominated almost exclusively by the Slovak Protestant bourgeoisie of proBenes sympathies. The Hlinka People's Party being banned, the Catholic section of the Slovak people ( the support of which was to decide the general election scheduled on May 26th, 1946) had no party of its own. To win these vital votes the leaders of the Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Catholics ("April Agreement") promising considerable concessions in exchange for the Catholic vote. 73 As a result of this solid backing of the Catholic majority the Democratic Party emerged victorious from the electoral contest polling 62.0 % of the total vote (999,622 votes), while the Communist Party gained only 30.4 % (489,596 votes), the remaining 7 ,6 % went to two minor parties or represented "white ticket" and informal votes. 74 While the electorate in the Czech lands overwhelmingly 72) G. Husak, Barnabitky a co im predchadzalo, in Nove slovo, No. 8/ 1968. 73) V. Precan, Slov ensky katolicizmus pred februarom 1948 (Bratislava , 1961), pp. 85-108. 74) Dejiny KSc (Praha, 1961), p . 504. �152 SLOVAKIA endorsed the Marxist policies 75 in Slovakia the Communist Party (which-it should be remembered-was already then a united party of both the Communist and the Social Democrats) came second best in what was actually a twoparty contest. This massive rejection of the Marxist policies led to deep soul-searching in the Central Committee in Prague and Bratislava. The Party now tempered (at least partly) its reckless nationalism and started to attack the Democratic Party for harbouring fascist and reactionary elements. 76 Though nominally both Communist and Democratic Parties were partners in the so-called United National Front they were soon fighting and abusing each other with fury and passion reminiscent of the interwar years. In spite of their electoral defeat the Communists, by clever and daring manipulation of their own and due to the ineptness, timidity and inexperience of the Democratic politicians were able to exert a decisive influence on the course of political events in Slovakia. They still retained the control of powerful organizations and pressure groups ( trade unions, farmers' organizations, partisans, etc.). Thus they were able to frustrate almost any attempt of the Democratic Party to honour its promises given to the Catholic voters.77 By their bullying tactics they brought about the estrangement between the leadership and membership of the Democratic Party. They accused many Democratic Party leaders of fascist conspiracy and subversive activity, demanded and got their removal from office and subsequent imprisonment (Kempny, Bugar, Stasko, Ursiny, etc.). Then in November 1947 they attacked the governmental positions of the Democratic Party, compelling it to give up 75) In the Czech lands the Communists received 38.9 % and the Social Democrats 15.8 % of the votes. The Marxist parties thus obtained 54.7 % . 76 ) M. Vartikova, Roky rozhodnutia. K dejiruim politickeho boja pred febriuirom 1948 (Bratislava, 1962); J . Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 247-253. 77 ) They engineered-with the help of their Czech comrades and colleagues-the sentencing and execution of the former President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso. By this they completely discredited the Democratic Party in the eyes of its voters, fully revealing its impotency and helplessness as a political force . See: F . Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso , President of the Slovak Repitblic (Sydney, 1967 ), pp. 37-40. �SLOVAKIA 153 its majority in such administrative bodies as the Slovak National Council, the Board of Commissioners, etc.78 By this victory the Communists effectively undermined the morale of the non-Communist forces and the stage was set for a complete take-over. The notorious 'coup d'etat', by which the Communists came to power in Czecho-Slovakia in February 1948, was largely a Czech affair. The resignation of the non-Communist ministers and the ensuing governmental crisis were confined to Prague. The confrontation was staged and the struggle was lost by the Czechs in the Czech lands. 79 As far as Slovakia was concerned there the issue was solved almost inaudibly in a matter of hours (long before the crisis was over in Prague). The Communist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, G. Husak, took over the main Post Office building in Bratislava on February 23rd, 1948 and was in complete control of all postal services, especially the vital telecommunication links between Bratislava and. Prague. To all Democratic Commissioners he dispatched letters of dismissal and to make sure that they took notice, he requested the Commissioner of the Interior, M. Feriencik (nominally a non-party member of the Board), to post police guards at their offices, to keep the "dismissed'' Commissioners out. 80 Then the Communists reconstituted a new Board allocating to themselves 10 (out of 15) positions, giving the remaining ones to their fellow-travellers.81 This moment signified the zenith of the KSS. What followed afterwards was a steeply descending road leading to the unenviable position of the next two decades(1948-68). 78 ) In the reconstructed Board of Commissioners the Democratic Party had to share the chairmanship with a Communist and its majority of nine on the Board of 15 Commissioners was reduced to a minor ity of six. 79) There are many accounts of this "parliamentary take-over" of governmental powers by the Communists. For the losing party's version see e.g. H. Ripka's Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), for the winning-side versio n see e.g. J . Vesely's Kronika unorovych dnti 1948 (Praha, 1958) . 80) V. Vagassky, Komunisticka strana ceskoslovenska (New York, 1953roneoed) p. 8. 81) J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 259-260. �li4 SLOVAKIA VI. 1948-1962 With the elimination of the non-Communist opposition there was no longer a need for two Communist Parties in one country. Steps towards the abolition of the KSS were taken on July 26th, 1948, when the Presidium of the KSc (consisting entirely of Czech Communists) decided: 1. The next meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS shall rule that the KSS ceases to exist as an independent party and become an integral part of the KSc. 2. The Party organization in Slovakia will still carry the name of KSS . 3. The Central Committee of the KSS shall be subordinated to the Central Committee of the KSc, it shall act according to its directives and it will implement the policy of the KSc in Slovakia. 82 This decision was proptly implemented on September 28, 1948 when the KSS, obeying the resolution of the Presidium of the KSc agreed to become "the territorial organization of the unitary KSC. 83 The merger was officially represented as a voluntary act mutually desired by both, and enthusiastically greeted by the Party press as such. But now it is admitted what has been generally known from the start that the Slovak Communists were most unwilling to give up their independence, to take up the status of an unprivileged minority destined to wait for the hand-outs of the senior and none-too-generous partner. Their fears were well justified but they could do nothing to prevent the inevitable. Thus they became the first victims of the renewed centralism with which the Communist rulers of Czecho-Slovakia were pursuing their new "socialist" policies. Gottwald, Kopecky and their accomplices, the authors and erstwhile advocates of Slovak selfgovernment, almost overnight forgot their earlier pledges. Robust and aggresive centralism was menacingly reflected in the new "Constitution of May 9th" (1948). In it the Slovaks were treated badly, 84 yet worse was still to come. 82) K. Kaplan, Utvcifeni genercilni linie vystavby socialismu v Ceskoslovensku (Pra ha, 1965) , p. 103. 83) Dejiny KSC (Praha, 1961) , p. 540. 84) While in 1945 the Commissioners were chosen by the Slovak National Council and responsible to it, in 1948 they were appointed by �SLOVAKIA 155 Most of those political and national rights which-as claimed by the KSS-were secured by the Slovak uprising in 1944 and saved by the victory of the working-class in 1948 were gradually removed one by one by the same people who once fought for them. With incredible, even gleeful, outward obedience the Slovak Communists were curtailing their own rights, restricting their own freedom of action. This subordinate relationship which now existed between the KSS and KSC was subsequently written into the Party Statutes for everybody to see. According to these approved rules "the KSS directs its activities by the decisions of the Congress of the KSC and the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSC ... The KSS convokes its congress after agreement with the Central Committee of the KSC ... The Central Committee of the KSS carries out the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSc and with the approval of the Central Committee of the KSC it solves the political and organizational Party questions in Slovakia". 85 Committed to these rules and bound by Party discipline the Communists in Slovakia ruthlessly applied the general Party line as drawn up in Prague by the Central Committee of the KSc, and including such unpopular measures as collectivization of farming, nationalization of all sectors of private enterprise, down to small shops and one-man businesses, wholesale purge of public life of all real and imaginary opponents of Communism, cruel persecution of the Catholic Church, its clergy and religious, victimization the Prague Government. The protective measures introduced in 1945 to safeguard the rights of the Slovak against the Czech majority were all removed in 1948. To pass or amend legislation a mere three-fifths majority of deputies was required. The Czech majority in the Parliament was always higher than this. (In 1954 there were only 98 Slovaks among 368 deputies). 85) The Statutes of the KSc , paragraphs 40, 42 and 47. See : Pravda of December 20th, 1952. Numerically the Party drew noticeably less strength from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. Shortly after the 1948 merger statistics were issued showing that in 1949 out of 2,311,066 members and candidates of the KSC only 236,432 were from Slovakia, i.e. 10.3%. ( Rude pravo of May 27th, 1950) . This disparity continued into the fiities and at the Tenth Congress of the KSC (1954) the Slovak delegates formed a 10,2% minority (Pravda of June 16th, 1954) . At that time 28% of the population lived in Slovakia. �156 SLOVAKIA of the intellectuals, adulation of Stalin and Gottwald, indiscriminate application of "superior Soviet methods" in all walks of life, etc.86 And when they did all these repugnant and hate-fometing tasks their Czech masters struck them with a wave of bloody purges. In the years 1949-54 (and especially after the Ninth Congress of the KSS in May 1950) the ranks of the Slovak Communists were decimated with a fury of terror which in its scope and horror surpassed all the blows ever inflicted by their class enemy. The purges form the most tragic and most neglected chapter in the history of the KSS.B 7 Within five years (1949-54) the KSS lost in purges seven out of 13 members of its Presidium (Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, ~midke, Bast'ovansky, Falt'an and Moskovic), some 30 % of its 60members Central Committee and thousands of Party members in diplomatic and administrative service, in the army, political bodies, institutions and other sectors of public life. They were removed from their posts amid the curses of their own comrades and comrades-in-arms and, having previously antagonized the masses of the Slovak people, they found themselves unpitied and friendless in their gravest hour. They were declared "enemies of the people", their work was debased, their publications banned, their past exorcised from the pages of the Party history.BB The principal guilt of which all the Slovak victims of the purges were accused was the unpardonable sin of "bourgeois nationalism", the very thing in which they were so much encouraged by their Czech comrades in 1945-6. It is generally not realized that the bulk of the victims of the 1949-54 purges were "bourgeois nationalists" (i.e. 86) In the writings of contemporary Communist historians all these measures were described as being socialist, progressive and to the benefit of the masses. Only now, after 15 years, some "mistakes" are being admitted for which the personality cult is blamed. 87) The purges were strictly taboo to the socialist historians until January 1968. Only in the field of literature a cautious attempt has been made to deal with this touchy subject, e. g. in Mnacko's Oneskorene reportaze, in Karvas's Jazva, etc. 88) More about the purges can be found in D. A. Schmidt's Anotomy of a Satelite ( Boston, 1952), in Vnuk's cistky - nezahojitel'ne rany KSS (Slovak v Amerike, November 9th,-30th, 1966); also Der Slansky-Prozess und seine Folgen (Recht im Ost und West, 5/ 1964, pp. 196-203. �SLOVAKIA 157 Slovaks) in Slovakia and "zionists" (i.e. Jews) in the Czech lands, though these two groups did not account for more than 13 ¼- of the KSc membership. It is no wonder then that the purges permanently poisoned the already strained Slovak-Czech relations beyond any hope of reconciliation. After the elimination of the Slovak element the Central Committee of the KSc entrusted the reins of the KSS to people of its own choice: Siroky, Bacilek, Duris, David, Dubcek, Rais, Branik, sefranek, Mauer, etc. As in the early twenties most of these were of non-Slovak origin ( Czechs and Jews) and a few of them were even Soviet citizens (David, Mauer). In March 1953 Stalin died and shortly after him K. Gottwald. The presidency of the Republic passed on to A. Zapotocky, while a well-known Slovakophobe, A. Novotny, became the first Party secretary. Novotny soon concentrated in his hands immense power and, assisted by V. Kopecky, was able to suppress all the liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin thaw. 89 Having thus delayed destalinization which was sweeping through Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Novotny paid increased attention to Slovakia where the dangers to his policies were greatest. In an attempt to subdue the passive resistance of the Slovaks and to break the nationalist spirit pulsating there in spite of purges, expulsions and bolshevist vigilance, Novotny further tightened the screw of Czech centralism. He introduced new administrative steps aimed at a more thorough control and reorganized the existing economic, cultural and social structure of the country. In this reorganization several Slovak industrial enterprises and cultural associations lost even their nominal independence and were integrated with their Czech counterparts into more compact "Czechoslovak" bodies.90 89) Kopecky's version of how the Party fought and defeated "revisionism" among the intellectuals is graphically, though one-sidedly, described in his book, CSR a KS(; (Praha, 1960), pp. 467-470. 90 ) These moves were allegedly designed for reasons of higher efficiency but the uneasy reluctance with which they were accepted in Slovakia indicates their insidious nature. Their implementation led to the dismissal of the President of the Slovak National Council, S. Sebesta, anct to renewed attacks on Slovak separatism by Bacilek, Kopecky, David, etc. �158 SLOVAKIA With regard to the Slovak political and administrative organs these were doomed to wither away by a devious method of ignoring their very existence. In spite of the fact that the Slovak regional organs were staffed by trusted Party members they were gradually reduced to complete inactivity. Though the Government was constitutionally obliged to appoint a Commissioner when new ministeries were created, this provision was, as a rule, ignored. 91 Under the mask of "Czechoslovak socialist patriotism" a new brand of undiluted Czech nationalism was superimposed on these centralist tendencies. Any opposition to this socialist Czechoslovakism was decried as bourgeois nationalism and one can see how often these accusations were levelled against the Slovaks after 1954.92 In an arrogant disregard of Slovak national aspirations the constitution which in May 1960 proclaimed CzechoSlovakia "a socialist country" further stripped the power of Slovakia's provincial government organs subordinating them completely to the Central Government. 93 This outrageous arrangement was presented as a final and satisfactory solution of the Slovak problem and the Party boasted in its official history that it had accomplished what the old capitalist system had found insoluble.94 However, the Slovak feelings about the situation are more aptly 91) E. Taborsk)', Communism in Czechoslov akia 1948-1960 (Princeton , N. J. , 1961), pp. 340-344. 92) V. ~iroky complained about it at the Tenth Congress of the KSS in April 1955; it was deplored in a leading article in Pravda of May 1st, 1956; in the aftermath of the Budapest revolt it was ruefully admitted "one of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism", Pravda of December 14th, 1956); in January 1958 it was violently denounced by K. Bacilek as having penetrated "into various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, sports, state apparatus, economic organs, etc." Pravda of January 10th and 11th, 1958) ; again by K. Bacilek and V. Kopecky at the Eleventh Congress of the KSS in April 1958; etc. See also: Slovak Nationalism Revisited (Radio Free Europe Papers of November 11, 1965). 93) The Slovak Commissioners must "attend to further tasks in the economic and cultural construction of Slovakia to the extent determined by the central government" (Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 [Princeton, N. J., 1961], p. 339) . 94) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), pp. 697-698. �SLOVAKIA 159 summed up in the words of the former member of the Secretariat of the KSS and Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky: By the new adjustments of the Slovak national organs (which led to the aboli5hment of the Board of Commissioners, to the sub ordination of Slovak national offices directly to the Ministeries in Prague, etc.) the Slovak nation found itself in the position of the only nation in the entire Socialist camp which on its own ethnic territory lacked such organs of the Socialist governmental administration which would correspond to its development, its present living standard, its numerical strength and, above all, to its indispensability to become really and in every respect an equal partner with the brotherly Czech nation.95 VII. 1962-1967 Misruled and unrepresented, the Slovak Communists resented the continuos Czech interference, the Socialist brand of "Czechoslovakism" and above all the persistence of Stalinist methods and Stalinist leadership to which they were subjected. But there was little they could do about it while the Party was strong and enjoyed Krushchev's support. 96 But in 1961-62 the Party's grip on the overall control started to slacken. There were several factors which contributed to this: the stagnation of the country's economy, the Sino-Soviet dispute which now broke into the open, renewed attacks on Stalin at the XXIInd Soviet Party Congress (October 1961). In the ideological split the KSc had no choice but to side with Moscow. Thus circumstances compelled it to do more than pay lip service to the cause of destalinization. Destalinization finally reached Czecho-Slovakia in 1962-3 and its advent was symbolically ushered in by the demolition of the huge statue of Stalin overlooking Prague (November 1962). The year 1962, the year of the XIIth Congress of the KSC, was also a year of intense ferment, especially in 95) M. Gosiorovsky, K niektorym otazkam vzt'ahu cechov a siovakov v poiitike KSc, in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 391. 96 Khrushchev's endorsement of the Party's Stalinist policies in 1957 was a very serious drawback for the opposing forces in the KSS who disliked Kopecky and Novotny's stiff measures against the Slovaks. Khrushchev on the occasion of his visit to Czecho-Slovakia declared (on July 11th, 1957): "The cause of Leninism in CzechoSlovakia is in good hands." (East Europe, 9/1957, p.41) . �160 SLOVAKIA Slovakia where the pent-up grievances gave rise to outspoken criticism of the excesses of the Stalinist era and of their perpetrators. The loudest critics of these abuses of naked power were the Slovak writers, journalists, scientists and other representatives of the intelligentsia. 97 The foremost task of destalinization was to rehabilitate the victims of the 1949-54 purges. Those bourgeois nationalists who were still alive were quietly released from prisons, but Novotny and his clique were most relucant to admit that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were fabricated. Such an admission would make fabricators of Novotny, Siroky and most of the power-holders in CzechoSlovakia. Subjected to mounting pressure the Party allowed the released prisoners to apply for re-admission to Party membership. Many of them did and their applications for re-admission read like the most savage condemnation of Communist tyranny ever written. 98 These were widely cir97) The mouthpiece of the discontented and critical voice was the official organ of the Slovak Writers' Association , Kulturny zivot, which in 1963 published an impressive number of critical articles. An open forum at which many abuses and horrors of the past and of the present were exposed was the Conference of Slovak Writers in Bratislava (April 21-22nd, 1963). At the First Congress of the Association of Slovak Journalists (May 28-29th, 1963) the wrongs and injustices of the era were bitterly denounced by M. Hysko , who publicly attacked the then Prime Minister, V. Siroky, as the prime mover behind the false accusations of the "bourgeois nanationalist" comrades, (Pravda of June 3rd 1963). 98) Some of them (e.g. Husak's) found their way abroad, where extracts from them were pub!ished in the emigre press. For English translation of parts from Husak's application see: News Digest International (Sydney) 3/ 1966, pp. 55-57. In 1968 a large number of rehabilited Party officials (as well as many non-Party men ) described their experiences at the hands of their jailers. Husak's account was serialized in a weekly, Nove slovo, Holdos's in the daily, Smena, but the most graphic expose of the inhuman treatment to which the victims of the cult era were subjected is in E. Loebl's book Svedectvo o procese s vedenim protistatneho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Slanskym (Bratislava, 1968) . From among the non-Communist prisoners there is the account by playwright I. Stodola in Kulturny zivot and that of military officer D. Viest in Slovenske Pohl'ady. Different organizations and institutions started to publish grim statistics about the era of lawlessness. According to various calculations there were 160 death sentences in 1948-53. The Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters claimed that 30,000-40,000 of its members became victims �SLOVAKIA 161 culated in Slovakia and their impact was enormous. At one stage they caused an open rebellion against Czech rule. Novotny tried to counteract these outbursts of discontent and criticism but his voice was drowned in an ever-growing protest. 99 To save his own skin he had to sacrifice his most valuable accomplices (and the most hated men in Slovakia) namely K. Bacilek (in March 1963), and when that did not suffice, V. Siroky and J . Duris (in September 1963). Of course the situation was far more serious than could be rectified by the removal of a few compromised Party officials. The main culprit, A. Novotny, and his group weathered the storm of criticism by sheer perseverance and stubbornness and with Moscow's backing retained their monopoly of power. At the end of 1963 the situation in the KSS differed only very little from that before the XIIth Party Congress. The leadership of the KSS was entirely in the hands of Novotny's men, like Bil'ak, Chudik, Sabolcik, Lenart, salgovic, Barbirek, Dvorsky, Cvik, Daubner, etc. In his selection Novotny was particularly careful to pick for his service people whose only qualification was blind following of the official Party line.No person of independent views or strong personal conviction made his way up the Party ladder. The most pathetic group in the Slovak political scene were the rehabilitated bourgeois nationalists. Though exonerated from their alleged crimes and officially "fully of judical and political persecution. The unlawfully sentenced citizens even founded their own organization "K 231". But the most moving (and damning) indictment of the cruelty of the Communist regime was the Resolution of the members of various religious orders presented to the Ministry of Culture and Information on April 17, 1968. It was signed by 6,174 religious who spent altogether 32,016 years in prison. (See Katoiicke noviny, May 5, 1968). 99) Novotny replied to the criticism of the Slovak Communist intellectuals on June 12th, 1963 at Kosice. He defended Siroky, maintaining that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were " substantially right" ( Prav da of June 13th, 1963). He sharply reprimanded and vilified two Slovak critics of his policies, M. Hysko and R. Kalisky, branding them as "irresponsible scribblers" (pisalkove ). R. Kalisky replied in kind and his long letter (of 30 pages) to "comrade President" lists a comprehensive catalogue of Czech wrongdoings towards the Slovaks. This letter was also widely read in Slovakia and heartily approved by all sections of the community. �162 SLOVAKIA rehabilitated" they still were doomed to remain in a political wilderness, hoping against hope for some miracle which would restore their earlier status. Their hopes could not have been realized without a major upheavel within the Party. They were, after all, striving and clamouring after positions which were held by their former judges and jailers, by men who had advanced literally over their "dead bodies". These men knew only too well to whom they owed their posts and what was expected of them in return. This state of affairs could not have been without impact on the Party's membership. Headed by uninspiring and subservient leaders, the KSS had become a living mockery of Lenin's conception of a Communist Party. The solution of the Slovak problem in 1962-67 advanced very little, if at all. The request of the Slovak intellectuals to federate Czecho-Slovakia according to the Soviet or Yugoslav model was rejected outright. 100 The Czechs were the dominant nation in a state "of two brotherly nations of equal rights" (as it is solemnly written in the 1960 Constitution) and continued to enjoy a disproportionately high number of prestige-bearing positions in the Party organs, State administration, diplomatic service, army, etc. The dissatisfaction in all strata of the Slovak community was there for everybody to see. If any concessions were made, these were only formal and completely unsatisfactory. Thus in 1964 the term "poverenik" (Commissioner), abolished in 1960, was reintroduced and in a common declaration of the Central Committee of both Parties (i.e. KS(:; and KSS) of May 7, 1964 it was announced that the Slovak National Council would participate "more fully" in all spheres of Slovak public life. 101 But there was no visible improvement, no advancement towards a fuller participation of regional organs in Slovakia's administration. In spite of all this crude nationalistic discrimination, in spite of obvious economic, political and cultural failures, 100) This proposal, the authorship of which is attributed to an erstwhile Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky, was rejected by Prague through its Slovak mouthpiece, M. Chudik (President of the Slovak National Council. According to Chudik the Slovak people did not wish any federation (Rude pravo of November 13th, 1965). 101 ) Za plnsie uplatnenie Slovenskej narodnej rady, (Bratislava, 1964). �SLOVAKIA 163 Novotny somehow managed to retain and even consolidate his personal power at the XIIIth Party Congress (MayJune, 1966). The Congress was a rather dull and uneventful affair: only those speakers were admitted who endorsed Novotny's policies. A lengthy and critical report on the economic situation and the much talked-about "new economic model" was to be delivered by Prof. 0. sik, but what finally emerged was a very mild substitute. The Central Committee elected a 10-man Party Presidium, in which there were three Slovaks (Dubcek, Lenart, Chudik). Among the Presidium candidates there were two more Slovaks ( Sabolcik and Sadovsky). The promised and expected reform which was to put Slovak-Czech relations on an entirely new basis did not materialize .102 VIII. 1967-1968 The situation had become unbearable by 1967. The forces of discontent were gathering momentum. Up to 1966-7 the main source of opposition to the Novotny regime was in Slovakia, where his treatment of the Slovak peoples and institutions provoked almost universal hatred. This resentment was gradually percolating into the all-state Party leadership. In 1967 Novotny's obstinacy to the "new economic model" caused further polarization of the leadership into the "dogmatists" and the "liberals". The economic reform could succeed only if coupled with decentralization and with a loosening of the tight dictatorial regime. Any relaxation on the political front immediately brought forward a demand for a thorough-going rehabilitation and undoing of the "mistakes of the cult era". The combined impact of these factors (i.e. the Slovak question, economy and uneasy liberalization) eventually led to the fall of A. Novotny. These grumblings came first to the attention of the outside world in June 1967, when the writers used their IVth Congress as a tribunal for a passionate denunciation 102) The Slovak writer, V. Mihalik ( member of the Central Committee of the KSS ) revealed (in Kulturny zivot 8/1966, p. 1) that the Party was preparing "an important document" aimed at the improvem1mt in Slovak-Czech relations. The document was to be tabled at the Thirteenth Congress of the KSc (May, 1966 ). Bu t it was not, and nothing has been heard about it since. �164 SLOVAKIA of naked power and for a bitter condemnation of the Party's performance in the last two decades. 103 The Party-always very sensitive to criticism-hit back hard in Oct. 1967. The principal culprits were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their professional posts, and their official journal, "Literarni noviny", was taken away from them. An attempt was made to exploit the existing difference between the Slovak and Czech writers and to play both groups against each other. But the Slovaks, at their meeting with the Slovak Party leaders on Oct. 16, 1967, briskly declined the honour of being the Party's favourites at the expense of their Czech colleagues. 104 Another indication of the stresses and strains at the top was the criticism at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSc in Sept. 1967 of the implementation of the new economic model. It was, perhaps, symptomatic that the Slovak Party Secretary, A. Dubcek, accused the government 9f discriminatory policies towards Slovakia. He charged that "the results for the first half of 1967 show that investments in Slovak industry totalled 21.9 1/r of the state investments and not 28 % as was laid in the directives of the XIIIth Party Congress". 105 The struggle for power was now on and manifested itself again at the Central Committee meeting in Oct. 1967, where the Slovak Party leaders in an unheard-of move demanded that Novotny abandon one of the two top functions he held (i.e. the First Party Secretary and the President of the State) . Novotny sensed the gravity of the 103) See IV. Sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelti, Praha 27. - 29. cervna 1967, (Praha, 1968), especially the speeches by M. Kundera (pp. 22-27) , P . Kohout (pp. 39-43), A. J. Liehm (pp. 99-204) and, above all, that of L. Vaculik ( pp. 141-150). The Slovak writers played a rather passive role at this gathering and their over-all performance was to become a source of serious embarrassment in the subsequent months. A heated dispute about the action of some Slovak writers (Mihalik, Spitzer, Valek, Minac, Kostra, Matu~ka, Rosenbaum , Egri, Luknar, Ponican as well as 9 Czech writers) who in their letter supported the party's policies in the cultural sphere (pp. 157-159 ) eventually led (in December 1968) to the collapse of the Slovak Writers' Union. See M. Resutik Rozlomeny svaz in Nove slovo No. 1/ 1969, p. 11. 104 ) Svedectvi (Paris) No. 32-33 / 1968, pp. 89-116. 105 ) Pravda (Bratislava), Sept. 29, 1967. �SLOVAKIA 165 situation and in December he invited Brezhnev to come to Prague to bolster his position. But Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8 )-if anything-made the situation worse . The next meeting of the Central Committee (Dec. 19-21, 1967) dealt Novotny the final blow and made his position untenable. At the following meeting of the Central Committee, a fortnight later, Novotny was finally voted out of office and replaced by Alexander Dubcek, who till then was considered N ovotny's man in Slovakia. Outside his native Slovakia Dubcek was a completely unknown personality .106 The key role-and this should be stressed again and again-in N ovotny's downfall was played by the Slovaks who found themselves in their socialist homeland economically exploited, nationally humiliated, culturally neglected and ruled as a colony by their Czech partners. Novotny, in his last speech as Party Secretary (New Year's speech, 1968) , tried to placate the Slovaks with the promise of a more generous economic consideration for Slovakia: " The need of nationwide industrial development must not obscure the important task of priority development of Slovakia which still has not reached the average economic level of the Czech regions". 107 But the offer was "too little too late". The new leadership of the KSc put the question of Slovakia as the number one problem to be tackled by them. Prague radio said on Jan. 5, 1968: "The Central Committee took note of the fact that the government and the Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit to the Party organs, on the basis of thorough situation analyses, specific proposals for perfecting their activities." The activities of the Slovak National Council being almost non-existent needed much more than perfecting. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Communist coup of February 1948, Dubcek spelt out the current difficulties which were troubling his leadership: "Many faults 106) For backgro und to Dubcek's personality see, e. g. F . Vnuk, Alexander Dubcek - tragedia poctiv eho komunistu in Kalendar Jednota 1969 (Middletown, Pa. , 1968), pp. 173-181. Also T. Szulc, A loo/c at Alexander Dubcek - the aparatchik who made a revoluti on in N . Y . Times (Weekly Review) , Jan. 12, 1969. 107) Pravda (Bratislava), Jan. 2, 1968. �166 SLOVAKIA have occured in internal Party life ... (where) the struggle between the progressive and conservative forces has not yet been concluded . . . ( There are) serious difficulties in the economy ... In our relations with the Slovak national organs we must rectify what was wrongfully violated after 1960 and things must be rearranged in such a way as to bring them in line with the contemporary stage of development of the state as a whole." 108 After this admission from the highest Party official things in Slovakia started to happen. M. Chudik (member of the Presidium of the KSc), N ovotny's stooge in Slovakia who was acting as Chairman of the Slovak National Council, hurriedly submitted his resignation. But he was not to be allowed to bow out as gracefully as that; he was dismissed in ignominy instead, on March 14, 1968. Having discarded its incompetent boss the Slovak National Council immediately published a resolution demanding that CzechoSlovakia become a federation. A new constitution to replace the one of 1960 was to give full legislative power to the Slovak National Council in all except foreign affairs, defense and state finances. Slovakia was to have a separate government. 109 In March the so-called "Czecho-Slovak spring" really started and the whole country was undergoing radical changes. Novotny's Party apparatus was falling to pieces. There was the defection to the West of Major-General Jan sejna; the resignation of the Trade Unions leader Pastytik; the dismissal of Chudik; the removal from office of the Interior Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor-General Bartuska; the suicide of Deputy Defense Minister V. Janko and Vice-President of the Supreme Court J. Brest'ansky; ousting of the chief Party ideologue J. Hendrych and the fall from the Presidency of Novotny himself. All this happened in the space of four weeks and had tremendous impact on the people. These events necessitated a new reorganization of the Party and the government. The five-day session of the Central Committee of the KSc named a new Presidium on April 1, 1968, in which Slovakia was given the largest 108 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Feb. 23 , 1968. 109) Pravda (Bratislava), March 15, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 167 representation ever : 4 in 11. 110 In the Secretariat there were 3 Slovaks out of 9 members (Dubcek-the First Secretary, Lenart, Sadovsky). On April 9 a new Cabinet was sworn in by Novotny's successor in the Presidency, General L. Svoboda. At the head of the new government stood 0. cernik. There were 5 deputy Prime Ministers and 23 Ministers. Here too the Slovaks were treated much more generously than ever before: 2 deputy Prime Ministers and 6 Ministers were from Slovakia. One of the deputy Prime Ministers was Gustav Husak, a rehabilitated Slovak "bourgeois nationalist". On April 10, 1968 the Party published its " Action Program",111 an ambitious document setting out " CzechoSlovakia's road towards socialism" and outlining the political and economic reforms by which it was to achieve one-party rule, mollified by the active participation of the non-party sections of the population. The Slovak question again figured prominently in the Program. A new symmetric federative arrangement of the state was proposed and the Slovaks were promised: 1. Slovak National Council and Council of Ministers (instead of the old Board of Commissioners), 2. Slovak national committees, 3. Autonomy in planning and budgeting for Slovakia, 4. State secretaries in those central ministerial departments where Ministers were Czechs, 5. Guarantee of Slovak rights against the Czech majority, 6. Adequate Slovak representation in the army, diplomatic service, etc. 112 In the less oppressive atmosphere of the day and in the absence of overt censorship public opinion soon started to exert pressure from below. This resulted first of all in the resignation or removal from the scene of those men who were closely linked with Novotny and his• dictatorial policies. To purge Novotny's followers from the Central llO ) They were Dubcek, Rigo, Bil'ak and Barbirek. Their nomina tion was accepted in Slovakia with some scepticism and their credentials as Slovaks were immediately questioned. It was pointed out that Rigo was a Gypsy, Bil'ak was a Ruthenian and Barbirek though born in Bratislava- was a Czech. And, of course, everybody knew that Dubcek had spent his childhood and adolescence (192438 ) in the Soviet Union. 111 ) A kcni Program KS(: pfijaty na p leruirni zasedani OV KS(: dne 5. du bna 1968, Praha 1968. ll 2 ) Akcni Program ...", pp. 27-28. �168 SLOVAKIA Committee of the KSc the masses demanded an extraordinary Party congress. Under the effect of ever-mounting pressure the Party leaders with some reluctance consented at last to convene it in September 1968. In Slovakia the burning question was that of federation. Obcession with this issue was so intense that little room was left for anything else. There was a minor controversy between two groups of Slovak intellectuals as to whether it was more correct to insist on federation before democratization or vice versa. This was, however, only a question of emphasis: the demand for federalization was almost unanimous. In the Czech lands the problem of federalization was hardly mentioned, and if at all, then not in a manner encouraging for the Slovaks. A public opinion poll revealed that 95 % of Slovaks were for federation and 90 ';c of Czechs against it. 113 The Czechs did not like to be reminded that federation was something the Slovaks were promised more than once in the past 50 years and hence long overdue. They preferred to dismiss the whole thing as an unrealistic and untimely affair of no concern to themselves. The famous "2000 words Manifesto" even suggested that in Slovakia the federation issue would be used as a shield by many old conservatives who would thus survive the democratization process: "Federation alone will not provide better living standards for either the Czechs or Slovaks, neither will it solve their economic and social problems. The rule of the Party-state bureaucracy may still survive especially in Slovakia, because there it could claim a victory in the fight by which greater freedom was gained (for the Slovaks) ."114 113) There were several surveys of public opinion on this issue. Obrana l'udu (June 1, 1968) cites the results of another survey, according to which the Slovaks were for federation "almost 100%", while in the Czech lands federation was favored by only 5% of those questioned! 114) For the full text of this Manifesto see Literarni Listy (June 27, 1968). The Soviet press called "2000 words" an "action program for the counter-revolution" (Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1968) , Dubcek deplored it as a "very serious obstacle to the further development of socialist democracy and society" (Rude pravo , June 29, 1968), S. Kodaj (Party official in East Slovakia) denounced it as "an open call for counter-revolution". In fact it was a call for pressure from below to get the Party to purge from �SLOVAKIA 169 This unkind remark in a document which so outraged the Soviet leaders and embarrassed the Communist leaders in Czecho-Slovakia, elicited a reply in the form of an open letter signed by over 200 Slovak intellectuals and intitled, "A word to the Czechs, and also Slovaks, who are worthy of it". In this response the Slovaks complained bitterly about the outrageous distortion of Slovak history by Czech officialdom ("From Shir's followers down to the men who led the uprising of 1944 nobody was good enough if he was a good Slovak first") and then defended their insistence on "federation without delay": "In today's democratization process the present inferior position of Slovakia is simply no longer tenable".11 5 No prominent political personality figured among those who signed the letter, yet the Czechs suspected that its instigator was Dr. Gustav Husak. The Deputy Prime Minister G. Husak was the most dynamic personality in the reactivated life of the KSS. 116 He re-emerged (after being sentenced to life inprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" in 1954) as a sworn enemy of Novotny and all his hangers-on in Slovakia. At the same time he was resolved to reassert as much an independent Slovak voice in the state and Party politics as possible. He still remained what he always had been, an orthodox and autocratic Communist at heart, but his hatred of Novotny put him in the one camp with the liberals. His uncompromising stand on immediate and comprehensive federalization assured him of a strong following in Slovakia. He was not even a member of the Central Committee of the KSS, yet his political influence in Slovakia was second to none. Early in July he swayed the regional Party conference in Bratislava to press for the KSS congress to be held in August 1968 (i.e. before the scheduled KSc Congress ) so that the Slovaks would come to the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc with their own specific all positions of power the men who had been responsible for the country's political, economic, moral and cultural decline. For the English translation of the whole document see East Europe No. 8/ 1968, pp. 25-28. 115) Slovo cechom aj Slovakom sucim na slovo in Nove slovo, No. 11/ 1968, pp. 1-3. 116) For a short biography of G. Husak read F. Vnuk's O Husakovi zrwva a v iacej in Kalendcir Jednota 1968, (Middletown, Pa., 1967, pp. 87-98). �170 SLOVAKIA proposals ( already approved by the KSS Congress) of the federalization scheme. 117 The internal development in Czecho-Slovakia since January and especially since March 1968 was a cause of serious concern in the Soviet Union and neighbouring people's democracies. The events in Czecho-Slovakia were directly connected with the students' demonstrations in Poland which produced a crisis in the Polish Party leadership. Afraid of similar consequences in East Germany Ulbricht imposed a ban on the German-language newspaper from Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian-language broadcast from Presov found keen listeners in the south-western part of the Soviet Union and caused uneasiness and discomfort to the Soviet Party leaders, to Ukrainian Party boss Shelest in particular. Dubcek and his colleagues were repeatedly summoned to Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw, while their counterparts from the other Socialist countries were arriving in Prague trying their best to stop the process which in Dubcek's eyes was democratic and humanizing, in theirs counter-revolutionary and revisionist. Then on July 15, 1968 the Central Committee of the KSc received a common letter from the "fraternal" Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. They found the situation in Czecho-Slovakia "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country". The catalogue of errors and faults was long and comprehensive and reflected their own fears and apprehensions. Only one aspect of the post-January development in the country was condoned without disapproval: "We welcome the rectification in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on a sound basis of brotherly collaboration within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". 118 The recipients of this "Warsaw letter" did not leave these accusations unanswered and refuted them one by one. In their written reply they stated emphatically: "We do not see any realistic reasons which would entitle you to assert that our present situation should be branded as counter-revolutionary."119 The Party Secretary Dubcek went 117) Pravda (Bratislava), July 7, 1968. 118) Prav da (Bratislava) , Special edition, July 18, 1968. 119) ib. �SLOVAKIA 171 on the air to reassure his countrymen (on July 18, 1968): "We do not want to abandon anything at all from our principles." The outcome of this correspondence was the confrontation between the 11-man Soviet Politburo and the entire 11-man KSc Presidium at cierna nad Tisou (July 29-Aug. 1, 1968), and afterwards the multilateral "comradely" meeting at Bratislava on Aug. 3. The official communique was inconclusive and the whole outcome of the conference was rather dubious. 120 Both participants ( i. e. the KSC on the one hand and the Communist Parties of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other) were convinced that they had successfully defended their own tenets of socialism. In a nationwide broadcast Dubcek again attempted to calm his fellow citizens: "You can be fully satisfied with the results and the spirit of the talks. We have kept our promises (i.e. not to deviate from the post-January course)." It sounded too good to be true. For the next 18 days Czecho-Slovakia lived in a fool's paradise, while the Red Army, under the pretext of largescale manoeuvres, was preparing the invasion of CzechoSlovakia. On Aug. 20-21, 1968, in defiance of their solemn promises to respect the national independence of every Socialist country, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five Communist countries invaded Czecho-Slovakia and put a sudden end to the great democratization experiment. In this gesture of Cain-like brotherhood Communism displayed its fear of democratization, its abhorrence of freedom, its inability to satisfy even the most elementary of human desires. It demonstrated that Communism cannot be liberalized without ceasing to be Communism. During that fateful night of Aug. 20-21 the progressive leaders of the KSc were kidnapped and taken in chains to Russia. This high-handed action of the Socialist allies 121 provoked a loud and indignant outcry all over the world, and-most unexpectedly-a resolute condemnation by the majority of the world Communist Parties, including those of China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, France, Italy, Great Britain, 120) Pravda (Bratislava), Aug. 4, 1968. 121) A Chronology of Occupation in East Europe, No. 10/ 1968,pp. 38-46. �172 SLOVAKIA Australia, etc. But by far the most effective was the reaction the Soviets encountered in the occupied country. It is impossible to describe in detail the ingenious methods of the passive and less passive resistance by which the Slovaks and Czechs frustrated the occupiers' efforts to "normalize the situation". The invasion united the Czech and Slovak nation in their opposition to this cruel act. But it appears that there was much less unity of action in the Party ranks. The KSS refused to back unconditionally the activities of the KSc in the first post-invasion days. The XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc, scheduled for Sept. 9 was hurriedly convened and took place during the night of Aug. 22 under the very nose of the occupying troops in a big Prague factory ( cKD plant) . The delegates (1095 out of 1543 expected to attend) elected a new Committee of 144 members. Of these 118 were new members and only 26 belonged to the old Central Committee. The representation from Slovakia amounted to 42 members, an unprecedented proportion, and there were 8 Slovaks in the 28-man Presidium: Dubcek, Husak, Zrak, 1'azky, Sadovsky, Colotka, Turcek, Pavlenda, Samel (?). 122 This should have satisfied the Slovaks, but it did not. The Soviets denounced the XIVth Congress in the most violent terms and did their utmost to undo it. According to Western reports the secret protocol drawn-up at the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet "negotiations" (sit venia verbi) on Aug. 28, 1968 contained 14 demands, one of which asked for the invalidation of the XIVth congress . As it happened this was the first thing the Russians succeeded in obtaining. A key role in making this congress into an "unevent" was played by G. Husak who was one of the negotiators in Moscow. While he was abroad the extraordinary Congress of the KSS started ( on Aug. 26 ). Husak returned just in time to deliver his address on the last day of the session. In his speech he questioned the legality of the XIVth Congress of the KSc and advised the delegates to the KSS Congress to reverse their stand taken three days earlier and to disavow the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc. Husak argued that at the XIVth congress the Slovak representatives to the Party 122) Prav da (Bratislava ), Special edition, Aug. 25, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 173 organs were elected "illegally" ... "undemocratically", that "out of 300 Slovak delegates selected to attend the congress proceedings only 4, later 22, and towards the end about 40 were present". 123 In complete disregard of the fact that it was the Russians who had prevented the Slovak delegates from participating at the Congress Husak addressed his indignant reproaches at those who elected him to the Party Presidium: "Nobody can impose on a sovereign nation and its party its will in a way we have witnessed, namely that a little group of people entrusted by nobody should determine the nation's political representation."124 Of course Husak's anger and fury would have been even greater if the XIVth Congress had failed to nominate him or some of his close associates to the position in the top Party hierarchy. His rhetoric was just a clumsy display of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactics. In sharp contrast to the XIVth Congress of the KSC, the Congress of the KSS was allowed to proceed undisturbed. It was attended by 607 of the 638 choosen delegates. It elected a 131-man Central Committee and a 12-member Presidium composed of Husak, Bod'a, Falt'an, Harencar, Klokoc, Luptak, Novomesky, Pavlenda, Sadovsky, Sedlakova, 'l'azky and Zrak. The 7-man Secretariat consisted of G. Husak (First Secretary) , L. Abraham, B . Graca (ideological spokesman ) , V. Pavlenda, S . Sadovsky, J. Turcek and J . Zrak. This was an entirely new team personally hand-picked by Husak. All of Novotny's men and Husak's opponents were either ousted (Bil'ak, Sabolcik, Pecha, Riga, Kriz, Hruskovic, Dvorsky, etc.) or demoted to ordinary Central Committee membership (Janik, Barbirek, Zupka, etc.). In the resolution of the Congress the Plenum took a stand on a number of current issues created by the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Slovakia, but the only problem it tackled with determination and vigour was that of federation. Husak said in his concluding address: "I recommend that we approve . . . our insistence on the federative rearangement of our state on the basis of principles outlined earlier and it should be enacted by Oct. 28 this year." 125 In the subsequent weeks the Slovak Communists pursued this 123 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 124) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. 125) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. �174 SLOVAKIA point of their program forcefully and relentlessly to its logical conclusion. The federation was indeed enacted on Oct. 27, 1968 and put into practice on Jan. 1, 1969. Today's Czecho-Slovakia consist of two Socialist republics, the Czech and the Slovak, with three governments, Czech, Slovak and Central. It can be said that federation is the only paragraph salvaged from the ambitious Action program of Dubcek's leadership. The draft of the new Party statutes was published for discussion early in April 1968 and it proposed that the Party too should be reorganized on federal lines. 126 It envisaged the Communist Party of the Czech lands and the Communist Party of Slovakia to deal with internal and domestic matters; for international representation and in matters which exceeded the limits of national competence there was to be a single representative of the two national parties, i. e. the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This proposition was politely forgotten after August, 1968; the Russians apparently did not like it. (Of course there were many other things the Russians would loathe to see in.practice, such as the new concept of democratic centralism, election of all party organs by secret ballot, limited terms of service on regional and national party committees, etc.). Thus whilst the KSS achieved a funda• mental alteration in the structure of the state, it was unable to adjust the structural pattern of the Party to fit the new political situation. The KSS is still without counterpart in the Czech lands 127 However, under Husak's new leadership the KSS has undergone a remarkable revival. In its relation to the KSc it has become more aggressive and self-assertive. The days of blind obedience of the Party line drawn up in Prague have been replaced by an avowed and dedicated service 126) Rude pravo, Supplement, Aug. 10, 1968. 127) At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSCS on Nov. 14-17, 1968 a substitute-counterwei ght to the Central Committee and Presidium of the KSS was set up: the so-called Party's Bureau for the Czech regions. It functions within the framework of the Central Committee of the KSCS, consists of 11 men and is headed by L. Strougal, assisted by two Secretaries (V. Hula and J . Kozel). The weekly journal "Tribuna" is its official organ. The only better known personality in the Bureau (beside L. Strougal) is the Prime-Minister Cernik. �SLOVAKIA 175 to the needs of the nation. At least that was what G. Husak proclaimed at the KSS Congress: "Let this Party rid itself of everything which is irresolute, everything which is opportunistic, let endure in it all that is firm, noble and prepared to struggle for the rights of this nation. 128 It remains to be seen to what extent the KSS will be able to realize this resolve. The strongman Husak was known to have made similar speeches in 1945-48, but after 1948 he was gradually silenced, removed from his Party posts and eventually imprisoned. So far he has succeeded in bringing about federalization of the state, but in the process he has antagonized a few influential groups in Slovakia (liberal writers, journalists, intellectuals) and the majority of the Czech population. He is being depicted in the Western press as a man who enjoys the trust of the Russians, as the man who annulled the XIVth Congress of the KSc, as the man who was instrumental in the removal of Smrkovsky, etc. 129 The conflict and dialectical contradictions between the Czechs and Slovaks are at present as acute as ever. Federation solved one old problem but generated at least a dozen new ones. The part played by the KSS in Slovak national history shows too much on the debit side and very little on the credit side. In the years 1948-67 the KSS was without doubt the most powerful single factor in shaping Slovakia's history. Yet in most instances it was a force which, with cynicism and arrogance, stood as a stumbling-block between the nation and its freedom, between the people and their political and cultural self-expression. In those years the KSS was just a tool of terror and intimidation wielded by a foreign oppressor over the Slovak masses. These things were openly stated in many sensational revelations 128) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. A question can be asked at this point as to how much the Party membership will drop if it is going to rid itself of everything which is opportunistic and irresolute and retain only that which is firm and noble. In 1968, just before the Soviet invasion the Party had in Slovakia 220,000 organized members, i. e. less than 6% of the population. If Husiik's criteria are applied this number can only decrease. 129) See e.g. the article of L. Vlasic: Pohyb s cudnym pozadim in Nove slovo, No. 1/ 1969, pp. 3 and 14. Also Husiik's speech at the Plenary session of the Central Committee KSC-S (Rude pravo, Jan. 21 , 1969, p. 7) . �SLOVAKIA 176 which appeared in the censorship-free press during the March-August period of the Dubcek era. The new leadership of the KSS has repeatedly stated that the return of the old days is out of the question. Yet (apart from federation) one witnesses almost daily a gradual retreat from the gains and achievements of the liberalization process. The presence of Red Army units in the country (now sanctioned by a treaty) makes certain that the conditions imposed on the KSC leadership on Aug. 28, 1968 are being implemented. How-under these circumstances-will the KSS safeguard the interests of the nation? Time alone will tell. Appendix I. N umerical representation from Slovakia in the Central Committee. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo of the KS(: (including candidates) in 1921-1968. Members in Members in Members in KSC. Seer. C. Committee KS(: Presid. Party Congress - -- Merger-Congress (1921) I 36 6 16.6 I. Congress ( 1923) I 26 5 19.4 II. Congress ( 1924) 50 6 12.0 52 III. Congress ( 1925) 6 11.5 52 IV. Congress ( 1927) 5 from Nov. 1928 I ? I ? 9/ V. Congress ( 1929) 52 1 4 7.7 4 7.8 51 VI. Congress (1931) 8 16.0 50 VII. Congress (1936) ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '38) ? ? ? Exile KS(: Paris, 1939) ? ? ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '43) Post-war KSC (Ko~ .• '45) I 21 10 47.7 VIII. Congress ( 1946 ) I 101 0 0.0 170? 32 18.8 from July 1948 108 22 20.2 IX. Congress ( 1949) 112 23 20.3 X. Congress (1954) 147 33 22.5 XI. Congress (1958) 147 30 20.4 XII. Congress ( 1962) 166 28 16.8 XIII. Congress ( 1966 ) ? ? ? from Jan. 1968 XIV. extraordinary ('68) I 144 42 29.2 1921-1968 ll485j 254 j 17.8 II I i I 12 8 9 9 11 15 17 10 12 7 3 7 7 14 18 21 11 15 12 15 19 28 270 I - -- - - 0 0.0 -- --0 0.0 -- --7 1 11.0 0 0.0 1 14.6 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 2 33.3 6 3 20.0 1 20.0 5 1 5.9 ? ? ? 1 10.0 4 1 8.3 1 25.0 0 0.0 No 1 33.3 Secretariat 0 0.0 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 elected 2 9.5 1 14.6 7 2 18.2 0 0.0 6 1 12.5 4 26.6 8 1 12.5 4 33.3 8 0 0.0 8 5 33.3 0 0.0 6 31.5 ? ? 8 28.6 41 j 15.2 jj 79 j 8 I 10.1 /I �SLOVAKIA 177 Append.ix II. The Leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) . (The office holders of the top Party positions in 1939-1969) A. ILLEGAL KSS. First Committee (March 1939-Aug. 1941): I;, Benada, J. Duris, J. Osoha. Second Committee (Sept. 1941- April 1942): 0. Krajnak, J . Osoha, V. Skrabala. Third Committee (June 1942- July 1942) : S. Dubcek, J. Lietavec, J. Osoha. Fourth Committee (July 1942- March 1943) : S. Bas t'ovansky, M. Hrusov- sky. Fifth Committee (Aug. 1943- Sept. 1944): G. Husak, L. Novomesky, K. Smidke. B. KSS IN POWER. M erger-Congress (Sept. 1944) President: K. Smidke. Vice-Presidents: G. Husak, J. Cech. Committee members : K. Bacilek, R. Balco, R. Blazovsky, F . cap, K. Dolinsky, D. Ertl, I. Frlicka, 0. Jelen, J. Lietavec, J . Mazur, L. Novomesky, J . Pull, J . Soltesz, M. Smida, J . Sziics, L. Viktorin. Nati onal Conference at Zilina (Aug. 1945) Presidium - President: V. Siroky. Vice-President: K. Smidke. Members : S. Bast'ovansky, J. :i'.>uris, L. Holdos, G. Husak, J . Soltesz, F . Zupka , M. Valachovic. Secretariat: K. Bacilek, S. Bast'ovansky, L. Holdos, E . FrR From Apr. 1946: K. Moskovic. IX Congress of the KSS (May 1950). Presidium - President: V. Siroky. First Secretary: S. Bast'ovansky. Members: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J. Branik, M. culen, J . :i'.>uris, M. Falt'an, K. Moskovic, J. Pull, S. Rais, E. Sykora, F . Zupka. Secretariat ( established in Oct. 1951) : V. Siroky, S. Bast'ovansky, J . Pull, K. Moskovic, M. Gosiorovsky. From Dec. 1951 also : P . David and I;. Benada. Xth Congress of the KSS (June 1953 ) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J . Branik, M. culen, P. David, M. Falt'an, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, 0 . Pavlik, J . Pull, R. Strechaj , V. Siroky, F. Zupka. Secretariat: I;_ Benada, P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, J . Pull. ? Congress of the KSS (April 1955). Presidium: K. Bacilek, M. Bakula, I;. Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, 0. Jelen, P . Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka. �178 SLOVAKIA Extraordinary Con gress of the KSS (April 1957) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , P. Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Xlth Congress of the KSS (May 1958). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , J . Kriz, P. Majling, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P. David, F . Dvorsky, J. Kriz, J . Lenart. Xllth Party Congress (Nov. 1962). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, P. David , M. Chudik, J . Lenart, M. Sabolcik. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary till April 1963, when replaced by A. Dubcek) , V. Bil'ak, F . Dvorsky, J . Kriz, J. Lenart. Xlllth Congress of the KSS (May 1966). Presidium: F . Barbirek, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, A. Dubcek, H. :t'.lurkovic, M. Chudik, J . Janik, J. Lorine, M . Sabolcik. From Jan. 1968 also M. Hruskovic, R. Harencar, M. Pecho. Secretariat: A. Dubcek (First Secretary till Jan. 1968, when replaced by V. Bil'ak), J . Janik, M . Sabolcik, J. Zrak. XIVth Extraordinary Congress of the KSS (Aug. 1968). Presidium: G. Husak, K. Bod'a, S. Falt'an, R. Harencar, 0. Klokoc, s. Luptak, L . Novomesky, V. Pavlenda, s. Sadovsky, M. Sedlakova, A. 1'azky, J . Zrak. Secretariat: G. Husak (First Secretary), L. Abraham, B. Graca, V. Pavlenda, S. Sadovsky, J. Turcek, J. Zrak. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is a CULTURAL and CIVIC organization of Americans of Slovak descent. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA wants to help Americans of Slovak descent in American political life, in business or professions, in social standing, and along educational lines. � SLOVAKIA 125 F. Vnuk: Fifty Years of Comn1unist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) The first notable Slovak commentary on Communism was made by Marx's contemporary, :Cudovit stur. His assessment of Communism was an outright condemnation: "Communism, in spite of all efforts and false pretences to win for mankind its rights, only brings about its degradation, since it has no sound knowledge of mankind. Because of its insistence on principles which are impractical and unattainable Communism is one of the maddest figments ever originating in the human brain." 1 In the past forty years stur was much abused by the Slovak Communist intellectuals because of his alleged reactionary thinking. 2 Yet Stu.r's rejection of Communism seems to epitomize the Slovak attitude more fittingly than all the recent attempts by Communist historians to present Communism as a progressive ideology destined to uplift and enrich the Slovak nation. The inescapable geography which put Slovakia in Central Europe exposed the Slovaks to direct contact with political Communism as far back as 1918-19. Since then the Slovak nation has undergone the complete range of relations which can exist between a nation trying to assert its political identity and an aggressive ideology. These relations, full of drama, paradox and tragedy, are briefly outlined in this short history of the Communist Patry of Slovakia ( KSS). I. 1918-1921 The very beginning of the KSS is characteristic. The Party started its existence outside Slovakia, in Budapest. 1) In his major work, Slawentum imd die Welt der Zukunft, Quoted by D. Okali in Dav; spomienky a studie (Bratislava, 1965), p. 284. 2) e.g. L. Novomesky, in his pamphlet, Marx a slovensky narod (Mala kniznica Davu, 1933) and in his article, Karol Marx reviduje hist6riu Slovakov (Dav, 2/ 1933, pp. 18-19). �126 SLOVAKIA There in November 1918 Erno P6r, Minister for Foreign Propaganda in the Communist Government of Hungary, was entrusted by Bela Kun and Tibor Szamuely to organize the Slovak Communist Party as a section of the Communist Party of Hungary. 3 The Party conscripted into its ranks Slovak workers, apprentices and soldiers living in those days in defeated Hungary (particularly in Budapest, Ostrihom-Esztergom, Bekes-Csaba, etc. ). On March 27th, 1919 it began publication of its own daily, "Cervene noviny" (Red News ). 4 But the Party ran into difficulties when it had to find leaders for the conscripted Slovak proletarian masses. There was hardly a single Slovak of rank and stature to lend his name to the movement. Thus the reins were initially given into the hands of Jewish Socialist and Communist organizers in Budapest who could speak Slovak. To overcome this deficiency Bela Kun requested Lenin to send him some able Slovak Communist leaders from Russia, where a "Czecho-Slovak" Communist Party formed from the Czech and Slovak prisoners of war had been functioning since May 1918.5 But since there were no prominent Slovak personalities among these either, Lenin sent to Budapest the next best thing: the Czechs. Among these the most dynamic was one Antonin Janousek who arrived in Budapest in January 1919.6 After some disagreement with B. Kun (Janousek wanted to lead a Czecho-Slovak section; Kun and his advisors were strongly against it, seeing in it implicit recognition of the imperialistic policies of the Entente ) he 3 ) M. Vietor, Slovenska soviets/ca r epub lika (Bratislava, 1959), p. 53. 4) P. A. Toma, Slovak Soviet Repu blic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, p. 203 ). 5 ) D ej iny K SC (P raha, 1961 ), p. 17. 6) See: Z. Horeni, Antonin Jan ousek, predseda revolucnej v lady Slovenskej r epubliky rad (Bratislava, 1964). This accoun t of t he Slovak Soviet Republic is abstracted from the following books: K. A. Medvecky: Slovensk y prevrat I -IV (Trnava , 1930-31 ); Vpad bol'sevikov na Slov ensko ro ku 1919 (Trnava, 1936) : M. Vietor, Slovenskci soviet ska r epu bli ka 1919 (Bratislava, 1955); C. Holotik, 0 Slovenskej repub like rad r . 1919 (Historicky casopi s 2/ 1959); V. Kr al, lntervencni val ka cs. burzoazie proti mad'arske sovetske r epublice r . 1919 (Praha, 1954); K. Culen, 0 Slovenskej soviet ske j republike z ro ku 1919 (Kanadsky Slovak, May 19-June 9, 1956); P. A. Toma , Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, pp. 203-215 ). �SLOVAKIA 127 was made head of the Czech section of the Communist Party of Hungary on April 12, 1919. Towards the end of April the Slovak and the Czech sections were brought under common leadership but it was plainly stated that the Slovak section was to maintain its independence and individuality. There was never a Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist Party of Hungary. The most important .went in the life of this Slovak section was thf, proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic which lasted only two weeks but which has become a source of confused pride and political embarrassment to the contemporary Czech and Slovak socialist historiographers. On May 20th, 1919 the Hungarian Communist government, accusing the Czecho-Slovak armed forces of violation of the Paris Agreement, ordered its Red Army to invade Slovakia. Carried on the wave of proud Magyar national ism, humiliated by the 1918 defeat, the Magyar troops swept the southern and eastern plains of Slovakia. They took Lucenec on May 30th, Levice on June 1st, Nove Zamky on June 2nd, Kosice and Banska stiavnica on June 6th, Presov on June 8th, Bardejov on June 11th and penetrated as far into Central Slovakia as Zvolen. On June 3rd, 1919 "Oervene noviny" wrote exultantly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is being established in Slovakia." The actual proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic took place at Presov on June 16th, 1919. It was ruled by the Provisional Revolutionary Executive Committee made up largely of Magyar-Jewish and Czech left-wingers. The only Slovak member of some significance was Stefan Stehlik. On June 20th, 1919 the Committee elected a Slovak Revolutionary governmem headed by Antonin Janousek. To T. G. Masaryk, who was residing in Prague as the elected President of Czecho-Slovakia, Janousek sent this challenging message: "We explicitly declare that from now on Slovakia belongs exclusively to the Slovak working class." 7 The donstitutional status of this short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic was obscure, but one thing was beyond doubt: it was violently anti-Czech and fiercely pro-Magyar. It aimed at the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia and was 7) Quoted by. K. culen in Kanadsky Slovak (of May 26, 1956), p . 3. �128 SLOVAKIA openly and aggressively separatist. Both Kun and Lenin considered Czecho-Slovakia as a wilful creation of capitalist Powers and as a tool of imperialist policies in Central Europe. Czecho-Slovakia was alleged to deny the Slovak people "its inalienable right of self-determination" and the Communists in establishing the Slovak Soviet Republic were rectifying this injustice. 8 In spite of all its revolutionary zeal the Communistsponsored separatism did not strike roots among the Slovak masses. They were not only apathetic but manifestly hostile to the venture in which they saw only an ill-disguised attempt of the moribund Hungary to save its territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the Hungarian Red Army from Slovakia (June 28-July 4, 1919) spelled the inevitable end of both the Slovak Soviet Republic and the Slovak section of the Communist-Socialist Party of Hungary. The Slovak decision in 1918 to exchange their hopeless life tinder the Magyars for a hopeful life with the Czechs was final and irreversible. 9 But it was a decision fraught with problems and difficulties. Slovakia entered the newly formed Czecho-Slovakia as a land of poor peasants with practically no Slovak urban proletariat. The adherents and disseminators of the Socialist ideas were largely the German and Magyar ( or magyarized) workers who were as contemptuous of their Slovak comrades as Marx and Engels had been of the Czechs and Russians. This antipathy was 8) Stefan Stehlik wrote in Cervene noviny (of July 7, 1919) : " On Slovak soil, freed from imperialism, today there was created an independent Slovak Soviet Republic. The first impulsive action of the proletariat liberated from t he yoke of Czech imperialism was to realize the right of self-determination which is being exhorted by the oppressors with such a great glory; in reality however, it is being perverted by them . . . Slovak Soviet Republic turns its weapons ... against all who threaten this real unpe rverted democracy, this inallienable right of self-determination" (by which at that time they could have meant only the Prague Government). Quoted by P . A. Toma , op. cit. pp. 208-209. 9) The first years of the Slovak-Czech relationship and its reflection in Slovak political, social and economic life, are described at length in several authoritative works, e.g.: F . Peroutka, Budovani statu I -IV ( Praha 1933-36 ) ; J . Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko -tihorske ( Praha, 1928) . V. Chaloupecky, Zapas o Slovensko (Praha, 1930 ), I. Derer, siovensko v prevrate a po nom (Bratislava, 1924) ; K. Sidor, Andrej Hiinka 1864-1926 (Bratislava, 1936) . �SLOVAKIA 129 mutual and in their anti-Magyar feelings the leaders of the Slovak Social Democrats (Derer, Lehotsky, Markovic) were indistinguisha ble from their bourgeois counterparts (Hlinka, srobar, Hodza). Thus in the political sense the parties contesting the first post-war elections in Slovakia offered very much the same program. It was only in the field of social reform that they differed. Here the Social Democrats surpassed everybody in generosity, promising to implement many far-reaching social and economic measures. Their radical policies appealed to the people dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions. Thus in the general election of April, 1920 the Slovak people gave their votes to the Social Democratic Party led by Ivan Derer. 10 The Magyars and Germans of Slovakia who refused to join Derer's political platform founded a Social Democratic Party of their own. 11 After its electoral victory the Slovak Social Democratic Party lost much of its fighting spirit, adopted many right-wing policies of moderation and even passivity while the Magyar and German Social Democratic Party moved further to the left towards radicalism and turbulent activities. It was led by an able group of ruthless leaders (most of them Jews, several served as Commissars in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun) who were constantly harassing "the reformist Social Democratic government" of V. Tusar by fomenting strikes, unrests and other forms of trouble. 12 Their activities 13 became fatal to the Slovak Social Democratic Party which was rapidly sliding under Czech control and soon became identical with all the unpopular measures of the Government. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's inability to fulfil its pre-election promises or to prevent the economic ruination of Slovakia, and the subsequent wholesale unemploymen t, brought about a massive 10) The Social Democratic Party polled 510,341 out of 1,341,191 valid votes and obtained 23 deputies in the Prague National Assembly. 11) They received 108,546 votes and obtained 4 deputies. 12) J. Mlynarik, Robotnicke hn•itie na Slovensku roku 1920 (od parla• mentnych volieb do decembroveho genercilneho strajku). Historick)' casopis, I/ 1960, pp. 26-27) . 13) Their strongholds were four population centres in the Slovak-Magyar borderland: Bratislava, where the German-languag e, "Volksstimme" was published, Komarno, Gelnica and Ko~ice, where the Magyarlanguage, "Kassai Munkas", was published. �130 SLOVAKIA desertion of the rank anc'l file members within months after the election. 14 In the meantime the Magyar Social Democratic Party at Kosice joined (in May 1920) the Third International and invited the other proletarian parties of Slovakia to follow suit. This proclamation was eagerly listened to by many Social Democratic leaders dissatisfied with Derer's weak and inept leadership. 15 In September 1920 at the Party Congress at Turciansky Svaty Martin Derer failed to win a vote of confidence ( out of 132 delegates only 15 voted for him). Unwilling to accept defeat he proclaimed the handful of his followers to be the only true Slovaks and true Social Democrats by which he drove the dissidents into a coalition with the Magyar and German left-wing radicals. The fruits of this coalition ripened rapidly. On January 16-17, 1920 the left-wingers of the Slovak, Magyar and German Social Democracy, as well as the Jewish Poale Sion, met at ~ubochna and founded the Communist Party of Slovakia in everything but name. 16 It is interesting to look at the national composition of the delegates participating at this Congress. Out of 149 delegates with voting rights 88 were Slovaks, 36 Magyars, 15 Germans, 6 Ruthenes, 4 Jews. 17 The omission to register under its own name proved a very serious one for the future destinies of the KSS. Against 14 ) M. Strhan, Kriza priemyslu na Slov ensku v rokoch 1921-23 (Bratislava , 1960, pp. 15-80), J . Kramer, K dejinam priemyslu na Slovensku za prvej CSR (Bratislava, 1955). 15 ) ~- Holotik, Sjazd socialno-demokratickej strany (l'avice) na Slov ensku v januciri 1921 (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1963) , pp. 340-341. 16 ) 1921. Spomienky na vznik KS(: (Bratislava, 1962). The Czech dele gate at the Congress, I. Olbracht, requested the assembled repre- sentatives of the Slovak Left to postpone the adoption of the name " Communist Party of Slovakia" in order to be able to adopt the name " Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia" later on. See also Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 165-166. 17 ) From the report of the voting commission, as quoted by M. Dzvonik 0 istom zakladajucom sjazde (Kulturny zivot, 7/ 1966, p. 6) . See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (Slavic Review, 14/ 1955, p. 353). Skilling gives slightly different figures, viz. 92 Slovaks. However, it must be mentioned that these numbers are somewhat misleading, especially with regard to the Jews who were present in every national group, and the Magyars, many of whom were counted as Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 131 the opposition of the Magyar delegates the Congress agreed to keep the question of the Party's name in abeyance. They decided to wait for developments in the Czech lands where the situation was ripening at a less r~pid rate. Finally at its XIVth Congress (in May 1921) the Czech Social Democratic Party formally accepted the ideological split in its ranks. Its left wing reconstituted itself as the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia ( KSc) immediately absorbing the Slovak section which, nameless and unaffiliated, had been waiting for four months for this moment.18 By this process the KSS lost its identity, becoming an anonymous partner in an unequal partnership. II. 1921-1929 The newly constituted KSC was from its beginning dominated by Czech-German leadership and looking largely after Czech national interest. Slovakia-because of the lack of native leading cadres-soon became a battlefield where the Czech and Magyar elements were fighting for influence . The Czechs were trying to woo the Slovak electorate by defending the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and the integrity of its territories. Already in September 1921 Klement Gottwald had become editor of a Slovak language Party paper, "Hlas l'udu" (People's Voice), and later in 1923 editor-inchief of another Commun.ist paper, "Pravda chudoby" (Poor Man's Truth). Other prominent Czech Party organizers who came to Slovakia in the early twenties included Karel Bacilek, Karel Schmidke and others. 19 While the Czechs concentrated mainly on the Slovak electorate, the Magyars tried to hold together a sizeable portion of the Magyar electorate by advocating revisionism, self-determination for ethnic minorities, etc. In the meantime Slovakia was becoming restive and in18) Dejiny KS(; (Praha , 1961) , pp. 170-172. While the Communist Party of Slovakia fused into the KSC smoothly and without murmur, the Communist Party of the Sudeten Germans (formed in March 1921 ) refused to amalgamate with the KSC . Its resistance was broken in November 1921 but only after Lenin's intervention. 19) Gottwald's activities in Slovakia, adorned with the socialist glamou;: of the cult era, are the object of a book by Z. Holotikova, Kl ement Gottwald na Slovensku v rokoch 1921-24 (Bratislava, 1953). Karel Schmidtke began to write his name as Karol Smidke only after 1945. �13l2 SLOVAKIA creasingly discontented with Czech administrative methods. economic and social discrimination and especially with the crude disregard of the Prague Government for the political aspirations of the Slovak natibn. The Slovaks were putting forward their demands for the promised autonomy but no one would listen. Even the KSC, dominated at the time by Czech nationalists, had only scorn for the Slovak demands. At its First Congress it declared: "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation." 20 This mistaken and unrealistic attitude was severely censured at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow (June-July 1924) where the following resolution was adopted: 1. The Congress affirms that in Czecho-Slovakia there does not exist a single Czechoslovak nation and that the Czechoslovak state, in addition to the Czech nationality, consist of the following nationali ties: Slovak, German, Magyar, Ukrainian and Polish. 2. The Congress considers it necessary for the KSC, in connection with these national minorities, to proclaim and to follow the slogan of the right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession. In particular the KSC must support the struggle of the Slovaks for their independence and it must strive continuously to wrest this movement for independence out of the control of the nationalist bourgeoisie and to bring it into a common struggle of the working class against capitalism ... 21 For the Czech Communists it was a bitter pill to swallow. Under its impact the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow was split into a majority and minority, the majori20) Protokol I. radneho sjezdu KSC (Praha, 1923 ), p. 14. In practice the KSC plainly demonstrated its Czechoslovakist and centralized tendencies. On January 1st, 1922 the KSC abolished the provincial Party structure in Slovakia, splitting the country into four regions directly subordinated to the Central Executive Committee in Prague. Shortly afterwards it abolished Slovak trade union organizations. Such moves seriously hindered the Party activities in Slovakia and antagonized many honest and sincere Slovak left-winge rs. These either left in disgust (like J . Schiffel, who returned to the U.S.A.) or were expelled as agents of the nationalist bourgeoisie (like Culen, Vercik and others ). 21) Pjatyj vsemirnyj kongress komunisticeskogo intenacionala, 17. ijuna - 8. ijttlia 1924 g. Stenografisceskij otcot, Cast' II. (Prilozenija) , ( Moskva, 1925 ), p. 129. �SLOVAKIA 133 ty refusing to accept the resolution of the Comintern. Among the ranks of the KSC the interference of the Comintern produced a serious crisis. The Second Congress of the KS(; was hurriedly convened in November 1924 to deal with the issue. The Congress met in the presence of a leading Comintern official, D. Z. Manuilskij. It was mainly due to his presence that the resolution issued at the end of the Congress proclaimed: "The Party cannot accept the bourgeois lie about the official Czechoslovak nation. By this ruse the Czech bourgeoisie wants to hide its colonial exploitation and bloody oppression of Ruthenia and Slovakia as well as other national minorities". 21 a But as it turned out even he was powerless to shake the dominating influence of the Czech nationalist right-wingers who in complete disregard of their own resolution continued in the old-style policies of ignoring the legitimate demands of the national minorities even within the Party.22 A dramatic development took place in March 1925. The Czech rightists and their arrogant attitude towards other nationalities, especially towards the Slovaks, were openly critized on the pages of "Pravda" by the Soviet expert on the nationalities problem, J. V. Stalin. Stalin saw the narrow-minded and selfish Czech nationalism as the roots of the right-wing deviationism in the KSC. He wrote: The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation ... And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Right and Left took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank . .. Such division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.23 Stalin's arguments were further developed by D. Z. Manuilskij who quoted, among others, such flagrant examples of national discrimination as the composition of the Politburo of the KSC which consisted of seven Czechs 21a) Protokol II. fadneho sjezdu KSt, (Praha, 1925) , p. 8. 22) Dejiny KSt (Praha, 1961), pp. 213-216. 23) J. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1954), Vol. VII., p. 61. See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism 1921-1929 (Slavic Review, 19/ 1960, pp. 238-239 ). �134 SLOVAKIA and two Germans but no Slovaks, Magyars, Poles or Ruthenes. 24 The elections in 1925 were the first real test of the Party's hold on the masses. On the whole the Party did not score badly: it emerged as the second strongest party in Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia the election results were a telling commentary on the existing situation. The Social Democratic Party practically disappeared (from 510,341 votes in 1920 to 60,581 votes in 1925). But its voters joined mainly the Hlinka People's Party which captured 489,027 votes (2 35,389 in 1920), i.e. 34.3 % of the Slovak electorate thus becoming the largest Slovak party.25 The Communist Party gained 198,212 votes in Slovakia but its support came mostly from the non-Slovak voters as can be seen from a closer look at the districts which voted for the Communists and at the men who were elected into the Parliament26 ( out of 8 deputies 3 were of Magyar nationality: Kopasz, Major and Steiner). The failure to capture the masses of the Slovak rural proletariat was openly admitted in Moscow and was attributed to the Party's omission to adopt the correct position towards the nationalities problem in Czecho-Slovakia and in particular towards the Slovaks: In Slovakia . .. under the influence of the revolution, in 1920 the peasant masses moved strongly to the left, but in the course of the last four years, owing to the passivity of the Communist P arty in the national question, 200,000 peasants passed from the Socialist 24) D. Z. Manuilskij, Uroki ceskogo krizisa, (Moskva, 1925) . It was the Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the IIIrd Party Congress (Sept. 1925) which consisted of: K. Gottwald, J . Hais, J . Haken ( President) , J . Harus, B. Jilek, A. Neurath, V. Stern, B. Smeral and A. Zapotocky. 25) Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1926 ( Bratislava, 1936), pp. 535-538. 26) El•ectoral Corn. % % % d is trict vote of •totail :Mandates :.\1:agy ars German5 1. ove Zamky 2 20.0 61 ,577 62.3 6.8 2. Ko§ice 20.9 40,095 2 41.6 9.9 3. Trnava 28,606 13.9 2.3 1 1.8 4. Banska Bystrica 17,694 11.0 2.2 1 5.6 5. Turc. Sv. Martin 22,355 1 9.5 0.5 5.1 6. Lipt. Sv. Mikula§ 15,697 1 7.4 1.4 1.7 7. Prefov 6.2 12,206 2.6 0 0.7 �SLOVAKIA 135 Party into a party, which, although it is clerical, fight for the autonomy.27 In spite of the impressive overall election results the Party was torn internally by rival factions. After ridding itself of the right wing (Bubnik) a new struggle developed between the so-called "ultraleft" (B. Jilek and V. Bolen) and "centre" (B. t5meral, K. Kreibich, A. Zapotocky). 28 These ideological conflicts touched the Party's life in Slovakia only marginally and even then the Czech leaders of the KSc in Slovakia (K. Gottwald in particular) were supporting the "centre" aginst the "left". In Slovakia the burning issues were not of ideological but of political and economic character. The continuous closing down of factories and industrial plants, growing unemployment, agricultural crisis, emigration, etc. were leaving little time for ideological disputes. 29 After 1926, when the Hlinka People's Party decided to join the government benches, the Communists tried hard to be the spokesmen of the Slovak people against the political wrongs and social injustices of the Czech bourgeoisie. Complete independence of Slovakia was advocated, Czecho-Slovakia was denounced as the offspring of an imperialist war. 30 In January 1927 the Party 27) G. Volkov, Ugnetennaja Prikarpatskaja Rus (Krestjanskij International, 3-5/ 1926, p. 126). ( Quoted in G. D. Jackson's Comintern and Peasant) (London, 1966), p. 288. 28) Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 249-269. 29) The economic situation of this period has been extensively studied by socialist historians, e. g. J . Mlynarik, Strajkove hnutie na Slovenska II. Zemerobotnici v obdobi 1919 az 1929 (Bratislava, 1961) ; P. Rapos, Priemysel Slovenska za kapitalizmu (Bratislava, 1957) ; J . Mlynarik, N ezamestnanost' na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1964) ; V. Plevza, K niektorym otazkam agrarnej krizy v rokoch 1924-34 na Slovensku (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1966, pp. 203-233); etc. 30) At this time the KSC in Slovakia at its National Conference at 2ilina (on July 25th, 1925) , launched, on Gottwald's instigation a massive campaign aimed at the expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia. The battle-cry of the Communist propagandists became : " Vypracte Slovensko! " ( Clea;: out of Slovakia!) . The full wording of the slogan was, "Vypracte Slovensko od potlacovacieho aparatu ceskej burzoazie", according to V. Plevza (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1965, p. 510) and "Vypracte Slovensko od nasilnickeho aparatu", according to J. Kramer and .J. Mlynarik (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, p. 438). Though there was no doubt about Gottwald's authorship of this slogan, the blame for the embarrassing "mistake" was put later �136 SLOVAKIA convoked a regional conference at Plesivec where it attempted to lead a nation-wide protest against the industrial decline of Slovakia. 31 But all with little success. In February 1929 the Fifth Congress of the KSC met. It passed into Party history as the final battleground where the splinter-groups of the Party dissidents were defeated and the "true bolshevist nucleus" of the Party came out victorious. But in spite of the intense ideological wrangle the Slovak question did appear on the agenda. The Slovak cause was defend by none less than K. Gottwald ( who was to emerge as the new leader of the Party) proclaiming before the Congress: "The !Ind Congress of the KSC declared null and void the theses of the Ist Party Congress (i.e. concerning the unitary "Czechoslovak" nation) but this was in words only . . . The ratification of the First Party Congress theses was only on paper, a mere formality".31a By promising new corrective measures Gottwald (who--it should be remembered-in those days was acting for the Party in Slovakia and was the spokesman for the Slovaks) swayed the overwhelming majority of the Slovak section of the KSC to the side of the victorious "bolshevist on J. Vercik, "the agent of nationalist bourgeoisie" (e.g. M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; ( ceskoslovensky casopis historicky), 1/ 1954, p. 4-15) . While attacking the Czech bourgeoisie for its oppression of the Slovak masses, the KSC leaders did not relax their centralist hold on their Slovak comrades. At each Party Congress the Slovak delegates complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs (See : Protokol III. fadneho sjezdu KSc [Praha, 1925] , pp. 41 and 73 ; Protokol IV. fadneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1927], p. 33 ; Protokol V . f<idneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1929] , pp. 40 and 50) , but in vain. This aspect of the Party history has been neglected by the socialist historians except a brief and restrained comment by J . Kramer and .J. Mlynarik, Revolucne hnutie a narodnostna ot<izka na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, pp. 423-443). For more recent writings on the theme see: Z. Holotikova, 0 rieseni narodnostnej otazky v KSc (Referat na konferencii Hist. ustavu SAV a ustavu dejin KSS, jun 1966) and J. Mlynarik, Dr. B. Smeml a slovensk<i n<irodnostn<i otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia (Cs. casopis historicky, 5/ 1967, pp. 653-666 ). 31 ) J . Pleva, Vy znam Plesiveckej konferencie v januari 1927 (Bratislava, 1958) . According to Kramer and Mlynarik (loc. cit. , p. 442, footnote 32 ) the importance of this conference was disproportio n ately inflated because of Gottwald's participation at it. 31a) Protokol V. f<idneho sjezdu KS(; (Praha, 1929) , p. 12. �SLOVAK.IA 137 faction". 32 However, one point is worth noting: while the "bolshevist nucleus of the Party in Slovakia was made up of Bacilek, Siroky, Steiner, Urx" 33 (i.e. two Czechs and two Magyars), the dissidents ("nationalists and liquidators") who were expelled from the Party amidst a storm of abuse ( culen, Felcan, Vercik) were Slovaks. 34 III. 1929-1938 The internal struggle inside the Party was fought bitterly and not always behind closed doors . Inevitably it undermined the Party's image in the voters' eyes. In the 1929 elections it gained 152,242 votes ( 10.55 % ) in Slovakia, a considerable decline in voting strength when compared with the 1925 election results ( 13.41 % ) .35 Yet in Parliament the new "bolshevist cadres" displayed fierce and sanguinary pugnacity epitomized in the words of the new Party leader, K. Gottwald, addressed in December 1929 to the coalition benches: We are the revolutionary Party of Czechoslovak proletariat and in Moscow we have, indeed, our revolutionary General Staff. Yes we go to Moscow in order to learn. Would you like to know what we learn"! We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian bolsheviks how to break your necks. And you must admit that the Russian bolsheviks are very good at it.36 32) Z. Holotikova, Bol"sevizacny proces KS(; v rokoch 1924-29 (Historicky casopis 2/1957, pp. 204-210); M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; (Cs. casopis historicky, 1/ 1954, pp. 4-15). 33) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), p. 256. 34) Vercik, Mlynarik, Koren, etc. were branded as "nationalists" and expelled; Culen, Felcan, Kolarikova, etc. were branded as "liquidators" and expelled also. The latter were the authors of the so-called "Hlohovecke memorandum" (of December 1928) in which they requested the reorganization of the Party structure in Slovakia and complete freedom of action in specifically Slov~k matters. (See : Pravda of January 31, and February 7th, 1929). In 1930 the KSC finally consented to a limited decentralization and a Slovak province ("celoslovensky kraj") of the KS(; was instituted. S. Major (of Magyar nationality) and K. Bacilek (of Czech nationality) were put in charge. See: V. Plevza, Vytvorenie celoslovenskeho kraja a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku na zaciatku tridsiatych rokov (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1962, p. 184). 35) For an interesting statistical analysis of the 1929 election results see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern E urope (Princeton, N. J ., 1961 ), pp. 150-158 and 216-219. 36) K. Gottwald , Spisy I (Praha, 1953), p. 322. �138 SLOVAK.IA During the severe economic depression which swept the Western world in the late twenties and early thirties and which caused acute unemployment in Slovakia (some 250,000 in 1933) 37 the Communists organized hunger marches, protest meetings and strikes. A meeting in May 1931 at a small village in southern Slovakia, Kosuty, ended with a shooting fray resulting in the death of three demonstrators. The Party skilfully exploited the incident to advertize the social plight of rural workers in the Slovak countryside. 38 In the years 1929-33 the Communist press paid much attention to the political solution of the Slovak question and Slovak grievances were repeatedly aired on its pages. But as V. Kopecky confessed at the Vrth Party Congress (1931) it was more in the nature of lip service than anything else: "The decisions of the Vth Party Congress concerning the solution of the nationalities problem remained on paper only and in spite of repeated emphasizing of their importance by the central leadership of the Party there was no practical indication that we were fighting for the right of self-determination of the nations." 38a This national inequality was demonstrated even in the Party hierarchy. The higher Party ranks were-as beforean almost exclusive monopoly of the Czech and German comrades. The Presidium constituted at the Vrth Party 37) Pfehled ceskoslovenskych ilejin III (1918-1945) (Praha , 1960) , p. 325. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the emigration figures which were considerably greater for Slovakia (where only about 25 % of the total population lived) than for the Czech lands: Emigration from C-SR: from Slovakia: 1928 24,540 13,544 1929 30,715 19,401 1930 25,712 16,682 1931 9,567 4,527 1932 5,165 2,222 1933 4,735 3,099 38) The shooting at Kosuty has attracted unusually great attention from Communist propagandists and publicists, e.g. the pamphlet, Nyn·i je v Kosv,tech pofcidek a klid (1931); V. Plevza, Kosutska trag edia (Prispevky k dejinam KSC, 8/ 1959, pp. 91-107) ; E. Pauliny, Kosutske udalosti v maji 1931 (Bratislava-Martin, 1961) ; E. Kadnar, Krvave Kosuty ( Bratislava, 1963) . It is perhaps worthwhile to note that the inhabitants of Kosuty were of Magyar nationality and so was S. Major, the convicted instigator of the disturbance. 38a ) Protokol VI. fcidneho sjezdn KSC, (Praha , 1931), p. 143. �SLOVAKIA 139 Congress had only one representative from Slovakia among its 15 members. 39 This omission was quite a serious matter, because by the midthirties the Communist Party of Slovakia was already producing its own native leaders. The young Slovak Communist students who in 1924 grouped in Prague around the quarterly Oater monthly), "Dav" (1924-1937), were growing up in stature and outlook and were ready and eager to take over from the Czech, Magyar and Jewish spokesmen of the Slovak proletariat. 40 Unfortunately they were striving for power at a time when the Party was purging itself of intellectual and other non-proletarian ballast, so that their hopes and expectations were frustrated.41 Other important changes in the Party line were also in the offing. The Party was directed by the Comintern to adopt new attitudes to a number of political issues. Up to 1933 the Communists considered democracy (i.e. bourgeois democracy) and fascism as "the children of the same mother, the bourgeoisie". 42 Masaryk, Benes, Hlinka, Kramaf were all Fascists of the same brand as Hitler and Mussolini. But by the summer of 1933 Stalin realized that Hitler was a much greater evil. Looking for new allies Stalin selected two of the most likely states worried by the growing power of Hitler's Germany: France and CzechoSlovakia. The KSc was instructed to take a more positive stand towards the official Czech foreign and domestic 39) It was E. Fried of Magyar-Jewish origin. Accordind to H. G. Skilling the ethnic composition of the 60-member Central Committee was as follows: 37 Czechs, 10 Germans, 8 Slovaks (and Magyars ), 4 Ukrainians and 1 Pole. See : H. Gordon Skilling, Gottwald and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1929-39 (Slavic Review, 20/ 1961, pp. 644-645) . The inadequate representation of Slovaks in the top P,0verning bodies of the Party apparatus (i.e. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo) is statistically summed up in Appendix I. 40) These young Communist intellectuals of the early twenties had their hey-day in the late forties and met a tragic fate in the early fifties. In the years 1950-54 they became the victims of purges and their rehabilitation began ,mly in 1963. For a post-rehabilitation view of the Dav-group see: S. Drug, Dav a davisti (Bratislava, 1965). 41) V. Plevza, Prispevok o cinnosti davistov v revolucnom hnuti za predmnichovskej CSR (Historicky casopis, 1/1964), pp. 20-21. 42) K. Gottwald , Spisy IV (Praha, 1951) , p. 212. �140 SLOVAKIA policies. This, of course, meant that the Slovak guestion and the nationalities problem in general had to be played down and the Party soon nodded its appproval where only a few months ago it used to voice its sharp criticism. 43 The signing of the Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Treaty in May 1935 marked a milestone in the Party's policy. The Party put on a mask of loyal respectability and replaced its internationalism by a newly-discovered patriotism. It conveniently forgot its past hostilities to "the imperialist agent Benes" and supported him in the presidential election in December 1935. At the Seventh Congress of the KSc (April 1936) the Party took a firm position "to defend CzechoSlovakia against Hitler". It became a zealous exponent of the Popular Front against Fascism and reaction, and the Slovak grievances once so prominent in its program were now hardly mentioned. The militant cry for "self-determination including the right to secede" was now replaced with much softer demands voiced by Gottwald at the VIIth Party Congress: "The Party will strive to achieve the realization of minimal requirements for normal coexistence of all nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia by insisting on a democratic policy towards nationalities and on equal rights for all nations ( of Czecho-Slovakia) in all spheres of public life." 44 The approaching municipal elections made the Party somewhat wary and hurriedly it came forward with a "plan for the economic, social and cultural advancement of Slovakia" announced at Banska Bystrica in May 1937.45 But the plan did not excite anybody. It was unrealistic and was looked upon as one of the many grandiose schemes which the Party submitted with monotonous regularity year after 43) A somewhat confused picture of the situation can be found in V. Plevza's KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1 938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 237-420. 44 ) K. Gottwald, Spisy VIII (Bratislava, 1953) , p. 167. This phase of Party activities is discussed at length in a number of publications such as Na obranu republiky proti fasizmu a v ojne (Bratislava, 1955) ; M . Filo, Boj KSC na Slovensku na obranu republiky (Bratislava, 1960) ; I. Kolesar, Otazka obnovy demokracie a demokratickych prciv i slobod proti fasizmu ( od VII. kongresu Kominterny r . 1935 ) Sbornik FFUK, 10/ 1959, pp. 163-181). 45 ) Deji11y KSc (Praha, 1961) , p. 359. Also V . Siroky, Za st'astne Slove nsko v socialistickom Ceslcoslovensku (Bratislava, 1952). �141 SLOVAKIA year, knowing well that it would never be called upon to implement them. The turns and twists in the Party line could not pos• sibly impress the Slovak electorate. In the municipal elections (May 1938) the Party found itself deserted by its erstwhile supporters. Its advocacy of pro-Benes and antiautonomist policies46 estranged it from the Slovak voters, while its noisy denunciations of the revisionist claims by Hungary, Germany and Poland antagonized its non-Slovak voters. The overwhelming electoral defeat in Slovakia (in the Czech lands the Party maintained its support) alarmed the Slovak Party leaders who clearly read the writing on the wall. 47 And thus on the eve of Czecho-Slovakia's disintegration the Party attempted another somersault and tried to sponsor the autonomistic cause, even if it meant forming a common front with Hlinka's Party. But it was now too late. No party in Slovakia cared for partnership with the Communists and Hlinka's Party least of all. The speed with which events marched by-passed the Party altogether. 46) J. U§iak, Boj KS(: s Hlinkovou slovenskou l'udovou stranou a vplyv na masy v obdobi ndstupu fasizmu (Pfispevky k dejindm KSC, 5/ 1963, pp. 710-29). Also V. Plevza, KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 462-474. 47 ) The Communist historians merely record the electoral defeat without going into details, without drawing any conclusion (e. g. Plevza, op. cit., p. 471 ). In many small towns the Communist vote virtually disappeared and in bigger towns it was severely reduced. On the whole the proportion of those who voted Communist dropped from 14% in 1935 to something like 8.9 % in 1938. No comprehensive results have been compiled so far; the Party historians carefully avoid this area. A brief glance at the election results in a few Slovak cities shows convincingly how the Party fared at the polls. (The results are compared with those of the Hlinka People's Party, the main beneficiary of the Communist loss. Figures are taken from Slovensky dennik of June 12, 1938): People's Party votes KSS votes Gain in% --19_3_5_[1938 ' ....Jl % _in--'l .... _L_o_s_s I _1_93_8__,_ 1 __,__1_93_5_ _ _ _T_o_w_n_ 2,493 I 44.3 j 1 8,133 5,640 45,7 2,399 1 2,856 i 5,255 Bratislava 333 I 37.91 910 1,243 88 13.5 554 Nove Mesto n / V I 642 44 I 607 I 563 I 1098 76 I 167 68.8 I 243 Snina 1 849 I 363 62.0I 586 4,658 2,098 I 2,560 55.0 Star11. !>ala I 1,064 1 ? 64 I ? Modra I 1,253 j ? 79 I ? Michalovce I 3,471 1 ? 777 I ? Trebgov (dist. ) I I I I I 1 �142 SLOVAKIA The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia found the Party's fortunes in Slovakia at their lowest ebb. This was openly acknowledged by the Party leadership in its report to the Executive of the Comintern in December 1938. With a remorseful self-criticism V. Siroky confessed: We Comm un ists represe nted in Slovakia the national interests of the Czech nation, while the Slovak national interests were furth er represented by Hlinka's Party ... Only at the last moment as the Czechoslovak crisis was reaching its climax did we put forward a demand for the democratic solution of the Slovak problem, i. e. the granting of full autonomy.48 IV. 1938-1944 The declaration of autonomy on October 6th, 1938 was shortly followed by the suppression of Party activities and in January 1939 the Party was disbanded. The Party leaders escaped abroad and with regard to Party leadership in Slovakia, it is interesting to note that the Slovak nationals, if they got away at all, fled mainly to the West (Valo, Clementis ), while the non-Slovak leaders sought their refuge in the Soviet Union (smidke, Bacilek, Major. Siroky went first to Paris, then to Moscow) .49 Drawing conclusions from the rejection of the Party policies by the Slovak people and facing the new situation fairly and squarely, the Comintern decided on the last and long-delayed step : it gave its approval to the founding of an independent ( albeit illegal) Communist Party of Slovakia ( in May 1939 ). 50 Its leadership was entrusted to three relatively minor and unknown functionaries: J. Duris, L. Benada, J. Osoha. Of these the ablest and most dynamic was Jan Osoha, a Czech by birth. The leadership faced a tremendous task of building a network of illegal cells from the fragments and remains of what once was a Party organization in Slovakia. Traditional Party strongholds went to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938.50 a The 48 ) Deji~nii krizov atka (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 27-28. 49 ) Slovak Studies IV (Rome, 1964) , p. 30. 50) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961 ), p. 399. 50a) Interesting evidence of the solid support the Party received from t he Magyar-speaking population of Slovakia can be found in the recently published bibliography, Zoznam komunistickych novin a casopisov marxi.stickej l' avice z rokov 1919-38 (Martin, 1961). The bibliography lists 125 separate newspapers and periodicals of which �SLOVAKIA 143 newly-acquired independence of Slovakia (in March 1939) was a powerful stabilizing factor on the political scene leaving very little scope for the subversive activities of the Communists.51 For the Communists the situation was further aggravated by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939), the Soviet participation in the Fourth partition of Poland and the Soviet recognition, both 'de facto' and 'de jure', of the independent Slovak state. Under the impact of these events the Slovak Communist leadership in the West (Paris) disintegrated.52 At home the Party leaders were even more confused and completely at a loss. The illegal handbills and propaganda pamphlets betray the prevalent mood of perplexity and obvious embarrassment of the underground Party organizers in their desperate attempts to explain away the things they could not comprehend. In the Soviet attitude towards the Slovak state they saw a sure sign of Soviet approval of the new geographicopolitical reorganization of Central Europe. In response to it they drew up, sometime in October 1939, a new political program, the key-note of which was: "The free and independent Soviet Slovakia." 53 This program became a dominant feature of all the illegal Communist activities in Slovakia up to 1944. It was only natural for an independent Party to sponsor such a policy in an independent state. But the scheme did not pass 71 were published in the Slovak language, 50 (i. e. 40 %) in Magyar, 3 in German and 1 in Ukrainian. 51) A. Huckova-Stvrtecka, cinnost' prveho ilegalneho Ostredneho vyboru KSS (Bratislava, 1959). 52) Clementis denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact for which he was expelled from the Pai ty, Siroky rapidly departed to Moscow and Valo retired into neutral passivity. About the impact of this infamous alliance on the Slovak (and Czech ) Communists in Paris, see Theo. I-I. Florin, S Vladom Clementisom v Parizi a v Lon.dyne (Dav, spomienky a studie, [Brati~ava, 1965), p. 467) . 53) Confiscated Communist propaganda handbills in the Archives of the German F'oreign Ministry, 56/ 38606-15. These documents help to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign for an independent Soviet Slovakia which was not later than in October 1939. At that time the Communists went to considerable trouble to explain that the Soviet Union had not exchanged Communism for the National Socialism of Hitler. �144 SLOVAKIA by unchallenged. The first to protest against this line was-as might have been expected-the illegal Communist Party in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia lead by Edo Urx who as a Party functionary had spent a number of years in Slovakia. The Party in the Protectorate continued to call itself the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It claimed to be the direct successor of the banned Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and a parent organization of the Communist Party of Slovakia. It advocated the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and objected to any policy promulgation which was not consistent with its current Party line. The Slovaks on the other hand were rejecting any kind of affiliation and insisted on equality and independence. After prolonged disagreement the dispute was referred to Moscow for arbitration 54 and there Gottwald issued a ruling completely vindicating the stand of the Slovak Communists. He sent the following message to Urx (in March 1940): Your pre-war pattern of thinking must change. Behind the slogan "Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia" are hidden imperialistic and antiSoviet schemes . .. We expressly emphasize that our Party fully accepts the right of self-determination both for the Czechs and fo r the Slovaks. This right of self-detevmination implies the right to live in an independent state. We fight for the restoration of the national freedom and territorial independence of the Czechs. As far as the Slovaks are concerned we fight for the complete sovereignity of the present-day Slovak state. It is this struggle for the right of self-determination which differentiates our road from that of Benes a nd world imperialism. The relation between the Czechs and Slovaks stand now on a new footing. Slovak separatism plays today a different role. That is why we are giving up the old slogans concerning Slovakia.ss Encouraged by this message the Slovak Communists tried to outdo in nationalist zeal everybody including the official Slovak propaganda. The only criticism they received from Moscow was the advice not to stress too much the Soviet character of their "independent Soviet Slovakia" program.56 54 ) The dispute is summarized in D ejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 63-88. 55) Deji nna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , p. 61. 56 ) S. Falt'an, Ku Kral'ov ej recenzii trochu inak (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1966, p. 58S. �SLOVAKIA 145 The idea of national independence being at the root of the Party's illegal activities was not given up even when the Soviet Union gave its official recognition to Benes and his government then in exile in London. The clandestine journal, "Hlas l'udu" (Voice of the people ), commented on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benes and the Kremlin: The pact between the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile is not seen by the Communist Party of Slovakia as a pact with the government of a future state which has its established boundaries, its established regime. The (Czecho-Slovak) government in London was created without the participation and without the will of the working people in Slovakia . . . The question of an independent (Slovak) state, or autonomy, or federation with the fraternal Czech nation is now of secondary importance and it will be settled after the defeat and destruction of German imperialism.56a Slovak police and security organs who had infiltrated the illegal Communist organizations57 watched this development with keen interest. When the Soviet-German conflict broke out (June, 1941) the Slovak police within a few hours arrested all the members of the illegal Central Committee (except J. Osoha) and some 1,100 illegal Party activists. 58 Most of these were released from detention after three or four weeks and lost no time in regrouping and starting again. A new Central Committee was set up by J . Osoha and this in turn was broken up by the police in April 1942. J. Osoha again eluded the dragnet and at56a) Quoted by M. Gosiorovsky in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 371. 57) In this connection it is worth quoting from a report of the German Minister to Slovakia, M. v. Killinger (of August 19th, 1940): "Die ... in die kommunistische Zellen geschickten Leute bewiihren sich sehr gut, so dass der Erfolg der Arbeit gesichert und alle Zellen der hier, wieder erstehenden kommunistischen Organisationen erfasst werden. Die inzwischen festgestellten kommunistische Funktioniire werden listenmiissig geftihrt und laufend ergiinzt" (2276/ 47987684). 58) German documents 610/ 248627. At this time the Russians parachuted into Slovakia V. Siroky and V. Skrabala. But they were discovered very soon after their arrival and put in prison where Siroky stayed until 1945. When in 1949 Siroky emerged as the most powerful man in Slovakia trusted by both Moscow and Prague, legendary stories were written about his underground and illegal activities which lasted-when all said and done-some fi ve weeks. �146 SLOVAKIA tempted to organize the third Central Committee of the KSS. But in July he was caught and imprisoned together with the other members of the Committee. 59 These police actions deprived the illegal Party organization in Slovakia of all its old leaders trained in the Stalinist mould of blind and unquestioning obedience. Continuity with the pre-war Party politics was thus broken and the way was cleared for new men to emerge at the top. As it happened they were almost without exception the younger generation of the Party intellectuals, recruited and groomed by Vlado Clemen tis ( then in London). They lacked the rugged working-class background but they possessed the self-assertive spirit of intense national pride. One of them, Stefan Bast'ovansky, tried to continue (against his better judgement) with the illegal activities in the old traditional style (handbills and pamphlets read by very few, incitement to sabotage obeyed by nobody) only to find himself in prison by May 1943.60 The leadership of the demoralized and decimated ranks now passed into the hands of G. Husak and L. Novomesky, who disagreed with those tactics and methods which were costing the Party so much and achieved nothing. As the men on the spot they proposed a more subtle and unorthodox approach which took into account the political and social conditions in Slovakia, the mentality and sentiments of the masses and the weakness of Slovak war-time administration. The Party really went underground and the outward signs of activities almost disappeared. Moscow, disturbed by the apparent lack of fighting spirit, decided to send to Slovakia two trusted emissaries to revive the dormant proletarian masses. They were K. smidke and K. Bacilek. Neither of them was Slovak but both had worked in Slovakia in the interwar period. smidke, the more experienced of the two, listened with interest to the suggestions of the Slovak intellectuals and to their amazement he agreed with them. 61 smidke set up a new Central Committee of the KSS 59) 0 . Krajnak, Protifasisticke hnutie na Slovensku. (Nova mys! , 8/ 1964, pp. 695-703); G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964 ), pp. 33-36; Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 122-126. 60) Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964), p. 126. 61) G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 51-56. �SLOVAKIA 147 (which included himself, Husak and Novomesky) re-established and revived the network of illegal Party organizations and directed their activities along a new and more realistic path. He entered into close collaboration with the bourgeois illegal groups (and, through them, with the army) and did not scruple to exploit to the full the nationalist sentiments and aspirations of the Slovaks. 62 The last thing was, of course, not an easy task, because in the meantime the Soviet Union had promised Benes to restore pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. And not only that. As revealed recently, Benes was given by Stalin, in December 1943, virtually a free hand in his dealings with the Slovaks. According to Fierlinger (Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Moscow) Stalin allegedly told Benes "to keep the Slovaks firmly in hand.''62 a By these tactics of exploiting nationalistic feeling in the country and with the military defeat of Germany looming larger and closer every day, the Communists and their bourgeois allies were preparing an armed uprising in Slovakia. Their conspiratory efforts were partly frustrated by an untimely start, triggered off by Soviet partisans, which doomed the venture to failure. But while it lasted (August-October 1944) "the Slovak national uprising" (as this revolt became officially known after 1945) was a remarkable achievement in several respects. 63 Its effect on the future political development of Slovakia was to be farreaching and lasting. Right at the beginning of the uprising the Communist Party of Slovakia came into the open and published ( on September 2nd, 1944) its proclamation in which it implied that Slovakia--though a part of Czechoslovakia-would have a very broad autonomy which would include even a sepa62) Slovenske ruirodne povstanie 1944 (Bratislava 1965), pp. 191-221. 62a) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava, 1968) . p. 11. 63) This event is by far the most written-about subject in modern Slovak history. For a critical review of bibliography on this theme see: F . Vnuk, Neuveritel'ne sprisahanie (Middletown, Pa., 1964) , pp. 181-191. Also S. Falt'an, Niektore otazky okolo hodnotenia SNP (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1964, pp. 161-185) . A complete bibliography of books and articles on the subject in 1963-64 was compiled by A. Kociska (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1965, pp. 309-328) . �148 SLOVAKIA rate army. 64 On September 9, 1944 the KSS began to publish the daily, "Pravda", proudly branded as "the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia".65 On September 17th, 1944 it arranged a joint Party Congress with the Social Democratic Party at which the Social Democratic Party merged into the KSS. It elected its own Central Committee with smidke as President, Husak and cech (Social Democrat) as Vice-Presidents. The Party displayed vigour and independence to a degree which both the Czech and the Soviet commissars found disquieting. The Czech Communists who were spending the war years in Moscow thought it necessary to reaffirm their primacy before it was too late and promptly dispatched to Slovakia two "experienced comrades", R. Slansky and J. sverma, to see that the Party line was correctly drawn and properly applied. After their arrival ( September 28th, 1944) the Slovak Communist leadership had to do as it was told. As a result there followed a great deal of retracting especially in those fields where exuberant nationalism had carried the home-grown leaders too far. The uprising revealed with startling clarity the secondary role and subordinate position to which the KSS was now relegated. In proclaiming their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Slovak Communists were negating the only positive asset of their political program so loudly advertised in 1939-44 under the slogan of an independent Soviet Slovakia. The blow was shattering not only to the Slovak people at large but also to the less doctrinaire Party members.66 In order to make the best of a bad job the Communists kept on assuring the people that the new Czecho-Slovak Republic would be incomparably better than the old one, 64) The proclamation persistently talks about " our Slovak (not Czechoslovak) army". For the full text of the document see: G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 257-258. 65) The daily, "Pravda", as it appeared during the uprising (September - October 1944) was recently reprinted and is available in a convenient form , Pravda v obdobi SNP (Bratislava, 1964) . 66) There were reports that workers at several places proclaimed a Slovak Soviet Republic (e.g. at Nemecke Pravno) ; in other places (Podbrezova) there was strong agitation for the proclamation of Soviet Slovakia. This unwillingness of the working class to return to a common state with the Czechs is most telling. �SLOVAKIA 149 that the excesses of the Czech administration would not be repeated, that the Slovak national individuality would be unquestionably accepted, etc. In other words they were posing as the guarantors of all those rights and achievements which the Hlinka People's Party had secured for the Slovak nation when declaring autonomy (October 1938). They openly advocated a federated Czecho-Slovakia.67 Unfortunately for them in 1944-45 the Slovaks were past the autonomy stage and were thinking in terms of state independence. Against the opposition of many Czech politicians, including Benes himself, the Slovak Communists succeeded in retrieving from the wreckage of the Slovak independence some of those prerequisites which gave post-war Slovakia a quasi-autonomous status.68 What is even more surprising, they were able to preserve their own independence. And thus one finds in post-war Czecho-Slovakia a somewhat anomalous situation. Alongside the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there existed a Communist Party of Slovakia (with no regional equivalent in the Czech lands ) which to all intents and purposes was treated as a separate political party. As it happened it was a most expedient arrangement because it enabled the Communists in the critical post-war months (April 1945-May 1946) to have two Deputy Prime Ministers in the Provisional Government (instead of one) and almost twice as many ministers, parliamentarians, etc. as any other political party. V. 1945-1949 In the years 1945-6 the KSS was without doubt the most nationalistic party ever to enter the Slovak political scene. It was vehemently anti-German and anti-Magyar, and there seemed to be no limits to its nationalistic ex cesses. It lured into its camp Slovak voters by the promise of agrarian and wide-spread social reforms, it appealed 67) Thus spoke G. Husak at Kosice on February 28th, 1945: "We wan t to have a federated state ... in which each nation will be master in his own house."- See: G. Husak, Za narodnu a l'udovu demo kraciu (Kosice, 1945), p. 14. Also J. Jablonicky, Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 248-296. 68 ) Program prvej dorruicej vlady narodneho frontu cechov a Slovcikov (Kosice, 1945) . �150 SLOVAKIA to the nationalist and even the religious feeling of the people, it was willing to overlook anybody's past, no matter how compromising.69 Outwardly the KSS was united, but, as it transpired later, inside it was torn with internal jealousies which very soon decomposed its ranks and paralysed its strength as an independent political force. The old-guard leaders ( Siroky, Duris, etc.) who spent their war years in prison did not see eye to eye with the leadership which had been put together during the 1944 uprising (Husak, smidke, etc.). The Siroky-group intrigued against the smidke-Husakgroup and in their schemes they had the support of the Czech Communist leadership. In May 1945 at the joint session of both Party Presidia the Slovaks were compelled to adopt a common policy with their Czech comrades on all public issues of the day. The role of the KSS was defined as being "a part of a unitary KSC with a united leadership".70 In practice it meant a complete subjugation of the KSS to the dictatorial authority of the KSC. This was the end of the short-lived independence of the KSS (19391945). One of the first moves of Gottwald was to impose on the KSS a more amenable leadership to replace the smidkeHusak-group. In July 1945 Gottwald delegated Siroky to take over the Party affairs in Slovakia. 71 Siroky hurriedly convened a Party conference at Zilina (Aug. 11-12, 1945) where he was confirmed in his position as the Party President. Siroky saw to it that the top Party positions were filled with his men. Thus he had become, already in Aug. 1945, the undisputed authority in Party matters in Slovakia. "Siroky concentrated in his own hands and in the hands of his own group of collaborators in the apparatus of the KSS Central Committee factual decisions about Party 69) This is again another neglected chapter of the Party history. The nationalist excesses, especially against the Magyar minority, formed a part of the accusation levelled at the " bourgeois nationalists" in 1950-54. An oblique reference to the nationalist policies of the KSS has been made recently in the book of J. Zvara, A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes melogdasa Szlovakuiban (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 22-69. Also J . Jablonicky in Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) pp . 396-409. 70) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava 1968) , p. 55. 71 ) ib., p. 99. �SLOVAKIA 151 policies, about the Party itself and about its leading cadres. These men were selected by Siroky himself according to his own personal likings", complained G. Husak recently. 72 Out of 9 men in the Party Presidium Husak identified these as the members of the Siroky group: Siroky, Duris, Bast'ovansky, Valachovic, Holdos. This leaves on the other side Husak, soltesz, smidke and Zupka. While acting as a strong man of the KSS, Siroky realized that he owed his position to the Czech Communists and consequently he was an ever-obedient executor of their wishes. In this way the policy of the KSS became divorced from the current needs and realities of the Slovaks. The policies of the KSc were designed to attract the Czech masses and paid very little attention to the Slovak national interests. The Party faced the first post-war electoral contest in a state of internal disunity, with a program which lacked conviction, realism and electoral appeal. Its only competitor for the allegiance of the Slovak electorate was the Democratic Party (heir and successor of the old Agrarian Party of M. Hodza) dominated almost exclusively by the Slovak Protestant bourgeoisie of proBenes sympathies. The Hlinka People's Party being banned, the Catholic section of the Slovak people ( the support of which was to decide the general election scheduled on May 26th, 1946) had no party of its own. To win these vital votes the leaders of the Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Catholics ("April Agreement") promising considerable concessions in exchange for the Catholic vote. 73 As a result of this solid backing of the Catholic majority the Democratic Party emerged victorious from the electoral contest polling 62.0 % of the total vote (999,622 votes), while the Communist Party gained only 30.4 % (489,596 votes), the remaining 7 ,6 % went to two minor parties or represented "white ticket" and informal votes. 74 While the electorate in the Czech lands overwhelmingly 72) G. Husak, Barnabitky a co im predchadzalo, in Nove slovo, No. 8/ 1968. 73) V. Precan, Slov ensky katolicizmus pred februarom 1948 (Bratislava , 1961), pp. 85-108. 74) Dejiny KSc (Praha, 1961), p . 504. �152 SLOVAKIA endorsed the Marxist policies 75 in Slovakia the Communist Party (which-it should be remembered-was already then a united party of both the Communist and the Social Democrats) came second best in what was actually a twoparty contest. This massive rejection of the Marxist policies led to deep soul-searching in the Central Committee in Prague and Bratislava. The Party now tempered (at least partly) its reckless nationalism and started to attack the Democratic Party for harbouring fascist and reactionary elements. 76 Though nominally both Communist and Democratic Parties were partners in the so-called United National Front they were soon fighting and abusing each other with fury and passion reminiscent of the interwar years. In spite of their electoral defeat the Communists, by clever and daring manipulation of their own and due to the ineptness, timidity and inexperience of the Democratic politicians were able to exert a decisive influence on the course of political events in Slovakia. They still retained the control of powerful organizations and pressure groups ( trade unions, farmers' organizations, partisans, etc.). Thus they were able to frustrate almost any attempt of the Democratic Party to honour its promises given to the Catholic voters.77 By their bullying tactics they brought about the estrangement between the leadership and membership of the Democratic Party. They accused many Democratic Party leaders of fascist conspiracy and subversive activity, demanded and got their removal from office and subsequent imprisonment (Kempny, Bugar, Stasko, Ursiny, etc.). Then in November 1947 they attacked the governmental positions of the Democratic Party, compelling it to give up 75) In the Czech lands the Communists received 38.9 % and the Social Democrats 15.8 % of the votes. The Marxist parties thus obtained 54.7 % . 76 ) M. Vartikova, Roky rozhodnutia. K dejiruim politickeho boja pred febriuirom 1948 (Bratislava, 1962); J . Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 247-253. 77 ) They engineered-with the help of their Czech comrades and colleagues-the sentencing and execution of the former President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso. By this they completely discredited the Democratic Party in the eyes of its voters, fully revealing its impotency and helplessness as a political force . See: F . Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso , President of the Slovak Repitblic (Sydney, 1967 ), pp. 37-40. �SLOVAKIA 153 its majority in such administrative bodies as the Slovak National Council, the Board of Commissioners, etc.78 By this victory the Communists effectively undermined the morale of the non-Communist forces and the stage was set for a complete take-over. The notorious 'coup d'etat', by which the Communists came to power in Czecho-Slovakia in February 1948, was largely a Czech affair. The resignation of the non-Communist ministers and the ensuing governmental crisis were confined to Prague. The confrontation was staged and the struggle was lost by the Czechs in the Czech lands. 79 As far as Slovakia was concerned there the issue was solved almost inaudibly in a matter of hours (long before the crisis was over in Prague). The Communist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, G. Husak, took over the main Post Office building in Bratislava on February 23rd, 1948 and was in complete control of all postal services, especially the vital telecommunication links between Bratislava and. Prague. To all Democratic Commissioners he dispatched letters of dismissal and to make sure that they took notice, he requested the Commissioner of the Interior, M. Feriencik (nominally a non-party member of the Board), to post police guards at their offices, to keep the "dismissed'' Commissioners out. 80 Then the Communists reconstituted a new Board allocating to themselves 10 (out of 15) positions, giving the remaining ones to their fellow-travellers.81 This moment signified the zenith of the KSS. What followed afterwards was a steeply descending road leading to the unenviable position of the next two decades(1948-68). 78 ) In the reconstructed Board of Commissioners the Democratic Party had to share the chairmanship with a Communist and its majority of nine on the Board of 15 Commissioners was reduced to a minor ity of six. 79) There are many accounts of this "parliamentary take-over" of governmental powers by the Communists. For the losing party's version see e.g. H. Ripka's Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), for the winning-side versio n see e.g. J . Vesely's Kronika unorovych dnti 1948 (Praha, 1958) . 80) V. Vagassky, Komunisticka strana ceskoslovenska (New York, 1953roneoed) p. 8. 81) J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 259-260. �li4 SLOVAKIA VI. 1948-1962 With the elimination of the non-Communist opposition there was no longer a need for two Communist Parties in one country. Steps towards the abolition of the KSS were taken on July 26th, 1948, when the Presidium of the KSc (consisting entirely of Czech Communists) decided: 1. The next meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS shall rule that the KSS ceases to exist as an independent party and become an integral part of the KSc. 2. The Party organization in Slovakia will still carry the name of KSS . 3. The Central Committee of the KSS shall be subordinated to the Central Committee of the KSc, it shall act according to its directives and it will implement the policy of the KSc in Slovakia. 82 This decision was proptly implemented on September 28, 1948 when the KSS, obeying the resolution of the Presidium of the KSc agreed to become "the territorial organization of the unitary KSC. 83 The merger was officially represented as a voluntary act mutually desired by both, and enthusiastically greeted by the Party press as such. But now it is admitted what has been generally known from the start that the Slovak Communists were most unwilling to give up their independence, to take up the status of an unprivileged minority destined to wait for the hand-outs of the senior and none-too-generous partner. Their fears were well justified but they could do nothing to prevent the inevitable. Thus they became the first victims of the renewed centralism with which the Communist rulers of Czecho-Slovakia were pursuing their new "socialist" policies. Gottwald, Kopecky and their accomplices, the authors and erstwhile advocates of Slovak selfgovernment, almost overnight forgot their earlier pledges. Robust and aggresive centralism was menacingly reflected in the new "Constitution of May 9th" (1948). In it the Slovaks were treated badly, 84 yet worse was still to come. 82) K. Kaplan, Utvcifeni genercilni linie vystavby socialismu v Ceskoslovensku (Pra ha, 1965) , p. 103. 83) Dejiny KSC (Praha, 1961) , p. 540. 84) While in 1945 the Commissioners were chosen by the Slovak National Council and responsible to it, in 1948 they were appointed by �SLOVAKIA 155 Most of those political and national rights which-as claimed by the KSS-were secured by the Slovak uprising in 1944 and saved by the victory of the working-class in 1948 were gradually removed one by one by the same people who once fought for them. With incredible, even gleeful, outward obedience the Slovak Communists were curtailing their own rights, restricting their own freedom of action. This subordinate relationship which now existed between the KSS and KSC was subsequently written into the Party Statutes for everybody to see. According to these approved rules "the KSS directs its activities by the decisions of the Congress of the KSC and the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSC ... The KSS convokes its congress after agreement with the Central Committee of the KSC ... The Central Committee of the KSS carries out the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSc and with the approval of the Central Committee of the KSC it solves the political and organizational Party questions in Slovakia". 85 Committed to these rules and bound by Party discipline the Communists in Slovakia ruthlessly applied the general Party line as drawn up in Prague by the Central Committee of the KSc, and including such unpopular measures as collectivization of farming, nationalization of all sectors of private enterprise, down to small shops and one-man businesses, wholesale purge of public life of all real and imaginary opponents of Communism, cruel persecution of the Catholic Church, its clergy and religious, victimization the Prague Government. The protective measures introduced in 1945 to safeguard the rights of the Slovak against the Czech majority were all removed in 1948. To pass or amend legislation a mere three-fifths majority of deputies was required. The Czech majority in the Parliament was always higher than this. (In 1954 there were only 98 Slovaks among 368 deputies). 85) The Statutes of the KSc , paragraphs 40, 42 and 47. See : Pravda of December 20th, 1952. Numerically the Party drew noticeably less strength from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. Shortly after the 1948 merger statistics were issued showing that in 1949 out of 2,311,066 members and candidates of the KSC only 236,432 were from Slovakia, i.e. 10.3%. ( Rude pravo of May 27th, 1950) . This disparity continued into the fiities and at the Tenth Congress of the KSC (1954) the Slovak delegates formed a 10,2% minority (Pravda of June 16th, 1954) . At that time 28% of the population lived in Slovakia. �156 SLOVAKIA of the intellectuals, adulation of Stalin and Gottwald, indiscriminate application of "superior Soviet methods" in all walks of life, etc.86 And when they did all these repugnant and hate-fometing tasks their Czech masters struck them with a wave of bloody purges. In the years 1949-54 (and especially after the Ninth Congress of the KSS in May 1950) the ranks of the Slovak Communists were decimated with a fury of terror which in its scope and horror surpassed all the blows ever inflicted by their class enemy. The purges form the most tragic and most neglected chapter in the history of the KSS.B 7 Within five years (1949-54) the KSS lost in purges seven out of 13 members of its Presidium (Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, ~midke, Bast'ovansky, Falt'an and Moskovic), some 30 % of its 60members Central Committee and thousands of Party members in diplomatic and administrative service, in the army, political bodies, institutions and other sectors of public life. They were removed from their posts amid the curses of their own comrades and comrades-in-arms and, having previously antagonized the masses of the Slovak people, they found themselves unpitied and friendless in their gravest hour. They were declared "enemies of the people", their work was debased, their publications banned, their past exorcised from the pages of the Party history.BB The principal guilt of which all the Slovak victims of the purges were accused was the unpardonable sin of "bourgeois nationalism", the very thing in which they were so much encouraged by their Czech comrades in 1945-6. It is generally not realized that the bulk of the victims of the 1949-54 purges were "bourgeois nationalists" (i.e. 86) In the writings of contemporary Communist historians all these measures were described as being socialist, progressive and to the benefit of the masses. Only now, after 15 years, some "mistakes" are being admitted for which the personality cult is blamed. 87) The purges were strictly taboo to the socialist historians until January 1968. Only in the field of literature a cautious attempt has been made to deal with this touchy subject, e. g. in Mnacko's Oneskorene reportaze, in Karvas's Jazva, etc. 88) More about the purges can be found in D. A. Schmidt's Anotomy of a Satelite ( Boston, 1952), in Vnuk's cistky - nezahojitel'ne rany KSS (Slovak v Amerike, November 9th,-30th, 1966); also Der Slansky-Prozess und seine Folgen (Recht im Ost und West, 5/ 1964, pp. 196-203. �SLOVAKIA 157 Slovaks) in Slovakia and "zionists" (i.e. Jews) in the Czech lands, though these two groups did not account for more than 13 ¼- of the KSc membership. It is no wonder then that the purges permanently poisoned the already strained Slovak-Czech relations beyond any hope of reconciliation. After the elimination of the Slovak element the Central Committee of the KSc entrusted the reins of the KSS to people of its own choice: Siroky, Bacilek, Duris, David, Dubcek, Rais, Branik, sefranek, Mauer, etc. As in the early twenties most of these were of non-Slovak origin ( Czechs and Jews) and a few of them were even Soviet citizens (David, Mauer). In March 1953 Stalin died and shortly after him K. Gottwald. The presidency of the Republic passed on to A. Zapotocky, while a well-known Slovakophobe, A. Novotny, became the first Party secretary. Novotny soon concentrated in his hands immense power and, assisted by V. Kopecky, was able to suppress all the liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin thaw. 89 Having thus delayed destalinization which was sweeping through Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Novotny paid increased attention to Slovakia where the dangers to his policies were greatest. In an attempt to subdue the passive resistance of the Slovaks and to break the nationalist spirit pulsating there in spite of purges, expulsions and bolshevist vigilance, Novotny further tightened the screw of Czech centralism. He introduced new administrative steps aimed at a more thorough control and reorganized the existing economic, cultural and social structure of the country. In this reorganization several Slovak industrial enterprises and cultural associations lost even their nominal independence and were integrated with their Czech counterparts into more compact "Czechoslovak" bodies.90 89) Kopecky's version of how the Party fought and defeated "revisionism" among the intellectuals is graphically, though one-sidedly, described in his book, CSR a KS(; (Praha, 1960), pp. 467-470. 90 ) These moves were allegedly designed for reasons of higher efficiency but the uneasy reluctance with which they were accepted in Slovakia indicates their insidious nature. Their implementation led to the dismissal of the President of the Slovak National Council, S. Sebesta, anct to renewed attacks on Slovak separatism by Bacilek, Kopecky, David, etc. �158 SLOVAKIA With regard to the Slovak political and administrative organs these were doomed to wither away by a devious method of ignoring their very existence. In spite of the fact that the Slovak regional organs were staffed by trusted Party members they were gradually reduced to complete inactivity. Though the Government was constitutionally obliged to appoint a Commissioner when new ministeries were created, this provision was, as a rule, ignored. 91 Under the mask of "Czechoslovak socialist patriotism" a new brand of undiluted Czech nationalism was superimposed on these centralist tendencies. Any opposition to this socialist Czechoslovakism was decried as bourgeois nationalism and one can see how often these accusations were levelled against the Slovaks after 1954.92 In an arrogant disregard of Slovak national aspirations the constitution which in May 1960 proclaimed CzechoSlovakia "a socialist country" further stripped the power of Slovakia's provincial government organs subordinating them completely to the Central Government. 93 This outrageous arrangement was presented as a final and satisfactory solution of the Slovak problem and the Party boasted in its official history that it had accomplished what the old capitalist system had found insoluble.94 However, the Slovak feelings about the situation are more aptly 91) E. Taborsk)', Communism in Czechoslov akia 1948-1960 (Princeton , N. J. , 1961), pp. 340-344. 92) V. ~iroky complained about it at the Tenth Congress of the KSS in April 1955; it was deplored in a leading article in Pravda of May 1st, 1956; in the aftermath of the Budapest revolt it was ruefully admitted "one of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism", Pravda of December 14th, 1956); in January 1958 it was violently denounced by K. Bacilek as having penetrated "into various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, sports, state apparatus, economic organs, etc." Pravda of January 10th and 11th, 1958) ; again by K. Bacilek and V. Kopecky at the Eleventh Congress of the KSS in April 1958; etc. See also: Slovak Nationalism Revisited (Radio Free Europe Papers of November 11, 1965). 93) The Slovak Commissioners must "attend to further tasks in the economic and cultural construction of Slovakia to the extent determined by the central government" (Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 [Princeton, N. J., 1961], p. 339) . 94) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), pp. 697-698. �SLOVAKIA 159 summed up in the words of the former member of the Secretariat of the KSS and Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky: By the new adjustments of the Slovak national organs (which led to the aboli5hment of the Board of Commissioners, to the sub ordination of Slovak national offices directly to the Ministeries in Prague, etc.) the Slovak nation found itself in the position of the only nation in the entire Socialist camp which on its own ethnic territory lacked such organs of the Socialist governmental administration which would correspond to its development, its present living standard, its numerical strength and, above all, to its indispensability to become really and in every respect an equal partner with the brotherly Czech nation.95 VII. 1962-1967 Misruled and unrepresented, the Slovak Communists resented the continuos Czech interference, the Socialist brand of "Czechoslovakism" and above all the persistence of Stalinist methods and Stalinist leadership to which they were subjected. But there was little they could do about it while the Party was strong and enjoyed Krushchev's support. 96 But in 1961-62 the Party's grip on the overall control started to slacken. There were several factors which contributed to this: the stagnation of the country's economy, the Sino-Soviet dispute which now broke into the open, renewed attacks on Stalin at the XXIInd Soviet Party Congress (October 1961). In the ideological split the KSc had no choice but to side with Moscow. Thus circumstances compelled it to do more than pay lip service to the cause of destalinization. Destalinization finally reached Czecho-Slovakia in 1962-3 and its advent was symbolically ushered in by the demolition of the huge statue of Stalin overlooking Prague (November 1962). The year 1962, the year of the XIIth Congress of the KSC, was also a year of intense ferment, especially in 95) M. Gosiorovsky, K niektorym otazkam vzt'ahu cechov a siovakov v poiitike KSc, in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 391. 96 Khrushchev's endorsement of the Party's Stalinist policies in 1957 was a very serious drawback for the opposing forces in the KSS who disliked Kopecky and Novotny's stiff measures against the Slovaks. Khrushchev on the occasion of his visit to Czecho-Slovakia declared (on July 11th, 1957): "The cause of Leninism in CzechoSlovakia is in good hands." (East Europe, 9/1957, p.41) . �160 SLOVAKIA Slovakia where the pent-up grievances gave rise to outspoken criticism of the excesses of the Stalinist era and of their perpetrators. The loudest critics of these abuses of naked power were the Slovak writers, journalists, scientists and other representatives of the intelligentsia. 97 The foremost task of destalinization was to rehabilitate the victims of the 1949-54 purges. Those bourgeois nationalists who were still alive were quietly released from prisons, but Novotny and his clique were most relucant to admit that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were fabricated. Such an admission would make fabricators of Novotny, Siroky and most of the power-holders in CzechoSlovakia. Subjected to mounting pressure the Party allowed the released prisoners to apply for re-admission to Party membership. Many of them did and their applications for re-admission read like the most savage condemnation of Communist tyranny ever written. 98 These were widely cir97) The mouthpiece of the discontented and critical voice was the official organ of the Slovak Writers' Association , Kulturny zivot, which in 1963 published an impressive number of critical articles. An open forum at which many abuses and horrors of the past and of the present were exposed was the Conference of Slovak Writers in Bratislava (April 21-22nd, 1963). At the First Congress of the Association of Slovak Journalists (May 28-29th, 1963) the wrongs and injustices of the era were bitterly denounced by M. Hysko , who publicly attacked the then Prime Minister, V. Siroky, as the prime mover behind the false accusations of the "bourgeois nanationalist" comrades, (Pravda of June 3rd 1963). 98) Some of them (e.g. Husak's) found their way abroad, where extracts from them were pub!ished in the emigre press. For English translation of parts from Husak's application see: News Digest International (Sydney) 3/ 1966, pp. 55-57. In 1968 a large number of rehabilited Party officials (as well as many non-Party men ) described their experiences at the hands of their jailers. Husak's account was serialized in a weekly, Nove slovo, Holdos's in the daily, Smena, but the most graphic expose of the inhuman treatment to which the victims of the cult era were subjected is in E. Loebl's book Svedectvo o procese s vedenim protistatneho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Slanskym (Bratislava, 1968) . From among the non-Communist prisoners there is the account by playwright I. Stodola in Kulturny zivot and that of military officer D. Viest in Slovenske Pohl'ady. Different organizations and institutions started to publish grim statistics about the era of lawlessness. According to various calculations there were 160 death sentences in 1948-53. The Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters claimed that 30,000-40,000 of its members became victims �SLOVAKIA 161 culated in Slovakia and their impact was enormous. At one stage they caused an open rebellion against Czech rule. Novotny tried to counteract these outbursts of discontent and criticism but his voice was drowned in an ever-growing protest. 99 To save his own skin he had to sacrifice his most valuable accomplices (and the most hated men in Slovakia) namely K. Bacilek (in March 1963), and when that did not suffice, V. Siroky and J . Duris (in September 1963). Of course the situation was far more serious than could be rectified by the removal of a few compromised Party officials. The main culprit, A. Novotny, and his group weathered the storm of criticism by sheer perseverance and stubbornness and with Moscow's backing retained their monopoly of power. At the end of 1963 the situation in the KSS differed only very little from that before the XIIth Party Congress. The leadership of the KSS was entirely in the hands of Novotny's men, like Bil'ak, Chudik, Sabolcik, Lenart, salgovic, Barbirek, Dvorsky, Cvik, Daubner, etc. In his selection Novotny was particularly careful to pick for his service people whose only qualification was blind following of the official Party line.No person of independent views or strong personal conviction made his way up the Party ladder. The most pathetic group in the Slovak political scene were the rehabilitated bourgeois nationalists. Though exonerated from their alleged crimes and officially "fully of judical and political persecution. The unlawfully sentenced citizens even founded their own organization "K 231". But the most moving (and damning) indictment of the cruelty of the Communist regime was the Resolution of the members of various religious orders presented to the Ministry of Culture and Information on April 17, 1968. It was signed by 6,174 religious who spent altogether 32,016 years in prison. (See Katoiicke noviny, May 5, 1968). 99) Novotny replied to the criticism of the Slovak Communist intellectuals on June 12th, 1963 at Kosice. He defended Siroky, maintaining that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were " substantially right" ( Prav da of June 13th, 1963). He sharply reprimanded and vilified two Slovak critics of his policies, M. Hysko and R. Kalisky, branding them as "irresponsible scribblers" (pisalkove ). R. Kalisky replied in kind and his long letter (of 30 pages) to "comrade President" lists a comprehensive catalogue of Czech wrongdoings towards the Slovaks. This letter was also widely read in Slovakia and heartily approved by all sections of the community. �162 SLOVAKIA rehabilitated" they still were doomed to remain in a political wilderness, hoping against hope for some miracle which would restore their earlier status. Their hopes could not have been realized without a major upheavel within the Party. They were, after all, striving and clamouring after positions which were held by their former judges and jailers, by men who had advanced literally over their "dead bodies". These men knew only too well to whom they owed their posts and what was expected of them in return. This state of affairs could not have been without impact on the Party's membership. Headed by uninspiring and subservient leaders, the KSS had become a living mockery of Lenin's conception of a Communist Party. The solution of the Slovak problem in 1962-67 advanced very little, if at all. The request of the Slovak intellectuals to federate Czecho-Slovakia according to the Soviet or Yugoslav model was rejected outright. 100 The Czechs were the dominant nation in a state "of two brotherly nations of equal rights" (as it is solemnly written in the 1960 Constitution) and continued to enjoy a disproportionately high number of prestige-bearing positions in the Party organs, State administration, diplomatic service, army, etc. The dissatisfaction in all strata of the Slovak community was there for everybody to see. If any concessions were made, these were only formal and completely unsatisfactory. Thus in 1964 the term "poverenik" (Commissioner), abolished in 1960, was reintroduced and in a common declaration of the Central Committee of both Parties (i.e. KS(:; and KSS) of May 7, 1964 it was announced that the Slovak National Council would participate "more fully" in all spheres of Slovak public life. 101 But there was no visible improvement, no advancement towards a fuller participation of regional organs in Slovakia's administration. In spite of all this crude nationalistic discrimination, in spite of obvious economic, political and cultural failures, 100) This proposal, the authorship of which is attributed to an erstwhile Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky, was rejected by Prague through its Slovak mouthpiece, M. Chudik (President of the Slovak National Council. According to Chudik the Slovak people did not wish any federation (Rude pravo of November 13th, 1965). 101 ) Za plnsie uplatnenie Slovenskej narodnej rady, (Bratislava, 1964). �SLOVAKIA 163 Novotny somehow managed to retain and even consolidate his personal power at the XIIIth Party Congress (MayJune, 1966). The Congress was a rather dull and uneventful affair: only those speakers were admitted who endorsed Novotny's policies. A lengthy and critical report on the economic situation and the much talked-about "new economic model" was to be delivered by Prof. 0. sik, but what finally emerged was a very mild substitute. The Central Committee elected a 10-man Party Presidium, in which there were three Slovaks (Dubcek, Lenart, Chudik). Among the Presidium candidates there were two more Slovaks ( Sabolcik and Sadovsky). The promised and expected reform which was to put Slovak-Czech relations on an entirely new basis did not materialize .102 VIII. 1967-1968 The situation had become unbearable by 1967. The forces of discontent were gathering momentum. Up to 1966-7 the main source of opposition to the Novotny regime was in Slovakia, where his treatment of the Slovak peoples and institutions provoked almost universal hatred. This resentment was gradually percolating into the all-state Party leadership. In 1967 Novotny's obstinacy to the "new economic model" caused further polarization of the leadership into the "dogmatists" and the "liberals". The economic reform could succeed only if coupled with decentralization and with a loosening of the tight dictatorial regime. Any relaxation on the political front immediately brought forward a demand for a thorough-going rehabilitation and undoing of the "mistakes of the cult era". The combined impact of these factors (i.e. the Slovak question, economy and uneasy liberalization) eventually led to the fall of A. Novotny. These grumblings came first to the attention of the outside world in June 1967, when the writers used their IVth Congress as a tribunal for a passionate denunciation 102) The Slovak writer, V. Mihalik ( member of the Central Committee of the KSS ) revealed (in Kulturny zivot 8/1966, p. 1) that the Party was preparing "an important document" aimed at the improvem1mt in Slovak-Czech relations. The document was to be tabled at the Thirteenth Congress of the KSc (May, 1966 ). Bu t it was not, and nothing has been heard about it since. �164 SLOVAKIA of naked power and for a bitter condemnation of the Party's performance in the last two decades. 103 The Party-always very sensitive to criticism-hit back hard in Oct. 1967. The principal culprits were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their professional posts, and their official journal, "Literarni noviny", was taken away from them. An attempt was made to exploit the existing difference between the Slovak and Czech writers and to play both groups against each other. But the Slovaks, at their meeting with the Slovak Party leaders on Oct. 16, 1967, briskly declined the honour of being the Party's favourites at the expense of their Czech colleagues. 104 Another indication of the stresses and strains at the top was the criticism at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSc in Sept. 1967 of the implementation of the new economic model. It was, perhaps, symptomatic that the Slovak Party Secretary, A. Dubcek, accused the government 9f discriminatory policies towards Slovakia. He charged that "the results for the first half of 1967 show that investments in Slovak industry totalled 21.9 1/r of the state investments and not 28 % as was laid in the directives of the XIIIth Party Congress". 105 The struggle for power was now on and manifested itself again at the Central Committee meeting in Oct. 1967, where the Slovak Party leaders in an unheard-of move demanded that Novotny abandon one of the two top functions he held (i.e. the First Party Secretary and the President of the State) . Novotny sensed the gravity of the 103) See IV. Sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelti, Praha 27. - 29. cervna 1967, (Praha, 1968), especially the speeches by M. Kundera (pp. 22-27) , P . Kohout (pp. 39-43), A. J. Liehm (pp. 99-204) and, above all, that of L. Vaculik ( pp. 141-150). The Slovak writers played a rather passive role at this gathering and their over-all performance was to become a source of serious embarrassment in the subsequent months. A heated dispute about the action of some Slovak writers (Mihalik, Spitzer, Valek, Minac, Kostra, Matu~ka, Rosenbaum , Egri, Luknar, Ponican as well as 9 Czech writers) who in their letter supported the party's policies in the cultural sphere (pp. 157-159 ) eventually led (in December 1968) to the collapse of the Slovak Writers' Union. See M. Resutik Rozlomeny svaz in Nove slovo No. 1/ 1969, p. 11. 104 ) Svedectvi (Paris) No. 32-33 / 1968, pp. 89-116. 105 ) Pravda (Bratislava), Sept. 29, 1967. �SLOVAKIA 165 situation and in December he invited Brezhnev to come to Prague to bolster his position. But Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8 )-if anything-made the situation worse . The next meeting of the Central Committee (Dec. 19-21, 1967) dealt Novotny the final blow and made his position untenable. At the following meeting of the Central Committee, a fortnight later, Novotny was finally voted out of office and replaced by Alexander Dubcek, who till then was considered N ovotny's man in Slovakia. Outside his native Slovakia Dubcek was a completely unknown personality .106 The key role-and this should be stressed again and again-in N ovotny's downfall was played by the Slovaks who found themselves in their socialist homeland economically exploited, nationally humiliated, culturally neglected and ruled as a colony by their Czech partners. Novotny, in his last speech as Party Secretary (New Year's speech, 1968) , tried to placate the Slovaks with the promise of a more generous economic consideration for Slovakia: " The need of nationwide industrial development must not obscure the important task of priority development of Slovakia which still has not reached the average economic level of the Czech regions". 107 But the offer was "too little too late". The new leadership of the KSc put the question of Slovakia as the number one problem to be tackled by them. Prague radio said on Jan. 5, 1968: "The Central Committee took note of the fact that the government and the Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit to the Party organs, on the basis of thorough situation analyses, specific proposals for perfecting their activities." The activities of the Slovak National Council being almost non-existent needed much more than perfecting. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Communist coup of February 1948, Dubcek spelt out the current difficulties which were troubling his leadership: "Many faults 106) For backgro und to Dubcek's personality see, e. g. F . Vnuk, Alexander Dubcek - tragedia poctiv eho komunistu in Kalendar Jednota 1969 (Middletown, Pa. , 1968), pp. 173-181. Also T. Szulc, A loo/c at Alexander Dubcek - the aparatchik who made a revoluti on in N . Y . Times (Weekly Review) , Jan. 12, 1969. 107) Pravda (Bratislava), Jan. 2, 1968. �166 SLOVAKIA have occured in internal Party life ... (where) the struggle between the progressive and conservative forces has not yet been concluded . . . ( There are) serious difficulties in the economy ... In our relations with the Slovak national organs we must rectify what was wrongfully violated after 1960 and things must be rearranged in such a way as to bring them in line with the contemporary stage of development of the state as a whole." 108 After this admission from the highest Party official things in Slovakia started to happen. M. Chudik (member of the Presidium of the KSc), N ovotny's stooge in Slovakia who was acting as Chairman of the Slovak National Council, hurriedly submitted his resignation. But he was not to be allowed to bow out as gracefully as that; he was dismissed in ignominy instead, on March 14, 1968. Having discarded its incompetent boss the Slovak National Council immediately published a resolution demanding that CzechoSlovakia become a federation. A new constitution to replace the one of 1960 was to give full legislative power to the Slovak National Council in all except foreign affairs, defense and state finances. Slovakia was to have a separate government. 109 In March the so-called "Czecho-Slovak spring" really started and the whole country was undergoing radical changes. Novotny's Party apparatus was falling to pieces. There was the defection to the West of Major-General Jan sejna; the resignation of the Trade Unions leader Pastytik; the dismissal of Chudik; the removal from office of the Interior Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor-General Bartuska; the suicide of Deputy Defense Minister V. Janko and Vice-President of the Supreme Court J. Brest'ansky; ousting of the chief Party ideologue J. Hendrych and the fall from the Presidency of Novotny himself. All this happened in the space of four weeks and had tremendous impact on the people. These events necessitated a new reorganization of the Party and the government. The five-day session of the Central Committee of the KSc named a new Presidium on April 1, 1968, in which Slovakia was given the largest 108 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Feb. 23 , 1968. 109) Pravda (Bratislava), March 15, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 167 representation ever : 4 in 11. 110 In the Secretariat there were 3 Slovaks out of 9 members (Dubcek-the First Secretary, Lenart, Sadovsky). On April 9 a new Cabinet was sworn in by Novotny's successor in the Presidency, General L. Svoboda. At the head of the new government stood 0. cernik. There were 5 deputy Prime Ministers and 23 Ministers. Here too the Slovaks were treated much more generously than ever before: 2 deputy Prime Ministers and 6 Ministers were from Slovakia. One of the deputy Prime Ministers was Gustav Husak, a rehabilitated Slovak "bourgeois nationalist". On April 10, 1968 the Party published its " Action Program",111 an ambitious document setting out " CzechoSlovakia's road towards socialism" and outlining the political and economic reforms by which it was to achieve one-party rule, mollified by the active participation of the non-party sections of the population. The Slovak question again figured prominently in the Program. A new symmetric federative arrangement of the state was proposed and the Slovaks were promised: 1. Slovak National Council and Council of Ministers (instead of the old Board of Commissioners), 2. Slovak national committees, 3. Autonomy in planning and budgeting for Slovakia, 4. State secretaries in those central ministerial departments where Ministers were Czechs, 5. Guarantee of Slovak rights against the Czech majority, 6. Adequate Slovak representation in the army, diplomatic service, etc. 112 In the less oppressive atmosphere of the day and in the absence of overt censorship public opinion soon started to exert pressure from below. This resulted first of all in the resignation or removal from the scene of those men who were closely linked with Novotny and his• dictatorial policies. To purge Novotny's followers from the Central llO ) They were Dubcek, Rigo, Bil'ak and Barbirek. Their nomina tion was accepted in Slovakia with some scepticism and their credentials as Slovaks were immediately questioned. It was pointed out that Rigo was a Gypsy, Bil'ak was a Ruthenian and Barbirek though born in Bratislava- was a Czech. And, of course, everybody knew that Dubcek had spent his childhood and adolescence (192438 ) in the Soviet Union. 111 ) A kcni Program KS(: pfijaty na p leruirni zasedani OV KS(: dne 5. du bna 1968, Praha 1968. ll 2 ) Akcni Program ...", pp. 27-28. �168 SLOVAKIA Committee of the KSc the masses demanded an extraordinary Party congress. Under the effect of ever-mounting pressure the Party leaders with some reluctance consented at last to convene it in September 1968. In Slovakia the burning question was that of federation. Obcession with this issue was so intense that little room was left for anything else. There was a minor controversy between two groups of Slovak intellectuals as to whether it was more correct to insist on federation before democratization or vice versa. This was, however, only a question of emphasis: the demand for federalization was almost unanimous. In the Czech lands the problem of federalization was hardly mentioned, and if at all, then not in a manner encouraging for the Slovaks. A public opinion poll revealed that 95 % of Slovaks were for federation and 90 ';c of Czechs against it. 113 The Czechs did not like to be reminded that federation was something the Slovaks were promised more than once in the past 50 years and hence long overdue. They preferred to dismiss the whole thing as an unrealistic and untimely affair of no concern to themselves. The famous "2000 words Manifesto" even suggested that in Slovakia the federation issue would be used as a shield by many old conservatives who would thus survive the democratization process: "Federation alone will not provide better living standards for either the Czechs or Slovaks, neither will it solve their economic and social problems. The rule of the Party-state bureaucracy may still survive especially in Slovakia, because there it could claim a victory in the fight by which greater freedom was gained (for the Slovaks) ."114 113) There were several surveys of public opinion on this issue. Obrana l'udu (June 1, 1968) cites the results of another survey, according to which the Slovaks were for federation "almost 100%", while in the Czech lands federation was favored by only 5% of those questioned! 114) For the full text of this Manifesto see Literarni Listy (June 27, 1968). The Soviet press called "2000 words" an "action program for the counter-revolution" (Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1968) , Dubcek deplored it as a "very serious obstacle to the further development of socialist democracy and society" (Rude pravo , June 29, 1968), S. Kodaj (Party official in East Slovakia) denounced it as "an open call for counter-revolution". In fact it was a call for pressure from below to get the Party to purge from �SLOVAKIA 169 This unkind remark in a document which so outraged the Soviet leaders and embarrassed the Communist leaders in Czecho-Slovakia, elicited a reply in the form of an open letter signed by over 200 Slovak intellectuals and intitled, "A word to the Czechs, and also Slovaks, who are worthy of it". In this response the Slovaks complained bitterly about the outrageous distortion of Slovak history by Czech officialdom ("From Shir's followers down to the men who led the uprising of 1944 nobody was good enough if he was a good Slovak first") and then defended their insistence on "federation without delay": "In today's democratization process the present inferior position of Slovakia is simply no longer tenable".11 5 No prominent political personality figured among those who signed the letter, yet the Czechs suspected that its instigator was Dr. Gustav Husak. The Deputy Prime Minister G. Husak was the most dynamic personality in the reactivated life of the KSS. 116 He re-emerged (after being sentenced to life inprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" in 1954) as a sworn enemy of Novotny and all his hangers-on in Slovakia. At the same time he was resolved to reassert as much an independent Slovak voice in the state and Party politics as possible. He still remained what he always had been, an orthodox and autocratic Communist at heart, but his hatred of Novotny put him in the one camp with the liberals. His uncompromising stand on immediate and comprehensive federalization assured him of a strong following in Slovakia. He was not even a member of the Central Committee of the KSS, yet his political influence in Slovakia was second to none. Early in July he swayed the regional Party conference in Bratislava to press for the KSS congress to be held in August 1968 (i.e. before the scheduled KSc Congress ) so that the Slovaks would come to the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc with their own specific all positions of power the men who had been responsible for the country's political, economic, moral and cultural decline. For the English translation of the whole document see East Europe No. 8/ 1968, pp. 25-28. 115) Slovo cechom aj Slovakom sucim na slovo in Nove slovo, No. 11/ 1968, pp. 1-3. 116) For a short biography of G. Husak read F. Vnuk's O Husakovi zrwva a v iacej in Kalendcir Jednota 1968, (Middletown, Pa., 1967, pp. 87-98). �170 SLOVAKIA proposals ( already approved by the KSS Congress) of the federalization scheme. 117 The internal development in Czecho-Slovakia since January and especially since March 1968 was a cause of serious concern in the Soviet Union and neighbouring people's democracies. The events in Czecho-Slovakia were directly connected with the students' demonstrations in Poland which produced a crisis in the Polish Party leadership. Afraid of similar consequences in East Germany Ulbricht imposed a ban on the German-language newspaper from Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian-language broadcast from Presov found keen listeners in the south-western part of the Soviet Union and caused uneasiness and discomfort to the Soviet Party leaders, to Ukrainian Party boss Shelest in particular. Dubcek and his colleagues were repeatedly summoned to Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw, while their counterparts from the other Socialist countries were arriving in Prague trying their best to stop the process which in Dubcek's eyes was democratic and humanizing, in theirs counter-revolutionary and revisionist. Then on July 15, 1968 the Central Committee of the KSc received a common letter from the "fraternal" Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. They found the situation in Czecho-Slovakia "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country". The catalogue of errors and faults was long and comprehensive and reflected their own fears and apprehensions. Only one aspect of the post-January development in the country was condoned without disapproval: "We welcome the rectification in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on a sound basis of brotherly collaboration within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". 118 The recipients of this "Warsaw letter" did not leave these accusations unanswered and refuted them one by one. In their written reply they stated emphatically: "We do not see any realistic reasons which would entitle you to assert that our present situation should be branded as counter-revolutionary."119 The Party Secretary Dubcek went 117) Pravda (Bratislava), July 7, 1968. 118) Prav da (Bratislava) , Special edition, July 18, 1968. 119) ib. �SLOVAKIA 171 on the air to reassure his countrymen (on July 18, 1968): "We do not want to abandon anything at all from our principles." The outcome of this correspondence was the confrontation between the 11-man Soviet Politburo and the entire 11-man KSc Presidium at cierna nad Tisou (July 29-Aug. 1, 1968), and afterwards the multilateral "comradely" meeting at Bratislava on Aug. 3. The official communique was inconclusive and the whole outcome of the conference was rather dubious. 120 Both participants ( i. e. the KSC on the one hand and the Communist Parties of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other) were convinced that they had successfully defended their own tenets of socialism. In a nationwide broadcast Dubcek again attempted to calm his fellow citizens: "You can be fully satisfied with the results and the spirit of the talks. We have kept our promises (i.e. not to deviate from the post-January course)." It sounded too good to be true. For the next 18 days Czecho-Slovakia lived in a fool's paradise, while the Red Army, under the pretext of largescale manoeuvres, was preparing the invasion of CzechoSlovakia. On Aug. 20-21, 1968, in defiance of their solemn promises to respect the national independence of every Socialist country, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five Communist countries invaded Czecho-Slovakia and put a sudden end to the great democratization experiment. In this gesture of Cain-like brotherhood Communism displayed its fear of democratization, its abhorrence of freedom, its inability to satisfy even the most elementary of human desires. It demonstrated that Communism cannot be liberalized without ceasing to be Communism. During that fateful night of Aug. 20-21 the progressive leaders of the KSc were kidnapped and taken in chains to Russia. This high-handed action of the Socialist allies 121 provoked a loud and indignant outcry all over the world, and-most unexpectedly-a resolute condemnation by the majority of the world Communist Parties, including those of China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, France, Italy, Great Britain, 120) Pravda (Bratislava), Aug. 4, 1968. 121) A Chronology of Occupation in East Europe, No. 10/ 1968,pp. 38-46. �172 SLOVAKIA Australia, etc. But by far the most effective was the reaction the Soviets encountered in the occupied country. It is impossible to describe in detail the ingenious methods of the passive and less passive resistance by which the Slovaks and Czechs frustrated the occupiers' efforts to "normalize the situation". The invasion united the Czech and Slovak nation in their opposition to this cruel act. But it appears that there was much less unity of action in the Party ranks. The KSS refused to back unconditionally the activities of the KSc in the first post-invasion days. The XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc, scheduled for Sept. 9 was hurriedly convened and took place during the night of Aug. 22 under the very nose of the occupying troops in a big Prague factory ( cKD plant) . The delegates (1095 out of 1543 expected to attend) elected a new Committee of 144 members. Of these 118 were new members and only 26 belonged to the old Central Committee. The representation from Slovakia amounted to 42 members, an unprecedented proportion, and there were 8 Slovaks in the 28-man Presidium: Dubcek, Husak, Zrak, 1'azky, Sadovsky, Colotka, Turcek, Pavlenda, Samel (?). 122 This should have satisfied the Slovaks, but it did not. The Soviets denounced the XIVth Congress in the most violent terms and did their utmost to undo it. According to Western reports the secret protocol drawn-up at the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet "negotiations" (sit venia verbi) on Aug. 28, 1968 contained 14 demands, one of which asked for the invalidation of the XIVth congress . As it happened this was the first thing the Russians succeeded in obtaining. A key role in making this congress into an "unevent" was played by G. Husak who was one of the negotiators in Moscow. While he was abroad the extraordinary Congress of the KSS started ( on Aug. 26 ). Husak returned just in time to deliver his address on the last day of the session. In his speech he questioned the legality of the XIVth Congress of the KSc and advised the delegates to the KSS Congress to reverse their stand taken three days earlier and to disavow the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc. Husak argued that at the XIVth congress the Slovak representatives to the Party 122) Prav da (Bratislava ), Special edition, Aug. 25, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 173 organs were elected "illegally" ... "undemocratically", that "out of 300 Slovak delegates selected to attend the congress proceedings only 4, later 22, and towards the end about 40 were present". 123 In complete disregard of the fact that it was the Russians who had prevented the Slovak delegates from participating at the Congress Husak addressed his indignant reproaches at those who elected him to the Party Presidium: "Nobody can impose on a sovereign nation and its party its will in a way we have witnessed, namely that a little group of people entrusted by nobody should determine the nation's political representation."124 Of course Husak's anger and fury would have been even greater if the XIVth Congress had failed to nominate him or some of his close associates to the position in the top Party hierarchy. His rhetoric was just a clumsy display of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactics. In sharp contrast to the XIVth Congress of the KSC, the Congress of the KSS was allowed to proceed undisturbed. It was attended by 607 of the 638 choosen delegates. It elected a 131-man Central Committee and a 12-member Presidium composed of Husak, Bod'a, Falt'an, Harencar, Klokoc, Luptak, Novomesky, Pavlenda, Sadovsky, Sedlakova, 'l'azky and Zrak. The 7-man Secretariat consisted of G. Husak (First Secretary) , L. Abraham, B . Graca (ideological spokesman ) , V. Pavlenda, S . Sadovsky, J. Turcek and J . Zrak. This was an entirely new team personally hand-picked by Husak. All of Novotny's men and Husak's opponents were either ousted (Bil'ak, Sabolcik, Pecha, Riga, Kriz, Hruskovic, Dvorsky, etc.) or demoted to ordinary Central Committee membership (Janik, Barbirek, Zupka, etc.). In the resolution of the Congress the Plenum took a stand on a number of current issues created by the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Slovakia, but the only problem it tackled with determination and vigour was that of federation. Husak said in his concluding address: "I recommend that we approve . . . our insistence on the federative rearangement of our state on the basis of principles outlined earlier and it should be enacted by Oct. 28 this year." 125 In the subsequent weeks the Slovak Communists pursued this 123 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 124) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. 125) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. �174 SLOVAKIA point of their program forcefully and relentlessly to its logical conclusion. The federation was indeed enacted on Oct. 27, 1968 and put into practice on Jan. 1, 1969. Today's Czecho-Slovakia consist of two Socialist republics, the Czech and the Slovak, with three governments, Czech, Slovak and Central. It can be said that federation is the only paragraph salvaged from the ambitious Action program of Dubcek's leadership. The draft of the new Party statutes was published for discussion early in April 1968 and it proposed that the Party too should be reorganized on federal lines. 126 It envisaged the Communist Party of the Czech lands and the Communist Party of Slovakia to deal with internal and domestic matters; for international representation and in matters which exceeded the limits of national competence there was to be a single representative of the two national parties, i. e. the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This proposition was politely forgotten after August, 1968; the Russians apparently did not like it. (Of course there were many other things the Russians would loathe to see in.practice, such as the new concept of democratic centralism, election of all party organs by secret ballot, limited terms of service on regional and national party committees, etc.). Thus whilst the KSS achieved a funda• mental alteration in the structure of the state, it was unable to adjust the structural pattern of the Party to fit the new political situation. The KSS is still without counterpart in the Czech lands 127 However, under Husak's new leadership the KSS has undergone a remarkable revival. In its relation to the KSc it has become more aggressive and self-assertive. The days of blind obedience of the Party line drawn up in Prague have been replaced by an avowed and dedicated service 126) Rude pravo, Supplement, Aug. 10, 1968. 127) At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSCS on Nov. 14-17, 1968 a substitute-counterwei ght to the Central Committee and Presidium of the KSS was set up: the so-called Party's Bureau for the Czech regions. It functions within the framework of the Central Committee of the KSCS, consists of 11 men and is headed by L. Strougal, assisted by two Secretaries (V. Hula and J . Kozel). The weekly journal "Tribuna" is its official organ. The only better known personality in the Bureau (beside L. Strougal) is the Prime-Minister Cernik. �SLOVAKIA 175 to the needs of the nation. At least that was what G. Husak proclaimed at the KSS Congress: "Let this Party rid itself of everything which is irresolute, everything which is opportunistic, let endure in it all that is firm, noble and prepared to struggle for the rights of this nation. 128 It remains to be seen to what extent the KSS will be able to realize this resolve. The strongman Husak was known to have made similar speeches in 1945-48, but after 1948 he was gradually silenced, removed from his Party posts and eventually imprisoned. So far he has succeeded in bringing about federalization of the state, but in the process he has antagonized a few influential groups in Slovakia (liberal writers, journalists, intellectuals) and the majority of the Czech population. He is being depicted in the Western press as a man who enjoys the trust of the Russians, as the man who annulled the XIVth Congress of the KSc, as the man who was instrumental in the removal of Smrkovsky, etc. 129 The conflict and dialectical contradictions between the Czechs and Slovaks are at present as acute as ever. Federation solved one old problem but generated at least a dozen new ones. The part played by the KSS in Slovak national history shows too much on the debit side and very little on the credit side. In the years 1948-67 the KSS was without doubt the most powerful single factor in shaping Slovakia's history. Yet in most instances it was a force which, with cynicism and arrogance, stood as a stumbling-block between the nation and its freedom, between the people and their political and cultural self-expression. In those years the KSS was just a tool of terror and intimidation wielded by a foreign oppressor over the Slovak masses. These things were openly stated in many sensational revelations 128) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. A question can be asked at this point as to how much the Party membership will drop if it is going to rid itself of everything which is opportunistic and irresolute and retain only that which is firm and noble. In 1968, just before the Soviet invasion the Party had in Slovakia 220,000 organized members, i. e. less than 6% of the population. If Husiik's criteria are applied this number can only decrease. 129) See e.g. the article of L. Vlasic: Pohyb s cudnym pozadim in Nove slovo, No. 1/ 1969, pp. 3 and 14. Also Husiik's speech at the Plenary session of the Central Committee KSC-S (Rude pravo, Jan. 21 , 1969, p. 7) . �SLOVAKIA 176 which appeared in the censorship-free press during the March-August period of the Dubcek era. The new leadership of the KSS has repeatedly stated that the return of the old days is out of the question. Yet (apart from federation) one witnesses almost daily a gradual retreat from the gains and achievements of the liberalization process. The presence of Red Army units in the country (now sanctioned by a treaty) makes certain that the conditions imposed on the KSC leadership on Aug. 28, 1968 are being implemented. How-under these circumstances-will the KSS safeguard the interests of the nation? Time alone will tell. Appendix I. N umerical representation from Slovakia in the Central Committee. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo of the KS(: (including candidates) in 1921-1968. Members in Members in Members in KSC. Seer. C. Committee KS(: Presid. Party Congress - -- Merger-Congress (1921) I 36 6 16.6 I. Congress ( 1923) I 26 5 19.4 II. Congress ( 1924) 50 6 12.0 52 III. Congress ( 1925) 6 11.5 52 IV. Congress ( 1927) 5 from Nov. 1928 I ? I ? 9/ V. Congress ( 1929) 52 1 4 7.7 4 7.8 51 VI. Congress (1931) 8 16.0 50 VII. Congress (1936) ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '38) ? ? ? Exile KS(: Paris, 1939) ? ? ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '43) Post-war KSC (Ko~ .• '45) I 21 10 47.7 VIII. Congress ( 1946 ) I 101 0 0.0 170? 32 18.8 from July 1948 108 22 20.2 IX. Congress ( 1949) 112 23 20.3 X. Congress (1954) 147 33 22.5 XI. Congress (1958) 147 30 20.4 XII. Congress ( 1962) 166 28 16.8 XIII. Congress ( 1966 ) ? ? ? from Jan. 1968 XIV. extraordinary ('68) I 144 42 29.2 1921-1968 ll485j 254 j 17.8 II I i I 12 8 9 9 11 15 17 10 12 7 3 7 7 14 18 21 11 15 12 15 19 28 270 I - -- - - 0 0.0 -- --0 0.0 -- --7 1 11.0 0 0.0 1 14.6 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 2 33.3 6 3 20.0 1 20.0 5 1 5.9 ? ? ? 1 10.0 4 1 8.3 1 25.0 0 0.0 No 1 33.3 Secretariat 0 0.0 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 elected 2 9.5 1 14.6 7 2 18.2 0 0.0 6 1 12.5 4 26.6 8 1 12.5 4 33.3 8 0 0.0 8 5 33.3 0 0.0 6 31.5 ? ? 8 28.6 41 j 15.2 jj 79 j 8 I 10.1 /I �SLOVAKIA 177 Append.ix II. The Leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) . (The office holders of the top Party positions in 1939-1969) A. ILLEGAL KSS. First Committee (March 1939-Aug. 1941): I;, Benada, J. Duris, J. Osoha. Second Committee (Sept. 1941- April 1942): 0. Krajnak, J . Osoha, V. Skrabala. Third Committee (June 1942- July 1942) : S. Dubcek, J. Lietavec, J. Osoha. Fourth Committee (July 1942- March 1943) : S. Bas t'ovansky, M. Hrusov- sky. Fifth Committee (Aug. 1943- Sept. 1944): G. Husak, L. Novomesky, K. Smidke. B. KSS IN POWER. M erger-Congress (Sept. 1944) President: K. Smidke. Vice-Presidents: G. Husak, J. Cech. Committee members : K. Bacilek, R. Balco, R. Blazovsky, F . cap, K. Dolinsky, D. Ertl, I. Frlicka, 0. Jelen, J. Lietavec, J . Mazur, L. Novomesky, J . Pull, J . Soltesz, M. Smida, J . Sziics, L. Viktorin. Nati onal Conference at Zilina (Aug. 1945) Presidium - President: V. Siroky. Vice-President: K. Smidke. Members : S. Bast'ovansky, J. :i'.>uris, L. Holdos, G. Husak, J . Soltesz, F . Zupka , M. Valachovic. Secretariat: K. Bacilek, S. Bast'ovansky, L. Holdos, E . FrR From Apr. 1946: K. Moskovic. IX Congress of the KSS (May 1950). Presidium - President: V. Siroky. First Secretary: S. Bast'ovansky. Members: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J. Branik, M. culen, J . :i'.>uris, M. Falt'an, K. Moskovic, J. Pull, S. Rais, E. Sykora, F . Zupka. Secretariat ( established in Oct. 1951) : V. Siroky, S. Bast'ovansky, J . Pull, K. Moskovic, M. Gosiorovsky. From Dec. 1951 also : P . David and I;. Benada. Xth Congress of the KSS (June 1953 ) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J . Branik, M. culen, P. David, M. Falt'an, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, 0 . Pavlik, J . Pull, R. Strechaj , V. Siroky, F. Zupka. Secretariat: I;_ Benada, P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, J . Pull. ? Congress of the KSS (April 1955). Presidium: K. Bacilek, M. Bakula, I;. Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, 0. Jelen, P . Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka. �178 SLOVAKIA Extraordinary Con gress of the KSS (April 1957) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , P. Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Xlth Congress of the KSS (May 1958). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , J . Kriz, P. Majling, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P. David, F . Dvorsky, J. Kriz, J . Lenart. Xllth Party Congress (Nov. 1962). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, P. David , M. Chudik, J . Lenart, M. Sabolcik. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary till April 1963, when replaced by A. Dubcek) , V. Bil'ak, F . Dvorsky, J . Kriz, J. Lenart. Xlllth Congress of the KSS (May 1966). Presidium: F . Barbirek, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, A. Dubcek, H. :t'.lurkovic, M. Chudik, J . Janik, J. Lorine, M . Sabolcik. From Jan. 1968 also M. Hruskovic, R. Harencar, M. Pecho. Secretariat: A. Dubcek (First Secretary till Jan. 1968, when replaced by V. Bil'ak), J . Janik, M . Sabolcik, J. Zrak. XIVth Extraordinary Congress of the KSS (Aug. 1968). Presidium: G. Husak, K. Bod'a, S. Falt'an, R. Harencar, 0. Klokoc, s. Luptak, L . Novomesky, V. Pavlenda, s. Sadovsky, M. Sedlakova, A. 1'azky, J . Zrak. Secretariat: G. Husak (First Secretary), L. Abraham, B. Graca, V. Pavlenda, S. Sadovsky, J. Turcek, J. Zrak. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is a CULTURAL and CIVIC organization of Americans of Slovak descent. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA wants to help Americans of Slovak descent in American political life, in business or professions, in social standing, and along educational lines. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1969, Vol. 19 Description An account of the resource Vol. 19 (No. 42), 1969. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1969 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 125 F. Vnuk: Fifty Years of Comn1unist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) The first notable Slovak commentary on Communism was made by Marx's contemporary, :Cudovit stur. His assessment of Communism was an outright condemnation: "Communism, in spite of all efforts and false pretences to win for mankind its rights, only brings about its degradation, since it has no sound knowledge of mankind. Because of its insistence on principles which are impractical and unattainable Communism is one of the maddest figments ever originating in the human brain." 1 In the past forty years stur was much abused by the Slovak Communist intellectuals because of his alleged reactionary thinking. 2 Yet Stu.r's rejection of Communism seems to epitomize the Slovak attitude more fittingly than all the recent attempts by Communist historians to present Communism as a progressive ideology destined to uplift and enrich the Slovak nation. The inescapable geography which put Slovakia in Central Europe exposed the Slovaks to direct contact with political Communism as far back as 1918-19. Since then the Slovak nation has undergone the complete range of relations which can exist between a nation trying to assert its political identity and an aggressive ideology. These relations, full of drama, paradox and tragedy, are briefly outlined in this short history of the Communist Patry of Slovakia ( KSS). I. 1918-1921 The very beginning of the KSS is characteristic. The Party started its existence outside Slovakia, in Budapest. 1) In his major work, Slawentum imd die Welt der Zukunft, Quoted by D. Okali in Dav; spomienky a studie (Bratislava, 1965), p. 284. 2) e.g. L. Novomesky, in his pamphlet, Marx a slovensky narod (Mala kniznica Davu, 1933) and in his article, Karol Marx reviduje hist6riu Slovakov (Dav, 2/ 1933, pp. 18-19). 126 SLOVAKIA There in November 1918 Erno P6r, Minister for Foreign Propaganda in the Communist Government of Hungary, was entrusted by Bela Kun and Tibor Szamuely to organize the Slovak Communist Party as a section of the Communist Party of Hungary. 3 The Party conscripted into its ranks Slovak workers, apprentices and soldiers living in those days in defeated Hungary (particularly in Budapest, Ostrihom-Esztergom, Bekes-Csaba, etc. ). On March 27th, 1919 it began publication of its own daily, "Cervene noviny" (Red News ). 4 But the Party ran into difficulties when it had to find leaders for the conscripted Slovak proletarian masses. There was hardly a single Slovak of rank and stature to lend his name to the movement. Thus the reins were initially given into the hands of Jewish Socialist and Communist organizers in Budapest who could speak Slovak. To overcome this deficiency Bela Kun requested Lenin to send him some able Slovak Communist leaders from Russia, where a "Czecho-Slovak" Communist Party formed from the Czech and Slovak prisoners of war had been functioning since May 1918.5 But since there were no prominent Slovak personalities among these either, Lenin sent to Budapest the next best thing: the Czechs. Among these the most dynamic was one Antonin Janousek who arrived in Budapest in January 1919.6 After some disagreement with B. Kun (Janousek wanted to lead a Czecho-Slovak section; Kun and his advisors were strongly against it, seeing in it implicit recognition of the imperialistic policies of the Entente ) he 3 ) M. Vietor, Slovenska soviets/ca r epub lika (Bratislava, 1959), p. 53. 4) P. A. Toma, Slovak Soviet Repu blic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, p. 203 ). 5 ) D ej iny K SC (P raha, 1961 ), p. 17. 6) See: Z. Horeni, Antonin Jan ousek, predseda revolucnej v lady Slovenskej r epubliky rad (Bratislava, 1964). This accoun t of t he Slovak Soviet Republic is abstracted from the following books: K. A. Medvecky: Slovensk y prevrat I -IV (Trnava , 1930-31 ); Vpad bol'sevikov na Slov ensko ro ku 1919 (Trnava, 1936) : M. Vietor, Slovenskci soviet ska r epu bli ka 1919 (Bratislava, 1955); C. Holotik, 0 Slovenskej repub like rad r . 1919 (Historicky casopi s 2/ 1959); V. Kr al, lntervencni val ka cs. burzoazie proti mad'arske sovetske r epublice r . 1919 (Praha, 1954); K. Culen, 0 Slovenskej soviet ske j republike z ro ku 1919 (Kanadsky Slovak, May 19-June 9, 1956); P. A. Toma , Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, pp. 203-215 ). SLOVAKIA 127 was made head of the Czech section of the Communist Party of Hungary on April 12, 1919. Towards the end of April the Slovak and the Czech sections were brought under common leadership but it was plainly stated that the Slovak section was to maintain its independence and individuality. There was never a Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist Party of Hungary. The most important .went in the life of this Slovak section was thf, proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic which lasted only two weeks but which has become a source of confused pride and political embarrassment to the contemporary Czech and Slovak socialist historiographers. On May 20th, 1919 the Hungarian Communist government, accusing the Czecho-Slovak armed forces of violation of the Paris Agreement, ordered its Red Army to invade Slovakia. Carried on the wave of proud Magyar national ism, humiliated by the 1918 defeat, the Magyar troops swept the southern and eastern plains of Slovakia. They took Lucenec on May 30th, Levice on June 1st, Nove Zamky on June 2nd, Kosice and Banska stiavnica on June 6th, Presov on June 8th, Bardejov on June 11th and penetrated as far into Central Slovakia as Zvolen. On June 3rd, 1919 "Oervene noviny" wrote exultantly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is being established in Slovakia." The actual proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic took place at Presov on June 16th, 1919. It was ruled by the Provisional Revolutionary Executive Committee made up largely of Magyar-Jewish and Czech left-wingers. The only Slovak member of some significance was Stefan Stehlik. On June 20th, 1919 the Committee elected a Slovak Revolutionary governmem headed by Antonin Janousek. To T. G. Masaryk, who was residing in Prague as the elected President of Czecho-Slovakia, Janousek sent this challenging message: "We explicitly declare that from now on Slovakia belongs exclusively to the Slovak working class." 7 The donstitutional status of this short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic was obscure, but one thing was beyond doubt: it was violently anti-Czech and fiercely pro-Magyar. It aimed at the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia and was 7) Quoted by. K. culen in Kanadsky Slovak (of May 26, 1956), p . 3. 128 SLOVAKIA openly and aggressively separatist. Both Kun and Lenin considered Czecho-Slovakia as a wilful creation of capitalist Powers and as a tool of imperialist policies in Central Europe. Czecho-Slovakia was alleged to deny the Slovak people "its inalienable right of self-determination" and the Communists in establishing the Slovak Soviet Republic were rectifying this injustice. 8 In spite of all its revolutionary zeal the Communistsponsored separatism did not strike roots among the Slovak masses. They were not only apathetic but manifestly hostile to the venture in which they saw only an ill-disguised attempt of the moribund Hungary to save its territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the Hungarian Red Army from Slovakia (June 28-July 4, 1919) spelled the inevitable end of both the Slovak Soviet Republic and the Slovak section of the Communist-Socialist Party of Hungary. The Slovak decision in 1918 to exchange their hopeless life tinder the Magyars for a hopeful life with the Czechs was final and irreversible. 9 But it was a decision fraught with problems and difficulties. Slovakia entered the newly formed Czecho-Slovakia as a land of poor peasants with practically no Slovak urban proletariat. The adherents and disseminators of the Socialist ideas were largely the German and Magyar ( or magyarized) workers who were as contemptuous of their Slovak comrades as Marx and Engels had been of the Czechs and Russians. This antipathy was 8) Stefan Stehlik wrote in Cervene noviny (of July 7, 1919) : " On Slovak soil, freed from imperialism, today there was created an independent Slovak Soviet Republic. The first impulsive action of the proletariat liberated from t he yoke of Czech imperialism was to realize the right of self-determination which is being exhorted by the oppressors with such a great glory; in reality however, it is being perverted by them . . . Slovak Soviet Republic turns its weapons ... against all who threaten this real unpe rverted democracy, this inallienable right of self-determination" (by which at that time they could have meant only the Prague Government). Quoted by P . A. Toma , op. cit. pp. 208-209. 9) The first years of the Slovak-Czech relationship and its reflection in Slovak political, social and economic life, are described at length in several authoritative works, e.g.: F . Peroutka, Budovani statu I -IV ( Praha 1933-36 ) ; J . Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko -tihorske ( Praha, 1928) . V. Chaloupecky, Zapas o Slovensko (Praha, 1930 ), I. Derer, siovensko v prevrate a po nom (Bratislava, 1924) ; K. Sidor, Andrej Hiinka 1864-1926 (Bratislava, 1936) . SLOVAKIA 129 mutual and in their anti-Magyar feelings the leaders of the Slovak Social Democrats (Derer, Lehotsky, Markovic) were indistinguisha ble from their bourgeois counterparts (Hlinka, srobar, Hodza). Thus in the political sense the parties contesting the first post-war elections in Slovakia offered very much the same program. It was only in the field of social reform that they differed. Here the Social Democrats surpassed everybody in generosity, promising to implement many far-reaching social and economic measures. Their radical policies appealed to the people dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions. Thus in the general election of April, 1920 the Slovak people gave their votes to the Social Democratic Party led by Ivan Derer. 10 The Magyars and Germans of Slovakia who refused to join Derer's political platform founded a Social Democratic Party of their own. 11 After its electoral victory the Slovak Social Democratic Party lost much of its fighting spirit, adopted many right-wing policies of moderation and even passivity while the Magyar and German Social Democratic Party moved further to the left towards radicalism and turbulent activities. It was led by an able group of ruthless leaders (most of them Jews, several served as Commissars in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun) who were constantly harassing "the reformist Social Democratic government" of V. Tusar by fomenting strikes, unrests and other forms of trouble. 12 Their activities 13 became fatal to the Slovak Social Democratic Party which was rapidly sliding under Czech control and soon became identical with all the unpopular measures of the Government. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's inability to fulfil its pre-election promises or to prevent the economic ruination of Slovakia, and the subsequent wholesale unemploymen t, brought about a massive 10) The Social Democratic Party polled 510,341 out of 1,341,191 valid votes and obtained 23 deputies in the Prague National Assembly. 11) They received 108,546 votes and obtained 4 deputies. 12) J. Mlynarik, Robotnicke hn•itie na Slovensku roku 1920 (od parla• mentnych volieb do decembroveho genercilneho strajku). Historick)' casopis, I/ 1960, pp. 26-27) . 13) Their strongholds were four population centres in the Slovak-Magyar borderland: Bratislava, where the German-languag e, "Volksstimme" was published, Komarno, Gelnica and Ko~ice, where the Magyarlanguage, "Kassai Munkas", was published. 130 SLOVAKIA desertion of the rank anc'l file members within months after the election. 14 In the meantime the Magyar Social Democratic Party at Kosice joined (in May 1920) the Third International and invited the other proletarian parties of Slovakia to follow suit. This proclamation was eagerly listened to by many Social Democratic leaders dissatisfied with Derer's weak and inept leadership. 15 In September 1920 at the Party Congress at Turciansky Svaty Martin Derer failed to win a vote of confidence ( out of 132 delegates only 15 voted for him). Unwilling to accept defeat he proclaimed the handful of his followers to be the only true Slovaks and true Social Democrats by which he drove the dissidents into a coalition with the Magyar and German left-wing radicals. The fruits of this coalition ripened rapidly. On January 16-17, 1920 the left-wingers of the Slovak, Magyar and German Social Democracy, as well as the Jewish Poale Sion, met at ~ubochna and founded the Communist Party of Slovakia in everything but name. 16 It is interesting to look at the national composition of the delegates participating at this Congress. Out of 149 delegates with voting rights 88 were Slovaks, 36 Magyars, 15 Germans, 6 Ruthenes, 4 Jews. 17 The omission to register under its own name proved a very serious one for the future destinies of the KSS. Against 14 ) M. Strhan, Kriza priemyslu na Slov ensku v rokoch 1921-23 (Bratislava , 1960, pp. 15-80), J . Kramer, K dejinam priemyslu na Slovensku za prvej CSR (Bratislava, 1955). 15 ) ~- Holotik, Sjazd socialno-demokratickej strany (l'avice) na Slov ensku v januciri 1921 (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1963) , pp. 340-341. 16 ) 1921. Spomienky na vznik KS(: (Bratislava, 1962). The Czech dele gate at the Congress, I. Olbracht, requested the assembled repre- sentatives of the Slovak Left to postpone the adoption of the name " Communist Party of Slovakia" in order to be able to adopt the name " Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia" later on. See also Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 165-166. 17 ) From the report of the voting commission, as quoted by M. Dzvonik 0 istom zakladajucom sjazde (Kulturny zivot, 7/ 1966, p. 6) . See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (Slavic Review, 14/ 1955, p. 353). Skilling gives slightly different figures, viz. 92 Slovaks. However, it must be mentioned that these numbers are somewhat misleading, especially with regard to the Jews who were present in every national group, and the Magyars, many of whom were counted as Slovaks. SLOVAKIA 131 the opposition of the Magyar delegates the Congress agreed to keep the question of the Party's name in abeyance. They decided to wait for developments in the Czech lands where the situation was ripening at a less r~pid rate. Finally at its XIVth Congress (in May 1921) the Czech Social Democratic Party formally accepted the ideological split in its ranks. Its left wing reconstituted itself as the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia ( KSc) immediately absorbing the Slovak section which, nameless and unaffiliated, had been waiting for four months for this moment.18 By this process the KSS lost its identity, becoming an anonymous partner in an unequal partnership. II. 1921-1929 The newly constituted KSC was from its beginning dominated by Czech-German leadership and looking largely after Czech national interest. Slovakia-because of the lack of native leading cadres-soon became a battlefield where the Czech and Magyar elements were fighting for influence . The Czechs were trying to woo the Slovak electorate by defending the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and the integrity of its territories. Already in September 1921 Klement Gottwald had become editor of a Slovak language Party paper, "Hlas l'udu" (People's Voice), and later in 1923 editor-inchief of another Commun.ist paper, "Pravda chudoby" (Poor Man's Truth). Other prominent Czech Party organizers who came to Slovakia in the early twenties included Karel Bacilek, Karel Schmidke and others. 19 While the Czechs concentrated mainly on the Slovak electorate, the Magyars tried to hold together a sizeable portion of the Magyar electorate by advocating revisionism, self-determination for ethnic minorities, etc. In the meantime Slovakia was becoming restive and in18) Dejiny KS(; (Praha , 1961) , pp. 170-172. While the Communist Party of Slovakia fused into the KSC smoothly and without murmur, the Communist Party of the Sudeten Germans (formed in March 1921 ) refused to amalgamate with the KSC . Its resistance was broken in November 1921 but only after Lenin's intervention. 19) Gottwald's activities in Slovakia, adorned with the socialist glamou;: of the cult era, are the object of a book by Z. Holotikova, Kl ement Gottwald na Slovensku v rokoch 1921-24 (Bratislava, 1953). Karel Schmidtke began to write his name as Karol Smidke only after 1945. 13l2 SLOVAKIA creasingly discontented with Czech administrative methods. economic and social discrimination and especially with the crude disregard of the Prague Government for the political aspirations of the Slovak natibn. The Slovaks were putting forward their demands for the promised autonomy but no one would listen. Even the KSC, dominated at the time by Czech nationalists, had only scorn for the Slovak demands. At its First Congress it declared: "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation." 20 This mistaken and unrealistic attitude was severely censured at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow (June-July 1924) where the following resolution was adopted: 1. The Congress affirms that in Czecho-Slovakia there does not exist a single Czechoslovak nation and that the Czechoslovak state, in addition to the Czech nationality, consist of the following nationali ties: Slovak, German, Magyar, Ukrainian and Polish. 2. The Congress considers it necessary for the KSC, in connection with these national minorities, to proclaim and to follow the slogan of the right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession. In particular the KSC must support the struggle of the Slovaks for their independence and it must strive continuously to wrest this movement for independence out of the control of the nationalist bourgeoisie and to bring it into a common struggle of the working class against capitalism ... 21 For the Czech Communists it was a bitter pill to swallow. Under its impact the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow was split into a majority and minority, the majori20) Protokol I. radneho sjezdu KSC (Praha, 1923 ), p. 14. In practice the KSC plainly demonstrated its Czechoslovakist and centralized tendencies. On January 1st, 1922 the KSC abolished the provincial Party structure in Slovakia, splitting the country into four regions directly subordinated to the Central Executive Committee in Prague. Shortly afterwards it abolished Slovak trade union organizations. Such moves seriously hindered the Party activities in Slovakia and antagonized many honest and sincere Slovak left-winge rs. These either left in disgust (like J . Schiffel, who returned to the U.S.A.) or were expelled as agents of the nationalist bourgeoisie (like Culen, Vercik and others ). 21) Pjatyj vsemirnyj kongress komunisticeskogo intenacionala, 17. ijuna - 8. ijttlia 1924 g. Stenografisceskij otcot, Cast' II. (Prilozenija) , ( Moskva, 1925 ), p. 129. SLOVAKIA 133 ty refusing to accept the resolution of the Comintern. Among the ranks of the KSC the interference of the Comintern produced a serious crisis. The Second Congress of the KS(; was hurriedly convened in November 1924 to deal with the issue. The Congress met in the presence of a leading Comintern official, D. Z. Manuilskij. It was mainly due to his presence that the resolution issued at the end of the Congress proclaimed: "The Party cannot accept the bourgeois lie about the official Czechoslovak nation. By this ruse the Czech bourgeoisie wants to hide its colonial exploitation and bloody oppression of Ruthenia and Slovakia as well as other national minorities". 21 a But as it turned out even he was powerless to shake the dominating influence of the Czech nationalist right-wingers who in complete disregard of their own resolution continued in the old-style policies of ignoring the legitimate demands of the national minorities even within the Party.22 A dramatic development took place in March 1925. The Czech rightists and their arrogant attitude towards other nationalities, especially towards the Slovaks, were openly critized on the pages of "Pravda" by the Soviet expert on the nationalities problem, J. V. Stalin. Stalin saw the narrow-minded and selfish Czech nationalism as the roots of the right-wing deviationism in the KSC. He wrote: The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation ... And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Right and Left took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank . .. Such division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.23 Stalin's arguments were further developed by D. Z. Manuilskij who quoted, among others, such flagrant examples of national discrimination as the composition of the Politburo of the KSC which consisted of seven Czechs 21a) Protokol II. fadneho sjezdu KSt, (Praha, 1925) , p. 8. 22) Dejiny KSt (Praha, 1961), pp. 213-216. 23) J. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1954), Vol. VII., p. 61. See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism 1921-1929 (Slavic Review, 19/ 1960, pp. 238-239 ). 134 SLOVAKIA and two Germans but no Slovaks, Magyars, Poles or Ruthenes. 24 The elections in 1925 were the first real test of the Party's hold on the masses. On the whole the Party did not score badly: it emerged as the second strongest party in Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia the election results were a telling commentary on the existing situation. The Social Democratic Party practically disappeared (from 510,341 votes in 1920 to 60,581 votes in 1925). But its voters joined mainly the Hlinka People's Party which captured 489,027 votes (2 35,389 in 1920), i.e. 34.3 % of the Slovak electorate thus becoming the largest Slovak party.25 The Communist Party gained 198,212 votes in Slovakia but its support came mostly from the non-Slovak voters as can be seen from a closer look at the districts which voted for the Communists and at the men who were elected into the Parliament26 ( out of 8 deputies 3 were of Magyar nationality: Kopasz, Major and Steiner). The failure to capture the masses of the Slovak rural proletariat was openly admitted in Moscow and was attributed to the Party's omission to adopt the correct position towards the nationalities problem in Czecho-Slovakia and in particular towards the Slovaks: In Slovakia . .. under the influence of the revolution, in 1920 the peasant masses moved strongly to the left, but in the course of the last four years, owing to the passivity of the Communist P arty in the national question, 200,000 peasants passed from the Socialist 24) D. Z. Manuilskij, Uroki ceskogo krizisa, (Moskva, 1925) . It was the Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the IIIrd Party Congress (Sept. 1925) which consisted of: K. Gottwald, J . Hais, J . Haken ( President) , J . Harus, B. Jilek, A. Neurath, V. Stern, B. Smeral and A. Zapotocky. 25) Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1926 ( Bratislava, 1936), pp. 535-538. 26) El•ectoral Corn. % % % d is trict vote of •totail :Mandates :.\1:agy ars German5 1. ove Zamky 2 20.0 61 ,577 62.3 6.8 2. Ko§ice 20.9 40,095 2 41.6 9.9 3. Trnava 28,606 13.9 2.3 1 1.8 4. Banska Bystrica 17,694 11.0 2.2 1 5.6 5. Turc. Sv. Martin 22,355 1 9.5 0.5 5.1 6. Lipt. Sv. Mikula§ 15,697 1 7.4 1.4 1.7 7. Prefov 6.2 12,206 2.6 0 0.7 SLOVAKIA 135 Party into a party, which, although it is clerical, fight for the autonomy.27 In spite of the impressive overall election results the Party was torn internally by rival factions. After ridding itself of the right wing (Bubnik) a new struggle developed between the so-called "ultraleft" (B. Jilek and V. Bolen) and "centre" (B. t5meral, K. Kreibich, A. Zapotocky). 28 These ideological conflicts touched the Party's life in Slovakia only marginally and even then the Czech leaders of the KSc in Slovakia (K. Gottwald in particular) were supporting the "centre" aginst the "left". In Slovakia the burning issues were not of ideological but of political and economic character. The continuous closing down of factories and industrial plants, growing unemployment, agricultural crisis, emigration, etc. were leaving little time for ideological disputes. 29 After 1926, when the Hlinka People's Party decided to join the government benches, the Communists tried hard to be the spokesmen of the Slovak people against the political wrongs and social injustices of the Czech bourgeoisie. Complete independence of Slovakia was advocated, Czecho-Slovakia was denounced as the offspring of an imperialist war. 30 In January 1927 the Party 27) G. Volkov, Ugnetennaja Prikarpatskaja Rus (Krestjanskij International, 3-5/ 1926, p. 126). ( Quoted in G. D. Jackson's Comintern and Peasant) (London, 1966), p. 288. 28) Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 249-269. 29) The economic situation of this period has been extensively studied by socialist historians, e. g. J . Mlynarik, Strajkove hnutie na Slovenska II. Zemerobotnici v obdobi 1919 az 1929 (Bratislava, 1961) ; P. Rapos, Priemysel Slovenska za kapitalizmu (Bratislava, 1957) ; J . Mlynarik, N ezamestnanost' na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1964) ; V. Plevza, K niektorym otazkam agrarnej krizy v rokoch 1924-34 na Slovensku (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1966, pp. 203-233); etc. 30) At this time the KSC in Slovakia at its National Conference at 2ilina (on July 25th, 1925) , launched, on Gottwald's instigation a massive campaign aimed at the expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia. The battle-cry of the Communist propagandists became : " Vypracte Slovensko! " ( Clea;: out of Slovakia!) . The full wording of the slogan was, "Vypracte Slovensko od potlacovacieho aparatu ceskej burzoazie", according to V. Plevza (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1965, p. 510) and "Vypracte Slovensko od nasilnickeho aparatu", according to J. Kramer and .J. Mlynarik (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, p. 438). Though there was no doubt about Gottwald's authorship of this slogan, the blame for the embarrassing "mistake" was put later 136 SLOVAKIA convoked a regional conference at Plesivec where it attempted to lead a nation-wide protest against the industrial decline of Slovakia. 31 But all with little success. In February 1929 the Fifth Congress of the KSC met. It passed into Party history as the final battleground where the splinter-groups of the Party dissidents were defeated and the "true bolshevist nucleus" of the Party came out victorious. But in spite of the intense ideological wrangle the Slovak question did appear on the agenda. The Slovak cause was defend by none less than K. Gottwald ( who was to emerge as the new leader of the Party) proclaiming before the Congress: "The !Ind Congress of the KSC declared null and void the theses of the Ist Party Congress (i.e. concerning the unitary "Czechoslovak" nation) but this was in words only . . . The ratification of the First Party Congress theses was only on paper, a mere formality".31a By promising new corrective measures Gottwald (who--it should be remembered-in those days was acting for the Party in Slovakia and was the spokesman for the Slovaks) swayed the overwhelming majority of the Slovak section of the KSC to the side of the victorious "bolshevist on J. Vercik, "the agent of nationalist bourgeoisie" (e.g. M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; ( ceskoslovensky casopis historicky), 1/ 1954, p. 4-15) . While attacking the Czech bourgeoisie for its oppression of the Slovak masses, the KSC leaders did not relax their centralist hold on their Slovak comrades. At each Party Congress the Slovak delegates complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs (See : Protokol III. fadneho sjezdu KSc [Praha, 1925] , pp. 41 and 73 ; Protokol IV. fadneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1927], p. 33 ; Protokol V . f<idneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1929] , pp. 40 and 50) , but in vain. This aspect of the Party history has been neglected by the socialist historians except a brief and restrained comment by J . Kramer and .J. Mlynarik, Revolucne hnutie a narodnostna ot<izka na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, pp. 423-443). For more recent writings on the theme see: Z. Holotikova, 0 rieseni narodnostnej otazky v KSc (Referat na konferencii Hist. ustavu SAV a ustavu dejin KSS, jun 1966) and J. Mlynarik, Dr. B. Smeml a slovensk<i n<irodnostn<i otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia (Cs. casopis historicky, 5/ 1967, pp. 653-666 ). 31 ) J . Pleva, Vy znam Plesiveckej konferencie v januari 1927 (Bratislava, 1958) . According to Kramer and Mlynarik (loc. cit. , p. 442, footnote 32 ) the importance of this conference was disproportio n ately inflated because of Gottwald's participation at it. 31a) Protokol V. f<idneho sjezdu KS(; (Praha, 1929) , p. 12. SLOVAK.IA 137 faction". 32 However, one point is worth noting: while the "bolshevist nucleus of the Party in Slovakia was made up of Bacilek, Siroky, Steiner, Urx" 33 (i.e. two Czechs and two Magyars), the dissidents ("nationalists and liquidators") who were expelled from the Party amidst a storm of abuse ( culen, Felcan, Vercik) were Slovaks. 34 III. 1929-1938 The internal struggle inside the Party was fought bitterly and not always behind closed doors . Inevitably it undermined the Party's image in the voters' eyes. In the 1929 elections it gained 152,242 votes ( 10.55 % ) in Slovakia, a considerable decline in voting strength when compared with the 1925 election results ( 13.41 % ) .35 Yet in Parliament the new "bolshevist cadres" displayed fierce and sanguinary pugnacity epitomized in the words of the new Party leader, K. Gottwald, addressed in December 1929 to the coalition benches: We are the revolutionary Party of Czechoslovak proletariat and in Moscow we have, indeed, our revolutionary General Staff. Yes we go to Moscow in order to learn. Would you like to know what we learn"! We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian bolsheviks how to break your necks. And you must admit that the Russian bolsheviks are very good at it.36 32) Z. Holotikova, Bol"sevizacny proces KS(; v rokoch 1924-29 (Historicky casopis 2/1957, pp. 204-210); M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; (Cs. casopis historicky, 1/ 1954, pp. 4-15). 33) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), p. 256. 34) Vercik, Mlynarik, Koren, etc. were branded as "nationalists" and expelled; Culen, Felcan, Kolarikova, etc. were branded as "liquidators" and expelled also. The latter were the authors of the so-called "Hlohovecke memorandum" (of December 1928) in which they requested the reorganization of the Party structure in Slovakia and complete freedom of action in specifically Slov~k matters. (See : Pravda of January 31, and February 7th, 1929). In 1930 the KSC finally consented to a limited decentralization and a Slovak province ("celoslovensky kraj") of the KS(; was instituted. S. Major (of Magyar nationality) and K. Bacilek (of Czech nationality) were put in charge. See: V. Plevza, Vytvorenie celoslovenskeho kraja a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku na zaciatku tridsiatych rokov (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1962, p. 184). 35) For an interesting statistical analysis of the 1929 election results see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern E urope (Princeton, N. J ., 1961 ), pp. 150-158 and 216-219. 36) K. Gottwald , Spisy I (Praha, 1953), p. 322. 138 SLOVAK.IA During the severe economic depression which swept the Western world in the late twenties and early thirties and which caused acute unemployment in Slovakia (some 250,000 in 1933) 37 the Communists organized hunger marches, protest meetings and strikes. A meeting in May 1931 at a small village in southern Slovakia, Kosuty, ended with a shooting fray resulting in the death of three demonstrators. The Party skilfully exploited the incident to advertize the social plight of rural workers in the Slovak countryside. 38 In the years 1929-33 the Communist press paid much attention to the political solution of the Slovak question and Slovak grievances were repeatedly aired on its pages. But as V. Kopecky confessed at the Vrth Party Congress (1931) it was more in the nature of lip service than anything else: "The decisions of the Vth Party Congress concerning the solution of the nationalities problem remained on paper only and in spite of repeated emphasizing of their importance by the central leadership of the Party there was no practical indication that we were fighting for the right of self-determination of the nations." 38a This national inequality was demonstrated even in the Party hierarchy. The higher Party ranks were-as beforean almost exclusive monopoly of the Czech and German comrades. The Presidium constituted at the Vrth Party 37) Pfehled ceskoslovenskych ilejin III (1918-1945) (Praha , 1960) , p. 325. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the emigration figures which were considerably greater for Slovakia (where only about 25 % of the total population lived) than for the Czech lands: Emigration from C-SR: from Slovakia: 1928 24,540 13,544 1929 30,715 19,401 1930 25,712 16,682 1931 9,567 4,527 1932 5,165 2,222 1933 4,735 3,099 38) The shooting at Kosuty has attracted unusually great attention from Communist propagandists and publicists, e.g. the pamphlet, Nyn·i je v Kosv,tech pofcidek a klid (1931); V. Plevza, Kosutska trag edia (Prispevky k dejinam KSC, 8/ 1959, pp. 91-107) ; E. Pauliny, Kosutske udalosti v maji 1931 (Bratislava-Martin, 1961) ; E. Kadnar, Krvave Kosuty ( Bratislava, 1963) . It is perhaps worthwhile to note that the inhabitants of Kosuty were of Magyar nationality and so was S. Major, the convicted instigator of the disturbance. 38a ) Protokol VI. fcidneho sjezdn KSC, (Praha , 1931), p. 143. SLOVAKIA 139 Congress had only one representative from Slovakia among its 15 members. 39 This omission was quite a serious matter, because by the midthirties the Communist Party of Slovakia was already producing its own native leaders. The young Slovak Communist students who in 1924 grouped in Prague around the quarterly Oater monthly), "Dav" (1924-1937), were growing up in stature and outlook and were ready and eager to take over from the Czech, Magyar and Jewish spokesmen of the Slovak proletariat. 40 Unfortunately they were striving for power at a time when the Party was purging itself of intellectual and other non-proletarian ballast, so that their hopes and expectations were frustrated.41 Other important changes in the Party line were also in the offing. The Party was directed by the Comintern to adopt new attitudes to a number of political issues. Up to 1933 the Communists considered democracy (i.e. bourgeois democracy) and fascism as "the children of the same mother, the bourgeoisie". 42 Masaryk, Benes, Hlinka, Kramaf were all Fascists of the same brand as Hitler and Mussolini. But by the summer of 1933 Stalin realized that Hitler was a much greater evil. Looking for new allies Stalin selected two of the most likely states worried by the growing power of Hitler's Germany: France and CzechoSlovakia. The KSc was instructed to take a more positive stand towards the official Czech foreign and domestic 39) It was E. Fried of Magyar-Jewish origin. Accordind to H. G. Skilling the ethnic composition of the 60-member Central Committee was as follows: 37 Czechs, 10 Germans, 8 Slovaks (and Magyars ), 4 Ukrainians and 1 Pole. See : H. Gordon Skilling, Gottwald and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1929-39 (Slavic Review, 20/ 1961, pp. 644-645) . The inadequate representation of Slovaks in the top P,0verning bodies of the Party apparatus (i.e. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo) is statistically summed up in Appendix I. 40) These young Communist intellectuals of the early twenties had their hey-day in the late forties and met a tragic fate in the early fifties. In the years 1950-54 they became the victims of purges and their rehabilitation began ,mly in 1963. For a post-rehabilitation view of the Dav-group see: S. Drug, Dav a davisti (Bratislava, 1965). 41) V. Plevza, Prispevok o cinnosti davistov v revolucnom hnuti za predmnichovskej CSR (Historicky casopis, 1/1964), pp. 20-21. 42) K. Gottwald , Spisy IV (Praha, 1951) , p. 212. 140 SLOVAKIA policies. This, of course, meant that the Slovak guestion and the nationalities problem in general had to be played down and the Party soon nodded its appproval where only a few months ago it used to voice its sharp criticism. 43 The signing of the Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Treaty in May 1935 marked a milestone in the Party's policy. The Party put on a mask of loyal respectability and replaced its internationalism by a newly-discovered patriotism. It conveniently forgot its past hostilities to "the imperialist agent Benes" and supported him in the presidential election in December 1935. At the Seventh Congress of the KSc (April 1936) the Party took a firm position "to defend CzechoSlovakia against Hitler". It became a zealous exponent of the Popular Front against Fascism and reaction, and the Slovak grievances once so prominent in its program were now hardly mentioned. The militant cry for "self-determination including the right to secede" was now replaced with much softer demands voiced by Gottwald at the VIIth Party Congress: "The Party will strive to achieve the realization of minimal requirements for normal coexistence of all nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia by insisting on a democratic policy towards nationalities and on equal rights for all nations ( of Czecho-Slovakia) in all spheres of public life." 44 The approaching municipal elections made the Party somewhat wary and hurriedly it came forward with a "plan for the economic, social and cultural advancement of Slovakia" announced at Banska Bystrica in May 1937.45 But the plan did not excite anybody. It was unrealistic and was looked upon as one of the many grandiose schemes which the Party submitted with monotonous regularity year after 43) A somewhat confused picture of the situation can be found in V. Plevza's KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1 938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 237-420. 44 ) K. Gottwald, Spisy VIII (Bratislava, 1953) , p. 167. This phase of Party activities is discussed at length in a number of publications such as Na obranu republiky proti fasizmu a v ojne (Bratislava, 1955) ; M . Filo, Boj KSC na Slovensku na obranu republiky (Bratislava, 1960) ; I. Kolesar, Otazka obnovy demokracie a demokratickych prciv i slobod proti fasizmu ( od VII. kongresu Kominterny r . 1935 ) Sbornik FFUK, 10/ 1959, pp. 163-181). 45 ) Deji11y KSc (Praha, 1961) , p. 359. Also V . Siroky, Za st'astne Slove nsko v socialistickom Ceslcoslovensku (Bratislava, 1952). 141 SLOVAKIA year, knowing well that it would never be called upon to implement them. The turns and twists in the Party line could not pos• sibly impress the Slovak electorate. In the municipal elections (May 1938) the Party found itself deserted by its erstwhile supporters. Its advocacy of pro-Benes and antiautonomist policies46 estranged it from the Slovak voters, while its noisy denunciations of the revisionist claims by Hungary, Germany and Poland antagonized its non-Slovak voters. The overwhelming electoral defeat in Slovakia (in the Czech lands the Party maintained its support) alarmed the Slovak Party leaders who clearly read the writing on the wall. 47 And thus on the eve of Czecho-Slovakia's disintegration the Party attempted another somersault and tried to sponsor the autonomistic cause, even if it meant forming a common front with Hlinka's Party. But it was now too late. No party in Slovakia cared for partnership with the Communists and Hlinka's Party least of all. The speed with which events marched by-passed the Party altogether. 46) J. U§iak, Boj KS(: s Hlinkovou slovenskou l'udovou stranou a vplyv na masy v obdobi ndstupu fasizmu (Pfispevky k dejindm KSC, 5/ 1963, pp. 710-29). Also V. Plevza, KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 462-474. 47 ) The Communist historians merely record the electoral defeat without going into details, without drawing any conclusion (e. g. Plevza, op. cit., p. 471 ). In many small towns the Communist vote virtually disappeared and in bigger towns it was severely reduced. On the whole the proportion of those who voted Communist dropped from 14% in 1935 to something like 8.9 % in 1938. No comprehensive results have been compiled so far; the Party historians carefully avoid this area. A brief glance at the election results in a few Slovak cities shows convincingly how the Party fared at the polls. (The results are compared with those of the Hlinka People's Party, the main beneficiary of the Communist loss. Figures are taken from Slovensky dennik of June 12, 1938): People's Party votes KSS votes Gain in% --19_3_5_[1938 ' ....Jl % _in--'l .... _L_o_s_s I _1_93_8__,_ 1 __,__1_93_5_ _ _ _T_o_w_n_ 2,493 I 44.3 j 1 8,133 5,640 45,7 2,399 1 2,856 i 5,255 Bratislava 333 I 37.91 910 1,243 88 13.5 554 Nove Mesto n / V I 642 44 I 607 I 563 I 1098 76 I 167 68.8 I 243 Snina 1 849 I 363 62.0I 586 4,658 2,098 I 2,560 55.0 Star11. !>ala I 1,064 1 ? 64 I ? Modra I 1,253 j ? 79 I ? Michalovce I 3,471 1 ? 777 I ? Trebgov (dist. ) I I I I I 1 142 SLOVAKIA The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia found the Party's fortunes in Slovakia at their lowest ebb. This was openly acknowledged by the Party leadership in its report to the Executive of the Comintern in December 1938. With a remorseful self-criticism V. Siroky confessed: We Comm un ists represe nted in Slovakia the national interests of the Czech nation, while the Slovak national interests were furth er represented by Hlinka's Party ... Only at the last moment as the Czechoslovak crisis was reaching its climax did we put forward a demand for the democratic solution of the Slovak problem, i. e. the granting of full autonomy.48 IV. 1938-1944 The declaration of autonomy on October 6th, 1938 was shortly followed by the suppression of Party activities and in January 1939 the Party was disbanded. The Party leaders escaped abroad and with regard to Party leadership in Slovakia, it is interesting to note that the Slovak nationals, if they got away at all, fled mainly to the West (Valo, Clementis ), while the non-Slovak leaders sought their refuge in the Soviet Union (smidke, Bacilek, Major. Siroky went first to Paris, then to Moscow) .49 Drawing conclusions from the rejection of the Party policies by the Slovak people and facing the new situation fairly and squarely, the Comintern decided on the last and long-delayed step : it gave its approval to the founding of an independent ( albeit illegal) Communist Party of Slovakia ( in May 1939 ). 50 Its leadership was entrusted to three relatively minor and unknown functionaries: J. Duris, L. Benada, J. Osoha. Of these the ablest and most dynamic was Jan Osoha, a Czech by birth. The leadership faced a tremendous task of building a network of illegal cells from the fragments and remains of what once was a Party organization in Slovakia. Traditional Party strongholds went to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938.50 a The 48 ) Deji~nii krizov atka (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 27-28. 49 ) Slovak Studies IV (Rome, 1964) , p. 30. 50) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961 ), p. 399. 50a) Interesting evidence of the solid support the Party received from t he Magyar-speaking population of Slovakia can be found in the recently published bibliography, Zoznam komunistickych novin a casopisov marxi.stickej l' avice z rokov 1919-38 (Martin, 1961). The bibliography lists 125 separate newspapers and periodicals of which SLOVAKIA 143 newly-acquired independence of Slovakia (in March 1939) was a powerful stabilizing factor on the political scene leaving very little scope for the subversive activities of the Communists.51 For the Communists the situation was further aggravated by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939), the Soviet participation in the Fourth partition of Poland and the Soviet recognition, both 'de facto' and 'de jure', of the independent Slovak state. Under the impact of these events the Slovak Communist leadership in the West (Paris) disintegrated.52 At home the Party leaders were even more confused and completely at a loss. The illegal handbills and propaganda pamphlets betray the prevalent mood of perplexity and obvious embarrassment of the underground Party organizers in their desperate attempts to explain away the things they could not comprehend. In the Soviet attitude towards the Slovak state they saw a sure sign of Soviet approval of the new geographicopolitical reorganization of Central Europe. In response to it they drew up, sometime in October 1939, a new political program, the key-note of which was: "The free and independent Soviet Slovakia." 53 This program became a dominant feature of all the illegal Communist activities in Slovakia up to 1944. It was only natural for an independent Party to sponsor such a policy in an independent state. But the scheme did not pass 71 were published in the Slovak language, 50 (i. e. 40 %) in Magyar, 3 in German and 1 in Ukrainian. 51) A. Huckova-Stvrtecka, cinnost' prveho ilegalneho Ostredneho vyboru KSS (Bratislava, 1959). 52) Clementis denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact for which he was expelled from the Pai ty, Siroky rapidly departed to Moscow and Valo retired into neutral passivity. About the impact of this infamous alliance on the Slovak (and Czech ) Communists in Paris, see Theo. I-I. Florin, S Vladom Clementisom v Parizi a v Lon.dyne (Dav, spomienky a studie, [Brati~ava, 1965), p. 467) . 53) Confiscated Communist propaganda handbills in the Archives of the German F'oreign Ministry, 56/ 38606-15. These documents help to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign for an independent Soviet Slovakia which was not later than in October 1939. At that time the Communists went to considerable trouble to explain that the Soviet Union had not exchanged Communism for the National Socialism of Hitler. 144 SLOVAKIA by unchallenged. The first to protest against this line was-as might have been expected-the illegal Communist Party in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia lead by Edo Urx who as a Party functionary had spent a number of years in Slovakia. The Party in the Protectorate continued to call itself the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It claimed to be the direct successor of the banned Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and a parent organization of the Communist Party of Slovakia. It advocated the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and objected to any policy promulgation which was not consistent with its current Party line. The Slovaks on the other hand were rejecting any kind of affiliation and insisted on equality and independence. After prolonged disagreement the dispute was referred to Moscow for arbitration 54 and there Gottwald issued a ruling completely vindicating the stand of the Slovak Communists. He sent the following message to Urx (in March 1940): Your pre-war pattern of thinking must change. Behind the slogan "Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia" are hidden imperialistic and antiSoviet schemes . .. We expressly emphasize that our Party fully accepts the right of self-determination both for the Czechs and fo r the Slovaks. This right of self-detevmination implies the right to live in an independent state. We fight for the restoration of the national freedom and territorial independence of the Czechs. As far as the Slovaks are concerned we fight for the complete sovereignity of the present-day Slovak state. It is this struggle for the right of self-determination which differentiates our road from that of Benes a nd world imperialism. The relation between the Czechs and Slovaks stand now on a new footing. Slovak separatism plays today a different role. That is why we are giving up the old slogans concerning Slovakia.ss Encouraged by this message the Slovak Communists tried to outdo in nationalist zeal everybody including the official Slovak propaganda. The only criticism they received from Moscow was the advice not to stress too much the Soviet character of their "independent Soviet Slovakia" program.56 54 ) The dispute is summarized in D ejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 63-88. 55) Deji nna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , p. 61. 56 ) S. Falt'an, Ku Kral'ov ej recenzii trochu inak (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1966, p. 58S. SLOVAKIA 145 The idea of national independence being at the root of the Party's illegal activities was not given up even when the Soviet Union gave its official recognition to Benes and his government then in exile in London. The clandestine journal, "Hlas l'udu" (Voice of the people ), commented on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benes and the Kremlin: The pact between the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile is not seen by the Communist Party of Slovakia as a pact with the government of a future state which has its established boundaries, its established regime. The (Czecho-Slovak) government in London was created without the participation and without the will of the working people in Slovakia . . . The question of an independent (Slovak) state, or autonomy, or federation with the fraternal Czech nation is now of secondary importance and it will be settled after the defeat and destruction of German imperialism.56a Slovak police and security organs who had infiltrated the illegal Communist organizations57 watched this development with keen interest. When the Soviet-German conflict broke out (June, 1941) the Slovak police within a few hours arrested all the members of the illegal Central Committee (except J. Osoha) and some 1,100 illegal Party activists. 58 Most of these were released from detention after three or four weeks and lost no time in regrouping and starting again. A new Central Committee was set up by J . Osoha and this in turn was broken up by the police in April 1942. J. Osoha again eluded the dragnet and at56a) Quoted by M. Gosiorovsky in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 371. 57) In this connection it is worth quoting from a report of the German Minister to Slovakia, M. v. Killinger (of August 19th, 1940): "Die ... in die kommunistische Zellen geschickten Leute bewiihren sich sehr gut, so dass der Erfolg der Arbeit gesichert und alle Zellen der hier, wieder erstehenden kommunistischen Organisationen erfasst werden. Die inzwischen festgestellten kommunistische Funktioniire werden listenmiissig geftihrt und laufend ergiinzt" (2276/ 47987684). 58) German documents 610/ 248627. At this time the Russians parachuted into Slovakia V. Siroky and V. Skrabala. But they were discovered very soon after their arrival and put in prison where Siroky stayed until 1945. When in 1949 Siroky emerged as the most powerful man in Slovakia trusted by both Moscow and Prague, legendary stories were written about his underground and illegal activities which lasted-when all said and done-some fi ve weeks. 146 SLOVAKIA tempted to organize the third Central Committee of the KSS. But in July he was caught and imprisoned together with the other members of the Committee. 59 These police actions deprived the illegal Party organization in Slovakia of all its old leaders trained in the Stalinist mould of blind and unquestioning obedience. Continuity with the pre-war Party politics was thus broken and the way was cleared for new men to emerge at the top. As it happened they were almost without exception the younger generation of the Party intellectuals, recruited and groomed by Vlado Clemen tis ( then in London). They lacked the rugged working-class background but they possessed the self-assertive spirit of intense national pride. One of them, Stefan Bast'ovansky, tried to continue (against his better judgement) with the illegal activities in the old traditional style (handbills and pamphlets read by very few, incitement to sabotage obeyed by nobody) only to find himself in prison by May 1943.60 The leadership of the demoralized and decimated ranks now passed into the hands of G. Husak and L. Novomesky, who disagreed with those tactics and methods which were costing the Party so much and achieved nothing. As the men on the spot they proposed a more subtle and unorthodox approach which took into account the political and social conditions in Slovakia, the mentality and sentiments of the masses and the weakness of Slovak war-time administration. The Party really went underground and the outward signs of activities almost disappeared. Moscow, disturbed by the apparent lack of fighting spirit, decided to send to Slovakia two trusted emissaries to revive the dormant proletarian masses. They were K. smidke and K. Bacilek. Neither of them was Slovak but both had worked in Slovakia in the interwar period. smidke, the more experienced of the two, listened with interest to the suggestions of the Slovak intellectuals and to their amazement he agreed with them. 61 smidke set up a new Central Committee of the KSS 59) 0 . Krajnak, Protifasisticke hnutie na Slovensku. (Nova mys! , 8/ 1964, pp. 695-703); G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964 ), pp. 33-36; Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 122-126. 60) Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964), p. 126. 61) G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 51-56. SLOVAKIA 147 (which included himself, Husak and Novomesky) re-established and revived the network of illegal Party organizations and directed their activities along a new and more realistic path. He entered into close collaboration with the bourgeois illegal groups (and, through them, with the army) and did not scruple to exploit to the full the nationalist sentiments and aspirations of the Slovaks. 62 The last thing was, of course, not an easy task, because in the meantime the Soviet Union had promised Benes to restore pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. And not only that. As revealed recently, Benes was given by Stalin, in December 1943, virtually a free hand in his dealings with the Slovaks. According to Fierlinger (Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Moscow) Stalin allegedly told Benes "to keep the Slovaks firmly in hand.''62 a By these tactics of exploiting nationalistic feeling in the country and with the military defeat of Germany looming larger and closer every day, the Communists and their bourgeois allies were preparing an armed uprising in Slovakia. Their conspiratory efforts were partly frustrated by an untimely start, triggered off by Soviet partisans, which doomed the venture to failure. But while it lasted (August-October 1944) "the Slovak national uprising" (as this revolt became officially known after 1945) was a remarkable achievement in several respects. 63 Its effect on the future political development of Slovakia was to be farreaching and lasting. Right at the beginning of the uprising the Communist Party of Slovakia came into the open and published ( on September 2nd, 1944) its proclamation in which it implied that Slovakia--though a part of Czechoslovakia-would have a very broad autonomy which would include even a sepa62) Slovenske ruirodne povstanie 1944 (Bratislava 1965), pp. 191-221. 62a) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava, 1968) . p. 11. 63) This event is by far the most written-about subject in modern Slovak history. For a critical review of bibliography on this theme see: F . Vnuk, Neuveritel'ne sprisahanie (Middletown, Pa., 1964) , pp. 181-191. Also S. Falt'an, Niektore otazky okolo hodnotenia SNP (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1964, pp. 161-185) . A complete bibliography of books and articles on the subject in 1963-64 was compiled by A. Kociska (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1965, pp. 309-328) . 148 SLOVAKIA rate army. 64 On September 9, 1944 the KSS began to publish the daily, "Pravda", proudly branded as "the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia".65 On September 17th, 1944 it arranged a joint Party Congress with the Social Democratic Party at which the Social Democratic Party merged into the KSS. It elected its own Central Committee with smidke as President, Husak and cech (Social Democrat) as Vice-Presidents. The Party displayed vigour and independence to a degree which both the Czech and the Soviet commissars found disquieting. The Czech Communists who were spending the war years in Moscow thought it necessary to reaffirm their primacy before it was too late and promptly dispatched to Slovakia two "experienced comrades", R. Slansky and J. sverma, to see that the Party line was correctly drawn and properly applied. After their arrival ( September 28th, 1944) the Slovak Communist leadership had to do as it was told. As a result there followed a great deal of retracting especially in those fields where exuberant nationalism had carried the home-grown leaders too far. The uprising revealed with startling clarity the secondary role and subordinate position to which the KSS was now relegated. In proclaiming their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Slovak Communists were negating the only positive asset of their political program so loudly advertised in 1939-44 under the slogan of an independent Soviet Slovakia. The blow was shattering not only to the Slovak people at large but also to the less doctrinaire Party members.66 In order to make the best of a bad job the Communists kept on assuring the people that the new Czecho-Slovak Republic would be incomparably better than the old one, 64) The proclamation persistently talks about " our Slovak (not Czechoslovak) army". For the full text of the document see: G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 257-258. 65) The daily, "Pravda", as it appeared during the uprising (September - October 1944) was recently reprinted and is available in a convenient form , Pravda v obdobi SNP (Bratislava, 1964) . 66) There were reports that workers at several places proclaimed a Slovak Soviet Republic (e.g. at Nemecke Pravno) ; in other places (Podbrezova) there was strong agitation for the proclamation of Soviet Slovakia. This unwillingness of the working class to return to a common state with the Czechs is most telling. SLOVAKIA 149 that the excesses of the Czech administration would not be repeated, that the Slovak national individuality would be unquestionably accepted, etc. In other words they were posing as the guarantors of all those rights and achievements which the Hlinka People's Party had secured for the Slovak nation when declaring autonomy (October 1938). They openly advocated a federated Czecho-Slovakia.67 Unfortunately for them in 1944-45 the Slovaks were past the autonomy stage and were thinking in terms of state independence. Against the opposition of many Czech politicians, including Benes himself, the Slovak Communists succeeded in retrieving from the wreckage of the Slovak independence some of those prerequisites which gave post-war Slovakia a quasi-autonomous status.68 What is even more surprising, they were able to preserve their own independence. And thus one finds in post-war Czecho-Slovakia a somewhat anomalous situation. Alongside the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there existed a Communist Party of Slovakia (with no regional equivalent in the Czech lands ) which to all intents and purposes was treated as a separate political party. As it happened it was a most expedient arrangement because it enabled the Communists in the critical post-war months (April 1945-May 1946) to have two Deputy Prime Ministers in the Provisional Government (instead of one) and almost twice as many ministers, parliamentarians, etc. as any other political party. V. 1945-1949 In the years 1945-6 the KSS was without doubt the most nationalistic party ever to enter the Slovak political scene. It was vehemently anti-German and anti-Magyar, and there seemed to be no limits to its nationalistic ex cesses. It lured into its camp Slovak voters by the promise of agrarian and wide-spread social reforms, it appealed 67) Thus spoke G. Husak at Kosice on February 28th, 1945: "We wan t to have a federated state ... in which each nation will be master in his own house."- See: G. Husak, Za narodnu a l'udovu demo kraciu (Kosice, 1945), p. 14. Also J. Jablonicky, Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 248-296. 68 ) Program prvej dorruicej vlady narodneho frontu cechov a Slovcikov (Kosice, 1945) . 150 SLOVAKIA to the nationalist and even the religious feeling of the people, it was willing to overlook anybody's past, no matter how compromising.69 Outwardly the KSS was united, but, as it transpired later, inside it was torn with internal jealousies which very soon decomposed its ranks and paralysed its strength as an independent political force. The old-guard leaders ( Siroky, Duris, etc.) who spent their war years in prison did not see eye to eye with the leadership which had been put together during the 1944 uprising (Husak, smidke, etc.). The Siroky-group intrigued against the smidke-Husakgroup and in their schemes they had the support of the Czech Communist leadership. In May 1945 at the joint session of both Party Presidia the Slovaks were compelled to adopt a common policy with their Czech comrades on all public issues of the day. The role of the KSS was defined as being "a part of a unitary KSC with a united leadership".70 In practice it meant a complete subjugation of the KSS to the dictatorial authority of the KSC. This was the end of the short-lived independence of the KSS (19391945). One of the first moves of Gottwald was to impose on the KSS a more amenable leadership to replace the smidkeHusak-group. In July 1945 Gottwald delegated Siroky to take over the Party affairs in Slovakia. 71 Siroky hurriedly convened a Party conference at Zilina (Aug. 11-12, 1945) where he was confirmed in his position as the Party President. Siroky saw to it that the top Party positions were filled with his men. Thus he had become, already in Aug. 1945, the undisputed authority in Party matters in Slovakia. "Siroky concentrated in his own hands and in the hands of his own group of collaborators in the apparatus of the KSS Central Committee factual decisions about Party 69) This is again another neglected chapter of the Party history. The nationalist excesses, especially against the Magyar minority, formed a part of the accusation levelled at the " bourgeois nationalists" in 1950-54. An oblique reference to the nationalist policies of the KSS has been made recently in the book of J. Zvara, A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes melogdasa Szlovakuiban (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 22-69. Also J . Jablonicky in Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) pp . 396-409. 70) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava 1968) , p. 55. 71 ) ib., p. 99. SLOVAKIA 151 policies, about the Party itself and about its leading cadres. These men were selected by Siroky himself according to his own personal likings", complained G. Husak recently. 72 Out of 9 men in the Party Presidium Husak identified these as the members of the Siroky group: Siroky, Duris, Bast'ovansky, Valachovic, Holdos. This leaves on the other side Husak, soltesz, smidke and Zupka. While acting as a strong man of the KSS, Siroky realized that he owed his position to the Czech Communists and consequently he was an ever-obedient executor of their wishes. In this way the policy of the KSS became divorced from the current needs and realities of the Slovaks. The policies of the KSc were designed to attract the Czech masses and paid very little attention to the Slovak national interests. The Party faced the first post-war electoral contest in a state of internal disunity, with a program which lacked conviction, realism and electoral appeal. Its only competitor for the allegiance of the Slovak electorate was the Democratic Party (heir and successor of the old Agrarian Party of M. Hodza) dominated almost exclusively by the Slovak Protestant bourgeoisie of proBenes sympathies. The Hlinka People's Party being banned, the Catholic section of the Slovak people ( the support of which was to decide the general election scheduled on May 26th, 1946) had no party of its own. To win these vital votes the leaders of the Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Catholics ("April Agreement") promising considerable concessions in exchange for the Catholic vote. 73 As a result of this solid backing of the Catholic majority the Democratic Party emerged victorious from the electoral contest polling 62.0 % of the total vote (999,622 votes), while the Communist Party gained only 30.4 % (489,596 votes), the remaining 7 ,6 % went to two minor parties or represented "white ticket" and informal votes. 74 While the electorate in the Czech lands overwhelmingly 72) G. Husak, Barnabitky a co im predchadzalo, in Nove slovo, No. 8/ 1968. 73) V. Precan, Slov ensky katolicizmus pred februarom 1948 (Bratislava , 1961), pp. 85-108. 74) Dejiny KSc (Praha, 1961), p . 504. 152 SLOVAKIA endorsed the Marxist policies 75 in Slovakia the Communist Party (which-it should be remembered-was already then a united party of both the Communist and the Social Democrats) came second best in what was actually a twoparty contest. This massive rejection of the Marxist policies led to deep soul-searching in the Central Committee in Prague and Bratislava. The Party now tempered (at least partly) its reckless nationalism and started to attack the Democratic Party for harbouring fascist and reactionary elements. 76 Though nominally both Communist and Democratic Parties were partners in the so-called United National Front they were soon fighting and abusing each other with fury and passion reminiscent of the interwar years. In spite of their electoral defeat the Communists, by clever and daring manipulation of their own and due to the ineptness, timidity and inexperience of the Democratic politicians were able to exert a decisive influence on the course of political events in Slovakia. They still retained the control of powerful organizations and pressure groups ( trade unions, farmers' organizations, partisans, etc.). Thus they were able to frustrate almost any attempt of the Democratic Party to honour its promises given to the Catholic voters.77 By their bullying tactics they brought about the estrangement between the leadership and membership of the Democratic Party. They accused many Democratic Party leaders of fascist conspiracy and subversive activity, demanded and got their removal from office and subsequent imprisonment (Kempny, Bugar, Stasko, Ursiny, etc.). Then in November 1947 they attacked the governmental positions of the Democratic Party, compelling it to give up 75) In the Czech lands the Communists received 38.9 % and the Social Democrats 15.8 % of the votes. The Marxist parties thus obtained 54.7 % . 76 ) M. Vartikova, Roky rozhodnutia. K dejiruim politickeho boja pred febriuirom 1948 (Bratislava, 1962); J . Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 247-253. 77 ) They engineered-with the help of their Czech comrades and colleagues-the sentencing and execution of the former President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso. By this they completely discredited the Democratic Party in the eyes of its voters, fully revealing its impotency and helplessness as a political force . See: F . Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso , President of the Slovak Repitblic (Sydney, 1967 ), pp. 37-40. SLOVAKIA 153 its majority in such administrative bodies as the Slovak National Council, the Board of Commissioners, etc.78 By this victory the Communists effectively undermined the morale of the non-Communist forces and the stage was set for a complete take-over. The notorious 'coup d'etat', by which the Communists came to power in Czecho-Slovakia in February 1948, was largely a Czech affair. The resignation of the non-Communist ministers and the ensuing governmental crisis were confined to Prague. The confrontation was staged and the struggle was lost by the Czechs in the Czech lands. 79 As far as Slovakia was concerned there the issue was solved almost inaudibly in a matter of hours (long before the crisis was over in Prague). The Communist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, G. Husak, took over the main Post Office building in Bratislava on February 23rd, 1948 and was in complete control of all postal services, especially the vital telecommunication links between Bratislava and. Prague. To all Democratic Commissioners he dispatched letters of dismissal and to make sure that they took notice, he requested the Commissioner of the Interior, M. Feriencik (nominally a non-party member of the Board), to post police guards at their offices, to keep the "dismissed'' Commissioners out. 80 Then the Communists reconstituted a new Board allocating to themselves 10 (out of 15) positions, giving the remaining ones to their fellow-travellers.81 This moment signified the zenith of the KSS. What followed afterwards was a steeply descending road leading to the unenviable position of the next two decades(1948-68). 78 ) In the reconstructed Board of Commissioners the Democratic Party had to share the chairmanship with a Communist and its majority of nine on the Board of 15 Commissioners was reduced to a minor ity of six. 79) There are many accounts of this "parliamentary take-over" of governmental powers by the Communists. For the losing party's version see e.g. H. Ripka's Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), for the winning-side versio n see e.g. J . Vesely's Kronika unorovych dnti 1948 (Praha, 1958) . 80) V. Vagassky, Komunisticka strana ceskoslovenska (New York, 1953roneoed) p. 8. 81) J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 259-260. li4 SLOVAKIA VI. 1948-1962 With the elimination of the non-Communist opposition there was no longer a need for two Communist Parties in one country. Steps towards the abolition of the KSS were taken on July 26th, 1948, when the Presidium of the KSc (consisting entirely of Czech Communists) decided: 1. The next meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS shall rule that the KSS ceases to exist as an independent party and become an integral part of the KSc. 2. The Party organization in Slovakia will still carry the name of KSS . 3. The Central Committee of the KSS shall be subordinated to the Central Committee of the KSc, it shall act according to its directives and it will implement the policy of the KSc in Slovakia. 82 This decision was proptly implemented on September 28, 1948 when the KSS, obeying the resolution of the Presidium of the KSc agreed to become "the territorial organization of the unitary KSC. 83 The merger was officially represented as a voluntary act mutually desired by both, and enthusiastically greeted by the Party press as such. But now it is admitted what has been generally known from the start that the Slovak Communists were most unwilling to give up their independence, to take up the status of an unprivileged minority destined to wait for the hand-outs of the senior and none-too-generous partner. Their fears were well justified but they could do nothing to prevent the inevitable. Thus they became the first victims of the renewed centralism with which the Communist rulers of Czecho-Slovakia were pursuing their new "socialist" policies. Gottwald, Kopecky and their accomplices, the authors and erstwhile advocates of Slovak selfgovernment, almost overnight forgot their earlier pledges. Robust and aggresive centralism was menacingly reflected in the new "Constitution of May 9th" (1948). In it the Slovaks were treated badly, 84 yet worse was still to come. 82) K. Kaplan, Utvcifeni genercilni linie vystavby socialismu v Ceskoslovensku (Pra ha, 1965) , p. 103. 83) Dejiny KSC (Praha, 1961) , p. 540. 84) While in 1945 the Commissioners were chosen by the Slovak National Council and responsible to it, in 1948 they were appointed by SLOVAKIA 155 Most of those political and national rights which-as claimed by the KSS-were secured by the Slovak uprising in 1944 and saved by the victory of the working-class in 1948 were gradually removed one by one by the same people who once fought for them. With incredible, even gleeful, outward obedience the Slovak Communists were curtailing their own rights, restricting their own freedom of action. This subordinate relationship which now existed between the KSS and KSC was subsequently written into the Party Statutes for everybody to see. According to these approved rules "the KSS directs its activities by the decisions of the Congress of the KSC and the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSC ... The KSS convokes its congress after agreement with the Central Committee of the KSC ... The Central Committee of the KSS carries out the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSc and with the approval of the Central Committee of the KSC it solves the political and organizational Party questions in Slovakia". 85 Committed to these rules and bound by Party discipline the Communists in Slovakia ruthlessly applied the general Party line as drawn up in Prague by the Central Committee of the KSc, and including such unpopular measures as collectivization of farming, nationalization of all sectors of private enterprise, down to small shops and one-man businesses, wholesale purge of public life of all real and imaginary opponents of Communism, cruel persecution of the Catholic Church, its clergy and religious, victimization the Prague Government. The protective measures introduced in 1945 to safeguard the rights of the Slovak against the Czech majority were all removed in 1948. To pass or amend legislation a mere three-fifths majority of deputies was required. The Czech majority in the Parliament was always higher than this. (In 1954 there were only 98 Slovaks among 368 deputies). 85) The Statutes of the KSc , paragraphs 40, 42 and 47. See : Pravda of December 20th, 1952. Numerically the Party drew noticeably less strength from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. Shortly after the 1948 merger statistics were issued showing that in 1949 out of 2,311,066 members and candidates of the KSC only 236,432 were from Slovakia, i.e. 10.3%. ( Rude pravo of May 27th, 1950) . This disparity continued into the fiities and at the Tenth Congress of the KSC (1954) the Slovak delegates formed a 10,2% minority (Pravda of June 16th, 1954) . At that time 28% of the population lived in Slovakia. 156 SLOVAKIA of the intellectuals, adulation of Stalin and Gottwald, indiscriminate application of "superior Soviet methods" in all walks of life, etc.86 And when they did all these repugnant and hate-fometing tasks their Czech masters struck them with a wave of bloody purges. In the years 1949-54 (and especially after the Ninth Congress of the KSS in May 1950) the ranks of the Slovak Communists were decimated with a fury of terror which in its scope and horror surpassed all the blows ever inflicted by their class enemy. The purges form the most tragic and most neglected chapter in the history of the KSS.B 7 Within five years (1949-54) the KSS lost in purges seven out of 13 members of its Presidium (Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, ~midke, Bast'ovansky, Falt'an and Moskovic), some 30 % of its 60members Central Committee and thousands of Party members in diplomatic and administrative service, in the army, political bodies, institutions and other sectors of public life. They were removed from their posts amid the curses of their own comrades and comrades-in-arms and, having previously antagonized the masses of the Slovak people, they found themselves unpitied and friendless in their gravest hour. They were declared "enemies of the people", their work was debased, their publications banned, their past exorcised from the pages of the Party history.BB The principal guilt of which all the Slovak victims of the purges were accused was the unpardonable sin of "bourgeois nationalism", the very thing in which they were so much encouraged by their Czech comrades in 1945-6. It is generally not realized that the bulk of the victims of the 1949-54 purges were "bourgeois nationalists" (i.e. 86) In the writings of contemporary Communist historians all these measures were described as being socialist, progressive and to the benefit of the masses. Only now, after 15 years, some "mistakes" are being admitted for which the personality cult is blamed. 87) The purges were strictly taboo to the socialist historians until January 1968. Only in the field of literature a cautious attempt has been made to deal with this touchy subject, e. g. in Mnacko's Oneskorene reportaze, in Karvas's Jazva, etc. 88) More about the purges can be found in D. A. Schmidt's Anotomy of a Satelite ( Boston, 1952), in Vnuk's cistky - nezahojitel'ne rany KSS (Slovak v Amerike, November 9th,-30th, 1966); also Der Slansky-Prozess und seine Folgen (Recht im Ost und West, 5/ 1964, pp. 196-203. SLOVAKIA 157 Slovaks) in Slovakia and "zionists" (i.e. Jews) in the Czech lands, though these two groups did not account for more than 13 ¼- of the KSc membership. It is no wonder then that the purges permanently poisoned the already strained Slovak-Czech relations beyond any hope of reconciliation. After the elimination of the Slovak element the Central Committee of the KSc entrusted the reins of the KSS to people of its own choice: Siroky, Bacilek, Duris, David, Dubcek, Rais, Branik, sefranek, Mauer, etc. As in the early twenties most of these were of non-Slovak origin ( Czechs and Jews) and a few of them were even Soviet citizens (David, Mauer). In March 1953 Stalin died and shortly after him K. Gottwald. The presidency of the Republic passed on to A. Zapotocky, while a well-known Slovakophobe, A. Novotny, became the first Party secretary. Novotny soon concentrated in his hands immense power and, assisted by V. Kopecky, was able to suppress all the liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin thaw. 89 Having thus delayed destalinization which was sweeping through Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Novotny paid increased attention to Slovakia where the dangers to his policies were greatest. In an attempt to subdue the passive resistance of the Slovaks and to break the nationalist spirit pulsating there in spite of purges, expulsions and bolshevist vigilance, Novotny further tightened the screw of Czech centralism. He introduced new administrative steps aimed at a more thorough control and reorganized the existing economic, cultural and social structure of the country. In this reorganization several Slovak industrial enterprises and cultural associations lost even their nominal independence and were integrated with their Czech counterparts into more compact "Czechoslovak" bodies.90 89) Kopecky's version of how the Party fought and defeated "revisionism" among the intellectuals is graphically, though one-sidedly, described in his book, CSR a KS(; (Praha, 1960), pp. 467-470. 90 ) These moves were allegedly designed for reasons of higher efficiency but the uneasy reluctance with which they were accepted in Slovakia indicates their insidious nature. Their implementation led to the dismissal of the President of the Slovak National Council, S. Sebesta, anct to renewed attacks on Slovak separatism by Bacilek, Kopecky, David, etc. 158 SLOVAKIA With regard to the Slovak political and administrative organs these were doomed to wither away by a devious method of ignoring their very existence. In spite of the fact that the Slovak regional organs were staffed by trusted Party members they were gradually reduced to complete inactivity. Though the Government was constitutionally obliged to appoint a Commissioner when new ministeries were created, this provision was, as a rule, ignored. 91 Under the mask of "Czechoslovak socialist patriotism" a new brand of undiluted Czech nationalism was superimposed on these centralist tendencies. Any opposition to this socialist Czechoslovakism was decried as bourgeois nationalism and one can see how often these accusations were levelled against the Slovaks after 1954.92 In an arrogant disregard of Slovak national aspirations the constitution which in May 1960 proclaimed CzechoSlovakia "a socialist country" further stripped the power of Slovakia's provincial government organs subordinating them completely to the Central Government. 93 This outrageous arrangement was presented as a final and satisfactory solution of the Slovak problem and the Party boasted in its official history that it had accomplished what the old capitalist system had found insoluble.94 However, the Slovak feelings about the situation are more aptly 91) E. Taborsk)', Communism in Czechoslov akia 1948-1960 (Princeton , N. J. , 1961), pp. 340-344. 92) V. ~iroky complained about it at the Tenth Congress of the KSS in April 1955; it was deplored in a leading article in Pravda of May 1st, 1956; in the aftermath of the Budapest revolt it was ruefully admitted "one of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism", Pravda of December 14th, 1956); in January 1958 it was violently denounced by K. Bacilek as having penetrated "into various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, sports, state apparatus, economic organs, etc." Pravda of January 10th and 11th, 1958) ; again by K. Bacilek and V. Kopecky at the Eleventh Congress of the KSS in April 1958; etc. See also: Slovak Nationalism Revisited (Radio Free Europe Papers of November 11, 1965). 93) The Slovak Commissioners must "attend to further tasks in the economic and cultural construction of Slovakia to the extent determined by the central government" (Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 [Princeton, N. J., 1961], p. 339) . 94) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), pp. 697-698. SLOVAKIA 159 summed up in the words of the former member of the Secretariat of the KSS and Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky: By the new adjustments of the Slovak national organs (which led to the aboli5hment of the Board of Commissioners, to the sub ordination of Slovak national offices directly to the Ministeries in Prague, etc.) the Slovak nation found itself in the position of the only nation in the entire Socialist camp which on its own ethnic territory lacked such organs of the Socialist governmental administration which would correspond to its development, its present living standard, its numerical strength and, above all, to its indispensability to become really and in every respect an equal partner with the brotherly Czech nation.95 VII. 1962-1967 Misruled and unrepresented, the Slovak Communists resented the continuos Czech interference, the Socialist brand of "Czechoslovakism" and above all the persistence of Stalinist methods and Stalinist leadership to which they were subjected. But there was little they could do about it while the Party was strong and enjoyed Krushchev's support. 96 But in 1961-62 the Party's grip on the overall control started to slacken. There were several factors which contributed to this: the stagnation of the country's economy, the Sino-Soviet dispute which now broke into the open, renewed attacks on Stalin at the XXIInd Soviet Party Congress (October 1961). In the ideological split the KSc had no choice but to side with Moscow. Thus circumstances compelled it to do more than pay lip service to the cause of destalinization. Destalinization finally reached Czecho-Slovakia in 1962-3 and its advent was symbolically ushered in by the demolition of the huge statue of Stalin overlooking Prague (November 1962). The year 1962, the year of the XIIth Congress of the KSC, was also a year of intense ferment, especially in 95) M. Gosiorovsky, K niektorym otazkam vzt'ahu cechov a siovakov v poiitike KSc, in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 391. 96 Khrushchev's endorsement of the Party's Stalinist policies in 1957 was a very serious drawback for the opposing forces in the KSS who disliked Kopecky and Novotny's stiff measures against the Slovaks. Khrushchev on the occasion of his visit to Czecho-Slovakia declared (on July 11th, 1957): "The cause of Leninism in CzechoSlovakia is in good hands." (East Europe, 9/1957, p.41) . 160 SLOVAKIA Slovakia where the pent-up grievances gave rise to outspoken criticism of the excesses of the Stalinist era and of their perpetrators. The loudest critics of these abuses of naked power were the Slovak writers, journalists, scientists and other representatives of the intelligentsia. 97 The foremost task of destalinization was to rehabilitate the victims of the 1949-54 purges. Those bourgeois nationalists who were still alive were quietly released from prisons, but Novotny and his clique were most relucant to admit that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were fabricated. Such an admission would make fabricators of Novotny, Siroky and most of the power-holders in CzechoSlovakia. Subjected to mounting pressure the Party allowed the released prisoners to apply for re-admission to Party membership. Many of them did and their applications for re-admission read like the most savage condemnation of Communist tyranny ever written. 98 These were widely cir97) The mouthpiece of the discontented and critical voice was the official organ of the Slovak Writers' Association , Kulturny zivot, which in 1963 published an impressive number of critical articles. An open forum at which many abuses and horrors of the past and of the present were exposed was the Conference of Slovak Writers in Bratislava (April 21-22nd, 1963). At the First Congress of the Association of Slovak Journalists (May 28-29th, 1963) the wrongs and injustices of the era were bitterly denounced by M. Hysko , who publicly attacked the then Prime Minister, V. Siroky, as the prime mover behind the false accusations of the "bourgeois nanationalist" comrades, (Pravda of June 3rd 1963). 98) Some of them (e.g. Husak's) found their way abroad, where extracts from them were pub!ished in the emigre press. For English translation of parts from Husak's application see: News Digest International (Sydney) 3/ 1966, pp. 55-57. In 1968 a large number of rehabilited Party officials (as well as many non-Party men ) described their experiences at the hands of their jailers. Husak's account was serialized in a weekly, Nove slovo, Holdos's in the daily, Smena, but the most graphic expose of the inhuman treatment to which the victims of the cult era were subjected is in E. Loebl's book Svedectvo o procese s vedenim protistatneho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Slanskym (Bratislava, 1968) . From among the non-Communist prisoners there is the account by playwright I. Stodola in Kulturny zivot and that of military officer D. Viest in Slovenske Pohl'ady. Different organizations and institutions started to publish grim statistics about the era of lawlessness. According to various calculations there were 160 death sentences in 1948-53. The Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters claimed that 30,000-40,000 of its members became victims SLOVAKIA 161 culated in Slovakia and their impact was enormous. At one stage they caused an open rebellion against Czech rule. Novotny tried to counteract these outbursts of discontent and criticism but his voice was drowned in an ever-growing protest. 99 To save his own skin he had to sacrifice his most valuable accomplices (and the most hated men in Slovakia) namely K. Bacilek (in March 1963), and when that did not suffice, V. Siroky and J . Duris (in September 1963). Of course the situation was far more serious than could be rectified by the removal of a few compromised Party officials. The main culprit, A. Novotny, and his group weathered the storm of criticism by sheer perseverance and stubbornness and with Moscow's backing retained their monopoly of power. At the end of 1963 the situation in the KSS differed only very little from that before the XIIth Party Congress. The leadership of the KSS was entirely in the hands of Novotny's men, like Bil'ak, Chudik, Sabolcik, Lenart, salgovic, Barbirek, Dvorsky, Cvik, Daubner, etc. In his selection Novotny was particularly careful to pick for his service people whose only qualification was blind following of the official Party line.No person of independent views or strong personal conviction made his way up the Party ladder. The most pathetic group in the Slovak political scene were the rehabilitated bourgeois nationalists. Though exonerated from their alleged crimes and officially "fully of judical and political persecution. The unlawfully sentenced citizens even founded their own organization "K 231". But the most moving (and damning) indictment of the cruelty of the Communist regime was the Resolution of the members of various religious orders presented to the Ministry of Culture and Information on April 17, 1968. It was signed by 6,174 religious who spent altogether 32,016 years in prison. (See Katoiicke noviny, May 5, 1968). 99) Novotny replied to the criticism of the Slovak Communist intellectuals on June 12th, 1963 at Kosice. He defended Siroky, maintaining that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were " substantially right" ( Prav da of June 13th, 1963). He sharply reprimanded and vilified two Slovak critics of his policies, M. Hysko and R. Kalisky, branding them as "irresponsible scribblers" (pisalkove ). R. Kalisky replied in kind and his long letter (of 30 pages) to "comrade President" lists a comprehensive catalogue of Czech wrongdoings towards the Slovaks. This letter was also widely read in Slovakia and heartily approved by all sections of the community. 162 SLOVAKIA rehabilitated" they still were doomed to remain in a political wilderness, hoping against hope for some miracle which would restore their earlier status. Their hopes could not have been realized without a major upheavel within the Party. They were, after all, striving and clamouring after positions which were held by their former judges and jailers, by men who had advanced literally over their "dead bodies". These men knew only too well to whom they owed their posts and what was expected of them in return. This state of affairs could not have been without impact on the Party's membership. Headed by uninspiring and subservient leaders, the KSS had become a living mockery of Lenin's conception of a Communist Party. The solution of the Slovak problem in 1962-67 advanced very little, if at all. The request of the Slovak intellectuals to federate Czecho-Slovakia according to the Soviet or Yugoslav model was rejected outright. 100 The Czechs were the dominant nation in a state "of two brotherly nations of equal rights" (as it is solemnly written in the 1960 Constitution) and continued to enjoy a disproportionately high number of prestige-bearing positions in the Party organs, State administration, diplomatic service, army, etc. The dissatisfaction in all strata of the Slovak community was there for everybody to see. If any concessions were made, these were only formal and completely unsatisfactory. Thus in 1964 the term "poverenik" (Commissioner), abolished in 1960, was reintroduced and in a common declaration of the Central Committee of both Parties (i.e. KS(:; and KSS) of May 7, 1964 it was announced that the Slovak National Council would participate "more fully" in all spheres of Slovak public life. 101 But there was no visible improvement, no advancement towards a fuller participation of regional organs in Slovakia's administration. In spite of all this crude nationalistic discrimination, in spite of obvious economic, political and cultural failures, 100) This proposal, the authorship of which is attributed to an erstwhile Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky, was rejected by Prague through its Slovak mouthpiece, M. Chudik (President of the Slovak National Council. According to Chudik the Slovak people did not wish any federation (Rude pravo of November 13th, 1965). 101 ) Za plnsie uplatnenie Slovenskej narodnej rady, (Bratislava, 1964). SLOVAKIA 163 Novotny somehow managed to retain and even consolidate his personal power at the XIIIth Party Congress (MayJune, 1966). The Congress was a rather dull and uneventful affair: only those speakers were admitted who endorsed Novotny's policies. A lengthy and critical report on the economic situation and the much talked-about "new economic model" was to be delivered by Prof. 0. sik, but what finally emerged was a very mild substitute. The Central Committee elected a 10-man Party Presidium, in which there were three Slovaks (Dubcek, Lenart, Chudik). Among the Presidium candidates there were two more Slovaks ( Sabolcik and Sadovsky). The promised and expected reform which was to put Slovak-Czech relations on an entirely new basis did not materialize .102 VIII. 1967-1968 The situation had become unbearable by 1967. The forces of discontent were gathering momentum. Up to 1966-7 the main source of opposition to the Novotny regime was in Slovakia, where his treatment of the Slovak peoples and institutions provoked almost universal hatred. This resentment was gradually percolating into the all-state Party leadership. In 1967 Novotny's obstinacy to the "new economic model" caused further polarization of the leadership into the "dogmatists" and the "liberals". The economic reform could succeed only if coupled with decentralization and with a loosening of the tight dictatorial regime. Any relaxation on the political front immediately brought forward a demand for a thorough-going rehabilitation and undoing of the "mistakes of the cult era". The combined impact of these factors (i.e. the Slovak question, economy and uneasy liberalization) eventually led to the fall of A. Novotny. These grumblings came first to the attention of the outside world in June 1967, when the writers used their IVth Congress as a tribunal for a passionate denunciation 102) The Slovak writer, V. Mihalik ( member of the Central Committee of the KSS ) revealed (in Kulturny zivot 8/1966, p. 1) that the Party was preparing "an important document" aimed at the improvem1mt in Slovak-Czech relations. The document was to be tabled at the Thirteenth Congress of the KSc (May, 1966 ). Bu t it was not, and nothing has been heard about it since. 164 SLOVAKIA of naked power and for a bitter condemnation of the Party's performance in the last two decades. 103 The Party-always very sensitive to criticism-hit back hard in Oct. 1967. The principal culprits were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their professional posts, and their official journal, "Literarni noviny", was taken away from them. An attempt was made to exploit the existing difference between the Slovak and Czech writers and to play both groups against each other. But the Slovaks, at their meeting with the Slovak Party leaders on Oct. 16, 1967, briskly declined the honour of being the Party's favourites at the expense of their Czech colleagues. 104 Another indication of the stresses and strains at the top was the criticism at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSc in Sept. 1967 of the implementation of the new economic model. It was, perhaps, symptomatic that the Slovak Party Secretary, A. Dubcek, accused the government 9f discriminatory policies towards Slovakia. He charged that "the results for the first half of 1967 show that investments in Slovak industry totalled 21.9 1/r of the state investments and not 28 % as was laid in the directives of the XIIIth Party Congress". 105 The struggle for power was now on and manifested itself again at the Central Committee meeting in Oct. 1967, where the Slovak Party leaders in an unheard-of move demanded that Novotny abandon one of the two top functions he held (i.e. the First Party Secretary and the President of the State) . Novotny sensed the gravity of the 103) See IV. Sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelti, Praha 27. - 29. cervna 1967, (Praha, 1968), especially the speeches by M. Kundera (pp. 22-27) , P . Kohout (pp. 39-43), A. J. Liehm (pp. 99-204) and, above all, that of L. Vaculik ( pp. 141-150). The Slovak writers played a rather passive role at this gathering and their over-all performance was to become a source of serious embarrassment in the subsequent months. A heated dispute about the action of some Slovak writers (Mihalik, Spitzer, Valek, Minac, Kostra, Matu~ka, Rosenbaum , Egri, Luknar, Ponican as well as 9 Czech writers) who in their letter supported the party's policies in the cultural sphere (pp. 157-159 ) eventually led (in December 1968) to the collapse of the Slovak Writers' Union. See M. Resutik Rozlomeny svaz in Nove slovo No. 1/ 1969, p. 11. 104 ) Svedectvi (Paris) No. 32-33 / 1968, pp. 89-116. 105 ) Pravda (Bratislava), Sept. 29, 1967. SLOVAKIA 165 situation and in December he invited Brezhnev to come to Prague to bolster his position. But Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8 )-if anything-made the situation worse . The next meeting of the Central Committee (Dec. 19-21, 1967) dealt Novotny the final blow and made his position untenable. At the following meeting of the Central Committee, a fortnight later, Novotny was finally voted out of office and replaced by Alexander Dubcek, who till then was considered N ovotny's man in Slovakia. Outside his native Slovakia Dubcek was a completely unknown personality .106 The key role-and this should be stressed again and again-in N ovotny's downfall was played by the Slovaks who found themselves in their socialist homeland economically exploited, nationally humiliated, culturally neglected and ruled as a colony by their Czech partners. Novotny, in his last speech as Party Secretary (New Year's speech, 1968) , tried to placate the Slovaks with the promise of a more generous economic consideration for Slovakia: " The need of nationwide industrial development must not obscure the important task of priority development of Slovakia which still has not reached the average economic level of the Czech regions". 107 But the offer was "too little too late". The new leadership of the KSc put the question of Slovakia as the number one problem to be tackled by them. Prague radio said on Jan. 5, 1968: "The Central Committee took note of the fact that the government and the Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit to the Party organs, on the basis of thorough situation analyses, specific proposals for perfecting their activities." The activities of the Slovak National Council being almost non-existent needed much more than perfecting. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Communist coup of February 1948, Dubcek spelt out the current difficulties which were troubling his leadership: "Many faults 106) For backgro und to Dubcek's personality see, e. g. F . Vnuk, Alexander Dubcek - tragedia poctiv eho komunistu in Kalendar Jednota 1969 (Middletown, Pa. , 1968), pp. 173-181. Also T. Szulc, A loo/c at Alexander Dubcek - the aparatchik who made a revoluti on in N . Y . Times (Weekly Review) , Jan. 12, 1969. 107) Pravda (Bratislava), Jan. 2, 1968. 166 SLOVAKIA have occured in internal Party life ... (where) the struggle between the progressive and conservative forces has not yet been concluded . . . ( There are) serious difficulties in the economy ... In our relations with the Slovak national organs we must rectify what was wrongfully violated after 1960 and things must be rearranged in such a way as to bring them in line with the contemporary stage of development of the state as a whole." 108 After this admission from the highest Party official things in Slovakia started to happen. M. Chudik (member of the Presidium of the KSc), N ovotny's stooge in Slovakia who was acting as Chairman of the Slovak National Council, hurriedly submitted his resignation. But he was not to be allowed to bow out as gracefully as that; he was dismissed in ignominy instead, on March 14, 1968. Having discarded its incompetent boss the Slovak National Council immediately published a resolution demanding that CzechoSlovakia become a federation. A new constitution to replace the one of 1960 was to give full legislative power to the Slovak National Council in all except foreign affairs, defense and state finances. Slovakia was to have a separate government. 109 In March the so-called "Czecho-Slovak spring" really started and the whole country was undergoing radical changes. Novotny's Party apparatus was falling to pieces. There was the defection to the West of Major-General Jan sejna; the resignation of the Trade Unions leader Pastytik; the dismissal of Chudik; the removal from office of the Interior Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor-General Bartuska; the suicide of Deputy Defense Minister V. Janko and Vice-President of the Supreme Court J. Brest'ansky; ousting of the chief Party ideologue J. Hendrych and the fall from the Presidency of Novotny himself. All this happened in the space of four weeks and had tremendous impact on the people. These events necessitated a new reorganization of the Party and the government. The five-day session of the Central Committee of the KSc named a new Presidium on April 1, 1968, in which Slovakia was given the largest 108 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Feb. 23 , 1968. 109) Pravda (Bratislava), March 15, 1968. SLOVAKIA 167 representation ever : 4 in 11. 110 In the Secretariat there were 3 Slovaks out of 9 members (Dubcek-the First Secretary, Lenart, Sadovsky). On April 9 a new Cabinet was sworn in by Novotny's successor in the Presidency, General L. Svoboda. At the head of the new government stood 0. cernik. There were 5 deputy Prime Ministers and 23 Ministers. Here too the Slovaks were treated much more generously than ever before: 2 deputy Prime Ministers and 6 Ministers were from Slovakia. One of the deputy Prime Ministers was Gustav Husak, a rehabilitated Slovak "bourgeois nationalist". On April 10, 1968 the Party published its " Action Program",111 an ambitious document setting out " CzechoSlovakia's road towards socialism" and outlining the political and economic reforms by which it was to achieve one-party rule, mollified by the active participation of the non-party sections of the population. The Slovak question again figured prominently in the Program. A new symmetric federative arrangement of the state was proposed and the Slovaks were promised: 1. Slovak National Council and Council of Ministers (instead of the old Board of Commissioners), 2. Slovak national committees, 3. Autonomy in planning and budgeting for Slovakia, 4. State secretaries in those central ministerial departments where Ministers were Czechs, 5. Guarantee of Slovak rights against the Czech majority, 6. Adequate Slovak representation in the army, diplomatic service, etc. 112 In the less oppressive atmosphere of the day and in the absence of overt censorship public opinion soon started to exert pressure from below. This resulted first of all in the resignation or removal from the scene of those men who were closely linked with Novotny and his• dictatorial policies. To purge Novotny's followers from the Central llO ) They were Dubcek, Rigo, Bil'ak and Barbirek. Their nomina tion was accepted in Slovakia with some scepticism and their credentials as Slovaks were immediately questioned. It was pointed out that Rigo was a Gypsy, Bil'ak was a Ruthenian and Barbirek though born in Bratislava- was a Czech. And, of course, everybody knew that Dubcek had spent his childhood and adolescence (192438 ) in the Soviet Union. 111 ) A kcni Program KS(: pfijaty na p leruirni zasedani OV KS(: dne 5. du bna 1968, Praha 1968. ll 2 ) Akcni Program ...", pp. 27-28. 168 SLOVAKIA Committee of the KSc the masses demanded an extraordinary Party congress. Under the effect of ever-mounting pressure the Party leaders with some reluctance consented at last to convene it in September 1968. In Slovakia the burning question was that of federation. Obcession with this issue was so intense that little room was left for anything else. There was a minor controversy between two groups of Slovak intellectuals as to whether it was more correct to insist on federation before democratization or vice versa. This was, however, only a question of emphasis: the demand for federalization was almost unanimous. In the Czech lands the problem of federalization was hardly mentioned, and if at all, then not in a manner encouraging for the Slovaks. A public opinion poll revealed that 95 % of Slovaks were for federation and 90 ';c of Czechs against it. 113 The Czechs did not like to be reminded that federation was something the Slovaks were promised more than once in the past 50 years and hence long overdue. They preferred to dismiss the whole thing as an unrealistic and untimely affair of no concern to themselves. The famous "2000 words Manifesto" even suggested that in Slovakia the federation issue would be used as a shield by many old conservatives who would thus survive the democratization process: "Federation alone will not provide better living standards for either the Czechs or Slovaks, neither will it solve their economic and social problems. The rule of the Party-state bureaucracy may still survive especially in Slovakia, because there it could claim a victory in the fight by which greater freedom was gained (for the Slovaks) ."114 113) There were several surveys of public opinion on this issue. Obrana l'udu (June 1, 1968) cites the results of another survey, according to which the Slovaks were for federation "almost 100%", while in the Czech lands federation was favored by only 5% of those questioned! 114) For the full text of this Manifesto see Literarni Listy (June 27, 1968). The Soviet press called "2000 words" an "action program for the counter-revolution" (Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1968) , Dubcek deplored it as a "very serious obstacle to the further development of socialist democracy and society" (Rude pravo , June 29, 1968), S. Kodaj (Party official in East Slovakia) denounced it as "an open call for counter-revolution". In fact it was a call for pressure from below to get the Party to purge from SLOVAKIA 169 This unkind remark in a document which so outraged the Soviet leaders and embarrassed the Communist leaders in Czecho-Slovakia, elicited a reply in the form of an open letter signed by over 200 Slovak intellectuals and intitled, "A word to the Czechs, and also Slovaks, who are worthy of it". In this response the Slovaks complained bitterly about the outrageous distortion of Slovak history by Czech officialdom ("From Shir's followers down to the men who led the uprising of 1944 nobody was good enough if he was a good Slovak first") and then defended their insistence on "federation without delay": "In today's democratization process the present inferior position of Slovakia is simply no longer tenable".11 5 No prominent political personality figured among those who signed the letter, yet the Czechs suspected that its instigator was Dr. Gustav Husak. The Deputy Prime Minister G. Husak was the most dynamic personality in the reactivated life of the KSS. 116 He re-emerged (after being sentenced to life inprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" in 1954) as a sworn enemy of Novotny and all his hangers-on in Slovakia. At the same time he was resolved to reassert as much an independent Slovak voice in the state and Party politics as possible. He still remained what he always had been, an orthodox and autocratic Communist at heart, but his hatred of Novotny put him in the one camp with the liberals. His uncompromising stand on immediate and comprehensive federalization assured him of a strong following in Slovakia. He was not even a member of the Central Committee of the KSS, yet his political influence in Slovakia was second to none. Early in July he swayed the regional Party conference in Bratislava to press for the KSS congress to be held in August 1968 (i.e. before the scheduled KSc Congress ) so that the Slovaks would come to the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc with their own specific all positions of power the men who had been responsible for the country's political, economic, moral and cultural decline. For the English translation of the whole document see East Europe No. 8/ 1968, pp. 25-28. 115) Slovo cechom aj Slovakom sucim na slovo in Nove slovo, No. 11/ 1968, pp. 1-3. 116) For a short biography of G. Husak read F. Vnuk's O Husakovi zrwva a v iacej in Kalendcir Jednota 1968, (Middletown, Pa., 1967, pp. 87-98). 170 SLOVAKIA proposals ( already approved by the KSS Congress) of the federalization scheme. 117 The internal development in Czecho-Slovakia since January and especially since March 1968 was a cause of serious concern in the Soviet Union and neighbouring people's democracies. The events in Czecho-Slovakia were directly connected with the students' demonstrations in Poland which produced a crisis in the Polish Party leadership. Afraid of similar consequences in East Germany Ulbricht imposed a ban on the German-language newspaper from Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian-language broadcast from Presov found keen listeners in the south-western part of the Soviet Union and caused uneasiness and discomfort to the Soviet Party leaders, to Ukrainian Party boss Shelest in particular. Dubcek and his colleagues were repeatedly summoned to Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw, while their counterparts from the other Socialist countries were arriving in Prague trying their best to stop the process which in Dubcek's eyes was democratic and humanizing, in theirs counter-revolutionary and revisionist. Then on July 15, 1968 the Central Committee of the KSc received a common letter from the "fraternal" Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. They found the situation in Czecho-Slovakia "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country". The catalogue of errors and faults was long and comprehensive and reflected their own fears and apprehensions. Only one aspect of the post-January development in the country was condoned without disapproval: "We welcome the rectification in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on a sound basis of brotherly collaboration within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". 118 The recipients of this "Warsaw letter" did not leave these accusations unanswered and refuted them one by one. In their written reply they stated emphatically: "We do not see any realistic reasons which would entitle you to assert that our present situation should be branded as counter-revolutionary."119 The Party Secretary Dubcek went 117) Pravda (Bratislava), July 7, 1968. 118) Prav da (Bratislava) , Special edition, July 18, 1968. 119) ib. SLOVAKIA 171 on the air to reassure his countrymen (on July 18, 1968): "We do not want to abandon anything at all from our principles." The outcome of this correspondence was the confrontation between the 11-man Soviet Politburo and the entire 11-man KSc Presidium at cierna nad Tisou (July 29-Aug. 1, 1968), and afterwards the multilateral "comradely" meeting at Bratislava on Aug. 3. The official communique was inconclusive and the whole outcome of the conference was rather dubious. 120 Both participants ( i. e. the KSC on the one hand and the Communist Parties of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other) were convinced that they had successfully defended their own tenets of socialism. In a nationwide broadcast Dubcek again attempted to calm his fellow citizens: "You can be fully satisfied with the results and the spirit of the talks. We have kept our promises (i.e. not to deviate from the post-January course)." It sounded too good to be true. For the next 18 days Czecho-Slovakia lived in a fool's paradise, while the Red Army, under the pretext of largescale manoeuvres, was preparing the invasion of CzechoSlovakia. On Aug. 20-21, 1968, in defiance of their solemn promises to respect the national independence of every Socialist country, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five Communist countries invaded Czecho-Slovakia and put a sudden end to the great democratization experiment. In this gesture of Cain-like brotherhood Communism displayed its fear of democratization, its abhorrence of freedom, its inability to satisfy even the most elementary of human desires. It demonstrated that Communism cannot be liberalized without ceasing to be Communism. During that fateful night of Aug. 20-21 the progressive leaders of the KSc were kidnapped and taken in chains to Russia. This high-handed action of the Socialist allies 121 provoked a loud and indignant outcry all over the world, and-most unexpectedly-a resolute condemnation by the majority of the world Communist Parties, including those of China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, France, Italy, Great Britain, 120) Pravda (Bratislava), Aug. 4, 1968. 121) A Chronology of Occupation in East Europe, No. 10/ 1968,pp. 38-46. 172 SLOVAKIA Australia, etc. But by far the most effective was the reaction the Soviets encountered in the occupied country. It is impossible to describe in detail the ingenious methods of the passive and less passive resistance by which the Slovaks and Czechs frustrated the occupiers' efforts to "normalize the situation". The invasion united the Czech and Slovak nation in their opposition to this cruel act. But it appears that there was much less unity of action in the Party ranks. The KSS refused to back unconditionally the activities of the KSc in the first post-invasion days. The XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc, scheduled for Sept. 9 was hurriedly convened and took place during the night of Aug. 22 under the very nose of the occupying troops in a big Prague factory ( cKD plant) . The delegates (1095 out of 1543 expected to attend) elected a new Committee of 144 members. Of these 118 were new members and only 26 belonged to the old Central Committee. The representation from Slovakia amounted to 42 members, an unprecedented proportion, and there were 8 Slovaks in the 28-man Presidium: Dubcek, Husak, Zrak, 1'azky, Sadovsky, Colotka, Turcek, Pavlenda, Samel (?). 122 This should have satisfied the Slovaks, but it did not. The Soviets denounced the XIVth Congress in the most violent terms and did their utmost to undo it. According to Western reports the secret protocol drawn-up at the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet "negotiations" (sit venia verbi) on Aug. 28, 1968 contained 14 demands, one of which asked for the invalidation of the XIVth congress . As it happened this was the first thing the Russians succeeded in obtaining. A key role in making this congress into an "unevent" was played by G. Husak who was one of the negotiators in Moscow. While he was abroad the extraordinary Congress of the KSS started ( on Aug. 26 ). Husak returned just in time to deliver his address on the last day of the session. In his speech he questioned the legality of the XIVth Congress of the KSc and advised the delegates to the KSS Congress to reverse their stand taken three days earlier and to disavow the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc. Husak argued that at the XIVth congress the Slovak representatives to the Party 122) Prav da (Bratislava ), Special edition, Aug. 25, 1968. SLOVAKIA 173 organs were elected "illegally" ... "undemocratically", that "out of 300 Slovak delegates selected to attend the congress proceedings only 4, later 22, and towards the end about 40 were present". 123 In complete disregard of the fact that it was the Russians who had prevented the Slovak delegates from participating at the Congress Husak addressed his indignant reproaches at those who elected him to the Party Presidium: "Nobody can impose on a sovereign nation and its party its will in a way we have witnessed, namely that a little group of people entrusted by nobody should determine the nation's political representation."124 Of course Husak's anger and fury would have been even greater if the XIVth Congress had failed to nominate him or some of his close associates to the position in the top Party hierarchy. His rhetoric was just a clumsy display of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactics. In sharp contrast to the XIVth Congress of the KSC, the Congress of the KSS was allowed to proceed undisturbed. It was attended by 607 of the 638 choosen delegates. It elected a 131-man Central Committee and a 12-member Presidium composed of Husak, Bod'a, Falt'an, Harencar, Klokoc, Luptak, Novomesky, Pavlenda, Sadovsky, Sedlakova, 'l'azky and Zrak. The 7-man Secretariat consisted of G. Husak (First Secretary) , L. Abraham, B . Graca (ideological spokesman ) , V. Pavlenda, S . Sadovsky, J. Turcek and J . Zrak. This was an entirely new team personally hand-picked by Husak. All of Novotny's men and Husak's opponents were either ousted (Bil'ak, Sabolcik, Pecha, Riga, Kriz, Hruskovic, Dvorsky, etc.) or demoted to ordinary Central Committee membership (Janik, Barbirek, Zupka, etc.). In the resolution of the Congress the Plenum took a stand on a number of current issues created by the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Slovakia, but the only problem it tackled with determination and vigour was that of federation. Husak said in his concluding address: "I recommend that we approve . . . our insistence on the federative rearangement of our state on the basis of principles outlined earlier and it should be enacted by Oct. 28 this year." 125 In the subsequent weeks the Slovak Communists pursued this 123 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 124) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. 125) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 174 SLOVAKIA point of their program forcefully and relentlessly to its logical conclusion. The federation was indeed enacted on Oct. 27, 1968 and put into practice on Jan. 1, 1969. Today's Czecho-Slovakia consist of two Socialist republics, the Czech and the Slovak, with three governments, Czech, Slovak and Central. It can be said that federation is the only paragraph salvaged from the ambitious Action program of Dubcek's leadership. The draft of the new Party statutes was published for discussion early in April 1968 and it proposed that the Party too should be reorganized on federal lines. 126 It envisaged the Communist Party of the Czech lands and the Communist Party of Slovakia to deal with internal and domestic matters; for international representation and in matters which exceeded the limits of national competence there was to be a single representative of the two national parties, i. e. the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This proposition was politely forgotten after August, 1968; the Russians apparently did not like it. (Of course there were many other things the Russians would loathe to see in.practice, such as the new concept of democratic centralism, election of all party organs by secret ballot, limited terms of service on regional and national party committees, etc.). Thus whilst the KSS achieved a funda• mental alteration in the structure of the state, it was unable to adjust the structural pattern of the Party to fit the new political situation. The KSS is still without counterpart in the Czech lands 127 However, under Husak's new leadership the KSS has undergone a remarkable revival. In its relation to the KSc it has become more aggressive and self-assertive. The days of blind obedience of the Party line drawn up in Prague have been replaced by an avowed and dedicated service 126) Rude pravo, Supplement, Aug. 10, 1968. 127) At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSCS on Nov. 14-17, 1968 a substitute-counterwei ght to the Central Committee and Presidium of the KSS was set up: the so-called Party's Bureau for the Czech regions. It functions within the framework of the Central Committee of the KSCS, consists of 11 men and is headed by L. Strougal, assisted by two Secretaries (V. Hula and J . Kozel). The weekly journal "Tribuna" is its official organ. The only better known personality in the Bureau (beside L. Strougal) is the Prime-Minister Cernik. SLOVAKIA 175 to the needs of the nation. At least that was what G. Husak proclaimed at the KSS Congress: "Let this Party rid itself of everything which is irresolute, everything which is opportunistic, let endure in it all that is firm, noble and prepared to struggle for the rights of this nation. 128 It remains to be seen to what extent the KSS will be able to realize this resolve. The strongman Husak was known to have made similar speeches in 1945-48, but after 1948 he was gradually silenced, removed from his Party posts and eventually imprisoned. So far he has succeeded in bringing about federalization of the state, but in the process he has antagonized a few influential groups in Slovakia (liberal writers, journalists, intellectuals) and the majority of the Czech population. He is being depicted in the Western press as a man who enjoys the trust of the Russians, as the man who annulled the XIVth Congress of the KSc, as the man who was instrumental in the removal of Smrkovsky, etc. 129 The conflict and dialectical contradictions between the Czechs and Slovaks are at present as acute as ever. Federation solved one old problem but generated at least a dozen new ones. The part played by the KSS in Slovak national history shows too much on the debit side and very little on the credit side. In the years 1948-67 the KSS was without doubt the most powerful single factor in shaping Slovakia's history. Yet in most instances it was a force which, with cynicism and arrogance, stood as a stumbling-block between the nation and its freedom, between the people and their political and cultural self-expression. In those years the KSS was just a tool of terror and intimidation wielded by a foreign oppressor over the Slovak masses. These things were openly stated in many sensational revelations 128) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. A question can be asked at this point as to how much the Party membership will drop if it is going to rid itself of everything which is opportunistic and irresolute and retain only that which is firm and noble. In 1968, just before the Soviet invasion the Party had in Slovakia 220,000 organized members, i. e. less than 6% of the population. If Husiik's criteria are applied this number can only decrease. 129) See e.g. the article of L. Vlasic: Pohyb s cudnym pozadim in Nove slovo, No. 1/ 1969, pp. 3 and 14. Also Husiik's speech at the Plenary session of the Central Committee KSC-S (Rude pravo, Jan. 21 , 1969, p. 7) . SLOVAKIA 176 which appeared in the censorship-free press during the March-August period of the Dubcek era. The new leadership of the KSS has repeatedly stated that the return of the old days is out of the question. Yet (apart from federation) one witnesses almost daily a gradual retreat from the gains and achievements of the liberalization process. The presence of Red Army units in the country (now sanctioned by a treaty) makes certain that the conditions imposed on the KSC leadership on Aug. 28, 1968 are being implemented. How-under these circumstances-will the KSS safeguard the interests of the nation? Time alone will tell. Appendix I. N umerical representation from Slovakia in the Central Committee. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo of the KS(: (including candidates) in 1921-1968. Members in Members in Members in KSC. Seer. C. Committee KS(: Presid. Party Congress - -- Merger-Congress (1921) I 36 6 16.6 I. Congress ( 1923) I 26 5 19.4 II. Congress ( 1924) 50 6 12.0 52 III. Congress ( 1925) 6 11.5 52 IV. Congress ( 1927) 5 from Nov. 1928 I ? I ? 9/ V. Congress ( 1929) 52 1 4 7.7 4 7.8 51 VI. Congress (1931) 8 16.0 50 VII. Congress (1936) ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '38) ? ? ? Exile KS(: Paris, 1939) ? ? ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '43) Post-war KSC (Ko~ .• '45) I 21 10 47.7 VIII. Congress ( 1946 ) I 101 0 0.0 170? 32 18.8 from July 1948 108 22 20.2 IX. Congress ( 1949) 112 23 20.3 X. Congress (1954) 147 33 22.5 XI. Congress (1958) 147 30 20.4 XII. Congress ( 1962) 166 28 16.8 XIII. Congress ( 1966 ) ? ? ? from Jan. 1968 XIV. extraordinary ('68) I 144 42 29.2 1921-1968 ll485j 254 j 17.8 II I i I 12 8 9 9 11 15 17 10 12 7 3 7 7 14 18 21 11 15 12 15 19 28 270 I - -- - - 0 0.0 -- --0 0.0 -- --7 1 11.0 0 0.0 1 14.6 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 2 33.3 6 3 20.0 1 20.0 5 1 5.9 ? ? ? 1 10.0 4 1 8.3 1 25.0 0 0.0 No 1 33.3 Secretariat 0 0.0 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 elected 2 9.5 1 14.6 7 2 18.2 0 0.0 6 1 12.5 4 26.6 8 1 12.5 4 33.3 8 0 0.0 8 5 33.3 0 0.0 6 31.5 ? ? 8 28.6 41 j 15.2 jj 79 j 8 I 10.1 /I SLOVAKIA 177 Append.ix II. The Leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) . (The office holders of the top Party positions in 1939-1969) A. ILLEGAL KSS. First Committee (March 1939-Aug. 1941): I;, Benada, J. Duris, J. Osoha. Second Committee (Sept. 1941- April 1942): 0. Krajnak, J . Osoha, V. Skrabala. Third Committee (June 1942- July 1942) : S. Dubcek, J. Lietavec, J. Osoha. Fourth Committee (July 1942- March 1943) : S. Bas t'ovansky, M. Hrusov- sky. Fifth Committee (Aug. 1943- Sept. 1944): G. Husak, L. Novomesky, K. Smidke. B. KSS IN POWER. M erger-Congress (Sept. 1944) President: K. Smidke. Vice-Presidents: G. Husak, J. Cech. Committee members : K. Bacilek, R. Balco, R. Blazovsky, F . cap, K. Dolinsky, D. Ertl, I. Frlicka, 0. Jelen, J. Lietavec, J . Mazur, L. Novomesky, J . Pull, J . Soltesz, M. Smida, J . Sziics, L. Viktorin. Nati onal Conference at Zilina (Aug. 1945) Presidium - President: V. Siroky. Vice-President: K. Smidke. Members : S. Bast'ovansky, J. :i'.>uris, L. Holdos, G. Husak, J . Soltesz, F . Zupka , M. Valachovic. Secretariat: K. Bacilek, S. Bast'ovansky, L. Holdos, E . FrR From Apr. 1946: K. Moskovic. IX Congress of the KSS (May 1950). Presidium - President: V. Siroky. First Secretary: S. Bast'ovansky. Members: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J. Branik, M. culen, J . :i'.>uris, M. Falt'an, K. Moskovic, J. Pull, S. Rais, E. Sykora, F . Zupka. Secretariat ( established in Oct. 1951) : V. Siroky, S. Bast'ovansky, J . Pull, K. Moskovic, M. Gosiorovsky. From Dec. 1951 also : P . David and I;. Benada. Xth Congress of the KSS (June 1953 ) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J . Branik, M. culen, P. David, M. Falt'an, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, 0 . Pavlik, J . Pull, R. Strechaj , V. Siroky, F. Zupka. Secretariat: I;_ Benada, P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, J . Pull. ? Congress of the KSS (April 1955). Presidium: K. Bacilek, M. Bakula, I;. Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, 0. Jelen, P . Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka. 178 SLOVAKIA Extraordinary Con gress of the KSS (April 1957) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , P. Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Xlth Congress of the KSS (May 1958). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , J . Kriz, P. Majling, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P. David, F . Dvorsky, J. Kriz, J . Lenart. Xllth Party Congress (Nov. 1962). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, P. David , M. Chudik, J . Lenart, M. Sabolcik. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary till April 1963, when replaced by A. Dubcek) , V. Bil'ak, F . Dvorsky, J . Kriz, J. Lenart. Xlllth Congress of the KSS (May 1966). Presidium: F . Barbirek, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, A. Dubcek, H. :t'.lurkovic, M. Chudik, J . Janik, J. Lorine, M . Sabolcik. From Jan. 1968 also M. Hruskovic, R. Harencar, M. Pecho. Secretariat: A. Dubcek (First Secretary till Jan. 1968, when replaced by V. Bil'ak), J . Janik, M . Sabolcik, J. Zrak. XIVth Extraordinary Congress of the KSS (Aug. 1968). Presidium: G. Husak, K. Bod'a, S. Falt'an, R. Harencar, 0. Klokoc, s. Luptak, L . Novomesky, V. Pavlenda, s. Sadovsky, M. Sedlakova, A. 1'azky, J . Zrak. Secretariat: G. Husak (First Secretary), L. Abraham, B. Graca, V. Pavlenda, S. Sadovsky, J. Turcek, J. Zrak. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is a CULTURAL and CIVIC organization of Americans of Slovak descent. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA wants to help Americans of Slovak descent in American political life, in business or professions, in social standing, and along educational lines.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Fifty Years of Communist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 19 (No. 42), 1969 pp. 125-178 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1969 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3913c0c0e176b5794db9f9f04f5a5cc6.pdf ec93320ccc8b7b93c0e0d3293708081e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 121 FIRST SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN IN AMERICA Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS .C.M. In 1879 two interesting romantics set out from their native city of Krompachy in Spis County, Slovakia. They were Janko Slovensky, then twenty-two years old, and his cousin, Julius J. Wolf, only nineteen. They had finished elementary school in Krompachy and college studies in Presov. After that, they attended the renowned Jesuit Teachers' College, Klastor pod Znievom, and earned their diplomas. Slovensky had some experience as tutor with a wealthy family in the county of Gerner but he soon convinced himself that was not the life for him. He preferred big game hunting in Africa and he planned to make this romantic impulse a reality. Julius Wolf, who had also tutored in a private family, was readily won to his cousin's idea and he gladly decided to accompany him. They were kindred spirits. They left home in the summer of 1879 against the advice of their parents. Their fathers reluctantly allowed them to go only becal:lse, parentwise, they hoped that a few practical lessons in the school of life would teach these sons the folly of such a fantastic undertaking. The adventurers left with no equipment, no guns, nothing but the fullness of anticipation and a thirst for excitement. Strangely, they did not go by a direct route to Africa. They may have planned their intinerary in a roundabout way because they considered England the gateway to the wide world and the English language the key to a realm of mystery. They traveled through Germany into England and Scotland where the unforseen happened. Either they boyishly lost courage or they sanely judged their resources to be inadequate in the light of reality or they made a mistake and boarded the wrong boat from Edinburgh. At any rate, their next stop after a long sea voyage was on the shores of the United States. Starting Life in U.S.A. with $35 At Ellis Island they pooled their funds and discovered that they had thirty-five dollars with which to establish �122 SLOVAKIA themselves in America. This realization ended their romantic dreams abruptly. The clamoring of hunger made them realize that they would have to accept the inescapable reality of work. And it would have to be the back breaking work of a common laborer since professional or clerical employment was beyond them until they would attain proficiency in English. They studied the situation soberly and agreed to spend their money for tickets to the industrial area around Pittsburgh. There they hired themselves out as day laborers and agonized at their new experience in the National Tube Works of McKeesport, Pennsylvania. The aching of their limbs only whetted their efforts to improve their position. They did their utmost to progress from primer English and to become Americanized, and they did not grow discouraged. Gradually they became hardened for strenous work in various capacities: as day laborers, carpenters, masons, and miners. Before long they even came to pride themselves on the fact that they were able to earn their livelihood by such taxing work and in such an alien world. Happily, their feeling of strangeness began to wear off soon, and native ability helped them to triumph over the language barrier. Then, to their joy, five other Slovak immigrants unexpectedly came into McKeesport in the spring of 1880. Life was definitely brighter from then on. Gradually, more and more Slovaks joined the little group in this mining and manufacturing region of Pennsylvania. There was a marked influx of immigration from Austria-Hungary and its tide was swelled by large numbers of Slovaks. They came especially from the more oppressed districts of eastern Slovakia where the contemporary political regime had denied them, among other rights, opportunities for schooling and self-improvement . The more enlightened classes from central and western Slovakia had sent out very few emigrants as yet. Natural Leaders of Slovak Immigrants Slovensky and Wolf had improved themselves considerably by this time and they became the natural leaders among the good-hearted newcomers in western Pennsylvania. Wolf had progressed from laborer to factory timekeeper, then to clerk, and before long he opened a business �SLOVAKIA 123 of his own. Slovensky, too, advanced himself and came to hold a position in the office of Max Scharnberg, former Austro-Hungarian consul in Pittsburgh. Through correspondence and personal contact, directly and indirectly he became increasingly aware of the many problems that were complicating the lives of Slovaks in America. Day by day the mail brought many questions to his employer's office. Some of them were very rational; others bordered on the fantastic, being the outgrowth of wild rumors and attempts to exploit strangers in a new world. But every problem which was brought to his attention was undeniably real. Are you wondering what some of these odd questions might have been? Here are a few: "Is it true that every man who does not return at once to his regiment in Hungary will be shot when he does come back?" "Is it true that the Turks have conquered Hungary and are going to behead everyone who does not become a Moslem?" (You must remember that Slovakia was at this time unwillingly incorporated within the territories of Austria-Hungary; hence, these men were worried about the families and relatives whom they had left behind.) "Please, tell me if it is true that after the Fourth of July no Slovak will get a job here, and if he doesn't leave America within a month, he will lose his life." "They tell me that everyone from Hungary must pay a ten-dollar tax every month if he wants to work in America. Is this really true?" There were also many letters asking for help in tracing families and relatives in America. A bewildered laborer had perhaps lost an address which he needed in order to find his relatives here and was helpless in the face of the situation. And would you believe it? Some poor things came with blind trust only. They had no idea of the size of their adopted land and, provincial-minded as they were at that time, they simply felt that once they had reached America, they would meet their friends and relatives as if they had come into their own familiar village. They had no address whatever and no idea where to begin their search for their kin in this vast new land. �124 SLOVAKIA Bulletin Published to Answer Questions On seeing how much his fellowmen needed help, Slovensky was anxious to relieve them as quickly and as satisfactorily as possible. When a flood of letters would come into Mr. Schamberg's office, repeating the same question or presenting similar problems, it occurred to Slovensky that the easiest way out to reach so many with the same necessary information, with the same helpful advice or instruction would be through a newspaper or a news sheet. But they had none. Would they like to have one, Slovensky wondered. Then he took the logical step. He sent out circular letters with that inquiry and after he had filed thirty prospectives agreeing to pay ten cents per copy of a weekly "Bulletin" which he proposed, he launched his new though modest venture and brought out the first Slovak "newspaper" in America at two o'clock one memorable morning in 1885. It consisted of a single sheet handwritten with duplicating ink and hectographed on foolscap since that was the size of the gelatin pad which Slovensky then had available for his "publication." The first page featured "news of the world" and the second featured "news items from home." This paper was not merely a local news sheet to be distributed in the immediate neighborhood of McKeesport; it reached out as far as Bonne Terre, Missouri, and Port Arthur, Canada. Issues were enclosed in envelopes for mailing and postage consumed two cents out of every ten-cent subscription fee or copy. We can hardly understand how daring was this enterprise. It took uncommon courage to propose a newspaper for people who had been denied the very fundamentals of literacy, a people who had been so exploited that they hardly knew how to appreciate the printed page as part of their ordinary lives, who had been so crushed as to be made to feel that "newspapers are for the elite only." For these reasons there commonly prevailed among them a tendency to feel that it was snobbishness or pretention tc aspire to such culture; it had so long been beyond their attaining. But Slovensky's faith in his people was not misplaced and he had the initiative to blaze the trail to better things for them in this new and promising world. The first twenty numbers of the "Bulletin" followed �SLOVAKIA 125 the format and the pattern of the original. The issue was generally read aloud in a public gathering place, often a tavern or an eating place, and then individual features and news items became more or less common property and was prominently posted on the main window of the establishment or placed behind glass in a picture frame and hung' where all might read-if they could-or refer to it. A large crowd always gathered in these places whenever the "Bulletin" was due. Everybody was eager for the news it brought; everybody wanted to be present for the reading of the "newspaper" which Slovensky edited in the saris dialect. He had chosen this dialect because it was his own and because it was most representative of the readers for whom the sheet was intended at the time. Such a favorable reception of the "Bulletin" was highly gratifying to Slovensky because he saw that it both helped and pleased his people, and he was assured that they were willing to support it, since the number of subscribers was mounting from week to week. In fact, the demand soon exceeded the capabilities of a hectograph job. Consequently, in the twentieth issue Slovensky announced that as soon as adjustments could be made, he would begin to publish a standard newspaper of eight pages and he asked his subscribers to bear with him until the change could be effected. Meanwhile he discontinued the hectographed sheet. While the broadening circle of his reading public waited with eager anticipation, Slovensky, wholly raw in this field but stimulated by enthusiasm and the desire to propagate a general good, applied himself to learn from German and American printeries all that a printer should know. He diligently scouted for type that would be suitable for Slovak reading and when by lucky chance he found something desirable in Chicago, he unhesitatingly gave for it all that he had saved from his five years' earnings in America. Julius Wolf was no less sacrificing in this cause. He sold out his flourishing business in favor of a partnership with Slovensky. First Slovak Newspaper in America The investment made, they both ardently set themselves to work and on October 2, 1886 they proudly released from the press in Pittsburgh the first edition of the new paper. It bore the title banner "Amerikanszko-Szlovenske �126 SLOVAKIA Noviny" (American-Slovak News). If you know a little Slovak, that spelling in the Slovak phrase will seem peculiar to you. Remember that these original journalistic efforts were in the saris or eastern dialect and with phonetic spelling closely resembling the Magyar language which both these men had learned in the only schools they had been allowed to attend in their boyhood. The luxury of a Slovak newspaper was now available to all these Slovak immigrants who had never dared to dream of such a privilege in their peasant serfdom. Circulation Rises Within two years the circulation of Slovensky's paper had risen increasingly: there were about six thousand paid subscribers. The efforts originally launched through that humble hectographed sheet evolved into a formidable teacher and protector of Slovak interests in this land of freedom. Both Slovensky and Wolf were conscious of their shortcomings as newspaper men, for neither had studied journalism, and neither had had any previous experience in printing or publishing. Realizing that they needed specialized help, they advertized for a professional copy writer or editor abroad. They waited patiently and hopefully but their appeal brought no response. Manfully, therefore, they carried on to the best of their ability. They were remarkably successful in reporting current news, fresh opportunities and prevailing conditions in America. They took pains to acquaint Slovak immigrants with their obligations as well as with the priviledges provided them under the laws of their new country. As occasion demanded it, they wrote editorials weighted with sound admonitions and with recommendations in order to protect their readers from snares and dangers of various types, and helped them to become Americanized more rapidly. Simplicity and intimacy characterized the paper to such an extent that one can easily see in it a kind of open correspondence with a reading public rather than a formal journalistic project in the full sense of the word. New Impetus in 1888 In 1888 new impetus and quality came to the paper because of the highly improved caliber of contributions �SLOVAK.IA 127 which Rovinov had begun to submit to it. Rovinov was the pen name of Peter Victor Rovnianek, an aspiring Slovak intellectual who migrated to America in order to enjoy academic and political freedom here. He was an ardent patriot, more eager to advance the national cause than to do anything else.For that reason he had originally undertaken studies for the priesthood, realizing that a good priest is both the leader and the teacher of many. When Rovnianek's aspirations were warped by the political atmosphere at home, and when brighter prospects were offered in America, he came to St. Mary's College in Cleveland, Ohio, as a young seminarian quite close to ordination. It was from this seminary that he sent out his freelance contributions to various publications both here and abroad. Because his heart was in his work, he had the capacity to impart his ardor to others. His brilliance was quickly recognized and appreciated. The Slovensky-Wolf partnership profited by Rovnianek's talents and stood in admiration of his gifts. They saw in him more than the personification of their ideal editor and felt that it was no longer necessary to seek help from abroad; Rovnianek was the one eminently qualified for the editorship of their paper. Unfortunately for them, he was at this time seriously contemplating a return to Europe. On May 13, 1889 fire destroyed practically the entire shop and assets of the American-Slovak Press and made Slovensky and Wolf feel that they were doomed to terminate their publication. In this dark hour, the mails brought to Pittsburgh Rovnianek's farewell letter. He had made his decision; he was leaving for home. Wolf received the message and at once telegraphed Slovensky who was in New York on business. He, in turn, immediately set out for Cleveland to dissuade Rovinov from leaving. After considerable discussion and persuasion, Slovensky concluded his interview with this stipulation: the American-Slovak News would continue to appear only if Slovensky, Wolf and Rovinov would form a partnership to be known as John Slovensky and Company. Otherwise he would not carry on. It was up to Rovnianek to seal either the doom or the promise of the paper. Because this was a momentous challenge for him, Rovnianek requested two weeks for consideration, and the matter rested. Rovnianek was now bitterly tom between the natural �128 SLOVAKIA desire to return home and the apparent need to stay in America. Monthly reports from Ellis Island indicated that immigration from Hungary was very much on the increase. It brought a steady stream of Slovaks into a better land and they needing help in orientating themselves. Rovnianek foresaw that the influx of Slovak immigrants at the current rate could easily mean a guarantee for the re-birth of his crushed nation in some better day. He realized how great was the need for these uprooted people in America to have wise leaders and true teachers. He saw how readily they could be exposed to error and false allegiance especially since there were already forces at work to undermine all that he had endeavored to elevate. These and other considerations, too, seemed to bear upon Rovnianek the conviction that if he really wished to be where he could do the greatest good as a patriot, he should assume the offered editorship of the still crude but highly potential American-Slovak News. He consulted with some of his intellectual friends: Vaclav Panuska, Dr. Francisci, Miller and others. They, too, advised against his return to Europe. Rovnianek Assumes Leadership Accordingly, Rovnianek resolved to become a partner and to accept the responsibilities of editorship. He sacrificed his seminary career and left Cleveland on June 28, 1889. As a 22 year old editor he began in earnest to establish his reputation in American-Slovak national life. He introduced many changes to improve the paper, the most spectacular and significant of which was to discard the use of the dialect form of expression and Hungarian spellings. Quietly but firmly he instated the true literary form of Slovak and American patriotism and tolerated no pretense of regard for foreign overlords. He prepared for his readers comprehensive reports on news from America and from the world at large, especially from Slovakia, so close to the hearts of the immigrants. Working-men always consulted Rovnianek's paper because it was his policy to include items bearing on labor conditions in various localities. He called attention to the fact that one mill or another was ready to hire additional help; that a shop in this town closed and consequently it would be frustrating to try to find employment there; that �SLOVAKIA 129 a strike was called at such and such a mine and it was unwise to scab and invite violence. Activities from various Slovak colonies in America were featured and were read with great interest. Serious editorials, instructive articles, essays and stories were provided in abundance. Rovinov ran an interesting serial on American history and he offered many translations of American Indian stories. Besides all this, his paper had many valuable contributions solicited from leading Slovak writers abroad: Vajansky, Sasinek, Dr. Wagner and others. Rovinov's own style was energetic, warm, colorful and fascinating, and his underprivileged public as well as literary readers found it appealing. The project did not fail do draw criticism and opposition from certain unfriendly factions but Rovnianek's im, mediate working atmosphere was favorable and amicable. He found in Wolf his greatest support and understanding. Julius Wolf was his bosom friend and Rovnianek pays him glowing tribute both in his memoirs and in a biographical sketch prepared for the Slovak National Almanac of 1894, referring to him as "a meek, well-tempered man, affable and urbane in society, accomodating and good-hearted at all times. He was wholly devoted to the Slovak cause and his zeal often mounted to fire." In all their 22 years of close collaboration they had but one misunderstanding and that one was very minor and puerile, ensuing upon a card game and opera engagement. Three Partners Work Hard All three partners worked indefatiguably seven days a week, eighteen to twenty hours per day, for the royal salary of nine dollars a week. The work of copy writing, editing, composing and printing did not in itself requisition all this labor. The fact is that there were innumerable business details calling for attention and demanding incessant work and more and more and more of everybody's time. The most time-consuming of them was soliciting new subscribers by house to house canvasses. Their entire plant consisted of one room measuring about 16 by 30. It was divided by a wooden partition. The fore section served as business office, book shop, editorial office, and administration department. Here Slovensky's desk was near the window. Through the center of the room �130 SLOVAKIA there stretched a long table covered with green felt. At its head sat the expeditor who folded copies and prepared them for mailing. One side of the table was reserved for Wolf who had been doing editorial writing until Rovnianek came. In the new partnership, the other side was allotted to Rovnianek as his working area. The rear section of the plant housed the composing and printing department where Joseph Gallik and Morris Greenstein operated a hand powered machine. Only Slovensky had the benefit of daylight. For the others, electric lights burned night and day . Soliciting Subscriptions When Rovnianek came to Pittsburgh, the paper's special list of subscribers ran to 1700 but there was no business manager to collect payments or to check for active subscribers, change of address, etc. Generally it was necessary to send an agent to collect and to solicit subscriptions. On week-ends, Rovnianek and Wolf often undertook such missions personally because the new editor felt that such contacts were essential in order to "sell" the newspaper idea to newer immigrants and to those who still felt too impoverished culturally and materially to invest in a subscription. Rovnianek also dedicated himself to the cause of fraternalizing. He visited town after town. When national consciousness was already awakened, he advanced the idea of a nationwide organization of all Slovaks in America. Often he came upon a home housing 20 to 30 or even 50 to 60 boarders none of whom cared to be bothered about subscribing to a paper which none of them would be able to read. Rovnianek did not appraise such a situation as hopeless. ·He would take out a primer he usually carried on such occasions and tactfully but effectively he would demonstrate how one begins to learn to read. Patiently he taught sounds and syllables, and usually he sold at least one primer in that house before he left, happy with the satisfaction that the spark of literacy was lighted in another mind. Eventually, after a few subsequent visits and instructions, he was able to sign up one or more new subscribers from amortg those who had started out so humbly but -earnestly. �SLOVAK.IA 131 In this way Rovnianek familiarized himself with the realities of life among his people in America and to form this knowledge and contact he drew factual material and background for articles, news items, editorials, and stories. He flayed weaknesses and failings that were avoidable; he censured lapses and deficiencies that were culpable; he commended diligence, virtue, achievement and honor. He could not condone sub-standard or unhygienic living conditions or loose and crude manners of life especially where children might be exposed to such undesirable influences. Exploiters inveighed against him and his paper but he was undaunted and carried on his vigorous campaign. Meanwhile Janko Slovensky began to experience a recurrence of the romantic urge. The wanderlust was upon him. His association with Rovnianek began to grow temperamental and finally in 1892 the partnership was dissolved. The P. V. Rovnianek & Co. carried on the publishing business and related interests. Slovensky married Mrs. Stewart, the widow of a sea captain and their long-time landlady. Then he settled in New Albany, Indiana, where he manufactured cigars until there was a relapse of restlessness. This time gold fever combined with wanderlust, and he began to prospect in Colorado and in Mexico. He hopefully formed the Elk Gold Mining Company and sold shares to Slovak acquaintances and to many who aspired to ready wealth. He learned from sad reverses, however, that his lack of experience in such a field served him very poorly. He had done much better prospecting amid the treasures of the mind in the world of journalism. From his gold mine in Mexico he finally returned to Los Angeles where family troubles were added to his business worries, and he died a tragic death in 1891. Wolf died in 1930. Their brain child, the promising pioneer Slovak American newspaper, carried on until 1924 when a large progeny of publications like Jednota, Ndrodne Noviny, Katolicky Sokol, Obrana, and Slovak v Amerike were capably serving Slovaks in America. SOURCES K. Culen, Slovcici v Amerike, Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. K. Culen, J . Slovensky, Winnipeg, 1955. P . V. Rovnianek, Zcipisky za iiva pochovaneho, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1924. Early issues of Ncirodny kalendcir. � SLOVAKIA 121 FIRST SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN IN AMERICA Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS .C.M. In 1879 two interesting romantics set out from their native city of Krompachy in Spis County, Slovakia. They were Janko Slovensky, then twenty-two years old, and his cousin, Julius J. Wolf, only nineteen. They had finished elementary school in Krompachy and college studies in Presov. After that, they attended the renowned Jesuit Teachers' College, Klastor pod Znievom, and earned their diplomas. Slovensky had some experience as tutor with a wealthy family in the county of Gerner but he soon convinced himself that was not the life for him. He preferred big game hunting in Africa and he planned to make this romantic impulse a reality. Julius Wolf, who had also tutored in a private family, was readily won to his cousin's idea and he gladly decided to accompany him. They were kindred spirits. They left home in the summer of 1879 against the advice of their parents. Their fathers reluctantly allowed them to go only becal:lse, parentwise, they hoped that a few practical lessons in the school of life would teach these sons the folly of such a fantastic undertaking. The adventurers left with no equipment, no guns, nothing but the fullness of anticipation and a thirst for excitement. Strangely, they did not go by a direct route to Africa. They may have planned their intinerary in a roundabout way because they considered England the gateway to the wide world and the English language the key to a realm of mystery. They traveled through Germany into England and Scotland where the unforseen happened. Either they boyishly lost courage or they sanely judged their resources to be inadequate in the light of reality or they made a mistake and boarded the wrong boat from Edinburgh. At any rate, their next stop after a long sea voyage was on the shores of the United States. Starting Life in U.S.A. with $35 At Ellis Island they pooled their funds and discovered that they had thirty-five dollars with which to establish �122 SLOVAKIA themselves in America. This realization ended their romantic dreams abruptly. The clamoring of hunger made them realize that they would have to accept the inescapable reality of work. And it would have to be the back breaking work of a common laborer since professional or clerical employment was beyond them until they would attain proficiency in English. They studied the situation soberly and agreed to spend their money for tickets to the industrial area around Pittsburgh. There they hired themselves out as day laborers and agonized at their new experience in the National Tube Works of McKeesport, Pennsylvania. The aching of their limbs only whetted their efforts to improve their position. They did their utmost to progress from primer English and to become Americanized, and they did not grow discouraged. Gradually they became hardened for strenous work in various capacities: as day laborers, carpenters, masons, and miners. Before long they even came to pride themselves on the fact that they were able to earn their livelihood by such taxing work and in such an alien world. Happily, their feeling of strangeness began to wear off soon, and native ability helped them to triumph over the language barrier. Then, to their joy, five other Slovak immigrants unexpectedly came into McKeesport in the spring of 1880. Life was definitely brighter from then on. Gradually, more and more Slovaks joined the little group in this mining and manufacturing region of Pennsylvania. There was a marked influx of immigration from Austria-Hungary and its tide was swelled by large numbers of Slovaks. They came especially from the more oppressed districts of eastern Slovakia where the contemporary political regime had denied them, among other rights, opportunities for schooling and self-improvement . The more enlightened classes from central and western Slovakia had sent out very few emigrants as yet. Natural Leaders of Slovak Immigrants Slovensky and Wolf had improved themselves considerably by this time and they became the natural leaders among the good-hearted newcomers in western Pennsylvania. Wolf had progressed from laborer to factory timekeeper, then to clerk, and before long he opened a business �SLOVAKIA 123 of his own. Slovensky, too, advanced himself and came to hold a position in the office of Max Scharnberg, former Austro-Hungarian consul in Pittsburgh. Through correspondence and personal contact, directly and indirectly he became increasingly aware of the many problems that were complicating the lives of Slovaks in America. Day by day the mail brought many questions to his employer's office. Some of them were very rational; others bordered on the fantastic, being the outgrowth of wild rumors and attempts to exploit strangers in a new world. But every problem which was brought to his attention was undeniably real. Are you wondering what some of these odd questions might have been? Here are a few: "Is it true that every man who does not return at once to his regiment in Hungary will be shot when he does come back?" "Is it true that the Turks have conquered Hungary and are going to behead everyone who does not become a Moslem?" (You must remember that Slovakia was at this time unwillingly incorporated within the territories of Austria-Hungary; hence, these men were worried about the families and relatives whom they had left behind.) "Please, tell me if it is true that after the Fourth of July no Slovak will get a job here, and if he doesn't leave America within a month, he will lose his life." "They tell me that everyone from Hungary must pay a ten-dollar tax every month if he wants to work in America. Is this really true?" There were also many letters asking for help in tracing families and relatives in America. A bewildered laborer had perhaps lost an address which he needed in order to find his relatives here and was helpless in the face of the situation. And would you believe it? Some poor things came with blind trust only. They had no idea of the size of their adopted land and, provincial-minded as they were at that time, they simply felt that once they had reached America, they would meet their friends and relatives as if they had come into their own familiar village. They had no address whatever and no idea where to begin their search for their kin in this vast new land. �124 SLOVAKIA Bulletin Published to Answer Questions On seeing how much his fellowmen needed help, Slovensky was anxious to relieve them as quickly and as satisfactorily as possible. When a flood of letters would come into Mr. Schamberg's office, repeating the same question or presenting similar problems, it occurred to Slovensky that the easiest way out to reach so many with the same necessary information, with the same helpful advice or instruction would be through a newspaper or a news sheet. But they had none. Would they like to have one, Slovensky wondered. Then he took the logical step. He sent out circular letters with that inquiry and after he had filed thirty prospectives agreeing to pay ten cents per copy of a weekly "Bulletin" which he proposed, he launched his new though modest venture and brought out the first Slovak "newspaper" in America at two o'clock one memorable morning in 1885. It consisted of a single sheet handwritten with duplicating ink and hectographed on foolscap since that was the size of the gelatin pad which Slovensky then had available for his "publication." The first page featured "news of the world" and the second featured "news items from home." This paper was not merely a local news sheet to be distributed in the immediate neighborhood of McKeesport; it reached out as far as Bonne Terre, Missouri, and Port Arthur, Canada. Issues were enclosed in envelopes for mailing and postage consumed two cents out of every ten-cent subscription fee or copy. We can hardly understand how daring was this enterprise. It took uncommon courage to propose a newspaper for people who had been denied the very fundamentals of literacy, a people who had been so exploited that they hardly knew how to appreciate the printed page as part of their ordinary lives, who had been so crushed as to be made to feel that "newspapers are for the elite only." For these reasons there commonly prevailed among them a tendency to feel that it was snobbishness or pretention tc aspire to such culture; it had so long been beyond their attaining. But Slovensky's faith in his people was not misplaced and he had the initiative to blaze the trail to better things for them in this new and promising world. The first twenty numbers of the "Bulletin" followed �SLOVAKIA 125 the format and the pattern of the original. The issue was generally read aloud in a public gathering place, often a tavern or an eating place, and then individual features and news items became more or less common property and was prominently posted on the main window of the establishment or placed behind glass in a picture frame and hung' where all might read-if they could-or refer to it. A large crowd always gathered in these places whenever the "Bulletin" was due. Everybody was eager for the news it brought; everybody wanted to be present for the reading of the "newspaper" which Slovensky edited in the saris dialect. He had chosen this dialect because it was his own and because it was most representative of the readers for whom the sheet was intended at the time. Such a favorable reception of the "Bulletin" was highly gratifying to Slovensky because he saw that it both helped and pleased his people, and he was assured that they were willing to support it, since the number of subscribers was mounting from week to week. In fact, the demand soon exceeded the capabilities of a hectograph job. Consequently, in the twentieth issue Slovensky announced that as soon as adjustments could be made, he would begin to publish a standard newspaper of eight pages and he asked his subscribers to bear with him until the change could be effected. Meanwhile he discontinued the hectographed sheet. While the broadening circle of his reading public waited with eager anticipation, Slovensky, wholly raw in this field but stimulated by enthusiasm and the desire to propagate a general good, applied himself to learn from German and American printeries all that a printer should know. He diligently scouted for type that would be suitable for Slovak reading and when by lucky chance he found something desirable in Chicago, he unhesitatingly gave for it all that he had saved from his five years' earnings in America. Julius Wolf was no less sacrificing in this cause. He sold out his flourishing business in favor of a partnership with Slovensky. First Slovak Newspaper in America The investment made, they both ardently set themselves to work and on October 2, 1886 they proudly released from the press in Pittsburgh the first edition of the new paper. It bore the title banner "Amerikanszko-Szlovenske �126 SLOVAKIA Noviny" (American-Slovak News). If you know a little Slovak, that spelling in the Slovak phrase will seem peculiar to you. Remember that these original journalistic efforts were in the saris or eastern dialect and with phonetic spelling closely resembling the Magyar language which both these men had learned in the only schools they had been allowed to attend in their boyhood. The luxury of a Slovak newspaper was now available to all these Slovak immigrants who had never dared to dream of such a privilege in their peasant serfdom. Circulation Rises Within two years the circulation of Slovensky's paper had risen increasingly: there were about six thousand paid subscribers. The efforts originally launched through that humble hectographed sheet evolved into a formidable teacher and protector of Slovak interests in this land of freedom. Both Slovensky and Wolf were conscious of their shortcomings as newspaper men, for neither had studied journalism, and neither had had any previous experience in printing or publishing. Realizing that they needed specialized help, they advertized for a professional copy writer or editor abroad. They waited patiently and hopefully but their appeal brought no response. Manfully, therefore, they carried on to the best of their ability. They were remarkably successful in reporting current news, fresh opportunities and prevailing conditions in America. They took pains to acquaint Slovak immigrants with their obligations as well as with the priviledges provided them under the laws of their new country. As occasion demanded it, they wrote editorials weighted with sound admonitions and with recommendations in order to protect their readers from snares and dangers of various types, and helped them to become Americanized more rapidly. Simplicity and intimacy characterized the paper to such an extent that one can easily see in it a kind of open correspondence with a reading public rather than a formal journalistic project in the full sense of the word. New Impetus in 1888 In 1888 new impetus and quality came to the paper because of the highly improved caliber of contributions �SLOVAK.IA 127 which Rovinov had begun to submit to it. Rovinov was the pen name of Peter Victor Rovnianek, an aspiring Slovak intellectual who migrated to America in order to enjoy academic and political freedom here. He was an ardent patriot, more eager to advance the national cause than to do anything else.For that reason he had originally undertaken studies for the priesthood, realizing that a good priest is both the leader and the teacher of many. When Rovnianek's aspirations were warped by the political atmosphere at home, and when brighter prospects were offered in America, he came to St. Mary's College in Cleveland, Ohio, as a young seminarian quite close to ordination. It was from this seminary that he sent out his freelance contributions to various publications both here and abroad. Because his heart was in his work, he had the capacity to impart his ardor to others. His brilliance was quickly recognized and appreciated. The Slovensky-Wolf partnership profited by Rovnianek's talents and stood in admiration of his gifts. They saw in him more than the personification of their ideal editor and felt that it was no longer necessary to seek help from abroad; Rovnianek was the one eminently qualified for the editorship of their paper. Unfortunately for them, he was at this time seriously contemplating a return to Europe. On May 13, 1889 fire destroyed practically the entire shop and assets of the American-Slovak Press and made Slovensky and Wolf feel that they were doomed to terminate their publication. In this dark hour, the mails brought to Pittsburgh Rovnianek's farewell letter. He had made his decision; he was leaving for home. Wolf received the message and at once telegraphed Slovensky who was in New York on business. He, in turn, immediately set out for Cleveland to dissuade Rovinov from leaving. After considerable discussion and persuasion, Slovensky concluded his interview with this stipulation: the American-Slovak News would continue to appear only if Slovensky, Wolf and Rovinov would form a partnership to be known as John Slovensky and Company. Otherwise he would not carry on. It was up to Rovnianek to seal either the doom or the promise of the paper. Because this was a momentous challenge for him, Rovnianek requested two weeks for consideration, and the matter rested. Rovnianek was now bitterly tom between the natural �128 SLOVAKIA desire to return home and the apparent need to stay in America. Monthly reports from Ellis Island indicated that immigration from Hungary was very much on the increase. It brought a steady stream of Slovaks into a better land and they needing help in orientating themselves. Rovnianek foresaw that the influx of Slovak immigrants at the current rate could easily mean a guarantee for the re-birth of his crushed nation in some better day. He realized how great was the need for these uprooted people in America to have wise leaders and true teachers. He saw how readily they could be exposed to error and false allegiance especially since there were already forces at work to undermine all that he had endeavored to elevate. These and other considerations, too, seemed to bear upon Rovnianek the conviction that if he really wished to be where he could do the greatest good as a patriot, he should assume the offered editorship of the still crude but highly potential American-Slovak News. He consulted with some of his intellectual friends: Vaclav Panuska, Dr. Francisci, Miller and others. They, too, advised against his return to Europe. Rovnianek Assumes Leadership Accordingly, Rovnianek resolved to become a partner and to accept the responsibilities of editorship. He sacrificed his seminary career and left Cleveland on June 28, 1889. As a 22 year old editor he began in earnest to establish his reputation in American-Slovak national life. He introduced many changes to improve the paper, the most spectacular and significant of which was to discard the use of the dialect form of expression and Hungarian spellings. Quietly but firmly he instated the true literary form of Slovak and American patriotism and tolerated no pretense of regard for foreign overlords. He prepared for his readers comprehensive reports on news from America and from the world at large, especially from Slovakia, so close to the hearts of the immigrants. Working-men always consulted Rovnianek's paper because it was his policy to include items bearing on labor conditions in various localities. He called attention to the fact that one mill or another was ready to hire additional help; that a shop in this town closed and consequently it would be frustrating to try to find employment there; that �SLOVAKIA 129 a strike was called at such and such a mine and it was unwise to scab and invite violence. Activities from various Slovak colonies in America were featured and were read with great interest. Serious editorials, instructive articles, essays and stories were provided in abundance. Rovinov ran an interesting serial on American history and he offered many translations of American Indian stories. Besides all this, his paper had many valuable contributions solicited from leading Slovak writers abroad: Vajansky, Sasinek, Dr. Wagner and others. Rovinov's own style was energetic, warm, colorful and fascinating, and his underprivileged public as well as literary readers found it appealing. The project did not fail do draw criticism and opposition from certain unfriendly factions but Rovnianek's im, mediate working atmosphere was favorable and amicable. He found in Wolf his greatest support and understanding. Julius Wolf was his bosom friend and Rovnianek pays him glowing tribute both in his memoirs and in a biographical sketch prepared for the Slovak National Almanac of 1894, referring to him as "a meek, well-tempered man, affable and urbane in society, accomodating and good-hearted at all times. He was wholly devoted to the Slovak cause and his zeal often mounted to fire." In all their 22 years of close collaboration they had but one misunderstanding and that one was very minor and puerile, ensuing upon a card game and opera engagement. Three Partners Work Hard All three partners worked indefatiguably seven days a week, eighteen to twenty hours per day, for the royal salary of nine dollars a week. The work of copy writing, editing, composing and printing did not in itself requisition all this labor. The fact is that there were innumerable business details calling for attention and demanding incessant work and more and more and more of everybody's time. The most time-consuming of them was soliciting new subscribers by house to house canvasses. Their entire plant consisted of one room measuring about 16 by 30. It was divided by a wooden partition. The fore section served as business office, book shop, editorial office, and administration department. Here Slovensky's desk was near the window. Through the center of the room �130 SLOVAKIA there stretched a long table covered with green felt. At its head sat the expeditor who folded copies and prepared them for mailing. One side of the table was reserved for Wolf who had been doing editorial writing until Rovnianek came. In the new partnership, the other side was allotted to Rovnianek as his working area. The rear section of the plant housed the composing and printing department where Joseph Gallik and Morris Greenstein operated a hand powered machine. Only Slovensky had the benefit of daylight. For the others, electric lights burned night and day . Soliciting Subscriptions When Rovnianek came to Pittsburgh, the paper's special list of subscribers ran to 1700 but there was no business manager to collect payments or to check for active subscribers, change of address, etc. Generally it was necessary to send an agent to collect and to solicit subscriptions. On week-ends, Rovnianek and Wolf often undertook such missions personally because the new editor felt that such contacts were essential in order to "sell" the newspaper idea to newer immigrants and to those who still felt too impoverished culturally and materially to invest in a subscription. Rovnianek also dedicated himself to the cause of fraternalizing. He visited town after town. When national consciousness was already awakened, he advanced the idea of a nationwide organization of all Slovaks in America. Often he came upon a home housing 20 to 30 or even 50 to 60 boarders none of whom cared to be bothered about subscribing to a paper which none of them would be able to read. Rovnianek did not appraise such a situation as hopeless. ·He would take out a primer he usually carried on such occasions and tactfully but effectively he would demonstrate how one begins to learn to read. Patiently he taught sounds and syllables, and usually he sold at least one primer in that house before he left, happy with the satisfaction that the spark of literacy was lighted in another mind. Eventually, after a few subsequent visits and instructions, he was able to sign up one or more new subscribers from amortg those who had started out so humbly but -earnestly. �SLOVAK.IA 131 In this way Rovnianek familiarized himself with the realities of life among his people in America and to form this knowledge and contact he drew factual material and background for articles, news items, editorials, and stories. He flayed weaknesses and failings that were avoidable; he censured lapses and deficiencies that were culpable; he commended diligence, virtue, achievement and honor. He could not condone sub-standard or unhygienic living conditions or loose and crude manners of life especially where children might be exposed to such undesirable influences. Exploiters inveighed against him and his paper but he was undaunted and carried on his vigorous campaign. Meanwhile Janko Slovensky began to experience a recurrence of the romantic urge. The wanderlust was upon him. His association with Rovnianek began to grow temperamental and finally in 1892 the partnership was dissolved. The P. V. Rovnianek & Co. carried on the publishing business and related interests. Slovensky married Mrs. Stewart, the widow of a sea captain and their long-time landlady. Then he settled in New Albany, Indiana, where he manufactured cigars until there was a relapse of restlessness. This time gold fever combined with wanderlust, and he began to prospect in Colorado and in Mexico. He hopefully formed the Elk Gold Mining Company and sold shares to Slovak acquaintances and to many who aspired to ready wealth. He learned from sad reverses, however, that his lack of experience in such a field served him very poorly. He had done much better prospecting amid the treasures of the mind in the world of journalism. From his gold mine in Mexico he finally returned to Los Angeles where family troubles were added to his business worries, and he died a tragic death in 1891. Wolf died in 1930. Their brain child, the promising pioneer Slovak American newspaper, carried on until 1924 when a large progeny of publications like Jednota, Ndrodne Noviny, Katolicky Sokol, Obrana, and Slovak v Amerike were capably serving Slovaks in America. SOURCES K. Culen, Slovcici v Amerike, Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. K. Culen, J . Slovensky, Winnipeg, 1955. P . V. Rovnianek, Zcipisky za iiva pochovaneho, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1924. Early issues of Ncirodny kalendcir. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1968, Vol. 18 Description An account of the resource Vol. 18 (No. 41), 1968. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1968 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 121 FIRST SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN IN AMERICA Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS .C.M. In 1879 two interesting romantics set out from their native city of Krompachy in Spis County, Slovakia. They were Janko Slovensky, then twenty-two years old, and his cousin, Julius J. Wolf, only nineteen. They had finished elementary school in Krompachy and college studies in Presov. After that, they attended the renowned Jesuit Teachers' College, Klastor pod Znievom, and earned their diplomas. Slovensky had some experience as tutor with a wealthy family in the county of Gerner but he soon convinced himself that was not the life for him. He preferred big game hunting in Africa and he planned to make this romantic impulse a reality. Julius Wolf, who had also tutored in a private family, was readily won to his cousin's idea and he gladly decided to accompany him. They were kindred spirits. They left home in the summer of 1879 against the advice of their parents. Their fathers reluctantly allowed them to go only becal:lse, parentwise, they hoped that a few practical lessons in the school of life would teach these sons the folly of such a fantastic undertaking. The adventurers left with no equipment, no guns, nothing but the fullness of anticipation and a thirst for excitement. Strangely, they did not go by a direct route to Africa. They may have planned their intinerary in a roundabout way because they considered England the gateway to the wide world and the English language the key to a realm of mystery. They traveled through Germany into England and Scotland where the unforseen happened. Either they boyishly lost courage or they sanely judged their resources to be inadequate in the light of reality or they made a mistake and boarded the wrong boat from Edinburgh. At any rate, their next stop after a long sea voyage was on the shores of the United States. Starting Life in U.S.A. with $35 At Ellis Island they pooled their funds and discovered that they had thirty-five dollars with which to establish 122 SLOVAKIA themselves in America. This realization ended their romantic dreams abruptly. The clamoring of hunger made them realize that they would have to accept the inescapable reality of work. And it would have to be the back breaking work of a common laborer since professional or clerical employment was beyond them until they would attain proficiency in English. They studied the situation soberly and agreed to spend their money for tickets to the industrial area around Pittsburgh. There they hired themselves out as day laborers and agonized at their new experience in the National Tube Works of McKeesport, Pennsylvania. The aching of their limbs only whetted their efforts to improve their position. They did their utmost to progress from primer English and to become Americanized, and they did not grow discouraged. Gradually they became hardened for strenous work in various capacities: as day laborers, carpenters, masons, and miners. Before long they even came to pride themselves on the fact that they were able to earn their livelihood by such taxing work and in such an alien world. Happily, their feeling of strangeness began to wear off soon, and native ability helped them to triumph over the language barrier. Then, to their joy, five other Slovak immigrants unexpectedly came into McKeesport in the spring of 1880. Life was definitely brighter from then on. Gradually, more and more Slovaks joined the little group in this mining and manufacturing region of Pennsylvania. There was a marked influx of immigration from Austria-Hungary and its tide was swelled by large numbers of Slovaks. They came especially from the more oppressed districts of eastern Slovakia where the contemporary political regime had denied them, among other rights, opportunities for schooling and self-improvement . The more enlightened classes from central and western Slovakia had sent out very few emigrants as yet. Natural Leaders of Slovak Immigrants Slovensky and Wolf had improved themselves considerably by this time and they became the natural leaders among the good-hearted newcomers in western Pennsylvania. Wolf had progressed from laborer to factory timekeeper, then to clerk, and before long he opened a business SLOVAKIA 123 of his own. Slovensky, too, advanced himself and came to hold a position in the office of Max Scharnberg, former Austro-Hungarian consul in Pittsburgh. Through correspondence and personal contact, directly and indirectly he became increasingly aware of the many problems that were complicating the lives of Slovaks in America. Day by day the mail brought many questions to his employer's office. Some of them were very rational; others bordered on the fantastic, being the outgrowth of wild rumors and attempts to exploit strangers in a new world. But every problem which was brought to his attention was undeniably real. Are you wondering what some of these odd questions might have been? Here are a few: "Is it true that every man who does not return at once to his regiment in Hungary will be shot when he does come back?" "Is it true that the Turks have conquered Hungary and are going to behead everyone who does not become a Moslem?" (You must remember that Slovakia was at this time unwillingly incorporated within the territories of Austria-Hungary; hence, these men were worried about the families and relatives whom they had left behind.) "Please, tell me if it is true that after the Fourth of July no Slovak will get a job here, and if he doesn't leave America within a month, he will lose his life." "They tell me that everyone from Hungary must pay a ten-dollar tax every month if he wants to work in America. Is this really true?" There were also many letters asking for help in tracing families and relatives in America. A bewildered laborer had perhaps lost an address which he needed in order to find his relatives here and was helpless in the face of the situation. And would you believe it? Some poor things came with blind trust only. They had no idea of the size of their adopted land and, provincial-minded as they were at that time, they simply felt that once they had reached America, they would meet their friends and relatives as if they had come into their own familiar village. They had no address whatever and no idea where to begin their search for their kin in this vast new land. 124 SLOVAKIA Bulletin Published to Answer Questions On seeing how much his fellowmen needed help, Slovensky was anxious to relieve them as quickly and as satisfactorily as possible. When a flood of letters would come into Mr. Schamberg's office, repeating the same question or presenting similar problems, it occurred to Slovensky that the easiest way out to reach so many with the same necessary information, with the same helpful advice or instruction would be through a newspaper or a news sheet. But they had none. Would they like to have one, Slovensky wondered. Then he took the logical step. He sent out circular letters with that inquiry and after he had filed thirty prospectives agreeing to pay ten cents per copy of a weekly "Bulletin" which he proposed, he launched his new though modest venture and brought out the first Slovak "newspaper" in America at two o'clock one memorable morning in 1885. It consisted of a single sheet handwritten with duplicating ink and hectographed on foolscap since that was the size of the gelatin pad which Slovensky then had available for his "publication." The first page featured "news of the world" and the second featured "news items from home." This paper was not merely a local news sheet to be distributed in the immediate neighborhood of McKeesport; it reached out as far as Bonne Terre, Missouri, and Port Arthur, Canada. Issues were enclosed in envelopes for mailing and postage consumed two cents out of every ten-cent subscription fee or copy. We can hardly understand how daring was this enterprise. It took uncommon courage to propose a newspaper for people who had been denied the very fundamentals of literacy, a people who had been so exploited that they hardly knew how to appreciate the printed page as part of their ordinary lives, who had been so crushed as to be made to feel that "newspapers are for the elite only." For these reasons there commonly prevailed among them a tendency to feel that it was snobbishness or pretention tc aspire to such culture; it had so long been beyond their attaining. But Slovensky's faith in his people was not misplaced and he had the initiative to blaze the trail to better things for them in this new and promising world. The first twenty numbers of the "Bulletin" followed SLOVAKIA 125 the format and the pattern of the original. The issue was generally read aloud in a public gathering place, often a tavern or an eating place, and then individual features and news items became more or less common property and was prominently posted on the main window of the establishment or placed behind glass in a picture frame and hung' where all might read-if they could-or refer to it. A large crowd always gathered in these places whenever the "Bulletin" was due. Everybody was eager for the news it brought; everybody wanted to be present for the reading of the "newspaper" which Slovensky edited in the saris dialect. He had chosen this dialect because it was his own and because it was most representative of the readers for whom the sheet was intended at the time. Such a favorable reception of the "Bulletin" was highly gratifying to Slovensky because he saw that it both helped and pleased his people, and he was assured that they were willing to support it, since the number of subscribers was mounting from week to week. In fact, the demand soon exceeded the capabilities of a hectograph job. Consequently, in the twentieth issue Slovensky announced that as soon as adjustments could be made, he would begin to publish a standard newspaper of eight pages and he asked his subscribers to bear with him until the change could be effected. Meanwhile he discontinued the hectographed sheet. While the broadening circle of his reading public waited with eager anticipation, Slovensky, wholly raw in this field but stimulated by enthusiasm and the desire to propagate a general good, applied himself to learn from German and American printeries all that a printer should know. He diligently scouted for type that would be suitable for Slovak reading and when by lucky chance he found something desirable in Chicago, he unhesitatingly gave for it all that he had saved from his five years' earnings in America. Julius Wolf was no less sacrificing in this cause. He sold out his flourishing business in favor of a partnership with Slovensky. First Slovak Newspaper in America The investment made, they both ardently set themselves to work and on October 2, 1886 they proudly released from the press in Pittsburgh the first edition of the new paper. It bore the title banner "Amerikanszko-Szlovenske 126 SLOVAKIA Noviny" (American-Slovak News). If you know a little Slovak, that spelling in the Slovak phrase will seem peculiar to you. Remember that these original journalistic efforts were in the saris or eastern dialect and with phonetic spelling closely resembling the Magyar language which both these men had learned in the only schools they had been allowed to attend in their boyhood. The luxury of a Slovak newspaper was now available to all these Slovak immigrants who had never dared to dream of such a privilege in their peasant serfdom. Circulation Rises Within two years the circulation of Slovensky's paper had risen increasingly: there were about six thousand paid subscribers. The efforts originally launched through that humble hectographed sheet evolved into a formidable teacher and protector of Slovak interests in this land of freedom. Both Slovensky and Wolf were conscious of their shortcomings as newspaper men, for neither had studied journalism, and neither had had any previous experience in printing or publishing. Realizing that they needed specialized help, they advertized for a professional copy writer or editor abroad. They waited patiently and hopefully but their appeal brought no response. Manfully, therefore, they carried on to the best of their ability. They were remarkably successful in reporting current news, fresh opportunities and prevailing conditions in America. They took pains to acquaint Slovak immigrants with their obligations as well as with the priviledges provided them under the laws of their new country. As occasion demanded it, they wrote editorials weighted with sound admonitions and with recommendations in order to protect their readers from snares and dangers of various types, and helped them to become Americanized more rapidly. Simplicity and intimacy characterized the paper to such an extent that one can easily see in it a kind of open correspondence with a reading public rather than a formal journalistic project in the full sense of the word. New Impetus in 1888 In 1888 new impetus and quality came to the paper because of the highly improved caliber of contributions SLOVAK.IA 127 which Rovinov had begun to submit to it. Rovinov was the pen name of Peter Victor Rovnianek, an aspiring Slovak intellectual who migrated to America in order to enjoy academic and political freedom here. He was an ardent patriot, more eager to advance the national cause than to do anything else.For that reason he had originally undertaken studies for the priesthood, realizing that a good priest is both the leader and the teacher of many. When Rovnianek's aspirations were warped by the political atmosphere at home, and when brighter prospects were offered in America, he came to St. Mary's College in Cleveland, Ohio, as a young seminarian quite close to ordination. It was from this seminary that he sent out his freelance contributions to various publications both here and abroad. Because his heart was in his work, he had the capacity to impart his ardor to others. His brilliance was quickly recognized and appreciated. The Slovensky-Wolf partnership profited by Rovnianek's talents and stood in admiration of his gifts. They saw in him more than the personification of their ideal editor and felt that it was no longer necessary to seek help from abroad; Rovnianek was the one eminently qualified for the editorship of their paper. Unfortunately for them, he was at this time seriously contemplating a return to Europe. On May 13, 1889 fire destroyed practically the entire shop and assets of the American-Slovak Press and made Slovensky and Wolf feel that they were doomed to terminate their publication. In this dark hour, the mails brought to Pittsburgh Rovnianek's farewell letter. He had made his decision; he was leaving for home. Wolf received the message and at once telegraphed Slovensky who was in New York on business. He, in turn, immediately set out for Cleveland to dissuade Rovinov from leaving. After considerable discussion and persuasion, Slovensky concluded his interview with this stipulation: the American-Slovak News would continue to appear only if Slovensky, Wolf and Rovinov would form a partnership to be known as John Slovensky and Company. Otherwise he would not carry on. It was up to Rovnianek to seal either the doom or the promise of the paper. Because this was a momentous challenge for him, Rovnianek requested two weeks for consideration, and the matter rested. Rovnianek was now bitterly tom between the natural 128 SLOVAKIA desire to return home and the apparent need to stay in America. Monthly reports from Ellis Island indicated that immigration from Hungary was very much on the increase. It brought a steady stream of Slovaks into a better land and they needing help in orientating themselves. Rovnianek foresaw that the influx of Slovak immigrants at the current rate could easily mean a guarantee for the re-birth of his crushed nation in some better day. He realized how great was the need for these uprooted people in America to have wise leaders and true teachers. He saw how readily they could be exposed to error and false allegiance especially since there were already forces at work to undermine all that he had endeavored to elevate. These and other considerations, too, seemed to bear upon Rovnianek the conviction that if he really wished to be where he could do the greatest good as a patriot, he should assume the offered editorship of the still crude but highly potential American-Slovak News. He consulted with some of his intellectual friends: Vaclav Panuska, Dr. Francisci, Miller and others. They, too, advised against his return to Europe. Rovnianek Assumes Leadership Accordingly, Rovnianek resolved to become a partner and to accept the responsibilities of editorship. He sacrificed his seminary career and left Cleveland on June 28, 1889. As a 22 year old editor he began in earnest to establish his reputation in American-Slovak national life. He introduced many changes to improve the paper, the most spectacular and significant of which was to discard the use of the dialect form of expression and Hungarian spellings. Quietly but firmly he instated the true literary form of Slovak and American patriotism and tolerated no pretense of regard for foreign overlords. He prepared for his readers comprehensive reports on news from America and from the world at large, especially from Slovakia, so close to the hearts of the immigrants. Working-men always consulted Rovnianek's paper because it was his policy to include items bearing on labor conditions in various localities. He called attention to the fact that one mill or another was ready to hire additional help; that a shop in this town closed and consequently it would be frustrating to try to find employment there; that SLOVAKIA 129 a strike was called at such and such a mine and it was unwise to scab and invite violence. Activities from various Slovak colonies in America were featured and were read with great interest. Serious editorials, instructive articles, essays and stories were provided in abundance. Rovinov ran an interesting serial on American history and he offered many translations of American Indian stories. Besides all this, his paper had many valuable contributions solicited from leading Slovak writers abroad: Vajansky, Sasinek, Dr. Wagner and others. Rovinov's own style was energetic, warm, colorful and fascinating, and his underprivileged public as well as literary readers found it appealing. The project did not fail do draw criticism and opposition from certain unfriendly factions but Rovnianek's im, mediate working atmosphere was favorable and amicable. He found in Wolf his greatest support and understanding. Julius Wolf was his bosom friend and Rovnianek pays him glowing tribute both in his memoirs and in a biographical sketch prepared for the Slovak National Almanac of 1894, referring to him as "a meek, well-tempered man, affable and urbane in society, accomodating and good-hearted at all times. He was wholly devoted to the Slovak cause and his zeal often mounted to fire." In all their 22 years of close collaboration they had but one misunderstanding and that one was very minor and puerile, ensuing upon a card game and opera engagement. Three Partners Work Hard All three partners worked indefatiguably seven days a week, eighteen to twenty hours per day, for the royal salary of nine dollars a week. The work of copy writing, editing, composing and printing did not in itself requisition all this labor. The fact is that there were innumerable business details calling for attention and demanding incessant work and more and more and more of everybody's time. The most time-consuming of them was soliciting new subscribers by house to house canvasses. Their entire plant consisted of one room measuring about 16 by 30. It was divided by a wooden partition. The fore section served as business office, book shop, editorial office, and administration department. Here Slovensky's desk was near the window. Through the center of the room 130 SLOVAKIA there stretched a long table covered with green felt. At its head sat the expeditor who folded copies and prepared them for mailing. One side of the table was reserved for Wolf who had been doing editorial writing until Rovnianek came. In the new partnership, the other side was allotted to Rovnianek as his working area. The rear section of the plant housed the composing and printing department where Joseph Gallik and Morris Greenstein operated a hand powered machine. Only Slovensky had the benefit of daylight. For the others, electric lights burned night and day . Soliciting Subscriptions When Rovnianek came to Pittsburgh, the paper's special list of subscribers ran to 1700 but there was no business manager to collect payments or to check for active subscribers, change of address, etc. Generally it was necessary to send an agent to collect and to solicit subscriptions. On week-ends, Rovnianek and Wolf often undertook such missions personally because the new editor felt that such contacts were essential in order to "sell" the newspaper idea to newer immigrants and to those who still felt too impoverished culturally and materially to invest in a subscription. Rovnianek also dedicated himself to the cause of fraternalizing. He visited town after town. When national consciousness was already awakened, he advanced the idea of a nationwide organization of all Slovaks in America. Often he came upon a home housing 20 to 30 or even 50 to 60 boarders none of whom cared to be bothered about subscribing to a paper which none of them would be able to read. Rovnianek did not appraise such a situation as hopeless. ·He would take out a primer he usually carried on such occasions and tactfully but effectively he would demonstrate how one begins to learn to read. Patiently he taught sounds and syllables, and usually he sold at least one primer in that house before he left, happy with the satisfaction that the spark of literacy was lighted in another mind. Eventually, after a few subsequent visits and instructions, he was able to sign up one or more new subscribers from amortg those who had started out so humbly but -earnestly. SLOVAK.IA 131 In this way Rovnianek familiarized himself with the realities of life among his people in America and to form this knowledge and contact he drew factual material and background for articles, news items, editorials, and stories. He flayed weaknesses and failings that were avoidable; he censured lapses and deficiencies that were culpable; he commended diligence, virtue, achievement and honor. He could not condone sub-standard or unhygienic living conditions or loose and crude manners of life especially where children might be exposed to such undesirable influences. Exploiters inveighed against him and his paper but he was undaunted and carried on his vigorous campaign. Meanwhile Janko Slovensky began to experience a recurrence of the romantic urge. The wanderlust was upon him. His association with Rovnianek began to grow temperamental and finally in 1892 the partnership was dissolved. The P. V. Rovnianek & Co. carried on the publishing business and related interests. Slovensky married Mrs. Stewart, the widow of a sea captain and their long-time landlady. Then he settled in New Albany, Indiana, where he manufactured cigars until there was a relapse of restlessness. This time gold fever combined with wanderlust, and he began to prospect in Colorado and in Mexico. He hopefully formed the Elk Gold Mining Company and sold shares to Slovak acquaintances and to many who aspired to ready wealth. He learned from sad reverses, however, that his lack of experience in such a field served him very poorly. He had done much better prospecting amid the treasures of the mind in the world of journalism. From his gold mine in Mexico he finally returned to Los Angeles where family troubles were added to his business worries, and he died a tragic death in 1891. Wolf died in 1930. Their brain child, the promising pioneer Slovak American newspaper, carried on until 1924 when a large progeny of publications like Jednota, Ndrodne Noviny, Katolicky Sokol, Obrana, and Slovak v Amerike were capably serving Slovaks in America. SOURCES K. Culen, Slovcici v Amerike, Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. K. Culen, J . Slovensky, Winnipeg, 1955. P . V. Rovnianek, Zcipisky za iiva pochovaneho, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1924. Early issues of Ncirodny kalendcir.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource First Slovak Newspapermen in America Description An account of the resource Sister M. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 18 (No. 41), 1968 pp. 121-131 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Tybor, Sister M. Martina, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1968 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ca848c11db1831c3dea9d219fc406d38.pdf 05ebb1620f2736aac93f4f27d4224040 PDF Text Text 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- �SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the �SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. �SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, �64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30). � 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- �SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the �SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. �SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, �64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, 64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource For Dr. Stephen Osusky's Benefit Description An account of the resource Dr. Peter Skalenický Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 60-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Skalenický, Peter Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4f5f952bb2569787e3329d8bebfee411.pdf eef801728331229dc6d7e84945ffd5a3 PDF Text Text 48 SLOVAKIA Fortieth Anniversary Canadian Slovak League Edward J. B eh u n c i k (The following is the message of Edward J. Behuncik, President of the Slovak League of America, on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Canadian Slovak League at the Marlborough Hotel, Winnipeg, Manitoba, canada, August 5, 197?.) I assure you that the Slovak League of America, with which originally so many of you were officially associated as branch officers and members, is happy with your growth and successful development. Like every good Mother, we in the United States take maternal pride in your accomplishments. And because you are such a good offspring we are even happier. We especially congratulate your wise founders whose foresight made this week's renewal activity possible. We remember in pr ayer and happy memory your departed leaders and officers. In this same spirit, we congratulate you on reaching the 30th year of the successful and productive publication of your excellent weekly, The Canadian Slovak. I think its editorials rate among the finest writings I've come across in any of the many publications I see. It's top notch in any language. You have, on your own, done great things for the Slovak cause because you've so greatly helped the Canadian Slovaks. When you help Slovaks in Canada, you help Slovaks in the United States and everywhere. So also, when we help Slovaks in the United States, then we help Slovaks in Canada and elsewhere. And working together, we help all Slovaks and indirectly all peace-loving and God-fearing people everywhere. Thus, we make our efforts to sooner bring to reality the �SLOVAKIA 49 cherished aspirations for the Brotherhood of Man under the Fatherhood of God. My appreciation has been quickened by the sense that your choice has been determined solely by your unending union-in word, in spirit and in fraternal co-operationwith the great Slovak civic and cultural federation, which I am fortunate to head at this moment of history. I was pleased to note in the minutes of your first organizational session on December 12, 1932, that you _pledged to support and co-operate with the Slovak League of America-the Minutes state: "4. Vyvinula sa dlha debata, v ktorej vedene bratom Karolom Maresom, zhromazdene delegatstvo uist'ovalo brata Jozefa Zemana, ze program a ciele 1. kongresu Slov. Ligy v Kanade su cisto slovenske, ze spolu so Slov. Ligou V Amerike chceme pracovat' za tu nasu slovencinu." I am happy to state that you've kept that commitment and am fully confident that you will continue to do so. I, therefore, beg your indulgence while I set forth for your thoughtful consideration several ideas which I hold to be of paramount importance in the drama which the members of the Slovak League of America and you, the members of the Canadian Slovak League, are enacting through our daily and regular performance of the duties .and privileges of membership in our respective leagues. The dictionary tells us that "a patriot is one whose ruling is the love of his country," and that patriotism is "love and zeal for one's country." We in the United States love our country just as much as you love Canada. But we, like you love and are proud of all that is great and noble in the history of the land of our forefathers - beautiful Slovakia. Otherwise, you would not this evening be in Winnipeg, your birthplace. By taking pride, real lawful pride, in all things Slovak, we become better citizens and patriots of the countries where we live. The flame of Slovak patriotism which had long burned and still burns with a steady flame in all times of stress �50 SLOVAKIA and danger, has enabled the nation to maintain the struggle for its rightful place of distinction as a separate member of the family of nations. It has also sustained all Slovaks in their age-old efforts to carry out their destiny in the face of the most formidable opposition throughout the centuries and thereby, has exorted the admiration and often the envy of foreign observers. This record gives fresh proof even today of the invincible and unbroken vigor and vitality of the Slovak. And meanwhile, it has promoted among the citizens of every land in which this Slovak patriotism has taken root a sense of public duty and the growth of a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to country, dominion or commonwealth. But, patriotism must be founded on great principles and supported by great virtues. It involves duties as well as privileges, and these duties arise not only in connection with the domestic relations of the citizens to his native or adopted country. They arise also in all that concerns the attitude of that country towards foreign nations. That is why we must make certain that all countries become cognizant of the legitimate aspirations and aims of the Slovak people. It is the clear duty of true patriotism everywhere to consider this question of the expansion and extension of the Slovak cause in which we seem to be fulfilling the manifest duty of our Slovak heritage. So, you as good Canadians and as good Slovaks have a firm assurance of loyalty and affection of the sons of Slovakia in the United States and wherever else they may be. You are also assured of their readiness to play their part with you in the common cause even to a greater extent than in the past. I have faith in our cause and in our Slovak people. That is why I am happy to have the privilege to lead the Slovak League of America in what I pray will be its most glorious era. That is why I am happy to solicit your continued co-operation in the days to come as we with you and other Slovak groups solidify and coordinate into a true pillar of Slovak unity and solidarity. �SLOVAKIA 51 We now have the structure-The Slovak World Cogress, founded in the headquarters site of the United Nations in June, 1970. I believe that with all the forces and enthusiasm of which the democratic processes alone are capable, we, firmly united, will complete and maintain that splendid edifice of our fraternal and heartfelt love, which commenced under such successful auspices at New York and Toronto. Henceforth, all Slovaks wherever situated enter upon a new epoch of noble union, in this world-wide Slovak Congress. I also believe that the firmness of purpose and strength of will which are necessary to this end shall be supplied by the patriotism which sustains the most strenuous efforts and makes possible the greatest sacrifice. You have the power and, I am confident, the will to fill this patriotic need-to contribute your patriotic share. You still have in full measure the opportunity of continued service until you have achieved, at least, your 100th Anniversary. All this time we can and will do because we are without fear. We are apprehensive, in these trying times, but we Slovaks have a solid, spiritual philosophy of life which will enable us to continue to face the future unafraid. In that spirit, we conduct ourselves in fraternal harmony and cultural and civic friendship. We have always presented throughout the years-you in Canada with us in the United States-the agreeable spectacle of a fraternal harmony and friendly co-operation absolutely united in the best interests of Slovaks and Slovakia. We have differed occasionally, as friends and kin must differ; but, we never had a single quarrel, we have had no factional fights. I think this displays a spirit for which it is worthwhile to continue to make sacrifices. And then as we grow older and the shadows begin to lengthen, we hopefully should be able to look back on �52 SLOVAKIA this period as a happy and fruitful era. We can then, in good conscience, turn over the reins to o~ successors with the feeling of satisfaction that, to the best of ou.rlimited talents, we contributed our small share to the mosaic of a greater Slovak nation, culture, tradition and haven of religious ·and intellectual achievements. And later, after much more time, when other futuregenerations look back on this period-yours and mine -they will see that what we did was but to carry on the work of our great predecessors. When they do so, we hope· they will be inspired to do a greater degree what we, on your Fortieth Anniversary, were and are trying to do for the greater honor and glory of our Heavenly Father-or as we would say in our Mother tongue Za .Boha a narod. Your gatherings are a living testimony of a determination to support the principles I have touched upon. The voice of gratitude and praise for all your contributions is limited to no area-it is. uttered by every Slovak: tongue. So, let us pray God that the day of triumph for Slovaks and Slovakia may soon come and while we pray and press on with unconquerable determination, let us make sure that we preserve the Slovak soul from the corrodinginfluences of injustice, materialism and selfishness. • • • I found the Democratic Convention to be totally undemocratic. At least two major candidates, who had considerable backing, withdrew from the race without a fight. This proves to me insincerity, dishonesty and cowardice on their part. After all, people contributed-and the candidates spent-millions. of dollars for their election. This money now has gone "down the river" simply because these men did not want to fight against certain odds. I admire the candidates who remained in the race to the end, but I lost all confidence in the men who gave up so easily, even though Labor and other powerful political and social elements were behind them. This again proves to me that politics is NOT above the board, that there are underhanded deals, and that the wishes of the people are NOT considered. This is tragic, because it is the people that have been and are footing the bill. - Fr. Louis P. Hohos � 48 SLOVAKIA Fortieth Anniversary Canadian Slovak League Edward J. B eh u n c i k (The following is the message of Edward J. Behuncik, President of the Slovak League of America, on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Canadian Slovak League at the Marlborough Hotel, Winnipeg, Manitoba, canada, August 5, 197?.) I assure you that the Slovak League of America, with which originally so many of you were officially associated as branch officers and members, is happy with your growth and successful development. Like every good Mother, we in the United States take maternal pride in your accomplishments. And because you are such a good offspring we are even happier. We especially congratulate your wise founders whose foresight made this week's renewal activity possible. We remember in pr ayer and happy memory your departed leaders and officers. In this same spirit, we congratulate you on reaching the 30th year of the successful and productive publication of your excellent weekly, The Canadian Slovak. I think its editorials rate among the finest writings I've come across in any of the many publications I see. It's top notch in any language. You have, on your own, done great things for the Slovak cause because you've so greatly helped the Canadian Slovaks. When you help Slovaks in Canada, you help Slovaks in the United States and everywhere. So also, when we help Slovaks in the United States, then we help Slovaks in Canada and elsewhere. And working together, we help all Slovaks and indirectly all peace-loving and God-fearing people everywhere. Thus, we make our efforts to sooner bring to reality the �SLOVAKIA 49 cherished aspirations for the Brotherhood of Man under the Fatherhood of God. My appreciation has been quickened by the sense that your choice has been determined solely by your unending union-in word, in spirit and in fraternal co-operationwith the great Slovak civic and cultural federation, which I am fortunate to head at this moment of history. I was pleased to note in the minutes of your first organizational session on December 12, 1932, that you _pledged to support and co-operate with the Slovak League of America-the Minutes state: "4. Vyvinula sa dlha debata, v ktorej vedene bratom Karolom Maresom, zhromazdene delegatstvo uist'ovalo brata Jozefa Zemana, ze program a ciele 1. kongresu Slov. Ligy v Kanade su cisto slovenske, ze spolu so Slov. Ligou V Amerike chceme pracovat' za tu nasu slovencinu." I am happy to state that you've kept that commitment and am fully confident that you will continue to do so. I, therefore, beg your indulgence while I set forth for your thoughtful consideration several ideas which I hold to be of paramount importance in the drama which the members of the Slovak League of America and you, the members of the Canadian Slovak League, are enacting through our daily and regular performance of the duties .and privileges of membership in our respective leagues. The dictionary tells us that "a patriot is one whose ruling is the love of his country," and that patriotism is "love and zeal for one's country." We in the United States love our country just as much as you love Canada. But we, like you love and are proud of all that is great and noble in the history of the land of our forefathers - beautiful Slovakia. Otherwise, you would not this evening be in Winnipeg, your birthplace. By taking pride, real lawful pride, in all things Slovak, we become better citizens and patriots of the countries where we live. The flame of Slovak patriotism which had long burned and still burns with a steady flame in all times of stress �50 SLOVAKIA and danger, has enabled the nation to maintain the struggle for its rightful place of distinction as a separate member of the family of nations. It has also sustained all Slovaks in their age-old efforts to carry out their destiny in the face of the most formidable opposition throughout the centuries and thereby, has exorted the admiration and often the envy of foreign observers. This record gives fresh proof even today of the invincible and unbroken vigor and vitality of the Slovak. And meanwhile, it has promoted among the citizens of every land in which this Slovak patriotism has taken root a sense of public duty and the growth of a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to country, dominion or commonwealth. But, patriotism must be founded on great principles and supported by great virtues. It involves duties as well as privileges, and these duties arise not only in connection with the domestic relations of the citizens to his native or adopted country. They arise also in all that concerns the attitude of that country towards foreign nations. That is why we must make certain that all countries become cognizant of the legitimate aspirations and aims of the Slovak people. It is the clear duty of true patriotism everywhere to consider this question of the expansion and extension of the Slovak cause in which we seem to be fulfilling the manifest duty of our Slovak heritage. So, you as good Canadians and as good Slovaks have a firm assurance of loyalty and affection of the sons of Slovakia in the United States and wherever else they may be. You are also assured of their readiness to play their part with you in the common cause even to a greater extent than in the past. I have faith in our cause and in our Slovak people. That is why I am happy to have the privilege to lead the Slovak League of America in what I pray will be its most glorious era. That is why I am happy to solicit your continued co-operation in the days to come as we with you and other Slovak groups solidify and coordinate into a true pillar of Slovak unity and solidarity. �SLOVAKIA 51 We now have the structure-The Slovak World Cogress, founded in the headquarters site of the United Nations in June, 1970. I believe that with all the forces and enthusiasm of which the democratic processes alone are capable, we, firmly united, will complete and maintain that splendid edifice of our fraternal and heartfelt love, which commenced under such successful auspices at New York and Toronto. Henceforth, all Slovaks wherever situated enter upon a new epoch of noble union, in this world-wide Slovak Congress. I also believe that the firmness of purpose and strength of will which are necessary to this end shall be supplied by the patriotism which sustains the most strenuous efforts and makes possible the greatest sacrifice. You have the power and, I am confident, the will to fill this patriotic need-to contribute your patriotic share. You still have in full measure the opportunity of continued service until you have achieved, at least, your 100th Anniversary. All this time we can and will do because we are without fear. We are apprehensive, in these trying times, but we Slovaks have a solid, spiritual philosophy of life which will enable us to continue to face the future unafraid. In that spirit, we conduct ourselves in fraternal harmony and cultural and civic friendship. We have always presented throughout the years-you in Canada with us in the United States-the agreeable spectacle of a fraternal harmony and friendly co-operation absolutely united in the best interests of Slovaks and Slovakia. We have differed occasionally, as friends and kin must differ; but, we never had a single quarrel, we have had no factional fights. I think this displays a spirit for which it is worthwhile to continue to make sacrifices. And then as we grow older and the shadows begin to lengthen, we hopefully should be able to look back on �52 SLOVAKIA this period as a happy and fruitful era. We can then, in good conscience, turn over the reins to o~ successors with the feeling of satisfaction that, to the best of ou.rlimited talents, we contributed our small share to the mosaic of a greater Slovak nation, culture, tradition and haven of religious ·and intellectual achievements. And later, after much more time, when other futuregenerations look back on this period-yours and mine -they will see that what we did was but to carry on the work of our great predecessors. When they do so, we hope· they will be inspired to do a greater degree what we, on your Fortieth Anniversary, were and are trying to do for the greater honor and glory of our Heavenly Father-or as we would say in our Mother tongue Za .Boha a narod. Your gatherings are a living testimony of a determination to support the principles I have touched upon. The voice of gratitude and praise for all your contributions is limited to no area-it is. uttered by every Slovak: tongue. So, let us pray God that the day of triumph for Slovaks and Slovakia may soon come and while we pray and press on with unconquerable determination, let us make sure that we preserve the Slovak soul from the corrodinginfluences of injustice, materialism and selfishness. • • • I found the Democratic Convention to be totally undemocratic. At least two major candidates, who had considerable backing, withdrew from the race without a fight. This proves to me insincerity, dishonesty and cowardice on their part. After all, people contributed-and the candidates spent-millions. of dollars for their election. This money now has gone "down the river" simply because these men did not want to fight against certain odds. I admire the candidates who remained in the race to the end, but I lost all confidence in the men who gave up so easily, even though Labor and other powerful political and social elements were behind them. This again proves to me that politics is NOT above the board, that there are underhanded deals, and that the wishes of the people are NOT considered. This is tragic, because it is the people that have been and are footing the bill. - Fr. Louis P. Hohos � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 48 SLOVAKIA Fortieth Anniversary Canadian Slovak League Edward J. B eh u n c i k (The following is the message of Edward J. Behuncik, President of the Slovak League of America, on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Canadian Slovak League at the Marlborough Hotel, Winnipeg, Manitoba, canada, August 5, 197?.) I assure you that the Slovak League of America, with which originally so many of you were officially associated as branch officers and members, is happy with your growth and successful development. Like every good Mother, we in the United States take maternal pride in your accomplishments. And because you are such a good offspring we are even happier. We especially congratulate your wise founders whose foresight made this week's renewal activity possible. We remember in pr ayer and happy memory your departed leaders and officers. In this same spirit, we congratulate you on reaching the 30th year of the successful and productive publication of your excellent weekly, The Canadian Slovak. I think its editorials rate among the finest writings I've come across in any of the many publications I see. It's top notch in any language. You have, on your own, done great things for the Slovak cause because you've so greatly helped the Canadian Slovaks. When you help Slovaks in Canada, you help Slovaks in the United States and everywhere. So also, when we help Slovaks in the United States, then we help Slovaks in Canada and elsewhere. And working together, we help all Slovaks and indirectly all peace-loving and God-fearing people everywhere. Thus, we make our efforts to sooner bring to reality the SLOVAKIA 49 cherished aspirations for the Brotherhood of Man under the Fatherhood of God. My appreciation has been quickened by the sense that your choice has been determined solely by your unending union-in word, in spirit and in fraternal co-operationwith the great Slovak civic and cultural federation, which I am fortunate to head at this moment of history. I was pleased to note in the minutes of your first organizational session on December 12, 1932, that you _pledged to support and co-operate with the Slovak League of America-the Minutes state: "4. Vyvinula sa dlha debata, v ktorej vedene bratom Karolom Maresom, zhromazdene delegatstvo uist'ovalo brata Jozefa Zemana, ze program a ciele 1. kongresu Slov. Ligy v Kanade su cisto slovenske, ze spolu so Slov. Ligou V Amerike chceme pracovat' za tu nasu slovencinu." I am happy to state that you've kept that commitment and am fully confident that you will continue to do so. I, therefore, beg your indulgence while I set forth for your thoughtful consideration several ideas which I hold to be of paramount importance in the drama which the members of the Slovak League of America and you, the members of the Canadian Slovak League, are enacting through our daily and regular performance of the duties .and privileges of membership in our respective leagues. The dictionary tells us that "a patriot is one whose ruling is the love of his country," and that patriotism is "love and zeal for one's country." We in the United States love our country just as much as you love Canada. But we, like you love and are proud of all that is great and noble in the history of the land of our forefathers - beautiful Slovakia. Otherwise, you would not this evening be in Winnipeg, your birthplace. By taking pride, real lawful pride, in all things Slovak, we become better citizens and patriots of the countries where we live. The flame of Slovak patriotism which had long burned and still burns with a steady flame in all times of stress 50 SLOVAKIA and danger, has enabled the nation to maintain the struggle for its rightful place of distinction as a separate member of the family of nations. It has also sustained all Slovaks in their age-old efforts to carry out their destiny in the face of the most formidable opposition throughout the centuries and thereby, has exorted the admiration and often the envy of foreign observers. This record gives fresh proof even today of the invincible and unbroken vigor and vitality of the Slovak. And meanwhile, it has promoted among the citizens of every land in which this Slovak patriotism has taken root a sense of public duty and the growth of a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to country, dominion or commonwealth. But, patriotism must be founded on great principles and supported by great virtues. It involves duties as well as privileges, and these duties arise not only in connection with the domestic relations of the citizens to his native or adopted country. They arise also in all that concerns the attitude of that country towards foreign nations. That is why we must make certain that all countries become cognizant of the legitimate aspirations and aims of the Slovak people. It is the clear duty of true patriotism everywhere to consider this question of the expansion and extension of the Slovak cause in which we seem to be fulfilling the manifest duty of our Slovak heritage. So, you as good Canadians and as good Slovaks have a firm assurance of loyalty and affection of the sons of Slovakia in the United States and wherever else they may be. You are also assured of their readiness to play their part with you in the common cause even to a greater extent than in the past. I have faith in our cause and in our Slovak people. That is why I am happy to have the privilege to lead the Slovak League of America in what I pray will be its most glorious era. That is why I am happy to solicit your continued co-operation in the days to come as we with you and other Slovak groups solidify and coordinate into a true pillar of Slovak unity and solidarity. SLOVAKIA 51 We now have the structure-The Slovak World Cogress, founded in the headquarters site of the United Nations in June, 1970. I believe that with all the forces and enthusiasm of which the democratic processes alone are capable, we, firmly united, will complete and maintain that splendid edifice of our fraternal and heartfelt love, which commenced under such successful auspices at New York and Toronto. Henceforth, all Slovaks wherever situated enter upon a new epoch of noble union, in this world-wide Slovak Congress. I also believe that the firmness of purpose and strength of will which are necessary to this end shall be supplied by the patriotism which sustains the most strenuous efforts and makes possible the greatest sacrifice. You have the power and, I am confident, the will to fill this patriotic need-to contribute your patriotic share. You still have in full measure the opportunity of continued service until you have achieved, at least, your 100th Anniversary. All this time we can and will do because we are without fear. We are apprehensive, in these trying times, but we Slovaks have a solid, spiritual philosophy of life which will enable us to continue to face the future unafraid. In that spirit, we conduct ourselves in fraternal harmony and cultural and civic friendship. We have always presented throughout the years-you in Canada with us in the United States-the agreeable spectacle of a fraternal harmony and friendly co-operation absolutely united in the best interests of Slovaks and Slovakia. We have differed occasionally, as friends and kin must differ; but, we never had a single quarrel, we have had no factional fights. I think this displays a spirit for which it is worthwhile to continue to make sacrifices. And then as we grow older and the shadows begin to lengthen, we hopefully should be able to look back on 52 SLOVAKIA this period as a happy and fruitful era. We can then, in good conscience, turn over the reins to o~ successors with the feeling of satisfaction that, to the best of ou.rlimited talents, we contributed our small share to the mosaic of a greater Slovak nation, culture, tradition and haven of religious ·and intellectual achievements. And later, after much more time, when other futuregenerations look back on this period-yours and mine -they will see that what we did was but to carry on the work of our great predecessors. When they do so, we hope· they will be inspired to do a greater degree what we, on your Fortieth Anniversary, were and are trying to do for the greater honor and glory of our Heavenly Father-or as we would say in our Mother tongue Za .Boha a narod. Your gatherings are a living testimony of a determination to support the principles I have touched upon. The voice of gratitude and praise for all your contributions is limited to no area-it is. uttered by every Slovak: tongue. So, let us pray God that the day of triumph for Slovaks and Slovakia may soon come and while we pray and press on with unconquerable determination, let us make sure that we preserve the Slovak soul from the corrodinginfluences of injustice, materialism and selfishness. • • • I found the Democratic Convention to be totally undemocratic. At least two major candidates, who had considerable backing, withdrew from the race without a fight. This proves to me insincerity, dishonesty and cowardice on their part. After all, people contributed-and the candidates spent-millions. of dollars for their election. This money now has gone "down the river" simply because these men did not want to fight against certain odds. I admire the candidates who remained in the race to the end, but I lost all confidence in the men who gave up so easily, even though Labor and other powerful political and social elements were behind them. This again proves to me that politics is NOT above the board, that there are underhanded deals, and that the wishes of the people are NOT considered. This is tragic, because it is the people that have been and are footing the bill. - Fr. Louis P. Hohos  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Fortieth Anniversary Canadian Slovak League Description An account of the resource Edward J. Behuncik Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 48-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Behuncik, Edward J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 name